Living Without Why

An Exploration of Personal Muslim Authenticity

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I wish to dedicate this work to Shahnaz Akhtar and all of my children

Special thanks to Dr Ian Draper and Mr Ibrahim Lawson
Abstract

This work aims to look into the question of authenticity and inauthenticity within the Muslim discourse. How muslim can Muslims really be?

Within the Muslim world the concept of authenticity is usually coupled with questions of adherence to the canonical and historical. Despite the fact that the Qur’an addresses the individual in a very direct manner, little emphasis seems to be focused on personal authenticity within contemporary Muslim circles. Muslim societies are understood to be communally based with less emphasis on the individual (Lewis : 2007) and yet inner searching has been very much a part of Muslim culture though this may now have shifted significantly in engaging with, what is argued here, as the increasing mundanization (Drane : 2000) and rationalist approaches to religion generally and specifically to Islam. This work sets out to explore what, if any, inauthenticities have arisen within the Muslim discourse that might have given rise to this. In attempting to think through these questions, various contemporary manifestations of global management culture are explored, the development of rationality within Muslim intellectual history and contemporary theological positions within Islam are brought up for examination. Throughout these enquiries any resulting connection with inauthenticity and rationalism is sought out. Has this management paradigm reached the religious sphere? Has there been a McDonaldization of Islam? How can these be effectively countered? Much of the analysis and discussion that takes place is through a dialectical perspective between classical Islamic and existentialist thought.

One of main aims of this research is to demonstrate ways of thinking through to potential personal authenticity despite the obstacles mentioned. This is a personal exploration orientated towards a personal authenticity in the context of the individual Muslim. It is not meant to be prescriptive nor exclusive but provide an example of working intellectually through to some form of authentic Muslim ‘beingness’.
Living without Why

A Muslim’s Attempt to Authenticity

By Stephen Trevathan

Abstract

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Without Why

An Exploration of Personal Muslim Authenticity
By Stephen D. Trevathan

Because there are Heaven and Earth
the ten thousand creatures are born;
because there are sun and moon
Heaven and Earth have light;
because there is the Sage
enlightening teachings arise.
To hear the teaching of the Sage
is to deepen knowledge and perception,
to know the past,
clearly to understand the future and the present,
to grasp the origin of Heaven and Earth
and the source of the myriad creatures,
to attain to celestial principles
and to see into the hearts of men;
it shows us the road we have come by
and demonstrates the return to Reality;

The Three-Character Rhymed Classic on the Ka’bah
Early 18th Century Chinese Muslim Poem
(Anon)

Introduction

This thesis sets out to demonstrate the process of arriving at an existential theology
for a Muslim individual, namely myself, the author of this work. What is put before
the reader makes no claim to be the way of authentic muslim ‘beingness’ but is rather
an undertaking of a way among other possible ways. Though stemming from the
subjective, any assertions are constantly examined against an objective critique. It
attempts to demonstrate a Muslim reasoning towards authenticity, within the context
of a bewildering plethora of positions vis a vis the Divine, the Prophet, Divine law,
society, the other and finally the self. Despite personal affiliation to Islam and active
participation within British, Dutch, Spanish and Moroccan Muslim communities for
over forty years as well as extensive travel across the Muslim world, the balance
between the emic and etic is held. The researcher is well aware of the dangers of the
‘Candid Ethnographer’ dilemma (Fine :1993) entailing the researcher working under the illusion that, situated within the field of study, rather than an outside observer, what is reported is the unmitigated truth. No such illusion was present during the compiling of this work.

In referring to existential theology, what is indicated here is a path undertaken, lived and experienced with immediacy rather than adherence to overly conceptualized systematizations of belief and learnt ‘truths’. This is based on the assertion that religion solely acted out through a rational knowing is quite distinct to that which ‘….is not with the reason only, but with the will, with the feelings, with the flesh and the bones and with the soul and with the whole body (Unamuno 2011 : 28). An underlying assumption is that a personal existential theology directly relates to the notion of authenticity. In Muslim discourse, authenticity is frequently limited to interpretations validated by textual or canonical sources. In this study, it refers to an intellectual process towards inward integrity mirrored naturally in outward action, rooted in an authentically determined historical praxis yet situated in the ‘now’.

This work is an enquiry into the binary opposition of authenticity and inauthenticity within a Muslim context. Are there inauthenticities within the contemporary Muslim discourse? How have they originated? What paths to authenticity exist and what could they consist of? These questions are addressed through the application of social theory, historical review, theology and philosophy. Much of this is explicitly or implicitly housed within classical Muslim thought and existentialist perspectives, though not necessarily in comparative mode but to see what comes forth from the encounter of these two distinct philosophies of Being.
In conclusion, this research project is carried out demonstratively, outlining one possible path of thought towards Muslim authentic beingness. Along the way, matters arise that may stimulate further thought and novel interpretation and it is intended for sharing with anyone of similar concern. Many of the themes raised will have implications beyond its immediate Muslim focus and it is hoped that the reader will engage with what follows and is motivated, even if in disagreement, to consider some of the issues set out here below in a manner particular and relevant to them.
Chapter One

Rationale

Western attention is usually drawn toward Islamists and less often to the efforts among Muslims to theorize more authentically about their own existence.

(Heyking : 2006: 76)

The impetus for embarking on this research came about as a result of a niggling uneasiness that arose over a period of time. In the early 70s, as a young man, I was confined to a small Moroccan hamlet due to illness for several months. There I was able to witness a culture embodying a primordial living out of everyday life permeated by a sense of the Divine. As a non-Muslim at the time, I never felt excluded from that. It seems unavailing to categorize a numinous experience; yet retrospective experience signifies that the ‘lived’ theology of the village was one of Sunni orthodoxy imbued with the tenets of Tasawwuf (Sufism). As a result of this experience and upon returning to northern Europe some months later, I converted to Islam and with little knowledge of the multifarious positions within the Muslim community, was initially brought into association known with a movement known as the Tablīghi Jamāt. For a new convert to the faith, it was an impressive display of human equality imbued with the spiritual, manifested in people of all social class, race and nationality literally eating from the same plate whilst seated on the floor, living, praying and learning together. Upon leaving this movement some months later, the wider Muslim community reflected the same whole-heartedness. It was the time of the World Festival of Islam (1976) backed and supported by many Muslim countries with various exhibitions and presentations that had an open, artistic and intellectual aura (Sabini : 1976; Beesley : 1978). There were no signs of any theological tensions, such as controversies over representational art or the legality of music, all of which
featured highly in the exhibition, whereas such frictions are highly characteristic of the contemporary Muslim discourse. The festival was well received by the general public and general apprehension of Islam was something akin to the current popularity of Buddhism. Sadly, it is not unreasonable to surmise that in all probability such a festival could not take place now without a great deal of controversy.

In the early 80s, a gradual but discernable change became evident and in place of fraternal acceptance of other Muslims, a tendency of initially inquiring into the ‘aqīdah (literally ‘creed’) of the other became common with the identification of themselves as belonging to a particular group adhering to a particular ‘aqīdah to the exclusion of others. As Lapidus states, ‘…since the 1970s latent Muslim identifications have begun to assert themselves in a worldwide Islamic revival’ (Lapidus : 2002 : 823). Bid‘ah, a concept of innovation usually used in its negative sense to indicate a deviation from the pure teachings of Islam, was in common usage for those did not share one’s ‘pure’ ‘aqīdah. All that was non-Muslim was increasingly demonized and conspiracy theories abounded, staged by a background of increasing upheaval and violence on a local and global scale. Indications of this are seen in the events surrounding Imam Khomeni (1902 – 1989), Colonel Ghaddafi (1942 – 2011), the shooting of a British policewoman from the Libyan Embassy (17th April 1984) and the Rushdie affair (1988). Retrospective investigation revealed that the seeds of this apparent turmoil had been historically germinating for some considerable time, stretching back to the 18th-19th century. What I experienced in the village may have been the remnants of a classical Islam, defined as the ‘sophisticated classical consensus which was worked out over painful centuries of debate and scholarship’, (Winter : 2009). In the early eighties, it seemed that the perception of
many Muslims was that Islam consisted of a moral code with socio-politico implications providing a clear identity. This is reflected in the following:

The entire experience of Islamic work over the past fifteen years has been one of increasing radicalization, driven by the perceived failure of the traditional Islamic institutions and the older Muslim movements to lead the Muslim peoples into the worthy but so far chimerical promised land of the 'Islamic State'.

(Winter : 2009 : 302)

This hardening theological positioning, especially in light of my experience in the Moroccan village, has been perplexing and has largely motivated the undertaking of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is not intended as any plea for a return to unity nor a nostalgic glance at the past but is rather an attempt to establish whether such changes have resulted from an inauthentic apprehension of Islam and if so, whether an individual path can be found out of this.

A View of the Contemporary Situation and the Muslim Classical Tradition

Examples of the deep seated changes within the Muslim world referred to above can be seen in the shifting away from the traditional means of transcending the self, afforded within what is sometimes referred to as the Prophetic way, (As-Sufi : 1975; Winter : 2009) and laid out in the classical canon, now largely overshadowed by a social and political ideology. There has been a widely documented move from the diversity of locality based Muslim cultural expressions, (Akbar : 2002) to a monolithic pan-Islamic outlook. Within the last fifty to seventy years, for different socio-historical reasons, such as colonization, secularism and materialism, (Arkoun : 1994), an alleged shift has occurred from regional, sapiential Muslim traditions, to a globalized, political ideology, (Bone : 2007; Brown : 1996; Nasr : 1987; Otayek : 1993; Akbar : 2002). The classical tradition has been sidelined by being deemed as
irrelevant in the contemporary age, coupled with the dying out of those with classical knowledge (Eickelman : 1978). Indeed, traditional scholars were frequently the first to be restricted and oppressed during colonial times and after the ensuing national independence were then deemed as outmoded and irrelevant, especially in light of the push for modernization reforms (al-Murabit : 1982; Eickelman : 1978).

As a result many Muslims have been severed from the root principles of the traditional classical mode, (Lewis : 2007; Malik et al : 2007; Samad : 2004) and filled the vacuum solely with ideologies of Islam as the heroic underdog challenging an oppressive western hegemony. Traditional praxis was directed mainly to bringing about a transformation of the self and in the understanding that if engaged upon on by society as a whole this has its effects on the outer social realm (Nasr : 1987; Winter : 2009; Lings : 1993; Burckhardt : 2008, 1992). The initial individual concern was a striving for *ikhlās*, usually translated as sincerity but probably more effectively defined as authenticity, the desire for the inner and the outward aspects of the individual to correspond. In contrast, contemporary responses are directed in the opposite manner, outwardly derived, with a hoped for inward effect (Roy : 1996; 2007) and usually depicted as adherence to a moral code. As Roy says, ‘The magical appeal to virtue masks the impossibility of defining the Islamist political program in terms of the social reality’ (1996 : 71). The response to the modern world within the Muslim homelands has lain in a propensity of social ideologies and reform, (Hourani 1972, Binder : 1988; Tamimi : 2001; Tibi : 1991 and Enayat :1982; Brown : 1996, Esposito : 1998, Esposito : 2010 ; Heykring : 2006; Nasr : 1987 : Roy : 2007). Despite frequent demonization of the western developed nations, many such reforms and ideologies ironically demonstrate that there has been more of an ‘….interaction
between western discourses of secular modernity and Muslim reformist discourse in the latter part of the twentieth century’ (Bruinessen & Howell : 2007: 7) than one would imagine. The focus and stress within reformist expressions of Islam generally tend to create a social context wherein there exists no other cultural expression other than itself, positing this as the original and sole archetype of Muslim culture, when in fact it is itself an expression of one particular type of Arab culture, (Alam : 2012; Rosen intro to Akbar : 2002). Hence, the idea of grand schemes of national development have been prioritized over the idea of any personal inner transformation.

Whether due to Western-style schemes of ‘development’, Marxism, nationalism, secularism, or Islamism, the Islamic world has suffered its share of ideological activism. What these ideologies share is a “big idea”, or ideology, that purports to transform the Islamic world into a post-industrial economy, Marxist utopia, collection of nations, liberal democracy, and caliphate, respectively. (Heyking : 2006: 76)

Contemporary trends in the wake of the Arab spring have brought forward the Islamicist agenda in Turkey, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. However, should the claims and promises of such political ideologies ever prove ineffectual, this could prove extremely turbulent, with either a drive to extremism or dangerous mass disorientation created by a vacuum of meaning. Such modernist Islamic ideologies are frequently characterized by grouping around the idea of Islamic identity through identifiable social conformities. This is well depicted in Orhan Pamuk’s novel, Snow (2004) wherein the main character is confronted with the process of Islamization in a Turkish town wherein Islam is depicted as an ideology demanding overt displays of pietas and conformity. This clashes with the sacred Muslim tradition, which for centuries had unselfconsciously permeated the life of the town in its own Turkish yet regional manner allowing for individual diversity and views. As the Iranian theologian and philosopher Soroush says, ‘We [had] communal actions and rituals,
but not communal faiths. Expressions of faith are public but the essence of faith is mysterious and private’ (Soroush: 2000:140).

It is hoped that this thesis will in some small measure attempt to readdress this balance, not in the notion of some return to a golden age but for those who still wish to be nourished by the rich spiritual tradition of Islam and who feel pain in its diminishment. It is intended to be an expression of the possibility of a reinvigoration of a ‘method of interpreting meaningful behaviour’, (Blattner: 2006: 4) central to an existentialist outlook and embedded within the classical Muslim tradition, a major component of which is comprised of embarking upon a path of authentic self-observation and an ensuing self knowledge. As Soroush suggests, ‘Islam also has a spiritual side. I think it is so powerful and so important that it has to be reintroduced in modern times’, (cited in Leezenberg: 2007: 2).

**Relevance of Existentialism to Muslim Classical Tradition**

Large parts of this study work from a comparative philosophical / theological base afforded through a juxtaposing of what some have called the ‘summoning philosophy’ (Frankl: 1986) and classical Muslim theology. In justifying this it is appropriate to consider the following; ‘The Greco-Roman-European classical tradition of thought and being is *humane* before it is Western. The truth captured and expressed by this tradition belongs to man as such, and not to Greece or France or Germany or America’, (Malik cited in Malik et al, 2009: 44). For the sake of legitimization from the Muslim side, the following Hadīth is proffered; ‘Abu Huraira reported: The Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, said, “Wisdom is the lost property of the
believer, so wherever he finds it then he is more deserving of it’, (Tirmidhi : 2007 : Hadīth 2687).

It is hoped that by a process of identifying similarities and differences between the conceptual domains of western existentialism and the Muslim sacred traditions, a meaningful framework for approaching the matter at hand is created. Advantages can arise when working in this comparative manner; for example, when corresponding elements are identified, with perhaps one tradition placing greater or emphasis, this serves to bring out the nuances more fully in the other. Likewise, for Muslims, who for one reason or another, are unable to fully access the accumulated wisdom of classical Islam (Lee : 1997), may find that existentialist concepts allows them deeper access to the Muslim spiritual tradition.

The ‘summoning philosophy’ indicates the summoning of actualization of the singular and the unique, insofar that it refers to the singularity or uniqueness of each person and each moment. This corresponds with Safranski’s (1998) calling the existentialists ‘Philosophers of the Moment’1. Bearing in mind this ‘singularity’ amongst existentialists, there is an aversion to codification and theorization and a prominent motif of authenticity. Thought is directed more directly to the ordinary lives of individuals confronting the enormous challenges of the modern age. It should be seen in contrast to the more abstract cognitive and theoretical constructions of the speculative philosophical tradition.

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1 Safranski’s reason for this lies in identifying these thinkers, (what others commonly call existentialists) as being concerned with temporality in some form or other as opposed to theoretical constructs. It also is a much looser description than the label existentialist which most of these thinkers would reject outright.
By ‘classical Muslim theology’ what is generally meant is Sunni classical orthodoxy (naql) and tradition (tūrath) and in conjunction with this, what this is what is meant henceforth by ‘traditional’ or ‘traditionalists’ except where indicated otherwise. The word ‘tradition’ implies ‘…the sacred, the eternal, the immutable Truth, the perennial wisdom, as well as the continuous application of its immutable principles to various conditions of space and time’ (Nasr : 1994 : 13 : emphasis added). Part of this historical evolvement is Tasawwuf (Sufism) though there are some that would argue against this, claiming that it is not part of a genuine and ‘pure’ Islam in that it incorporates elements unfamiliar and alien to Islam. However, the reverse could be argued; those who make such arguments such as the salafīs are ‘pseudo-traditionalist’ movements, according to Nasr (1994 : 13) and in reality comprised of ‘modernist’ paradigms which are anathema to sacred traditions. For the purposes of this thesis, such counter allegations are considered to have come about originally through misunderstandings promulgated avertly or inadvertently by ‘modernist’ elements within the Muslim world (Cornell : 2004; Nasr : 1994; Keller : 1995a).

In terms of Sufism, the element of this tradition known as ‘Akbarian’ will be the general backdrop in this thesis. As with existentialism this does not refer to any sharply defined school of thought or movement but to noted figures inspired by the Andalusian, Muhiyîn ibn al-‘Arâbî (1165 – 1240) frequently given the title, Sheikh al-Akbar, (the great master) and hence the label, Akbarian. Ibn ‘Arâbî, (as he is more

2 This a term used to describe early the early Muslim community but which now refers to a modern day movement of the Muslim community and is often related to the school of thought known as ‘wahabism’. The word ‘salaf’ refers to the people and practices of the early Muslim community considered to be closer to the original Divine message and the Prophet and hence regarded as models to emulate. The modern day movement is puritanical and literalist by nature and is understood by many as having arisen in reaction to the European colonialism and ideas. They perceive the Sufis to have deviated from the ‘true’ Islam and this is reciprocated by the Sufis in regard to the Salafîs.

3 The more concise name of ‘Ibn’Arabi’ will be used in the text except in relation to to quotes where the fuller name of ‘Ibn al-‘Arabi’ will be used.
commonly known) expounded a perspective that has greatly influenced the Muslim world, though this goes frequently unrecognised, to the extent that many contemporary detractors of Ibn ‘Arabi often espouse views linked directly to his thought without realizing it, (Chodkiewicz : 1991). The Akbarian perspective is difficult to summarize quickly but suffice it to say at this point that it is characterized by an emphatic and pervading sense of the unicity of all existence, \( \text{wahdat al-wujūd} \), consisting of the idea that the minutiae of everyday occurrences have significant meaning in other unseen dimensions in ascending order leading up to the ultimate cause of all things, the Divine Essence. These corresponding manifestations of the Divine within temporal and infinite dimensions signify that ultimately there is nothing but God. Placed within the context of \textit{imagio dei}, the human individual is seen as possessing innumerable possibilities and opportunities to transcend personal limitations. Though clearly other-worldly, it is not especially esoteric in that it is not at the expense of the exoteric. Thus in Ibn ‘Arabi’s world-view, religious manifestations, rather than being in contrast to the inner, are mutually enhanced in the joining of the outer and inner and are seen as one and the same. The outer law \( \text{(shari‘ah)} \) is adhered to and yet seen in light of its inner essence and principles and applied to the context and conditions of the moment. The \textit{Tasawwuf} referred to in this work to comes with specific but not sole reference to the \textit{al-Qadiriyyah ash-Shādhiliyyah} tradition\(^4\) which is strongly placed within the Akbarian perspective, (Cornell: 2004). The combined way of thought and action derived from the Akbarian and \textit{Qadiri-Shādhilī}an sources includes known figures, amongst many others, as al-Qūnawī (d.1274 CE), al-Mursī (d.1296 CE), Ibn ‘Ata’īlāh (d.1309 CE), al-Qaysari (d.1351 CE), al-Jīlī (d.1428 CE), Mulla Sadrā (d.1640 CE), ad-Darqawi (d.1823 CE),

\(^4\) Based on the combined seminal influence of Abdul Qādir al-Jilani, (1077–1166) and Abul Hasan ash-Shadhili, (1187-1259 CE)
Ibn ‘Ajiba (d.1809), az-Zarruq (d.1493) and al-Alāwī (d.1934 CE), al Bouchichi (b.1922 - ) amongst others.

While on the surface some fundamental and perhaps irreconcilable differences between the existentialist and Muslim perspectives seem to exist, appearances can be deceptive and striking affinities, similarities and nuances are also there to be identified. Notwithstanding, though Burckhardt may have seen compatibilities between various faiths and forms of thought as ‘a coincidence of spiritual vision’ or ‘only a question of differences in perspective or mode of expression’ (1976 : 10), dissimilarities must also be acknowledged. Primarily, in this case, because inherent to existentialist thought, is the reluctance to accept universal theories or any systematic categorization, even to the extent of rejecting the label of ‘existentialism’. Islam, on the other hand, starts from a very clear metaphysical premise. A possible area of contention could be the question of whether the Qur’an can be subjectively and individually interpreted. Others might argue for the Qur’an as the embodiment of existentialist choice and immediacy such as Cantwell-Smith (1978) and Bruns reflects the paradoxical ring of existentialism when he asserts:

> The whole movement of reading as an appropriation or internalization of the text is reversed. Here there is no grasping and unpacking and laying the text bare. On the contrary, reading is participation. To understand the Qur’an is to disappear into it.
> (Bruns : 1992 : 126)

Notwithstanding, the relationship between existentialism and religion has been close though perhaps not always comfortable. The complexity of this is seen in one existentialist theologian stating that, ‘….one of the perils inherent in the existentialist influence upon theology is that existentialism might prove to be the gnosis of the twentieth century’, (Macquarrie 1980 : 228).
Existential resistance to universal theorization can be seen in the following remarks of Foucault’s; ‘…Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and the police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write’, (1972: 17). It is also evident in Heidegger’s *Letter on Humanism* (2004), refuting Sartre’s sympathetic endeavour to categorize his *magnus opus*, ‘Being and Time’ (2008) as a humanism. In contrast, the tenets of Islam are based on *a priori* assumptions of the existence of God and at the very least, the historical role of the Prophet as the ‘Messenger’ of God. The reaction of some ‘Philosophers of the Moment’ could be to see this as the arbitrary codification of the abstract, the ethereal, even the illusory, in the same way that any other universal theory in philosophy is challenged by them. Yet, ironically, mystics might also have an aversion to the codifying of the Divine and therefore may have some empathy with this existentialist view. Despite these notions, it would be a shallow to immediately brand the likes of Nietzsche (1844 – 1900) and Heidegger with the tag of atheism. In the case of Nietzsche, popularly associated with ‘the death of God’, recent research shows that it not may not be the case that he was atheist (Young: 2006) and that, in fact he had some sympathies with Islam (Jackson: 2007). The ‘father of existentialism’, Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855), certainly demonstrated a visceral opposition to the theologians of his time but was motivated to oppose what he saw as a mundanization of Christianity, likewise Unamuno (1864-1936), existentially Catholic as Buber (1878 – 1965) was existentially Jewish. There is now clear evidence of Heidegger being strongly influenced by Zen Buddhism and Daoism (Parkes et al: 1987; May:1996; Caputo: 1986), as well as being irrefutably inspired
by the Christian mystic, Meister Eckhardt\(^5\), (Caputo : 1986). Malik (2009) cites the Egyptian philosopher Badawi as saying: ‘Heidegger, for example, uses most of the Christian doctrinal categories: sin, fall, elevation, personhood, etc, but he empties them of all religious content in order to render them pure and general existential concepts’, (2009: 55). Despite seemingly contradictory statements over time; the possibility of finding compatibility with other cultural forms of thought is not totally abandoned by Heidegger. Though referring to Buddhism and the Far East, Heidegger asks ‘……whether ultimately the thinking experience can be reached by a being of language that would ensure that Western European and East Asian can enter into dialogue in such a way that there sings something that wells up from a single source’, (Heidegger cited in Parks :1987 : 1). Yet it is also understood that none of these figures provide direct answers to the question of Islam, despite the fact that Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Foucault and Derrida all made references to it in varying degrees.

Given all of the above, it is apt to borrow from Malik, (2009) to stress that this work is not a ‘Heideggerizing of Muslim theology’ but more of a ‘Muslim theologizing of Heidegger’, (Malik : 2009 : 43). Affinities are acknowledged, yet there can be no losing sight of the differences between existentialist and religious approaches to the question of authenticity.

That commonalities do exist between the ‘Philosophers of the Moment’ and Akbarian perspectives has come to light primarily through increasing academic and literary interest. Such links may previously have remained unexamined due in large measure to the eclipsing of the classical hermeneutical tradition by modernist Muslim

\(^5\) (1260 – 1327)
interpretation, on the one hand, and the effects of western orientalism on the other, (Heykring: 2006, Nasr:1987, Said : 1979). However, in recent years considerable academic and literary endeavour has been carried out in the field, largely in English and French but also in Arabic, Farsi and Turkish idioms. A notable example is seen in the work of a coterie of Iranian scholars, (Bouroujderi : 1997) or through the auspices of Shi’a theology and philosophy, which seems to have originated with the work of Henry Corbin⁶, (Cheetham : 2003) Analogical studies comparing Heidegger with such Muslim thinkers such as Mulla Sadra⁷ and Ibn ‘Arabi, (Akbarian & Zamania: 2011; Corbin : 1971; Kamal : 2006, 2010; Acikgenc : 1993 ). These deal mainly with the question of ontological difference and metaphysics. Interestingly, these theologians / philosophers alluded to here, have been deemed by some as as ‘anti-western’ and ‘neo conservative’ by some critics, who perceive a basic incompatibility between these and mysticism, (Mehru : 2007:1). Soroush (2006) has also been highly critical of Heideggerian ideas within Iranian academic, religious and political arenas, interpreting these as fascist elements, probably in reference to Heidegger’s flirtation with Nazism.

In the Arab world, the Egyptian philosopher, Abdul Raman Badawi, (1917-2002) particularly stands out as having identified common themes between Muslim thought and European existentialism. He identified ‘anxiety’ and ‘falleness’ as something strongly evident within the Muslim psyche, (key themes within European existentialism), especially within the mystical tradition of Islam, as Badawi says, ‘Je

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⁶ Henry Corbin, (1903-1978), Professor of Islamic studies at the Sorbonne, Paris, France. Particularly focused on the Iranian mysticism and the Illuminist School of thought of Mulla Sadra. Heavily influenced by Kierkegaard and especially Heidegger

⁷ Mulla Sadra, (1572 – 1640) was an Islamic Philosopher, theologian and ‘alim of Iranian origin who is the founder of what is known as Transcendent Theosophy (al-hikmah al-muta’liyah), heavily influenced by Ibn ‘Arabi.
trouve chez les coufi une définition de l’angoisse qui réassemble trait pour trait a celle de Heidegger’\textsuperscript{8} (Badawi cited by Mikhail : 1992 : 29). In Badawi’s seminal book, \textit{Al Insaniyya al Wujudiyya fi al-Fikr al-Arabi}, (1947)\textsuperscript{9}, he concludes:

We maintain with confidence that the connection between contemporary existentialism and Kierkegaard does not exceed by much the similar connection between Islamic Sufism and the existential philosophical persuasion. Arabic Sufism can play the inspirational role that Kierkegaard has played for European existentialism.

(Badawi cited in Malik : 2009 : 54)

While the identification of these commons ground between western and Muslim understanding may have occurred recently, the elements themselves, (i.e. anguish, anxiety, \textit{angst}, falleness, etc.) is no recent thing. Arab and Turkish philosophers and novelists may consciously expound on Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian themes within a Muslim context, (Malik : 2009; Armaner : 2009; Jahanbegloo : 2009), but the Sufi themes distinguished by Badawi, can be said to stem back to fundamental aspects of Islam and to early semitic culture itself wherein the individual had an ‘…..existential awareness of the tensions and paradoxes that are constitutive of his being as one who knows in himself freedom, finitude, guilt, and the possibility of death’ (McQuarrie: 1972 : 36). Such nuances have existed within all the Abrahamic faiths, indeed perhaps within all human experience and religious expression.

Therefore, in acknowledging Badawi’s work, Mikhail comments, ‘That existentialism finds a place in modern Arab thought and modern Arab fiction is therefore appropriate’, (2009 : 30). Malik (2009) identifies numerous examples of existential persuasion in the literature of two well known Egyptian novelists, Najib Mahfouz

\textsuperscript{8} Translation - ‘With the Sufis I find a point by point definition of anxiety that correlates with that of Heidegger’

\textsuperscript{9} ‘Humanism and Existentialism in Arabic Thought’ (1947), only available in Arabic.
(1911-2006) and Yusuf Idris, (1927-1991). Mahfouz engaged with Sufism for a period of his life, (El Shabrawy : 1992) and frequently uses overt Sufi references within his work, as seen in *The Thief and the Dogs*, (Mahfouz : 2008). Yusuf Idris also writes around clear existentialist themes also making frequent reference to Sufism within the plots of his stories, (Mikhail :2009), to be seen particularly well in his *Lughat al ‘Ay’ay*. (The Language of Pain :1990). The main character of Al Hadidi has several epiphanies leading to an eventual realization that he has spent most of his life conforming to the norms of society and despite his material success is deeply unfulfilled.

Heyking (2006) in describing the work of the Turkish novelist, Orhan Pamuk suggests that he ‘……[experiments] with mysticism, not as an escape from the ideological furnace, but as a means of recapturing a more authentic experience of reality characterized by existential openness’ (Heyking : 2006 : 73). In Pamuk’s *Snow* (2004), the character of Ka, strives to retain his authentic self, amidst an increasing globalized world and a plethora of conflicting ideologies. Pamuk’s novel seems ultimately to suggest that the Muslim community would benefit more in focusing on the every day and plain common sense rather than devote time and energy to grand ideologies and that more self-knowledge is gained through interacting with the concrete experiences of the everyday than through the theoretical.

**Summary**

In this Chapter a rationale has been presented based on personal observation of the apparent effects of modernism within the Muslim discourse and the desire to address the question of individual authenticity in relation to this. In justification of and
proposing to use a comparative approach between classical Islam and existentialism in approaching these questions, coinciding and differing elements between both of these have been explored.

Having established a rationale and a general context, the next chapter moves on to discuss hypotheses and methodology. In keeping with the general theme, some space is allocated to establishing an overall authentic basis to the methodologies employed in seeking out inauthenticities within the Muslim context, becoming embodying something of ‘a play with a play’.
Chapter Two

‘…..qualitative researchers inhabit the ‘lived border between reality and representation’ (Gubrium and Holstein : 1997: 102).

Hypotheses and Research Methods

Hypotheses

The ontological assumptions and assertions upon which this work is based are presented here to reveal something of the subjectivity, interests, biases and inclinations of the researcher and thereby provide the reader with some background and framework to approach this thesis. It will also allow both the reader and the researcher to address and critique these assumptions. According to Mayring (2004) this should entail the following; a) that the general direction of the research and the possible inferences that might be drawn from any text analysis are determined but without compromising objectivity; b) that the researcher clarifies their own position and approaches undertaken in regard to that which is being researched; c) that the historical and social background, i.e. the subjective contexts of the texts to be analysed are also presented; d) that the researcher highlights aspects of the material and text interpretations and the refers these back to the research question. In doing so, adaptations and revisions taken as a result of the continuing process of analysis must be also be recorded and e) that a criteria of reliability and validity are maintained by linking to and providing justification through other subject areas and knowledge rendering the research easy to validate and checked for reliability.

In this vein, therefore the over arching presuppositions within this work are based upon the following hypotheses:
a) Mundanization of the Sacred

That there is a human propensity to codify and mundanize the numinous and seemingly unexplainable, or in another sense, shift from mythos to logos. Religious or ‘metahistorical’ narratives usually, though not always, start out with some mystical experience of divine origin or some other inspirational event; which upon being experienced by an individual is then compelled into action. Such a person may subsequently be depicted as either founder, leader, prophet or saint who in turn inspires others through their teaching. Rightly or wrongly, perhaps in the desire to sustain and maintain the teaching with the passing of time, these inspired teachings are prescriptively codified and conceptualized leading to essentialist doctrines which at times seem counteractive to the original inspiration.

A loose set of dichotomies illustrating this can be seen in the oppositional polarities of form vs. essence, static vs. dynamic, private vs. public, creativity vs. formalism, mystical vs. dogmatic, puritan vs. indulgent and passive vs. active. Such tensions might also be discerned historically in the broadly conflicting approaches of Lao Tse vs. Confucius, Jesus vs. Pharisees / Saducees, and Moses vs. Pharoah, (Shen : 1994). Islam is no exception to this general rule and perhaps affords a contemporary context of a historic shifting of paradigms.

The religious sphere seems to have been as greatly effected by this over-rationalization and systematization as the ‘profane’ world and the Muslim world presents no exception to this. The basic mode of thought within the religious arena would seemingly have an inherent rejection of the primacy of human rationalization as opposed to the concept of Divine will and yet this does not appear to have withheld against this influence.
Though not exclusively so, self-knowledge and personal authenticity were some of the primary concerns of the religious project. Within the Muslim world, there has been a paradigm shift away from this towards seeing Islam as a social and political ideology.

b) The predominance of Rationalism

May suggests that there is ‘…the tendency on our culture to be preoccupied with “rational” mechanical phenomena and to suppress “irrational” experience and that this has held increasing sway since the Renaissance (1996b : 21). In the seventeenth century, it is possible to detect what has been termed ‘mathematical rationalism’ wherein understanding of human nature could be appropriated through the same type of rational certitude present in mathematical concepts. This involved a separation of mind and body, stemming in large dimension to the Cartesian dualism, itself a product of seventeenth century thinking (Descartes 1596 – 1650) which we deal with further on. This had engendered the belief in the rational control of the emotions. Pascal (1623 – 1662)\(^1\) felt it important to distinguish rationalism from reason for the latter is a distinctive characteristic of human nature, posing a dignified human contrast in the face of uncaring and thoughtless nature. Nonetheless, he felt that reason is limited in that it is ultimately subjective and can be tied to things like vanity and self-interest and used to rationalize things like injustice, rendering rationality ultimately irrational. Ritzer’s use of the Holocaust is relevant here, as exemplifying modern social engineering and a supremely methodical system for dispatching vast numbers of people - rationality gone mad.

\(^1\) Even though one of the prominent seventeenth century intellectuals Pascal was exceptional in considering there to be enormous limitations to rationalism. Some consider him to be the father of existentialism.
In the nineteenth century, there was a shift which Tillich (1944) termed ‘technical reason’.

During the last hundred years the implications of this system have become increasingly clear; a logical or naturalistic mechanism which seemed to destroy individual freedom, personal decision and organic community; and analytic rationalism which saps vital forces of life and transforms everything, including man himself, into an object of calculation and control.

(Tillich : 1944 : 67)

One of the main characteristics of this was a compartmentalization within theories, science and culture itself. Mind and body were also further delineated and what was previously a rational control of the emotions evolved into the repressing of the emotions. The rawer aspects of human nature like sex or hostility were foresworn and outwardly subdued on a widespread basis. On both an individual and social level, the result has been psychological alienation and inauthentic beingness (May : 1977 : 20-55).

The existentialist view is that rationalism has evolved to such an extent that it predominates the human project as a whole and has evolved into systematics and codified perceptions of the world resulting in tidy universal theories constructed to explain the world. The primacy of pursuing universal and ultimate truths through the means of pure objectivity is understood to be at the expense of, and resulting in the denigration of lived experience and praxis. This also implies that everything has a reason and a reason for everything is demanded – the ‘truth’ is out there somewhere and just needs to be discovered. The role of thinking is directed solely towards proving or disproving the reason or veracity for every phenomenon encountered and in order to do so a sustained mindset of sceptical doubt is constantly maintained. Rather than being a thinking tool at the service of human endeavour, appropriately
applied in certain but not all aspects of lived experience, rationality has become the ontological paradigm of the modern world.

c) A false dichotomy of Authenticity versus tradition

That seeking personal authenticity does not need to automatically necessitate negation of the traditional or classical modes of tradition (in particular the religious). While there may be a popular misconception of personal authenticity as necessitating a rejecting of tradition, this is strongly argued against. Much rests on what is meant by ‘tradition’, ‘classical’ or the ‘sacred’. For the purposes of this work, it is argued that classical Islam can be lived authentically or inauthentically, as one chooses.

The Path of this Research

Now having presented the basic hypotheses underlying this study, the research path, in very broad terms, lies in the following sequence:

a) Enquiring into what ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ means through a general philosophical and theological approach.

b) Broadening out the question of inauthenticity by exploring its connectivity between rationalism and ‘global management culture’. Ritzer’s (1996) theory of McDonaldization and Cantwell Smith’s (1978) theory of the reification of religion are examined and critiqued and whether elements of these are detectable within Islam are also looked into.

c) An examination is taken into aspects of Islam that naturally run counter to reifying tendencies. A distinction is made between mysticism and the origins of
religion, and its position *vis a vis* rationalism occurring within the religious sphere.

d) The role of rationality within Muslim intellectual history and any consequences or effects this may have had is examined briefly, culminating in a discussion concerning the *naqli* (transmitted tradition) and *aqli* (intellectual) approaches. The themes raised here are pursued further and are used to identify a very loosely defined fault line argued as the one side, a Western / Maghrebian / Andalucian / *naqli* position and on the other, an Eastern / Turkish / speculative theological stance. The intellectual and methodological characteristics of the *maliki, hanafi* and *hanbalī madhabs* are also placed within these groupings. Ending with the different characteristics of the *Qaidiryya* and *Naqshabandi* Sufi orders also placed within this dichotomy.

e) Having established some basic precepts, a more detailed and philosophical comparison between existentialist thought and Sufism is conducted in regard to rationalism, mysticism vs. esotericism, knowledge of the self and ‘the moment’ thereby affording a deeper understanding of authenticity and inauthenticity.

**Research Methodology**

Due to the nature of the subject and circumstances, this work consists mainly of a qualitative hermeneutic approach and therefore is generally humanistic, deductive, interpretivist and anti-positivist with aspects of social and historical research, some analysis of texts, critique and philosophical and theological enquiry. The review of appropriate literature or theories are brought to bear on the questions raised through an analysis of philosophical and theological textual content and the evaluating, critiquing and interpreting of these will be the foremost method used in this work. It is
primarily based on drawing from initial personal and phenomenal experience and thinking through particular aspects of these, resulting in the setting up of an enquiry to explore the issues raised in the preceding section.

In terms of this research, ‘methodology’ implies not so much a systematic framework but rather a way of approaching the subject matter and what is presented was not methodologically led. This was a conscious choice and any eventual opting of methodology evolved through an appropriately chosen method. For example, in examining rationalism within a Muslim context it was thought that tracing the historical presence of rationalism through Muslim intellectual history would be a fruitful course of action. Identifying particular theoretical critiques was carried out retrospectively and even rather reluctantly and some sympathy was felt for Hughes and Starrock’s observation that some contemporary researchers, ‘do not worry about epistemology and ontology but about the particular problems they confront from their theories and investigations’ (1997 : 94). It is considered that even the links between philosophy and research methods are contentious;

Since the nature of philosophy, and its relationship to other forms of knowledge, is itself a major matter of philosophical dispute, there is, of course, no real basis for us to advocate any one view on these matters as the unequivocally correct conception of the relationship between philosophy and …..research. 

(Hughes & Starrock : 1997 : 13)

Supposedly, such difficulties are compounded when different methodologies are employed as is the case with this thesis. Providing a distinct basis for several intertwining theoretical frameworks was difficult but what is presented here should be seen as embodying what Mason calls a ‘parallel logic’ methodology wherein each section of the research is regarded as a ‘mini-study’ (2006 : 5) in its own right and within its own terms but with a consistent aim, which later offers ‘a secondary
analysis that cross cuts all of them at a later stage’ (2006 : 5) offering the chance to traverse methodological boundaries.

**Breakdown of Methodology by Chapter**

Chapter Three begins with a philosophical and theological exploration of the concept of authenticity and inauthenticity. Chapter Four moves on from this to expand upon the concept of inauthenticity through employing a critical theory approach in addressing the phenomena of McDonaldization, global management culture and rationalism as prevailing social and cultural trends in a manner more ‘critical than affirmative’ (Horkheimer cited in Hanssen : 2004 : 282). In Chapter Five, the concept of reification is used to augment the social theories examined previously, particularly the idea of the reification of religion, carried out on the back of Smith’s seminal work, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (1978). Recourse is taken to an objective and quantitative method in bringing in considering data from research and word count surveys undertaken by Cantwell Smith in examining historically determined reifying tendencies within Muslim hermeneutics. Mason (2006) says that research that is primarily qualitative and ‘which focuses on social processes in rich and proximate detail, the inclusion of some background quantitative material, perhaps in the form of local or national demographic data, can help in making the research part of a bigger set of observations. Now having built a case for McDonaldization and reification within the religious sphere, Chapter 6 surveys current trends and positions within the Muslim communities and the theologies they employ and critiques them. Chapter Seven explores the countering of reification within Islam, initially by carrying out a brief historical analysis of European counterculture and its relationship to Islam and secondly by a philosophical and theological analysis of mysticism and its
role in relation to religion in exploring whether any claim could be made to its being the antithesis of reification. Having established that the underlying feature of some of the different manifestations of inauthenticity that had been explored in previous chapters, lay in rationalism, a further historical analysis is also used in Chapter Eight to undertake a brief survey of rationalism within the development of Muslim intellectual history. From here, building upon some identified trends within Muslim thought, two particular typologies are identified and loosely linked with certain geographical areas in Chapter Nine. The implications of these typologies and the approach to the practice of Islam are discussed from cultural, theological and philosophical perspectives. Also from what has preceded in the previous chapter, a comparative and critical theory approach is used for the study of the various juridical schools of thought and the differing methodologies deployed lending a particular characteristic to each one of these. These are represented insofar as they constitute a possible ‘abode’ or framework for personal authenticity within traditional modes. Chapter Ten moves onto a deeper existential and ontological analysis on the back of Heidegger and Ibn al ‘Arabi in critiquing rationalism and the foundations upon which it is based, i.e. modernist metaphysics. Having established the critique of rationalism and metaphysics, in Chapter 11 the question of authenticity and inauthenticity are raised again yet a deeper level in regard, again, to the respective thought of Ibn ‘Arabi and Heidegger enquiring into the aspect of inauthenticity as a ‘falleness’ or being distracted from Reality, (i.e. Allah). The nature of certain aspects of authenticity as being clearings and openings for ultimate Reality to come into the everyday is also discussed from existential and sufic perspectives. In the same vein, an enquiry into immediacy and ‘being in the moment’ as opposed to the planned and reasoned response to life is also undertaken in Chapter 12, this time more in regard to
Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Ibn al ‘Arabi. The general question of time is delved into from a philosophical and theological perspective and the idea that the way we perceive time enframes our existence is presented and that such an enframing can result in the inauthentic. The final Chapter concludes the research and examines the changes in the researcher’s thinking brought about by the work and suggests areas of research that could be undertaken that have arisen as a result of this work.

**Critical Theory**

One of the primary approaches is critical theory, evolving from Kant’s critique of ‘reason’ in that it;

………..specifies the object of critique, that is, what critical theory operates upon. Kant’s critical philosophy directs itself upon ‘reason’. One of Kant’s leading themes is that reason has an inherent tendency to seek application regardless of cognitive context, and it is the job of critique to circumscribe reason’s epistemological application to what Kant considers to be the bounds of knowledge.

(Rush : 2004 : 10)

The idea that critical theory takes into account an awareness of the self within the act of critique, aligns itself well with the ambience of this research in its self-reflexivity and awareness of the personal limitations. Rush says, ‘Critical Theory is also concerned to explicate conditions upon rationality and regards this task as implicating its assessment of its own rational limitations’ (2004 : 10).

In tracing the developmental history of critical theory, Rush (2004) determines that one of the initial founders of the ‘Frankfurt School’,

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11 A loosely grouped collection of philosophers, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse amongst others, who founded the Institute of Social Research at the University of Frankfurt who sought alternative social development as opposed to both Capitalism and Soviet style communism but yet who were Marxist and believed that Marxist had been misused and misunderstood. Later critical theorists move away from this position though Marx remains a central reference for critical theory.
Horkheimer (1895 – 1973) identified two contrasting forms of critique dichotomies as 1) ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’ and 2) ‘rationalism’ and ‘irrationalism’. Horkheimer, while critical of what he calls ‘irrationalism’ as an idealist overreaction to ‘rationalist idealism’ and which he identified with the hermeneutical phenomenology of Heidegger and Nietzsche. While acknowledging the quality of the critique of ‘rationalist idealism’, he perceived them as seemingly oblivious to their own idealism. In relation to the preconscious appropriation to life and existence, ‘irrationalism’ had ‘…replicated the supernatural ground of existence’ of idealism (Rush : 2004 : 23), which accords with Horkheimer’s Marxist perspective. Yet it is precisely these elements which has an affinity with this thesis, i.e. the penetrating ‘irrationalist’ critique of rationalism and the hint of something indefinable.

Critical theory is employed in viewing the prevalence of a global scale management culture, in particular Ritzer’s (1996) social theory of ‘McDonaldization’ and its application to contemporary religion and Islam in particular. Critical theory is also used in relation to the question of reification.

**Content Analysis**

Another methodology used is Content Analysis which Krippendorff (2004) understands as comprising a technique for analysing texts allowing for ‘replicable and valid inferences’ (2004 : 19). In order to do so effectively, it is essential that the material fits into some framework. Krippendorff summarises three different conceptual frameworks within this methodology: a) definitions that take content to be *inherent* in a text. Krippendorff cites Berelson who states that Content Analysis is a ‘research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the
manifest content of the communication’ (2004 : 19). Krippendorff questions the ‘quantitative’ in that while that it has its place – yet that reading is more of a qualitative process as interpretation cannot be avoided. Krippendorff’s main criticism is reserved for the phrase, ‘description of the manifest content of the communication’ (2004 : 20). Krippendorff sees this as implying that content is contained or resides within the message. The reader’s participation is inactive and passive and he argues that content also lays with the reader.

The second approach is b) content has the priority of the source of a text, i.e. the issues and general ideas of the text. Yet also important in this approach is the contextual analysis of the text so that one may make, ‘….specific inferences from text to other states or properties of its source.’ (Krippendorf : 1969 : 103) This may refer to the historical or personal circumstances under which the text was created and recorded. However, this is not always available as we may not have access to any details of people involved. The emphasis here is on the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘to whom’ which again fails to allow a role for the contemporary researcher and the relevance their interpretation has on the question at hand.

Another approach is c) wherein content is taken to emerge during the process of a researcher analysing a text in relation to a particular context. This approach is the one which Krippendorff sees as the most comprehensive and acceptable for the following reasons; Texts have no objective qualities – they are meant to be read – they are subjective by nature and they invite reader interpretation. Books are not generally written to be unto themselves, just as any work of art or presentation of any sort are for audience participation. The general the role of literature, art, philosophy and
theology is to shared and reacted to and therefore texts do not have singular meanings, they are by necessity interpreted in a variety of ways, with no singular meaning. A question arises as to the rights of the author/instigator of a text and arbitrary interpretations of their work. It is understood that completely subjective interpretations that consciously or unconsciously refuse to take into account something of what may have been inferred by the writer is flawed. Particularly if the author has made an effort in attributing and clarifying a particular meaning, whereas with work such as that of Samuel Beckett, (1906 – 1989 ) this may not be the case. Yet even a clearly attributed meaning can be understood differently when the meaning is approached through different disciplines. Essentially, the argument lies between the idea that the researcher goes off on a complete tangent to it being understood that no text will ever be agreed to upon every detail. If the researcher is not allowed to interpret a text in a way that is indicated to them, then content analysis will be pointless and critical scholarship would be jeopardised if not allowed to go outside of the accepted norms of the accepted interpretation. Nevertheless, some acknowledgement of popular or accepted opinion has to be referred to in some way. Textual meanings can address things outside of the immediate content of the text itself and communication of meaning can and is frequently developed further. How do others use the text? What ideas do the texts stimulate in others and what does that further indicate are all questions that must be allowed to rise and should be the concern of content analysis and indicative of a qualitative approach to research.

Use of Translated Works

The analysis and interpretation of a variety of texts will be utilized in this research, many of them will be translations from several different languages and this throws up
some complex issues. In the first instance, how faithful to the original works are the translations? Secondarily, will any interpretation of these translated texts further compound the distance from the original text? If so, does this render the findings of the research as unviable? Can research be compromised by the presence of other languages and required translations? The following section will deal some aspects of translation theory eventually leading to a justification as well as shedding further light on some aspects of methodology used in this research.

Even in the original language, the reading of either Heidegger or Ibn ‘Arabi, to mention but two of those whose work is presented here, could be challenging for the vast majority of native speakers, as readers may not have immediate access to the text by dint of the complex subject matter. Not surprisingly, translation into other languages does not render the inherent complexities any easier than the original. However, without translation the work of these seminal thinkers would have remained within a relatively small group of people for whom these works were comprehensible and the significant influence of some of the written work referred to in this research would have been minimal had they remained in their original languages. Some may argue that translations have gone beyond being considered translations and are, in a sense, works in their own right. Benjamin (1992) argues that ‘Translatability is an essential quality of certain works’ and that ‘…..by virtue of its translatability the original is closely connected with the translation; in fact, this connection is all the closer since it is no longer of importance to the original’ (1992 : 72). It is interesting to note the following comment concerning the Macquarrie & Robinson translation of Heidegger’s Being and Time (2008), ‘It has even been remarked by German students that Heidegger becomes more comprehensible when read in this translation’
While what makes something translatable may be another matter, yet a translation of a text itself could itself be a foregrounding of ideas and a thing worthy of consideration itself, independent yet related to the original text. If it is the means by which others understand and given access to a text and its general focus then this could be said to be something that stands on its own merits. Nonetheless, the fact remains that within a translated work the obvious uncertainty is that the content as formulated by the original writer may somehow deviate from or be corrupted in some way through translation, perhaps supplementing the meaning of ‘lost in translation’. In Translation Theory (or the Philosophy of Translation) this is the ‘Problem of Equivalence’ and is the central debate at the core of the differences between Language Relativism and Language Universals, two major perspectives from which translation is considered.

Linguistic or Language Relativism translation theory argues that different languages are in effect different ways of looking at the world and therefore translation from one culture to another cannot be literal or word for word translations but rather that the ‘sense’ of the text is translated, though of course, as faithful to the original text as possible. The weakness of the Relativist approach to translation would lie in questioning whether the nuance and concepts considered indirectly translatable would deviate from that of the original author’s intentions and thus, to a greater or lesser degree, deviate from the original work. Relativism would argue that British cultural perspectives are quite distinct from that of Germans and Arabs and that a word for word translation would not allow for a true and full understanding. For example, ‘a warm welcome’ in English does not translate well into Arabic, as ‘cool’ would be
considered the more affable. The American expression, ‘tickled to death’ indicating delight also does not translate well into other languages.

Noam Chomsky would be considered a primary proponent of Language Universals or Universal Rationalism, as he argues for language constituting a common and integral part of human nature. As he points out there is an amazingly similar syntax within over 4,000 different spoken languages. What this suggests is that translating a text from one language to another can be accurate enough so that the reader will imbibe a major aspect of the intentions of the original author. The translator takes the concepts expressed in the ‘host’ language to the ‘guest’ language. As the reader of the translation shares common and innate human characteristics with the reader of the host text, the original writer’s intentions are understood. From this viewpoint the translation is more of a linguistic and rational exercise; any different cultural contexts encountered in the translation will be overcome by the shared human potential for rationalization – where differences occur rational thought processes can analyze and weigh up the situation arriving at a conclusion or understanding of what is being said.

Bruns (1992) elucidates upon these differences in observing that while it might be possible for everyone to understand something like geometry it will not necessarily be possible to understand the geometrist’s mind. People of different cultures may understand a geometrical formula of Euclid’s yet we do not understand Euclid himself. Other concepts however are less easier to define and Bruns suggests that while everyone understands a shovel to be a shovel, the concept of ‘justice’ may be more difficult to agree on. However, we would not drastically fall short of some general conceptual consensus of what constitutes justice and that ‘we know what it
would be for the concept of justice to be fully intelligible’ (Bruns : 1992 : 3).

However, while Universal Rationalism perceives translation as an act of rationality and objectivity, Bruns believes that ‘…the question of how far one can do this is controversial. What are the limits of reduction? Can one understand the world by repressing one’s involvement with it?’ (Bruns : 1992 : 4). Nietzsche is also cited in saying ‘that there is no way to adjudicate among rival versions of anything, because everything is internal to interpretation’ (Bruns : 1992 : 4). However, while we may take this as an indication of some truth and not dismiss it outright, we must resist the idea of a total impasse of endless conflicts of interpretations.

Another aspect of equivalence is afforded by an understanding between temporal cultures, which is also an act of translation (Bruns : 1992) and relevant to this thesis. While there are profoundly differing conceptions of love between the medieval and the modern era there is a central concept of love by which it is possible for the modern reader to understand the medieval troubadour tradition through the behaviour of the lovelorn or the infatuated as being related to this central concept of love. Equally, if it were feasible, the medieval person would be able to grasp something of the modern discourse of love. Yet it is the outcome of this approach, which should be questioned. For the sake of argument; what would occur were a translator theoretically able to completely transcend their world, to such an extent that all subjectivity was reduced to the barest minimum and the objectivity increased to the point of presenting the closest possible rendition of Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought from Arabic to English? Would there not be a danger of simply presenting a historical document, a rendition of the world that Ibn ‘Arabi inhabited and would the degree of relevance for the here and now been reduced significantly? Would one be engaged in an act of
preserving rather than translation? Perhaps more significantly, to what degree is the modern reader emotionally touched by the tales of unrequited love, which was surely the objective of the troubadour as he sang? Do non-German and non-Arabic speakers engage and respond to the translated works of the likes of Ibn ‘Arabi and Martin Heidegger? Certainly. Are German and Arabic speakers agreed as to the conclusions arrived at by either one of these? Certainly not.

