TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

by
Önder Çakır

A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science and International Studies
School of Government and Society
The University of Birmingham
September 2014
ABSTRACT

This research explores the external and internal factors and their roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy, which has witnessed many changes in the post-Cold War era. External factors are explained by referring to structural systemic dynamics, while internal factors are conceptualised within the scope of agency.

Analysis is conducted on three levels. At the ‘systemic level’, the effects of changes created by the international system are discussed based on the Neorealist view of the international system. To avoid the pitfalls of Neorealism, which ignores domestic and individual factors, the focus of the study is shifted to the main agential factors in the domestic sphere of foreign policy-making at ‘state level’. On the third platform of analysis, the ‘individual level’, ideational factors of key figures are integrated into foreign policy analysis.

It is argued that systemic effects were influential on Turkish foreign policy in the first period (1990-2002), while agential factors were weak and incapable of responding enough to pressures generated by changes in the international system. In the second period (2002-2010), however, the role of the system in shaping Turkey's foreign policy lessened, while the stronger and coherent governmental agency started to be a rising factor in shaping foreign policy.
To Özge, my lovely Daughter
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people in Turkey and in the UK helped and supported me while this PhD thesis was being written. Firstly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professors David Hastings Dunn and Edward Newman for their guidance as my supervisors. I am indebted to them for their invaluable support and encouragement.

I would like to thank my friends from the PhD community in POLSIS and those from different departments of the University of Birmingham. Without their friendships, everything would be joyless and pale. Among all the very valuable friends, special thanks go to Alp Önal, Büke Boşnak, Shaf Zaafer, Doğa İstanbulluoğlu, Emel Akçalı, Haytham Abushaban, Ali Kemal Yenidünya, Dicle Dövencioğlu, Esra and Alper Kaliber, Ivan Farias, Flor Gonzales, Kamala İmranlı, Olga Okan, Ali Amirmoayed and Oscar Pardo Sierra for their close friendships and support. I also need to thank to the interviewees who shared their knowledge and experiences with me.
## CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION

I  Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1

II  The Structure of the Thesis .......................................................................................... 5

### CHAPTER 1 THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

I  Introduction .................................................................................................................... 8

II  Neorealism and Foreign Policy ...................................................................................... 9

III  Other Theoretical Approaches ..................................................................................... 177
   A)  Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) ............................................................................... 177
   B)  Agent-Structure Debate ........................................................................................ 20

IV  Change and Foreign Policy .......................................................................................... 222
   A)  Notion of Change in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis .......... 222
   B)  Mainstream International Relations Theory and Concept of Change ..................... 255

V  Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................. 277
   A)  The Problem of the Unit and Level of Analysis ...................................................... 288
   B)  Systemic Level of Analysis .................................................................................... 388
   C)  State Level of Analysis .......................................................................................... 399
   D)  Individual Level of Analysis .................................................................................. 466

VI  Methodology of Research ............................................................................................ 499
   A)  Data Selection ......................................................................................................... 533
   B)  Data Collection ........................................................................................................ 533
   C)  Data Analysis .......................................................................................................... 544
CHAPTER 2 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1923 UNTIL THE END OF COLD WAR ERA

I Introduction ............................................................................................................. 566

II General Characteristics of Turkish Foreign Policy ........................................... 599

A) The Roots of Turkey's Western Tendency and Turkish Foreign Policy.. Error! Bookmark not defined. 9

B) The Foreign Policy Preferences of the Republic.............................................. 611

C) Main Principles in General Turkish Foreign Policy......................................... 644

D) The Political Structure of the Republic from the Perspective of Foreign Policy-Making and Share of Political Power ................................................................. 666

III Turkish Foreign Policy in the Inter-war Period.............................................. 677

A) World Politics in the Inter-war Period and Turkey ........................................ 677

B) Efforts to Provide Security for the Newly Born Republic ............................. 6868

C) Foreign Policy Implementations and Attempts to Provide Regional Security ........ 711

D) Security Concerns before the Second World War ...................................... 744

E) The Systemic Structure and State Level Attributes of the Period ............... 766

IV The Second World War and Turkey................................................................. 7777

A) The Outlook of the International System before the War ......................... 7777

B) Resistance to the Pressures to Get Turkey Involved in the War ................. 778

C) The End of World War Two.......................................................................... 779

D) The Systemic Structure and State Level Attributes of the Period ............... 80

V Turkish Foreign Policy in the Cold War Period............................................ 81
A) Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Changing Environment of the Post-World War Era...... 81

B) Reasons for Turkey’s Western Alignment ................................................................. 82

C) NATO Membership and the Debate on Western Dependency.............................. 90

D) The Baghdad Pact and the CENTO........................................................................... 97

E) The Cyprus Problem and Disappointment with the Western World....................10101

F) Attempts to Integrate with the World after the 1980 Military Coup d’état .............10303

G) The Systemic Structure and the State Level Attributes of the Cold War Period.......10404

VI Conclusion..................................................................................................................10808

CHAPTER 3 THE FIRST PERIOD: 1990-2002 ....................................................................1133

I Introduction......................................................................................................................11313

II The World: The End of the Cold War and Its Effects on the International System ....11515

A) The End of the Cold War and its Implications for International System ..............11515

B) The Post-Cold War World.......................................................................................... 116

C) The Changing International System and Turkey......................................................12020

III Turkey: Major Foreign Policy Events of the Period .................................................1211

IV Analysis of the Period with Regard to Turkish Foreign Policy Issues ..................1266

A) Systemic Level..........................................................................................................1266

B) State Level.................................................................................................................14242

C) Individual Level .....................................................................................................18282

V Conclusion....................................................................................................................18888

CHAPTER 4 THE SECOND PERIOD: 2002-2010 ............................................................1911

I Introduction.....................................................................................................................1911
II The International System: The Second Decade After The End Of The Cold War ..........19393

A) The 9/11 Attacks and the International System................................................. 196
B) The New World Order: Unipolar or Multipolar World? ..................................... 198
C) The International System and Turkey in the Second Decade Post-Cold War ..........2011

III Turkey: Major Foreign Policy Events of the Period ............................................20202

IV Analysis of the Period with Regard to Turkish Foreign Policy Issues ................20505

A) Systemic Level ........................................................................................................20505
B) State Level .............................................................................................................20808
C) Individual Level ....................................................................................................22323

V Conclusion.............................................................................................................22426

CHAPTER 5 COMPARISON OF THE PERIODS .........................................................22828

I Introduction .............................................................................................................22828

II Differences and Similarities of the International System in the Two Periods........22929

III Comparative Analysis of the Periods with Regard to Turkish Foreign Policy Issues.....2311

A) Systemic Level ........................................................................................................2311
B) State Level .............................................................................................................23535
C) Individual Level ....................................................................................................23838

IV Conclusion .............................................................................................................23939

CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................2422

I The Thesis ..............................................................................................................2422

II Empirical Findings and Inferences ........................................................................24646

III Conclusion .............................................................................................................2511
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Governments, parties, prime ministers and general elections in power during 1990-2002

Table 2. Governments, parties, prime ministers and general elections in power during 2002-2010
INTRODUCTION

I Introduction

After the Cold War, it has become a kind of daily routine to encounter news, headlines and columns regarding Turkish foreign policy issues in the print and visual media: “Countries with coasts on the Black Sea meet under Turkish initiative to establish economic cooperation organisation”; “Leaders of Central Asian Turkic Republics gathered in Istanbul”; “Turkey is taking over command of Stability Force (SFOR) in Bosnia”; “Turkey dispatches 1,500 troops for Kosovo Peace Force (KFOR)”\(^1\) are some possible examples of this trend, which was rare and unusual before the 1990s. In addition, beginning in the 2000s, similar articles have been seen in the media, such as: “Membership negotiations between The European Union and Turkey start in October”; “Turkey wants to be mediator in the Lebanon crisis”; “Turkey intensifying its effort to reconcile Israel and Syria”; “President Gül makes unofficial visit to Armenia”\(^2\). Towards the end of the second post-Cold War decade, Turkey started to be identified as one of the world’s rising powers, alongside the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Accordingly, headlines in media and academic spheres changed to, “The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century’s First Muslim Power” (Çağaptay, 2014), “Turkey’s Global Strategy” (LSE IDEAS, 2011), “Turkey’s Rising Global Influence” (McKelvey, 2012), “The Rise of Turkey as a

\(^{1,2}\) These are representative examples invented by the author, based on various newspaper headings with similar content regarding the Turkish foreign policy of the period.
Superpower” (Burns, 2012); “A Country’s Welcome Rise”; “Stealth Superpower: How Turkey Is Chasing China in Bid to Become the Next Big Thing” (Feffer 2010).

Indeed, the post-Cold War period has witnessed many new and unusual events for Turkey in the field of foreign policy. In contrast, the Cold War era was static in terms of Turkish foreign policy, one of the general characteristics of which was the status quo. Because of the bipolar nature of the international system, Turkey’s foreign policy alternatives were limited. In this period, Turkey generally played the roles that were designated by its western allies against Russia and the Communist bloc and did not extend its foreign policy beyond these limitations. Turkey’s role in the international system was generally based on its strategic position in the East-West confrontation, especially as a strong buffer against the USSR. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has expanded its foreign policy relations with countries from Western Europe to Central Asia, from the Balkans to the Middle East, from the Caucasus to Africa.

It is generally accepted that international relations and world politics have been transformed since the end of the Cold War period. The breakdown of the USSR and the dissolution of the Communist bloc caused changes to the international system, which passed from being a bipolar world to a unipolar one. The balance of power was altered. Changes at the international level resulted in consequences for the world and for regional foreign policy. Moreover, two decades since the end of the Cold War, the debate on the ‘changing world order’, which signifies the emergence of non-western powers and corresponding decline of the American domination of world politics, characterises this later stage of the post-Cold War era.

This thesis aims to explore external and internal (domestic) factors and their roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War. External factors will be explained by
making reference to the structural systemic dynamics created by changes in the international system. On the other hand, internal factors will be predominantly examined within the scope of agency. Here, agency refers to the main actors that influence Turkish foreign policy making, with the Turkish Government having a key position, and the military to a certain extent. Looking at this period – especially through the lens of agency – it is logical to divide the post-Cold War era into two periods. The first covers the time between 1990 and 2002. This period corresponds to the end of the Cold War and the time when Turkey was ruled by various coalition governments. Indeed, during this era, twelve different governments came to power in total, seven of which were coalition governments. The second period is between 2002 and 2010, during which time the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government was in power alone, with a strong parliamentary majority.

In international policy there has often been a conflict between two trends in the literature, with some authors focusing primarily on structural factors and others more on the impact of the people, party, or leader, i.e. agency. In fact, the structure and agency dilemma is a long and unavoidable discussion in the social sciences, and in political science specifically. It is also a problem in the field of international relations, especially in international relations theory and foreign policy analysis.

This dichotomy is also reflected in the way in which Turkish foreign policy has been discussed. In this respect, two obvious perspectives come to mind. Firstly, changes in the nature of the international system have allowed for alterations in Turkish foreign policy. Secondly, these alterations have originated in the party, the JDP, which has been in power since 2002. In the Turkish case, some authors argue that foreign policy changed during the 1990s mainly because of the changes in the nature of the international system. It has even
been claimed that: Turkey is one of the most affected countries from the cyclical systemic changes in world politics (Aydın, 2013), while some others have argued that the main actor causing changes in Turkish foreign policy was the JDP (Tuğal, 2007; Dağı, 2008; Davutoğlu, 2008).

In the literature, although there are some studies and publications on the post-Cold War period of Turkish foreign policy, most of these focus on Turkey’s EU membership process, Turkish-American relations and some specific areas of Turkish foreign policy such as that regarding Greece, Cyprus and the Turkic Republics. In addition, some works concentrate on security and identity issues in Turkish foreign policy in the given period. However, there is a lack of research dividing the post-Cold War period into two eras with reference to the characteristics of these phases, or focusing principally on external and domestic factors in the context of structure and agency. For these reasons, it is believed that this research will contribute to the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy.

The challenge that I am going to deal with in this thesis is how to bring together these two trends, since it seems obvious that neither of them can claim the whole truth. It is apparent that the JDP’s rise and its influence on Turkish foreign policy cannot be explained without making reference to the structural context. On the other hand, it also seems to be obvious that alterations in the structural context itself do not determine what foreign policy an individual state, such as Turkey, will actually pursue.

In this respect, under the spotlight of the core research question: “What are the external and internal (domestic) factors shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War?” the sub-questions will be:

* Why has Turkish foreign policy changed?
What are the effects of structural changes on Turkish foreign policy in the time periods 1990–2002 and 2002–2010?

What is the impact of agency (i.e. government, military) on the changes in Turkish foreign policy in each period?

Which factor has the most effect in each period, structural effects or agency?

The journey of Turkish foreign policy, starting from the end of the Cold War, will be analysed on three levels. The first is the ‘systemic level’. The effects of systemic changes brought about by the collapse of the Cold War order will be discussed based on the Neorealist view of the international system and making reference to empirical cases. The following levels will allow the project to avoid the pitfalls of Neorealist thought, which ignores domestic and individual factors. At the ‘state level’, the second layer of analysis will predominantly focus on agency, which is conceptualised by determining the government and the army as the main domestic agential factors in foreign policy-making. Ethnic and interest groups and the media will be incorporated into the analysis as complementary agential factors. The third and last platform of analysis will be the ‘individual level’, through which personal factors will be integrated into foreign policy analysis. In this context, the leaders and key actors who held office during the given periods will be assessed.

**II The Structure of the Thesis**

The research will be conducted over five successive chapters which make up the body of the thesis, preceded by an introduction and followed by a conclusion. The first chapter will be dedicated to theory and methodology. In this chapter, a theoretical framework will be constructed, firstly by discussing and problematising the mainstream discourse of
International Relations, namely Neorealism, then by explaining the proposed conduct of a multilevel analysis at the systemic, state and individual levels. The methodology of the thesis, which designates how the theoretical framework will be applied to the empirical data, will also be described.

Chapter 2 will cover the period in Turkish foreign policy from the foundation of the Republic in 1923 to the end of the Cold War. It is designated as an introductory chapter with the aim of preparing the reader for the core of the research project: Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. After giving essential information on the main characteristics, determinants and principles of Turkish foreign policy and reflecting on major debates on the topic against a historical background, this chapter will explain the main shifts in the international system, as well as changes at unit level and their repercussions on issues of Turkish foreign policy, in advance of the main focus of the research: the post-Cold War era.

Chapter 3 will serve the purpose of analysing the first period of research: 1990–2002. In this chapter, the outlook of international politics and alterations in the system will be provided. After a summary of the features of Turkish foreign policy events of the period, a detailed analysis will be undertaken on the systemic, state and individual levels with reference to issues of Turkish foreign policy.

Chapter 4 will focus on the second period of research: 2002–2010. Firstly, a view of the international system and the conditions of world politics will be given. Then changes in the international system will be examined in terms of structural components and balance of power. The effects of the 9/11 attacks and the debate on polarity will be reviewed before the focus moves to Turkey. At the core of Chapter 4, a detailed study of the period with
reference to issues in Turkish foreign policy and a multilevel analysis at systemic, state and individual levels will be conducted.

The last chapter will be reserved for a comparison of the two periods, 1990–2002 and 2002–2010, with the purpose of revealing similarities and differences between the periods in question based on the analysis. The comparative assessment will be performed by maintaining the original flow of the three-level analyses as presented in Chapters 3 and 4.

The thesis will be completed with a concluding chapter that reviews the main empirical findings and their implications.
CHAPTER 1 THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

I Introduction

In this chapter, the mainstream discourse of International Relations, namely Neorealism, will be discussed and problematised as far as it relates to the aims of this dissertation. It will be argued that Neorealism fails to conceptualise all levels of International Politics, and to incorporate domestic and individual factors into the analysis. Therefore, a theoretical framework will be suggested in order to provide a better understanding of the foreign policy of a state. This will enable the research to be conducted at the three levels of analysis: systemic, state and individual.

This chapter consists of four main sections: Introduction, Neorealism and Foreign Policy, Theoretical Framework and Conclusion. Following the Introduction, in the second section, after providing an outlook on Neorealist foreign policy approach, a critique of the theory will be provided by focusing predominantly on three aspects: its structure-biased approach, exclusion of domestic factors from analysis, and its inability to forecast changes in foreign policy. The need to incorporate domestic and individual factors will be emphasised in order to provide a better understanding of the foreign policy of a state as well as its systemic dynamics.

In the third section, Theoretical Framework, the units and levels of analysis will be set out. After the need to conduct a multilevel analysis has been explained, each level of analysis will be elaborated in turn.
*Systemic Level of Analysis: This level of analysis will be conceptualised by making reference to Neorealism and the structure-agency debate in International Relations literature. In the subsequent step, structural influence will be integrated into the foreign policy behaviour of a state.

*State Level of Analysis: This level of analysis will be conceptualised by determining the government and the army as domestic agential factors in foreign policy-making by drawing on the structure-agency debate. The agential capacity will then be integrated into the foreign policy behaviour of a state.

*Individual Level of Analysis: This level of analysis will be conceptualised by determining presidents, prime ministers and prominent advisers as members of the political elite who affect foreign policy making by making reference to Foreign Policy Analysis and partly to the Bureaucratic Politics approach. This individual influence will then be integrated into the foreign policy behaviour of a state.

At the end of this theoretical endeavour, an adequate theoretical framework will be developed with the purpose of explaining foreign policy in general and Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era in particular.

In the concluding part, the main findings of this chapter will be briefly presented.

II Neorealism and Foreign Policy

In this section, a foreign policy overview of Neorealism will be provided along with a critique, which will focus primarily on three points: its structure-biased approach, its exclusion of domestic factors from the analysis and also its inability to forecast changes in foreign policy. It will be argued that, in order to provide a better understanding of the
foreign policy of a state, besides systemic dynamics, domestic and individual factors should also be incorporated into the analysis.

As Snyder (2002) briefly summarises, Realism, or classical Realism, was founded by Hans Morgenthau and took shape mainly around his and Edward Hallett Carr’s writings (Morgenthau, 1948; Carr, 1946) after the Second World War. The birth of Neorealism occurred when this theory was modified by Kenneth N. Waltz in his seminal work, *Theory of International Politics* in 1979. Although the Neorealist approach is also referred to as Structural Realism, some scholars (Buzan et al., 1993) argue that Structural Realism is a version of the theory stemming from Waltz’s own modifications of Neorealism. Over the course of time, Neorealism diversified through the work of various scholars into Defensive Realism (Waltz, 1979; Jervis, 1978; Snyder, 1991; Walt, 1991; Lynn-Jones, 1998; Taliaferro, 2001), Offensive Realism (Gilpin, 1981; Mearsheimer, 1990; Labs, 1997; Zakaria, 1998) and Neoclassical Realism (Rose, 1998; Lobell et al., 2009).

Neorealists argue that the international system is anarchical. States, as the main units in this system, pursue their own survival. Neorealism conceptualises the realm of foreign policy as an autonomic field in which pre-determined goals are pursued by states. The state, which is acknowledged as the key actor in international politics, is the fundamental unit of the Neorealist analysis. According to Waltz (1979; 2004), the structure is defined by the international system, which has three significant characteristics: (a) the ordering principle of the system: anarchy; (b) the character of the units in the system: sovereign states; and (c) the distribution of the capabilities of the units in the system. In the Neorealist approach, while ‘anarchy’ is an ordering principle for the international system, ‘hierarchy’ is, in turn, the ordering principle for the domestic political structure. Since there is no higher authority which can mitigate the security concerns of states in the
anarchical environment of international politics, states must struggle against each other to assure their national security. They should avoid long-term cooperation, which creates interdependence and which may also result in benefits for one side causing a relative loss to the other. Under these circumstances, states have to follow an adaptive principle of ‘self-help’. Similarly, in the domestic realm, which is dominated by the ‘hierarchy’, individuals “specialise in a harmonious and interdependent division of labour” (Waltz, 1979, p.104ff) which can only be achieved when security problems are solved by the state.

Under these conditions, power becomes a widely accepted instrument of international relations, since states assure their security by resorting to power. They are, therefore, compelled to accumulate power as a requirement of the international system (Collard-Wexel, 2006). Power also has a central role in defining the position of states and shaping their foreign policy behaviour. The concern for security is accepted as an essential interest for states and, therefore, it determines states’ actions (Baumann et al., 2001). Hobson (2000, p.18) characterises Neorealism’s understanding of the state as the ‘passive adaptive state’.

Neorealism makes assumptions about principles. The initial principle relates to the nature of the international realm. According to the Neorealists, the international system is characterised by anarchy. Because of the lack of a superior authority, states have to pursue their own survival. Neorealism regards the state as the main unit of the international system. This sovereign state, in its anarchical environment, is a rational actor and concerned mainly with security and survival. The state, therefore, sees other states as potential enemies and avoids cooperating with them. However, a state might form or join alliances for the sake of its survival (Waltz, 1979, pp.88-93,102-104, 107).
Neorealists have been resolute defenders of the international system’s dominance over state foreign policy. The structure of the international system shapes the foreign policy choices of states. Neorealists argue that some incentives and limits are generated by the structure of the international system, and states take these into consideration when they conduct their foreign policies (Baumann et al., 2001). As summarised in Hobson’s last principle, above, states have no agential power against the international structure and do not exert a determining influence over it. Put differently, states are unable to either shape the international system or reduce its constraining power on the units (Hobson, 2000, p.26).

However, the domestic political system, unlike the external system, is hierarchical in the Neorealist approach. States have high domestic agential power, which means that they can act completely free of domestic constraints (Hobson, 2000, p.28). Foreign policy is formed and decisions are taken in a rational environment in domestic politics. In other words, the role of internal politics in foreign policy-making is mostly disregarded by the Neorealists (Telhami, 2002). In fact, as a structural theory, Neorealism takes the state to be a unitary actor which requires a rationalist form of agent-structure interplay. Accordingly this preference enables the theory to respond to some questions while making it difficult to answer others.

Under these circumstances, a fundamental question suggests itself: To what extent can Neorealism explain foreign policy? Neorealists claim that the foreign policy behaviour of a state depends on its power position as the independent variable, forming with respect to its weight and share in the international system and by the number of poles in that system (Waltz, 1993; Baumann et al., 2001). These dependent variables in a state’s foreign policy
behaviour are not determined by domestic factors – external dynamics are again pre-eminent.

At this point, the debate between Offensive and Defensive Neorealists should be discussed. Although followers of both approaches defend the main assumptions of Neorealism, they differ from each other in their understanding of the implications of anarchy, which makes them theoretical competitors (Taliaferro, 2001). Dating back to Snyder’s *Myths of Empire* (1991), the distinction between these two branches of the discipline became evident over the course of time.

Offensive Neorealism was postulated in detail in Mearsheimer’s book: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001). According to him, great powers are not generally satisfied with the actual distribution of power in the international system. The anarchical environment of the international system compels states to maximise their powers while also seeking opportunities to weaken potential adversaries so that they can improve their relative power positions (Taliaferro, 2001). Because of this aggression by states, the international system witnesses an endless power competition in which power maximisers survive while losers face extinction (Rudloff, 2013). Baumann et al. (2001) argue that these states, in seeking power maximisation, pursue influence-seeking policies. The factor that drives states to maximise their relative power is the anarchical milieu and this is an optimal way for them to secure themselves.

Defensive Neorealism, on the other hand, is presented by Lynn-Jones in his article “Realism and America’s Rise” (1998) and derives mostly from Waltz’s seminal book *Theory of International Politics* (1979). Lynn-Jones argues that conflicts and wars are not certain to be produced by the international system and that, in comparison with aggression, defensive policies are often the best way to maintain security for states (Lynn-Jones, 1998,
This is because, according to Taliaferro (2001, p.159), states seek to maximise relative security rather than relative power. Because incentives for aggressive policies and expansion are produced by the international system only under very limited circumstances, security can be achieved by states following reasonable foreign policies. For Defensive Neorealists, few incentives are created by the international system for states to seek additional power. Instead of this, the system exerts pressure on states to preserve their existing level of power (Snyder, 2002, pp.151-152). Along the same lines, great powers can conduct military, diplomatic and economic policies as alternatives to aggression and expansion (Jervis, 1978). One of the significant differences of Defensive Neorealism is that some domestic factors, such as belief systems, misperceptions and the effects of international organisations, can influence states’ foreign policy decisions.

Lieb (2004, p.26) aptly summarises the position of states and their domestic politics:

Specifically, Neorealism holds at its basis that external pressures will outweigh domestic ones as state leaders rationally choose a foreign policy that will minimize security risk in an anarchical international system. In other words, the neorealist approach, whose foremost advocate is Kenneth Waltz, presumes that elites – the empowered individuals shaping their nations’ foreign policy – will be free of any domestic constraints that might sway their strategy for global interactions. National politics, international institutions, and ideological or cultural affinities among nations have little relevance.

Neorealism tends to neglect domestic factors in the formation of foreign policy. This is clearly expressed by Waltz, who views Neorealism as a theory of international politics which explains how states’ behaviour is shaped by external conditions. He furthermore suggests that Neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, and thus claims nothing about the effects of domestic factors (Waltz, 2004). In reply to criticism about the absolute domination of the system over states’ foreign policy decisions, Waltz argues that states can choose whether or not to behave in line with the signals generated by the international system, but they have to bear the consequences of their decisions. It should be stated here
that Neorealism’s neglect of the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy behaviour stems from its focus on the system and does not explain unit-level change (Waltz, 1986, p.329). According to him (Waltz, 1996) the international structure is a constraining, rather than a determining, factor of states’ foreign policy behaviour. Due to competition and adaptation between states in the international system, structural pressures shape foreign policy outcomes. International systemic pressures and foreign policy output are generally mediated by domestic factors.

Returning to the question, “to what extent can Neorealism explain foreign policy?”, although Neorealism is an essential theory of international politics, it has limitations in terms of its applicability to foreign policy. An adequate analysis of foreign policy behaviour requires paying attention to more than solely external factors, which Neorealism has produced, and more than the assumption of a rational and unrestricted actor, which Neorealists make (Lieb, 2004). The Neorealists have contributed much to foreign policy, but they have not produced a theory of foreign policy. More specifically, Neorealism contains some important aspects with which to understand states’ foreign policy choices, such as the need for survival and security, the accumulation of power, and the role of relative power in explaining the degree of opportunity that states have in the conducting of foreign policy. Nevertheless, power and security cannot explain the various motivations of states in conducting their foreign policies. As a result, because of its failure to account for the motivation of states, Neorealism is unable to give a convincing account of the particular foreign policies of most states (Telhami, 2002). In this realm, Neorealism needs help, which can be gained from outside the theory (Waltz, 2004). The Neorealists have also been criticised for their inability to predict or explain the end of the Cold War, along with other transformations in international politics (Koslowski et al., 1994). This
deficiency is attributed to their tendency to minimise or ignore the importance of certain key factors relating to change and transformation, such as society, culture, identity and tradition.

Addressing common criticisms of Neorealism on the grounds that it is old-fashioned and dysfunctional, Kapstein (1995) conducted a review of the works of De Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Rosecrance and Stein (1993) and Snyder (1991). He argues that, in spite of numerous works which mainly criticise this structural theory on the grounds that domestic and ideational factors are also able to influence and shape states’ foreign policies, they cannot present worthwhile contributions to International Relations theory in terms of theory-building by using methodological approaches and case studies. He attributes these failures of the works criticising Neorealism to their inability to offer options that could result in the modification of Neorealist theory. In other words, they are unable to produce either a consistent framework or a workable model demonstrating how and to what extent domestic factors shape a state’s foreign policy. Kapstein also adds that academic publishing based on case studies does not generate useful findings from which general results can be derived. He concludes that the Neorealist theory maintains its value and position among International Relations theories in spite of some pitfalls.

Scholars who take a different point of view, such as Legro and Moravcsik (1999), accept the domination of Realism and a wide propensity to test Realism among scholars, especially in the field of International Relations and Security Studies. Therefore, it can be said that Neorealism is still the dominant theory in the field of International Relations and that it still plays a part in the on-going research agenda of IR theory.

In brief, Neorealism conceptualises foreign policy as the sum of the external performance of the sovereign main actor and the nation state against other states, with the
purpose of assuring its survival in an anarchical international environment. In doing so, it postulates that states have a high domestic agential power. Therefore, they are not affected by domestic constraints and can pursue their foreign policies free of such constraints. In the international field, however, the state has no agential power. Therefore, it has no ability to either shape the international system or to mitigate the constraints created by the system. As a natural corollary, the structural effects of the international system dominate the units, while the same logic neglects any domestic effects in this framework of analysis.

In spite of the high value that it places on defining and explaining the influence of structural effects on a state’s foreign policy behaviour, Neorealism, because of its structure-biased approach, with the accompanying exclusion of domestic factors from the analysis and inability to forecast changes in foreign policy, is not well suited to providing a complete and reasonable explanation of foreign policy. Since Neorealism focuses mostly on the systemic level, it is insufficient to explain how states operate their foreign policies at the unit (state) and individual levels. In order to provide a better understanding of the foreign policy of a state, besides the systemic dynamics provided by the Neorealist approach, domestic and individual factors should be incorporated into the analysis by expanding the level of this analysis from the systemic level of Neorealism to the unit (state) and individual levels.

III Other Theoretical Approaches

A) Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

Unlike Neorealism, which tries to explain the state’s formation of foreign policy based on system-level attributes, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) focuses on human factors. In
International Relations, all transactions happen among nations in which humans, as single entities and groups, take decisions and implement them. FPA tries to examine these decisions by focusing on the process of decision-making, which generates the decisions, and the human decision-makers (Hudson, 2005). In this approach, any factors from any level of analysis that influence the decision-making process are taken to consideration. As a result, FPA is a multilevel, multifactorial and interdisciplinary approach. Because of its focus on humans in decision-making, FPA is also labelled as agent-orientated and actor-specific (Hudson, 2007). Roughly speaking, there is no difference between Neorealism and FPA in accepting the state as the main unit of international relations. Naturally, foreign policy decisions are formulated at the national level. However, these decisions are taken and implemented by humans in the domestic environment. This means that decision-makers are under the influence of both internal and external pressures, and attributes stemming from their identities, ideologies and values. For these reasons, FPA deals with material and ideational factors together in explaining foreign policy decisions.

The orthodox International Relations theory, Neorealism, differs from FPA in the former’s deterministic approach, which can be seen in what most scholars of foreign policy consider to be its excessive generalisation. While Neorealism stresses the need to maximise the security of primarily independence-driven states, largely by means of the exercise of power, FPA, which strives to show the actual positions and goals of states, emphasises the open interplay of various aspects of foreign policy, both domestic and international (Hill, 2003).

In Neorealist thought, self-interested actors are assumed to maximise their gains by behaving in a rational manner. The gap caused by this rational actor approach is filled by FPA’s consideration of actors at the individual level. FPA argues against the rational actor
mindset that is accepted by Neorealists and Liberals. FPA initially tries to discover the motives and other sources of the behaviour of international actors, particularly states, by focusing on the decision-making mechanism so that it can reveal formal self-descriptions (and narratives) of the processes of government and public administration. It tests the plausible hypothesis that the decision-making process, to some degree, determines the outputs of foreign policy (Hill, 2003). According to Hudson (2007), the important point about the FPA approach is that this intersection does not happen in the state but in the human decision-maker.

However, FPA has its own theoretical challenges. It is difficult to determine the exact power of actors or the size of the communities they represent; furthermore, the ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ environments are not clearly demarcated. The primary tasks of FPA have been to clarify its basic concepts in order to avoid misinterpretation and to explain how agency can be comprehended in the modern world. In doing so, it faces the challenge of both reconstituting the idea of political agency in world affairs and rethinking the relationship between agency and foreign policy (Hill, 2003).

In this research, the principles and methods of FPA with its analytic and explanatory power about decision makers and the decision making process will be applied mainly in the analysis of the individual level, at which the study will focus on the main actors who were in decision making positions and their mental and personal attributes, with the aim of revealing their impact on Turkish Foreign Policy during the given period.

It should be noted that FPA techniques will be used as a complementary analysis adding to the first two layers, the systemic and state levels, rather than claiming any further dimensions, for instance making the system-level analysis into an individual decision-maker-level analysis, as in Mintz’s (2007) effort of “Behavioral International Relations” or

**B) Agent-Structure Debate**

In recent decades, Realism has been subject to diverse theoretical challenges and these critiques have resulted in nothing but the weakness of state-centric accounts. As a result, a necessity has arisen for International Relations as a field to move ahead so as to reform its notion of agency. By the same token, the relationship between foreign policy and the state and its meaning in the context of the ‘agency-structure debate’, which are complex theoretical issues, have been at issue (Hill, 2003).

As a result of a genuine dilemma over foreign policy, much attention has been focused on structures: power balances for realists and neo-realists, international regimes for liberals and markets for those who prioritise globalisation, while the question of agency has been disregarded, ignoring the question of what foreign policy actually includes (Hill, 2003).

According to Carlsnaes (1992), the agency-structure problem comprises two interconnected characteristics. The rigorous one, which is considered as more significant, is ontological and the other can be defined as epistemological in broad terms. The ontological aspect focuses on both the basic properties of agents and structures in the capacity of ‘units of analysis’ and the relationship between them. Carlsnaes (1992), referring to Wendt (1987, p.338), argues that, since human agents and social structures are interrelated entities, it is impossible to interpret either completely without reference to the other. Despite the general acceptance of the importance of considering the mutual effect between agency and structure as well as the suitability of the properties of agent and social structures for an accurate understanding of social behaviour, the problem persists when conceptualising these entities and the relationship between them (e.g., agency and
As far as International Relations are concerned, in conjunction with the agency-structure debate, the questions are: how can we make the core assumption that both agents and social structures interact mutually in shaping the foreign policy behaviour of sovereign states analytically operational, and how do the main methods in modern foreign policy analysis operate in this respect (Carlsnaes, 1992)?

In practice, human beings as constituent parts of agency are involved in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies. Humans act in the name of units which have the right, power, responsibility and capacity to form and implement foreign policy. In terms of power possession and coherence, the state is considered as the major agent in foreign policy-making. Different states naturally have different structures which affect and shape the actions of agents in a way that varies in both degree and kind (Cerny, 1990).

As pointed out by Walter Carlsnaes (1992, p.256),

As long as the agency-structure issue remains unresolved, the foreign policy analyst is unable to address a crucial aspect of empirical reality itself; that the policies of states are a consequence of, and can hence only be fully explained with reference to, a dynamic process in which both agents and structures causally condition each other over time. In short, as long as the metatheoretical issue discussed here resists a solution, the problematic nature of explaining the dynamics of foreign policy change itself remains unresolved.

Bureaucracy can be defined as another agential constituent in foreign policy-making and implementation processes. As the main body of institutions, the organisations and organs of state mechanism, i.e. bureaucracy, are responsible for continuity and expertise required by delicate foreign policy issues. Bureaucratic institutions vary widely from ministries to organisations, departments and even numerous diverse offices. Regarding foreign policy bureaucracy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs comes to the fore as the primary bureaucratic unit responsible for foreign policy-making and implementation.
Examining the practice of foreign policy decisions is crucial in analysing foreign policy. Hill (2003), who believes that the implementation process of foreign policy decisions is as important as the decision-making, argues that foreign policy activities cannot be accounted for solely by focusing on the decision-making phase. He suggests that an assessment of the implementation stage is essential because the outcomes of foreign policy decisions sometimes differ from the original goals.

Finally, the individual actor (the agent itself) is also regarded as part of agency. Given the complexity of foreign policy machinery, there are numerous individual actors in foreign policy process, yet the most important are those who hold more power and influence in the process. In other words, the decision-makers themselves and the actors who proportionally hold a more remarkable share in foreign policy choices are considered as individual agents. In this context, presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs and advisors on foreign policy issues can be regarded as key components of analysis at the individual level.

**IV Change and Foreign Policy**

A) **Notion of Change in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis**

The concept of change has gradually taken more of the attention of scholars since the late 1980s. Efforts to conceptualise change have mainly tried to find some common questions such as what is change in foreign policy, in which conditions does change happen, how do governments behave in the face of change. Making a quick review, we can see that the works of various scholars on change in foreign policy handle different facets of the matter from varied perspectives.
James Rosenau, who gathered his articles in the book *The Study of Political Adaptation* (1981), establishes its approach to the notion of the change based on the idea of adaptation. According to him, understanding change and continuity requires the study of political adaptation. To Rosenau, foreign policy is a kind of political instrument that governments primarily use for the purpose of adjustment to changes in their field of activity. In this context, governments have to achieve balance between external and internal factors in order to survive and realise their objectives. Like rational actors, policy-makers whose minds are already prepared to gain maximum benefits with minimum expenses have a central position in this mechanism of environmental requirements and adaptive behaviour. In the process of political adjustment, policy-makers face domestic and international constraints while they are trying to adjust the foreign policies of their countries. Rosenau (1981) classifies policy adaptation types under four patterns, each of which has different repercussions in terms of foreign policy stability and alteration. In ‘preservative adaptation’, policy-makers react to both external and internal demands and changes, and they behave to the contrary in ‘promotive adaptation’. When policy-makers are responsive to external factors, he mentions ‘acquiescent adaptation’. In ‘intransigent adaptation’ pattern, policy-makers are only sensible to internal demands and changes. Rosati et. al (1994) criticise Rosenau on the grounds that he focused only on governments’ adaptation types in the face of internal and external stimuli in place of the repercussions of these categories on foreign policy.

Among other scholars interested in foreign policy change, Hermann (1990) gives prominence to the decision process. According to him, changes in foreign policy have four different sources: leaders, bureaucracy, external pressures and internal alterations. The role
of the decision-making process can be either hampering or encouraging. Therefore he highlights the decision process to understand alterations in foreign policy.

Holsti et al. (1982) consider foreign policy change and foreign policy restructuring, stating that alteration in foreign policy occurs slowly over a long time period while restructuring happens more quickly. On the other hand, Goldmann (1988) focuses on notions of stability and destability in the process of foreign policy change.

Skidmore (1994) analyses foreign policy change possibilities of states, based on their strengths in the domestic milieu and the international structure. According to him, alteration in foreign policy is likely if a country has a weak international position and strong domestic domination. However, an internationally powerful state is probably having difficulties in implementing deviations in its foreign policy, especially if it has a decentralised internal structure in which many interest groups and actors have acquired considerable power. He also claims that level of external pressure for foreign policy alteration and state control over domestic politics determines the degree of change proportionally. When external pressure is high, a change in policy is likely. With regard to domestic conditions, a high level of state domestic authority facilitates foreign policy change by decreasing the possible costs.

Skidmore (1994) also classifies states facing international constraints and incentives, based on their level of power. Three types of states are available: strong or very powerful states, middle-size powers and small powers. In terms of resistance to external shock and pressures coming from the international system, strong states are less responsive. In other words, changes in the international environment do not directly force them to make a shift in their policies. Middle powers, on the other hand, are more vulnerable to external
constraints. A middle power, therefore, has much more reason to adapt its foreign policy to external changes because of its limited power in the international order. In respect to small powers, this type of state is the most open to external shocks. In practice, however, small powers do not have the necessary political mechanisms to realise adjustments in their foreign policies. They generally survive by sacrificing their independence and continuing their entities as satellites of very strong states.

As seen above, scholars have tried to explain different sides and factors in order to give an improved explanation for the context of foreign policy change. These multi-causal explanations are mainly based on sources of foreign policy which require deep analysis of the international, domestic and individual origins of foreign policy and change. In other words, for a comprehensive account of foreign policy, system-centred, state-centred and society-centred explanations should be analysed as parts of a whole. Moreover, the interplay between these should be taken into consideration (Ikenberry et al., 1988).

B) Mainstream International Relations Theory and Concept of Change

For many scholars in the field, mainstream International Relations theory, notably Realist and Neorealist thought, comes short of explaining what happened in the international system during the downfall of the Cold War system. The Neorealist model, indeed, was not able to predict a peaceful end to the existing world order. Moreover, the incentives taking the USSR to the dissolution were leader-driven to some extent, contrary to Realist concepts of rational actors and national interest (Grunberg and Risse-Kappen, 1992). To the Neorealists, on the other hand, the end of the Cold War did not mark a radical change in the international system, instead bringing changes in power relations and
alliances stemming from alterations in the distribution of capabilities in the system (Holm and Sorensen, 1995).

According to Neorealism, states have to respond to the changes created by the international system. This is the only way of surviving in the anarchical international order. If a state fails to adjust in the changes produced by the global distribution of power, it is most likely to pay the costs and even put its existence at risk. This Realist model of change is described as evolutionary: a state's foreign policy behaviour is accepted as a function of external constraints created by the system (Skidmore, 1994). In this mechanism, the state is regarded as a rational actor which has the ability to maximise national interest by accounting for the costs and benefits of alternative foreign policy behaviours.

As Ruggie (1986) explains, change can occur in the Neorealist international system only in two ways. First, there must be a shift in the distribution of capabilities, the power capacities of states, in the system. This kind of change has been very rare in the past. The only example is the beginning of the bipolar Cold War order after three hundred years of multipolarity. The second possibility of change can happen only if the anarchical structure of the system is turned into hierarchical order, which has been never been seen in the history of the modern state system. Kenneth Waltz’s theory lacks the aspect of change. This is because Waltz ignored the differentiation of units, in an important methodical part of his analysis, by attributing the meaning of differences instead of separateness to the term ‘differentiation’.

Beside the theoretical assumptions which weaken Neorealist theory in terms of the concept of change, the assumptions of the Realist model also inhibit the Realists from tracing the source of change in foreign policy. First, Neorealism’s exclusion of the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy-making constrains the model from
recognising the real sources of change in the modern political system, such as bureaucracy, interest and pressure groups. Second, the rational actor assumption which regards the state as a unitary entity also excludes individual factors such as leaders and key decision-makers, their values and beliefs. This leaves a significant aspect of change in politics, leaders, out of the analysis.

Incorporating the domestic factors into the state level and human beings’ influence into the individual level of analysis, therefore, would also equip this research with the notion and ability to explain change in foreign policy.

V Theoretical Framework

This section will discuss and determine the units and levels of analysis for the present study. After explaining the need to conduct a multilevel analysis, each level of analysis will be individually examined under the respective sections: systemic, state and individual level of analysis.

The systemic level of analysis will be conceptualised by referring to Neorealism and the structure-agency debate in International Relations. Subsequently, the structural influence of the international system on the foreign policy behaviour of states will be integrated into the analysis.

The second section, dedicated to the state level of analysis, will present the government and the army as domestic agential factors in foreign policy-making by making reference to agency in the structure-agency debate. Agency will then be integrated into the analysis of the foreign policy behaviour of a state.
In the last section on the individual level of analysis, presidents, prime ministers and some advisers who affect foreign policy-making as individual political elites will be determined by referring to Foreign Policy Analysis, and partly to the Bureaucratic Politics approach. At this stage, individual influence on the foreign policy behaviour of a state will be integrated into the analysis.

