NON-PARTY ORGANISATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
IN BRITAIN, 1945-1986: POLITICAL AND PUBLIC ACTIVISM

By

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A thesis submitted to
The University of Birmingham
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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The University of Birmingham
August 2013
DEDICATION

For Mum, Dad and Steph.
This thesis is about non-party and non-governmental organisations campaigning for and against European integration in Britain between 1945 and 1986. These groups have so far been largely overlooked by studies on Britain’s relationship with Europe. The thesis will examine how these groups operated between the spheres of public activism and institutional politics. They targeted the general public directly with the aim of becoming popular mass movements, and focused on emotive and populist themes and adopted a moralistic tone as part of a broad non-party or cross-party appeal. Old-fashioned methods of activism, including pamphleteering and mass meetings, were used to cultivate a groundswell of support. However, these groups were not able to wrest control of the EEC membership issue away from Westminster. In the case of anti-EEC groups, attempts to acquire political influence and attract more parliamentarians to the campaign were at odds with the “anti-establishment” or “anti-political” tone adopted by sections of their support. Divisions over whether to adopt a more “insider” strategy of lobbying and adopting the model of a research-based think-tank or whether to continue seeking mass support stifled the campaign. Disagreement over strategy, and the confused position between public protest and Westminster politics, caused the anti-EEC campaign’s to fail.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincerest thanks go to my supervisors Professor Matthew Hilton and Professor Nick Crowson, for being so supportive, encouraging, and accommodating. The financial support I have received from their project studying non-governmental organisations, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, has been vital. I am very grateful for their comments and contributions, both from different but equally valuable perspectives. I would also like to thank Dr Chris Moores and Dr Kieran Connell for their personal and professional support during my time at Birmingham. I am also grateful for the constructive responses from those in attendance at the New Approaches to Political History conference at the German Historical Institute in London, the Postgraduate Conference at the University of Birmingham and the Europe 1945-1965 Comparative and Transnational Approaches conference at the University of Reading, at which parts of this work were presented.

I am grateful for the help of the staff at various institutions who have assisted me in researching this thesis, particularly to the staff at the archives reading room at the British Library of Political and Economic Science at the London School of Economics, who were always extremely helpful and friendly and provided a great deal of information on the Campaign for an Independent Britain catalogue from which much of this thesis has utilised. I would also like to thank the staff at the Bodleian Library in Oxford, Hull History Centre, the Labour History Centre in Manchester, the Parliamentary Archives in the House of Lords Record Office, the Modern Records Centre at Warwick University, and Special Collections at University College London for their assistance.

I am especially grateful to my family and friends for their patience, encouragement and support. I would particularly like to thank Claire Whitbread and Katie Weston for their support in the closing stages. A special mention must also go to Neil Jennings, Elizabeth Shaw and Karin Malmberg for accommodating me during my myriad research trips to London.
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**ABBREVIATIONS**

**Organisations**

ACML: Anti-Common Market League

BACMC: British Anti-Common Market Campaign

BHL: British Housewives League

BiE: Britain in Europe

BLR: British League of Rights

CACMIS: Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service

CGE: Conservative Group for Europe

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CMC: Common Market Campaign

CMSC: Common Market Safeguards Campaign

CMEU: Christian Movement for European Unity

CND: Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

COFER: Conservatives for European Reform

ELEC: European League for Economic Co-operation

EM: European Movement

EUF: European Union of Federalists

FBM: Forward Britain Movement

FU: Federal Union

KBO: Keep Britain Out

LCE: Labour Committee for Europe

LCMC: Labour Common Market Committee

LNU: League of Nations Union
NCMPC: National Common Market Petition Council

NRC: National Referendum Campaign

PEP: Political and Economic Planning

PFM: Political Freedom Movement

RBCMC: Referendum Before Common Market Committee

SBC: Safeguard Britain Campaign

SEN: Save Europe Now

TUACM: Trade Unions Against the Common Market

UEA: United Europe Association

UEM: United Europe Movement

UKCEM: United Kingdom Council of the European Movement

UKIP: UK Independence Party

UNA: United Nations Association

WACM: Women Against the Common Market

**Terms**

CAP: Common Agricultural Policy

EEC: European Economic Community

EU: European Union

VAT: Value Added Tax
INTRODUCTION

At the time of writing, the question of Britain’s membership of the European Union is once again at the heart of British political debate. The Conservative government’s proposal for a referendum on British EU membership by 2017 has ensured that the issue will re-emerge and continue to be a subject of dispute both inside and outside of Westminster.¹ It is a subject that has consistently drifted in and out of the British political agenda ever since the first steps towards European political and economic integration after the Second World War. British governments on the whole have been half-hearted towards involvement in European integration since declining to participate in the Schuman Plan in 1950, due to wariness of supranational development, the perception of Britain as a global power and a strong attachment to the Commonwealth. Successive governments were similarly negative towards integration, and favoured a free trade area in spite of the European Economic Community’s foundation in 1957. Declining economic performance and the psychological impact of the Suez crisis led to a reversal of policy, and two British applications to join the EEC were vetoed in the 1960s. After Britain became an EEC member in 1973, it was still seen as an intransigent partner, holding a referendum on membership in 1975, and criticising numerous aspects of EEC policy, particularly regarding Britain’s budgetary contribution. The Conservative Party became increasingly sceptical of European integration in the late 1980s, particularly after Margaret Thatcher’s critical Bruges Speech in 1988, and this strand of right-wing Euroscepticism has remained strong ever since.

Euroscepticism has gradually emerged into the British political mainstream since the early 1990s, and attitudes ranging from antipathy to hostility are prevalent in numerous MPs from all major political parties. However, the most prominent advocates of British withdrawal from the EU are currently the UK Independence Party (UKIP), whose rise in popularity further reflects a resurgence in Euroscepticism amongst the British public. Yet despite the recent emergence of UKIP as a political force, its current leader Nigel Farage has consistently sought to distance it from the three major political parties. In response to David Cameron’s claim that UKIP contained ‘some pretty odd people’, Farage declared that he was both ‘here as a campaigner’ and was a ‘conviction politician’. The recent departure of UKIP’s chief executive, who described the party as ‘a bunch of enthusiastic amateurs’ after his efforts to professionalise the party were resisted, raises further questions as to UKIP’s position on the political landscape. This tension between public campaigning and gaining political support and influence within Westminster has both placed the anti-EU movement in a unique position between the realms of institutional politics and mass movements, and historically has stifled the development of a successful anti-EU campaign.

This thesis will look at the development of non-party and non-governmental organisations for and against European integration in post-war Britain which operated between the spheres of public protest and Westminster politics. Its particular focus is on those organisations which sought to engage with and influence the public directly. On the far-reaching, complex, high political and elitist subject of British involvement in a supranational European community, these were groups and campaigns which members of the public could

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3 “Nigel Farage wants Ukip to remain a ‘bunch of amateurs’”, *Daily Telegraph*, 20 August 2013, retrieved 20 August 2013
join, engage in campaigning for, and invest their support or trust to represent their views on European integration and Britain’s international position and national identity. This thesis therefore focuses on these groups who had public membership, sought to mobilise public opinion and, in the words of Uwe Kitzinger, included a ‘straight undifferentiated appeal to the public’ in their activities.⁴

In concentrating on groups with open membership and an active public campaigning role, the emphasis of the thesis will therefore fall more heavily on the anti-Market side, and focus predominantly on anti-Market groups formed from 1961 onwards. The difference between pro- and anti-Market groups after this period is elucidated well in Lord Windlesham’s study into political communication, where he contrasts the small pro-Market campaign formed in 1961 targeting informed opinion with anti-Market movements ‘communicating with the public direct, and influencing the Government through the medium of popular opinion’.⁵ Groups who sought to mobilise public opinion in favour of European integration in the immediate post-war period, however, will be analysed as they attempted to bridge the gap between pressure group and emotive mass campaigns before declining in the mid-1950s. These groups share similarities with the anti-Market organisations of 1961 onwards in operating on the political fringes, being comprised of an assortment of politicians, dedicated campaigners and public members, targeting both public and parliament for support, and using emotive, resonant and cross-party issues – often relating to issues of national or European identity – to target a broad base of support. The pro-integration organisations that usurped them by no means cease to be significant; on the contrary, their professional and

efficient operations, their wealth of financial and political resources, and their continuing campaigning efforts make them worthy of detailed investigation. However, the sheer breadth of their archival material, in combination with this study’s concentration on campaigns engaging in a direct dialogue with the public, means that only the populist pro-Market campaigns of the late 1940s and 1950s will be assessed. After 1961, anti-Market organisations seeking to mobilise, and speak for, the general public shared the same strategic dilemmas and the same political space as their pro-integration predecessors.

By utilising the archival material of these groups, it will look at how they perceived the issues, how they mobilised and what arguments they used in an attempt to acquire mass support. On the one hand they would often appeal on emotive issues and adopt a moralistic tone in order to gain popular momentum, yet they would also adapt their campaigning to current issues, and appeal to the public on non-party or cross-party issues. In the case of the anti-Market movement, different groups were brought together by this broad non-party appeal. Disillusionment with government policy and party machinery, and an “anti-establishment” or “anti-political” tone was a common factor amongst anti-EEC groups, although this led them to be in the paradoxical position of criticising and campaigning outside of Westminster politics while at the same time fighting to protect the loss of parliamentary sovereignty resulting from EEC membership.

This clash between the popular and the political was a primary reason for the failure of anti-EEC campaigns. Whilst campaigning along populist lines on the issues of national identity, sovereignty and democracy, figures within the campaign were aware that the issue remained rooted in the political sphere and thus sought the support of parliamentarians in order to maximise political support and appear respectable and prestigious. This was
particularly troublesome in the 1970s and 1980s where the ‘political’ members on the committees of anti-EEC groups wanted to professionalise and focus on research that would influence politicians, while other elements within the groups wished to re-launch mass movement campaigning. This clash between idealists and realists meant that these organisations often had a confused strategy and definition, and lacked the dynamic leadership that could combine appeals to parliament and public or develop an organisation in a particular direction. Campaigning on an issue so deeply rooted in institutional politics, they were unable to transcend their campaigns into the national mass movements they wished for. Looking at the internal development of these hitherto overlooked organisations, along with their rhetoric and their activities, will determine why they struggled to make an impact, whilst also demonstrating that campaigning on the issue of Britain and European integration was not solely confined to Westminster.

This introduction will firstly consider the wider historiography on British involvement with the European integration process, along with the emerging political and historical analyses of British Euroscepticism. As will be shown, this thesis will signal a move away from the Westminster-centric approach on the subject that, with some exceptions, has focused predominantly on the formulation of government and party policies. In providing a detailed analysis of the opinions and strategies of organisations on European integration, it will bridge the divide between historical cultural and institutionalist approaches towards British Euroscepticism. The introduction will then outline the longitudinal approach taken by this thesis, and the source material used. Finally, it will give an outline of the thesis, and summarise the arguments of each chapter.
Britain and European integration – a historiographical overview

This thesis seeks to broaden the study of British responses to European integration by analysing the composition, ideology and actions of pressure groups and movements that existed and operated outside of, or on the periphery of, government and political parties. In this respect, this thesis exists alongside a historiography which has remained Westminster-oriented over several decades. The use of government records stored at the National Archives [formerly Public Record Office until 2003], combined with the continual lure of material annually declassified under the “Thirty Year Rule” of the Public Records Act, have maintained this government-centric approach, as political historians seek to explain British policy within an ongoing narrative of reluctant engagement with the European community. Whilst the recent trend toward “new political history” has seen an incorporation of a cultural dimension within the study of institutional politics – or in the words of James Vernon, ‘we are all cultural historians now… invoking the holy trinity of the categories of class, race and gender’ – works on Britain and European integration have remained largely immune to these methodological developments.6 Yet the dearth of studies that seek to analyse opinions on European integration from beyond the Cabinet or Foreign Office or party machinery is of more concern, despite more recent moves in the right direction. This introduction will now outline the development of the historiography of Britain and European integration, and in doing so will justify the approach taken by the thesis itself.

The majority of works on Britain and European integration can be summed up by one of two short phrases, “missed opportunities” or “awkward partner”. The former implies that the decisions of British governments were to blame for its delayed and reluctant membership

of the EEC, that they continually “miss the bus” with regard to European integration and their obstinacy causes them to lag behind community developments. While this theory has been questioned as the historiography has developed, the notion of Britain as an “awkward partner”, out of step with the European community, has remained inherent. Stephen George’s *An Awkward Partner* has arguably become the definitive work on British policy towards the European community, outlining the clashes of successive British governments with the community and their overall reluctance to engage wholeheartedly with European integration.\(^7\)

Placing each government’s European policy within its domestic and international context, George seeks to explicate ‘the basis for that [awkward partner] reputation’ that ‘has remained through to the time of writing’.\(^8\) The continuity of British “awkwardness” lies at the heart of the narrative of this body of work, with parallels drawn between British policy before EEC membership, first neglecting to join a supranational community and then launching half-hearted applications, and as an obstinate EEC member after 1973.

One of the reasons for the perpetuation of the “missed opportunities”/“awkward partner” school relates to the background and political stance of the authors of its most prominent works. Three of these authors watched British-European developments from close proximity in either an official or journalistic capacity. Miriam Camps, who worked in the U.S. State Department on European co-operation and integration in close contact with British government officials, produced a number of studies in the 1960s during the period of failed British applications.\(^9\) Her study of British relations with the nascent European community, written shortly after French President Charles de Gaulle’s vetoing of the British application, written shortly after French President Charles de Gaulle’s vetoing of the British application,

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\(^8\) Ibid., p.1

\(^9\) For more details on Camps’s background and career, see Daddow, O., *Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical Perspectives on Integration* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.91-94
lamented Britain’s refusal to join the European Economic Community in the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{10} Camps revisited this subject several decades later with a chapter stating that ‘missing the boat’ at the Messina Conference in 1955 was the first in a series of mistakes made by British governments.\textsuperscript{11} Hugo Young’s \textit{This Blessed Plot}, another landmark in the “awkward partner” school, expands on George’s work through the use of governmental records at the National Archives, along with the author’s personal connections with British parliamentarians and civil servants through his position as political editor for the \textit{Sunday Times} and a political columnist for the \textit{Guardian}.\textsuperscript{12} A ‘notorious pro-European’, Young’s work portrays membership of the European community as an inevitability, and therefore British reluctance is seen as ‘[h]igh political misjudgement’ where ‘much opportunity was, by sheer lapse of time, wasted’, as ‘Britain struggled to reconcile the past she could not forget with the future she could not avoid.’\textsuperscript{13} Roy Denman, a governmental official involved in the negotiation of Britain’s accession to the EEC, adopts a similar approach to Hugo Young. His overview of British relations with Europe, \textit{Missed Chances}, incorporates pre-war British policy towards Europe and similarly uses official documentation from the National Archives to analyse the perceived mistakes and ‘the reasons for the consistent failure of the British political class to understand continental Europe’ either side of accession.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10} Camps, M., \textit{Britain and the European Community 1955-63} (London: Oxford University Press, 1964)
\textsuperscript{11} Camps, M., “Missing the Boat at Messina and Other Times?” in Brivati, B. and Jones, H. (eds), \textit{From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945} (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993)
\textsuperscript{12} Young, H., \textit{This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair} (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998)
\textsuperscript{14} Denman, R., \textit{Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century} (London: Cassell, 1996), p.4
European integration, and confirmation of his pro-European stance, are confined to his autobiography.\textsuperscript{15}

Devotion to the European cause, what Anthony Seldon described as history written by ‘self-styled Europeans’, has therefore been a key defining factor upon the lines along which the “awkward partner” literature was shaped. \textsuperscript{16} Oliver Daddow has also noted this trend of writing historical criticism of post-war foreign policy in the hope of influencing future policy. Daddow divides this along the lines of orthodox and revisionist schools, where orthodox writers, those ‘first to the field’ writing shortly after events in question, ‘set the agenda’ for future research.\textsuperscript{17} The ‘orthodox “missed opportunities” interpretation’ written by the likes of Camps was therefore directed at those pro-Europeans aiming ‘to change the course of British policy’.\textsuperscript{18} The use of archival material and governmental documentation, what Daddow calls the ‘disciplinisation’ of the subject of Britain and European integration, has led to the creation of a revisionist school based around the use of ‘newly released primary sources’.\textsuperscript{19} The release of government records, along with new literature in the fields of international and diplomatic history that reinforced the theme of Britain’s post-war decline, led the first revisionist studies to interpret British policy from a different angle.\textsuperscript{20} One of the most prominent revisionist analyses from a diplomatic approach, by John Young, uses Public Record Office material to

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\textsuperscript{15} Denman, R., \textit{The Mandarin’s Tale} (London: Politico’s, 2002) \\
\textsuperscript{17} Daddow, \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945}, p.58 \\
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p.59 \\
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.}, p.115 \\
\end{flushleft}
assess British governmental policy as ‘a reaction to decline’, and finds that ‘after 1945 Britain had a more sophisticated European policy than is often realised’. As had previously occurred with the historiography of Britain’s appeasement policy leading up to the Second World War, governmental policy was assessed more sympathetically with regards to political and economic constraints and geopolitical strategy, and with reference to archival material.

This development, however, has led to a preoccupation with the use of material at the National Archives for analysis of Britain and European integration. Historians on the subject have attributed its academic interest to ‘the availability of documents’, ‘[t]he Thirty Year Rule’, and the area ‘just opening up in the archives’. Daddow notes than in parallel with the rise of revisionist historiography in the field and its ‘disciplinisation’, the Public Record Office became both the ‘first port of call’ for contemporary historians, and home to the most reliable and respectable source material. One of the consequences of the continual use of governmental source material, however, has been a glut of works on the policies of British governments towards the European community. What was once a ‘reinvigorated’ debate has now been dominated by what one author has dubbed the Public Record Office ‘mafia’. The aforementioned references to studies of the ‘British political class’ by Denman and of ‘[h]igh political misjudgement’ by Hugo Young – compounded by Young’s description of his work as a ‘study of leadership’, separated into thematic chapters on key political leaders and officials – demonstrate the elitist focus of the majority of the historiography on Britain and

22 Anne Deighton and John Young in correspondence with Daddow: Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, pp.144-45
23 Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, p.145. For more on the Public Record Office’s hold over the subject, see pp.144-154
European integration.25 Given the remoteness of the European Union felt by the majority of the British population, and the high political manoeuvring of British politicians on the subject of European integration, the self-imposed boundaries of the historiography reinforces the Westminster-centric nature of the subject.

Furthermore, use of source material at the National Archives has made detailed historical studies of British policy in more recent periods, for which government records are yet to be declassified and released, tentative and brief. For example, Denman’s study of Britain’s record as an EEC member up to the time of writing takes up a solitary chapter, with scarce primary source material to supplement newspaper articles and personal recollections.26 However, the aforementioned high esteem that governmental records are held in has led to scepticism of those parts of studies that fall within the Thirty Year Rule, such as Stephen George’s review of John Young’s *Britain and European Unity* which claimed ‘Young’s foray into more contemporary scholarship does not enhance his reputation as a scholar’.27 Anthony Forster has noted this theoretical divide within political history formed by the Thirty Year Rule, asking whether the period for which archival material is available should be ‘the province of contemporary historians, and [the period] after the territory of political scientists?’. However, the ‘pre-eminence of primary sources’ within contemporary political history that Forster mentions can instead be read as a pre-occupation with The National Archives, and no reference is made to archival material for recent decades deposited elsewhere.28 The development of the historiography has thus continued to predominantly

25 Denman, *Missed Chances*, p.4; Young, H., *This Blessed Plot*, p.3
26 Denman, *Missed Chances*, ch.13
study the actions of political elites over different periods determined by the availability of new material at the National Archives, from Britain’s non-participation in European integration in the late 1940s and 1950s\(^{29}\), to the first application in 1961 (and its failure in 1963)\(^{30}\), to new works on Britain’s second application under Harold Wilson.\(^{31}\) The continual focus on governmental policy and the use of archival material dictated by the Public Records Act thus appear to be mutually reinforcing.

There have been some steps outside these boundaries, eschewing the study of governmental policy within the timeframe dictated by source material within the National Archives and broadening the scope of the historiography. In the field of diplomatic history, multilateral and transnational approaches utilising the records of foreign governments and the EEC itself have portrayed a more complex dimension to the British-EEC relationship. Piers Ludlow’s detailed analysis of the Brussels negotiations from 1961-63 looks at the developments from the point of view of the EEC and its member states, with Public Record Office documents used as ‘an important complement’.\(^{32}\) The edited collection by George


Wilkes on the first British application similarly utilises multi-national archival material to add a new perspective on events. Moving away from high politics and diplomacy, party political studies by the likes of N.J. Crowson and Roger Broad have developed the scope of the field by assessing the responses of the Labour and Conservative parties to the evolving issue of European integration. Rather than analysing the importance of domestic constraints and pressures on governmental policy, these works trace the development of party policy and the relationship between party machinery and supporters in order to better the external factors on policy formulation. Assessing the European issue through the framework of political parties makes the role of public opinion and electoral advantage more prominent factors in these studies, with the views of party committees to constituency associations evaluated as constraints on party (or, when in power, government) policy. Anthony Forster describes this development as a shift from a ‘behaviouralist’ school focused on ‘the importance of leadership behaviour’ to a ‘party’ school which focuses on the intra-party responses to European integration and an ‘institutionalist’ school which accounts for the adversarial two-party system in the formulation of European policy.

However, while the step beyond the National Archives has been a welcome development, there remains an absence of studies taking into account the mobilisation of public opinion outside of a party political support base. The difficulty in finding reliable source material to support the study of public responses to European integration has been a primary reason for this. Recent works by Mathias Haeussler and Robert Dewey have assessed

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34 Crowson, N.J., The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945; Broad, R., Labour’s European Dilemmas: From Bevin to Blair (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001)
the formulation of public opinion and the role of the British media in shaping the debate on Europe, studying what Dewey has labelled the ‘low politics’ of media opinion, pressure groups and activists.\textsuperscript{36} However, both of these works are restricted to the first application for EEC membership in 1961-63. Contemporary studies from the 1960s and 1970s also shed light on public opinion towards European integration, but the overall picture remains incomplete, and weighted towards the period incorporating unsuccessful applications and accession.\textsuperscript{37}

Studies of pressure groups on the European issue, both contemporary and academic, have so far also been limited. For the early pro-Market organisations, the failed efforts of the United Europe Movement appear to have been forgotten in the historiography, while the work of Richard Mayne and John Pinder on Federal Union has a somewhat hagiographical feel to it.\textsuperscript{38}

Lord Windlesham’s short analysis of the relationship between the influence of pressure groups and public opinion on the EEC issue serves as a useful starting point into research into the early years of the Anti-Common Market League.\textsuperscript{39} Crowson’s article on the League’s influence on the 1962 South Dorset by-election also sheds light on the group’s activities, but its emphasis is predominantly on the by-election’s impact on the Conservative Party.\textsuperscript{40} Both Robert Lieber and Jeremy Moon have attempted more broad analyses of the EEC issue.


\textsuperscript{39} Windlesham, Communication and Political Power

\textsuperscript{40} Crowson, N.J., “Lord Hinchingbrooke, Europe and the November 1962 South Dorset By-election”, Contemporary British History, 17:4 (2003), pp.43-64. However, Crowson does include more detailed analysis of the Anti-Common Market League within The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945.
encompassing the responses of governments, parties and pressure groups and tracing the trends of public opinion.\footnote{Lieber, British Politics and European Unity; Moon, J., European Integration in British Politics 1950-63: A Study of Issue Change (Aldershot: Gower, 1985)} However, their studies of promotional pressure groups campaigning for or against membership are brief, and outweighed by their attention to sectional pressure groups and trade unions. Similarly, Uwe Kitzinger’s study of pro- and anti-Market campaigns is useful but also brief and dated, with access to only promotional material and financial records.\footnote{Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion} While the influence of sectional pressure groups continues to be examined, studies of groups and movements directing their efforts towards the public, particularly those using the internal records of the groups in question, remains limited.\footnote{Bromund, T., “Whitehall, the National Farmers’ Union, and Plan G, 1956-57”, Contemporary British History, 15:2 (2001), pp.76-97; Rollings, N., “British Industry and European Integration 1961-73: From first application to final membership”, Business and Economic History, 27:2 (1998), pp.444-454} This thesis assesses the aims, opinions, composition and strategies of these organisations that operated between spheres – on the fringes of politics and seeking to mobilise public opinion.

In terms of analysing the anti-Market organisation, this thesis also heeds Dewey’s call to trace ‘[t]he lines of descent from the anti-Marketeers to the Eurosceptics’.\footnote{Dewey, British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63, p.221} The growth in the study of Euroscepticism, both within British politics and as a more widespread phenomenon, is another way in which the academic debate on Britain and European integration has moved beyond the analysis of governmental policy. Two different approaches to the subject of Euroscepticism can be observed, a historical cultural approach and a structural institutionalist approach, which would appear to fall along the aforementioned blurred lines of contemporary history and political science respectively.\footnote{Simon Usherwood noted these two trends, and attested that the institutionalist approach had been overlooked – Usherwood, S., “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management”, Government and Opposition, 37:2 (2002), pp.211-230, p.212} The former, in line
with many of the governmental analyses, attributes British reluctance towards European integration to historical notions of exceptionalism, while the institutionalist approach studies the production of Eurosceptic groupings as a result of the British electoral system and political party management. Chris Gifford, from the cultural perspective, has argued that rather than being ‘the politics of opposition’ found on the extremities of the political spectrum, ‘Euroscepticism is intermeshed with the politics of the mainstream’. The populist themes of exceptional national identity and political culture, Gifford claims, transcended the party system in a context of post-imperial decline and uncertainty, and Eurosceptic discourse has thus capitalised on these emotive cultural myths of ‘British “otherness” from Europe’.

In addition, Menno Spiering, using the example of opposition to metrication in the late twentieth century, has demonstrated how perceptions of national history and culture, and Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of the ‘invention of tradition’, have underlined British opposition to European integration.

Richard Weight, in his analysis of British post-war national identity, has similarly attributed British reluctance to engage with European integration to enduring historical and cultural attributes within a paradoxically fading notion of “Britishness”.

However, in spite of the centrality of emotiveness and populism to this approach, popular campaigns and non-party organisations that appealed broadly but directly to the public have been overlooked in favour of a more generalised study of the Eurosceptic mentalité.

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The institutionalist approach deals more directly with the organisational forms which such Eurosceptic opinion has assumed. Simon Usherwood has argued that this approach has been overlooked and that ‘there has been comparatively little research into the mechanisms and processes behind the mobilisation of [the] movement’ of Eurosceptic forces.\textsuperscript{50} The institutionalist school has developed from Paul Taggart’s comparative analysis of Euroscepticism in Western Europe, which claimed that single-issue political parties strategically used Euroscepticism as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ to distance themselves from established centrist parties. Although the Conservative Party’s subsequent drift towards a more Eurosceptic position has demonstrated that such opinion within established parties can become more than merely factional, the article’s assertion that ‘the institutional context is vital for understanding Euroscepticism’ has remained influential.\textsuperscript{51} Mark Aspinwall has developed this approach by demonstrating how Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system and the necessity of party management leads to governing parties being forced to accommodate Eurosceptic backbenchers, rather than the more centrist powersharing produced under systems of proportional representation. In British politics, therefore, parties and governments adopt more cautious and reluctant policies as Euroscepticism is channelled in a more ‘anti-centrist’ way.\textsuperscript{52} Usherwood’s approach differs from Aspinwall’s model in that while Aspinwall focuses on the accommodation of Eurosceptic MPs through the formulation of European policies intended to preserve party unity, Usherwood looks at the externalisation of Eurosceptic opinion. Usherwood argues that as British political parties produce

\textsuperscript{50} Usherwood, S., “Proximate Factors in the Mobilization of Anti-EU Groups in France and the UK: The European Union as first-order politics”, \textit{European Integration}, 29:1 (2007), pp.3-21, p.4
\textsuperscript{52} Aspinwall, M., “Structuring Europe: Powersharing institutions and British preferences on European integration”, \textit{Political Studies}, 48 (2000), pp.415-442

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compromise policies so as to maintain party unity and avoid alienating an indifferent public, Eurosceptic (and, arguably, pro-European) elements work with non-party groups and organisations more in line with their opinions. Usherwood claims that it is often a constitutional or policy event within the European community, to which the established parties cannot respond effectively, that acts as the catalyst for the formation of such organisations.

While it is true that the 1961 announcement of application for British EEC membership was the catalyst for the foundation of a number of anti-Market organisations, they were formed by concerned people on the political fringes and from middle class professions rather than by MPs. This represents a problem with analyses of externalisation, in that they remain Westminster-centric in focusing on party management rather than the analysing the non-party organisations themselves, or attributing them with a proportional amount of agency. These organisations often approached MPs and politicians, in the hope of attaining political influence or ensuring political balance at their helm. This thesis will therefore seek a middle ground between historical cultural and institutional approaches, in both assessing the use of emotive and populist issues within the anti-Market argument, and their fluctuating position toward and away from institutional politics.

Despite being an issue which has polarised public opinion over the past few decades, popular movements campaigning for or against membership of the EEC and EU – along with their aims, activities, rhetoric and their engagement with the public – have not been subject to

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53 Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management”
54 Usherwood, “Proximate Factors in the Mobilization of Anti-EU Groups in France and the UK: The European Union as first-order politics”
in-depth historical analysis. Top-down approaches to the subject of Britain and European integration, and to Euroscepticism, have led to what Dewey calls ‘an incomplete appraisal of attitudes and indirect influences’. Usherwood’s analysis of these organisations works as a useful starting point. In looking at the process leading to the formation of groups ‘outside the set of formal institutions’ at Westminster, Usherwood stakes a claim for the importance of these non-party groups by highlighting their ideological freedom and their public-oriented strategies. Far from being an issue interpreted and discussed in elitist circles, much of the debating and manoeuvring on the European issue has taken place on the fringes of the Westminster machinery, from political party factions to public campaigns and membership organisations to think-tanks and research bodies. The composition of these non-party or cross-party organisations that ‘bring together elements of political parties and the general public’ corresponds with their position in the middle-ground between parliamentary politics and public activism. The increasing influence of non-party anti-EU organisations after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 led Usherwood to conclude that ‘we must look beyond pure party politics, to the wider field of civil society and the role of non-party groups’ for a complete picture of the EU membership debate. However, while concentrating on the conditions which engender the creation of such organisations, Usherwood’s analysis of the organisations themselves is necessarily a ‘brief overview’. The aforementioned divide between contemporary history and political science is again a factor in this, as the focus on structural and institutional factors prevails over archival evidence.

56 Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management”, p.222
57 Ibid., p.222
58 Ibid., p.230
59 Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management”, p.226
A lengthier analysis of Eurosceptic mobilisation by Anthony Forster seeks to bridge this divide by looking more closely at the history of these fringe organisations through the framework of political science, by looking at their activities during ‘the key events in British policy towards the European integration project’, which acted as structural-institutional ‘set-piece opportunities’ to mobilise.\(^6^0\) Similarly to Usherwood, Forster bemoans the lack of study of British Eurosceptic groups within the historiography of Britain and European integration, although he criticises the ‘institutionalist’ approach along with governmental and party analyses as being insufficient. Eurosceptic groups are ‘often treated as of tangential interest’, he argues, and the evolving nature of Euroscepticism and the activities and impact of the organisations have been neglected.\(^6^1\) However, Forster’s work is of a similarly introductory nature, and its main purpose appears to be as a corrective to works within the field of political science which perceive Euroscepticism to be a modern phenomenon predominantly affecting the Conservative Party from the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty onwards. Furthermore, despite detailing the development of non-party groupings within which politicians campaigned against EEC membership, the emphasis as suggested by the book’s title is on the mobilisation of sceptics from the perspective of Westminster and political parties. In this assessment, parliamentary activity provided the opportunity for mobilisation and in some cases the only effective arena for action, meaning that the campaigning activities of non-party organisations, who sought public support as well as political influence, are often ignored.

The lack of archival source material in both of these works therefore leads to an incomplete picture of these organisations. While it is true that organisations seeking popular support for or against European integration were necessarily reactive to events in Westminster

\(^6^1\) *Ibid.*, p.5
and within the EEC institutions, it is important to assess how they sought to shape the issue, how they attempted to maintain campaigning when the EEC issue was off the political agenda, and how their development and their actions were connected with their failure to attain political or popular support. Given the recent growth in the study of non-governmental organisations [NGOs], it is surprising that these campaigns on the boundary between politics and protest have not been looked into. Given that McKay and Hilton state that for ‘any significant issue of the last sixty years, NGOs will have been involved’, these organisations campaigning on an often extremely salient political issue have so far largely eluded empirical study. It has also often been an emotionally resonant issue with the public. Changing notions of national identity in post-war Britain were amplified by the prospect of British membership of the Community, and becoming a part of Europe was perceived by a large proportion of the public to be an alteration of Britain’s historic course. British membership was therefore perceived by anti-Marketeers and Eurosceptics to be a threat to British sovereignty and a historic, fixed notion of national identity and “Britishness”. However, there has been a public disinterest or lack of knowledge of much of the inner workings of the EEC and EU, and the constitutional details and intricate consequences of membership. Anti-EEC groups therefore not only reinforced the image of the EEC as a product of complex bureaucratic artifice compared with the historic and trusted political systems of Westminster and the Commonwealth, but they were also some of the primary conveyors of information about EEC policies and workings. In doing this they filled the aforementioned void left by political parties who played down the EEC issue to avoid internal rifts and the loss of votes. In acting

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63 Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management”
as mediators between the EEC and the public, and adopting the role of ‘watchdogs’, these organisations thus occupy a fascinating position in the wider spectrum of NGO activity. Usherwood believes the current think-tanks and organisations concerned with European integration are now ‘much more alert’ than the public and politicians and possess ‘an autonomous capacity to accumulate, evaluate and disseminate information’.

Organisations from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s attempted to fulfil this role, but by seeking the support of the public as much as the support of opinion-formers, their directions and tactics were confused. In their failure to attain political influence they were ‘outsider’ groups, despite often holding the same opinion as substantial numbers of MPs. By pursuing political and mass movement strategies, they utilised both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ tactics. However, in spite of the steps towards professionalization made by anti-EEC groups in the 1980s, they never truly sought ‘insider’ status. The boundaries of parliamentary and protest activity are therefore blurred. While some NGOs, such as the Child Poverty Action Group, were able to balance parliamentary lobbying with high-profile media campaigns and a strong public presence, organisations on European integration often lacked the dynamic leadership and the financial backing to successfully campaign in both spheres. The impact of the Referendum Party in the 1990s, led by the highly visible and extremely wealthy Sir James Goldsmith, reinforces this point.

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Sources

This thesis is an organisational study of the initial pro-Market and anti-Market movements, treating these organisations as valuable and worthwhile areas of historical inquiry in their own right rather than as the product of externalisation or other political forces. Its approach therefore moves away from institutional analyses based around political opportunity structures, which assess the ‘set of constraints and opportunities that encourage or discourage’ mobilisation.\(^{66}\) In assessing the agency and actions of these organisations, within the context of political developments, it tends towards more of a resource mobilisation approach, exploring how they mobilised support and their forms of organisation, their aims and their internal unity. Such an approach therefore looks at more than just a political position but also assesses in detail the strategic tasks of ‘mobilising supporters, neutralising and/or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathisers, and achieving change in targets’, and the potential clashes between these tactics.\(^{67}\) In terms of anti-Market organisations, it seeks to both elaborate on the study by Dewey and broaden the timeframe of analysis significantly. It also adopts the same form of detailed organisational analysis adopted by studies of other NGOs, such as the work by Christopher Moores on the National Council for Civil Liberties, by Paul Byrne and Jodi Burkett on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and by Tom


Buchanan on Amnesty International and other human rights organisations. Analysis of the internal machinations of these organisations reveals divisions between political and public approaches, which shaped their aims, strategies and composition. These developments framed the public message presented by the pro- and anti-Market campaigns, as well as the manner in which they were presented. The thesis therefore seeks to examine the developments internally, with regards to the often turbulent relationship between committee and rank-and-file and between politicians and activists, and externally in terms of the shifts between insider and outsider strategy and the fluctuating distance between these organisations and institutional politics.

This thesis therefore seeks to be a more empirical and detailed analysis than Forster’s introductory assessment of mobilisation in key events. The organisations in this study are assessed in the context of changing external circumstances, and how they reacted to the political context that is thoroughly covered in the historiography by governmental and party analyses. It is concerned with how they reacted to changes in access to institutional politics, and how they sought to create and harness public opposition when access to the political sphere was denied to them. Their reactions to when European integration was a recessed issue in Britain – in the 1950s for public pro-Market campaigns, and after the failed applications in

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69 Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*
the 1960s and after the 1975 referendum for anti-Marketeers – revealed fundamental differences in aims and strategy.

As well as undertaking a more detailed study, this thesis is a more long-term analysis than those that take a similar approach, such as Dewey and Haeussler.\textsuperscript{70} By employing this longitudinal approach that assesses the shifting positions, aims and dynamics of the public campaigning organisations, recurrent trends become apparent. When faced with unfavourable circumstances and diminishing resources, organisations were divided as to whether to revive mass campaigning or seek more direct political influence, revealing a consistent divergence between committees and grassroots activists. This tension between politicians and campaigners pulled the organisations in different directions and kept them in a state of flux. Furthermore, this long-term focus on shifting strategies and issues within the development of the anti-Market campaign reveals how a number of organisations converged around a common position and consensus. The desire to appeal to a broad base of support and the promotion of cross-party issues meant that initial party political concerns converged on liberalist themes – of the defence of individual democratic rights and promotion of direct democracy, of free trade and consumerism, and of liberal democratic development and institutions intrinsic to British national identity. Convergence on these liberal themes led to portrayal of the issue of EEC membership as an oppositional clash between liberalism and individualism against state and supranational control and centralisation of power, meaning that liberalism and anti-establishment rhetoric ran through the heart of the anti-Market campaign. The long-term approach, attempted briefly by Dewey in his concluding remarks,

combined with an organisational analysis reveals these common themes and difficulties within popular campaigns on the EEC.

Before discussing the source material used for this thesis, it would be useful to give a brief overview of the organisations that were active on the subject of European integration in post-war Britain. The two predominant organisations in support of British involvement in European integration before the EEC’s creation were Federal Union and the United Europe Movement. Both were founded in the spectre of conflict, the former in 1938 and the latter in 1947, with aims of uniting Europe along peaceful and political lines. European organisations with British sections, such as the European League for Economic Cooperation, also formed in the late 1940s. From these European organisations, the umbrella European Movement formed with its own United Kingdom Council (UKCEM), including the European League for Economic Cooperation and the United European Movement. While the United Europe Movement faded in the 1950s, the UKCEM, along with the Britain in Europe organisation founded by Federal Union in 1959, became the two most prominent advocates of British membership of the EEC.

As political opinion gravitated towards EEC entry, pressure groups began to form against membership in the early 1960s. The three most prominent in this period were the Anti-Common Market League, the Keep Britain Out campaign, and the Forward Britain Movement. While the latter was no longer active by the mid-1960s, the Anti-Common Market League and Keep Britain Out remained vocal campaigners against EEC membership throughout the decade. The umbrella Common Market Safeguards Committee was formed in

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71 These are the three major pressure groups mentioned in Dewey, *British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63*, pp.117-137
1969, which had close connections with the Anti-Common Market League in terms of both personnel and, after 1973, its premises.\textsuperscript{72} Other smaller organisations, including Women Against the Common Market, the National Common Market Petition Committee and the Referendum Before Common Market Committee, argued their own particular case against membership in this period. The National Referendum Campaign was launched in early 1975 to co-ordinate the activities of existing groups within the “No” campaign, including the Anti-Common Market League, Get Britain Out and the Common Market Safeguards Committee.\textsuperscript{73} After the referendum defeat, the National Referendum Campaign disbanded and Get Britain Out ceased activity. However, personnel within the National Referendum Campaign and Common Market Safeguards Campaign wished to continue campaigning under an umbrella movement opposing EEC policies and the federalist progression of European integration. The Safeguard Britain Campaign was therefore formed in early 1976, and remained one of the most prominent anti-Market pressure groups along with the continuing Anti-Common Market League. The Safeguard Britain Campaign, in attempts to better define its aims and attract more supporters, changed its name twice, to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign in 1982 and then to the Campaign for an Independent Britain in 1989.

The organisational approach of this thesis is reflected by the predominance of sources from the official archival material of these organisations. The majority of the anti-Market organisations’ sources are held in the Campaign for an Independent Britain collection at the British Library of Political and Economic Science. This houses the records of the Anti-

\textsuperscript{72} Both organisations shared an office at 55 Park Lane, London: Minutes of an Executive Committee meeting of Common Market Safeguards Campaign, 21 February 1973, CIB/1/3, British Library of Political and Economic Science

\textsuperscript{73} Keep Britain Out had changed its name to Get Britain Out in 1973 with the commencement of British EEC membership.
Common Market League, the Common Market Safeguards Campaign, and the Safeguard Britain Campaign and British Anti-Common Market Campaign. It also holds records for a number of smaller organisations such as the National Common Market Petition Council, the Referendum Before Common Market Committee, the Anti-Dear Food Campaign and various Labour and Conservative groupings. As the more prominent organisations have only been analysed briefly, this extensive collection has so far not been investigated, and its importance in analysing the development of the anti-Market campaign from the 1960s to 1980s is vital.