A further perspective from anthropology can also shed light upon the matter for it too is a question of translation. One observes the practices of a particular culture and then communicates these back to a different cultural grouping. This is depicted in a manner enabling the eventual ‘foreign’ audience to contextualize and process these through their own cultural conceptual frameworks. William Foley (1997) argues that if there was no possibility of comprehension between cultures then anthropology would be devoid of purpose and the same could be said of translation. In his view, the act of translation denotes the existence of similarities between different worldviews. The role of the translator is to locate these similarities and exploit them enabling comprehension in the target audience. Yet we must take into account the debate within anthropology as to whether its objective lies in knowing more about ourselves and our respective societies or whether it is simply an act of description of the other and any value thereof, which seems vaguely akin to the Rationalist and Relativist arguments of translation and also something raised initially in this research; i.e. the commitment to knowledge based in the experiential and not merely the academic.

Ultimately, it is felt that a full justification for the use of translated texts in this research cannot be housed within either the Rationalist or Relativist arguments. When
considering the complexity of thought from various sources featured in this research it seems wrong to assume that the ‘problem of equivalence’ will be met adequately in stressing the similarities in human comprehension on the one hand and on the other concentrating on the differences. Neither theory seems to deal adequately with the ‘gap’ to be translated between complexity of thought and wider accessibility for the purposes of application, a matter particularly relevant in conjunction with the various texts that will be referred to in this work. Relativist and Rationalist theory may argue over the means of understanding the concept of medieval court love yet the idea of individual perception seems to be left out of the equation. This suggests that perhaps there is another approach beyond either one of the major approaches to translation, indicating something more of a question of perception and interpretation.

The question of perception is postulated by Putnam in his accepting that human beings have the capacity to share concepts because of common human characteristics yet they may not share the perceptions of concepts. Lenclud presents an example of this, wherein the phrase ‘slobbers his food all over his shirt’ is technically a description devoid of value judgment but nevertheless has a ‘strong negative emotive force’ (1996 : 7) and the perception overrides both the concept and the rules of grammar. When perceptions are spoken of then it is impossible to ignore the idiosyncratic subjective perception of the specific individual something that until now has not been referred to directly but has been lurking around the perimeters of the arguments presented until now, though touched upon in an earlier reference to Nietzsche.
Hermeneutical Approaches

Gadamer (2007) concurs with the idea that a purely objective translation or interpretation is impossible as the reader is too bound by their own ‘facticity’ and cultural and personal conditioning to ever be able to understand the original as is. If we consider the act of interpretation in a wider sense we see that objectivity is quite unattainable, as Laing says, ‘I see you, and you see me. I experience you, and you experience me. I see your behaviour. You see my behaviour. But I do not and never have and never will see your experience of me’ (1967 : 17 - 18). However, in Gadamer’s view, the difficulties of interpretation are not just situated in the sphere of time, place or individual but in language itself. There is a constant shifting flux in our moods and perceptions reflected in the language we use and understand with. The boundaries of language are constantly altering in such a manner that even the writing of a note or memo may not be understood by the very same author in the same way as it was originally written. In this way language acts in a counter balancing manner in pulling in two ways, a) it holds back our interpretive ability and b) provides a limited access to texts and in effect brings about what Gadamer calls a ‘fusion of horizons’ (2007 : 180), a dialogical and creative intercourse between the reader and the text (not the author), which is the basis of the interpretive process. These ‘horizons’ can be cultural, time bound and historical, ethnic, traditional as well as lingual. As with interpretation, these horizons can be arenas of thought yet also limiting it. In the ‘fusion of horizons’, ‘….the past and the present meet, in which what is alien is appropriated and otherness is overcome, though only as a process and a task that never comes to an end (Mehta : 1971). However, Gadamer (2007) believes that this ‘fusing’ needs to be raised to the level of philosophy and that it is actually the heart of the philosophical endeavour. Gadamer and Ricouer are usually identified with this
moderate hermeneutical stance (Gallagher : 1992) and critics such as Betti (1962) and Hirsch (1977) of both this centrist and the more radical hermeneutics see an inherent danger of subjectivism and relativism in believing that ‘The interpreter’s primary task is to reproduce in himself the author’s “logic”, his attitudes, his cultural givens, in short, his world’ (Hirsch : 1967 : 242-243; my italics). However, Hirsch later makes the point that even a supposedly valid interpretation does not automatically infer that this is the ‘correct version’ but that it is likely to be the closest one achievable on the evidence available. Hirsch differentiates between the meaning of a text, which in his view doesn’t change and the significance of a text, which can and may change.

However, what neither the Rationalist, (a position that Betti and Hirsch would probably be indirectly identified with); or Relativist theories incorporate is the wider apprehension of translation and interpretation. From the point of view of radical hermeneutics, even the act of the original creation of a text is a translation, for as Johnson says it is, ‘precisely the way in which the original text is always already an impossible translation that renders translation impossible’ (Johnson : 1985 : 146). Derrida (1985a), eminently identified with radical hermeneutics, articulated the idea that philosophy is nothing more or less than translatability. Furthermore, translation in Derrida’s terms has wider implications as:

….an operation of thought through which we must translate ourselves into the thought of the other language, the forgotten thinking of the other language. We must translate ourselves into it and not make it come into our language. It is necessary to go toward the unthought thinking of the other language.

(Derrida : 1985a : 115)
The ‘unthought thinking’ is the non rational, pre-conceptual and unspoken context, a de-distinguishing of the dualism of the presence or absence of a thing, (Nancy : 2000).

It does not refer to explicit, thematic or conceptual knowledge but that which is deeply embedded; a preconscious interpretation unformulated into any conceptual form and this is the aspect that one should delve into to understand another culture. One should be open to ‘feeling’ the quintessence of another culture without theorization. Interpretation, like understanding, is something that we “always already” posses’ (Caputo : 1987 : 69-70). This is the unformulated and preconceptual thought which ‘cuts across the distinction between understanding and interpretation’ (Caputo : 1987 : 70) and it is here that one must extract something of the core meaning of the text through enquiry. Yet this is not a rational based questioning; as in; ‘Does this exist and what is the proof?’ In this manner, a translation of the original text is not recollected but rather undergoes repetition in the Kierkegaardian sense (1983); a repetition of the initial act of creating the original text yet now transformed and supplemented. Derrida should not be misunderstood as saying that translation should discard the original text and make free play upon it; whereas in reality he speaks of a creative tension between the ideal of flawless translation and the impossibility of this ever happening, (Derrida : 1985b) and yet we must persevere with translation for these tensions are what constitutes language itself. It demands reflecting and dwelling on matters of meanings and how this is communicated and which can bring forth something akin to the original text perhaps even going beyond. ‘Fidelity’ to the original text here means a journey of enquiry to the heart of the matter, yet one is also bound to the conventions of language and there is no choice but to accept this, it is an unavoidable reality. The focus is not upon the preservation of the text but the creation
of meaning, not *ex nihilo* but based in and around the original text. The appropriation of that translation is necessary but equally important is to transcend it, thus constituting a *transcending towards the original text’s ultimate possibilities* (Gallagher : 1992). It can be an ambiguous exchange with the original text’s meanings functioning as both a constraining and liberating force.

Derrida claims that the idea that one could translate from one language into another faithfully is a fruitless pursuit for as he says, ‘*Une ’bonne' traduction doit toujours abuser.*’ (Derrida : 1997 : 273 ). Significantly, this does not translate well into English, literally meaning ‘A “good” translation should always abuse’. What is really suggested is that the act of translating cannot help but contort the original meaning but *interpretation* can be both innovative and imaginative (Robinson : 1997). The term ‘abuse’ must be understood not to refer to its English usage as negative or violent but seen as opposed to what Lewis (1985) calls the *us*-system which refers to the common *usual*, the *useful* and normal linguistic *usage*. Derrida’s deconstruction theory stipulates that translated concepts should be ‘ab –used’ The prefix ‘ab’ means ‘away from’ so that the interpretation is presumably *away from* the original and the *us*-system. In extrapolating further upon the interplay of the tensions referred to above, Lewis speaks of an ‘abusive fidelity’ (1985 : 56) in regard to the original text. The possibility of appropriating the core meaning that emerges indicates that the meaning may not be far from the original but yet going beyond.

**Translingual Approach**

There also lies the possibility that theories as whole entities are more effectively translatable than texts. Lydia Liu (1995) draws from Edward Said (1983): ‘Said introduces a concept of literary practice that emphasizes creative borrowing,
appropriation, and the movement of ideas and theories from place to place in an international environment' (Liu : 1995 : 20). Liu uses the term ‘Translingual’ whereby she defines the process by which languages interrelate. New theories, discourses and meanings and words are derived from other languages, which may bear more proximity than translated blocks of text between the very same set of languages. These theories and the discourses that consequently arise are not ‘transformed’ by finding place within another language context but are rather created within the new language itself through the various types of debate that take place. Additionally, these new concepts and meanings can be re-appropriated by the original language community.

The overall perspective that is taken in this thesis concerning use of translations and secondary texts extends further back prior to the act of translation from one language to another; in fact, taking place when the thoughts for the original texts where first recorded. In this manner, the use of translations and secondary texts are seen each as a work in their own right, related to the original yet independent of it as a work in its own right, up to and including the interpretations and perceptions arrived at in this work. In addition Liu’s idea that conceptual theories as entities may actually be more easily translatable than blocks of texts is also taken as having merit. In general the principles of Radical Hermeneutic principles are taken on in this thesis to engage with and within the phenomena around the body of ideas engendered translated and secondary texts. The publication of these in English will be how they are understood in the Anglo Saxon world, not forgetting the element of individual perception and interpretation and the possibility that such translations will be at great variance with the original is highly improbable.
The Use of Texts

This research is not text led. As a result of life experiences and reflection thereon, 
with vaguely self-directed reading around some of the issues involved, any use of 
texts is through an initial line of thought based on memories of accumulated readings. 
In this thesis this has served to amplify and provide justification for arguments or to 
refute previously held lines of thought or argument and bring on a change of thinking 
to open new pathways to follow. However, such texts are to be seen as Foucault says :

Mais un livre est fait pour servir à des usages non définis par celui 
qui l’a écrit. Plus il y aura d’usages nouveaux, possibles, imprévus, 
plus je serai content. Tous mes livres ... sont, si vous voulez, de 
petites boîtes à outils. Si les gens veulent bien les ouvrir, se servir de 
telle phrase, telle idée, telle analyse comme d’un tournevis ou d’un 
desserre-boulon pour court-circuiter. 12

(Foucault : 720 : 1994 )

Consequently, there are many texts that have been referred to and it is difficult to 
establish ‘main texts’. Nevertheless, a few do protrude above others as having had a 
seminal effect on this work. These are :

from the French by P. Kingsley), Cambridge, Islamic Texts Society

Afary, J. & K.B. Anderson, (2005), Foucault and the Iranian Revolution- Gender and 
the Seductions of Islamism, Chicago, University of Chicago Press

Ad-Darqawi, Sh. A., (1981), The Darqawi Way, (Translated by A. Bewley), Norwich, 
Diwan Press

Al-Habib, Sh. M., The Diwan of Shaykh Muhammad ibn al Habib, Norwich, Madinah 
Press


12 “…but a book is to be used for purposes not defined by the one who wrote it. The more new uses, 
unexpected uses, they can be used for, the happier I will be. All my books ... are, if you want, small 
toolboxes. People can open it and use such and such a phrase or idea or an analysis like a screwdriver 
or a wrench…”
Burckhardt, T., (1992) *Fez, City of Islam*, (Translated from the German by W. Stoddart), Cambridge, Islamic Texts Society

Burckhardt, T., *Introduction to Sufi Doctrine*, (Translated from the German by D.M. Matheson), Wellingborough, Northamptonshire, Thorsons Publishers Ltd.


Lings, M. (1971), *A Sufi Saint of the Twentieth Century – Shaikh Ahmad Al’Alawi – His Spiritual Heritage and Legacy*


Previous and Current Research around the Subject

More recent and academic western endeavours identifying correlating themes between existentialism and Islam are to be found in Almond (2004) who incisively counterpoises Derrida’s thinking with that of Ibn ‘Arabi and Sufism generally to address questions of the constraints of rational thought, mystery, perplexity and confusion, all of which can be brought to bear and directed to the question of authentic selfhood. In a later published work, Almond (2007) brings together the perspectives of diverse thinkers and writers such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Borge, Pamuk and Baudrillard to make postmodern representations upon the question of Islam. The topics cover a range of issues from a critique of modernity, the multifarious forms of Islam, postmodern, existential and philosophical theory in conjunction with the Muslim world, all of which are relevant to the matter at hand.

Coates (2002) makes a short but seminal contribution by making a specifically Akbarian comparison with European existentialism. He identifies parallel ideas in the contrast of facticity or stark ‘givenness’ of the world, wherein individuals find themselves, with the simultaneous and paradoxical encounter of the sheer complexity of primordial existence and inherent possibilities thereof. Coates also remarks upon
the shared notion of the ‘immediacy of the moment’ corresponding with elements of Heidegger and Kierkegaard, which will be further examined in the concluding chapter. The underlying link with European existentialism, Coates believes, lies in the primacy of existence over thought; existence first and foremost and not as a result of thought.

Some focus on personal authenticity is to be found in Khwaja (1987) in a work entitled *Authenticity and Islamic Liberalism*. The definition of authenticity given is as follows:

An authentic Muslim / Christian / Hindu is a person, who inwardly accepts, for its own sake, the system of beliefs, values, obligations and behavior patterns deemed to be the central core of the religion, and acts accordingly. If, however, the person inwardly dissents from some feature of the system but freely, that is, without any extraneous motive of fear or reward, opts to defer to the system (because of the overwhelming depth appeal of the system as a whole) and also moulds his actions accordingly, he too may be said to be an authentic believer. If, however, such a person remains in a state of inner doubt, tension and indecision or ignores the conflict between his inner responses and some feature of the system, or tries to rationalize the stipulated ‘higher wisdom’ of the system by arguments which he (in his heart of hearts) rejects, he would cease to be an authentic believer.

(Khawaja :1987: 33)

This is a fairly comprehensive definition of personal authenticity at some level. However, Khawaja does not make direct links between inauthenticity and the effects of reification and rationalism though there are passing references; ‘If you think that religious truths are just like other propositions and are to be viewed in the logic of truth or falsehood, then I don’t agree with you’, (Khawaja : 1987 : 3). The concept of inauthenticity in Khawaja’s work is situated chiefly around questions of social pressure and conformity.
A highly significant work to be considered in light of this research is that of R. D. Lee (1997) who directly addresses the question of Muslim authenticity from a variety of perspectives. Lee succinctly and effectively identifies seven characteristics of authenticity in European thought such as; particularity, radicalism, autonomy, unicity, group action, equality, and institutionalization and applies these to the thought and writing of four well known Muslim figures, namely Muhammad Iqbal, Sayyid Qutb, ‘Ali Shari’ati and Muhammad Arkoun. Lee identifies a basic similarity arising in their search for Muslim authenticity, reflected more widely within the Muslim world, as residing somewhere beyond both tradition and modernity.

Some criticism could be leveled at this idea primarily because it seems an over simplification and secondarily because there is little exposition of what is meant by traditionalism or any discussion of the classical. Throughout the book the traditional is depicted as an outmoded form of thought unsuitable for the age seen in such comments as ‘Tradition suppresses human choice and saps human initiative’ and ‘The issue of authenticity cannot arise in traditional society’ (1997 : 16) both of which seem rather sweeping statements. While Lee does mention at one point that the search for authenticity leading to original and creative frames could include ‘….even the “traditional” which is no longer traditional by virtue of having been examined and reconstructed’ (1997 : 16). Certain presumptions are made here regarding the traditional and a pathway to authenticity does not require rejection of the worldly, nor the traditional, nor modernity, though it may do.

One cannot help feeling that Lee’s perspective is one entirely stemming either from ‘counter tradition’ or ‘modernism’ both of which are the antithesis of tradition. Lee’s
depiction of tradition is not surprising, as the positioning of the four people chosen for the analysis, though at variance with one another, can all be firmly placed within the ‘modernist’ or at best the ‘psuedo-traditionalist’ (Nasr : 1994) category and it would have been perhaps more equitable and comprehensive to have had two traditionalists and two modernists, (Said Nursi comes to mind though some may dispute the degree of his traditionalism). Despite this and especially in the opening chapters, Lee deals comprehensively with aspects of individual and personal authenticity, yet his main focus moves from the direction of the individual to wider society; which again is understandable when considering the general outlook of those that Lee examines in his work. This work will, to some extent, try to readdress some of these imbalances.

Most of the discourse on personal authenticity in the Muslim world has been articulated around an *a priori* rejection of western influence. From an Iranian perspective but probably equally applicable across the Muslim world, Boroujderdi comments that:

The common denominator between many contemporary Iranian thinkers and the Western existential philosophers referred to …..is their preoccupation with the problematic of authenticity. Both groups believe in the telos of living a moral, sensible, passionate and authentic life. …..For the prototypical Iranian intellectual this has translated into a rejection of the apish imitation of the West on the grounds that mimicry and submission are fraudulent and counterfeit states of being.

(Adib-Moghaddam :1997 : 27)

More populist reformist tendencies are rooted in the idea of authentic legitimacy in concurring with the interpretation of values and actions of the *salaf*, (the earliest Muslim community around the Prophet). However, this is less about the authentic and more about authentication and is usually associated with the religious, social and political aspirations of revivalist movements such as the *ikhwan Muslimin, Wahhābi*
and Salafi movements but can also be also linked with notions of Arab nationalism and populism, (Saktanber : 2002; Al Azmeh : 2009; Esposito : 2010). This authentication is frequently pursued in thought, word and deed and is of the reforming type mentioned previously in Pamuk’s novel (2004) and situated within a desire to return to a perception of the customs and actions of the salaf.

Leonard Binder’s work, *Islamic Liberalism - A Critique of Development Ideologies* (1989) provides both examples and a critique of this legitimizing authenticity within the Muslim discourse. Binder conducts his attention chiefly to historicity and interpretation of the *turath*, (legacy - heritage) and focuses on the question of how the individual and the collective reflects and enacts out the values and beliefs of the earliest community, *(salaf)*. Binder understands that:

> The task of the phenomenological hermeneutic is to distinguish between inauthentic or unacceptable historical manifestations of Islam and authentic manifestations, between the inauthenticity of the decline and the authenticity of the salaf [the early community]. The renaissance of Islam is, consequently the reassertion of the historical truth of the earliest period of Islam as the true being of Islam and the authentic being of the Muslims of today. The Muslims of today are to reaffirm that authenticity by choosing to live their lives in accordance with their “own most being”.

(Binder : 1988: 294)

In the two extracts above there two basic tensional binaries that may not be immediately apparent but which within the Muslim discourse can be seen in the above extracts, consisting of the *dahir* (external) and the *batin* (interior) and the concept of the *salaf* (ancestors or in this sense the earliest Muslim community) and *khalaf*, (succeeding generations - Blinder : 1988; Esposito : 2011). Consciously or unconsciously, these polarities play a significant role within this authenticating process in contemporary Muslim social and private discourse. The first set refers to
the social and outward positioning of the individual vis a vis the internal, private world of the individual. When these concepts are extended to a wider social arena it can indicate the dichotomy of the collective and the individual. Other essential tensional binaries could be said to lie in; din and dunya, religious and worldly, diraya and riwaya, critical understanding of traditions and unexamined acceptance of tradition; ijtihād and ijma, independent interpretation and authoritative consensus; khawas and awam, elite and mass; shari’a and haqā’iq, law and reality all of which bear relevance for the Muslim individual self. Despite Biner’s allusion to the ‘own most being’, his focus centres mainly on the dahir, (outward), the hermeneutics of authentication and the obvious problematic involved. The batin, (inward) or personal element comes into play only in response to how the individual conforms to the collective interpretation of its societal traditions. Some of the underlying tensions and dynamics thrown up by this will be present in much of this research. To be clear, the balance of focus in this present work is orientated more to the individual as a self, building upon and starting more from their ‘own most being’ yet not devoid of the social context. It will attempt to deal with the batin of the individual and the degree and manner in which they engage or commit to dahir positions within contemporary Islam.

This concludes a survey of previous and relevant research and literature carried out in regard to shared existentialist themes in Muslim and European thought in regard to the subject of Muslim personal authenticity. While what has been presented feeds into and provides relevant theoretical background to the subject of Muslim personal authenticity, as far as can be ascertained, besides Lee (1997) and Khawaja (1987) there is little else that appears to have been written directly in regard to the question
of Muslim authenticity. Nor does any tangible and existing discourse on this within Muslim communities appear to be happening and the reasons behind Heyking’s assertion that, ‘Western attention is usually drawn toward Islamists and less often to the efforts among Muslims to theorize more authentically about their own existence’ (2006: 73) may lie more with the Muslim community than anything other. There can be no denying of tensions between thought and piety in the Muslim world rendering any philosophical discourse as problematic. As Shayegan says:

The problem of the Islamic world resides in its cumbersome atavism, its defensive reflexes, its intellectual blockages and above all in the illusory pretensions that it possesses ready made answers to all the world’s questions. We need to learn a certain humility, a certain understanding of the relativity of values.

(Shayegan: 1992: 29)

At the same time there are profound noetic themes concerning the self within the Qur’an and within classical orthodoxy, which might demand a different thinking, perhaps a thinking more akin to the European existentialist, wherein the starting point begins and ends with the human being rather than objects or subjects outside of the self.

In summary, the rationale and the hypotheses for this research have been presented. The methodology framework utilized to address the research question and exemplarize a more authentic theorizing about existence within the Muslim sphere has also been provided. Now, in setting out upon the path as outlined above, the next chapter consists of delving deeper into the question of authenticity and its obverse and extending these to the social and religious realm.
Chapter 3

Existential Authenticity

‘Therefore existential authenticity is possible only with reference to the transcendent ideals.’

(Pruett : 1973 : 577)

‘The search for who “we” are as opposed to what “they” would want us to be.’

(Lee : 1997 : 14)

In determining whether and how inauthenticity or its inverse exists within the religious realm of Islam, the first step taken in this chapter is to attempt a more specific definition of authenticity. This is not an easy task as the concept is both nebulous and indeterminate. Nevertheless, despite this, there is some general consensus as to what is referred to by the term. For example, most people would accept that it entails a lack of pretence and an honesty and integrity with the self in thought, word and deed. Yet absolute definitions will not be forthcoming and any analysis taking place can only be perceived as a partial apprehending of the subject of authenticity and the self, (Wittgenstein : 2002). Therefore the aim here is to arrive at a definitive ‘theory’ but is more directed towards enquiring into authenticity.

The complexities of answers to the following questions demonstrate the indeterminateness of the term; Can one lie or withhold information and remain authentic? Is it inauthentic to speak to an elderly person differently than one would speak to a close friend? Is ‘impression management’ inauthentic? One may argue that social interactions are a means wherein different norms and narratives are mediated, which goes towards shaping meaningful experience and which would seem to negate the exigency of an authentic self. Is a pursuit of authenticity carried out solely for personal fulfilment itself an authentic thing? Is personal authenticity tied to autonomy
and breaking free from social, religious and cultural conditioning? Could it actually signify the very opposite; embracing such conventions consciously?

The concept of authenticity defies easy description as it has neither an objective quality nor is it a predicate that can be easily used to describe a person, as would be the case with other associated words like ‘honesty’ or ‘sincerity’, (Golomb : 1995) and indeed, authenticity needs to be clearly distinguished from these. Trilling believed authenticity to be ‘a more strenuous moral exercise than “sincerity”, a more exigent conception of the self and of what being true to it consists in, a wider reference to the universe and man’s place in it and a less acceptant and genial view of the social circumstances of life’, (Trilling : 1972 cited in Golomb : 1995 : 10).

**Mircea Eliade (1907 – 1986)**

Eliade believed that human existence was essentially a striving for authenticity and that religion was the main vehicle and means of expression in achieving this end, (1965:10; 1975:12-13), in other words, religion as *the* mode of being human in the world. As a biographer of Eliade later stated, ‘Religion is the most profound and meaningful way of interpreting the story of human existence’ (Girardot 1982 : 8). Eliade perceived the ‘Real’ (Ultimate Reality) as non dualist, free of all attributes, definitions and limitations; an Ultimate Reality, (the ‘Real’) which lays at the core of all religious manifestations and the sacred, (1965 : 28) as well as the source of human authenticity. The role of myth and ritual is to act out and make manifest the real and authentic as something correspondingly existing outside and inside human beings. Human inauthenticity, Eliade believed, had come about as a result of humans no longer understanding their human origins, yet it is precisely this understanding that
makes them human. In understanding Eliade we must comprehend ‘religion’ here in the widest sense of the word and not in any denominational sense, (yet not excluding these) but referred more generally to human perception of the sacred in everyday existence, irrespective of any organised religion. Eliade believed that authenticity lay in the human search for liberation from the limitations of the temporal and spatial through transcending these. Human inauthenticity had come about through a truncation from the ‘archaic ontology’ of our authentic human nature. This ontology is the standpoint from which the ‘Real’ could be perceived on one hand and the temporal world / human existence on the other, yet imbued with the ‘Real’ both within and beyond it, as something tangibly experienced yet incapable of being conceptualized, (1965 : 202-03). This approach is what Eliade called a ‘traditional’, ‘pre-Socratic’ and ‘authentic’ philosophy (1975:124-25) and echoes the work of Heidegger, for whom Eliade held considerable and lasting regard, (Wasserstrom :1999). The inauthentic lies in the non-religious and the profane as being neither real nor eternal. Eliade believed that modern man had become diverted by the temporal and spatial; embroiled in ‘the terror of history’ with a corresponding loss of primordial immediacy, natural wisdom and the depletion of primal concern with existential human experience, (1965:49). *Vis a vis* the ‘Real’, the impermanency of history and the flux of the temporal and spatial indicates that the pursuit of knowledge of things of the world as less worthy; in order to act authentically in the world more meaningful and sustainable values are needed.

With this view in mind, it seems possible that any given tradition could be considered inauthentic when it curtails the amplitude and effervescence of the original message, rendering it possibly in contravention to that tradition as it was at its inception. Even
this is a delicate thing; for the holding true to original teachings can itself become yet another type of stultification and an inappropriate responses to a constantly changing world.

Soren Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855)

Soren Kierkegaard’s contribution to the questions of authenticity and the self are crucial to any understanding of authenticity and the self. ‘The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self.’ (Kierkegaard : 2004 : 43). In simpler terms this implies that the self consists of that which recognizes itself as a self and also in relation to others. Kierkegaard understood selfhood as consisting of the process of coming to the perception of one as a genuine individual and the awakening and search for this is the most important human undertaking possible, an ethical imperative. According to Kierkegaard, the alternative is living with partial recognition of the self, overwhelmed by triviality and sensuality and the imitation of others resulting in a drifting through life devoid any meaningful purpose.

But the only life wasted is the life of one who so lived it, deceived by life’s pleasures or its sorrows, that he never became decisively, eternally, conscious of himself as spirit, as self, or, what is the same, he never became aware-and gained in the deepest sense the impression-that there is a God there and that ‘he’, himself, his self, exists before this God’

(Kierkegaard : 2004 : 57)

There are three evolving aspects to Kierkegaard’s approach to the self; the first lying in what has just been referred to above, the ‘relating to the self’. However, this is not the self being defined by that relationship but rather is defined by that which does the relating so that in a necessarily dynamic ongoing movement the self is always in a fluid process of becoming. Secondarily, in claiming that this self is that which
consciously relates itself to itself, in doing so, also naturally encounters that which created the self, i.e. the Divine. For without this divine element we would have the conundrum of a self-created self. Kierkegaard does not delve deeply into this beyond stating, ‘Such a relation which relates itself to its own self, must either have established itself or have been established by another’ (Kierkegaard : 2004 : 43).

Returning to Kierkegaard, anxiety is the human reaction to non-being as opposed to being. This non-being is not just a question of annihilation or physical death but also of meaninglessness. The self is aware of the ‘beingness’ of itself in correlation to non-being in a way that animals are not and thus posseses ‘a relation which relates to itself’.

Kierkegaard speaks of levels of selfhood, the highest of which would be the recognition of the Divine, seemingly not inferring religious or doctrinal belief but simply some conception of a *force majeur*. The implication of this is that the self has to have originated from something that is even more basic than the self. The self stems from and is created by another and is therefore related to it. The alternative to this divine element would be the idea of having the choice or ability to create one’s own identity, something that Kierkegaard sees as an unstable conceptual grounding. So the second aspect of the self, as understood by Kierkegaard, lies in coming upon an innate spiritual potentiality, (this perception of the Divine), discovered within during the search and recovery of the self. It is interesting to note that Ibn ‘Arabi bases much of his thought on a hadith, ‘He who knows himself knows his Lord’ (ibn ‘Arabi quoted by Chittick: 1989 : 312) which he establishes as one of the main objectives of the mystic path. According to Kierkegaard, one resulting behaviour of the individual who comes upon this Divine element within the self, is a predisposition
for seeking solitude away from the masses. Nevertheless, authenticity can be achieved simply through the self’s consciousness of its self, with or without the appropriation of the Divine, though Kierkegaard see this as a lower form of authenticity. The third element is synthesis; which is the relation between two entities with the relationship itself as a third entity. There it is the self that does the relating and the self that is discovered, (in the highest level the discovery of the Spirit / Divine) and then there is the relationship between the two which constitutes a third entity, all three of which when put together, constitutes a process of authenticity. It is important to understand the individualism implied by this selfhood as not equated with contemporary notions of independence and autonomy but rather ironically, a being of selflessness, (Kierkegaard : 2004) and there will be more on this later. In religious terms, a general overview of Kierkegaard’s approach should not be seen to be at the expense of, nor devalue, the exoteric; as it neither implies an individualized or arbitrary interpretation of such, nevertheless, it does make the point that impersonal knowledge, (i.e. the exoteric), should not gain ascendancy over personal knowledge.

Kierkegaard also stressed the primacy of subjectivity and that the truth of something is not limited to objective facts though they may play an important part. The most important aspect of truth is how one acts in regard to objective facts. From an ethical vantage point, living or acting out one’s subjective truths carries far greater weight than bare objective facts so that truth lies all the more in subjectivity, not objectivity. Authenticity lies in the acting out of one’s subjective truth and conviction, which frequently may conflict with the status quo.

The moment I take Christianity as a doctrine and so indulge my cleverness or profundity or my eloquence or my imaginative powers in depicting it, people are very pleased. I am looked upon as serious Christian. The moment I begin to express existentially what I say,
and consequently to bring Christianity into reality, it is just as though I had exploded existence - the scandal is there at once.’

(Kierkegaard : 2003 : 343)

For Kierkegaard the search for the self is the precursor to the religious path and religious authenticity. For the search itself is transformative though perhaps not always conclusive and gives priority to transcending the self rather than accumulating external religious knowledge. ‘God in heaven surely knows best what is the highest that a person can aspire to and complete. Scripture only asks if you were a trustworthy servant’ (Kierkegaard : 1992:148). Kierkegaard believed that meaningful truths do not emerge from dispassionate objective truths but from a visceral subjectivity. While a moral code is relatively easy to adhere to, one could argue that the altering of the self is what religion ultimately asks for, something which creates an extraordinary individual, perhaps one not always adhering to the accepted norms of socially conditioned behaviour or even common patterns of human behaviour. Rather than being directed from an outer morality, authenticity lies more in the knowledge of whether the individual is living up to the ideals of the self. Relatedly, the ‘despair’ or ‘falling’ of the self lies in the degree to which it covers up or conceals inconsistencies from itself, (Kierkegaard : 2004 ). What is depicted here is an actual, subjective and existential search for self-transformation as opposed to a preoccupation with living out and maintaining theories and appearances. This is a movement from mindless conformity to mindful autonomy, (but does not necessitate automatic rejection of tradition), to transforming to freely chosen values and meanings rather than encultured ones. In the final movement, committing one’s life to a way of being so that one is what one pursues.
Inauthenticity

Everyone is the other and no one is himself.
(Heidegger : 1996 : 120)

As we have seen, authenticity suggests some type of fulfillment vis a vis genuine human existence and experience but it is perhaps best understood in absentia, i.e., inauthenticity, something considered an integral part of the human condition occurring through different pressures with an ensuing loss of the self, sacrificed by compliance and acceptability to others. A corresponding loss of genuine relationships with others can take place as neither the individual or the other is authentically related to with both parties functioning by the dictates of conventional norms. Fortunately, transformation is possible and a life given over to inauthenticity can be overcome and the self regained, albeit with difficulty in proportion to the degree of adherence to social expectations and the strength of motivation and energy to dispel this. This element of recovery is well gleaned from the German word for authenticity; eigentlich, a literal translation of which would be ‘own self’. In this way, regaining authenticity is the retrieving of one’s true self or wrestling one’s identity from the inclinations of the many. A thorough and honest evaluation of the self is required wherein the individual recognizes personal inauthenticity and grappling with who one really is. The illusions of the self that are cultivated are mostly situated in the realm of language, through the descriptive labels accepted as the reality of the self. Therefore the self can be something created mainly in language swamping the one with self delusion and heedless impulsivity.

Through words and concepts we are continually misled into imagining things as being simpler than they are, separate from one another, indivisible, each existing in and for itself. A philosophical mythology lies concealed in language that breaks out again every moment, however careful one may be otherwise.

(Nietzsche : 1996 : 306)
Heidegger used several different terms to describe inauthenticity before actually rounding it off and employing the word and concept in ‘Being and Time’ (2008) often referring to the same phenomena as ‘lapse’, ‘decline’, ‘collapse’, falling’ and ‘ruinance’, the latter of these defined as ‘…the movedness of factual life which it “enacts” and is in itself, as itself, for itself, and, in all of this, against itself’ (Heidegger : 2001: 98). All of the proceeding language, seemingly rather dramatic when we come upon Heidegger’s later definition of all this in ‘inauthenticity. What is most striking, is that these largely match with Heidegger’s overall view of the human self. Significantly, selfhood is a process rather than some sort of station, referred to in the use of the word ‘movedness’. What can be concluded from this is that inauthenticity (or ruinance as above) is a way of being and that all ways of being are an ongoing process.

In ‘Being and Time’ (2008) Heidegger explicitly states that inauthenticity does not mean that one is ‘no longer a being-in-the-world’ but that on the contrary it is a particular type of being-in-the world, that is, nonetheless, overwhelmed or benumbed by the ‘world’ and the other beings in that ‘world’ in ‘being-with-one-another’ (Heidegger cited by Steiner : 1978 : 94) indicating a giving over of the self to the ‘world’ and the ‘other’. As Crowe paraphrases Heidegger, ‘…an inauthentic life is one that is not lived by itself’ (2006 : 72) for ‘authentic potentiality’ lies in ‘being its own self’, (Heidegger cited by Steiner : 1978 : 94). Despite this Heidegger remains unjudgemental of this, insisting that we should not see this as a failure of the human quest.

*Dasein* has in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for being its own self. It has fallen into the ‘world’. ‘Falleness’ into the ‘world’ means an absorption in being-with-one-another, insofar as the latter is guided by idle talk, hunger
for novelty and ambiguity…On no account however do the terms ‘inauthentic’ and ‘non-authentic’ signify ‘really not’, as if in this mode of existence Dasein was altogether to lose its being. ‘Inauthenticity’ does not mean anything like no-longer-being-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of being-in-the-world. (Heidegger : 2008 : 220)

Outward conventions of tradition or modernity can conflict with individual choice and may involve rejection through seeking personal authenticity. The authentic life can be situated between the dichotomy of accepting one’s existential condition yet without resignation to it, (Lee : 1997). On the other hand, resignation to one’s situation can be profoundly authentic, as in Kierkegaard’s Knight of Infinite Resignation, (Kierkegaard : 1983) though leading eventually to the Knight of Faith. As such, one can only be authentic in relation to some context or in relation to something else. It is difficult to imagine how someone would be living authentically in a social vacuum. What would constitute personal authenticity on Mars? One’s authenticity is situated within the context one is placed in; the historical and personal epoch, the customs, geographical location, language, culture and religious background.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter an attempt has been made to arrive at a more detailed interpretation of authenticity and inauthenticity on the back of different viewpoints of various thinkers. Certain motifs have emerged; authenticity involving a process of coming to integrity with the self and an awareness of personal choice (freedom) and responsibility. On the other hand, inauthenticity involves a living out of one’s life through others and not in or of itself.

In the next Chapter we broaden out the question of inauthenticity by examining any connectivity it may have with rationalism, globalization, homogeneity,
standardization, and institutionalization. In doing so, a social phenomenon known as McDonaldization will be reviewed. Going further, Ritzer (1996) argues that all areas of human interaction have been effected by McDonaldization including religion and Beyer (2006) describes modern religion as an ‘institutional “reification”’, utilized in the packaging of a globalized image and social identity, (Beyer : 2006 : 185). In the next chapter we will examine these claims, ultimately looking into whether the McDonaldization theory can be extended to Islam.
A wide spread phenomena of the latter part of the 20th century has been the emergence of management as a primary social technology but has now developed on a global scale. This ‘global discourse of management’, (Schuerkins : 2004) features as a key aspect within entities like state administrations, corporations, leisure industries, labour unions, schools, education, religious institutions and catering industries but has also become evident in the everyday life of the individual, many of whom have consciously or unconsciously, rightly or wrongly ‘contributed to the creation of a world controlled by managers’, (Schuerkins : 2012).

A prime example of this global management discourse lies in ‘McDonaldization’, a theory originally conceived of by George Ritzer (1996) and later taken up by many other writers and commentators. Ritzer claims that the foundation of ‘McDonaldization’, lies upon the primacy and dominancy of rationalism:

I have been thinking about the process of rationalization for many years. It has long been believed that bureaucracy represents the ultimate form of rationalization. However, it gradually began to dawn on me that something new was on the horizon, something destined to replace the bureaucratic structure as the model of rationalization. That “something” turned out to be the fast food restaurant, most notably McDonald’s, which revolutionized not only the restaurant business, but also American society and ultimately, the world.

(Ritzer : 1996 : xvii)
He emphasizes McDonalds being used as an example rather then being the sole representative of this phenomena. Ritzer bases his theory on Max Weber’s (1864 – 1920) sociological concept of the ‘iron cage of rationality’. Weber was anxious that bureaucracy would eventually disallow for human diversity and individuality and would become cages wherein people became trapped by moving from one rationalized structure to another throughout their lives, ‘from rationalized educational systems to rationalized work places, from rationalized recreational settings to rationalized homes, (Ritzer : 1996 : 21). Ritzer believes that Weber’s depiction of bureaucracy as the epitome of rationalism has now been historically superseded and expanded upon by the fast food industry as epitomized by McDonald’s. He utilizes Weber’s framework for identifying this rationalizing tendency as lying in efficiency, calculability, predictability and control as in the replacement of human with non-human technology. Another Weberian concern was the inevitability of the ‘irrationality of rationality’ – the more rationally a structure evolves the more irrational it can become.

**Rationalism, Irrationality and Inauthenticity**

To demonstrate the irrational, Ritzer uses the example of the rationalization of recreational activities, usually conceived of as that which allows some escape from the numbing rationalization of daily work routines. However, package tours are now used widely for this purpose wherein perspectives offered of other cultures are rigidly controlled, food consumed and accommodation offered resembles the same environment that tourists have come from. Everything is safe, predictable and quantifiable, all of which provides no escape from the iron cage of rationality. The
relation between rationalism, the irrational and inauthenticity layed out within the ordinary, everyday level is highlighted by Ritzer, ‘Thus the people who serve us in fast-food restaurants, on the phone on behalf of credit card companies, in the malls and as telemarketeers, are all, as a general rule, interacting with us in an inauthentic way’, (Ritzer: 2004: 10).

The evolving of the irrational out of the rational can be seen in the novel, *Catch 22*, (Heller: 1996) and in the work of those like Franz Kafka and George Orwell. On similar note, the well known quote of Heidegger concerning technology sheds further light on the irrationality of the rational.

> Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in its essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.\(^\text{13}\)

**Critique of Ritzer's McDonaldization**

Ritzer’s work has elicited an enormous response and a diverse critique of the McDonaldization theory has sprung from this. Some have accused him of cultural elitism, such as Parker (1998) arguing that in fact Weber’s theory of rationalization had a far ‘deeper ambivalence’ than Ritzer gives credit for and McDonaldization theory weighs down negatively as a ‘condemnation of modern forms of organization and culture’, (Parker: 1998: 3). Parker is more concerned with the possibility of countering McDonaldization from a more critically theoretical position, not on what he sees as Ritzer’s nostalgic cultural elitist perspective. Parker’s alternative view is

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\(^{13}\) This quote is from four lectures on technology that Heidegger gave in 1949. The notes are unpublished but it was first quoted in Wolfgang Schirmacher's *Technik und Gelassenheit*. Freiburg: Alber, 1983. It is also used in Demythologizing Heidegger (*Bloomington*, 1993), p. 132. Caputo claims that referenced this from a translation of this passage from The New York Review of Books, June 16, 1988, pp. 41-43 by Thomas Sheehan
that there is more resistance and future potential resistance to the McDonald’s culture
than Ritzer gives credit for and that postmodern culture will not just lay down and
acquiesce. J.S. Caputo (1998)\textsuperscript{14} finds Ritzer’s approach flawed in that it doesn’t
answer really answer the question of why people have continued to frequent
McDonald’s in large numbers. He calls for looking at McDonald’s from a narrative
paradigm, in a sense rejecting Ritzer’s more logical paradigm and opts instead for a
more democratic approach. In this regard, Caputo infers that each of us constructs
narratives to negotiate our way through life and that the one concerning McDonald’s
and McDonaldization is yet another one; the story line created by McDonald’s being
‘food, folks and fun’ and accessibility to ‘Americana’ typified by the Japanese ad
jingo for McDonalds as the ‘United tastes of America’. We are free to invest in these
stories or not and Caputo’s postmodern view would be that there is no one universal
theory to be taken as absolute truth, this is one story amongst many others. Smart
(1999) forefronts the cultural rather than the economic view, in that he believes Ritzer
should have taken American hegemony as the driving force behind the global hyper
development of McDonaldization as opposed to taking McDonald’s on its own
merits.

There has been a great deal of critical acclaim and a general resonance with the
McDonaldization theory. The fact remains that the primal human act of food
preparation and the eating as systematized by McDonalds’ has far reaching influence
into many different social spheres. The result being a transposing of much of social
structure into a faceless scientism, progressively subtracting the human element
increasingly out of the equation. Is it destructive? Ecologists and health experts will

\textsuperscript{14} Not be confused with J.S. Caputo
attest that it is on several different counts. Is it dehumanizing? The fact that technology is developing to replace human labour supposedly because of unpredictable human variance and inexactitude is beyond doubt. Is exactitude and precision in all things a desirable outcome? There are viable reasons to generally see the process of McDonaldization as a commodification, (read ‘reification’) of human life. As objectively as possible, rightly or wrongly, it is not irrational to suggest that blanket social rationalist tendencies do tend to take control away from the individual. However, as Caputo suggests, individual choice is never taken away, each person has the right to either submit or not, i.e. not to go to McDonald’s. Or do they? It could be countered that it is difficult for the majority to conduct everyday life without encountering the iron cage all around us and not just in our food preferences. Is it a concrete fact of everyday life or simply a narrative amongst others? The fact is that the systemization is so pervasive that many people do feel restricted in the options available whilst others take the conditions for granted.

Nor does Ritzer’s theory necessarily denote cultural elitism. Would we accuse Orwell (2003) of such; could the creation of the fictional land of Oceania in ‘Nineteen Eighty Four’ be considered as culturally elitist? While McDonaldization may only partially answer the question of why people turn to the hamburger in such large numbers, it does not make the evolving sanitization of human characteristics from social structures any the less Kafkaesque or Orwellian. Granted each individual has internal conscientious freedom to not accept the premises of McDonaldization, nevertheless, the external options to disengage becomes increasingly narrow. There is no doubt that there have been benefits to some aspects of McDonaldization, which perhaps reflect Weber’s ambivalence more accurately than Ritzer gives credit for, as Parker
(1998) suggests. Yet we must not forget that Ritzer was attempting to make accessible a sophisticated argument that was worth making, to a large number of people. Ultimately the argument has proven a compelling one and has become a focal point for discussion of social change, something which the majority of his critics acknowledge.

**McDonaldization in the Religious Realm?**

In consideration of the fact that McDonaldized management systems have extended far beyond the provision of food into other social realms; the question of whether religion has also succumbed to this process can be asked. On the face of it, it would seem to be the least likely to undergo a process of rationalization as religion claims to deal with the numinous, assumedly the converse of rationality. Yet Ritzer proposes that, ‘Almost all social institutions (for example, education, sports, politics and religion) were adapting McDonald’s principles to their operations’. Elsewhere, Ritzer comments on the 1985 Vatican announcement that Catholics could receive indulgences through televised broadcasts of the Christmas papal benediction in St Peter’s Square as an example of streamlining efficiency, as something characteristic of McDonaldization, (1996 : 48). Nevertheless, while Ritzer does not devote too much space to the manifestation of this in religious communities, there is concrete evidence provided by looking at the Megachurches phenomena in the United States.

McDonaldization has extended the process of rationalization to the realm of all major social institutions, including religion. In some cases, this process has occurred in a literal fashion; several churches in the southern United States have added McDonald’s restaurants and similar retail food establishments to their facilities, complete with drive-through windows. Food courts, bookstores, cafes, boutiques, and even banks have also become part of the worship experience. These developments are best viewed as a by-product of a fundamental paradigm shift in religious organization among
evangelicals, that is, churches restructuring themselves according to a corporate business model.

(Watson & Scalen : 2008 :1)

That the label could equally be applied to the religious realm is explored in greater depth by Drane (2001), in reference to the Christian church. He bemoans the fact that upon exploring ‘the extent to which Ritzer’s McDonaldization thesis could be applied to the Church, I did not have far to look before some of my worst fears were confirmed.’, (Drane : 2001 : 35). Following in the footsteps of both Weber and Ritzer, he applies the iron cage of rationality in its four precepts; efficiency, calculability, predictability and control to the Christian church. Drane questions whether it is;

…possible to have a world view – or a church structure-dominated by predictability without at the same time denying, or at least seriously jeopardizing, belief in a biblical God? It is certainly striking that all those spiritual paths that are now emerging in the West as serious alternatives to mainline Christian belief incorporate significant elements of the mystical, the numinous, the unpredictable, and the non-rational (which is not, of course, the same as the irrational).

(Drane : 2001 : 45)

In regard to the Mega Churches; these are defined as those churches which have a Sunday attendance of upwards to two thousand people and above but the term is confined to the Protestant American churches, though there are Catholic churches with the same large scale congregations but not included under this category. Hendricks is cited by Cook (2002 : 22) as saying, ‘In marked contrast to the traditional way of "doing church," the mega church operates with a marketing mentality: who is our "customer" and how can we meet his or her needs?’.

While commenting on evidence of a widespread postmodern search for spiritual expression and fulfilment, the irrationality of the rational is summed up in Drane’s
contention that ‘we seem to have ended up with a secular church in a spiritual society’, (Drane : 2001 : 54). He also wonders why so little critique has been forthcoming from the religious community in response to this commodification of human life. Part of this he puts down to the Protestant ethic which historically emphasized a more rationalized approach to the Divine and perhaps contributed to the eventual domineering rationalism characteristic of the modern era. Drane comments on the irony of the Catholic church, despite being so hierarchically institutionalized, yet seemingly able to respond more effectively than protestants to postmodernism especially in its approaches to mystery, non rationality and the numinous, the absence of which is so glaringly absent in the McDonaldization paradigm.

**McDonaldization of Islam? Has Barbie converted?**

Is it possible to build a case for a McDonaldization of Islam? In a book intended for those engaged in the prosleytizing of Islam, (dawah) in the New York area, we read the following:

> It is therefore, desirable that at least in New York City and its Metropolitan area, Dawah activities should be planned and carried out on a uniform and regular basis with set targets to achieve within a stipulated time frame. The Dawah Committee, the Moderator and Dawah workers in their meetings, will determine the targets and time schedule.

(Siddiqui : 1993 : 50)

The language of this quote clearly demonstrates the discourse of management and a systemized rationalization of Islam with defined characteristics of McDonaldization. Is this an indication of a wider phenomenon within the Muslim world? Certainly there does seem to be a desire for efficiency, calculability, predictability and control within central aspects of Muslim practice. An example of this is the common presence of readily available computer deduced timetables for the prayer times found in mosques.
all over the world. In muslim countries times and dates of prayers and festivals are frequently established by governments which attests to elements of calculability, the quantitative and control. Previously, prayer times were primarily localized and measured by the length of the shadow of a *sutra* or the naked eye’s perception of daylight. Admittedly, there has always been some controversy around this, ‘The early authorities in most of the known Fiqhi schools fought against such a use of calculations, as absolutely against the established Sunnah that required looking at the shadow or the phenomenon of Sunrise and Sunset for the prayer times’, (Shah : 2009 : 7) though this did not mean that calculation was not available if viewing was somehow hampered but used as a secondary source. Even such calculations can be seen to have more direct relevance than computerized technology.

The Hajj travel industry also shows distinct features of McDonaldization. Saudi Arabian laws and regulations, discourage individual travel and encourage group travel packages run by Hajj Tour operators. However much this ‘may jar with the ethos of sacrifice, simplicity and humility of hajj…..’ (Butt : 2010). A large majority of pilgrims stay in top quality hotels with global fast food outlets such as McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Burger King readily available. The Hajj package tours offers efficiency, calculability, predictability and control, completely at variance from the arduous journey the hajjis made in previous years. ‘The Hajj requires a degree of detachment from worldly pursuits and worldly needs’, (Al Oadah : 2006). No judgement is intended here beyond the observation that the Hajj inherently stresses detachment contradicting the controlled and packaged hajj of today. Borrowing from Ritzer, this is arguably a ‘rationalized worship ritual’. These above examples are presented here briefly only as a small yet perhaps significant sampling indicating that Islam is no stranger to ‘management discourse’ and McDonaldization tendencies.
Summary

In this Chapter the relatedness of inauthenticity, the irrational and rationalism has been established as well as looking at its symptomatic implications, such as the syndrome of global management culture, artificiality, bureaucracy, standardization, institutionalization, all of which is embodied in the McDonaldization theory. The question of the religiously ineffable having been tainted by McDonaldization has also been discussed, which included the subject of Islam.

In the next chapter, the questions of inauthenticity and rationalism are delved into further and broadened out through an examination of the concept of reification. This is then applied to the religious domain, ending again with a more specific and more detailed look at Islam.
Chapter 5

Reification - Egotistical Calculations

‘It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of Philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation.’

(Marx & Engels : 2012 : 32)

Reification

The etymological breakdown of the word reification is based on res ; ‘a thing’ and facere; ‘to make’ combining together ‘to making something a thing’; as in the making of something abstract into a concrete thing or even perhaps making something out of nothing and is akin to an ontological metaphor. This is initially a mental, conceptual and possibly a behavioural occurrence, according to whom one refers to, wherein something that doesn’t have ‘thing-like’ properties in or of itself comes to be regarded as such. The process of reification is one in which a) appropriation of an abstract concept as a concrete entity takes place and is, b) now detached from its original context it is c) then placed and used within another context. Now truncated and dislocated from its original meaning and essentially estranged from itself inauthentically – it is depicted as a ‘something’, which it is not, either through a limiting constraining or an expansive fallacy. It is certainly related to the increasing standardization and codification characteristic of the ‘management discourse’ and the ‘iron cage of rationality’ applied to so much of contemporary human endeavour and the ensuing estrangement that has occurred has been consistently commented upon over several decades. The argument presented here is that reification, presented as ‘something which it is not’ has distinct correlations with dichotomies of authenticity and inauthenticity.
Reification is a concept originally attributed mainly to Marx who defines it, ‘…as a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things’ (Marx: 1978: 320). Nevertheless, it appears that Marx did not use the actual word, ‘Reification’ except on one occasion, (Pitkin : 1987). Nevertheless, he used several other terms and concepts closely aligned with reification such as *Entfremdung*, (literally *strangifying* or alienation) which Marx saw both as occurring through the ‘transformation of human beings into thing-like beings which do not behave in a human way but according to the laws of the thing-world’, (Petrovic :1983 : 412) and thus the concept is regarded as being a central tenet to his thinking. Lucaks (1971) later built on the concept of reification within his general theories of capitalism, using the word *Verdinglichung*, (direct translation – ‘thingification’) in attempting to expound further upon Marx’s concept of *Entfremdung*. For Lucaks, the exchange of commodities within a capitalist context exemplifies the idea of people as a means to an end, quantative, instrumental and profitable. Understandably, he directly associated Weber’s disquietude at widespread social rationalization as the reification of society. In Lucak’s view, in partaking in the capitalist exchange of goods, the individual utilizes a calculative appraisal of the objects to be bought or sold, the other person/s involved as potential factors to meeting their needs and finally the individual’s skill in negotiating profitably, all comprising a ‘thing-like’ transaction and as such becomes second nature and effects all aspects of the individual’s life bringing on a type of overall human behaviour wherein the individual is reduced ‘contemplatative’ (1971 : 89) behaviour, and a ‘detached observer’, (1971 : 207). The ‘contemplation’ denotes the passive observer and the ‘detached’ signifies emotional detachment. The individual is now no longer engaged in their surroundings but is now reduced to a neutral observer, unaffected by
what occurs around them, within themselves or with others – all aspects of the world and the people around them become viewed as things. A phenomena, which in his view, was furthered by the mechanization of work, as in factory assembly lines, wherein humans become subordinate to the demands of the machine. As many spheres of human interaction have adapted such factory production line methodologies, Lukacs saw this as evidence of reification spreading through all levels and all aspects of society. Also inherent to this is a different division of labour resulting in an increasing ‘specialism’ wherein nobody is able to see the whole and nobody bears ultimate responsibility. Lucaks’ theory of reification has fallen somewhat by the wayside partly due to the fall of communism and partly because of perceived flaws in some of Lucaks’ thinking in this regard. However, the concept has revived in renewed interest as a useful model of social anthropology, (Pitkin : 1987, Honneth : 2008). Lucak’s thinking can be considered as too simplistic in the perception of objectification automatically pertaining to reification as there is recognition that there are perhaps some areas of human life that function best from within an objective standpoint that may not necessarily directly equate with reification.