A) The Problem of the Unit and Level of Analysis

The level of analysis approach problematises the selection and restriction of specific components of analysis (Moul, 1973). With the purpose of encapsulating the terms ‘unit’ and ‘level of analysis’ based on his own description, Wight (2008, p.103) states:

Unit of analysis refers to the object of the inquiry; the level of analysis is to how to explain the aspect of the object under consideration. It is a distinction between what we want to explain (the unit) and how we explain it (the level): the explanandum and the explanans.

According to Buzan (1995) on the other hand, the level of analysis problem is about the identification and treatment of various places in which causes of observed phenomena can be discovered.

The debate on levels of analysis appeared in the 1950s partially under the influence of the Behavioural Account, which aimed to apply the methodology of the natural sciences to the social science disciplines. General System Theory also affected this tendency, which comprised more positivist and ‘scientific’ methods such as observation, hypothesis testing and quantitative techniques. These approaches were new for social sciences in general and for International Relations in particular, which had mostly been based on history and law. The Behaviouralists who were insisting that researchers should be more conscious about
methodology, ontology and epistemology in their enquiries created a common awareness of the level of analysis. This also marked the beginning of the debate on levels of analysis in International Relations (Buzan, 1995). The level of analysis problem has appeared in the debate in the form of the usage of several models on state behaviour. For instance, it is reflected as the ‘billiard ball model’ in which the size of ball (state) and the arrangement of balls on the billiard table (international system) are described as determinants in Hans Morgenthau’s analysis, while some other scholars, such as Richard Snyder, emphasise the importance of national and internal (domestic) effects on state behaviour (Moul, 1973).

The behavioural impact on the epistemological debate of social sciences also gave rise to another discussion which can be referred to as atomistic vs. holistic. Atomism is a methodology originating from the natural sciences involving dividing the subject in question into its constituent parts. The holistic approach, on the other hand, departs from the notion that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Holism claims that the component parts of a system and even their behaviours are shaped by the structure created by the system. Waltz (1979) labelled Atomists as reductionist and the Holistic approach as systemic (Buzan, 1995).

The level of analysis problem was introduced to the field of International Relations in Kenneth Waltz’s much quoted book, *Man, The State and War*, in 1959. Waltz, unlike the classical writings on war of the époque, reorganised the reasons for the war by using different images based on diverse positions and different kinds of description. In his analysis of theories of war and international relations, Waltz argues that there are three types of level, which he names ‘image’ in international relations. The first image focuses on the role of individuals in explaining state behaviour in foreign policy. The second image claims that a state’s foreign policy behaviour is shaped by determinants at the
state/national level. The third image argues that a state’s foreign policy outcomes are determined by the international structure.

According to Hobson, Waltz’s schema provides a useful analytical tool, although it has two main limitations. First, it is not applicable to theories which aim to find out the determinants at national level rather than the international realm. Secondly, it proves ineffective for theories which use more than one level to explain foreign policy outcomes. Furthermore, he recommends a fourth image which can cover theories claiming that national or sub-national causalities shape the international field, while the international level in turn forms the national field (Hobson, 2000, pp.11-12).

Morton Kaplan, in his book *System and Process in International Politics* published in 1957, embraced the levels from a different perspective. Kaplan, who tried to ascertain the types of international system, focused mainly on power distribution and alliances (Hollis et al., 1991). Unlike Waltz, who championed the system level, Kaplan was much more in favour of the state level (Buzan, 1995).

Singer’s article “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations” (1961) is accepted as a milestone in the theoretical improvement of International Relations. He argues that the principal aim of a theory is to explain, and a model must have an analytical capability in terms of causal relationships among the variables. He takes the foreign policy behaviour of states as the unit of analysis and postulates two levels to explain this unit, the international system and the national state.

The systemic level of analysis is described as the most comprehensive level by Singer (1961). He argues that this level has the ability to embrace the whole web of interactions which occur in the system and its environment. It is possible to examine the forms of
interaction in the system, the processes and conditions of coalitions and power configurations, alterations and their influences on political institutions, and rules and standards imposed in social milieu by studying the system. Singer claims that conducting research at the systemic level allows the researcher to see the whole picture of international relations. The level of comprehensiveness decreases when the level of analysis is shifted to a lower level. As far as its explanatory power is concerned, students of IR come across several limitations at this level. The researcher tends to overemphasise the influence of the system over the national level while underestimating the role played by national actors in the international structure. It also allocates a relatively small space to examining divergence in the practices of the units, i.e. the nation states.

His second level of analysis is the nation state as a main actor in international relations. Singer (1961) states the capacity to observe different patterns among actors as the most advantageous aspect of this level. The state level encourages the observer to examine the actors in a detailed fashion, which the systemic level would never allow, looking at goals, motivations and purposes in national policy. Only a detailed study of the actors would make effective generalisations possible for the comparative nature of international relations. On the other hand, a study at state level requires further examination of the goals, aims, and motivations of the foreign policy of the state in question. Unlike the system level, which ignores the processes of decision-making and the attributes of actors by assigning rational and equal goals to the actors, the state level necessitates the analysis of conditions in which goals are set, of the internal and external influences which affect the decision-making processes and of the impact of the domestic, political and institutional context in which the actors have evolved.
As suggested by Singer (1961), the researcher may develop more interest in one level than another or may switch levels when they deem appropriate. But the crucial point is that the direction should never be shifted during the course of the study:

Representing different levels of analysis and couched in different frames of reference, they would defy theoretical integration; one may well be a corollary of the other, but they are not immediately combinable. A prior translation from one level to another must take place. (Singer, 1961, p.91).

Moul (1973) agrees with Singer that shifting between levels should not be done during the course of the study. Moul, however, claims that a shift between levels must be made in order to assess the relative weights of the systemic (external) and domestic (internal) variables. According to him, in each model of state behaviour, when one variable is treated as the most important, the others are underestimated. These models should be assessed by the way in which the hypotheses or theories are examined. Since this is primarily an empirical problem, the researcher must shift forward and backward with the purpose of achieving a better theoretical account in which specific factors in a state’s foreign policy (external) behaviour can be explained.

Moul (1973) refers to Hanrieder’s (1967) criticism of Riggs, Masters, Alger and Russett on the grounds that they make use of models which are generally used for the study of domestic politics in analysing foreign policy. Hanrieder’s disagreement based on Singer’s statement evokes two different points:

First, they practically ignore the injunction that concepts from different analytical environments can be used interchangeably only with grave methodological consequences. In that respect, these proposals are too radical in dismissing voices of caution that point out the dangers of interchanging concepts from one level of analysis with those of another. Secondly, they are too conservative in implying that structuring international and national politics with parallel analytic concepts “naturally” links these two levels of analysis. Ironically, the very assumption of parallelism tends to perpetuate the traditional notion that international and domestic systems are conceptual entities with ineradicably distinct boundaries, even though the nature of their political processes may be regarded as not fundamentally different. (Hanrieder, 1967, p.977)
Moul argues that it might be analytically appropriate to apply the same models at different levels of analysis. Yet, unlike Hanrieder, he claims that the level of analysis problem does not foresee the idea that concepts applied for different analytical milieus can be employed in rotation only with grave methodological consequences.

Describing systematic empirical research and data-gathering efforts as significant for the future of International Relations as a discipline, Singer expresses the importance of empirical knowledge:

We may observe correlations between all sorts of forces in the international system and the behaviour of nations, but their causal relationship must remain strictly deductive and hypothetical in the absence of empirical investigation into the causal chain which allegedly links the two. (Singer, 1961, p.87)

According to Wight (2008, p.106), although Singer proposes two levels, he in fact suggests a third level, which represents individuals at the bottom level. Indeed, Singer explains the third level option in his article:

On the other hand, if the nation or state is seen as a group of individuals operating within an institutional framework, then it makes perfect sense to focus on the phenomenal field of those individuals who participate in the policy-making process expectations, while institutional abstractions are not, except in the metaphorical sense. Thus, if our actor cannot even have a phenomenal field, there is little point in employing a phenomenological approach. (Singer, 1961, pp.88-89)

And also:

It must be stressed that we have dealt here only with two of the more common orientations, and that many others are available and perhaps even more fruitful potentially than either of those selected here. (Singer, 1961, p.90)

An opposing account is suggested, however by Isaak, (1974) who criticises Singer’s level of analysis approach for characterising ‘people’ as ‘things’. According to Isaak, Singer's article is a sample of the reification which is increasingly seen in International Relations theory. In the context of level of analysis, individuals can only be considered as apparatuses of a system.
Isaak claims that reifying groups of people into ‘objective’ nation-states or a single international system, as Singer did, is a misconception based on an attempt at depersonalisation which is performed with an imperialistic consciousness at least at the theoretical level. Isaak criticises Singer for insisting on using a systemic framework despite his emphasis that the system-orientated model inclines towards overstating the influence of the system on the national actors, while it downgrades the effect of the actors on the structure. As an alternative, Isaak recommends, “a humanistic science of international politics must begin by analyzing the tensions between specific human needs and perceptions and existing social facts that either frustrate or help to satisfy such needs” (Isaak, 1974, p.276).

The levels of analysis approach is widely acknowledged in the field of International Relations, since it is deemed useful and practical to make sense of the main issues of the field by using the system, state and individual levels. It has, therefore, exerted great influence on International Relations. In this respect, although Singer’s role seems less significant than the contribution of Waltz, his review of Waltz’s book in 1960 and his 1961 article proved important in the theoretical debate on the level of analysis problem (Buzan, 1995).

At this juncture, Hollis and Smith’s (1991) contribution is relevant. They propose four levels of explanation in international relations theory: international system, nation state, bureaucracy and individual. They argue that the levels they offer can be combined into three groups: system-unit (state), state-bureaucracy, bureaucracy-individual. Each grouping contains its own system (structure) and unit (agency). As such, the state is the unit (agency) in the system-unit (state), while the state becomes the system (structure) for bureaucracy in the state-bureaucracy group. By the same token, bureaucracy is the unit
(agency) in the state-bureaucracy pair, whereas it turns out to be the system (structure) in the bureaucracy-individual pair. When explaining the interaction among these groups, one should clarify whether a process runs from system to unit (top-down approach) or vice versa (bottom-up approach) (Hollis and Smith, 1991; Buzan, 1995).

Drawing particularly on the works of the three writers, Kaplan, Waltz and Singer, who opened the debate, more questions can be posed. For example, how many, and which levels of analysis should exist in international relations? By which criteria can these levels be defined and differentiated from one another? And once a scheme of levels is set out, how can one put the pieces back together again to achieve a holistic understanding? According to Buzan (1995), the discussion on any of these three questions has not yet ended. Buzan (1995, p.202) further argues:

> It is not at all clear what the rules are for designating something as a level, or for denying it that status. Consequently, there is no agreement on how many or what levels there are (or could be) for the study of international relations.

Buzan (1995) accepts the three levels approach of Waltz and partly Singer, as do most international relations scholars: individual (often focused on decision-makers), unit (usually state, but potentially a group of human beings designated as actors) and system. According to Buzan’s analysis, levels have a kind of spatial scale (three dimensional and going from small to large or from individual to system). Firstly, a range of spatial scales or heights comes to mind when we think about the ‘level’ as a term. With this in mind, levels can be accepted as positions in which outcomes and sources of explanation can be found. Buzan continues:

> Levels are ontological referents rather than sources of explanation in and of themselves. The introduction of levels of analysis into international relations by Waltz, Singer and Kaplan could be conceived in these terms, and much of debate about levels of analysis has de facto taken place within this framework. (Buzan, 1995, p.204)

Secondly, he suggests that:
Levels are understood as different types or sources of explanation for observed phenomena. In principle, anything that can be established as a distinct source of explanation can qualify. In practice, debate in international relations has largely developed around three ideas:

* Interaction capacity; defined generally as the level of transportation, communication and organization capability in the system.
* Structure; defined generally as the principle by which units within a system are arranged. Structure focuses on how units are differentiated from one another, how they are arranged into a system, and how they stand in relation to one another in terms of relative capabilities.
* Process; defined generally as interactions among units, particularly durable or recurrent patterns in those interactions. Process focuses on how units actually interact with one another within the constraints of interaction capacity and structure, and particularly on durable or recurrent patterns in the dynamics of interactions. (Buzan, 1995, pp.204-205)

Buzan claims that Waltz was wrong in limiting the debate to two levels, the system and the unit (state), hence blurring the division between units of analysis and sources of explanation, and presuming that at the system level, the mere source of explanation is the structure itself.

Hill (2003) also agrees with Buzan in that a clear division between units of analysis and modes of explanation must be drawn in explaining structure and agency. This is what the original ‘levels of analysis’ approach did not do, either in or of itself.

Buzan comes up with a matrix to combine the two schemes. In this matrix, each unit of level of analysis is intertwined with all of the sources or types of explanation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units of analysis</th>
<th>Sources of explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsystem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit (State)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this matrix, as Buzan (1995) puts it:

Structures, process and interaction capacity can be found as sources of explanation in
individuals, states and the international system. Differentiating units of analysis and sources of explanation resolves much of the incoherence about how many and what levels. (Buzan, 1995, p.205)

It is widely acknowledged that levels of analysis approach has exerted a substantial influence on the field of International Relations. First of all, a level of consciousness has been achieved for the consideration of epistemological and ontological issues. Second, it has shaped the mainstream theoretical debate in the field by urging researchers to be more meticulous in their work. Third, at the theoretical level, debates have given rise to developments which have paved the way for a better understanding of complex issues in international relations. Lastly and most importantly, the level of analysis debate has enabled scholars to ponder some substantive questions such as: what does the concept of the ‘international system’ signify? What are the valid methods of explanation? What is the relationship between analytical constructs and ‘real’ entities in the world?

Using of levels of analysis in a research denotes a diverse, multi-causal position in reductionist and holistic approaches (Buzan, 1995). The answer to the question as to which units of analysis and sources of explanation can provide valuable data on the issue at hand in International Relations theory is that any level of unit or source of explanation can appear dominant in explaining international events (Buzan, 1995). According to Buzan (1995, p.213, referring to Moul, 1973, p.499; Hollis and Smith, 1991, pp.6-7):

In international relations generally, all the levels are powerfully in play. The important theoretical question is: if two or more units and sources of explanation are operating together, how are their different analyses to be assembled into a whole understanding? To this there is yet no clear answer. Waltz's position, probably widely shared, suggests that explanations on different levels can be added together and assigned relative weights in relation to any given analysis. But it is not clear how this weighting might be done, or even whether it is methodologically sound.

As a result, although major steps have been taken as the level of analysis debate has developed, significant issues such as the quality and quantity of levels, the essence of
interaction between them and the system/structure and unit/agency dichotomies persist, with scholars putting forward diverse opinions. Consequently, numerous questions in the debate remain unresolved.

As mentioned above, different scholars propose various levels of analysis. Although the number and names of levels differ from scholar to scholar, the common point of agreement is that system, state and individual levels are the main levels in the analysis. By this token, the framework of analysis in this research will be based on these three levels.

B) Systemic Level of Analysis

The answer to the question as to what ‘international system’ means is that it is the sum of its parts and of the interactions between them. This is an ontological description. From the epistemological point of view, the system must be something more than the sum of its constituent parts and their interactions. The structure or essence of the system can only be identified in this perspective (Buzan, 1995).

The system level has been defined as “encompassing the totality of interactions which take place within the system and its environment” by Singer (1961). In the same context, Waltz’s (1959) definition is also similar: the system level, composed of a structure and interacting units, can be defined by the arrangement of the system’s parts and by the principle of that arrangement (Waltz, 1959).

For mainstream International Relations theories, most notably Neorealism, the complexity of the international realm engenders difficulties which can be neglected by policy-makers only at the risk of failure. This systemic point of view injects a strict determinism into the analysis by reducing the state’s conduct of foreign policy to a
challenge between the policy-maker and the system which has previously been established by entrenched boundaries. Nation states are tacitly compelled to play the roles assigned to them by the international system with a view to maintaining the system’s stability or balance. In this analytical approach, which fundamentally neglects the domestic political variables, the foreign policy goals of a state are predominantly evaluated by the extent to which the constraints exerted by the system are internalised. As a natural corollary, the limits imposed by the international realm give analytical superiority to other factors (Hanrieder, 1967).

Even though an analysis of the international system is necessary in examining the foreign policies of states, this endeavour should not take the researcher to the point where they investigate the extent to which state behaviour is shaped by systemic and domestic factors or the degree to which it stems from specific characteristics of states. In terms of variance between systemic and domestic attributes in determining foreign policies of states, Singer’s previous warning to the researcher that incorporating the system and national levels is not relevant should be borne in mind. In Moul’s (1973) own words:

> You cannot add the percentage of variance of interstate war in the system ‘explained’ by attributes of the system to the percentage of variance of interstate war “explained” by national attributes. You would be adding forests and trees, quarries and rocks or gardens and flowers. (Moul, 1973, p.499)

C) **State Level of Analysis**

The state level of analysis refers to the nation state as the main actor in international relations. Both Waltz and Singer use this level as an inevitable component of their analyses. Singer describes the most advantageous aspect of this level as being its ability to observe different patterns among the actors. According to him, research at the state level
encourages the observer to study the actors in detail. On the other hand, he argues that research at the state level necessitates additional analyses of the goals, aims, and motivations of the foreign policy of the state. The decision-making process and attributes of actors, internal and external influences and impact of the domestic, political and institutional context in which the actors evolved should be taken into account.

At this stage, in order to describe and explain the state level, it would be relevant to examine the state and seek the answers to questions such as: What is a state? What are the organs and components of a state? How does a state function in terms of foreign policy-making?

1. State and Foreign Policy

State is a kind of abstraction. In other words, it is a legal and sovereign entity which does not have a material existence. It is an abstraction, yet embodies concrete organisations. The state with its constituent institutions represents the people who live within a state’s defined territory.

The origin of today’s modern state goes back to the Treaties of Westphalia in the 17th century. Through these treaties, states excluded the direct influence of supranational powers such as the Pope or the Holy Roman Emperor in the ruling of their countries. This made the sovereign nation-state free of hierarchical boundaries in forming its foreign policies. The territorial-nation state form of the Westphalian System also constituted the basis of international relations. The rules and principles of the treaties which evolved throughout the 18th century allowed for the formation of a type of state which is sovereign within a defined territory. In an international political environment where the states are
legally equal and independent from variances in their policies, opposition to any kind of intervention into a state’s domestic affairs gained general recognition.

Policies are conducted by the government in a state. The government is accepted as an agent responsible for making decisions and choices and responding to the policies of other states in the international arena. Although the term ‘government’ seems to represent a monolithic entity, it in fact consists of persons who are in charge of institutions which compose the state as a whole. Governments execute three main tasks: the legislative function (making laws), the judicial function (interpreting and executing laws), and the executive function (enforcing laws and conducting policies) (Reynolds, 1980).

In states, governments are the main foreign policy-makers, and foreign policy-making is largely performed as part of their executive function. The state is a social institution. The environments in which the state subsists can be divided into two different milieus. First, the state exists in an internal (domestic) environment. This internal environment comprises all institutions of the state which exist in a specific territory and their interactions with the internal milieu as well as with each other. Second is the external (international/structural) environment of the state, which is formed by all other states and their interactions with the external (international) system (structure) and with each other. It is assumed by mainstream International Relations theory that both environments are engaged with by the state with the intention of interference (Brown, 1977).

Foreign policy represents a wide array of choices made by decision-makers and the implementation of these decisions. Neither is foreign policy made in a vacuum nor do policy-makers live in a bell jar. In order to account for how foreign policy is made, it is necessary to disaggregate the external (international) and internal (domestic) environments.
Government, the main foreign policy-maker, functions in extremely complex external and internal environments (Holsti, 1995). Naturally, foreign policy-makers are exposed to these two different environments while they are making decisions on foreign policy.

In the internal (domestic) environment of a decision-maker, the most important factor is achieving short and long-term aims which are supposed to be determined by national interests. The geography, demography, economy, culture, tradition, military posture and political system of the state are other factors which can influence the choices of decision-makers when they are producing policies for the state they represent. In the external (international) environment, however, the main dynamic is the policies of other bodies acting in the international sphere; mostly the governments of other states. Both the internal and external environments impose opportunities and constraints which have to be taken into consideration by decision-makers while making their choices and instituting policies (Reynolds, 1980; Holsti, 1995). A state’s foreign policy is naturally affected by what happens within the state. The domestic environment imposes opportunities and constraints on decision-makers. It is analytically significant to specify the channels through which the domestic realm has an impact upon foreign policy. The complex interplay between the foreign and domestic environments can only make sense provided that these two analyses are not merged into each other (Hill, 2003).

Holsti (1995, pp.252-253, figure 11-1) distinguishes the external and domestic environments and states the features of these two separate contexts:

- **External/Structural Factors:**
  1. Structure of system (latitude of choice)
  2. Characteristic/structure of world economy
  3. Purposes and actions of other actors
4- Global and regional problems
5- International law, world opinion.

• The Domestic Context:

1- Socioeconomics/security needs
2- Geographic and topographic characteristics
3- National attributes
4- Government structure/philosophy
5- Public opinion
6- Bureaucracy
7- Ethical considerations

Here, it must be stated that making a distinction between the external and domestic realms of international politics is becoming an increasingly difficult task. The rise of international political, economic and social actors which are operating across the world, globalising the world and increasing interdependence among international and regional actors have resulted in more blurred frontiers and an intertwined structure in the two realms of foreign policy. This, naturally makes the research on International Relations, especially that dealing with the influences of external and internal factors over foreign policy, more difficult and complicated.

Hill (2003) argues that foreign and domestic politics are interpreted universally, yet vary only in degree. Various forces, social, economic, political and historical set the framework of the domestic environment. Domestic input into foreign policy is produced in a different way in different societies, since there are different conceptions of an ideal world, and the steps to be taken to improve it may well differ. To Hill (2003), foreign policy emerges from the domestic milieu. If it is alienated from the domestic environment, society and the state, foreign policy exists in a vacuum. There is an interplay between the
foreign and domestic milieus of foreign policy. In this context, domestic factors affect foreign policy decisions, while domestic politics are influenced by external dynamics. He therefore describes domestic and foreign as divergent in terms of degree and character.

Reynolds (1980, p.51) also states that features in the internal and external environments interact, and interrelations occur between these two environments. Foreign policy is regularly formed by the domestic environment, which exists in a kind of mutual interaction with the international milieu. Both domestic and international factors are distilled during the decision-making process of a state. In this sense, foreign policy cannot be considered only as a basic projection of a state’s position in the international environment. The interaction between the domestic and international milieus is a sophisticated and continuous one. The causality created by foreign and domestic pressures on foreign policy reactions cannot be distinguished at all times (Hill, 2003).

The ‘Two level game’ approach of Robert Putnam (1998) is a significant methodology in that it describes key decision-makers as players operating in the domestic and international milieus at the same time. Leaders are seeking agreements with the other players in the international environment, while also pursuing settlements with internal players in the domestic milieu. Although this approach, which presents a negotiation-centred model, is valuable because of its ability to assess the policy-maker with regard to the domestic and international factors simultaneously, it is criticised for its limited applicability (Hill, 2003).

Although it may vary depending on different regimes and administrations, a government is normally accepted as the ultimate machinery of control in a state. Foreign policy-making is one of the major responsibilities of a government, along with security,
economy, defence, justice, education and other social policies. In parliamentary democracies, like Turkey, the government is regarded as the main foreign policy-maker.

A government consists of various bodies and institutions. Ministries, councils, undersecretaries and general directorships are the examples of governmental organisations. Each one shares and executes the main responsibilities and duties of a government. In spite of this division of labour, ministries are increasingly involved in other fields because of the necessities of a globalising world. But each main field is occupied by a ministry such as justice, health or defence. Foreign policy-making falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a government.

As seen above, in hierarchical terms, the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are to be accepted as the main foreign policy-makers at the state (unit) level. In each state, the military is regarded as a major component of that state’s defence and security policies. As survival in an anarchical environment is the core aim of any state, military power becomes one of the significant elements of the state. This gives an important institutional status to the army in a state. The role of the army in the foreign policy-making process can vary depending on its institutional power, which can be shaped by social and historical traditions and also conflicts of interest in domestic politics. In some states, like Turkey, the army has proportionally more power in domestic politics as well as in foreign policy. In these cases, the army should be included in the analysis as an actor involved in foreign policy-making.

Along with international inputs, foreign policy is subject to a continuous stream of domestic inputs. Domestic sources of foreign policy are numerous. The term ‘source’ is used as an umbrella term to replace or cover the more solid terms of constraints and limits. Foreign policy is under the influence of transnational and domestic values, thoughts,
advantages and disturbances. Foreign policy-makers who take common international concerns and values into consideration are exposed to limits created by the domestic society. This narrows the manoeuvring position of decision-makers in foreign policy-making (Hill, 2003).

In terms of foreign policy analysis, it can be assumed that the foreign policy behaviour of states can be understood by focusing on connections in two main milieus: first by looking at the acts of a state between its external position and domestic environment and second by examining the relationship between the foreign policy issue on the table and the decision-making process utilised to address this issue. As foreign policy is formulated in a domestic environment, the sources which shape that environment should also be taken into consideration in any analysis. In this respect, the traditional components of foreign policy analysis such as ‘public opinion’, ‘influence of the media’, pressure groups, organisational structure and so on (Brown, 1997) are also integrated into the examination of the state level of analysis. In the present environment, the evolving character of foreign policy is discussed, for instance, by asking “is it more than what foreign ministries do?”, and the components of the decision and meaningful actions are interpreted accordingly. To arrive at a reasonable conclusion, the researcher should not only possess knowledge of how choices are formulated, but should also pose such critical questions as who has most influence on the decisions and how their viability may be calculated.

D) Individual Level of Analysis

In the levels of analysis approach, the individual level is ignored at the expense of other levels. In particular, Singer and Waltz, although recognising the individual realm,
mainly focus on the systemic and state levels rather than individuals. For instance, Singer lays emphasis on the individuals by stating:

If the nation or state is seen as a group of individuals operating within an institutional framework, then it makes perfect sense to focus on the phenomenal field of those individuals who participate in the policy-making process. (Singer, 1961, p.88)

He also has some doubts about the parameterisation of the factors which affect individuals. He continues:

Even if we are convinced that their perceptions and beliefs constitute a crucial variable in the explanation of a nation's foreign policy, can they be observed in an accurate and systematic fashion? (Singer, 1961, p.88)

As the influence of behaviouralism and its criticisms has become more prominent over time, the lack of the individual level in analysis and the necessity of involving it in the levels of analysis approach has been more frequently stated by scholars. In this respect, Isaak (1974) argues that scholars who take the international system as their basis and use the nation state as the point of departure predominate international politics. Whether used alone or together as the aspects of levels of analysis, these two ‘levels of analysis’ prevent the field of international relations from having a third alternative, the proposition that the works of this field are deficient as long as they fail to analyse individuals in interaction with other individuals.

On a daily basis, the actions of a state are run by the government. An action of government is an overarching term to refer to a whole set of actions by numerous institutions. At the heart of these actions lie a large number of individuals acting as agents (Reynolds, 1980). When focusing on foreign policy-making, one cannot omit the role of individuals. The major constitutive elements of an actor’s actions are values, perceptions, motives, ideologies and even prejudices.
One should admit that observation of all individuals in foreign policy-making is neither possible nor meaningful in an analysis. But international politics and foreign policy can be studied at the individual level by focusing on the actions and behaviours of individual statespeople who are in key positions in the foreign policy-making process. The motivations, ideas, perceptions, values, ideologies or idiosyncrasies of those who are authorised to make decisions in foreign policy-making in a state are the main focus of this level of analysis (Holsti, 1995).

Foreign policy analysis has made significant contributions to the International Relations field. Hudson (2007, p.7) claims:

The single most important contribution of foreign policy analysis to international relations theory is to identify the point of theoretical intersection between the most important determinants of state behaviour: material and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human decision makers.

To start with, Foreign Policy Analysis tries to find out the motives and other sources of the behaviour of international actors, particularly states, by paying attention to decision-making so that it can search for the formal self-descriptions (and fictions) of the processes of government and public administration. It tests the plausible hypothesis that the decision-making process, to some degree, determines the outputs of foreign policy (Hill, 2003).

Foreign policy choices are formulated, decided and implemented by individuals. In the foreign policy-making process, political actors are regarded as a functioning connection between ideas and the process itself. Ideas and belief systems are significantly wide and complex concepts. When a link can be detected between certain ideas and policy-makers, this means that ideas are institutionalised. In other words, to find a causal linkage between ideas, beliefs and foreign policy, it is essential that ideas are institutionalised. This means that institutional ideas have the chance to influence the political outcome. Institutionalisation is indicative of the ideas which are implanted in institutions, in this case
political parties (Özkeçeci-Taner, 2005). Ideas and beliefs are also closely related to world views which are central to constituting an image of the world outside. The image of the outside world shaped through the lenses of ideas and beliefs accordingly has an impact on the choices and decisions of policy-makers (Blum, 1993). Moreover, according to Holsti (1967), during a time of uncertainty or when a decision-maker has insufficient information about a foreign policy issue, it is likely that the beliefs and ideas of the political actor have more impact on their decision.

At the individual level of analysis of this thesis, the main actors and decision-makers in foreign policy-making, i.e., presidents, prime ministers and some advisers as individual political elites who affect foreign policy-making, will be analysed according to their personal characteristics, perceptions, motivations, ideals, values and ideologies by drawing on Foreign Policy Analysis.

VI Methodology of Research

This section comprises the methodology of the thesis which will designate how the theoretical framework of the thesis will be applied to the empirical data. The main purpose of the methodology will be to demonstrate how the research has been designed, and how data were collected, sorted and analysed. In order to explore the change in Turkish foreign policy in the Post-Cold War period, external (structural) and internal (domestic) factors and their roles in this change will be examined.

Changes in Turkish foreign policy in the Post-Cold War era will be analysed at three different levels and the underlying research question will be to explore the external (structural) and internal (domestic) factors and their roles in shaping Turkish foreign
policy. These three levels are the systemic, unit (state) and individual levels. The main task will be to show how and to what extent Turkish foreign policy was transformed in this specific period.

External factors are explained by making reference to structural systemic dynamics which were created by changes in the international system. Internal (domestic) factors are, on the other hand, considered through the lens of agency, which refers to the main actors who influence Turkish foreign policy-making: the government as a main policy-maker and the military as a determining factor to a certain extent.

The first level of analysis will be dedicated to the systemic level. At this level, the structural influences created by the changes in the international system and their roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy will be examined. In order to provide an effective analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the given period, a comprehensive and analytical assessment of the end of the Cold War and the structural transformation brought about this event is due. As Holsti (1995, p.350) states:

The influence of systemic structure on foreign-policy objectives and actions is also prominent when the structure is undergoing fundamental changes. New power configurations, the decline of bloc cohesiveness, or the rise of new powerful states creates both new opportunities and new risks; old limitations are cast off, and new possibilities for formulating or stressing national objectives arise.

Analysis at the systemic level will be conceptualised by making reference to Neorealism and the structure-agency debate in the International Relations literature. Although the Neorealist approach remains inadequate in assessing the role of domestic factors, it holds a strong explanatory power as far as systemic influences on a state’s foreign policy behaviour are concerned. As Singer (1961, p.80) aptly explains:

By focusing on the system, we are enabled to study the patterns of interaction which the system reveals, and to generalize about such phenomena as the creation and dissolution of
coalitions, the frequency and duration of specific power configurations, modifications in its stability, its responsiveness to changes in formal political institutions ...

As regards the use of systemic level analysis to assess the empirical data, the first step will be an analysis of the changes in the international system occurring with the end of the Cold War. Secondly, the impact of these changes on Turkish foreign policy will be analysed by focusing on specific significant foreign policy issues of the period. For example, in the first period (1990-2002) Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic Republics represented a deviation from the policies of the Cold War period. In this context, the systemic influences such as the dissolution of the bipolar system, the demolition of the USSR and the power vacuum left by the USSR in the region will be analysed based on the principles of the Neorealist approach.

The second level of analysis will be the state (unit) level. At this level, the focus will shift towards domestic factors. The key foreign policy decision-making agency will be conceptualised as the government and the military based on the special conditions of Turkish politics. The role of the government and the army in determining Turkish foreign policy in the Post-Cold War era will be examined. In addition to the government and the army, the components of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), i.e., public opinion, interest groups and media, will be incorporated into the analysis as complementary factors when necessary. The power struggle between the major agencies in foreign policy, the government and the army, will feature as a significant characteristic, since it has important repercussions on the foreign policy-making process. The consequences of this contention not only affect domestic politics but also influence foreign policy-making in Turkey. As Friedman and Starr (1997, p.20) argue:

Agent behaviour within one structure or arena may influence the agent's standing in another structure or arena, and the structural change in one arena may influence the agent's standing in another arena.
Concerning the application of state level analysis into the empirical data, the major foreign policy issues will be analysed from the perspective of the agents, i.e., the government and the army. The influence of other factors such as public opinion, interest groups and the media, if any, will also be taken into consideration within the concept of FPA. As stated above, the power struggle between the major agents will be analysed in terms of their influences on certain foreign policy issues.

The final level of analysis will be the individual level. This level of analysis will be conceptualised by drawing on the FPA and the concept of agency. Agents, whether single individuals or collectives, are entities that are capable of making decisions and putting these into action. Because of the complex organisation of foreign policy mechanism, the actors involved are numerous. The selection of actors in foreign policy will be made according to their relative power and influence in foreign policy decision-making. By this token, the key decision-makers who have taken a proportionally significant share in influencing foreign policy are chosen as individual agents of analysis. These are presidents, prime ministers and some advisers. Analysis will be made by making reference to the FPA and partly to the Bureaucratic Politics approach.

In terms of application of the state individual level analysis of the empirical data, the role of key decision-makers on certain foreign policy issues will be analysed using the analytical tools provided by the FPA. The personal attributes of these individuals, such as their past experience, backgrounds, values, ideologies and worldviews will also be taken into consideration in order to explore their individual influence, if any, on foreign policy issues of the period.
A) Data Selection

Within the scope of qualitative methods, the vast body of existing literature on Turkish Foreign policy in the Post-Cold War era was widely used. Books, articles and working papers were given primary importance. Furthermore, government programmes, parliament resolutions, political party programmes and parliamentary debates were also analysed. The media was another source of information, especially for certain policy issues.

To generate, interviews which made with senior politicians, high-ranking diplomats, scholars, researchers at prominent think thanks and foreign policy newspaper columnists were regarded as important sources. In the selection of interviewees a set of criteria was applied. Firstly, in order to provide triangulation, the number of interviewees was balanced for each period (1990-2002 and 2002-2010). Secondly, the position and status of interviewees was also taken into consideration.

B) Data Collection

Secondary resources on Turkish Foreign policy in the Post-Cold War period such as books and articles were collected via university and national libraries and electronic sources. For official reports, party programmes, parliamentary records, the relevant bodies such as the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and think tanks were used besides libraries and electronic sources. Media were another reference, particularly for media archive research.

Concerning the data generated, in-depth interviews conducted with senior politicians, high-ranking diplomats, scholars, staff from think thanks and foreign policy newspaper columnists were regarded as important sources. The interviews were carried out through semi-structured texts and in open-ended form.
C) Data Analysis

The collected data will be analysed along the principles of qualitative research methods. Any written materials and interviews will be assessed within the scope of qualitative research methods. Findings and remarks will be stated separately for the systemic, state and individual levels of analysis.

VII Conclusion

Although the Neorealist approach is insufficient when assessing the role of domestic factors, it retains a strong descriptive power as far as systemic effects on a state’s foreign policy behaviour are concerned. Due to Neorealism’s predominant focus on the systemic level and, as a corollary, its failure to conceive all levels of international politics, a theoretical framework is needed which is able to cover domestic and individual factors as well. In this context, three different levels of analysis will be used: systemic, state and individual.

Analysis at the systemic level will be conceptualised by making reference to Neorealism with its Offensive and Defensive approaches and the structure-agency debate in the International Relations literature. Turkish foreign policy will be analysed in terms of systemic effects and the constraints and possibilities created by the structure. These systemic influences will be examined from the point of Defensive Neorealism. In addition to these, the way and the level of systemic pressure on Turkey which is a middle size power in its region will be discussed by making reference to specific significant foreign policy issues of the period.

The second level of analysis will focus on the state (unit) level. The government and the army, determined as key agencies in foreign policy-making, will be examined through
referral to the instruments of foreign policy analysis. In the domestic context, the role and effects of components such as public opinion, interest groups and the media will also be considered as complementary factors when necessary. The relationship between government and army will form another reference point in order to understand the effects of this power struggle on foreign policy decision-making.

The individual level will form the last step of analysis. The key actors involved in foreign policy-making as individual agents, namely presidents, prime ministers and foreign policy advisers, will be analysed in terms of their influence on foreign policy-making during the given period of Turkish foreign policy.
CHAPTER 2 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1923 UNTIL THE END OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

I Introduction

This second chapter covers Turkish foreign policy from the foundation of the Republic in 1923 to the end of the Cold War. As an introductory chapter, it will prepare the reader for the core of the research project: Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. This thesis aims to find answers to the main research question: What are the external and internal (domestic) factors shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War? Although the main research will be conducted on three levels, systemic, state and individual, these levels of analysis will not be applied in this introductory chapter. Instead, the chapter will focus on:

* Explaining the general framework of Turkish foreign policy from the birth of Turkish Republic to the post-Cold War era

* Stating its main characteristics, determinants and principles

* Reflecting the major debates on Turkish foreign policy

As the historical background of Turkish foreign policy is laid out, the main shifts in the international system, as well as changes at unit level and their repercussions on foreign policy issues, will be deduced, with the aim of offering an insight into the core of the analysis; Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

The chapter will feature Turkish foreign policy in general, and its interwar, Second World War and Cold War era applications in particular. It has six main sections: introduction, general characteristics of Turkish foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy in
the inter-war period, the Second World War and Turkey, Turkish foreign policy in the Cold War period and conclusion.

In the second section, the general characteristics of Turkish foreign policy from the foundation of the republic in 1923 will be examined. The roots of Turkey’s western tendencies in the fields of politics, culture and economics will be discussed. This will lead to further debates about western dependency on Turkish foreign policy. Meanwhile, Turkey will be analysed in terms of its foreign policy objectives, strategies and implementations. The second section will continue with a discussion of the main principles of Turkish foreign policy. At the end of this section, the characteristics of the republic's state structure will be briefly examined in terms of the relationships between institutions within the state and their roles in foreign policy-making.

The third section will examine Turkish foreign policy in the inter-war period. After a brief explanation of world politics in that era, Turkey’s efforts to provide security for its newly born and fragile republic will be explained. Turkey’s foreign policy implementations will be analysed in terms of its relationship with regional states and the great powers. Here, the Balkan entente and the Saadabad pact are the primary examples of regional alliances in Turkish foreign policy. The security concerns of Turkey, which became dense towards the end of the inter-war period, and the way in which Turkey managed its foreign policy will also be analysed. The last part of this section will assess the international system in the inter-war period, the processes that took the world into the Second World War and their influence on Turkish foreign policy. At the unit level, the changes in senior state personnel after the death of Ataturk and their reflections on the state level will be briefly stated, especially with regard to the relationship between the government and the army.
The fourth section of this chapter will cover the Second World War and Turkey. After presenting the outlook of the international system before the war, Turkey’s efforts to guarantee its security and keep the country out of the war will be explicated, including seeking alliance with the great powers. Another discussion will be Turkey’s resistance to the pressures coming from both the Axis and the Allies to involve the country in the war for their side. This section will be closed with a general picture at the end of the Second World War at the systemic and state levels.

The fifth section will look at Turkish foreign policy in the Cold War era. Firstly, Turkey’s changing foreign policy environment following the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity in this period will be examined. The reasons for Turkey’s western alignment in the context of the Soviet threat will be discussed from different points of view. In this context, understanding what factors directed Turkey to pursue its Cold War period foreign policy applications and which external incentives and deterrents were effective in determining the policies to pursue will also make it possible to explain the policy changes at the end of this period, as the post-Cold War era is the main focus of the thesis. The section will also focus on Turkey’s efforts towards being a part of the western defence system and NATO membership. The debate in the existing literature on Turkey’s western dependency will be a key element of the discussion in this section. The conditions which led to the formation of the Baghdad Pact and the CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization) will be explained. The Cyprus problem and the disappointment of Turkey created by its western allies because of their reactions to the Cyprus crisis will also be stated. The section will continue with significant events of the 1980s, notably the military coup d'état in 1980, then the return to democracy in 1983. Finally, the systemic feature of the Cold War period, bipolarity, will be assessed in terms of its structure and reflection in
international politics in general and Turkish foreign policy in particular. The major political events will also be viewed through the lenses of foreign policy-making and the relationship between the main actors at state level, the government and the army.

The conclusion, with a very brief summary of the chapter, findings and remarks, will complete the second chapter.

II General Characteristics of Turkish Foreign Policy

A) The Roots of Turkey’s Western Tendency and Turkish Foreign Policy

The West has had a significant role and effect on Turkish history, politics, economy and culture. The Turks have had territory in Europe for six hundred and fifty years. Throughout this period, the Turks were regarded by the West first as a conquering superior and sworn enemy in the classical Ottoman age, as a component part of the European system during the Empire’s golden age, later in the decline period as an admirer and unsuccessful imitator of western civilisation and finally with the new Turkish Republic as a follower and ally (Aydın, 1999).

During the Ottoman decline, some limited westernisation attempts were implemented, which had been devised as a solution to prevent the empire from dramatic decline. As a matter of fact, the nineteenth century reforms helped the Turkish and Europeans to become closer (Mango, 2005; Heper, 2005). With the foundation of the new republic, the Turks took western civilisation as a model. The new republic extensively retained westernisation in the economic, political, social, cultural and military fields (Zürcher, 2005, pp.172-173). In the field of foreign policy, the western tendency was also a strong incentive. In spite of the fact that Turkey fought against the western powers during the First World War, then in
the independence war, one of the fundamental features of Turkish foreign policy was its western orientation (Aydın, 1999).

The Kemalism which was the new republic’s leading ideology was deeply ‘western’ in inspiration and aspiration (Millman, 1995). Atatürk believed that modernisation and civilisation meant westernisation, secularisation and autonomy for the individual from religion (Walker, 2009). He deeply believed that as long as the nation held itself in the modern world, radical changes in the structure of Turkish society and culture were necessary and he was sure that superficial modernisation was valueless (Keyman, 2008). Turning down Turkey’s Ottoman legacy initially allowed Atatürk to create a new nation that the historical problems which he had experienced in the final decades of the Ottoman period could not hinder. As a result, Atatürk’s legacy of the Kemalist Revolution contained the Ottoman legacy by rejecting its immediate history and transforming itself into a nationalist ideology that has guided Turkey. Turkey's western orientation in terms of its foreign policy was a natural result of Atatürk's overall attitude that Turkey embraced the West and refused the East. During this period, western-orientated Turkish foreign policy was implemented in combination with the establishment of cultural ties with the West (Aydın, 1999).