The British Library of Political and Economic Science also holds the private papers of Lady Juliet Rhys Williams and Frances Josephy, which together contain records of the wider pro-Market campaign for the immediate post-war period, including the United Europe Movement and Federal Union, along with the European League for Economic Co-operation, the European Movement and the Christian Movement for European Unity.

Of the various minutes of committee meetings, newsletters, correspondence, pamphlets and propaganda comprised in the Campaign for an Independent Britain collection, some sources have proved more useful than others. Predominantly, correspondence both within and between anti-Market organisations has been pivotal to highlighting where on the political map these organisations were located and where its members and the committees wanted them to be. Internal correspondence between committee members outlines the divisions within the organisations over the direction its personnel felt it should be taking. Most of the internal frustrations are detailed within this correspondence where members were likely to be more candid about their disillusionment or exasperation about the campaign’s development than in the minutes of committee meetings. Correspondence from local groups, as well as collections of records of some local Anti-Common Market League groups, has
therefore been utilised. However, of equal importance of correspondence amongst committee members, with more active campaigners advocating a bolder public-oriented strategy and more political figures fearing the organisations becoming disreputable, or even being infiltrated by extremists. This correspondence reveals a continual rift between those members who wanted to mobilise the campaign and those members who wanted to consolidate it.

Publications of these organisations have also been useful in a number of ways. By adopting a longitudinal approach, the production of either simple leaflets and pamphlets or more detailed reports and analyses reflected the wider strategy of the campaigns on integration, and whether populist or political support was sought. Furthermore, analysis of propaganda has shed light on how the organisations framed the issues of EEC membership, focusing on cross-party issues to appeal to as broad a support base as possible. However, while pamphleteering with large print runs was designed to reach a mass audience, there was a sense that some circulars were preaching to the converted and not disseminating the message far enough. Nevertheless, circulars and newsletters have been useful beyond their prioritisation and presentation of certain issues. In maintaining a connection and a dialogue with members and local groups, these missives were pivotal both in the sense of keeping the issue prominent and the campaign alive, but also in informing and mobilising grassroots support. Complaints from local groups about a lack of public campaigning or guidance from the centre meant that committees needed to keep members interested, occupied and placated. This material therefore would direct them towards political and public forms of activism.

The lack of local groups’ material for some organisations has been a problem. The difficulty of locating records for the Keep Britain Out campaign has been problematic in attempting to investigate their working relationship with the Anti-Common Market League
and within the Common Market Safeguards Campaign. However, some records have been located both in the Campaign for an Independent Britain collection and in the private papers of Hugh Gaitskell at the Special Collections of University College London. The reason for the lack of comprehensive records for both Keep Britain Out – and for another network of local groups, the National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations – may be down to the lack of professional administration of these organisations. Uwe Kitzinger claimed that Keep Britain Out ‘did not believe in getting bogged down with card indices of membership and correspondence’, was organised in a loosely co-ordinated network of ‘autonomous local action groups’, and had no paid employees until late 1971. Therefore, it is unlikely that detailed records would have been kept, maintained or deposited as archival material.

An *ad hoc* method of operation may also be the reason for the absence of committee minutes or formal records for the Anti-Common Market League’s initial few years in the Campaign for an Independent Britain Collection. However, this gap has been partly filled by the private papers of Lord Hinchingbrooke, the League’s first and longstanding president, which contain correspondence with a number of politicians and campaigners, including the League’s first chairman John Paul. The private papers of Neil Marten – Conservative MP, co-founder and Vice-Chairman of the Common Market Safeguards Committee and Chairman of the National Referendum Campaign – also contains a wealth of correspondence and records of the organisations he was involved in, including some Conservative party groups. This is complemented by records of the Conservative European Reform Group, a Eurosceptic group of Conservative MPs founded in 1980, held within the private papers of Margaret Thatcher at Churchill College, Cambridge. In studying the pro-Market campaigns, the private papers of

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74 Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion*, p.246
Victor Gollancz at Warwick Special Collections contain a number of files of correspondence and records relating to the United Europe Movement, of which Gollancz was a joint vice-chairman. Furthermore, gaps within the material on both pro- and anti-Market organisations are filled by the Britain in Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, which comprises all the available published material, including pamphlets, reports, and newsletters, of almost all the organisations in this thesis and numerous other pressure groups concerned with Britain and European integration.

**Thesis outline**

This thesis will plug a gap in the historiography on Britain’s relationship with the European Economic Community by assessing the failed campaigns to inspire passionate support for, and then popular support against, British membership of a European community. Its first chapter looks at the often-overlooked United Europe Movement and the more prominent Federal Union in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While the initial steps towards European integration, and the opposition of British governments under Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill, has been the subject of considerable historical analysis, popular opinion on the issue has been overlooked. Both the United Europe Movement and Federal Union utilised the rhetoric of pacifism and humanitarianism, and the post-war fervour in some circles for reconciliation, to present the case for European integration to the public. Large-scale events and meetings, such as the packed Albert Hall meeting at which the United Europe Movement was officially founded, showed the resonance that this message carried.

However, both organisations began to fade into obscurity in the 1950s, unable to influence the decision-making either in Westminster and the Foreign Office, or in the
meetings at Strasbourg at which the supranational development of the European Economic Community began to take shape. The United Europe Movement’s preoccupation with a European community based on cultural bonds and a common European identity – defined in contrast to the totalitarianism and atheism on the other side of the Iron Curtain – and its opposition to rigid constitutional integration put it at odds with developments on the continent. Furthermore, it reflected the British preference for ‘loose association’ and intergovernmental basis for integration which came to dominate the attitude of British politicians to European integration for decades, and which is still prevalent today. The chapter demonstrates how both the United Europe Movement and Federal Union attempted to inspire a groundswell of popular support for European integration, and how ‘federalism’ took on the characteristics of a ‘movement’ distanced from the more formal lobbying of government and civil service. Ultimately, however, this distance may have contributed to the decline of both organisations, and caused them to be usurped by more professional and technocratic pressure groups concerned with gaining support from government and industry rather than the public. The economic case carried more weight than the emotional case, and the subsequent technocratic and elitist nature of pro-EEC groups has failed to truly inspire popular support for British membership ever since.

Chapter two looks at the formation and activity of groups opposed to British entry into the EEC between Harold Macmillan’s announcement to the House of Commons in 1961 of the intention to apply for EEC membership, and the eventual commencement of Britain’s

75 For example, David Cameron’s recent speech on the future of the European Union described it as ‘a family of democratic nations’ where ‘flexible, willing cooperation of is a much stronger glue than compulsion from the centre’, and called for ‘a bigger and more significant role for national parliaments’: Speech by David Cameron at Bloomberg, 23 January 2013, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/eu-speech-at-bloomberg/, accessed 5 March 2013
membership in 1973. The organisations which formed in 1961-62 following Macmillan’s speech – the Anti-Common Market League, the Forward Britain Movement, and the Keep Britain Out campaign – each had a separate ideological stance. However, despite targeting different bases of support, these groups were united by disillusionment with party policy and the failure to take into account the views of grassroots party membership or the general public on the issue of EEC membership. Frustration with party machinery, party whips and a lack of intra-party democracy went hand-in-hand with the lack of consultation on British involvement in European integration. This, combined with the Anti-Common Market League’s jettisoning of the explicit approach to Conservative Party membership, formed the grounds for a large non-party campaign against EEC membership. The campaign’s ‘anti-party’ or ‘anti-politics’ character thus formed a substantial part of the movement’s rhetoric and appeal, and remains a key component of the current anti-EU campaign.76 Whilst party politics and ideology prevented anti-Market MPs from collaborating effectively, key figures in anti-Market organisations outside of Westminster began to collaborate more closely, forming more united umbrella organisations at the end of the turn of the decade such as the Common Market Safeguards Committee, the National Anti-Common Market Demonstration Committee, and the National Common Market Petition Committee.

At the heart of these developments in the anti-Market campaign was the desire to appeal directly to the general public and mobilise a large-scale campaign against entry. Although often their figures did not reflect it, these organisations were formed with mass membership in mind, seeking to take the issue to the public through propaganda and

76 Nigel Farage, leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party, recently stated that ‘a really good non-EU reason why people are voting for us… [is] because we’re not like the other three [major political parties]… I tell you, I think the anti-politics thing is quite an important factor’: “This Eurosceptic Isle”, broadcast on BBC Radio 4, 25 February 2013
pamphleteering, mass petitions and demonstrations. The evocative, non-party issues on which the campaign focused ran parallel with its populist character, and were utilised to appeal to as broad a base of support as possible. The issue of sovereignty was portrayed as both a diminution of the democratic rights of the individual voter as well as a weakening of the powers of Westminster, and allowed anti-Market organisations to present themselves as defenders of the public from the developing trend of ‘big government’. Concentration on the economic aspects of membership were concerned as much with the price and quality of basic foodstuffs and the introduction of Value Added Tax as it was with more weighty issues such as balance of payments. Championing the consumer, therefore, allowed the campaign to appeal across both class and gender lines. That these issues began to take prominence over other more emotionally resonant issues, regarding patriotism, national identity and the Commonwealth, shows an increasing complexity within the anti-Market case. In combining the aim of mass mobilisation with the desire for political legitimacy, the chapter argues that the anti-Market organisations occupied a unique position between protest and politics, a middle ground which hampered their ability to work effectively across both spheres of action.

The 1975 referendum on Britain’s EEC membership saw both pro- and anti-EEC groups refine their arguments put forward to the public in an attempt to mobilise support. Chapter three assesses the anti-Market movement between the start of Britain’s EEC membership in 1973 and its campaign in 1975 under the umbrella movement of the National Referendum Campaign. In its attempt to turn the public against membership, the Campaign continued to focus on the populist issues of rising prices, decline in choice and quality of foodstuffs, protection of the poorest sections of society, and other ways in which the average voter, consumer or family would be affected by continued membership. In both rhetoric and
organisation, the National Referendum Campaign appeared to be the end product of the anti-Market movement’s continual progress throughout the 1960s and early 1970s towards a unified body, representing the popular case against EEC membership across the political spectrum. However, this narrative passes over the internal divisions within the National Referendum Campaign, notwithstanding the very public discord between anti-Market MPs such as Tony Benn and Enoch Powell which has already been covered at length. The composition of the National Referendum Campaign was in fact a fragmented unity between the more professionalised and politicised Common Market Safeguards Campaign at the helm of the organisation, and the more militant, anti-establishment organisations on the periphery.

Once again, the anti-Market movement was unable to bridge the political and public spheres and found itself operation within a thankless middle ground. The National Referendum Campaign committee was preoccupied with seeking the support of parliamentarians and exhibiting political legitimacy, in order to obtain positive media coverage and to win the support of moderate or undecided voters. The Common Market Safeguards Campaign, utilising the political influence and accommodating personalities of Douglas Jay and Neil Marten, therefore emerged as the most influential of the constituent organisations. By contrast, groups such as Get Britain Out and the National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations were viewed as more politically extremist with eccentric, demagogue leadership. The “anti-political” character of these groups, who tended to concentrate more on local grassroots mobilisation, was seen as being potentially alienating to moderate support and embarrassing to the wider campaign. The clash between political and public, national and local, and respectability and populism, demonstrates once more the
uneasy position which the anti-Market campaign occupied, and the divisions over direction which have plagued the campaign throughout its history.

Chapter four continues to assess the actions of the anti-Market campaign between the referendum defeat and the 1986 Single European Act, a period in which for the majority of the population the question of EEC membership was something of a lapsed issue. As such, the study of anti-EEC organisations beyond the Westminster sphere in this period has thus far been largely neglected. Yet the ongoing development of the campaign, largely outside of the public eye, reveals the same clashes over the campaign’s aims, composition and rhetoric that would trouble it during its more prominent periods. The campaign would again fail to either inspire mass mobilisation against EEC membership or to become an influential body in the political debate on the issue, predominantly because its personnel could never agree along which of these routes it wanted the campaign to proceed. The formation of the Safeguard Britain Campaign from the ashes of the National Referendum Campaign represented something of a victory for the “political” side of the fractured anti-Market movement, while also continuing the aim of a popular movement seeking to influence public opinion over EEC membership and attempting to keep the issue alive. However, as the debate over Britain’s EEC membership developed in the late 1970s and 1980s, the campaign’s character fluctuated in its attempts to adapt and maintain relevance. Whereas the “Safeguard” title had initially proven to be a safe, moderate label to attract varying levels of scepticism in the post-referendum period, hardliners within the organisation campaigned for a title that reflected the ultimate goal of EEC withdrawal. The name change to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign in 1982, however, alienated the political support which had been central to its “Safeguard” predecessor, and appears particularly misguided when party political groups such
as the Conservative European Reform Group aimed to work within the framework of scepticism at this time. The tensions between the “political” and “mass movement” approaches are also evident in the attempts of the campaign’s committee to professionalise and develop into a think-tank. The committee sought to gain “insider” status for the campaign through focusing on research dissemination and the expertise of a small number of highly knowledgeable individuals. This shift away from a mass movement strategy ostracised local groups and grassroots supporters, and disappointed figures within the campaign who sought a renewed propaganda drive to capitalise upon widespread scepticism and hostility towards the EEC. As with the referendum campaign, divisions over the nature of the campaign stifled its development and prevented it from gaining mass support. In this case, the political approach failed to connect with the general public, and the hardline message of withdrawal alienated moderate support, ensuring that the anti-Market movement would remain on the fringes of political debate.

The thesis ends with the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 for a number of reasons. Primarily, this event represents a clear demarcation between two distinct periods of the anti-Market movement. The Single European Act put the issue of the EEC firmly back on the British political agenda, and dissatisfaction with aspects of the treaty and with the direction of the EEC’s development culminated in Margaret Thatcher’s “Bruges Speech” of 1988. This speech represented the adoption of Euroscepticism into the British political mainstream, and resulted in the creation of an ‘alphabet soup’ of Eurosceptic and anti-Market organisations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, formed both within and on the periphery of British politics.77 While anti-Market organisations from the timeframe of this thesis – such as

77 “This Eurosceptic Isle”, broadcast on BBC Radio 4, 25 February 2013
the anti-Common Market League and the Campaign for Independent Britain (previously the British Anti-Common Market Campaign and Safeguard Britain Campaign) – continued to exist, their memberships and operations were increasingly diminished. Just as the public campaigns in favour of European integration were outmuscled by more closed-off, technocratic organisations in the 1950s, Eurosceptic think-tanks and organisations staffed by political figures dominated the anti-Market campaign after the Bruges Speech. This political “second wave” of Eurosceptic mobilisation has already been assessed in the work of Simon Usherwood, and the decreasing presence of archival material for the late 1980s and 1990s justifies a political scientific approach.78 As a result, this thesis is intended to fill the historical gap and operate alongside these works on post-Bruges organisations.

The anti-Market movement had political aspirations but lacked the support of political heavyweights or MPs with the influence or credibility to transform anti-Market organisations from fringe groups into established political movements. Furthermore, attempts to appeal to a broader political support base by diluting the anti-Market message and embracing a more moderate stance of scepticism were thwarted by the continual presence of hardline anti-Marketeers who failed to hide their ultimate aim of EEC withdrawal. While rhetoric in Westminster seemed to shift from outright hostility to more qualified Euroscepticism, these hardliners were not satisfied with piecemeal gains or safeguards, and alienated potential political support, particularly from the Conservative Party. They belonged more to the ‘populist’ camp within the anti-Market movement, believing that the anti-Market message, if presented with enough force, would inspire a nationwide revolt against EEC membership.

However, just as the ‘political’ camp lacked the support of a political heavyweight to spearhead a prominent campaign, the ‘populist’ camp lacked a charismatic figure, either drawn from within or outside of the Westminster sphere, to lead the popular national groundswell of support it sought. While political realists sought ways to keep the campaign alive whilst the issue of EEC membership disappeared and re-appeared from the political agenda, mobilisers and figures more closely connected with local grassroots groups felt increasingly betrayed by Westminster politicians and sought to maintain a public campaign on their own terms – campaigning against British membership, and then towards British withdrawal at the earliest possible opportunity. Its inability to effectively unite these two different approaches, or to establish an effective organisational framework that connected grassroots campaigners with political figures on committees, lay at the heart of the anti-Market movement’s failure.

Britain’s post-war policy towards European integration and the European community is often seen as a high political and elitist concern. This is particularly applicable for the years preceding Britain’s first application to join the EEC in 1961. That the Community’s gradual formation and its inception in 1957 were serious foreign policy issues for governments, statesmen and cabinets to discuss and decide cannot be refuted. As such, the decision of the Labour government of Clement Attlee not to join the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, and the decisions of the Conservative governments of Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to remain outside of the European integration process, have attracted the interest of high political and international relations historians for decades. Interpretation of the issue has thus undergone the familiar processes of revisionism and counter-revisionism – from the initial political and journalistic rhetoric of ‘missed opportunities’ to more detailed and sympathetic assessments of foreign policy decision-making – without ever setting its sights beyond the confines of the closed world of Westminster and the Foreign Office.

Attempts to analyse the impact of British pressure groups and movements on European integration have therefore been limited, with historians preferring to analyse the ins and outs of the intergovernmental conferences and governmental policy-making that led to the

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1 On the functional dilemma of ‘mass membership versus pressure group’, a Federal Union committee reiterated that Federal Union ‘does not exist to carry on purely educational activities, to act as a “Keeper of the Grail” or guardian of a kind of Toec-H lamp.’: Report of the Committee on Organisation Set-Up by the 1956 Annual General Meeting of Federal Union [n.d., 1956], JOSEPHY J/2/7, British Library of Political and Economic Science (BLPES)

2 For a historiographical overview of the ‘orthodox’, ‘revisionist’ and ‘counter-revisionist’ schools on Britain and European integration, see Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945. For examples of the orthodox approach, see Camps, Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963 and Camps, “Missing the Boat at Messina and Other Times?” in Brivati and Jones (eds.), From Reconstruction to Integration. For an example of the revisionist school, see Melissen and Zeeman “Britain and Western Europe, 1945-51: Opportunities Lost?”
European Community forming without Britain. As an example of the latter, Peter Hennessy’s analysis of British attempts to ‘shift minds and inspire hearts’ toward the idea of a united Europe talks down the early efforts of the European Movement and instead centres on Attlee’s Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, ‘the man who counted’, and a Foreign Office diplomat, Sir Edmund Hall-Patch.\(^3\) In his quest for inspirational visionaries, Hennessy looks for the ‘true direction of British foreign and economic policy… [in] the real world of secret meetings and diplomatic exchanges’, yet describes the world of Whitehall as ‘passion-free zones’.\(^4\) Anthony Forster’s essentially party-based analysis of the ‘ebb and flow’ of Euroscepticism in British politics does account for non-governmental pressure groups, but his central focus in this period is the mindset of the ‘political establishment’, unwilling to embark on the European project. Furthermore, Forster fails to acknowledge that several prominent figures of the political elite were either actively involved in or supporters of those movements that he is quick to dismiss. He even goes as far as to say that, in this period,

\begin{quote}
…what little discussion that took place was confined to the political elite, and internalised within the major political parties at Westminster and key Whitehall departments, sometimes reaching the floor of the House of Commons, but rarely aired in the public domain.\(^5\)
\end{quote}

In other cases, European integration movements receive only a passing mention. Richard Weight, in his study of changing British and Home Nations’ identities, makes reference to both ‘a small European Movement’ and to Federal Union, initially successful but dismissed by the Foreign Office as possessing ‘an inebriated optimism’, attempting to instil a

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{4}{Ibid., pp.359-60, p.363}
\footnotetext{5}{Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, p.10}
\end{footnotes}
sense of Europeanism into the hearts of the British populace. Other studies have attributed more importance to British pressure groups, protest movements and social movements, but have been more selective in doing so. Adam Lent’s study of post-war social movements in Britain tends to focus on leftist grassroots movements, and gives a particular emphasis to those more radical social and political movements of the 1960s and 1970s that ‘effectively sidelined’ the more ‘hierarchical, elitist pressure groups’ of the 1940s and 1950s that used conventional tactics to facilitate ‘piecemeal legislative change’. While it must be acknowledged that the pro-European campaign was prone to a stuffy elitism, the aspiration of some of the European pressure groups to engage with the public and aim for mass mobilisation shows a certain distance from the realm of high politics, or what Lent calls ‘dining with MPs’.

This chapter will therefore look at two movements which, by seeking to engage with the public in campaigning for European integration, linked the spheres of politics and socio-political activism in the late 1940s and 1950s – the United Europe Movement (UEM) and Federal Union (FU). By combining mass mobilisation, education and opinion-forming, these movements retained a social dimension, and endeavoured to bring the issue of European unity into the public sphere. As such, they attempted to act more like political or social movements than pressure groups, and therefore can no longer be overlooked or dismissed as mere elitists by political historians. Rather, their attempts to inspire the public through a positive message of pacifism and religious and cultural unity utilised a humanistic rhetoric, which grassroots

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6 Weight, *Patriots*, p.177, pp.102-3. It should also be mentioned that Weight also makes light of the impact of one of Britain’s more prominent post-war pressure groups, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, highlighting its modest membership figures and claiming ‘there is no evidence that it had any effect on… British public opinion’: p.289.


supporters could crusade for and build a basis of mass public support. FU’s persistent focus on grassroots campaigning, public membership and social dimension, even after much internal soul-searching and institutional professionalization, demonstrates that it does not easily fit Lent’s pre-1960s model of conservative, institutionally-based organisations.

This chapter will first analyse the origins, aims and politics of both FU and the UEM. FU’s pacifist rhetoric, proposing political federation as the means to prevent war, placed it within a network of movements for moral causes and humanitarian issues. However, its idealism and its radical agenda led to limited, left-liberal support, and made it too much of an “outsider” organisation lacking in political weight. If FU was too distant from the political sphere, however, UEM was arguably too close to it. It aimed to promote a sense of cultural Europeanism and a common European identity and shared European history, yet defining this along religious lines led to accusations of UEM being anti-Soviet, and its image as a Conservative organisation prevented it from amassing widespread support.

The chapter will then analyse the tactics and organisational structures of both organisations. Both organisations targeted the general public directly and sought to be mass movements rather than closed pressure groups. FU’s focus on grassroots activity and its structure of local branches gave the organisation a strong social dimension, and it perceived increasing membership to be crucial to its development. However, the radical aims and active branch work of FU reinforced its image as a small group of idealistic devotees, rather than the “cheap participation” or “mail order” membership of other campaigning organisations.9 UEM’s propaganda also directly targeted the general public, but it failed to develop its

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membership due to both a lack of a proper constitution or organisational structure, and a sense of elitism or snobbery from its more prominent members.

The final section will show how both campaigns struggled to adapt to the new political climate of the 1950s, with FU stagnating and UEM declining into insignificance. A combination of dwindling funds, a reinforcement of internationalist tendencies, and public suspicion or lack of knowledge of federalism hindered the development of popular support for European unity. FU was subject to internal debate over the nature of the organisation and its future development, but proposals to transform FU into a study group were dismissed in favour of balancing a renewed membership drive with targeting opinion formers. UEM, however, disintegrated as its leading members joined the Conservative government or were absorbed into other pressure groups.

These more influential groups of the mid-to-late 1950s – including the European League for Economic Co-operation (ELEC), Britain in Europe (BiE), Political and Economic Planning (PEP), and the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement (UKCEM) – belonged to a very different sphere, however. Concerned more with economics and industry, they prided themselves on expertise rather than public support, and concentrated more on influencing government and business than launching a popular crusade. The failure of the forgotten public campaigns of FU and UEM was thus a turning point in the issue of European integration in Britain, as the discourse became technocratic and the public became more detached from the issue. While Eurosceptics would later bemoan the lack of a public mandate for Britain’s entry into the European Community, the moment in the late 1940s when FU and UEM sought to popularise European integration on a simple, cross-party basis represents the
nearest to popular enthusiasm from the bottom up for integration that Britain saw in the post-war period.

**The origins, aims and politics of Federal Union**

Federal Union was founded in September 1938 during the crises that led to the Munich agreement, as the League of Nations and traditional political diplomacy were both failing to prevent the escalation of conflict in Europe. Seeking ‘to promote supranational government as the only method of abolishing war’, it had a particularly strong pacifist dimension. While its ultimate aim was world government, FU saw supranational integration of Europe as essential to preventing the sort of discord on the continent that had twice led to global conflict in the first half of the twentieth century. Its pacifist ideals and focus on peace aims thus made it an attractive organisation to those of a liberal, pacifist disposition. However, as this section will demonstrate, FU’s more radical and idealistic aspects and its own perception as a moral protest movement, both limited its left-liberal support base and left it as too much of an “outsider” organisation, caught between mass support and political influence and bereft of both. This section will first analyse its pacifist and religious, Nonconformist rhetoric and support that placed FU within a wider network of humanitarian and moralistic campaigning organisations, before demonstrating how its development as a protest movement with a radical yet lofty agenda limited its support to middle class left-liberals and left it on the fringes of politics.

FU’s pacifist nature meant it found its support increased during times of conflict or heightened international tension, and that a political atmosphere of ‘peace kites being flown in

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10 Draft resolution no. 1, enclosed with letter from J. Keith Killby to Frances L. Josephy, 30 November 1950, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES; “Federal Union: 21”, 1959, 1 MX 190-204, Federal Union in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
all directions’ was ‘unfavourable’ to the organisation.\(^{11}\) Its membership rose from two thousand in July 1939 and peaked after the outbreak of the Second World War, having risen ‘at the rate of 200 members a week’ in the early stages to a membership of ten thousand in over 200 branches by 1940.\(^{12}\) Membership fell back to its pre-war figure of less than two thousand in 1946, but began to rise again slightly in the late 1940s, as the issue of integration resurfaced and as the Cold War began to descend on Europe.\(^{13}\) With FU reporting in November 1947 that the number of new members was five times the monthly average intake for the past year, and with new branches being established, the combination of peace and an uncertain international future clearly presented FU with an opportunity to press for integration.

Attlee’s call for Europe to ‘federate or perish’ took on greater significance after the war with the threat of atomic warfare. FU used the development of nuclear weapons to increase its call for a stronger political and diplomatic system across Europe. FU claimed that while the continent had ‘entered the age of the aircraft, rocket, and atom’ in terms of arms, it was, politically, still in ‘the steam age’, while some areas had ‘sunk back into the mail-coach age’.\(^{14}\) Thus, European federation was proposed as the solution to international anarchy, and to ensure the prevention of diplomatic disputes and nuclear conflict. However, just as FU benefited from international tension in proposing a system for lasting peace, it similarly had to find the right balance between presenting federalism as ‘an immediate palliative and an ultimate remedy’ for the nuclear threat, and portraying a bleak international outlook in which

\(^{11}\) Memorandum from B.D. Barton to Executive Committee members [n.d., 1954], JOSEPHY J/2/6, BLPES

\(^{12}\) Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union: The Pioneers, p.15; “Background Information 1938-1947” [n.d.], JOSEPHY J/1/4, BLPES; Young, H., This Blessed Plot, p.15

\(^{13}\) Mayne and Pinder, p.50. Despite the increase in membership, Federal Union still lamented the low figure of ‘a mere 3,000 people’: “Federal Union and the Future – An Opinion”, R. Stevens, 7 October 1948, JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES

\(^{14}\) “Union: Now or Never” by “A Student of Europe”, 18 January 1948, The Observer
the need for this federalist solution appeared urgent.\textsuperscript{15} The nuclear issue thus formed a central part of FU’s message to the public, as the urgency of the issue and the ‘effect of shock tactics’ allowed them to argue for international co-operation on a “clean slate” basis, allowing for the ‘easier mobilisation of the forces of idealism in favour of a completely fresh approach.”\textsuperscript{16} FU proposed in the initial post-war period that it

\begin{quote}
…does not fail to maximise atomic bomb potentialities, so ideal for its propaganda purposes, and that it does its utmost to draw public attention to itself by justifiably posing as the only organisation with an effective answer to this latest weapon…\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Much of FU’s support consequently came from pacifists such as disillusioned former members of the League of Nations Union (LNU). The failure of the League of Nations, an international system in the inter-war period based on ‘national self-determination’, led to FU attracting support from the LNU’s rank-and-file who became more receptive to the federalist argument in the late 1930s and early 1940s.\textsuperscript{18} One of the leading figures in FU described her conversion from being a passionate LNU supporter as occurring when the League ‘began to look somewhat like an Anglo-French alliance, and we all had to start thinking again.’\textsuperscript{19} FU also sought in the months following the end of the Second World War to co-operate with pacifist organisations such as the National Peace Council and the International Friendship League in order to organise mass meetings and potentially attract support. It also shared prominent members and supporters with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND),

\textsuperscript{15} Letter from Lord Beveridge to Federal Union supporters [n.d.], JOSEPHY J/1/19, BLPES
\textsuperscript{16} “Notes on Policy for Discussion by Council”, October 1945, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES
\textsuperscript{17} Final Agenda for Annual General Meeting of Federal Union to be held 20-21 July 1946, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES
\textsuperscript{19} Margaret Richards, in Mayne and Pinder, \textit{Federal Union: The Pioneers}, p.21
such as MP Victor Gollancz, Canon John Collins and Bertrand Russell. In 1960, FU members who were taking part in the Aldermaston March organised by CND distributed FU leaflets to fellow ‘Aldermarchers’ who may have been attracted to their pacifist federal message. The following year, FU member John Bowyer distributed the pamphlet *Love Not War* to the marchers, keen to demonstrate the institutional solution to the threat of nuclear war. While in the past LNU supporters had been unsure over questions of disarmament and political, economic or military sanctions, FU advocated a purer form of pacifism based on federal rather than intergovernmental institutional solutions. It therefore sought to portray a situation where ‘[t]hose who want peace no longer prepare for war – they prepare for federal government’.  

Many of FU’s more prominent supporters and members also came from a religious background, as it drew support from the Anglican and Free Churches in the same way that the LNU had done before the Second World War. In 1939, William Temple, the Archbishop of York, joined FU, and lauded its ‘staggeringly effective appeal to the British mind’. It appealed to the minds of Christian leaders because, according to Temple, its rhetoric of ‘mutual interdependence’ and ‘brotherhood’ was in line with the Christian spirit. The religious influence behind FU’s pacifistic, humanistic and humanitarian rhetoric can be seen from the motion tabled in the House of Commons by Labour MP Gordon Lang, ‘a

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20 Minutes of Executive Committee of Federal Union, 3 August 1945, JOSEPHY J/1/11, BLPES; “Notes for members attending 1960 Annual General Meeting of Federal Union”, JOSEPHY J/1/19, BLPES; CND marchers were referred to as ‘Aldermarchers’ in Minutes of Executive Committee of Federal Union, 16 March 1960, JOSEPHY J/1/19, BLPES  
22 “Peace Bond”, pamphlet [n.d., 1946], 1 MX 580, Federal Union in *Britain and Europe since 1945* microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources  
24 Ibid., p.26; Mayne and Pinder, *Federal Union: The Pioneers*, p.26  
25 Coupland, *Britannia, Europa and Christendom*, pp.25-26
Nonconformist minister with a reputation as a speaker for being able to move audiences’.26 The motion’s long-term policy ‘to create a democratic federation of Europe’ called for the inclusion of a constitution ‘based on the principles of common citizenship, political freedom, and representative government’, with an additional charter for human rights.27 It was in this manner that Christian principles and liberal democratic, humanitarian politics combined within FU’s rhetoric. FU therefore placed Christianity at the centre of the campaign to unite Europe along democratic lines, declaring that

Religion certainly has a vital part to play in bringing peace to the world. It is true that no amount of political machinery alone will solve the problem of war. […] Religion and politics must combine if the great evils in the world are to be eradicated. Federal Union is one of the ways of putting Christ’s second commandment in practice.28

FU in fact formed part of a network of moral movements and pressure groups in the immediate post-war period, that sought to gain enough popular momentum and public support to achieve their humanitarian goals without primarily campaigning through the parliamentary political system. FU members and sympathisers such as Gollancz, Sir William Beveridge and Conservative MP Robert Boothby also became involved in the humanitarian campaign for aid, reconstruction and help with the refugee problem in Europe after World War Two. Of the Save Europe Now (SEN) campaign, Matthew Frank writes that ‘[m]oral-idealistic arguments for taking action [were] informed by Christian, liberal humanist or socialist notions of a brotherhood of man…’.29 Much the same, but with more long-term aims, can be said of the

26 “Forceful Orator”, Gloucestershire Echo, 28 February 1948, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/6/9, Modern Records Centre [MRC], University of Warwick
27 “An Urgent Request from the Rev. Gordon Lang MP”, circular to Federal Union supporters, 16 March 1948, JOSEPHY, J/1/12, BLPES
28 “Questions and Answers: All You Want To Know About Federation”, 1946, 1 MX 562-577, Federal Union in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
federalist campaign, aiming for supranational European unity to lead to a ‘good and just society based on co-operative ideals’ and a ‘peaceful and democratic world’. By defining Europe along general principles of liberty and federalism, FU therefore presented European integration as the solution which would give man ‘the chance to develop his personality and fulfil his high destiny’, and inspire the ‘highest and most creative energies in man’.

It was due to these far-reaching humanistic aims that FU was criticised as being highly idealistic by other pressure groups. By 1957, Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams, a founding member of the UEM who had by this point become sceptical about the form the European Community had taken, was accusing FU of ‘wishful thinking’, and that their moral crusade had ‘taken on the character of a religion’ by ‘earnest people, who... have discarded their old faith in favour of a humanistic atheism...’. While FU’s religious influences above challenge the accusations of atheism, its focus on pacifism and humanitarianism would prove problematic. Coupland claims that FU’s first official statement of policy, calling for a ‘federation of free peoples’ to secure ‘peace, based on economic security and civil rights for all’, was open enough for FU to be ‘ideologically heterogeneous’. But politically, its concentration on humanitarian and human rights issues, combined with its commitment to a pooling of some national sovereignty, meant that FU attracted most of its support from a progressive left-liberal strand of politics, despite its cross-party or non-party aspirations. This is evident in the account of

30 “Britain in Europe: Viewpoint for the Labour Movement”, Foreword by Sam Watson [n.d., 1958?], 1 MQ 314-328, Federal Trust for Education and Research in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
31 “Peace Bond”, pamphlet [n.d., 1946], 1 MX 580, Federal Union in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
32 “The Survival of Great Britain as a Great Power”, speech by Juliet Rhys-Williams, 7 February 1957, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/7, BLPES
33 Coupland, Britannia, Europa and Christendom, pp.22-23
one Mass-Observation diarist who noted at a meeting that FU did not favour capitalism or socialism, but was more concerned with human rights and ‘liberty for the individual.’

FU found support in the political sphere from Gollancz, activist Labour MP and founder of the Left Book Club, Ronald Mackay, a Labour MP devoted to federalism, Lord Beveridge, creator of the welfare state in Britain, and other MPs from the Labour and Liberal parties. These political figures, along with liberal supporters outside of Westminster such as Russell, H.G. Wells and Barbara Wootton, reinforced the perception that FU’s strands of humanitarianism, internationalism and progressive politics attracted those of a left-liberal disposition. Wootton may have claimed that federation was a non-political concept, and a ‘neutral instrument’, but her own style of internationalist, democratic socialist, welfarist politics both won FU many of its early adherents, and typified the politics of FU members. Yet despite the presence of political figures, many of FU’s members were described as highly idealistic ‘disciples’ of Wells and Russell, and ‘woolly-minded’, ‘crankish’ and ‘politically vague’ by Mayne and Pinder. The combination of political figures and idealistic “crusading” membership demonstrates that FU should be seen more as a protest movement than a movement with serious aims in institutional politics. In many ways, FU sought to portray itself as different to the more traditional pressure groups that operated in the ‘conservative’ political atmosphere that Lent claims was symbolic of the early post-war era. Rather than lobbying government with research data like other pressure groups, FU sought to build

34 Adam Matthew Digital, Mass-Observation Archive, Diarist 5363, 19 December 1939
35 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union: The Pioneers, p.50
36 Ibid., p.44, p.12. For more on the politics of Barbara Wootton, see E. Jacobs, “‘An Organising Female with a Briefcase’: Barbara Wootton, Political Economy and Social Justice, 1920-1950”, Women’s History Review, 16:3 (2007), pp.431-446
37 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union: The Pioneers, p.19
38 Lent, British Social Movements since 1945, p.8
momentum and influence public opinion in order to precipitate action. In the words of one report,

An organisation devoted primarily to publications and research has a proportion of pressure work to do but by its very nature is already more akin to a pressure or ‘respectable’ group than is a membership body of the Federal Union type. ³⁹

FU therefore attempted to remain detached from traditional politics, by promoting the progressive concept of federalism and challenging those politicians who had ‘lost their faith’ and were ‘chained by precedent to the past, tied hand and foot to the old systems…’. ⁴⁰ It was thus ‘willing to openly accuse Government and Opposition of endangering this country’ through their isolationist stance and their refusal to join the integration process. ⁴¹ In addition, however, it targeted political parties for support of its agenda, claiming it would be ‘foolish, because of an obsession to keep clear of party politics, to ignore the Parties.’ ⁴² FU’s ostensible non-party character ensured its distance from the traditional political system and allowed it to challenge the agendas and actions of all political parties. It did this most staunchly during General Elections, recognised ‘as the time when Federal Union should be working at its greatest intensity’. ⁴³ Guidelines on approaching and questioning candidates were consistently produced, including a 1950s publication entitled ‘Election Topics’ with

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⁴⁰ “The Challenge” by Henry Usborne MP, in “Federate or Perish”, Federal Union [n.d.], JOSEPHY J/1/4, BLPES
⁴¹ Letter from J. Keith Killby to Frances L. Josephy, with draft resolutions enclosed, 30 November 1950, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES
⁴² Current Topics, April 1956, JOSEPHY J/1/18, BLPES
⁴³ Minutes of Executive Committee of Federal Union, 1 June 1945, JOSEPHY J/1/11, BLPES
instructions on sending deputations to candidates and organising meetings with candidates as
speakers. The aim, according to the document, was to raise awareness that

that there are people actively concerned with more than domestic issues; do this
much and you are helping to create that mystical thing called Public Opinion – a
force never more powerful than at the time of a General Election.

Criticism of the political elite was often more direct as well, reflected in their criticism
of British delegates at the Rome Congress of the European Movement in June 1957. An
observer noted how many delegates were absent from sessions ‘either because they seemed
bored (the majority) or because they seemed embarrassed’, and how their complaints ranged
from the Congress being ‘enough hot air for a lifetime’ to the hotel being ‘like a bordello
without the compensating attractions’. One MP ‘clearly hadn’t a clue about what was going
on in Europe’; another appeared ‘the type to support whatever the government says about
foreign policy and seems to have considered the expedition something of a lark…’. By
contrast, however, UEM stalwart Lady Rhys-Williams was described as ‘an astonishing
person… angrily trying to stir MPs to action, bitterly critical of the Government and the
Foreign Office…’.

On the whole, however, FU would pride itself on being different to “respectable”
organisations such as the UEM and the Movement for World Government, claiming that their
competitors’ combination of ‘big names’ and ‘policies far less radical than our own’ made

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44 “Agreed Conclusions on the Policy and Propaganda reached at the Weekend Conference”, 25-27 March 1949, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES; Election Topics, April 1955, JOSEPHY J/1/16, BLPES
45 Election Topics, April 1955, JOSEPHY J/1/16, BLPES
46 Memorandum from A. Morris to all members of Federal Union Regional Commission [n.d., 1957], JOSEPHY J/1/18, BLPES
them a different type of membership organisation.\textsuperscript{47} FU was in many ways similar to the protest movements that it shared principles and personnel with, such as CND and SEN. The latter, for example, had the same pacifistic and humanitarian principles, and, like FU, sought to draw support from left-liberal and progressive thought, such as Liberal and Labour MPs, religious leaders, trade unionists and influential thinkers.\textsuperscript{48} Lady Violet Bonham Carter’s claim that the SEN was ‘Liberalism as I understand it’ as well as ‘Christianity’ can also be applied to FU.\textsuperscript{49}

However, while FU perceived itself as more radical than its contemporaries, the popular perception of FU as a protest movement with a radical agenda may have limited its support. Such perceptions were not helped by bold claims about the political impact that federalism would have, with Alexandre Marc, Secretary General of the European Union of Federalists (EUF), claiming that ‘federalism stands for an actual revolution, individual and collective, which demands the revision of all existing values.’\textsuperscript{50} With the term ‘federalism’ carrying such connotations, FU advised members on some occasions to not emphasise the word ‘federal’ in their correspondence to MPs and the press.\textsuperscript{51} The wartime account of one Mass-Observation diarist, however, shows that outsiders coming into contact with FU principles were ‘defeatist and suspicious of anything so radical’.\textsuperscript{52} Other diarists’ accounts show that FU membership was not widespread, and confined predominantly to ‘the artisan type and... middle-class intelligentsia’, and written off by some as a ‘liberal intellectual idea’

\textsuperscript{47} Memorandum from Douglas Robinson on Administrative and Non-Political Policy, 7 July 1953, JOSPEHY J/2/6, BLPES
\textsuperscript{48} Frank, M., “The New Morality: Victor Gollancz, ‘Save Europe Now’ and the German Refugee Crisis, 1945-46”, p.243
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid.}, p.244
\textsuperscript{50} “United States of Europe” by Alexandre Marc, in “Federate or Perish”, Federal Union [n.d.], JOSEPHY J/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{51} Letter from J. Keith Killby to Federal Union members, 9 June 1950, JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES
\textsuperscript{52} Adam Matthew Digital, Mass-Observation Archive, Diarist 5139, 11 January 1940

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that would ‘fizzle out... if it’s not got over to the people.’ The Mass-Observation diaries also too often show a brief dabbling in the federalist movement, with only brief mentions of the occasional meeting attended or set up by the diarist. Some were interested in the idea but did not want to be actively involved in FU, or were put off by ‘interminable’ discussions, while some only understood the federalist principle vaguely, one diarist stating his intention to ‘get the Penguin book on it’. But while seventy per cent were aware of the term ‘Federal Union’, only thirty-eight per cent knew its meaning even vaguely, one of the many incorrect definitions being ‘[i]t’s some peace racket’.