Other weaknesses in Lucaks argument lies in the fact that his theory tends to suggest that there is no going back – innate human tendencies had been totally annihilated and reified. He felt that true human nature experienced the world in an existential and qualitative way appreciating the quiddity and uniqueness of individual objects and people. He understood reification not just as a misapprehension of reality but as the whole paradigmatic ontology under which capitalism functions. While it is possible to argue that Lucaks identification of reification within society is a valid one, some of the reasons he forwards for this may be faulty. For example, the idea
that reification would end with the communist revolution is an idea which is now defunct and was something that Lukacs himself questioned towards the latter part of his life. Despite these apparent flaws, some philosophers and social anthropologists are now beginning to revive the concept as a useful model whilst contesting Lucak’s arguments as to how the phenomena developed, (Pitkin : 1987, Honneth : 2008).

A poignant example of this reification can be seen in the evolving perception of the natural world. A river is no longer perceived of as a river but as a possible source of energy – the river as hydraulic power, (Heidegger : 1982 : 16). The river has become reified, an object to be used with all of the economic and environmental implications thereof. Human beings are also perceived of as units of consumerism, objects to be used to an end. Different nations are perceived of as possible markets of consumption. Importantly, Lucaks, as Heidegger, believed that the disruption of human relations presented by reification disallowed a true and full encounter with authentic human experience, yet neither perceived reification as a moral wrong and that even in rudimental form, some aspect of active engagement still remained in human relations, (Honneth 2008). It was rather that, the acquired ‘second nature’ of a detached and objective perception of the world, reified human interaction, (yet never fully excising the primordial active engagement of human beings) is a faulty interpretation of the world. From the similarities and differences between the two thinkers, Honneth (2008) distils the idea that reification is more of a process, a habit or manner of behaviour rather than some systemic knowledge framework. Guess (2008) is somewhat critical of this as he thinks that Honneth downplays enormous differences between these different thinkers in making his point. Nevertheless, despite their very different vantage points, both Heidegger and Lucaks understood (albeit in the latter case somewhat inconsistently), that beneath this ‘second nature’
tendency there is a deep and underlying existential involvement with the world that is natural to human beings, which Heidegger refers to as ‘caring’ and Lucaks as ‘empathetic engagement’. Both appear to refer to this as referring to one who participates as opposed to the one who merely observes. Honneth (2008) believes that closer examination of these concernful views pertains more to involvement in the world with minimum discord, as congenially as possible so as to maintain a flow of engagement with the world around us. Honneth (2008) combines these definitions; culled and developed from Heidegger, Lucaks (and Dewey), further supported by Cavell’s (1993) theory of primary recognition. Cavell believes that the individual is existentially engaged with the other before he can approach the other in any cognitive sense. Taking effective recourse to arguments from child development psychology, Honneth uses this to further establish clearly that the subject (i.e. the individual) always engages with people and things existentially before any cognitive process could begin. In this manner there exists a tension between recognition versus cognition models of social interaction. By ‘recognition’ what Honneth refers to is being able to identify, perceive and appreciatively know and accept the people and circumstances in one’s life and cognition, leading possibly to the reification of the other.

Cavell’s concept of acknowledgment contains an element of empathetic engagement or sympathy, of an antecedent of identification, which is ignored by those who claim that understanding other people requires nothing more than an understanding of their reasons for acting.

(Honneth : 2008 : 50-51)

It is when the individual forgets the primary act of recognition that reification becomes possible. Such a forgetting does not mean an abandonment of recognition
but minimal attentiveness to the qualitative aspects of the people and the environment or expressed in personal denial or defensiveness.

However, Guess (2008) questions Honneth’s theory in asking why recognition should be inherently positive or negative and is an over simplification of the concept of participation. Does lack of participation immediately infer reification, (Butler : 2008)? Guess believes that Honneth’s depiction of the concept lends itself more to something that must precede any emotional or attitudinal stance and that this is more in accordance with Hedeidegger’s view. As such the element of concernedness, (recognition) should have no moral or ethical basis whereas Guess finds Honneth’s concept to be one with an attendant morality and therefore not one, which affords any valuable social critique. Lear (2008) also believes that there is a tendency for the prior condition, (i.e. primary recognition) to be perceived as relating to a ‘fall from grace’ polemic. What went before was good and the good has been forgotten but can be ‘recognised’ and recovered, as such he believes that too much ‘goodness’ is built into the prior condition. In responding to this, Honneth stresses that one should not understand recognition as being by definition either sympathetic or affectionate. Lear (2008) is also of the opinion that the terms reification and recognition are ambiguous ones and as such lack precision and have ‘slippage’ so that Honneth arrives at conclusions ; ‘that are stronger than the evidence or the argument allows’, (Lear : 2008 : 131). The attempt to establish the use of the word ‘recognition’ as a precondition to cognition seems somewhat awkward; for it implies knowing something from a previous encounter or to express something like ‘I concede’ or ‘I grant’, (Guess : 2008). Nevertheless, what Honneth refers to remains viable despite the somewhat maladroit wording and should not be rejected outright. Similarly, the
revivification of the reification concept has some currency and could bear fruit as a working social model, especially in light of things like McDonaldization.

In terms of objects and nature, Honneth believes that these involve a different perspective. Our relations with people can be reified but our relation to nature and objects is reified. The problem here lies more in not recognizing the value and import given to objects and thereby further detracting from existential meaning of the human environment. Honneth believes that reification is not only possible but can take place in relation to other people, nature, objects and even ourselves:

My feeling is that the tendency towards self-reification will increase as subjects become more aware and more involved in the institutions of self-portrayal that possesses the characteristics just described. Institutions that latently compel individuals merely to pretend to have certain feelings or to give them a self – contained and clearly contoured character will promote the development of self-reifying attitudes.

(Honneth : 2008 : 82-83)

This has clear affinities with Foucault’s theories of ‘self-surveillance’ wherein societal behaviours and structures persist within the self whether one is in company or not or within one’s internal dialogue as opposed to one’s outward social behavior. (Foucault : 1995). His view of the institution also has clear affinities with reification and bears the stamp of a basic inauthenticity. Modern collective education and its institutionalization provides an excellent example of Foucauldian perception of reification and its relation to the standardization process. Within most modern educational systems the individual student has a ‘permanent observation’ (Foucault : 1995 : 126) set upon them. Devos explains the Foucauldian perception of this as; ‘Not only is the pupil’s presence recorded, but their cognitive progress is tested and registered, evaluated and compared, their motivation, their attitude, the composition of their family, the problems of their family, the profession of their parents, etcetera’,
Faisal Bodi, a known Muslim journalist and news commentator argued for state funded Muslim schools in the UK admiringly stating that such schools were ‘factories for university graduates and professionals’ (Bodi :1997) with no apparent sense of irony. The obvious connection with the concept of reification is self-evident – the individual child is handled as a thing, not as a living and complex individual being. In Foucaultian terms such institutions can be seen in yet another light. Though being instruments of power and authority, they are originally set up altruistically to address some societal need, such as illness or illiteracy resulting in hospital and schools, yet ultimately the self-preservation of the institution ultimately supercedes the needs of those for whom the whole thing was conceived for in the first place, (i.e., patients, pupils).

Yet another perspective on reification stems from the sociological theory of Berger and Luckmann, (1967) who also use the concept albeit in a different sense than Lucak’s Marxist perspective. The difference lies primarily because they see it as separate from objectification and they see as socially functional and not as the culmination of historically opposed forces. However, they do perceive reification as either being possible in universal individual naïveté or within a collectively social context. Reification was understood to be characteristic of primitive societies but is remedied through increasing experience and sophistication that would naturally de-reify. On the individual level and as part of the human cycle of development, reification will never end as each child will go through a period of this until de-reifed by learning and experience. Some argue that current education models serve more to reify things, perhaps on a higher level than that experienced by the young child and perhaps in changing one misappropriation of reality for another one, (Gatto : 2005).
However, Berger & Luckmann do also perceive a possible existential inauthenticity present wherein one obviates the element of personal choice and responsibility by projecting these onto a social role, (i.e. husband, manager, soldier, etc.) or a stereotypification of that role. ‘I have no choice in the matter, I have to act this way because of my position [as a]…’, (Berger & Luckmann : 1967 : 91). Reification is also the inability to see that social institutions and conventions have simply been brought into existence through human agency and are not ‘functional imperative[s] of the social system’, (Berger & Luckmann : 1997 : 90). This incapacity to understand the human originatives of these, results in ‘the world of institutions appears to merge with that of nature’ (Berger & Luckmann : 1967 : 90) and ‘the world loses its comprehensibility as a human enterprise, (Berger & Luckmann : 1997 : 89).

Despite flaws in his analysis and the emergence of the McDonaldization theory as a whole, these tend to confirm Lucaks’ analysis of reification as a historical and dialectical development. While it does not wholly discount Berger & Luckmann’s later view, especially in regard to the obviation of choice and responsibility, Lucaks’ perspective seems the more plausible in light of the development of things and in view of the fact that these authors wrote some time ago. The view of primitive societies has also undergone some revision, as Kuper says, ‘The theory of primitive society is about something which does not and never has existed’, (Kuper : 1988 : 8).

Rose (1978) denies reification as even being a viable concept in claiming that Marx had not meant that which Lucaks has ascribed to the concept. Yet Bewes, (2002) ventures that Rose’s contention is to be seen more mirrored in Derrida’s *différance* than in outright refutation. Derrida insists on *différance* as pertaining to or indicating
that which is neither word nor concept and as Bewes points out, as far as it can be expressed, pertains to ‘non-reifability’, (Bewes : 2002 : 111). Indeed, he utilizes Derrida’s deconstructive critique further to assert that behind the identification of the reification concept, or at least the façade of it, there actually lays a seemingly inverted motive in justifying the concept of reification in that:

Reification privileges, or seems to privilege, use value over exchange value, nature over culture, speech (or thought) over writing, immediacy over mediation, instinct over rationalization, emotion over intellect, spontaneity over routine, the invisible over the visible, morning over evenings, youth and innocence over age and knowledge and love at first sight over marriage.

(Bewes : 2002 : 114)

This Derridean interpretation could be equally applied to the McDonaldization theory tackled previously. However, it can be misleading to see deconstruction as the unmasking of some fallacy, whereas it might be requesting that it does not self-righteously masquerades as something other than it is. While it may be that an approach to reification could be found in the attitudes mentioned in Bewes’ quote above, the choice is still presented and one either invests in the chosen idea or not. Nevertheless, it is also clear that insisting on reification becomes itself a reifying of reification, all of which seems to suggest that there is a delicate balance, a no man’s land or difféance to be maintained in such cases. Indeed, difféance seems to be the sphere where one is unaffected by either one or the other side of the reification argument and is an ultimate transcending of a duality - where as soon as we pose the concept of reification its opposite possibility – the ‘no reification’ immediately rises into view. Another aspect comes into play, for reification is steeped in duality insofar as the ‘thing’ and the individual’s perception are separate, thus embodying the subject / object dichotomy. Transcending this means an absolute non-acceptance of
the premises and practically speaking if one lives accordingly one would be 
unaffected by iron cages. There is resonance here with the Jain theory of Manifold 
Predications (Syādvāda) an all too brief summary of which is seen in its establishing a 
conceptual truth as ‘in some ways it is and in some ways it is not and it is 
indescribable’ - *différance* could be equated with ‘indescribable’, (Kalghagi : 2009). 
Nevertheless, does this mean that they we passively accept everything? A stance 
might be taken and actions ensue yet all of it carried out in a detached yet committed 
manner. Equally, this position may ensure that the non-reified, (i.e. speech over 
writing, instinct over rationalization, etc.) is not reified.

An inseparable aspect of reification, arising from deconstruction, is anxiety (or fear) 
and is considered so essential that ‘indeed reification as a concept would not exist 
without it’, (Bewes : 2002 : 96). He points out that many of those who write and think 
about the concept of reification usually express the anxiety that the theory itself or the 
converse will become reified. He proposes that the concept must be continually 
interrogated as unmediated usage simply linking reification to notions of ‘moderni 
or ‘progress’ is insufficient and serves only to reify reification itself. Ultimately, 
though he suggests that an absolute reification is an impossibility and inherently 
paradoxical for total reification would be the end of reification, as conceptual 
awareness of it would be nullified, for if it became the ontological paradigm, it would 
be nigh impossible to recognise. Yet the fact that no one would be conscious of it 
does not render it in any way as morally justifiable. While ultimately one may have 
some sympathy with the stance of *différance* and even situate one’s self within it, this 
does not mean an accompanying non-decisiveness and passivity to all that is 
encountered. For despite all, it is simply a fact that the life of ordinary people is
becoming increasingly mechanized and dehumanized and that options for existing outside of this are rapidly diminishing. Whether that is a good or bad thing or neither of these may be up to the individual and yet there is sense of possible nihilism here.

**Reification and Religion**

‘...a long range development that we may term a process of reification: mentally making religion into a thing, gradually coming to conceive of it as an objective systematic entity.’

(Cantwell Smith : 1962: 51)

It may seem already apparent that the reification of religion is a possibility from what we have seen of the work of Drane (2006) and others above. Yet it is felt to be a question requiring deeper analysis which is provided by looking at Cantwell Smith’s (1978) seminal theory of the ‘mundane process’ wherein a transcending vigorous personal faith is eventually substituted for a ‘human and limited conceptualization’, (1978 : 118) and evolves into a ‘reification of religion’.

There is evidence enough of a different paradigm in a pre-Cartesian world where something more of a living bond existed between people and the world they inhabited, (Nishtani : 1982) with the bond itself embedded within a perceived presence of both the Divine and Evil interwoven within the experience of the everyday world. The cogito or rather the cognosco had been in a primordial, subordinate relationship to esse (being). In our times, the connection of the self with the world has changed significantly. Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum established the ego as the criterion of its own reality of esse (being) separated and relegated to human experience. Others apart from the ‘Philosophers of the Moment’ have commented on the problematical consequences which have resulted from the Cartesian line of
enquiry, (Pope John Paul II : 1998; Prisig : 1984; Nishtani : 1982). The move away from this primordial state resulted increasingly in a mechanistic view of the world, living creatures and even the human body are perceived of as mere parts of a machine. It is characteristic of western modes of thought to see the world as so many interlocking cogs and wheels creating both energy and movement. Based in this it is easy to see how a concept of God developed as the prime mover, transcendent and far removed from creation yet moulded within a similar linear and hierarchical structure. In this neatly defined metaphysic, the basis of western religious thought, humans as the imago dei is at the pinnacle of creation thus claiming sovereignty over the sub creation. The world becomes raw material for humans to enact their superiority upon and exploit it. Life itself, the will and the intellect are employed as the tools by which human beings dominate the world around them in a supposed imitation of the Divine. In contrast to this and in very broad terms, Eastern religious thought bases itself upon a basic harmonious and organic oneness at the core of all creation, the Divine ‘is interpenetrative of the deepest human essence and interpenetrated by the human essence in turn and hence transcendently immanent in his ‘creation’. (Nishtani : 1982 : xiv). So while there appears to be some variation of rationalistic appropriations of the Divine between Eastern and Western religions, it will be argued here that this is not necessarily the case or rather is no longer the case.

*Cantwell-Smith’s – ‘The Meaning and End of Religion’*

Though it may seem retrospectively obvious, Cantwell Smith, (from hereron referred to as Smith) coherently argued that there was clear evidence that earlier religious communities did not have a word for either the concept of ‘religion’ or ‘religions’ nor even for themselves. Labels designating one as ‘Jewish’ or ‘Buddhist’ were not in
usage demonstrating that the discourse within these groupings were less doctrinally rooted and rather indicated communities of belief, living out of a chosen obedience and faith. A subtle example of this is provided by John Hick in the introduction to Smith’s book (1978) in attempting to illustrate the point just made, wherein he discusses the title of a well known text of Augustine’s entitled *De Vera Religione*. Hick perceives both the title and the text that follows as something frequently misconceived and mistranslated in its being depicted as the ‘The True Religion’ giving the impression that Augustine is engaged in polemical discussion of the superior merits of Christianity, in contradiction to other ‘false’ faiths. In fact, Hick believes that the title is more accurately interpreted as referring to ‘True Religiousness’ at the expense of no one and addressed to individual faith, an interpretation with which the text seems to bear out.

Citing the exceptions of Islam and Sikhism, Smith (1978) argues that many religions did not originally function under the concept of being a named, labelled or unique community. So in the early developmental stages of the major religions, the adherents did not have a name for themselves or make significant distinctions between themselves and others. Those who followed Dharmic teachings did not initially name this as such nor see themselves as Buddhists or Hindus. Any distinctions that might have existed would have been based on being students of a spiritual guide (*guru*) in the context of the multitudinous spiritual teachings available in what is now known as India. Hindus certainly did not have a name for themselves and the categorizing label is still considered debateable. As an example of this, many Hindus easily regard Jesus as an Avatar who simply takes his place amongst a pantheon of Gods which exist on the Subcontinent but do not denote themselves as Christians (Hedlund :
2001). Equally in Judaism and Christianity, what was originally felt to be a particular approach to understanding life and the world developed into a conceptual schema based on outward system of observances; which was initially depicted by others. Jesus did not preach a consolidated system of belief nor did he seem to have a notion of ‘Christianity’ but was more concerned with human beings and their connection to the Divine. The absence of a self-imposed or clearly defined group identity is evident in many of the older major religions.

The first appearance of such codification occurs primarily in the encounter with western colonialism where, in order to subjugate and govern better, it was thought necessary to develop some form of classification. Extending this further, Smith argues that current concepts of religion are constructs of Western post-enlightenment theory, mainly applied to non-western traditions and that this categorization is still evident in academic approaches and hence Smith is critical of the way in which religions have traditionally been studied. A genuine appropriation of religious tradition is hindered and obscured when understood solely as historically fashioned theological nuclei separated into ‘contraposed ideological communities’ (Smith 1978: xi) with prescriptive and exclusive membership criteria. Asad (2001) agrees with Smith’s overall criticism of this as religious essentialism, wherein the adherents of a particular religious tradition are understood to share some common essence and that this shared essence drives both the behaviour and outlook and ultimately concluding in some innate uniformity. This negates the enormous variety of religious expression in a given tradition as well as the agency of individual interpretation. In reality, the label ‘religion’ is simply a convenient yet stultifying categorization for something that was in actuality a flowing, dynamic and evolving understanding
within a community. Smith argues forcefully that religion should be studied as historical rather than eternal with an approach of religions as ‘subjective notions of truth in any meaningful attempt to understand other men’ (Pruett : 1973) should be the central focus. Smith felt that Western Universities needed to approach the study of non-Western religions as appropriately as possible to the subject content rather than through the traditional Euro-American humanist lens. The imposition of this academic approach had over time had created an impaired inter-religious understanding while simultaneously having a negative influence on intra-theological thinking within the various sacred traditions themselves. This can be seen where religious communities were engaged in hostilities and creating derogatory definitions to clearly distinguish and begin the process of dehumanizing the perceived enemy. When adding with the later colonial codification of the conquered and the biased demarcation of the ‘other’ this eventually resulted in religious communities defining themselves in contradiction to others, ironically even utilizing the definition of others for themselves. This was also transposed to the intra-religious, an example of which is afforded by the historical appropriation of the label ‘orthodox’ by certain sectors of the Jewish community which was originally a contemptuous taunt by other Jews of dissimilar theology. It was insulting as it had been culled from Christianity and created by progressive Jewish elements around the end of the 18th century to describe the allegedly reactionary and conservative Jew. After some initial furore, the label was overtime, eventually appropriated by these conservatives to proudly differentiate themselves from the Reform and Liberal movements (Hirsch : 1997). In more contemporary terms, the appropriation of the word, ‘nigger’ by the African American community as a term of endearment provides a similar example, (Kennedy : 2002; Galinsky et al : 2003). As such, this has bearing on the effects of allegedly
discriminatory notions imparted towards the Muslim community, succinctly outlined in the findings of the Runnymede Trust consultation paper entitled, *Islamophobia its features and dangers*, published in 1997. There is evidence of the word ‘Paki’ now being used by young people British Pakistani origins to describe themselves and their community and yet considered as racist if used by Asians of other origins or non-Asians (Bhatia : 2007). Other research has revealed prevalent attitudes among women choosing to wear the *niqab*, suggesting a defiant appropriation of discriminatory attitudes towards the *niqab* as a symbol of the oppression of women, which in fact these women are anything but that (Perlaz : 2007; Shirazi & Mirsha : 2010). Even with the deeply negative social outcomes stemming from discrimination generally, these are further compounded by the eventual possibility of Muslims defining themselves consciously or unconsciously by such labels having an added detrimental effect. In religious terms, the negative judgment of Islam as an aggressive religion can be appropriated on a twofold basis, first dropping the apprehension of Islam as of an intrinsically numinous quality and shifting to Islam as an expression of defiance and welcoming of the idealized status of the underdog and victim.

Smith’s theory of the ‘mundane process’, which does not refer to the tedious but to a gradual shifting from the sacred to the worldly, denotes a significant historical shift believed to have occurred within different theologies and practice across the religious spectrum in varying ways and at varying rates. Interestingly, the process seems to have intensified over the last two hundred years to the present day and the increased rapidity of this trend is historically in tandem with the onset of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Age. Even in the case of western Christianity, a self-conscious
awareness of identity did not arise until the age of scepticism and the arrival of the modern age and hence forged within a defensive mode. Though referring to Christianity, we get some sense of this heightened velocity of change in reading that; ‘…..especially in recent centuries [Christians] have formally institutionalized their religious life more than perhaps is true of any other society on earth, either at present or throughout the past’, (Cantwell Smith 1968 : 66).

One of the central philosophical tenets upon which Smith bases his argument is best expressed in the words of Asad (2006), ‘[Smith’s] argument is that no thing corresponds, properly speaking, to the noun “religion”. The use of that term to refer to what does not exist – namely the personal quality of faith – therefore inevitably reifies it.’ (Asad : 2001 : 206 ). In this manner, there is no Buddhist, Christian or Sikh people but there are Buddhist, Christian and Sikh ways of life. As Bailey (1969) points out Smith was not original in this as the theologians, Barth, Brunner and Bonhoeffer had previously articulated similar arguments. Using these words as nouns is reifying whereas these should be seen as descriptive and used as adjectives. In relation to the truth of religion, one should not ask, ‘Is Judaism true?’ but should rather ask ‘What does Judaism mean to the Jews – how does the individual Jew live up to the claims of Judaism?’. Smith argued for historical religious tradition to be seen as facts and that any truth to be ascertained lay in the degree to which participant participated. The emphasis is not on whether men respond to God but how they do so. Smith comments, ‘From the truth of an adjective –Christian or Muslim or Buddhist, a man may be a good Christian or Muslim or Buddhist….nothing follows about nouns’ (Smith : 1967 : 101). Nevertheless, the exceptions are two unequivocal nouns with profound meaning, ‘God’ and ‘person’
related to the concept of ‘religion’ in the truest sense of the word as the relation between the individual and God. Rounding this up more conclusively Smith says:

By ‘faith’ I mean personal faith. … By ‘cumulative tradition’ I mean the entire mass of overt objective data that constitute the historical deposit, as it were, of the past religious life of the community in question: temples, scriptures, theological systems, dance patterns, legal and other institutions, conventions, moral codes, myths, and so on; anything that the historian can observe.

(Cantwell Smith: 1978: 156-157)

Smith believes that the study of religions has been unbalanced insofar that either the historical religion or the personal transcendent aspect, (i.e. faith) is neglected at the expense of the other and in order to avoid this, proposes that we should approach these as two separate aspects, both worthy of attention yet with the individual as the link between the two. Nevertheless, Asad criticizes Smith on this point arguing that Smith postulates ‘faith’ as an internal matter and ‘not as a relationship created through, maintained by, and expressed in practice…… the developed capacities, the cultivated sensorium, of the living body and that, in its engagement with material objects and social conditions, makes meaningful experience possible.’ (Asad: 2001: 208-209). In saying this, Asad is arguing that while it may be true that faith is internal and is mistakenly reified if posed as something external in the world. Yet if faith is expressed as external action, is the case for reification quite as strong? Could it then be named without reification? In a similar external sense, Bailey (1969) thinks that Smith has ignored the import of Christian or Muslim ‘mission’. Asad (2001) finds that Smith somewhat confuses the issue of reification by fusing two separate notions with insufficient distinction between the two. On the one hand he sees Smith as relating reification to the Weberian notion, as in degrees of systemization of doctrine and practice. On the other hand, naming the abstract as a concrete thing or as Asad describes it, ‘mistaking the word for the thing it names’ (2001: 209) is what
he questions. At another point Asad (2001) also criticizes Smith in seemingly referring to Hindus as the most unrefied and yet in referring to some examples of sectarianism within that tradition mentions these as a fractional to ‘the total Hindu complex’ suggesting a contradicting essentialism. ‘Hinduism is simply what Hindus believe and do. But my concern is that it is also, paradoxically, a heterogeneity that it is describes as a singular “vision” attributed to a collective subject’, (Asad : 2001 : 209). Without denying the concept of religious reification, Asad believes that Smith was extreme in his application. The point being made that in some way we must use language to describe a certain groups of people. While Asad finds Smith extreme in identifying reification and that underlying this is the increasingly popular contention, though ‘only half-formulated in Smith’s text’ (2001 : 212) that the Abrahamic monotheistic traditions are essentially intolerant and that this is ‘careless thinking’. No expression is given to the exclusivist praxis of polytheistic religions or the inclusivity of monotheistic believers or to the variety of behaviours in which “tolerance” is expressed and lived’, (2001 : 212) and as such, Asad believes that the ‘reification of Islam’ is itself reified. He finds Smith’s presentation of Islam in India as an ‘alien force’ (2001 : 210) to be a classical orientalist narrative and yet stresses that his concern is not with Smith’s apparent bias with Hinduism as opposed to Islam but rather that the historical situation is misrepresented. Smith makes no mention of the Aryan invasion of south Asia, the expulsion of Buddhism and the evolving of the rigid caste system as all having occurred before the arrival of Islam in India. Asad returns to the aspect of faith in practice as being distinct from internal ‘faith’ and that Smith’s alleging that sharp boundaries were drawn between believers and unbelievers in India by Muslims is based on the faulty assumption that adherence to a particular faith was solely an internal and cognitive one, later substantiated by
British colonial categorization that Smith himself originally decried. Whereas Asad believes that boundaries are drawn through external and practical means and that there were ‘complicated patterns of belief and practice shared among various local populations of Muslims and Hindus’, (2001 : 211). Asad also cites the apparent nationalization of Hinduism and some of the methodically structured campaigns to recover ‘converts’ from the lower castes and claiming that Indian Muslims are originally and therefore essentially Hindu to demonstrate that Smith had also contradictorily reified the concept of Hinduism as being the least reified.

Additionally, the concept of Islam as the most reified entity is also challenged in Asad’s presenting the differing interpretations on relations with non Muslims from within the four schools of jurisprudence (madhhāb [sing.] madhhāb [plu.]) to demonstrate the lack of entity like uniformity. While Asad may find Smith to be extreme in his application of reification, he is himself relatively extreme in his application of non-essentialism. Yet Asad’s arguments are never defensively couched on behalf of Islam and he agrees with Smith’s basic idea of non-essentialism, though finding some of the arguments for this as contradictory. He argues that Smith’s stating that religions ‘present’ themselves in some degree or other as to the degree of an ‘organized and systematized entity’, (Smith cited by Asad : 2001 : 211) implies that religions are ‘subjects capable of self-presentation’ and that ‘One might have expected that Smith, of all people, would be aware that “Islam” does not present itself; it is named Muslims in specific times and places who express their understanding of a tradition they call “Islam”, (2001 : 211-212) and this would presumably be the case for any other faith tradition. He also suggests that Smith may have overly focused on Muslim ‘spokesmen’ largely from India and Pakistan and may therefore be lacking in a wider Muslim perspective.
Bailey (1969) believes there are signs of naïveté in Smith’s transcendent understanding of faith and that he too readily diminishes the importance of specific and differing beliefs in something like the afterlife. To what extent must a Christian, Jew or Muslim believe in the afterlife and the conditions pertaining to their attainment without compromising their faith? How literally or symbolically should these be taken? ‘Where does Vedanta fit into Smith’s understanding of faith?’ asks Bailey (1969 : 290). Perhaps Smith’s harshest critic, Bolle (1964) is dismissive of his work as a whole labelling it as lacking clarity by summarily compounding the complex concepts behind ‘religion’ and ‘religious faith’ and proposing the replacement of these as ‘traditions’ and ‘systems’ under the heading of ‘cumulative traditions’ without proper exposition, ‘The historical method followed is astoundingly superficial’, says Bolle (1964 : 171) and goes on to accuse Smith of lacking in a necessary grounding in hermeneutical and epistemological problems. However, Prueet (1973) responds to this criticism by pointing out that despite the obvious lack of some of the wider and deeper implications of what Smith introduces, there is a reason why he does not endeavour upon any deeper theological and philosophical grounding for his innovatory ideas. Smith’s apparent deficiency in not approaching ‘meta-questions’ (Prueet :1973 : 588) is explained by his considering these as western based ‘objective’ impositions and that the nature of what he contended with lay in the ‘personalist’ and ‘subjective’ realm whereas the former was provocatively non conducive in opening a dialogue with non-western religions. ‘The goal is to understand religious persons, whether or not the method we use corresponds to an epistemological norm’, (Prueet : 1973 : 589) and ‘…these methodological issues must be treated by the historically self-conscious Western
student as part of his own tradition and not as a “universal” methodology for understanding the faith of other men.’, (Prueet : 1973 : 590).

Gualtieri (1969) finds seemingly contradictory arguments within Smith’s ideas on transcendence and faith. On the one hand, he finds that Smith seemingly accepting anything of ultimate selfhood or personal, existential authenticity to be a matter of faith and this has traces of a secular orientation and yet overriding all of this is suggestion that such expressions faith are ultimately God centred. Consequently, Gualtieri (1969) questions this alleged narrow depiction of faith, believing the term should extend to ‘its application to all life-commitments to ultimate value – the so-called secular as well as the explicitly spiritual or theological’ (Gualtieri : 1969 : 111). Some credibility can be given to the concept of secular or ‘humanist faith’, even though faith is usually defined as that which goes beyond or is considered reasonable or evident and perhaps could be seen as contributing to ‘de-reifying’ Smith’s theory of reification. However, Smith (1967) was strongly critical of many secular critics of religion who in their ‘insensitivity and discourtesy […] misunderstand and underestimate’ (Smith : 1967 : 31) the religious, finding their attitude reminiscent of evangelical missionaries in colonial times. Returning to Asad (2001) and the question of faith:

Smith’s separation of ‘faith’ from what he calls ‘cumulative tradition’, his presentation of the former as something transcendentally personal and the latter as its collective worldly expression, and his lack of interest in the formalities of worship and behaviour render the difference between the man of faith and one who has no faith virtually unobservable. Any view of religious life that requires the separation of what is observable from what is not observable fits comfortably with the modern liberal separation between the public spaces (where our political responsible life is openly lived). The idea seems that to be one that one’s beliefs should make no difference to publicly observable life and, conversely, that how one behaves can have no significance for one’s ‘inner
condition. Such a view prevents one from investigating how ‘faith’ and ‘cumulative tradition’ form each other, and how the grammar of faith differs from one tradition to the other.

(Asad : 2001 : 215)

These observation is insightful and does somewhat detract from Smith’s theory of reification as rooted in aspects of the ‘cumulative tradition’ which are the external acts of faith. While it sheds some doubt on his reification theory, nonetheless, Smith’s argument cannot be fully discounted and contemporary events could be said to attest to this. Asad’s views in particular, serve to moderate these effectively, providing a fuller and more balanced picture, especially in regard to faith and praxis, even if thereby ‘de-reifying’ Smith’s reification theory somewhat. A culmination of the two perspectives provides a good example of the idea of différance and Syādvāda, as being something that is and yet is not. Nevertheless, as we have seen and will see further, there are many Muslims who are inclined towards an essentialist, ‘organized and systematic entity’ of their faith despite the more realistic variance of practice and belief that Asad presents. Ironically, there would be many Muslims who would be critical of a non-essentialist stance in regard to Islam and yet probably agree with the idea of faith expressed in the external as well as the internal.

Rightly or wrongly, whatever theoretical and critical conclusions Asad arrives at these are surpassed by current events on the ground that seem to ascribe validity to Smith’s theory. In addition, there is a sense in which Asad appears to get bogged down into specifics, losing sight of the overall case being made. Even if some aspects of Smith’s theory are flawed, the overall conclusions are viable, something that Asad does not deny.

In fact, it could be argued that reification as a whole has perhaps evolved more extensively than either Smith or Asad envisaged and events have moved on
considerably since Smith’s and Asad’s publication, (February 2001, significantly prior to September 11th of the same year) with accelerated velocity. Certainly it could be argued that the mundane process is clearly more evident than ever; from hardening attitudes in inter and intra religious discourse and exclusivist attitudes, doctrinally legitimized resulting in many of the faithful considering themselves as part of an ‘exclusive salvation offering society against others’, (Hick’s introduction in Smith : 1978 : xi). Considering that The Meaning and End of Religion was initially published in 1962 attests to his keen insight. Such conflicts have ended in death, violence and destruction, perhaps unimaginable in Smith’s time and most certainly the antithesis of authentic religion as defined by such as Eliade. Such codifying tendencies have corrosively seeped into the ineffable and sacred core of the religious traditions and Gould (1999) suggests that religion itself is frequently lived and expressed in terms which are fundamentally contradictory to its nature. As we have seen, reification can be seen to be at such universally penetrating levels that nearly all aspects of human life globally are effected, (Lucaks : 1971; Heidegger : 2008). While an attempt to counteract this may lie in returning to Eliade’s vision of religion as a deep-rooted alternative by which human authenticity may be recovered from superficiality, the problem is compounded further when the religious itself is nullified in providing such alternatives. It is also important to note that Asad is highly complimentary of Smith’s raising of the matters in question and believes that Smith’s Meaning and End of Religion is a classic work that should be part of any comparative religious discourse. With all of the above in mind, it is considered justifiable to continue to further examine the case for the reification of Islam.
The Reification of Islam

…the essential tragedy of the modern Islamic world is the degree to which Muslims, instead of giving their allegiance to God, have been giving it to something called Islam.’

(Cantwell Smith : 1967 :115)

In 2002, Mecca Cola was launched in France, one amongst approximately six other similar brands, motivated by anti - Coca Cola, (read anti American) sentiments, though it does use similar colouring and lettering to the Coca Cola brand. Sharma & Williams, (2006) question the idea of a global Muslim brand saying that while there may be similar Christian global brands they are not perceived as such, nor use christian references as a basic selling point. They also believe that given the complexity and variance of these cultures it is impossible to codify or commodify what being Muslim or Christian actually is.

Shirazi, (2010) has carried out research on the marketing of veiled dolls across various Muslim countries. These were again apparently prompted by an Al Azhari scholar pronouncing Barbies’ style of dressing as ‘[promoting] an un-Islamic way of dressing’. (Meikheimar cited in Shirazi : 2010 : 13). Shirazi reports that Barbie dolls are made in China but in this case now with different clothing, (i.e. kaftan, hijab, etc.). Barbie has converted ! Shirazi is not convinced, instead believing that, ‘…..one must perceive the Islamic commodification of hijabi dolls not as a religious ideological trend but rather as a clever marketing strategy that utilizes and exploits religion’ (Shirazi : 2010 : 13). Returning to the question of Hajj, we can clearly detect the traces of reification when we read of the economic benefits of the Hajj:

While the direct economic impact of the Hajj is easily observable……. If fostered and applied more deeply, capabilities and skills linked to the Hajj can be pivotal in developing and expanding world-class initiatives and
companies. The skill set of the Hajj economy can, if viewed strategically, be a significant source of competitive advantage. (Rehman Institute: 2009)

No mention here of the essentially religious or spiritual aims of the Hajj but rather a depiction of a system able to be transferably modelled to be competitively profitable elsewhere.

Islam – Noun or Adjective?

The word ‘Islam’ was used infrequently by Muslims until up to about fifty years ago, (Smith : 1981) and the increasing preponderance of the word corresponds with a supposed phase in the historical objectification of the faith.

The Arabic term Islam itself was of relatively minor importance in classical theologies based on the Qur'an. If one looks at the works of theologians such as the famous al-Ghazali (d. 1111), the key term of religious identity is not Islam but iman (faith), and the one who possesses it is the mu'min (believer). Faith is one of the major topics of the Qur'an; it is mentioned hundreds of times in the sacred text. In comparison, Islam is a relatively less common term of secondary importance; it only occurs eight times in the Qur'an. Since, however, the term Islam had a derivative meaning relating to the community of those who have submitted to God, it has taken on a new political significance, especially in recent history. (Ernst : 2003 : 63)

Equally the adjective ‘Islamic’ or the idea of ‘Islamization’ were also virtually unknown up to fifty years ago and yet very commonplace in contemporary Muslim parlance, (Euben : 2002; Hoodbhouy : 1992; Panjwami : 2004). These words come with difficulties, for as a matter of course, when determining something as ‘Islamic’ the possibility of its opposite, the ‘unIslamic’ arises immediately and is as problematical as the concept of something being ‘American’ or ‘un American’, a thing which Edward Said, (cited by Rothstein : 2001) called ‘ideological confections’ and ‘false universals’, loaded with underlying and flawed assumptions that do not
bear up to any sensible analysis. One aspect of this lays in the fact that while many would understand these to apply to the general precepts and injunctions of the Qur’an and the Sunnah there are also geographical implications, which are both problematic and impair understanding. This can be seen in referring to things like ‘Islamic food’ and ‘Islamic clothes’, wherein many people understand these to be recipes or clothes from the Middle Eastern or Sub Continent. The principle of food and dress in Qur’anic and Prophetic terms simply enjoins nothing more than that they consist of halal contents in the first instance and modesty and covering the shape of the body in the second, something easily achieved by means of recipes from any country or loose fitting clothes from any culture.

Another very common conversational tendency within the Muslim community has been centred around the idea of serving Islam. A typical example of this is to be found in the following:

Being Muslims we are obligated to serve Islam by spreading its teaching to the world and by showing the real image of Islam. For this, first of all we must have a character that perfectly reflects a Muslim’s personality.

*We can serve Islam* by having a correct resolve and sincere intention, for Allaah blesses an action that is done sincerely for His sake alone, even if it is little. We should teach the newly converted Muslims, that how to offer prayers, fast, proper Qur’an Recitation and other good deeds.

*We can serve Islam* by knowing the right way and following it. The Straight Path means following the way of Qur’an and our Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) with regard to the principles, ways and means of da’wah and being patient in adhering to that, whilst treating people with kindness and compassion, because they are suffering from the disease of sin.

*We can serve Islam* by giving precedence to that which is in the interests of Islam over your own whims and desires. *Serving* this religion means giving what is most precious of your money, effort, time, thought, etc. Have you not seen those who love sport (football
or soccer) for example, how they devote their efforts, time and money to their beloved sport? But more is expected of you than that.

_We can serve Islam_ by following in the footsteps of the scholars of prestigious Islamic Schools, daa'iyahs and reformers, having patience for your companion and putting up with tiredness and exhaustion. For you are doing a great act of worship which is the mission of the Prophets and Messengers and those who follow in their footsteps.

(Islamic Education Online : 2009 : emphasis added)

Smith aptly articulates the question that arises here, ‘Does [the word ‘Islam’], 

......designate not an ideal but an actuality; not what God asks of men but what men choose to give Him?’, (Cantwell Smith 1981 : 58). There are countless other publications and websites which utilize the ‘service to Islam’ concept. Yet there appears to be no theological grounds for such a concept in the Qur’an as there appears to be no mention of ‘serving Islam’ within the text and an argument can be made that it is not Islam that Muslims are to serve but Allah, (Shepard : 1989). In the extract above there is one occurrence of the word ‘Allah’ whereas the pairing of the words ‘serve’ and ‘Islam’ occurs several times. Other similar phrases and binary word / concepts combinations used frequently are; ‘love Islam’, ‘defend Islam’ and ‘protect Islam’ amongst other similar wordings and concepts. Again, according to the Qur’anic paradigm and presumably therefore that of the Muslim community, it is not Islam that should be served or loved but Allah, (Qur’an 2: 165). In like fashion this can be equated to the difference between attitudes to the Qur’an, namely _waqar_ (reverence) and _ibada_ (worship); for as Asad (2011) states, the Qur’an is approached only in a reverential manner, as only God can be worshipped. Concluding this, one can only wonder alongside Smith says, ‘To reflect on these words is to realize how profoundly the meaning of [the word] Islam has changed!’ (Cantwell Smith 1981: 64)
Does such a shift in discourse signify an evolving definition of the word into a conceptual icon pertaining to a religio-cultural group? Smith comments that ‘If these cases are carefully considered, reflection seems to lead one to conclude that the word Islam has become the name not even of a religion but of a culture and a community’, (Cantwell Smith 1981 : 56). As we have already seen, the charge cannot only be laid only at the door of the Muslims for, as Timothy Winter comments, there is a modern tendency to:

……..redefine the language of religion to allow it to support identity politics. Religion has, of course, always had the marking of collective and individual identity as one of its functions […]. However, ….. this dimension has in all the world religions been allowed to expand beyond its natural scope and limits. Increasingly, religionists seem to define themselves sociologically, rather than theologically.

(Winter : 2003 : 5-6)

Another significant influence on Muslim self-perception stems from outside, situated within the public and private discourse of non-Muslims regarding Islam and Muslims. Negative perceptions and opinions frequently based on flawed generalizations only serve to narrow the parameters of how Muslims choose to define themselves and their religion. The Runnymede Trust consultation paper entitled Islamophobia - Its features and dangers (1997), identified eight opposing distinctions pertaining to Muslims and Islam within the public consciousness entitled ‘Open and Closed Views of Islam’. The distinctions identified were; monolithic / diverse; separate / interacting; inferior / different; enemy / partner; manipulative / sincere; discrimination defended / discrimination criticised; Islamophobia natural / problematic. As already demonstrated, substantial historical and contemporary evidence suggests that communities unconsciously or consciously take on the labels and classifications wielded upon them from the ‘other’. What is being proposed here is that if, as
Heidegger says, ‘Language is the house of being and in its home man dwells’ (2002: 262) and coupled with the Sapir and Whorf hypothesis (Cohn & Russell: 2012), then further added to by Smith’s theory concerning the labelling and categorization from outside sources; it can be suggested that the language we use concerning individuals or whole communities can be fundamental in their forming of individual or community identity and self perception. If the above proposition is viable, then it is perhaps possible to posit that these are potential causes and/or symptoms of an identifiable process of reification within the Muslim body.

The Reification of Islam as an exception to the Rule

Understanding the how and why of the transmutations of such words and the conceptual shifts involved, Smith’s ‘mundane process’ and ‘reification of religion’ offers considerable insight. Despite the historical description of the evolvement of a religious reification process outlined previously, Smith (1978) understood Islam to be an exception to the historical process of reification. It is important to note that he a specialist in Muslim theology as well as fluent in Arabic and his view cannot be easily discounted nor summarily categorized as orientalist, despite Asad ascribing orientalist nuances within some of his work. Specifically within Muslim history, he identifies a particular type of reification not mirrored elsewhere within any of the other major religions, except for some aspects of Sikhism. In contrast, to earlier religious phenomena the Muslims did have a name for their belief system and an identity. The word ‘Islam’ does occur in the Qur’an and is therefore understood to be not a name given by others but divinely bestowed. A fundamental Qur’anic paradigm lies in the Arabic word, din meaning ‘religion’ (Qur’an : V 49) demonstrating a clear notion of religion as a phenomenon, including Islam and other religions. As already demonstrated such concepts were not as sharply delineated in earlier religious
phenomena where the emphasis lay more on the personal spiritual path as opposed to the collective project. Reflecting this, Islam can make claim to political, social and legal systems that are strongly intertwined with the theological, perhaps more so than with other major religions. More specifically in India and China Islam is rendered more coherently consolidated as compared to Hinduism and more ‘morphous’ than Buddhism and Christianity (Smith : 1978).

The initial evidence for this lying in the era of Islam’s inception, wherein the historical context into which it emerged was such that it simply could not be as equally amorphous as may have been the case in the evolving of earlier religions. Within the already existing Abrahamic traditions, stages of development had already been breached wherein a sense of specific and separate religious entities had already occurred. These had been brought about in relation to subtle but powerful systemizing influences in the wider region stemming from Zarathustran and Manichean traditions. Cantwell Smith (1978) believes these influences, issuing mainly from Persia, played a much a greater part in Middle Eastern religious thought than is usually given credit for. While Zarathustra had not preached a religion his ideas are thought to have had far reaching consequences particularly within Judaism (Black : 1962 : 696; Duchesne-Guillemin : 1988)

Christianity was allegedly also affected both through its evolvement through Judaism and through inherited aspects of Mithraism, considered a later Roman derivation of Zoroastrianism, (Cumont : 1956; Fremont & Gandy : 1999; Reynolds : 1993). Partially evident of this and something that Smith finds particularly pertinent was the idea of two distinct groups of people – those that through some voluntary act choose to either rise to heaven or descend to hell; i.e., those adhering to the group’s beliefs
and attaining ultimate bliss while those that reject are thereby damned. In addition, there was the further influence of Manichaeism – essentially fabricated religion also originating from Iran, which was based on a very deliberate structured system of belief – reification *par excellence*. These systemizing developments have played an enormous part in both Middle Eastern and Western traditions and it was under these prevailing theological positions that Islam came to fruition.

Other evidence of this lies in examining the Prophet Muhammad’s awareness of his own role and it is not difficult to surmise that he was very aware of the construction of a system of belief with a defined focus on the sociological. Smith points out that the concept of *umma* plays a far more essential role in Islam than the concept of *sangha* (community) plays within Buddhist teachings or any other tradition. Its emphasis on a sociological system constitutes one of the unique features of Islam indicative of a more consolidated idea than within other prominent traditions. It is clear that the early Muslim community had the notion of a Islam as a distinct value distinguishable from other religions.

Another unique aspect of Islam pertaining to reification raised by Smith, lies in the fact that it is essentially reformational; situated outside of the belief systems considered to be in necessity of reform, in that Islam claims to reform the monotheistic tradition of the Jews and Christians. Non-Muslims frequently understand to be the judeo-christian influence on Islam, while to Muslims it is the continuation and resolving of the Abrahamic tradition. Smith posits the idea that the valid historical interpretation is to see this as a movement for the reform of traditions outside of itself. In summary, Smith see Islam as having come into being at a time
where schematized religion had evolved sufficiently so that distinctions between
different faith positions were already reified, the Prophet seemed to know that he was
addressing anamed and defined community and Islam’s chief role was correctional.
All of these are indications of a type of reification not evidenced in other older
traditions, although Smith identifies similarities and differences with Sikhism that
was founded much later.

Notwithstanding all of this, Smith identifies two other significant reification processes
that Islam underwent at a later stage, stemmimg from within the Muslim body and
from the outside. The internal aspect was simply that the Muslims themselves tended
towards greater reification – systematizing and codifying their faith to a greater
degree than at its inception. This was all the more so at the end of the 18th century
under the new influence of Europe and largely in an ensuing reactionary mode against
European colonial powers. ‘One discovers that also in the Islamic case as in others the
emergence of a conceptualised and named entity has, despite appearances to the
contrary, been in significant part a gradual but rather late aberration’, (Cantwell Smith

A different interpretation of the Muslim canon began to evolve. Smith points out that
this was not a linguistic question but rather a question of a paradigm shift manifesting
within the Muslim ummah resulting in the Qur’an and role of the Prophet being
interpreted differently. There were enormous forces from within the Muslim
community ranged against this later reification process constituting a ‘nonreifying or
pre-reifying’ interpretation which Smith and others (Ernst : 2003) characterized as:

…sensitively religious, less superficial in their response, less liable
to the outsider’s mundane view and more perceptive of transcendent
overtones. Further, such evidence that is available indicates that
these persons were in early Islamic times in preponderating majority, at least among leaders; and that over the course of the centuries there has been a demonstratable drift from the personalist, vivid and open sort of interpretation towards the other, the closed and reified view that today is common.’

(Cantwell Smith : 1978 : 110)

Though Smith makes little mention of such polemics in contemporary terms, there is ample evidence that this dichotomy still exists to this day. At this point, for want of a better description, the term ‘classical’ will be used to denote the view of those described in the above quote, the word ‘traditional’ having connotations that can be confusing. This classical position was strongly challenged (and is still the case today) particularly in the areas of Qur’anic interpretation where the consensus was, and is, that much has been misunderstood through linguistic and faulty arguments and justifications, (Nasr : 1990 ; Winkel : 1997). These have been brought to bear; usually by what Smith calls ‘impersonalist’ and ‘entity like’ interpretations of essential words and concepts like *din* (religion), to denote a greater ‘separateness’. He provides an example of this in the interpretation of the Qur’an, Chapter 3, Verse 19, ‘Verily the religion in the eyes of God is Islam’, wherein modern interpretation indicates the meaning as more inclined towards signifying, ‘the right religion is Islam’. Smith cites the example of the bi-monthly Journal of the *Holy Qur’an Society of Pakistan* entitled *Al Islam*, founded in the early fifties, which carried the logo with the following translation of the verse in question, ‘Verily the only Faith acceptable to Allah is al-Islam’ and is arguably a commonly understood meaning attributed to this verse within the Muslim community today. In contrast, Smith believes that there is evidence, in the Qur’anic text and the written interpretations thereof of something much more ‘vibrant, searching and transporting’, (1978 : 110). Smith utilizes one of the most widely accepted, exhaustive and authoritative commentaries on the Qur’an by Abu Ja’far al-Tabarî, (d. 310 H – 933 AD), commonly known simply as al-Tabarî, whose
other works include writings on the sciences and dialects of the Qur’an and a history of the world in thirty volumes. Somewhat akin to Hick’s understanding of Augustine, al-Tabarī’s commentary on this particular verse consists of stipulating that ‘true religion’ signifies obeisance to the Divine as opposed to a more sectarian concept of defining what and which is ‘the true religion’ and describes it as referring to an action of the will as opposed to adherence to a system. On the other hand it must be stressed that this is not to suggest that al-Tabarī (nor Augustine, for that matter) or the classical outlook generally proclaimed an eclectic spirituality and it is clearly understood that by referring to the Divine, al-Tabarī meant the Muslim understanding of this. But what it does signify is something more orientated towards the individual rather than indicating any faith system. In another well known verse ‘al yawma akmaltu lakum dīnakum’ (Chapter 5 Verse 3) meaning ‘This Day I have completed your religion for you’, frequently cited in modern interpretations as having been revealed towards the end of the Prophet’s life, suggesting a finalization of the ‘system’. Yet most of the famous commentators did not place the timing of this revelation towards the end of the Prophet’s life. From the biographies of famous awliya, (saints), (Cornell : 1996 ; Cornell : 1998; Chodkiewisz : 1993; Abbas : 1993) and from contemporary accounts of people claiming to follow the Muslim spiritual path in the classical sense, (Lings : 1993 ; Burke : 1993 ; Skalli : 2012) one gets the sense of an indeterminate series of personal experiences, occurrences and events, which taken altogether form a process that eventually elicits a personal transformation. The idea of a ‘system’ seems at odds with the profession of Islam of many Muslims others and the dichotomies this raises has been in part the motivation behind this research enquiry. There is a common orientation, with which the paths within which the paths are very wide rendering Islam not as a singular entity, nor
something that one person can exactly define as to what it is nor what it should be.

Halliday (1996) strongly debunks the idea of some shari’aesque central platform that all Muslims ascribe to and the exclusiveness of Islam and its supposed impenetrability is hugely overestimated. Equally, Al-Azmeh believes the idea of a singular Islam as ‘generically closed, utterly exceptionalist’, (2009:8), or lacking diversity is an illusion issued forth from both Islamophobic and Islamophilic confabulations. The balance between the individual, the collective and the religion is perhaps better described by Jackson (1999):

> The ‘tradition’, although conceived and delimited in different ways by different insiders and outsiders, is a reference point for individuals and groups. Membership groups (institutions, religious movements, denominations, ethnic groups, and peer groups, for example) evolve situationally in relation to, and sometimes overlap with, one another. The individual is strongly influenced by the membership of groups and identifiable as part of the wider tradition but is, nevertheless, unique. […] the interpretation of a religious way of life involves a study of individuals in the context of groups, with the wider tradition employed as a general point of reference.  