A fundamental shift in the bases of political legitimisation and a redefinition for Turkey arose from the establishment of a modern, secular and constitutionally based nation-state under the leadership of Atatürk. It was impossible for anyone to ignore the transition of a traditional society into a modern one both internally and externally. Thanks to Kemalism, Turkey was situated in modernisation and civilisation within a western model of development, together with a particularly strict interpretation of secularism (Walker, 2009).
Different opinions have been expressed on the origin of Turkey’s western tendency in its foreign policy. For instance, Aydın (1999) argues that the western orientation of Turkish foreign policy was intentional and continued to be a policy choice. This choice cannot be explained with the limited aim of 'countering an imminent threat' or formulations such as 'the economic interests of the ruling elite'. On the other hand, Millman (1995) claims that the Turkish attitude towards the West was formed by both sentiment and calculation; this cannot be ignored. Turkey took the West as an ideal model to guide its own development and hoped to find security against the threats of the West.

B) The Foreign Policy Preferences of the Republic

The new republic, which was no longer an empire but a nation-state, shaped its foreign policy with a realistic approach. It never pursued any territorial claim. The major aim was to preserve the state and to develop the country to reach a contemporary level. In order to ensure its survival on the international stage, Turkey needed to challenge the new international system. According to Gözen (2009, p.60), in the transition process from the empire to a nation state, one of the priorities of the new state was to be accepted as a new actor in the international arena. Accordingly, the republic would need to solidify its sovereignty both in the domestic and international realms. Turkey’s foreign policy was designed by its founder, Atatürk, who put an end to the expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire. Among his preferences, peace, independence and sovereignty were in the lead. Principally, pursuing a pacifist foreign policy was a necessity for the new republic. The founding leaders of the republic came from the Ottoman legacy, which had spent more than a century under the economic, social and military interference of the great powers. They naturally aimed to establish a new system in which full sovereignty belonged to the
state itself. A nation state which would not allow any social fragmentation was intended to be created by the founders (Çiftçi, 2010, pp.190-191). Many reforms were started in this direction in social and economic life. As Gönlübol and Sar (1996, pp.59-60) rightly state, during this transition process, the country needed peace both inland and abroad. This necessity compelled the young republic to pursue pro-peace foreign policies.

The Turkish Republic under Ataturk's leadership attempted to adopt the institutions and the values of the West so that it could increase the pace of modernisation and the development process. This western tendency did not, however, include any dependency on the political, military or economic context (Aydın, 2000). The Ottoman Empire severely suffered in its last decades because it nearly lost its independence due to opening up and becoming more vulnerable to foreign interferences and economic privileges granted to foreigners. This reality was a major factor which increased Turkey’s sensitivity to all aspects of sovereignty and independence (Aydın, 1999).

With regard to foreign policy implementation, firstly the western orientation had a strong influence on Turkey's foreign policy. Ataturk turned the nation’s face to the West and rejected closer relations with the East. The other preferences of that period were, as Millman (1995) states, good relations and alliance with Soviet Russia without being subordinated, and ensuring security in the Balkans.

There is an on-going debate in the literature on Turkish foreign policy’s Middle East alienation during the inter-war period. According to Danforth (2008), some scholars such as Robins (2003), Fuller (2004), Larrabee (2007) and Bozdağlıoğlu (2003) assert that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s political disengagement from the Middle East was caused by his nationalist ideology and domestic commitment to westernisation, in fact overemphasising the role of domestic identity and ideology while determining Turkish foreign policy. As far
as Danforth (2008) is concerned, Ataturk’s disregard for Middle Eastern affairs and a broader policy of moderate isolationism reflected the fact that in the wake of the Second World War, the Middle East was largely under European political control, and there were few independent states with which Turkey could have relations. In terms of relations, Turkey could not have had a Middle Eastern policy that was separate from European states. Under these circumstances, the only important decision that could have been taken by Turkey’s leaders was whether or not to challenge the mandate powers with the aim of reasserting influence in the region. Once this option was rejected by Ataturk’s principles, Turkey had little to gain through involvement in the Arab world, and risked little through non-involvement.

Danforth (2008) defines Ataturk’s rejection of the Ottoman Empire claims to the Middle East as the most revolutionary and pragmatic choices Ataturk had ever made. While he explains this rejection of imperial ambitions as being a result of Ataturk’s nationalist ideology, which he used in organising the Turkish state, Danforth also states that the refusal of past aspirations revealed Ataturk’s determination to pursue the necessity of young Turkey. Danforth gives Ataturk’s different attitudes in relation to Hatay, Mosul and the western trace territorial disputes which were not solved in the Lausanne Treaty as evidence of Ataturk’s preference for pragmatism, or in other words, the new republic’s need for his nationalist ideology.

As he explains, Hatay, Mosul and Western Thrace were all regions which Turkey had disagreements about respectively with France, Britain and Greece. Whereas Hatay and Mosul, containing an important port and significant oil reserves respectively, were of clear economic importance, Western Thrace was not. In terms of demography, nevertheless, Western Thrace was more commonly Turkish-speaking. While Hatay was split between
Turkish and Arabic speakers, in Mosul, only the minority Turkoman population spoke Turkish. At the Lausanne Conference and in the years that followed, Ataturk showed his determination to regain Hatay and Mosul, in stark contrast to the indifference he showed towards Western Thrace, where the population had the best claim to Turkish identity as it was then defined. While these priorities reveal the definite victory of pragmatism over nationalism, they should not be taken as evidence that Ataturk’s nationalism was not sincere.

The priority of peace, sovereignty and national development over expansionist-revisionism dominated his foreign policy. After Ataturk's death, one of his close associates, Ismet Inonu, took over the presidency of Turkey. He was so dedicated to the Kemalist ideology in general, and the foreign policy principles of peace and sovereignty in particular, that Turkey under his leadership followed the Kemalist regime loyally in all respects, resulting in foreign policy remaining mostly unchanged under Inonu’s leadership (Aydin, 2000).

C) Main Principles in General Turkish Foreign Policy

Scholars offer different ways in which to split Turkish foreign policy into periods. For instance Turkish foreign policy is divided by Aydin (2000) into four periods: 1923-1945 (inter-war period), 1945-1960 (total western dependence), 1960-70 (rapprochement efforts to the eastern and Third World) and 1970-80 (loneliness in the international area). On the other hand, Oran (2002a) divides the period into: 1919-1923 (The Years of Salvation), 1923-1939 (Relative Autonomy 1), 1939-1945 (Relative Autonomy 2), 1945-1960 (In the axis of the Western Bloc and 1960-1980 (Relative Autonomy 3). However, there is more consensus, concerning the early Republic era (1923-1939). This period is generally divided
in two stages: 1923-1932 and 1932-1939 (Gönlübol and Sar, 1996; Gözen, 2009; Kodal, 2007). In the first period, Turkey was in a transition period filled with economic and social revolutions and efforts to restructure from empire to nation state. In this direction, Turkey pursued conciliatory foreign policies even with the states, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Greece, with which it fought in the independence war, 1919-1923. Indeed, the international agreements that Turkey signed during this period in the international arena almost solely regarded cooperation, friendship and non-aggression.

Aydın (1999) described the main characteristics of Turkish foreign policy as: national security issues always having great importance; strong attachment to independence and sovereignty; identity crisis caused by belonging to both the West and the East; not reaching the aim of being a developed country; devotion to international commitments; and an effort to recover its image in the international arena. He also explained the influential goals and principles designated by Ataturk as Turkish foreign policy as: the establishment and preservation of a national state with complete independence conditioned by modern Turkish nationalism; the promotion of Turkey to the level of a contemporary civilisation by means of Kemalist principles; and an attachment to realistic and peaceful means in foreign policy actions.

From 1923, and in the following years of the republic, the foreign policy preferences of the new Turkish state were full sovereignty, impartiality, and politic and economic independence (Oran, 2002b; Aydın, 1999, Erkin, 1952).
D) The Political Structure of the Republic from the Perspective of Foreign Policy-Making and Share of Political Power

In order to pave the way for analysing the government and the army as the main foreign policy-makers at unit (state) level in the chapters ahead, it is important to assess the early republic period in terms of the structure of the state apparatus and power sharing.

The Republic of Turkey was founded as a parliamentary democracy. This meant much to the people who had been governed for five centuries under an absolute monarchy and under a constitutional monarchy for less than two decades. Institutionally, Turkey was governed by the president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, was in charge of the government. The parliament consisted of a single party's elected representatives. Foreign policy was institutionally conducted by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Naturally, the President and the Prime Minister also had roles in this process.

However, the new regime had features of the past. This meant that the power was possessed by Atatürk (Heper, 2011, p.43) in almost every field of state apparatus, including foreign policy-making, at the most senior level. The Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, also had places in the rank of hierarchy.

As a matter of course, this state level structure affected the relationship between institutions in foreign policy-making. For instance, the army, which was historically powerful and had had a say in foreign policy issues since Ottoman times, had been subordinate to the president in foreign policy-making during the Atatürk era, for several reasons. First Atatürk had the power and the last word on foreign policy issues. Second, he was also a soldier who spent years at war and was given the title Marshall by the
constituting parliament during the independence war. For these two reasons, the army, despite its historical position and the prominence of security and military issues in the period, had no excessive power in foreign policy-making circles. Naturally, the position of the army would start to change with Atatürk’s death.

\section*{III \hspace{1cm} Turkish Foreign Policy in the Inter-war Period}

A) World Politics in the Inter-war Period and Turkey

After World War I, world politics was dominated by powerful states such as Britain, France, Italy, Germany, the USA and Japan: the great powers. Since the colonisation period had not yet ended, most of these great powers had colonies and vassals around the world. Besides these great powers, there were limited numbers of middle powers in the system. Therefore, the international system was multi-polar.

The inter-war period witnessed many political, social and military events. Besides wars, independence movements, political struggles and economic competition, one of the key events which affected nearly all states was the world economic crisis.

In the international system which was principally ruled by the great powers, Turkey was one of the middle powers. Turkey was quite different from the other middle powers in the period on the grounds that it was the inheritor of a great power, the Ottoman Empire. In other words, a great power had transformed into a middle power, unlike those that became a middle power from a colonial past, and Turkey could be defined as a middle power essentially due to its diplomatic capabilities which originated from its location and geostrategic position, rather than its economic ability (Barlas, 2005).
B) Efforts to Provide Security for the Newly Born Republic

After the independence war, 1919-1923, Turkey entered the inter-war period having resolved its many major problems with the great powers. Indeed, the independence war which was started in 1919 by the Turkish national movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) had ended with the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. The unsolved legal problems of the new Turkish state were: the status of the straits, whose governance was later to be decided by the International Straits Commission of the League of Nations; territorial dispute over Mosul, whose resolution was left to a later decision of the League of Nations; Western Thrace, which was left to Greece, after the Turkish inhabitants were given some special rights; and the Sanjak of Alexandretta, which was left under French mandate.

According to Aydınc (1999), Turkey was able to solve these disagreements in its favour by using military force or by presenting the other side with a fait accompli. Ataturk chose not to pursue an interventionist policy and avoided such a venture which would create many risks because he had decided to establish long-lasting peace with the western world. Numerous scholars, however, rightly argue that the new republic had no power for any further military engagement, after having fought continuously for more than ten years since the first Balkan War in 1912.

The inter-war period, especially the first part, was a drastic transformative and productive time in the homeland of the Turkish republic. Radical reforms were being put into effect in the social, economic and cultural life of the people. In these years, Turkey was struggling to transform from a multicultural empire into a secular nation state which aimed to be a part of the modern world. After ensuring its external security with the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey, it thus focused on its internal affairs and nation-building efforts.
As Hale (2002) remarks, the government was heavily involved in domestic reconstruction and reforms in the period between 1923 and 1930 during which time the international situation was relatively peaceful.

The period between the Mosul crisis (1924-1925), which arose from a disagreement between Turkey and the United Kingdom during negotiations to find a solution to the Mosul dispute, causing some insurgences in Turkey’s south eastern border, and 1934, when Italy started to be a danger to the eastern Mediterranean due to its expansionist attitude, was a time in which foreign policy issues had little importance. This period was defined by Millman (1995), as “a period of introspection” during which Turkey was trying to ensure its security by concluding effective agreements with its neighbours, such as the Treaty of Non-Aggression with Soviet Russia in 1925 and was trying to avoid the creation of external problems so that it could deal with its internal issues.

Turkish foreign policy decisions in the inter-war period, according to Millman (1995), were based on certain principles (beliefs and preferences). The first preference was establishing good relations and alliance with Soviet Russia by avoiding subordination in order to ensure Turkey’s eastern and Black Sea security. Indeed, Ataturk made a significant effort to maintain an appropriate level of relations with Soviet Russia. Although he was opposed to the Communist ideology, he established a close connection during the Turkish independence war and accepted Soviet Russia’s support. After founding the Turkish republic, Ataturk allowed a Communist Party to be formed as long as it stayed in the formal margins. He pioneered the 1925 non-aggression treaty concluded with Soviet Russia (Danforth, 2008).

The second preference of Turkish foreign policy in the inter-war period was the Balkan Entente. This was a natural result of Turkish strategic thinking that the Balkans
must be kept far away from the war and confrontation that had dominated the peninsula for over 400 years. As part of the Balkans, the Turks believed that the Balkan states should not have internal strife among themselves.

The last preference in that period, according to Millman (1995), was rapprochement with the West, particularly with the United Kingdom. The main logic behind this principle was to provide assistance in deterring the Italian threat and German domination and also to keep the southern borders secure, where the neighbours were Iraq, a mandatory territory of Britain, and Syria, one of France. Convergence with the West was also significant for Turkey when seeking a change in its favour regarding the status of the straits.

In the first part of the inter-war period the situation was quite normal in the Balkans and Mediterranean. There was intense competition between France and Italy over the Balkans. After France’s treaty of alliance with Belgrade in 1927, Rome concluded a neutrality treaty which resulted in only a certain amount of short-term maritime collaboration with Turkey (Barlas, 2005).

What Turkey was seriously concerned about was the expansionist Italy. Mussolini had the intention to seize Anatolia. In 1924, the fascist leader attempted to form secret concentrations of troops in the Dodecanese Islands with the aim of attaching the Mediterranean shores of Anatolia (Açıkalın, 1947). This attempt was condemned strongly by the Turkish Government.

In contrast with Millman’s (1995) argument that the activism in Turkish foreign policy started to be seen in 1934, this activism dates back to the first years of the 1930s, when Turkey began to follow a more active foreign policy. Indeed, between 1930 and 1933, conferences were organised among the six Balkan countries: Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania, to improve regional collaboration. The Balkan states
aimed to jointly cope with the economic and political side effects of the world economic crisis (Barlas, 2005; Altuğ, 1989). Turkey aimed to create a secure zone against the Italian menace, which consisted of non-aligned states in the Balkans and Mediterranean. To this end, a treaty of friendship was concluded with Greece in September 1933. In October and November of the same year, Turkey signed two separate treaties of friendship, non-aggression and reconciliation with Romania and Yugoslavia (Barlas, 2005).

One of the significant events of this period was Turkey’s joining the League of Nations in 1932. Through this attachment, Turkey’s goal of being accepted into the international community was realised to a great extent. Turkey also started to play a prominent role in the League of Nations (Millman, 1995). In 1934, Turkey was accepted as a member of the Assembly of the League of Nations, replacing China, and held the presidency of the Assembly in 1937 (İşyar, 2009, pp.576-578).

C) Foreign Policy Implementations and Attempts to Provide Regional Security

By 1934, Turkey had already ensured the security of its eastern and Black Sea regions by concluding a ten-year non-aggression treaty with Soviet Russia. Its southern borders with neighbours Iraq and Syria did not create security problems because of Turkey’s close relations with Britain and France. In the Balkans, Turkey was improving its effort to form a Balkan Entente. On the other hand, the fascist Italian dictatorship was increasing the level of threat for the Balkans and the Mediterranean. By the time Hitler came to power, Germany was becoming a potential danger.

Italy started to fortify the Dodecanese islands in contravention of the Lausanne Agreement, which had decided on non-military settlement of the islands. The Italians, on
the other hand, were applying pressure by using mainly diplomatic channels to annex the Mediterranean province of Turkey; Antalya (Millman, 1995; Hale, 2002). The Four-Power Pact, which aimed at close cooperation in Europe between Italy, Britain, France and Germany, was proposed by Mussolini in March 1933. This meant that the great powers would get more involved in the region. This prompted Turkey and the other Balkan states to form a Balkan Entente (Barlas, 2005).

The Balkan Entente was signed in Athens between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania on 9 February 1934. Since Albania was under the influence of Italy, which was not in favour of this kind of pact, it did not join the other Balkan countries. The signatories agreed to preserve the Balkan States’ frontiers against any aggression from the Balkan countries and to consult together in the event of any threat to peace in the region (Altuğ, 1989). The Entente, as Barlas (2005) argues, was designed to resist a possible threat from within the Balkan Peninsula, namely from Bulgaria, which had open intentions on Macedonia. The Greeks also insisted on this. Ankara was also conscious that Bulgaria needed the support of Italy if it was to dare to cause disorder in the Balkans. The Greeks declared that signing the agreement would not lead Greece into a war with Italy. Similarly, Turkey affirmed the same reserve regarding a war with Russia.

The Balkan Entente was a success in terms of Turkish diplomatic efforts to stabilise and ensure the security of the region. According to Barlas (2005) this achievement can be explained by various factors. Firstly, the Balkans consisted of small and relatively weak states which were seeking a secure environment. Among them, Turkey was the only sizeable and relatively powerful state. Secondly, the contiguous Balkan geography, which does not separate the region with definite land forms, imposes on the Balkan states the need for a common defence alternative rather than a system in which each state relies only
on its own security. Thirdly, the interests and competition of the great powers, especially Italy, Germany and France, over the region, although they had not exerted a significant influence on the region, increased the security concerns of the Balkan states and directed them towards joint policies. Finally, the Balkan states were also in economic difficulties, which were exacerbated by the world economic crisis. This supports the idea of regional collaboration. Moreover, these common interests of the Balkan states enabled Turkey to develop a Balkan strategy independent of the great powers in this period.

Italy’s occupation of Abyssinia in October 1935 increased Turkey’s concerns about Italian expansionism. Turkey focused heavily on improving existing regional agreements. Following a visit to Romania and Yugoslavia by a military commission from Turkey, a tripartite military conference was organised between the countries in Belgrade in November 1935. A military convention was signed which initiated reciprocal military aid between Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia in case of aggression against any party (Barlas, 2005). In order to guarantee Turkish security, Ataturk’s government decided to increase the size of the Turkish Army and modernise its equipment (Millman, 1995). In 1935, Turkey and Russia extended the Treaty of Non-Aggression for another period of ten years. The Montreux Convention, which changed the status quo set in Lausanne and improved Turkey’s rights, was signed on 20 July 1936 (Açıkalın, 1947).

The other regional pact concluded by Turkey in the inter-war period was the Saadabad Pact. This was a kind of collaboration and non-aggression agreement and was signed between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan on 8 July 1937 in Teheran. In fact, an agreement was initialised between the parties in Geneva in 1935, but the conclusion was postponed because of a border dispute between Iran and Iraq. The signatories agreed to defend their common frontiers, to consult common interests and to commit to no
aggression against one another’s territory (Altuğ, 1989). The Saadabad Pact was marked as the first attempt by regional states to establish a Middle Eastern security pact (Watt, 1988).

D) Security Concerns before the Second World War

International events between 1935 and 1939 showed an increasing deterioration in international relations, in many cases reaching open aggression (Açıkalın, 1947). Italy was proclaimed as an aggressor because of the invasion of Abyssinia. Rome pursued a strategy of forming alliances with different countries in the Mediterranean to divide the regional powers into different blocs. Italy, thus, made efforts to prevent regional powers in the Balkans and the Mediterranean from establishing ententes. Mussolini, who believed that France, his rival in the Balkans, had had influence over the formation of the Balkan Entente, never welcomed the pact (Barlas, 2005).

Throughout the inter-war period, especially until 1937, Turkish military planning was based on the ability to fight against any possible enemy without assistance (Millman, 1995). The increasing Italian and German threats, however, showed Turkish officials that, despite Turkey's relatively large size and strategic regional importance, they did not have the necessary military materials and sources to maintain its territorial security alone. Ankara, therefore, realised that it was a part of a greater project than that of just collaborating with its Balkan neighbours for security (Barlas, 2005).

Indeed, after the conclusion of the Balkan Entente, Turkey had to modify its earlier strategy to provide security by pursuing the formation of alliances among like-minded regional states independent from the great powers. The changed international conditions and growing danger forced Turkey to welcome regional efforts initiated by great powers,
especially France and Britain (Barlas, 2005). Meanwhile the Italian invasion of Abyssinia brought Turkey and Britain to a closer attitude about Mediterranean security (Açıkalın, 1947). The unsuccessful attempt to create a Mediterranean pact which would include Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, France, Spain and Britain was a good example of Turkey’s changed policy. The condensing great power rivalry in the Mediterranean region prevented Turkey from achieving further diplomatic goals as a middle power (Barlas, 2005).

Towards the end of the inter-war period, Turkey already had an alliance with Russia and the Balkan Pact was an effective agreement. Britain was the only element still missing in the formation of Turkish security (Millman, 1995). The invasion of Albania by Italy, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, on the one hand, and the increasing German pressure on Poland and intense Italian-German activity in the Balkans on the other, were the first steps towards a war.

Just ten days before Germany and Italy announced the Pact of Steel, on 12 May, 1939, Turkey and Britain publicised a joint declaration. The two states agreed on the interests of their national security, and declared that they would collaborate and provide each other all support in the event of aggression and war in the Mediterranean region. Turkey and Britain also declared that the establishment of security in the Balkans was significant. In the same context, a similar joint Turco-French declaration was issued on 23 June 1939 (Açıkalın, 1947).

Soviet Russia unofficially proposed a pact for the joint defence of the straits to Turkey after the Montreux convention: the Soviets suggested a new agreement to Turkey which included a pact of joint defence of Dardanelles, a guarantee that Men-of-War belonging to countries other than Black Sea powers should not be allowed to pass the Dardanelles and a
reservation in favour of Germany, providing that in no event should the treaty, by effect or consequence, lead to an armed conflict with Germany. The Soviets also declared their dissatisfaction with the policy followed by the Turkish Government which sided with Britain and France, who were fighting against Germany (Açıkalın, 1947).

The Soviet attitude against Turkey meant that the country faced another threat, while trying to ensure Balkan and Mediterranean security. This last threat made the Turkish position clearer. In this direction, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Great Britain and France was signed on 19 October 1939.

E) The Systemic Structure and State Level Attributes of the Period

Beside the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia and Italy, the number of great powers in the international system increased more specifically with the inclusion of the USA and Japan after the end of the First World War. With this expansion, the ‘Great Game’ spilled over into the Far East and the Pacific Ocean. States dissatisfied with the status by the end of the First World War, namely Germany and Italy in Europe and Japan in the Far East, were threatening the peace with their expansionist intentions. By 1930, concern and suspicion started to dominate the international system.

As with many states during this period, Turkey’s security concerns were also growing because of the increasing international tension. Turkey had spent a decade setting straight its internal order becoming a member of the international community after its foundation. In line with the increasing aggression in world politics, Turkey, which had mainly preferred regional alliances to ensure its security in the international realm, was compelled to find allies among the great powers. This would harm Turkey’s full sovereignty and impartiality principles. Moreover, Turkey faced the urgent necessity of arming its outdated
army. With very limited economic resources, armament would cost Turkey more debt and economic problems which would cause greater problems later in both foreign and domestic politics.

At the unit level, the changes in the senior state officials after the death of Ataturk and their reflection on the state level will be briefly discussed, especially with regard to the relationship between the government and the army. In his lifetime, there was no significant problem in the relationship between President Atatürk and the army. His close friend and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall Fevzi Çakmak, held this position between 1921 and 1944. Hale (1996, pp.78) describes the period under Atatürk’s presidency as “the army stays in the background”. After the death of Atatürk, Ismet Inonu took the presidency. İnönü worked with Marshall Çakmak until his retirement from the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1944. Although under İnönü presidency, the relationship between the government and the army was much more harmonised in comparison with the Ataturk period, deviations started, which would rise and fall during the following years (Oran,2013,p.75).

IV The Second World War and Turkey

A) The Outlook of the International System before the War

By the early days of 1939, the world was already on the brink of a great war. Up until the end of the 1930s, various events escalated the tension in the international arena. For instance, Mussolini started to pursue an expansionist policy, Hitler came to power, Germany announced its strong intention to change the conditions of the Versailles Treaty, Italy invaded Abyssinia, and Japan increased the level of its aggressive and expansionist
policies. Moreover, the League of Nations, founded with great hopes of regularising international relations and maintaining peace, had already almost lost its efficiency.

In 1939, events would accelerate this approach to war. Czechoslovakia was occupied by the Germans. In May, Germany and Italy announced the Pact of Steel, which was an official form of its 1936 version, and bound the two countries both politically and militarily. In August, a non-aggression pact was signed by the Soviets and Germans. While German pressure was increasing in Poland, a mutual assistance treaty was concluded between Britain and Poland. In the end, the war broke out on 1 September 1939, when Germany attacked Poland.

B) Resistance to the Pressures to Get Turkey Involved in the War

Until the winter of 1943, Turkey managed to stay out of the war and preserved its neutrality. The Allies, however, started to increase their pressures to involve Turkey in the war. They considered new plans to defeat the Germans, after German troops had lost the Battle of Stalingrad against the Soviets and the German campaign had been stopped in Africa. Turkey, naturally, was at the centre of these plans, due to its geographical location and strategic position. The German failures in Stalingrad and Africa had paved the way for the idea to open another front in western or southern Europe in order to lead the German troops to a stalemate. In this way, German military pressure on Soviet Russia would lighten, enabling the Russians to head towards the Balkan Peninsula. Until that time, Turkish neutrality had been enough to prevent the war from spreading over the Middle East and the Caucasus. But now, Turkey’s non-belligerency posed an obstacle for the Allies, who aimed to continue the war into Europe (Aydin, 2002; Deringil, 1982).
Winston Churchill started attempts to get Turkey involved in the war. His plans were based on the assumption that Turkey would be sent the necessary armaments via Syria or another convenient region. Turkey, then, would invade the Balkan Peninsula to attack the German troops. This plan failed and was never put into practice due to doubts about Turkish unwillingness, possible political complications and strategic problems. At the Casablanca Conference, held in June 1941, the Allies decided to keep fighting until the Axis forces definitely surrendered. Churchill and the USA President Franklin Roosevelt were decisive in continuing their efforts for Turkish involvement in the war (Hale, 2002).

In this direction, Churchill met President Inonu on 30 January-1 February 1941 in Adana, Turkey. President Inonu wanted more military aid from the Allies without taking the risk of entering the war. He was also deeply concerned that after a possible German defeat, Soviet Russia might fill the gap in the Balkan Peninsula and dominate the whole of Europe. Although some military staff committee meetings were organised after the Adana summit, the Allies’ effort to convince Turkey to enter the war remained inconclusive. The Cairo and Teheran Conferences were also ineffective in creating the solution to this issue. In February 1944, the British were no longer providing military aid to Turkey. In the same year, Soviet Russia informed Britain that they were no longer willing to see the Turks in the war. By July 1944, the British had the idea that putting more pressure on Turkey would not be useful to convince them to enter the war (Hale, 2002; Aydin, 2002).

C) The End of World War Two

In spite of great pressure and sometimes open threats, Turkey managed to preserve its neutral position and until the last stage of the war. More importantly, due to intense and successful diplomacy and effective strategies, it had been able to ensure its sovereignty and
territorial security without firing a gun or losing a soldier. However, the war was about to end and a new world order would be formed. Turkey wanted to have its place in this new structure.

In the Yalta Conference, held 4-11 February 1945, the Allies announced that only those states which waged war against the Axis could be members of the United Nations, which was planned to replace the League of Nations after the war. This declaration had an impact on the Turkish leaders, and Turkey decided to declare war on the Axis on 23 February 1945 (Hale, 2002).

D) The Systemic Structure and State Level Attributes of the Period

During the period of the Second World War, the bloodiest ever witnessed, the international system was defined by the conditions of war. With the start of the war, Turkey’s security concerns increased. War in the international arena naturally affected Turkey’s position. Military mobilisation was declared. Around a million soldiers in total, regular army and reserves, were being fed. Rationing started to be applied to many foods and basic goods, and limited state resources were allocated for military needs. The state increased its control of economic and social life.

The war, however, created some benefits for Turkey, especially in the economy. Turkey was able to export its raw materials with higher prices and higher amounts to the belligerent states. But this benefit was limited to the war period (Ülman and Sander, 1972). After the end of the war, these temporary economic price conditions would end and create additional problems for the country’s economic balance.

In this period, the systemic conditions set up by the war directly affected Turkey’s foreign policy decisions. Turkey managed to stay out of the war in spite of excessive
pressures from the belligerent states. At the unit level, due to the necessity for control and supervision in wartime economic and social life, the influence of the state increased. The private enterprise class, historically weak in the young republic, was harmed by the economic conditions of the war and the rising weight of the state on the economy. These economic problems would create additional problems for the state in the following years.

V  Turkish Foreign Policy in the Cold War Period

A)  Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Changing Environment of the Post-World War Era

By the end of the Second World War, world politics were becoming bi-polar, unlike the multi-polar system in the inter-war period. The actors of the multi-polar world were leaving their place to two superpowers. After the long and devastating war, the great powers of the inter-war era had relatively lost power regardless whether they were on the side of the winners or losers. On the other hand, the USA and Soviet Russia were emerging as the head actors of the post-war period, which would transform into the Cold War after collaboration opportunities between the two wartime allies disappeared, mainly due to the latter’s expansionist policies.

This transformation of world politics would create additional problems for Turkey as a middle sized country which had managed to preserve its sovereignty and territorial unity during the Second World War by pursuing a cautious policy based on the power balances between the great powers (Oran, 2002d). Indeed, Turkey had pursued a balanced foreign policy during the Second World War. The major aims of Turkish leaders were to ensure territorial security by preferably staying out of the war without creating a total dependency
on either bloc of the war. With these purposes, they remained in collaboration with the two sides and tried to keep the war far away from their borders. However, Turkey’s relations with the Allies and the Axis were not on an equal level. Turkish politicians, therefore, stayed closer to the western Allies, who were the ones that would be able to provide long-term security for Turkey without sacrificing the country’s sovereignty and independence (Aydın, 2002).

While pursuing these policies, one of Turkey’s main sensitivities was to avoid disturbing and facing opposition from its northern neighbour, Soviet Russia. On the other hand, while Turkey, due to its alliance treaty with Britain and France, followed a pro-Ally foreign policy, it tried to keep its relations balanced with Germany. Turkey did not feel an excessive German threat except during the period between November 1940 and June 1941 when the Germans invaded Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece on Turkey’s western borders. After Operation Barbarossa began, the possibility of being invaded simultaneously by Germany and Soviet Russia became improbable. Turkey, however, started to be concerned about being freed from a possible German invasion by Soviet Russia rather than the German incursion itself (Aydın, 2002). During the war, President Inonu ensured that if Turkey became involved in the war, it would be invaded by Soviet Russians either on the Axis side or as a rescuer. He was also conscious that after the war, the Russians would be a major problem for Turkish foreign policy and Turkey would have to deal with this powerful neighbour alone (Armaoglu, 1958).

B) Reasons for Turkey’s Western Alignment

Since the seventeenth century, Russia’s aggression and expansionist policies had made this country the ‘arch enemy’ of the Ottomans. Throughout their joint history, thirteen
Russo-Turkish wars created deep animosity and mistrust between the Turks and the Russians. A history filled with fear, threat, distrust, hostility and endless wars created one of the deep-seated principles in Turkish foreign policy: Russia, the northern neighbour, was the major danger to Turkey’s security and sovereignty (Aydın, 1999; Millman, 1995).

With the foundation of the new republic in 1923, the Turkish leaders, however, tried to establish better relations with Soviet Russia. The Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression which concluded in 1925 and extended in 1935 for another ten years period until 1945, was the fruit of these mutual intentions. Turkey, which pursued a balanced foreign policy during the Second World War, avoided annoying Soviet Russia. Until the Russians entered the war against the Axis, Turkey’s two main concerns were possible Russian participation in the Axis side and being invaded by Russia. Between the years when Germany attacked Soviet Russia and the German failure in Stalingrad, a relatively safe period existed in Turkey in terms of the Soviet threat. After that, the northern neighbour became again a present danger for Turkey. President Inonu believed that after the war, the Russians would continue to be problem for Turks. Turkey would not have to wait until the end of the Second World War to face the Russian threat again.

On 19 March 1945, Soviet Russia denounced unilaterally the Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression concluded in 1925 and extended for ten years in 1935 until 7 December 1945. According to their statement, the reason was the inability of the treaty to meet the new situation and changing conditions. The Soviets were pursuing a bilateral understanding with Turkey concerning the alteration of the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936. They had already showed their intention in the Yalta Conference in February 1945 (Aydın, 1999; Seydi, 2006; Erkin, 1952).
The Soviet proposal was expressed to the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow on 7 June 1945. Briefly, they demanded the solution of three major problems in order to renewal the non-aggression treaty. The issues were firstly, an alteration to the Turkish-Soviet border, meaning the annexation of Kars and Ardahan provinces to the Soviets; secondly, providing military bases to the Soviets on the straits for joint defence; and finally, revision of the Montreux Convention to adapt it to current conditions. In fact, these were the same demands presented to the Germans by Soviet Russia in return for their participation in the Axis in the Second World War. Turkey replied that the first two Russian demands were outside the discussion. Moreover, they added that Turkey was always ready to negotiate the revision of the Montreux Convention. Russia’s historical claims to the straits had become visible again. President Inonu responded to the Soviets, “We did not have any obligation to annex any part of Turkish territory or Turkish rights, we lived with the honour and we would die with the honour without any hesitation” (Açıkalın, 1947.) After this tough statement, the Soviets repeated the same demands. The possibility of a new treaty between the two countries disappeared and the Soviets started to increase their pressure on Turkey (Aydın, 2002).

As soon as it was facing an active Soviet menace, Turkey sought international support, turning to Britain and the USA and demanding reactions against the Soviets with the reason that Soviet domination in Turkey would endanger not only Turkey’s security but also western interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Britain, which agreed completely with Turkey that the Soviet demand would create great risks for British interests in the region, was willing to show a strong reaction to the Russian claims. Mostly due to its economic weakness after the destructive Second World War, Britain needed American support to cope with the Russians. However, at that time the USA was seeking
opportunities to shape the post-war world with the Russians’ participation. Although they shared the British perception that the Soviet claims on Turkey did not fit the principles which the USA was trying to establish in international politics, they chose to keep silent. The American attitude created a deep disappointment in the Turkish government (Seydi, 2006; Aydın, 2000).

By January 1946, the Soviet government had started to seek negotiation with Turkey to impose its demands. During that time, it was becoming clear in the eyes of the British and American governments that the Soviets would not stop putting pressure on Turkey until they took control of the straits. At the Moscow Conference in December 1945, Britain and the USA realised that pursuing an appeasement policy would result in definite Soviet domination of Turkey, Greece and the rest of the Middle East. More importantly, the conference ended Anglo-American optimism about cooperation with the Soviets in the post-war period. After the disappointment of the Moscow Conference, President Truman commenced an aggressive campaign of criticism against Soviet policy in the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria and Romania. In addition, he blamed the Soviets for aiming to attack Turkey and capture the Straits. The USA Ambassador to Ankara, Edwin Wilson’s, despatches also had significant influence in Washington and helped the Soviet threat to Turkey to be understood. He continuously repeated his argument that the actual Soviet aim was not the alteration of the Straits regime, but the domination of Turkey. The USSR had composed vassal states in its immense regime. Turkey was the only gap among these vassals. Moscow, therefore, was reluctant to accept Turkey’s relation with the western democracies (Seydi, 2006).

Washington tended to agree with Ambassador Wilson and started to devote closer attention to the Soviet threat to Turkey. In March 1946, Britain announced that the Treaty
of Alliance with Turkey, dated 1939, was still in effect. This was a diplomatic signal to the USSR that Britain supported Turkey. In the same context, the USA government decided to take the remains of Turkish Ambassador, Ahmet Munir Ertegun, who had died on duty in Washington in November 1944, to Turkey. The battleship Missouri, the strongest battleship in the USA Navy, was chosen to accomplish this mission. The ship was accompanied by two destroyers anchored in the Bosporus on 5th April 1946. Istanbul was visited by an American battleship for the first time. Although the ostensible mission of the convoy was returning the Ambassador’s body to his country, this also meant the appearance of one of the USA Fleet’s most powerful battleships in the Mediterranean. This was an obvious message to Moscow that the USA was ready and always had the ability to send its navy to the defence of the Straits. Turkey realised that its isolation against the Soviet threat was now to be ended. Nonetheless, there was still no visible support for Turkey in the case of Soviet attack (Seydi, 2006; Aydın, 2000; Hale, 2002).

The USA and British backing could not prevent the Soviets from putting pressure on Turkey. The Armenian repatriation scheme aimed to annex Turkish territories which had been formerly inhabited by Armenians to Soviet Armenia. It was planned by a special committee, under the order command of the Soviet Armenian Government. Armenians living in the region, for instance in Romania, Greece, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, were the targets of this scheme. In the direction of the plan, around one and half million Armenians who were living in different countries at the time were contacted and tried to be convinced to settle in Armenia. However, in the summer of 1946, around only six thousand Armenians returned to Soviet Armenia from Syria and Greece (Seydi, 2006; Aydın, 2000).

Failure with the Armenian campaign did not prevent the Soviets from trying a similar campaign. At the Foreign Minister Conference in 1946, the Russians launched a campaign
to found an autonomous Kurdistan. However, this was designed much more to provoke Turkey than to achieve the Kurdistan campaign. It had features of propaganda and remained inconclusive (Seydi, 2006).

According to the consensus reached at the Potsdam Conference on 17 July and 2 August 1946, the Soviet government sent a note to Ankara, London and Washington on 8 July concerning a demand of revision of the Montreux Convention. The Soviet proposal contained the following articles (Tellal, 2002; Seydi 2006):

1- The Straits should always be open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.

2- The warships of the Black Sea Powers should use the straits without any constraint at all times.

3- Non-Black Sea powers should not be permitted except in cases specially provided for assistance.

4- The establishment of a new regime should be negotiated under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers.

5- Turkey and the USSR, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, should organise joint means of defence of the Straits for the prevention of the utilisation of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers.

Britain and the USA Governments declared by diplomatic notes that the defence of the straits should be entitled to Turkey itself, and they were against the Soviet demand that the new regime of the straits should be negotiated only under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers. These notes were followed by Turkey’s response to the Soviet proposal. The Turkish government agreed with the Soviets that the Montreux Convention should be negotiated in order to adapt to the new conditions. In this manner, Turkey
accepted the first three articles in principle. However, Turkey was firmly against Articles four and five, stating that they were inadmissible (Tellal, 2002). Although the Soviet government affirmed its earlier demand on 24 September 1946, the tone was more moderate than before (Seydi, 2006). The exchange of notes on the status of the straits and the alteration of the Montreux Convention had existed as a matter on the table until Turkey was included in the Truman Doctrine in 1947.

The Truman Doctrine had significant consequences from the standpoint of Turkey’s security and economic needs and western interests in the region. In terms of security issues, Turkey was under the present threat of the Soviets. Although Turkey had already signed the alliance agreement with Britain, it was suspicious that the British, who were in a deep economic crisis, had the ability to support Turkey efficiently against a Soviet attack (Hale, 2002). A memorandum presented to Truman by the Secretaries of War and the Navy on 15 August 1946 was important to demonstrate the Soviet threat on the western interests in the region as well as in the rest of the world. According to the memorandum (Seydi, 2006, pp.131-132),

Once the Soviets established themselves in the Straits, they would use their forces to gain control over Turkey. It was accepted by the top USA authorities that if the USSR succeeded in this objective, it would be extremely difficult to prevent the USSR from obtaining control over Greece and over the whole Near and Middle East, including the Eastern Mediterranean, and in those areas cut off from the Western world. When the USSR obtained full mastery of this territory, which is strategically important from the point of view of resources, and communications, it will be in a much stronger position to obtain her objectives in India and China.

On the other hand, the Turkish economy was in difficult situation due to high military mobilisation caused by the Soviet threat. Indeed, Turkey was surrounded by around four hundred thousand Soviet troops all around its frontiers with the USSR, the Caucasus and
Bulgaria. The necessity of maintaining a considerable army and keeping it ready against threats imposed a massive burden on the Turkish economy (Seydi, 2006).

At a time when Turkey was in strong need of political, military and financial support to maintain its security and independence against the Soviet threat, in February 1946, Britain announced that it would cut the cord to Turkey and Greece because of its own economic problems. The British wanted the USA to take over this aid task. The Americans accepted this through the formulation of the Truman Doctrine (Hale, 2002).

The Soviet pressure in the region in general and on Turkey and Greece in particular forced the USA to intervene in the situation. The Soviet pressure endangered Turkey’s independence and the Greek civil war strengthened the Soviet position in the Balkans, which had already partly entered under Soviet domination through the Soviet involvement in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Greece was in civil war and the Communist guerrillas had the opportunity to take control of the country.

As Seydi (2006, pp.134-135) states, a JCOS memorandum of the time clarified the USA perspective on Turkey:

In peacetime Turkey holds a key position with respect both to the Middle East and to the Arab world generally. Turkey’s determination to stand up to Soviet pressure and the western democratic ability to support her will prove a test case to all Middle East countries. If the USSR dominates Turkey in peacetime it is highly probable that all the Middle East countries would then come rapidly under similar Soviet domination. If the USSR can absorb Turkey in peace, our ability to defend the Middle East in war will be virtually destroyed. In war Turkey presents a natural barrier to an advance by the USSR to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East countries, Palestine in particular.

President Truman submitted a proposal to Congress on 12 March 1947 which comprised aid of 400 million dollars for Greece and Turkey. Turkey would receive 100 million dollars of aid, while 300 million was dedicated to Greece. The Truman Doctrine meant that Turkey was not out of the western area of interest. It was mostly welcomed in Turkey.
According to Erhan (2002, pp.532-533), Turkey had three main reasons to accept the American aid provided through the Truman Doctrine. Firstly, because the Soviet threat had created a deep fear and isolationism effect in the country, Turkish leaders believed that Soviet expansionism could only be precluded by establishing closer ties and cooperation with the western world. Secondly, the economic condition of the country was an important factor. Although Turkey did not enter the Second World War, its economy was in a bottleneck. The country was keeping 245 million dollars of official reserve to be used in case of possible war with the Soviets. However, additional funds were needed to put the development plans into practice. Finally, staying out of the war prevented the Turkish Army from having modern armaments. The army was still based to a large extent on infantry, equipped with old-fashioned arms, while the air force and the navy were relatively ineffective.