By perceiving itself as a radical protest movement, FU was unable to generate the same sort of mass support enjoyed previously by the likes of the LNU and after the war by the United Nations Association (UNA), consisting of a couple of thousand members compared to UNA’s 85,000 members in 1949. UNA was able to attract internationalists and humanitarians through its work on human rights and post-war recovery, while its lack of supranational authority ensured moderate support was not alienated, and led to backing from the political elite. By contrast, support from politicians of FU along the lines of Attlee’s ‘federate or perish’ statement was, according to Hugo Young, ‘pious, trenchant – and only of passing seriousness.’ FU sought to be detached from institutional politics, but it lacked the endorsement and authority of senior political figures to counterbalance, or add credence to,
the more outlandish and radical aspects of its federalist agenda. As such, it lacked the political prestige or recognition of a pressure group and the widespread support of a successful political movement.

**The origins, aims and politics of the United Europe Movement**

The United Europe Committee was formed in January 1947 from the basis of the ‘electric’ response to Churchill’s ‘United States of Europe’ speech in 1946 where, according to Richard Mayne and John Pinder, ‘[a] united Europe began to seem possible’. With aims of forming a larger, popular campaign, the Committee officially launched itself as the United Europe Movement at their large Albert Hall meeting of May 1947. The UEM’s rhetoric was less explicitly pacifist than FU, but placed the aim of peace alongside an emotive and positive appeal for strength and security through common European culture, heritage and identity. After its inception in 1947, Commander Stephen King-Hall set out the Movement in a BBC European Service broadcast as a positive, pro-active campaign for peace and unity, in defence of ‘a constructive cause not against anybody or anything, but for the people, the life, the culture and prosperity of Europe’ as well as ‘the cause of World peace’.

UEM sought to work for the peace and prosperity of Europe through a less radical promotion of Europeanism than FU, advocating integration on both cultural and governmental levels, and reinforcing a sense of shared European identity, principles and objectives. The Movement thus set out an aim of getting national governments to perceive themselves as

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60 “Progress of Campaign for United Europe” [n.d.], Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/1/32, MRC, University of Warwick
61 Transcript of “United Europe”, BBC European Service: General News Talk, 17 January 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/1/1, MRC, University of Warwick
European, so that ‘they will begin to shape their practical policies always with the object of fitting them fruitfully into the general pattern of a United Europe.’ However, from the outset the UEM attempted to popularise European integration from the bottom up, by changing public attitudes and making British people ‘conscious of their European status and responsibilities’. Churchill sought to direct the Movement’s campaign primarily toward the general public, believing that ‘[o]nce the sense of being Europeans permeates the minds of ordinary people… practical action by governments will swiftly follow.’ While its aims were not as radical or as federalist as FU’s, the UEM therefore shared some similarities in both the breadth of its scope and its ambitions to become a mass movement.

The UEM judged that its positive and sentimental campaign would resonate with the public, appealing to the ‘most imaginative and generous’ aspects of the British population and translating into a popular campaign for integration. As an example, the Movement asked Bertrand Russell for his personal reasons for supporting European unity, particularly if this related to European civilisation, heritage and identity, as this would be ‘the most interesting line from the point of view of the reading public…’. The UEM reinforced this romanticised notion of European identity by recalling the historical notion of a united Europe and attempts throughout history to achieve continental integration. Speeches by UEM figures made reference to ‘[i]ntelligent men’ who had been discussing united Europe ‘for centuries’, portraying the Movement’s goal as a ‘dream’ and ‘vision’ that everyone from ‘kings and...

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62 Draft of Churchill’s letter for inclusion in “United Europe” newsletter, 1949, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/5/5, MRC, University of Warwick
63 Memorandum from Kenneth Hare-Scott to Duncan Sandys, Lady Rhys Williams and Gordon Lang, 20 January 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/2, BLPES
64 United Europe: News-letter of the United Europe Movement, no.1, 1949, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/5/1, MRC, University of Warwick
65 Address on European unity by Stephen Spender at Christian Action lunch-time forum, 20 November 1951, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/7, BLPES
66 Letter from Kenneth Hare-Scott to Bertrand Russell, 24 January 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/2, BLPES
princes’ to ‘humble men’ had sought to implement.\textsuperscript{67} The UEM ensured that such an aim was presented as achievable, however. The publication ‘United Europe: A Short History of the Idea’ chronicled the philosophical aspects of the issue from ancient Greece to the twentieth century, but also called for ‘men of action’, and implied that readers could make history by ensuring ‘that the dream of the philosophers can become a reality.’\textsuperscript{68} It was in this manner that the UEM consistently sought to present European integration as an achievable goal, provided it dealt with those issues and tenets, encompassed by a shared identity, that naturally brought continental people together. Much of the UEM’s construction of this ‘European identity’ centred around this notion of a shared European history, described to Russell as making the public ‘think of themselves as having a great European heritage, as well as a national heritage’\textsuperscript{69}. The drive for European integration would also focus on the shared European values held across the continent, both cultural and religious, which proved a more difficult and controversial facet to define. The collaboration between British Churches and the European movements helped reinforce these values as central to the campaign for European integration. According to Philip Coupland, religious leaders saw Christian principles as the spiritual bond that held European civilisation together, and perceived European identity as not constructed by ““race”, ethnicity or language”, or by geopolitics, but by Christendom.\textsuperscript{70} This perception of Europe was central to UEM’s philosophy and, as with FU, the Movement’s religious dimension would shape perceptions of the political ideology of its members.

\textsuperscript{67} Quote from Harold Macmillan at Birmingham United Europe Movement meeting, “Britain’s Message of Hope to Europe”, \textit{Birmingham Post}, 7 February 1948, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/6/7, MRC, University of Warwick; Transcript of United Europe Movement speech by Stephen King-Hall, broadcast on Radio Luxemburg, 1 February 1948, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/3/16, MRC, University of Warwick; \textit{United Europe: News-letter of the United Europe Movement}, no.1, 1949, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/5/1, MRC, University of Warwick


\textsuperscript{69} Letter from Kenneth Hare-Scott to Bertrand Russell, 24 January 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS, J/6/3/2, BLPES

\textsuperscript{70} Coupland, \textit{Britannia, Europa and Christendom}, p.11
Seeking to popularise European unity amongst the general public, and making European identity, civilisation and culture the focus of the campaign, UEM actively sought support from Christian leaders from an early stage. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, was first contacted by the UEM’s Leo Amery, who promoted the conception of a spiritual European integration. Churchill then wrote to Fisher of the need to ‘arouse the fervour of a crusade’ for integration, winning the support of the Churches and appealing to public sentiment. UEM strengthened the spiritual and cultural aspect of the popular campaign for integration by launching the Christian Movement for European Unity (CMEU), seeking to unite Europe through religious values and ‘a spirit of mutual helpfulness’. The two organisations worked closely, with UEM providing funding and personnel to found the CMEU, and the CMEU using the UEM’s constitution as its basis to build up a mass movement, with ‘potentially vast support to be found throughout the country.’

However, UEM’s focus on the spiritual and cultural aspect of European identity would define these European values against an “other”; in this case the ‘Russian menace’ that threatened liberal democratic Europe. The speeches of Victor Gollancz on behalf of UEM demonstrate how this focus on the preservation of ‘the spiritual fabric and moral values of European life’ tied in with criticism of Soviet Russia. His speech for the UEM to be broadcast on Radio Luxemburg in 1948 called for the defence of ‘liberal or Christian’ values deemed as ‘infinitely precious’ and manifesting themselves in freedom of thought, speech and

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71 Coupland, Britannia, Europa and Christendom, pp.91-92  
72 Christian Movement for European Unity leaflet [n.d.], RHYS WILLIAMS J/8/4, BLPES  
73 Both Lady Rhys Williams and Edward Beddington-Behrens were mentioned as supporters of Christian Movement for European Unity in a letter from A.J. Heriot, Honorary Secretary of Christian Movement for European Unity, to Rhys Williams, 29 November 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/8/4, BLPES; Report of a meeting of Christian Movement for European Unity, 17 October 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/8/4, BLPES  
74 Interview with Rhys Williams, British Weekly: A Journal of Christian and Social Progress, 6 October 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/8/1/2, BLPES  
75 United Europe Movement leaflet [n.d.], Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/1/77
religion. ‘Soviet communism’, by contrast, offered no such freedom and threatened Europe with ‘the loss, certainly for decades, probably for centuries, and possibly for ever, of the very spring, the very living seed, of human progress’, and meant that a united Europe would have to be a ‘United Western Europe’.

The broadcast was deemed as ‘an attack on Russia’ by Radio Luxemburg and sections were not transmitted, leaving Gollancz angry that the speech was left as ‘a lot of platitudes’. His proclamation at a UEM meeting at Birmingham Town Hall, flanked by the Archbishop of Birmingham and Harold Macmillan, that European unity would ‘preserve Western values [that] are being terribly threatened by Communist penetration’ further demonstrates how UEM rhetoric interpreted European culture and identity to be “Western” or “civilised” culture.

The perception of the UEM being anti-Russian was reinforced by the predominance of ‘Tory Strasbourgers’ in the UEM’s Executive Committee, with Churchill at the helm and his son-in-law, Duncan Sandys, as Honorary Secretary. Despite its Conservative image, the UEM was in fact comprised of what Arthur Marwick dubbed ‘middle opinion’ concerned with cross-party cooperation in social, political and economic planning. UEM’s members, both from within and outside of Westminster, belonged to a progressive strand of politics concerned with economic planning and social welfare, in addition to a united Europe. Macmillan, Boothby and fellow Conservative Oliver Stanley all had experience working with

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76 Transcript of speech by Victor Gollancz to be broadcast on Radio Luxemburg [n.d., 1948], Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/3/25, MRC, University of Warwick
77 Letter from Victor Gollancz to Duncan Sandys, 24 March 1948, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/3, MRC, University of Warwick
78 “United Europe: World’s Only Hope”, Birmingham Gazette, 7 February 1948, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/6/5, MRC, University of Warwick
79 The term “Tory Strasbourgers” was first used by John W. Young in “Churchill’s ‘No’ to Europe: The Rejection of European Union by Churchill’s Post-War Government, 1951-1952”, p.927
planning organisations such as the ‘Next Five Years’ Group and Political and Economic Planning in the 1930s, while Lady Rhys-Williams, of whom Macmillan claimed had ‘a remarkable knowledge of technical economics’, was herself Vice-President of the Economic Research Council for some time.\(^\text{81}\) Stephen King-Hall, writer and broadcaster from a military background, was on the staff at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, a study group into peace aims and foreign policy with governmental links.\(^\text{82}\) He was also an associate of economist John Maynard Keynes, of whose followers included Boothby, ‘an early Keynesian’.\(^\text{83}\) That European integration was the international aspect of this type of far-reaching progressive politics of planning and welfare is evident in Macmillan’s recollection that a united Europe was to be ‘a new order in the Old World – democratic, free, progressive, [and] destined to restore prosperity and preserve peace.’\(^\text{84}\) The UEM, however, was intended as more of a popular movement than the study groups these figures had experience working with, and was attempting to form public opinion as much as political opinion. Some UEM members were naturally suited to such a role, such as King-Hall who ‘saw himself as a mediator, whose information would be “respected by the expert, and acceptable to the general reader”’.\(^\text{85}\) In this sense, the UEM and FU as organisations lie somewhere between membership or associational political movements, think-tank study groups, and party politics.

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\(^{84}\) Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune*, p.168

The UEM may have been handicapped by its image of a Conservative leadership, but with prominent members belonging to “middle opinion” and cooperating with members of other parties, the campaign for European integration was in fact a mix of progressive Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour figures more disposed towards collaboration. In fact, although Ross McKibbin has claimed that organisations of an ostensibly non-political character covertly reinforced ‘Conservative electoral hegemony’, it can be argued that the UEM put progressive liberalism ‘firmly on the political agenda, even though the parliamentary Liberal parties of various guises were bent on splitting and self-destruction.’

As the British delegation to the Hague Congress endured an emergency landing upon their return to Britain, Macmillan’s call for ‘Women and Liberals first’, after Bonham Carter and Lord Layton ‘happily discussed the future of the Liberal Party for over an hour’, sheds some light on the political character of the campaign. Prominent figures worked for the Liberal Party outside of Westminster, including Lady Rhys-Williams as Honorary Secretary of the Women’s Liberal Foundation and chair of the Party’s publications and publicity committee, and Goddard, the UEM Secretary, as the party’s Director of Organisation. Bonham Carter also worked behind the scenes for the party, while King-Hall was a ‘liberal internationalist’ and Lord Layton, Honorary Treasurer of UEM, was chairman of the News Chronicle, seen as


87 Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, p.162

a ‘beacon of liberal thinking’ in the 1930s. With the UEM housing such a combination of leading Conservatives, liberal thinkers and activist Labour supporters, perhaps another term can be borrowed from Marwick to describe their political stance – that of ‘centre-progressives’, described as ‘the apostles of political agreement’.

The campaigning of Gollancz, and the support of the likes of Labour MP Gordon Lang and trade unionist George Gibson, also make the ‘Tory Strasbourgers’ tag not entirely accurate for UEM. The Labour Party hierarchy, however, felt the UEM amounted to the Conservative Party playing party politics, leading to their National Executive Committee (NEC) discouraging MPs against joining ‘Mr Churchill’s Committee’ which ‘excludes Russia from Europe’. Gollancz would come under attack for his continued cooperation with the UEM, one venomous attack warning him that

If you can believe that the part-author of the insane and atrocious ‘policy’... of Unconditional Surrender, of Yalta, of Teheran, - yes, and despite his hypocritical handwashings and crocodile tears for its victims, of Potsdam: if you can believe that this cheap huckster of lies and hate that have for ever made a United Europe impossible, is interested in saving anything but the shattered political fortunes of Winston Spencer Churchill – then you will believe anything.

90 Marwick, “Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning, Progress and Political ‘Agreement’”, p.297
92 Letter from Morgan Phillips, General Secretary of Labour Party, to Gollancz, 23 January 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/2/8, University of Warwick
93 Letter from Sam Pollock to Gollancz, 16 May 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/2/87, MRC, University of Warwick
Gollancz replied that he was ‘prepared to co-operate with anybody for a cause in which I believe – and then to leave the platform if and when it develops on lines in which I don’t believe’.\(^94\)

However, Gollancz’s attempt to ‘lift the thing definitely above party’ and establish a cross-party basis for the UEM, only using Churchill for his ‘immense prestige’ in Europe, would fail, as the UEM remained too Conservative and too rooted in institutional politics.\(^95\) By cooperating with religious leaders in promoting a European identity and culture constructed against the ‘other’ of Soviet Russia, the political one-sidedness of the UEM was reinforced, and the lack of a cross-party basis of support would cause them trouble in future years. Grantham aptly encapsulates the UEM’s limitations with his claim that ‘in view of its objective the movement could not be non-political; in view of its leadership it could hardly be non-partisan.’\(^96\) These perceptions of UEM prevented it becoming a cross-party movement for European integration, and limited its support.

Focusing on European identity and the spiritual side of integration also led the UEM to focus on a particular type of European unity, that of an “organic” union of Europe. This was partly down to the aforementioned desire of UEM to present European integration as a simple achievable aim, but also a product of its collaboration with Church leaders, advocating a spiritual and cultural unity and avoiding committing to any ‘mechanical schemes’.\(^97\) The UEM presented the public with a ‘broad and flexible declaration of intent’ behind which a

\(^94\) Letter from Gollancz to Sam Pollock, 19 May 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/2/95, MRC, University of Warwick
\(^95\) Letter from Gollancz to Henry Usborne, 21 February 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/2/41, MRC, University of Warwick
\(^97\) Coupland, \textit{Britannia, Europa and Christendom}, p.91
large movement could accumulate.\textsuperscript{98} Churchill’s message to followers from the outset was that the Movement’s task was to

\begin{quote}
…spread the knowledge that this thing is really possible, so that the conviction of the people may be converted into the conduct of the nation. We must create a climate of opinion.\textsuperscript{99}
\end{quote}

The UEM’s approach was hence concerned with issues of practicality and principle rather than the economic and political technicalities of European integration. This led to criticisms that British figures working for integration, in the words of Boothby, ‘concentrated too much on the spire, and too little on the foundations.’\textsuperscript{100} The desire to maximise public support by focusing on the idealistic aspects of European integration would backfire when that integration became a reality, as UEM’s desire to avoid integration on federal lines failed and its support declined thereafter.

The UEM avoided discussion of the constitutional details of integration, for fear of alienating public support by backing a specific political scheme. With regards to the general public, popularising the idea of a united Europe involved overcoming psychological obstacles as much as political ones. Figures in the Movement thus wanted its reports to ‘deal with practical issues and not be over concerned with detail’, avoiding ‘academic detail’ and guided by ‘broad principle’ in an attempt to acquire widespread support.\textsuperscript{101} The economic aspect of integration was a particular issue that the UEM wanted to avoid discussing in detail. Roy Harrod, an economist and member of both the UEM and ELEC, claimed that the discussion of

\begin{table}
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\textsuperscript{98} “How the United Europe Movement Was Born”, \textit{European Community Information Service}, p.22, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/UE/6/61, MRC, University of Warwick  \\
\textsuperscript{99} \textit{United Europe: News-letter of the United Europe Movement}, no.1, 1949, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/5/1, MRC, University of Warwick  \\
\textsuperscript{100} Boothby, R., \textit{Boothby: Recollections of a Rebel} (London: Hutchinson, 1978), p.224  \\
\textsuperscript{101} Minutes of a meeting of United Europe Movement Economic Sub-Committee, 24 November 1947, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2, BLPES \\
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tariffs by economists and politicians ‘smells of the lamp’ and ‘will tend to bog down the United Europe project’.\footnote{Letter from Roy Harrod to Rhys Williams, 17 November 1948, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2, BLPEs} Conservative MP Peter Thorneycroft likewise warned of the ‘real danger of getting so involved in the complex details of the financial mechanism required that we shall lose sight of the real objective.’\footnote{Memorandum from Peter Thorneycroft, 18 February 1948, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2, BLPEs} Lady Rhys-Williams’s criticism of an economic report by David Eccles, a member of ELEC and a Conservative delegate to the Council of Europe, shows UEM were often critical of technical reports by study groups, Eccles’s report being criticised as a ‘governessy and featureless document’, ‘entirely disastrous’ and full of ‘pious nonsense’.\footnote{“Obituary: Viscount Eccles”, The Observer, 1 March 1999; Notes by Rhys Williams on Eccles Economic Report, 31 August 1948, RHYS WILLIAMS J/8/1/2, BLPEs} In this respect, despite the prominence of the “progressive planners” within its ranks, the UEM perceived itself as more of an idealistic movement than a technocratic, academic lobbying or pressure group.

Another key reason why the UEM avoided discussion of constitutional details was what Macmillan described as both a preference for intergovernmental cooperation and a suspicion of federalism, and being ‘frightened of technocrats’\footnote{‘Anything that needed to be done for European unity could surely be better done by Governments working through Ministers, ambassadors and officials’: Macmillan, H., Tides of Fortune: 1945-1955 (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.159, p.206}. The concept of an “organic” development of European unity dominated UEM rhetoric, particularly Boothby, whose statement in the House of Commons called for ‘spiritual growth’ leading to ‘a series of organic acts of union’, and Churchill, who told Boothby that integration involved ‘not making a machine, [but] growing a living plant.’\footnote{Boothby, Boothby: Recollections of a Rebel, p.217} Traditional and familiar lines of development were preferred, with the UEM playing a significant role in founding the intergovernmental Council of Europe and Consultative Assembly, which proved a disappointment to continental
The UEM’s hopes for the Strasbourg Assembly were in line with its general aims for the campaign for integration – to ‘appeal to the imagination of people’ and ‘cultivate simplicity’, avoiding overwhelming reports and documents or ‘vast numbers of reporting sub-committees’. However, it desired a ‘talking-shop’, which would become a dirty word for those that desired real constitutional union, despite the British wing of the European Movement identifying itself ‘with [the] desire to travel as fast as possible towards [a] really practical and desirable goal, not necessarily the most perfect on paper, but the one that will work.’

By not defining politically the sort of Europe they wanted, and remaining fixed on functional integration based on intergovernmental cooperation, the UEM would run into problems when more substantial federalist schemes were proposed. Churchill was particularly guilty of this sort of vagueness, ever since his “United States of Europe” speech, described by Macmillan as ‘an emotional appeal’ where ‘he did not attempt to expound a detailed plan’ but put forth ‘a broad and general appeal for European unity…’. From this speech onwards, it was unsure whether or not Churchill meant to include Britain, with its international ties, in his conception of a united Europe. An early warning in a Mass-Observation report about attitudes to European integration neatly sums up the problems with the UEM’s strategy, stating that ‘working up mass emotions… is a good deal easier than working up a balanced,

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107 Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945*, p.15
110 Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune*, p.227, p.154
intelligent, long-term attitude’. This idealism and short-termism, and its image as a Conservative-led organisation, prevented the UEM from being an effective pressure group or a widespread political movement respectively.

**Tactics, activities and organisational structures of FU and UEM**

Despite differences in their aims for European unity and their levels of political support, both FU and the UEM sought to popularise the idea of integration by engaging the public through mass campaigns, rather than by directly lobbying governments. However, their differences were reinforced by the way both organisations operated. FU’s emphasis on membership and its perception of a more ‘radical’ disposition and more ‘radical’ aims, led it to focus more on grassroots activity. In this sense, it never transcended beyond being a fringe movement, or its own perception of being ‘similar to… other voluntary political organisations.’ In contrast, the UEM utilised more of a top-down strategy to bring the issue to the general public more directly, to increase the popular demand for united Europe to complement their political influence. However, its elitist nature meant it struggled to capture the public’s imagination.

FU saw membership as fundamental to its organisation as it perceived that other organisations, including the UEM, were ‘not membership organisations in the same way we are’. The emphasis was therefore on increasing membership, bringing in those who were ‘politically minded and those capable of being aroused to political interest’ so that FU could

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become ‘as nearly a mass movement as any movement can be.’

In 1950, the aim was to double membership, seen as ‘essential’ as membership remained around the two thousand mark having fallen after a brief rise in the late 1940s. This increase was to be achieved through ‘more intensive branch work throughout the country’ and through a number of membership drives. Advice was issued to existing members to persuade people to join, including which matters to bring up in conversation and which phrases to use, ensuring that the ‘victim’ joins immediately if they display interest. Members were advised that persistence was the key, as ‘[i]t is only by increasing our membership in this way that we shall get anywhere.’

FU sought to influence opinion and increase membership through propaganda, both directly and via the press. FU combined the broad appeal in its humanistic, pacifistic rhetoric with a ‘pictorial and striking’ form in its posters and pamphlets in a universal approach to membership. The ‘popular language’ on display was thus ‘written to catch the interest of ordinary people, such as audiences coming out of theatres, factory workers, miners and housewives.’ In addition, FU maintained good relations with the press both nationally and locally, with branches encouraged to contact newspaper editors and advised that ‘[e]ditors want news. A local Federal Union meeting is news.’ Letters to the editor, even unpublished

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115 Minutes of meeting of Federal Union Administrative Committee, 10 October 1947, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES
116 Minutes of Meeting of National Council of Federal Union, 24-25 June 1950, JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES; Minutes of Meeting of Administrative Committee of Federal Union, 6 January 1950, JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES; “Federal Union and the Future – An Opinion”, R. Stevens, 7 October 1948, JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES
117 Letter from Federal Union to Armed Forces members, 8 February 1946, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES
118 “Hints on How To Get New Members” [n.d., 1950], JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES
119 Circular to Federal Union members regarding Election Committee’s suggestions [n.d., 1945], JOSEPHY J/1/11, BLPES
120 Report of Committee “A”, part of “The Way Ahead”, 6 November 1947, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES
121 “Federal Union: Notes on Organisation” [n.d.], JOSEPHY J/1/4, BLPES
ones, were perceived as useful as ‘[c]ontinuous pressure and the evidence of support of the federal idea would have a great effect on editorial policy…’.

From its inception, FU perceived itself as ‘a membership organisation with a democratic constitution’, and it was this constitution, along with a focus on grassroots activism and active membership that distanced FU from other pressure groups and movements in the minds of its leaders. Its branch structure fell under the coordination of regional organisers who, while being directed by the Executive Committee on policy matters, advised the Executive Committee on the formation of such policy. A dialogue between national and local levels was thus facilitated, giving FU both a top-down and bottom-up structure. This was reinforced by the creation of an Administrative Committee, assigned ‘to take decisions on all matters excluding those of extraordinary importance’ and placed below a more politically prestigious Executive Committee ‘elected because of their competence to give advice on matters of policy’. The Administrative Committee oversaw membership drives, and aimed to keep local members busy by encouraging existing members to find new recruits, fulfilling a dual purpose of increasing the membership and keeping it active. The rank-and-file were also kept active and enthusiastic by ensuring vacant places on committees were filled, as part of a ‘division of labour’. FU’s Administrative and Organisation Committees thus effectively linked local branches and members to the wider organisation, by ensuring achievable tasks were delegated, that branches were not seen ‘merely as fund-raising

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122 Minutes of National Committee, 29 May 1949, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES
123 “Questions and Answers: All You Want To Know About Federation”, 1946, 1 MX 562-577, Federal Union in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
124 “Federal Union: Notes on Organisation” [n.d.], JOSEPHY J/1/4, BLPES
125 Federal Union circular regarding Administrative Committee, 12 July 1947, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES
126 Minutes of meeting of Federal Union Administrative Committee, 10 October 1947, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES

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bodies’, and that members ‘should never be allowed to sit out in the cold, seeing practically nothing for [their] money.’

This link was strengthened by FU’s publications, such as Federal News, seen as ‘essential’ in maintaining the ‘interest and support’ of members. Current Topics, another FU publication, was more concerned with grassroots activism, maintaining the balance between informing members and initiating action. Sent to all members of FU regardless of the level of their subscription, it was a more accessible supplement to Federal News, providing information on ‘vital’ grassroots action that was ‘increasing rapidly’, and calling for contributions from the rank-and-file, claiming,

One excellent way of showing a movement is a movement, a body with active limbs and a healthy brain, is to use “Current Topics”, as well as Federal News, as a medium for expressing your views…

The democratic publication was a success, the first issue receiving a ‘most encouraging response’ from members in comparison to more traditional informative pamphlets. Another publication, ‘Root and Branch’, followed by giving a series of ‘pointers’ to members on forming local branches, with a similar democratic approach calling for readers to contribute ideas or ‘lessons from bitter or pleasant experience’.

Branches were of particular importance because of the social dimension to FU. In spite of Lent’s definition of social movements being motivated by radical lifestyle politics,

129 Letter from J. Keith Killby to Frances L. Josephy, 2 October 1952, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES
130 Current Topics, November/December 1954, JOSEPHY J/1/16, BLPES; Current Topics, September 1954, JOSEPHY J/1/16, BLPES
131 Branch Secretaries Newsletter, October 1954, JOSEPHY J/1/16, BLPES
132 “Root and Branch: A Memorandum on Branch Organisation and Activities” [n.d., 1956], JOSEPHY J/1/18, BLPES

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this aspect of FU makes it more of a social ‘movement’, separated from the world of traditional politics and pressure groups, than has been acknowledged.\textsuperscript{133} Fittingly for a movement launched around a barrel of beer, social activities and events were locally ‘essential to the life of a branch’, as well as having a wider ‘considerable financial and publicity value’.\textsuperscript{134} By bringing members together, a sense of association and fraternity was fostered within FU, and the idealism of members was maintained, by ensuring their enthusiasm ‘not killed by their “feeling alone”…’.\textsuperscript{135} Federal Union ‘dances’, held as part of the organisation’s Annual General Meetings in the late 1940s, were important for bringing in outsiders and spreading the name of Federal Union throughout the public sphere. While internal political discussion was encouraged at these dances, with areas set aside to sit and talk\textsuperscript{136}, it was believed that

If [people] are familiar with the words ‘Federal Union’, because Federal Unionists ran a dance they attended, they are much more likely to read a letter on Federal Union in their local paper, and to get some interest in it. Even if a dance only makes people ask ‘What is Federal Union’, it will have served its purpose as advertisement.\textsuperscript{137}

However, an additional purpose of FU dances, to attract ‘people who will never be interested in meetings, but who nevertheless are potential voters’, highlights the problem FU had in attracting active support.\textsuperscript{138} FU’s membership level did not surpass the figure of two to three thousand in the late 1940s, comprising of many hard-working devotees, but its radical aims and active branch work did not attract it to the outside observer. The fleeting mentions of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[133]{Lent defines social movements as ‘grassroots mobilisations which were initiated outside of the established structures and values of the existing polity’: \textit{British Social Movements since 1945}, p.3}
\footnotetext[134]{Mayne and Pinder, \textit{Federal Union: The Pioneers}, p.7; “Root and Branch: Memorandum on Branch Organisation and Activities” [n.d., 1960], JOSEPHY J/1/18, BLPES}
\footnotetext[135]{Report of Committee “B”, part of “The Way Ahead”, 6 November 1947, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES}
\footnotetext[136]{“Special notice” [n.d., for Federal Union Annual General Meeting of April 1949], JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES; Branch Secretaries Newsletter [n.d., 1953], JOSEPHY J/1/15, BLPES}
\footnotetext[137]{“Federal Union: Notes on Organisation” [n.d.], JOSEPHY J/1/4, BLPES}
\footnotetext[138]{\textit{Ibid.}}
\end{footnotes}
Federal Union by Mass-Observation diarists show how interest in the organisation was often short-lived and suggests FU had a high turnover of members. One diarist’s short-lived activity sums up the attitude to FU well, attending just one local branch meeting because he was ‘interested in the matter but not disposed to do anything active in it’, and noting that the branch ‘nearly roped me into being on the committee’. FU thus remained small but active, experiencing a ‘paradox’ of dwindling membership and finance but increasing activities, publications and grassroots activity. Such developments reveal how FU was unable to make the transition from a fringe movement to a large popular political campaign.

FU were initially concerned that the UEM would have mass movement intentions when it was established in 1947, and kept in close contact with its Honorary Secretary, Duncan Sandys, over the issue. It later felt reassured that the UEM was as a membership ‘prestige group’ rather than a membership ‘movement’. However, Churchill did in fact intend to launch a ‘popular movement’ for European integration, and the UEM did seek to engage with the wider public, defining its role as ‘to educate, inform and inspire opinion’. Its membership was in fact around the same level as FU’s in the late 1940s, with figures around three thousand described as ‘extremely disappointing’. This combination of membership and political prestige, with aims of both popularising integration and pressuring

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139 Adam Matthew Digital, Mass-Observation Archive, Diarist 5058, 3 December 1939
140 Annual Report of the Executive Committee for the Annual General Meeting of Federal Union, 1954, 1 MX 163-169, Federal Union in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources; Annual Report of Federal Union, March 1954 - March 1955, 1 MX 170-181, Federal Union in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
141 Minutes of Federal Union Executive Committee, 24 January 1947, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLGES; Minutes of Federal Union Executive Committee, 2 June 1947, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLGES
143 United Europe: News-letter of the United Europe Movement, no.1, 1949, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/5/1, MRC, University of Warwick; Draft of Churchill’s letter for inclusion in United Europe newsletter, 1949, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/5/5, MRC, University of Warwick
144 Letter from Goddard to Sandys, Lang and Rhys Williams, 6 April 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/2, BLGES
government, meant that the UEM was something of a combination of a popular movement and ‘professionals’ forming opinion. Its character is evident in Lady Rhys-Williams’s claim that in promoting integration,

> It is by a genuinely enlightened public opinion that the Governments can be pushed into activity; and equally, it is by a thoroughly informed set of business and professional experts and workers who understand what is involved that the whole vast operation can be carried through.¹⁴⁵

The UEM therefore utilised a more top-down approach to mobilising the public towards European integration. UEM’s aforementioned aim of encouraging idealism by avoiding discussion of constitutional matters was reinforced by its own organisational structure. Oliver Stanley specified this at UEM’s initial Albert Hall meeting, stating that the Movement should avoid ‘any great mechanism of areas and branches’ and should focus on organising mass meetings rather than forming a network of branches or ‘the creation of a formal organisation with a detailed Constitution’, as ‘we do not wish to bury our ideals beneath an over elaborate machine’.¹⁴⁶ Stanley did state that the UEM wanted ‘a two-way traffic in ideas’, but while the Movement looked into the question of decentralisation via regional networks of either honorary secretaries or county committees, this development never appeared to happen.¹⁴⁷ Thus, the relationship between the UEM’s central organisation and its members remained limited and detached. In forming a connection between the two, the journal *European Review* was seen by the central committee as an essential informative tool,

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¹⁴⁵ Notes for Rhys Williams’ United Europe speech in Newcastle, 18 September 1948, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/7, BLPES
¹⁴⁶ Speech by Oliver Stanley MP, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/5/7, MRC, University of Warwick; Minutes of a meeting of Executive Sub-Committee of United Europe Committee, 4 March 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/1/13, MRC, University of Warwick
¹⁴⁷ Speech by Oliver Stanley MP, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/5/7, MRC, University of Warwick; Circular from Hare-Scott to United Europe Movement members [n.d., 1948], RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2, BLPES
but were concerned that it was ‘the only return our members get for their subscription’ and ‘the only link between our members…’ 148

The foundation of UEM’s popular campaign began with the highly-publicised meeting at the Albert Hall on 14 May 1947, which was sold out after a ‘run on tickets’. 149 The meeting was a publicity success, and was followed by large meetings in Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, London, Bristol and Oxford. 150 The United Europe exhibition was a similar success, with Churchill ‘rapturously received by a crowd which waited in the street to greet him’ and receiving ‘an equally warm welcome’ inside. 151 Having brought the issue to the greater public, UEM leaders then sought to persuade the public to take action and inspire grassroots action for the European cause. The aim was now to take discussion of European integration ‘out of the detached atmosphere of the London club, the college library, the fashionable salon’ and bring it to ‘the man-in-the-street and his wife’, leading to ‘mass support’ from ‘ordinary men and women’. 152 The emphasis was now on UEM members and the public to take action, with a Radio Luxemburg broadcast instructing listeners to

...preach the gospel, make converts. Put the case to your work-mates; in pubs, cafes, clubs, wherever you meet your friends, spread the gospel of United Europe.

148 Letter from Amery to Churchill, 7 March 1953, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/1, BLPES; Report from the Organising Secretary to a meeting of the General Purposes Committee, 22 June 1949, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/1/72, MRC, University of Warwick
149 Letter from Gollancz to Churchill, 8 May 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/2/72, MRC, University of Warwick; Letter from Gollancz to Mrs W.E. Partridge, 12 May 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/2/79, MRC, University of Warwick
150 Letter from Robert Boothby to Gollancz, 16 May 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/2/90, MRC, University of Warwick; Memorandum, “Progress of Meetings”, part of Minutes of a meeting of General Purposes Committee of United Europe Movement, 4 February 1948, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/1/37, MRC, University of Warwick; Report from the Organising Secretary to a meeting of the General Purposes Committee, 22 June 1949, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/1/72, MRC, University of Warwick
Work for the cause as if your life depended on it... **YOU** are Everyman and 
Everyman is you.153

The UEM thus sought to increase the popular, grassroots aspect of its campaign by continuing 
to attempt to increase support through meetings, literature and propaganda. By providing an 
early lead, the UEM hoped that a position would be reached where its campaign could ‘grow 
and expand from the bottom up’, as ‘International Committees must be supported by popular 
campaigns, [and] the popular campaigns must be swept forward by the intellectual cavalry of 
discussion groups.’154

However, UEM’s propaganda failed to capture the imagination the way it intended. The response to the United Europe Exhibition, which highlighted ‘the benefits of co-
operation, interchange of ideas and a fuller knowledge of the customs, ideals and the way of 
life among the peoples of Europe’, was that despite the good attendance, a ‘more positive 
theme must be evolved’ to attract support to the movement.155 Similarly, UEM films, seen as 
of ‘inestimable value’ to UEM ‘as a medium for educating public opinion in favour of United 
Europe’, were advised to appeal more to the imagination.156 Suggestions included displaying 
‘typical frontier scenery’ to romanticise the issue and ‘combat the impression that there is 
indeed a physical barrier’, and bringing in aspects of ‘hot-gospelling’ and ‘Romance’.157

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153 Transcript of United Europe Movement speech by Stephen King-Hall, broadcast on Radio Luxemburg, 22 February 1948, Gollanz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/3/19, MRC, University of Warwick  
154 United Europe Movement, Discussion Group no. 1, “United Europe and Western Unity”, [n.d.], RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/2, BLPES  
155 “United Europe Show To Tour Britain”, *News Chronicle*, 15 November 1948, Gollanz papers, 
MSS.157/3/UE/6/6, MRC, University of Warwick; Memorandum, “United Europe Exhibition”, 20 January 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/2, BLPES  
156 Letter from Vivian Carter to Brian Goddard, 26 November 1951, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/6, BLPES  
certain snobbery was behind these suggestions, however, as it was suggested the ‘simple human tragic story’ was needed as ‘a majority of humans… are tragically simple…’.  

The voluntarist, “crusading” identity of those involved in the UEM may also have reinforced a perception of elitism that prevented the Movement gaining mass support. When its propaganda and membership drives were unsuccessful, it was assumed within the UEM that failure was due to ‘a good deal of ignorance and sense of remoteness concerning the real issues involved’. In some cases this was seen by some in the movement as due to ‘an appalling ignorance’ or ‘an almost complete apathy’ on European issues, due to the separation of the issue from the ‘individual daily living’ of the public. Rather than ignorance or apathy, however, Lady Rhys-Williams believed that the public had to be led on this intricate matter, and that Churchill’s idea of a United Europe ‘sprang like Minerva from his head, fully born, but for some time was too bright for mortal eyes to see clearly!’ Subsequently, the UEM sought to target ‘the simple citizen’ in its policy statements, and advised its speakers ‘not to speak over the heads of the audience’, once more avoiding technical issues in order to sustain idealism and popular momentum. 

However, despite this utilisation of simple propaganda in an attempt to garner mass support, UEM’s desired combination of prominent figures and large membership was not achieved. Its focus on idealism over development of a constitutional structure, combined with its sometimes elitist attitude, reinforced the image of UEM as a committee-led “prestige

References:
155 Letter from Richard Hawkins of Rotary International to Goddard, 23 November 1951, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/6, BLPES
156 Memorandum by Rhys Williams, “United Europe Movement: Propaganda Campaign in Relation to the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement”, 29 March 1949, JOSEPHY J/5/7, BLPES
157 Letter from Councillor Doris Long to Rhys Williams, 20 November 1948, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/6, BLPES
160 Letter from Goddard to Sandys, 24 April 1951, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/7, BLPES; Letter from Goddard to Sandys, 24 April 1951, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/7, BLPES
group”, and prevented its aims of a popular public campaign for European integration being completely achieved. By contrast, FU’s complex structure gave members and branches the opportunity to participate and influence policy. Its propaganda was similarly aimed at the general public, and developing its membership base was seen as pivotal to any future success. Yet its idealistic nature, combined with public indifference to federalism, meant FU did not develop beyond a close-knit group of left-liberal devotees, taking the form more of a protest group rather than a mass movement. These qualities, however, contributed to the longevity of FU throughout the 1950s while the UEM went into terminal decline. The next section of this chapter analyses how both organisations reacted to political developments, before demonstrating how both organisations were usurped by more technocratic, lobbying-oriented pressure groups less concerned with influencing public opinion or developing mass support.

The 1950s – The ineffectiveness and decline of FU and UEM, and the rise of the study groups

With FU perceived as too much like a radical protest group on the fringes of politics, and the UEM as too political and elitist, both organisations would continue to struggle to attract public interest and support in the 1950s. The escalation of the Cold War, including the Soviet consolidation of Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade, and the outbreak of the Korean War, made the issue of European integration develop increasingly along ‘functional’ lines. Issues of economics, defence and practical necessity replaced those of idealism. FU’s aims for federation became more limited and functional, recognising that a union involving Eastern Europe and Russia, while avoiding an anti-Communist impression, ‘leads us back to re-join

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163 Lord Beveridge recalled in Federal Union’s twenty-first anniversary publication that the Cold War ‘compelled [Federal Union] to recognise that immediate progress could most effectively come along functional lines’: “Federal Union 21”, 1959, 1 MX 190-204, Federal Union in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
the Faries [sic] down the garden."  