(Jackson : 1999 : 203)

This is also reflected in the outward expression of Islam where the study of *fiqh* (jurisprudence) reveals that there are many accepted yet different positions and interpretations taken by the classical *ulumāʾ* (scholars) and suggests that there is a manifestation of broad guidance and strides that each individual might take to actualize Islam in their lives.

In a chapter headed, (1981), *Faith in Islamic History : the Meaning of Arkan*, Smith demonstrates that al-Ghāzali understood a well-known precept; *tasdiq bi-al janān, wa igrar bi-al-lisān, wa’amāl bi-al-arkān*, (belief in the heart, confirmation by the tongue and action within the pillars [of Islam]) differently. The word *arkan* has been commonly interpreted as meaning ’pillar’ but Smith presents Al-Ghāzali, in fact, as
interpreting this as the limbs of the body. Without fully denying this, Ziaul Haque believes that this sort of assumption requires greater research and that ‘merely interpreting a few theological terms in a certain, although plausible, way is not enough’, (1982 : 121), which seems to reflect Asad’s critique of Smith’s methodology. When taking account of the overall thrust of Smith’s contentions regarding the reification of Islam in its entirety, including the analysis of word usage, as referred to above, his argument seems more than just plausible. Ziaul Haque (1982) concludes that the problem ‘must be investigated in its linguistic, theological, historical and sociological aspects’ (1982 : 121). But it is difficult to see how Smith has not done exactly this, with an exacting and comprehensive methodology, in researching the possibility of shifting definitions of Islam, *iman*, *shari’ah* and *arkan* as further indicating a reification of Islam. Notwithstanding all of the elements of a specific reification that Smith identifies in Islam, he eventually moves on to demonstrate that, in fact, even Islam is not quite such an exception as might first appear and Asad (2001) attests to his attempt in this, despite finding contradictory contentions in Smith’s general argument. The correlation of existentialist thought with Smith’s understanding of a primacy of an active principal as opposed to the reified and theoretical, will be dealt with at length later in this work. Nevertheless, it is important to stress something at this point; if one takes the general thrust of Smith’s ideas to signify generally that ‘Theology is to revelation what musical criticism is to music’, (Cantwell Smith : 1967 : 82), a comment perhaps taken out of context and not to be taken literally, then it will be argued that an un-reified and authentic way can also be found within the conscious appropriation of Muslim theology and certainly not at the expense of the transcendent.
Smith (1978) identifies three types of contemporary understandings and usage of the word Islam which are as follows:

1. Islam as the decision of self-commitment of the individual – an intensely personal submission to God, quite distinct from that of anyone else. An act of immediate deliberate dedication existentially embarked upon wherein the individuals link themselves to a transcendent Divine reality and a community based around this. A dynamic and dialectically formed phenomenon.

2. Islam as a phenomenological and tangible reality with concrete historical and sociological components. The grouping of people around these events and the beliefs engendered.

3. Islam as a Platonic ideal. A total perfect system, manifesting as a schematized and institutionalized utopia.

The first of these was the earliest and predominant interpretation, yet gradually eclipsed by the second and third perspectives according to Smith. Another argument put forward is the contention that there are verses in the Qur’an where relative exclusivism is criticised as in Chapter 3 Verse 66, ‘Abraham was not a Jew nor yet a Christian but he was an upright man who surrendered.’ Smith believes that the evidence indicates that ‘The Qur’an is concerned, and presents God as being concerned with something that people do, and with the persons who do it, rather than an abstract entity’ (1978 : 111).

Evidence of mundaneization is perceived through a grammatical analysis of the Qur’anic text and Smith makes the observation that verb forms far outnumber the nouns in Qur’anic usage overall that suggests action rather than naming. Smith acknowledges that as a non-Muslim his understanding of this may not be the ‘right or
transcendent one’ but that it is an entirely feasible one and ‘in fact closer to the straightforward and simple meanings of the Arabic words …...in fact it was the interpretation given to to these passages by , if not most, of the leaders of Muslim religious thought in the early centuries’ (1978 : 113). He also carried out an analysis on the titles of religious works that spanned across centuries. Asad (2001) is dismissive of this method in stating that, ‘The attempt to derive far reaching semantic conclusions through simple word count is in general misguided’, (Asad : 2001 : 221). However, this type of statistical analysis is now quite common, (Dukes : 2011; Wiersma : 2007; Intellyze : 2012; Buckwalter : 2003) and it is difficult to see how this approach can be dismissed as entirely inconclusive or of little import in establishing the shifting meaning and word usage changing over time and indicative of something. Asad’s criticism of this is not justified or extrapolated sufficiently enough to deserve discarding the analysis quite so easily. For the analysis of religious titles, Smith uses a renowned archive, Brockelmann's Geschicht der arabischen Litteratur, (1909) which no less than Montgomery Watt\footnote{Emeritus Professor Montogomery Watt, (1909 – 2006) University of Edinburgh; Islamic Studies and Arabic.} declared ‘an essential and very helpful tool of research for serious scholars of Islamic and Arab affairs.’ (Brill Catalogue : 2012). It is difficult to see how the archive could not have been more appropriately used.

Should this have constituted the only evidence Smith provided then perhaps Asad’s criticism would have had more currency but that is not the case. Below is a summary of Smith’s analysis (1978) followed by further comments and observations.

a) \textit{Islam} is used eight times in the Qur’an and is a verbal noun to mean ‘the name of an action, not of an institution; of a personal decision, not a social system.’ (1978 / 1991 : 112). Nonetheless, it still
appears only a third of the instances then its foundational verb *aslama* occurs. This word is defined as the imperative to ‘choose to recognise as binding upon the self’. (1978 / 1991 : 112). ‘Vivid and dynamic – and personal: these are the qualities of the term *Islam* in the Qur’an. What was proclaimed was a challenge not a religion’, (1991 : p113). This would tend to suggest that the existential act of the individual holds precedence within the Qur’an over a declared membership to the community.

b) The word *Allah* appears 2,697 times whereas ‘Islam’ occurs eight times. This infers a focus on the central objective; God, rather than the system of belief. Smith notes that this ratio is reversed in modern Muslim writing. Nevertheless, the interpretation of Islam should be seen in the light of it being a verbal noun; ‘the name of an action; not of an institution; of a personal decision; not a social system’, (1978 : 112). The Qur’an also speaks of *Islamukum*, i.e., ‘your Islam’, one’s personal commitment to the Divine command.

c) In the Qur’an (also reflected in classical theological work) the human side of the relationship is usually designated by the concept of faith in its various forms in Arabic. Examples of these are *iman* (faith), occurring 45 times and the related word *mu’min* (one who has faith) occurring 5 times more frequently than the word *Muslim*, (related to the word Islam) and designates one who follows the outward practice of Islam. *Mu’min* (related to the word Iman) refers to the decision to act
in faith with all the implications thereof as opposed to the outward expression of belief, i.e., Muslim. A mu’min is by necessity already a Muslim, whereas a Muslim may not be a mu’min. ʾImān, (faith, related to the word mu’min) is considered an active quality, one that commits the person in which he is caught up into a ‘dynamic’ relationship with the Divine and to other human beings; ‘the ability to see the transcendent and to respond to it’; to hear God’s voice and to act accordingly’, (1991: 112). In similar vein the word kāfarā means not to disbelieve, ‘but rather to reject: it too is active,  engage […]What the Qur’an presents is a great drama of decision, those who accept and those who spurn’, (1991: 112). Smith says that this can also be seen in the correlation of the writing of the ‘classical theologians’….. and the actual behaviour of the Muslim community who in their early creative history set forth to remake the world’, (1991: 112).

As mentioned previously, alongside evidence of the historical and hermeneutical development of meaning attributed to the words Islam and ʾImān within in the Qur’an, Smith also looks for corresponding evidence in the frequency the usage of these words in the titles of religious books. The survey was taken from titles listed in Brockelmann’s (1909), multivolume, ‘Geshichte der arabischen Litteratur’, listing more than 25,000 books, over a large span of time, from the 8th to the 20th century. These were arranged chronologically allowing Smith to discern whether any significant paradigm shift is evident. The percentage distribution in the Qur’an came out as Iman 85% in contrast to Islam 15%. In Classical & Medieval book titles, (up to 1300 A.D.), the distribution was Iman 40% to Islam 60%. In the Modern era, (1300 to
1900 A.D.), *Iman* stood at 7% in relation to *Islam* at 93%. Smith sees it possible to discern a clear shift in Muslim usage of the term *Islam* as a noun denoting a religion rather than a verbal noun.

Elsewhere Smith (1981) undertook an analysis of the historical understanding and usage of the word *shari’ah*, (Muslim canonical law), which is at the forefront of any contemporary discussion of Islam today. Smith again detects a later codification, (5th to 6th century A.D.), indicating reification, by making a distinction between *shar’*, (literally a ‘path’ or ‘way’) and *shari’a*, (the plural form of the former), so that rather than ‘patterned systems of incumbencies’, (1981: 93), the definition of *shari’ah* indicates ‘ways’ rather than ‘way’. Given this, Smith sets out to determine whether the positioning of *shari’ah* within the Muslim nexus occupied the same primacy and emphasis during the classical period. Although not quite as extensively wide ranging as that utilized with the Brockelmann archives. He sifts through the entire content of some renowned texts, scholars and schools of thought such as; the *Mu’tazilah* and individuals such as Imam Abu Hanifah, (*Wasiya*), al-Ash’ari, (*al-fiqh al-akbar*), the Hanbalī scholar, al-Juwayni, (*Kitab al-irshad*) and several texts of al-Ghāzali, to name but a few. His general findings that that the word count for *s-h-r* rooted words was very low. Smith admits the possibility that it was taken for granted and as being so central that it was not considered in need of mention but argues that several other similar concepts such *Allah* and Prophethood, (*nubuwa*) were frequently mentioned and were clearly central. The foregrounding of the concept of religious law was neither ‘basic or central or emphasized as a concept in Islamic thought during these centuries’ (Cantwell Smith: 1981: 95) and that its later appearance corresponds with a decline in intellectual robustness and he makes the suggestion that ‘a closer
understanding may involve a more personalized and moralized conception than ‘law’, (Cantwell Smith : 1981 : 89) and that the evidence, ‘strongly suggests that the *shar’ia* is not a major concept for classical Islamic thinkers’, (Cantwell Smith : 1981 : 90).

The societal results of this reifying phenomenon have been a defensive, apologetic or even aggressive mentality on the part of many Muslims in regard to ideologies, societies, cultures and religions outside of the Muslim nexus. This brings us to the point that an evidential aspect of Smith’s theory of the mundaneization process resides in the correlation between religious reification and an apologetic attitude in a given community. A defensive stance requires something to defend and in doing so the object of defence is repeatedly clarified and delineated further against attack. He expresses the view that this tendency is at work within all the different religions across the globe but is particularly evident within the Muslim world. Smith comments, ‘On scrutiny it appears that the almost universal Muslim use of the term Islam in a reified sense in modern times is a direct consequence of apologetics [...] the impulse to defend what is attacked would seem a powerful force toward reifying’, (Smith : 1999 : 115). Anecdotally, there does seem to be an increase in Muslim apologetics indicating a parallel increase in reification and all the implications thereof. Featuring prominently within the Muslim discourse is the concept of *nizām*. The word does not exist in the Qur’an nor has any root derivatives therein. It is, says Smith:

> The explicit notion that life should be or can be ordered according to a system, even an ideal one, and that it is the business of Islam to provide such a system seems to be a modern idea (and perhaps a rather questionable one).

(Smith : 1999 : 117)
Summary

In this chapter and the previous, an argument has been established for the existence of some inauthenticity within the Muslim discourse, with some indication as to how these might have come about. This was carried out mainly through looking at concepts such as reification and, in the previous chapter, McDonaldization. The general argument is that these have arisen through the human propensity to rationalize and standardize the world in which they live and within the religious sphere this has played in the codification of the nebulous and ineffable. In the following chapter, the implications and positions that have arisen within Islam as a result of these are outlined and critically examined the various positions that have arisen as a result of reification and attempts to unpick the confusing options on offer for the individual Muslim in pursuit of the authentic.
Chapter 6

Positions within the Muslim Community in Light of Reification

‘…and those who commodify religion thus have no religion – for he who trades in something, soon sells it and does not own it any longer.’


This schism between the modernist objectification of Islam as opposed to the classical stance, as presented above, is something upon which many ordinary Muslims and non-Muslims remain confused about to this day (Kidwai : .2010; Brown : 1996; Nasr : 1987, Bruinessen & Howell : 2007). Indicative of this kind of confusion is a report commissioned by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy entitled Reformation of Islamic Thought (2006) wherein the author asks, To what extent are these liberal, reformist thinkers engaged in genuine renewal of Islamic thought? Do they succeed in challenging the negative image of the West presented by the traditionalists? ‘(Zayd : 2006 : 1). There is a great deal of confusion implicit in these questions concerning labels such as ‘liberal’ and ‘reformist’ and ‘traditionalists’ and who or why, in fact, would be inclined to counter negative images of the West in the Muslim world. It is disconcerting that Dutch governmental policies could be possibly constructed on what seems shallow and confused premises, nor is the Muslim world exempted from this sort of confusion. It is necessary to reconsider, refine and redefine such labels and their respective positions.

The reasons for such confusion lies mainly in historical and socio-political trends that can be said to emerge from the encounter between European Enlightenment attitudes and the theocracies of traditional sacred societies. As mentioned previously, in the Muslim lands governments and intellectuals have responded to long standing European colonization and subsequent independence by attempting reform in the
political, economic, educational and socio-cultural arenas. However, this has resulted in considerable social and religious upheaval, as Mohammed Arkoun points out:

Such is the psychocultural background common to all political activity of every Muslim leader at least until the end of World War II. It was the period of naive consciousness, because these generations believed naively that it was enough to take the prescription for the success of Western civilizition and apply them to Muslim countries. Secularism was perceived as one of those effective prescriptions to be applied to societies where religion controlled all the happenings and gestures of daily life. Those generations of Muslim intellectuals did not have a sufficient grasp of history to be able to pin down the ideological genesis, sociopolitical functions, and philosophical limits of secularism in the West.

(Arkoun : 1994 : 25)

According to Ziaul Haque (1982) another significant result of this upheaval was that:

….the logical result of the political process in many Muslim societies where socialization of Islam has been attempted, i.e., more emphasis has been laid on the law and economics and the transcendental/moral aspect has been relegated to the background removing man away from his God and enveloping him in legal and economic intricacies’

(Ziaul Haque : 1982 : 120)

Halliday (1996) argues comprehensively against the notion of clashing civilizations claiming it a fallacy precisely because ‘…we are not dealing with a world of contrasting political traditions: the very terms in which European power and values have been challenged are ones taken from European tradition – the state, the nation, rights, independence, democracy’ (Halliday : 1996 : 5). As a result of these seemingly failed attempt at socio-politico rationalization, Brown (1996) identifies three main tendencies as having emerged in the religious sphere:

*Traditional Classical Islam*

This is the form of Muslim cohesion over many centuries, wherein the traditional *ulamā‘* and *fuquha* upheld the accumulated basic Prophetic
pattern in establishing and maintaining the Muslim community. The view held here would be that by definition, Islam is never in need of reformation, incorporating within itself its own critique and revision. However, it is understood that these things do not occur instantly simply altering, ‘to suit the latest fantasies and ambitions of men’ (al-Murabit : 1982 : 1) and the idea of ‘revolution’ is not a concept accepted by the classical canon. Winkel (1997) points out that the classical way is one which does not rule out novel interpretations but nor does it arrogantly assume that centuries of acute and impassioned Muslim scholarship are of no consequence. The classical mode is based on the contextual and the interpretative.

It could be argued that this type of critique is uniquely modern and doesn’t reflect the world that Eickelman depicts in following the career pathway of the classical scholar Qādī Abdul Rahman. Eickelman writes:

Western scholars have for the most part downplayed the vitality of Islamic learning for the modern era, a neglect reinforced by the tendency of nationalists and technocrats in North Africa and elsewhere to deny significance to men of learning whose notions of political action have differed from their own.

(Eickelman : 1985 : xvi)

The classical reaction to western dominance was based on ‘withdrawal and non cooperation’ but not in any violent sense. Eickelman (1985) provides an account of the encounter between classical education and a more modern systemized educational approach in recounting events from a renowned classical centre of higher religious education in Marrakesh, the Yusufiya, in the 1930s:
The Yusufiya had no sharply defined body of students or faculty, administration, entrance or course examinations, curriculum or unified sources of funds. In fact, its former teachers related with amusement the frustrated efforts of French colonial officials to determine who its "responsible" leaders were and to treat it as a corporate entity analogous to a medieval European University.

(Eickelman : 1985 : 86)

This account indicates an absence of institutionalization in a Foucaultian sense with any related conceptual effects of reification. Sufism has also been identified with orthodox classical Islam and was certainly present in the Yusufiya and al Qarawayn in Morocco during the 1930s though by then somewhat denigrated by both modernists and fundamentalists since the early nineteenth century (Segalla : 2009, Cornell : 1998). Another aspect of the classical model but historically indicative of wider Muslim application was the authority and power accorded to religious scholars even in the temporal realm as can be seen by the deposing of Moulay Abdel Azziz in 1908 in Morocco by the ulamā’ as a result of his appearing to be ineffective in stemming French and European influence generally in the country. The Fez ulamā’ simply withdrew their support and declared his brother, Abdul Hafid as the new sultan, (Segalla : 2009). Representing all that is not modernist, un-institutionalized and un-reified, the classical tradition has come under sustained attack by both secular and Islamic modernists who were also critical of the traditional ulamā’ tendency to stay put – and follow tradition – even in the face of the challenges provided by encountering the values of the west.

The [classical] ulama and the Islamic legal discourse (fiqh) have been continually and ferociously attacked, even from among the Muslim world, from many quarters – from secularists to modernists, reformists to
fundamentalists. If these groups have one thing in common, it is a desire for power and more specifically for state centred schemes for Muslim progress. Simply stated the ulama stand in the way of this as modern centralization has historically been shunned by the ulama. In fact the very essence of the ulama project – that edifice erected to determine rules and regulations from revelation-is its decentralization, slow accumulation of positions and argumentation, local dominion and diffusion. No one person can define and represent the Islamic experience, so the ulama resist Islam being centralized in the person of the nation-state leader or in any university or institute. And as for state-centred schemes for progress, in accord with traditional religions, the ulama do not see progress as a virtue.

(Winkel : 1997 : 1)

In the view of classical scholars, the reformist movements preach a confused polemic based on a literalist interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadīth that is understood to be permeated by overly rational methods and modes of thought confusedly mixed in with the tenets of religious faith and belief. As mentioned previously, there is some irony in the fact that the modernist movements; avowed critics of all things western are themselves based on similar intellectual grounds and premises that characterises western secularism. Without wishing to cause confusion in the mind of the reader, it is important to stress here that despite the given label and either by oversight or error, this category is not the group that is referred to as ‘traditionalist’ in the Dutch report by Zayd (2006) above. Finally, the experience of Abou El Fadl in regard to the seeming demise of the traditional classical way is relevant here:

I was fortunate enough to have internalized an ethos that was quickly vanishing in the Arab world. This is not the place to engage in a full description of the nature of this ethos, except to say that it was, in part, apologetic. However, it was also immersed in the juristic tradition of disputation, opinions, and schools of thought. The jurists
with whom I studied were masters of the dusty yellow-books (al-kutub al-safra), who, at the time, believed that the puritanism of the Wahhabis was a marginal and passing phase. They were quite wrong. The ethos of which I speak celebrated and revelled in the search for the Divine Way. The search, the study-the process of pondering, weighing, and balancing was considered the ultimate act of worship (‘ibadah). The engagement of the intellect in searching the Divine Way was invariably superior to the engagement of the body in treading the Divine Way. True piety manifested in the search for knowledge (talab al-ilm) -- this piety then affirmed by the physical acts of prayer, fasting, and so on. Importantly, finding the correct answer to any juristic problem was not considered a part of the act of worship (‘ibadah). Finding the correct answer, if one existed, was considered a gift and blessing from God to be humbly enjoyed as long as it exists.

(Abou : 2001 : 6)

It also involves the idea of taqlīd referring to the layman’s following and adherence to the accumulated wisdom and teaching of past scholars. Modernists put greater stress on ijtiḥād or fresh interpretations of Divine law, which strongly distinguishes between immutable principles and those that were subject to change. Probably due to this, the classical fuquha have been frequently considered as moribund and unable to meet the challenges of modern existence and progress.

The earliest manifestations of reform that really opposed the classical position in the modern era are those undertaken by such diverse groups as the Ahli-hadīth in the Indian subcontinent, which appeared in the early to mid nineteenth century and the subsequent later appearance of the Wahhābi movements in the Middle East in the late nineteenth century which preserved and built upon the allegedly reformist thought of ibn-Taymiyya (1263 – 1328) and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (1703 – 1792).
Islamic Modernists

This encompasses modernists, reformists, fundamentalists and extremists linking people as diverse as Usāma bin Lāden (1957 – 2011) and Recep Tayyip (1954 – )\textsuperscript{16}. As Lapidud says, it is ‘an umbrella designation for a wide variety of movements’ (2002 : 823). If modernity is defined as reason, science and technology all of the above named groups would therefore fall under the ‘modernist’ label (Kurzman: 2003), a fact which is often confusing for non-Muslims and many Muslims. It is for this reason that Nasr terms ‘fundamentalists’ as ‘psuedo-traditionalists’ who ‘…while denouncing modernism, accept some of the most basic aspects of modernism’ (1994 : 19)\textsuperscript{17}. Nasr argues that the groups mentioned are all modernist despite their many apparent and profound differences, the link between; modernists, ‘fundamentalists’, reformers, revivalists, extremists and Islamists lies mainly in the reformational idea that for Islam to succeed in the modern world it is necessary to return to the canonical sources and reinterpret them in light of the modern world.

One of the oldest of these groups to be considered ‘fundamentalist’ would be those known as Wahhābi (and by extension the Salafis), though those pertaining to this group would refuse the label. Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab at-Tamini (1703 – 17920) was born in Najd, in present day Saudi

\textsuperscript{16}The current Turkish Prime Minister

\textsuperscript{17}The term ‘fundamentalist’ is considered an inaccurate label but is used in here in order to prevent confusion and is used between quotation marks and in quotes. Any serious practising Muslim would believe in the ‘fundaments’ of the religion but it is acknowledged that in using this term many people are referring to extreme religious positions and therefore ‘extremism’, ‘extremists’ or Lumbard’s ‘puritanical reformists’ (2004) are considered more accurate. Whenever possible these terms will be used in place of ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘fundamentalism’ except when it could be deemed as potentially confusing. Other labels given to this type of movement will be referred to later.
Arabia. He spent sometime studying under various scholars in Basra where he began to formulate reformist ideas. He was a follower of the *Hanbalī* school of thought yet at the same time was opposed to the idea of *taqlīd*, perceiving this as the unquestioning following of a particular *madhhab*. He was opposed to the visiting of graves of the companions of the Prophet and the saints and within the sphere of his local influence called for a return to the stoning of adulterers. He saw it as essential to rid the Muslim world of *bid‘ah* (innovations) and *shirk* (the worshipping of idols) which he saw as encompassing things like the veneration of saints and prohibited the visiting of graves. He was also critical of sufi positionings in general deeming some ideas and practices as heretical. His controversial stance involved him being expelled from various tribal communities until he was eventually taken under the wing of the Saud tribe, some of whom were his students. The Saud tribe was engaged in a long term military campaign for over 140 years to wrest total control of the Arabian peninsula from the Turks that was eventually successful in 1924. The religious stance of ibn Abdul Wahab had become intrinsically bound up with Saudi culture and politics and when the Saudi family eventually ascended to power this provided a religious and political base for the dissemination of *Wahhābi* influence. *Wahhābīsm* has had a considerable impact on the Muslim world with their insistence on *ittibaa’* or the ‘following of the correct model’, an arbitrary assumption of what is correct that many have contested (Haddad & Esposito: 1998). The *Wahhābīyah* are committed to shucking off the accumulated accretions of classical disciplines and commentaries on Qur’an, Sunna and Hadīth and championed the use of *ijtihād*, or the use of personal interpretation of the
Qur’an and Sunna. The method proposed for this was a rigorous literalist interpretation of the which bound them to single interpretations of Qur’an and Hadīth, equally rejecting the classical use of *qiyās* (argued reasoning on legal questions) or *usul* (theoretical principles) or *ta’wil*, (esoteric, internal interpretation), (Brown : 1996). From the modernist and fundamentalist view, the classical tradition had rendered knowledge content like *tafsir* (Qur’anic commentary) under centuries of calcified erudition passed on by rote memorization and had, in effect, slammed the holy book shut and sprinkled it with punctilious erudition’ (Hardman: 2009 : 140) and that one of the purposes of classical education was to form an elite group capable of ‘..reading the Qur’an properly and guide the less fortunate masses who were unable to understand it for themselves’ (Hardman : 2009 : 138).

As for the modernist or Islamist position perhaps the best representatives of this are *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* (the Muslim Brotherhood). The group would also come under the label of ‘Islamist’ and is one of the most influential movements in the Arab world. Its founder, Hassan Ahmed Abdel Rahman Muhammed al-Banna (1906 – 1949) was an Egyptian Imam and school teacher. He followed the *Hanbalī madhhab* and was a member of the *tariqa al Hassafiyyah* (a Sufi order) and was greatly influenced by Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865 -1935), an early Islamist thinker. At an early age al -Banna was involved in political activity against colonial influences and secularist tendencies adopted by the Egyptian government. His establishing of the *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* in 1928 was followed by phenomenal expansion across Egypt. The organizational structuring of the movement was highly institutional and multi-functional aiming to appeal to
people at all levels of society and mainly funded by businesses and clinics. Currently the organization consists of the following sections; Executive leadership, Organizational office, Secretariat general, Educational office, Political office, Sisters office. The emphasis was and is on reviving Islam in the form of modern governance, establishing educational and public health institutions and establishing Egyptian national identity and Arab pan-nationalism. The movement was also aimed at countering colonialism and inequality. In its organizational structures and its pursuit of the Islamic nation state, the movement could be identified as adhering to 19th century modernist principles and values stemming from the west. From the classical viewpoint Islam has its own well-tested methods of governance and the nation state is regarded as yet another western conceptual import. In the same vein the Brotherhood promotes democracy.

Evidence of this can be further seen in Esposito’s comments on a recent Gallup World Study poll:

‘……. focusing on the attitudes of those with radical views and comparing them with the moderate majority results in surprising findings. When asked what they admired most about the West, both extremists and moderates had the identical top three spontaneous responses:

(1) technology; (2) the West’s value system, hard work, self-responsibility, rule of law, and cooperation; and (3) its fair political systems, democracy, respect for human rights, freedom of speech, and gender equality. A significantly higher percent of potential extremists than moderates (50 percent versus 35 percent) believe that “moving towards greater governmental democracy” will foster progress in the Arab/Muslim world.

(Esposito : 2006 : 6-7)
Commonalities within Modernist Muslim Movements

The commonality regarding reform between the reformists such as the *al-Kwan al-Muslimūn* and the *Wahhābi* and *Salafī* movements, lies through their shared origins in reformist ideologies stemming from figures such as Jamal al Din Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad ‘Abdu (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865 -1935), Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab at-Tamini, coupled with the basic argument that Islam is dynamic by nature and therefore capable of modernizing selectively (Euben & Zaman : 2009). Despite these shared roots, there are significant differences between modernism, ‘fundamentalists’ and literalists, evident in issues such as modern reformists’ contention that neither the classical works of Islam nor many present day scholars of the Muslim world are suitable for the contemporary world, something that ‘fundamentalists’ would disagree with. While ‘fundamentalists’ may reject some contemporary classical scholars this may not be extended to the classical texts. In their place they prefer contemporary scholars¹⁸ who apply modern textual methodologies based in and around the context of canonical rulings from the early Muslim community. As Nasr points out;

The [classical] traditionalist and the so-called ‘fundamentalist’ meet in their acceptance of Qur’an and Hadith, as well as in their emphasis upon the *Shari’ah*, but even here their differences remain profound.....tradition always emphasizes the sapiential commentaries and the long tradition of Quranic hermeneutics...where as so many of the ‘fundamentalist’ movements simply pull out a verse of the Quran and give it a meaning in accordance with their goals and aims”

(Nasr : 1994 : 18)

¹⁸ Though many would contest their educational qualifications in being attributed the title.
This last approach embodies the idea that all that is needed to become authoritative is a working knowledge of the Qur'an, a selective reading of some works on Hadīth and the internalization of the conceptual ideal of the "true" Islam’ (El Fadl : 2001 : 8).

Frequent misunderstandings occur when ‘fundamentalists’ are perceived as ‘traditionalists’, evidenced in the Dutch report cited above and cause considerable confusion, wherein ‘liberal reformists’ (read modernists) are positioned against ‘traditionalists’, (‘fundamentalists’). Some of this confusion is bound up with the garb and the speech of some ‘fundamentalists’ linking them to the traditions of the Muslim past, whereas in actual fact, the opposite may be the case, as ‘….the term also gives the impression that ‘fundamentalists’ are conservative and wedded to the past, whereas their ideas are essentially modern and highly innovative.

‘…..fundamentalists are not impractical dreamers. They have absorbed the pragmatic rationalism of modernity and under the guidance of their charismatic leaders, they refine these ‘fundamentals’ so as to create an ideology that provides the faithful with a plan of action.

(Armstrong : 2000 : xi)

It is impossible to discuss fundamentalism without referring to the inherent anger manifested by fundamentalists occasioned by what they see as harmful innovation (bi’da) stemming from the classical position on one hand and the secular reformist modernists on the other, linking these with economic, social and religious subjugation, often resulting in violent confrontation. Armstrong believes these to be

‘….embattled forms of spirituality, which have emerged as a response to a perceived crisis. They are engaged in a conflict with enemies whose secularist policies and beliefs seem inimical to religion itself. Fundamentalists do not regard this battle as a conventional political struggle, but experience it as a cosmic war between the forces of good and evil. They fear annihilation, and try to fortify their
beleaguered identity by means of a selective retrieval of certain doctrines and practices of the past.

(Armstrong : 2000: xi)

Within Muslim terms, Winkel (1997) perceives such extremists or fundamentalists as having roots which hark back historically to an early tribe of Bedouin known as the *Khawārij* (those who depart), who soon after the death of the Prophet adopted strict and literal interpretation of Islam. One famous tenet of theirs was the idea that sinning against the *shari’a* rendered one an unbeliever eternally and could be executed. Though there is no inference of this being the attitude adopted by contemporary ‘fundamentalists’. Nevertheless, the *Khawārij* were dogmatic, literal and extreme (Rahman : 1979) and this relates to the mindset of contemporary ‘fundamentalist’ movements such as the *Wahhābiya* and *Salafiya*. Winkel sees *Khawārijite* tendencies in the *Wahhābist* Saudi government’s destruction of the tombs of the Companions, *(Jannat al Baqi)* in 1925 in fear of the danger that people might began to pray to the dead instead of orientating themselves to God. According to Winkel (1997) one contemporary characteristic of this group is their ability to;

…..create clear lines of battle, quickly and surely defining its enemies, (Jews, tradition bound Muslims, Americans) seeks rapid development and success (throwing derision at the traditional responses of *sabr* [patience] and the other worldliness of Sufis) and mocks the sacred, whether in art, attire, housing or occupation.’

(Winkel :1997 : 16)

Winkel distinguishes the *Khawārij* voice as having greater contemporary influence due to its sensationalist anti western stance and more will be discussed in terms of the effect of the *Khawārij* in Muslim intellectual history later in this thesis. The only major exception to the overarching critique of all things western

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19 The *Khawārij* were a group of puritanical literalists that emerged in the earlier history of Islam. We will be examining them in greater detail later.
is science and technology; which presumably can be ‘Islamiziced’ (al-Faruqi : 1982). What manifests is an insecure religious identity based on difference and opposition to others of differing views, however slight, both within the Muslim world and non-Muslim world. Winkel prefers the title ‘technists’ as opposed to ‘fundamentalists’ believing that any practising Muslim believes in the fundamentals of their faith and can be therefore labelled as such without negative connotations. He defines the technists as those who believe that Muslim decline is due to an application of faulty technique. Should they apply the right technique; and here Winkel provides examples, such as a hijāb law or hudūd ordinances (legal punishment or penalty – as seen in Pakistan), this would then allow the kind of societal success that is seen in the western world.

Winkel perceives the epitome of the technists approach to be the perception of the Qur’an as a constitution, robbing it of its richness and profundity into a ‘tremendously uni-dimensional and flat document’ (1997 : 18). He believes that the vast majority of ordinary Muslims functioning outside the Khawārij technist paradigm seem to have given over to an assumed notion of the technists as having a monopoly on scriptural rectitude and moral correctness by their having co-opted the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadīth with confusing results;

Well meaning Muslims, Sufis and spiritualists, lay and non academically trained Muslims alike, tend to accept the technist arrogation of the texts without challenge. Believing themselves bereft of hadīth and the Quran, they forsake the text and search elsewhere for solutions to problems facing their communities.

(Winkel : 1997 : 18 – 19)

Winkel recounts his own experience of having acquiesced to the notion of the technists holding an interpretative dominion over the texts and that the only option
left for well meaning Muslims was to reach beyond these to recapture an ethical Islam outside of the texts perhaps from things like architecture and other cultural manifestations. Nevertheless, in researching the matter further and challenging the technists over the text he discovered that the Islam engendered by them was at odds with ‘a dozen centuries of scholarship’. Indeed, the classical understanding of Islam was manifested in traditional architecture, languages and poetry but there appeared to be a misappropriation of the historical positions of the champions of the technists, namely ibn-Taymiyyah and ibn-Hanbal. As Winkel says, ‘My study of these thinkers leads me to believe that they completely rejected all manifestations of this Khawārij tendency’ (Winkel: 1997: 19).

Reformist Secular Modernists

Muslim political leaders adopted western modes on the assumption that they had successfully led to establishing European nations as world powers. In this manner a rational, empirical mindset was attempted particularly through establishing reform in educational curricula and the scientific, military and economic arenas. Kemal Ataturk of Turkey and Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser of Egypt would be good examples of this.

Reformist secularism in the Muslim world is understood to originate from a humanizing of the Prophet as opposed to that of the cosmically spiritual figure attributed to classical modes such as the ‘Perfect Man’ as evoked by Ibn ‘Arabi and al-Jīlī (1983). This evolved from thinking based mainly on interpretations stemming back to ideas attributed to Shah Wali Allah (1703 – 1762) of India, (emphatically not secularist) occurring in the light of a declining Mughal empire and an attendant breakdown of Muslim society (Schimmel: 1985). The Prophet was perceived more in
the role of progressive social and political reformer eventually leading, sometime during the early 1960s, to Gamal Abdul Nasser referring to the Prophet as the ‘imam of socialism’ (Schimmel : 1985 : 237). In this we can see the Prophet perceived in a more rational and political light, far from the numinous ‘irrationalities’ of mysticism. Another seminal influence was that of the previously mentioned Muhammad ‘Abdu of Egypt (1849-1905) though he would probably not have seen himself as a secularist. Some of ‘Abduh’s main contentions were that Muslims should not be subserviently reliant on the classical commentaries interpreting canonical texts but they should use personal reasoning and rationality to arrive at their own conclusions. He was particularly opposed to Sufism, especially popular Sufism, as superstitious and holding back the overall progress of the Muslims. ‘Abdu considered European culture as exhibiting admirable qualities based on the capabilities of its citizens to make independent and reasoned choice whereas the majority of Muslims were backward with very little understanding of their own religion; nor did he subscribe to the principle of the authority of the Sunna. Together these ideas combine to establish later attitudes and concepts of the Prophet’s importance lying solely in the religious realm and decidedly not in the political sphere. This was an idea particularly identified with the several key figures such as the Oxford graduate and Al Azhari scholar and student of Muhammad ‘Abdu ; Ali’Abd al-Rizaq (1888 – 1966) sometimes known as the ‘father of Islamic secularism’ who argued that the Prophet neither wished to engage in the political nor did his Divine mission encompass politics (Tagelsir Ali : 2009; Kassab : 2009).

Even while they deny the authority of the Prophet in specific details, the secularists implicitly recognize the general authority of the Prophetic example. Furthermore, they justify their own position by invoking the example of
the Prophet, arguing, in effect, that secularism is a valid model because Muhammad himself was a good secularist.

(Brown : 1996 : 67)

Winkel’s (1997) depiction of what he calls the batiniyyah, connected to the word batin (inward) as in ‘people of the inward’ refers to those that deny the outward aspects of Islam and may well fit under this Reformist Secular category in that it refers presently to some intellectuals and academics types who interpret the sacred texts entirely in symbolic and philosophical terms. While they adhere to a notion of Islam there is no expression of this in the outwardly. Also possibly to be included under this category could be the ibahiyyah, (Winkel : 1997) who attempt to argue for liberalization of or the permissibility of things that are considered to come under the haram (forbidden). An example of this might be seen in the argument of the permissibility of eating pork as in the modern age as there is now refrigeration or the argument that alcohol is not literally forbidden in the Qur’an.

One defining characteristic of this movement was the self-conscious adoption of ‘modern’ values – that is, values that authors explicitly associated with the modern world, especially rationality, science, constitutionalism, and certain forms of human equality. Thus this movement was not simply ‘modern’ (a feature of modernity) but also ‘modernist’ (a proponent of modernity).

(Kurzman : 2003 : 32)

Areas of contention and confusion between Classical and Modernist Perspectives

Some general areas of contention and theological controversy have been referred to already but are analysed more thoroughly in what follows. These disagreements can be said to be centred around three basic issues (Brown :1996) and yet each of these have implications beyond the initial premise :

a) Anthroporhism within ‘aqīdah (doctrine)
This concerns whether or not Allah assumes some manner of form or body existent in space and time. This dispute arises through various *ayats* where the hand of Allah or the face of Allah is mentioned. The aforementioned medieval reformer, ibn-Taymiyya (1263-1328) held a particular interpretation of *Hanbalī* thought, (one of the four schools of thought in Sunni Islam) which has been frequently been misunderstood as anthropomorphic by his allegedly upholding that if Allah used such terminology in the Qur’an, then therefore He has a hand and face, etc. or moves in space and time through things like descending to the lower heavens in the latter part of the night, according to one well known Hadīth. Ibn-Taymiyyah’s expression of these views has created a considerable polemic between the classical and modernist positions even up to this day. However, there seems to be some misunderstanding of his position, as his written work seems to suggest a middle way reflecting the position of the early community, (ibn-Taymiyyah : 1996; Michot : 2006 & 2007). This can be summed up as seeking neither rationalization nor engaging in speculation as to the meaning of ‘hand’ in terms of the Divine. At the same time this does not reject the perceptible meaning of ‘hand’, nor attribute symbolic meaning to it; all of which comprises an attitude known as the *mufawwidāh* or ‘non-committal’ in wanting or needing to know more beyond what is given in the Qur’an. Furthermore, in refuting the accusation that the *Hanbalī* position, (the *madhhab* which ibn Taymiyyah followed) justifies anthropomorphism, the classical scholar Nuh Ha Mim Keller recounts the questioning of Imam Ahmed Hanbal, (a renowned imam, after whom one of the four schools of
thought) concerning this: ‘Imam Ahmad was asked about the Hadīth mentioning "Allah’s descending," "seeing Allah," and "placing His foot on hell"; and the like, and he replied: "We believe in them and consider them true, without ‘how’ and without ‘meaning’ (bi la kayfā wa la ma’nā)’ (Keller : 1995b) which is distinct from anthropomorphism. Despite Hanbālī jurisprudence being part of the classical canon, the majority of traditional ‘aqīdah (doctrinal creed) positions from the classical school is that these were allegorical and figurative (ta’wil) references rather than literal ones so that there is some variance within the schools of thought with the Mālikī position closer to that of the Hanbālī.

Furthermore, Michot (2006) makes a highly credible argument that ibn-Taymiyyah has been wrongly accused by past and present classical scholars and non-Muslim commentators as anthropomorphic in outlook, anti-Sufi and anti-madhhab, whilst on the other hand wrongly appropriated by extremists to argue their cause for advocating violence. Muslims of other persuasions frequently and mistakenly identify ibn-Taymiyyah (and by extension the Wahhābiya and Salafiyya) with anthropomorphism. Yet the Wahhābiya and Salafiyya wrongly use and over emphasise aspects of ibn-Taymiyyah for critiquing the classical taqlīd, the madhāhib and the Sufi positions (Rahman : 1979; Keller : 1994). Confusingly for many, there is irrefutable evidence that many famous Hanbālī scholars were indeed Sufis, including ibn-Taymiyya, who was in the Qādirīyya Order. Vice versa, the renowned Sheikh of that order, Sheikh Abdul Qādir al Jilani was himself of the Hanbālī madhhab (Makdisi : 1973). This will be surprising to some, as the Hanbālī
madhhab is usually associated with the more puritan stance, probably in relation to its being associated with Saudi Arabian culture and politics and the Salafī and Wahhābi elements.

The hostility to many Sufi ideals and practices of the Wahhabi sect, in which Hanbalism survives in the modern world, may have encouraged the view that Hanbali traditionalism were intrinsically hostile. […] But in fact there has never been any widespread and categorical rupture between traditionalism and Sufi mysticism, and by the Middle period many prominent Hanbalis were themselves initiated into Sufi chains of authority. (Berkey : 2003 : 236)

The principles embodied in the traditionalism of Hanbalīsm have many shared characteristics with Mālikīsm and the evident link between classic traditionalism, especially in the aspect of mufawwidah20 and Sufism present in both of these schools of thought is something that will be explored further later in this work.

b) The madhāhib (schools of thought).

The four schools of thought; the Mālikī, Hanbalī, Shāfī’ī and Hanafī schools of thought named after famous earlier scholars has been an essential element of the traditional canon of Islamic jurisprudence. They do not constitute fissures within the Muslim nation. However, modernists and reformists question the need for such schools of thought seeing them at best as an irrelevance and at worst a sinful innovation (Rahman : 1979; Keller : 1995a), in arguing that each Muslim must interpret the word of God and the words and acts of the Prophet for themselves. On the surface a plausible argument and yet the classical response is that the body of

20 The position of not questioning further beyond that which is stated.
knowledge and the complexity of everyday life is too vast to allow for simple deductions to be made by the unversed and that great confusion would arise as a result which seems to be borne out through current events. The circumstances within which a verse of the Qur’ān was revealed or the factors involved in those events described by one of the Ḥadīth are complex and can only be commented upon by one who has studied these in detail over a long period of time. The interpretation may have great import with significant implications and are not likely to be accessible to the ordinary Muslim. The profounder aspects of the interpretation and its application in law requires an intensive scholarly background with the madhāhib providing this abundantly as frameworks of and for accumulated wisdom and knowledge (Coulson : 1964; Rahman : 1979; Brown : 1996). The following of a madhāhib is called taqlīd and does not necessarily imply a blind and unquestioning acceptance on the part of the individual.

c) Tawassul and wasila.

Tawwasul signifies ‘agency’, as in ‘the means to..’, ‘approach’ or ‘proximity to’ enabling one to achieve something. It refers generally to the performance of something that will bring one nearer to God (ash-Shafi : 2007; al-Yahsubi : 1991). The appeal to a person, as a means of appealing to God and entailing something like asking them to pray on your behalf is called wasila. Enormous controversy has arisen about whether it is permissible for the Prophet to be a wasila in one’s supplication to God by dint that he is no longer alive and is therefore rationally can no longer act
as an intercessor (shafi’) with God and the disputation also covers the visiting of the graves of the awliya, (the friends of God or saints) for the same purpose. Classical and well know supplications are always directed towards the Divine beginning with phrases such as, ‘…beseeching You through your Prophet’ or ‘… for the sake of your Prophet’ or ‘…by the light of your Prophet’ or in the case of saints, ‘I ask you by the grace of your saint, ….’ or something similar. All of the classical madhhāhib accept this form of supplicating the Divine, in some degree or other but always with the clear understanding that ultimately the direction of the plea is not made to the Prophet or the saint in question. However, the Salafī and Wahhābi positions on this is that it is forbidden on the basis that once a person dies they are no longer considered capable of being an intermediary with God and doing so is shirk, (attributing power other than to God) and considered the gravest of sins (Duwaish : 2012; al-Butami : 1981). The classic response to this is provided below:

As for the heinous comparison, from near or far, of Muslims making tawassul through the Prophet to the Christian worship of Jesus, or Muslims making tawassul through awliya to the Christian worship of saints, we ask Allah to reform those who make such comparison and stray so widely from the right path in their views as to forget, by ignorance or design, that Muslims are strict monotheists who worship Allah alone and use the blessings of particular acts, times, places, and persons to benefit them, not as objects of worship. If you persist in not seeing the difference between taking one as an object of worship on the one hand, and using one as a means to obtain blessings on the other, we ask Allah from protection from such misguidance, for persistence in making analogies between the doctrines of Muslims and Christians in disregard of their fundamental disparity is a characteristic of the enemies of Islam.

(al-Dimashqi cited by al-Na’man : no date)
Kabbani (1996) refers to Ibn-Taymiyyah’s ‘Treatise on Lawful Forms of Worship and Reprehensible Innovation (Risalat al ibadat al shariyya wal farq baynaha wa bayn al bid’iyya)\textsuperscript{21} wherein Ibn-Taymiyyah unambiguously states that an example of the lawful method is provided by the ‘those who follow the sufi path’.

The most distinctive feature of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s (1703-1792) reasoning at the core of the Wahhabi undertaking constituted in the idea that it is not sufficient for an individual to just affirm God’s Unicity and the Prophet as the messenger of God. Of additional, yet extreme importance is the denial of any other object of worship, which he based on a famous Hadith wherein it is stated that in denying all other than God as worthy of worship the believer is safe from harm (Commins: 2006).

Based on this rationale, Ibn Abd’ al-Wahhab sets out to describe various forms of idolatry in the renowned Book of Tawhid, (al Wahhab: 2006) including things like making a vow to another person as an act of idolatry, despite any concrete textual basis. Seeking the help of others could, in some cases, be a form of idolatry, based on a verse of the Qur’an wherein God calls upon the believers not to seek help except from Him. Al-Wahhab used further evidence to establish this from a Hadith wherein the Prophet admonished some of the companions for seeking the help of someone known as a hypocrite urging them rather to turn to God for assistance. This was extended to prohibiting asking anyone for assistance irrespective of the

\textsuperscript{21} Risalat al ibadat al shariyya wal farq baynaha wa bayn al bid’iyya, Beirut: Lajnat al-Turath al-Arabi, 5:83
nature of the request or the sincerity of need and is one of the major issues of contention against the Wahhābis. Whereas Ibn Abd al-Wahhāb reasoned that the essence of worship as ‘calling upon’ anything other than God was a major form of sin, the classical argument against this was that the intention and expectation of the individual in asking help from another human being could not be so summarily judged. If an individual calls upon another being with the understanding that ultimately they are calling upon God through the auspices of human agency then this does not constitute idolatry or something directed to other than God.

In concluding this section, the result of these conflicts has caused enormous upheaval not only in the Muslim world but globally. An interesting yet improbable solution to this religious, political and social upheaval is presented by Lumbard:

In adopting foreign theories and analytical models without fully evaluating them, both modernist and puritanical reformist (to avoid the amoeba-word "fundamentalist") Muslims have abandoned the guidance of their own intellectual heritage. But in order to be effectively assimilated into the Islamic world, such modes of thought must first be evaluated. Then what is found to be of value can be incorporated organically through a genuine intellectual and civilizational discourse, as happened in the encounter between Islam and Greek thought in the ninth and tenth centuries. When, however, one intellectual tradition is abandoned outright, there is no basis for the evaluation of another intellectual tradition and none of the fertile ground that is necessary for effective assimilation. Recovering the Islamic intellectual tradition is thus an essential, if not the essential, step to ameliorating the malaise which Muslims and non-Muslims alike have long bemoaned and decried. When this has occurred, Muslim peoples will be better prepared to engage Western civilization without surrendering to it altogether or opposing it outwardly while capitulating inwardly.

(Lumbard : 2004 : 40)
Chapter 7

Mysticism and the Iconoclasm of Islam

‘It is often simpler …. to fall back on the mechanics of religion instead of tackling the reality of being religious.’

Making Sense of Religion (Ofsted : 2007 :12)

European Counterculture and the Muslim world

Historically, the religion of Islam had provided an alternative to the pervading presence of rationalism in the Euro-American context. In order to escape the consumer-led and industrialist exactitudes of modern Western life in the 60s and 70s, many people looked towards Muslim society (and the East) to recapture a sense of the mysterious and the paradoxical, (Halman : 2006; Heelas : 1996; Johnstone :1981; Kose :1996; Maclean : 2006). In the Book of Strangers, (Dallas : 1972), the central character is depicted as one who escapes from a sterile, systematized and clinical society, into the desert Muslim lands where he encounters a basic humanity intertwined with the Divine in all aspects. Taji-Farouki describes the era;

There was a bid for liberation from the controls and limitations of institutions experienced as coercive and repressive and radical disillusionment with the ‘mainstream’ meanings and values they provided. This encompassed traditional religion, its plausibility having in any case been thrown into crisis by the undermining effects of pluralization, itself a product of the processes of modernization. In their homelessness, counterculture youth undertook of necessity a turn to the self as the only remaining source of meaning and significance. One major counterculture orientation thus found expression in a search for ways of life that nurture ‘the authentic self’. The idea of pursuing this by taking the ‘journey to the East’ indeed became so popular that the countercultural interest in Eastern traditions (religions of the ‘Orient’) was one of the most striking features of the sixties.

(Taji-Farouki : 2007 : 3)

This was not a novel phenomenon, for centuries, the Muslim world had provided a refuge for those out of step with the European status quo. Peter Lamborn Wilson’s
(2003) historical study of the European ‘Renegadoes’ between the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century, suggests many of these felt ‘abandoned and betrayed Christendom as a praxis of social resistance’ (Wilson : back cover). A significant amount of European non-conformists chose to live in the Ottoman world, which offered a viable alternative society based on meritocracy and greater social tolerance and mobility. For many people, who for one reason or another felt alienated from mainstream society and unable to keep up pretences of respectability, societal norms or religious mores, converted to Islam. Some joined North African Pirate Corsair communities of along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts to engage in a piracy of European shipping. As Wilson states, the situation in the early 17\textsuperscript{th} century was as follows:

In a broader context, Islam might have had a vague appeal for some Europeans who were simply anti-religious or at least anti clerical…..A general impression of Islam’s freedom from any authoritative priesthood or even dogma percolated into European culture or soon would do so. A line of European intellectual Islamophiles began to appear.’

(Wilson : 2003 : 20)

Interestingly, Wilson traces Nietzsche’s existentialist approach back to a tradition of free thinkers and anti-christian sentiments by route of the Enlightenment, Freemasonry and Rosicrucianism to an Islamophile tradition in Europe.

Would contemporary Islam offer the same attraction to present day non-conformists like their 16\textsuperscript{th}, 17\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} century forebears? While there is some contemporary appeal to Islam for who feel disenfranchised, this seems currently within the context of racial and social class tensions, (Bowen : 2009; Haddad : 2006; Marsh : 1984; Rambo : 1993; Wohlrab-Sahr :1999; Kose : 1996; Walker : 2005; Zebiri : 2004; Zebiri :2008) and this has been a constant source base for conversion to Islam. Nevertheless, this differs from those those covered in Wilson’s research, who were
not able to accept the basic premises of European society on an intellectual and spiritual basis. Taji Farouki, (2007) cites numerous sociological research showing the typical profile of the counter-culturalists in the 60s / 70s, who orientated themselves to the East. These were usually white, though not exclusively, educated, middle to upper middle class and as likely female as male who took ‘a turn to the self as the only remaining source of meaning and significance’ in a search for “the authentic self”, (Taji-Farouki : 2007 : 3) and from amongst this grouping, many turned to Islam.

Wohlrab-Sahr (1999) distinguishes a contemporary typology of those who converted in disassociating from their own social context in a ‘symbolic battle’. This is usually a rejection of socio-moral conventions, sub cultural behaviour and the concept of loyal citizenship in which, ‘Islam is related to a biographically relevant problem of social integration and recognition’, acted out to ‘[enable] the symbolization of maximal distance within one’s own social context’, (Wohlrab-Sahr : 1999 : 361).

Perhaps one way of differentiating between those identified by Wilson and Wohlrab-Sahr typologies could be located in distance; Wohlrab-Sahr’s typology remaining in their social context and locality but accentuating their ‘maximal distance ’ from the known and familiar. In contrast, the first type, as depicted in Wilson and Taji-Farouki, removing themselves physically and mentally from their familiar surroundings and contexts. This first typology may be also be distinguished by borrowing and adapting the Berger et al, (1974) term; ‘homeless mind’, as displaced, ‘intellectual vagrants’ who turn inward in the desire for ‘the personal encounter with the transformative sacred’, (Taji-Farouki : 2007 : 4 ). The second typology is more aligned with ‘…articulating problems of disintegration in one’s own social context.. ’, (Wohlrab-Sahr : 1999 : 361) and orientated more outwardly to the socio-moral
sphere. The first group might, as classified by Rambo (1993) have undergone a powerful transformative event; ‘Conversions are often stimulated by an extraordinary, and in some cases mystical, experience. (1993 : 48) which points to a more internal orientation. The latter group seems identified in Al-Toma and Hibell’s (2012) study of British converts as those whose motivation to convert ‘….may stem from a political rather than spiritual basis which can involve a rejection or questioning of conventional norms and standards prevailing within British society. (2012 : 33).