Although all of the factors Erhan (2002) mentions can be accepted as effective reasons to shape the government’s attitude to the Truman doctrine, it can be said that the Soviet threat, which created both psychological and factual effects, was the most important. In this context, it is easily seen that Tellal (2002)’s three reasons were more or less related to the Soviet threat. It also should be added as another psychological aspect that western aspirations were seen by the founders as a desirable target for the new republic to reach, also facilitating cooperation with the West.

C) NATO Membership and the Debate on Western Dependency

The end of the Second World War had brought some troubles for Turkey. The Soviet threat which presented itself with territorial and military demands on Turkey concomitant with political and military pressure in the international arena was formidable. Because
Turkey did not have enough power to contend with this threat, it sought external support. Even though, in the beginning, Turkey referred to the Britain after a period of indecision when Turkey was completely alone against its northern neighbour, in the end, the USA took over to maintain the deterrent backing of the British, who had been experiencing economic inadequacy since the end of the Second World War.

At that time, the Turkish leaders needed to find at least an equal power in the international arena to help them to resist the Soviet pressure. Moreover, Turkey needed economic aid to maintain its military mobility against this immediate threat. Finally, for durable security, Turkey wanted an alliance based on mutual security commitments with the western world (Hale, 2002).

In this direction, Turkey turned its face to the West in general and to the USA in particular. Indeed, after a period of loneliness in the face of Soviet threat, especially in 1945 and 1946, Turkey was included in the Truman Doctrine in 1947. In the following year, it was covered by the Marshall Plan, which was mainly designated for the Western European countries. Turkey became a member of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation in 1948. The next year, it was invited to the Organization of European Cooperation and Development, and also became a full member of the Council of Europe.

As summarised above, since 1945, when the Soviet threat appeared, Turkey had managed to secure western support and started to integrate with the western world in terms of political and economic policies. By 1950, in spite of a decrease in the threat from the USSR and progress in gaining western political, military and economic support, the main belief in Turkey was that the USSR was still a major danger to the country’s security (Aydın, 1999). This distrust would shape Turkey’s policies during the Cold War.
According to Erhan (2002, pp.543-544), the rationale which prompted Turkey to pursue a role in the western defence system in general and in NATO in particular can be explained by four main motives. First, as Aydın (1999) also states, the deep mistrust of the Soviets did not change the perception of the threat from the USSR in the minds of the Turkish politicians. Moreover, the non-alignment policy that Turkey pursued during the Second World War created a fear of isolationism in the new world order after the war. Turkish leaders were eager to be part of the western bloc so that they could eliminate the risk of loneliness in the international arena. In By entering into the western security sphere, Turkey could ensure its security and modernise its army. Second, Turkish politicians considered NATO membership as a continuation of the western-orientated foreign policy which they mainly pursued after the foundation of the new republic. For them, NATO membership was also a natural right of the country which was a founder member of the European Council. Third, by 1950 Turkey had already been provided with economic and military aid, mainly by the USA. The politicians were concerned that the aid might decrease if Turkey stayed out of NATO. They pursued NATO membership in order to guarantee the current aid flow and benefit from possible future aid. Finally, it was believed in public opinion and intellectual circles that Turkey’s NATO membership was essential to continue and improve the domestic democratic reforms initiated by establishing a multi-party system in 1946.

In terms of Turkey’s reasons for joining the western security system and being a member of NATO, although Aydın (2000) agrees with Erhan (2002) that Turkish politicians regarded NATO membership as natural result of the western tendency in the field of foreign policy, he claims that the pursuit of membership was much more based on
political and economic factors rather than strategic and military concerns, as the Soviet threat had already been prevented by 1950.

In this atmosphere, Turkey applied to join the Atlantic Pact in October 1948, just six months after the Brussels Agreement was signed. Although Turkey repeated its demand in May 1950 after NATO was founded on 4 April 1949, its efforts to be member yielded no result. Britain and the Scandinavian states were mainly opposed to Turkey’s membership. Turkey’s entrance into NATO would expand the organisation’s sphere of influence to the East Mediterranean and the Middle East. Because Britain dominated the Middle East at that time, it did not want NATO to be another power factor in the region. The outbreak of the Korean War would change Turkey’s position. After the United Nations resolution, the government decided to send 4,500 troops to Korea on 25 July 1950. Turkey’s support for Korean War, the Turkish army’s performance during the war and, more importantly, the increasing Soviet threat throughout the world, directed the USA to support Turkish membership of NATO. These events also positively influenced the opposition in NATO to Turkish affiliation. Eventually, American determination produced the result: Turkey became a member of NATO with Greece on 18 February 1952.

The period which started with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and continued with the Marshall Plan in 1948 and eventually NATO membership in 1952 created a military and economic dependency on the West for Turkey. Due to its security, economic and military needs, the country had become much more dependent on the West by the end of the inter-war period and during the Second World War. Moreover, Turkey's foreign policy was therefore inclined to the West. The Soviet’s foreign policy applications for establishing closer relations with the Arab countries, especially with Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the Middle East, caused belief among Turkish leaders that Turkey might be surrounded by pro-
Soviet, hostile Arab countries. This increased Turkey’s security concerns stemming from its northern neighbour. In the 1950s, Turkey’s foreign policy was a natural result of its western alignment. Accordingly, Turkey followed western policies towards the communist bloc and the non-aligned countries (Erhan, 2002; Aydin 2000). For instance, in spite of opposition to the partition of Palestine, Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise Israel and establish diplomatic relations. Turkey initiated the attempt to establish a Middle East Defence Organization in 1951. This was perceived by the Arabs as a different form of Turkish and western expansionism and worsened Turkey’s relations with the Arab world. Turkey had a dynamic role in the Baghdad Pact and the Balkan Treaty in parallel with Britain’s and America’s interest in the regions, although it had no political and military gain from these organisations. Turkey, in line with its western dependency in foreign policy, supported the Western countries during the Suez crisis in 1956 at the expense of the deterioration of its relations with the Arab countries. In the following year, by the same token, Turkey threatened Syria when USA-Syria relations were in crisis. It showed harsh opposition to the coup in Iraq in 1958.

The western dependence of Turkey in terms of the economic and military fields and foreign policy created discussion in the literature about the reasons for this dependence.

According to Erhan (2002, pp.535-537), the period which started with the Truman Doctrine helped Turkey to improve its relations with the USA and resist Soviet demands at the outset. However, afterwards a western, mainly USA-orientated foreign policy was pursued. The Soviet involvement in the Middle East was also a factor that fed Turkish security concerns. USA military aid turned into a foreign trade deficit for Turkey over the course of time, because of the need to import spare parts of military equipment. This
created an economic dependence on the West as well. Turkish foreign policy was inclined
to the west as a result of this military and economic dependence.

As Tellal (2002, pp.507-508) states, the Soviet threat was the main factor in Turkey’s
initial western inclination and subsequent western dependency in most scholars’
explanations. For example, Bilge (1992, p.352) explicates Turkey’s western entente as a
result of Russian territorial demands. He adds, “These demands directed Turkey to the
opposite side even if it was not intended in the beginning at all”. Gurun (1969) claims that
Turkey’s NATO membership would be unimaginable if the Soviet demands had not
existed. In a similar vein, Ulman (1961) states that although Turkey did not enter into the
Second World War, it had to keep its half million strong army mobilised. Because of the
Soviet threat after the end of the war, Turkey could not disband its reserve army and
needed military aid. He claims military needs as the main reason for Turkey’s NATO
membership.

Unlike other writers, Aydın (2000, p.106-107) classifies the reasons for Turkey’s
western dependency as inter-connected domestic and systemic ones. According to him,
two inter-related systemic factors which occurred in the international arena affected
Turkey’s motivation to establish closer relations with the West. One was the change in the
international system which transformed the structure of the system from ‘balance of
power’ to ‘bipolar’. In such a system, the political neutrality pursued by Turkey since the
birth of the republic and during the Second World War would lose its logic and efficiency
for a middle-sized country like Turkey located in a geographically important region. In
other words, Turkey encountered the Russian threat. This forced it to find an ally to ensure
its security against the threat. The other systemic factor was the appearance of Soviet
Russia as a superpower in world politics. This was the reason for amplifying the level of
insecurity perceived by Turkey after the Soviet territorial demand of Turkey. In addition to these systemic parameters, Aydın also states that the triumph of the western democracies against the monarchies and dictatorships in the Second World War and the belief that world politics would be shaped according to the ideas of the western political system seemed to encourage Turkey to change its neutral position. The domestic factors are described by Aydın as political and economic. The change in the Turkish political structure from a one party to a multi-party state, which was believed to be contingently initiated by the alterations in the international system following the Second World War, also played a significant role in shaping the new Turkish foreign policy. Finally, economic needs which mainly stemmed from the need to have a large army during and after the Second World War caused a western inclination in general and in terms of foreign policy.

In all of these explanations, the common factor that caused the western dependency is the Soviet threat. However, there is another debate in the literature around the degree of the threat and the timing of the western support. Many scholars, including Oran (1970, p.71), Aydın (2000, p.108) and Tellal (2002, p.508) claim that the highest level of the Soviet threat to Turkey was in 1945 and 1946. In this period, Turkey had no formal support from the USA and had to resist the threat alone. In spite of the effort of Turkish officials who tried to explain the seriousness of the Soviet threat on all grounds, the USA politicians and bureaucrats tried to appease the Turkish side. The only visible support at the time was the return of the Turkish Ambassador’s body on the battleship Missouri in 1946. However this mainly created a moral effect on the Turkish side. The first concrete American support was the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. In other words, when the USA decided to aid Turkey, the Soviet threat had already passed its peak.
Whatever the reasons, the western dependency of Turkey after the end of the Second World War was a breaking point for Turkey in general and its foreign policy implications in particular. As explained in the second section of this chapter, the general characteristics of sovereignty and independence were the two most important aspects of Turkish foreign policy. Although the new republic during Atatürk's leadership and in the inter-war period had conducted a modernisation programme and adopted a state and societal structure approaching western values, this western tendency in state and society building had never turned into any dependency in terms of the political, military or economic fields. Conversely, during the period mentioned above, the new republic applied development plans for economic improvement based on its own resources. In the foreign policy field, Turkey established pacts and non-aggression agreements with the regional states, especially in the Balkans, and with the Soviets, to ensure its security. This independent nature of Turkish foreign policy had continued without any interruption until 1939, when Turkey concluded the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Great Britain and France. Although the treaty was the first formal example of commitment to the western states, it never caused any dependency. On the contrary, Turkey managed to stay out of the war in spite of the great pressures from the western states.

D) The Baghdad Pact and the CENTO

When NATO was founded on 4 April 1949, Turkey’s efforts to join this defence organisation remained inconclusive, mainly due to the opposition of Britain and the Scandinavian states. Britain, which dominated the whole Middle East during that period, regarded the Middle East as its own sphere of influence and did not want NATO to be
involved in the region. The British intended to form a kind of regional defence organisation in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece, Turkey and some Arabic states. This plan could not be put into practice for various reasons including the USA distant stance on regional pacts, differences in perceptions of threats among the regional actors, and so on. Britain’s effort to form a defence organisation in the region, the Middle East Command, remained unsuccessful in 1951 due to Egypt’s refusal. By 1953, with the presidency of Eisenhower, the USA decided to take the initiative in the Middle East where British control had gradually diminished. The idea of establishing a ‘Northern Tier’, which would circle Soviet Russia, emerged at that time. The Northern Tier consisted of countries which were in the Soviet sphere of threat in the Middle East and the Near East, namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria. According to the USA foreign secretary, John Foster Dulles, Middle East defence should be based on the Northern Tier states (Fırat and Kurkcuoglu, 2002).

In this direction, the first step which led to the formation of the Bagdad Pact was the military assistance agreement signed between Iraq and the USA in 1954. Iraq then concluded the mutual security and defence agreement, the Bagdad Pact, on 24 February 1955. The existing British security agreement with Iraq, where they had two airbases, would expire in 1957. They wanted to continue their influence in Iraq and joined the pact on 4 April. After Pakistan signed the pact in September 1955, Iran was included as a member of the pact. The USA also encouraged the formation of the Bagdad Pact and supported it from the beginning. However, it did not become a member for several reasons. First, the USA did not want to jeopardise collaboration opportunities with the non-member Arab countries, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Second, it avoided provoking Israel, which had deep problems with the Arab world. Finally, the USA did not want to provoke a reaction
from Soviet Russia to the point that it organised defence formations against the Russians (Hale, 2002).

The formation of the Bagdad Pact caused numerous reactions in the Arab world. In many aspects, the pact could not meet expectations. First, member states could not form a military body for mutual defence. Since Turkey was already a member of NATO, it did not have many military resources to dedicate to the pact. Iraq, Iran and Pakistan also lacked possessions and expected military aid from Britain and especially the USA. Second, the pact could not achieve a common stance against communism and the Soviet threat. Moreover, it resulted in polarisation among the Arab nations. Therefore, Iraq, the only Arab member of the pact, was isolated in the Arab world. Third, Israel regarded the pact as being against its interests. Israel’s harsh policies in the region increased the reactions to the pact, which was considered a pro-western organisation by the rest of the Arab world. Consequently, the Bagdad Pact, which was designed to provide regional security in line with the western interest, the USA and Britain in particular, facilitated rapprochement between the Arab countries and Soviet Russia (Fırat and Kurkcuoglu, 2002).

The military coup in Iraq in June 1958 was the beginning of the end for the Bagdad Pact. The new military government, which wanted to follow a foreign policy independent from Britain and the USA, quickly established relations with China, the Soviet Union and neutral countries. The Iraqi government delayed the withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact until March 1959. Iraq, however, no longer attended official meetings. The official withdrawal of Iraq resulted in the end of the Baghdad Pact, after which it was restructured as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) on 21 August 1959 (Goktepe, 1999).

According to Melek and Kurkcuoglu (2002), the Bagdad Pact did not bring a successful conclusion for Turkey for several reasons. The pact could not improve the Arab
states’ relations with the West in general and with Turkey in particular. In addition, Turkey could not become a leader in the Middle East; on the contrary it was blamed for pursuing its Ottoman legacy by carrying the banner for the west. This worsened Turkey’s relations with the Arab World, especially Egypt and Syria. Turkey was also marginalised by the Third World for the same reason. Moreover Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorated, because Israel regarded the Pact as against its interests in the region. Finally, Turkey did not receive as much foreign aid as it had expected from the USA and Britain.

CENTO was planned to reinforce the military and economic potential of its member states, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, against any kind of direct or indirect aggression. After the collapse of the Bagdad Pact, Britain stayed in CENTO as a full member. Although the Americans entirely lost their confidence in the pact, they tried not to leave the region totally to Soviet Russia. In this context, the USA signed mutual agreements with each single member of CENTO. But in general the new situation of the pact was not promising (Goktepe, 1999).

The British Foreign Office summarised the general situation and problems of CENTO in a memorandum of 7 April 1964 (Goktepe, 1999, pp.119-120).

1. The continued existence of CENTO, as a deterrent to Russian expansion and subversion and as a means of maintaining the pro-Western alignment of the regional members, in particular Iran, is an important United Kingdom and Western interest.
2. CENTO remains a weak organization in constant need of moral and material bolstering by the United Kingdom and the United States.
3. CENTO's weakness derives mainly from its dubious credibility as a military organization and from the divergences in aims and policies among its members.
4. The maintenance of the military credibility of CENTO depends to a considerable extent on the United Kingdom commitment of four Canberras quadroons in Cyprus; any weakening of the commitment could be seriously damaging. A subsidiary United Kingdom contribution is the military aid at present applied to providing a radar chain in Iran.
5. The Ministerial Council meetings provide important occasions for strengthening CENTO morale and confidence and it is vital for the United Kingdom and the United States to make the most of them from this point of view.
6. The economic programme is a useful adjunct to the organization's activities, improving its public image and helping to convince the regional members of its value. The United Kingdom contribution is modest but slowly increasing and it is in our interests to encourage and support such an increase.

With regard to Turkey, CENTO was not the only western alliance tie for Turkey; it always gave greater significance to NATO than to CENTO. Turkey's major expectations from CENTO were to restrain the danger of communism which was created by its northern neighbour, Soviet Russia, and also to help to improve its relations with the Middle Eastern Arab countries. In this manner, Turkey desired Egypt, Jordan and Syria to join the pact. However this could not be achieved. The other purpose of Turkey’s CENTO membership was to increase its amount of foreign aid, particularly from the USA and Britain. For the regional countries, CENTO was a kind of institution which facilitated cooperation and collaboration. It lasted for twenty years and came to an end thanks to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 (Goktepe, 1999).

E) The Cyprus Problem and Disappointment with the Western World

Turkey's western dependency in the political, military and economic fields, which mainly stemmed from seeking security against the Soviet threat, also dominated Turkish foreign policy during the first stage of the Cold War. In the first half of the 1960s, another problem, Cyprus, appeared as a tough and long lasting factor in Turkish foreign policy.

After being dominated between 1571 and 1878 by the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus was leased to the UK in exchange for the protection of the Mediterranean against the Russian threat in 1878. With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the British announced that they had annexed the island. The island gained independence from Britain in 1960. The Republic of Cyprus was established after negotiations between Britain, Turkey,
Greece and both sides of Cyprus in Zurich and London in February 1959. The republic was a bi-communal state and equal rights were given to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The presidency was left to the Greeks while the vice-presidency was given to the Turks. However, the Greek leaders in the government did not agree with the current situation which had been provided by the Zurich and London Agreements. By the end of 1963, acts of violence had started between the two communities on the island. The Turkish minority was deprived of its constitutional rights and subjected to majority violence.

Although Turkey took these problems to the NATO and UN several times and negotiated with the USA, it could not manage to find a solution for the problems on the island. Turkey was not satisfied with the NATO and American approaches to the Cyprus Problem. While the acts of violence still went on, in June 1964, the Cypriot parliament decided to establish general conscription for the Greek Cypriot defence forces. The Turkish government decided to intervene in the situation unilaterally and notified its allies. The American response came with the Johnson letter which warned Turkey not to rely on its NATO allies for protection against Soviet aggression that could be caused by a possible Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Moreover, President Johnson added in his letter that Turkey could not use any USA armament for intervention in Cyprus (Bolukbasi, 1993).

The Johnson letter created shock for the Turkish leaders. Moreover, it raised deep suspicions about western commitments to the defence of Turkey in general, and USA support in particular. After the Johnson Letter, which showed Turkey that its national interests were no longer completely identical to those of the USA and other western allies, Turkish politicians started to criticise Turkey’s dependency on the west. This disappointment compelled Turkey to establish closer ties with other blocs such as the Islamic countries, the Third World and even the USSR. Turkey tended to turn its face
towards these alternatives. Oran (2002e, p.657 ff) describes this era - between 1960 and 1980 - as one of relative autonomy for Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkey in general and its foreign policy in particular would continue to be mainly anchored to the West until the end of the Cold War period.

F) Attempts to Integrate with the World after the 1980 Military Coup d'état

Turkey witnessed many social and economic problems causing severe polarisations in the country during the Cold War period, which also affected political and economic life. Beginning in mid-1950, the army increased its weight in foreign and domestic politics. Military interventions into democracy in 1960 and 1971 were followed by another in 1980. Before this intervention, the 1970s saw increasing ideological clashes between the leftist and rightist movements. When the country came to the brink of the civil war, the army held a coup d’état on 12 September 1980. The military junta prepared a constitution which came into force in 1982. In the following year, the country returned to civilian rule, holding a general election.

As with any divergence from democracy, the military coup in Turkey damaged the image of the country in the world in general and in the eyes of the western countries in particular. In this context human, minority and religious rights, which had long been considered as domestic affairs, became significant and problematic factors in Turkey’s foreign relations, especially those with western European states in the 1980s and the following decade. Ironically, while Turkey was being harshly criticised by western countries regarding political issues, the country started to be integrated with the world by implementing radical policies in economic liberalism. By the second half of the 1980s, Turkey, which wanted to strengthen its position in the western world, tried to solve its
political problems with progressing its democracy by aiming for membership of the European Union (EU). However, Turkey’s application for full membership in 1987 was refused by the EU.

G) The Systemic Structure and the State Level Attributes of the Cold War Period

The main difference the Cold War period brought to the international area was the alteration in the nature of the system’s polarity. With the end of the Second World War, the international system started to become bipolar after centuries long multipolarity. This change would alter the character of international politics. Indeed, the world was consisted of two poles now: the USA and the USSR. The USA was the largest economy, which produced more than half of world’s output; also its military competence was unique. On the other side, the Soviet Union, although not a totally industrialised country and rather based on agricultural production, had an immense territory, vast natural resources and a huge land army which defeated the German attacks during the war. In comparison with these two countries, European states were war-torn. They had lost significant human and economic resources and their cities and infrastructures were demolished in the course of the brutal war.

In a bipolar system, the international system is dominated by two major powers which are tough rivals or more precisely adversaries in many respects. These two poles are in a condition of equilibrium in terms of power and overall strength. Actually, the poles in a bipolar system create zones of influence which only two powerful states can cope with (Mearsheimer, 1999). The struggle of two poles for these domains shapes the international order (Ikenberry, 2011).
The bipolar Cold War system emerged from efforts to fill the power vacuum in Europe and Eastern Asia which occurred due to the setbacks to the expanding Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War (Ikenberry, 2011). It ended wartime alliances and created new poles, alliances and zones of influence. This new power balance produced a severe systemic rivalry which included an arms race, ideological, economic and geopolitical competition between the two poles of the USA and the USSR (Osterud, 1992). In terms of balance of power, the Cold War era was totally different from the pre-war international system based on power balances between several great powers which had constituted a multipolar international system.

During the bipolar systemic structure of Cold War period, under the pressure of tight nuclear and conventional military rivalry, the security needs and concerns of states led to the relationships between them. States conducted their foreign policies in comply with the conditions of two opposite alliances, formed as a natural result of the polarised system. Besides the political relationships in world politics, economic and social liaisons also took shape in reference to the notion of cold war, which formed between the extreme edges of the two blocs (Holm and Sorensen, 1995). As a consequence, in an environment of mutual insecurity, foreign policy decisions were generally taken as a reaction to each pole’s political or military move or as a precaution to restrain the rival pole from potential further moves (Osterud, 1992). With the end of the Cold War, the bipolar world would give way to a new international system after more than forty years of dominance.

Although the Cold War years are accepted as unsafe and precarious due to the ideological tension between hostile blocs, the high probability of war and proliferation of destructive weapons, it is also believed that it embraced some stabilising properties. Bipolarity in world politics, nuclear deterrence and strict lines between blocs over Europe
prevented the superpowers from possible war, and this created a kind of stabilisation (Chace, 1992; Bowker, 1997). John Lewis Gaddis (1986) described the Cold War as “the long peace”.

Concerning the ability of the Cold War to maintain a long peace, Mearsheimer (1999) stated that bipolar systems are more peaceful than other patterns. First, the low number of rivals - only two - reduces the number of conflicts. Accordingly, this leaves less room for a possible war between them. Second, because of the equivalence of power between the two poles in the system, in which imbalances in power are quickly fixed and power vacuums are not allowed, deterrence is easier. And finally, deterrence has more influence on each pole given that any miscalculation could cause inevitable damage to a pole’s existence. Indeed, as Osterud (1992) states, competition between the superpowers mostly restrained them from engaging in serious armed conflicts, not only in their own orbits but also in their outer regions of influence.

Regarding Turkey, the change in the international system with the end of the multipolar world also compelled the country to adapt its foreign policy in line with the new conditions of bipolarity. Turkey, which sought to provide security preferably by establishing cooperation and alliances with regional powers, had to conspire with the great powers during and in the wake of the Second World War. By the end of the war, however, the country faced allying itself with one of the superpowers. Forming an alliance with the USA in general and with the western bloc in particular was the way that Turkey chose in order to resist the USSR, its neighbour with which it had had problems and struggles throughout its history.

Associated with its alliance with the western bloc, Turkey provided a secure place in the international area to a certain extent. On the other hand, the country became more
dependent on its allies in the realm of foreign policy. In this regard, Turkey's foreign policy alternatives stayed limited due to the restrictions caused by the nature of the bipolar international system.

In terms of state level attributes, Turkey underwent many changes during the Cold War period. First, Turkey passed into a multiparty system by 1946, after twenty-three years of a one-party system since its foundation. Moreover, relationships among the constituents of the state also differed in comparison with Atatürk's presidency in the inter-war period. Under Atatürk's administration, the entire state machinery was working in tandem owing to his dominance over the state, emanating from his absolute power and vision. Over the course of time, this harmony among state components loosened for various reasons, such as leaders, wars, and economic, social and ideological problems.

After the end of the Second World War, Turkey faced many economic problems. For instance, the amount and price of the raw materials exported by Turkey during the war decreased, causing a considerable loss of income for the country. In addition, in spite of the end of the war, the need for armament continued because of the intensification of the Soviet threat against Turkey. Another reason was industrialisation. Turkey was an agricultural country and lacked fossil fuel sources, except coal, and key industries. Industrialisation, therefore, was seen as a remedy for development by the leaders of Turkey. Nevertheless, the country also lacked the capital and savings to finance development. Foreign debt and international loans were regarded as the solution for the economic growth of Turkey (Sander, 2006, pp.92-93). The increasing burden of the debt over time and failure of the development programmes for domestic and international reasons would cause severe economic and social troubles in the following decades.
In terms of the relationships between the main foreign policy-makers, a divergence between the government and the army started to be seen at the end of the Atatürk period in 1938. Reflections of different ideological approaches in the politics of the multiparty system from 1946 also caused disputes among the institutions of the republic. The coups d’états staged by the army in 1960, 1971 and 1980 fed the divergence between the government and the army at every turn. The army improved the legal basis of its intervention into domestic and foreign politics by issuing the constitution of 1961, alterations to the constitution in 1971 and 1973, and the constitution of 1982.

**VI Conclusion**

This chapter covering Turkish foreign policy from the foundation of the Republic in 1923 to the end of the Cold War is an introductory chapter to prepare the reader by offering an insight into the core of the research project: Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period and for the main research question: What are the external and internal (domestic) factors shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War?

In this chapter:

* a general framework of Turkish Foreign Policy from 1923 to 1990 has been drawn up

* the main characteristics, determinants, and principles of Turkish foreign policy have been given

* the major debates on Turkish foreign policy have been reflected upon.

In addition, for the purpose of providing a background to the three-level analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era presented in Chapters 3 and 4, in this
chapter, while a historical background of Turkish foreign policy is given in the core
narrative, the main shifts in the international system and alterations at the unit level and
their repercussions on foreign policy issues are deduced for four separate periods: the first
years of the republic, the inter-war period, the Second World War and finally the Cold War
era.

The Turkish Republic, which was the successor to the Ottoman Empire, determined its
foreign policy principles to be sovereignty and independence. Although the new state
conducted a modernisation process mainly based on western values in the political, social
and economic fields, it pursued an independent and non-aligned foreign policy during the
inter-war period. Turkey ensured its security against increasing threats in the lead-up to the
Second World War by establishing regional alliances.

In spite of forming treaties with the great powers on the brink of the Second World
War and strong pressure from these powers in the direction of entering the war, Turkey
managed to stay out of the conflict and preserve its neutrality.

However, the end of the Second World War brought about many changes in the
international arena. The multipolar system of the pre-war era gave way to a bipolar system.
The end of the war witnessed the rise of two superpowers, the USA and the USSR. Faced
with the Soviet threat, which was based on territorial demands, in the new international
system Turkey was compelled to find an ally capable of protecting the country against the
Soviet threat.

The western alliance, which started with the Truman Doctrine, continued with the
Marshall Plan and eventually led to NATO membership, provided security for Turkey.
However, this alliance transformed into Turkish dependence in the fields of politics,
economics and the military over the course of time. Turkey followed a western-dependent
foreign policy. In comparison with its earlier stance – for instance non-alignment during the inter-war period and neutrality during the Second World War – this western dependency meant a shift for Turkey. Naturally, this created a debate among scholars.

During the 1960s, Turkey experienced another deviation in its foreign policy, exemplified by disappointment with the Cyprus Problem. However, Turkey in general and its foreign policy in particular would continue to be mainly anchored to the West until the end of the Cold War period.

In terms of international systemic conditions, the multipolar system in which more than two states struggle for domination of the international field existed until the end of the Second World War. In this order, the world is divided into sub-regions where each region is possibly controlled by a powerful state which constitutes one of the poles in the system. After the Second World War the system transformed into a bipolar one dominated by two major powers. In this bipolar order, the two poles create zones of influence throughout the world.

The influence of systemic factors in shaping Turkish foreign policy is significant. During the inter-war period, Turkey, a new actor in the international arena after replacing its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, established its security policies by forming regional alliances in its sub-regions, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Black Sea. Towards the time of the Second World War, as aggression in international politics intensified due to the revisionist states, Germany and Italy, being full of discontent with the order formed after the First World War, Turkey needed to set up alliances with the other great powers, France and the United Kingdom. During the Second World War, Turkey stayed in alliance with these great powers; however, it managed to remain uninvolved in the war in spite of strong pressure from its allies. When the Second World War ended and the international system
started to transform into a bipolar one, Turkey had to adapt its foreign policy in line with the new conditions of the system. In this regard, Turkey joined the western alliance led by the USA. In this way, Turkey ensured its survival and security in the international realm, at the expense of becoming more dependent on its allies in the realm of foreign policy. Naturally, Turkey’s options in foreign policy remained limited because of the constraints created by the essence of the bipolar order.

After this outline of the characteristics of the international system and its influences on Turkish foreign policy throughout the four periods, it is also important to summarise the alterations in the features of the government and the army as the main foreign policy-makers and the relationship between them, as this paves the way for the unit (state) level analysis in the following chapters. During the early years of the republic, the administrative system was a parliamentary democracy based on a one-party regime. The president was at the top of the state administration, with broad authority, followed by the prime minister and his cabinet.

During Ataturk’s presidency, the state machinery performed well until his death in 1938, owing to his vision and absolute dominance of the state institutions, including the historically powerful army. After Ataturk, deviations started gradually to appear between the domestic policy-makers, the government and the army. During the following period, the extraordinary conditions of the Second World War, economic problems and divergent ideologies caused more rifts among the key actors at the state level. Democracy was suspended three times by military coups d’état, in 1960, 1971 and 1980. After each intervention, the army gained a stronger position in the legal field because of the new constitutions and constitutional alterations made after the coups. The struggle between
these two actors would create additional problems, especially after the end of the Cold War period.
CHAPTER 3 THE FIRST PERIOD: 1990-2002

I Introduction

This thesis, seeking the answer to its core research question: What are the external and internal (domestic) factors shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War? consists of five main chapters. In the analysis, the post-Cold War era is divided into two periods. The first period spans 1990 to 2002, whereas the second covers 2002 to 2010. This, the third chapter, will cover the first period of this research, 1990 to 2002. The rationale behind this division is as follows:

* The first period starts in 1990, which is more or less accepted as the end of the Cold War period and the beginning of the post-Cold War era. The 1990s are also widely accepted as a period in which domestic political stability was relatively weak because of frequent general elections and several coalition governments coming to power in Turkey.

* The second period starts in 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government came into power with a strong majority. This brought to a close the period (1990-2002) during which Turkey was governed by twelve different governments, most of which were weak and fragile coalitions.

The hypothesis of the thesis is that Turkish foreign policy can be explained by the relative significance of external (systemic) factors and internal (domestic) effects in each period of the post-Cold War era. In the first period (1990-2002), systemic factors appear to be more influential on Turkish foreign policy, whereas (governmental) agency remains relatively weak. This is mostly because politically weak governments were incapable of
reacting to the initial effects of the post-Cold War era. In terms of power sharing and the power struggle in domestic politics between the government and the army, the vacuum created by weak governments in the foreign policy-making process was filled by the army, which approached foreign policy issues strictly from a security perspective.

The chapter includes five main sections. The introductory part will begin by explaining the core argument of this thesis and how this chapter will fit into the aims of the current study. In the second section, entitled “The World: The End of the Cold War and Its Effects on the International System” the international system during the post-Cold War period will be examined in detail. The sub-sections on the end of the Cold War and its implications for the international system, and that on the post-Cold War world will be dedicated to structural changes in the system; its influences on the world stage will be subject to analytical enquiry within the scope of a new unipolar world. Lastly, the effects on Turkey of the alterations in the world politics will be briefly stated preparatory to the forthcoming main analysis sections of this chapter.

In the third section, the focus will shift towards Turkey. Before moving onto a detailed empirical assessment in the following sections, major foreign policy cases in the post-Cold War era will be briefly specified.

The fourth section will be dedicated to examining the period in question in detail with reference to issues in Turkish foreign policy. The analysis will be conducted in three sections. first, the effects of systemic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War on Turkish foreign policy will be discussed, making reference to empirical cases.

The second, state level, analysis will predominantly focus on agency, which is conceptualised by determining the government and the army as the main domestic agential
factors in foreign policy-making. Ethnic and interest groups and media will be incorporated into the analysis as complementary agential factors when required.

Individual level is the third and last section. At this level of analysis, individual influence will be integrated into the foreign policy behaviour of Turkey. In this context, the leaders and key actors who held offices in the given period will be assessed.

Lastly, in the concluding section, the main findings of this chapter will be briefly presented.

II The World: The End of the Cold War and Its Effects on the International System

A) The End of the Cold War and its Implications for International System

There is a common debate on when, why and how the Cold War ended. In terms of the timing, George H.W. Bush stated the unification of Germany on 22 November 1990 as the end of the Cold War. James Baker, the Secretary of State between 1989 and 1992, considered the USA and USSR’s joint reaction and condemnation of Iraq due to its annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 as the end of the Cold War. Some argue that the dissolution of the USSR on 25 December 1991 denotes the end of the period.

Beside the dispute about its start and end times, the reasons for the end of the Cold War have also raised debate. Reasons put forward range from Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ policy, which came into practice with glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), and President Reagan’s determined policies against the Communist countries (Shultz, 1993; Kissinger, 1995) to a relative decline in both superpowers.
In the time span from 1989 to 1991, the most historic events that the world has seen since the end of World War II in 1945 took place. The series of events that paved the way for the end of the Cold War period, such as the end of Soviet control in Central and Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the break-up of the Warsaw pact and the dissolution of the USSR, can be stated as the main cornerstones of this process.

Whatever the dominant reasons for the end of the Cold War, most mainstream scholars as well as politicians affirm that the Cold War ended with a decisive victory for Western capitalism (Fukuyama, 1989; Halliday, 1993; Kissinger, 1995). According to Fukuyama, in his much disputed work, The End of History? (1989), the period closed with the triumph of capitalism and liberal democratic order, which are trademarks of western civilisation. He went further and claimed that this victory is perpetual and irreversible. Therefore, he states, the history which had long witnessed the struggle between the civilisations ended with the universalisation of western liberal democracy.

Although it is a common argument that the momentum of the dissolution of the USSR and the collapse of the communist bloc played a significant role in the end of the Cold War, any connection of this to the absolute victory of capitalism or to the end of history are rather exaggerated statements. It is more appropriate to consider the end of the Cold War in detail by analysing the effects of the end of this period and its implications.

B) The Post-Cold War World

It is significant to note that the fall of the Cold War system happened over a short time period. Contrary to fears and expectations, the system broke down without causing either interstate war or bloodshed. The East-West confrontation slowed down with the end of the Cold War. The rivalry in the Third World between the USA and the Soviet Union lessened
to a certain degree. The two superpowers agreed to make a significant reduction in the nuclear weapons that they owned. Moreover, the two former rivals, even adversaries, worked in cooperation during the first Gulf War in the Middle East.

The end of the Cold War system introduced significant changes to the international system. First of all, it altered the relationship between the superpowers by suppressing inter-state conflict and nuclear confrontation. Secondly, it marked the end of communist regimes with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. Thirdly, the world map was altered by the conclusion of the communist alliance structure (Halliday, 1993). The breakdown of the USSR resulted in new independent states in Europe and Asia. The end of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe also indirectly allowed for the creation of new states in Eastern Europe (i.e. states arose out of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia). Finally, a wave of liberal values, such as democracy and open market rules in economy, gained momentum in their spread throughout the world.

The retreat of the communist threat in Europe not only lent impetus to the enlargement of the European Union, but also paved the way for relative resilience in the old western alliance (Dockrill, 2005). The European Union, led mainly by a Franco-German partnership, had a louder voice in world politics in comparison with the Cold War’s bipolar order.

During the Cold War era, interstate problems and potential instabilities had been covered in a geopolitical cloud. Under the conditions of the Cold War, any conflict might be transformed into a reason for which the two superpowers could get into a massive war. This environment restrained many regional disputes from deteriorating or even emerging. As Gaddis (1992) states, the superpowers’ crisis management ability created a system
through which regional crises were appeased within the structure of international or inter-bloc stability requirements. This mechanism was based on the presence of two effective superpowers. However, in the post-Cold War period, the USSR was no longer a pole of the bipolar world.

Although the sources of instability in the world remained more or less the same, such as nationalism, ethnic and religious motives, economic disputes and inequalities, in the post-Cold War period, the end of the Cold War system made it more difficult to contain regional disputes throughout the world. The post-Cold War world, therefore, saw the emergence of previously ignored disputes, e.g., Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, East Timor and, Sierra Leone, which turned into conflicts after the disappearance of the bipolar system.

In terms of its systemic consequences, the end of the Cold War was trailed by a change in the structure of international relations. The bipolar world system was over (Grunberg and Risse-Kappen, 1992). Four decades of behavioural habits in foreign policies had to change in the face of these radical changes in international system and the ensuing shifts in the foreign policies of major powers (Rosati et al., 1994).

After the end of the Cold War, different ideas were proposed about what was to replace the bipolar system. While some scholars (Holm and Sorensen, 1995) hesitate as to where the international system will go, multipolarity or unipolarity, Mearsheimer (1992) claims that the bipolar system ended and a multipolar system occurred as a new international order. According to him, the USSR lost its pole position of the Cold War period but was still a major European power along with Germany, France, Britain and perhaps Italy. The other major powers were China, India and Japan. He includes the USA
as a great power in this multipolar world because of its ability to affect Europe and Asia at the same time. On the other hand, Ikenberry (2011), states that with the end of the Cold War, the international system transformed into a unipolar character which was led by the USA, rather than a multipolar one. According to him, the USA’s unipolar position did not appear suddenly. It was a natural conclusion of the USA’s existence as a leading state since the beginning of the twentieth century.

Indeed, the USA had emerged as a great power on the world scene by the end of the nineteenth century. In spite of a period of voluntary isolation from intervening in international problems between the two World Wars, it pioneered world politics after the Second World War. Hunter (1992) emphasises the importance of this historical process by stating that the USA supremacy was not just a result of the end of the Cold War. It has represented the most powerful nation of the world since the First World War, and is also geographically well located in comparison with the other major powers. The USA has dominated a large proportion of economic, military and technological aspects at an international scale to a larger extent then the other major powers. With the end of the Cold War, throughout which the Americans had led the western alliance, the USA became the leading power by far for the rest of the world.

The structure of unipolarity differs from bipolarity in terms of systemic features. While two more or less equivalent powers dominate international politics in the bipolar system, in unipolar system, a sole state which has far more capabilities in power than the other main actors in the international arena shapes the world system. Moreover, unlike bipolarity, there is only one pole in a unipolar system. That pole is the state itself which reigns over global politics. In this sense, according to Ikenberry (2011), the international system is unipolar and the USA is the sole pole. He reaches this conclusion on the grounds
that the USA has incommensurable material capabilities. In addition to this, it is also a provider of liberal structures, like a hub with which other states need to function in a liberal world system.

In fact, a unipolar world in the centre of which stood the USA, appeared after the end of the Cold War. The bipolar system of the Cold War period was replaced with a unipolar one. This would change power relationships between the pole and the periphery. In the same direction, alliance patterns and power balances would alter in the post-Cold War era. Variations in the parameters of international system would affect security issues. As Holm and Sorensen (1995) stated, in the relatively insecure world of the new period, security concerns at the regional level would become prominent.

C) The Changing International System and Turkey

Turkey was regarded as valuable ally by the western bloc in the characteristic conditions of the Cold War period. Mearsheimer (1999) states that in bipolar systems, small powers tend to act in concert with major powers, especially in highly strategic regions. Accordingly, Turkey, a middle power not only situated in the middle of geostrategic regions such as the Middle East, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the East Mediterranean and Eastern Europe but also possessing a border with the USSR, had opted to form an alliance with the western bloc since its foundation in 1923. Because of its geographic proximity to the USSR, it was given a stronghold role in the southern flank of NATO. As a small power, because of the power balances of the period, Turkey enjoyed the tutelage of its Western allies, especially while its historic enemy, Russia, was standing over its immediate border making threats and claiming Turkish territories. In addition to its
relative military and economic weakness, the bipolar systemic structure of the Cold War World did not give wide room for independent manoeuvre to Turkey in the domain of foreign policy.

The end of the Cold war affected Turkey in many respects. In terms of systemic effects, the disappearance of the bipolar world forced Turkey to adapt its Cold War policies and strategies to the new international conditions. With the dissolution of the USSR, initially Turkey seemed to lose its strategic position in the eyes of its western allies, which meant a great deal to the country. The post-Cold War era would force Turkey to switch its foreign policy from a passive and dependent nature to a relatively active and more independent style. In the first decade of the new era, Turkey would have many opportunities in its region as well as in the world to realise this transformation in the domain of foreign policy.

### III Turkey: Major Foreign Policy Events of the Period

After the end of the Cold War, Turkey faced the systemic shock waves created by the changes in the international systemic structure. Especially in this first period (1990-2002) of Turkish foreign policy under examination in this chapter, systemic changes generated strong pressures which compelled Turkey to adapt its foreign policy into the new systemic configuration of the post-Cold War era while the country was struggling with domestic political problems that occurred around coalition governments. In this section, the chief events in Turkish foreign policy will be given before an analysis of the period on three different levels: systemic, state and individual.
The disintegration of the USSR and the collapse of the communist bloc caused significant changes to the international system. The balance of power significantly altered and the international system evolved from a bipolar world to a unipolar one. The new system forced most states to harmonise their foreign policies with the new conditions. Changes at the international level resulted in major consequences in world politics as well as regional foreign policy. While the changes were taking place in the international system, new actors entered world politics. States had to adapt themselves to new conditions. Turkey, one of the middle-size regional states, experienced the pressure of these changes in the balance of power (Bacık et al., 2004). This also presented new opportunities for Turkey to increase its influence, especially at the regional level (Aybet, 2006). The changing international context compelled Turkey to alter its foreign policy. For instance, Turkey, strictly devoted to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s famous motto, “peace at home, peace in the world”, participated in the Allied coalition against Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 1990. This move aimed to reassert the country’s strategic importance, which was claimed to have diminished after the collapse of the communist bloc. In the early 1990s, Turkey launched an ambitious policy towards the new independent Turkic republics of Central Asia in order to expand its sphere of influence in foreign policy (Sayarı, 2000; Emerson and Tocci, 2004). One of Turkey’s most important attempts in the post-Cold War era has been to concentrate on integration with the European Union (EU).