However, while European integration was now seen in the political sphere as a necessity, FU acknowledged a shift in public attitudes away from foreign affairs. In 1951, it perceived the political climate to be ‘the most unfavourable that Federal Union has ever experienced’, with the public ‘ignoring international politics’, having ‘no faith in the future’ and having ‘lost all faith in ideals’.  

Yet this was proclaimed despite the increasing popularity and success of the UNA and other internationalist movements. Religious leaders turned away from support of the European integration issue, according to Coupland, and towards more global and humanitarian concerns such as world peace, the Commonwealth and relations between Europe and developing countries. Thus when the discourse of European integration became concerned with economic rationality, humanitarian and pacifistic support for the campaign turned their attention elsewhere. The success of the UNA, for example, may have been due to its shifting concerns relating to charitable and humanitarian campaigns, and in the words of Frank Field, extending ‘beyond internationalism to a perception of “planet earth”’. It could therefore attract the political elite, who still believed in Britain’s world role and international position and the principle of total national sovereignty, and a combination of federalists, pacifists, humanitarians and environmentalists. The words of United Europe campaigner Victor Gollancz, that ‘[t]here is nothing so depressing as a movement which has achieved its aims’, are also relevant in this respect.  

For those FU members supporting European integration out of a concern with the international situation or pacifistic or humanitarian  

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164 Circular to members of the Executive Committee of Federal Union, 2 October 1950, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES  
165 Federal Union financial report by J. Keith Killby, 6 February 1951, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES  
166 Coupland, *Britannia, Europa and Christendom*, pp.183-5  
167 Field, F., *60 Years of UNA-UK*, p.13  
168 Frank, “The New Morality: Victor Gollancz, ‘Save Europe Now’ and the German Refugee Crisis, 1945-46”, p.250
concerns, the progression of continental unity in the 1950s meant that they, like Gollancz, may have turned their attention elsewhere in the belief that integration was a job done. FU was thus troubled by a combination of ‘external’ factors, namely international developments, and ‘internal factors such as [a] lack of coherent organisational policy’ throughout the 1950s.169

In response to the events of the 1950s, and in light of the aforementioned ‘paradox’ of a small but highly active movement, it was suggested by some leading FU members that the organisation should drop its mass movement ambitions and focus on targeting elite opinion. By the 1950s, membership had still not surpassed a few thousand, and was seen by some in FU to be of diminished importance. It was no longer necessarily vital as regards raising funds for FU, as by 1955 it amounted for only a quarter of its income, and only a massive increase in membership would raise that proportion.170 With FU unlikely to be a truly mass movement, membership was no longer regarded as ‘synonymous with influence’, yet there was still a desire in FU to engage with the public and create a popular momentum for European integration.171 Sustaining momentum and membership, according to Frances Josephy, was the only way to prevent a downward spiral and eventual closure.172

The 1950s thus became a period of soul-searching for FU with regards to its tactics and internal organisation. The first suggestion that FU become an ‘efficient educational body

169 ‘We realise that at the moment it is unfortunately true that Great Britain will not join a European Federation, but we feel very strongly that such countries of free Europe as wish to federate immediately should be encouraged to do so’: Letter to Federal Union members [n.d., 1952], JOSEPHY J/1/15, BLPES; Report of the Committee on Organisation Set-Up by the 1956 Annual General Meeting of Federal Union [n.d., 1956], JOSEPHY J/2/7, BLPES
171 Ibid.
172 Letter from Josephy to Killby, 27 October 1950, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES
along Fabian lines’ was put forward in 1948, after a decline in membership from its wartime peak had led to a pessimistic outlook. The disappointment after the European Assembly meetings at Strasbourg also engendered suggestions that FU ‘withdraw into the wilderness’, ‘pruning the dead wood and dangerous elements’ into a ‘small nucleus’ rather than being a large movement of ‘half-hearted support’. FU officially decided to ‘continue as before’ in its approach to the public, but discontent continued to surface. Talk of ‘retrenchment’ by cutting back on production of Federal News was linked to this shift away from membership, leading to Secretary Keith Killby resigning on the grounds that the Executive Committee’s proposal could ‘jeopardise the future [of] Federal Union as a Membership movement.’ His successor, Douglas Robinson, continued to warn of FU developing into ‘one of a large number of glorified study societies; a sorry reflection of its former self.’ Alternatives to mass membership continued to be put forward, however, including by Robinson who hypothesised that FU could become ‘a pressure and lobbying group’ or ‘educational in character’, before concluding that it should ‘go all out developing our membership and our ability as a pressure group…’

The division between strategies came to a head over a resolution on the ‘urgent necessity of increasing membership and reviving Branch activity’ for the 1960 Annual General Meeting. Antony Morris described this as looking at FU’s position in ‘purely

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173 “Federal Union and the Future – An Opinion”, R. Stevens, 7 October 1948, JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES
174 Letter from J. Keith Killby to Frances L. Josephy with enclosed draft resolutions, 30 November 1950, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES
175 Ibid.
177 Letter from E. Douglas Robinson to branches, 20 October 1952, JOSEPHY J/1/14, BLPES
178 Memorandum on Administrative and Non-Political Policy by Douglas Robinson, 7 July 1953, JOSEPHY J/2/6, BLPES
quantitative terms’ when ‘the quality of most branches is steadily falling’. Morris thus advocated a structure along the lines of the Fabian Society or Bow Group, aiming membership at the ‘exceptionally well-informed’ rather than being a ‘large, but ill-informed, organisation, swamped by amateurs and cranks…’. Responses regarding FU’s organisation ‘ranged from mass provincial membership to suggestions for an intellectual closed shop’. However, an amended version of the original resolution was passed, seeking to increase membership and engage both its members and the general public with the European integration issue.

FU’s decision in the mid-1950s to gain the support of those with ‘influence over the ideas and activities of others’, such as community leaders, ‘businessmen and trade unionists, politicians and journalists’, does, however, demonstrate how FU professionalised in this period and adapted to a change in discourse. Morris may have been right that the subject of European integration was becoming increasingly concerned with ‘economic and constitutional ideas which [are] exceedingly difficult to express in terms which will command wide acceptance among the sort of people who are normally attracted to a “popular” movement.’ Thus by focusing on professional organisations, and producing publications such as Ronald Mackay’s “Whither Britain” highlighting the economic benefits of Britain joining a European federation, FU adjusted from a campaign that on the whole had moved from positive idealism to economic practicality.

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179 Memorandum from A. Morris, “Reorganisation of Federal Union” [n.d., 1960], JOSEPHY J/1/19, BLPES
180 Minutes of Executive Committee of Federal Union, 17 February 1960, JOSEPHY J/1/19, BLPES
181 Minutes of Federal Union Annual General Meeting, 23 and 24 April 1960, JOSEPHY J/1/19, BLPES
182 Memorandum from A. Morris, “Reorganisation of Federal Union” [n.d., 1960], JOSEPHY J/1/19, BLPES
183 Minutes of a meeting of Federal Union National Council, 26 January 1952, JOSEPHY J/1/15, BLPES
The UEM had similar problems as a result of the developments of the early 1950s, with ‘intellectual confusion’ as to whether integration should be on a functional or federal basis. The refusal of successive governments to join the European Coal and Steel Community set out in the Schuman Plan left the UEM with a ‘lack of a clear and coherent policy’, waiting for a statement of governmental policy before ‘effective work could be done.’ This once more demonstrates how the UEM was too tied to the political sphere, unable to take a lead independent of government or to generate its own momentum for a popular campaign after the issue disappeared off the political agenda. The departure of prominent UEM members to take Cabinet posts in the Conservative government in 1951 reinforces this point of UEM being too political. Furthermore, while Churchill had turned away from European integration and became ‘obsessed with nuclear matters and Big Three summits’, his election as Prime Minister had a negative effect on UEM, as those who joined the movement attracted by his prestige felt that

…because he has assumed the Premiership he can be trusted to do all in his power, consonant with the safeguarding of the interests to this country, to promote greater unity in Europe.

The departure of the likes of Robert Boothby and Lord Layton from UEM also reveals the rigidness of the sort of Europe most members of UEM desired, that of an intergovernmental union based on idealism and sentimental appeal. Both were firm advocates of an intergovernmental approach through the Council of Europe, Boothby claiming that federation outside of the Council would have ‘no roots in history, no traditions, and no

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184 “The Turning Point for Europe”, Robert Boothby, July-September 1952, RHYS WILLIAMS J/22/3, BLPES
185 Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Management of the United Europe Movement, 26 February 1953, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/1, BLPES
186 Letter from Rhys Williams to Churchill, 28 November 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/6, BLPES; Notes for United Europe Movement meeting of 26 February 1953, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2/3, BLPES
viability in terms of politics, economics, or military power’, and would be ‘totally void of mass emotional appeal’, ‘an artificial product of professional politicians rather than the outcome of any spontaneous natural growth, or popular demand.’ As the discourse of European integration turned to economic and military matters, and continental federation started to take shape, UEM members either left the campaign or worked for European unity through other organisations such as ELEC. The Movement been made to look ‘out of date’ by the Cold War and then struggled to keep up with events on the Continent.

Like FU, the UEM also sought to target ‘professional organisations and their trade journals’ for finance and support, but a combination of rapid decline in membership and finance, being left behind by developments, and accusations of party bias left the UEM in irreversible decline in the 1950s. As continental integration without Britain started to take shape, its membership dropped to around one thousand eight hundred members by August 1952, approximately half the figure of three and a half years ago. Within six months that figure fell to one thousand, and by 1956 there were only five hundred subscribers. This contributed to a financial decline that was initiated by the UEM’s loans to the UKCEM. With the UKCEM facing the possibility of legal action in the late 1940s due to their perilous

187 Speech by Lord Layton to a Meeting of the United Europe Lunch-Time Forum, 1 October 1952, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/7, BLPES; “The Turning Point for Europe”, Robert Boothby, July-September 1952, RHYS WILLIAMS J/22/3, BLPES
188 United Europe Movement was given task to ‘organise a study group’ looking at institutions rather than any membership, campaigning or propaganda: “UEM and UKC”, note of discussion between Layton, Boothby and Beddington-Behrens, 19 February 1957, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/2, BLPES; Letter from Rhys Williams to Gollancz, 23 April 1950, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/4/38, MRC, University of Warwick; “United Europe Movement” note by Commander Stephen King-Hall [n.d.], Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/1/101, MRC, University of Warwick
189 “UEM: Propaganda Campaign in Relation to the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement”, Rhys Williams, 29 March 1949, JOSEPHY J/5/7, BLPES
190 Letter from Goddard to Rhys Williams, 12 August 1952, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/1; Letter from Hare-Scott to Sandys, Rhys Williams and Lang, 20 January 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/2
191 Notes for United Europe Movement meeting of 26 February 1953, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/2, BLPES; Letter from Rhys Williams to Julian Amery, 13 March 1956, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/6, BLPES
finance, the UEM loaned the UKCEM an initial advance of £3,500, followed by further loans.\textsuperscript{192} The UEM soon complained of this ‘very great strain’ which had ‘prevented it from developing its campaign in Great Britain and on the Continent on the lines which it had originally planned.’\textsuperscript{193} Furthermore, when the UKCEM was reorganised in 1949, the UEM was left both without purpose and money. Activities in the field of ‘converting public opinion’, membership, fundraising, meetings and propaganda were to be ‘carried out through the agency of the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement, and not through the United Europe Movement as at present’, and the UEM, thus ‘relieved of much of its present expenditure’, would contribute £15,000 to the UKCEM annually.\textsuperscript{194} This reorganisation coincided with the first ‘discreet injection’ of large sums of money from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States, in a covert operation which, according to Richard Aldrich, was designed to undermine British political resistance to federalism.\textsuperscript{195} The UEM’s commitment to gradual, intergovernmental integration meant that, unlike FU, the EUF or ELEC, their leaders and members were perceived as ‘foot-draggers’, and it became sidelined as federalist development took hold.\textsuperscript{196} This combination of factors demonstrates how the UEM was very much left behind by developments in Europe, and with a fall in public

\textsuperscript{192} Memorandum from Sandys to Mr Curtis and Goddard [n.d.], RHYS WILLIAMS J/7/3, BLPES; Letter from Goddard to Layton, 16 February 1950, RHYS WILLIAMS J/7/3, BLPES; Memo from Goddard to Sandys, 14 December 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/7/3, BLPES; Letter from Goddard to Layton, 16 February 1950, RHYS WILLIAMS J/7/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{193} Memorandum from Lang to Rhys Williams, 18 November 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{194} Memorandum, “Suggestions for the Reorganisation of the London Office of the European Movement, the Office of the United Kingdom Council, the Office of the United Europe Movement”, 20 September 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/7/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{195} Aldrich, R.J., \textit{The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence} (London: John Murray, 2002), p.343
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Ibid.}, p.347, p.350. Ironically, Lord Layton, a key figure in the UEM, is described as ‘a crucial link’ between the British section of the European Movement and the CIA funding body, but his association with other organisations campaigning for integration ensured a continuing involvement with the campaign beyond the UEM: p.359
support it became a mere study group by 1957, in spite of its initial fanfare, while the prospect of it being subsumed into UKCEM was also discussed.\textsuperscript{197}

As the discourse of European integration became more economic and less idealistic, economic study groups became more prominent at the expense of both FU and the UEM. The British Section of ELEC, which broke away from the UEM in the late 1940s, was one of the more prominent of these study groups. Previously part of the United Europe Economic Committee, a decision was made after the Hague Congress, for immediate study of economic questions, ‘to expand and strengthen the British Section of ELEC.’\textsuperscript{198} The UEM retained an Economic Sub-Committee which, rather than delving too deeply into the technical aspects, was to attract publicity and propaganda for the cause of European unity with practical reports.\textsuperscript{199} Confusion and rivalry soon began to occur, however, given that in 1948, nine out of the thirteen UEM Economic Sub-Committee members also worked for ELEC.\textsuperscript{200} However, the marked difference between the publicity and propaganda produced by the UEM Economic Sub-Committee and the technical studies of the ‘Elekites’ remained.\textsuperscript{201} Moreover, by promoting ‘solidarity in every sphere, by the means judged to be the best in each case’, ELEC

\textsuperscript{197} The United Europe Movement was given the task to ‘organise a study group’ looking at institutions rather than any membership, campaigning or propaganda: “UEM and UKC”, note of discussion between Layton, Boothby and Beddington-Behrens, 19 February 1957, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/2, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Management and Annual General Meeting of United Europe Movement, 14 February 1957, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/7, MRC, University of Warwick
\textsuperscript{198} Memorandum of British Section of European League for Economic Co-operation, 7 June 1948, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of the General Purposes Committee of the United Europe Movement, 25 November 1947, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{199} Minutes of a meeting of the United Europe Movement Economic Sub-Committee, 24 November 1947; RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2, BLPES; “Committee of Economic Co-operation, Report by E. Beddington Behrens” [n.d.], RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{200} Letter from Beddington-Behrens to Rhys Williams, 14 June 1948, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{201} David Eccles wrote to Rhys Williams complaining about the ‘Federalists’, saying ‘one must try to reason with them and tell them of the sort of work you and the Elekites are doing’: Letter from David Eccles to Rhys Williams, 5 December 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/7/4, BLPES
was an ideal organisation to work for functional European unity in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{202} It summed up the new political situation with its claim that ‘Europe is uniting, too slowly to please the visionaries, yet at a rate that surprises – and at the same time satisfies – the world of business and of labour.’\textsuperscript{203}

ELEC’s work involved producing detailed technical publications, many of which were papers for European economic conferences which provided the ‘driving force and expert knowledge’ on economics to politicians.\textsuperscript{204} Their publications were therefore for political and governmental consumption, with ‘distinguished personalities’ and ‘[g]overnmental and non-governmental organisations’ all ‘favourably impressed by the quality of our deliberations...’.\textsuperscript{205} Whereas UEM and FU’s appeals had been to the public, ELEC produced ‘methodical and detailed studies of a highly technical level’ and ‘of the kind of quality which are usually produced only by the civil servants of Government departments for study by other civil servants...’.\textsuperscript{206} In this sense, ELEC was closed off from the general public, with ‘no system of membership... in the ordinary sense’ and no public meetings, but with ‘[s]tatesmen, economists, trade-unionists, business-men and others interested in promoting the economic co-operation between the States of Europe’ all being eligible for membership.\textsuperscript{207} Instead,

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\item \textsuperscript{202} Letter from Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to Beddington-Behrens, 18 October 1954, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/4/1, BLPES
\item \textsuperscript{203} “The Coming Tasks of Europe”, 1960, 1 LZ 764-879, European League for Economic Co-Operation in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
\item \textsuperscript{204} Letter from Rhys Williams to Professor Colin Clark, 1 September 1953, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/4/1, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of the European League of Economic Co-operation, 4 June 1953, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/1/14, BLPES
\item \textsuperscript{205} Report of Secretary General, presented to a meeting of the General Assembly of the European League for Economic Co-operation, 15 December 1951, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/1/1, BLPES
\item \textsuperscript{206} Letter from Rhys Williams to Elma Dangerfield, Joint Executive Editor of European-Atlantic Review, February 1957, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/4/2, BLPES
\item \textsuperscript{207} Members of the public interested in joining ELEC were initially pointed in the direction of the UEM instead: Letter from A.J. Heriot, Secretary of ELEC, to R.G. Wrugh, 29 June 1950, RHYS WILLIAMS J/7/1/1, BLPES; Draft constitution of the British Section of European League for Economic Co-operation, 28 December 1948, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/4/9, BLPES
\end{itemize}

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ELEC was rather a unison of business figures and politicians, from prominent economists and civil servants such as Lord Layton and Sir Harold Butler to six cabinet members of the Macmillan administration, including Macmillan himself and ‘old United Europeanite’ Duncan Sandys.\textsuperscript{208} This close connection between business and government therefore enabled ELEC to formulate European policy and opinion at an elite level without engaging, educating or forming public opinion in the way that the UEM and FU had sought to.

Furthermore, by aiming their memberships towards figures from finance, industry and business, economic-oriented pressure groups were more able to raise larger sums of money than the likes of UEM and FU and survive through the 1950s. Despite Lady Rhys-Williams believing ELEC was running ‘on a shoe-string’ compared to the vast sums poured into the UKCEM accounts, UEM’s disappointment at raising £10,000 at a benefit dinner was due to the fact that ‘ELEC can do better than that without Churchill to help.’\textsuperscript{209} Furthermore, Central Intelligence Agency funding from the US had a role in promoting British industrial and business interest in European integration via commissioned studies by the Economist Intelligence Unit.\textsuperscript{210} One of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s studies led to the formation of Britain in Europe (BiE), founded in 1959 to study the economic implications of European integration and British Common Market membership. Similarly to ELEC, it targeted economic, industrial and business interests, producing publications it perceived to be ‘essential… for every export executive and business economist, as well as all those in

\textsuperscript{208} The other members being Peter Thorneycroft, Lord Kilmuir, Sir David Eccles and J.S. Maclay: Letter from Rhys Williams to Baron Boel, 15 January 1957, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/4/2, BLPES; Letter from Rhys Williams to S.P. Chambers, 4 March 1957, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/4/1, BLPES

\textsuperscript{209} Letter from Rhys Williams to Alfred Robens MP, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/4/2, BLPES; Letter from Rhys Williams to Goddard, 30 August 1951, RHYS WILLIAMS J/6/3/1, BLPES

\textsuperscript{210} For information on the American Committee on United Europe’s connections with the European federalist movement, see Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, chapter 16. For more on its relationship with the Economist Intelligence Unit, see p.359, p.448
industry, commerce, the trade unions and politics who study the economic processes affecting this country'.

These ranged from short and concise presentation of the facts, through their ‘Highlights’ publication, to large commissioned reports by the Economist Intelligence Unit of around 600 pages, but their target audience remained the same, aiming for ‘[a] “Highlights” on every chairman’s desk, and a News-Letter in the briefcase of every export or overseas factory manager…’

As with ELEC, BiE made little attempt to engage the public, and produced its reports in the hope of influencing business and government. Rather, it perceived it to be the government’s job ‘to form and guide public opinion’ rather than theirs, as public opinion ‘cannot be expected to understand these intricate issues…’ Subsequently, BiE felt that

…there would not appear to be any need for the Government to feel any anxiety about British opinion; all it needs to do is give the lead and justify its decision…

In spite of this, BiE was often slow to challenge the government over its decisions on Europe in this period, and did not exert the same sort of pressure that UEM and FU sought to. While believing that ‘no government worth its salt should recoil from the task of moulding public opinion’, BiE also felt that ‘[i]t is not for us, of course, to criticise the Government’, that has to ‘cope with the situation as a whole, and with many pressure groups who see things from a

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211 Minutes of the first Annual General Meeting of Britain in Europe, 9 December 1959, 1 BX 9-15, Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
212 August/September 1960 newsletter, 1 BX 1407-1462, Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources; Director’s Report to the Council of Management of Britain in Europe for its meeting of 26 July 1960, 1 BX 34-37, Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
213 October 1960 newsletter, 1 BX 1463-1524, Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
214 May/June 1960 newsletter, 1 BX 1208-1277, Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
point of view dramatically opposed to ours. BiE instead seemed to pride itself on the quality of its publications rather than its pressure work, having brought about an ‘increased awareness’ and ‘a more constructive climate of opinion’ which led the government ‘to be not unsupportive of [our] work…’ Its assimilation of Europe House in May 1960, who organised public meetings in the aim of creating ‘a well-informed public opinion’ and ‘a lively public interest in European affairs’, and attempted to engage with the public in a more political campaign for Common Market membership, demonstrates how the economic study group came to dominate the campaigns for European integration by the late 1950s.

At the re-launch of the UKCEM in 1954, Arthur Woodburn noted that the EM’s problem in the past had been that ‘[g]overnments had refused to countenance the European Movement because it was regarded as an Opposition party, a pressure group for Strasbourg.’ Pressure groups and movements promoting European unity, therefore, had to work closely with the government in the new political landscape of functional integration of Western Europe, of which Britain was on the periphery. Groups like ELEC and BiE established links between business and government, rather than informing and mobilising the public and forming links between public and government. It was decided that the UKCEM ‘should be an educational and not a policy making body’ so as to not apply too much direct

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215 June/July 1960 newsletter, 1 BX 1278-1355, Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources; Minutes of second Annual General Meeting of Britain in Europe, 25 January 1960, 1 BX 74-81, Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
216 Minutes of second Annual General Meeting of Britain in Europe, 25 January 1960, 1 BX 74-81, Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
217 Letter from Europe House to Gollancz, 13 February 1959, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/EM/1/23, MRC, University of Warwick; Europe House pamphlet [n.d.], Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/EM/1/24, MRC, University of Warwick. Details of merger in minutes of an Extraordinary General Meeting of Britain in Europe, 17 June 1960, 1 BX 16-21 Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
218 Meeting of Executive of United Kingdom Council of the European Movement, 21 July 1954, 1 MH 55-60, European Movement (UKC) in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
pressure on the government over Europe.\textsuperscript{219} The UKCEM was still, however, not entirely comfortable on campaigning on a wholly economic basis, and sought a more inspirational political campaign capable of mobilising public opinion. A sign of how much the “functionalist” approach to European integration had changed the issue can be seen in the response from the public to an EM questionnaire in 1956. The EM perceived from the results that there was a risk of ‘neutralism’ in the void left by a decline in federalist faith, and that ‘the appetite of politicians for precise definition in logical terms’ had led to stagnation in the campaign for integration. What was needed, the EM believed, was ‘[a] few Churchillian phrases’ to give ‘impetus and inspiration’, as part of an ‘emotional appeal’. Even if the appeal was ‘mythical and unattainable’, ‘[y]outh must crusade for something. If they are not offered a worthy ideal to pursue, they may well be attracted to unworthy ones.’ The EM therefore still saw the importance of a popular basis of support for European integration, and that where there were new fields of progress, including economic co-operation, EM needed ‘to present these to public opinion in the most inspiring way that can be devised…’\textsuperscript{220}

A letter to Rhys Williams on the opinions of ex-Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and a group of London citizens also demonstrates the limitations of campaigning for integration on an economic basis. The correspondent had asked Spaak, a leading figure in the campaign for European integration, what the best line to persuade people to support a united Europe would be, and Spaak responded that, while continental Europeans would be attracted by the economic issue, he was ‘not sure that that answer is valid for Britain’. Members of the public also seemed to be attracted by the message of lasting European peace, ‘a simple and

\textsuperscript{219} Meeting of Executive of United Kingdom Council of the European Movement, 21 July 1954, 1 MH 55-60, European Movement (UKC) in \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources

\textsuperscript{220} Comments on European Movement Questionnaire, 14 May 1956, RHYS WILLIAMS J/5/1/2, BLPES
easily understood argument.' The EM thus attempted to engage with the public through the new stage of the European campaign, maintaining some of the popular mass movement tactics of the UEM and FU in their approach.

On the whole, however, the groups that campaigned for European integration in the late 1950s were more “insider” organisations than the public-oriented campaigns of FU and UEM. The former, in the face of diminishing success, had flirted with the idea of becoming this sort of study group or educational group, before settling on a middle ground by increasing membership and targeting opinion-formers and influential figures. However, the economic and constitutional complexities of the European integration issue had left idealistic campaigning organisations such as FU and UEM struggling for influence and support, whilst “insider” organisations such as ELEC, BiE and UKCEM aimed to provide expertise to business and government.

Conclusion

In 1961, Rhys Williams, whose opinion on the ‘Catholic “Little Europe”’ of the Common Market had by now made her something of an opponent of British membership, wrote to Macmillan shortly before he would announce his government’s intention to apply for Common Market membership. Reminiscing about the manner in which Europe had come together, she recalled the failed attempt of UEM, ‘[i]n the old days under Churchill... to create

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221 Letter from M.A. Cameron to Rhys Williams, 11 December 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/7/4, BLPES
222 Letter from Beddington-Behrens to Rhys Williams, 16 March 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS J/7/2/2, BLPES
the image of “Europa” – the spirit of the European continent’, and base the campaign for integration around a common European identity formed through a shared heritage, shared values, and the collective experience of the horrors of total war. The attempt to form a popular campaign based on public pressure for a united Europe, had failed, and economic integration and the impetus of business had succeeded in forming the Common Market, but Rhys Williams warned that,

Economic arrangements alone are not enough. They tend to disrupt rather than unite feeling except during the euphoria stage of a boom, which is now over. The strains begin to show, and only a real ideal can hold things together.\textsuperscript{223}

The attempt to form a popular campaign based on moral, positive ideals may have failed, but the attempt was there, and both FU and the UEM attempted to bring the matter from the world of high politics and intergovernmental conferences into the public sphere. Gollancz stated his and his colleagues’ reason for FU membership as ‘the expression of a simple aspiration, and to cooperate as individuals, and in any way we chose, with those working towards the same ends.’\textsuperscript{224} Both FU and UEM provided the general public the opportunity for this expression of a pro-European belief and identity, and the chance to participate in the crusade for integration. These campaigns were flawed, often because they were of a quite elitist nature, particularly in the case of UEM whose inability to decentralise and engage the public in grassroots activity prevented it from forming a large mass membership base, which may have provided the momentum – or, almost as importantly, the income – to extend its activity throughout the 1950s. From the fanfare of the Albert Hall meeting of 1947, seen as the official birth of the wider European Movement, it faded into

\textsuperscript{223} Letter from Rhys Williams to Macmillan, 26 February 1961, RHYS WILLIAMS J/21/6, LSE
\textsuperscript{224} Letter from Gollancz to Usborne, 21 February 1947, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/2/41, MRC, University of Warwick
obscenity in the 1950s. As UEM declined, the FU was torn between aspiring towards being a pressure group or a mass movement, as it grappled with the difficulty of framing complex issues in simple terms to the public. The intensification of the Cold War, the government’s ambivalent approach to European unity, and the trend towards a federal government of the Six left a void for the more professional UKCEM, and the economic study groups ELEC and BiE, to campaign for British integration with Europe. The discourse on British membership had become economic, and failed to truly inspire the public in the way that the campaign for peace, unity and the potential to achieve something historic had attempted in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The rise to prominence of more professional, technocratic pro-Market pressure groups in the 1950s helped to usher in what Stephen George described as ‘a gradual official realization’ amongst the British political elite of the need to engage with the EEC. There was a belief, however, that the lobbying activities of the pro-Market campaigns also had a negative effect. Miriam Camps, writing shortly after the de Gaulle veto of 1963, believed that the fervour for integration from ‘[t]he Common Market campaign carried on by the press and by the “European” groups’ at the turn of the decade ‘grossly oversimplified’ the difficulties inherent in Britain joining the EEC. Nevertheless, the perception of the close relationship between these groups and the government was criticised by the anti-Market groups which emerged in the early 1960s. In a booklet published by the Anti-Common Market League, an article by R. Hugh Corbet sought to expose the hidden federalist agenda of pro-Market pressure groups. Details were provided of the likes of the UKCEM, the United Europe Association, the European-Atlantic Group and BiE, backed by political figures on their executive committees and receiving the ‘naïve patronage’ of religious leaders. Under a ‘façade of impartiality’, Corbet explained how

Westminster and Whitehall, the City of London and Industry, are all no doubt well versed in these groups. But what of the people; the tax-payers, the ones who suffer the pay pauses and fight the wars?

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2 George, S., An Awkward Partner, p.32
3 Camps, Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963, p.294
4 Corbet, R.H., “The Federalist Pressures in Britain” in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, p.21, p.23 p.20
ACML furthered this line of argument throughout the booklet, with its Chairman and founder John Paul highlighting the ‘friendly persuaders’, organisations ‘with vested interests in British entry’ into the EEC, and with references to the resources and influence of ‘political, industrial and financial’ pressure groups elsewhere. Yet while these organisations may have had influence owing to their “insider” status, the reality of the process towards the first EEC application was more complex. Hugo Young has argued that key figures in Whitehall in the 1950s, notably Michael Palliser and Sir Gladwyn Jebb in the Foreign Office and then Sir Frank Lee at the Board of Trade, were the drivers behind the government’s reassessment of its European policy. Furthermore, it is arguable that the final decision to apply for membership was the result of high political rather than economic factors. While, as Young points out, the economic superiority of the EEC became clear by the mid-1950s and the ‘truth was becoming available, for those who could count’, the ‘geo-political context’ was of greater importance.

Wolfram Kaiser has argued that the Foreign Office began to assume a greater role on the European issue than the Board of Trade, as it became more an issue of foreign policy than economics. Geopolitical concerns such as the desire to replace leadership of the Commonwealth with leadership of the EEC, to strengthen the transatlantic “special relationship” and to retain an independent nuclear deterrent meant, according to Kaiser, that a

5 Paul, J., “The Broad Economic Consequences” in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, p.52; “The Anti-Common Market League”, in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, inside back cover
6 George Wilkes does, however, highlight one example, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Commonwealth and Europe commissioned by Britain in Europe in 1958 and published in 1960, which he claims ‘had considerable influence in the preparation of government opinion’ before the EEC application: Wilkes, G., “The Commonwealth in British European Policy: Politics and sentiment, 1956-63” in May, A. (ed), Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe: The Commonwealth and Britain’s applications to join the European Communities (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.68
7 Young, H., This Blessed Plot, pp.104-108
8 Ibid., p.105, p.128
9 Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans, p.109. Jacqueline Tratt also supports this view of initial trading concerns, followed by a political rationale – Tratt, The Macmillan Government and Europe, pp.188-89
failed application would still meet most of the government’s objectives. The application’s timing also sought to split the Labour Party over Europe, and the centrality of the EEC application to the Conservative Party’s modernisation policy contributed to its partisan nature.

However, the anti-Market groups’ perception of an elite-led campaign for European integration in the 1960s remains somewhat justified. Robert Lieber argues that prior to 1961, the EEC issue was predominantly discussed by government and officials and interest groups as elites became ‘increasingly receptive to the idea of EEC membership’. By contrast, public opinion on EEC membership was highly volatile during the first application, with the Macmillan government failing to provide a lead or rally the public to the pro-EEC cause. Macmillan’s announcement to the House of Commons in 1961 immediately marked the starting point for a period of fierce debate outside of the parliamentary arena. An issue that had previously been the preserve of politicians and sectional interest groups became politicised, as political parties, the public and promotional pressure groups argued the case for or against EEC entry. As Lieber highlights, while a few promotional pressure groups existed

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12 Lieber, British Politics and European Unity, p.207, p.233
before Macmillan’s announcement to the House of Commons, ‘most sprang up in response to the suddenly increased salience of the European issue’.\textsuperscript{14}

With Macmillan’s announcement, according to Anthony Forster, cruder anti-European arguments were refined as ‘the landscape in which opponents of supranational integration changed markedly.’\textsuperscript{15} However, while the aforementioned example of anti-Market rhetoric demonstrated an inherent populism and desire to speak on behalf of the British public, pro-Market pressure groups continued to target elites rather than mass support. While the likes of the UEM and FU had sought, and failed, to engage with the wider public on the EEC issue, Lieber notes how the Common Market Campaign, the ‘most important’ of the pro-Market groups, ‘operated on an elite basis to influence informed opinion’.\textsuperscript{16} According to Lieber, this was the result of seeking ‘to sustain and encourage an existing governmental policy’, and led to an elite-oriented appeal to the ‘non-partisan middle ground’, or the ‘middle opinion’ identified by Marwick.\textsuperscript{17} The only partial exception was the United Europe Association, founded by the UKCEM as its mass-membership wing in 1961 and ‘united by the common belief in the ideal of a United Europe.’\textsuperscript{18} As a result of this predominantly elite-based pressure group activity, and the political decision for application stemming from government and Whitehall activity, the anti-Marketees perceived themselves to be in the position of targeting and mobilising public opinion on the EEC membership debate.

\textsuperscript{14} Lieber, \textit{British Politics and European Unity}, p.208
\textsuperscript{15} Forster, \textit{Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics}, p.12
\textsuperscript{16} Lieber, \textit{British Politics and European Unity}, p.215
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, p.215, p.217; Marwick, “Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning, Progress and Political ‘Agreement’”
\textsuperscript{18} Statement of aims of the United Europe Association, attached with minutes of the Executive Committee of UKCEM, 5 December 1962, 1 MH 229, UKCEM in \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources. This group was unrelated to the UEM.
This chapter will analyse the populist campaigns undertaken by anti-Market organisations, with reference to their more elite-oriented pro-Market counterparts, between 1961 and 1973. Macmillan’s announcement led to the mobilisation of ‘a cluster of newly organised groups’ in response, each with different ideological standpoints.¹⁹ The three most prominent single-issue, promotional pressure anti-Market groups formed in 1961 were identified by Dewey as the Anti-Common Market League (ACML), the Keep Britain Out movement (KBO), and the Forward Britain Movement (FBM).²⁰ ACML was formed after a series of meetings at the house of Peter Walker, a newly-elected Conservative MP and former Chairman of the Young Conservatives. Walker, believing the group should be ‘a research and information organisation’, left before the ACML was founded by John Paul and a group of Young Conservatives as a more vocal campaigning organisation.²¹ KBO was founded by free trade advocates S.W. Alexander and Oliver Smedley, and has been branded by Dewey as ACML’s ‘Liberal counterpart… on a much smaller scale’.²² In addition to the free trade liberalism of Smedley and Alexander, ‘entrenched in resurrected “dear food” battles of the past’, KBO’s liberalism incorporated defence of individual freedom and rights, as evidenced by Alexander’s co-founding of the Society of Individualists, and the later Vice-Chairmanship of Sir Ian Mactaggart, Chairman of the Society for Individual Freedom.²³ FBM, founded by

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¹⁹ Windlesham, Communication and Political Power, p.163
²⁰ Dewey, British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63
trade union leader Richard Briginshaw, was aimed at other trade unionists, Labour members and peace activists, but fell into decline and inactivity after the failure of the EEC application in 1963.24

In his analysis of opposition to the first EEC application, Dewey has claimed that the ideological inclinations of each of the aforementioned anti-Market pressure groups limited collaboration and co-operation between them.25 While citing ‘instances of collaboration’ in the form of rallies and public meetings, Dewey is right to highlight the lack of a ‘unified front’ amongst anti-Marketeers.26 However, focusing on the unsuccessful early umbrella movements which included more extremist and maligned elements detracts from the common ground shared between the three main groups.27 Anti-Market groups in this period, according to Robert Lieber, were all characterised by ‘the extent to which they found it necessary to act outside the corridors of power’, and the outsider status these groups held forced them ‘to aim at recruiting a mass clientele’.28 Furthermore, by focusing on issues that appealed to the public on a cross-party or non-party basis, these groups attempted to develop beyond their ideological origins. Dewey is right to underline ACML’s Conservative origins, but the repeated use of a number of its early statements and leaflets, including the unambiguous “Conservatives and the Common Market”, somewhat overstates the appeal to Conservative

25 George Wilkes has also cited the party political leanings and a lack of cohesion of the anti-Market groups during the first application: Wilkes, G., “The Commonwealth in British European Policy: Politics and sentiment, 1956-63” in May, A. (ed), Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe: The Commonwealth and Britain’s applications to join the European Communities (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.68
26 Dewey, British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63, p.117
27 For example, Dewey mentions the Anti-Common Market Union, which incorporated the League of Empire Loyalists and the True Tories, savaged in the article “The Earl of Sandwich’s Crew”, Spectator, 30 August 1962: Ibid., p.117
28 Lieber, British Politics and European Unity, p.209
voters, despite noting that ACML later ‘achieved a degree of cross-party membership’.\(^{29}\) Furthermore, Nigel Ashford has noted that by February 1962 it had dropped the direct appeal to Conservatives from its propaganda to broaden its membership and publicity material.\(^{30}\)

The anti-Market organisations, after initially campaigning along more traditional ideological or party political lines, were by the end of the 1960s appealing to the public on a non-party or cross-party basis quite separate from the more liberalist and elite-minded ‘middle ground’ of the pro-Marketeers.\(^{31}\) The populist, non-party issues focused on by the anti-Market movement were more than ‘banal assumptions about the sanctity of national freedom and a common perception that Britain’s independence and international status were increasingly vulnerable’.\(^{32}\) Rather, they formed the common ground for the disparate strands of the anti-Market movement to co-operate more closely throughout the 1960s. Bereft of access to party political machinery and lacking active support from established MPs, a nucleus of anti-EEC mobilisation was formed from the fringes of the parliamentary arena, leading to the creation of co-ordinating bodies such as the Common Market Safeguards Campaign (CMSC) and its affiliated subsidiary campaigns, and a cross-over of personnel between organisations.

This meant the campaign occupied a unique, if sometimes confused, position in relation to institutional politics. The anti-Marketeers made clear their frustrations with the increasing cross-party consensus on the pro-Market side as the 1960s progressed, often spilling over to criticism of the functioning of political parties and the Westminster system.


\(^{31}\) Lieber, *British Politics and European Unity*, p.217

and even non-cooperation and confrontational protest tactics. Yet they simultaneously were unable to remove the issue from the realm of parliamentary politics, and were forced to direct their campaign as much towards pressuring politicians as generating a groundswell of opposition to EEC entry amongst the general public. They thus lay somewhere between what Helen McCarthy termed the ‘anti-party instincts’ of the likes of Oswald Mosley’s early 1930s New Party in their ‘critique of the parliamentary system’ and the more progressive, centrist outlook of their pro-Market forerunners, oscillating between their own conception of how parliamentary democracy should work and being forced to address the politicised issue of EEC membership.\footnote{McCarthy, H., “Leading from the Centre: The League of Nations Union, Foreign Policy and ‘Political Agreement’ of the 1930s”, \textit{Contemporary British History}, 23:4 (2009), p.528} Preservation of the democratic rights of the individual, as much as that of national sovereignty, was central to the anti-Market campaign, along with other issues that resonated with and affected ‘the people’ regardless of party political ideology.

The first part of this chapter will analyse these issues and arguments that would form the basis for a non-party campaign in the 1960s and early 1970s, leading to increased cooperation between the separate anti-Market organisations. They focused on the political effects of EEC membership and the resulting loss of sovereignty throughout the 1960s, while the government and pro-Marketeers focused on the economic benefits of membership. The issue of sovereignty remained a cross-party issue, and focusing on it allowed the anti-Marketeers to put forward a reasoned case against membership. The more emotive side of preserving sovereignty was framed within the wider argument of preserving national identity and heritage, as anti-Market groups espoused the kind of populist cultural opposition studied
by the likes of Gifford and Spiering.\textsuperscript{34} The symbolic resonance of British law, institutions and policies were defended in opposition to creeping “Europeanisation” in the same way that Britain’s unique and gradual path to democracy was placed opposite the perceived artificiality of federalism. Similarly, the Commonwealth, whilst declining in political and economic significance during the 1960s, retained a significant cultural weight. The appeals of an “organic” and trusted political system, free trade, and the ability to help Commonwealth and third world producers all formed a cross-party rationale for placing the Commonwealth system ahead of EEC membership. The increasing focus on the British consumer rather than producers in the 1960s also reflected the anti-Marketeers’ strategy of targeting as wide a range of public support as possible, and the targeting of women and housewives as politicised groupings also demonstrated the increasing importance of price rises and consumer economics and the cross-party nature of their appeal.