Perhaps over simplifying, Roy writes; ‘To convert to Islam today is a way for a European rebel to find a cause; it has little to do with theology’ (Roy cited by Bubandt : 2010 : 103). In the more recent past many of the more socially privileged Europeans became Muslim, (Hellyer : 2007), lending further argument to differentiate conversions on spiritual and intellectual grounds as opposed to moral and social disenfranchisement. Some examples of this are:

In the 18th and 19th Centuries there were a number of converts to Islam amongst the English upper classes, including Edward Montague, son of the ambassador to Turkey. Other notable conversions included Peter Lyle, the Admiral of the Tripolitanian Corsair Fleet during Nelson’s nineteen century Battle of the Nile, and Hedley Churchward, the first recorded British Muslim to perform Hajj’.

(Al Toma & Hibell : 2012 : 21)

In a rather dated but well known publication, Islam- Our Choice, (Bawany : 1992), republished by the Saudi government, (not to be mistaken with the later book of the same title – Dirks & Parlove : 2003), the personal accounts of thirty two converted European Muslims, (plus Japanese and other nationalities), circa 1900- 1930, reveal them to be invariably from the professional or aristocratic strata of society. Moreover, their accounts reveal more of the inner search or mystical experience variety than any form of social protestation. Commenting on the French publication, D'Une foi l'autre,
les conversions a l'Islam en Occident (Rocher & Cherqaoui : 1986), Winter (aka Sheikh Abdul Hakim Murad) says, ‘Their conclusions are clear. Almost all educated converts to Islam come in through the door of Islamic spirituality’ (1997). This begs the question, what changes have occurred within the Muslim world, that now attract a different type of convert motivated more by the socio-political rather than the spiritual basis that was previously the case?

**Mysticism and the Religiously Maximalist - Minimalist Dichotomy**

Those possessed of a religious persuasion commonly profess a belief in a Divine Being frequently expressed through communitarian rituals. For the sake of argument, we could say this can incorporate two different types of individual interpretation; a minimal and maximal interpretation of religion. The minimalist interpretation would incorporate an adherence to a creed or dogma related to canonical and scriptural texts. On the other hand, a maximal interpretation of religion could equally adhere to a creed or dogma yet involve a wider definition. A maximalist interpretation might involve the experiential interpretation of the religious life perhaps making links with elements not found within the perimeter of the core beliefs. This infers no negation of the beliefs, rituals or scriptures of one’s given faith nor adapting eclectic supra religious perspectives. A further formulation of the differentiation between minimalist and maximalist religious perspectives might be indicated in polarities; form vs. essence, private vs. public, mystical vs. dogmatic and the passive vs. active. A devout and committed Catholic may possess this maximalist religious perspective.

In arguing the existence of God, the religious person would most likely base this on causality, cosmological or ontological arguments, which are at centre of the metaphysical religious structures. However, the maximalist approach referred to
above might tend to move away from the metaphysical formulation of God; the posing of the ‘when and where’ of God are questions considered somewhat irrelevant. For the maximalist, bringing such questions to bear into the everyday phenomenal world could be seen the imposition of a facile dualism between theism and atheism. Whereas the minimalist perspective may be prone to the idea that a particular doctrine defines Truth, Existence, the Universe and God in exclusive and absolute terms, the maximalist view tends towards the position that exact definitions of these things are beyond precise human comprehension but are indications of a greater reality. In this latter case, the individual ascribes meaning and value to the rituals and doctrine of as a fully conscious and voluntary act of commitment rather than a duty incumbent on believers. The more rationally minded believer or atheist may require, in their different ways, more concrete evidence for faith, either insisting on there being rational evidence for the existence of God or not. On this basis, the atheists have it as evidence for the existence of God can be philosophically refuted on a variety of counts. For example, the idea of a prime mover encompassed within the Causation argument; what evidence is there that this signifies only one prime mover or that the prime mover has any other qualities other than ‘moving’? (Hollenbach : 1994). The maximalist might question the need for establishing this kind of evidence. Why do we presume that we should demand proof in the first place? In the same way that Literature may be an inadequate discipline to solve a maths equation, rational deduction may be an inadequate discipline to approach the question of God. We can see something of the nuance of this in Caputo’s explanation of Derrida’s concept of différance, in describing it as ‘formlessness’ and ‘namelessness’ (1997 : 212) retreating and resisting definition or theorization. While the general consensus of western philosophy may perceive religion as irrational, this might be more revealing.
of the limitations and prejudices of rationalist thought than anything to do with religion. Yet it would appear that since the enlightenment, religion has progressively succumbed to the primacy of the rational and as Gould (1999) suggests, it is frequently communicated in a manner contradictory to its essential nature. Within the parameters of rationality, the theological discourse is ultimately unable to match the exactitude of the rational and is thereby called into doubt. Once religion is ‘institutionalized’ by dint of rational deduction, its essential nature is lost. The categorization, codification of truth, of existence and of God – is the placing of a grid work of metaphysics upon the numinous. As Caputo says, ‘Metaphysics cannot digest movement, becoming, temporality, genuine novelty and the attempt to do so results in ridiculous logicizations’ (1987 : 18). As we have seen, over-rationalized religious doctrine can conceivably foment the human tendency of fundamentalism and puritanism and is perhaps religion at its least effective.

**Mysticism**

As with différence, mystical experience is not so easily prescribed and relates more to the ineffable and indefinable. Popularly misunderstood as something rather fanciful, it is important to define exactly what is meant by mysticism. General understanding perceives it as stemming from the past involving those who undergo supranormal experiences or able to perform extraordinary phenomenon or miracles. While Muslim modernists and reformers are severely criticism of Western scholarship on Islam, they have adopted the view of early Western orientalists in perceiving mysticism as something imported from Christianity and other religions into Islam (El-Fadl : 2001).

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22 Not to be confused with J.S. Caputo
Bertrand Russell (2007) saw mysticism as the antithesis of rationality in postulating that a mystic could not also be a rational individual. Wittgenstein says ‘It is not how things are in the world that is mystical but that it exists’ (Wittgenstein : 2002 : 88).

Misunderstandings can ensure as a result of the mystic’s heightened sensibilities, giving an acute sense of the wonder of being and existence, where ordinary things are experienced as extraordinary things, which to the outsider appears strange and illogical. This is corroborated in the following description of the mystical state:

…concerning touch they feel extreme delight, at times so intense that all the bones and marrow rejoice, flourish and bathe in it. [...] The experience is common with spiritual persons. It is an overflow from the affection and devotion of the sensible spirit, which each person receives in their own way’

(John of the Cross cited by Welsh : 1996 : 125)

The sensationalism of claiming such things as bi-location, levitation, speaking with the dead, visions, healing by touch and other unexplainable phenomena has tended to obscure an inherent earthiness in the message of much of what the genuine mystics have had to say. On the other hand, it is important not to discount such phenomena. If there is a God, an encounter with the Divine must be overwhelming and what is communicated will not be mundane. However, it is important not to dwell on these experiences, they are essentially secondary and can detract from the essential. Instead of seeing the mystics as a privileged group accorded experiences that ordinary people do not have, we should veer more toward seeing them as ‘clarifiers of what it means to be human’ (Welsh : 1996 : 123). In speaking of both Pamuk and Soroush, dealt with previously in Chapter One, Heyking (2006) understands them both to relate to ‘…..mysticism, not as an escape…..but as a means of recapturing a more authentic experience of reality characterized by existential openness’ (p76). Another characteristic of mysticism to be considered is that of ‘earthiness’, something which Klein (1967 : 13) identifies in the mysticism of the Prophet Muhammad and those
that followed after him. There are elements of bawdiness to be seen in Jalaluddin Rumi’s *Mathnawi* (1983) and mystical love for God masquerading as profane love and drinking of wine and drunkenness to denote spiritual states such as those which appear in the poems of al-Khayyam (d.1131) (Fitzgerald : 1997), or Abu Madayn al-Ghawth, (d.1179; Cornell : 1996), al- Shushtari (d.1253; Elinson : 2011), all of whom are renowned Muslim mystics; to name but a few. Other mystical attributes in the Prophetic practice were asceticism, devotional exercises and a rationale for mystical states.

Both Heidegger and Derrida engaged with the thought of Meister Eckhardt, a primary figure of Christian mysticism, clearly recognising him as possessing an uncommon insight into the nature of things. Heidegger expressed the view that genuine mystics could be ‘astoundingly clear’ and expound views characterized by ‘extreme sharpness and depth of thought’ (1996 : 39). In further contrast to the nebulous concept of mysticism commonly held, it can also refer to a more grounded idea of that which can be claimed as an experience of ‘communion with Ultimate Reality’ (Steindl-Rast : 1989: 36; Rahner : 2010) appearing as something that many human beings who might never claim themselves as mystics can undergo at some point or other in their lives (Steindl-Rast : 1989; Maslow : 2004; Harmless : 2008; Rahner : 2010). Tensions between such experiences and institutionalized religion can be fraught nonetheless, the relationship is close and inevitable.

If the religious pursuit is essentially the human quest for meaning, then these most meaningful moments of human existence must certainly be called “religious”. They are, in fact, quickly recognised as the very heart of religion, especially by those people who have the good fortune of feeling at home in a religious tradition. And yet, the body of religion doesn’t always accept its heart. This can happen in any religious tradition, Eastern or Western. To the established religion, after all, mysticism is suspect. The established religion asks:
Why is there a need for absorption in the Cloud of Unknowing when we have spelled out everything so clearly?  

(Steindl-Rast : 1989 :11)

Almost all religions seem to originate in the mystical experience of its founder and with the passing of time, a set of beliefs are built around this experiences; resulting eventually in mundaneizing the ineffable. As Steindl-Rast says ‘There is no religious doctrine that could not ultimately be traced back to its roots in mystical experience’ (1989 : 11) and ‘The same plot is acted out repeatedly on the stage of history: every religion seems to begin with mysticism and end up in politics’. Breaking this down, the mystical experience occurs, upon which the intellect steps in to interpret what has occurred which is the beginning of doctrine. The intellect swoops in on the initial experience in the human compulsion to interpret and understand and formulations are made. Even the inclination to try to avoid naming or classifying the experience remains an intellectualization of the experience and leads to a doctrine. As time passes, further intellectual accretions accumulate upon the earlier formulations, slowly detracting from the initial experience and the numinous begins to concretize. Similarly, the early ethical formulations, translating the primal mystical experience into everyday actions, also become codified through the perhaps mistaken desire to adhere to the original experience, yet slowly become incapable of changing to new circumstances. As for the ritual aspect, the same sort of atrophying occurs through the desire to conserve and perfect the meaning of the earliest rituals derived from the primary mystical event and as a result people become more attached to the form of the ritual than the essence. In addition, ever narrowing circles of differentiation are created between those who are seen to adhere to ever narrowing definitions of what the original teachings signify and those who do not, whereas in reality the original experience points to the universal. All of these together, result in historically
fashioned dogmatisms, legalisms and ritualisms that become progressively removed from the primal and initial experience and eventually rendering the religious as irreligious. However, religion can also serve to facilitate a two way process from the primordial initial experience to its application in the present through the acceptance of the mystical. The mystics have frequently served to point a way back by rupturing through the skein of doctrine and ritual; yet without negating it, to point the way back to the original effusive experience indicating and encompassing an authentic knowledge beyond theoretical ‘book’ cognizance and a love encompassing all things.

In discussing mysticism within the Abrahamic traditions Idel & McGinn (1996) express the view that:

…mystics constantly break through existing theological theories in order to stress the unity of love and cognition ... Gregory the Great’s ‘amor ipse notitia (‘love itself is knowledge’) provided Western contemplatives with a basis for affirming again and again that the highest love includes supreme knowledge ... We detect a similar favoring of love among Muslim mystics.

(Idel & Ginn :1996 : 22)

The accumulated accretions of dogma can manifest outwardly in stultifying social structures and institutions. While there may be a need for structures or institutions, it is when such structures become ends in themselves that the tradition is ultimately betrayed. Such structures require the ability to transcend themselves and as Steindl-Rast says real faith involves letting go ‘of institutional structures and so [finding] them on a higher level – again and again’ (1989 :14). As Gallagher says, ‘The continued existence of tradition depends upon learning and interpreting processes. Traditions live only to the extent that they play themselves out in such situations, only to the extent that they are transcended and appropriated in this interchange which questions and transforms them’ (Gallagher : 1992 : 168).
There are means and ways of reconnecting back to the primal effusion or heart of religion. One of these has been through the presence of people who have seemingly reconnected with the immediacy of the initial mystical experience, adhering to the outward forms of the religion but not slavishly bound to them. These are processes and indications rather than ends in themselves and the existential choice before each believer is to reconnect to the mysticism at the heart of their tradition, focusing on the ‘becoming’ rather than occupying a formulated ‘being’, in short, a journey towards authenticity. Inauthenticity could occur when Islam is seen as identifying a category of people and occupying a sociological identity, at the expense of a more authentic appropriation of it as a process of ‘becoming’ through the primal and mystical experience of the Prophet. The basic formula of the Islamic creed La illaha ila llah\(^{23}\) is an assertion made about the reality of existence and not an exclusive historical assertion.

From the maximalist and mystically religious perspective, theism as represented in cosmological or ontological arguments are inadequate approaches to the question of God. Arguments proving the existence of God can be philosophically dismissed and this indicates nothing more than that this may not be the means of approaching the question. Equally, a theological discourse housed rationality is ultimately unable to match the exactitude of rational scientific discourse and thus calls it into doubt. Rational religion taken to the extreme foments the human tendency towards fundamentalism and puritanism - anathema to the mystics and is perhaps religion at its least effective.

\(^{23}\) ‘There is no god but the God’. This will be discussed at length later.
One of the challenges to traditional religious thought lies in that which has evolved out of the methodology of Cartesian doubt. In relation to the question of God – Descartes’ theory inadvertently suggests a greater enablement of an easier human appropriation of the Divine; effectively a mundanization of God with a lesser and considerably restricted role. A bifurcation in human conception has developed between God and creation through the ramifications of Cartesian subject / object divide. The subject – object duality has deeply pervaded Western thought and values by separating human intellect from the individual’s existence, hence perhaps separating the human from the Divine. Hence the usual critique of the res cognitans is that in solidifying the concept of ego, this has posited the ego as a central vantage point in connection with the world and existence generally (Nishtani : 1982).

**Esotericism**

As with mysticism there is confusion over the definition of esotericism. Again, like mysticism, it too refers to non-rational and experiential aspects of religious experience. The esoteric ranges from Occultism, Hermeticism, alchemy, Rosicrucianism, magic, Gnosticism, Kabbalah and Freemasonry and various other secret societies, generally favouring the ‘mythical/symbolic over discursive forms of expression’ (Hanegraaff : 1999 : 226). Esotericism differentiates between the outer (exoteric) as opposed to the inner (esoterism) and as Alice Bailey describes it, is: ‘the science of the inner soul of all things’ and ‘the meaning which is to be found behind all individual, community, national and world affairs’ (Bailey : 2006 : 38). It lays claim to accessing hidden, underlying, yet essentialist, core universal theories behind all worldly phenomena. Inaccessible to the average person, esotericism can be said to be the inner search for universal theories and metaphysical system building and run
counter to the existentialist themes presented thus far in this work. Esotericists frequently lay claim to a primacy of knowledge transcending all other knowledge by its inherently transcendent nature – the mysterious key to all things. In the religionist sense, the esotericists claim ascendancy over the exoteric in its advocacy of religious syncretism, narrowing the focus of its analysis to that which is allegedly common to all religions. Alice Bailey (1880 – 1949), a prominent esotericist, describes it thus;

…. the emphasis upon the world of energies and to recognise that behind all happenings in the world of phenomena (and by that I mean the three worlds of human evolution) exists the world of energies; these are of the greatest diversity and complexity, but all of them move and work under the Law of Cause and Effect.

(Bailey : 2006 : 1)

However, a critique of the esoteric shows some basic flaws, as it functions within the terms of its own reference; in the ‘principle of [its own] reason’. mainly centred around the idea. Perhaps even more poignantly, despite this grounding, esotericism remains firmly within a traditional metaphysical system, thoroughly rationalist and therefore seemingly at odds with a mode of thinking that claims to transcend the rational. Esotericism falls prey to an unquestioning adherence to the semantic basis of their mode of thinking (i.e., ‘inner truth’, ‘outer’, ‘sophia perennis’, ‘syncretism’) as self evidently true with no further underlying rationale. Some of contradiction is manifest in the following passage from Fritjof Schuon (1907 – 1998) a well-known perennial esotericist:

..the exoteric point of view cannot comprehend the transcendence of the Supreme Divine Impersonality of which God is the personal Affirmation; such truths are of too high an order and therefore too subtle and too complex from the point of view of simple rational understanding.

(Schuon : 1984 : 38)
Conflicting truth claims of religions are deemed details of little importance. When the esotericist looks at Islam, they see a general theory, rather than its ‘particular and immediate’ praxis and specificity, yet regard theory as ‘timeless and universal’ despite Islam claiming that. We may begin to recognise similar fault lines in the historical development of thought in the Muslim Western and Eastern lands - perhaps pointing to a link between Eastern speculative thought and ‘speculative mysticism’. The authentic path proposed here, does not recognise a separate inward way (Sufism) diametrically opposed to an outward one (shar’ia), for they have been classically seen as two sides of a coin, neither claiming primacy over the other.24 It is useful to remember the assertion that Maghrebean Islam is ‘more earthy than esoterically mystical’ yet ‘indistinguishable from Sufism’ (Wilson : 2003 : 175).

Any encounter with God in the Muslim sense plays out through God’s omnipresence, by means of either tanzih (transcendence) and / or tashbih (immanence), in other words as impersonally personal or personally impersonal. In this manner, there are no separate inner or outer realities for they are integral to each other. ‘The existence of a man who meets with that reality must not be thought of simply as “internally” personal existence’ (Nishatani : 1982 : 41). Not much more will be said about this beyond quoting the words of Sidi Ali Jamal (d.1779), the sheikh of Moulay ad-Darqawi, (1760 – 1823) who said : ‘The faqir will not obtain the fruit of knowledge until the shari’ah [outward] and his reality [haqā’iq – reality – the inward] are one thing (al-Jamal : 1977 : 246).

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24 This has direct correlation to the controversy involved in the introduction of al-Ghāzali’s books into al-Andalus and their subsequent burning.
Summary

In this Chapter, an account of Islam has been given as historically providing refuge to Westerners seeking alternatives and contrasted with the current situation. The idea of religion inherently possessing a counter challenge to the monolithic, lying within their mystical origins, has also been discussed. The chapter ends on making a clear distinction between esotericism and mysticism. In all this, it is hoped that the presence of inauthenticity within the religious realm has been recognised through identifying its interrelation with reification, modernism and rationalism and shown to be diametrically opposite to genuine mysticism.
Chapter 8

A Brief History of Rationalism in the Muslim Context

Building further upon the effects of rationalism covered in previous chapters, it is proposed here to undertake a critical and historical review of Muslim thought. This is carried out in order to trace some of the inevitable accrued formulations and distance from the original and mystical Prophetic experience in the cave of Hira, a phenomenon discussed in the last chapter.

After the death of the Prophet, one of the most significant events for the Muslim community lie in the effects ensuing from the Battle of Siffin in 648 (CE) with lasting consequences to this day. After the Prophet Muhammad’s death (632 CE) the question of succession arose; which resulted some thirty years later in the assassination of the third and fourth caliphs, Uthman Ibn ‘Affan in 656 and Ali ibn Talib in 661 and war and dissension. At Siffin two opposing armies supporting rival claims of succession, one side led by Ali ibn-Abu Talib, (599 - 661), the son in law of the Prophet and on the other, Muʿāwiya the Ist, (602 - 680) who was Governor of Damascus and the cousin of the recently assassinated Uthman and who felt that he was the rightful successor to the position of Caliph. As a result of this, Ali ibn-Abu Talib had dismissed Muʿāwiya who consequently refused to step down. Ali ibn-Abu Talib’s army was in a strong strategical position to defeat Muʿāwiyah and when the two armies faced each other poised for attack. In a tactic presumably designed to delay the inevitable, Muʿāwiyah called for adjudication in the matter of the succession. This was agreed to and on the instigation of Ali ibn-Abu Talib, neutral arbitration was arranged with someone from either side, Abu Musa al Asha’ri and 'Amr ibn al-'As, presumably with the intention of settling the matter in a manner
conducive to the future well being of the Muslim community as a whole. However, the arbitration actually resulted in Mu‘awiyah confirmed as not only having the greater right of succession but as a result of this also causing a mutiny on the part of some in the ranks of Ali ibn-Abu Talib. The mutineers were known as the Khawārij (those who leave), and they deemed that what Ali and his chosen arbitrators had done, as not only wrong, but as having constituted a major sin in having consented to adjudication in the first place, in that it indicated some doubt in Ali’s claim to the caliphate. Not only did they arbitrarily designate this as a major sin shortly afterwards but also declared it irredeemable and incapable of being forgiven by the Divine (Rahman : 1979; al-Maghnisawi : 2007).

In justifying their separation from the main body of Muslims; the Khawārij took it upon themselves to make a series of legal opinions extending far beyond the particulars of the incident yet anchored still anchored in the original conflict. They generated complex moral and theological positions in establishing what they declared constituted ‘sin’. They also judged it the Muslim community’s right to kill anyone guilty of a major sin, political, moral or theological. A major sin indicated that through the act of sinning, the perpetrator was designated as an infidel or apostate and therefore punishable by death. Subsequently, Ali ibn Talib and the two arbitrators were judged as such eventually resulting in Ali ibn-Abu Talib’s murder at the hands of a khāwarīj assassin in 661. Furthermore, the Khawārij went on to claim that the position of caliph should be abandoned altogether but any other leading position should not be the preserve of members of the Prophet’s tribe, the Quraysh, as had been the understanding up to that point and that the position should be granted only through communal agreement. In time, some branches or mutations of the khāwarīj even abandoned the idea of any type of religious authority whatsoever, even to the
extent of the having an established Imam in the mosque, (except for any random person chosen to lead the ritual prayer) arguing that the individual is capable of reading the Qur’an on his own and required no intermediary interpretation. Other similar legal decisions were frequently attributed to the Khawārij, distinctive in being extreme and against mainstream opinion, though these might well have been incorrectly attributed. The term probably came to designate anyone considered to be taking up severe positions and not need necessarily refer to the actual group involved in the Siffin incident (Rahman : 1979; Fahkry : 1997; al-Maghnisawi : 2007). What characterized the Khawārij was a particular kind of rigid, inflexible iconoclasm with a puritanical bent and a claim of orthodoxy. An indication of this was their considering their arbitrary interpretations to be binding on upon all Muslims. If we think of certain movements such as the Wahhābiyya or Salafīyya or other modernist movements and compare this with the characteristics and self assumed orthodoxy of the Khawārij, there does seem to be some similarities. In referring to contemporary Khawārij influence, Rahman comments;

Indeed something of their radical spirit (although not overt influence) has been relived […] in relatively recent movements inspired by radical idealism such as the Wahhabis in the 12th/18th century, and, in a more moderate spirit and more recently the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Middle East […]. We shall also note, when we discuss modern movements in Islam, certain aspects of the similarity of the Kharijite ideals with certain aspects of the doctrine of the radical Islamic movement, the Jama’at-i- Islami, in Pakistan.

(Rahman : 1979 : 170)

Some of this can be seen in the refutation of the reasoning of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahab (1703 – 1792) the founder of the Wahhābi movement already mentioned previously, by his brother Suleyman ibn Abd al Wahab who was also a religious scholar. ‘At numerous points, he accused his brother of rupturing Muslim unity and in so doing, going down the same misguided path as the Khairijites of early Islamic
times’ (Commins : 2006 : 23). Elsewhere Commins comments on other scholarly critique ranged against Muhammad ibn Abd’ al-Wahhāb (1703-1792) during his time by Sulayman ibn Suhaym, (1718-1767) as being indicative of arguments used against the Wahhābi s up to this day. On the basis of the Wahhābis having declared whole towns guilty of infidelity and consequently waging jihād on them across the Arabian peninsula on the basis of their being idolaters, (though they considered themselves Muslims), ‘Ibn Suhaym accused the reformer of declaring that whoever did not agree with his position is an unbeliever and that whoever agrees with his position is a believer…’ (Commins : 2006 : 21). In fairness and in contrast to the Khawārij, there were elements of redemption in Abd’ ibn al-Wahhāb’s perspective as he did understand that many of the ‘idolaters’ mistaken beliefs were based in ignorance rather than outright rejection and insisted that those deemed as such should be invited to see the errors of their ways.

Returning to the earlier era, the Khawārij opposition to unequivocal allegiance to the family of the Prophet as sole and rightful heirs to the caliphate roused much resistance and series of counter positions arose originating in reaction to the excesses of the Khawārij (al-Maghnisawi : 2007). Reactions ranged from absolute allegiance to the family of the Prophet and bestowing martyrdom to Ali ibn-Abu Talib. Perhaps not in direct reaction but surely related; this became the oppositional response of the Shi‘ah to the extent that the caliph or Imam was not only the political and spiritual leader but the infallible interpreter of the Qur’an, particularly its hidden meanings. Other positions ranged against the Khawārij were those of the Murji‘ah who established a different dispositional stance; īmān (faith) as consisting of a knowledge of God and

25 The khawārij are also referred to as the Kharijites
submitting to his will but bearing love for the Divine (Fakhry : 1997). In direct opposition with the Khawārij, they believed that disobedience; any minor or major sin, did not automatically entail disbelief in God that thrust one into kufr, (rejection of the Divine). For the Mujir’ite the question of Īmān (faith, belief) ‘was entirely a matter of inner assent; (Al Sharastani Abd al Karim cited by Fakhry : 1997 : 16) as opposed to outer practice and ‘the true believer is admitted to Paradise by virtue of his sincerity and love, rather than his action or obedience’ (Fakhry : 1997 : 13). The matter of the individual’s sin should be left to the Divine Mercy and much of oppositional reaction roused against the Khawārij was centred around the question of individual responsibility in regard to sin. The Khawārij insisted on the fact that human beings had freewill, for they could not accept the idea that God would be the cause of someone instigating a bad act. Hence, the consequences of the Khawārij conflict at Siffin resulted in the first and earliest known debates between intellectual ‘camps’ that arose in the Muslim world, setting off a series of other controversies still evolving to this present day. The first of these was between the Qadaris and the Jabariyyah. The Qadaris26 who proposed the question of free will and are often associated with the revered Hassan al Basri (d.728) and posited the argument that the individual was a free agent and should be held responsible for their own actions. The jabariyyah argued for strict predestination and were also known as the Mujbirah (Determinists) headed by Jahm ibn Safwan (d.745) and his adherents (al-Maghnisawi : 2007). They argued that all power stemmed from God and that no human had within them the agency of freewill. ‘Starting from the Koranic premise that God was Omnipotent, the determinists (al-Mujbirah) asserted that man is incapable of any activity, since he is already fully determined (majbūr) in his actions, which are wholly

26 Also know as the Qādirīyya but should be mistaken for the Sufi order by the same name.
created by God’ (Fahkry: 1994a: 36). God could not be spoken of or described in the same terms that human acts are described (as in verbs) and that to do so was delineating the indefinable and committing the sin of anthropomorphism. On the other hand, when describing human actions – a priori powerless without God – a figurative form of speech was necessary in everyday conversation which nonetheless incorrectly attributed the action to the individual, whereas in reality these were determined Divinely. These opposing arguments of the Qadaris and jabris became the basis of many ensuing theological debates within the Muslim world and can be traced back to the Khawārij controversy. However, it is important not to equate the position of the mujbirah (the jabris) with the zealousness of the Khawārij. Additionally, such opinions and standpoints were utilized in the application of political power and authority. Theories established by intellectual debate had political implications as exemplified by the ruling Ummayads (661 – 750) who officially assumed the theological position that all matters were predestined by God, (the jabbari position). The implications being that people in authority were not directly responsible for any actions they took, as would be the case of ordering cruel punishments and torture (Saeed & Saeed: 2004; Fakhry: 1997). Any reprehensibility was secondary and all guilt removed, as what had occurred had been meant to occur and ordained so by God, perhaps furnishing early examples of ‘the irrationality of the rational’. In addition to this, the Ummayads claimed this to have been the traditional view of the salaf (the righteous ancestors – first Muslim community). These claims were challenged by the Qadaris and subsequently officially sanctioned reprisals were taken against them. It is indicative that the allegations made against them centred on the

27 Not necessarily to be confused with the modern movement known as the salafis though the claim of this movement is associated with the idea of being in line with the first Muslim community.
Qādirīs having been corrupted by Greek philosophy and Christian theology, for Islam had now come into contact with the knowledge and practice of Ancient Greece.

The Beginning and Development of Speculative Philosophy and Structured Theology within Islam

While the intellectual positions and movements mentioned above had based themselves around particular questions arising out of the excesses of the Khawārij they did not initially form any overarching paradigms of Muslim interpretation. The main juridical tenets, (fiqh) had remained constant and unaffected by such conflicts and the juridical has to be distinguished from the more theological though of course there are clear overlaps and the development of this will be dealt with later. Yet with the passing of time more evolved general theological positions moved in on the juridical praxis of the everyday of ordinary Muslims becoming entrenched around the central themes of sin, responsibility and free will. More evolved and detailed arguments were developed and expanded to fortify the premises of respective intellectual stances, which had implications beyond the immediate debate. For example, the interpretation of Qur’an was central to these arguments and used as both rationale and stimulus for further questions requiring different, more evolved, sophisticated, intellectual approaches and methodologies, all of which went into forging the beginnings of a more speculative and structured theology. There was also considerable dissension around the question of ta’wil, a method of interpretation of the above mentioned mutāshabīhāt verses of the Qur’an. Ta’wil involves the idea that such verses must concur with reason thus maintaining the independence of reason in regard to revelation. This whole of this type of discourse became known as kalām, literally meaning ‘speech’ and was something that expanded theology beyond praxis and basic creed. This is not to be confused with what the Mutakallimūn that
eventually formed itself sometime later in the mid tenth century and also referred to
as kalām (Haleem : 1996). Presumably kalām refers to the ‘speech or words of God’
and theology became the subject which deliberates upon the meaning of God’s words;
to be contrasted with the simple yet profound belief system of the original Muslim
community. It is both inconceivable and evident that the early community did not
engage in the type of discourse characteristic of these Muslim intellectual movements
and schools. Equally, inconceivable is that such an original discourse could be
maintained in light of a nascent Muslim society encountering different cultural and
social circumstances that required establishing certain guiding principles to maintain
some coherent unity

As with the word kalām, the Greek ‘logos’ also means signifies ‘word’ with related
meanings; as in the word ‘logical’ or ‘theology’ signifying ‘the word of God’, both
derived from this. Accordingly, kalām refers to a method of discursive philosophy
employed by the Muslims with the object of arriving at an ultimate truth; a dialectic
method adapted from the Greeks, used to arrive at a greater understanding of the truth
in the Qur’an. Given the central role of the Qur’an as the primary source of truth, a
more methodological approach to understanding the text emerged in which two
specific categorizes were initially made concerning verses in aiding interpretation.
One of these categories was known as mukhama and which has its root in the word
uhkima meaning deciding between two things, equally related to a series of words
invariably to do with judgements and wisdom. The mukhama verses are those, which
refer to very clear decisive issues, mainly legal rulings but also clear elucidation
between truth and falsehood.28 Other Qur’anic verses were identified which do not set

28 An example of the Mukhama: ‘O you who believe! When you deal with each other in transactions
out clear delineations of interaction in social, commercial, governance or religious observance and are more open to varied interpretation. Even the muḥāṣṣir’s (exegete’s) background knowledge of the event and circumstances of the verses did not always simplify or aid interpretation. Such verses are named by the Qur’an itself as *mutāshabihāt* (ambiguous), which is derived from the word *ishtābahā* denoting ‘uncertain’ things. Such verses were given this category when it seemed that the meaning was neither clear cut or easily agreed. When considering both the readiness of the *Khawārij*, and it must be said, the general human propensity, to insist on one unassailable interpretation, then it is clear that much claiming and counter claiming would occur. Thus by the 7th century (CE) there were any number of interpretations of various *mutāshabihāt* verses, which were endlessly expounded upon, refuted and debated (Rahman : 1979) and these differences evolved into various intellectual camps with strongly delineated forms of thought. These were not constrained only to internal Muslim dialectics for Muslims were now encountering Christian and other belief systems engendering more debate with an inevitable intellectual cross pollination taking place.

While Greek philosophy was assimilated by Muslim scholars it is important to distinguish this from what is popularly known as ‘classical Athenian’ philosophy. Rather, what the Muslims encountered was that which had been inherited, sustained

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29 An example of *mutāshabihāt*: ‘It is God who created for you all that is on the earth, then turned to the heights, and fashioned them into seven heavens, and God knows all things’ (Al-Qur’an 2: 29).
and developed in the late antique world mainly by Nestorian Christians in southern Iran and Alexandria, Antioch and Khurasan (Robinson : 1996). This was especially so in Alexandria, where prior to the Muslim conquest, Greek thought had become thoroughly cosmopolitan and adapted more religious and mystical tones that had evolved considerably from the more classical mode of thought. This brand of philosophy, now referred to as Neo-platonism, merged the different classical modes of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Pythagoreanism and Stoicicism and was the integration brought about through the teaching of Plotinus in the 3rd Century AD and later incorporated wisdom from India and the East. In a general sense, it is a theory of the world as a place of imperfect materialism and the soul as being able to rise above this world through knowledge of the transcendent God. It was only later that recourse was taken to actual Greek texts and that translations were undertaken and deliberated upon. Though prior contact with Greek thought had already occurred in the borderlands, the Muslim conquest of Alexandria in 641 was seminal in this respect as this city had maintained its reputation as a living and thriving centre for Greek science, medicine, philosophy and Hellenic Christian theology. It was this latter aspect that is understood to have profoundly influenced Muslim thought at the time and spread further east to Damascus during the Ummayyad period (661 – 750). Intellectual controversies now stemmed from a heady mixture of Muslim – Christian encounters arising out of political struggles and theological differences based around questions of the correspondence between the earthly realm and the spiritual between Muslim and Christian understanding. In this manner, the Greek philosophical tradition was adopted and developed by large segments of Eastern and Western Muslim intellectual circles in the eighth and ninth century. By the eleventh century, under the patronage of rulers like Hunayn Ibn Ishaq (d.873), major Greek
philosophical figures had been translated into Arabic (Robinson : 1996). Fakhry (1994b) is of the opinion that the Muslims did not merely copy and pass on Greek thought but actually advanced its scope further insofar as their focus started from the basic premise of the unicity of creation as emanating from God and life after death, most of which had not been the philosophical concern of the Greeks.

In logic, they not only amplified Aristotelian categories and canons in very extensive commentaries or paraphrases, but actually questioned and revised them; they also contributed significantly to the analysis of logical terms in a manner which was not equaled by any of the Greek philosophers or commentators

(Fakhry : 1997 : ix-x)

There was less interest in Greek literature or history as the Muslim focus was rather more utilitarian and the analysis tools most appreciated were reason, logic and natural science. It is crucial to consider the change of paradigm and mental outlook within the Muslim world required in appropriating philosophical methodology and is a subject that is not commented upon sufficiently.

When less emphasis is placed on the actual intellectual inheritance and more focus on the dispositional paradigm shift that it brought about other things begin to emerge. For this ‘Greek’ perspective was a novel approach insofar as it called for a critically disembodied attitude, objectively orientated towards any given question or phenomena. The Greek reflective mode was one which called upon the individual to subdue any personal interest or emotional attachments so that objective truth could be arrived at. One has to take into account what Muslim ‘beingness’ encompassed prior to this encounter. From the accounts of the Prophet and the Companions and the jahiliyya (the era of ignorance prior to the arrival of the Prophet Muhammad) we can surmise that these were a people who were largely subjective in outlook and entirely
engaged, functioning within a world of feelings and passionate action and anything but detachedly objective. But this does not infer a primitive, chaotic unreasonability or either a lack of impartiality or empathy when required. Based on classical sources, Bashier (1978) expresses the view that the term jāhiliya is all too frequently misinterpreted to refer to an obtuse barbarity whereas in fact the pre-Islamic semitic tribes possessed ideals and characteristics of karamah, an innate and natural dignity, karām, a generous nobility encompassing jud, an almost irrational generosity as exemplified by the renowned legendary figure of Hatim al-Tai 30, muruwwah, chivalry, as exemplified by the famous 7th century, Alliance of the Virtuous, (Hilf-al Fudūl) formed in pre-Islamic times in Mecca to confront injustice against travelling merchants who came to Mecca and who had little tribal associations or support in Mecca. Also najdah, signifying a readiness to come to the help of anyone oppressed even if it involved risk to the self. The term jāhiliya refers more to the ignorance of the Divine revelation of the Qur’an while the term Bedouin, literally a desert dweller but referring to anyone living nomadically in open spaces away and outside of the cities. This word has composite and seminal meanings, on the one hand, the virtuous qualities just listed above, combined with a deep rooted sense of personal freedom, while on the other, a concomitant lack of refinement and an impassioned commitment between thought and action. In the ‘Muqaddima’ of Ibn Khaldūn (1332 – 1406), a famed historical treatise and the first of a seven volume history of the world, he writes, ‘The Arab Bedouins are a wild people….Their wildness is dear to them, for it means for them freedom and independence from all authority’ (Ibn Khaldūn : 2 : 25). Expressing this bedouin mentality and counterbalancing quality equally famed Emir Abd al-Qādir (1808 – 1883) wrote :

30 A legendary 6th century figure known for his exceptional generosity and regarded as the epitome of this virtue acknowledged to this day within Arab culture.
O thou who preferrest the dull life of the town
To wide free solicitude
Dost thou despise nomadic tents
Because they are light, not heavy
Like houses of stone and lime
If only thou knewest the desert’s secret !…

(Emir Abd al-Qādir cited in Burckhardt : 1992 : 21)

This is to be contrasted with Ibn Khaldūn’s depiction of the city dweller, ‘They are used to luxury and success, and to giving in to their worldly desires. Consequently their souls are coloured by every kind of reprehensible and negative characteristic’ (Ibn Khaldūn cited in Burckhardt : 1999 : 19). However, this should not be reduced to some romantic yearning for the pristine desert life, for in contrasting and juxtaposing the idea of the nomadic with refinement and ‘culture’ of the city, they emerge as repositories of knowledge, such as spirituality, science and the arts. Conversely, nor is this to be interpreted in detriment to the nomad for ‘In order that the city may not die or inwardly decay, it must be continually nourished by the influx of nomadic elements, while contrariwise the Bedouins must share in the spiritual influence that emanates from the city’ (Burckhardt : 1992 : 24). Ibn Khaldūn’s theory is that human culture is always poised between the two extremes of civilization and nomadism and that any imbalance one way or the other resulted in either degenerative corruption (civilization) or lawlessness (nomadic). Therefore the perfect balance for human society was between the sedentary and the nomadic and Burckhardt understands this equilibrium to be central to Muslim culture, manifested in the equilibrium seen in the great classical cities of Islam, particularly evident in Fez. As for the encounter with Western civilization, ‘Only the European Renaissance, and a fortiori French rationalism, which found its expression in the French revolution, adopted completely literally the “civilization” of man as its goal’ (Burckhardt : 1992 : 23) rendering the overwhelming impetus behind the modern concept of human
development is here perceived as an imbalance. In this understanding we can begin to see the nuances of Kierkegaard’s (2008) reference to the differences between Jewish (read semitic) and Greek paradigms. Within Ibn Khaldūn’s dichotomy of the sedentary versus the anti sedentary there are nuances of Kierkegaard’s polarities between the religious and the ethical, the subjective versus the objective, passionate subjectivity and reasoned objectivity, the situational versus the universal and the present moment versus the projected future.

By the middle of the eighth century the Qadari\textsuperscript{31} movement, already mentioned above, evolved into the famous Mu’tazilah school of thought. Wasil ibn ‘Ata (d.748), a protégé of Hasan al Basri (642 – 728) is generally seen as the founder of this movement and provides an example of the punctiliousness of the debates and controversies that raged at the time and as the lingering influence of the *khawārij* controversy. Wasil ibn ‘Ata was said to have split with his teacher over the ‘major sin’ matter, wherein he believed that the sinner was neither fully Muslim, nor fully *kāfir* (disbeliever). As Wasil ibn Ata had removed himself from his own teacher or *a’tazala* (to withdraw) the adherents of this school were named the Mu’tazilah and became a prominent intellectual movement for over 250 years.

The Mu’tazilah engaged in a rational and Hellenistic form of logic and syllogism, which grew into various metaphysical dogma. An example of one of the precepts of this school of thought was based around the argument for Divine Justice and Unicity – not preordained as this would render religious obligations as meaningless as in: ‘I am not following the commandments of God because God has ordained it so’ (Fakhry

\textsuperscript{31}Again not to be confused with the Sufi Order of the same name which evolved some time later.
The Mu’tazilah position involves the understanding that Divine Justice recognises the human capability to choose between right and wrong and human beings instinctively know one from the other. A merciful God cares for his creation and would otherwise be unjust and therefore they asserted that God functions in a way which is best for his creation. It was reasoned that people are compensated for any suffering in the after life, (according to an interpretation of the Qur’an) for any suffering they may have endured whilst living. Those in opposition to the Mu’tazilah understood this as a deplorable suggestion of a reciprocal relationship between humans and the Divine (Glasse : 2001). Whereas the Mu’tazilah maintained that in some manner, there is an obligation on God’s part toward acts of goodness on the part of the individual. This was directly opposed to the Mujbirah and naqli (traditionalist) view that God was not bound by anything and that whatever is Divinely commanded is right and whatever is Divinely prohibited is wrong.

The Dichotomy of ‘Aqli and Naqli

Those of Mu’tazilah leanings of interpretation found themselves in opposition with the Mālikī and Hanbalī traditions (madhāhib [pl.] madhab [sgr]). This was a conflict between rational (‘aqli) or reasoned faith and traditional faith (naqli). It is important to differentiate the madhāhib as juridical and not theological and in broad terms to see the former as based on praxis with the latter based on the theoretical, though there is considerable overlap between the two. This form of thinking is often referred to as a ‘traditionalist’ and/ or ‘transmissionalist. However, it is of extreme importance not to understand the naqli as part of some reactive, nostalgic trend or possess or the mordancy of the Khawārij; as the madhāhib, by their very nature cannot be equated with the puritanism of the Khawārij in any manner or form. Yet the
Engagement with the Qur’an was generally on an explicit basis and interpretation was based on the classical linguistic and grammatical grounds. As an example of this there is the famous incident recounted from several different sources wherein Mālik ibn Anas (711 – 795) otherwise known as Imam Malik and the founder of the Mālikī madhhab was asked about Allah’s establishment (istiwā) on the throne (Qur’an 20 V. 5), ‘How is he established?’ asked the man. Imam Malik is recorded to have looked down sweating profusely then looking up and replying, ‘”The Merciful is established over the Throne” just as he described Himself, (i.e. in the Qur’an). One cannot ask “How?” as “How?” does not apply to Him. Belief in it is obligatory, asking about it is innovation’ (Keller : 1994 : 854). As Fakhry says, ‘Ibn Hanbal [and Malik] …..in their deference to the Koranic text, refused to even debate these questions…’ (1994a : 36: my italics) and so what emerges is the tendency for the traditionalists or the naqli, (i.e. the Mālikī / Hanbalī positions) to have based their beliefs on revelation by apprehending the Qur’an seemingly in a more literal fashion, (but without being literalists) and affirming their faith without wishing to engage in knowing why or how it could be verified. Upon closer analysis, we can see how this breaks the usual pattern of rationality. The need or requirement for everything to be understood more thoroughly is not embarked upon in the naqli perspective – the Qur’an is not a common book compiled by man but as the Divine word is taken as it is and is not interrogated in the same manner as a human being might be. Clearly, this view contrasts sharply with the speculative nature of Mu’tazilah thought that was fully established by the late eighth to ninth century and there were now two distinct positions in the Muslim world – the traditionalist (naqli) one wherein God was approached by means of his revelation and the mu’tazilite who denied literal interpretations and affirmed man’s individual free will and wished to defend the faith
through the use of reason and render it intellectually plausible (‘aqlí). The Greek metaphysics effect is seen in the Mu’tazilite interaction in their affirmation of the autonomy of human reason and that man could come to know God through reasoning without revelation. Whereas the traditionalists approach insisted on the assertion of God’s incomparability and unknowability.

There was another noted intellectual movement incorporating more of a pure philosophy method (falsafa). These individuals contended that philosophical truth was applicable to all fundamental questions thereby rendering religious symbolism as something of a populist means of conveying truth in a way accessible to them. From this, something of an intellectual élite emerged from Muslim neo-Platonism with the likes of Al Kindi\textsuperscript{32} (d. circa 866), one of the earliest scholars associated with Aristotle, born in Kufah but lived and taught in Baghdad and is said to have written over 242 treatises covering philosophy, logic, metaphysics, arithmetic, spheres, music, astrology, geometry, medicine and politics (Corbin : 1993; Klein-Franke : 1996).

Al Kindi was perhaps one of the first to engage in ta’wil, the type of interpretation of the mutāshabihāt verses mentioned above. While he may not have adhered to the Mu’tazilah in all matters he generally had strong sympathies with many of their basic precepts. Nevertheless, philosophy was never well received in popular circles as falsafa was regarded as something of an intruder into Muslim thought and remained so throughout much of its intellectual history as the Greek foreignness of being quite apparent. Others were the neo-Platonist Al Farabi (872 – 950 AD) who was famous

\textsuperscript{32} Abu Yusuf Ya’qub Al Kindi One of the earliest scholars associated with Aristotle, born in Kufah but moved and taught in Baghdad. He is said to have written over 242 treatises on logic, metaphysics, arithmetic, spheres, music, astrology, geometry, medicine and politics.
for his constant travelling between some of the great Muslim centres of learning such as Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad. He held jobs as varied as a religious judge in Aleppo to being a garden caretaker and frequently suffering under the consequences of different political and intellectual trends. His intellectual span encompassed philosophy, science, logic, sociology, medicine, mathematics and music. Al-Farabi was able to simplify the study of logic easier by dividing it into two categories; *Takhayyūl* (idea) and *Thūbut* (proof), (Black : 1996). The renowned Ibn Sina (980 - 1037) devoted himself to Muslim jurisprudence, philosophy, natural, physical science, logic and Euclid as well as mastering the disciplines of astronomy, theology, metaphysics, medicine, psychology, music and mathematics (Inati : 1996).33 Notably absent from this list are the figures of Ibn Baja, Ibn Hazm and Ibn Rushd and the reason for this is that these figures were situated in the Western lands of the Muslim world and therefore considered as having different intellectual development. Despite these significant figures, much of the problem lay in the fact that *falsafa* never managed to convincingly amalgamate the ideas of Plato, Pythagoras, Neoplatonism in a logical fashion accessible to the ordinary Muslim. Thus philosophy is still viewed with some trepidation within the Muslim world. As al-Jabri says, ‘Philosophy was never an intellectual luxury within Islamic society. In was in fact, ever since its birth, a militant ideological discourse (Al-Jabri : 1999: 55).

….the philosophers had always been unpopular in Islam. Among the upper classes, many cultivated philosophy and science with enthusiasm. But the multitude hated and persecuted all who were marked as devotees of philosophy. 

(Coulton : 1996 : 122-123)

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33 Perhaps Ibn Sina’s most famous work was the famous *Al-Qanun fi al-Tibb*, (The Rules of Medicine) an immense tome of medical knowledge.
Viewed in the general sense, in the Muslim world as a whole, it is true that up until the 8th century that both *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and *ilm* (knowledge) held very little difference between them; both dealt with morals, dogma and law and markedly less with any theology. The idea of discussing the nature of God, in this earlier period was seen as nebulous and even dangerous — as the Qur’an itself deals very little with theological questions in any depth.

In the pre-speculative and pre-controversy period, reason (*fiqh*) and tradition (*ilm*) were regarded as complementary and there is no doubt that in the Ancient Muslim attitude reason and revelation or reason and Shari’a were not distinct. But in the later 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th centuries, the Mu’tazila rationalists introduced an opposition between *‘aql* (reason) and *sam*’ (tradition and authority) or Shari’a.’

(Rahman : 1979 :104)

Yet in the Western lands of the Muslim world, this ‘pre-speculative and pre-controversial’ period, (though the latter is arguable or at best relative) was maintained beyond the 9th century. This *sam*’ or *naqli* position was consciously maintained in Al-Andalus and the Maghreb and that despite itself eventually lead to a form of philosophy that seems to have superceded its Eastern counterpart. Al-Andalus and the Maghreb, two areas linked by common cultural, religious and political ties were disassociated from the politics and cultural developments of the Eastern lands under the influence of the Ummayad, Abbasid and Fatimid domination. As a result, the intellectual development of the region took another route and the role of reason and rationalism developed differently and is a matter of some consequence. Al-Jabri (1999) gives two reasons for this; 1) the lack of a long pre-Islamic heritage, the impact of Christian and pagan beliefs never really having much impact on the Muslim culture of these areas, as might have been the case in the Eastern Muslim conquest of Alexandria and the cultural pollination that took place there and spread throughout the Muslim Eastern lands. The previous cultures that had occupied these regions did not
have the capability of competing with Muslim culture and 2) Al Andalus and the
Maghreb had remained culturally and ideologically free of Eastern influence. As a
result, intellectual development and the employment of reason was comparatively low
level and as al-Jabri says,

We must emphasize the fact that Al-Andalus and the Maghreb
regions had, during all this period, proceeded no further than the
level of intellectual activity of the time of the early conquest, i.e.,
Islam of the companions (sahaba) and the followers (tabi’un) whose
basic sources for the acquisition of knowledge remained oral
accounts (riwaya) and transmission (naql), be it for religious,
linguistic or other knowledge, unlike the East where one could find
numerous schools of law, theology and grammar.’

(al-Jibri : 1999 : 64)

Of course, due to the phenomenon of wide spread travel in the Muslim world, not
least the yearly Hajj, there was an awareness of the theological and philosophical
controversies that raged in the east but none of these Eastern intellectual movements
were able to find fertile ground in the Western lands. Thus the praxis-based
methodology of the original community (salaf)34 was maintained over the cultural and
religious aspects of society in that region. There is a tendency for historians to view
this as a reactive and retrogressive tendency vis a vis intellectual development
elsewhere, which includes al-Jabri, though he does acknowledge that this isolation
culminating in the Muwahidūn era in the region (roughly 1120-1215) was ultimately
beneficial in the development of a more authentic Arab-Islamic Philosophy,
particularly seen in the thought of Ibn Hazm (994-1064) and Ibn Rushd (1128-1198).
However, the contention of this work will argue against this overall historical view of
the i position as something reactive. That the Mālikī school of law was the

34 Again, not be confused with the contemporary movement with the same name
predominant doctrine utilized over the regions of Al-Andalus and the Maghreb and the reasons for this were as much political as they were religious.

The Abbassids in the East had adopted the doctrine of the Hanifite School, (that of the Iraqis), and Malik Ibn Anas, the founder of the Malikite School of Jurisprudence, was perceived as a figure of opposition to the Abbassids, not only because of the school’s doctrine that made wide use of the Prophet’s sayings – as opposed to the Hanafi School, which preferred personal opinion (ra’y) - but also because of some politically motivated positioning that he was rumoured to have taken against the Abbassid.

(al-Jabri : 1999 : 65)

It is important to take note of the geographical connotations of the Hanafīs as located in the east and within the religious and cultural context wherein the development of rational thought had taken root within theological circles and the ensuing preponderance of the ra’ y (opinion) method of the Hanafī madhhab. Though the Hanafīs are certainly considered to be part of the traditionalist movement as one of the four schools of jurisprudence, there are clear indications that reason and rationality plays more of a role within their methodology than can be accredited to the Mālikīs. Nevertheless, this geographical element does not bear out fully, as the Hanbalī madhhab was also located in the East, though more to the south, in the hijazi region (Arabian Peninsula) and would be considered more akin, if not more traditionalist than the Mālikī approach. In this regard, Rahman (1979) says, ‘The Mu’tazali offensive forced the extreme wing of orthodoxy, therefore, to change the pre-controversial attitude of ancient Islam and explicitly to reject human reason’ (Rahman : 1979 : 105). Again the wording of this statement; as in ‘extreme wing of orthodoxy’ could be questioned as reflecting a certain interpretation assumed by modern analysis, in similar fashion al-Jabri uses the term ‘rigorism’ in describing the Mālikī ulamā’ (1999 : 70). These themes will be developed further at a later stage in this work.
The Mālikī jurists in Al Andalus and the Maghreb were strongly opposed to outside influences in the fear of importing ideas that could remove or distance the community from the ethos of the original Medinan community. The Andalusi / Idrissi rulers appropriated the Mālikī methodology in the view that it had clearer and more direct links with the first community while also staunching all things Eastern which reflected their political positioning. Al-Jabri (1999) is somewhat cynical of this in alleging that this amounted to political manipulation of the religious, indicated by his labelling ‘The Maliki jurists, who were the ideologues of the Ommeyad state..’ (al-Jabri : 1999 : 66). The use of the word ‘ideologue’ suggests a modern historical hermeneutic of scepticism of all things ‘political’ on his part. There appears to be no evidence of manipulation akin to the Eastern Ummayad authorities’ appropriation of the jibri\(^{35}\) position to explain away harsh measures meted out to opponents and the Western Ummayad position need not have been motivated as rather cynically portrayed, as there could have been an honest religious concern on the part of the authorities. It also fails to take into account the nature of the divide between the political and the religious, which is incorporated within the naqli. Al-Jabri (1999), basing his history of Andalusian / Maghribean intellectual development upon Ibn Tufayl (1105 – 1185) of Guadix and Sa’id al- Andalusi (1213- 1286) of present day Alcala la Real; in establishing that scholars initially took up the ‘ancient scientists’ knowledge, (i.e., Greek) such as astronomy, mathematics and logic. Al-Jabri sees as having been tolerated by the Mālikī scholars in aversion to Eastern theological problematics. However, al-Jabri seems to make an unwarranted difference between scholars (ulamā’) and jurists (fuqaha) and equally between knowledge (‘ilm) and

\(^{35}\) Not to be confused with al-Jibri, the Moroccan historian and philosopher just mentioned previously
jurisprudence (fiqh). Even in the later decline of emphasis placed in Maliki jurisprudence during the Muwahidūn period, the scholars were actually considered to be Mālikī ulamā’ themselves; added to this is the fact that the faqīh is by default an ‘alim. In other words there would have been very few ulamā’ that would have required a faqīh to approve or consent their work. Again this may reflect a twenty first century compartmentalization of knowledge, the perception of secular and religious positions that would not have existed at the time. For example, one of the most famous scholars of the Western regions, Ibn Rushd (1128-1198) wrote the well-known jurisprudence manual Bidāyat al-Mujtāhid wa-Nihayāt- al-Muqtāsid which was regarded by the famous theologian, Ibn Jafar Thahabi (1033) as possibly the best book on Mālikī jurisprudence, despite the fact that Ibn Rushd is renowned for his expertise in philosophy.