The breakdown of the USSR and the fall of the communist bloc greatly changed Turkey’s foreign policy outlook. Because of the independence declarations of some Soviet republics, Turkey no longer had a border with Russia; accordingly, the Soviet threat to Turkey weakened (Hale, 2002; Oran, 2003). Likewise, the collapse of the USSR had the
impact on Turkey that some problematic neighbours such as Iran, Syria and Iraq were deprived of a traditional ally (Uslu, 2006).

By the end of the Cold War period, Turkey’s geostrategic importance had diminished for the western bloc. One may also argue that Turkey has become a key country alongside the new centres of world politics - the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean. With the first Gulf War in 1991, it was widely accepted that Turkey has much greater geostrategic value than in the Cold War period (Larrabee et al., 2003; Robins, 2003; Özkeçeci-Tuner, 2005; Uslu, 2006). In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has transformed its peripheral role in world politics into a central position, especially in terms of current or possible conflicts in its region (Robins, 2003; Davutoğlu, 2008).

Changes in the international system, i.e., from a bipolar world to a unipolar one, forced Turkey to modify its status quo orientated foreign policy. The end of the Cold War period, emergence of new states and tilting of the balance of power unveiled many problems which had been frozen during the Cold War and destabilised the regions around Turkey; the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. These drastically transformed Turkish foreign policy by urging it to develop its position while bringing about new threats and disputes (Sayarı, 2000; Bağcı et al., 2004; Uslu, 2006).

The decline of the Soviet effect in the Balkans and the dissolution of Yugoslavia changed Turkey’s policy in this region. The newly independent states were recognised and closer relations were established by Turkey with Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and later Bosnia and Croatia (Kut, 2000; Bağcı et al., 2004; Larrabee et al., 2003). Greece became an exception with which Turkey has had many problems, such as the Aegean problems (demilitarisation of the islands, extension of territorial waters,
delimitation of the continental shelf, flight Information Region/FIR and disputed islets) and Cyprus.

Although great pressure on the Turkish governments emanated from public opinion, especially from strong domestic groups which were formed by people who had historical affinities with the Balkans, Turkey, at times accused of having a hidden agenda related to its neo-Ottomanist strategy about the Balkans, avoided unilateral action and attempts in the region (Türkeş, 2004; Larrabee et al., 2003). On the contrary, Turkey made a significant effort to stabilise the region which suffered from ethnic problems such as those in Bosnia since 1991 and in Kosovo starting from the mid-1990s, in line with its western allies such as the USA and the EU under the umbrella of NATO and UN operations (Hale, 2002; Sayarı, 2000; Türkeş, 2004). Turkey acted in parallel with NATO and participated in the solution to the Bosnia and Kosovo crises by sending its troops to the regions.

In particular, during the conflicts and wars in the Balkans, Turkey was successful in influencing international organisations, (the UN and the NATO) and the USA over Balkan policy. This can be explained by two main factors. First, Turkish foreign policy objectives seemed compatible with USA policy objectives with regard to the Balkan conflict. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy enjoyed great support from the USA, as the USA was sceptical about the possibility of Russian involvement in the region. Second, at the domestic level, almost all political actors in the decision-making procedure of Turkish foreign policy had reached consensus on Turkish involvement in the Balkan conflicts. This consensus can to a large extent be explained by cultural, political, economic and social factors.
Regarding the policies towards the Middle East, Turkey’s low profile policy on the region started to alter with the Gulf War in 1990. Turkey presented a tough position against Saddam Hussein’s regime together with the international community. Turkey’s interest in the region increased after the Gulf War. The Gulf War created a power vacuum in Northern Iraq which was to the benefit of the Kurdish separatist movement (PKK). This caused serious security concerns for Turkey, mostly relating to Kurdish separatism, which was labelled as expansion (Sayari, 2000; Larrabee et al., 2003). With Russia’s influence declining in the region, Turkey conducted a more independent foreign policy in the Middle East. Beside launching several incursions into Iraq against PKK and demanding that Syria stopped supporting the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, Turkey established a partnership with Israel, signed energy agreements with Iran, and tried to solve regional problems in Lebanon and Palestine as a mediator.

As briefly given above, the period from the end of the Cold War in 1990 until 2002 was witnessed by many as a breaking point for Turkish foreign policy. The changes in the international system and alterations in the relative weight of institutions and actors in politics and economics, for instance, the increasing effect of the military in the foreign policy-making process through the National Security Council (an advisory body consisting of presidents, high-ranking generals and select members of the council of ministers), the influence of the growing economy and economic organisations on foreign policy issues and the rising role of media to affect public opinion on foreign policy can be stated as considerable factors involved in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.
**IV Analysis of the Period with Regard to Turkish Foreign Policy Issues**

**A) Systemic Level**

There is an on-going debate among scholars and International Relations theorists regarding the extent to which state behaviour is shaped by the international system. Neorealists see a strong linkage between the conditions of the international system and states' foreign policy behaviour. To them, states determine their foreign policy acts according to constraints imposed by the international system which is regulated by power relationships among the units within it. The connection between the system and states' foreign policy decisions is linked by rational actors who are supposed to behave in the direction of incentives and limits created by the external environment, where the rules of anarchy are prevalent and states pursue their survival (Keohane, 1984, p.167). States which have no power to control the nature of this system, therefore, have to take into account the result of their objectives in foreign policy (Waltz, 1979, p.90-91). Otherwise they are punished by the systemic structure for not acting up to external constraints.

In fact, it would not be reasonable to claim that states are implicitly compelled to play only the roles assigned to them by the international system or that the international structure does not exert any influence on the foreign policies of states. Despite numerous different approaches ranging from Neorealist determinism to agency and identity-based Constructivism, it is widely acknowledged that the international structure engenders inducements and limits, to a certain extent, for states’ foreign policies.

Moreover analysing the systemic level allows the researcher to examine international relations in a larger perspective. This increases the level of comprehensiveness, which may
not be possible at a lower level of analysis. A system level analysis also enables the researcher to make generalisations according to the findings of the research. On the other hand, the systemic perspective risks injecting a strict determinism into the analysis by reducing a state’s conduct of its foreign policy to a challenge between policy-makers and the system which was previously established by entrenched boundaries. In this analytical approach, which fundamentally neglects the domestic political variables, the foreign policy goals of a state are predominantly examined through the extent to which constraints exerted by the system are internalised by the state. Put differently, it gives analytical superiority to the systemic factors while neglecting the domestic and individual factors.

From the lenses of two rival branch of Neorealism, Offensive and Defensive, with the end of the Cold War, the actual distribution of power in the international system changed. The systemic waves incentives and constraints on states. Turkey, as a middle size power in its region, had its share from these changes. The international system, by creating pressures, pushed Turkey to maintain its security in the new environment where Turkey was surrounded many problems in its vicinity. Turkey, as having limited military and economic power and necessary resources, far away from being a great power or even a regional hegemon since the Ottoman Empire of 18th century, had no change to maximize its power by showing aggression as Offensive Neorealists assert. To sustain its security in anarchical international environment of the post-Cold War era, Turkey had to pursue policies to increase its security as Defensive Neorealists argue.

In this direction, Turkey opted for pursuing defensive policies to maintain its security. Firstly the conflicts aroused around its immediate borders and neighbour regions were treated as positive attitude in order to find solutions. For the problems which Turkey could not afford to solve by itself such as Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts in the Balkans and the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, many efforts were showed before international organizations; the UN, NATO and the EU.

Secondly Turkey tried to strengthen its position in existing alliance in NATO. By doing so, it pursued policies in line with NATO's expansion policies and made a lot of efforts to incorporate its neighbours into the Assemble. In addition to this, Turkey sought for new alliances. The rapprochement towards Turkic Republics of Central Asia and leading to formation of The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) were significant examples of these efforts. The most important projects of Turkey in this way was its bid for the EU membership.

Lastly Turkey conducted an economic policy to increase its ties especially with neighbour states in order to create a higher interdependency for the sake of maintaining its security.

In this section, I will examine Turkish foreign policy in the period 1990-2002 in terms of systemic effects as well as the constraints and possibilities created by the international structure. In this way, the changes in the international system occurring with the end of the Cold War will be the first focus of the analysis. Second, the impact of these changes on Turkish foreign policy will be examined by putting the spotlight on significant foreign policy issues of the period.

The hypothesis regarding to this period is that the systemic factors came to be more dominant in shaping Turkish foreign policy, while agency at the unit level remained relatively weak. The politically fragile coalition governments were not capable of responding effectively to the strong initial effects of the changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, in domestic politics, the government and the army entered into a power struggle. As a result, the vacuum created by weak
governments in politics in general and in the foreign policy-making process in particular was filled by the army.

The Cold War system provided a kind of balance and maintained stability to a certain extent in the bipolar world. In terms of Turkish foreign policy, the prevalence of the Cold War was a primary element from the second half of the 1940s until the middle of the 1980s. Because of security concerns, mostly created by its threatening neighbour, the USSR, Turkish policy-makers were inclined to integrate with the western bloc. This epoch allowed Turkish politicians to conduct a stable and static foreign policy which was resistant to domestic political constraints (Özkeçeci-Taner, 2005). The structure of the Cold War, consisting of Turkey’s geostrategic value as a western outpost as opposed to the communist world, its NATO membership and Atlantic alliance, contributed to the steady atmosphere in the bipolar world.

With the end of the Cold War, however, the delicate balance provided by the Cold War conditions started to vanish. As a consequence, the relative stability which was primarily established in the last decades of the Cold War declined. This rendered the world more risky and unstable and generated many regional conflicts which were previously appeased within the Cold War system. The static and moderately stable structure of the Cold War was replaced by a new systemic environment in which outbreaks of regional conflicts and ethnic disputes frequently occurred. This new system displayed a kind of shaky ground where the formation of new alliances could easily be modified according to the newly arising problems (Gönlübol, 1996).

Because of the increase in the number of sub-systems and the degree of interaction between systems and sub-systems with the effects of globalisation, analysing the system by
drawing on traditional political, strategic, military and economic views became almost impossible. The contemporary international system turned into a complex structure in which hierarchical and multicentred foreign policy behaviours intertwined with power relations (Sönmezoğlu, 2004). Moreover, while breaking points in international politics were mostly based on the ideology of the Cold War period, new fault lines along geopolitics, geo-economic and geo-cultural features emerged throughout the world (Kekevi, 2004).

At this point, while Sönmezoğlu mentions the rise of sub-systems in world politics, explanations based on regionalisation should be considered because of the importance of regions increasing at the end of the Cold War. After the transformation to a unipolar order, regional disputes could not be escalated to the global level any more (Lake, 1997). This pressure, stemming from the change in the system at the end of the Cold War, necessitated states to give weight to regional security issues. States in many regions throughout the world thus started to invest in regional security arrangements in order to cope with the challenges created by security regionalisation. From the perspective of the unipole, regional security corporations help to maintain regional stability with lower costs (Press-Barnathan, 2005).

From Turkey’s perspective, the end of the Cold War brought numerous challenges, changes and opportunities. It can be argued that Turkey appeared as one of the countries most affected by the systemic changes in world politics in this period. While maintaining a relatively stable ground in the bipolar world, Turkey had to experience a process in which it switched from passivity to activism in terms of foreign policy by the beginning of the post-Cold War era (Sander, 1994; Aydin, 2003). During the first stage, the replacement of the USSR with Russia removed the borderline between Turkey and Russia. Turkey became
coterminal with the newly independent former USSR republics, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. While Russia was struggling to cope with its internal problems, this partly soothed the sense of the communist USSR threat on Turkey, which had been subject to the risk of Russian invasion during the Cold War. Secondly, Turkey emerged from the Cold War as a relatively stronger state. This did not emanate from improvements in the country, however. Turkey became surrounded by relatively weak neighbours in this particular period (Oran, 2003). In the East, Turkey was bordered by Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, which replaced the USSR. In the south, Syria and Iraq were deprived of their significant USSR support. In the north, Ukraine superseded the USSR on the opposite shore of the Black Sea. In Bulgaria, lying in the northwest, Jivkov’s communist regime ceased to exist. The changes that occurred after the end of the Cold War set Turkey as one of the strongest states of a vast region covering the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Balkans and the East Mediterranean.

However, the end of the bipolar system and the collapse of the communist bloc posed challenges for Turkey as well. During the Cold War, Turkey enjoyed high geostrategic importance from the perspective of the western bloc. This position allowed Turkey to become an indispensable member of the western club. Thanks to its location, Turkey, the outpost of the western bloc and the stronghold of NATO’s southern flank, secured itself a place in the western bloc and provided its security against a historical architecture-enemy, Russia, (the USSR in the Cold War) in a manner which it would otherwise never be able to cope with on its own. As mentioned above, the end of the bipolar system and the collapse of the communist bloc diminished the geostrategic importance of Turkey for its western allies. This came as a shock for Turkey, whose foreign policy was based predominantly on the East-West confrontation of the Cold War conditions. Since Turkey lost had its most
important ammunition in its foreign policy, it was prevented from conducting its balanced policy which had been in place since the decline of the Ottoman Empire; a period where the bipolar system collapsed and the western bloc declared its political, ideological and economic triumph (Oran, 2003). In the new systemic structure, Turkey was stuck between the new political and ethnic fault lines created by the systemic changes in the East/West as well as the North/South axis (Kekevi, 1994). The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict (1988-1994) between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the eastern border of Turkey, ethnic conflicts in the Balkans in the West, the conflict and war with Russia in Chechnya in the north of Turkey and also Kurdish-Arab clashes in Iraq in the South can be cited as examples of this threatening environment.

With the end of the Cold War, significant changes occurred not only at the global scale but also in the regions which surrounded Turkey. The map of the Caucasus was entirely redrawn. The region which had been under Soviet sovereignty came to be represented by three new independent states. The same was true for Central Asia. Former USSR territory came to be dominated by new sovereign states to which Turkey felt kindred and held historical and cultural ties. Just after their declarations of independence from the USSR, Turkey was among the first countries to recognise their independence.

The Balkan Peninsula was among the regions most affected by the end of the Cold war. The loss of the USSR’s dominance in the Balkans caused the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which had embraced different races and religions. These events drifted the region into a state of chaos, ethnic conflict, massacres and power struggles until the onset of the new millennium. The declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovakia in 1991 coupled with aggressive nationalism by the Serbs triggered an armed conflict among the former Yugoslavian peoples. While Muslim Bosnians became the victims of massacres in
the heart of Europe from 1992, the member states of the European Union were caught up in a power struggle. Germany, the driving force of the union, regarded the liberation of Croatia and Slovakia as an opportunity to increase its influence in Eastern Europe. France and the United Kingdom, which were concerned about Germany’s inspiration, backed Serbia (Oran, 2003). This stalemate caused the prolongation of the Bosnian massacre for several years. In the end, the USA intervention in 1995 proved necessary to cease the conflict in the Balkans.

As for the Middle East, the collapse of the USSR created a huge power vacuum in the region. Syria and Palestine lost their long-term protector. Iran and Iraq were exposed to the ‘dual containment’ policy of the USA (Indyk et al., 1994) and Israel came to the fore as a relatively stronger state in the Middle East. While Syria could not resist the USA peace plan in the Middle East, Israel gained power and ground at the expense of Palestine. The absence of communist support for Palestine brought about the weakening of the Marxist character of the independence movement and paved the way for the increase of power of Islamist radicals.

The post-Cold War period provided a basis for an unbalanced relationship between Turkey and the European Union. Turkey’s application for full membership in 1987 was refused by the EU. The end of the Cold War ceased the East-West confrontation and reassured Europe’s security concerns. The dissolution of the communist bloc eliminated the immediate communist threat for Western European countries. Moreover, in Central and Eastern Europe, the remnants of former communist countries were willing to integrate with Western Europe. Under these circumstances, the relative importance of Turkey, which had lost its geostrategic position in European security, naturally diminished in comparison with
the former communist states which had the potential to form a wide buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe.

Turkey had been confused about how to conduct its foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. Turkey’s main ally, the USA, seemed not to be eager to back Turkey as it traditionally had during the Cold War. Moreover, its Western European allies no longer regarded Turkey as an essential partner for their security. For Turkey, however, integration with the European Union became a primary foreign policy goal. This decision was based on political and economic reasons. Turkey sought for solidarity in the international area for the reasons explained above. In the economic sense, Turkey had experienced tough conditions since the mid-1980s. Furthermore, Greece, its main rival, had been accepted into the EU in 1981. For political and security reasons, Turkey felt the need to be on the same side as Greece, as it did in NATO.

This inconsistent stance caused an unbalanced relationship between Turkey and the EU in the post-Cold War era. Contradictions in the expectations of both sides finally converged in 1995 when Turkey was accepted into Customs Union with the European Union, the first time that a non-member state became party to the Customs Union in the history of the Union. This decision, which would cause significant deficits in the country’s balance of trade in the following years, was regarded as a future entry ticket to the Union. In 1997, at the EU summit in Luxembourg, the union declared firmly that customs union did not promise instant full membership for Turkey. The refusal in 1997 left Turkey disappointed in its full membership ambition. At the Helsinki summit two years later, surprisingly, the EU which did not want to derail Turkey from the Union’s axis, accepted it as a candidate.
Since the late 1980s, events had indicated that Turkey was no longer accepted as a strategic ally by the western bloc. Turkey’s application for full membership in 1987 was refused by the European Union in 1989. Turkey’s proposal to form a free trade zone with the USA was not regarded favourably by the American administration. In addition, the USA declared that it would close some military bases and decrease the number of its military staff in Turkey. Although at first glance, the end of the Cold War showed that Turkey’s geostrategic importance decreased for the western allies, Turkey did not have to wait long to change this perception. The Gulf Crisis, which started with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, and later the First Gulf War in 1991, showed that Turkey was still a key country for the interests of the West (Larrabee et al., 2003; Uslu, 2006). During the Gulf crisis, the USA demanded Ankara’s help on three fronts. The first was its consent to use the USA military bases in Turkey. The second was to mass Turkish troops along the Iraqi border vis-à-vis Saddam Hussein’s troops in the North. The last was to send troops to the Allied forces in Saudi Arabia. The first two demands were satisfied, whereas the last in spite of Turkish President Turgut Özal’s great efforts, could not be met (Uzgel, 2001). The opposition of the bureaucracy and the chief of military staff dominated the will of the Turkish prime minister. This internal political crisis cost two ministers and the chief of general staff, who all resigned over dissidence with Prime Minister Özal in 1990.

The first Gulf War suggested that Turkey was a still a significant player in its region. However, President Özal’s ‘strategic partnership’ bid in his visit to Washington just after the Gulf War in March 1991 was refused. At the end of 1991, the international system witnessed even more radical events: the dissolution of the USSR and emergence of new independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The USA needed Turkey as an ally to become more influential in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. The vacuum
that was created by the dissolution of the USSR was filled by the USA and its allies in a way that protected American and western interests. A possible return of Russian domination would cause damaging effects to American interests. Thus, President Öztal’s strategic partnership suggestion in 1991, previously refused by the USA, was proposed by the USA itself under the title ‘enhanced partnership’ during Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel’s visit to Washington in February 1992. The USA stated that Turkey was a reliable partner and a model for the newly independent Caucasian and Central Eastern republics. Richard Holbrooke, the Deputy Secretary of State in charge of European Affairs, stated that Turkey became a front running country in the post-Cold War era and that Turkey was involved in most issues, political, military, economic and energy related, regarding NATO, the Balkans, Cyprus, the Aegean, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Moreover, some authors claimed that Turkey had much more geostrategic value than it used to have in the Cold War period (Larrabee et al., 2003; Robins, 2003; Uslu, 2006). In the same vein, strategist Zibigniev Brzezinski (1997) described Turkey as a geopolitical axis which functioned to provide stability in the Black Sea region, controlling the passage to the Mediterranean, balancing Russia in the Caucasus, working as an antidote against Islamic radicalism and supporting NATO in the southern flank. This ‘enhanced partnership’ between the USA and Turkey continued and even deepened during the 1990s independent of the frequently changing Turkish coalition governments.

The relationship between the USA and Turkey in the post-Cold War era can be described as one between a hegemon or a preeminent superpower and a regional power (Oran, 2003). A regional power like Turkey had to take the superpower’s policies into consideration while conducting its foreign policy. This proved an essential factor for a regional power whose resources and influence were limited in comparison with those of
the superpower and emanated from its lesser capability to affect the international system. The stable hierarchy in the system used to suffice for Turkey to construct its political, economic and security parameters in a mostly static way. Security issues were solved within NATO, while economic activities were conducted mainly with the European Economic Community. These main parameters orientated Turkish foreign policy decision-makers to implement mainly short-term, rarely medium-term, strategic plans within the frameworks previously drawn by the superpowers, instead of forming longer-term, independent policies. In the event of divergence with the superpowers on regional politics, the regional power ran the risk of being punished by the system. For Turkey, the USA embargo after the former’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974 presents an example. The end of the bipolar world which created radical changes in the international system, however, resulted in difficulties in defining the international sphere and power relations. The atmosphere of uncertainty which emerged in parallel to the new international system created opportunities for states which were seeking for advantage to thrive in the international hierarchy (Davutoğlu, 2002). Turkey’s active position in regional politics in the early post-Cold War period can be accounted for from this point of view to a certain extent.

The external (systemic) factors affected Turkish Foreign Policy in the following ways:

Through the instrumentality of the changes in the structure of world order and balance of power: As explained in detail above, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar world brought about drastic changes in the international system. Polarity in the world order shifted, and the balance of power altered. Accordingly, relations between poles and peripheries changed and regional security issues gained importance. Changes in systemic components accordingly created pressures in foreign policy issues. All of these
can be stated as key systemic reasons for changes in Turkish foreign policy in the period 1990-2002 and gradually influenced Turkey and its foreign policy.

First, Turkey, a winger on NATO’s southern flank and strongly tied to its allies in the wake of initiatives during the Cold War era, had more room for manoeuvre in its foreign relations. This affected Turkey’s foreign policy in two ways. Initially, it had a negative character because of the end of the Cold War, which left Turkey in an environment where border disputes, ethnic conflicts and related social and economic problems which had been mostly frozen under the bipolar conditions re-emerged by the early 1990s. Indeed, just after the end of the Cold War, Turkey experienced the Gulf Crisis with its immediate neighbour, Iraq, in 1990. In the following year, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia was gaining a violent character. In the Balkans, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, ethnic problems came to the fore and violence erupted. This problematic geography forced Turkey to chance its traditional static foreign policy in order to defend the country and pursue its interests. Changes in the balance of power in the world system, notably the demolition of the communist bloc, created opportunities for Turkey as well. On the positive side, thanks to the new independent states in the Caucasus, Turkey no longer held a border with Russia. The power vacuum produced by the dissolution of the USSR allowed Turkey to use more initiative and conduct more active foreign policies in the region. In this direction, the newly independent former USSR republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, with which Turkey had kinship, historical, cultural and religious connections, enabled Turkey to establish rapidly developing relations which would have never been possible in the Cold War period. Furthermore, the disappearance of Soviet support to Iraq and Syria left Turkey in a better position to deal with its mutual problems with these two countries. Similarly, in the Balkans, relations with Bulgaria and Romania,
once they were deprived of USSR backing, would be easier to conduct for Turkey. Turkey’s stance in the Gulf Crisis and activism in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans were an indication that it had changed its traditional approach of non-involvement in foreign policy. With the Iraq issue and the Gulf Crisis, Turkey also altered its old policy of staying unbiased in inter-Arab disputes.

The second way in which the new power relations in the world system obliged Turkish decision-makers to change its foreign policy was the decline in the strategic value of Turkey due to new power balances of the new era. In this context, Turkey, which had gained a strong role from its geographical proximity to the USSR and related important position in western defence plans, seemed to lose its geostrategic value with the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the softening of the East-West confrontation. However, the Gulf Crisis and ensuing developments showed the USA that Turkey still held a strategic location in a region full of conflicts and disputes.

From the viewpoint of the EU, nevertheless, the situation was different. For Western European countries, Turkey was no longer on the whitelist and it had lost its strong ally position which was valid and necessary for the western bloc during the Cold War, to the advantage of Central and East European countries which had been recently freed from communism. These countries, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Baltic Republics were henceforth deemed as natural components of Europe in historical, social and cultural terms. Priority on the path towards membership of the union was given to these countries instead of Turkey, which had been on the waiting list since the Ankara Agreement in 1964.
Lastly, and in relation to the second reason explained above, Turkey, which had particularly lost its strategic position in the eyes of its European allies, could not define a proper position for itself among the newly building security architecture in Europe, despite its long-term western alliance and NATO membership. Turkey, which existed in an environment where mutual, multilateral disputes and conflicts emerged after the end of the Cold War, therefore felt the need to give more weight to security issues in its foreign policy. Even this reason itself had an important impact which obliged Turkey to pursue a more active foreign policy in comparison with the Cold War period.

By virtue of its integration into global economy: The starting point of Turkish economic liberalisation came through the decisions taken on 24 January 1980 by the Demirel government. With this structural stabilisation programme, the Turkish economy, which had long suffered from a deficit in the balance of payments, high inflation rates, budget deficits and a foreign debt problem, was intended to be stabilised by liberalising and reorganising the fundamentals of the economy (Müftüler-Baç, 1995). These precautions meant that strong state protection of the economy and import substituting industrialisation, which had continued for nearly fifty years, was abandoned. Some authors claim that the liberalisation of the Turkish economy had started to change the conditions of the Cold War environment for Turkey (Aydın, 2003; Laçiner, 2010). However, one can argue that it equally changed the nature of Turkish foreign policy, at least initially.

It can be argued that 24 January 1980 decisions denoted the beginning of a long process in which Turkey was opening up into the global economy. The economic liberalisation initiated by the 24 January decisions was accepted as an important factor in integrating the country into the global economy (Özkeçeci-Taner, 2005). More importantly, this liberalisation attempt turned economic considerations into a significant
aspect of foreign policy-making in Turkey. Particularly with the return to democracy in 1983, the new Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who was previously under secretary of the prime ministry and the bureaucrat behind these decisions, considered foreign policy from an economic perspective. During his six years in the office of Prime Minister and four years of presidency until his death in April 1993, his foreign policy approach was based on the premise that Turkey should promote economic cooperation in the region and increase interdependency with regional states in order to decrease the risk of confrontation with them (Laçiner, 2010). Thus during the Özal period, Turkey held an unbiased position toward the war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988, maintained equidistant political relations and more importantly continued an increasing trade with both countries.

Although it can be stated that economic considerations turned out to be more decisive in forming Turkish foreign policy since the mid-1980s, the economy itself alone cannot be regarded as an independent component in foreign policy-making in Turkey. The first Gulf War, therefore, showed that there were more important considerations for Turkish foreign policy decision-makers than economic reflections. Just after the end of the Cold War, in 1990, a crisis erupted with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein regime. Despite its strong trade relations and economic interest with Iraq, and the cost of huge financial losses, Turkey sided with the international community and obeyed strict UN embargo rules against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Indeed, the UN embargo on Iraq ended Turkish exports into this country. It also affected Turkey’s trade with other countries in the region because of problems with the transportation of goods. Moreover, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, the main energy route of the time, which satisfied the need for crude oil and income generation for Turkey remained ineffective. According to some calculations, the Gulf War cost Turkey around $50 billion (Dedeoğlu, 2011).
In brief, economic factors had started to be taken into consideration in conducting Turkish foreign policy issues, especially from the 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, economic reflections became an important component of foreign relations. The higher the degree to which Turkey integrated with the global economy, the more the decision-makers had to take financial issues into account in foreign policy-making. As the level of economic development in the country increased through time, industrialists and businessmen had more say in the government’s foreign policy. The role of economic establishments such as financial foundations and business associations were also becoming more influential in domestic politics. (The effects of economic organisations will be examined in the section entitled Other Factors below). For this period of research (1990-2002), however, it can be argued that the economy was still less instrumental in Turkish foreign policy-making when compared with security, defence and political issues.

To the question as to whether Turkey could resist the systemic pressures instead of changing its foreign policies during the period at issue, as one of Turkey’s leading scholars in International relations and Foreign Policy Analysis (Sönmezoğlu, 2011) states that “Turkey was a middle-size power with relatively weak domestic authority. It had nearly no ability to change international system. For this reason, relationship between Turkey and international structure was unilateral. The changes observed in Turkish Foreign Policy in the first decade of post-Cold War, therefore, could mostly be associated with external factors”.

B) State Level

As explained in the first chapter, the state level was described as second level by Singer (1961) in his work on levels of analysis. The nation state, accepted as the main actor
in International Relations by Neorealism is the focus of this level. Analysis at the state level presents significant advantages to the researcher and encourages a detailed examination of actors in a specific case. This is a feature that would otherwise not be provided by research at the systemic level. Study at this level requires further analysis of goals, aims, and motivations in the foreign policy-making of the state in question.

In the internal (domestic) environment of a decision-maker, the important factor appears as achieving short and long-term aims which are supposed to be determined by national interests. The geography, demography, economy, culture, tradition, military and political system of the state can be cited among the factors which can influence the choices of decision-makers when they are producing policies for the state they represent. Since state actions are profoundly political in nature, members of government and those in decision-making positions are restrained by both external systemic factors and internal political conditions when constructing the foreign policies of the state. Mainstream International Relations approaches criticise Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) for failing to explain unanticipated foreign policy choices in particular, because of its tendency towards actor-specific views (Özkeçeci-Taner, 2005). On the contrary, the domestic political perspectives of FPA differ from those of mainstream International Relations theories, which accept the nation state as a monolithic actor, in that they emphasise units and actors (Hudson and Vore, 1995).

A state’s foreign policy is naturally affected by what happens within the state. The domestic environment imposes opportunities as well as constraints on decision-makers. There is complex interplay between foreign and domestic environments. Various forces, social, economic, political and historical, set the framework of a domestic environment. In this context, domestic factors affect foreign policy decisions, while domestic politics are,
in turn, influenced by external dynamics. Domestic sources of foreign policy are numerous. Foreign policy is shaped under the influence of transnational and domestic values, thoughts, advantages and challenges.

In terms of foreign policy analysis, it can be argued that the foreign policy behaviour of states can be understood by focusing on interplays in two main milieus: first, by looking at the interaction of a state’s external position with its domestic environment; and second, by examining the relationship between the foreign policy issue at hand and the decision-making process used to address this issue. The influence of domestic factors on foreign policy has been examined by many researchers using FPA methods. They have primarily focused on discernible domestic political structures like the regime type and political institutionalisation of the country under examination (Özkeçeci-Taner, 2005).

The hypothesis regarding this period is that the (governmental) agency remains relatively weak although systemic factors are more influential in shaping Turkish foreign policy for the same time period. This is mostly because the scores of governments, nearly all of which were coalitions, constituted a weak and fragile governmental agency through this period (1990-2002), as will be analysed in detail below. Correspondingly, this would cause a vacuum in domestic politics which would be filled later by the army. The power struggle in domestic politics between the government and the army would, in turn, be a factor weakening governmental agency, while it would give more power to the army in Turkey. This lack of coherence between institutions within the state would negatively affect the capability of agencies to respond to the systemic pressure created by the changes in the international realm.

In the case of Turkey, the internal political structure and political institutions played a significant role in shaping the domestic context as well as constructing the country’s
foreign policy. The emergence of ethnic Kurdish nationalism and the affiliated separatist movement, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and rising political Islam, as new fault lines, deeply influenced the Turkish political system in the 1990s. The struggle, clashes and confrontations emanating from these fault lines can be stated as key factors in understanding the foreign policy of the period in Turkey.

At this level of analysis, the state (unit) level constitutes the focus of the study. The government and the army, determined as key agencies in foreign policy-making, will be examined through reference to the instruments of foreign policy analysis. In the domestic context, the role and effects of components such as public opinion, interest groups and the media will also be included in the analysis as complementary factors when necessary. The relationship between the government and the army will feature as another reference point in order to understand the effects of this power struggle on foreign policy decision-making in the Turkish case.

**The Structural Codes of the Turkish Domestic Political System**

Before embarking on the analysis of the key actors, i.e. the government and the army, it will be useful to explain the characteristics of the Turkish domestic political system. Providing an outlook on the political structure, ideas and thoughts which dominated the period will enable the reader to better contextualise the analysis of Turkish foreign policy-making.

As already discussed in the second chapter, the Ottoman Empire (1299-1918), Turkey’s predecessor, had a military character and its foreign policy was driven by offensive military motivations, especially in the formation and enlargement periods (Aydin, 1999). With the collapse of the empire at the end of the First World War, Turkey,
as a nation state, was born out of the ashes of the empire. Although the new republic was very dissimilar to its antecedent, Turkey inherited some of the fundamental features of the Ottoman Empire which shaped the Turkish modernisation project and foreign policy. Since Turkey retained most of the Ottoman Empire’s ruling elite that had dominated the empire in its last decade, the new Turkish state was able to establish an experienced bureaucratic class. An educated official class, most of who had been instructed based on western standards and occasionally from the military establishment emerged. Afterwards, the core of Turkey's modernising elite, under Atatürk's leadership and within a single party authoritarian rule, was formed by this elite group of administrators (Aydın, 1999; Uzgel, 2002). These elites, coming from the Ottoman past and military tradition, yet equipped with western values, thrived with the help of Atatürk’s revolutionary principles which shaped the new republic and would later be named Kemalism. Kemalism consists of six main principles: republicanism, secularism, statism, revolutionism (reformism), populism and nationalism, which directly affected policy-making and governance in Turkey from its foundation (Ataöv, 1986).

Robins (2005) claims that Turkish foreign policy-making is strongly influenced by two types of actor: the state elite and the governing elite. The state elite, he argues, who are embodied in the military and the bureaucracy, mostly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consist of Kemalists who are strictly tied to secularism and the indivisible national unity of the Turkish Republic. These state elites consider themselves the self-appointed guardians of Kemalism. The governing elite, on the other hand, consists of various segments of society and represents certain ideologies varying from the adaptation of Kemalist ideology to different degrees to nationalism and Islamism. Robins adds that the foreign policy field was dominated by the state elite at the expense of the governing elite. Indeed, the group
named the state elite by Robins and their role in the modernisation of the Turkish republic in general and foreign policy in particular are generally acknowledged by most scholars, in spite of different denominations (Keyman, 2008; Aydn, 1994; Efegil, 2012). For instance, Ahmad (1993) called them the Kemalist elite. Regarding Kemalism’s role in foreign policy-making, Aydn (1994) denotes ideology as one of three factors; the others were structural and cyclical. He mentioned the significant influence of the Kemalist elite on Turkish foreign policy-making.

This ‘elite competition’, to draw on Robins (1997), affected Turkish politics in general and foreign policy-making in particular in the post-Cold War period. Reflections of this struggle can be seen in various degrees throughout this era. Details of this rivalry over the outlook of domestic politics will be given below.

1. Government

As explained in detail in the first chapter, states perform both in an internal (domestic) environment which consists of institutions, organisations, citizens, etc. in a specific territory, and in an external (international/structural) environment formed by states, international institutions and organisations. States interact with domestic and international environments in the pursuance of their functions. Therefore these two environments must be taken into account when regarding how foreign policy is made, which is one of the major responsibilities of a government, along with security, economy, defence, justice and education. Governments, are regarded as the key foreign policy-makers, consist of various bodies and institutions. Ministries, councils, undersecretaries and general directorships share and execute the main responsibilities and duties of a government. Foreign policy-making comes under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a government.
In Turkey, political life witnessed turbulent times as eleven different governments, seven of them coalitions, were formed by seven prime ministers between 1990 and 2002. In the same period, fourteen ministers of foreign affairs were post. In order to analyse the impact of internal politics on foreign policy decisions, the governments of the period will be examined along with important domestic and foreign policy events of the time period from 1990 to 2002.

**Coalitions in Politics and Foreign Policy Issues**

Coalition governments have attracted the special attention of scholars of politics and International Relations. Due to their nature, these types of governments are seen as examples of consensus or clash of ideas among coalition partners, especially in foreign policy. Foreign policy-making is a long and complex process. Hagan (1993) claims that the authority and actors involved in foreign policy-making procedures should obtain consensus on issues when a foreign policy decision necessitates the allocation of national resources. In a coalition government, each party needs the other to continue the existence of the coalition. This situation also enables the members of a coalition to bargain on foreign policy issues through the threat of withdrawing from the government (Hermann et al., 1989). In coalition politics, Hagan (1993) adds, domestic politics and its repercussions are also influential in shaping the foreign policy decisions of the members of coalitions. However, scholars cannot agree on how and which political and institutional restraints of coalitions have impacts on foreign policy (Karboo, 2008). The partition of position of any partner, or “precise distribution of power” in Hagan’s (1993) words in a coalition government, such as number of ministries and related state institutions which are controlled by the partners, are accepted as a basic factor in determining policy-making. Harmony and ability to reach an agreement, especially in the case of strong opposition...
among partners, are also seen as significant factors in keeping the coalition fully functioning. Size matters in coalition governments! However, Karboo (1993) states that junior partners can influence policy decisions in spite of holding relatively less power in a coalition. She highlights that the senior party must be in a kind of consensus with the junior one in the coalition. In fact a kind of accord, a ‘coherence’ with a proper notion, is needed not only within the coalition partners but also between the government and other institutions which constitute the state machinery ensemble.

The Reign of the Coalitions in Turkey

One of the most typical characteristics of this first period (1990-2002) was that it was predominantly dominated by coalition governments. The first and the only majority government of the period was the Motherland Party (MP) that came to power before the end of the Cold War in 1989. The Motherland Party (MP) was changed by the coalition government formed by the True Path Party (TPP) and the Republican People Party (RPP) in November 1991. This was the starting point of the coalition period in Turkish politics for the period covered by this research. In other words, during twelve years, a majority government only ruled at the beginning of the period for less than two years. Drawing on Robins’ (2005) arguments regarding the nature of coalition politics in Turkey, their typical characteristics are ideological and factionist attitudes along with clashes among personalities and disruptions created by these problems.

Table 1 shows the governments, parties, prime ministers and general elections of 1990-2002.
### Table 1. Governments, parties, prime ministers and general elections in power during 1990-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic Government Number</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Type of Government</th>
<th>Party/Parties in Power</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th</td>
<td>25.06.1993</td>
<td>05.10.1995</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Tansu Çiller (TPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. True Path Party (TPP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Social Democrat Populist Party (SDPP) (until February 1995)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Republican Peoples Party (RPP) (from February 1995)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st</td>
<td>05.10.1995</td>
<td>30.10.1995</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Tansu Çiller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>True Path Party (TPP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52nd</td>
<td>30.10.1995</td>
<td>06.03.1996</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Tansu Çiller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. True Path Party (TPP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Republican Peoples Party (RPP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53rd</td>
<td>06.03.1996</td>
<td>28.06.1996</td>
<td>Coalition (Minority)</td>
<td>Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz (MP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Motherland Party (MP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. True Path Party (TPP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th</td>
<td>28.06.1996</td>
<td>30.06.1997</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Necmettin Erbakan (WP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Welfare Party (WP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. True Path Party (TPP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Post Modern Coup d’état
The governments shown in Table 1 and their domestic and foreign policies are examined below.

47th and 48th Governments (Motherland Party (MP))

These majority governments were based on the 46th government formed by Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party following the general elections in November 1987. The Motherland Party, which embodied the four political wings, conservatives, liberals, social democrats and nationalists, took 36.3% of the total votes, yet obtained 292 seats in the parliament (65%) because of the high election threshold and unfair election regime (Alkan,
Özal was elected as President in November 1989, taking over the presidency from Kenan Evren, who was the leader of the military coup in 1980 and completed his seven years in this post: Yıldırım Akbulut was appointed as Prime Minister to replace him. According to the constitution, during his presidency, Özal had to break all official connection with his Motherland Party. He, however, continued his authority over the party and hence the government. This created tensions between President Özal, the cabinet and opponents in the Motherland Party (Hale, 1992). Turgut Özal, a charismatic leader with a unifying character in Turkish politics, kept his position as the preeminent actor of Turkish foreign policy-making both in his office of prime minister and later in his presidency (Doğan, 2008).

The rule of the Motherland Party (46th-48th Governments) coincided with the Gulf Crisis and the demolition of the USSR. The Gulf Crisis started with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 and evolved into the First Gulf War in 1991, which exposed these governments to severe pressures in both domestic and international politics. At the beginning of the crisis, the government and the security establishment strove to maintain Turkey’s traditional non-involvement policy vis-à-vis inter-Arab disputes. At this juncture, Turkey announced that it would continue its oil trade with Iraq via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline in the wake of the National Security Council meeting on 3 August (Hale, 1992). As crisis deepened because of Saddam Hussein’s tough stance in refusing to halt the invasion of Kuwait, Turkey had to side with the western allies. The implementation of the UN resolutions cost Turkey a very heavy financial burden stemming from the interruption of trade with Iraq and with other Middle Eastern countries whose transportation routes passed through Iraq.
President Özal wished to get more involved in the Gulf crisis, by sending troops together with the coalition allies to Iraq. He was severely criticised by his opponents in his former party in power as well as the opposition parties in Parliament, the True Path Party and the Social Democrat Populist Party, and the media. In accordance with Turkey’s constitutional provisions, sending troops abroad (which equals a declaration of war) and allowing the USA to use Incirlik military airbase for offensive operations required a parliamentary resolution. Özal was accused of being adventurist and putting the country in jeopardy. After lengthy and heated discussions in Parliament, the government bill containing the right to declare war, sending troops abroad and allowing foreign troops to be settled on Turkish soil was pruned and passed without declaration of war in September 1990. The government had the necessary authorisation to send troops to Iraq. However, as it would later turn out, there was significant opposition to President Özal’s plans on Iraq (Hale, 1992). The following months deepened the struggle between Özal and his opponents. In October, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer resigned. To make things worse, at the beginning of December the Chief of General Staff General Necip Torumtay also stepped down. Following these two events, the domestic political crisis regarding the Iraqi conflict came to a head.

At the state level analysis, the coherence between institutions in foreign policy-making is an important factor and requires the accommodation of opinions between the president, the ruling party, the army and public opinion. In this case, divergence between President Özal and the rest of the actors in foreign policy-making, as well as public opinion, restrained him from actively engaging in the war against Iraq. In other words, the domestic political pressure coming from the parliament, bureaucracy and public opinion obliged the key foreign policy decision-makers to revise their policies.
Akbulut’s mission ended with the electoral defeat of the presidency of the Motherland Party at the party congress held in June 1991. Akbulut, who had long been criticised harshly for being President Özal’s puppet and enabling him to intervene in government policies, lost against Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz in the Motherland Party congress and stepped down from the office of prime minister.