The second part of this chapter will analyse the tactics and operation of the anti-Marketeers, demonstrating how they sought to mobilise both outside and inside the political arena, with a “dual approach” of targeting both the wider public and political support upon which the success or failure of EEC entry legislation would depend. In contrast to their pro-Market counterparts, anti-Market groups sought mass membership and targeted public support directly via simple propaganda. Large print runs of leaflets and pamphlets also ensured grassroots involvement in distributing propaganda and looking to increase membership, along with participation in mass meetings and demonstrations which intended to show the strength of public support on the issue. Anti-Market groups also engaged in more traditional pressure group activity, seeking to gain influence and exert pressure in

\textsuperscript{34} Gifford, “The rise of post-imperial populism in the UK: The case of right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain”; Spiering, M., “The Imperial System of Weights and Measures: Traditional, superior and banned by Europe?”
Westminster. Mass lobbying of parliament and MPs was combined with a systematic monitoring of MPs’ views in order to target those potentially sympathetic to the anti-Market cause. Independent by-election candidates were also a more direct engagement with the parliamentary sphere.

In this sense, not only did groups like the ACML seek ‘to influence public and parliamentary opinion in every possible way to achieve a reversal of the disastrous decision [to apply for EEC membership]’ from their inception, they also sought to fulfil the typical role of pressure groups and NGOs in connecting the electorate with the political institutions intended to represent them, a vital function in their perception of an active parliamentary democracy.\(^{35}\) Yet the anti-Market groups’ engagement with parliamentary politics and attempt to pursue an “insider” strategy increasingly left its personnel disillusioned. The final part of this chapter will shed further light on the anti-political and anti-party nature of the anti-Market campaign, and further demonstrate their position in the gap between the political and public spheres. Their opposition to greater governmental interference on a European level and their suspicion of lobbyist involvement was combined with frustration with party machinery, such as increased centralised control over policy and candidate selection and the increased use of party Whips. This allowed them to present the anti-Market campaign as a disenfranchised dissenting voice, and as Gifford says, ‘as the representatives of the people and the guardians of popular sovereignty’.\(^{36}\) However, its inability to further mobilise public opinion into a national movement or a new political party represented its failure to make significant headway in either its public or political strategies.

\(^{35}\) ‘Campaign Against Common Market’, unknown press cutting detailing ACML’s forthcoming first public meeting [n.d.], CIB 7/1, BLPES

\(^{36}\) Gifford, The Making of Eurosceptic Britain, p.132
**Issues and arguments: the anti-Market case**

Political effects: loss of sovereignty and defence of the public

Opposition to the political and constitutional aspects of the EEC had been an aspect of anti-Market rhetoric since the antipathy shown by British politicians towards supranational European integration at the Council of Europe in 1949. When the Macmillan government presented its application in economic terms, anti-Market groups voiced their strong concern for retaining British parliamentary sovereignty. From the outset, groups such as ACML were most concerned about the political consequences of joining the EEC, and publicised the ‘permanent, irrevocable loss’ of parliamentary sovereignty.37 Derek Walker-Smith’s article in the *Daily Express* on the political impact of EEC entry, quoted in ACML’s February 1962 newsletter, spelt out the anti-Marketeers’ fears, claiming the government

...should have to bring British law into line with the Common Market on a wide range of subjects.... Everything which might conflict with the Treaty of Rome would have to be repealed or amended, even if every single member of Parliament preferred it to remain as it was.38

During the negotiations for Britain’s first EEC application, ACML continued to condemn EEC entry as ‘the greatest surrender of British parliamentary government and sovereignty, to an alien bureaucracy over which we should have no control’.39 In its arguments, ACML’s predominant concern, motivated by their ‘belief in British Parliamentary Government’, was the delegation of power and sovereignty away from Parliament to both

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37 ACML membership form [n.d., 1961], CIB/7/1, BLPES
38 *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, February 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES
39 *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, April 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES
‘our own civil service in Whitehall’ and ‘a group of European bureaucrats’. Anti-Marketeers objected to the principle of EEC membership as they rejected, ‘[r]egardless of any “terms”’ the government could obtain, ‘the prospect of being ruled by [a European] Executive Commission... and by a council of Ministers’. This preoccupation with preserving the traditional British system of parliamentary sovereignty, democratic self-government and the authority of Westminster was central in attracting parliamentarians from both main political parties, such as Tony Benn, Enoch Powell and Peter Shore, to the anti-Market cause. A motion due to be presented to the House of Commons by the anti-EEC Common Market Committee on the day of Macmillan’s announcement in July 1961, ‘opposing any material derogation of British sovereignty’ resulting from entry into the Common Market, was evidence of immediate parliamentary opposition to the government’s application.

Yet with the Macmillan government, in fear of alienating public support, presenting the application in economic terms, anti-Marketeers faced the challenge of presenting the political consequences to the wider public. Anti-EEC pressure groups were aware of this difficulty; ACML’s collection of articles titled Britain, not Europe criticised both government and pro-Market groups for their continual emphasis on economic factors. Corbet’s aforementioned article on “The Federalist Pressures in Britain” described pro-Marketeers, ‘[i]mbued with notions of world government’ and federalism, as ‘[s]ophisticated propagandists’ whose ‘public utterances today are chiefly economic.’ ACML’s chairman John Paul also criticised the pro-EEC groups and ‘friendly persuaders’ who, aware that the

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40 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, October 1962, CIB 7/1, BL Pes; Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, August 1962, CIB 7/1, BL Pes
41 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, October 1962, CIB 7/1, BL Pes
42 Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, p.39
44 Corbet, R.H., “The Federalist Pressures in Britain” in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, p.20, CIB 7/1, BL Pes
public would not support federalist arguments, ‘represent the issue as one of economics’.\textsuperscript{45}

*Britain, not Europe* signified the beginning of ACML presenting its own political and economic arguments against entry in order to counteract assumptions derived from pro-Market propaganda. Publications such as William Pickles’ *Not with Europe: the Political Case for Staying Out* provided a more sophisticated critique of EEC membership, which was followed up by shorter leaflets on the threat to sovereignty.\textsuperscript{46}

Opposition to membership on political grounds remained central to ACML’s campaign approaching the second EEC application, soliciting financial support to produce a simple booklet on how the EEC would mean ‘the beginning of the end for Britain’s parliamentary government’ to be distributed widely.\textsuperscript{47} Increasing concentration on the political basis for opposing entry represented an increasing desire to present a more sophisticated and reasoned argument. In 1967, John Paul criticised the anti-Market case put forward on the television programme “This Week” by Conservative MP Sir Cyril Osborne, chosen by ‘some backroom mogul’, as ‘pathetic’ and ‘largely emotional and did no kind of justice to the sensible case, which we can put forward....’\textsuperscript{48} In another letter Paul complained that, having been rejected by the programme, his case ‘about the institutional aspects of EEC superseding Parliament was not made by anyone else.’\textsuperscript{49} ACML gradually learnt the importance of a ‘respectable’ and rational case against entry during the 1960s, and by persuading politicians and economists to put forward the arguments against entry, ACML was

\textsuperscript{45} Paul, J., “The Broad Economic Consequences”, *Britain, not Europe*, p.52, CIB 7/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{47} *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, February 1966, CIB 7/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{48} Letter from John Paul to Lord Hill of ITA, 28 April 1967, CIB 7/12, BLPES
\textsuperscript{49} Letter from John Paul to James Butler, Head of Features, Diffusion Television Ltd, 1 May 1967, CIB 7/12, BLPES

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afforded a greater level of respectability that a lack of access to elite decision-making and a lack of support from senior political figures had denied them. By 1969, the decision was made by ACML to further concentrate on and publicise the constitutional case so that ‘it will not be so easy to brush it aside or ridicule it as the work of unenlightened non-conformists.’

1969 also saw the publication of a booklet on the Treaty of Rome by ACML, which, on the back of articles and published letters from MPs such as Derek Walker-Smith, Peter Bessell, Neil Marten and Douglas Jay, ensured ‘there was no point paying for an advertisement [for the booklet] until there was some diminution of interest’ on the subject.

Walker-Smith’s article brought particular praise from ACML’s Executive Committee as ‘a sober appraisal rather than a head-on argument on the subject’, and a copy of the article was distributed with their July newsletter. By the turn of the decade, fears of the political consequences of EEC entry had begun to take hold in the Common Market debate across group boundaries and political affiliations.

During the second application, the opportunity for presenting an anti-Market case on a constitutional basis changed as, according to Lieber, the cross-party consensus on EEC membership reduced the influence of pressure groups but ‘allowed a more direct treatment of Common Market entry with less need to disguise its political implications.’ Furthermore, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the economic argument for EEC entry became weaker, pro-Marketeers began to stress the more political and idealistic motivations for membership. An analysis of the economic consequences of entry by Douglas Jay predicted that ‘Britain would lose all along the line’, and that ‘joining the EEC would be more nearly a case of economic

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50 Letter from Leo Price to Sir Robin Williams, 9 December 1969, CIB 7/13, BLPES
51 Minutes of Executive Committee of ACML, 22 October 1969, CIB 7/3, BLPES
52 Minutes of Executive Committee of ACML, 25 June 1969, CIB 7/3, BLPES
53 Lieber, British Politics and European Unity, p.274
suicide.’ ACML also observed that in the face of the diminishing economic benefits of membership, pro-Marketeers such as Foreign Secretary and Deputy Labour Party Leader George Brown had ‘gone back to stressing the political side.’ 54 According to Uwe Kitzinger, however, pro-Marketeers tried to deliberately steer the debate towards economic issues, as pro-Market pressure groups felt on safer ground discussing the economic rather than political aspects of entry. 55 By the turn of the decade, however, a combination of devaluation and inflation in Britain led to anti-Market groups challenging EEC entry as ‘far too high a price to pay’ based upon their own economic estimates. 56 A fringe group associated with the ACML, called the Referendum Before Common Market Committee (RBCMC), summed up the change in the pro-Market case by highlighting how lobbyists were ‘now hastily saying that the issue must be regarded as an idealistic and not an economic one. There could hardly be a clearer admission of economic disadvantages.’ 57

By contrast, anti-Market groups decided to increase their concentration on political and constitutional issues, as evident in the new umbrella group CMSC’s “Safeguard Britain Campaign” launched at the end of 1969. Its primary objective was to ‘safeguard Britain’s political independence and her ability to play her full part in democratic international institutions, while opposing the submergence of Britain in any federal state.’ 58 In many ways, this was a reaction on the part of anti-Market groups to events on the continent and the formal efforts of British governments applying for EEC membership. CMSC agreed in 1970, as a

54 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, October 1967, CIB 7/1, BLPES
55 Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, p.224
56 Statement by Labour Committee for Safeguards on the Common Market, 1969, CIB 7/1, BLPES
57 Advertisement by Referendum Before Common Market Committee in The Times, 26 September 1969, CIB 7/1, BLPES
58 Minutes of a meeting of the Common Market Safeguards Committee (CMSC), 25 November 1969, CIB 1/1, BLPES. Safeguard Britain Campaign would be the name of the new umbrella movement formed in 1976, which CMSC was instrumental in creating.
result of the Brussels negotiations and of the Werner Report of 1969 planning the course for the EEC’s supranational political and economic development, to ‘concentrate increasingly on the political and constitutional aspects of the matter’ without being ‘led into the blind alley of arguing about how long a transition period there should be, as this is clearly no solution at all.’

Likewise, ACML at this point was extremely perturbed by developments such as the Werner Report’s recommendation for a supranational ‘decision centre’, seen as ‘a euphemism for government – a central European government.’

Consequently, anti-Market groups’ criticisms focused mainly on political and constitutional developments during the early 1970s. The government’s White Paper *Costs and Benefits of Entry*, which at the request of Heath and his ministers was heavily weighted towards economic aspects over the political issues of sovereignty and law, was strongly criticised by anti-Market groups.

The Executive Committee of the Common Market Study Group, an all-party parliamentary anti-Market group, condemned it as ‘a propaganda document, superficial and full of generalisations’, and criticised the government for circulating a condensed version of the paper through the Post Office. It followed up these criticisms with calls for a Select Committee to examine the claims of the paper more closely.

CMSC’s verdict on the White Paper was that it was ‘ambiguously worded’ and had left the benefits of EEC entry ‘as unintelligible and mysterious as ever’.

The anti-Market group’s focus on the White Paper demonstrated their determination to challenge the government’s avoidance of the political aspects of EEC

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59 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC, 2 November 1970, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP88, Dorset Record Office
60 *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, November 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
61 Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, p.43
63 Minutes of meeting of Common Market Study Group Executive Committee, 28 July 1971, MS Eng. Hist. C.1131/81, Bodleian Library
64 *Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin*, no. 1, April 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
membership, such as Neil Marten’s letter to Lord Balniel of the Ministry of Defence claiming the paper’s arguments were ‘purely hackneyed old European folk-lore and they need probing.’

The negotiations in Brussels were also criticised from a political perspective by the anti-Market groups. Marten complained about the negotiations’ avoidance of fundamental political and constitutional matters, stating that they

...were not to change the character of the Common Market at all. Geoffrey Rippon raised no large issues. He questioned not one clause of the Rome Treaty. [...] Great issues of principle... were not put into the negotiations at all.

Marten also complained after the completion of negotiations in Brussels that concerns about the future political development of the EEC, which was of great concern to the public, had been ‘swept under the carpet during the negotiations’. The anti-Market groups’ concern that the public were either being misled or ill-informed on the negotiations and on the consequences of EEC membership was also evident in criticisms of the government’s negotiation of transition periods. These periods were described by ACML as ‘only of transitional significance’, and that after British membership was secured the EEC would ‘creep towards a Federal Union without ordinary people being aware of what is happening. When they do realise it will be too late – their self-government will have disappeared.’

Terms discussed in the Brussels negotiations were therefore portrayed as mere ‘transitional arrangements’ and ACML claimed that ‘[w]hen this becomes clear towards the end of the

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68 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, November 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
negotiation we shall be told that it is now too late to say ‘No’ particularly on political grounds." Anti-Market groups thus saw themselves as defending the public by giving them clear information about the political aspects of membership, and were encouraged to view the negotiations’ concern with transition periods as a diversion from the fundamental issue of membership, and that they were, according to CMSC, ‘the option of slow strangulation rather than sudden death. After this we can only ask: What is there to negotiate about?’

On the issues of the loss of sovereignty and political integration into the EEC’s supranational structure, anti-Market groups therefore presented themselves as defenders of the public for whom these consequences would be widespread. CMSC Bulletins and ACML newsletters together dealt with the latest political developments in the EEC, in the absence of governmental information on such matters in Britain. While politicians negotiated on Britain’s future in Brussels, CSMC expressed that the public ‘have no wish to surrender in this way their right to order their own internal affairs, nor do they desire the emasculation of their parliamentary institutions and liberties.’ Politicians were thus targeted on the political aspects, as groups like ACML mobilised their supporters to challenge election candidates in their constituencies on the loss of sovereignty and the danger of a federal Europe. Anti-Marketeers had challenged the evasiveness of politicians before, with Richard Body criticising Michael Stewart’s prevarications on the economic effect of membership in a letter to the Telegraph, and stating that ‘[n]ot just Members of Parliament but every one of us should be given the opportunity of assessing for himself whether the Treaty of Rome should

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69 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, May 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
70 Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin, no. 3, September 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
71 Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin, no. 3, September 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
72 ACML Election Newsletter no.1, June 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
be signed.’

By contrast, before the publication of the White Paper an ‘authoritative study’ had been arranged by ACML to look at the economic consequences of entry, stating that ‘[i]f the Government refuses to publish their estimate of the cost to Britain, the League will do the job instead.’

Accusations of a ‘cover-up job’ followed until the Government’s production of what ACML dubbed ‘Mr Heath’s Off-White Paper’, criticised as being ‘replete with propaganda’ and containing ‘little analysis of the political and economic issues involved’.

Anti-Market groups like ACML thus portrayed themselves as the link between policy and the public in the absence of impartial information on the issue from the government, and as defenders of the public’s true wishes, as evident in John Biffen’s claim that the government’s policy

...totally misreads the fundamental nature of the decision and the widespread public unease lest freedoms and sovereignties are surrendered beyond recall and national economic advantages are traded away for intangible benefits which belong to some misty future.

Biffen’s concerns even went as far as fearing political violence resulting from the loss of sovereignty, the loss of respect for political institutions and the weakened bond between public and parliament; such were the concerns of anti-Marketeers to preserve the traditional Westminster model of democracy. In presenting these fears to the public, anti-Market groups from all sides sought the widest support base possible on a non-party political basis,
forming a consensus in opposition to constitutional aspects of the Treaty of Rome by the early 1970s.

**Impact on British political culture: national tradition, history and heritage**

Concerns about British sovereignty being lost through membership of the EEC also contained a symbolic dimension beyond constitutional aspects and the removal of power from British institutions. In attempting to defend ‘traditional’ British sovereignty in the early 1970s, Neil Marten sought to challenge the pro-European pressure groups over their confusion of national sovereignty and national identity, claiming,

> I have never heard anyone seriously claim that we would lose our identity – cricket, tea breaks, grumbling, straw boaters at Henley – they will continue in the same old way – just as Quebec maintains its particular identity in a federal Canada.⁷⁸

Anti-Marketeers were concerned, however, with the perceived threat to aspects of British identity inherent within traditional British law, institutions and customs. Loss of political sovereignty was contrary to Britain’s own particular progression to democratic government, and diminished the role of Parliament, itself a source of national identity and pride. Consequently, EEC membership’s threat to British parliamentary democracy was also a threat to Britain’s identity, heritage, and democratic development. Chris Gifford has also focused on how British political culture and identity were used in populist Eurosceptic discourse, including myths and assumptions regarding Britain and the “other” of Europe.⁷⁹ However, by focusing on the Conservative rebellion against the Maastricht Treaty ratification, Gifford goes on to place this championing of British political identity, alongside issues of sovereignty and

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⁷⁹ Gifford., “The rise of post-imperial populism in the UK: The case of right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain”
trade, as part of a specifically right-wing strand of Euroscepticism. Gifford’s claim elsewhere, that the Europe issue was ‘no longer contained by the party system’, is more convincing, as earlier anti-Market groups aimed their appeal to a broad non-party support base, particularly when factoring in the symbolic issue of the Commonwealth.80

From the first application in the early 1960s, anti-Marketeers emphasised how political sovereignty and ability to make independent decisions that Britain would lose upon joining the EEC was ‘the essence of independent nationhood, achieved in the early dawn of our history and resolutely safeguarded ever since.’81 EEC entry was therefore perceived as a threat to Britain’s identity and status as much as it was a threat to her political practice. Anti-Market groups, imbued with a sense of patriotism, were willing to fight to preserve the traditional Westminster model of democracy in Britain. Sir Piers Debenham, the anti-Market candidate in the South Dorset by-election of November 1962, emphasised this by placing the preservation of ‘[o]ur system of government’ as his key reason for opposing the Treaty of Rome, ahead of wider concerns such as the Commonwealth and the impact on power-bloc politics.82 Anti-Marketeers therefore highlighted the differences between the British political system and that used on the continent, and were able to portray an inherent incompatibility that meant Britain would be better outside of the EEC. As an example, Derek Walker-Smith could present himself as ‘not against the Common Market’, claiming ‘in many speeches from

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80 Gifford., “The rise of post-imperial populism in the UK: The case of right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain”, p.858
81 Walker-Smith, D., “British Sovereignty and the Common Market”, in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, p.12, CIB 7/1, BLPES
82 Letter from Sir Piers Debenham to electors of South Dorset, 31 October 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES
1961 onwards I have said that I wish them well, but unfortunately the structure of the Treaty of Rome does not suit British requirements.  

EEC entry was perceived to not only threaten traditional British institutions, which would be subordinated to supranational European institutions, but also traditional British laws and policies, such as the criminal system and habeas corpus. Concerns that continental law would supplant British law, and that British judges ‘would have to adopt the Continental practice’, permeated the literature of anti-Market groups, who appealed to British patriotism by appealing to traditional British identity inherent in Britain’s existing laws and policies. The National Referendum Campaign aimed its appeal, for example, at those who ‘believe that our Constitution, the English legal system, [and] English law have served us well in the past’, and who wished to preserve British laws and policies from the ‘flood of draft proposals’ emanating from the EEC as part of ‘harmonisation’ with continental policy. On standing against Edward Heath as an independent parliamentary candidate in the 1964 General Election, ACML Chairman John Paul’s campaign combined an anti-EEC platform with opposition to the abolition of Resale Price Maintenance. Paul described the latter policy, with its ‘onus of proof’ clause, as ‘un-English’ and ‘typical of the Continental system of Jurisprudence, founded upon Roman Law… [and] in keeping with the authoritarian methods of the Common Market Executive Commission’s regulations…’ Paul’s personal commitment to opposing the abolition of Resale Price Maintenance represented the

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83 Letter from Derek Walker-Smith to Leo Price, 25 November 1969, CIB 7/13, BLPES  
84 “The True Significance of Joining the Common Market” [n.d.], ACML, CIB 7/9, BLPES  
85 Walker-Smith, D., “British Sovereignty and the Common Market”, in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, p.15, CIB 7/1, BLPES  
86 “The Common Market and the Threat to English Law” [n.d.], National Referendum Campaign, CIB 8/3, BLPES  
87 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, April 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES; See also election leaflet for John Paul [n.d., 1964], CIB/7/1, BLPES
determination of anti-Marketeers to preserve traditional British policies as well as parliamentary sovereignty, further demonstrated by John Biffen’s proclamation that EEC membership would threaten the ‘continuing thread in [Britain’s] modern history... to maximise free and unhindered world trade’, a traditional British policy which ‘made good national sense’.  

Successive governments’ “Europeanisation” of domestic policies was seen by anti-Market groups as a threat to British national identity and as a precursor to full EEC membership. ACML’s newsletters regularly emphasised this stealth “Europeanisation” to its members throughout the 1960s, particularly in 1963 to stress that the threat from the EEC had not been removed by de Gaulle’s veto. Updates were published about the “Europeanisation” undertaken by ‘Government and Establishment’, such as the introduction of European road signs, the campaign for decimalisation, the use of the centigrade scale, and VAT seen as ‘the first taste we have of the meaning of ‘keeping-in-step’ with other Common Market Countries’. At first associated with ‘the European and anti-Commonwealth quartet’ of Macmillan, Sandys, Heath and Peter Thorneycroft in the Conservative Government, ACML would criticise the Labour Government in 1968 for continuing the policy of Europeanisation, outlining the cost of road signs, decimal currency, metrciation, the Channel Tunnel and the stationing of troops in Germany at around £1.35 billion.  

On Target, a fortnightly publication produced the British League of Rights (BLR), also dealt with metrciation and the introduction of EEC policies, emphasising the issue as not merely one of cultural sovereignty and national

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88 Speech by John Biffen to Denbigh Conservatives at Abergele, 22 January 1971, MS Eng. Hist. C.1138/238-242, Bodleian Library  
90 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, July 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPES; Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, February 1968, CIB 7/1, BLPES;
identity, but as an issue of individual rights against what the Wolverhampton and West Midlands branch described as the ‘bureaucratic control’ behind the introduction of VAT.\textsuperscript{91} Furthermore, according to ACML, it symbolised the lack of patriotism of British governments which, in the face of modernisation, lacked faith in traditional British policies and sought ‘to abandon British methods without enquiry, in the apparent belief that they are all antiquated idiosyncracies [sic] typical of this country.’\textsuperscript{92}

Anti-Market groups also saw national identity within Britain’s own particular historical democratic development, to which EEC entry was perceived to be both threat and a backwards step. Within ACML, the difference between British and continental institutional development was recognised at all levels. An article outlining the federalist agenda of the EEC described the British people as ‘politically mature’ with a ‘glorious history’, to whom federalism was ‘an experience beyond their ken.’\textsuperscript{93} Likewise, a letter from the Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML to the House of Lords criticised politicians who, in supporting EEC entry, had ‘stopped the clock of evolution... halting the most dynamic period of our history from the time of Henry VIII’, and would ‘put the clock back 400 years’. EEC membership was thus seen as going against a Whiggish trend of national independence and increasing democratic government, where Britain would ‘once again [be] a subservient state of the Continent’, except ‘this time our taxes will go to Brussels instead of Rome.’\textsuperscript{94} CMSC similarly criticised transferring powers from Westminster to ‘untried and undemocratic institutions’, against the democratic freedoms granted to the public

\textsuperscript{91} Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 8 December 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES; Circular/minutes of Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML [n.d., March 1971], CIB 7/15, BLPES
\textsuperscript{92} Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, September 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{93} “Political Union: The Aim of Europe” in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, CIB 7/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{94} Letter from Wolverhampton and West Midlands branch of ACML to House of Lords, 24 November 1971, CIB 7/15, BLPES
through the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, reform acts and female suffrage.\textsuperscript{95} Furthermore, the presence of historian Arthur Bryant in the anti-Market campaign – later as President of CMSC and Chairman of the National Common Market Petition Council – reinforced the centrality of Whig history and British historical development within its rhetoric.\textsuperscript{96} Anti-Market groups presented themselves as defending the British public’s democratic rights, as evident in ACML’s condemnation of politicians that claimed the EEC issue was too complicated for the public to judge, its newsletter stating that the British public ‘did not win the political battles of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries to have this reactionary nonsense thrust upon us again.’\textsuperscript{97} Anti-Marketeers thus perceived themselves as representing a people ‘acheing [sic] for more intimate government and a greater sense of identity and compact between rulers and public’, and who wished for a further continuation of devolved democracy as opposed to Common Market membership.\textsuperscript{98}

Reverence for Britain’s historical path to democracy amongst anti-Marketeers was allied with a desire for Britain to retain its ‘great power’ status, for which the freedom for British governments to draw up their own policies was a vital component. During the first application in the early 1960s, ACML was concerned by the influence of the U.S. Government on Macmillan’s decision, and decried Britain’s ‘obedience to foreign interests’, particularly American policy designed, according to ACML, ‘to strip a subservient Britain of

\textsuperscript{95} Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin no.3, September 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{97} Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, June 1971, CIB 7/3, BLPES. This has echoes of the statement in Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges Speech seventeen years later, where she declared ‘We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels’: Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the College of Bruges, 20 September 1988, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, \texttt{http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332}
\textsuperscript{98} Speech by John Biffen to Denhig Conservatives at Abergale, 22 January 1971, MS Eng. Hist. C.1138/238-242, Bodleian Library
her military and political independence.’

De Gaulle’s intervention did not ease the fear of anti-Marketeers, who continued to be suspicious of U.S. influence on Britain’s ‘acceptance of the American Polaris deterrent [and] the panicky discarding of Empire responsibilities’ as well as the EEC membership bid; all were perceived to show a ‘lack of faith in Britain’s capacity to lead an independent life.’

ACML’s appeal was therefore aimed at British patriots who still saw Britain as capable of remaining a global power, and called upon a new British policy of ‘ending defeatism [and] reviving British national spirit, independence and self-confidence’ – what Biffen described as finding ‘a meaningful patriotism in a post-Imperial situation.’

National identity and patriotism were thus at the heart of anti-Market groups’ appeal to the public, and their protest actions were often imbued with a historical or traditional British imagery. From the motorcade of local anti-Market groups who unfurled ‘huge anti-Market slogans’ on the white cliffs of Dover and ‘solemnly burned’ EEC flags to the distribution of leaflets by ACML outside the Albert Hall at the Last Night of the Proms – where the possibility of infiltration with banners was discussed – anti-Marketeers sought a patriotic mobilisation free of party political allegiances.

Demonstrations at war memorials were a particularly symbolic example of how Britain’s history and identity was utilised by anti-Market groups, including Women Against the Common Market (WACM) laying a wreath at the Cenotaph during a day’s demonstration at Trafalgar Square, in memory of people ‘in this

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99 *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, January 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES; *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, December 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES
100 *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, November 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPES
102 Letter from Denis Martin, Secretary of Dover & Folkestone District Anti-Common Market Group, to supporters, 22 March 1972, CIB 7/16, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 31 August 1971, CIB 7/3, BLPES
and other lands’ who had defended democracy, and ‘in the hope that no British Government will ever sign the Rome Treaty, which would be a total betrayal of all that Britain and the British Government have stood for.’\textsuperscript{103} A local ACML group also believed that a more useful tactic than that suggested by WACM, of organising a mass lobby of MPs on the day of voting, would be to hold anti-Market demonstrations at war memorials nationwide observing five minutes’ silence, emphasising the importance of national history and identity in the anti-Market appeal.\textsuperscript{104} The Macmillan government was aware in 1962, after a study throughout the country, that most anti-Market views were the result of “‘emotional”, patriotic reasons which were [hard] to overcome’.\textsuperscript{105} Anti-Market groups across the political spectrum played on these emotions, and by the end of the decade CMSC sought to unite ‘all those of good will and patriotism who are determined to resist this ill-conceived project and cry “Halt”’.\textsuperscript{106}

The Commonwealth: political, economic and symbolic resonance

The Commonwealth, as an issue that encompassed national identity and heritage, political sovereignty and trade and economic power, was central to the early anti-Market campaign. John Paul’s election leaflet in the 1964 General Election called upon those electors of Bexley who wanted to keep Britain out of the EEC as ‘an independent parliamentary country... linked by the Monarchy and by ties of blood, friendship, trade and mutual interest, with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and other countries worldwide’.\textsuperscript{107} This alliance of independence and retention of the Commonwealth was seen by anti-Marketeers as key to Britain retaining its world power status, and prioritising the Commonwealth above any

\textsuperscript{103} Minutes of a meeting of WACM Executive Committee, 19 October 1971, DMK 2/2, Hull History Centre
\textsuperscript{104} Letter from S.E. Bushnell, Honorary Secretary of ACML Bournemouth & District Auxiliary, to Anne Kerr, 4 October 1971, DMK 2/27, Hull History Centre
\textsuperscript{105} Weight, Patriots, p.334
\textsuperscript{106} Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin no.3, September 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{107} Letter from John Paul to electors of Bexley, 30 September 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES
European integration was a primary aim of the anti-Market groups, not least ACML with its slogan ‘Commonwealth Before Common Market’. Yet while the Commonwealth remained a serious issue in the Common Market entry debate, it had changed within the space of ten years from the heart of Gaitskell’s ‘thousand years of history’ speech at the Labour Party Conference of 1962 to an issue that appeared ‘to be going by default in the great debate.’ George Wilkes has argued that the party political basis of the three main anti-Market groups – ACML, KBO and FBM – meant that aside from political cohesion and tariff preference, ‘their consensus ended there’. Yet while the political and economic significance of the Commonwealth did decline throughout the 1960s, it retained a cultural significance which groups used to appeal to a broad base of support. The Commonwealth issue appeared to fade, yet it remained an ideal for patriots, internationalists and humanists to hold against what playwright John Osborne described as the ‘ugly, chromium pretence’ of the EEC.

ACML, formed at the aforementioned meetings at Peter Walker’s house, was initially driven by a pro-Commonwealth core, before deciding to oppose EEC membership on several fronts. Walker left ACML during its formation, but his defence of the Commonwealth continued as he called for its expansion and spread the anti-EEC entry message on a tour of the Commonwealth in June 1962. ACML’s newsletters, meanwhile, focused heavily on the Commonwealth issue between 1961 and 1964, claiming it to be ‘in greater jeopardy than it

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108 See, for example, letter from John Paul to Lord Hinchingbrooke, 19 March 1962, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP87, Dorset History Centre
111 Weight, Patriots, p.328
ever was in the War." Moreover, the Macmillan government was criticised heavily for ‘selling the Commonwealth down the Rhine’, with leading figures such as Macmillan and Sandys accused of being ‘anti-Commonwealth’ and deliberately undermining the importance of it after the de Gaulle veto. This defence of the Commonwealth against “progressive”, so-called Conservative opinion” was seen as striking a chord with the general public, as ACML attributed the Conservative Party’s unpopularity in mid-1964 with its ‘strong anti-Commonwealth line’.

Labour anti-Marketeers also saw the Commonwealth as a populist issue, as Jay spoke of how EEC membership at the expense of ties with Australia, Canada and New Zealand was ‘something which the British public just will not accept’, as they ‘understand, what Tory politicians apparently do not, that the Commonwealth is of far greater value to Britain than any part of Europe can ever be.’

While anti-Marketeers were unmoved by the emotive forces that lay behind the EEC’s formation, and did not recognise the common European spirit prevalent in the federalist groups of the previous chapter, it was the sentimental and cultural attachment to the Commonwealth that made it such a central theme of anti-Market rhetoric. The Commonwealth was in many ways an extension of British identity, as evident in Gaitskell’s televised broadcast referring to Australia, Canada and New Zealand as ‘very British indeed’ and ‘part of the family’. People from the Commonwealth, he explained, ‘speak our language; they learn our literature. They have our traditions; they have our political institutions; they share our monarchy.’ It was for this reason that Gaitskell, while playing down the political

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113 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, April 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPE
114 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, June 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPE; Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, April 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPE; Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, July 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPE
115 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, April 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPE
116 Speech by Douglas Jay at Aylesbury, 19 September 1962, Gaitskell/C/256.2, University College London (UCL) Special Collections
effects of entry, saw the safeguarding of the Commonwealth as ‘the nub of the whole question’.

Similarly, Arthur Bryant associated Britain’s ‘strong common identity’ and ‘insularity spiritual as well as geographical’ with the bonds that made British people ‘far nearer in thought and emotional response to the English-speaking peoples of Canada and Australia, New Zealand and Rhodesia, and of the United States itself [than to Europeans].’

It was, according to ACML, more than common institutions and culture; Britain and the Commonwealth shared ‘sentiment and general outlook.’

Furthermore, the Commonwealth was perceived to be already proven as an effective international forum for politics and trade that had been slowly and organically established over many years. By contrast, the EEC, founded by ‘high level policies... based on false doctrinaire assumptions’, was predicted to founder in the same way as the United Nations, while the Commonwealth’s major strength against such technocratic edifices and against the threat of Communism was its ‘human appeal’.

While ACML President Lord Hinchingbrooke saw the EEC as a ‘selfish, unity-shattering organisation’ likely to lead to conflict, anti-Market groups from both political sides saw the Commonwealth as an international forum capable of preserving peace. John Paul’s election campaign called for revival of the Commonwealth as ‘a powerful world force for good’, while Lord Attlee, speaking on behalf of the Labour Committee on Britain and the Common Market, described the Commonwealth, ‘with its members in five continents, as a far more hopeful foundation for

117 Labour Party Political Broadcast by Hugh Gaitskell, 8 May 1962, Gaitskell/C/255, UCL Special Collections
119 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, April 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES
120 Sir Clifford Heathcote-Smith, “American Influence in European Union” in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, p.18, CIB 7/1, BLPES
121 Letter from Lord Hinchingbrooke to G.W. Nasmith, 6 November 1958, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP256, Dorset History Centre
peace and democracy than any narrow European group." A letter sent to Gaitskell by a supporter demonstrates the cross-party appeal of the Commonwealth, its author stating,

Many like myself who have been actively engaged in the anti Common Market Campaign differ widely in party political matters but are all united in the belief that by retaining our political independence and forming closer bonds with the Commonwealth we can make a better contribution to both material and spiritual progress than by diluting ourselves in the maelstrom of the European nations forming the EEC.

Despite its prominence in the early 1960s as a key issue in the EEC debate, defence of the Commonwealth was used less in anti-Market rhetoric towards the end of the decade, and cropped up far less often in ACML newsletters, replaced by issues of rising prices and political effects of entry. However, as Britain’s trading patterns began to shift towards Western Europe and away from the Commonwealth, anti-Market groups placed great emphasis on the need to protect Commonwealth producers who would be at risk from EEC entry. Protection of poorer producers was seen as part of Britain’s “civilizing mission” in the Commonwealth, adding a humanitarian aspect to British national identity. ACML’s call as early as 1962 for a British and Commonwealth policy outside of the EEC and ‘based on national pride, independence and a real drive to help the under-developed parts of the globe’ demonstrated their global outlook and rejection of the EEC as narrow and inward-looking. Likewise, Lord Hinchingbrooke bemoaned the lack of British investment in the Commonwealth during the first application and declared that ‘Britain needs a dose of

122 Letter from John Paul to electors of Bexley, 30 September 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES; Message from Lord Attlee, Labour Committee on Britain and the Common Market, July 1962, Gaitskell/C/256.7, UCL Special Collections
123 Letter from F. Atkinson to Gaitskell, 24 September 1962, Gaitskell/C/256.6, UCL Special Collections
124 Wilkes has noted that the Forward Britain Movement, ‘anti-imperialist’ and in support of Commonwealth trading preferences and giving equal attention to ‘new’ Commonwealth as well as the Old Dominions, was an early advocate of this: Wilkes, G., “The Commonwealth in British European Policy: Politics and sentiment, 1956-63” in May, A. (ed), Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe, p.70
125 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, December 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES
economic morals and the present laisser-faire system does not provide it.\textsuperscript{126} Hinchingbrooke favoured the ‘really worthwhile’ industrial policy of exporting products ‘to the developing countries of the Commonwealth and the rest of the world for the raising of living-standards’, and believed that ‘British Government policy [should be] directed towards an unselfish attempt to raise living-standards overseas to something nearer to what is enjoyed at home.’\textsuperscript{127}

In Commonwealth countries that traditionally exported foodstuffs such as sugar, butter and meat to Britain, EEC entry would be ‘a disastrous prospect for these producers, many of whose industries were encouraged by Britain and developed for her market.’\textsuperscript{128} As a result, humanitarian organisations such as Oxfam and Action for World Development began to oppose EEC entry on the grounds of the effect it would have on developing countries.\textsuperscript{129} Anti-Market groups were thus able to mobilise a more humanitarian appeal irrespective of party political allegiances, although national identity and national interest were at the heart of the desire to protect Commonwealth producers. CMSC proclaimed that both ‘[s]elf-interest and honour equally dictate that [Britain] make[s] the safeguarding of Commonwealth trade a sticking point in negotiations with the Six’.\textsuperscript{130} Furthermore, the importance of free trade within a global market was seen as an inherent facet of British national identity and historic development, particularly to the free trade advocates within KBO who ‘summoned Cobdenite

\textsuperscript{126} Letter from Lord Hinchingbrooke to J.C. Coleman, 26 October 1961, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP225, Dorset History Centre
\textsuperscript{127} Letter from Lord Hinchingbrooke to J.F. Crosfield, Chairman and Managing Director of Crosfield Electronics Ltd, 15 August 1962, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP225, Dorset History Centre
\textsuperscript{128} CIB Bulletin no.3, September 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{129} “Have Some Cane Sugar While You Still Can!”, Action for World Development Leaflet [n.d.], DMK 2/11, Hull History Centre; Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 8 December 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{130} CIB Bulletin no.3, September 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES. This sentiment is reiterated in Julie Smith’s article on the 1975 referendum, where she states that rising world food prices in the global recession meant that ‘impassioned debates about “kith and kin”’ and Commonwealth producers did not resonate as strongly in the 1970s: Smith, J., “The 1975 Referendum”, \textit{Journal of European Integration History}, 5:1 (1999), pp.41-56, quote on p.53
interpretations of Britain’s imperial heritage’. As demonstrated by Frank Trentmann, free trade and open markets had become an integral part in the ‘popular narrative’ of British democratic development, ‘a national story of liberty and freedom that was contrasted with the militarist path of protectionist countries like Imperial Germany’. John Paul, harking back to Britain’s historic commitment to free trade, opposed the idea of restricted trade within the EEC, arguing that ‘Britain’s market is the world.’ This combination of free trade principles with a humanitarian, global outlook meant that the political, economic and cultural preservation of the Commonwealth could attract support across political boundaries.

Targeting the consumer: economics and price rises

In opposing EEC entry based on its perceived economic consequences, as with concerns about political sovereignty, anti-Market groups aimed their rhetoric towards the British public by highlighting the effects that EEC membership would have on the wider population as a whole, and its impact upon their daily lives. In addition to focusing on the more large-scale, macroeconomic issues of entry such as the impact on the country’s balance of payments, anti-Marketeteers were extremely preoccupied with matters such as the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) and the rise in the price of foodstuffs resulting from new EEC trade laws, and their effect on the average British consumer or family. Issues such as food prices remained free of the influences of party ideology or social class as, despite the concerns of left-wing groups such as WACM and Trade Unions Against the Common Market

131 Dewey, British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63, p.128
133 Paul, J., “The Broad Economic Consequences” in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, p.52, CIB 7/1, BLPES.
For more on how free trade became a part of British national identity and democratic culture, see Trentmann, Free Trade Nation; Howe, A., Free Trade and Liberal England, 1845-1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
about the effects of price rises on the most vulnerable, concerns about the quality and nutritional value of foodstuffs and the effects of VAT upon British producers were also prominent. By the early 1970s, consumers and housewives had become key politicised anti-Market groupings in themselves in the EEC entry debate, while remaining separate from party political ties. Indeed, WACM attempted to appeal beyond the “housewife” tag to a wider female identity, appealing to women on a cross-party or non-party basis.