Despite this, al-Jabri suggests that, due to this consciously hermetic stance from Eastern ideas, the Western Muslim scholars, (despite his contention, inclusive of both fuquha and ulamā’), were thereby afforded the chance to develop and strengthen techniques in a unique way, whereas theological concerns in the East had not undergone the same maturation as in:

…going through the phase of mathematics and the physical sciences and rushed development of thought directly towards metaphysics. In Al-Andalus, however things ran their natural course: philosophy developed there when scholars turned earnestly to the study of mathematics, astronomy and logic for a whole century, without ever getting involved in the theologian’s problematics of the conciliation between “reason” and “transmission” that was at the center of theoretical thought in the East.

(al-Jabri : 1999 : 69)

Accordingly, Maghrabean and Andalusian scholars were able to circumvent the obstacles that had been faced in the East, such as kalām and its dialectical theology
and Eastern neo-platonism. However, it was a famous Mālikī scholar who is seminally responsible for the establishment of Malikism in the Māghrib and the Sub-Saharan. Abū ‘Imran al-Fasī (975 – 1015) had studied under the renowned Ashʿarī – Shāfiʿī - Mutakallimūn Bagdadi scholar, al Bāqillānī (950 – 1013) under whom ‘he was introduced to the then revolutionary idea that Ashʿarite and Shāfiʿite doctrine of ʿūsūl might be harmoniously combined in a Maliki environment’ (Cornell : 1998 : 35) though there was considerable resistance to this initially.

Despite this, as a result of the hold-off of Eastern speculative intellectual development, this meant that scholars like Ibn Rushd dealt primarily with Aristotle’s methodology rather than directly with his metaphysics which had resulted in so much controversy in the East. In this manner, Western Muslim philosophy had developed far stronger and deeper roots in the methodological fundamentals and the scientific basis of this metaphysics primarily through the study of logic and physics. This intellectual path of development grew from the end of the Ummayad rule (circa 1030) and was discretely maintained through the al-Murābitūn era (circa 1040-1147) finally emerging more publicly during the al-Muwahidūn (1121-1269) period. In particular, the al-Muwahidūn promoted the premises of a more elucidated theoretical theological thinking in oppositional reaction to the al-Murābitūn who based themselves on the -naqli position resulting in the al-Muwahidūn accusing them of mujāssima (anthropomorphism) very reminiscent of the accusations made upon Ibn Hanbal referred to previously. Again, this was not just political propaganda; as Stroumsa says, ‘The rejection of anthropomorphism was not, however, a mere strategy in order to legitimize the declaration of jiḥād on fellow Muslims. The abstract incorporeal conception of God was a cornerstone of the al-Muwahidūn doctrine of divine unity (tawḥīd), (Stroumsa : 2009 :54). While the al-Muwahidūn maintained the Mālikī law,
even taking on more of a dhahiri (exoterist) position, in the area of theology they identified largely with al-Ghazali (1058 – 1111) and the Ash‘ari kalām arguments (Stroumsa : 2009; al-Jabri : 1999).

Some of the major figures emerging out of the Western Andalusi and Maghrebean thought are presented here in tracing the role of reason through Muslim intellectual history. Ibn Baja (1106-1138) was born in Spain (possibly Saragossa) and died in Fez and is known primarily as the teacher of Ibn Rushd but was a prolific scholar in his own right. He was a mathematician, sociologist, theologian, doctor and philosopher and was closely allied with the al Murābitūn dynasty especially in Saragossa. Considering Ibn Baja’s thought in general, this fact seems somewhat anomalous with the labelling of the al- Murābitūn as rigorously opposed to all forms of philosophical enquiry. However, in professing a mystical philosophy, he was criticized and branded as a heretic in some quarters (Goodman : 1996; Forcada : 2007), and imprisoned for a while in present day Rueda de Jalon. Ibn Baja understood the human soul to develop through a series of phases, plant (embryonic), animal (sense based) and ultimately to the rational life, (rational speculation) and rejected some of the basic tenets of Sufi thought, especially the idea that the ultimate ends of human experience were to experience na‘ima, the Divine pleasure, arguing that if this was the ultimate goal as something for its own sake it would supersede the rational, rendering the intellectual faculty and knowledge generally as essentially redundant. Ibn Hazm (994-1064), born in Cordoba frequently identified with the dhahiri movement, (exoterist) though he had significant differences with them. This movement is frequently assoicated with the Hanbalī school of thought and dealt with things like the difference between apparent and literal meanings arguing that the two may not be the same. This is the
idea that the Qur’an and Hadīth should be taken on the apparent meaning as understood and that the apparent meaning may not be the literal meaning. When using metaphorical language, i.e., ‘...throwing stones in glass houses’, the apparent meaning as understood is that one should not criticize others when one may be equally blameworthy, the literal meaning speaks for itself. As such Ibn Hazm rejected allegorical interpretations of the Qur’an and Hadīth preferring instead grammatical and syntactical analysis. The dhahiri perspective on qiyās (analogical reasoning); wherein principles are applied to seemingly new situations was that this was effectively granting superiority to human reasoning over that of Divine will. The view on ijma was that it was something that only the first community had been able to engage in and that generally all things had been encountered and established, (bearing in mind that Ibn Hazm lived in the Middle Ages). He was also indisposed towards taqlīd (imitation) in relation to adherence to the madhāhib preferring that the non-jurist individual should ask the jurists the best methodology to arrive at a decision for himself. Ibn Hazm was also a logician, philosopher and astronomer and is credited with having discovered the spherical nature of the earth’s surface and that sound travelled at speed.

Already mentioned yet equally famous is Ibn Rushd born in Cordoba, who similarly made remarkable contributions in philosophy, logic, medicine, music and jurisprudence. He studied philosophy and law from many scholars including Ibn Baja with whom he also studied medicine.36 In philosophy, his most important work Tuḥafut al-Tuḥafut was written in response to al-Ghāzali’s work criticism of falasafa. His views on fate were that man is neither in full control of his destiny nor is it fully

36 At one point he was the chief physician for Abu Yaqub, the Caliph of Morocco.
predetermined for him. However, Ibn Rushd was censured by many scholars for his
defence of philosophy and rationality (Urvoj : 1996).

Even though al Mansur was an enlightened ruler, seeing the dangers facing Islam and wishing to appease the conservative scholars, he accused Ibn Rushd of heresy and ordered the burning of some of his books. He needed the support of the Malikite jurists in his fight against the Castilians.

(Salloum : 1998 : 6)

Again the oft criticized Mālikī scholars are perceived as reactionary zealots whereas in reality, even al-Jabri grudgingly concedes some understanding of their position – the esoterism and speculative thought of the East had sown confusion and did not seem to reflect the Prophetic approach as manifested in the early community.

**Countering the Rationalists - Abu Hasan Al Ash’ari and the Mutakallimūn**

Amid the wide ranging and diverse controversies, one important middle ground position was established by Abu Hasan Al Ash’ari (874 – 936) who subsequently became a founder of a major school of orthodox theology, which bears his name and endures to this day, representing standard Sunni Orthodoxy.\(^{37}\) He was a student of al-Dhubba’i, (a leading Mu’tazilan scholar of Basra) but eventually changed to a traditionalist position by virtue of visions he had of the Prophet Muhammad. In the first of these visions he was commanded to adhere to the traditional (naqli). Believing his vision to be true and since the traditionalists refuted rational argument for the existence of God he also gave this up. In the third vision, however, he was told to adhere to the *naqli* but not to abandon *kalām*. Therefore while abandoning the content and beliefs of the *Mu’tazila*, he nevertheless continued to defend his new beliefs by the type of rational argument which the *Mu’tazila* employed.

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\(^{37}\) The Al Maturidi Creed and Al Tahawi Creed are also mainstream Sunni but less well known than the *Ash’ari*. 
It can be difficult for the casual historian to distinguish between three intellectual movements when looking at the intellectual development of this era. One interconnecting and intertwining word that unites and distinguishes these *Ash’ari* position; from that of the *Mu’tazilah* as Cyril Glasse says, ‘Kalām is dominated by the school of Al Ash’ari (Glasse : 2001 : 249). The confusion lies in *kalām* being a word used to denote a structured theology by the *Mu’tazilah* themselves that emerged out of the controversies surrounding the interpretation of Qur’an and defense of the religion. But what later emerged is yet another movement named the *Mutakallimūn* or (the adherents of *kalām*) which evolved out of deep seated qualms concerning the limits of reasoning as employed by the *Mu’tazilah*. Thus Kalām though originating as a type of philosophical theism developed by the-*mu’tazilite* adaptation of speculative philosophy, came to represent a reaction against the excessive reasoning of the *Mu’tazilah*. Kalām eventually became a major feature within Islamic thought in its own right. One example of this systematic theology (*kalām*) was a postulation of a structured cosmological argument. It was based on a well known rational and causational argument for the existence of God dating back to Plato but refined within medieval Muslim philosophy and theology. The outline of the *kalām* cosmological argument is as follows:

1. The Universe either had (a) a beginning or (b) no beginning
2. If it had a beginning, the beginning was either (a) caused or (b) uncaused
3. If it had a cause it was either (a) personal (intelligent not mechanical) or (b) not personal (neither intelligent nor mechanical).
While the *Mutakallimūn* and the *Muʿtazilah* were speculative thinkers they were somewhat different from the more purist philosophers (*falsafa*) in that their starting point was the basic tenets of Islam. In reality this was also the starting point of the majority of philosophers but the popular perception of them was that they engaged in dangerous free thought and suspicion arose as to an alleged sophistry of the philosophers in relying more on reason than revelation. At the same time *Kalām* is also a rational attempt to prove God’s existence and Al Asha’ris’ approach was also based on the basic methodology of Greek discursive logic. The questions with which they concerned themselves remained the perennial ones; the anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Qur’an, pre-determinism, personal responsibility and whether the Divine Attributes were part of the Divine Essence. The *Ashʿarites* and the *Mutakallimūn* believed that (and incidentally still do) the Divine Attributes are both eternal and separate from the Divine Essence usually expressed in stating that Divine is not all merciful because He has the attribute of being All Merciful which was the position of the *Muʿtazilah*. The *Mutakallimūn* and the *Ashʿarīs* believed that the attribute of mercy issues forth because He is All Merciful. In this manner, the Attributes are not the Essence nor are they different to the Essence. However, fear of the philosophers may have been exaggerated as it was not necessarily the case: ‘Unlike doubt ridden modern philosophy, the classical philosophy of the Muslims was based upon the certainty of God and revelation’ (Glasse : 2001). While there was some consternation at things like validating Plato and Aristotle’s view that revelation proceeded from one’s intellect which is a point that some Muslim philosophers eventually settled on, most famously Ibn Tufayl (c.1105-1185) previously mentioned, suggested something akin to this. Obviously, this challenged the basic canonical belief that the Prophet was directly inspired by God and which would have
implications in regard to the nature of the Qur’an. However, though Ibn Tufayl never actually denied the Divine origin of the Qur’anic revelation it ‘nevertheless horrified the theologians’ (Glasse : 2001 : 356).

Perhaps the most famous theologian to question the limits of philosophical speculation was Abu Hamid al-Ghāzali (1059 – 1128). Born in Tus in the Khorasan region now in present day Iran, al-Ghāzali, at one point a renowned and highly respected religious scholar, appointed to teach at the Madrassa Nizamīyāh in Baghdad, one of the most renowned religious institutions of the time. Controversially he abandoned both his reputation and position to become a wandering ascetic feeling that there was something missing in his spiritual life and wrote of this event later in his life. From this point he devoted himself to a spiritual path, which resulted outwardly in prolific writing on various subjects mainly religious but also philosophical as well as subjects like astronomy. It was during his wanderings that he encountered Sufi teaching and was thereby underwent personal transformation. He famously opposed the adherents of falsafa through critiquing their metaphysical rudiments and postulates and is considered by many to be one of the great Muslim theologians. One of his most famous books is the Tahāfut al-Falāsīfā, (The Incoherence of the Philosophers)³⁸ wherein he is said to have conclusively destroyed the premises of philosophy by depicting it as overly rational and reductionist. Al-Ghāzali manages to combine, the traditional view, the intellectualist view and mysticism in this work in opposing figures of some magnitude, such as Ibn Sina and al-Farabi. He refutes any logical justification and explanation of God as something inherently contradictory in nature and ultimately fruitless as he was strongly of the

³⁸ As mentioned, sometime later Ibn Rushd wrote a rejoinder to his Tahāfut al Falāsīfā entitled Tahaāfut al Tahāfut, ‘The Incoherence of the Incoherent’
view that the Divine and the mystery of the universe and creation are beyond the limits of conscious rational human thought and was able to make a balance between religion and reason by identifying their respective realms as consisting of the infinite and the finite. Mathematics and the sciences were exact knowledges and therefore within the realm of the rational. He adroitly took the very tools of Aristotelian logic and Socratic methodology to distinguished some flaws and arbitrary presumptions of the neo-platonists which he identified as an excessively rationalist Aristotelianism, (Gianotti : 2001). In opposing the likes of al-Farabi, he argued that reason alone was incapable of arriving at an understanding of the Absolute and the Infinite. Grounded in the finite, reason was inadequate in transcending this and engaged only in the relative. Furthermore he expressed the view that philosophy could be a dangerous in relying on man’s rational thinking alone, potentially leading to excessive doubts and questioning, anathema to religious experience. Al-Ghāzali should not be construed as absolutely anti-philosophical, indeed much of his work in refuting falsafa was philosophically constructed itself;

Not an anti rationalist by any stretch of the imagination, al-Ghazali is obviously not setting out to refute all of the philosophical doctrines embraced by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Indeed, he judges much of their intellectual tradition, including logic and the natural sciences to be beneficial to the work of the religious scholars, such as the jurists (fuquha) and the mutakallimun.’ (Gianotti : 2001 : 88)

While many consider him as being largely responsible for the decline of pure rational thinking in Islam, ironically in using the philosopher’s tools against them, al-Ghāzali ultimately managed to produce a more favourable attitude to philosophy in some quarters as eventually the philosophers were forced to improve the clarity of their theories and to tighten up their logic as witnessed in the work of the Andalusians Ibn Baja and Ibn Rushd, both of whom undertook the defence of philosophy.
Perhaps the most famous of al-Ghāzali’s work was the *Ihyāʿ Ulūm al-Din* (The Revival of the Religious Sciences) which sought to unite the esoteric with the exoteric by highlighting the connection between mysticism and orthodox religion. In uniting the inwardly spiritual with the outwardly ritualistic aspects of the faith he laid emphasis on the importance of authentic sufism, which he saw as a clear path to the Absolute while at the same time also taking on something of a reformist role towards excesses of within Sufism of the time. Parts of his work was translated into Latin during the Middle-Ages and his theories have penetrated deeply into European thought with clear references to him in both Jewish and Christian theology. It is particularly evident in the arguments used by Aquinas in re-establishing the authority of orthodox Christianity in the West.

*An Encounter of some Interest*

While Ibn ʿArabi, has not yet been introduced in this work in any detail, it is of some interest at this point to recount a famous alleged incident between Ibn ʿArabi and Ibn Rushd, the great philosopher of the Peripatetic School[^39] mentioned above. As a young man in Cordoba, Ibn ʿArabi was taken by his father to meet Ibn Rushd. Ibn ʿArabi’s growing reputation for spiritual capacity had reached the philosopher’s ear and he allegedly questioned Ibn ʿArabi as to whether one was able to arrive at the same level of spiritual understanding through illumination and divine inspiration as was possible from speculative thought. Ibn ʿArabi’s frequently quoted account of the meeting with

[^39]: So named as it referred to Aristotle’s habit of walking back and forth (peripatetic) whilst giving lectures at the Lyceum in Athens. It signifies him as being a member of the Aristotelian school of thought.
one of the major Muslim figures of the philosophical speculative tradition is characteristically as ambiguous as it is intriguing:

As I entered, the philosopher arose from his seat and came to meet me, showing me every possible token of friendship and consideration and finally embracing me. Then he said to me: “Yes?” I in turn replied to him: “Yes”. Then his joy increased as he saw that I understood him. But next, when I myself became aware of what it was that had caused him joy, I added “No”. Immediately Ibn Rushd tensed up, his features changed colour and he seemed to doubt his own thoughts. He asked me the question, “What kind of solution have you found through illumination and divine inspiration? Is it just the same as what we receive from speculative thought?” I replied to him: “Yes and no. Between the yes and the no spirits take flight from their matter and necks break away from their bodies”. Ibn Rushd turned pale: I saw him start to tremble. He murmured the ritual phrase, “There is no strength save in God”, because he had understood my allusion. (Abbas : 1993 : 37)

Abbas comments on various explanations of this incident, culled in the main, from presentations and discussions by Michel Chodkiewicz, a specialist in Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought, based upon his interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s own written account of this. Chodkiewicz believes that the subject matter obliquely referred to by Ibn Rushd was to do with the resurrection of the bodies on the Last Day. Presumably – the rationalist Ibn Rushd would have seen this be an allegory rather than a literal truth. While neither Chodkiewicz nor Abbas are able to fully explain Ibn ‘Arabi’s response; both comment that one might understand Ibn ‘Arabi’s enigmatic response as politely intimating the futile imponderability of that which concerns the rational speculation. Ibn Rushd’s spiritual state (hāl); nor his death; nor the progress of his soul thereafter would be affected in the slightest by whether he could rationally establish the truth of the Day of Resurrection as an allegory.40 It might also constitute amiable advice, in warning that such speculation could lead to charges of blasphemy on the part of the authorities leading to a possible death penalty by beheading.

40 One of the philosophical analyses that Ibn Rushd worked on.
As already outlined above, Ibn Rushd’s position was to interpret Prophecy and revelation by means of Aristotelian reason. He negated the notion previously posited by Ibn Sina of a ‘pure intellect’ without sensory perception and comprising ‘pure imagination’ as the means to a spiritual realization. Corbin compared the distinction to such things as the divide between faith and reason, prophecy and rationalism, theology and philosophy and oriental wisdom and Western secularism (Corbin: 1993). While Ibn ‘Arabi based his thought upon spiritual realization, he had an appreciation of philosophy and did not see it as being entirely useless. Yet he later cautioned in his Futūhāt al Makkiyya (Meccan Revelations), (Ibn al-‘Arabi: 2002) that reflection alone could lead to confusion and false conclusions and that he preferred that such reflection was couched within the context of spiritual revelation induced by an immersion into the Divine, chiefly through the means of contemplation (fikr) and the dhikr (repeated invocation of the Divine names of Allah). Nevertheless, he does allow that a few people have on rare occasions reached or been granted a high spiritual level through speculative thought, mentioning Plato, as being an example of such a phenomena.

The Neo Hanbalite Position

Some aspects of the Hanbali position have already been mentioned but are used to focus on a perspective of an anti – rationalist stance. As we have seen some of the first reactions to philosophical speculative thought was a call for a return to the more literalist or ‘traditionalist’ transmitted (naqli) stances, despite significant and important differences between these two approaches which require further explanation. The Hanbalî scholar Ibn Taymiah (d 1328) declared all vestiges of
Greek or any other outside influences, ideas or intellectual groups based beyond the pale of Islam; as understood as practised up to the death of the Prophet, were *ahli bid’ah* (people of heretical innovation). This included all such afore mentioned groups: the *Khawārij*, the *Shī‘ah*, the *Murji‘ah*, and the *Mu‘tazila*, and philosophical or theological theories. This general approach called for a return to a pure interpretation of the Qur’an and this stance could be termed traditional insofar as the early or first community of Muslims allegedly did not have access to other forms of thought.\(^{41}\) Fakhry (1997) labels this position as neo-Hanbalite\(^ {42}\) indicating figures like Ibn Taymiah who took up a call for a return to the ways of the *Salaf* (the early original Muslims). Surprisingly, he also rejected the teaching of *Ash’ari* which was now at the core of all Sunni orthodoxy. As for the philosophers; Ibn Taymiyyah found that they had been unable to prove anything conclusively or advance anything within the religion; on the contrary the evidence was that they were in perpetual debate and disagreement. He perceived the philosophers as engaging in sophistry and assuming the Qu’ran to be something for the common masses and the religious truths revealed thereof served to inculcate some morality for the uneducated, which in turn indicated a scepticism of revealed religious truths. In a well known book *Dar ta’rud al ‘aql wa’l Naql* (Rejection of the Conflict between Reason and Tradition) Ibn Taymiyyah ‘…. criticized the methods of Al Razi and Al Amidi and others who put ‘*aql* before *naql* (Nasr & Leaman : 1996 : 82). In this book, Ibn Taymiyyah also criticizes Ibn Rushd for leaving out what he considers the most important group, i.e

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\(^{41}\) Many would consider this debateable – Wilfrid Cantwell Smith for one. Whether Islam can boast of pure Arab influence at the inception of Islam with an absence of exterior influences would appear to be debatable.

\(^{42}\) M. Fakhry *A Short Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism*, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, 1997, Pg 101
the *Salaf*\(^{43}\) when listing the number of main groupings within the Muslim world and just as is the case of with al-Ghazali, he refutes Ibn Rushd’s arguments through his own philosophical analysis. In *al Radd’ala’l Mantiqiyin* (The Refutation of the Logicians), Ibn Taymiah attacks the fundamentals of Aristotelian logic through finding flaw with its methodology, i.e. the syllogism (Fahkry : 1997; Haleem : 1996; al-Maghnisawi : 2007). Ibn Taymiyyah refutes this basic methodology on the grounds of it being possible to arrive at an invalid conclusion drawn from this method of reasoning and that when considering the mental aptitude of different people and the difficulty some may have with the middle term, i.e., referring to the second of two propositions which lead to a conclusion or given the possibility of differing interpretations of the middle term, can result in differing conclusions and is therefore not a consistent or reliable means to truth. For in rationalization lies the possibility to provide an account of or for something with sufficient plausible reasons even if these are not true.

Ibn Taymiyyah and later his student, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah are perhaps the best known representatives of the earlier neo-Hanbalīte position which has had major reverberations in the rise of modernist and Islamist movements, whose adherents frequently relate their views back to Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah. As a result neo-Hanbalītes are frequently associated with the contemporary Wahhābi and *Salafī* movements. They are also identified as precursors and the main source of inspiration for the 18\(^{th}\) century reformer Muhammad ibn Abdul al-Wahhāb (1703-1792). When considering Winkel’s ‘technist’ critique, the recourse to a supposed

\(^{43}\) Referring to the earliest Muslim communities not the contemporary movement.
rationality, the rejection of tradition, albeit in the name of tradition and the virulent stance taken against the Sufi position, this can seem paradoxical indeed.

The Sufi Approach

‘The One is known before any definition and before any letters’

(Attributed to Abu Bakr al-Shibli by al-Qushayri : 2007 : 5)

It is appropriate to look at the sufi perspective in the historical context of rationalism and the counter response, though there will be a far more detailed breakdown of sufism later. It is enough at this point to define something of the historical position of sufism in relation to rationalism. Al-Qushayri, a famous sufi and author of the *Al Risala al-Qushayriyya fi Ilm al-Tasawwuf* (Al-Qushayri’s Epistle on Sufism : 2007) writes:

> Know, may God have mercy on you, that the elders of this path built the foundations of their affair upon the sound fundamental principles of God’s oneness. In this way they protected their beliefs from reprehensible innovations and tried to bring themselves closer to the ways of the pious forefathers and the followers of the Prophet’s Sunna, namely the doctrine of God’s oneness that contained neither likening nor stripping. They knew well the true nature of God’s eternity and realized fully how an existent entity emerges from non-existence.

(al- Qushayri : 2007 : 4)

The ‘path’ in this quote refers to the sufi method of spiritual wayfaring while the ‘likening’ and ‘stripping’ refer in the former to ascribing human attributes to God on the one hand and postulating that God has no attributes at all in the latter, all of which is indicative of the controversies that raged during that era, placing the sufis well within the *naqli – Ash’ari* positioning.
The *Hanbalī* view, (including Ibn Taymiyyah’s), on Sufism and how this does not seem to accord with the manner in which these historical figures have frequently been perceived has already been covered. Closer historical analysis suggests that both were far more than just supportive of the Sufi position than is commonly accepted (Michot : 2006). In Ibn Taymiyyah’s case, while there seems to be aspects of Sufism of which he is critical, not only does he seem to be an admirer of Sheikh Abdul Qādir Jilani (1077- 1166), a major figure in the development of Sufism but allegedly claimed to be an adherent of the *tarīqa al-Qādirīyyah* (the Qādirī Order) based on al-Jilani’s teachings, eventually becoming a Sheikh in his own right within that order (Kabbani : 1996; Makdisi : 1974; Makdisi : 1990; Michot : 1996). In terms of this assertion, Picken writes,

> There is also, however, a minority view promoted by George Makdisi that Ibn Taymiyya was a Sufi disciple of the Qadiri fraternity. Although Makdisi’s position is not easy to defend, the opposing view is also debateable and hence I would place Ibn Taymiyyah in this third category – that of Hanbali Sufi reformers’
> (Picken : 2011: 247)

Ibn Taymiyyah wrote a hundred page commentary on the Sheikh’s famous *Futuh al Ghayb* (Michel : 1981) found in a collection of his writings, *Majmu’fatawa - Ibn Taymiyyah* wherein Ibn Taymiyyah responds to questions regarding Ibn ‘Arabi, Suhrawardi, Ribi’a, al-Hallaj and other well known figures in sufism (Michot : 2007) and published in Saudi Arabia, 

44 Majmu’fatawa Ibn Taymiyyah (no date),Vol. 10, Riyadh, pgs. 455-548

45 Majmu’fatawa Ibn Taymiyyah al Kubra, (no date),Vol. 11, ‘At Tasawwwuf’, Dar ar-Rahmah, Cairo

46 Majmu’fatawa,(1981) edited by A. Ibn Qasim, 37 Volumes, Rabat, Maktabat al-Ma’rif

*Note: page 196*
other works (Kabbani : 1996). Another very common assumption is that Muhammad ibn Abd’ al-Wahhāb (1703-1792) refuted Sufi thought outright, yet there are numerous references that would suggest that he was not as virulently anti-sufi as is often portrayed (al-Makki : 2012), indicated by the following sort of statement ‘I never accused of unbelief Ibn ‘Arabi or Ibn al-Fari for their Sufi interpretations’ from his ar-Rasa’il ash-Shakhsiyya (al-Wahhāb : cited by As Sunnah : no date : 1) and ‘From among the wonders is to find a Sufi who is a faqīh and a scholar who is an ascetic (zahid) from the book Mu’allafāt al-Imam al-Shaykh Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (al-Wahhāb : cited by al-Makki : 2012 :1)

When casting an overall view over the phenomena of Sufism three chronologically sequenced modes emerge though not entirely exclusive of each other (Fahkry : 1997). The earliest of these was the way of ascetism originating in the early 7th century. This early ascetism was probably in reaction to the Muslim community’s preoccupation with the worldly whilst establishing political systems and coming to terms with new found wealth and expansion. The main preoccupations of these early figures, like Hasan al Basri (d.728) mentioned previously, was the temporality of existence and the finiteness of the human condition, in relation to the Eternal and the Divine. These were people who led lives of self imposed simplicity and poverty impelled with ‘the urge to reach out to the infinite’ (Fahkry : 1997 : 73)

Another mode of Sufism is the ecstatic, spiritually drunken (sukr) way which ensues from an overwhelming love of God, which Fakhry refers to as pantheistic or unitary

mysticism epitomized by the likes of al Bistami (d.874) and Al Hallaj. (d.922). These eminent figures represent a teaching of self annihilation or personal extinction (*fana*) in the presence of Divine reality and a union (*ittihad and / or jam*) with the Divine wherein the mystic becomes a channel or agent of God. Their spiritual state was ecstatic and the utterances they were famous for usually expressed some aspect of union with the Divine. Some of these were highly controversial and outwardly blasphemous though inwardly expressing a reality accessible to those of spiritual understanding. Al Hallaj’s spiritually ‘drunken’ statement ‘I am the Truth’ (*ana l-ḥaqq*), in reference to Divine Attribute, the Reality (*al Ḥaqq*) was in the eyes of some, claiming divinity, which exoterically was blasphemous. Consequently, al-Hallaj was famously executed in brutal fashion on a charge of blasphemy.

The third mode of Sufism to be looked at here is one of outward *sahw* or soberness, (though some would claim with inward *sūkr* -spiritual drunkenness (Lings : 1993; Eaton : 1985). In this regard three main figures are worth mentioning. Abu Qasim ibn Muhammad Al Junayd, (830 – 910), Abu Hamed Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghāzali (1058-1111), already mentioned above and lastly Ibn ‘Arabi, though in a sense he can be seen to encompass all three modes. Apropos al-Junayd, after the ecstatic effluence of the unitarian mystics, his way is seemingly sober yet none the less profoundly experienced. The mainstay of his approach was to bring the more spiritual into ordinary life advocating normal pursuits of jobs and professions for those following the Sufi way, instead of the wandering dervish mode more identified with mystical inebriation. In contrast with the ecstacies, al-Junayd’s approach was one of soberness (*sahw*) and in keeping with this approach, he was a shopkeeper in Baghdad and is reputed, when approached by al-Hallaj to take him on for spiritual
instruction to have been unwilling to accept al-Hallaj within his circle claiming that ‘I do not accept madmen’. To Al Hallaj’s ecstatic ejaculation ‘ana’l haqq’ he is reputed to have responded, ‘No. It is through al haqq (The Reality) that you exist.’ (Glasse : 2001 : 243) though other sources claim that al-Hallaj was the student of al-Junayd,

As for al-Ghāzali, his position epitomizes much of Sufi thought, despite the fact that he also used a dialectic manner in confronting the seemingly excessive rationality of the peripatetics and as a Shāfi’ī, he put forward his ideas through the use of qiyās (analogy). Yet al-Ghāzali’s definitive stance was that the Sufis were the true inheritors of the Prophetic way. The Divine could not be known through rational means nor through personal union but only through the desire and the mercy of the Divine to unveil itself, usually but not always, as a result of an individual’s difficult journey of self discovery and spiritual effort. The approach of Ibn ‘Arabi, will be detailed at length at a later stage of this work.

The event of the Prophet’s experience of revelation within the Cave of Hira, when set against the deliberations of the Khawārij and all that has transpired from that clearly demonstrates what was expounded in the in the preceding chapter. The initiating mystical experience of the founder is interpreted and conceptualized so as to formulate ways of being and ethical human interaction. However, in wishing to hold fast to the primacy of the initial experience something of its immediacy is lost in

48 However, several sufi commentators that while sufis may disagree outwardly esoterically there is understanding and it is worth remembering that affiliation with ecstacies like Al Hallaj’s could be threatening by association.
ongoing intellectualizations resulting in a slow removal away from the founder’s experience and with the changing circumstances of time begin to atrophy.

**Exponency and Proponenty**

In this sense, it is argued here that the Prophet, his immediate community and those that followed, (the sahaba and tabi’in respectively), could be said to be exponents, as they embodied the Hirian experience, whereas later intellectual speculative development renders the Muslim community as proponents of the Muhammadan experience. In the light of this understanding the naqli approach may be perceived differently and perhaps not quite as reactive and retrogressively as is usually proposed. First and foremost, the exponential nature of the Prophet is expressed in his being described as the ‘Qur’an walking’ by his wife Aisha sometime after his death. Whereas, the impression of the more ‘aqli (dialectic) schools of thought presented above are more indicative of the proponent mode outlined here who set forth arguments with underlying a priori theoretical assumptions requiring some measure or form of apologetics to justify truths which not immediately evident when reading canonical or sacred texts. On the other hand, there is a distinct lack of propenency in the discourse of the likes of Imam Malik, one only has to look at the terse response to the question concerning the istiwa of Allah. There is no inclination to explain or propound further than that the modality of istiwa is known without need for further elaboration. No recourse is taken to logic or dialectic discourse in respect to the Divine. His use of reasoning analogy was consciously limited:

Although Malik himself makes frequent use of analogical reasoning—as I have shown but it seems to be by citation of the sunnah terms in the Muwatta’, that the ‘amal precepts to which they pertain are ‘off limits’ to analogy and that despite their anomalous nature they are legitimate parts of Islamic law by virtue of the fact
they had been instituted under the aegis of Prophetic legislative authority.  

(Abdullah : 1978 : 26)

This is mirrored in the later attitudes of Mālikī movements such the al- Murābitūn, who consciously resisted intellectual speculation. This naqli position is widely interpreted in the Western modern dialectic as having been retrogressive and intransigently intolerant, an attitude also assumed or perhaps adopted by some modernist Muslim commentators. This is particularly seen through the interpretation of the al Murābitūn presence in Andalus. Stroumsa says ‘The Almoravids are identified with Mālikī law, and typically (or stereotypically) described as opposed to rational speculation in all its forms’ (Stroumsa : 2009 : 9). Yet, it is also the period wherein an enormous surge of mystical thought and major figures in Muslim mysticism emerged from both the Maghrib and al- Andalus, such as, Abdullah ibn Yassin Jazouli (d.1036), Abu Jafar Ishaq Amghar (d.1060), Moulay Abu Abdellah Amghar (d.1060), Shaker ibn Yaala Dukkali (d.1060), Abu Abdallah ar-Ragragi (d.1065), Abul Fadl ibn Nahwi (d.1098), al-Qādī ‘Ayad ibn Moussa (d.1129). Levitzion (1977) sees the appropriation of Sunni Sufism by the Muwashidūn as the means by which they challenge the ‘narrow-minded Malikism’ of the Murābitūn through a ‘trend towards Sufism’ (1977 : 338). Yet Mohamed Hassan Mohamed (2012) contends that ‘.the difference between Mālikīsm and Sufism is not as substantive as the Almoravid-Almohad duel seems to suggest’ (Mohamed : 2012 : 127). Hammoudi (1999) also suggests that any transition was more a slow melding, ‘the synthesis between ‘ilm (exoteric science) and gnosis, synthesis that led the ‘ulema to mystical awareness and the Sūfis towards the quest for ‘ilm’ (Hammoudi cited by Mohamed : 2012 : 127)
To the Sufis, both early and late, Muhammad’s Koranic revelations were themselves the result of mystical experiences, and in their attempt to recreate these experiences, many Sufis would utter pronouncements that were prophetic or oracular in nature.

(Khalidi : 1985 : 70)

When understood this way, the exponency of both the Mālikī jurist and the mystic seems conjoined and these roles were often simultaneously.

Some Conclusions

In conclusion – it is hoped that this brief tracing of the rational within Muslim intellectual, philosophical and theological history provides some perspective of the Muslim mind. What emerges from this brief overlook is a persistent schism engendered by the move away from the original position of the early community. We have seen this as initially manifesting in the Khawārij position and later manifested in the position of Mu’tazilah, forming a polemic under which the Muslim discourse has laboured ever since.

In their secondary form we note two divisions in the Muslim community. The mu’tazili and the khawārij. The first make sects and divisions while the second cut off and reject the body, that is, are an elite. The first introduce the rationalist spirit into subject matter that is beyond its scope while the second rightly insists that only they are right – in the former viewpoint nobody is right. What, with the mu’tazili is right, is to be the enquirer, is an end in itself.

Historically, the mu’tazili come out of the khawārij. The khawārij make takfīr of the main body of believers. They in turn split from their original allegiance and set up a further, more extreme “correctness”. At that instant they become mu’tazili and indeed it was from their ranks that the movement emerged.

So by their nature these two impulses to deviation and sectarianism are forced to cross connect one with the other in a doomed dialectic, one which is rarely if ever recognised by its practioners.

(al-Murabit : 1982 : 5)

Once a Grecian response to Khawārij exclusivist thought had taken hold position became entrenched. Many of those who denounced the use of dialectics and
rationality, an acknowledged Greek legacy, frequently used reason itself against the ‘reasoners’. This does not detract from their critique – as in the case of al-Ghāzali who found philosophy irrelevant, yet acknowledged the effectiveness of logic. The overview also indicates that the naqli position does seem to have an affinity with the earliest community prior to the Khawārij. Do the rationalist historical trends identified constitute a degeneration in the form that Smith has outlined; codification of the sublime and a mundaneization of the sacred? How do the ‘aqli and naqli positions stand relatively vis a vis reification?

As has been outlined, philosophy is still not considered generally in a positive light in the Muslim world, a residual suspicion of the rampant speculative tradition of thought from the Eastern Muslim lands. Nevertheless, rationality, essential to philosophical pursuit, plays a central part within the average Muslim’s understanding of religion. This can be discerned largely through the recourse to rational discourse taken by the majority of scholars in addressing ‘lay’ people. The more pronouncedly negative reactions against philosophy are usually based on a confused definition of what philosophy consists of, its aims and where its roots lie (Coulton : 1996). The Malaysian traditionalist Syed Naquib al-Attas understands philosophy to stem from Western roots:

..conceived and disseminated throughout the world by Western civilization; knowledge which pretends to be real but which is productive of confusion and scepticism, which has elevated doubt and conjecture to the ‘scientific’ rank in methodology and which regards doubt as an eminently valid epistemological tool in the pursuit of truth.

(Attas : 1979 : 19-20)

Al-Attas’ depiction of the results of rational thinking could perhaps be contested in his citing this as solely a Western phenomenon, whereas its origins are arguably both
Greek and markedly augmented by Muslim thought. While there are acknowledged elements of rationalism in past Muslim intellectual history there is also evidence of this in more contemporary Muslim thought; when discussing the views held on philosophy by classical scholars, differentiating them as ‘..those not influenced by the rationalizing movements of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Islamic centuries associated with the name of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and others...’ (Nasr : 1982 : 4). Within the Muslim mind, classical or otherwise, there lurks the suspicion in the potential of philosophy to cause internal confusion and loss of faith by exceeding theological boundaries and causing doubt, ‘….most of modern philosophy is in fact kufr from the Islamic point of view’ (Nasr : 1982 : 5). Yet despite these objections to speculative philosophy and rationalizing, ironically, the names of those like al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd are nostalgically hailed as the great intellectual heroes of Islam. In fact, this intellectual tradition plays a current role in the mind of the Muslim community and there is constant harking back to a golden era of Muslim intellectual tradition. As Al Jabri says:

The dialogue surrounding this axis and the dialectical order that it implies are set between the past and future. As for the present, it is present, not only because we refuse it, but also because the past is very much present to the point that it infringes upon the future and absorbs it. Acting as the present, the past is conceived as a means to affirm and rehabilitate one’s identity.’

(al-Jabri : 1999 : 9)

Others admire the developed world’s apparent success in material wealth through its technological progress but equally reject a seemingly unfettered atheistic intellectual pursuit as leading to personal alienation and collective corruption, a view very central to the writings of Sayid Qutb and Muhammad Iqbal, both of whom have been particularly influential. The concept of ‘Islamizing’ is underpinned by the belief that the method can be disconnected from the outcome so that production and wealth
obtained through technological means is sought after as desirable. Yet the intellectual underpinnings and cause and effect are somehow seen to be mitigated by the insertion of Islam through ‘Islamizing’ the means of production, technology and banking worlds on a global scale. Whether it is possible to pursue unrestrained technological development and divorcing it from its originating modes of thought and social consequences is proving difficult to substantiate. In referring to this particular mindset al-Jabri says:

Its followers claim to support the scientific method, objectivity and “strict” neutrality. This reading insists that it is “disinterested” and “without any ideological intentions whatsoever.” The upholders of this habitus claim to be only in understanding and knowledge: if indeed they do borrow the “scientific“ method from the orientalists, they firmly reject their ideology. But when they say this, they forget, or pretend to forget, that along with the method they also adopt the vision. After all, are vision and method not inseparable?

(al-Jabri : 1999 : 12)

Summary

In this Chapter, a rationalist thread has been pursued through Muslim intellectual history. Despite an apparent aversion to speculative philosophy, viewed primarily as a western phenomenon, it would appear that this speculative tradition has held a strong presence within the history of Muslim ideas. While it may be usual to say that that western philosophy owes a large debt to Muslim civilization, another way of approaching this would be for Muslims to assume some responsibility for the contemporary dominance of rationalism and the effects thereof. Yet the antidote for this also lies within the religion of Islam and Muslims could be more conscious of transforming current paradigms, through application of the more mystical aspects of Islam. Saying that, there can be no question that despite shared aspects of rationality with medieval Muslim thought, western philosophy has evolved uniquely and in some sense to an extreme. In the last three to four hundred years, the development of
systematic doubt as a thinking tool has developed beyond anything that Muslim philosophers could have ever conceived.

Not wishing to lose sight of the question of personal authenticity, it is hoped that the reader will now be beginning to form some idea of a general orientation. This lies in an approach placing less demand for reasons, acknowledging the imponderable, recognizing the Divine as beyond human cognition and a savouring of the numinous. In the next Chapter, these will be translated into searching for an unprescriptive yet at the same time, more defined and authentic habitus within the contemporary Muslim context. Various typologies and positions within the Muslim world are compared, which though regionally based historically exemplify some of the concepts that have been discussed up to this moment. A fault line is explored between a Maghrebean, *Mālikī*, Shakirin Sufism on the one hand and a Turkish, *Hanafī* and *Mujahaddah* Sufism on the other.
Chapter 9

A Maghrebi and a Turkish Islam

The notion of a Maghrebian and Turkish Islam are connotative labels only and have been chosen as being representative of two types of ‘Muslimness’ that is emerging in the West and re-emerging in the Muslim homelands. These are by no means to the exclusion of other group such as neo-Salafīs, neo-Wahhābis, perennials and universalist-Sufis⁴⁹, to name but a few. The denotations of Maghrebi and Turkish, should not be viewed as fixed geographically based concepts corresponding to the named regional areas but rather more as dispositional, though they are attitudes that have arisen from historico-regional, socio-politico and religious influences (Nasr : 2002; Yavuz : 2004). Some of the reasons for this has been indicated from the brief historical summary of Muslim thought and is a subject ripe for full scale research in its own right. For the purposes of this essay these labels are used only as a general indication to indicate a certain attitude and approach.

The Maghrebean Way

Modern Morocco or Maghrib, which prior to concepts of the modern state was known as al-Maghrib al-‘Aqsa (the Farthest West) was a region as opposed to a ‘nation’. As Vincent Cornell (1998) points out, this region and its cultural proclivities have historically been more clearly delineated than most other regions of the Muslim world prior to the establishment of the ‘nation state’. To Morocco’s north lies the Mediterranean forming a natural barrier, as does Atlantic Ocean to the west. In the south lies the Sahara desert, yet another great geographical border. While there is no

⁴⁹ As in the Sufi Order International under the present Master Zia Inayat Khan.
naturally defined border to the east, a clearly defined political and cultural difference has existed from the sixteenth century. Despite many similarities, there remain distinct cultural modes and identities between Algeria and Morocco, something that has long been acknowledged. Turkish historical supremacy and influence in Algeria for over three hundred years did not spread to Morocco, which never came under Ottoman rule. Within this clearly defined region of Morocco, a potent mixture of cultural and historical events have resulted in it being strongly identified with Sufism and the presence of a number of famous saints (awliya) clearly attests to this.

The explicit aspects of a *Maghrebi* Islam are loosely based on three fundamentals typical of what may be termed *Idrisism*. This is based on legitimisation of the Qur’an and Hadīth and then the consensus of the community and finally *wirata*, the principle of a combined spiritual and temporal succession of leaders. The second of these; community legitimization, (based within the *Mālikī* school of thought), is the canon referred in coming to legal decisions when required, i.e., when new issues arrive that neither the Qur’an or Hadīth deal with specifically. The interpretive methodology here will primarily not take recourse to anything outside the Muslim canon as opposed to a more dialectical approach characteristic of other *madhāhib*. The canonical community consists of the fuqaha, (jurists scholars) who know the appropriate canonical texts for a given situation and the relevant legal dialectic (*furu’ al fiqh* or the branch of jurisprudence). The next level of referral is knowledge of the actions and legal decisions of the early Medinan community before and after the death of the Prophet known as ‘amal madina, (the actions of the people of Medina). Crucial to all this was the foundational knowledge and method of *usul ul fiqh* (the method or roots of jurisprudence) based upon the *al-Muwatta* (1982) of Malik bin Anas, (who
we have encountered previously in regard to the \textit{naqli} ) and the methodology thereof in the governing and application of law and establishing ritual within the community. In extension from this principle of ‘\textit{amal} the Mālikī madhab was particularly, but not solely, noted for the concept of \textit{maslahah} – or concern for the needs and benefits of a society, involving things like the knowledge of ‘\textit{urf}, (social habits and customs particular to a given culture but not contravening the principles of Muslim law) (Abdullah : 1978).

The third and last aspect of the Maghribean way is that of succession, centred around the historical events of the arrival of Moulay Idris I in the Maghreb, (hence the term \textit{Idrisism}). He was a direct descendant of the Prophet, as the great grandson of Hassan and as such accorded special respect (\textit{ahli al bayt}). Fleeing the political struggles arising from attempts to overthrow the Abbasid dominancy and with the threat of assassination he eventually found a safehaven safe in what is now modern day Morocco in 757. His arrival resulted in allegiance (\textit{bay’ah}) from the Muslim Berber tribes and acceptance of Islam by those tribes that had as yet not converted since the initial arrival of Islam in 518, thereby establishing Muslim governance in Morocco. Upon his eventual assassination in 762 by the Abbasids, his son Moulay Idris II succeeded him and eventually established a united Muslim caliphate within the Maghreb. A distinct concept of leadership evolved around both of these figures, which was consolidated particularly in Moulay Idris II who possessed the charisma of the Prophet which meant that his leadership involved both the worldly and other worldly. This relates to the spiritual legacy of Muhammadan grace (\textit{baraka}), which is believed to derive from the Prophet himself. As Vincent Cornell says ‘…Idris II is more closely associated in the hagiographical and historical record with the innate and
personal aspects of the Prophets own uswa hasana’⁵⁰ (Cornell : 1998 : 200). This ‘Muhammadan tradition of leadership’ (ibid: 200) lies in the bay’ah or pact of allegiance, which can be either spiritual or political, though ideally these two would be combined as they are perceived to have been were with Moulay Idris II. This is based on the historical pact of Hudaybah, when the companions swore fealty to the Prophet in all aspects of his leadership encompassing the inward and the outward. It is in this manner that any authority is passed on and the spiritual aspect of this authority includes baraka. Political authority is also passed on in this manner but ideally combining the both as it did with both Moulay idris I and II. The concept of baraka is both subtle and ineffable and endowed with a great deal of social and religious import. It is a type of spiritual energy in which the Divine is said to intercede in human affairs usually through the agency of individuals, places and objects but which originates in the temporal world through the auspices of the Prophet. It involves a certain aesthetic paradigm on an intellectual and emotional basis, which individuals are either granted or touched by in various degrees. The signs of baraka are a certain vibrancy, a willingness to engage and an abundance of adab (spiritual courtesy).

Other qualities of baraka are that it translates itself into the characteristic qualities of the individual or place so that different manifestations of Divine grace manifest through various people, (living and dead) or places, sometimes a combination of both (Cornell : 1998) as well being in within objects or food. As evidence of this, people will visit specific people or tombs for specific cures or the resolving of particular problems. This is the point of contention dealt with previously regarding the Wahhābi and Salafi schools of thought who see this as a major bid’ah (innovation). Classical Islam insists on its permissibility as long as the one or place being venerated is not

⁵⁰ uswa hasana meaning ‘aesthetic model’
thereby accorded the power of granting the supplicant’s favours. Similarly, the role of the living saint and the manner in which he or she is revered also courts controversy.

The ultimate source of this baraka is the Divine through the Prophet; acknowledged as the door between the Divine and the temporal world and one of the reasons why the Prophet is so greatly revered. By extension the awliya (the saints, both living and dead) are the inheritors of the Prophet and dispense baraka albeit not with the magnitude of the Prophet’s station. This sense of baraka is tangibly intertwined within the tenets of Sufism and Moroccan society combined effectively within the turuq, (the Sufi orders). The result of this is an orthodox, more earthy than esoterically mystical, classical, simultaneously urban and rural, yet literate Maghrebi Muslim position indistinguishable from Sufism (Wilson : 2003).

It is interesting that upon the arrival of al-Ghāzali’s famous work Ihya ‘Ulum ud-Din (The Revival of the Religious Sciences)51 in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, the reaction to it by the Andalusian fuquha, (invariably of the Mālikī school) condemned the books and ordered their public burning (Fletcher : 1997; Ruano : 2006). Ostensibly, one of the reasons being that, in effect, al-Ghāzali’s treatment of Islam and Sufism as separate entities requiring justification was a requirement that did not exist in the view of the maghrebi or andalusi fuquha (jurists), for whom this was component parts of one reality. Despite al-Ghāzali’s anti-rationalist stance, his ‘Eastern’ discursive and theoretical underpinnings of arguments were considered overly esoteric by the ‘praxis-oriented Islam of early Mālikīsm’ (Cornell : 1998 : 33). Additionally, the fact of al-Ghāzali’s adherence to the Shāfi’ī madhab resulted in his being prone to analogy (qiyāṣ); thereby encompassing more of an aqli as opposed to a naqli

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51 Fons Vitae and the associated Islamic Texts Society are publishing different sections of the Ihya ‘Ulum ul-Din
approach as favoured by the *Mālikī* position also played a part in these judgements. However, as in all things, the boundaries of this division are blurred as Abū ‘Imrān al-Fāsī (974 – 1039) labelled as one of the ‘most important proponent[s] of institutionalized Malikism’ but also a saint of his time (Cornell : 1998 : 35) was known to have studied under al-Bāqillānī in Baghdad who had been the student of Abū Hassan al-Ashʿarī of the *Ashʿarī* creed. Al Fāsī also learnt the *Shāfiʿī* āsūl and found that these could ‘be harmoniously combined in a Maliki environment (Cornell : 1998 : 35). On returning to Morocco and teaching his newly acquired views, he was imprisoned for his pains but eventually taught ‘his āsūl-based version of *Mālikī* jurisprudence and *Ashʿarī* theology for the remainder of his life’ (*ibid* : 35). His student, Waggāg ibn Zallū al-Lamtī (d.1053) was one of the early people of considerable influence on the *murābitūn*. Later the *Muwahidūn* (Almohades) who succeeded the *Murābitūn* in Andalusia by dint of military invasion was profoundly influenced by their founder’s shift (Ibn Tumart 1080 – 1130) from the *Mālikī* methodology to more of a *Shāfiʿī* āsūli methodology which in turn led him to the more esoteric thought of the *Shāfīite* al-Ghāzali. The clear delineation between the outer and the inner made in the *Ihyaʿ ‘Ulum ul-Din* was seen to create ‘outward legalists’ and ‘inward experience –ists’ (Murabit : 1982 : 135) which contravened the holistic aspect of Malik’s Medinan model. An example of this can be seen in the *ilm al mukashafa* (intuitive or mystical interpretation) as outlined in al-Ghāzali’s work which eventually allowed Ibn Tumart, the leader of the *Muwahidūn* to interpret verses of the Qur’an putting himself forward as the *Mahdi*, for which no contradiction was brokered. The concept of *Muʿamala*, usually denoting ‘business practice’, changes in meaning when mentioned in conjunction with *mukashafa*, which changes to referring to practical, phronesis type approaches to the refinement of character and the spiritually
enhancing. This dichotomy sums up the difference between these different perspectives of Sufism, in essence a \(\text{Sh}\ddot{\text{a}}\ddot{\text{f}}\ddot{i}\) \(\text{i}\) type of Sufism and a \(\text{M}\ddot{\text{a}}\ddot{\text{l}}\ddot{k}\ddot{i}\) type of Sufism or perhaps and East / West division of Sufism. The verses utilized by Ibn Tumart to put himself controversially forward as the \(\text{m}\ddot{\text{a}}\ddot{h}\ddot{d}\ddot{i}\) had been considered by the \(\text{M}\ddot{\text{a}}\ddot{l}\ddot{i}\ddot{k}\ddot{i}\) to be \(\text{m}\ddot{\text{u}}\dddot{\text{h}}\ddot{\text{a}}\ddot{k}\ddot{a}\ddot{m}\ddot{a}\) (solely outward interpretation) verses. In summary, we have a somewhat confusing ensemble of al-Ghāzali’s apparently anti-rationalist position, albeit theoretically expressed in a manner characteristic of Eastern Muslim rational thought combined with a more esoteric approach as opposed to the less rational and praxis based spirituality of the \(\text{n}\ddot{\text{a}}\ddot{q}\ddot{l}\ddot{i}\)-\(\text{M}\ddot{\text{a}}\ddot{l}\ddot{i}\ddot{k}\ddot{i}\) position as outlined above.