The 48th government, presided over by Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, was aware of the end of the bipolar world and started to feel the discomfort and uncertainties emanating from the unbalancing waves of transition in world politics. In the government programme, it was highlighted that Turkey was not only a European country but also a country of the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Balkans and Middle East. Because of Turkey’s position, an active and multidimensional foreign policy was foreseen (The Official Gazette of Turkey, 06 July 1991, No: 20921, pp.5-7). However, because of the rifts in the party and disputes with president Özal, the Motherland Party, under Yılmaz’s short-lived prime ministry, could not conduct a proper and plausible foreign policy vis-à-vis the global conditions in transition.

After coming to prime ministry in June 1991, Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz called for a general parliamentary election in the autumn. His aim was to renew the support of his electorate. However, in the elections, his party lost their majority and became the major opposition party.

49th Government (True Path Party (TPP) and Social Democrat Populist Party (SDPP))

The first coalition government since Turkey’s return to democracy in 1983, following the coup d’état of 1980, was formed by the centre-right True Path Party and the centre-left
Social Democrat Populist Party under the prime ministry of TPP’s Süleyman Demirel on 20 November 1991. The transfer of power from his Motherland Party to the coalition under the leadership of his former colleague and current arch-rival Süleyman Demirel’s True Path Party limited President Özal’s control over foreign policy. This would soon translate into disputes and clashes of ideas on decision-making in critical issues.

The rule of this coalition coincided with discussions about foreign policy which became inflamed, and traditional Turkish foreign policy was questioned. For most of society, Turkish foreign policy issues were largely accepted in the past and it was acknowledged that Turkey approached them with a sense of responsibility and caution. However, Turkish foreign policy was henceforth criticised for being submissive and undecided (Hale, 1992). This discussion about the foreign policy attitude of the country emanated from some significant events. First, the Cold War had ended and the power balances in the world and the region were reshuffled. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey found itself in the middle of an insecure and unbalanced geography which posed the country both problems and opportunities. Secondly, for the first time in a long period, Turkey was governed by leaders who were open to change and believed that Turkey must alter its status quo-orientated foreign policies, not only to maintain its security and welfare and meet the necessities of the new world, but also to benefit from the opportunities presented by the post-Cold War world. In this regard, discussions about the foreign policies that Turkey should pursue concentrated mostly around the terms passive-active, careful-unhesitant, static-dynamic and responsible-adventurist foreign policy.

It can be argued that both President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel were in favour of an active foreign policy in comparison with the traditional approach. The problem, however, was the extent to which they were keen on the change. President Özal, compared
with Demirel, had always been more radical about an active foreign policy. His performance in the Gulf crisis during his prime ministry was the most important indication of this attitude. Prime Minister Demirel, on the other hand, in spite of his inclination to alter Turkish foreign policy, was relatively more static and responsible. The discussion about Turkish foreign policy and the difference in the ideas of the leaders in foreign policy-making reverberated with the new foreign policy events of the period.

Regarding the harmony in foreign policy issues between the coalition partners, it can be stated that the True Path Party and the Social Democrat Populist Party worked mostly in tune with each other. In spite of their ideological differences, as a coalition of centre-right and centre-left, the harmony between two parties was surprising (Özkeçeci-Taner, 2005).

One of the significant foreign policy issues of this coalition was the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. After the dissolution of the USSR, in the Caucasus, both Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independence. Turkey recognized Azerbaijan a month before recognizing other former Soviet republics. The dispute which originated in 1988 between Azerbaijan and Armenia turned into a real war just a couple of months after their independence in 1991. During the war, which lasted more than two years, Armenians, militarily supplied by the Soviets, invaded the Nagorno-Karabakh region, equal to 20% of the total Azerbaijan territory, where a predominantly Azeri population had been living.

Turkey had long advocated respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the states as its traditional foreign policy approach, and became the only country to support Azerbaijan, whereas the USA was inclined to side with Armenia and Russia did not hesitate to directly give its backing to Armenia (Uslu, 2003; Cornell, 1998). As the war
continued and Armenians committed mass killings against the civil Azeri population, huge demonstrations were organised in Turkey to protest against the Armenians.

The key point in this case for the decision-makers was the divergence between President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel’s approaches. Özal was in favour of a pro-Azeri policy. Prime Minister Demirel, however, was more cautious. Özal, who blamed Russia for supporting Armenia, stated that Armenians should be threatened with the limited military involvement of Turkey, whereas Demirel believed that any Turkish military intervention in the conflict would lack a legal basis (Cornell, 1998). The deterioration of the Azeri position in the war and the growing public pressure encouraged President Özal to make signals of intervention. He declared that Turkey would improve its military ties with Azerbaijan and send weapons. Immediately afterwards, Turkey was warned not to become involved in the conflict by the defence minister of Russia in an undiplomatic way.

In this case, while Turkey wanted to amass support for Azerbaijan, including military backing, assisted by the president, some parties in opposition and the wider public opinion, it had to restrain its ambitions because of the Russian threat, which was described by Turkish Chief of General Staff, General Doğan Güreş, in June 1994 as “posing a greater threat to Turkey than it used to during the Cold War” (Başlamış, 1994) and the incumbent Prime Minister’s cautious policy. This case demonstrated that domestic politics, including the stance of the president, parliamentary support and strong public pressure, could not be enough to influence the government to take decisions regarding the military involvement of Turkey in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. Prime Minister Demirel, in order to disperse the negative image of the government after its non-alignment in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, especially in Turkish public opinion, and justify his policy decision, made the case
that “a Turkish intervention on Azerbaijan's side would only result in putting the whole world behind Armenia” (Batur, 1993).

Çiller’s Premiership (50th, 51st and 52nd Governments)

After President Özal’s sudden death in April 1993, Prime Minister Demirel was elected as president on 16 May 1993. Demirel appointed Tansu Çiller, Professor of Economics at Bosporus University in Istanbul, as prime minister from among numerous veteran candidates from the True Path Party. This appointment was deemed inappropriate on the grounds that Mrs Çiller had neither experience nor success in politics and foreign policy. Moreover, she differed with Demirel on economic and foreign policy issues over the course of time. She believed in a more open economy, in spite of its risk of creating dependence, and did not have Demirel’s cautious attitude to foreign policy (Doğan, 2008).

The first Çiller Government, the 50th government of the Turkish republic, was formed in June 1993 as a coalition with the Social Democrat Populist Party. Vice Prime Minister and Leader of the Social Democrat Populist Party, Erdal İnönü, seceded from these missions. Murat Karayalçın, former mayor of Ankara, was elected as the party leader and took over the office of vice prime minister.

The new government had more awareness of the changing world system after the end of the Cold War. Hence, the government programme included the challenges which appeared in the post-Cold War era. It was stated that a multi-dimensional foreign policy should be pursued in order to cope with the emerging perils of the post-Cold War world (The Official Journal of Turkey, 06 July 1993, No: 21629, pp.5-8.) The government programme also included remarks regarding relations with the European Community (EC). Conclusion of Customs Union with the EC was a target and defined as a significant stage
in the relationship. The Customs Union with the EC, signed in March 1995, came into force by 1996 and was later declared as a victory by the Çiller government.

The Social Democrat Populist Party merged with the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) in February 1995. Consequently, the coalition government turned into a TPP-RPP partnership. At the RPP congress, Deniz Baykal was elected as the leader of the party and took over the vice prime ministry from Murat Karayalçın in September 1995. Çiller and Baykal failed to agree on some policies, mostly economic ones. These disagreements resulted in Çiller’s resignation and ended the 50th government. Çiller founded the 51st government in October 1995. This was a minority government and was short-lived, since it failed to receive a vote of confidence in the parliament.

The 52nd government was established as a coalition between the TPP and the RPP again in October 1995. This was a provisional government which would take the country to general election on 24 December 1995. A coalition protocol was not even signed between the partners.

During the three governments founded by Çiller between June 1993 and October 1995, Turkey suffered from severe economic problems. Hyperinflation rate, high public sector debts and a growing deficit of the balance of payments caused one of the most severe economic crises in Turkey in January 1994. An economic austerity package announced in April could not be successful in solving the problems (Heper, 2008). On the other hand, Kurdish separatism, headed by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), became more violent during these years. Turkey’s Kurdish problem had already internationalised by the beginning of the 1990s. Especially after the Gulf Crisis and the international
intervention in the Kurdish region in northern Iraq, this area, isolated by international forces and away from Saddam Hussein’s control, created a safe haven for the PKK.

The significant issue in the foreign policy bureaucracy during Çiller governments was the rapid changes in the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the 50th and 52nd governments, approximately over two and half years, six different ministers were in charge of foreign affairs. When compared with the period from 1980 to 1991 when six Ministers of Foreign Affairs served, this circulation damaged the foreign relations of the country and made it difficult to conduct a stable and efficient foreign policy. On the other hand, a fiasco in economic policies, escalation in Kurdish separatist violence and failure of the governments to deal with this threat encouraged Çiller to adopt a more nationalist stance. Moreover, she left the army greater room for manoeuvre, implicitly delegating some of civil government’s rights to the military (Sakallıoğlu, 1996).

Indeed during her office, the civilian control of the army, which was not too strong historically, lessened to certain extent. By allowing the army more autonomy and using an increasing nationalist discourse, Çiller tried to gain more public support, which she had already lost owing to the economic and security problems mentioned above. This situation, however, would pave the way for the military’s increasing role in domestic and foreign policy issues, in conjunction with the weakening foreign policy decision-making establishment caused by the fast circulation of ministers of foreign affairs as a consequence of fragile coalition governments.

53rd Government (Motherland Party (MP) and True Path Party (TPP))

The parliamentary election held in December 1995 did not allow any party to come to power on its own. Çiller’s True Path Party lost votes and came out of the elections as the
third party after Motherland Party. More importantly, an Islamist party, the Welfare Party (WP) of Necmettin Erbakan won the 21.4% of the votes and gained the electoral victory.

After Erbakan's efforts to form a coalition government had failed, President Demirel, however, charged Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, of the Motherland Party with forming the 53rd government. Yılmaz created a minority government in coalition with Çiller’s True Path Party in March 1996. Bülent Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DLP) would support the government outside of the coalition. The government, formed by two rival centre-right parties, set full membership to the European Union (EU) as a target in the coalition protocol (The Common Protocol between MP and TPP, 1996, p.10). As to the government programme, with the concern about founding a provisional Kurdish state in northern Iraq, it was stated that Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity should be preserved (The Official Journal of Turkey, 13 March 1996, No: 22579, pp.17-18).

Lack of confidence arising from a long and abrasive political rivalry between the coalition’s centre-right parties complicated the governance. After public recriminations between Yılmaz and Çiller on corruption and political abuses, the 53rd government was discharged after the withdrawal of Çiller from the coalition and the resignation of Prime Minister Yılmaz in June 1996.

54th Government (Welfare Party (WP) and True Path Party (TPP))

After the failure of Yılmaz-Çiller coalition government, President Demirel charged Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party with forming a new government. Erbakan and Çiller, of the True Path Party, agreed and formed the 54th government on 28 June 1996. The rise to power of the Welfare Party, a pro-Islamist party, as principal partner of the government, was the first of its kind in the Republic’s history. This overheated the struggle
between the state elite and the governing elite, as Robins (2005) describes. In order to provide a fuller picture, it will be useful to explain Erbakan and Islamist politics in Turkey.

**Erbakan in Turkish Politics**

The Islamist tradition has not been a long one in Turkish party politics. The first Islamic party, the National Order Party (NOP) was founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970. The NOP, which advocated the protection of rights and interest of local entrepreneurs and merchants, had also a strict stance towards the West and its commercial culture. The party described the westernisation process, which was the main project of the Turkish Republic since its foundation, as disloyal to national and religious principles, and purportedly aimed to construct an Islamic identity without violating the state’s principle of secularism (Dağı, 2008). The party defended private enterprise under the control of the state. The supporters of the party were conservative provincial traders, artisans and farmers. The NOP was closed down after the military coup in 1971. The party was functionally replaced by the National Salvation Party (NSP), founded by the same team in 1972 (Tuğal, 2007; Özbudun, 2006; Dağı, 2008). The NSP gained 11.8% of votes in the parliamentary elections in 1973. Although the party was not able to pass the 12% electoral threshold, it played an important role during 1973 and 1980 when the coalitions seemed inevitable. Necmettin Erbakan, the party leader, served as vice prime minister in some coalition governments in this period. With the coup d’état in 1980, the NSP, like the other political parties, was closed and the leaders were banned by the military from undertaking political activity.

After three years’ break under military rule, it was reincarnated in Turkish political life as the Welfare Party (WP) in 1983 under the leadership of Recai Kutan, while Erbakan’s
political ban after the coup in 1980 was still in effect. Since political prohibitions were removed in the referendum in 1987, Erbakan returned to active politics and was elected the leader of the Welfare Party.

**The Dilemmas of the 54th Government**

The WP and TPP coalition was an inconsistent partnership in many aspects. In domestic politics, for instance, while the TPP advocated a liberal and open market economy, the WP was much more in favour of state controlled liberalism. In addition to this, the WP was a pro-Islamist party, whereas the TPP was a secular one. Similarly, in the domain of foreign policy, the parties had contradictory approaches. For instance, the TPP advocated westernisation and full membership to the EU, whereas Erbakan’s foreign policy approach relied on mistrust against the West in general and western institutions of international community in particular (Doğan, 2008). Erbakan adopted a discourse in which he and his party promoted collaboration with other Islamic countries, an Islamic common market, an Islamic NATO, an Islamic UNESCO, and an Islamic monetary unit. The party’s foreign policy approach included anti-western elements in general, and anti-American, anti-European, anti-Zionist, and even anti-Semitic elements in particular. In this respect, the European Union was regarded as ‘a Christian club’ and the membership process of Turkey to the EU was criticised by the WP (Özbudun, 2006).

**The 54th Government’s Foreign Policy Implementation**

Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, during his stay in power for approximately one year, chose only Muslim countries for official visits. He made his first international visit to Iran, with which he advocated to improve the relationship in August 1996. During this visit, a $23 billion gas deal was signed. Erbakan was criticised by western governments for this gas agreement with Iran on the grounds that Iran had been declared a ‘rogue state’ for
its support for terrorism (Robins, 1997). Erbakan’s visit to Iran, the first step of a ten-day trip, continued with other Muslim countries in Asia: Pakistan, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. These visits helped Erbakan to realise an idea which he had long advocated. A group of developing (Muslim) countries, D-8, consisting of Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria, held its first meeting at the level of ministers of foreign affairs on 22 October 1996 in Istanbul. The second meeting was also organised in Istanbul in January 1997.

Erbakan made his second official visit abroad to Egypt, Libya and Nigeria in October 1996. In Libya while he was hoping to show his solidarity with that country, he was unexpectedly disgraced by Muammar Gaddafi, who harshly criticised Turkey for its relationships with the USA and Israel and the Turkish stance on the Kurdish problem (Sayari, 1997). This created a shockwave in Turkey and Erbakan was widely blamed for ruining Turkey’s image abroad.

Although Prime Minister Erbakan pursued pro-Islamism in interstate relations in accordance with the political background, he departed from his traditional line in Turkey’s relations with western allies and in interactions with western institutions. For instance, during his rule, he ratified a military collaboration and education agreement with Israel which had already been signed in January 1996 (Heper et al., 2000).

Robins (1997) and Heper et al. (2000) argue that Erbakan’s behaviour regarding the relationship with Israel was an opportunist attitude to prevent confrontation with the military. However, it was much more related to Erbakan’s capacity. He took his visits to Muslim countries as a natural framework of his mission. His choice to visit only Muslim countries can be criticised, yet the choice of countries for official visits, as for policy acts, cannot justify his condemnation. Regarding the ratification of the military agreement with
Israel, his failure to ratify would have amounted to declaring war against the army, which Erbakan would never win under the political conditions of the period and the domestic power balance between the government and the army. Thus the latter issue was a matter of power and capacity rather than opportunistic behaviour. Erbakan’s approval of two other critical issues, first a $600 million deal for the modernisation of Turkish F-4 aircraft by Israel, and second, the reauthorisation of the Provide Comfort operation, which aimed at maintaining security in northern Iraq by forming a no-fly zone, should be explained in a similar vein.

However, the approach of the Welfare Party regarding the European Union was slightly different. They totally antagonised the European Union project and Erbakan and his party labelled it a Christian Club. As regards Customs Union with the EU, which had been signed and came into force before the WP and TPP coalition government was formed, Erbakan and his team had a softer approach. He was not opposed to the Customs Union, but wanted the agreement to be renegotiated in order to change articles disadvantageous to Turkey. Robins (1997) argues that Erbakan grounded his objection to the Customs Union on the complaints of small and middle-sized business owners who constituted part of WP’s electorate. The notion of protecting voters’ rights is an acceptable explanation. Yet, in this case, harmony among the coalition partners can be proposed as a logical alternative. Given that improving relations with the EU with the purpose of full membership to the union had been an overriding goal of the TPP, Erbakan’s attitude to these issues can be explained by the aim of maintaining harmony among the coalition partners, which he had already offended in many respects.

Taken the foreign policy implementations of the WP–TPP government as a whole, Robins (1997) describes this duelling in the orientations, origins, aims and divergent
policies of two partners in a coalition as “division of labour”. As will be seen in the following section, both parties conducted policies in parallel with their intentions as far as circumstances permitted. This created a picture in foreign policy where the WP tried to improve relations with Muslim countries, while the TPP became an outlet of the government to the West in general and to the EU in particular. Describing the divergence among coalition partners as ‘division of labour’ is not correct for the following reasons. Firstly, a state of division of labour requires not only talent, but also intention and willingness. In other words, in an ideal situation, the parts constituting the whole are classified and charged according to their talents and will. It is true that in the WP–TPP coalition, both partners focused on foreign policy issues in which they were experienced and willing. On the other hand, the coalition partners were not happy with the each other’s policies on foreign policy. For instance, there existed a tension between the partners because the TPP and Çiller, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, were not informed by the WP about many foreign policy issues initiated and conducted by Erbakan and his executive staff (Özkeçeci-Taner, 2005).

The Post-Modern Coup and the End of the WP–TPP Coalition

When the WP came to power as the principal partner of the coalition government with the TPP under senior pro-Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan’s premiership, it created deep worry and anxiety among the westernised elite, most of whom were in the state bureaucracy, political life, the security establishment and the business sector (Heper et al., 2000). Indeed, these sectors were concerned that an Islamist government, the first in the Republic’s political history, would change the principles and functions of the secular Turkish republic, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a staunch proponent of secularism. In fact, a set of related reasons underlay these concerns. Firstly, the elites thought that an
Islamist government would create pressure to force them to change their lifestyles and impose an Islamic way of life, which they would never reconcile with their secular and republican set of values. Secondly, the elites feared that their privileged positions in both the public and private sector would be jeopardised and might be replaced with pro-Islamist ones over the course of time.

The military, which had power in politics historically and institutionally, had been cautious about the coalition since its inception. In practice, Erbakan government’s domestic and international policies increased the elites’ concerns. They, therefore, started to struggle against the WP. The army expressed its criticism of and dissatisfaction with the government’s policies through the National Security Council (NSC) meetings, which gathered politicians and the security establishment once a month. As the coalition aggravated the elites’ concerns because of pro-Islamist tendencies in both the domestic and foreign realms, the elites led by the army augmented the tone of their criticism. Moreover, the army started to organise briefings intended for wider public opinion, ranging from the media to bureaucracy, from business circles and the judiciary to university staff (Heper et al., 2000). In these briefings, the audience was informed and warned that Kemalist values and the secular republic were under threat because of the WP’s policies in the coalition.

The tension gradually increased between the WP and elites in general and the army, most of the media, the judiciary, academia and the rest of the bureaucracy and business circles. On 11 January 1997 Prime Minister Erbakan organised a dinner and invited people including some religious sects’ leaders. They joined the dinner in their traditional, religious dress. This event, for the first time in the republic’s history, was perceived as a direct challenge by Erbakan to the Kemalists. This created a huge reaction in the country. The final straw came when the mayor of Sincan municipality, a partisan of the WP, organised a
theatrical show in Sincan on the outskirts of Ankara, promoting jihad and sharia law. Moreover, Iran’s Ambassador to Ankara was present at the show. The promotion of Islamist values in a secular country in the presence of Iran’s ambassador, the highest representative of the country regarded as an exporter of Islamism in Turkey, caused havoc. The following week, the military’s tanks roamed the centre of Sincan. This was an indication of a provisional military intervention.

At the National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997, the military wing, the chief of general staff and commanders in chief of the armed forces imposed a list of anti-Islamist measures, which consisted of 18 articles varying from education to legal arrangements, on the government. With the pressure of the army, the government, which was unwilling to implement these recommendations-cum-ultimatums of the NSC, resorted to the approval of the parliament. The struggle between the army and the government continued in the ensuing months (Jenkins, 2007). The government shuffled its feet on implementing the decisions of the NSC. It the end, the pressure overwhelmed the resistance of the government. According to the coalition protocol between the WP and the TPP, the prime ministry was occupied interchangeably by Erbakan and Çiller over a two year period. When it came to the end of Erbakan’s first year in the prime ministry, due to the huge pressure of the army, he decided to leave his position so that Çiller could continue as prime minister. Erbakan resigned with the expectation that Çiller would be appointed as prime minister on 18 June 1997. President Süleyman Demirel, surprisingly, charged Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the main opposition Motherland Party, with forming the new government. This denoted the end of the WP-TPP coalition government. The course that started with the NSC meeting on 28 February until the end of coalition government is
referred to as the “28 February Process”, and the event was labelled a postmodern coup d’état.

**Analysis of 54th Government’s Period**

The WP-TPP coalition was an example of inharmonious government in Turkey. The coalition’s inconsonance was not limited to relations among the coalition partners. More importantly, the coalition, especially the WP wing showed incongruuity with the secular state as well. The WP in general and Prime Minister Erbakan in particular became a target of elites and institutions which championed secular, Kemalist and republican values.

The major foreign policy-makers in Turkish politics, the government and the army displayed totally different and adverse behaviours which stemmed from dissimilar goals and motivations in foreign policy-making during the 54th government. While the senior coalition partner, the WP, pursued foreign policies in harmony with its pro-Islamist worldview, the elites led by the army withstood the WP in accordance with their set of values, epitomised by Kemalism, secularism and republicanism. In this case, the structure of domestic politics, in which institutions shared the power with the government, restrained Prime Minister Erbakan and the WP from conducting pro-Islamist policies which appeared as the goals and motivations of a political agency.

The coalition’s foreign policy implementations were influenced by domestic politics in two ways. First, the senior partner, the WP, tried to follow a foreign policy congruent with its worldview and its electorate’s expectations. Erbakan’s visits to Muslim countries to promote bilateral relations and his initiation of a group of developing Muslim countries (D-8) can be shown as examples. Second, the secular and Kemalist establishment, as part of domestic politics and characteristic of Turkish political life, imposed constraints on the
WP’s ambitions. Erbakan’s moderate approach toward NATO, which he had long criticised harshly, and his softening attitude towards Customs Union with the EU, which came into force under his rule, along with his ratification of military collaboration agreements with Israel, served to demonstrate the limitations created by domestic politics.

Here it should be stated that there were external restrictions, and the interaction between domestic and international politics were also influential on the WP’s foreign policy behaviour. Erbakan’s rise to power created suspicion and dissatisfaction on the part of the USA administration (Robins, 1997). It was later stated that the Erbakan administration posed a threat to the interests of the USA (Makovski, 1997). The same is true regarding relations with Israel, Turkey’s main ally in the region for a long time. In addition to bilateral relations with the USA and Israel, Turkey’s liabilities to international institutions emanating from its memberships such as NATO and the Customs Union with the EU, imposed limitations on the WP’s foreign policy initiatives. In this direction, a moderate approach toward NATO, his tempered attitude against the Customs Union and his ratification of military collaboration agreements with Israel, Turkey’s major ally in the region, where Turkey was circled by Greece, Syria and Iran, can be assessed as constraints created by international politics.

When Erbakan’s period is examined as to whether it can be labelled as a deviance from the historical Western inclination of Turkish foreign policy, it is mostly accepted by actors in the decision-making process at the time that the westernised line of Turkish foreign policy was not changed by Erbakan (Öymen, 2012). This is, indeed, not because of Erbakan’s own will, but due to the external and internal constrains explained above.
55th Government (Motherland Party (MP), Democratic Left Party (DLP) and Democratic Turkey Party (DTP))

This minority government was formed by the coalition parties led by Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz of the Motherland Party on 30 June 1997. The government was supported by the Republican People’s Party (RPP) outside the coalition. The coalition consisted of two centre-right parties, the MP and the DTP and a centre-left party, the DLP.

In the coalition protocol, improving regional relations and membership to the EU were marked as foreign policy goals of the coalition. On the Cyprus question, it was stated that the ties would be increased with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), without mentioning any solution to the conflict (The Coalition Government Protocol between the MP, the DLP and the DTP, 1997). In the government programme, the requirements of the Customs Union would be completed as quickly as possible so that the goal of full membership to the EU could be realised soon. The significant issue in the programme was that the Cyprus issue was associated directly with the security of Turkey. It was stated that the Cyprus question was not only vital for the TRNC, but also for Turkey, and that the government was aware that the significance of the issue was increasing (The Official Journal of Turkey, 13 July 1997, No: 23048, p.7).

One of the most important foreign policy issues of the period was the refusal of Turkey’s full membership application to the EU at the Luxembourg summit in 1997. The EU’s decision created a severe reaction in Turkey. The government condemned the decision as unjust and prejudiced and declared that Ankara suspended political negotiations with Brussels. The decision urged many people, including top political leaders, to reconsider whether Turkey’s full membership attempt was worth all of the effort and humiliation (Park, 2000).
Even though all parties in the coalition participated in the December 1995 elections, the way in which the 55th government came to power was controversial. The previous government had to step down after the indirect intervention of the army, called a ‘postmodern coup d’état’. The coalition, therefore, had to implement the measures against religious fundamentalism dictated by the army (Jung, 1998). The government seemed to feel indebted to the army for coming to power. Indeed, the weak coalition governments and domestic and external security problems of Turkey in an insecure geography had increased the role and influence of the military in Turkish politics. In particular, the postmodern coup d’état of 28 February 1997 further solidified the powerful position of the army in Turkey.

The impact of the army can be explicitly detected in the other foreign policy events of the period. For instance, in September 1998, General Atilla Ateş, the army commander, explicitly threatened the Syrian administration to stop accommodating Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the separatist Kurdish organisation, PKK (Özcan 2010).

**The Ecevit Period: the 56th and 57th Governments**

Various disagreements brought the 55th coalition government to an end. The new government was formed by Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DLP) in January 1999. This was a minority government and its main mission was to carry the country to the elections to be held in three months’ time in April 1999. This minority government was supported by the MP and the TPP from outside.

In the government programme a major point was the pronunciation of the confederation approach to the Cyprus question. It was announced in the programme that the existence of two separate states in Cyprus was undeniable. For a possible solution, a confederate structure for the island would be supported by the government (The Official Journal of Turkey, 17 January 1999, No: 23586).
The Democratic Left Party came out of the elections as the first party by taking 22% of the total votes. The 57th government was formed by the DLP as coalition with the participation of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and the Motherland Party (MP) under the premiership of Bülent Ecevit in May 1999.

Economic problems and inner political turmoil stigmatised the rule of the 57th government. Suffering from economic difficulties, the government had to sign agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and work in harmony with the recipes of the IMF. The fragile economic structure of the country resulted in domestic political disputes which in turn destabilised the country.

In the sphere of foreign policy, one of the most important events of the period was the EU finally granting Turkey candidacy status in 1999. As a candidate state, a new period started in Turkish foreign policy and in relations with the EU in particular. Turkey had to face plenty of problems in terms of adapting its domestic and foreign policy priorities to the EU’s line in such cases as the Cyprus problem, the Aegean disputes with Greece, and the Armenian question. After 1999, Turkey accelerated the domestic reforms which were accepted as a means of Europeanisation. Indeed, in order to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, political reforms had been adopted by the Ecevit government.

The other significant foreign policy event of the period was the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. The relations between Greece, a former colony of the Ottoman Empire for 400 years, an occupying force of western Anatolia after the World War I and rival of Turkey during the republican era, had always been problematic. The Aegean problems with Greece, including disputes over the extension of territorial waters, delimitation of the continental shelf, demilitarisation of the Greek islands, doubtful sovereignty issues over islets and disagreement on the flight information region (FIR) had
been left unsolved for a long time. More recently, the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in the Greek Embassy in Kenya and with a Greek diplomatic passport, which was accepted as obvious Greek support for the separatist Kurdish movement in Turkey, exacerbated the existing tension. However, by 1999, the two countries started to get closer, especially after the devastating earthquake in Turkey, which improved humanitarian assistance between the two countries. In December, after Turkey was granted EU candidate status, numerous agreements were signed between Turkey and Greece in the fields of terrorism, immigration, energy transportation, fisheries, environment, education, drug traffic, tourism and sport (Rumelili, 2007; Oğuzlu, 2004).

The 57th government also witnessed improving relations with the USA. The American administration had supported Turkey in many issues in the international area, such as Western European Union, Turkey’s candidacy to the EU and the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Turkey also conducted policies in accordance with the USA in Iraq and Iran, and supported the USA intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

In general, the Ecevit government conducted comparatively effective and successful foreign policies in the international scene. In domestic politics, however, economic difficulties and political crises forced the government to call for an early election in 2002.

With regard to the coalitions period, assessments made by one of Turkey’s well-regarded diplomats, also later undersecretary of ministry of foreign affairs and vice general secretary of a political party, are remarkable. He claims that Turkish foreign policy could not make any progress in terms of foreign policy during the coalition governments between 1991 and 2002. Moreover, those years are lost years for foreign policy and diplomacy (Batu, 2012).
2. The Army

In hierarchical terms, the government and ministry of foreign affairs are to be accepted as the main foreign policy-makers at the state (unit) level. In each state, the military is regarded as a major component of the state’s defence and security policies. As survival in an anarchical environment is the core aim of any state, military power becomes one of the significant elements of state. This gives an important institutional status to the army in a state. The role of the army in the foreign policy-making process can vary depending on its institutional power, which can be shaped by social and historical traditions and also conflicts of interests in domestic politics. In some states, like Turkey, the army has proportionally more power in domestic politics as well as in foreign policy. In these cases, the army should be included in the analysis as an actor in foreign policy-making.

As Hermann et al. (1989) argue, when an ultimate decision unit is formed by several autonomous bodies, foreign policy decisions must be taken with consensus among those units. The role of the army in foreign policy-making in Turkey can be assessed based on its role in politics. In order to provide a better understanding, it will be useful to explain historically and institutionally the place of the military in Turkey.

Turks as a nation have a military character. This comes from their history. Their origins are from Central Asia. Turks started to move from their motherland to the West as nomad warriors. They adopted a sedentary life and formed states on the way when they stopped during their centuries-long journey to the West. History is filled with sixteen Turkish and Turkic states from Central Asia to Europe. The cumulative experiences of this rough and difficult life required Turks to have the skills of a warrior and a respectful attitude to them as well. Starting with Anatolia in 1071, the states established by Turks had a predominantly military character. The Seljuks and the Ottomans were a continuation of
this tradition. In the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire, westernisation attempts initiated by the imperial elite consisted principally of militarism as a remedy for the empire’s decline (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). By the end of World War I, the remnants of the empire invaded by the states victorious in the war were rescued by the salvation movement led by Mustafa Kemal, who was an idealist Ottoman general.

The founders of the Turkish Republic were dominantly well-versed military staff from the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Naturally people who had military discipline and character shaped the new republic in its first decades. The military remained as a reliable and prestigious institution in the Turkish political and administrative system. The army had been seen as an assurance of the republic and Kemalist values. Moreover, it had been regarded as a safeguard by the Turkish nation when the republic and regime were in peril due to internal and external threats. For instance, the army was always a deterrent and protection against external threats and offensive countries. From the perspective of the army, domestic menaces were also perceived by the army for the sake of the republic. Three times in the short history of the republic, in 1960, 1971 and 1980, the army undertook military coups and suspended democracy for a while.

Each coup d’état, and the constitutions changed or totally rewritten by the juntas, increased the army’s position and power institutionally. In particular after the 1980 intervention, the 1982 constitution was intentionally designed by the army in order to limit political participation and solidify state institutions, notably the army (Sakallıoğlu, 1997). The National Security Council (NSC), which had existed since the 1960 constitution, was strengthened by the 1982 constitution. According to Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, the NSC consists of the prime minister, the chief of the General Staff, the ministers of national defence, internal and foreign affairs, the commanders in chief of the army, navy
and air force and the general commander of the police, under the chairmanship of the
president of the republic. The NSC is the highest body in which security and defence issues
stemming from both external and internal threats are examined. The NSC’s decisions are
submitted to the government, where they should be urgently taken into consideration
(Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). Beside the NSC, the army has various channels through which it
claims its autonomy and exerts its power in the political system. One of these is the army’s
almost full sovereignty against the Ministry of Defence. The two laws which embodied the
responsibilities of the Ministry of Defence in 1970 gave the general chief of staff the right
to determine defence policies, including the army’s budget, intelligence requirements,
internal security necessities and staff promotions. In addition, in the Turkish system, the
general chief of staff is liable to the prime minister, instead of the minister of defence
(Sakallıoğlu, 1997).

The constitutional and legal structure of Turkish administrative system detailed above
allowed the army to expand its power and exert influence over domestic and foreign
policy-making processes. In addition to these legal channels in favour of the army, events
in the post-Cold War period which increased both external and internal threats to Turkey,
such as the insecure environment with many examples of ethnic and religious conflicts in
the region, domestically destabilising economic crises and fast-growing Kurdish separatist
violence, facilitated the army to become a central authority in the security establishment
and exert its power over domestic and foreign policy-making (Özcan, 2010). Furthermore,
the weak and fragile coalition governments paved the way for the army to reinforce its
powerful position in the political system, filling the vacuum created by fragmented
coalition governments (Uzgel, 2003).
For the reasons explained above, the army remained a strong actor in Turkish domestic and foreign policy making in this first period (1990-2002) of Turkish foreign policy. In many cases, assessed under the article of government, the army was the main actor influencing foreign policy-making. The military’s position also created problems between the governments and the army; this sometimes manifested as friction, for instance the resignation of General Chief of staff Necip Torumtay, who was in disagreement with President Özal on the Gulf Crisis. Or it emerged as a campaign organised by the army against Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and his Welfare Party, ending up with the resignation of the government and the postmodern coup d’état.

As explained above, the state level analysis of this period (1990-2002) presents a divided pattern in the general internal structure. This divided sample is manifested either in the form of various coalition governments in which parties were in agency but with different, even adverse and conflicted, ideas in terms of foreign policy, or in the form of power struggles between governments and army. Lack of coherence in the agency complicated the assessment foreign policy issues and the making of decisions in an efficient and timely manner.

As a result, divided agency in domestic politics, or the struggle between government and army or ‘elite competition’ from another point of view, affected Turkish politics in general and foreign policy-making in particular in the first decade of the post-Cold War period. Reflections of this struggle seen in various degrees throughout this era indicate that the (governmental) agency remained relatively weak, therefore incapable of reacting efficiently to the initial effects of the post-Cold War era. Moreover, the vacuum created by weak governments in the foreign policy-making process was filled by the army, which approached foreign policy issues strictly from a security perspective. This would be
another factor contributing to the weakening of the agency in Turkey during the period at issue.

3. Other Factors (Ethnic and Interest Groups, Media)

As stated before, foreign policy is formulated in a domestic environment which has the potential to influence policy decisions. In analysis, therefore, conditions and the domestic realm and actors of domestic politics should also be taken into consideration. Brown (1997) describes the traditional components of foreign policy analysis as public opinion, media, pressure groups and the organisational structure. These will also be integrated into the examination at the state level of analysis where appropriate.

Regarding interest groups, because they generally have interests around foreign policy issues which have the potential to directly or indirectly impact on their vested or potential interests, this kind of group tries to affect the foreign policy decisions of governments in accordance with their benefits.

Public opinion in Turkey had an impact on foreign policy issues to different extents and in positive and negative directions. For example, in the case of the Gulf Crisis in 1990, President Özal advocated a more interventionist attitude, including direct involvement in the war against Iraq with the western allies. In spite of a considerable amount of support from the media and public, Özal could not put his plans into practice and Turkey had to give only limited support to the Allies. Again under Özal’s presidency, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia created deep feelings in public opinion. Like President Özal, most people in Turkey were in favour of Turkey’s military involvement in the dispute in favour of Azerbaijan. Besides Turkey’s close kinship with Azerbaijan, the oppression to which the Azeri people were subjected made hundreds of
thousands of Turks take to the streets. Huge demonstrations were organised. The media also helped the issue to come to the fore and stay on the agenda for a long time. In spite of all this pressure and support created by public opinion and the media, the Demirel government preferred not to take a military stance regarding the issue. In the two issues mentioned above, Turkish foreign policy contrasted with public opinion.

In some cases, however, Turkish foreign policy was constituted in harmony with public opinion and the pressures from ethnic groups, for example, Turkey’s active policy regarding the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995 and the Kosovo crisis starting from 1989 to the intervention in 1999. Both the media and ethnic Bosnian and Albanian populations living in Turkey showed a great interest in these issues.

Regarding the influence of interest groups / civil society organisations on foreign policy decisions, it can be stated that there were no common and powerful non-governmental organisations for a number of reasons. Firstly, the military intervention in 1980 and its constitution of 1982 limited the right of organisations and created an apolitical environment in which civil organisations had to emerge. Secondly, the relatively underdeveloped economic conditions and social regression arising from the frequent economic crises and political turmoil prevented people from establishing these kinds of civil bodies and also from gathering around the rare existing ones. Two rare examples of these organisation emerged in the business sector: the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Organisation (TÜSİAD) and its equivalent established by conservative and pro-islamist circles, the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Organisation (MÜSİAD).
In this first period of Turkish foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, TÜSİAD tried to create pressure and public opinion regarding the Kurdish question, human rights, democratisation, economic liberalisation and further relationships with the EU. On the other hand, MÜSİAD preferred to approach the issues from a conservative point of view and organised activities concerning religious freedom, the headscarves question and some political issues.

C) Individual Level

The individual level will form the last step of the three-level analysis. The key actors involved in foreign policy-making as individual agents, namely presidents, prime ministers and foreign policy advisers will be analysed in terms of their influence on foreign policy-making in the period of Turkish foreign policy under discussion.

Foreign policy choices are formulated, decided and implemented by individuals. In the foreign policy-making process, political actors are regarded as a functioning connection between ideas and the process itself. Ideas and belief systems are significantly wide and complex concepts. When a link can be detected between certain ideas and policy-makers, this means that those ideas are institutionalised. In other words, to find a causal linkage between ideas, beliefs and foreign policy, it is essential that ideas are institutionalised: institutional ideas have the chance to influence the political outcome. Institutionalisation is indicative of the ideas which are implanted in institutions, in this case political parties (Özkeçeci-Taner, 2005). Ideas and beliefs are also closely related to world views, which are central to constituting an image of the world outside. The image of outside shaped with the lenses of ideas and beliefs accordingly makes an impact on the choices and decisions of
the policy-makers (Blum, 1993). Moreover, according to Holsti (1967), during times of uncertainty or when a decision-maker does not have enough information about a foreign policy issue, it is likely that the beliefs and ideas of political actors have more impact on decisions.

At the individual level of analysis of this research, the main actors and decision-makers, the leaders as key figures in foreign policy-making processes will be analysed according to their personal characteristics, beliefs, motivations, ideas, values and ideologies, drawing on Foreign Policy Analysis.

1. Leaders as Key Individuals in the Decision-Making Process

*Turgut Özal*

He had an electrical engineering degree from Istanbul and researched engineering economy in the USA. The time he passed in the USA had a significant impact on his beliefs and world view. The advanced level in technology that American people reached for, individual rights and mobility, high wealth and a prosperous lifestyle based on a consumption society left great impressions (Acar, 2002). After coming back to Turkey, Özal became engaged in politics in the Justice Party (JP), the main centre-right party of that time. Between 1967 and 1971 he led the state planning organisation. After the 1980 military intervention, he was given the post of economy minister in the cabinet formed by the junta as a transition government. In 1983, he founded the Motherland Party (MP), which embodied the four political wings: conservatives, liberals, social democrats and nationalists. The MP came out first in the 1983 elections. He repeated this election success in 1987 and remained as prime minister until 1989, when he was elected as president in
November 1989, taking the presidency from Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup d’état.

In spite of his religious background, Özal was a strict liberal who spent nearly all his career setting up a liberal order in Turkish politics and economics. In terms of foreign policy, Özal always preferred to break taboos. He contradicted the ministry of foreign affairs, which is representative of traditional foreign policy-making in Turkey. For this reason, during his prime ministry, two ministers of foreign affairs chose to resign.

According to Çakmak (2008), Özal, known as a conservative and a religious and strong believer, established relationships with Muslim countries on the basis of mutual economic interests instead of religious friendship and did not show typical Islamist attitudes in his political life and leadership. First, his lifestyle and his infatuation with America differentiated him from being an Islamist or even a conservative. During his six years prime ministry and less than four years presidency until his sudden death in 1993, his foreign policy decisions championed Turkey promoting economic ties among the regional countries and increasing interdependency to decrease the risk of conflict (Laçiner, 2010). On the other hand Gözen (2009, p.81 ff) claims that Özal's interest and ambition towards Islamic countries were not less than his attitude to the western world. However his approach to Islamic states was not emotional but opportunistic.

Turgut Özal's foreign policy vision and implementations were formed around three key principles; active, multi dimensional and economy-orientated (Laçinok, 2007, p.552). Turgut Özal complained about the heavy bureaucratic system in Turkish foreign policy and championed an active foreign policy. Accordingly he contracted with various institutions in Turkey’s foreign policy-making circle such as the army, the ministry of foreign affairs and Prime Minister Demirel during his presidency.
As partly explained above in the state level analysis, Turgut Özal brought change to Turkish foreign policy to a certain extent. His effort to open the country to the world introduced an economy-orientated foreign policy. Turgut Özal's pragmatism and pro-activism in foreign policy produced results in some foreign policy issues such as relationships with the USA and the Middle East. Because of the disagreements between him and the institutional structure of foreign policy-making, namely the army and the ministry of foreign affairs, he did not have the opportunity to realise his vision to a large extent, as happened in the First Gulf War and the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

* Süleyman Demirel

Demirel obtained his BA degree in civil engineering in Istanbul and spent a year in the USA Bureau of Reclamation in 1949. After returning to Turkey, he served as Head of the State Hydraulic Works. In 1954-55 Demirel researched some private and public institutions in the USA. Demirel started his political career in the Justice Party (JP), one of the main right wing political movements of the country. In 1964 he was elected as the party's leader. Between 1965 and 1980 he served as prime minister from time to time. His political activity was banned by the junta of 1980. After seven years’ separation Demirel went back to politics in 1987. He started to serve as prime minister in 1991. Because of President Özal's death, he took over the presidency in 1993 and stayed in this position until 2000.

Although he and his family had a religious and conservative background, Demirel adopted modernity as a guide throughout his political life. Demirel was criticised for being overambitious, but he replied to by stating that ambition is not a condemned behaviour
Economic development and progress were the concepts on which he rested his political discourse.