The issue of rising food prices increased in prominence in anti-Market rhetoric in the mid-1960s, as concerns about the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy and its impact upon British agriculture shifted towards the impact of entry upon the general public and the individual consumer. Although in the early 1960s it was acknowledged by some anti-Marketeers that food prices would rise\textsuperscript{134}, the ACML was more concerned with the effect of entry on British farmers resulting from ‘the end of the Agriculture Acts of 1947 and 1957 as the cornerstone of [British] agricultural policy’ during the first application, where trade tariffs and agricultural subsidies dominated the negotiations in Brussels.\textsuperscript{135} Rather than concerns about the British consumer, ACML’s rhetoric during the first application represented a preoccupation with agricultural output, in the belief that EEC membership would mean ‘British agriculture will never achieve the same prosperity and productivity again’, echoing the Chief Economist of the National Farmers’ Union’s claim that removal of agricultural guarantees would lead to ‘a loss to our producers... greater than any gain accruing from the

\textsuperscript{134} Letter from Sir Piers Debenham to South Dorset electors, 31 October 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{135} ACML membership form, n.d. [1961/62], CIB 7/1, BLPES
Common Market Commission’s agricultural proposals.¹³⁶ This early concern with agriculture reflects ACML’s initial Conservative support base.

By the mid-1960s, however, anti-Market rhetoric was beginning to shift towards a defence of the general public, as evident in ACML’s plans to draw up a leaflet in 1966 with points on prices, the economy and agriculture ahead of those on politics and the Commonwealth, emphasising the increasing importance of standard of living and daily life in the EEC debate.¹³⁷ On the same day, ACML Vice-President Sir Robin Williams set out ACML’s policy ‘to bring home to ordinary people of Britain the consequences of Common Market membership’, particularly ‘the higher food prices that would follow if Britain had to adopt the EEC food and agricultural policy with its high tariffs and levies’, and proposed a national campaign to print the potential rise in prices on food packaging and leaflets on the rise in prices.¹³⁸ The following year, ACML began to publish statistics on price rises to its supporters, claiming that ‘the prompt acceptance of the Common Market’s dear food policy’ would ‘increase the cost of food in Britain by about 6/3d per head per week.’¹³⁹ The government’s publication of estimates of the cost of entry in advance of the White Paper led to more persistent and substantial claims in from anti-Market groups about rising food prices in the late 1960s and early 1970s. CMSC claimed the White Paper could not hide ‘the savage increase in the price of food and cost of living, and a massive permanent burden on the balance of payments.’¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ “Conservatives and the Common Market”, ACML, 12 October 1961, CIB 7/1, BLPES
¹³⁷ Letter from Sir Robin Williams to John Paul, 5 December 1966, CIB 7/1, BLPES
¹³⁸ Letter from Sir Robin Williams to W. Garfield Weston, 5 December 1966, CIB 7/1, BLPES
¹³⁹ Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, January 1967, CIB 7/1, BLPES
¹⁴⁰ Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin, no.1, April 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
By 1971, anti-Marketeers were observing that ‘[t]he local elections and parliamentary bye-elections show that the cost of living is the dominant factor in British politics’, and the price of food was therefore, according to Neil Marten, ‘a key issue to hammer.’\textsuperscript{141} In doing so, anti-Market groups aimed their literature highlighting the cost of living directly to the general public. Both ACML and CMSC mass-produced simple leaflets detailing the prices of essential foodstuffs, clothes and white goods, comparing either the average Common Market price or a specific example from one member state with the equivalent price in Britain.\textsuperscript{142} CMSC’s leaflet “Why Food Is Dear” proved ‘very popular with members and supporters’, with 50,000 copies printed and distributed widely.\textsuperscript{143} Leaflets such as these fitted ACML’s policy, explicitly stated in the mid-1960s, to target a broad range of people across the general public. According to John Paul, while ‘[ACML’s] literature has to cater for all types and classes of people, many of whom require full explanations such as we endeavour to give’, there were ‘also people who require something more abbreviated...’, and thus ACML sought to produce ‘even more down to earth literature, to cater for as wide a range of folk as possible.’\textsuperscript{144}

In targeting the general public for support, anti-Market groups thus presented the food prices issue as one that affected the population as a whole, both as consumers and producers. As alluded to above, anti-Market groups, particularly those with more left-wing foundations, were highly concerned about the impact of price rises on the most vulnerable. KBO

\textsuperscript{143} Minutes of a meeting of the CMSC Executive Committee, 25 July 1973, CIB 1/3, BLPES; “Why Food Is Dear” [n.d.], CMSC, CIB 1/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{144} Letter from John Paul to C.F. Nowlan, 30 March 1967, CIB 7/9, BLPES
commented that the rise in cost of living would lead to ‘widespread poverty and great hardship’ for the most vulnerable sections of society. Neil Marten, Vice-Chairman of CMSC, also believed that the introduction of VAT, a ‘reversal of our present way of life by taxing food’, would be ‘[h]ard on the poor.’ A letter from an ACML supporter painted perhaps the bleakest picture of life after the price rises, predicting sections of the population being too poor to afford meat, eggs, dairy, bread or tea, with ‘some of the very poor... trying to eat tins of meat sold as dog food’. The end of agricultural life, a loss of industrial jobs due to cheap labour, and even a higher suicide rate were predicted. The fault for these developments lay, according to the supporter, with ‘stupid politicians’ who had not ‘stopped to think about ordinary people like you and me’. The effect of price rises on the quality of life and nutritional quality of food was a key concern for anti-Marketeers, with ACML claiming the government’s varying estimates on the rise in expenditure on food, based on ‘changes in the pattern of consumption’, meant ‘in plain English that people will buy margarine because they can no longer afford butter’, as well as other lower-quality substitutes. It was also believed that the introduction of VAT would increase the cost of living for the public as a whole, particularly as foodstuffs would be subject to it. Price rises, therefore, continued to prove a resonant and cross-party issue within the anti-Market case.

142 Keep Britain Out (KBO) leaflet [n.d.], CIB 7/1, BLPES
144 “Is This You in 1969?”, enclosed with letter from K.G. Jackson to ACML, 17 May 1967, CIB 7/2, BLPES
145 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, May 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
Targeting the housewife: mobilising support along gender, not party, lines

The issue of price rises thus made the marketplace a focal point for cross-party or non-party activism, and made consumers a politicised grouping, in the debate over EEC entry. WACM, for example, sought to follow in the footsteps of the protests of the British Housewives’ League (BHL) on rationing in the late 1940s by combining with them in organising a mass protest in Parliament Square against EEC entry and food prices rises, ‘given the publicity now being given to meat prices’. \(^{150}\) People were encouraged to protest against entry after the discovery of future price rises via the publication of the White Paper led to what CMSC described as ‘an immediate and hostile public response’, with three-quarters of housewives in one poll believing food prices would rise ‘alarmingly’. \(^{151}\) By following the model of activism set by BHL, WACM’s anti-EEC activism in the marketplace moved the issue of Common Market entry away from idealistic issues to those affecting the average person on a day-to-day basis. \(^{152}\) The shopping baskets used by WACM members to raise money outside the House of Commons were also symbolic of the new target audience of the anti-Market campaign, as well as being a more subtle approach to fundraising than the use of collecting tins. \(^{153}\) WACM also supplied polythene bags bearing the slogan ‘No Common Market’ both to individual shoppers and anti-Market organisations such as KBO, CMSC and the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service (CACMIS), spreading the anti-

\(^{150}\) Letter from W.D. Rollins to Anne Kerr [n.d.], DMK/2/14, Hull History Centre
\(^{151}\) Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin no.1, April 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES; Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin no.2, June 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
\(^{153}\) Minutes of a meeting of Women Against the Common Market (WACM) Committee, 4 December 1970, DMK/2/2, Hull History Centre
Market message across party political boundaries. The instance of a left-wing organisation like WACM selling shopping bags to both CACMIS and delegates of the Liberal Party Conference demonstrated how the issue of price rises and the effect of entry upon the British consumer was a truly non-party facet to the anti-Market campaign, appealing to ‘the ordinary type of British people’ who were ‘strongly represented’ at WACM’s Trafalgar Square rally.

By the early 1970s, partly as a result of WACM’s efforts, housewives became an even more established politicised group in the Common Market debate. WACM’s demonstrations outside supermarkets and in shopping centres identified the female consumer as a potential anti-Marketeer, and other anti-Market groups began to set out to ‘appeal to the Housewife to say ‘No’ to the Common Market and the high cost of living’. In Wolverhampton, housewives were thus encouraged to write letters to MPs and the local press on the rising cost of living, while the local group pressured the Ministry of Agriculture on the rise in price of butter, culminating in an attempt to get housewives to take ‘an active interest’ in the build-up to the parliamentary vote of October 1971. One pro-Market organisation, the parliamentary grouping Conservative Group for Europe (CGE), sought to directly challenge the anti-Market propaganda aimed at housewives by setting up a Women’s Advisory Committee described as ‘a very vital key point at the moment in relation to the cost

154 Correspondence between Anne Kerr and Parker’s Paper Supplies of Feltham [n.d., July 1971], DMK/2/1, Hull History Centre; Expenses of Mrs Chuter of WACM [n.d., 1971], DMK/2/1, Hull History Centre
155 Minutes of a meeting of Women Against the Common Market (WACM) Committee, 20 July 1971, DMK/2/2, Hull History Centre; Minutes of a meeting of Women Against the Common Market (WACM) Committee, 9 June 1971, DMK/2/2, Hull History Centre
157 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 8 December 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES; Circular/Minutes of a meeting of the Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML [n.d., June 1971?], CIB 7/15, BLPES
158 Circular/Minutes of a meeting of the Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML, 2 September 1971, CIB 7/15, BLPES; Circular/Minutes of a meeting of the Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML, 12 August 1971, CIB 7/15, BLPES
of living, housewives, etc’, and produced the leaflet “Housewives and the Common Market”; both were aimed at gaining the support of women’s organisations for EEC entry. The female consumer remained a key target for propaganda after entry into the EEC, with Renee Short of CMSC suggesting directing a campaign aimed at women’s organisations in light of the still-rising food prices. The importance for anti-Market groups of having the support of women, and not just the female consumer, was made explicit by Christopher Frere-Smith, Chairman of KBO, who advised ex-Labour MP Anne Kerr that the anti-EEC consumer movement that became WACM should have reference to the word ‘women’, and stated that

Mr Heath recognises that it was the women of this country who were responsible for the defeat of the Labour government. It is the women of this country who can save this country and our people from the politicians' folly.

Those within WACM shared this belief that ‘woman [sic] generally should be appealed to and not always just “housewives’”, and that demonstrations should extend beyond shopping centres and marketplaces to ‘factory gates where women are working’, extending the potential non-party base of support against EEC entry further.
In appealing to the consumer, the internationalist, the humanist, the traditionalist and those concerned about protecting a traditional British model of parliamentary sovereignty, the anti-Market groups’ appeal lay outside of the party political framework and by the 1970s could form the basis for a cross-party campaign. Groups with Conservative, Labour or Liberal origins had become concerned with the same issues of political and cultural sovereignty, national identity, and price rises, and thus tailored their message to the public on the whole rather than any party political or ideological faction or support base. Attempts to inspire a large-scale mass campaign on behalf of a public majority believed to be disenfranchised by the cross-party consensus on the EEC issue by the late 1960s were in contrast to pro-EEC pressure groups’ elitism that left the public unconvinced by the arguments for EEC entry. The following section will assess the operations of anti-Market groups, where mass movement tactics coincided with campaigns to pressurise and influence MPs and act as a form of “parliamentary watchdog” on the issue.

**Tactics and operation**

**Seeking mass support**

While the antis sought to attain and demonstrate mass support, pro-EEC pressure groups were less concerned with mass mobilisation and seeking grassroots support. In the run-up to Macmillan’s announcement in 1961, and in the wake of a declaration from the EM that national councils should have ‘direct subscribing members’, UKCEM discussed the possibility of creating an affiliated movement for individual membership.\(^\text{163}\) The United

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\(^{163}\) Minutes of a meeting of the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement (UKCEM) Management Committee, 21 June 1961, 1 MH 434-437, *European Movement in Britain and Europe since 1945* microfiche
Europe Association was launched as a result, on a provincial basis and with the support of local bodies and personalities, but by the end of 1962 only one regional committee had been launched.\textsuperscript{164} The major cross-party pro-Market pressure group during the first application, the aforementioned CMC, was founded by key figures from FU and Britain in Europe to influence elite opinion, its press release signed by leading pro-EEC political figures and distinguished signatories.\textsuperscript{165} Seeking to influence informed opinion and ‘invariably aimed for the top’, CMC had ‘no enrolled members, no regular subscriptions and no widespread regional organisation’.\textsuperscript{166} Furthermore, it declined to amalgamate its campaign with the United Europe Association, despite their common objective.\textsuperscript{167}

Intra-party pro-EEC groups were just as distant from rank-and-file supporters. CGE, (previously the European Forum until 1970), drew its support from Conservative MPs and prospective candidates, as well as leading pro-Europeans and industrialists, attracting complaints that the group should do more to attract ‘the grass roots of the Party’, such as through a large mass meeting at the Party Conference.\textsuperscript{168} On the Labour side, the Labour Common Market Committee (LCMC), active during the first application, was not intended to be a mass membership organisation, and was instead to concentrate on the ‘vitaly important’ task of ‘influencing members of the Parliamentary Labour Party’ and ‘uncommitted
Parliamentary colleagues’, with a sub-committee set up to arrange meetings exclusively for Labour MPs for this purpose. Concerns were therefore raised that the LCMC ‘was insufficiently known to Constituency Party members and rank and file trade unionists’, yet its Chairman Roy Jenkins and Treasurer John Diamond, both key figures in the cross-party CMC, continued the policy of concentrating on influencing MPs. Its publications, such as the regular *Newsbrief*, left the ‘mass market’ propaganda to Labour newspapers such as the *Daily Mirror* and *Daily Herald*, considering it ‘better to try to appeal to reasonably informed opinion, rather than to antagonise it by merely uttering slogans.’ Re-launched as the Labour Committee for Europe (LCE) after de Gaulle’s first veto, it cast its net wider with a form of Associate Membership established in 1967, offering individual members of the public a subscription to publications and notification of its activities, in order to attract more support from local CLPs. Yet this development came in for immediate criticism from *Tribune* who accused the LCE of having ‘first and second class citizens’. It also felt restricted by leadership policy, avoiding campaigning in constituencies until 1966 ‘in order not to encourage an anti-EEC counter-campaign.’ Such a cautious and top-down approach was typical of the way pro-EEC groups operated in the campaign for EEC entry.

By contrast, groups like ACML set themselves out from the outset to directly influence public opinion. Declining the more research-based, intra-party approach preferred

169 Minutes of a meeting of the Labour Common Market Committee (LCMC), 24 January 1962, 1 OR 8-9, Labour Common Market Committee in *Britain and Europe since 1945* microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
170 Minutes of LCMC meetings, 14 May 1962, 1 OR 16-17, 4 July 1962, 1 OR 20-21, Labour Common Market Committee in *Britain and Europe since 1945* microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
171 LCMC memo [n.d.], 1 OR 43-44, Labour Common Market Committee in *Britain and Europe since 1945* microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
172 Letter from Colin Beever, Honorary Secretary of Labour Committee for Europe, to John Fairhead, Secretary of Paddington South Constituency Labour Party, 29 July 1967, Labour Committee for Europe, Box 2 [uncatalogued], People’s History Museum
173 Minutes of a meeting of Labour Committee for Europe, 3 May 1966, 1 NY 45-48, Labour Committee for Europe in *Britain and Europe since 1945* microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
by Peter Walker, ACML’s foundations were in membership and activism, and it had, according to Lord Windlesham, ‘from the start the ambition to become a mass movement’, and was ‘concerned to present its message directly to the general public.’ Its early membership forms, therefore, declared ACML’s aim as ‘to enlighten and influence public opinion in every possible way’ and mobilise enough public opposition to prevent EEC membership. In 1963, its membership had reached ‘over 30,000 people of all parties’, and they had managed to retain around 10,000 members by the end of the decade, with the number of active, ‘hard-core’ members rising quickly during 1970. That ACML managed to remain in existence when Common Market entry was off the political agenda, such as after the de Gaulle veto when the ‘apathy on the whole subject’ claimed victim to FBM, demonstrated both the appeal of ACML and the reactive nature of anti-Market groups. CMSC, who sought to operate on the two levels of ‘intellectual debate and propaganda’, had around 10,000 members on its mailing list and was making print runs of 100,000 copies of its newsletters.

That the anti-Market groups’ printed literature exceeded their membership figures indicates that this was their predominant method of communicating directly with a large public base. With much of its literature produced in simple pamphlet form, ACML ensured it covered a broad base from intellectual explanations to propaganda. It therefore consistently

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174 Windlesham, *Communication and Political Power*, p.164, pp.174-75
175 ACML membership form [n.d., 1961/1962], CIB/7/1, BLPES
176 The figure of 30,000 was quoted in both the *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, August 1969, CIB/7/1, BLPES and a letter from John Paul to electors of Bexley, 30 September 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES. A letter was sent to 3,000 ‘hard-core’ members informing them of Paul’s death while 7,000 more were chased up for active support: Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 25 June 1969, CIB 7/3, BLPES. The number of newsletters sent rose from 3,808 in October 1969 to 5,277 in August 1970: Minutes of ACML Executive Committee meetings, 22 October 1969, 16 September 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
177 *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, February 1966, CIB 7/1, BLPES
178 CMSC memo, “Office Administration and Organisation” [n.d., 1971], CIB 1/2, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 28 July 1971, CIB 1/2, BLPES;
sought a ‘more persuasive approach’ than its pro-entry counterparts. Widespread
distribution of its literature was a tactic adopted during the first EEC application, with a
million copies of its “Common Market Quiz” distributed door-to-door in 1962 and separate
leaflets produced on different aspects of opposition to entry. In his study of ACML’s early
activity, Windlesham estimates that it produced and distributed as much literature on the
Common Market issue as the Conservative Party during the first application, despite the
disparity in their resources. One example of their ability to mass-produce leaflets to counter
pro-Market literature was at the Conservative Party Conference in 1961, where ACML
members handed out 3,000 leaflets produced at very short notice, before pro-EEC literature
has been distributed. Over 50,000 copies of a booklet on the Common Market were
distributed in 1967 during the second application, despite the retrenchment that had occurred
in previous years. The revival of the Common Market entry issue in 1970 was matched by
the production of leaflets with print runs between 10,000 and 100,000. Some of these took
the form of ‘very simple’ propaganda, such as its “Don’t Be Fooled in 1971” leaflet, listing
basic political and economic consequences of entry. ACML estimated that approximately
470,000 items of literature were distributed in 1970, rising to over 750,000 in 1971. Anti-
Market advertisements were also placed in the national press in the early 1970s in a joint
effort between ACML and RBCMC.

179 Letter from Tom Neate to John Paul [n.d., 1968?], CIB 7/9, BLPES
180 *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, September 1962, CIB 7/3, BLPES
181 Windlesham, *Communication and Political Power*, p.173
182 Progress Report by John Paul, 18 October 1961, CIB 7/1, BLPES
183 *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, January 1967, CIB 7/1, BLPES
184 Table of literature produced by ACML between January 1970 and February 1971, CIB/7/3, BLPES
185 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 1 February 1971, CIB 7/3, BLPES; “Don’t Be Fooled
in 1971”, ACML leaflet, CIB 7/3, BLPES
186 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 31 August 1971, CIB 7/3, BLPES
187 “The Greatest Betrayal in Our History”, advertisement in *The Times*, 15 September 1971, CIB/7/3
Grassroots activity

However, the debate between ACML and RBCMC over the effectiveness of advertisements in the press is indicative of the importance that ACML placed upon active membership and grassroots campaigning. While RBCMC’s chairman S.E. Scammell sought an extensive advertising campaign through local and national newspapers, Sir Robin Williams placed more importance on both ‘gradually increasing [ACML’s] membership’ and working ‘to produce literature and encourage our supporters to distribute it locally – thus spreading the word.’\textsuperscript{188} While Scammell considered leafleting supporters to be preaching to the converted and a waste of money, Williams believed that the massive number of leaflets being distributed by active supporters was crucial to increasing support, claiming

\ldots if we can recruit ten times as many active members we can similarly increase our distribution. I believe that the return in actual value on our expenditure is immeasurably greater than the return on your expenditure.\textsuperscript{189}

Grassroots activity and active membership was thus a key facet of the anti-Market campaign. An article in the \textit{Globe and Mail} on the different anti-Market organisations referenced ACML’s ‘extremely active members’ and CMSC urging its members ‘to knock on doors [and] distribute leaflets (which it also prints)’.\textsuperscript{190} Circulating literature was a key task for members, including ACML’s who were asked to picket ‘meetings, exhibitions, concerts etc’ with leaflets.\textsuperscript{191} Increasing membership and demonstrating their strength of public opinion was valued extremely highly by anti-Market groups, with CMSC stating in its \textit{Bulletin} that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{188} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to S.E. Scammell, 20 August 1970, CIB 10/3, BLPES ; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to S.E. Scammell, 11 June 1970, CIB 10/3, BLPES
\item \textsuperscript{189} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to S.E. Scammell, 27 April 1971, CIB 10/3, BLPES
\item \textsuperscript{190} “UK skeptics and opponents make market views felt”, \textit{Globe and Mail}, 11 May 1971, DMK/2/17, Hull History Centre
\item \textsuperscript{191} Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 22 October 1969, CIB/7/3, BLPES
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
‘[o]f course we need money – but perhaps we need people more – a large number of extra campaigners to spread the word and develop our activity.’ Members were therefore asked to approach sympathisers and ask them to join CMSC, ‘a very simple thing everyone can do’ that could potentially ‘double and treble our membership in a short period’. Likewise, from the outset ACML felt that its grassroots should be ‘obtaining more members’ all the time.

The National Common Market Petition, launched by leading figures of ACML in 1968 with a committee (NCMPC) comprising of leading anti-Marketeers of all sides, was another aspect of the anti-Market campaign driven by grassroots activity. NCMPC claimed that as ‘public opinion cannot easily express itself by normal methods’ due to the general cross-party support for entry, the Petition, addressed to the Queen, was a way ‘to enable the voters to make their wishes known.’ What was envisaged was something on the scale of the League of Nations Union’s Peace Pledge Ballot in the 1930s, a ‘monster petition’ with ‘many millions of signatures’ against EEC entry. By 1970, despite 1,000 signatures a week being collected for the Petition it was seen as ‘not nearly enough’ by ACM, with 133,864 signatures registered. This figure had risen to over a quarter of a million within a year, before being presented in May 1972 with approximately 750,000 signatures. It was local, grassroots involvement that helped bring about this rapid rise in signatures, with ACML publicising some of the best individual efforts in its newsletters, from the 84-year old

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192 Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin, no. 3, September 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
193 ACML membership form [n.d.], CIB 7/1, BLPES
194 Press Statement by National Common Market Petition Council, 10 June 1968, CIB/8/1, BLPES. Preparation had started a year earlier, with details in Anti-Common Market Newsletter, July 1967, CIB/7/1, BLPES
195 Douglas Jay, NCMPC press release, 10 June 1968, CIB 8/1, BLPES
196 Letter from John Paul to Emmanuel Shinwell, 19 June 1967, CIB 7/11, BLPES
197 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 21 January 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
198 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 22 October 1970, CIB/7/3, BLPES; Correspondence between Sir Robin Williams and Sir Martin Charteris at Buckingham Palace between July and October 1972, CIB/8/6, BLPES. The final figure was cited as 764,107 signatures: Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 4 May 1972, CIB/7/4, BLPES
supporter in Scotland who had acquired over 500 signatures to the dairy farmer in Hertfordshire canvassing for two hours each evening despite having to be up at 4.30am each morning.\textsuperscript{199} According to ACML, the Petition was ‘an effort in which everyone, in every walk of life, can make a contribution’, and ‘[e]ven the most inactive supporter... should have a [petition] form in the house’.\textsuperscript{200}

**Mobilisation: meetings and demonstrations of support**

The involvement of grassroots activists at mass meetings and demonstrations was central to the anti-Market campaign; According to Ron Leighton, activists favoured the sort of assembly where people did not simply ‘listen patiently to speeches’ but were given the opportunity to take action and ‘something which allows our members to participate, and “do something”’.\textsuperscript{201} ACML organised a large number of public meetings during the first application, which they had believed to be an ‘enormous success’.\textsuperscript{202} Of the thirty-five public meetings held in 1962, alongside the 205 meetings held at other clubs and societies, the largest was the public rally at Westminster Central Hall in September, with nearly 2,000 people attending, yet the fact that many of its meetings were arranged at short notice highlights the decentralised nature of ACML’s support.\textsuperscript{203} The early 1970s saw a revival of large-scale public meetings in light of the parliamentary debate on EEC entry, with Central Hall again used for a CMSC rally in June 1971. This ‘mammoth rally’, held to show ‘a massive demonstration of public opposition’ to EEC entry and to send ‘an unmistakable warning to the Government’, was seen to be ‘highly successful’ and led to discussion of

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\footnote{\textit{Anti-Common Market League Newsletter}, October 1967, CIB 7/1, BLPES} \footnote{\textit{Anti-Common Market League Newsletter}, July 1967, CIB 7/1, BLPES; \textit{Anti-Common Market League Newsletter}, October 1967, CIB 7/1, BLPES} \footnote{Memo from Ron Leighton to CMSC members [n.d.], DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre} \footnote{\textit{Anti-Common Market League Newsletter}, October 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES} \footnote{\textit{Ibid.}; Windlesham, Communication and Political Power, p.175}
\end{footnotes}
holding a rally in Trafalgar Square for the autumn ‘when the atmosphere would be critical’. The rally, a ‘national united demonstration’ held four days before the Common Market vote in Parliament, had the support and participation of all major anti-Market organisations, in contrast to an earlier rally in March organised by WACM and KBO that had been less successful. The 24 October rally organised by the National Anti-Common Market Demonstration Committee, a subsidiary of CMSC, was reported by CMSC as having been ‘a great success [with] the Square filled.’ Some demonstrations organised by anti-Market groups even had a militant edge to them, in particular two attempted demonstrations by KBO in Brussels and Calais that brought police intervention and arrests. WACM also attempted to get its members to stand their ground if asked to move whilst demonstrating and fundraising outside the House of Commons, and although WACM’s chairman Anne Kerr stated that there were to be ‘no martyrs [or] militant methods yet’, it shows that disobedience was a tactic considered by WACM. Furthermore, a supporter of WACM ‘not normally stirred to militancy in any sphere’ wrote to Kerr explaining she was drawn to WACM because of their ‘constructive ideas and the will to get things moving.’ Keen to take action on the EEC issue, she added,

As in my old C.N.D. days when I was a student, the question for me is what on earth can the individual do to preserve the way in which he or she would prefer to

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204 Circular from Ron Leighton to CMSC members, April 1971, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre; Minutes of a meeting of the Common Market Study Group Executive Committee, 9 June 1971, MS. Eng. Hist. C.1131/77, Bodleian Library
206 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 17 November 1971, MS. Eng. Hist. C.1130/319-320, Bodleian Library
207 “Facts Relating to Arrest by Brussels Police on 22 January 1972”, Christopher Frere-Smith, MS Eng. Hist. C.1140/13-17, Bodleian Library; DMK/2/12, Hull History Centre
208 Minutes of WACM Executive Committee meetings, 4 December 1970, 24 November 1970, DMK/2/2, Hull History Centre
live? It is all too easy to sit back and accept it as a fate decreed by the unapproachable politicians, about which the housewife and the worker can do nothing except grumble to the neighbours.²⁰⁹

There were, however, problems with ensuring mass meetings and rallies gained enough in the way of publicity and attendance. The less successful Trafalgar Square meeting in March 1971, held the same day as a St Patrick’s Day parade, received bad publicity owing to reports of ‘derisory attendance’ and suggestions that there were ‘more pigeons than people’.²¹⁰ Bad publicity due to poorly attended meetings was particularly damaging given that anti-Market groups were increasingly concentrating on utilising newsworthy ‘gimmicks’ to ensure coverage in the national press and on television and radio, such as the presentation of the National Common Market Petition ‘in a colourful way’ as part of a mass lobby and rally.²¹¹ Lack of finance, as well as the successful passage of the European Communities Bill in parliament, after which the number of mass meetings had declined, both restricted the impact of mass demonstrations and rallies by anti-Market groups.

One way to counteract this was to direct mass pressure towards the political establishment. With amendments to the European Communities Bill about to be discussed, Leighton called upon CMSC members to take action in a mass lobby of Parliament, hoping for ‘the press and T.V. to have pictures of thousands of people “besieging” Parliament’.²¹² This tactic shows that while the issue of Common Market entry was being discussed in Parliament, it remained a highly politicised issue rooted in the political sphere, despite the best efforts of anti-Market groups to publicise it and demonstrate their mass support. CMSC

²⁰⁹ Letter from Miss Lorna C. Read to Anne Kerr, 1 June 1971, DMK/2/19, Hull History Centre
²¹⁰ Letter from Ron Leighton to Anne Kerr, 15 March 1971, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre
²¹¹ Letter from Ron Leighton to CMSC members, February 1972, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre; Letter from Ron Leighton to ‘all Campaign Groups’, 17 March 1972, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre
²¹² Letter from Ron Leighton to CMSC members, April 1972, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre
therefore placed great emphasis on ‘the value of public pressure continuing whilst the Parliamentary proceedings were in progress’, as did ACML, which as early as 1967 was seeking to ‘mobilise public opinion so as to support [anti-Marketeers] who share our views.’

Demonstrations and rallies often had a political target, such as those held outside of the House of Commons, the Ministry of Agriculture, or Chequers during a meeting between Heath and French President Georges Pompidou. The anti-Market campaign thus sought to use its mass pressure against the government, and make clear to the government that the majority were against EEC entry.

**Pressure group activity: lobbying, opinion polls, political pressure**

Anti-Market groups did this directly through meetings with politicians. The mass lobby of Parliament staged on 2 May 1972 by CMSC was intended to demonstrate the strength of public opinion directly to MPs during the discussion of amendments to the European Communities Bill; one amendment called for a referendum, the other for a general election. A deputation presented the Common Market Petition to the government, followed by a mass lobby of MPs combined with a rally at Westminster Central Hall, a tactic that served to emphasise ‘the value of public pressure continuing whilst the Parliamentary proceedings were in progress.’ Action had previously been arranged for members to lobby their constituency MP at Westminster on the day of the vote in Parliament, with the aim of

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213 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 15 March 1972, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre; Letter from John Paul to Emmanuel Shinwell, 1 May 1967, CIB 7/11, BLPES

214 Minutes of meetings of WACM Executive Committee, 4 December 1970, 15 March 1972, 21 June 1972, DMK/2/2, Hull History Centre

215 Letter from Leighton to CMSC members, April 1972, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre

216 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 15 March 1972, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre; Minutes of a meeting of the Common Market Study Group Executive Committee, 27 April 1972, MS. Eng. Hist. C.1131/91, Bodleian Library
applying some late pressure. WACM’s Executive Committee also arranged a number of meetings in Westminster with leading politicians, including Harold Wilson, Michael Foot, Geoffrey Rippon and Jeremy Thorpe, and a deputation from the Committee was received by MPs in the House of Commons Lobby. WACM lobbied politicians in order to demonstrate the extent of anti-Market opinion evident ‘from contact with the public’ of which WACM ‘claim[ed] to speak for the majority of... and particularly for housewives.’ A local branch of one anti-Market organisation, British Business for World Markets, even claimed to have ‘established close contacts with a number of MPs on both sides’, making them ‘a valuable “lobby”’ instigating a ‘two-way exchange of ideas and opinions’.

Another tactic utilised by anti-Market groups to demonstrate the strength of public opinion, particularly in the early 1970s, was to conduct local opinion polls and referenda. ACML ‘objectively conducted’ many of these polls and, when the result was an anti-Market majority, supporters were informed that ‘[e]very opportunity should be taken to bring these results to the attention of MPs...’. This gave activists the opportunity to campaign, with ACML’s Wolverhampton and West Midland Branch encouraging its members to canvass for signatures and show them to those MPs and parliamentary candidates who may have been open to persuasion. Local groups in CMSC and KBO also organised referenda, with KBO’s referenda in July and October 1971 showing anti-Market majorities in ten constituencies, with

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217 Letter from Williams to ACML members, 23 October 1971, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre
219 Letter from Kerr to Harold Wilson, 30 March 1971, DMK/2/29, Hull History Centre
221 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, December 1971, CIB/7/3, BLPES
222 Circular/minutes of Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML [n.d., June 1971], CIB 7/15, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 16 September 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
generally between 32 and 73.5 per cent of the electorate polled, and over half the electorate polled in six of the constituencies.\textsuperscript{223} The Political Freedom Movement (PFM), a small anti-Market organisation seeking to increase the electorate’s political power and strengthen democratic government, also held a number of referenda, including in Heath’s constituency of Bexley, where around a third of the electorate was polled.\textsuperscript{224}

Other pressure groups, however, felt that politicians and parties should be targeted more directly than via a demonstration of popular sentiment. The BLR, for example, suggested after the Common Market vote in Parliament focusing on pressurising anti-Market MPs into demanding a referendum, rather than ‘spending energy trying to whip up public support for the campaign’, which was ‘a mere beating of the air.’\textsuperscript{225} In the run-up to the parliamentary vote, the direct targeting of MPs was seen as critical by the anti-Market campaign in order to prevent passage of the European Communities Bill in Parliament. Anti-Market groups therefore approached MPs directly to apply pressure, concentrating on those with no firm viewpoint on the EEC issue who could be influenced against entry. This policy was in operation from the first application, with ACML encouraging supporters to write to MPs to voice their opposition, yet it became more systematic and directed more towards impressionable MPs as the issue became more politicised.\textsuperscript{226} In the early 1970s, both locally

\textsuperscript{223} Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 28 June 1971, MS. Eng. Hist. C.1130/310, Bodleian Library; Referenda Results, KBO [n.d., 1971], MS. Eng. Hist. C.1140/354, Bodleian Library. The exception is in Brentford and Chiswick, where 22 per cent of the electorate were polled.

\textsuperscript{224} Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 31 August 1971, CIB 7/3, BLPES

\textsuperscript{225} \textit{Anti-Common Market Activities}, no.14, British League of Rights [BLR], 30 September 1972, DMK/2/14, Hull History Centre

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Anti-Common Market League Newsletter}, June 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES
and nationally, letters were sent ‘to all those [MPs] under pressure’, with MPs from all three parties targeted.  

A great deal of pressure was exerted, however, on Conservative backbenchers who were perceived as ‘wobbly’ in the face of pressure from the party leadership and whips, both leading up to the parliamentary vote and the following stages of the bill’s passage. Those Conservative MPs who had already revealed themselves to be anti-Marketeers were supported through letter-writing campaigns organised both locally, such as the Folkestone & District Group who sent letters to the ‘Conservative 70s Group’ of rebels led by Derek Walker-Smith, and nationally, with ACML encouraging its members to congratulate the thirty-nine Conservative rebels ‘on their courage, integrity and patriotism and [pledge] support for the future’. Yet this was not merely to show support, as demonstrated by KBO who claimed the stance of anti-Market Conservatives was of ‘paramount importance in the Parliamentary battle’, and CACMIS who in June 1972 perceived the parliamentary debate to be ‘at a crucial stage’. It was an attempt to influence enough MPs into voting against the EEC legislation so as to obstruct or sabotage it, such as in the Second Reading where CMSC sought to ‘ensure that as many as possible of the 39 Conservative MPs who voted against entry on 28\textsuperscript{th} October

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227 Letter from Francis E. d’Aft, Chairman of West Country ACML, to Neil Marten, 22 March 1972, MS. Eng. Hist. C.1130/72, Bodleian Library; Minutes of a meeting of WACM Committee, 15 March 1972, DMK/2/2, Hull History Centre
228 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 11 May 1972, DMK/2/11, Hull History Centre
229 Letter from Denis Martin, Secretary of Folkestone & District Anti-Common Market Group, to supporters, 22 May 1972, CIB 7/16, BLPES; Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, December 1971, CIB 7/3, BLPES
230 Letter from Christopher Frere-Smith to KBO supporters, 4 November 1971, DMK/2/13, Hull History Centre; Minutes of a meeting of Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service (CACMIS), 7 June 1972, DMK/2/14, Hull History Centre
do so again’, with supporters urged to ‘assure [their MPs] of strong support in the constituency for this point of view.’

With the passage of the bill hanging in the balance, anti-Market groups therefore acted as a type of parliamentary “watchdog” on the EEC issue, keeping check on MPs’ views and attempting to ensure the failure of the legislation. Again, anti-Market groups had been doing this since the early 1960s, encouraging letters be sent to MPs and candidates to ascertain their position on EEC entry, and publicising their views, such as in ACML’s 1964 election newsletter which distinguished ‘the really keen Common Marketeers’ from anti-Marketeers to its supporters ahead of the election. As the issue became further politicised in the early 1970s, ACML and CMSC collaborated on drawing up a set of questions for members to ask MPs and parliamentary candidates, ‘designed to embarrass pro-Market MPs and disconcert doubtful MPs.’ The resulting document, “Question Your MP”, followed the distribution by CMSC of a set of questions for members to ask candidates in 1970. This action coincided with the distribution of Voters’ Veto forms, perceived as ‘a very effective way of obtaining the true interest of your MP’ on the EEC issue. The Voters’ Veto forms were first distributed to ACML members during the General Election campaign of June 1970 and were

232 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, September 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPES; Anti-Common Market League General Election Newsletter, September 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES
233 Letter from Sir Robin Williams, Chairman of ACML, to Stephen Haseler, Honorary Treasurer of CMSC, 20 August 1971, CIB 7/13, BLPES; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to ACML supporters [n.d., 1971], CIB 7/13, BLPES
234 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 28 May 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
235 Circular/minutes of Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML [n.d., April 1971?], CIB 7/15, BLPES

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signed and forwarded to MPs threatening the loss of electoral support if they revealed themselves to be pro-entry until the parliamentary vote of 28 October 1971.236

Pressuring candidates to declare their position on EEC entry before elections and threatening to withdraw support for pro-entry candidates was intended, according to CMSC, to both ‘bring great pressure to bear on our representatives and ensure that this is a live election issue.’237 While trying to influence uncertain MPs into opposing entry, anti-Marketeers such as Neil Marten monitored the parliamentary levels of support for and against entry in anticipation of the vote in Parliament. Uwe Kitzinger’s *Diplomacy and Persuasion* details the activity of Conservative Party Whips and CGE in attempting to monitor and secure sufficient support in Parliament for the Bill to pass, while on the opposite side, Marten was keeping a record of anti-Market Conservatives, estimating between seventy and eighty MPs in early 1971.238 The parliamentary vote was thus keeping anti-Market activity rooted within the political arena.

Pressuring MPs into declaring their position thus allowed anti-Market groups to mobilise campaigns against those who favoured British membership and increase opposition to membership in Parliament. Victor Montagu, formerly Lord Hinchingbrooke, criticised referendums and polls that were ‘ignored by the executive’, emphasising the importance of backbenchers in Parliament and explaining that ‘[t]he only thing which frightens a tough executive is the presence behind him in the Chamber of passionate men with half drawn

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237 *Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin* no. 1, April 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES
swords.’ ACML, belying its Conservative origins, believed that it was therefore ‘of utmost importance that anti-Market candidates be returned whether they be Conservative, Labour or Liberal’. Anti-Marketeers stood as candidates for general and by-elections from the first EEC application. Arguably the biggest electoral impact of an anti-Market candidate EEC was in the South Dorset by-election in November 1962, which the Conservatives lost after independent anti-Market candidate Sir Piers Debenham, supported by the previous incumbent Lord Hinchingbrooke, polled 12.3 per cent of the vote.

However, after de Gaulle’s veto independent anti-Market candidates struggled to make an impact, not least because, according to Montagu, single-issue candidates were standing ‘chiefly on a recessed issue’. For example, John Paul’s ‘full-scale, responsible’ campaign against Heath in Bexley obtained only 2 per cent of the poll. Although anti-Market groups continued to put forward independent anti-Market candidates, their limited finances led them to proceed with caution, concerned that parties would use the electoral results as propaganda to show the majority of the public favoured entry. For this reason, active Labour anti-Marketeer Douglas Jay opted not to support independent candidates, claiming that ‘the risks are too great, and that we have to go on working through the Party machines.’ Furthermore, cross-party groups had to be careful not to associate themselves too closely to parliamentary

239 Letter from Victor Montagu to Maurice Petherick, 15 July 1971, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP259, Dorset Record Office
240 Anti-Market League Newsletter, May 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
242 Letter from Victor Montagu to John Paul, 12 April 1964, D/MAP87, Dorset Record Office
243 Letter from John Paul to Victor Montagu, 23 October 1964, D/MAP87, Dorset Record Office
244 “The Lessons of the Kingston By-Election”, Donald A. Martin, Anti-Market Activities, BLR, 13 May 1972, DMK/2/14, Hull History Centre. Martin described the tactic of putting forward independent anti-Market candidates as ‘a waste of time and effort as well as money’ in the wake of the Kingston result.
candidates. Frere-Smith, standing as an independent by-election candidate at Sutton and Cheam, downplayed the election campaign’s connection with KBO, as KBO was

...supported by many Members of Parliament and other prominent Party politicians and they would obviously find it impossible if they were to support organisations which run candidates against their own Party.246

This, in combination with ACML’s statement on the election of anti-Market candidates regardless of party, emphasised both the need for anti-Market groups to collaborate on their Westminster efforts, but also their need to present themselves as cross-party or non-party in order to obtain political influence.