There is a homogeneous nature to the quality of relations between the spiritual master and disciple within the within the different \(\text{t}\ddot{\text{u}}\ddot{r}\ddot{u}\ddot{q}\) of Moroccan Sufism which has spilled over into general Moroccan society. The decoding of the individual disciple’s makeup and the master’s skill in addressing the particular egoistic traits to be overcome to awaken different the spiritual inspiration is not geared towards uniformity. Quite to the contrary, the creating of \(\text{r}\ddot{\text{i}}\ddot{\text{j}}\ddot{a}l\;\text{u}'\ddot{l}\ddot{l}\ddot{a}h\) (men and by extension women of Allah) in all the diversity that this entails. This is abundantly clear in the letters written by Mulay al-'Arabi ad-Darqawī (1760-1823), in the \(\text{L}\ddot{\text{e}}\ddot{t}\ddot{t}\ddot{e}r\ddot{s}\ddot{o}\ddot{f}\;\text{a Sufi Master}\) (1969) and the \(\text{D}\ddot{a}\ddot{r}\ddot{q}\ddot{a}w\ddot{i}\;\text{W}\ddot{a}y\;–\;\text{L}\ddot{e}\ddot{t}\ddot{t}\ddot{e}r\ddot{s}\ddot{o}\ddot{f}\;\text{a}\;\text{Shayk}\ddot{h}\;\text{M}\ddot{a}\ddot{w}\ddot{l}\ddot{y}\;\text{al}\;\text{Arabi}\;\text{ad}\;\text{Darqawi}\) (1981). Here we see the Sheikh (Spiritual master) address the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of individuals by presenting alternative views to their apparent spiritual dilemmas and prescribe actions designed to overcome such personal obstacles. These are expressed in a cascading mixture of direct, self effacing and at the same time rigorous tone. An example of which is provided on the occasion of being asked by a \(\text{f}\ddot{a}\ddot{q}\ddot{i}r\) (disciple or adept, literally meaning the ‘the poor one’) as to
what was the best profession for one on the spiritual path with the Sheikh replying that ‘...the great profession is leaving professions’ (Darqawi : 1981 : 119). This particular tone and manner is rather typical of the relation between Sheikh and disciple of Moroccan Sufism. A modern day example, personally witnessed, wherein a Sheikh travelling with two fuqārā arrived at a cafeteria to have breakfast where the format was a buffet style of service. The three of them went to avail themselves of the food on offer. One of the fuqārā was of a delicate nature while the other was of a heartier disposition. As was his custom, the delicate faqīr put very little food on his plate while the other served himself generously. Upon arriving back at the table to eat, the Sheikh instantly switched their plates around.

We see here an appreciation of human variance and characteristics, which is an essential ingredient of this way. The different hagiographies of the shayukh (plural for spiritual masters), the awliyā (saints or friends of God) and the fuqārā (pl. of faqīr, disciples or adepts) display an enormous diversity of character (Cornell : 1998; Burke : 1993). While fraternal cohesion is an essential ingredient, nevertheless, the peculiarities of different human characters allow for something of a dynamic and organic interpretation of Islam as a committed personal path taken in commonality with others and based in the moment as opposed to a solely textual approach to learning. This varied idiosyncratic nature was witnessed during an invocation gathering personally witnessed in North Eastern Morocco, where one of the fuqārā, whenever spiritually overcome, would loudly repeat the words ‘Tide ! Tide !’ which is the brandname of a detergent sold in Morocco. Upon asking about this, it was related that the person in question sold such detergents off a roadside cart and this was
his vendor’s cry. The Sheikh laughingly but nonetheless seriously commented that it was a call for a washing of his heart.

These traits of Maghrebi Sufism and by extension Maghrebi Islam is one wherein a vigorous orthodox shari‘a is balanced undifferentiatingly with the autonomous vagaries of an inner individual spiritual path. So all pervading is this that it influences the political and personal spheres of Moroccan society to the extent that it even legitimizes the structures of political power, (Cornell : 1998; Hammoudi : 1997). Thus…. ‘in and through the hegemony of sainthood, as has been noted, it seems logical to consider the master-disciple relationship in Sufi initiation as the decisive schema for the construction of power relations’ (Hammoudi : 1997 : 75).

The Turkish Way

There is also sufficient evidence to argue for the concept of a Turkish Islam. While concepts of baraka and the relationship between spiritual master and disciple are also very much part of Turkish Islam there are significant differences. ‘We should accept the fact that there is a specific way of being Muslim which reflects the Turkish understanding and its practices in those regions which stretch from Central Asia to the Balkans’ (Ocat : 2004 : 79).

Whereas the three fundamentals of Maghrebi Islam were firstly; Qur’an, then adherence to the community legitimization and finally wirata (combined spiritual and temporal governance); the Turkish rendition differs in the second and third aspects. In the Turkish mode, as would be expected, the Qur’an is the first point of reference, then the deliberation of the ulamā’ based on their interpretation of texts and the third aspect of the Turkish version is the relationship between a centralized state and the
Turkish Islam is forged out of various tensions existing between orthodoxy and heterodoxy within the rural and urban contexts. The orthodoxy has traditionally consisted of a powerful body of state based ulamā’ whose authority lay within its identification with political authority. For the ‘….Turkish solution to potential competition with religious power has been to incorporate, federalize and control every facet of religious life’ (Yavuz : 2004 : 221). The result being a sophisticated religious hierarchy evolving as the ulamā’ served the state, which in turn maintained and protected religious culture so that the state and Islam were different aspects of the same entity.

Although there is no formal clergy in Sunni Islam, the Ottoman ulema functioned as a class with its own distinct sense of identity and common interest and remained loyal to the state as long as they were benefiting from such loyalty. State centrism was highlighted as a result of the consolidation of the central authority and the colonial penetration in the nineteenth century.

(Yavuz : 2004 : 220)

This state led legacy, as Yavuz (2004) points out, is a Turkish Islam based around the idea of Islamiyat or ‘Islamizing’, (Yavuz uses the ‘Islamicate’ 2004 : 218) institutions, conceptual frameworks and everyday minutiae as a result of this ‘state centric culture and religion’ (2004 : 220). In tandem with this, religious attitudes are textually prescriptive; ‘….in Turkey, print Islam or textual Islam is the dominant mode’ (idem : 220). The general result is a highly structured and ritualistic religious presence, linked with the Ottoman Empire’s military apparatus, in the pursuit of a stable political life and the security of the state apparatus. Yavuz cites Ülken, a leading Turkish scholar who postulates that Turkish Islam and its Sufism is morality led, more tanzih (negative theology) as opposed to the more tashbih (proximity to God – immanence or positive theology) aspect of Islam (2004 : 219). Here the focus
is on countering the ego and disciplining it through increased piety and adherence to the moral code.

The heterodox element was the result of Islam encountering ancient shamanic and Buddhist traditions and was accepted on the basis of its ability to build on these. The Turkish nomadic conversion of the Seljuks to a more sedentary lifestyle is identified closely with this conversion process to Islam. A great deal of tension lay in the struggle typified by the Royal Court culture of entities like the Ottoman Empire and the heterodox popular culture of ordinary folk. The more heterodox Sufi movements were considered out of the pale and on the periphery of society by practices considered outside the legal boundaries of Islam.

Sufism has played an enormous role in the development of Turkish Islam on both sides of the ortho-hetero divide though even the orthodox turūg are usually characterized by a non-literal perspective wherein ‘traditions rather than doctrine define a religion’ (Yavuz; 2004: 219) and concentrates on the more fantastical and miraculous phenomena of the Sufi saints, perhaps a residual effect of the shamanic traditions.

**The Mālikī Madhhab**

Much has been said already about this particular school of thought and its methodology in previous chapters. The famous collection of the *Muwatta’* is said to be the first compilation of Hadīth52 and written by the famed Malik ibn Anas, (93 –

52 Though it is said that the *Muwatta’* significantly differs from other collections of Hadīth and should not be categorized as such.
179H), known as Imam Malik after whom the *madhhab* is named. The *Muwattā* ('the well trodden path') is the *opus magnum* of Imam Malik and is frequently mistaken for being a collection of Hadīth, whereas it is neither this nor a manual of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) as usually understood within the Muslim tradition. In fact, it combines to form more of a *corpus juris* (a body of law) as opposed to *corpus traditionum* (a record of past laws) insofar that it depicts and records the Medinan community’s legal precedents and rituals with the inherently accepted precepts and principles therein, all of which is summed up as constituting the ‘*amal* of Medina or the ‘actions of the people of Medina’. It is interesting to contrast this with the description of the *Hanafī* madhhab as *ahli ra‘iy* or ‘the people of opinion’, the former based on human action and the other on more speculative thought.

Writing of the Maliki approach, Clarke, in the introduction to his translation of al-Qayrawani’s (922-996) ‘*Kitab al –Jami*’ (literally ‘Book of Summary’ but in the English translation entitled *A Madinan View* (1999) says, ‘….it was abhorrent to the first communities [i.e., the Madinan community of the *Muwatta*’], to pose hypothetical questions’, (p15). Much of the *Muwatta*’s text is based on *mu’amalat*, (ordinary everyday transactions) and not just the devotional and seen as more grounded in active spirituality rather than prescribed actions.

There are clear links between *Maghrebi* culture, its religious aspect in *Idrisim* and the *Mālikī* madhhab, whose root source was the earliest Muslim community of Medina.

As has been asserted previously, the *Mālikī* position has possibly been misconstrued as prohibitively reactionary in being accused of a narrow fundamentalism, particularly

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53 Imam Malik was the first of the four major mujtahids, (a highly rated scholar capable of independent ruling)
in conjunction with the Mālikī fuquha position within the al Murābitūn. This alleged rigidity of the Mālikīs is frequently contradistinguished with the seemingly freethinking, historical creative trends of Muslim intellectual history. As has been argued, it seems possible that this may be a case of contemporary values being applied to a historical situation and some deconstruction of this has been attempted above and an alternative view presented; the desire to maintain a front against excessive rationalism and esotericism needs to be seen in a more objective light. Al-Jabri (1999) in speaking of the historical Mālikī presence in the region weighs in against ‘…. [attributing] some ready-made qualifiers to these jurists, such as “rigorism” and […] not to accuse them of being responsible for the “stifling of freedom of thought” (1999: 65). The fact is that some of the great Muslim mystics thought to have embodied the spiritual profundity of the Muslim sacred texts in word and deed, lived and wrote during this time. If the modern day assumptions of illiberality in the religious and cultural ethos of these eras did actually exist then how would renowned Sufi figures appear and be accepted at that time? The rejection of what was perceived as an Eastern malaise of speculation and fanciful esotericism should not be mistaken for a wholesale rejection of an inner Muslim path. The Murābitūn-Mālikī resistance to such ideas has no connection whatsoever with what have been labelled above as contemporary technists, modernists or fanatical Muslim elements; in short, the Murābitūn do not reflect the Khawārij impulse, in fact quite the reverse.

There is something in the nature of the Mālikī madhab that has parallels with the ‘neo classical’ typology identified above and existentialism. Primarily by dint of the

54 It may now be clear that the word ‘mysticism’ or ‘mystic’ used here does not refer to the ethereal or overly esoteric but rather to those dedicated to the inner expression of the outer. More on this will follow.
fact that traditional dialectical reasoning was considered inadequate in the methodology of Malik due to their stance on discursive and speculative approaches and insistence on human praxis:

...Aristotelian logic was an inadequate tool for analysing certain parts of Maliki and Hanafi legal theory, because of the heavy reliance in classical logic upon the universal syllogism, which is poorly-suited for examining propositions that pertain to the realm of probable inference. Several fundamental concepts in Maliki and Hanafi legal theory, as I will show, pertain to the realm of probable inference. Hence, later Islamic legal theorists who were tied to the mode of syllogistic thinking and absolute deduction were unable to analyse and evaluate them properly. (Abdullah : 1978 : 19)

In terms of the notion of taqlīd or the concept of adherence to one of the schools of thought; this is frequently misinterpreted to mean blind and unquestioning adherence to one of the schools of thought and settling this question of taqlīd is an important one. It is an aspect that was severely criticized by the likes of Muhammad ibn Abd’ al-Wahhāb (1703-1792), Jamal al Din Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad ‘Abdu (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865 -1935). In order to make taqlīd it is necessary to establish who is followed and what the following consists of. It directly refers to some of the issues raised in the section concerning a Maghrebi Islam and contrasted with the account of the Turkish ulamā’.

From the modernist perspective, the question of taqlīd is perceived as a blind adherence and formulates one of the main points of contention with the traditional. Yet, the muqalīd, (related to taqlīd), one who follows, must be assured of the qualifications and attitudes of a faqīh and thereupon voluntarily and autonomously decide to take on the teachings of the faqīh without reservation and without questioning. To often this is wrongly juxtaposed with ijtihād or (independent reasoning usually outside the madhhab). To some extent this is understandable,
insofar as there are verses in the Qur’an wherein taqlīd is inveighed against.\footnote{Qur’an C.5: V104-105; C17:V36; C.21:52-54; C.43:V22-24}

However, this is something of a misconception, as the taqlīd referred to in these cases refers to an unmindful adherence to core beliefs; as based solely on one’s culture and custom, etc. Whereas aspects of Muslim law and creed, do not challenge basic belief and are of such complexity that it falls out of this definition. When considering the enormous expectations and thoroughness of the faqīh’s erudition, in addition to the enormous body of accumulated wisdom, any reservations seem more akin to skepticism of a Cartesian hue.

How unfortunate is it then that the most precious and delicate of subjects: Islamic Law, is being singled out as the one thing, concerning which every person is to consider himself an authority, no matter how deficient and defunct his or her abilities may be? In fact, tragically, it is said to be his duty to access and understand the Holy Qur’an and Hadith directly by himself. The arguments of this modernist movement are being loudly voiced, evermore frequently, in masjids, university Islamic societies and Islamic events. It is a sad development that increases the Umma’s disunity in addition to sapping its energies, diverting it from many higher and loftier plateaus of religious endeavour. The truth is that if a number of undeniable facts were to be considered with reason and objectivity, it would become quite clear that taqlīd must be obligatory for the non-scholar and even for those scholars who have not acquired the lofty qualifications of a Mujtahid scholar.

(Sajaad : 2011 : 3-4)

In contrast, taqlīd or even ultimately īman (faith) in Divine existence can be seen through a Kierkegaardian lens. An acceptance of the nature of things, that no purely objective confirmation of the veracity of the accumulated deliberations of the fiqhā will ever be arrived at through some quantitative or accumulated sensory data; for that matter, even the very existence of God remains unprovable through such means. The individual makes a starkly unmediated decision, a choice not totally devoid of proof or reasoning which satisfies them, but yet an entirely conscious and fully volitive act
of commitment, far removed from a slavish adherence. It is a leap from doubt by virtue of the inherent paradox of the absurd (Kierkegaard: 1980). This is not a passive surrender of responsibility but rather a fully conscious act of responsibility (Murabit: 1982: 67).

In developing the notion of taqlīd further, it is important to look at the origins of the idea of the madhhab itself. The root of the word madhhab stems from the word dhāhabā meaning ‘he went’ and madhhab literally means ‘the way he went’ so that in the case of the madhhab al Mālikī it is ‘the way that Malik took’ and in this manner a committed adherent to the madhhab would be one who partakes of the ‘way that Malik took’. Imam Malik, nor any of the other Imams, probably never envisaged a school of thought bearing their name and we can began to appreciate the matter from a different standpoint. Taking the ‘way that Malik took’ was formerly something that one decided to undertake or something that a group of people consciously undertook.

If one were to argue that the concept of the madhhab has ‘…crystallized into a concept of academic schools’ (Murabit: 1982: 42) this is a valid observation and if the objections of current reformist attitudes refers to this then there is some merit to their argument. In actual fact, there were several different ‘ways that people took’ without the objective of forming any official schools. The criticism of the Salafīsts or Wahhābis may be valid but only in that taqlīd is wrongly misconstrued as a regional cultural custom to be adhered to or a to blind obligation to follow one’s ancestors. On the other hand, not everyone is capable of following the detailed arguments and decisions of the fuquḥā and the madhāhib. An otherwise devout Moroccan peasant or urban office worker may not necessarily have the time, the ability nor the inclination to delve into difficult matters of fiqh. In contrast, the result of people making their
own, perhaps un-informed decisions can cause social upheaval; something that can be seen to have already occurred.

Whether the original methodologies of the renowned Imams has been pristinely and rigidly preserved within the various schools of thought adorned with their names is another question. To some extent these should be expected to evolve. In particular, the Hanafī madhhab, contained largely within the geographical borders of the Ottoman Empire, has had many common borders with non-Muslim lands and therefore greater shifts and adaptations from earlier positions were required. Despite this necessary historical evolving, the madhāhib have maintained distinct characteristics and methodologies.

Ibn Rushd’s analysis of these different legal opinions indicated to me that there were patterns that recur consistently and predictably in the differing conclusions of each of the major fuquha whose opinion he treated. Hence, it appeared to me that there was a real connection between the legal theory of their schools, even though in some cases that legal theory had not been written down until generations after the death of the early fuquha.

(Abdullah : 1978 : iv)

That each madhhab has distinct characteristics cannot be disputed and most historical scholars perceive these differences as characterized from the angle of legal doctrine, either through the corpus of definitive jurist rules and decisions (furu’ ul-fiqh) or the jurisprudential principles (usul al-fiqh). In How Hanafīsm Came to Originate in Kufa and Traditionalism in Medina (1999), Christopher Melchert states that the vast majority of historians of Islamic law consider legal doctrine as the determining element in the development of the different madhāhib.

Perhaps out of all the madhāhib we can be fairly assured of the basis of the Mālikī position due to some of its earliest texts still existing:
The history of early Islamic doctrine is naturally complicated by the very uneven survival of texts. We are relatively well informed when it comes to the nascent Maliki school, particularly as it developed in Egypt and the West. On the basis of the Mudawwana of Sahnun, for example, Calder has clearly identified a stage in the formation of Maliki doctrine that focuses on Hijazi experts of the eighth century, by contrast with the sharp focus of the Muwatta' of Malik, (particularly the recension of Yahya ibn Yahya) on (1) hadith, Prophetic valued above Companion, and (2) Malik as their authoritative interpreter. For the Maliki school, then, Schacht's theory of a regional stage seems to be confirmed. (Melchert : 1999 : 320)

The Mālikī method has something of the cyclical about it for despite not denying the veracity of a Hadīth the Mālikī faqīh will not use such a Hadīth in deliberation without there being any evidence of any past practical application (‘amal) of that Hadīth. This is the basic usul or basic methodological principle of this Mālikīs. The cyclical is manifested in the fact that a) the evidence provided for the usul does emerge from Hadīth but b) only when there is corresponding ‘amal and c) the manner of establishing what the ‘amal was, is arrived at through Hadīth or the sunna of the Prophet and the early community.

The science of hadith cannot be separated from ‘amal because what is the use of a hadith if it cannot be acted upon ! Even if that hadith is acceptable, its significance is that people act on it, and it takes preference over the one that is not acted upon.

(al-Murabit : 1982 : 58)

Therefore the distinctive element of the Mālikīs lies in its connections to the actions of the people of Medina (‘amal madina) which holds great value in and of itself. The connection is evidenced in the saying of one of the early companions, Zayd ibn Thabit who said, “If you see the people of Madina adhering to a matter then know that means that it is sunna”. (Hadīth cited by Murabit : 1982 : 45). The import of Malik’s
concept of the ‘amal was that it constituted ‘a desired norm of social behaviour in Islamic society’ albeit not set out in any written theoretical form (Abdullah : 1978 : 23) so that in Malik’s fiqh, non textual sources (the ‘amal) are prioritized to the extent that he would set aside textual evidences which were not seen to have manifested in the customs of the people nor those which contradicted the ‘amal (Abdullah : 1978 : 33). As is common in all human groupings and societies there was also a variety of actions or ‘amal that could be performed in a variety of ways around a particular concept. Malik’s manner in dealing with such differences in the Muwatta’ which Sheikh Umar Faruq Abdullah refers to as ‘mixed ‘amal’ was in his characteristic phrasing; al ‘amr ‘indana or ‘that which we prefer’ which in no wise contradicts or criticises other actions but is that which Malik chooses to follow, which does not deny of the veracity of the other actions. In contrast, the methodologies, particularly of the Hanifi and Shafi’i schools of thought, rely upon accumulated analogies and previous analogical cases with established legal precedents requiring an encyclopaedic knowledge on the part of the scholars, less linked to human actions yet more based in the theoretical. A rather colourful and earthy response of the naqli scholar, Al-Shabi (d. 723) opposed to these more theoretical and speculative approaches is indicative of this, who when asked to formulate an opinion for a religious ruling replied; ‘What will you do with my opinion? Piss on my opinion’ (Melchert : 1999 : 329).

The Muwatta, then, was written at a time when the concern to ascertain the basis of authority of the law had led to its growing expression, both by the majority of scholars as well as the oppositional group as precedents established by the early Islamic authorities and by the Prophet himself. Malik’s chosen method of composing his treatise was the first to report such precedents as were known, and then to consider them, interpret them, and accept them or otherwise in the light of his own reasoning and the legal tradition of Medina. His supreme criterion was the local consensus of opinion, and there was nothing so sacrosanct about Traditions from
the Prophet or other precedents that enabled them to override this authority in cases of conflict.

(Coulson : 1964 :46-47)

The import of the Medinan connection cannot be over emphasized as there is enormous support for this position in the traditions due to the emphasis given to the excellence of its people and the baraka of the place itself, especially in light of the Prophet’s presence. For it was where Islam was established as well as the final resting place of the Prophet.

What the messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace has said about Madina as a place does not constitute mere praise for a piece of land or a group of houses. On the contrary, it is but praise for the people of that land and those houses, calling attention to the fact that these attributes shall endure in them but shall vanish from other than them.

(Qādī ‘Iyād cited by Murabit : 1982 : 44)

Whole chapters are devoted to the subject of Medina and its people in all the major classical collections of Hadīth. The fact that Imam Malik was a resident of Medina throughout his life only adds to the strength of this position within Muslim terms.

The application of Mālikī methodology within contemporary society, remains primarily founded on human actions as opposed to the theoretical. The mufti or faqīh gives their formal opinion upon a given matter of law or the legal issues within a factual everyday situation. The response of the jurists is the crucial link between theory and everyday events and through this the vital relationship between the practical and theoretical is played out. While the fuquha have always claimed their primary attachment to the basic tenets of the shari’a, modifications relevant only to the situation can occur as a result of local or current customs or even particularities of the case. This is not a change of the law but rather seen as the development of the inherent principles of the basic law in application to the ‘facticity’ and particular
circumstances of an everyday event. In this manner, the faqīh based in the Mālikī methodology takes into consideration the social and cultural factors involved to arrive at a fair judgement, which is in contrast to the faqīh who applies proofs of a textual nature from past fuqaha from different eras, geographical regions and social customs in place of immediate actuality and locality. As Dutton says, ‘the true corpus of the law is seen as being preserved not in a corpus, but in the actions, or amal of men’ (Dutton : 1999 : 3) An example of this is to be seen in modern Moroccan Mālikīsm, where the madhhab developed some features of its own while still maintaining its basic principles:

Now in Morocco, from the end of the ninth/fifteenth century onwards, ‘judicial practice’ (‘amal) as opposed to the strict doctrine of the school, found a recognised place in the system, and it was set down in special works. The later Maliki school in Morocco took more notice than the other schools of law of the conditions prevailing in fact, not by changing the ideal doctrine in any respect, but by recognising that the actual conditions did not allow the strict theory to be translated into practice, and that it was better to try and control the practice as much as possible than to abandon it completely, thus maintaining a kind of protective zone around the shari‘a. Later Maliki doctrine in Morocco upheld the principle that “judicial practice prevails over the best attested opinion”, and it allowed a number of institutions rejected by strict Maliki doctrine. This Western Maliki ‘amal is not customary law; it is an alternative doctrine valid as long as it is felt advisable to bring custom within the orbit of shari‘a, and it mirrors, on a different plane, its predecessor, the ‘amal of Medina. (Schacht : 1964 : 61-62)

The Hanafi madhhab

In its being closely identified with differing ruling dynasties, particularly the Seljuk and Ottoman, the Hanafi madhhab was able to extend far away from the central Muslim heartlands into areas like the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia (Turkey), Khurasan, Transoxania, and Afghanistan and even into China. Its influence in these areas is still strongly evident.
The Hanafī school of thought is named after its founder Abu Hanifa an Nu’man ibn Thabit (699 -767). He is primarily known for the systemization of the theoretical in the technicalities of legal thought and is accredited with being the first to organise the writing of *fiqh* under various categories and sub headings (Haddad : 2007). His method is considered by many to have been more highly refined, with a broader base and more thorough than his contemporaries, one of who would have been Imam Malik. On the other hand, Schacht rather controversially postulates that: ‘A high degree of reasoning, often somewhat ruthless and unbalanced, with little regard for practice, is typical of Abu Hanifa’s legal thought as a whole’ (1964 : 45). Though there are no extant manuscripts by Abu Hanifa himself which outline his legal perspective nor those expounded upon by his leading students; Muhammad al Shaybani and Abu Yusuf of whom Schacht says: ‘…the doctrine of Abu Yusuf often represents a reaction to Abu Hanifa’s somewhat unrestrained reasoning, although, in diverging from his master, he occasionally abandoned the more perspicacious or more highly developed doctrine’ (Schacht : 1964 : 45).

The Hanafīs were at one time closely associated with the Mu’tażila (Stern : 2012) and in direct opposition to the Ash’arites which is evident in the context of the renowned Shāfi’ī and Sufi, al-Qushayri and the events surrounding his life in Khurasan:

After the city fell under the control of the powerful Saljuq dynasty in 429/1038 al-Qushayri was embroiled in the struggle between the rival scholarly factions of Hanafites and Shafi’ites which competed with one another for ideological ascendancy. In 436/1045 al-Qushayri asserted his position as the leading spokesman of the Shafi’ite-Ash’rite party of Nishapur by issuing a manifesto in defence of its orthodoxy. His advocacy of Ash’arite theological tenets aroused the ire of its Hanifite opponents. When the powerful
Saljuq vizier ‘Amid al-Mulk al-Kunduri threw in his lot with al-Qushayri’s Hanafite-Mutazilite opponents, he was arrested …

The Hanafīs were also closely linked with the Ottoman Empire and its expansion from which there evolved an extremely complex and codified system of law due to the exercise of the Ottoman state across a range of different cultures and lands. In the early sixteenth century under Selim I (1512 – 1520) and Suleyman I (1520 – 1560) installed the Hanafi madhab, ‘which had always been the favourite of the Turkish people’ (Schacht : 1964 : 88) as the effective and systematized administration of justice and civil affairs within the vast Empire. Ottoman Turkey was the only country to have codified the shari‘a to the extent that it became the official law of the state. In establishing and maintaining this they provided a ‘uniform training of scholars and kadi and organized them in a graded professional hierarchy’ (Schacht : 1964 : 90).

Out of this grew the position of the Grand Mufti who was at the head of the trained and schooled qādis. This position became one of the highest offices of state responsible for seeing the sacred law upheld throughout the Ottoman lands and overseeing the qādis. The efficacy of this legal and administrative system is renowned and contributed greatly to the growth and cultural flowering of the Ottomans. For this reason, the Hanafī madhab can be said to be the fiqh of large scale governance and Empire. Not only was authority given to the trained qādis in all legal matters but they were also given charge of the supervision of public morals aided and supported by the subashi or police set up to carry out their decree on a given matter.

The degree and role of speculative thought (ra‘y) within the Hanafī madhab can be identified in one of the earliest books of Hanafī fiqh currently known; the scholar, al-Gassas set out an argument against those who criticized the use of rational argument.
by turning it back to its critics.

The best proof of this necessity is that one who denies the validity of rational argument is himself obliged to resort to reason to justify his denial. This assertion, which is typical of the ahl al-‘ilm wa-l-nazar argumentation against traditionalism and skepticism, appears in the chapter entitled Al-qawl fi wugub al-nazar wa damm al-taqlid, which precedes the chapter on qiyas. The chapter continues with a critical analysis of the notion of 'ilm, which strangely recalls early Mutazili arguments.

(Bernand : 1985 : 625)

**Mujahaddah and Shakirin Approaches to Sufism**

We have already dealt somewhat with al-Ghāzali above; we know that he was of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab and closely aligned with the Ash‘arī position and a major opponent of the Mu‘tazilah. We have also seen that in the eyes of the earlier Mālikī scholars particularly those aligned with the Murābitūn but also prior to that, he was regarded as embodying an ‘Eastern’ approach. In terms of spiritual teaching, one of al-Ghāzali’s main spiritual teacher’s (Sheikh) was Abu Ali Farmadi at-Tusi (d. 1055), whose spiritual line descends from the Siddiqiyah, (i.e., from the line of Abu Bakr Siddiq, one of the foremost companions of the Prophet). This lineage is significant as it was also the line which later evolved to Muhammad Baha‘udin Shah Naqshband Bukhari, (1318 – 1389) who was the founder of the Naqshabandi tariqa, which similar to the Hanafī madhhab, geographically pertained to the Seljuk and Ottoman domains around the central Muslim heartlands into areas like the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia (Turkey), Khurasan, Transoxania, and Afghanistan and even into China.

The Shādīlīyya way was founded by the Moroccan Abu Hassan Ash-Shādīlī (1175 – 1258) and was centred mainly within North and Saharan Africa and is descended through the Alawiyya line of spiritual transmission (i.e. through Alī Ibn Abī Talīb, the
young cousin of the Prophet) and through the Qādirīyyah spiritual chain of
transmission (silsīla) founded by Sheikh Abdul Qādir Jilani (1077-1166). In both
cases, the geographical origins were long ago transcended and yet the contemporary
manifestation of these turūq (plural of tariqā – path, order or way) retain some
flavour of the intellectual and theological nuances of the cultural environment that
they were founded in.

Most Muslim scholars declare that in essence; there is little that divides either the
madhāhib or for that matter the turuq. While this is acknowledged there are
nonetheless, some differences and distinctions made between the way of spiritual
exertion (mujahadah) and the way of gratitude (shukr). An example of the latter an be
seen in the writings of al-Lamti (2007) in reporting the words and responses given
under the tutelage of the famous Moroccan sheikh, Sidi Abdul ‘Azziz ad-Dabbagh
d.(1718). The way of gratitude, usually identified with the Shādilīs, encompasses a
less strident yet full and ecstatic disposition of gratitude to Allah. While the
mujahadah way, frequently paired with the more Ghāzalian Naqshbandi approach,
focuses more on rigorous spiritual exercises. The Shādilī tend to the more ecstatic in
the performance of the hadra, a rhythmical communal swaying to and fro in rhythm to
particular litanies and inspired poetry, while the Naqshbandis are more prone to the
more contained and silent dhikr. Al-Lamti describes this as the original way of the
early Muslim community and the fact that he was Shādilī has to be kept in mind. In
the way of gratitude, the way of the early community a thankful disposition in every
moment brought people to high spiritual stations. Thereafter, with the best of
intentions, people aimed for these high spiritual states and set out to gain these
through rigorous spiritual exercises. The original aim was proximity to Allah and the
Prophet in thought, word and deed and any spiritual openings were by-products,
whereas the later ones aimed at spiritual states and stations. Both ways are recognized as correct and yet in the perhaps biased view of al-Lamti, the way of *shukr*, (i.e., the *Shādīlī*) is the more authentic. The stress is said to be more on the cultivation of the inward and therefore great acts of enduring worship are not considered of primary concern and normal, eating drinking and enjoying of life in the continual and constant awareness (*hudur*) of the Divine Presence arrived at through gratitude.

….. to be attached to the Real (al-Haqq) Most Glorious and Exalted; keeping ever at His door; taking refuge in Him with every motion and rest; fleeing from the moments of inattention that intersperse those of presence, and in short, disciplining oneself to hold ever fast to Allah Mighty and Majestic, and persisting therein—even though one is not engaged in a great deal of outward worship.

(al-Lamati : 2007 : 60)

Spiritual openings can be sudden and not especially sought after. This to be contrasted with the spiritual strivings, often deprivations, undergone by *mujahadah* approach which focuses on the experiences obtained through such strivings and in a sense, these spiritual openings are obtained through secondary means.

The Naqshabandi order, as we have seen, distinguished itself historically by an emphasis on sober adherence to the shari‘ah as the indispensable concomitant of the spiritual path.

(Algar : 1990 : 43)

Again it must be stressed that there is a great deal of overlap here and it should not be understood to suggest that the other *turuq*, in particular the *Qādirīyyah* or the *Shādīlī* are in any way less exacting in their adherence to the *shar‘ria*. The one may be said to be based on disposition and the other on adherence.

A well-known contemporary *tariqa* situated in and around Turkey and Syria is the Naqhshbandi – Haqqani path headed by Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani. In a website dedicated to his teachings and under the subheading ‘About the Most Distinguished
Naqshabandi Way’ the following is taken:

The most distinguished Naqshbandi Order is the way of the Companions of the Prophet and those who follow them. This Way consists of continuous worship in every action, both external and internal, with complete and perfect discipline according to the Sunnah of the Prophet. It consists in maintaining the highest level of conduct and leaving absolutely all innovations and all free interpretations in public customs and private behavior. It consists in keeping awareness of the Presence of God, Almighty and Exalted, on the way to self-effacement and complete experience of the Divine Presence. It is the Way of complete reflection of the highest degree of perfection. It is the Way of sanctifying the self by means of the most difficult struggle, the struggle against the self. It begins where the other orders end, in the attraction of complete Divine Love, which was granted to the first friend of the Prophet, Abu Bakr as-Siddiq.

(Naqshabandi-Haqqani Sufi Order of America : 2011 : 1)

This can be contrasted with a text from another well known and contemporary tariqa originating in Morocco, the Qādirī al-Boūtchīchī and highly characteristic of the Shādīlī way. The following is taken from the spiritual ‘will’ of the preceding sheikh, Sidi al-Hajj al-Abbas al-Qādirī al-Boūtchīchī, shortly before his death, which similarly indicates something of this way.

Thus my relationship with you is rather a spiritual teaching based on:

a) Companionship in Allah
b) Love for his sake
c) Gathering for his remembrance
e) Seeking the madam (assistance) of the Messenger of Allah


Summary

In summation up to this point, inauthenticities within contemporary Muslim discourse have been identified through the application of social theories and reification. Rationalism has been identified as constituting a possible root cause for inauthenticity. To understand the effects of this within contemporary Muslim
discourse, the development of rationalism within Islam’s intellectual history has been also been traced and argued as constituting a possible basis for potential inauthenticities. Following on from this, a ‘Turkish’ Islam has been contrasted with a ‘Moroccan’ Islam where it is postulated that the prolonged encounter with rationalism in the East has resulted in a more speculative philosophical tradition resulting in a more structualised, theoretical approach to Islam, (i.e. Turkish). Being less exposed to the speculative philosophies and esotericism prevalent in the East, the Greek sciences had longer to root and bear their own fruits unimpaired by the likes of the neo-Platonic influences in the Western; i.e.; Moroccan intellectual tradition. It was demonstrated that this Western Islam places more emphasis on praxis as opposed to the more theoretical approaches of the East.

On the back of all that has gone before, in the next Chapter we now turn to more of a philosophical approach to enquire into and survey the binary opposition of inauthenticity and authenticity within a more Sufic mode, though this will not always be made explicit.
Chapter 10

Living Without Why

Heidegger’s critique of Western metaphysics (and metaphysics generally) affords a deeper perspective of the effects of rationalism and leads on to the question of personal authenticity. Though the ontologies under which Heidegger and Ibn ‘Arabi lived under are decidedly different, both are primarily philosophers of Being. While the modernist paradigm was not the context under which the medieval Muslim mind functioned, the codification of belief, under the yoke of rationalism, was something that Ibn ‘Arabi was concerned with. Hence, the propensity to rationalise and codify should be seen as less a question of Western metaphysics and more of a universal human tendency.

The main focus here will be on a series of lectures by Heidegger published under the title, The Principle of Reason (1996) focusing on Leibniz’s principio rationis wherein ‘nothing is without reason’ (nihil est sine ratione) or ‘nothing is without ground’. Heidegger sees the principio rationis as the over-determining of a concept unformulated prior to Leibniz, yet present in that epoch and eventually evolving into the foundation of Western metaphysics. In short, this is the demand that a rationale or a reason be brought forth for whatever is held to be true. Heidegger holds this to be of great historical importance, in that this metaphysical tradition has mistakenly located the essence of ground in the idea of a fundamental principle, to enormous effect on a global scale.

56 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 1646 – 1716 was a famed polymath of enormous influence. He is one of the great rationalists in the History of Philosophy having made an immense contribution to modern logic and analysis. He is equally famed in the History of Mathematics and invented calculus and the binary system.
Critique of Axiomatic Structure

Heidegger understands a principle as that which is the base for a series of propositions deriving their origin from that principle. The problem is identified as lying in the very nature of forming an initial, general principle designed to be the fundament of any subsequent propositions. Essential to this, would be a definition of the word ‘principle’, as well as ‘ground’ or ‘fundamental’ and yet there is no definition for these words within the *principio rationis*. While the *principio rationis* may be the ground for all other principles, what grounds of definition is it based upon?

The proposition must be ‘something’, in relation to ‘nothing is without reason / ground’ so according to its own definition it too must have a grounding. Yet, as ‘the first principle’ nothing should come before it and so it thereby negates itself. The alternative would be an infinite regress for each progressive grounding for a ground would require a ground itself. What is hereby revealed is that every beginning, every first principle is nothing of the kind but involves some kind of initial arbitrary assumption.

Leibniz also formulated that ‘for every truth a reason can be given’ which is known as the ‘principum reddendae rationis’. Heidegger etymologically roots out the meaning establishing that *reddere* means ‘to give back’ rendering the *principum* as ‘for every truth a reason must be given back’. The notion of ‘giving back’ gives rise to Heidegger asking three questions (1996 : 118), paraphrased here:
a) *If the principum claims to be the grounding principle for every other ground then on what grounds does the principum itself lie upon? What does it give back?*

b) *Why is there a constant imperative for grounds to be given for every occurrence, truth or thing?*

c) *Why presume that any ground must be given back?*

One apparent cause in the presumption that grounds are provided for every proposition, may have arisen as a result of some confusion as to the manner of being in the world. The Cartesian ontology separates the ‘knowing’ mind from the ‘unknowing’ body. In some form or other this lays stress on the human as observer on one side and the rest of the universe on the other. The physical body of the observer and the world it inhabits is somehow inferior to knowledge derived from observation. This observing and knowing ego is perceived as an ethereal and worldless entity with the only means of relating to the world is through interacting via mental judgements and concepts. In this manner, it is reassuring to the ego when reason (or ground) is fed back (*reddere*) to guarantee to the ego that its interpretations and representations are real and correct. Heidegger points out that the *reddere* not only refers to the knowledge of the world but that all experience, even the emotional, demands a reason. This constant demand for reasons and grounds being delivered to the thinking subject easily subjects human beings to limitations formed by prevailing common attitudes. Heidegger sees the widespread upheaval in the human condition as having resulted from the *principum* in that our continual demanding for grounds ultimately reveals us as groundless and rootless. Thinking is employed for the purposes of ‘demanding reason’ and reduced to the ‘calculative’ resulting in the predominance of mathematical-technical sciences. We come full circle with
seventeenth century philosophy; ‘The common denominator was the confidence that each man was a rational individual who could arrive at autonomy in his intellectual, social, religious and emotional life. Mathematics was considered as the chief tools of reason’ (May : 1996b: 23).

However, an alternative is provided. The structure of fundamental principle as the block upon with all following propositions built upon it is known as an ‘axiomatic system’. However, Heidegger revives an Ancient Greek understanding of the word ‘axioma’ as coming from the verb ‘axio’ meaning to value or appreciate something by virtue of it standing forth as something remarkable of itself, independently of any human evaluation. Thus the axiom provides a vantage point by virtue of its standing forth of itself from out of which other things are perceived. Heidegger understands Euclid’s Axiom Theory as more of an objective luminosity shedding light on related phenomena as opposed to the traditional understanding of two similar things being similar to a third rendering them all similar to one another and thereby constituting a proposition. By this, human thought is enabled to see what these objects mean in the light of that particular axiom and what other further undisclosed meanings exist in the light of that axiom.

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57 Heidegger analysis of German and Greek words becomes more than just an instrument of his thinking but rather a major element of his thought. He finds long buried or eroded meanings in words that bring ideas to life. But not just that – it also actively demonstrates that the erosion of meanings is a manifestation of the erosion of Western thought. Additionally, Heidegger created a particular style of language in his philosophising based on this etymologising tendency. His use of neologisms has been a controversial issue and one of the mainstays of Heidegger’s critics, whilst others proclaim his style as significant which causes the reader to reflect deeply rather than blithely skim over the text. Ibn ‘Arabi and his spiritual successors were and still are very prone to this within the Arabic language.
Heidegger’s Without Why

Western philosophers have tended to perceive mystics as irrational whereas Heidegger often expressed the view that the mystics were ‘astoundingly clear’ and expounded views characterized by ‘extreme sharpness and depth of thought’. True mysticism is considered as rising above and transcending both the rational and irrational. (Heidegger: 1996: 35-36; Caputo: 1986). Heidegger utilizes a poem by the mystical poet Angelus Silesius in direct contrast to Leibniz’s assertion that nothing is without why. Angelus Silesius’ poem is as follows (cited by Caputo: 1986: 61)

*Ohne Warum*

_Die ros’ist ohn’ warum, sie bluhet weil sie bluhet_  
_Sie acht’t nicht ihrer selbst, fragt nicht, ob man sie siehet._

_Without Why_

The rose is without why, it blossoms because it blossoms  
It has no care for itself or whether it is seen.

The poem seems to stand in direct contradiction to Leibniz’s principle that ‘Nothing is without why’ whereas Angelus Silesius seems to counter; ‘The rose is without why’. Heidegger argues that the common sense interpretation would be to establish the poem as being in error, but that our obstinate rationalising blinds us to the subtler meanings within the poem (Caputo: 1986). Common sense dictates to us that the rose blooms as a result of different climatic and soil conditions and therefore has very much of a tangible ground upon which it is based. Heidegger counteracts this by stating that the poem never says that the rose is not without grounds but that it is
without why. ‘The rose has a ground but it does not consider (achtet nicht) nor does it question (fragt nicht) it.’ (Caputo : 1986 : 62)

Heidegger no longer perceived Leibniz’s *principum* in the same way but rather sees it as an oracular expression of Being unfolding within the Western tradition. Being speaks through Leibniz almost in the sense of an oracle and what Heidegger hears is a profoundly simple, even primordial statement, differing significantly from the original interpretation, (Caputo : 1986). Heidegger sees Being as standing forth and disclosing itself though not having been properly listened to due to the fact that we are often thoughtless about things either familiar or close to us, as in the matter of existence itself. Heidegger hears in the *principum* ‘Nothing is without ground’ differently as ‘no thing has no ground’ now more of an assertion rather than a negation, the assertion being that ‘Nothing (i.e. Pure Being) has no ground. ‘Nothing’ highlights its opposite, for it can be seen to reveal ‘something’ by the fact that there is anything at all (i.e. a being) to experience the nothing indicates that there is a being. 58 The relation of *Nothing* to Being means that the *principum* is stating the opposite to what may seem its obvious initial interpretation, i.e. that in fact there is no ground to No-thing, like Siliseus’ rose it simply is and is without a grounding or a why. This does not mean that Heidegger disregards the concept of ‘grounding’ completely or that *dasein* has no base in the world. The individual project is the ‘world’ or the sphere wherein one projects oneself and one’s possibilities are realised and it is in this arena that the Principle of Ground as simply understood does holds relevance to some extent. Heidegger explains this in stating that it is only in the enlightenment of the *dasein* as to its own transcendence to the world that the Principle really holds forth.
the concealed meaning (Caputo : 1986). How? *Dasein* creates the foundation for itself in which it interacts with the world and the beings within that world but within that world there is no true grounding. The only true ground lies in the transcendent Being over all other existence but this only comes to light through the thought awareness of the *dasein*:

Thus we see that the birthplace of the Principle of Sufficient Ground lies neither in the essence of the assertion nor in its truth, but rather in ontological truth, i.e. in transcendence itself.

(Heidegger : 1969 : 122)

**Ibn ‘Arabi’s *Taqyid wal Hasr* (Limiting and Restricting)**

Though Ibn ‘Arabi does not dismiss the appropriate use of rationality, he is disparaging of this in matters pertaining to the Divine, seeing them, in effect, as nothing more than mental edifices in a vain attempt to appropriate Absolute Reality, ‘When a person rationally considers God, he creates what he believes in himself through his consideration. Hence, he considers only a god that which he has created through his own consideration’ (Ibn ‘Arabi cited by Chittick : 1989 : 62). These ‘Gods of Belief’, as Chittick (2005) refers to them, are built up around the disposition and tendencies of the individual and have something of the idolatrous. ‘In effect, everyone worships himself, because what we worship is what we conceptualize, grasp, believe and understand (Chittick : 1989 : 113). In fact, God is known only by the fact that He is not known ! […..] The knower of God does not transgress his own level. He knows that he knows that he is one of those who do not know’, (Ibn ‘Arabi cited by Chittick : 1989 : 154). The main inadequacies of speculative thought and the rational faculties in approaching the Divine lies in three areas:
1. Finitude

The finitude of the being compared with the infinitude of Being (God) renders the reasoning faculty woefully inadequate.\(^{59}\) Even then, Ibn ‘Arabi asserts that the Absolute Reality is even beyond descriptions of infinitude. However, the majority of people especially the philosophers, the scholars and thinkers randomly seize upon some relatively minute droplet from a ‘An Ocean without a Shore’\(^{60}\) delineating it as the Real, to the exclusion of anything else using these to form theories, world views, epistemologies and paradigms around this fixed concept of God based around their personal inclinations. Whereas the Real is not definable but is *sirr* (secret), not by dint of it needing to be kept esoterically hidden but secret by dint of its indefinability and inexpressibility.

2. The Constant Flux of the Real and *Différance*

Everything is in *tanawwû* or in constant flux (Almond : 2004 : 17) and nothing ever remains beyond the instant, nor is ever repeated ‘because of the Divine Vastness’ (Ibn ‘Arabi cited in Chitick : 2004 : 104 - 105) and ‘God never discloses Himself in a single form to two individuals, nor in a single form twice’ (Ibn ‘Arabi quoting Abu Talib al-Makki cited by Chittick : 1989 : 105; Almond : 2004 : 17). Attempting to select one instant using it to describe The Real is what Ibn ‘Arabi equates to an attempt at fettering of the change and flux, to hold it still, (*ahli ‘aql wa taqyid wa hasr* – the people of binding, limiting and restricting; Ibn ‘Arabi cited in Izutsu : 1993 : 31). ‘To describe God is to restrict Him; to predicate his Essence is to constrain

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\(^{59}\) This is aptly summed up in one of the famous aphorisms of the Kitab al Hikam of Ibn Ata’illah, ‘What a difference between what He brings to you and what you present to Him!’ (Ibn Ata’illah : 1973). Ibn Ata’illah was one of the spiritual successors of Ibn ‘Arabi.

Him. Whoever practices theology, in effect, forces God to repeat Himself, again and again, imposing a banality and a predictability upon God’ (Almond : 2004 : 18).

Almond sees similarities in Derrida’s approach to the polysemic nature of text and that it is never interpreted in the same way by different people or in the same way by the same person. It is important to bear in mind that ‘text’ need not only refer only to literature. Almond (2004) points out that the unrepeatability aspect for Derrida lies in the unknown fate of the text, i.e., who will read it and what will they make of it and how will it be used; ‘…there are only contexts without any centre of absolute anchoring’, (Derrida cited in Almond 2004 : 21). Thus the possibility of infinite meanings of the text is linked to the limitless contexts that are possible. Also, in Derrida’s view the interplay of presence and absence, (as in différance) in each event of reading interpretation and the infinite number of outcomes and interpretations that can ensue from this has strong similarities with Ibn ‘Arabi. In Derrida’s view there is a constant deferral of fixed meaning as the tensions of differences that determine one thing or another are in constant flux, a perpetual playing between presence and absence that never allows for a final definitive meaning to be chained down.

3. The Paradox of Concurrent Immanence (tashbīh) and Transcendence (tanzīh)
Ibn ‘Arabi includes both the Mu’tazilah (positive theology) and the Ash’arites (negative theology) in their differing attempts to intellectualize a limit to the unlimitable and that the unknowability of the Divine can be reduced to some binary opposition. In the eyes of Ibn Arabi the truth of this lies elsewhere, in that both Immanence and Transcendence co-exist simultaneously, ‘If you insist on His

In some ways it and in some way it is not and it is indescribable, the Syadvada.
transcendence, you restrict Him, and if you insist only on His Immanence, you limit Him’; (Ibn ‘Arabi: 1980: 75)

Almond (2004) sees similarities with Derrida’s thought insofar as he also was wary of such counterpoising and in his deconstruction is always able to perceive that there is some obscured hierarchy of values, privileging one side as above the other for theoretical justification or ideological reasons. This was demonstrated previously to some extent in Bewes (2002) use of Derridean deconstruction of the concept of reification (see p.81 above). Derrida’s has a nugatory perception of such oppositional duality, finding a meaningless, almost childish, mutual dependence on the opposite concept to negatively define itself. In demonstrating this, Almond poses transcendence as against immanence which ultimately ‘can only pretend to meaning through contrast with their opposites – in other words, the immanent can only be understood as the non-transcendent’ and *vice versa* (Almond: 2004:25). What is finally at stake here is the question of the paradoxical and clearly both Ibn’Arabi and Derrida welcome the presence of paradox against stucturalism, something of an anathema to the rationalist mindset. The Divine Reality or Absolute Reality is, in the eyes of the Akbarian, an enormous paradox that is to be accepted and welcomed and yet it brings on a perplexity, also welcomed; as Ibn ‘Arabi pleads, ‘My Lord, Increase my perplexity concerning you’ (Ibn ‘Arabi: 1980: 79).

In concluding this section, it is relevant to consider the major differences between the medieval mystic and the Philosophers of the Moment, who tend to negate universal theories or logicentricism. The nature of the metaphysics that Ibn ‘Arabi functioned under was different on a number of levels from the metaphysics which Heidegger has addresses above. The medieval metaphysics, particularly the one embodied by Ibn
‘Arabi, as opposed to theorized, was not the axiomatic structure that Heidgger challenges. Ibn ‘Arabi’s speaks of visions and dreams replete with experiential immediacy – with no trace of Cartesian objectivism. He did not believe, he knew and by this knowledge he did. As Claude Abbas says, Ibn ‘Arabi underwent ‘…visions, dialogues with the dead, ascensions, mysterious encounters in the imaginal world, miraculous journeys in the celestial spheres (Abbas : 1993 : 36). There is no apparent structure to what Ibn ‘Arabi records and as Ian Almond notes the purpose of this seemingly haphazardly recording of thought, (organized more systematically after his death) is ultimately to do away with it; ‘…the intricate, hierarchical system that Ibn ‘Arabi has constructed must be understood as a very Wittgensteinian ladder, one which can be kicked away out from under one’s feet after it has been climbed’ (Almond : 2004 : 14). At the same time, Coates (2002) suggests that the categorization of concepts has not been meant to be totally abandoned but recognised for having their place, function and limitations. Coates describes the Akbarian approach as a ‘dispositional ontology’ (2002 : 12) insofar as it has ‘a kind of tolerance, openness and metaphysically inspired generosity of outlook’ (2002 : 13). Coates quotes Ibn ‘Arabi ‘the person of knowledge (‘arif) does not get caught up in anyone form of belief’ (2002 : 14). The dispositional ontology entails primarily a metaphysics which fully acknowledges the perspectival, conditioned and relative’ (2002 : 15) and we are reminded again of the Syādvāda and différance for everything has its value and its place as within this metaphysic several different paradigmatic discourses, that on some levels may even seemingly discordant, may take place.
Knowledge of the Self

Undoubtedly, the pursuit of self-knowledge is essential to the concept of authenticity and Ibn ‘Arabi frequently asserts that the only way of knowing the Absolute is for us to know ourselves. In obtaining self-knowledge there is a distinguishing and shedding of accrued attitudes and dispositions that hinder our view of the primordial self yet in arriving at knowledge of the self one comes upon the Immutable and Absolute (Ibn ‘Arabi : 1976). From both the existential and Muslim point of view this is an ontological difference relationship between being / Being or created / Creator.

Alienation from the self, perhaps one symptom of inauthenticity is something that Heidegger believes both can only be overcome ontologically. The ‘ontological difference’ is a major feature of Heidegger’s thinking and is best summed up in Wittgenstein’s saying, ‘How extraordinary that anything should exist! How extraordinary that the world should exist!’ (Wittgenstein : 1993 : 40). Heidegger establishes that ‘Being’ is distinct from existents or ‘being’ (or ‘beings’).