Demirel's foreign policy approach accepted Atatürk's motto “Peace at home, peace in the world” as an essential principle. He was in favour of a balanced foreign policy giving prominence to economic development (Tuncer, 2007, p.147). The concept of balance took an important position in his foreign policy vision. He stated that he did not like an active and passive foreign policy divide. When conditions occur, states pursue active policies. The country is never put at risk at the expense of conducting an active foreign policy (Tuncer, 2007, p.151). Indeed, Demirel formed foreign policies which sought optimum conditions for security and development. In this regard, he believed in cooperation with western states (Yavuzalp, 1996, p.144).

As partially explicated above in the state level analysis, Demirel approached foreign policy issues cautiously. He prioritised security aspects while conducting Turkish foreign policy in the turbulent times of Post-Cold War era. Demirel, in spite of his inclination to alter Turkish foreign policy, stayed relatively more static and responsible. Moreover, he sometimes restrained President Önal from pursuing more active (adventurous according to Demirel) foreign policy during his prime ministry. The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a good example of Demirel's struggle with Önal.

* Necmettin Erbakan

Erbakan was a mechanical engineer whose work and academic life went with flying colours in Turkey and Germany. Devoutly religious, he was influenced by the leader of the Naqshbandi order, Mehmet Zait Kotku.
As explained, Erbakan held a unique position in Turkish politics. He was the founder of the first Islamic party, the National Order Party (NOP), in 1970. As party leader, served as vice prime minister in some coalition governments in the period 1970-1980. Then he became prime minister in 1996 until he was felled from this position by a modern coup d'état in 1997.

Erbakan founded his political discourse on the concepts of ‘national vision’, which is a combination of Islamist and nationalist values. National vision championed economic development based on its own economic and social values while refusing westernism (Özdalga, 2008). Later, he would form the notion of ‘fair order’, which defended justice at each stage of social and political life.

In the field of foreign policy, Erbakan defended international relationships based on independence and national values. He labelled this vision a foreign policy of honour (Bakır, 2007, p.376). The need to change foreign policy was a rhetoric that Erbakan emphasised (Robins, 2003, p.146). Erbakan's ideology and values were naturally represented by his foreign policy agenda. According to him, western values were inappropriate for Turkey (Sasley, 2012, p.558) Erbakan’s foreign policy approach relied on mistrust of the West in general and western institutions of international community in particular (Doğan, 2008).

As in the examples given in the state level analysis, Erbakan tried to pursue a foreign policy in line with his ideology and worldview to a certain extent. He had long advocated collaboration with other Islamic countries in the fields of economy, defence and social policies. During his stay in power as prime minister, Erbakan, for roughly one year, paid official visits to Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt,
Libya and Nigeria. The first meeting at the level of ministers of foreign affairs of the D-8 (Developing Muslim Countries) was held in October 1996 in Istanbul. However Erbakan seemed to depart from his traditional stance against the EU and Israel. He repressed his discourse which labelled the EU a Christian Club. Surprisingly, during his rule, a military collaboration and education agreement with Israel was ratified. Erbakan’s divided behaviours in foreign policy are associated with both the nature of coalition politics and his opportunistic attitude to prevent confrontation with the military.

V Conclusion

In this chapter, Turkish foreign policy in the Post-Cold War era between 1990 and 2002 has been examined. In order to explore the external (structural) and internal (domestic) factors and their roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy, the analysis was conducted on three different levels.

At the first level, systemic effects created by changes in world politics and their reflections in Turkey and Turkish foreign policy were examined. In brief, the changes in the international system stemmed from the end of the Cold War and the transformation of a bipolar world, which altered the balance of power in a drastic way. Accordingly, relations between poles and peripheries changed and regional security issues gained importance. Changes in systemic components consequently created pressures within states’ foreign policy issues. All of these can be stated as the key systemic reasons for changes in Turkish foreign policy during the period 1990-2002 and they gradually influenced Turkey and its foreign policy.
In conjunction with the alteration in power balances, firstly, Turkey had more room for manoeuvre in its foreign relations. This created both constraints and opportunities for Turkish foreign policy. Secondly, the new power relations in the world system obliged Turkish decision-makers to adapt their foreign policy to these new conditions. This obligation showed itself as being for different reasons. Initially, the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the softening of the East-West confrontation indicated that Turkey lost the geostrategic value it had gained thanks to its geographical proximity to the USSR. This meant that Turkey no longer held a key position in western defence plans. However, the Gulf Crisis in 1990/91 and the ensuing developments showed the USA that Turkey still held a strategic location in this region, surrounded by conflicts and disputes. It had been understood that Turkey was no longer on the whitelist and had lost its strong ally position for Western European countries. The Turkish state could not define a proper position for itself among the newly developing security architecture in Europe despite its long-time NATO membership. Central and Eastern European countries, which had recently been freed from communism, had replaced Turkey as privileged strategic allies. These events, therefore, required Turkey to give more weight to security issues in its foreign policy, pursuing a more active foreign policy in comparison with the Cold War period.

At the second level, on the agency side of the coin, the government and army were assessed as two key actors in foreign policy decision-making. Before the role of these two actors was examined, the general characteristics of Turkish policy-making were summarised. Eleven governments were founded during the period 1990-2002, most of them coalitions, and these have been analysed according to their types, the domestic political conditions when they were formed, major foreign policy issues at the time and their reactions to these issues. The remarks and findings indicated that the political
ideologies of the parties that formed the governments, the degree of convenience or struggle between the parties in the government, the condition of international politics at the time, the situation in domestic politics and the nature of the foreign policy issues in question all had varying degrees of influence on the government during the process of foreign policy-making.

As a second component of analysis at the state level, the army was examined, both in its historical, traditional place in Turkish politics and in terms of the sources of its political and institutional power in contemporary times. It was found that the role of the army in Turkish political life in general, and foreign policy in particular, increased during the period under question. The reasons for the augmentation of the army’s role in the foreign policy decision-making process were the legal structure of the domestic political system, which favoured the army, and events in the post-Cold War period which increased both external and internal threats to Turkey. These included the insecure environment full of ethnic and religious conflicts outside the country, destabilising economic crises and the fast-growing Kurdish separatist violence inside the country. This all facilitated the army in becoming a central authority in the security establishment and in increasing and exerting its power over domestic and foreign policy-making. Furthermore, the weak and fragile coalition governments paved the way for the army to reinforce its powerful position in the political system, filling the vacuum created by fragmented coalition governments.

The influences of public opinion, the media, civil society and ethnic groups over weak coalition governments were also analysed using examples of foreign policy issues.

At the third and last stage of the analysis, the individual level, the roles of the main actors and decision-makers in foreign policy-making were analysed based on their beliefs, motivations, ideas, values and ideologies, drawing on Foreign Policy Analysis.
CHAPTER 4 THE SECOND PERIOD: 2002-2010

1 Introduction

This is the fourth chapter of the thesis which seeks the answer to its core research question: What are the external and internal (domestic) factors shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War? The chapter covers the time period 2002-2010 when the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government came into power with a strong majority, which put an end to the period (1990-2002), during which Turkey was governed by various fragile coalition governments.

The main hypothesis of the thesis is that Turkish foreign policy can be explained by the relative significance of external (systemic) factors and internal (domestic) effects in each period of the post-Cold War era. Regarding the second period (2002-2010), the agency seems comparatively strong, mainly because a stable majority government which was relatively better equipped and institutionally experienced vis-à-vis the effects of systemic changes, had started nearly a decade ago. The assertive stance of the government in domestic politics would enable it to restrain the role of the army in foreign policy decision-making in the ensuing years.

The chapter includes five main sections. It will begin with an introduction, explaining the core argument of the thesis and how this chapter will fit into the structure of the study.

In the second section, changes in the international system will be examined in terms of structural components and balance of power. The sub-sections on the 9/11 attacks and the international system and the new world order: uni or multipolar? will be dedicated to
understanding the dynamics of this second period in terms of world politics. In the third section, the focus will move towards Turkey and the major foreign policy events of the period will be examined. Here, before moving on to a detailed empirical assessment in the following sections, major foreign policy cases in the post-Cold War era will be briefly specified.

The fourth section will present a detailed study of the period in question with reference to issues in Turkish foreign policy. The analysis will be conducted in three sections. The first is at the systemic level. The effects of systemic changes brought about during this second period on Turkish foreign policy will be discussed by making reference to empirical cases.

The second, state level, analysis will predominantly focus on agency, which is conceptualised by determining the government and the army as the main domestic agential factors in foreign policy-making. At this level of analysis, the appearance of the JDP, the sole and majority party in the governments throughout this period in Turkish politics will be put under the microscope. Then, the foreign policy principles of the JDP will be examined. The section will progress with an analysis of the important foreign policy events of the period under the three JDP governments (58th, 59th and 60th) in power during this period. The army is the other agency in the state level analysis. The role of the army, given in structural and empirical perspectives in the previous chapter, will be examined both in terms of its role in foreign policy events and on the basis of its power struggle with the government. At the end of the section, the ethnic and interest groups and media will be incorporated into the analysis as complementary agential factors.
At the individual level of analysis, individual influence will be integrated into the foreign policy context of Turkey. In this context, the presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs and advisors who held power to shape Turkish foreign policy in the given period will be incorporated into the analysis.

The concluding section will present the main findings of this chapter.

II The International System: The Second Decade After The End Of The Cold War

Systemic factors are one component for analysing Turkish Foreign Policy within the frame of the core research question which explores the roles of external (systemic) and internal (domestic) factors in shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War. A careful enquiry into the international system in the second decade after its transformation, therefore, is significant for interpreting both Turkey's position in the world system and, more importantly, how Turkey dealt with the systemic factors while pursuing its foreign policy. For this reason, in this section the state of the international system and Turkey's position in the whole picture will be analysed in depth.

The end of the Cold War brought an end to the bipolar world and also a complex set of inter-related events in world politics. The dissolution of the USSR, transformation of Europe and emergence of latent disputes and fresh regional disagreements can be given as examples of repercussions in world politics. With the end of the Cold War, the USA appeared as the most powerful actor in post-Cold War world politics.

In ideological and cultural terms, the rival ideology, communism, had been defeated by capitalism and liberal values championed by the West in general and the USA in
particular. In terms of economy, the USA, which had been challenged by high economic growth rates in Japan and the EU during the 1980s, was enjoying its economic and financial position in the more integrated world since the end of the Cold War. In the military domain, no country remained to challenge USA power after the disintegration of the USSR. During the 1990s, the ‘American Empire’ was more dominant than ever before (Cox, 2002). With the onset of the post-Cold War period, the bipolar system of the Cold War transformed into a unipolar one. Certain events demonstrated that the USA had a kind of quasi-hegemony in world politics. First, the Gulf War against Iraq was conducted as a joint attack under the leadership of the USA with the participation of almost all major powers, including the USSR. The USA reflected its leading role in world politics during the Bosnian War in 1995 and Kosovo crisis in 1999. None of the major powers challenged the role of the USA and the use of USA-led military power in these clashes (Pape, 2005).

In the unipolar international system of the 1990s, the USA was the most powerful state and no country, alone or in cooperation, had the ability to balance its power. Scholars differ on whether the USA was a hegemon. According to Pape (2005) the unipolar world of the 1990s did not denote a hegemonic system and the USA was not a hegemon. In the international scene, the balance of power system was still valid, which amounted to the fact that, despite its superpower position, the USA was not independent from possible counterbalancing attempts of secondary powers in the system. On the other hand, Jervis (2006) regards the USA as a hegemon in a unipolar world order.

Regardless of whether it was a hegemon or superpower in the unipolar international system of the post-Cold war period, the USA principally aimed to maintain the status quo in international politics (Jervis, 2006). In this context, while enjoying its position, the USA promoted democracy and liberalism all over the world. Although nothing occurred to
weaken the unipolar system, the USA intervened in some cases such as Iraq in 1991 and the Serbian crises in 1995 and 1999 for the sake of preserving the system. In this period, for almost the entire rest of the world, the USA was regarded as the leader of the world and largely respected and supported in its policies throughout the world.

In the USA, both the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations followed the policy summarised above. After coming to power in 2001, the new president, George W. Bush, and his team launched a different plan. In June 2002, the USA National Security Strategy was announced by George W. Bush. The document was prepared by a team headed by Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, hawkish neo-conservatives who had long championed the principles presented in the document (Leffler, 2003). The National Security Strategy was based upon approaches of unilateralism, pre-emptive action and military domination. It stated that the USA had the right, unilaterally if necessary, to wage war against the countries called rogue states (namely Iran, Libya, Iraq, Syria and North Korea) in order to prevent them from attacking the USA and American interests. This policy required the domination of a superior and persistent military power in comparison with the other major actors in world politics (Pape, 2005). Analysts also suggest that the National Security Strategy might have derived from the Draft Defense Guidance, which was prepared in 1992 by a team led by Paul Wolfowitz for Dick Cheney, the secretary of defence in George H. W. Bush’s cabinet. The Draft Defense Guidance argued that, regardless of whether it was bipolar or multipolar, the international system would continue to create major conflicts and wars which would endanger American interests. The USA, therefore, should not allow the emergence of any competitor on the world stage. With this aim, the USA should have an army which no rival could dare to confront. In the same direction, even if they were not directly relevant to the country, the USA should overcome
problems and disputes in world politics so as to prevent the related countries from increasing their military capacities to deal with those problems by themselves (Jervis, 2006).

A) The 9/11 Attacks and the International System

The terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon headquarters in Washington on September 11 2001 left a deep impact on international politics. According to most scholars, it was a milestone in world politics which equals the effects of events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, which had paved the way to the post-Cold War period. The attacks not only changed the world but also USA foreign policy. Moreover, the 9/11 incident showed how much the USA, the global superpower, was vulnerable (Cox, 2002). According to some authors, however, in spite of the great significance of 9/11, it would not change international politics. World politics would show much more continuity instead of change (Kennedy-Pipe and Rengger, 2006). When this claim is taken into consideration in international relations history, it is possible to find similar patterns. On the other hand, by witnessing the flow of events occurring on the world stage after 9/11, it can definitely be argued that much has changed when compared with the previous period.

In order to analyse the changes after 9/11, USA foreign policy should be put under scrutiny. As mentioned above, between the beginning of the post-Cold War era and the 9/11 attacks, the USA designated its priorities as preserving and enforcing the unipolar international system. With the occurrence of the 9/11 incident, the USA administration, the Bush presidency more precisely, declared war on terrorism and described the states supporting terrorists as rogue states, using the jargon of President Bush’s national security team: as threats to American interests (Jervis, 2006). In this sense, the National Security
Strategy reflected the USA commitment to waging pre-emptive war against the terrorist and rogue states, unilaterally if necessary. The USA would use its unique power to fight these threats and promote freedom, democracy and liberal values all over the world (the National Security Strategy, 2002).

After the 9/11 attack, the USA started its bellicose unilateral policies with the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. The second step would be the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which provoked controversy. American unilateral activism following 9/11 refuted the argument of the 1990s that the USA, as a global preeminent superpower, would be less interventionist in world affairs (Press-Barnathan, 2005). Indeed, public opinion had showed far less interest in international politics than domestic issues since the 1980s (Walt, 2001).

In terms of various aspects of world politics, it is hard to claim that much altered due to the terrorist attacks on the USA. The 9/11 attacks, however, induced changes in American foreign policy. Immediately after 9/11, the USA was still the primary economic and military actor in the world, despite the loss of some prestige. Moreover, the USA still held the same foreign policy aims. It wanted to keep the world under its control. In order to impede the emergence of any rival power, the USA tried to appease or intervene, if necessary, in the disputes around the world. It controlled nuclear proliferation and the production of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the USA championed democracy, liberalism and human rights as global values. In sum, what changed in the post-9/11 world was the sequence and primacy of the USA foreign policy objectives. More significantly, as Walt (2001) argues, the USA altered the way in which it pursued its goals from multilateralism to unilateralism.
The repercussions of the changes in USA foreign policy, as it was the centre of the unipolar world, were of particular concern to Turkey, because it was naturally affected by these alterations. Precisely, the USA invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, conterminous to Turkey, within the context of the war on terror policy would influence Turkish foreign policy decisions and the relationship of Turkey with this strongest power of the world.

B) The New World Order: Unipolar or Multipolar World?

The polarity of the international system is concerned with any states in the world politics, as it determines the balance of power and alliance patterns which are important factors that each state should take into consideration while formulating its foreign policy. It is also significant for Turkey, which had based its survival on the balance of powers among the great powers in the last centuries of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, and during the Cold War period. Indeed Turkey, a middle-sized power and regional player, is under the direct influence of the USA's foreign policy across the world and in Turkey's immediate region.

In the post-Cold War era, a unipolar world with the USA the only superpower emerged with the fall of the USSR. Unipolarity is an international structure in which one country has power that cannot be counterweighted by any other actor in the system. But the concentration of power in the superpower in a unipolar system is not enough to render it a hegemon or a global empire (Wohlforth, 1999).

From the viewpoint of Neorealist literature, unipolarity is the most changeable system structure in comparison with bipolarity and multipolarity. This impermanent aspect of unipolarity stems from the motivation it creates for other states to restore the balance against the superpower with the aim of equilibrating the threat caused by their global
power (Waltz, 1997). A unipolar system which reduces security competitions between
great powers in the system is accepted as more peaceful than its alternatives, due to there
being fewer possibilities of conflict of any states with the superpower (Kupchan, 1998).

Although it is a peaceful system structure, because of its ephemerality, unipolarity can
often be regarded as an illusion. Indeed, Layne (1993) argues that the unipolar system is
geopolitically an interregnum. According to him, systemic changes caused by the rise and
fall of great powers have always been shocking in world history. Due to its nature in
motivating other states to counterbalance, the unipolar system dominated by the USA will
eventually witness the rise of adequate states as great powers. Layne, therefore, predicted
that the unipolar system would be transformed into a multipolar one in the period 2000-
2010. Wohlforth (1999), however, argues that if the USA engaged enough in the
international system built around American power, by creating incentives and providing
order, the unipolar structure of the system would be sustained.

Multipolarity is a structure in which more than two states dominate the international
field. The world is divided into sub-regions, each possibly controlled by a powerful state
which constitutes one of the poles in the system. Compared to unipolarity and bipolarity,
the international order is much more difficult to maintain in a multipolar world because of
the number of poles led by great powers which conceivably have different interests and
ideas and policies regarding how international order should be set up. Concordantly, under
multipolarity, it is relatively more difficult to maintain alliances, provide cooperation
among states and keep areas of influence under control (Van Evera, 1999).

After 9/11, the international system did not change and has remained unipolar (Press-
Barnathan, 2005). Some great powers and regional actors, however, showed reactions to
the unilateral foreign policies of the USA. The intervention in Afghanistan, to a certain extent, and the Iraqi invasion in 2003 can be given as examples of these reactions. Since the end of the Cold War, the responses of states such as France, Germany and Russia to USA unilateral policies have been assessed in different ways. For instance, Layne (1993 and 2006) and Wohlforth (1999) describe these efforts as balancing. In a similar fashion, this is called soft balancing by Pape (2005) and Brooks and Wohlforth (2005). From a different point of view, the reactive states are blamed by Kagan (1998) for seeking a false or honorary multipolarity in which they pursued an equal partnership with the USA without paying for the military, political and financial burden that this required.

In order to give a proper picture, the researcher needs to know the conditions that transform a unipolar system into a multipolar one. Put simply, balancing and soft balancing are not enough to create equal poles that can compete with the superpower in unipolarity. In this direction, cooperation among great and regional powers in the form of traditional alliances is insufficient to challenge the unipolarity. Instead, states have to combine their economic and military powers in order to increase their power concentration to the level of that of the superpower. This can be achieved through the creation of powerful regional poles in the system (Wohlforth, 1999). In contrast, while the unipolar order requires states to give weight to regional security issues, it encouraged the pole, the USA, to promote regional security cooperation in order to help maintain regional stability with lower costs (Press-Barnathan, 2005). The USA, consequently, faced states willing to cooperate rather than balancing at the regional level. The USA is still the superpower and more importantly the system is still unipolar. Moreover, the emergence of an equal power to the USA does not seem to be plausible in the near future.
C) The International System and Turkey in the Second Decade Post-Cold War

In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, Turkey was blindsided by the changing international system and its strong and demanding repercussions in world politics. Turkey had to cope with the strong constraints of systemic waves while struggling with political and economic instabilities in its domestic sphere.

When it comes to the second decade, the transformation of the international system, from bipolar to unipolar, had become settled. The constraints created by the system and their pressures on states ceased to a certain extent. A state of equilibrium in the international system was reached in comparison with the first post-Cold War decade. Even though this sense of calm in world politics would be broken by the 9/11 attack in 2001, this could not create as much of a catastrophic turbulence in the system as it would if it had happened in the 1990s.

Turkey was also in an enhanced condition at the beginning of the new millennium. During the previous decade, it had more or less met the systemic challenges in spite of its domestic political problems, which mostly stemmed from weak coalition governments. In the second decade after the end of the Cold War, the systemic pressures on Turkey relatively decreased (Bal, 2010, p.51). In this regard, the country would improve its relationships with the European Union and the Middle East. In an relatively secure environment in comparison with the first period, Turkey, which had had a majority government, for more than ten years by 2002, would enter into productive cooperation with most of its neighbour states, while its relationship with the USA was up and down.
**III Turkey: Major Foreign Policy Events of the Period**

One of the most important foreign policy events of the period was the USA invasion of Iraq and its repercussions on Turkish foreign and domestic policies. Although supportive of the Allied forces in the Gulf War in 1991, Turkey was unwilling to join the Iraq invasion in 2003 because of security and political concerns. Turkey did not want a war on Iraq, in its immediate neighbourhood. Public opinion was divided deeply between proponents and opponents of Turkish involvement in the war. The USA's proposal to Turkey included allowing 62,000 American troops to settle in Turkish territory. It would also give Turkey the right to send 40,000 troops to Northern Iraq (Robins, 2003; Benli-Altunışık, 2006). This was a great opportunity to take the initiative with the problematic Northern Iraqi region, which the separatist Kurdish terrorist organisation PKK used a base for launching terrorist attacks into Turkey. The USA's offer also included $2 billion in aid and a $20 billion long-term low-interest loan to Turkey, which needed it economically. The motion, however, was refused in the Turkish National Assembly on 1 March 2003. This refusal created shock, because the USA army had prepared its invasion plan for opening a front to Iraq from the North. The Americans did not have any suspicion that the motion might be refused by the Turkish assembly. While the motion was being voted on, the USA's warships were waiting for operation, moored offshore from Turkey’s Iskenderun Bay of Turkey. Consequently, the USA had to change its plan of operation and invade Iraq from the South, which was much more expensive and difficult. This had a deep impact on USA-Turkish relations. It also prevented Turkey from intervening in PKK bases in Northern Iraq, which caused instability in Iraq and increased Turkey’s security risks.
Another significant foreign policy event was around the relationship with the EU. Regarding Turkey's long-held goal to be a full member of the European Union, Turkey gained ground, especially in the first half of the period. Turkey’s relationship with the European Union goes back to the 1960s, when Ankara Agreement (1963) was signed heralding the launch of the Customs Union, which was finalised in 1996. However, the accession process was not as smooth. After the Turkish application for candidacy was refused twice in 1987 and 1997, the EU finally granted Turkey candidate status in 1999. As a candidate state, Turkey had to face plenty of problems in terms of adapting its domestic legislation. After 1999, Turkey accelerated the reforms to aim at EU membership. Between 2002 and 2005, when Turkey started the negotiation process with the EU, the country made a great effort to implement the acquis communautaire of the EU. In this period, Parliament, where the ruling JDP party had the majority, accepted two constitutional revisions and six ‘harmonisation packages’. From 2005, however, the relationship slowed down and negotiations were temporarily frozen in 2006. Until the end of the period, there would be no improvement in the path of Turkey’s European Union membership.

In terms of Turkish foreign policy's long-standing problem, Cyprus, the approach of the JDP to the solution envisaged by the UN can be stated as another significant event of the term. Cyprus had been one of the key issues within EU-Turkey relations, especially once Turkey was given candidate status in 1999. Since Cyprus, Greece and the UK were currently members of the EU, the Cyrus question was highly Europeanised. Before the EU Council Summit in December 2002, the UK, holding the presidency at that period, proposed to Turkey cooperation with the EU on Cyprus and the European defence disputes. This issue was solved in an affirmative way, and Turkey agreed to adopt a
constructive stance on Cyprus (Robins, 2003). Oğuzlu (2004) has a similar ideas to Robins that Turkey made a considerable effort to find a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of the European Security and Defence Policy. Dahlman (2004) also focuses on Turkey’s shift in its Cyprus policy and its efforts to find a solution on Cyprus. Although the Turkish army announced that the Kofi Annan plan was a threat to the national interest of both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the Cypriot Turks were heartily encouraged to vote in favour of the UN referendum on 24 April 2004 by the Turkish government (Kaliber, 2005). The JDP changed the traditional approach of Turkish foreign policy on this issue and supported the UN’s Kofi Annan Plan for the solution on the island. With this new policy, Turkey altered its former approach which insisted on the preservation of a balance of forces and the protection of a co-ethnic community by the existence of the Turkish military. Contrary to the former view which had been devoted to protecting Turkish Cypriots, Turkey accepted that security could be maintained through well-established rights on a legal platform and federal experience which would be established by a prospective solution in the island (Emerson and Tocci, 2004). In the referendum, however, the Greek side voted against the Annan Plan and stalled the 2004 attempts at a solution. Greek Cypriot membership of the EU in May 2004 would make the issue a Gordian knot.

Another important foreign policy issue in this period is the deterioration of relations with Israel. Two long-term allies of the region had disagreements starting in 2008. Turkey increasingly raised its voice on Israel’s stances on the Palestine issue and conditions in the Gaza Strip. The squabble between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Peres in Davos in 2010 exacerbated the situation. And finally Israel's military operation against the civil flotilla taking humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, which ended up with the death of nine
Turkish citizens, ceased the friendly relationship between two states. This would have significant influence on Turkish foreign policy as well as on regional power balances.

The period 2002-2010 is not limited to the four main foreign policy cases summarised above. Beside these the term witnessed various events in the realm of foreign policy some of which will be examined in the state level section below, while the JDP governments’ foreign policies are analysed under the scope of agency.

**IV Analysis of the Period with Regard to Turkish Foreign Policy Issues**

A) Systemic Level

In this section, Turkish foreign policy in the period 2002-2010 will be examined in terms of systemic effects as well as the constraints and possibilities created by the international structure. In other words, the external factors created by the structure of the international system and their influence in shaping Turkish foreign policy will be assessed.

The hypothesis of this thesis is that Turkish foreign policy can be explained by external (systemic) factors and internal (domestic) effects in the post-Cold War era. From the perspective of analysis at the systemic level, systemic influences on Turkish foreign policy seem to lessen in this second period (2002-2010). In addition to this difference in the systemic level, at the state level, the second component of the analysis, at which the foreign policy of the country is formulated in interaction with the factors of domestic politics, governmental agency became powerful and instrumental in the foreign policy-making process, being relatively better equipped and institutionally experienced vis-à-vis the effects of systemic changes.
This is mainly because the changes in the international system created by the end of the Cold War and following the transformation of the systemic structure were mostly completed in the first period of this research (1990-2002). In other words, the international system had already passed from a bipolar order to unipolarity. Changes in the foreign policies of states associated with the alteration of the systemic components had also mostly already materialised. Unlike the first epoch of this research, which caused turbulent times in world politics, in the second period, the international system settled down. Therefore, it can be claimed that this period of research was relatively free of systemic constraints in comparison with the first epoch.

In the second decade following the end of the Cold War, the international system was still unipolar and largely dominated by the USA. A considerable event affecting the superpower was the 9/11 attacks in 2001. These terrorist strikes changed the foreign policy notions of the superpower, the USA. The transformation of the USs’ conduct of its foreign policy from multilateralism to unilateralism with the concept of the ‘war on terror’ impacted on the international system and world. This alteration in USA security concepts and foreign policy brought about the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Turkey had survived the first shock waves created by the end of the Cold War era during the first period of this research. Turkish foreign policy had accommodated the conditions of the post-Cold War era by conducting foreign policies in a region surrounded by disputes and insecurities that occurred after the changes in power balances and alliances created by the new era. When it comes to the second period of the research (2002-2010), the problems created by the transformation of the system from bipolarity to unipolarity had already been relieved. The problems in the Balkans and the Caucasus were mostly solved
or at least relieved to a certain extent. Correspondingly, Turkey found itself in a relatively safer environment.

In addition to these improvements, Turkey had also strengthened its position in the region. With the help of increasing regionalisation in the unipolar world, Turkey became one of the most important countries of its vast surroundings: Eastern Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. The 9/11 attacks did not change the structure of the international system. But the changes that occurred the in superpower's foreign policy after 9/11, namely the USA’s ‘war on terror’ policies and unilateral inclinations in the management of terror problems in the international arena influenced Turkey’s stance in two major respects. First, since this event changed alliance patterns to a certain extent, Turkey, as a NATO member, was affected and became involved in the process indirectly. Secondly but more importantly, the USA, the world superpower, became Turkey’s neighbour with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The world’s most powerful country was henceforth placed in the primary sphere of influence of Turkey. This would change the rules of the game, not only because of the economic importance of Iraq for Turkey, but also the long-standing Kurdish issue.

The appearance of the USA in Turkey’s realm would again have a major influence on Turkey’s relationships with the states in the region. Moreover, the de facto existence of a systemic superpower adjacent to the country and the rise of its interests in the region in its war on terror would bring forth consequences for Turkish foreign policy and also affect the domestic politics of the country.

Regarding what international system required from Turkey, it changed slightly in this second period of analysis, 2002-2010. As summarised above, due to completion of from
bipolarity to unipolarity to a high degree turbulent times of the period just after the end of the Cold War settled down. Accordingly security concerns of Turkey relatively decreased. In addition to this, the policies Turkey pursued in line with Defensive Neorealist approach, also helped the country to increase its security level at the end of first period; 1990-2002.

As a result all of these, the international system created relatively less pressures on Turkey to sustain its security. Turkey, within this framework, preferred to increase its power along with maintaining its security.

In line with this objective, Turkey, firstly, continue its efforts to provide a peaceful environment in its vicinity. Turkey attempted to prevent the USA from invading Iraq by showing efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the issue. The problems between Israel and Syria were tried to be solved with the help of Turkish mediation.

Secondly Turkey continue to reinforce its position in alliances, international and regional organisations in this period as well. In the project of its EU membership, Turkey gained a lot of ground. As a result of these efforts, membership negotiations started in 2005. In the harmony with its goals, a collaborative and very positive behaviour was displayed for solution of Cyprus dispute.

Lastly Turkey proceed in progressing its economic ties with neighbour states in order to create a higher interdependency for the sake of maintaining its security. In parallel with recovery of the country's economic problems and improvement in economic parameters, Turkey's economic influence increased in neighbour countries.

B) State Level

In terms of analysis at the state level, the hypothesis regarding the second period (2002-2010) is that the agency was comparatively strong at the state level, mainly because
of the stable majority government. Indeed, the JDP was the only political party in power during the eight years under examination. After the period of coalitions, this novelty would alter the nature of agency in Turkey. In domestic politics, the role of the army would be restrained in foreign and domestic politics because of the assertive stance of the government within the period.

The change in the formation of governmental agency from numerous weak coalition governments to a strong majority government brought political stability to Turkey. It meant that a better equipped, internally coherent and institutionally experienced governmental agency was in charge after a decade of coalitions. In addition to the relief in terms of the pressures originating from the international system, the amelioration in governmental agency also enabled the governments to cope with the systemic factors which had already lessened by this period.

At this level of analysis, the government and the army, the key agential bodies which have significant roles in the formulation and the implementation of foreign policy in Turkey, will constitute the focus of the study. In the following sections, the governments and the army will be analysed through reference to the instruments of foreign policy analysis which assess the role of domestic factors on foreign policy by focusing on apparent domestic political structures and the political institutionalisation of the country.

Besides analysis of the governments and army and the relationship between them at the state level of analysis, in the domestic context, the role and effects of public opinion, interest groups and the media will also be included in the analysis as complementary factors if required.
1. The Government

With this period (2002-2010), Turkish politics met single party rule after more than a decade of weak and fragile coalitions. The Justice and Development Party (JDP), in its first election in November 2002, received approximately 34% of the vote. The party, thanks to the election threshold, gained 355 seats (65%) in the parliament. The second general election in July 2007 ended up a victory with a voting rate for the JDP of 46%.

Table 2 shows the governments, party, prime ministers and general elections in power during 2002-2010.

Table 2. Governments, parties, prime ministers and general elections in power during 2002-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic Government Number</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Type of Government</th>
<th>Party/Parties in Power</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Election (3 November 2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th Government</td>
<td>14.03.2003 - 29.08.2007</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (JDP)</td>
<td>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before analysing the governmental agency referring to the significant foreign policy events of the period, it is necessary to describe the JDP and its position in domestic politics in order to evaluate its reflexes and stance regarding foreign policy issues in general and against the role of the army in particular.

**The JDP in Turkish Political Life**

In fact, the roots of the JDP were based on the first Islamist political leader of Republic, Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan. Most founders of the JDP grew up around Erbakan and with his ideology throughout their political life. When the Welfare Party (WP) was closed down by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it was a continuation of the previous Islamist parties of Erbakan, the Felicity Party (FP) was founded. The FP witnessed the scramble of two wings, ‘traditionalists’, the supporters of Erbakan, and ‘innovationists’, defending a moderate approach. At the FP congress in May 2000, Abdullah Gül ran for party leadership as the innovationist candidate against Recai Kutan, from the old guard of the traditionalists. Abdullah Gül's loss of the election at the FP congress created the idea of founding a new party among innovationist circles under the guidance of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç. Erbakan's movement would soon divide into two different organisations soon. Not long afterwards, the moderate wing founded the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in August 2001, under the
leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the popular mayor of Istanbul (Dağı, 2008; Özbudun, 2006).

According to Kahraman (2009, p.125), the traditionalists suggested that Erbakan's Islamic movement had to compromise with the state. Otherwise, conflicting with the state, its values and its institutions would cause the same results: closed parties, being banned from politics and coup d'etats, as had already happened. He claims that this idea was formed under the necessity that the growing number of Anatolian businessmen, the important component of the party grassroots, would not be able to increase its power across the country through part of a movement clashing with the state. Unlike its predecessor parties stemming from Erbakan tradition, the JDP rejected describing the party using Islamic discourse. Because of previous experiences in the cases of the Wealth Party and the Virtue Party of Erbakan in recent political history, the leaders of the JDP were conscious that quarrelling with the secular circles is not regarded well by the Turkish people (Çavdar, 2006). The JDP stated that ideologies, including Islamism, ended in the age of globalisation and described the party’s stance as ‘democratic conservatism' (Akdoğan, 2004, p.12ff) The party’s leaders paid attention to assuring the army and the media that religious issues would not be used in party politics (Daği, 2008; Tuğal, 2007). This created deep concerns on the part of the republican, secular and Kemalist state establishment, which had ruled the country almost since its foundation in 1923. These groups considered the Islamists as a threat to the republic and the democratic values of the country, which had been hard-earned throughout the century-long westernisation project of the country.

From a sociological point of view, the JDP voters consisted of rural residents, artisans and small traders in the cities, urban squatters and the Islamist bourgeoisie (Özbudun,
The supporters of the party regarded the JDP as “the political representative of the new middle class” which comprised provincial artisans and traders, small and mid-range entrepreneurs, young business executives and a considerable portion of the working class (Insel, 2003). Under these circumstances, the party insisted that it was the centre-right party in Turkish political life and willing to establish a consensus between provincial businessmen, religious intellectuals and the secular state elite (Tuğal, 2007). According to Yavuz (2010, p.10) an Islamist bourgeoisie emerging from provincial businessmen in the party grassroots falsified the Weberian proposition of incoherence between Islam and capitalism in Turkey's case. On this point, Kahraman (2009, p.124) claims that the JDP could not generate a sound ideology, because, especially during the first years of the party, its discourse on ‘liberal conservatism’ could not resonate within the mass of society. Indeed, liberal conservatism would make sense when liberal circles started to support the JDP in the following years. Consequently the JDP government, while strengthening its rule by convincing suspicious voters that the JDP would never Islamise the secular republic, was also contending with the army and trying to restrict its sphere of influence.

The Foreign Policy Principles of the JDP

The architect of the JDP's foreign policy strategy, Ahmet Davutoğlu (2008), the principal consultant to the Prime Minister, first Abdullah Gül then Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since 2003, signifies the principles of Turkish foreign policy under a five main titles. First, a balance between freedom and security: the defence and security needs of the state should not be an obstacle to individual liberty. Second, a zero problem policy with the neighbours: The JDP aims to solve all the problems that Turkey has had with neighbouring countries, such as Greece, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Armenia. The third principle is to grow relations with the neighbouring regions and beyond: Turkey’s regional impact
expands to the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The fourth principle is adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy: Turkey’s relations with global actors (USA, NATO and the EU) aim to be complementary, not competitive. The last is rhythmic diplomacy: the necessity to comply with rapid changes in international diplomacy (Davutoğlu, 2008, Sözen 2008). According to Davutoğlu (2008, p.83), interference in world politics by using a coherent international stand shows Turkey’s aim in foreign policy and indicates the conversion of the state from a central country to a global power.

A prominent scholar in the field of International Relations, Ahmet Davutoğlu, presented his foreign policy approach and its foundations in his book, *Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* (The Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position) (2001). He claims that Turkey is not an ordinary nation state in the international system. On the contrary, Turkey inherited the political and cultural experiences and accumulations of the Ottoman Empire, its predecessor and a significant power in world history. Because of these features, attributed to Turkey by its history, Turkey cannot act without compliance with this features. In the past, especially during the Cold War period, Turkey might not have acted in line with this character because of the special conditions of the time. Now, however, Turkey should pursue effective policies in its region, bearing in mind that this is a natural necessity of Turkey's historical and geographic debt. Turkey should use these benefits, presented by its history and geography, and establish advanced relationships with near and far neighbours. In this direction, an active foreign policy should be pursued based on wise strategic planning. Turkey is not a frontier country as per the role given to the country during the Cold War period. The position of bridge country between the West and the East designated for Turkey after the Cold War is also not appropriate. Its geographical
and ideational features cast a role of central state for Turkey. In accordance with its new central position in world politics Turkey, should ensure security and stability both for itself and its region (Davutoğlu, 2008, pp.77-79). In this way, the ideational ground was set by Davutoğlu for the JDP’s foreign policy implementations such as the zero problem policy and growing relationships with its neighbours, multi-dimensional foreign policy and rhythmic diplomacy: the necessity to accommodate rapid changes in international diplomacy.

Davutoğlu's (2001) approach to foreign policy has been both praised and criticised. One of the most common criticisms is to accuse him of Neo-Ottomanism, claiming that Turkey has intentions to revitalise the Ottoman Empire by pursuing an active foreign policy towards the states that lay within Ottoman territory in the past (Murinson, 2006: Gözen, 2010, p.26; Uzgel, 2010, p.359). From a different point of view, Oran (2013, p.134) criticises the thoughts of Davutoğlu (2001) on the ground that it is based on realism which theorises the balances and dynamics of power from the perspectives of geopolitics, mostly great powers. According to him, because Turkey is not a great power, an old-fashioned realist approach cannot fit it. Although the active foreign policy pursued by the JDP can naturally be misunderstood by states in the former Ottoman territory, criticism of the non-compatibility of realism for Turkey is unfounded. Oran's criticism of Neo-Ottomanism regarding Davutoğlu in particular and the JDP governments in general is much more consistent. According to Oran (2013, pp. 196-198) the discourse of Davutoğlu and the government on Neo-Ottomanism fed the debate in the academic and political spheres both in Turkey and abroad. However, reconstituting the Ottoman Empire is materially impossible. Oran believes that the JDP used this discourse for three reasons. First the discourse of Neo-Ottomanism was operated as an framework against Kemalism,
which downgraded the different identities, including islamism, by the JDP, a pro-Islamist party. Second, Davutoğlu's nostalgic approach to the Ottoman Empire in his book *The Strategic Depth* is transformed into political discourse as Neo-Ottomanism to energise JDP voters. Lastly, and related to the second point, the need for a motivation-orientated symbolic project of the Anatolian businessmen who constituted the driving force of the JDP's grassroots is supplied with this discourse, which also magnifies the image of the party.

In the foreign policy area of the JDP party programme (2012) and the programmes of the 58th Government (2002), 59th Government (2003) and 60th Government (2007), it is stated that Turkish foreign policy needs its priorities to redefined and a new balance must be established between the national interests of the country and the reality of the changing regional and global environment. The programmes indicate that with a strategic perspective, Turkish foreign policy will be harmonised in line with regional and global issues.

**58th and 59th Governments**

As stated previously, the USA invasion of Iraq became a current issue for the 58th Government which had came to power in November 2002. The motion which would allow the USA to use Turkish territory to occupy Iraq was refused in the Turkish National Assembly on 1 March 2003. This created a shock and resulted in a strong shake in the relationship between the USA and Turkey. However, Turkey had had a good relationship with the USA. For instance, Turkey supported the USA occupation of Afghanistan in 2001 and sent its troops to there within the scope of the ISAF. Moreover, in the field of
economy, Turkey's severe crisis in 2001 had been soothed through the help of the IMF and the USA.

Gözen (2010, p.26) argues that the refusal of the motion is an indication of the change in foreign policy under the JDP government, on the grounds that it is also a sharp divergence of Turkey from the USA in terms of the Middle East. His claim can be accepted to a certain extent, in that Turkey used to act generally in line with the USA in the Middle East. However, it is too early to label this event a signal of an alteration in Turkish foreign policy.

A prospective invasion of Iraq threatened three main risks for Turkey (Turan 2012, p.288). The first regards the fear that Iraqi Kurds who had lived as a part of territorial integrity in Iraq might gain their independence if Saddam Hussein fell from the power. Related to this, they might increase the separatist intentions of the Kurds living in Turkey. The second risk was economy-orientated. Turkey, which had to pay a huge economic burden after the First Gulf War in 1991, never wanted to experience the same adverse effects of war in its immediate region. The last risk was more psychological. The JDP government thought that the country's image would be harmed in the eyes of the region with which the new government was planning to improve relationships if Turkey occupied Iraq with the USA and coalition states.

To analyse the refusal of the motion in the Parliament and the general attitude of the JDP, we must examine the other actors’ positions in terms of foreign policy. In 2003, Ahmet Necdet Sezer was the president. He had been elected in 2000 by the three-party coalition government, the 57th Government formed by the Democratic Leftist Party (DLP) with the participation of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and the Motherland Party
(MP) under the premiership of Bülent Ecevit. Ahmet Necdet Sezer had been the president of the constitutional court when he was nominated as the independent candidate by the coalition government. He was a stout Kemalist and never welcomed the JDP’s rise to power. During the motion crisis, President Sezer considered the approval of the UN as imperative. Since there was no UN resolution, he was openly against allowing the USA to use Turkish soil to invade Iraq.