Anti-Market organisations thus found themselves positioned between the spheres of parliamentary politics and mass protest. They directed their message to the general public, distributing vast quantities of literature and propaganda and calling upon large numbers of supporters to voice their opposition to EEC entry, yet they were never able to completely control the issue or remove it from the political arena. As a result, reactive campaigns to prevent the passage of legislation required the patronage of anti-Market MPs, and the presence of anti-Market MPs within the House of Commons. Anti-Market groups lacked political influence, yet remained convinced of the fact that the majority of the public opposed EEC entry. Supported in large numbers but denied access to the decision-making process, they therefore sought to fulfil the typical role of a ‘protest’ pressure group or NGO, perceiving themselves as bridging public opinion and parliamentary decision-making. Their frustrations with what Herbert Kitschelt called ‘highly bureaucratised political party machines and interest groups’ also added an anti-establishment and anti-political element to their

246 Letter from Frere-Smith to KBO supporters, 25 September 1972, CIB 10/2, BLPES
rhetoric. In tandem with seeking to preserve Westminster sovereignty, they sought a new form of direct, active democracy in the belief that traditional democratic participation had been obstructed by party machinery and lobbying groups. The final section of this chapter will assess this critique of the parliamentary system that kept anti-Market groups in the ground between politics and the public sphere.

Non-party or anti-party? The anti-Market campaign on the political fringes

In encouraging public participation and attempting to preserve and increase the public’s democratic influence, anti-Market groups perceived themselves as promoters and defenders of the traditional conception of an active democracy. For many anti-Marketeers, Britain’s entry into the EEC against the wishes of the majority was viewed as a systemic democratic failure. Anti-Market organisations operating in the gap between Parliament and electorate and between parties and grassroots support, therefore, represented the fringes of a larger political debate on how active parliamentary democracy should work. Their championing of direct democracy over centralised power reflected the liberalist and anti-statist nature of their campaign. In the words of a colleague of John Paul, campaigning against the permanent implementation of British Summer Time that was viewed as a way of aligning Britain to continental time, they felt the public ‘must make Democracy work by participation…’

Protecting the rights of the individual against the powers of centralised government and bureaucracy formed a part of the anti-Market groups’ rhetoric. They believed that EEC membership would further dissociate the public from the governmental process, and

248 Letter from B. Jensen to various local newspapers and local MPs, 20 January 1969, CIB 7/14, BLPES
perceived that, as with communism, the ‘centralization of power’ was at the heart of EEC policy.249 Similarly, groups such as ACML were against this centralising trend domestically, claiming that the creation of regional councils as part of EEC policy meant that ‘[a]ll the time the representation of the individual is being diminished’.250 In addition to protecting individual rights, the belief that ‘larger units of government do not get more efficient but... less so’, as expressed by a member of WACM’s Executive Committee, lay behind opposition to the EEC.251 As John Biffen told a meeting of Conservative supporters,

We have learned to live with the twin evils of growing government and its increasing inaccessibility; they were evils richly fed by the years of socialism. The question is now whether or not we wish to add to both the scale and remoteness of government.252

This belief went beyond centralisation of government and criticised the influence of wealthy, professional lobbying and study groups on governmental policy. R. Hugh Corbet, in ACML’s Britain, not Europe, wrote of the influence of pro-European groups such as those formed by FU and the Federal Trust for Education and Research, the latter described as ‘a highly organised, highly sophisticated, political machine.’ Politicians, he claimed, had become ‘the tools of highly organised pressure groups’, and that while pressure groups defending the interests of a country and its people were ‘the life-giving blood of a healthy parliamentary democracy’, the contempt federalist groups had shown for Britain and its

249 Circular/Minutes of a meeting of the Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML [December 1972], CIB 7/15, BLPES  
250 Letter from W.H. Brown, Chairman of Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML, to local parishioners, 4 May 1972  
251 Minutes of a meeting of WACM Executive Committee, 24 November 1970, DMK/2/2, Hull History Centre  
252 Speech by John Biffen to Denbigh Conservatives at Abergele, 22 January 1971, MS Eng. Hist. C.1138/238-242, Bodleian Library
people showed that such democracy was ‘diseased’. In its most extreme form, this disdain for wealthy, organised pro-European groups was evident in one anti-Marketeer’s letter to Gaitskell blaming international financiers, and the ‘unscrupulous type of wealthy international Jew’, for Britain’s EEC application and for founding PEP ‘with the sole purpose of bringing in a totalitarian state in Britain.’

Frustrations with party hierarchies

Anti-Market groups such as ACML, BLR and PFM were more concerned with the lack of party democracy and the systemic failures of the two-party system in Westminster that were ostracising the views of rank-and-file supporters and voters. ACML was preoccupied with the increasing distance between Conservative Party leadership and grassroots supporters from its inception, founded as a ‘group of rank and file Conservatives’ disillusioned with Macmillan’s decision to apply for EEC membership. John Paul expressed disappointment at the limited opportunity for anti-Market speakers at the 1961 Conference, and called the following year’s Conference ‘so unrepresentative of rank-and-file views’ as to be ‘almost a bit of a laughing stock’. Furthermore, party loyalty of the ‘hard core of Party office-holders and Agents’ meant it would have been ‘an unprecedented shock to the Government’ if the Conference had voted against EEC entry, and ACML claimed that the two hundred votes and

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253 Corbet, R.H., “The Federalist Pressures in Britain” in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, p.24, CIB 7/1, BLPES
254 Letter from Miss C. Savage to Hugh Gaitskell, 27 September 1962, Gaitskell/C/256.6, UCL Special Collections
255 ACML membership form [n.d.], CIB 7/1, BLPES
256 Progress Report by John Paul, 18 October 1961, CIB 7/1, BLPES; Letter from John Paul to Sir Robin Williams, 29 October 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES
numerous abstentions for Robin Turton’s amendment was ‘indicative of the feelings of millions of the rank and file of the Party.’

Thus, on the one hand anti-Market groups believed rank-and-file opinion against EEC membership was being ignored, and on the other hand they believed that leadership policy and the party organisation were pressuring the rank-and-file into changing their views on EEC membership. In place of real party democracy, according to RBCMC’s S.E. Scammell, were resolutions favouring entry passed by ‘a few score “trusties” who [are] concerned only to support the Party Line on the ‘my leader right or wrong’ basis.’

Lord Hinchingbrooke, in response to those Conservative Party association workers in his old constituency of South Dorset who felt betrayed by his support of an independent anti-Market candidate in the November 1962 by-election, was also critical of how constituencies’ loyalties to their local candidate or MP had been superseded by loyalty to the Party leader, increasing the party hierarchy’s stranglehold over grass-roots opinion.

Justifying his actions to a President of a local Conservative Association, Hinchingbrooke bemoaned the ‘disastrous Maxwell-Fyfe reforms’ which increased central control over associations that had ‘developed from the ground upwards’, claiming ‘[i]f [party] loyalty is to be directed to the party leaders only, then we can pack up representative government altogether’.

Hinchingbrooke’s frustration with the Conservative Party hierarchy would only increase when he found them to be ‘totally unhelpful’ in his efforts to be reselected as a Conservative Party candidate, his correspondence in the Daily Telegraph about associations...

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257 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, October 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES
258 Letter from S.E. Scammell to all MPs, 6 July 1971, CIB 7/3, BLPES
259 Letter from Lord Hinchingbrooke to Lt-Colonel G.W. Mansell, 20 November 1962, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP272, Dorset Record Office
260 Letter from Lord Hinchingbrooke to D.P. Burke, President of North Dorset Conservative Association, 10 December 1962, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP219, Dorset History Centre
and candidate selection leading to other activists criticising the ‘self-perpetuating cabals’ that controlled Conservative associations.\textsuperscript{261} MPs and party workers who followed the Conservative Party’s policy on Europe were condemned by ACML as ‘sycophants and blind followers of the Government line’, while the promotion of pro-Marketeers was seen as ‘actively encouraged by the top.’\textsuperscript{262} Those pro-European Conservative politicians who placed loyalty to the policies of leadership above principle were described by Michael Shay as ‘professional politicians’ who contributed to the ‘face-less image of the Conservative Party’.\textsuperscript{263} In contrast to those loyal to governmental policy, anti-Market MPs believed their views were also being ignored by the party hierarchy, with Marten complaining in 1971 about ‘a complete lack of serious contact between the Party machine and the antis.’\textsuperscript{264}

Political parties’ control over their MPs on the issue of EEC membership was increased by the use of party Whips, which anti-Market organisations were quick to criticise as an affront to the views of the public. Heath, as a Conservative Party Whip in the late 1950s, came under attack from ACML in the 1960s as being preoccupied with ‘the authority of Parliament’ on the EEC issue, whereas according to ACML, ‘it is the wish of the electorate that should count.’\textsuperscript{265} The passage of the European Communities Bill through Parliament increased the role of the Whips, leading to what Marten called ‘the unparalleled exertions which are being made to secure the passage of the Common Market legislation... against the preponderant will of the electorate.’ Marten claimed ‘the party organisation, radiating from

\textsuperscript{261} Letter from Victor Montagu to L. Martin, 20 April 1966, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP254, Dorset History Centre; Letter from Victor Montagu to John Orford, party activist in St Helens Conservative Party association and member of North West CPC, 1 September 1966, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP258, Dorset History Centre
\textsuperscript{262} Shay, M. [Honorary Secretary of Anti-Common Market League], “The Conservative ‘Europeans’” in Corbet (ed), Britain, not Europe, p.27, CIB 7/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{263} Letter from Neil Marten to Sir Michael Fraser, Conservative Central Office, 24 May 1971, MS. Eng. Hist. C.1138/401-2, Bodleian Library
\textsuperscript{264} Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, April 1964, CIB 7/1, BL PES
Conservative Central Office’ were attempting to ‘cajole and suborn office-bearers and supporters behind the backs of Members of Parliament’, applying pressure on them to go along with government policy. For example, ACML and WACM were concerned that Toby Jessel, the Conservative MP for Anne Kerr’s Twickenham constituency who had previously been an outspoken opponent of EEC membership, had ‘been under strong Party pressure to take the Heath line’ in the run-up to the parliamentary vote. It was for this reason that, when listing those MPs strongly for or against membership in each party in a general election newsletter, those Conservatives who were not listed as anti were presumed by ACML ‘to be mostly followers of the Party line, and thus liable to vote as the Whips dictate.’ However, while party politicians such as Marten felt that, although the system was being abused, Whips were ‘as essential to life in politics as a system of police is to life in towns’, groups such as the PFM called for the abolition of the Whip system and free votes on every parliamentary issue. According to PFM, those who voted on principle and against the Whips would }

...publicly be ‘on the mat’ – but more odiously, they will be subjected to the more pernicious ‘backdoor’ methods of ‘disciplinary action’. Their wisdom and their consciences are nought. The Party comes first.

As early as 1962, Lord Hinchingbrooke was expressing the belief that the combination of discipline from the party organisations and the system of Whips was making the

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267 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Anne Kerr, 15 September 1971, DMK/2/25, Hull History Centre
268 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, September 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES
270 Press release by Political Freedom Movement [n.d.], 1 SW 1, Political Freedom Movement in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
governmental system more presidential. Anti-Market organisations thus argued that this was disenfranchising the electorate and making it difficult for anti-Market opinion to be articulated. The situation was made more difficult for anti-Marketeers in 1967, when all three main parties supported British EEC membership in principle for the first time. NCPMC’s formation was justified by Douglas Jay on the grounds that ‘it was difficult for public opinion to express itself easily by normal methods’, or through normal party political channels. The *Sunday Telegraph* also expressed concern at the possible consequences of consensus among parties on the European issue, as the lack of a party ‘raising an alternative banner under which the sceptics can rally’ would lead to a ‘disenfranchised’ majority and the possibility of ‘new party alignments’, with which ‘the consensus politics of the last decade [would be] unable to cope.’ Anti-Market groups emphasised how centralised government, a lack of party democracy and the American-style growth of the ‘power of the caucus’ had led to the public being ‘disenfranchised’. However, according to BLR this problem was a systemic problem with party politics, as much to do with the two-party cycle of government and opposition as with a lack of party democracy. BLR argued that regardless of the changes in government, governmental policy remained the same, and that, despite the ‘encouraging sign [of] growing grass-roots anti-Common Market opposition’, in party politics ‘there are not enough people at the grass-roots concentrating on policy instead of party loyalty or “not rocking the boat”.’

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271 Letter from Lord Hinchingbrooke to Bernard Elliwan, 10 December 1962, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP239, Dorset History Centre
272 “Pre-campaign Support from 97,000 Anti-Marketeers”, *Guardian*, 11 June 1968, CIB 7/1, BLPES
274 *Political Intelligence Weekly*, published by John Paul, 12 May 1968, CIB 7/14, BLPES; *On Target*, 4:10, British League of Rights, 11 November 1972, DMK/2/14, Hull History Centre
275 *On Target*, 4:10, British League of Rights, 11 November 1972, DMK/2/14, Hull History Centre
With political parties perceived to be unresponsive to the views of their rank-and-file supporters, there was a void within which anti-Market groups could operate and mobilise for support. As alluded to above, pro-Market organisations failed to capitalise on this disenfranchised rank-and-file, and sought to influence elite and parliamentary opinion. The European Forum and CGE had little connection with the Conservative Party’s grassroots support, while LCE maintained a policy to remove ‘all obstacles within the Labour Party’ and build relationships with continental socialists, which did not seek to increase and mobilise grassroots support.\textsuperscript{276} LCE recognised this problem in 1968, calling for a nationwide tour of Brains Trusts on the EEC issue as ‘there was a gap in European thinking between local and national level in the Party.’\textsuperscript{277} Organisations such as WACM therefore sought to appeal to the disillusioned anti-Market grassroots of the Labour Party, and criticised, ‘those Labour lights, who talk of high ideals, while obviously so out of touch, with how a worker feels. [...] Too long the Party’s suffered its Non-Socialist élite.’\textsuperscript{278} Emmanuel Shinwell, who although reluctant to join ACML co-operated closely with John Paul, sought with his Labour colleagues to influence local grassroots support and reported to Paul that their ‘decision... to persuade Labour Constituencies is having an excellent effect.’\textsuperscript{279} Likewise, aware that anti-Market opinion could not express itself effectively at Conservative Party Conferences, ACML sought in 1970 to ‘pay more attention to the Conservative rank and file and convert the “doubtfuls” through the constituencies’, and planned a public meeting in Blackpool to

\textsuperscript{276} Minutes of a meeting of Labour Committee for Europe (LCE), 23 October 1967, 1 NY 76-78, Labour Committee for Europe in \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
\textsuperscript{277} Minutes of a meeting of LCE, 22 October 1968, 1 NY 89-90, Labour Committee for Europe in \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
\textsuperscript{278} Poem in a letter from Audrey Garner to Anne Kerr [n.d.], DMK/2/19, Hull History Centre
\textsuperscript{279} Letter from Emmanuel Shinwell to John Paul, 8 July 1967, CIB 7/11, BLPES
coincide with the Party Conference.\textsuperscript{280} Gaining support of the general public, and parties’ grassroots support, was therefore essential to the anti-Market campaign, with RBCMC speaking of the Conservative Party hierarchy ‘who wholly misrepresent the grass-roots of their local Conservative vote’, and that ‘[t]reachery on this issue at the head, [and] subservience to the party line below, are destroying the Conservative Party for a generation.’\textsuperscript{281}

\textbf{A systemic problem? Anti-party and anti-establishment tendencies of the anti-Market campaign}

In the perceived absence of party democracy, with the opinions of grassroots voters either being manipulated or ignored, anti-Market groups in some cases demonstrated an attitude bordering on ‘anti-party instincts’ of which McCarthy wrote.\textsuperscript{282} As early as 1962, ACML wrote of how party machinery’s control of candidate selection and maintenance of party unity had left political parties ‘divorced and centralised from the minds and souls of the people.’\textsuperscript{283} John Paul, in an appeal to the newly-elected U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1969, wrote of how ‘party politicians’ standing is lower in public esteem than probably ever before’ and how the anti-EEC majority had become ‘estranged from the bulk of party politicians who put the contrary point of view’, allowing ACML and other non-party anti-Market groups to capitalise upon the disenfranchised grassroots who were unable to influence party policy.\textsuperscript{284} It was this disillusionment with political parties, combined with his strong anti-EEC views, which had led to Paul’s independent candidacy at the 1964 General Election.

\textsuperscript{280} Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 16 July 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{282} McCarthy, “Leading from the Centre”, p.528
\textsuperscript{283} Corbet, R.H., “The Federalist Pressures in Britain” in Corbet (ed), \textit{Britain, not Europe}, p.20, CIB 7/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{284} Letter from John Paul to President Richard Nixon, 5 March 1969, CIB 7/11, BLPES
Paul’s election leaflet lamented that ‘defeatism has since the war been widespread in all Parties, and in the “Establishment”... [and] the intellectuals and “top brass” generally.’ Candidates independent of political parties, ‘free of Party Whips and their insidious patronage and “Jobs for the Boys”’, had ‘led in several pieces of important legislation in the past’, but the decline of independent candidates, according to Paul, had led to Parliament being controlled by the machinations of political parties.\textsuperscript{285} ACML elaborated on this anti-party, anti-establishment stance in the mid-1960s claiming that ‘[m]ost thinking folk are so disillusioned these days with politicians (and their parties) that their abuse... especially at election times... is taken for granted and largely ignored.’\textsuperscript{286} Anti-Marketeers thus believed party politics and parliamentary politics had been skewed by the highly organised machinery of political parties. Powell emphasised this by describing in an interview with the \textit{Guardian} that political parties should not be manipulating grassroots opinion, but rather,

\begin{quote}
Politicians articulate, crystallise, dramatise if you like, render intelligible and therefore render capable of being turned into action, legislative or administrative, something which is present already in people’s minds. If this were not so, I can’t think what would be the meaning of democracy.\textsuperscript{287}
\end{quote}

The PFM articulated this anti-party, anti-establishment sentiment most clearly in the early 1970s, its motto calling for a ‘new concept of British politics’.\textsuperscript{288} PFM was founded in response to the European issue, and the passage of European Communities legislation in Parliament was viewed by PFM as ‘the tragedy of Party politics endangering the existence of

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\textsuperscript{285} Letter from John Paul to electors of Bexley, 30 September 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{286} ACML, “What Joining the Common Market Really Means”, 1 March 1966, CIB 7/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{287} “Europe’s undertaker?”, \textit{Guardian}, 22 February 1971, DMK/2/17, Hull History Centre
\textsuperscript{288} “The Political Freedom Movement – The New Concept of British Politics” [n.d.], 1 SW 4, Political Freedom Movement in \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
\end{flushright}
the nation.’

With the aim of returning political power to the electorate, PFM called for the abolition of Whips, free votes on every issue in Parliament, power transferred from the Executive back to MPs, and ‘[r]eform of the Electoral System to achieve a true and fair representation in the House of Commons with a real choice by the voters.’

In “Let Us Try Democracy”, PFM’s founder Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett called for wide-ranging reforms that would implement ‘a truly democratic system of representation’. His strongest criticisms were reserved for ‘the unconstitutional Party system of Government’, described as one of ‘the greatest single causes of mediocrity in British Political Life’ and as ‘machinery to defeat the purpose of Democracy, and as such it functions extremely well.’ Party loyalty and the power of party lead-erships meant that issues could not be debated honestly in Parliament, and the free vote was therefore called for to ensure the majority’s true views were represented. In the words of Bennett,

A ‘Non-Party system’ is ‘normal’, and there appears to be no reason why normal methods which function in every other activity of men should fail to function in a free Parliament.

This sentiment could be found in other anti-Market organisations, with calls for ‘an Independent Party, dedicated to carry out the wishes of the People, as in all true Democracies.’ However, while ACML wrote in 1963 that it received ‘a constant stream of letters suggesting that the time is ripe for the formation of a new political movement’, representing ‘a surge of feeling and a general disillusionment with the present parties’, it was

289 PFM press release, 5 July 1972, 1 SW 28, Political Freedom Movement in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
290 PFM press release [n.d.], 1 SW 2, Political Freedom Movement in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
291 Don C.T. Bennett, “Let Us Try Democracy” [n.d.], 1 SW 15-18, Political Freedom Movement in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
292 Letter from G.A. Chamberlain to Anne Kerr [n.d.], DMK/2/19, Hull History Centre
aware that more finance was needed ‘to convert today’s unease into wider action’ in the future. Lord Hinchingbrooke, as President of ACML, also felt that it was ‘purely a national movement, formed for a specific purpose’, and that its expansion into a new political party was not necessary in the 1960s. Hinchingbrooke wrote that political parties ‘are not formed by the propagation of sets of principles in favour of a special set of ideas, even though those ideas are utterly praiseworthy’, and instead their formation ‘takes place in an atmosphere of crisis, and by splitting allegiances out of the old parties under stress of popular acclaim.’

Thus, while Hinchingbrooke and his colleagues disagreed with a number of Conservative Party policies such as EEC membership and ‘over-swift’ decolonisation, Hinchingbrooke wished to preserve the fundamentals of the existing political system, claiming that ‘[t]he formation of a new political quarter or identifiable group within the Conservative Party is not, in my opinion, called for.’

Similarly, despite his work with CMSC and CACMIS, Neil Marten, as a Conservative MP, called upon Conservative Central Office to produce objective publications stating the anti-Market view not only to increase anti-Market support, but also, … [to] at all costs avoid giving an impression of a divided Party so far as the public is concerned. We certainly do not wish to get into the position where Conservative MPs – and other prominent Conservatives – have to attack the publications of our own Party and the views expressed in them.

This contrast between the inherent party loyalty of the majority of anti-Market MPs and the unaffiliated activists within anti-Market groups would later be problematic, as chapters three and four will demonstrate, as politicians within the organisations were accused of being too...

293 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, July 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPES
294 Letter from Lord Hinchingbrooke to J.N. Charlton [n.d., 1963/64?], Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP87, Dorset Record Office
295 Letter from Lord Hinchingbrooke to Brian Loder, 22 May 1963, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP253, Dorset Record Office
conservative. In the 1960s and early 1970s, however, it predominantly demonstrated the inability of the anti-Market campaign to make sufficient progress in the public or political spheres to transform anti-Market sentiment into a mass movement or a political force.

**Conclusions**

Anti-Market groups thus found themselves positioned between the political sphere and mass mobilisation. They sought mass support through populist arguments and issues which would lead to organisations founded around particular party political ideologies campaigning together on the same common ground, leading to the foundation of the umbrella group CMSC. Political sovereignty, national identity inherent in British political culture, the Commonwealth and price rises all had a resonant, cross-party appeal. In contrast to elite-oriented pro-Market groups, they directly targeted the general public and sought mass membership, yet their parallel targeting of political support through the monitoring and lobbying of MPs reflected their position on the political fringes. Their anti-establishment character, borne out of frustration with bureaucratised political party machinery, reinforced the image of anti-Market organisations as protest groups, unable to attain political influence and locked out of political decision-making processes.
CHAPTER THREE: ‘DEMA GOUERY WITH A VENGEANCE’?: ANTI-EEC ORGANISATIONS, 1973-751

The anti-Market campaign was left, as one group admitted, ‘in the dumps’ in 1973.2 A combined rally on 30 December 1972, and a few demonstrations to tie in with the Fanfare for Europe in the first week of 1973, signalled a determination to continue campaigning. However, the battle to prevent British membership of the EEC had been lost, and in the initial months of membership there appeared to be a lack of direction and policy amongst the anti-Market organisations.3 Indeed, the CMSC’s outgoing Director, Ron Leighton, had to reassure other anti-Market groups in early 1973 that it had not collapsed.4 Whereas in the 1960s, anti-Market groups went into relative dormancy after British attempts at EEC entry were blocked, the campaign now had to both maintain the saliency of the EEC issue and continue to mobilise the public against it.

The period between EEC entry and the referendum is predominantly viewed through the framework of party political manoeuvring, with the anti-Market groups that combined under the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) umbrella in 1975 portrayed as actors in intra-party battles.5 Those works that do focus on the activities of anti-Market organisations do so in a cursory manner, such as Philip Goodhart’s brief summary of the constituent

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1 Denman, Missed Chances, p.250. This was a phrase used by Roy Denman to describe Harold Wilson’s denouncement of the European standardisation of beer and bread. While this could also translate to anti-Market groups’ populist rhetoric regarding food policy, it could also be applied to their tactics and their anti-establishment character, although the chapter will demonstrate that this populism was also matched by a desire for political support and respectability.

2 Folkestone and District Anti-Common Market Group newsletter, 29 May 1973, CIB/7/16, BLPES

3 ‘I would say that the main concern among Anti Marketeers is not so much about organisation, but about policy, or lack of it’: Letter from Francis d’Aft, Chairman of West Country ACML, to Sir Robin Williams, 26 May 1973, CIB/7/17, BLPES

4 Letter from Ron Leighton to Donald Martin, National Director of British League of Rights and National Organiser of Anti Dear Food Campaign, 23 February 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES

5 Young, J.W., Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999
organisations within the NRC being GBO, CMSC and ‘a smattering of smaller organisations’. Another contemporary account of the referendum by Butler and Kitzinger is more comprehensive and employs a greater focus on nationwide campaigning activities, but still remains fairly Westminster-centric. Julie Smith’s article assesses the umbrellas organisations’ campaigning and the issues being debated in impressive detail, in spite of a lack of archival material. Elsewhere, emphasis is instead laid on Labour Party leader Harold Wilson’s attempt to maintain unity amongst a party divided over, but broadly opposed to, EEC membership. Renegotiation of membership terms within the EEC’s Council of Ministers, followed by an election pledge to allow a public vote on EEC membership via a referendum, served to contain a great deal of intra-party dissent on the issue. While anti-Market groups capitalised on these tactical devices of renegotiation and referendum, the issues under discussion were those on which they had campaigned for several years, and had continued to do so after 1973. References in Labour’s 1974 election manifesto to the ‘consent of the British people’, ‘imposition of food taxes on top of rising world prices’, ‘draconian curtailment of the power of the British Parliament to settle questions affecting vital British interests’, and the Common Agricultural Policy’s ‘threat to world trade’, all correspond with the rhetoric of anti-Market organisations in this period.

This chapter will assess how these organisations approached the situation between Britain’s EEC entry and the referendum, when they were ‘now attacking the status quo instead of defending it’ and having ‘to sell the idea that Britain to survive must get out of the

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8 Smith, J., “The 1975 Referendum”
9 Denman, *Missed Chances*, p.247
Anti-Market organisations were once again positioned between mass protest and institutional politics, targeting both political and public support but failing to attract substantial backing from either. While concern over the same cross-party issues and occupying a common ground had previously brought anti-Market groups closer together, questions of strategy now became a divisive element in the anti-Market campaign, particularly when the referendum brought the issue fully into the public domain.

This chapter will first analyse the two major cross-party issues which the anti-Market campaign focused on – prices (particularly of foodstuffs) and sovereignty – and explains how their differing nature and resonance reflected a wider division between the campaign’s public and political outlook. These subjects guided NRC’s two major aims, ‘to restore to the British Parliament the exclusive right to pass laws and impose taxation binding on citizens of the UK’ and to ‘re-establish the power of the UK to trade freely, particularly in the case of food, with any country in the world’. The Get Britain Out campaign also rejected what it saw as the two main principles of the EEC, supranational authority and community preference in trade, making the issues of prices and sovereignty central to the campaign. The issue of rising food prices, in a time of economic crisis and severe inflation, was a particularly populist one. By focusing both on the threat to the poorer sections of society and the decline in quality and choice in the marketplace for the more affluent, anti-Market groups targeted the wider public as consumers, across class or party boundaries. However, defence of the consumer often led the campaign to employ anti-establishment rhetoric, particularly when pro-Marketeers attempted to deflect the issue. Furthermore, a rise in food prices on a global scale

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10 “Some Recommendations for the Future” by Christopher Frere-Smith, 30 January 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES
11 NRC press release, 7 January 1975
12 GBO manifesto [n.d., 1974], 1 NP 113-16, Get Britain Out in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
led other anti-Marketeers to push for sovereignty to be the campaign’s key issue. Monitoring the introduction of EEC legislation immediately became a task for anti-Market groups, who sought to provide examples to the public of a loss of sovereignty. However, the issue did not appear to be resonant with the public, and the importance with which anti-Market MPs attached to sovereignty demonstrated its political, Parliament-centric nature.

The clash between seeking political and public support is also evident in the image which the anti-Market campaign wished to present. The second part of this chapter will assess the character and tactics of anti-Market organisations, and the incongruous strategy of seeking political support and respectability whilst also employing anti-establishment rhetoric. Groups like the ACML, as political outsiders, had been previously been extremely critical of governments and politicians to secure EEC membership, and revealed an anti-establishment character in the process. However, in the period leading up to the referendum, both the ACML and the CMSC sought support from the political sphere. The NRC brought together MPs from across the political spectrum, and sidelined the more extremist anti-Market groups, in order to present a respectable image. Its Chairman Neil Marten and Vice-Chairman Douglas Jay met with senior government figures and media representatives in order to ensure fairer and more equal media exposure and treatment. In response to the increased media prominence, anti-Marketeers needed to present a respectable case and a united front, which sat uneasily with the anti-political, anti-establishment tendencies within the campaign. Once again, partial access to the political sphere and parliamentary elites meant that anti-Market organisations occupied a middle ground between political lobbyists and outsider protest groups. The referendum defeat by a vote of two to one represented a failure in both spheres,
and reflected a fragmented coalition and an inability to unite the public and political strands of the anti-Market campaign effectively.

**Key issues of the anti-Market referendum campaign: public and political**

**Food prices**

The previous chapter demonstrated how the issue of rising food prices had become a central pillar in a non-party, populist campaign against EEC entry, as an issue both affecting the public across party, class and gender lines and relating to the broader issues of the Commonwealth and agriculture. In the British economic downturn of the mid-1970s, the issue of inflation and rising prices continued to be a major concern amongst the public, dominating both of the general elections of 1974 and becoming what David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh called ‘the central issue of the period’.¹³ Anti-Market groups maintained their focus on the issue of food prices which had remained high after EEC entry, and continued to monitor food policy and changes to trade patterns. Again, their arguments were not solely centred on the economic effects of rising prices upon consumers, but were also concerned with issues of food quality and nutrition, and threats to British national identity. In defending the rights of the consumer over the profiting producer, the campaign adopted an anti-establishment tone in its attempt to mobilise support. The connection that anti-Marketeers drew between the issue of food policy and the problems of inflation also demonstrates how they saw the food prices issue as a microcosm of the wider economic problem in Britain, and saw a return to liberalist free trade as an economic panacea.

The issue of rising food prices appeared to have continued resonance with anti-
Marketeers in the pre-referendum period. CMSC’s aforementioned “Why Food Is Dear”
leaflet, aimed directly at the public, plainly set out the rise in prices of essential foodstuffs
within the previous three years and attributed this to the pursuit of EEC membership. It
criticised some of the aspects of Common Market food policy, such as the Intervention Board
which it perceived as having the ‘sole job… to keep up prices in Britain by buying up food,
storing it, and if necessary mixing chemicals with it to make it unfit for human
consumption.’

The CMSC subsequently decided that ‘emphasis on food prices was right and
should continue’ and the ACML also continued to produce leaflets on rising food prices and
VAT. By February 1974, ACML personnel perceived the issue of food prices and the EEC
to be ‘the people’s issue in [the general] election’ and the issue which would resonate most
with the public in their campaign. This was reinforced by several opinion polls, including a
MORI poll which showed that 58 per cent of the electorate saw the cost of living as the key
issue, which ‘showed that shop prices had much more appeal than sovereignty.’

In another poll in 1974, two-thirds of respondents cited EEC membership as a cause of rising food
prices. Douglas Jay, Chairman of both the CMSC and its Labour Party counterpart and
Vice-Chairman of the NRC, was a key exponent of the arguments on food policy, writing

15 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 25 July 1973 CIB/1/3, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of
ACML Executive Committee, 8 May 1973, CIB/7/4, BLPES
16 Press release by Havering and Redbridge branch of ACML, Hornchurch and Upminster Echo, 21 February
1974, CIB/7/18, BLEPS
17 Young, H., This Blessed Plot, p.221; Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p.109
18 Jowell, R. and Hoinville, G., Britain into Europe: Public Opinion and the EEC, 1961-75 (London: SCPR,
1976), pp.54-55
articles for the Spectator and Sunday Express and leaflets for the CMSC on price rises. Jay went as far as to declare after the referendum that the issue

...should have made the central if not the only, theme of the campaign. It was true. It was overwhelmingly important for the whole nation. And the public both understood and believed it. [...] But some perfectly sincere and indeed fervent anti-Marketeers had not the propaganda sense to see that in public sentiment the cost of food was the dominant and decisive issue.

Anti-Market groups within the wider network perceived the widespread impact of the price rises and VAT to be affecting consumers and ‘people in all walks of life’, and presented it as a cross-party issue. The Anti Dear Food Campaign (ADFC), formed in 1973 by former Keep Britain Out figures Oliver Smedley and S.W. Alexander, also contributed to the anti-Market campaign by criticising many of the changes in food policy attributed to EEC membership. Its particular target was the Intervention Board, seen as ‘the weakest link in the armoury of the Common Agricultural Policy’ and as both ‘vulnerable to attack’ and ‘difficult to explain away to the public.’ Repeated reference was therefore made to it in leaflets, and a number of demonstrations were organised outside its British headquarters in London. By what Butler and Kitzinger called pointing ‘emotively to the [Intervention Board’s] creation of beef mountains, butter mountains and wine lakes’, anti-Marketeers were thus aware of the

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20 Jay, Change and Fortune, p.485
21 Letter from W.H. Brown, Chairman of Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML, to supporters [n.d., spring 1973], CIB/7/15, BLPES
23 Letter from David Farrer, National Organiser of Anti Dear Food Campaign, to unknown recipient [n.d.], CIB/10/7, BLPES; Letter from David Farrer, National Organiser of Anti Dear Food Campaign, to Sir Robin Williams of ACML, 31 October 1973, CIB/10/7, BLPES
24 Anti Dear Food Campaign press release, 26 March 1974, CIB/10/7, BLPES
public perception of the Intervention Board, and intended to make it the focus of a popular campaign.\textsuperscript{25} The NRC also sought to portray the Intervention Board’s hoarding and denaturing of food and the sale of surplus food at a lower price to Russia as ‘immoral’.\textsuperscript{26} Its attempt to shun the use of ‘raw statistics’ at press conferences in favour of ‘data which relates to family life’ and which was within ‘most peoples [sic] experiences’ also made food prices and the household budget a key theme in the campaign, and directly targeted public support.\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore, in the early months of Britain’s EEC membership, the ACML felt that a campaign centred on food policy rather than EEC withdrawal would attract more support from moderates, believing a slogan such as ‘Stop Taxes on Food’ to be less divisive than ‘Out of the Common Market’.\textsuperscript{28} 

While the ADFC retained a focus on mobilising support against EEC food policy through leafleting and demonstrations, research on the issue was undertaken by the ACML and the Open Seas Forum, who together compiled ‘more detailed information’ before presenting it to the public.\textsuperscript{29} A network of groups on the food prices issue therefore began to form, with the ADFC having close connections with female consumer group the British Housewives’ League, sharing meetings, members and, at one point, premises.\textsuperscript{30} It later

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\textsuperscript{25} Butler and Kitzinger, \textit{The 1975 Referendum}, p.187 \\
\textsuperscript{26} “Concerned about your food?”, National Referendum Campaign [NRC] leaflet [n.d.], NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives \\
\textsuperscript{27} Proposed list of National Referendum Campaign [NRC] Press Conferences, by Barrie Sherman, Director of Research for Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs [n.d.], MS Eng. Hist. c.1132/109-110, Bodleian Library \\
\textsuperscript{28} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Denis Martin, Secretary of Dover & Folkestone District Anti-Common Market Group, and Ron Leighton, 24 May 1973, CIB/7/16, BLPES \\
\textsuperscript{29} Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 26 November 1973, CIB/7/4, BLPES \\
\textsuperscript{30} Invitation to supporters to ADFC and BHL meeting in Worthing, June 1973, 1 AV 4, Anti Dear Food Campaign in \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources. It was decided at the BHL’s AGM that subscribers to BHL’s \textit{Housewives Today} and the British League of Rights’ \textit{On Target} were treated as de facto members of ADFC: \textit{Housewives Today}, no.9, June 1973, 1 DB 70-76, British Housewives’ League in \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources. Correspondence of both BHL and ADFC showed that in 1973 they shared the same address in Epsom, Surrey. 
\end{flushleft}
became affiliated with both the CMSC and the NRC, with Smedley being appointed to the Committee of the former, due to its contribution to the campaign against rising food prices.31

The “Hungry Market”: impact of price rises on the most vulnerable

Organisations with a specific concern about the public’s position as consumers made claims, which in hindsight seem exaggerated, about the EEC’s food policies driving up the cost of food to such high prices that a large section of the population would be under-fed. Women Against the Common Market was still claiming after the referendum defeat that the EEC’s food policies were ‘driving us into starvation – no less.’32 Their spiritual antecedents, the British Housewives’ League, took the argument directly to the government, with a delegation meeting Joseph Godber, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. It warned that ‘rocketing prices of basic foodstuffs might lead to widespread malnutrition’ and that a national subsidised loaf should be introduced to aid the most vulnerable.33 Joyce Mew, an active figure in both the British Housewives’ League and the ADFC, spoke at a meeting of the latter to advocate further protection and information for consumers. She asked,

How can the housewife budget to withstand this economic blizzard? Much can be done by the experienced and knowledgeable. Unfortunately, many of the ignorant and the aged are already suffering from malnutrition and if prices continue to rise as they undoubtedly will, then the outlook will be grim.34

31 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 14 January 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
32 Letter from Barbara Fellowes of WACM to Uwe Kitzinger, 30 July 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
33 Statement by Joyce Mew to Press Association, 14 March 1973, in Housewives Today, no.7, April 1973, 1 DB 63-69, British Housewives’ League in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
34 Housewives Today, no.9, June 1973, 1 DB 70-76, British Housewives’ League in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
The anti-Market campaign’s direct message to the public was similarly austere and alarmist. “Why Food Is Dear” highlighted that the price rises affected ‘pensioners and large families with low earnings’ the most, and that the CMSC would ‘safeguard the housewife against rises in food prices and the cost of living’.35 The NRC’s broadcasts also targeted the consumer by highlighting the impact of price rises on both ‘the housewife’s food bill’ and the most vulnerable. One broadcast featured female shoppers interviewed in a market who were informed that price rises ‘hit people like yourselves of course who are on relatively low wages’ and that ‘[i]f you’re a pensioner, or a single person, or have got a large family, or a low income’, the consequences could be even more severe.36 Consumers were also warned of the impact of VAT, a ‘tax on consumption operating through a rise in prices and therefore, in so far as it is imposed on necessities... hits the low paid harder than the better off’.37 Anti-Marketeers thus argued that price rises would be more damaging for the poorest sections of society, such as pensioners, who ‘spend more of their money on food than any other class.’38 The interests of ‘[m]illions of working people – the self employed – the small traders – the pensioners – the retired – all people living on fixed incomes’ were juxtaposed with ‘those who organise monopolies and price rings’ who formed part of the establishment that had brought Britain into the EEC.39

36 Transcript of NRC broadcast on BBC Radio 4, 27 May 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
37 “1975 Referendum, the Common Market: In or Out”, Labour Research Department, March 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
38 “Never Cheap Food Again?” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 AT 259-60, Anti-Common Market League in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
39 “Statement no.5 – The Common Market: a conspiracy against the people” [n.d., 1975], 1 PX 8, Liberal “No to the Common Market Campaign” in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
The “Tasteless Market”: Food quality and Commonwealth imports

As well as seeking to defend the poorest sections of society from food price rises, the anti-Market campaign’s concentration on issues of quality and choice revealed liberalist and free-market perspectives, demonstrating the cross-party nature of the campaign on food policy. Concerns about the nutrition and quality of food under new EEC regulations combined the interests of both the working and middle classes. Certain foods being priced out was a concern, with the ADFC claiming that increases in the costs of cheese may remove ‘the old age pensioner’s cheapest source of protein’, and that ‘the British people are now consuming less beef per head than in the last months of rationing.’ More alarmist stories emanated from anti-Marketeers about European housewives having to boycott expensive dairy products ‘in spite of the glut of dairy produce in the EEC’ and the cheap sale of butter to Russia. While these examples indicate a concern for the nutritional well-being of the more vulnerable, the anti-Market campaign was also concerned with maintaining the quality of traditional foodstuffs.