In Heideggerian terms; the word ‘Being’ is that which supersedes all existence including ‘beings’. From here on, ‘Being’ and ‘being’ will be differentiated by the use of lower case and higher case usage of the initial letter and dropping the quotation marks; with being referring to existent individual human lives yet only under the context of Being. However, in denoting beings, Heidegger also uses the term dasein and rarely uses ‘man’, ‘woman’ or ‘human’ in his writing. Nor should we understand either being or dasein as merely denoting human lives (existents) but also a ‘a pure expression of being’ (Heidegger : 1985 : 171), as an ‘existence’ embodying human potential or elsewhere as a ‘clearing’ wherein Being can emerge (Heidegger : 1962 : 133). The word dasein stresses the connection with ‘Sein’ (i.e., Being). ‘The essence
of *dasein* lies in its existence’ (Heidegger : 1962 : 62).

Each *dasein* has their own attributes and ‘facticity’ given to them in a given world context wherein their unique possibility of grasping experience is presented; the choice of attitudes and dispositions or the option of letting these pass. The notion of *dasein*’s individuality as a *dasein* amongst others lies in taking possession of or recognizing one’s uniqueness. *Dasein* has the option of covering this uniqueness, despite its knowing itself to be different from other entities by choosing to avoid this responsibility, portraying itself as just another item in the world and conforming to mass conventions and pressures. For Heidegger *dasein* stands before two options – *authenticity*, a being conscious of its acceptance of its self and *inauthenticity*, one who conforms to conventional attitudes and behaviour and an unthinking participant in the ‘public realm’.

Heidegger admires the early pre-Socratic philosopher, Paramenides, due to his conviction that the question of Being and its relation to thought indicates a unique and extraordinary relation between beings and Being. Since the Socratic age there has been a move away from asking *what Being is* to questions defining *what beings are*. Whether or not there is a clear direct answer to the question, ‘What is Being ?’ is a matter of some vulgarity for Heidegger, As we have seen, the idea that everything must have an answer is not going to allow any clearing for Being to manifest. Heidegger asserts that beingness is only and always *within and under the context of* Being and as he says ‘a being is never without Being’ (Heidegger cited in George : 2000 : 22). As Being transcends every being and being is dependent upon it for its existence, the temptation to equate this with an omnipotent, omniscient Divinity is
hard to resist yet there is nothing more than a likeness in the relationship.

The Nothing

One way that Heidegger approached the matter of Being was to formulate the question ‘What about the nothing?’ (Heidegger : 2002 : 95) as opposed to the more direct ‘What is the nothing?’. Meister Eckhart, the German mystic frequently referred to and quoted by both Heidegger and Derrida (Caputo : 1986; Almond : 2004), stressed the absolute dependency of creatures upon God and saw creatures as consisting of ‘absolutely nothing’ and ‘pure nothing’ (Clark : 1957 : 173) and compares being in relation to Being as comparable to the way that air holds light, it does not own it rather it is bestowed upon it by the sun. The air is nothing in itself except by virtue of its being bestowed upon.

The ‘nothing’ in this case should not be understood to indicate the null and void and Heidegger points out that we deny the concept if we think of it as such for ‘nothing’ is. ‘Nothing’ usually arises out of taking the totality of something and then negating it, so that the concept of ‘nothing’ arising out of the function of negation, whereas Heidegger sees the ‘nothing’ as a thing experienced and encountered in challenging our sense of ‘what is’ and thereby detaches us from the sphere of things. What is this experience? Heidegger believes that this can occur within boredom and anxiety. Daily existence can result in the individual becoming lost in the complexity of their lives. One is confronted by the ‘all’ insomuch as it is a lacking – a ‘nothing’, an ontological occurrence wherein the totality of our lives can be illumined before us and revealed to be without meaning. This experience of the ‘nothing’ highlights its opposite and can be seen to be revelatory of ‘something’, namely a being to experience the nothing.

The ‘nothing’ is encountered through boredom or anxiety and not through the any
functioning in any logical sense whatsoever. In this sense, Heidegger sees the ‘nothing’ as a process that only can only occur within the being. In and through anxiety we experience that the being is. ‘In the clear night of the Nothing of anxiety the original manifestation of being as such first arises: that they are beings – and not nothing’ (Heidegger : 2002 : 103). The being or object stands out like a star on a clear, dark night to a backdrop of nothingness. Heidegger sees this as further indication that the nothing and being are inextricably linked, as the nothing actually constitutes the essence of being and Nothing is Being itself, especially seen when the word is changed to No-thing; as Being is not a thing.

Later Heidegger wrote of Ereignis, a sort of self-disclosure and self-concealing of Being, which he claimed has occurred since the early Greeks to our present epoch. This is the notion of a conscious; almost Loki\(^{62}\) like play of Being, a concept that provides ample fodder for critics of Heidegger who accuse him of being more a mystic than a philosopher (Rosenstein : 1978). His discourse is qualitative, resulting in an absence of precise definability as opposed to the concrete resolving of the more quantitative aspects of philosophical expression. Indeed, Heidegger's refuses to enter into the traditional arena of philosophical ‘as good a job of putting potential critics on the defensive as any philosopher in history’ (Rorty : 1982 : 39). Rorty also claims that attempting to categorize Heidegger as poet, mystic or philosopher only serves to confirm Heidegger’s theory all the more that ‘various distinctions are themselves products of metaphysical system-building’. Clearly, Heidegger sees the possibility of other types of discourse in that there are things that can only be apprehended by non-rational or supra-rational means.

\(^{62}\)The wily trickster God of Norse mythology
The ontological difference can be found in the foundational declaration of Islam (shahada) in the formulaic words; lā ilaha illā ‘llāh. The first part of the statement (lā ilaha...) signifies ‘There is no god’ and if we are to take this statement on its own merit it seemingly denies the whole grounding of existence from a doctrinal Muslim perspective for if there is no God there can be no existence. However, there is a deeper meaning to this quite to the contrary of this initial superficial interpretation.

The Divine Essence (dhat); which is beyond any human comprehension and related to its Absolute Non Manifestation and Absolute Reality and as such; it is No-thing, far beyond and transcending the notion of God. As Abd al Karim Al-says, in addressing the No-thing of Absolute Reality:

Oh Thou who art neither quiddity nor name, nor shadow, nor contour, nor a spirit, nor body, quality, nor designation, nor sign, - to Thee belongs existence and non existence, (al wujud wa-l-‘adam).

(al-Jīlī : 1983 : 5)

The second part is an affirmation, …ilā ‘llāh, (meaning ‘…except God’). This is the unfolding descent of the Akbarian levels – Nothing necessitates Being. A clearing occurs through the No-thing / Nothing and in the clearing possibility arises. Once Nothing / Nothing is determined or distinguished then the element of possibility (al imkan) comes into the play, i.e. the possibility of Some-thing. Thus Non-Existence transforms to Existence; Non-Being transforms to Being. In this secondary act, the distinguishing of Being or Existence means that the possibility of Non-Existence also comes into play again and in this manner Being and Non Being, Existence and Non Existence, Manifest and Hidden are but One.

In looking at the next level; that of the Divine Attributes and Names or Manifest Divinity itself (uluhiyah) we see the total declaration, (la ilha ila llah) to be the
perception of the Absolute through the relative (Being through being). There are many meanings to be derived from this, such as ‘there is no reality except the Reality’ or ‘there is no truth except the Truth’. The first negational part of the declaration; (lā ilaha…) corresponds to stark statements of ‘there is no reality’ and ‘there is no truth’, ‘there is no meaning’, etc. The relative expressed is by necessity finite; yet under the umbrella of an overriding, constant and infinite existence; to which the finite itself owes its existence. Thus, in effect, statements presenting the finite can be seen to be non existent and by extension, the ‘truths’ that humans exchange in the everyday world are relative conversations and as reality is relative, being is relative and meaning is rendered arbitrary and so they have non-existence. Yet it is only when the second part of the formula is pronounced; (īllā ‘llāḥ) that the first part’s true meaning is revealed as being the relative and the second part of the formula refers to Being – the all-pervading omniscient, omnipresent aspect of the Divine which throws the first part of the statement into proper relief – as the relative as from behind the no-thing emerges Being. From this it may now be easier to paraphrase the shahadah to be able to declare something along the lines of ‘There is no reality but The Reality’ (Al-Haqq) or ‘There is no existence but the Existence’ (Al Wujud) or ‘There is nothing but No-thing’ or in an all-encompassing definition, ‘There is nothing but Allah’.

For Ibn ‘Arabi, the ordinary sensible world of every day existence, of which we are in the habit of regarding as a reality, is actually a sort of dream. With our senses we construct the world around us by distinguishing one thing from another, co-relating them, ordering and categorising them thereby creating a seemingly solid and material world. This construction of ‘reality’ is not truly reality as pertains to Being (wujud) but has more to do with the world of dasein. For Ibn ‘Arabi the world is an illusion, it
has no real existence. We imagine that it is an autonomous world when in truth it is nothing of the sort.

Know that you yourself are an imagination. And everything that you perceive and say to yourself, ‘this is not me’, is also an imagination. So that the whole world of existence is imagination within imagination.

(Ibn al-'Arabi : 1976 : 129)

For Ibn ‘Arabi, this means that the world we perceive is a product of our personal faculty of imagination, which is active within the larger domain of an objective imagination. However he does not see everyday existence in a negative temporal sense to be abandoned in the search for a real world as the imagination or dream does not infer valueless or even falsehood (Izutsu : 1984). For Ibn ‘Arabi it simply means that our everyday world is a reflection of something else and that the apparent ‘reality’ of the everyday is not the true ‘Reality’. So in a sense his starting point is that our ordinary perception of the world is not a subjective illusion but rather an objective illusion as it constitutes an unreality that is yet founded on a firm ontological basis and which ‘is tantamount to saying that it is not an illusion at all, at least in the sense in which the word is commonly taken’ (Izutsu : 1984 11) and as such there is a doubtless correlation with Heidegger's view that being is not the true Being. This everyday ‘reality’ is an indication of a greater ‘Reality’ and Ibn ‘Arabi employs a Hadīth of the Prophet to explain this, ‘All mankind is asleep and when they die they wakeup’ (Ibn al-'Arabi : 1976 : 178). In this sense death does not refer to the physical but to a spiritual breaking through, an individual throwing off the shackles of phenomenal sense and reason to pierce through its confining boundaries to the web of multifarious phenomenal things to that which lies beyond the veil of ordinary existence, which in the eyes of Ibn ‘Arabi, indicates the Absolute Reality. As
mentioned before, though Ibn ‘Arabi does not see the ordinary dream-like world as illusory but as a particular indication of the Absolute Reality. The temporal world consists therefore of various forms, properties and states all of which weave together to create life and existence as known through the physical senses. If one is able to understand these forms and properties as nothing (no-thing) in themselves but as so many manifestations of the Reality (some-thing) than they have attained to the deepest knowledge and understanding of the self and existence around them (Izutsu : 1984).

Ibn ‘Arabi perceived the Prophets, Saints and Gnostics as those who have arrived at such a fundamental understanding. Though they may perceive the Absolute Reality beyond the veil of the iconic, they have visions and dreams that are couched in the very forms, properties and states that ordinary people have but which for them are indicators of which they are able to interpret. For most of us we are too easily convinced that that the world is materially solid and are not amenable to the idea of its being any indication of anything beyond the immediate nature of our immediate world.

It is God who made the world and endowed it with existence. The entire Universe is therefore supremely beautiful. There is nothing ugly in it. On the contrary, in it God has brought together all perfection and all beauty. The gnostics see it as being nothing other than the form of the Divine Reality, for God is he who is epiphanized in every face, He to whom every sign refers back, He upon whom all eyes rest, He who is worshipped in every object of worship.

(Ibn al-‘Arabi : 1972 : 449 - 450)

Yet despite the extraordinary nature of those able to see beyond the immediate, Ibn ‘Arabi refutes the doctrine of ‘unio mystica’ or mystical union with God so commonly understood in esoteric circles. With Ibn ‘Arabi, union with the Absolute Reality is an
impossibility as there must always be a distinction between creature and unknowable Creator. Ibn ‘Arabi is more existential than esoteric in his expression, something that is not immediately perceived by people unfamiliar with his work and there is a distinct matter-of-factness to Ibn ‘Arabi’s descriptions of the other-worldly.

Despite his extensive writing, Ibn ‘Arabi himself did not lay out any formally prescribed ontological theory or doctrine. However, those who followed in his wake, such as al-Qāshānī (d.1330) and al-Jīlī (1366 – 1424) did codify his thought somewhat. In this regard, Al-Qāshānī, outlined five levels of Being or the Reality which form an integral and organic whole; though each level (hadharat) represents a mode of self-manifestation of Being or Absolute Reality. These stages are as follows:

1. The Level of the Essence (dhat) – which is at a level beyond any human comprehension. This is the Absolute non manifestation and Absolute Reality beyond comprehension.
2. The Level of the Divine Attributes and Names, The Divinity (uluhiyah).
3. The Level of Actions, The Lordship over all things (rububiyyah)
4. The Level of Form / Images (amthal) and the Imagination (khayal).
5. The Level of the Sensible Perception and Experience (mushahadah)
   (Adapted from :Izutsu : 1984 : 11)

What can be confusing with Ibn ‘Arabi and many past and present people following his general mould, is in extrapolating a particular point they will move from one level to the other; i.e., from the level of dhat to the level of amthal within a single sentence; from an ontological discourse to the religious. Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse takes place within the background of counterposing wujud, (Being or existence) as opposed to mahlīyya denoting quiddity, ’thingness’ or ‘whatness’. We cannot determine wujud in itself or from itself but only through the manifestation of things emanating from wujud. The concept of wujud is identical to the Divine Essence in its Absolute
Reality, is sometimes described as that which is non manifest in itself while making other things manifest’ (Murata : 1992 : 66).

For Ibn ‘Arabi, an initial requirement for taking up the spiritual path is a stripping away known as *takhli* (stripping away of the self – a sort of deconstruction of the self). He sees this as a return to a primordial state, a state of nothingness, an almost dumb animality to the most basic foundation of ‘humanness’, which he sees as a spiritual station, exemplified in the Prophet Idries, (Ibn al-'Arabi : 1980 : 235). The Muslim spiritual process (Sufism) can be summarized in three stages and is mentioned by Ibn ‘Arabi continuously throughout his works as well as by other Sufi masters both prior to and after him. This stripping of the ego, an annihilation of the subjective human attributes is the first stage. At the second stage, upon arriving at their nothingness they then realise that they are at one with the Divine Essence, through complete annihilation of the self, referred to within Sufi terminology as *fana*. The third stage is where the self is regained (*baqa*), what had been stripped away is now given back from nothingness; but it is not as it was before, for the self is now infused with the Divine and is able to see phenomenal things blurring at the edges of their forms, (so to speak) and mingling in the ocean of Divine Oneness. The whole process can be viewed in terms of a purification of the ego, not particularly in any dualistic moral sense but rather as an annihilation of subjectivity which if left, detracts from pure being. An example of something to be stripped away could be the activity of reason, wherein the cessation of the ego (*nafs*) as the empirical subject of both reason and desire results in a transformation of a new ego aligned with the Absolute. This is seen as ‘knowing oneself’ as one really is and not the illusory
narrative that the ego has built up about its self. Similarly, in his *Treatise on Being* (1976) Ibn ‘Arabi says:

> And for this the Prophet (upon whom be peace) said: ‘Whoso knoweth himself knoweth his Lord.’ And he said (upon him be peace): ‘I know my Lord by my Lord.’ The Prophet (upon whom be peace) points out that by that, that thou art not thou: thou art He, without thou; not He by entering into thee, nor thou entering into Him, nor He proceeding from thee, nor thou proceeding forth from Him. And it is not meant by that, that thou art aught that exists or thine attributes aught that exists, but it is meant by it that thou never wast, nor wilt be, whether by thyself or through Him or in Him or with Him. Thou art neither ceasing to be nor still existing.

(Ibn al-’Arabi : 1988 : 4-5)

According to Ibn al-‘Arabi there are two different implications in asserting that the only way of knowing the Absolute is for us to know ourselves. The first is that we either consciously shed or authentically accept those subjective aspects of the self that we have been made aware of. The second is that, in knowing ourselves we come across the primordial self and in doing so we touch upon the immutable and Absolute. The desire to know the Absolute Being conceptually is humanly impossible, yet if we go into the depth of ourselves we perceive the Absolute within the self, albeit not through intellectualization but within the touchstone of our being. In finding the ultimate Reality or Being within the self, what is revealed is that there is no difference between ourselves and everything else in the world and so on another level of reality there is no ontological difference, despite having stated this previously. As there is no difference between things – there is nothing but One Reality. Only by going within ourselves; penetrating through the consciousness of the self can we discover the primordial nature of Divine presence within all things so that in ‘knowing ourselves’ we begin ‘to know the Lord’. It is when we become aware of ourselves as either a form or non-form of Divine self manifestation that we can start to see the blurring of outer forms melding into the One. A comparison of this is afforded in the example of
the candle in relation to the sun – the candle is absorbed and obliterated in relation to the light of the sun – the candle flame is a No-thing.

In short summary, the wayfarer strips away till there is no-thing and a transformation takes place, from the no-thing, some-thing takes place. Even more concise; purified from being, (i.e., some-thing) one comes to no-thing, from the no-thing, Being emerges. How the no-thing results in some-thing can be seen in the more everyday and ordinary application of Heidegger’s ‘distinguishing’ or ‘naming’ of things. These could be previously undetected aspects the self has now identified and called into being through language. This is a sort of ‘self reckoning’, (muhasaba) a practical example of which may be afforded in the case of someone distinguishing that the mainstay of their interaction with others is based on maintaining a humorous and witty demeanour and that they habitually maintain to gain acceptance from others. When one is able to distinguish something like this then they are no longer completely compelled to do so and are freed up to consider either giving it up or consciously maintaining it. In distinguishing it, we create, in Heideggerian terms a ‘clearing’ an empty space before us, a no-thing for something that could or might happen. Rather, it is used to represent a clearing for a transformation of being for the emergence of Being. It is a clearing distinguished in that present moment, not in the future and when the clearing is present, experience, expectations, rationality and perspective are stilled, opened and freed up.

Ibn ‘Arabi believed that the only way of knowing the Absolute is for us to know ourselves as explicated in the Hadīth, ‘Whoso knoweth himself knoweth his Lord’ (Ibn al-‘Arabi : 1976 : 4). The pursuit of the Absolute in its unknowable non manifestation is futile and the pursuit of the Absolute in its manifested form is only
carried out by going profoundly into ourselves. Ibn ‘Arabi perceived both the animated and unanimated worlds as being so many forms of the Absolute Manifestation (God). This meant that ultimately and essentially there is no difference between living things and objects and is therefore the objective view. On a phenomenological level there are innumerable differences between the multifarious lives, beings and objects of the universe, which is the subjective view. In the nature of things, we do not have recourse to penetrate the outer realities to perceive the essential oneness of all things; to see the underlying unity of all existence. According to Ibn ‘Arabi it is only when we delve into our own interiors and actually experience within, the self manifestation of the Absolute that we come to any objective view. Therefore the ‘knowing of the self’ can be the beginning of ‘knowing the Lord’. For it is only when we experientially know and become conscious that our very being is itself a form of the self manifestation of the Absolute that we can begin to perceive the universe as essentially an the pervading Oneness of Absolute Manifestation.

In the next Chapter we will begin to look at developing a combined view of certain aspects further relating to issues of authenticity and inauthenticity with a final rounding off these by couching these concepts in terms of ‘falleness’ and distraction to ‘other than Allah’, respectively Heideggerian and Sufi terms. These will lead on to other concepts to be looked at, namely the Clearing and the Opening (jātīh) that deal essentially with the event of and the implications of authenticity, in relation to the nature of Being and the Divine.
Chapter Eleven

Aspects of a Path to Authenticity

The ‘other than Allah’ and Falleness

Many Sufi texts, both present and past, refer frequently to the concept of ‘.other than Allah’ which is explained further here. As mentioned briefly before, within traditional Islamic thought Existence (wujud) finds its opposite in the concept of mahiyya (quiddity). For classical traditional muslim scholars wujud lays beyond definition. Anything subject to space or time or delineated belongs to mahiyya and the quiddity of a thing can be known whereas this is not the case with wujud. As with existence, we can only know wujud in that it is determined by a thing – we know it because it exists. It is that which is non-manifest in itself but which makes other things manifest. The problem lies in getting caught in the illusory trap of duality and otherness without perceiving the Reality behind it. Ibn ‘Arabi directs himself directly to this question in Risalat ul Wujudiyyah.

His Prophet is He, and His sending is He, and His word is He. He sent Himself with Himself to Himself. There was no mediator nor any means other than He. There is no difference between the Sender and the thing sent, and the person sent and the person to whom he is sent. The very existence of the prophetic message is His existence. There is no other, and there is no existence to other, than He, nor to its ceasing to be, nor to its name, nor to its named.


This ‘other’ here refers quite simply to all which is other than the Absolute Manifestation or the Divine in all the varying levels mentioned above. To be caught up with them is to be caught up with inauthenticity. This is the idea of giving reality to something ‘other’ which has no reality as opposed to recognising the Absolute Reality upon which the ‘other’ is contingent. It is seen as an almost natural decline in perception – the human reason insisting on having tangible and concrete forms to
focus and function with and also as a type of forgetting for it is believed that all humans consciously or sub consciously know the Reality – but cover it over. It is interesting to note that the word kufr commonly used to denote non-muslims, unbelievers or unfaithful in reality means ‘to cover’ and the word insān; the word for ‘humans’ is based in the root concept of ‘to forget’.

In his different works but particularly in Bezelts of Wisdom – Al-Fusus al-Hikam (1980), Ibn ‘Arabi discusses the varying degrees of a possible inner transformation of man from Otherness to the Divine. This is none other than the transformation from materiality to spirituality or inauthenticity to authenticity. The ordinary person is seen to be in a state of ‘veiledness’ from true Reality as they are under the dominance of their senses and corporeality therein entailing their intellects as under the influence of the demands of the body and its relation with the material, (al nash’ah al danyawiyah). Their understanding is thereby impeded and ‘veiled’ from the essential Reality of all things. Another word used for Sufism or tasawwuf is haqa’iq- meaning Reality and linked etymologically with the root meaning of ‘truth’, (i.e. the Reality or the Real).

In order for those in the grip of worldly materialism, whom Ibn ‘Arabi calls ‘the people of binding, limiting and restricting’ or ahli ‘aql wa taqyid wa hasr (Ibn ‘Arabi cited in Izutsu : 1993 : 31) perhaps well-suited to being linked with Heidegger’s ‘calculative thought’ can be transformed to perceive Reality by developing al ayn al basirah, (spiritual insight). According to him a person who has embarked upon the path of realization to the Divine must shed himself of the intellect – in a sense being

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63 Some would say that such a definition is wrong. Someone may not be a Muslim and not consciously or subconsciously cover anything up.
almost animalistic and earthly – a sort of primordial existence by abandoning themselves to the elemental. Essentially this must be considered to be the abandonment of reason and cessation of the thinking. It is claimed by the Sufis that this method is essentially the Prophet’s way, in primarily challenging people to think about the nature of the self, an existential confrontation - a confrontation with the reality of the self within the world.

For Heidegger there is also a very clear distinction between the being who truly pursues a path to their own innermost and essential nature and those who become overly occupied with the business of everyday existence thereby forgetting the question of Being. In Derrida’s Of Spirit – Heidegger and the Question (1987) he asserts that one of Heidegger’s major themes, though not mentioned much by him, nor by his admirers or his critics, is the question of the Spirit and the Spiritual. The presence of this is felt by its absence and Heidegger refers to the spiritual when he focuses on those who do not externalize, are not alienated and are present-at-hand.

However, his approach must not be understood as any sort of judgemental issue though perhaps rather confusingly, Heidegger, with something akin to religious terminology describes such a person as ‘fallen’. Dasein has fallen, in this case, not from a state of grace to a state of sin, but out of its ‘innermost’ way to a public mode of existence. In later works he develops this theme further where the ‘fallen’ are those who are concerned with beings, with the rules that govern them (as in the sciences) and the way they are controlled and manipulated, (technology). This is contrasted with ‘thought’ a quiet, meditative state, which produces nothing tangible and is therefore easily superseded by that which seems to produce tangible things through actions. Heidegger sees a perpetual danger in man being exposed to getting lost in
beings, of being swept away by everyday concerns. He calls for a return to the forgotten essential ground within man, deeper than anything apparently human and in which man is exposed to the presence of something which transcends beings altogether (Caputo : 1986 ).

Returning to Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of transformation from the Other to Reality the first step in from liberating the self from over dominating reason (‘aql), perceived as being intrinsically chained to the material world. At the next stage of ascent, another type of reason takes its place termed by him as ‘aql mujarrad which is free and pure of the corporeal and provides a perspective of the true ontological structure of even the most ordinary things in the world, such a person has attained a spiritual rank. The first step in Ibn ‘Arabi’s transformation from what he called Otherness to Reality lies within a liberation from natural Reason (‘aql) which is related to the larger aspect of the nafs, (egocentricity) perceived as intrinsically chained to the material world. Moulay al-

‘Arabi ad- Darqawi speaks of this divide thus:

This is obvious for so long as you consort with (worldly) people, you will never smell the perfume of the Spirit in them; you will only smell the smell of sweat, and this is because they have been enslaved by sensuality; it has taken possession of their hearts and limbs; they see their profit only in it, so that they chatter about it, busy themselves with it, rejoice in it alone and can barely drag themselves away from it. And yet many are they who have freed themselves from sensuality in order to plunge into the Spirit for the rest of their lives, (may God be pleased with them and let us profit from their blessing, Amen, Amen, Amen). It is as if God (be He exalted) had not given them the Spirit (i.e. to worldly people) and yet each one of them is a part of it, as the waves are part of the ocean.

(ad-Darqawi : 1969 : 1)

It is interesting to compare this with Heidgger’s discourse on inauthenticity and ‘falleness’ (Verfall) translated here by George Steiner from the original Sein und Zeit.
Dasein has in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for being its own self. It has fallen into the ‘world’. ‘Falleness’ into the ‘world’ means an absorption in being-with-one-another, insofar as the latter is guided by idle talk, hunger for novelty and ambiguity...On no account however do the terms ‘inauthentic’ and ‘non-authentic’ signify ‘really not’, as if in this mode of existence Dasein was altogether to lose its being. ‘Inauthenticity’ does not mean anything like no-longer-being-in-the–world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of being-in-the–world.

(Heidegger cited by Steiner : 1978 : 94)

In Heidegger’s case it is not the overcoming of the nafs (ego) but rather what he calls ‘subjectism’ (Subjectittat), (Heidegger : 1971b). This is where the given precepts, perhaps a theory, are imposed upon phenomena or reality. In other words, Being is expected to conform and adhere to the rules and principles laid down and created by the ‘thinking subject’. So it is not the nafs which is to be overcome but rather the setting up of the ‘thinking subject’ as the highest principle, even above Being which Heidegger calls ‘the absolutization of reason’ (Rorty : 1982 : 32). Heidegger clearly sees such renowned thinkers as Descartes, Leibniz and Kant as belonging to the tradition of subjectism. This bears a resemblance to the religious concept of pride; an essential element of the nafs’ feelings of self importance and for Heidegger detachment is not so much overcoming ‘self willing’ but to give up willing altogether. In this sense it is to transcend even attempting to stem willing itself; particularly in re-presentationational thinking. Though Heidegger does not speak of ‘self willing’ in any moral or sinful context, nevertheless it does seem to strongly convey a sense of self importance. Heidegger sees the everyday world and its things as derivative, resting on deeper grounds than is immediately apparent but grounds that are not forthcoming to analysis but are perhaps more accessible through intuition. Yet nor does he deny the Aristotelian definition of the human being as a rational animal in the context of a representational thought process; but that there is a realm beyond
representational thinking. In this realm essential human nature is rooted in the essence of its relationship to Being and through this the grounds for one’s relationship with other beings. So while Heidegger does not discard ‘everydayness’ he does not wish it to be granted an absoluteness thereby eclipsing the deeper ground of one’s being.

Another possible correlation in thinking is to be found by comparing the potentiality of *al insan al-kamil* (the perfect human) to Heidegger’s notion of authenticity. Ibn ‘Arabi’s perspective of the role of the perfected being easily runs parallel to Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. In Ibn ‘Arabi’s view; every aspect of the phenomenal world is an aspect of the Absolute Divinity in some state of determination but what role does the individual human being play in this? The Human being is clearly part of this determined material world – and yet constitutes a unique part of through the possession of consciousness. This unique aspect of being human allows at the every least a conceptual knowledge of the ‘theo - ontological difference’. Indeed, it is the extent to which an individual is conscious of this that determines the level or station (*maqām*) of his knowledge.

The least of these are those who have no awareness of even the possibility of the ‘theo - ontological difference’ and see and grasp the material world giving it full credence in its density and materiality, with no thought of any possibility of anything beyond what they see and hear. It is worth bearing in mind that this not need be solely irreligious people, on the contrary – it could refer to those who aspire to piety and are ‘religious’. They can be in the thrall of forms and not perceive the essence in the same sense as the more carnal might be prone to. A higher station might be those able to distinguish the Unity of Existence behind the manifold outer forms. Yet a higher station is attained by those who experience both the forms and the essence and yet see
them interrelated and originating from Divine Unicity. The highest are those who experience all dimensions, outer and inner, form and essence, as One Reality, recognising their domains, functioning simultaneously within them through the perception of there being no difference between them.

**The Clearing and the Opening (fāṭīh)**

We have briefly alluded to Heidegger’s concept of ‘the clearing’ but it would be interesting to expound further on this in relation to the Sufi concept of ‘the opening’ (fāṭīh) both of which refer to something akin to a type of epiphany. In Sufic terms, the event of fāṭīh refers to a momentary glimpse of the Truth (al-haqq) as in a moment of illumination; referred to in a variety of ways, such as the ‘falling away of veils’, the ‘opening of veils’ or the ‘ripping of veils’ between the creature and the Creator (al-Jilani : 1999). Something of a perception of The Real or Absolute Reality (haqāʾiq) is made manifest to the individual, who as a result of this experience is momentarily or permanently stripped of all pretence, concepts and emotional constructs. These ‘openings’ can be of a permanent nature or occur in a flash instant. It is related to the concept of hāl, a spiritual state, induced by such an opening but is perhaps better understood through Heideggerian terms, as the potential of dasein to be ‘the clearing’ for an involuntary taking on or appropriating of truth or where the event of truth can take place, (i.e., Being). Both Heidegger and Ibn ‘Arabi understood that the individual does not bring about such an event of their own accord and can only really provide the space or clearing for such a thing to happen in an unpredictable manner. Already mentioned, an important aspect of Sufi methodology is the concept of takhālli, which implies the stripping away of the nafs (ego). Once this the stripping away has occurred, soething called tahalli (embellishments) could take place. These are
spiritual graces, insights and experiences of heightened sensitivities and an acute sense of awe and wonder previously discussed in reference to mysticism. For while the first aspect of this (i.e., takhāllī), may be said to be initiated by the individual, the second aspect, tahāllī (embellishments in terms of spiritual or character) is engendered through the auspices of the Divine Will, yet even then, within deeper Sufic understanding, the initial motivation on the part of the spiritual seeker also emerges from the Divine Will, i.e., the seeker seeks by Divine Will. Heidegger’s perspective correlates this; for while the relationship of Being with being may be a subsistent relationship as seen as in the phrase ‘…des wesende verhältnis zum Sein als Sein which translates in meaning to ‘…the unfolding relationship of Being to being whose nature it is to be related’ (Heidegger : 1959 : 177 : author’s translation). His later views were that genuine thinking does not proceed from dasein but as he says, ‘Being is no product of thought. On the contrary, indeed, essential thinking is an event of Being’ (Heidegger cited in Caputo : 1986 : 25) The earlier Heidegger saw dasein’s relation to Being as originating and depending on dasein to both initiate and sustain it (Pattison : 2000). Whereas previously Being depended on man’s ability to break through assumptions and prejudices and to question Being from a new vantage point; the later Heidegger decisively shifted to the view that Being did not come as a result of questioning – in fact it was exactly this type of questioning that had to be given up (Heidegger : 1993 : 91-114). ‘Being does not come in response to a question but as a gift or favour bestowed on man’ (Heidegger : 2002 : 91 – 114). In making such ‘a clearing’ or ‘an opening’ both dasein and the murid (the Sufi student) are both by far the lesser in respect to Being or God.

The other sense of ‘clearing’ can be see to be those referred to previously as those who experience the two dimensions; the outer forms and the inner realities as
stemming from one Divine Unity – and are referred to by Ibn ‘Arabi who are
described in the famous hadith …. ‘draws near to me through voluntary devotion
beyond the required until he becomes loved by Allah and thereby the eyes that Allah
sees with, the ears that He hears with and the tongue that He speaks with and the
hands that He holds with (Nawawi : 2004; Sahih Bukhari : 1997 : Hadith 509). They
are no longer engaged with mental comprehension but rather they are; to coin an
appropriate phrase from another Hadīth, ‘...the Qur’an walking‘ and it is these
people whom Al Jilli; termed ‘The Perfect Human’ – (al-insan al-kamil).

64 Part of a famous hadith constituting the reply of the wife of the Prophet, who when after his death
was asked about his nature and character.
Chapter 12

Time and the Moment

_Al Waqt_ and the _Øieblikket_

In discussing aspects of the _Mālikī fiqh_ previously, an emphasis has been placed on its existential approach, situated in the actual as opposed to theoretical speculation, it is the situational versus the universal. It is argued here that was a fundamental characteristic of Muslim understanding, especially prior to the advent of speculative theology. An example of this can be understood from the nature of the Qur’anic revelation itself, which was almost in its entirety based around the situational. Revealed verses would in the vast majority of cases, ‘descend’ on the Prophet usually in relation to something that was said or happening around or in relation to the Prophet and which are known as _ashab ul-nuzul_, literally the ‘circumstances / cause of the Revelation’. Something of this is also portrayed in the ethos of what will be called here a Medinan Islam, as expressed through Malik’s _al-Muwatta’_ depicted by Goldziher in reference to the _Muwatta_:

> It is a _corpus juris_, not a _corpus traditionum_.... Its intention is not to sift and collect the healthy elements of the traditions circulating in the Islamic world but to illustrate the law, ritual and religious practice, by the _ijma_` recognized in Medinan Islam, by the sunna current in Medina..

   (Goldziher : 1978 : 198)

Given this existential actuality, acutely manifested in Medinan Islam and then coupled with the phenomenon of _ashab al-nuzul_, it is not difficult to see the natural emergence of a concept known as ‘_ibn al-waqt_’ or the ‘daughter / son of the moment’ which corresponds to the _Øieblikket_, (Kierkegaard’s ‘blink of the eye’ moment or ‘instant’) and which will be explained here.
An essential part of the modern paradigm rooted in the metaphysical structures of rationalism and Cartesian doubt are the aspects of time and space. Yet in traditional societies time is regarded and measured differently as is evident in the Kāla Vyavahāra Hindu measurement of time, contained in the Vishnu Purāṇa, ranges from the smallest measurement of time equated to one blink of the eye, (1 blink = Nimeesa; 10 blinks = Kaasthaas) to a year and one day, (Ayana) and ultimately to a Muha Yuga which equals 4,320,000 years. In the Muslim world time is understood in three dimensions, sarmād which is the changeless and perpetual, (i.e., eternity), dahr, the relation of changing time with the changeless and zaman, (i.e., ordinary time) (Nasr : 2007). What is evident in this is that there is no quantitative aspect in these definitions of time whereas ever since the Cartesian view has prevailed, time is generally experienced as a linear and quantitative commodity. The scientific view has divested time of quality and is what would have to be called ‘objective’. This is something which Husserl spoke of in differentiating between the terms of Erfahrung (neutral / objective experience) and ‘lived experience’ or Erlebnisse (Husserl : 1991). The latter perhaps being a more ‘subjective’ time which is not measured but experienced and would be more regarded as states of mood, feeling or passion. A particular state may take hold of someone for years or only seconds of linear time and bears no relation to any standardized unit or calculative method. The ‘subjective’ experience of time also has a past, present and future but understood differently. The past could and can, from a certain viewpoint, represent the fleetingness of life, also highlighting the constant, less than an infinitesimal part of a nano-second shift that is immediate experience. The past can also bring forth considerations related to the origins from whence one came and related primordial questions. The future is that which is vague and unknown and easily forgotten or cloaked in anxiety but which can equally point to the end of life and perhaps to a return to the origin or Paradise, Hell,
eternal rest or oblivion. But it is the present moment or each successive moment as it occurs which has primacy above all else. Ibn ‘Arabi defines the present moment thus:

..by the convention of the Folk (the Sufis) – [it is] the state in which you are in the time being. So it is a thing that exists (now) between two non-existents, (the past and the future); not as time but as things that have passed or are yet to come. (Ibn al-‘Arabi cited by Yousef : 2008 : 66 : emphasis added)

Each individual is perpetually faced with the choice of living in the present, the past or the future. One option is to be totally in the moment, yet immersed and losing the self in the everyday world of Das Man with no thought of the past or the future which is the meaning of ghaflāh (heedless forgetfulness) an imperfect presence in senuousness which is limited in scope. Ensuing feelings of frustration or wasted time is down to the individual not understanding the nature of time and has more to do with attitude and disposition regarding the passing of time.

Another option could be fretting about the past or worrying about the future. A third and final option is to recognize the possibility to be physically and mentally present in the moment as something connected to the unchanging eternal. The moment that stands before one is ‘…already outside of time and “is” in principle already in the Eternal Realm’ (Nasr : 2007 ). All aspects of past and future are contained in the present moment, otherwise stated as constituting; ‘the point whereto all times are present’ (Perry cited by Nasr : 2007 : 167). For the ‘now’ is the only moment we can ‘be’ and to be now is to be in a constant ‘becoming’. This is time conceived of as a continual flux of instances and moments which can be called ‘momentary time’ (Bowering : 1997). Being present in the moment, the past is irredeemably gone and rendered a place of no action and the future cannot be acted in as of yet and is therefore also an area of no action.
And now the moment. A moment such as this is unique. To be sure, it is short and temporal, as the moment is, it is passing, as the moment is, past, as the moment is in the next moment, and yet it is decisive, and yet it is filled with the eternal. A moment such as this must have a special name. Let us call it: the fullness of time.

(Kierkegaard : 1985 : 18)

It is from Kierkegaard that the epitaph ‘Philosophers of the Moment’. Most commentators have suggested that Kierkegaard speaks here of the moment when the individual truly and fully encounters the paradox of the Christ (Watkins : 2001) and in that moment, there is the repetition (not the recollected theory) of the historical Christ actually re-enacted as entering into the world of events ‘now’ occurring, not in person but in *phenomena*. For him, if time is a flowing succession of the past, future and the present then identifying any ‘moment’ seemingly stops this sequential flow (Kierkegaard : 1980) and therefore for him the moment was a thing out of time, just as eternity is ‘no-place’ in the sequence of the three modes of temporality, so it is with the moment and this is their relation.

Kierkegaard describes the moment as ‘time’s atom’ but cannot can be established or exist without eternity – much in the same relation between Being and being in the ontological difference, in like fashion but now in terms of space and time, eternity has No-place (Kierkegaard : 1996 : 207) just as Being is No-thing. Without eternity the moment cannot exist because time is by nature a thing that flows by and eternity is the unchangeable backdrop and this is the affinity that they have. ‘The moment is that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other […..] whereby time constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time’ (Kierkegaard : 1980 : 89).

An encounter with the Divine ‘in the moment’ reflects the Muslim belief that within
the heart of each human being there is a common grounding or point of contact with
the Divine and a option to understanding time can be found in the concept of hidra
(conscious or mindful presence) wherein one is present to every passing moment,
relinquishing one’s own will to the Divine will. In addressing the question of
presence or full awareness and mindfulness in the moment, Kierkegaard says, ‘Most
men think, talk and write as they sleep, eat and drink, without ever raising the
question of their relation to the idea; this only happens among the very few....’
(Kierkegaard cited by Ward : 2008 : 33). Similarly Ibn ‘Arabi spoke of certain kinds
of people whom he called, ‘ibn al-waqt’, ‘abu al-waqt’ or ‘abd’ al-waqt’, (in order;
son of the moment, father of the moment, and servant of the moment), all of which
are variants on the theme; people who in one way or another are present-in-the-
moment. Such a person has arrived at a level of spiritual understanding wherein;

…each instant is a glorious “time” of theophany. The Absolute
manifests itself at every moment with this or that of its Attributes.
The Absolute, viewed from this angle, never ceases to make a new
self-manifestation, and goes on changing its form from moment to
moment. And the true “knowers”, on their part, go on responding
with flexibility to this ever changing process of Divine self-
manifestation. Of course, in so doing they are not worshipping the
changing forms themselves that come out outwardly on the surface;
they are worshipping through the ever changing forms the One that
remains eternally unchanging and unchangeable.

(Izutusu : 1983 : 84 )

Yet there are other definitions of waqt or that which concerns those who inhabit the
moment as ibn al-waqt. There is the concept of hāl (sudden spiritual state), which is
the momentary flash of experiencing the Divine presence. This hāl is not reached by
any efforts on the part of the individual but occurs through Divine intervention. In the
famous Kashf Al-Majūb, al- Hujwīrī (990 – 1077) defines it thus; ‘something that
descends from God into a man’s heart, without his being able to repel it when it
comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his own effort’ (Al-Hujwīrī : 2000 : 181). As
such, the *hāl* is considered to be a Divine gift as opposed to the *maqām* (spiritual station) which comes about through the spiritual strivings of the individual (Snir: 1999), though even this might be questioned. Both are given yet both usually require some effort.

However, it is the idea of being present to and in each moment, which is worthy of attention here and seems to show some affinity with both Kierkegaard and Ibn ‘Arabi’s thoughts on the subject. This is a heightened awareness or consciousness of ‘being here’, involving an awareness of the circumstances, surroundings, the objects and the people present in a given moment bringing about a synthesis of thought, feeling and action within the individual. In Muslim terms it relates to the awareness of the Absolute Being which is reflected in the Hadīth that the Prophet’s response when asked to define *ihsān* was ‘It is to worship Allah as though you see Him, and though you do not see Him, you know that He sees you’ (Sahih Bukhari: 1997: 47: 1). The effect of this mindful presence ‘in the moment’ is clearly depicted in this well-known Hadīth, cited previously but now approached from a slightly different perspective.

_Narrated Abu Huraira: Allah's Apostle said, "Allah said, ….. My slave keeps on coming closer to Me through performing Nawafil (praying or doing extra deeds besides what is obligatory) till I love him, so I become his sense of hearing with which he hears, and his sense of sight with which he sees, and his hand with which he grips, and his leg with which he walks…"

(Sahih Bukhari: 1997: Hadith 509)

Within this quote it is possible to detect the elements of an aware presence so intense that the individual becomes virtually immersed in the Absolute Real, resulting in no pause between thought, will and action and is a thing more akin to inspiration. Such a person, Divinely inspired, in total awareness of the occasion, participants and objects present, would say and do the right thing at the right moment – in complete harmony with their surroundings, they are *ibn al-waqt*. 
The question of temporality is central to Heidegger’s thought for he sees it is that by which Being is involved most closely with dasein (Heidegger : 2008 : 377). In doing so he also recognizes ‘the moment’ as being of great import in the relation of Being with dasein. Yet he does not understand this to be a chain of sequential ‘nows’ but in a fluid spread of the three temporal modes, nevertheless, by being in the present we are already stand outside of this spread. He develops Husserl’s idea of felt experience of inner time as opposed to measured standardized time by understanding first of all, the centrality of lebensweld (the world as lived) for dasein and secondarily as something experienced through the three dimensions of time which he calls ectases (Heidegger : 2008 : 38) based on his understanding of human existence as Ek-sistenz, the etymological roots of which are related to the concept of ‘standing beyond the self’ (Heidegger : 2008 : 377). Ectases is also of a similar root, though in the case of the latter, Heidegger does not use this in ecstatic sense as commonly understood but as something which already ‘stands out’ as in standing out of the flow of time; an awakened emerging from the normal flow of linear time as commonly perceived. The ‘moment’ or ‘instant’ is where the ectases or temporal modes converge, yet not static but as a moving point. They are perceived as being of the utmost significance in determining what follows, (projected into the future) with possible far-reaching consequences for the individual, in the future, but also strangely with the potential to change the past. As the ‘now’ moment may be more significant than the next, one must be awake and aware for such moments. Nevertheless, despite this, Heidegger’s view of the moment is not so much that it will project one into the eternal but rather that it immerses one in one’s own-most being to thereby experience raw Being, which in itself encompasses the eternal.

65 Heidegger uses the same terminology as Kierkegaard, the Augenblick (in the blink of the eye)
Chapter 13

A Concluding Chapter

In many of the towns and cities of Morocco it used to be quite common to see the figure of the majdūb or the ‘Divine fool’ and throughout the Muslim world such figures existed. The majdūbin are said to be those who are overwhelmed by God until they are considered senseless and with no care for worldly affairs and as such they are often bedraggled and homeless. To those unfamiliar with the majdūb such people can easily be mistaken for the mentally imbalanced and yet the majdūb is to be differentiated from the insane (majnūn) by an initially imperceptible difference. One of the most famous of these in Morocco was one Sidi Abdur-Rahman al-Majdūb (d.1568) and is credited with inspired sayings in rhyming couplets, which are still used and recited today. The majdūb (or majdūba fem.) is a revered figure and their words and actions are considered to be divinely inspired and unfiltered by social convention. They are seen to be indicators of the underlying reality of different situations or those who reveal the latent feelings that remain unsaid – as if they were walking ‘deconstrutors’ and have been known famously to cut through the pretence of civil society. Certainly they were symbols of the irrational element of the Divine and human interaction always ready to point to the absudities of the rational. Significantly, the figure of the majdūb is now a disappearing figure in the towns and cities of Morocco and this perhaps a barometer of an encroaching management culturalization of the country coupled with the rationalization and ‘sterilization’ of Islam. In many ways this is what this thesis has been about, the change from the unpredictable and unmeasured which mirrors the Divine, to the standardized and controlled, which in turn reflects the human endeavour, fruitless though it may be, to bring under control both the wild forces of nature and virtues and vices that rage.
within the inner dimensions of the human. Ibn ‘Ata’illah al- Iskandari(d. 1309) says ‘Let yourself be at rest from self-management. Do not undertake to do what someone else has carried out on your behalf’ (al- Iskandari : 2004). The majdūb could not possibly be further away from the global management culture as they are the exact antithesis. This is no call to bring back the majdūbs nor a call to follow their way. It is more about promoting an awareness of the possibility of an authentic path available within the beingness of being Muslim in the face of the inauthentic. It has been the quest for the meaning of being oneself in the context of being Muslim, an existential and intellectual journey in search of some solid framework for personal authenticity. The framework arrived at and loosely defined is the; Muslim, Classical, Maghrebean – Andalusi, Mālikī, Akbarian and Qadīriyyan ash- Shādhiyyan, judged capable of providing a setting for personal authenticity. However, nor is this framework set in stone and there is recognition that it equally any such positioning holds the potential for inauthenticity. Even the question of a framework can be questioned for ultimately it is only an outwardly prescribed positioning. When dealing with personal authenticity, the individual is the starting point, not the theories or theological positionings. The existentialism utilized throughout this research has been essential in helping to illuminate several aspects of the more personal quest for authenticity but this has been accompanied by the insight and accumulated wisdom provided by classical Islam. It is hoped that what has been covered demonstrates a manner in which to arrive at some authenticity based on sound reasoning and a strong theological positioning but also allows for the flexibility of different individuals to find their own way within this. It is not a recommendation to take these particular views on as they are specific to me. Each individual must go through some process which has some affinity with this.
Residual Effects of the Research

The research has changed much of the content and processes of my own thought, in some places consolidating understanding and in other areas involving a shedding of some preconceived ideas in the place of new ones. Things that stand out as having been radically revised would be my understanding of esotericism and the interrelational differences of the esoteric between western and eastern Sufism. The naqli position of the Hanbalī madhab also has undergone a significant change within my own understanding as a result of the work carried out here. The usual interpretation of the Hānbalī position is that of an anti-intellectual and inflexible entity that has probably evolved due to its historical identification with the Wahhābi movement. In fact, the Hānbalī position has been in some sense, a vanguard against some of the cognitive excesses within the Muslim world. At the same time it has afforded me a better understanding of such movements and while I may not agree I have been given a better understanding of how these have come about.

Of the many ideas that have been abandoned, the main one is undoubtedly the idea that reason and rationality were mainly products of Western thought. While the role of rationality within Muslim intellectual development has been acknowledged globally, the extent of its centrality to Muslim intellectual development was not something that I was previously aware of. Another area would be the reputation of the al-Murābitūn, depicted as as harsh and intolerant in their religious approach, which I have come to believe is an overly simplistic and ultimately fallacious interpretation. While their mysticism or intellectual pursuit was not of the speculative Eastern sort, it remained a conscious intellectual choice. Existential, passionate and tenacious
commitment when juxtapositioned with speculative thought and modernist Cartesian doubt should not be automatically mistaken for fanaticism.

Another aspect, which has also come to light, has been a clear differentiation between esotericism and mysticism. On the one hand an Eastern Muslim esotericism with strong Neo-Platonic roots, contrasted with the Maghrabean, an earthy, praxis based mysticism, seemingly more directly related to the Prophet and the early community. This had not been quite so obvious previously and during this work I have been able to explore the variants of mysticism and esotericism, rather loosely identifying them as running parallel with Eastern and Western intellectual trends in the Muslim world. However, one particular anomaly to this is found in the work and experience of Ibn ‘Arabi, who in many ways seems rather esoterically Eastern in much of his discourse and yet at the same time it is strangely not speculative, in that what he writes about was experienced by him and not arrived at through intellectual deliberations so that there is also a certain earthiness and sense in what he says. Nevertheless, what has come down from him to the Qadiriyyah ash-Shadhiliyyah does not retain all aspects of his discourse (then again no one really could) but the presence of wahdat al-wujūd looms large in these Sufi cultures.

Further Areas of Research

One aspect that has been brought out by this research is that there is a great need for more thinking, in the Heideggerian sense; (i.e. not necessarily philosophy), about what it means to be Muslim and what the implications of this are in the world that we occupy. This thinking should be in and of itself Muslim and not, as is presently the case, in reaction to the non – Muslim. In particular, the implications of enframing, another Heideggerian concept which refers to our ontological mindframe and how this
directs us to inhabit our world, needs to be understood to thereby enable people to move on from this. For example, one aspect of this might be to look further into the role of technology. As we have seen, for Heidegger, calculative thought and the global management culture are things that are synonymous with a predominate technology that have brought with it a new and particular way of structuring the world (Enframing). Heidegger sees this as having direct relativity with any authenticity of being, insofar as we have seen that the concept of the ‘fallen’ was linked by Heidegger to the fact that much of our current beingness in the world is controlled and manipulated by technology. Thus perhaps, people in general, especially those who have a belief in the Divine, need to be enquiring into and engaging in a discourse with the role of technology into how it frames the view we have of ourselves and our world. Muslims are absolutely no exception to this. There is no getting away from the inherent paradox of Muslims needing to engage in thinking and enquiring into the dominant paradigm and yet on the other hand accepting that rationality is limited and thereby learn to shed a relentless ‘Why’. All of the above needs further thought and research as they have enormous implications on things like education, ethics and theology. There is a growing body of research making comparisons between various existentialists and this should continue and broaden out into the implacatory. Collectively and individually the Muslims need to work out a more thought out philosophy of being in regard to the modern world.

In a more historical sense, other areas of research could be into much of recent and contemporary research on the al Murābitūn. I believe that their depiction as essentially anti-intellectual philistines says more about modern attitudes and enframing than it does about this particular dynasty. Related to this, another area
worthy of research could be a more thorough look into this historical western resistance towards eastern speculative philosophy. There is an expansive amount of material waiting to be discovered of enormous importance regarding the relationship between Christians and Muslims in al-Andalus. Historically and theologically, there is a still a great deal of work to be carried out into differing approaches of Sufism, which will have direct implications on Muslims today. Frequently, when people use the word Sufi or its Arabic equivalent they are speaking at cross purposes by meaning different things rendering the conversation worthless and incinatory. For Muslims it is time to put aside some of the notions propagated by extremists and yet others that should be taken up. It is time for Muslims to see Muslim history for what it is, both varied and valid. A great deal more research should be carried out on the Hanbalī madhhab, to distance it from what it is currently associated with, in terms of Saudi Arabian positions and extremism.

**Conclusion**

Finally, it is hoped that this work will be of wider interest to people than may seem immediately apparent. Some of the issues raised here could be relevant to people of different faiths or even those with none. The process and method of a journey to authenticity undertaken in this work is meant to be the salient feature and the final position arrived at, is almost of secondary importance. The need for individuals to recognise inauthenticity within themselves as well as around them and from there to work through their beliefs and positions related to this, perhaps casting back into the past, essentially to discover ‘what it means to be me’ seems to be becoming a necessity rather than a luxury. The enframing that was spoken of previously, (something in which rationalism is strongly bound up in) needs to be, at the very least,
recognised if never completely shed. We must learn to live, not completely without
why but to know, intuitively and aesthetically, when we should leave off asking why.
Therefore if this work causes even one person to think and enquire (perhaps rather
than question) into the possible options, perhaps even adopting some of the
approaches presented here in working through the maze presented by the encounter of
religion with contemporary life, then the effort will be doubly rewarded.
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