On the other hand, the JDP government, headed by Prime Minister Abdullah Gül who personally believed that it would be very difficult to explain to Turkish society if Turkey supported the USA invasion of Iraq, stated that any decision in this direction would place a very heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the state's executives (Kürkçüoğlu and Koraş, 2011). He therefore made great efforts to solve the problems between Iraq and the USA. In this regard, Prime Minister Gül made official visits to the states in the region and shared his opinions that any destabilisation in Iraq would cause a high price to pay for all of the countries in the region (Turan, 2012, p.289). Achieving no results in its diplomatic attempts, the JDP government canalised its effort into cooperation with the USA on the conditions that Turkey's concerns regarding Iraq must be answered by the USA.

Regarding the Army's position, the generals were not eager to take the whole responsibility for this risky decision (Benli-Altunüşik, 2006, p.190). When commanders or high ranking officers met, broad statements were not given to the American side which was expecting the Turkish Army's open support for occupying Iraq. The excuse of the Turkish side was that this decision was taken by the Turkish Assembly (Yeşiltaş, 2009, p.45).
As will be assessed in the other factors section below, public opinion and civil society were also mostly against the war in general and cooperation with the USA in invading Iraq in particular. In the end, the refusal of the motion damaged the relationship between Turkey and the USA. Turkey would need to make efforts to repair this damage in their relations.

The refusal of the motion can be analysed within the scope of the three level analysis. From the systemic level perspective, the USA’s pressure on Turkey to cooperate in the occupation of Iraq was a systemic factor, because the USA was the superpower of the unipolar international system. After the 9/11 attacks, the USA changed the code of its foreign policy around its implementation of the war on terror, ending up with a unilateral inclination in international relations, and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. These policies generated systemic effects on actors in world politics. Turkey, therefore, came under systemic pressures, which tried to compel the country to work in cooperation with the USA.

At the state level, on the other hand, a more complex situation existed. The President was absolutely against cooperation with the USA under the current conditions, without a UN resolution. In governmental agency, there was no agreement in the issue. The JDP government had came to power by a majority six months ago. This issue was the first significant test for the JDP, which was not ready to give a coordinated response. The army was not in favour, but it expressed its thoughts. With respect to public opinion and media, they were against cooperation to a large extent. Public opinion condemned the prospective USA occupation as unfair and unethical. Surveys showed that 94% of citizens were opposed to the invasion (Gözen, 2009, p.352).
The key factor in this case was national interest. The First Gulf War, 1990-1991, caused severe damage to the Turkish economy. Kurdish separatism and related terror also increased in the conditions occurring after the First Gulf War. In this respect, Turkish politicians and public opinion were clear that a new war on Turkey's immediate border would again cause huge economic loss. Moreover, the proposed motion that USA soldiers would settle on Turkish territory had never happened since the Independence War, during which Ottoman territories were occupied by French, British and Greek forces. These two concerns, together with ethical considerations, increased the idea that being in collaboration with the USA on the invasion of Iraq was against Turkey's national interests.

In the final analysis, the case of the refused motion showed that Turkey resisted systemic pressures, and that domestic factors at the state level determined foreign policy. The components of the agency in state level, the government and the army, associated with the media and public opinion, choose to pursue the national interests which formed in the domestic sphere and, did not act in line with the systemic pressures.

**60th Government**

The JDP governments opened a new period in terms of the relationship with the Middle East which had long been ignored. In the period including the initiative referred to as the Middle East Opening, the JDP government aimed to improve and strengthen relations with the Middle East and other Islamic countries. According to the vision and background drawn up by the architect of the JDP's foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey, as a centre state in world politics, should conduct active policies, especially in the states in its region with which it had deep historical and cultural ties. The principles in line with this vision, the zero problem policy with neighbours and a multi-dimensional foreign
policy, encouraged the JDP to improve relationships with the Middle Eastern countries (Çetinsaya, 2008). In addition to the fact that the JDP's Middle East policy aspirations coincided with its foreign policy principles, the conditions in the region were also suitable (Özcan, 2010). Turkey's refusal to work in cooperation with the USA regarding the occupation of Iraq increased the country's image in the eyes of regional states which had considered Turkey as the close ally of the West. Relations with Syria had flourished by the 2000s, after a long period of crisis. Iraq, undergoing a reconstruction process after the war, welcomed Turkey. Iran acted in line with the other regional states. In the end, Turkey started to develop very good relationships with the Middle East. In this sense, political, economic and cultural relationships reached a hitherto unseen peak in Turkey's history.

The JDP's Middle East policies were associated with the Islamic roots of the party, as one factor among the others (Uzgel, 2013, p.264). However, it is clear that the Middle East policy was a natural consequence of the JDP’s foreign policy philosophy.

2. The Army

The army's historically strong position in Turkish politics and its influence over political issues and institutions had increased during the first period of this research, because the coalition governments were in a weak condition and because of increasing concerns about the security of the country, which had faced both external and internal threats in the environment after the end of the Cold War era. Moreover, the army coupled its power with a post-modern coup d’etat in February 1997.

During this period of analysis (2002-2010), however, the army encountered less favourable external and internal conditions for maintaining its position. On the
international front, Turkey was in the process of EU membership which forced the country to democratise its politics, legislation and institutions. The main ally of Turkey, the USA, championed democratic and liberal values and human rights as a natural part of its superpower position in the unipolar world. In other words, any attempt by the army to increase or continue its influence in politics would be harshly criticised by the international community and by Turkey’s allies.

Domestically, the army faced a strong and determined majority government, the JDP. From the perspective of the JDP, the army was holding excessive power which was used to exert influence on democratic governance in many aspects of politics, and this should be curtailed. Furthermore, the democratic consciousness had increased in society, where democratic demands were growing and civil society was flourishing. These conditions made the decline of the role of the army in Turkish politics inevitable. But this would not happen smoothly.

The initial concerns of the governing elites regarding the JDP transformed later into a harsh power struggle between the ruling party and the republican, secular and Kemalist circles of the country which were present in the political institutions, bureaucracy, judiciary, business life and more importantly the army. This struggle would stigmatise Turkish domestic politics, foreign policy and socio-economic life throughout this period. Towards the end of the period the JDP government would take over the reins. As Özbudun and Hale (2010) described, in this second period, the struggle continued in a condition of controlled disagreement between 2002 and 2006, during which time the government strengthened its position by instituting legal regulations. It shifted to a state of challenge and crisis by 2007, when some of the army executives were arrested for being a part of a
plot against the government. In the last phase came the army's withdrawal by 2007-2008 onwards, after which the government took almost complete control.

3. Other Factors (Public Opinion, Ethnic and Interest Groups, Media)

During this period, other factors, notably, civil society, interest groups and the media, increased their roles and influence on the country's foreign policy in comparison with the period of 1990-2002. The progress in the field of democracy and improvement in economic conditions naturally affected society in a positive way. Moreover, civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Turkey started to become more connected to their counterparts across the world (Cicioğlu, 2012). All of these factors strengthened civil society and paved the way for its exerting increasing influence on political life and the foreign policy decision-making mechanisms.

The invasion of Iraq by the USA, and refusal of the parliamentary resolution which would permit the USA to use Turkish territory, in March 2003 was a good example of other factors. In the same regard, similar forces influenced the foreign policy of the government towards Israel to some extent. In particular, public opinion influenced it in a negative way over Israel's treatment of Palestinians, and some islamist groups with traditional opposition to Israel created additional pressure on the JDP government.

C) Individual Level

In comparison with the previous period, there are many fewer figures affecting the foreign policy-making process in this period, because of the domination of majority governments instead of various coalitions.

1. Leaders as Key Individuals in the Decision-Making Process
*Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*

A former islamist politician and mayor of Istanbul, had created considerable influence as conservative democrat in Turkish politics. He is known as a scout Muslim and ambitious character (Kaplan, 2007). Erdoğan spent years in the Milli Görüş Hareketi (National View) Movement, in which he held many important positions from his youth (Besli and Özbay, 2010). Erdoğan's style and stance in politics resembled Turgut Özal, the former president. According to Ak (2012a, p.522), Erdoğan’s nature is described as challenging political limitations, relationship orientated and directive.

Erdoğan considered foreign policy as an significant field. From when he came to power, he gradually increased his interest in foreign policy issues. In this context, Erdoğan increasingly joined foreign visits and especially international summits. In line with his openness to knowledge, Erdoğan prefers to work with various advisors. Although he became more and more effective in decision-making processes in general, it is said that Erdoğan gave primacy to the ideas of his advisors, notably Ahmet Davutoğlu (Ak, 2012b, pp.172-173).

Sasley (2012) characterised Erdoğan's foreign policy approach as pragmatist in comparison with the first islamist figure of Turkish politics, Necmettin Erbakan, in a study regarding Turkey's EU membership process. It is obvious that Erdoğan is very different from Erbakan in many manner. Sasley's approach can be accepted within the boundaries of his case study, the EU membership process. However, Erdoğan had also other dispositions such as anger and obstinacy, as it would be seen in his later years in power.

Erdoğan, in spite of his high interest in foreign policy, left broad room for his adviser, and later minister of foreign affairs, Davutoğlu. Erdoğan, in power for years and working
coherently with his team, had the opportunity to directly influence foreign policy-making. His background, ideology and worldview were institutionalised via the government headed by him and affected Turkish foreign policy in the given period.

* Ahmet Davutoğlu

A professor of international relations, is accepted as representing the main figure behind the JDP’s foreign policy since 2002. His life story, moving from a small town in Anatolia to Istanbul, then to Malaysia as an scholar, also reflects his value-orientated character (Zengin, 2010). Davutoğlu was appointed as the chief foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan in 2003. Until he was appointed minister of foreign affairs in 2009, he played a major role in the formation of the Turkish foreign policy of the period. As analysed above, Davutoğlu presented his main foreign policy philosophy in his principal book, *The Strategic Depth* (2001)

Davutoğlu conceptualised the pillars of the JDP's foreign policy. He worked behind the scenes in his early career as foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan. Koçer (2008, p.924) argued that Davutoğlu became more pre-eminent in Turkish foreign policy-making by 2007. He attributed this increase in Davutoğlu’s role and influence to his increasing missions and responsibilities in the field of foreign policy, as peacemaker in some conflicts and a representative at international meetings.

Davutoğlu entitled later as the strategic mind of Turkey (Bayhan, 2012), prepared, managed and implemented Turkish foreign policy on the strength of his abilities of high perception and conceptualisation from when the JDP came to power. Equally important as his ideational advantages, he benefited from his place in the mechanism of statecraft, which he used as a wide and safe channel through which he was able to institutionalise his
ideational capacity in order to exert full influence on the Turkish foreign policy of the given period.

V Conclusion

In this chapter, Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era between 2002 and 2010 has been examined. An analysis of the three different levels was conducted with the purpose of exploring the external (structural) and internal (domestic) factors and their roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy.

At the systemic level, the muscular effects of the system which had been experienced during the previous period lessened in the international system during the period of 2002-2010. This was because the strong waves generated by the system due to the alteration from bipolarity to unipolarity had become much more settled after a decade. Moreover, no dramatic changes in the international order were experienced in the system during this period. Although the changes in the USA, the superpower of the unipolar world, after the 9/11 attacks created pressures to a certain extent in world and regional politics, this cannot be compared with those fierce waves during the first period. The system remained unipolar and dominated by the USA during this period as well. Turkey was relatively less influenced by systemic pressures during the period 2002-2010. This meant that the country had to spend comparatively less effort to respond to the pressures coming from the system.

At the state level, Turkey experienced remarkable alterations in agency during this period. First of all, the era of coalitions was ended by the accession of the JDP to sole power. A powerful and consistent governmental agency can be stated as the main reason why the army had to return to barracks.
The individual level of analysis also produced interesting consequences for this timeline. The key figures in foreign policy-making had the opportunity to inject their ideational features into the foreign policy-making of the country. This was mostly due to the coherence of the majority governments, which worked with the other governmental bodies, the army and the state executives, in a more consistent way.
CHAPTER 5 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

(COMPARISON OF PERIODS)

I Introduction

In this chapter, the two different periods of Turkish foreign policy, 1990-2002, analysed in Chapter 3, and 2002-2010, examined in Chapter 4, will be compared. The aim of this chapter is to reveal similarities and differences between the two periods in question based on the analysis conducted in the two previous chapters.

It is believed that this comparative chapter will help in the explanation and understanding of the thesis in seeking answers to its core research question: What are the external and internal (domestic) factors shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War?

The original flow of the three-level analysis as presented in Chapters 3 and 4 is maintained in this chapter, which consists of four main sections. In the introduction, the objective of the chapter and the role of this comparative step as a part of the whole thesis will be explained. The second section will cover the differences and similarities in the international system during the two periods. As in Chapters 3 and 4, Section Three will be the main part of this chapter, in which a comparative analysis of the periods with regard to Turkish foreign policy issues will be conducted at the three different levels of analysis. Firstly, the pressures exerted by the changes in the system on Turkish foreign policy during
the two periods will be compared at the systemic level. Secondly, at the state level, the analysis making reference to the agential constituent at the domestic level, the government, the army and other factors, if any, will be assessed using the comparative method. Thirdly, the individual level will be the place of comparison for the personal roles and influences of the key actors who held power during the two periods. In the concluding section, the main findings of this chapter will be briefly presented.

II Differences and Similarities in the International System during the Two Periods

The nature of the international system during the periods 1990-2002 and 2002-2010 is given from a comparative perspective in this section. In this way, structural changes in the system and its repercussions for world politics during the periods in question are compared.

The beginning of the 1990-2002 period marks the timeline for the end of the Cold War era, which had lasted for more than four decades. The Cold War ended in 1990 with the dissolution of the USSR, which also opened up a new epoch in the international system: the post-Cold War era. The collapse of the Cold War system happened over a remarkably short time and peacefully. But its echoes in the international system would be experienced over a much longer period.

Bipolarity, the main feature of the international system during the Cold War period, transformed into unipolarity during the post-Cold War era. In conjunction with this alteration in the systemic order, changes occurred in world politics. For instance, the East-West confrontation between two blocs, headed by the USA and the USSR, ended. New
states emerged throughout the world. Disputes and struggles between states in the same vicinity, which had been repressed under the bipolar system, started to reappear and led to conflicts and even wars. Democratic values and liberal economic rules spread throughout the world.

Patterns in the foreign policy behaviour of states also shifted. States had to adapt their foreign policies to the conditions of the new international order. In relation to the alteration in the balance of power in the system, alliance patterns and relationships between the unipole and periphery also changed. Regional security issues came to the fore based on the naturally increasing significance of sub-regions of the world under the influence of a dominant superpower in a unipolar world.

The second period examined in the thesis, 2002-2010, signifies the second decade after the end of the Cold War. As opposed to 1990-2002, this period was relatively calm in terms of changes in the international system. No alterations occurred in the international order, which was still unipolar. The 9/11 attacks in 2001, however, created significant differences in the foreign policy of the USA, the superpower of the unipolar world order. Although the USA’s war on terror policy changed the focus of its foreign policy decisions and implementations from multilateralism to unilateralism, which also caused some changes in world politics, in the international system at large, a condition of equilibrium was reached.

When comparing the two periods, 1990-2002 and 2002-2010, in terms of alterations in the international system and their reflection in world politics, it can be argued that the two periods differ greatly. Unlike the period of 1990-2002, which was subject to a change in the international order from bipolarity to unipolarity, the period of 2002-2010 did not face
any major alterations in the international order. During the first period, therefore, the international structure generated much more pressure on the system in general and on its actors, the states, in particular. This meant that on average states had to take systemic effects more into consideration while conducting their foreign policies in the period 1990-2002 than during 2002-2010.

With respect to similarities between the two periods, 1990-2002 and 2002-2010 equally passed under the conditions of a unipolar systemic order. Similarly, the USA was the dominant superpower of world politics throughout the two periods. The two periods each witnessed a significant event in world history: the dissolution of the communist bloc during the first period and the 9/11 attacks and subsequent actions during the second. Although these events were not equivalent to each other physically, they were equally dramatic.

**III Comparative Analysis of the Periods with Regard to Turkish Foreign Policy Issues**

**Policy Issues**

A) **Systemic Level**

The period of 1990-2002 had a significant impact in terms of the effects of the systemic changes and their consequences on Turkey’s international position and its foreign policy. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey became a relatively stronger country. This was not due to any improvement in Turkey’s own political, economic or social constituents, but because of the relative weakness of the other countries in its region after the dissolution of the USSR. During this period, the systemic waves emanating from the changes in the
international order compelled Turkey to transform its Cold War era static foreign policy from its passive and dependent nature into a relatively active and more independent form.

Depending upon the strength of the systemic effects on world politics over the region in which Turkey was located, Turkish foreign policy experienced and dealt with more events during the period of 1990-2002 in terms of both quality and quantity. One problem arising from the change in the polarity of the international order was that disputes and conflicts frozen under the conditions of the Cold War period started to reappear during the first period. Correspondingly, Turkey found itself in the middle of the fires.

In the fields of politics, security and economy, Turkey experienced the destabilising influences of the First Gulf War between Iraq and the coalition powers headed by the USA at its southern border. To the West, Turkey was surrounded by conflicts and disputes among the Balkan countries, most of which experienced political, economic and social problems after becoming free from their communist regimes, including interstate disputes escalated by the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the East, where three independent states – Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia – emerged after the disappearance of the USSR, Turkey witnessed the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which lasted for years and ended up with the invasion of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, equivalent to a fifth of Azeri territory, by Armenian forces backed by the Russian Army.

The Russo-Chechen war between 1994 and 1996 was another security concern for Turkey because of its geographical proximity to the Caucasus and the fact that it hosted a large number of citizens of Chechen origin.

In addition to this, Turkey’s long-term disputes with Greece – the Cyprus problem, demilitarisation of the Greek Islands, the extension of territorial waters, delimitation of the
continental shelf, the Flight Information Region/FIR and disputed islets between the two countries – had been transferred to the platform of the EU with the full membership of Greece to the union in 1981, and these started to be more problematic for Turkey in the international arena, as the EU expanded and emerged as a significant actor in world politics during the period of 1990-2002.

What was more, Turkey’s war with the Kurdish separatist movement (PKK), fed by the power vacuum in Northern Iraq after the First Gulf War, was no longer an internal problem. It was internationalised by the EU, which was becoming more and more critical of Turkey on its human rights and democratic values.

During the first period, Turkey also experienced opportunities emanating from the changes in the international order. Within this scope, Turkey no longer had a common border with Russia, thanks to the emergence of the new independent states in the Caucasus. More importantly, the power vacuum left by the USSR after its dissolution enabled Turkey to conduct active policies establishing or improving its relationships with the vast region from the Balkans to the Middle East, and even to Central Asia, where new states were emerging with which Turkey had kinship and historical, cultural and religious connections.

It can be argued that the systemic pressures on Turkey relatively lessened during the 2002-2010 period. Because of the growing weight of the regions in unipolar system politics, Turkey started to emerge as a regional power in its surrounding area during this second period.

Turkey entered this epoch with alarms ringing, informed by the invasion of Iraq by the USA and the coalition forces. Making a great effort to prevent a war in its immediate vicinity, Turkey preferred to stay out of the war when its diplomatic attempts failed.
Turkey’s differences with the USA on Iraq’s invasion affected both its relationship with the superpower and its interests in the region in a negative way.

In another entrenched problem of Turkish foreign policy, Cyprus, Turkey was unable to get the desired result in spite of its support for the solution in the island within the framework of the UN proposition, the Annan Plan. The refusal of the Greek Cypriots in their plebiscite of 2004, while the Turkish Cypriots voted in favour by a landslide, invalidated the efforts of Turkey and the international community.

Turkey’s journey towards EU membership is another foreign policy issue worthy of mention. After Turkey’s nomination as a candidate state in 1999, a new period started in Turkish foreign policy in terms of relationships with the EU. At the beginning of the period 2002-2010, Turkey was very enthusiastic about membership. Accordingly, it made considerable efforts to meet the acquis communitaire by harmonising its legal structure in line with the EU’s. Over the course of time, especially after the enlargements of the union in 2004 and 2007, the driving forces of the EU, notably Germany and France, altered their attitude and started to oppose Turkey’s membership. The economic difficulties occurring among EU members would later consolidate the anti-Turkey front, while Turkey also lost its initial excitement due to the controversial attitude of the union, which had never been applied to any candidate country before.

It can be argued that Turkey had to deal with fewer problems in foreign policy in 2002-2010 compared with the previous period. This gave the country the opportunity to spend its resources and energy on improving its position in the region and across the world by establishing new diplomatic ties while strengthening the current ones and also by improving its cooperation with other countries, starting with its neighbours.
From the point of view of Defensive Neorealism, these two period presented different patterns. Because of the strong pressures created by the international system, Turkey had to pursue policies to increase its security in the first period. In other words, Turkey's high security concerns were significantly high. And this notion was the main factor to shape Turkish Foreign Policy which gave weight to defensive policies during the period.

In the second period, however, security concerns of Turkey relatively decreased mainly because transition of the system from bipolarity to unipolarity nearly completed. Turkey's defensive and pacifist policies also helped to form a relatively safe environment in its location. In the period of 2002-2010 Turkey was able to policies to increase its power along with maintaining its security.

B) State Level

The period of 1990-2002 was an interesting timeline during which anomalies could be observed at the state level, especially in the agency, which was constituted by the government and the army, as the main actors in foreign policy-making. With reference to the governmental agency, as given in detail in Chapter 3, this first period of analysis witnessed eleven coalition governments, seven of which were coalitions that reigned for more than ten years in total within the twelve-year period.

Most of these coalition governments lacked coherence in both domestic and foreign policy. In the same period, the main foreign policy-making body within the government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was headed by fourteen different ministers. In addition to deviation within the governments, some extreme examples of divergences between presidents and prime ministers were also seen in this period. For instance, the disputes
between President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel, reaching an implicit enmity, prevented Turkey from taking effective decisions on foreign policy issues. The contests between President Demirel and Prime Ministers Çiller and Erbakan can also be given as examples of incoherence within the state.

Regarding the army, determined to be the second institution in the agential structure at state level, it also presented anomalies in the state machinery and in its relationships with the governments. The army increased its role, historically strong and backed by legal foundations in the constitution and related laws, in the foreign and security policies of the country by filling the vacuum in domestic and foreign policy-making left by the weak governments in the relatively insecure environment of the post-Cold War period. This further strengthened the position of the army in Turkish politics, where it already exerted influence over domestic and foreign policy-making processes. The Army's increasing power in foreign policy was another factor to weaken the coalition governments. Because of openly criticism of the Army regarding many foreign policy issues the governments caused a view of disunity and incapability in the eyes of international community, The governments had difficulties to preserve the country's interests in international area and vis a vis states. This was one of the main reason that Turkey could not take efficient steps compelled by international system in the way of maintaining its security and also benefited by the opportunities and incentives of the systemic conditions in the first period.

In addition to its excessive role in policy-making, army executives also became involved in direct conflict with the state executive. The disputes between President ÖZal and the Chief of General Staff of the period, which ended up with Chief of General Staff's resignation and divergences between Prime Minister Çiller and the command echelon are good examples for how incoherence affected agency.
Under the above-mentioned conditions of fragile coalitions, disputes at the top of the state executive, incoherence both within the government and between the army and governmental bodies, the governments were not able to respond to the constraints and opportunities imposed by the system in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.

When it came to the second decade after the end of the Cold War era, Turkey encountered very different view at the state level. In terms of governmental agency, the country saw a majority party, the JDP, after nearly eleven years. Apart from the stability brought by the majority governments, the election of Abdullah Gül, former prime minister and later minister of foreign affairs in the JDP governments put an end to the divergence, common in the previous period, among the top executives at state level.

Concerning the role of the army in politics and the relationship between the army and the governments, the situation started to become normal in the period of 2002-2010. First, the role of the army in domestic and foreign policy was naturally limited to a certain extent with the end of the coalition governments. Second, the government took some legal steps in line with the harmonisation of the legal structure of the country to align with the EU’s acquis communautaire. Within the scope of these democratisation attempts towards EU membership, the army's role in domestic and foreign policy was limited by legal arrangements.

The dramatic alterations at state level in general and in the governmental agency and the army in particular created much more coherent agency. Under these proper conditions at state level, the governments had more ability to respond to the constraints and opportunities offered by the international system in the post-Cold War era, at a time when systemic pressure had already lessened.
When comparing these two periods, 1990-2002 and 2002-2010 in the context of state level analysis, it can be said that there is no similarity between these epochs. However, there were plenty of contrasts. For instance, in contrast to the period of 1990-2002, a majority government was in power throughout the second period, 2002-2010. In the first period, lack of coherence affected the relationships within the coalition governments and between the governments and the army, including those among the chief executives of the state, but the second period, especially after the role of the army in the state machinery was limited to a certain extent, experienced much more coherence across the state level.

C) Individual Level

The individual level is the place where personal and ideational features, such as the personal characteristics, beliefs, worldviews, motivations, institutionalised ideas, values and ideologies, of the key actors in the foreign policy-making process are analysed.

With regard to the first period, 1990-2002, President Turgut Özal, Prime Minister, later President, Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan were put under examination. In the general view, Özal can be described a liberal, modernist leader, despite his religious background, and a risk taker. Demirel is regarded as overambitious in his political life but cautious in foreign policy issues. Erbakan is an example of a stout religious politician with radical ideas stemming from his Islamist ideology. The problem in this period regarding individual analysis was that none of these figures had enough opportunity to fully exert their ideas and values on the foreign policy issues of the country. This is for two reasons. First, because of the fast circulation in governmental agency, these key actors could not find enough time to affect foreign policy decisions in line with their ideational features. Second, because of the incoherence within the governments, between
the governments and the state executives, and lastly between the governments and the army, the key actors in foreign policy-making were unable to exert their influence enough on state processes. In other words, they were limited by incoherence and clashing ideas in agency.

In the second period, 2002-2010, however, the key actors in foreign policy making, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the principal consultant to the Prime Minister, later minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, had enough opportunity to exert their ideational features into foreign policy issues in the safe harbour of majority governments which worked with governmental bodies, the army and the state executive in a more coherent way.

**IV Conclusion**

This chapter has compared two periods of Turkish foreign policy, 1990-2002, and 2002-2010, which were analysed respectively in Chapters 3 and 4, with the purpose of revealing similarities and differences between these two periods in order to help the explanation and understanding of the thesis as it sought answers to its core research question: What are the external and internal (domestic) factors shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War?

In terms of a comparative analysis of the international system during the two periods, it has been ascertained that they are quite different on the grounds that the international order transformed from bipolar to unipolar during the period 1990-2002 while there was no change in the polarity of the system in 2002-2010. Correspondingly, much greater pressures were exerted by the system during 1990-2002 than between 2002 and 2010. From a different point of view, this signifies that states were subject to more systemic
effects while they were formulating and implementing their foreign policies during 1990-2002, as opposed to 2002-2010. On the other hand, the condition of the international order, unipolarity, was steady during both periods. In a similar vein, these two consecutive periods were dominated by the USA.

With regards to analysis at the systemic level and its effects on Turkish foreign policy, during the period of 1990-2002, the systemic changes and their reflections generated strong pressures on Turkey’s international position and its foreign policy. Accordingly, depending upon the strength of the systemic effects on world politics and over the region in which Turkey is located, Turkish foreign policy experienced and dealt with more foreign policy events during the period of 1990-2002 in terms of both quality and quantity. On the other hand, during the 2002-2010 period it can be argued that the systemic pressures on Turkey relatively lessened. Moreover, during this second period, a time when the regions came to the fore in world politics, Turkey’s emergence as a regional power is also significant. It can also be stated that, as a result of having to cope with fewer problems in foreign policy in comparison with the previous period of 1990-2002, Turkey had the opportunity to allocate its limited resources and power to improving its place in the region and across the world, expanding its foreign policy to broader geographies while improving its cooperation with nearly all states, especially with most of its neighbours.

Regarding the state-level analysis during the two separate periods, it is difficult to find any similarities between these timelines, while there were many sharp contrasts. For example, while the period of 1990-2002 saw the reign of coalitions, majority governments were in charge across the second period, 2002-2010. From the perspective of the quality and efficiency of the agential components at state level, the relations within the coalition governments and between the governments and the army, including those among the chief
state executives, were distinguished by a lack of consistency during the first period. During the second period, however, the majority governments enjoyed much more coherence across the state level, especially after the role of the army within the state machinery was restricted to a certain extent.

Lastly, the comparison at the individual level of analysis also generated interesting consequences for these two time periods, 1990-2002 and 2002-2010. During the former period, the characteristics of the agency of conflicting parties in the various short-lived coalition governments and incoherent affiliations among the components of agency meant that the key individual figures could not find the opportunity or the proper channels to exert their ideas and values on the foreign policy issues of the country. Conversely, during the later period, with the safe harbour of majority governments which worked with other governmental bodies, the army and the state executives in a more consistent way, the key actors of foreign policy-making had enough opportunity to inject their ideational features into the foreign policy-making of the country.

As can be seen from the analysis above, Turkish foreign policy had to deal with many internal problems in agency at the state level while it was under great pressure from systemic constraints during the period of 1990-2002. This prevented Turkey from responding to the systemic pressures in an effective way, while it also partially restrained the country from taking advantage of incentives created by the system. During the second period, however, Turkey, having more proper agential features at the state level and being exposed to relatively fewer systemic pressures, was able to improve its foreign policy while being much more effective in responding to systemic constraints and opportunities.
CONCLUSION: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

I  The Thesis

The subject of this thesis is Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The thesis aimed to explore both external and internal factors and their roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy throughout its long journey from the static and nonreactive nature of the Cold War period until the present day, when Turkey is considered to be a rising power alongside the BRIC countries in the world politics of the post-Cold War era.

In the framework of the research, external factors have been explained by making reference to the structural systemic dynamics created by changes in the international system. On the other hand, internal factors have been predominantly analysed within the scope of agency, which refers to the main institutions in Turkish politics, the government and the army, which have influenced the foreign policy-making process.

Turkish foreign policy was divided into two separate periods, 1990–2002 and 2002–2010, in order to study it in detail. The rationale behind this division is as follows:

* The first period starts in 1990, which is more or less accepted as the end of the Cold War period and the beginning of the post-Cold War era. The 1990s are also widely accepted as a period in Turkish politics during which domestic political stability was relatively weak because of frequent general elections and several coalition governments coming to power. The end of the period has been designated as 2002, when the reign of the coalitions was ended by the majority government of the Justice and Development Party (JDP).
* The second period starts in 2002, when the JDP government came into power with a strong majority. This year also denotes the point at which the USA, the superpower of the unipolar world, made changes to its foreign policy within the scope of the war on terror, after the devastating attacks of 9/11.

In this respect, under the spotlight of the core research question: “What are the external and internal (domestic) factors shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War?” the sub-questions were:

* Why has Turkish foreign policy changed?

* What are the effects of structural changes on Turkish foreign policy in each time period: 1990–2002 and 2002–2010?

* What is the impact of agency (i.e. government, military) on the changes in Turkish foreign policy in each period?

* Which factor has the most effect in each period, structural effects or agency?

The research was conducted on three levels. The first is the ‘systemic level’, which was conceptualised by making reference to systemic features of Neorealism and the structure–agency debate in International Relations literature. In the empirical analysis, structural influences were integrated into the foreign policy behaviour of Turkey by making reference to the foreign policy events of each period.

The following two levels have allowed the research to avoid the pitfalls of Neorealist thought, which ignores domestic and individual factors, by including the agent-orientated and actor-specific nature of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in the discussion. In this context, the second, ‘state level’, was conceptualised by determining the government and
the army as the main domestic agential factors in foreign policy-making. At this level, ethnic and interest groups and the media were incorporated into the analysis as complementary agential factors when appropriate. On the empirical side of the research, the agential factors were integrated into the analysis of Turkish foreign policy actions.

The third and last platform of analysis is the ‘individual level’, through which personal factors related to the leaders and key actors who held office during the given period were integrated into the foreign policy analysis. The empirical dimension has also been included at this level of analysis by making reference to the leaders’ influence on Turkish foreign policy issues.

It was observed that most of the literature on Turkish foreign policy, despite the presence of many studies and publications in diverse volumes on the post-Cold War period of Turkish foreign policy, focuses on Turkey’s EU membership process, Turkish–American relations and some specific areas of Turkish foreign policy, such as that regarding the USA, Greece, Cyprus and the Turkic Republics. In addition, some works have concentrated on security and identity issues in Turkish foreign policy by assessing these issues from the perspective of a constructivist approach in the given period. However, it was discerned that there is a lack of research that handles the twenty-year post-Cold War period by focusing principally on external and domestic factors in the context of structure and agency and conducting a multilevel analysis. For this reason, it is believed that this research contributes to the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy.
*The main hypothesis of the thesis is:

Turkish foreign policy can be explained by the relative significance of external (systemic) factors and internal (domestic) effects in each period of the post-Cold War era.

* Sub-hypotheses regarding the first period of research (1990–2002):

a) Systemic factors appear to be more influential in shaping Turkish foreign policy.

b) Agency at the state level remains relatively weak.

* Sub-hypotheses regarding the second period of research (2002–2010):

a) The systemic influences on Turkish foreign policy seem to lessen in this period.

b) Agency is comparatively strong at the state level.

The research has been presented in five consecutive chapters, which comprised the body of the thesis, with an introduction at the beginning and a conclusion at the end. The first chapter was devoted to theory and methodology, in which a theoretical framework was constituted, firstly by discussing and problematising the mainstream discourse of International Relations, Neorealism, then by explaining the need to conduct a multilevel analysis at the systemic, state and individual levels. The methodology, which designates how the theoretical framework of the thesis is applied to the empirical data, was also given here.

Chapter 2 covered Turkish foreign policy before the period in question. It was designated as an introductory chapter with the aim of preparing the reader for the core of the research project. To this end, the main characteristics, determinants and principles of Turkish foreign policy were set out and the major debates in this area were reflected
against their historical background. Changes at the systemic and state levels and their repercussions on foreign policy issues were also discussed.

Chapter 3 served the purpose of analysing the first period of the research: 1990–2002. In this chapter, firstly, the outlook of international politics and the alteration in the system was provided. After a summary of the features of Turkish foreign policy events during this period, a detailed analysis was undertaken at the systemic, state and individual levels with reference to Turkish foreign policy events.

The focus then moved to the second period of the research, 2002–2010, in Chapter 4. Firstly, a view of the international system and the conditions of world politics was given, then changes in the international system were examined in terms of structural components and balance of power. The effects of the 9/11 attacks and the debate on polarity were reviewed before the focus moved to Turkey. At the core of Chapter 4 was a detailed study of the period with reference to events in Turkish foreign policy. An in-depth multilevel analysis at the systemic, state and individual levels was conducted.

The last chapter was reserved for a comparison of the two periods, 1990–2002 and 2002–2010, with the purpose of revealing similarities and differences between them based on the analysis. The comparative assessment was undertaken by maintaining the original flow of the three-level analysis as presented in Chapters 3 and 4.

II Empirical Findings and Inferences

An overall picture of the empirical findings derived from the research will be presented in light of the answers to the research questions and hypotheses of the thesis. Firstly, it can be argued that the broad aim of the thesis, to explore the external and internal
factors and their roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy, has been met through the natural flow of the research, which examines external factors as part of the systemic-level analysis and internal factors within the state and individual level analyses. The core research question of the thesis: “What are the external and internal (domestic) factors shaping Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War?” was also answered at the end of the same process of analysis on three levels.

It can be seen from the analyses that the external factors shaping Turkish foreign policy in the given era are the pressures on states created by the international system itself. These can take the form of constraints and/or incentives. Regardless of their type, these pressures force states to change their foreign policies in line with them. The strength, density and frequency of the pressures applied all increase if there is an alteration in the international order. As Hollis and Smith (1991) stated, the alteration in polar configuration was caused by the changes in distribution of capabilities. Interactions between the units (states) in the system are affected if a change occurs in the structure of the system.

Regarding the answers to the sub-questions, the findings are:

* Why has Turkish foreign policy changed? It changed during the period in question for various reasons. Firstly, systemic waves occurring after the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the USSR compelled Turkey to adapt its foreign policy to new conditions. As Koslowski and Kratochvil (1994) stated, strong repercussions occur across the world if a bloc transforms in the bipolar system.

Secondly, at the state level, a change in the nature of agency or of relationships between agential bodies might result in foreign policy alterations. In the example of Turkish foreign policy, when the JDP came to power in 2002, this changed the essence of
the governmental agency from coalition governments to majority governments. This provided coherence within the government and between the government and the army, and paved the way for various changes in Turkish foreign policy. For instance, the JDP’s rise to power as the majority party changed the attitude of the Turkish government away from the traditional approach regarding the UN solution to the Cyprus question, in spite of the army’s opposition.

Thirdly, at the individual level, the main actors holding power in the foreign policy-making process might insert their personal ideational features such as ideology, values, beliefs, worldview, etc. as an impetus for change, supposing that they can institutionalise their ideational characteristics. President Özal’s limited influence on the foreign policy of the period, emanating from his characteristics and worldview, can be seen as an example at this level.

* What were the effects of structural changes on Turkish foreign policy in both time periods, 1990–2002 and 2002–2010? In the period 1990–2002, the systemic changes and their consequences on Turkey’s foreign policy were significant. The systemic pressures created by the changes in the international order forced Turkey to transform its Cold War era static foreign policy, with its passive and dependent nature, into a relatively active and more independent form. In the 2002–2010 period, however, Turkey was relatively free from systemic pressures, which relatively lessened because no major alterations in the international order occurred.

* What was the impact of agency (i.e. government, military) on the changes in Turkish foreign policy in both periods? In the first period, governmental agency was weak because of the fragile coalitions. Moreover there was a lack of coherence within the successive
governments and between the governments and the army. For these reasons, it cannot be said that agency had any significant impact on changes in Turkish foreign policy. In contrast to the first period, during the period of 2002–2010, agency was strong as a result of the majority JDP government. In addition to this, consistency was provided within the government and its relationships with the army. The governmental agency, the JDP, could lead changes in Turkish foreign policy in the second period, such as growing relationships with Middle Eastern countries.

* Which factors had the most effect in each period, structural effects or agency? In the period 1990–2002, the systemic factors were far more influential, while agency was weak, as stated above. Conversely, in the second period, 2002–2010, agency was definitely more influential, while systemic pressures had already lightened.

With regard to the assessment of the hypotheses, the findings are:

* Main hypothesis: Turkish foreign policy can be explained by the relative significance of external (systemic) factors and internal (domestic) effects in each period of the post-Cold War era: This is definitely proved correct. Both the Turkish foreign policy of the period in question and the changes in that foreign policy can be explained by the relative weight of systemic and domestic factors.

* Sub-hypotheses regarding the first period of research (1990–2002):

  a) Systemic factors appear to be more influential in shaping Turkish foreign policy: This is true on the ground that systemic effects were strong because of the international order’s transition from bipolarity into unipolarity. This meant that on average states had to take systemic effects more into consideration while conducting their foreign policies from 1990–2002.
b) Agency at the state level remains relatively weak: This hypothesis is quite accurate, because politically weak and fragile governments were incapable of reacting to the initial systemic effects of the post-Cold War era. Moreover, the power struggle between successive governments and the army further weakened governmental agency.

* Sub-hypotheses regarding the second period of research (2002–2010):

a) The systemic influences on Turkish foreign policy seem to lessen in this period: This is correct because of the relative calmness of the period in terms of changes in the international system. Indeed, no significant alterations occurred in the international order during this period, and the international order remained unipolar. Although the USA’s war on terror policy, formulated after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, changed the superpower’s focus in its foreign policy decisions and implementations from multilateralism to unilateralism, which also caused some changes in world politics, in the international system, a condition of equilibrium was reached over the course of time.

b) Agency is comparatively strong at the state level: This is proved, and occurred mainly because of the stable majority JDP governments in power during this period. After the period of coalitions, this novelty altered the nature of agency in Turkey. In domestic politics, the role of the army was restrained because of the assertive stance of the government within the period.

A last finding at the individual level arising out of the research process, which is not covered by the initial research questions or hypotheses, is that actors at the individual level who have personal and ideational features, such as personal characteristics, beliefs, worldviews, motivations, ideas, values and ideologies, are able to exert their ideational features as long as these ideational features are institutionalised through the agency.
III Conclusion

With this research, the long period of Turkish foreign policy that took the country from the Cold War years into the second decade of the post-Cold War era has been analysed in detail. The period at issue is a very long episode which abounded in significant events for Turkey in both the international environment and the domestic realm. In terms of the systemic level, the international order transformed with the end of the bipolar world during the period, not a common occurrence in world history. At the state level, the nature of agency completely changed from the first period to the second. The individual level also witnessed many different actors at each stage of the research.

In addition to the length of the period, its richness of events in terms of the empirical side was also a challenge to the researcher. However, attentive research has been conducted in spite of the lengthiness and complexity of the timeline. From the perspective of Turkish foreign policy, twenty years, offering great variations on the empirical side, have been analysed at three subsidiary levels. It is believed that this research will fill an important gap in the literature on Turkish foreign policy and also give inspiration to researchers for new projects.
REFERENCES


Acikalin, C. (1947) Turkey's international relations. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944- ), 23 (4): 477-491


Batu, İ. (20 November 2012) *Interview with author*. Istanbul, Turkey.


Emerson, M. and Tocci, N. (2004) Turkey as a bridgehead and spearhead, integrating EU and Turkish foreign policy, Centre for European Policy Studies, EU-Turkey Working Papers No. 1


Kaarbo, J. (1993) Power and influence in foreign policy decision-making: the role of junior parties in coalition cabinets (Germany, Israel). PhD Dissertation, the Ohio State University, Columbus, OH.


Politikası: Son On Yıl (Turkish foreign policy: the last ten years). Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık. pp. 177-221


Öymen, O. (25 September 2012) **Interview with author.** Istanbul, Turkey.


Robins, P. (1997) Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan, Survival, 39(2): 82-100


*Comparative Politics*, 29 (2):151-166


The Coalition Government Protocol between the MP and the TPP and Annexes (1996), Prime Ministry’s Printhouse, 03 March, Ankara

The Coalition Government Protocol between the MP, the DLP and the DTP and The List of Ministerial Cabinet (1997), Prime Ministry’s Printhouse, 29 June, Ankara.


The Official Journal of Turkey, 06 July 1991, No: 20921, pp.5-7

The Official Journal of Turkey, 06 July 1993, No: 21629, pp.5-8

The Official Journal of Turkey, 13 July 1997, No: 23048, p.7

The Official Journal of Turkey, 17 January 1999, No: 23586


Tuğal Cihan (2007) NATO’s Islamist, hegemony and Americanization in Turkey New Left Review, 44: 5-34


Uzgel, İ. (2003b) Between praetorianism and democracy: the role of the military in Turkish foreign policy. *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 34: 177-211