The ADFC’s main objectives were therefore not merely concerned with the availability of cheap food but also to ‘work for policies that permit British consumers to purchase good food at the cheapest possible prices’. The quality of milk became a concern in the first year of membership, with EEC regulations leading the introduction of skimmed and semi-skimmed milk, and the limitation of whole milk to 3.5 per cent fat compared to the previous British minimum of 3.7 per cent fat, where people ‘drink milk as it comes from the

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40 Anti Dear Food Campaigner, no.2, August-September 1973, 1 AV 21-28, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
41 “Our Better Tomorrow: in the Common Market or the economics of bedlam” leaflet [n.d., 1973], 1 AT 232-233, Anti-Common Market League in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
42 ADFC press release [n.d.], CIB/10/7, BLPES [emphasis mine]
cow’. When questioned, the Milk Marketing Board responded that they had ‘kept up the quality of milk and can’t see any reason why we should lower it. The change can only add to the butter glut [across the EEC].’\textsuperscript{43} The debate surrounding skimmed milk continued beyond the referendum, both inside and outside Westminster.\textsuperscript{44} The use of continental wheat within the EEC also led to anti-Marketeers seeking to maintain the quality of British bread. British producers were unable to take advantage of surpluses from Commonwealth harvests, meaning that bread in Britain would no longer be made from ‘hard Canadian wheat’ and would ‘get dearer and nastier until in 1978 it reaches full Community price and quality, and the loaf that was 10½p will cost you at least 20p for poorer bread.’\textsuperscript{45} EEC regulations on the import of Commonwealth sugar also led the Get Britain Out campaign to remind the public that, once the shortages in granulated sugar had passed, they should ‘remember why you can’t get caster sugar, cube sugar or brown sugar.’\textsuperscript{46} An NRC leaflet also made reference to Britain’s market for fresh fruit, describing it as ‘very selective, insisting upon the highest quality.’ Importing fruit from Commonwealth harvests allowed Britain to purchase fresh fruit throughout the year, and despite the price being affected by the overhead costs of refrigeration during long sea journeys, the leaflet argued that Commonwealth fruit ‘nevertheless secures the market it deserves by its extremely high quality.’ Under EEC regulations, ‘the UK consumer would be

\textsuperscript{43} “Market rule will change your milk”, Evening Standard, 25 June 1973, MS Eng. Hist. c.1141/13, Bodleian Library
\textsuperscript{44} CMSC reported that a debate on skimmed milk in Westminster ‘had brought the constitutional situation to the attention of the House of Commons and a further debate has been promised’: Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 26 April 1976, CIB/1/4. The European Commission and voluntary welfare organisations also collaborated on the issue of the disposal of skimmed milk powder: Hansard Society, The British People: their voice in Europe: report of an independent working party sponsored by the Hansard Society on the effects of membership of the European Community on British representative institutions (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977), p.125
\textsuperscript{45} “Never Cheap Food Again?” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 AT 259-60, Anti-Common Market League in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
\textsuperscript{46} “The Great Vanishing Trick” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 NP 331, Get Britain Out in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources. For more context on the shortages in sugar, see “Rationing starts as sugar shortage looms”, Guardian, 9 July 1974; “Why the sugar shortage meant embarrassment for the Government”, The Times, 6 December 1974
compelled to eat low quality (long stored) fruit outside the Community season instead of the high quality freshly gathered supplies from the southern hemisphere.’ These examples, along with the EEC’s ‘debasement of high-quality meat by freeze-storing’, meant that the quality of food was as much a concern as its price and availability. With price rises making it more expensive to maintain current standards of eating, Marten warned that the EEC ‘will be a Hungry and Tasteless Market.’

Free trade and cheap food were seen as the cornerstones of British commercial policy, the latter alluded to in several references made by the British Housewives’ League and the ADFC to the repeal of the Corn Laws. ADFC believed that Britain’s prosperity began with the repeal in 1846, and Smedley envisioned the organisation as ‘the twentieth century equivalent of the Anti Corn Law League which brought cheap food to the people in the 1840s.’ VAT highlighted to anti-Marketeers the ‘sharp contrast between British and continental social and economic conventions’, as Britain had ‘scrupulously avoided a VAT on foodstuffs’ and other consumer durables and essentials. Continental systems were also

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47 “Commonwealth Trade: The True Facts” by S. Stanley-Smith, NRC, April 1975, MS. Eng. Hist. c.1148, Bodleian Library
48 “State of the Nation: Britain’s economy would be stronger outside the EEC than in”, memorandum by Neil Marten [n.d.], MS Eng. Hist. c.1141/267-273, Bodleian Library
49 “Stop Being Conned – Fight for Cheaper Food” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 AV 63, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources; Letter from Oliver Smedley to ADFC members, 6 June 1975, 1 AV 67, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources. The influence of the Anti-Corn Law League was enduring throughout the anti-EEC campaign, influencing the title of both the Anti-Common Market League and the Anti-Federalist League [the predecessor to the UK Independence Party], and advocated by Smedley as the model for the British Anti-Common Market Campaign in the 1980s: Sked, A., “Reflections of a Eurosceptic” in Baimbridge, M. (ed), The 1975 Referendum on Europe: Volume 1: reflections of the participants (Exeter: Academic Imprint, 2006), pp.143-145; Letter from Oliver Smedley to Lord Stoddart, 12 April 1985, CIB/3/2, BL.PES
criticised for having inefficient agricultural production propped up by CAP funding, and fishing methods that were ‘more like massacre’ where cod had ‘become a luxury food’.  

The solution proposed by anti-Marketeers was withdrawal from the EEC along with the return to a traditional British agricultural policy that would benefit both producer and consumer and keep prices down. Anti-Market rhetoric on food policy was therefore concentrated to some extent on issues of national identity, which was already threatened by EEC membership affecting trade policy and food consumption. Britain’s role, for example, was perceived to be outward-looking and at the centre of global trade, importing a large proportion of the food it needed. Its previous agricultural policy was to subsidise farmers to guarantee prices for the producer and keep prices low for the consumer, a national policy which anti-Marketeers called for a return to. Anti-Marketeers thus perceived the traditional British policy to be ‘a well tried trading system among friends, based on mutual benefit and respect and having an essentially liberal foundation.

The demand to import high-quality Commonwealth food therefore reinforced this strand of free-trade liberalism within the anti-Market campaign, perhaps most evident in the ADFC with the likes of Smedley, Alexander and Frere-Smith having been previously involved in Liberal politics. This liberalism was often more explicit in the wider economic

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51 “Who Really Runs The Country? or The Economics of Bedlam – Phase II” leaflet [n.d., 1974], 1 AT 250-251, Anti-Common Market League in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
52 “Food Costs More in the Common Market” by Sir John Winnifrith, published by CMSC, March 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
53 “Why You Should Vote No”, leaflet by NRC [n.d., 1975], BIE/28/2, Parliamentary Archives
54 “Commonwealth Trade: The True Facts” by S. Stanley-Smith, NRC, April 1975, MS. Eng. Hist. c.1148, Bodleian Library
55 Smedley and Alexander had both been ‘heavily involved in Liberal Party politics’ – the latter a chairman of the London Liberal Party – and had both stood as candidates, before becoming disillusioned and leaving the Party in 1962 over the EEC issue. They had previously worked together in the Society of Individualists: Cockett, R., Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-tanks and the economic counter-revolution, 1931-1983 (London:
solutions advocated by the ADFC, who saw the food policy issue as a microcosm of Britain’s economic problems and relations with the EEC. In its “Manifesto for Survival”, for example, it set itself aside from ‘measures being advocated by the conventional politicians of left and right’ in advocating withdrawal from the EEC and a return to free trade.\(^{56}\) In addition to these solutions, the ADFC also advocated a reduction of taxation on wages and consumer goods as the liberalist basis for an economic recovery.\(^{57}\) It sought to gain the support of free-market capitalists, calling for British politicians to introduce ‘free trade, sound money and taxation of site values’, leading to new businesses, new employment opportunities, reduced taxation earnings, and allowing Britain to break out of its ‘protectionist stranglehold’.\(^{58}\)

Change in food policy was therefore seen as the first step to economic recovery, tackling inflation and stabilising the value of the pound, and giving the British consumer ‘money of high quality and purchasing power not the present confetti currency which introduces grave injustices and discord into our community.’\(^{59}\) Statements by anti-Marketeteers about the right to buy food from global markets were underlined by the desire for good quality food and the prerogative of consumer choice. The call to ‘take more advantage of the seasons, the climates and soils of the whole world instead of being compelled to confine our purchases largely to a European temperate zone’ was implicitly concerned with the quality

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56 ADFC press release [n.d., 1974], CIB/10/7, BLPES
57 “Manifesto for Survival” [n.d., 1974], 1 AV 46-49, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
58 “The Anti Dear Food Campaign Says If You Truly Believe in Free Markets and a Capitalist Society, Read This... And Vote No in the Referendum”, ADFC advertisement in The Times, 28 May 1975, 1 AV 66, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
59 “The Anti Dear Food Campaign says stop the collapse of the pound now!” leaflet [n.d., 1973], 1 AV 10, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources; “London is being brought to a standstill!” leaflet [n.d., 1973], 1 AV 11, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources

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and variety of food available to the British consumer.\textsuperscript{60} Statements made during the referendum campaign by Sir John Winnifrith, ex-Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, elaborated on these benefits of global free trade, advocating the import of foods from places ‘where the climate or the quantity or quality of farmland make production cheaper’ and where there was a ‘natural advantage’ to producing certain foods.\textsuperscript{61} The import of dairy products and lamb from New Zealand, for example, which Winnifrith described as coming ‘straight off the grass’, implied a superior quality due to climate and landscape.\textsuperscript{62} Underlying the anti-Marketeers’ concentration on the price, availability, quality and variety of food available to purchase in Britain was a belief that ‘[t]he consumer is entitled to buy what he wants, where he wants and when he wants it.’\textsuperscript{63}

\textbf{Championing the consumer: anti-establishment rhetoric in the food prices argument}

Anti-Marketeers therefore pitted the interests of the public as consumers in opposition to those of producers in their rhetoric. They argued that while the previous system encouraged free trade and gave the consumer ample choice and low prices, the protectionist EEC system worked for the benefit of the producer over the consumer, giving, according to an NRC broadcast, ‘the farmers more money each year, so when their prices go up, the housewife’s food bill goes up.’\textsuperscript{64} They also emphasised the bias towards producers when discussing how the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) ‘provides a floor and not a ceiling’ for prices.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} Letter from S.W. Alexander to MPs, 1 June 1973, CIB/10/7, BLPES
\item \textsuperscript{61} “Food Costs More in the Common Market” by Sir John Winnifrith, published by CMSC, March 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives; Speech made by Sir John Winnifrith at NRC rally at Conway Hall, London, 12 April 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
\item \textsuperscript{62} Speech made by Sir John Winnifrith at NRC rally at Conway Hall, London, 12 April 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
\item \textsuperscript{63} “Commonwealth Trade: The True Facts” by S. Stanley-Smith, NRC, April 1975, MS. Eng. Hist. c.1148, Bodleian Library
\item \textsuperscript{64} Transcript of NRC broadcast on BBC Radio 4, 27 May 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
\end{itemize}
guaranteeing income for farmers but maintaining high prices for the consumer.\textsuperscript{65} Import taxes and levies were thus seen as artificially inflating the price of food ‘for the benefit of subsidising Continental agriculture.’\textsuperscript{66} Furthermore, anti-Marketeers attributed the huge surpluses of food in the form of ‘butter mountains’ and ‘wine lakes’ to a lack of control of production, implying that consumer demand was no longer controlling agricultural output; in his criticism of the Intervention Board, Neil Marten said that under a British system, ‘[s]ensible people grow food to eat.’\textsuperscript{67} Their priority was to protect the consumer, and the removal of marketing boards and guarantees under EEC membership was perceived to remove the link between producer and consumer and introduce an element of instability.\textsuperscript{68}

This rhetoric was permeated with the aforementioned anti-establishment element found in the anti-Marketeers’ wider argument, with Heath criticised by the ADFC for being ‘in favour of a dear food policy in the interests of a section of the community’ and looking to ‘secure special privileges for great sectional interests.’\textsuperscript{69} Powerful farming pressure groups that ‘get their way over consumers and taxpayers’ would combine with the government ‘to make the workings of the Common Agricultural Policy even more restrictive and unjust in the

\textsuperscript{65} “State of the Nation: Britain’s economy would be stronger outside the EEC than in”, memorandum by Neil Marten [n.d.], MS Eng. Hist. c.1141/267-273, Bodleian Library
\textsuperscript{66} Joint ACML, CMSC and KBO newsletter, March 1973, CIB/7/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{67} Press release of speech made by Christopher Harrisson, former Chairman of the Egg Marketing Board, 2 May 1975, 1 NP 372-3, Get Britain Out in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources; Speech by Neil Marten at NRC press conference [n.d., 1975], NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
\textsuperscript{68} “A Farmer’s View of the EEC” by Christopher Harrisson [n.d., 1975], 1 NP 322-29, Get Britain Out in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources. This does, however, differ to the stance of Oliver Smedley who, along with fellow Institute of Economic Affairs founder Antony Fisher, was strongly opposed to agricultural subsidies and protection, including marketing boards: Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, pp.124-126
\textsuperscript{69} ADFC flyer distributed during Hove by-election [n.d., 1973], 1 AV 1, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources. ADFC’s anti-establishment stance may have been further influenced by the fact that the Conservative candidate in this by-election was Tim Sainsbury, a board member of the J Sainsbury supermarket chain, who went on to win the seat.
interests of that great sacred cow, British Agriculture." Groups like the ADFC were therefore looking to combine together and ‘smash the highly protected vested interests of agriculture, industry, commerce and finance’ which had supported EEC membership and whom the anti-Marketeteers positioned themselves against in their bid for popular support.

The image of a connection between producers and pro-Marketeteers was reinforced by Britain in Europe’s close association with food manufacturers, after the formation of an umbrella lobby group of several trade organisations and an information service on food policy and prices. Britain in Europe responded by drawing consumers into their meetings with representatives of the food industry. However, the anti-Marketeteers’ ‘potentially damaging argument’ that presented the referendum debate as the pro-Market Establishment ‘against the interests of “ordinary people”’ would continue to trouble BiE. Its initial strategy to ‘counter attack on prices’ in the referendum campaign displayed an awareness of the issue’s significance. BiE had established food, along with sovereignty, as the ‘most difficult themes’ of the campaign, the former being the ‘[m]ost important issue’ to ‘face up to.’

Aware that the anti-Market campaign’s concentration on food policy could attract more support from women, they produced leaflets aimed at housewives in order to develop a

70 “The CAP Conundrum” by Harold Lind, in the Anti Dear Food Campaigner, no.1, July 1973, 1 AV 13-20, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
71 “The Anti Dear Food Campaign Says If You Truly Believe in Free Markets and a Capitalist Society, Read This... And Vote No in the Referendum”, ADFC advertisement in The Times, 28 May 1975, 1 AV 66, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
72 Minutes of a meeting of BIE Referendum Steering Group, 16 April 1975, BIE/28/1, Parliamentary Archives; “Food industry works with pro-EEC group”, The Times, 16 April 1975
73 Minutes of a meeting of BIE Referendum Steering Group, 16 April 1975, BIE/28/1, Parliamentary Archives
74 Opinion Research Centre survey for the Britain in Europe Steering Committee, 30 April 1975, cited in Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent, p.154
75 Letter from Ernest Wistrich, Director of the European Movement, to Noel Priestley, Britain in Europe [BiE] Regional Organiser for Devon and Cornwall, 15 May 1975, BIE/4/5, Parliamentary Archives. Concern over the exploitation of the cost of living issue by anti-Marketeteers in presenting the economic case was also evident in the Conservative Party in 1970: Crowson, N., The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945, p.117
76 Minutes of meeting of BiE Executive Committee, 7 May 1975, BIE/28/1, Parliamentary Archives
stronger line on the issue. Similarly, both the Labour Campaign for Britain in Europe and the Liberal Europe Campaign targeted families in their referendum campaign literature, defending EEC food policy, promising a better standard of living and promoting the EEC’s social policy. ‘For the family’s sake’, the public were encouraged to vote Yes. However, as the campaign progressed it was felt within BiE that food prices was the strongest issue within the anti-Market case, and for pro-Marketeers to continue engaging and publicising it ‘will be (and may already have been) damaging’.

Anti-Marketeers therefore attempted to counter pro-Market propaganda through the adoption of an anti-establishment line in much of their rhetoric. The ACML appealed to the public to place their trust in the anti-Marketeers that had ‘prophesised that food prices would rise and hence wages and so the cost of goods generally’, rather than the pro-Marketeers that had overestimated British economic performance within the EEC. Anti-Marketeers therefore used the issue of food policy to distance themselves from the majority of politicians who had voted for EEC entry and caused the increase in prices. While political parties blamed each other’s policies for inflation and an economic downturn, anti-Marketeers highlighted ‘their apparent failure to put any blame on our membership of the Common Market, as the main cause of inflation’, ‘a shocking admission of the conspiracy which surrounds any adverse points. It is about time Politicians faced up and told the people the truth.’

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77 Minutes of a Press Conference Executive Meeting, 19 May 1975, BIE/28/1, Parliamentary Archives; Letter from Ernest Wistrich to Noel Priestley, 15 May 1975, BIE/4/5, Parliamentary Archives
78 “Don’t slam the door on the future – unite with Europe” leaflet [n.d.], 1 PN 38, Liberal Europe Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
79 “We are better off in Europe” leaflet [n.d.], 1 NU 50-51, Labour Campaign for Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
80 Opinion Research Centre survey for the Britain in Europe Steering Committee, 20 May 1975, cited in Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent, p.165-166
81 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, March 1975, CIB/7/4, BLPES
82 Letter from W.H. Brown to supporters, September 1974, CIB/7/15, BLPES
criticised in the first years of EEC membership for having ‘forced up food prices to the highest levels ever known in this country’ by pushing Britain into membership.83 The ADFC also targeted Heath’s Bexley constituency by leafleting in the run-up to the February 1974 election ‘so as to make his constituents aware of the forces behind the recent shocking rises in food prices.’84

By 1975, this anti-establishment aspect had become more explicit, with an NRC research officer suggesting that the campaign’s television broadcasts ‘should continue to harp on food and jobs, with frequent attacks on the other side, that we are not being told the truth, think for yourself, commonsense etc.’85 These themes were elaborated in the suggestions for the broadcast on prices, with the pro-Marketees likened to Napoleon the pig in George Orwell’s Animal Farm in that ‘all foods are dear, but some foods are dearer than others!’ At the expense of housewives, the only people who would be able to afford higher prices would be ‘the well-heeled city-slickers, the expense account businessment [sic] and all their sympathisers.... Not the ordinary people of this country.’ The other underlying theme was therefore to inform the public not to listen to pro-Marketees, as ‘[t]hey are not interested in your welfare.’86 Anti-Marketees thus portrayed themselves as defending the general public from the combined forces of the EEC, Westminster politicians and big business. However, this anti-establishment image would be problematic when seeking to present a respectable political case, as will become clear later in this chapter.

83 “Why Food Is Dear”, CMSC [n.d., 1973], CIB/1/3, BLPES
84 ADFC press release [n.d.], CIB/10/7, BLPES
85 Letter from Shaun Stewart, NRC Research Officer, to Neil Marten [n.d.], MS Eng. Hist. c.1132/3, Bodleian Library
86 Letter from Shaun Stewart, NRC Research Officer, to Neil Marten [n.d.], MS Eng. Hist. c.1132/4-12, Bodleian Library

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Furthermore, anti-Marketeers’ arguments on food prices began to weaken as the referendum date neared. Each organisation had focused on rising prices since the late 1960s in an attempt to provoke opposition on materialist and moral grounds, but by the time that the NRC was formed, Neil Marten was warning of changing food prices in world markets. While previously it had been a central argument, Marten questioned ‘how far this is genuinely still a very strong card to play’, and that it should be ‘played with some caution for the time being.’ The fact that a greater proportion of the public attributed price rises to an increase in world price rises than EEC membership in a 1974 opinion poll reflected how the anti-Market argument had weakened in the build-up to the referendum. Julie Smith has also noted how the emphasis on EEC price rises came at a time of ‘profoundly altered global conditions’ where world food prices had risen above EEC prices.

Anti-Marketeers were thus unsure how to combat the point put forward by pro-Marketeers that ‘[t]here is no cheap food being made in the world any more’ and that the CAP ‘brings Britain stable supplies at reasonable prices’. These two points became something of a mantra for pro-Marketeers, with organisations keen to stress the security and stability that EEC food policy would bring, and reiterating that ‘the era of cheap food is over’. Britain’s position as an importer of food, combined with rising fuel costs, poor harvests and growing demand, meant that it would ‘be safer in the Community which is almost self-sufficient in

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87 “Some Thoughts on the Referendum Campaign”, Neil Marten, NRC, 7 January 1975, CIB/9/1, BLPES
88 Jowell and Hoinville, Britain into Europe, pp.54-55
89 Smith, “The 1975 Referendum”, p.53
90 “Propaganda Points being made by European Movement and their friends”, memorandum [n.d.], MS Eng. Hist. c. 1132/92
91 “Britain and the European Community – a note for Trades Unionists at the 1974 Trades Union Congress” [n.d., 1974], 1 NY 1112-17, Labour Committee for Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
food’, and pro-EEC rhetoric therefore centred on food security, to ‘safeguard supplies’. The attempt was to create a positive image of EEC food policy, providing steady prices in times of uncertainty, as ‘the Common Supermarket’, with ‘[w]ell stocked shelves’, ‘[b]ulk buying values’, ‘[p]lenty of choice’ and ‘[f]air prices’, based ‘just around the corner.’

The fading of the food policy issue after the referendum also demonstrates the decline in its relevance in the mid-1970s. After the referendum, anti-Marketeers focused on political moves towards further integration in the EEC that were not sanctioned by the referendum result, with leading anti-Marketeers supporting the creation of a body to oppose moves towards a federal Europe. The aims of the new organisation were to ‘monitor Common Market developments, ensure that the vote was used to protect British interests, press for effective Parliamentary supervision of EEC laws and oppose moves towards... a Federal Europe.’ Although the ADFC, which greatly declined in significance after the referendum, sought to continue to mobilise on food prices and campaign for a return to ‘cheap food’, it was an exception amongst fellow anti-Marketeers, including previous food prices campaigner Douglas Jay who now believed the priority was ‘to expose the damaging absurdities of the EEC and resist all further invasion of British liberties and independence.’ Food prices may have had populist appeal, but they lacked the political currency of the ongoing argument regarding the loss of sovereignty, which this chapter will now assess.

92 “Why You Should Vote Yes” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 CC 105-112; “Securing our food” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 CC 125-26; “You Can’t Take Your Food for Granted Any Longer!” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 CC 113-16: all Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
93 “Shoppers – How you answer these questions is how you should vote” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 CC 129, Britain in Europe and Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
94 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Douglas Jay, 18 August 1975, CIB/7/4, BLPES
95 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 23 June 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
96 Minutes of CMSC Branches Conference, 27 September 1975
The attempt to ‘sell’ the issue of sovereignty to the public

Self-government and the preservation of political sovereignty became the key issue in the anti-Market campaign upon British entry into the EEC. Anti-Marketeers saw the ‘second round’, having been defeated in the battle over EEC membership, as one that would be ‘fought between the federalists and anti-federalists’, and thus believed a campaign to ‘Speak up for Britain’ inside the EEC could gain the support of those who were previously pro-Market. The “anti-federalist” line was therefore seen as a way of appealing to political moderates. The task for anti-Marketeers was to convey its intrinsic importance to the public before the referendum, and demonstrate how EEC membership and regulations had introduced ‘[a] lot of today’s evils’ such as VAT and the Intervention Board. Frere-Smith of Get Britain Out thus sought to use EEC regulations as a scapegoat for Britain’s domestic situation, suggesting that ‘[e]verything that goes wrong from now on we shall be able to attribute to Common Market membership’ and that it was ‘essential... that we are able to exploit every opportunity that arises and the opportunities will be enormous.’ Anti-Market groups were to be ‘well-informed on everything that is happening’, including ‘what draft regulations and directives, recommendations and opinions are in the pipe line in Brussels.’

This did not mean, however, that anti-Marketeers were to treat sovereignty as a subject merely for research and lobbying in order to pressurise governments and politicians. The campaign attempted to gain public support through the tried and tested methods of pamphleteering, by highlighting the threat to independent British policies posed by EEC

97 “An Appraisal of the Present Position in the Conservative Party with regard to the Common Market” by Christopher Frere-Smith, 23 January 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES
98 Letter from Havering and Redbridge ACML to electors of Havering-Upminster [n.d., 1974], CIB/7/18
99 “Some Recommendations for the Future” by Christopher Frere-Smith, 30 January 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES
membership and providing examples of how the public were already being affected. Neil Marten’s pamphlet for the CMSC, “The Common Market: No Middle Way”, set out the federalist structure and course inherent in the EEC and the dangers of membership, claiming that “[t]he fundamental question is ‘go federal’ or ‘stay independent’ – the other questions are peripheral.”¹⁰⁰ The ACML, in the run-up to the referendum, stated their belief that parliamentary sovereignty must be continually accentuated and that, in addition to Marten’s pamphlet, a more popular leaflet on sovereignty and independence would be required.¹⁰¹ Its contribution to targeting public support on sovereignty, “Common Market – Out!”, was a short leaflet highlighting the worst consequences of membership.¹⁰² The NRC’s publications also gave strong emphasis to aspects of sovereignty and independence, with one of their four themed leaflets and broadcasts dedicated to the issue. Their two-thousand word leaflet, distributed to every household, also gave ‘[e]qual emphasis’ to the issues of sovereignty and food prices, the two pillars of the anti-Market argument.¹⁰³ Impetus for campaigning on sovereignty was not exclusive to the campaign leaders, however. Grassroots campaign members operating in local groups were also passionate on the issue, with a branches conference of the CMSC unanimously passing a resolution from the North Kent branch ‘to emphasise the issue of British self-government in the campaign ahead.’¹⁰⁴

The NRC, in considering how to broadcast the issue of sovereignty to the public, made it clear that it should be used as an issue underlining ‘all the points we have made on food prices/taxation, regional policy, trading agreements etc.’ It was made clear that the campaign

‘must not treat the subject in the abstract’ but rather use ‘examples that really touch the man in the street’. Anti-Market publications also often focused on issues that affected the daily lives of the public, including ‘such obvious targets as CAP and undemocratic legislation’. By ensuring that anti-Marketeers both ‘stress the present as well as the prospective loss of self-government (our national sovereignty) that Common Market membership involves’, the campaign was able to focus on both the EEC’s federalist development and the changes it had already brought to the British public. The ACML’s “Common Market – Out!” leaflet thus focused on the introduction of EEC regulations concerning unpopular juggernaut lorries, and other regulations that ‘deal with our taxes, banks, motor insurance and thousands of other things – even what goes into our own ice-cream, sausages and “pints”...’ The Referendum Before Common Market Committee also used the example of the introduction of juggernaut lorries as evidence of a diminished powers of both the electorate and government, reducing the ‘Mother of Parliaments’ to a farce. The EEC’s effect on British law, from ‘the kind of tax we pay [to] the size of lorries on our roads’, was therefore used to highlight the extent to which it could intrude upon the daily lives of the public. Neil Marten highlighted the introduction of VAT as both evidence of a move towards economic and monetary union, and that ‘the supremacy of Parliament is under assault’, and called for politicians ‘to assert the role of the Commons as guardian of popular liberties.’ The EEC Commission proposal to increase the minimum driving licence age to eighteen years was also criticised by Marten due

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105 Letter from Shaun Stewart, NRC Research Officer, to Neil Marten [n.d.], MS Eng. Hist. c.1132/4-12, Bodleian Library
106 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 16 December 1974, CIB/1/3, BLPES
107 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, May 1974, CIB/7/4, BLPES
108 “Common Market – Out!”, ACML [n.d., 1974], NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
109 Letter from S.E. Scammell, RBCMC, to Western Gazette, 15 September 1973, CIB/10/3, BLPES
110 “1975 Referendum, The Common Market: In or Out”, Labour Research Department, March 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
to the potential bypassing of Parliament and the removal of the connection between MPs and the electorate. Marten called upon MPs to see EEC directives ‘not as some remote and complicated nonsense but as part of our own domestic law-making system. For that is what it is.’ 112 All of these examples were used, therefore, because of the perceived relevance and resonance amongst the public of

the effect which people feel the Common Market will have on their lives – heavier and noisier lorries, food prices, increased steel prices and general interference (for no good purpose) in the way we do things in this country. Sacrifices to be made on the altar of harmonisation – standardisation of everything – proposed by non-elected civil servants in remote Brussels – these are the things which cause disenchantment. [...] For the constitutionalist, it has now been demonstrated how far we surrendered our sovereignty... 113

Lack of resonance: a parliamentary, not public, issue

As with food prices, sovereignty was seen by Britain in Europe as one of the more difficult themes to deal with, and one on which the anti-Marketeers and media would force them onto the back foot. 114 However, anti-Marketeers found it difficult to put across to the public the loss of sovereignty that had occurred since the start of EEC membership. Neil Marten, the key “constitutionalist” of the anti-Market campaign, declared it ‘essential to define exactly what we mean by [sovereignty], e.g. the sovereign power of an independent Parliament and the power of the British people to govern themselves’, in order to make the issue best understood by the public. 115 Christopher Frere-Smith, despite basing much of Get Britain Out’s campaign around the issues of national independence and self-government, even

112 Statement by Neil Marten, 27 February 1973, MS Eng. Hist. c.1141/3-6, Bodleian Library
114 Minutes of a meeting of BIE Executive Committee, 7 May 1975, BIE/28/1, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of BIE Executive Committee, 21 May 1975, BIE/28/1, BLPES
115 “Some Thoughts on the Referendum Campaign”, Neil Marten, NRC, 7 January 1975, CIB/9/1, BLPES
went as far as to suggest the term ‘sovereignty’ should not be used at all by anti-Marketeers, claiming it was ‘no good talking about sovereignty except to sophisticated audiences.’\textsuperscript{116} After the referendum result, it was claimed that Frere-Smith had criticised Marten for suggesting that the issues of sovereignty ‘had penetrated to the public’ during the campaign, believing that pro-Marketeers had helped prevent the issues getting across.\textsuperscript{117}

Frere-Smith’s anti-establishment character may have led him to divide public and parliamentary campaigns and issues in too absolute a manner, but he may have been correct in suggesting that the issue of sovereignty resonated more with the parliamentary rather than the public sphere. As noted above, opinion polls showed sovereignty had less appeal than food prices amongst the public, and Butler and Kitzinger stated that, in spite of the introduction of EEC regulations,

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\text{...if voters did not already realise that Britain’s Common Market membership involved a substantial loss of sovereignty, it was not clear how at this late date the point could be brought home to them.} \textsuperscript{118}
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The lack of public interest in issues of sovereignty during this period has been noted elsewhere. Opinion polls showed that while a consistent majority believed Britain would have less say in her own affairs, a high proportion also believed Britain would be able to protect her interests better as an EEC member, and that the loss of sovereignty ‘was not, in practice, of great importance’.\textsuperscript{119} Furthermore, the Hansard Society noted that in spite of prominent examples of loss of sovereignty through administrative acts, the specialised impact of EEC legislation meant the effects went unnoticed by the majority of the public, and that the House

\textsuperscript{116} “Battle lines of In or Out”, \textit{Sunday Telegraph}, 16 March 1975, CIB/9/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{117} “Instant break-up by antis”, \textit{Daily Telegraph}, 7 June 1975, CIB/9/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{118} Butler and Kitzinger, \textit{The 1975 Referendum}, p.114
\textsuperscript{119} Jowell and Hoinville, p.58
of Commons exhibited greater anxiety on the issue given the effect on its powers and procedures.  

The difficulty of conveying the threat of a loss of sovereignty to the public was underlined in a discussion on the forthcoming televised NRC broadcasts. A broadcast was to feature Michael Foot and Enoch Powell, the campaign’s ‘two aces’, on the question of parliamentary sovereignty and ‘the rights of the people to decide and not the politicians.’ However, while programmes on subjects such as food prices were to have a ‘quick and bright’ style featuring numerous ‘major/minor examples of Brussels lunacy’, the sovereignty broadcast was perceived to be ‘in many ways the most difficult content-wise’. The attempt by constitutionalists such as Powell, Foot and Anthony Wedgwood Benn to preserve the traditional Westminster system, and prevent the transferral of power from the House of Commons, demonstrated how the issue had its roots in the Westminster paradigm, and failed to resonate as much with the public. For the likes of Neil Marten, and dissenting Labour cabinet ministers, sovereignty was the central concern, with other issues, as Marten repeatedly stated, ‘peripheral’.  

The division of anti-Marketeers between the more public issue of food prices and the political issue of sovereignty also demonstrates the somewhat fragmented unity of the campaign. As Butler and Kitzinger noted, the campaign became shaped around two camps: those more concerned with the economic effects of membership such as food prices and balance of payments, including Douglas Jay and Barbara Castle, and the constitutionalists.

120 Hansard Society, *The British People: their voice in Europe*, chapter 5
121 “For discussion: the four national TV slots”, NRC memorandum [n.d., 1975], MS Eng. Hist. c.1132/93-95, Bodleian Library
such as Marten, Powell and Benn. While Jay and liberalist anti-Marketeers within the ADFC and the Get Britain Out campaign saw prices as a populist issue upon which to stir up opposition, the likes of Marten saw sovereignty as the most serious issue. Marten also believed it was an issue upon which a groundswell of fundamental opposition to membership could emerge, from the millions of ‘moderate middle of the road people who have no instinct for rule from Brussels’ and ‘patriotic people with a love of independent self-government.’ Marten believed this was the issue that made ‘Conservatives, Liberals and Labour join on the same platform to oppose membership.’ However, the division between the populist and political themes of prices and sovereignty led to campaigning taking on something of an ad hoc, disunited character. This division of the public and political was reflected in the character of the different anti-Market groups and the personnel within the anti-Market campaign, which this chapter will now analyse.

**Character and tactics of the anti-Market referendum campaign**

The confused position of the anti-Market organisations between the spheres of politics and protest was reinforced by their composition and their rhetoric. On the one hand, anti-Market groups in this period, both before and during the referendum, approached anti-Market MPs in Parliament for support and political influence. The CMSC, with parliamentarians such as Jay and Marten occupying prominent positions, took the initiative in forming the NRC. This umbrella movement needed an image of respectability and unity in order to court the media and receive favourable coverage. The establishment respectability of its opposite number, Britain in Europe, reinforced the need to appear as politically moderate and

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125 Speech by Neil Marten at Exeter, 19 April 1975, MS Eng. Hist. c.1132/345-6, Bodleian Library
respectable. Yet at the same time, anti-Marketeteers had presented themselves as anti-establishment demagogues, and anti-statist and “anti-political” tendencies tended to colour their rhetoric. The tensions between organisations with more political aims, such as the CMSC and the ACML, and those with more of an anti-establishment ideology such as Get Britain Out and the ADFC, reinforced the disunited image of the anti-Market referendum campaign.

Political “respectability”: anti-Market groups seeking political support

Anti-Market organisations that coveted political influence, such as the ACML and the CMSC, actively sought the support of MPs. In 1973, in an attempt to revitalise itself after failing to prevent British EEC entry, the ACML courted controversial Conservative MP Enoch Powell, who had been an opponent of British membership since the late 1960s. The Executive Committee offered Powell a position as the League’s Vice-President, and also wished to publish one of his recent speeches as a leaflet. However, despite Powell cooperating with the League in certain areas, including the anti-Market bookstore hired for the duration of the Blackpool Party Conferences, Powell declined both the position and an invitation to speak at a meeting. While few Conservative MPs had been willing to vote against their party on the European Communities Bill in Parliament, even fewer were willing to play an active role in anti-Market organisations. In the hope of mobilising more Conservative opposition in the build-up to the referendum campaign, other Conservative MPs

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126 Philip Goodhart states that the possibility of ‘provoking an anti-elitist backlash’ was noted on the pro-Market side: Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent, p.166
127 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 3 July 1973, CIB/7/4, BLPES
128 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 26 November 1973, CIB/7/4, BLPES
129 Forster notes that of the 41 Conservative MPs who voted against membership in October 1971, only Ronald Bell, Richard Body, Neil Marten, Edward Taylor and Sir Robin Turton played an active role in the NRC: Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, p.51
were approached, but John Biffen and Roger Moate, who were consecutively asked to join the Committee, both declined.\textsuperscript{130} Ronald Bell eventually accepted a position on the Executive Committee but failed to attend any of its meetings before resigning around six months later.\textsuperscript{131} Bell, alongside Conservative colleague Hugh Simmonds, launched the fairly insignificant Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome as a successor to the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service in March 1975, which may explain his absence from the League’s Committee meetings.

The CMSC encountered a similar problem in finding more Conservative MPs to join its Committee, with Marten asked to find a parliamentary colleague to join himself, Jay, and Sir Robin Williams at the launch of his “Common Market – No Middle Way” pamphlet.\textsuperscript{132} In addition to this, Jay’s initiative inviting a number of Labour MPs to become Patrons of the CMSC demonstrates how the Campaign sought political influence and prestige on a cross-party basis.\textsuperscript{133} However, the CMSC, with the largest amount of political support on its Executive Committee, appeared as the most moderate and respectable of the anti-Market organisations. In a draft letter in 1973 appealing to the government for funding on the same basis as the European Movement, the organisation’s more moderate aims aside from withdrawal, such as ‘protect[ing] vital British interests against interference from Brussels’, were emphasised.\textsuperscript{134} Perhaps as a result of this moderate reference to “safeguards” in its title, the Campaign had, in the words of political journalist David Watt, ‘the political names’,

\textsuperscript{130} Minutes of ACML Executive Committee meetings, 26 November 1974, 27 January 1975, 11 March 1975, CIB/7/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{131} Minutes of ACML Executive Committee meetings, 16 April 1975, 13 May 1975, 18 November 1975, CIB/7/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{132} Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 9 July 1974, CIB/1/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{133} Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 24 September 1974, CIB/1/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{134} Letter from Richard Kitzinger to Sir Robin Williams, with draft letter to government attached, 6 March 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES
headed by ‘leading light’ Douglas Jay, and assumed the *de facto* leadership of the anti-Market campaign.\textsuperscript{135} Jay and Frere-Smith became Vice-Chairmen of the NRC, but in his role as Chairman, Neil Marten was described by the ACML as being ‘spokesman for all of us with the Government... and with the BBC and ITV’.\textsuperscript{136} Butler and Kitzinger also emphasised Marten’s respectability as ‘an agreeable, respected person’ who, though ‘not a high flyer among parliamentarians... had a certain influence as a straightforward and moderate person.’\textsuperscript{137}

Leading anti-Marketeers desired this image of respectability to run through the NRC. Subsequently, a formula was devised whereby affiliation with the NRC would be limited to ‘anyone who was primarily concerned with opposing membership of the Common Market’. As a result, extremist groups such as the National Front and minor political parties could be excluded, although the Scottish Nationalist Party, the Ulster Unionists and Plaid Cymru would all later be affiliated.\textsuperscript{138} This led to the refusal to accept the affiliation of the Conservative Trident Group, a right-wing rival to the party’s Monday Club, and the British League of Rights, a right-wing civil liberties group described as ‘anti-semitic and white supremacist’, which was only allowed to send an observer.\textsuperscript{139} The question of the affiliation of the National Council for Anti Common Market Organisations proved more problematic. It was viewed with suspicion upon founding itself as a rival organisation to existing anti-Market

\textsuperscript{135} “A penny-farthing ride from Europe”, David Watt, *Financial Times*, 23 May 1975, CIB/9/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{136} *Anti-Common Market League Newsletter*, March 1975, CIB/7/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{137} Butler and Kitzinger, *The 1975 Referendum*, p.100
\textsuperscript{138} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Jay, 15 July 1974, CIB/9/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{139} Minutes of a meeting of NRC Executive Committee, 21 April 1975, MS Eng. Hist. c.1131/179, Bodleian Library; Barberis, P., McHugh, J., Tyldesley, M., (eds), *Encyclopedia of British and Irish Political Organizations: parties, groups and movements of the twentieth century* (London: Pinter, 2000), p177; Minutes of a meeting of NRC Executive Committee, 3 February 1975, NRC/2, Parliamentary Archives. The Trident Group was founded by Victor Montagu and Francis d’Aft, who were both active within the anti-Market campaign through the Anti-Common Market League.
groups in May 1973, acting as an umbrella for a number of local groups.\textsuperscript{140} Suspected of ‘being embarrassingly right-wing’, its leader Air-Vice Marshal Don Bennett was described by one newspaper report as being ‘the durable eccentric who tried for years to mobilise a political movement [the Political Freedom Movement] from Blackbushe Airport.’\textsuperscript{141} While leading anti-Marketeers wished to include the National Council within the NRC, they believed that some of their groups were largely comprised of National Front members, although Bennett denied this when Jay put it to him at a CMSC committee meeting.\textsuperscript{142} Anti-Marketeers thus had to find the right balance between a mass campaign and a “pressure group” image of respectability and prestige.

\textbf{NRC’s media campaign}

The need to court the media during the referendum campaign was another key reason for the formation of the NRC. Originally stressed by the National Council in a motion at the CMSC’s Branches Conference, the issue of fair media treatment was taken up by Jay and Marten, the two leading politicians in the anti-Market campaign.\textsuperscript{143} In what Butler and Kitzinger described as ‘pre-emptive strikes’, Jay exchanged letters with Harold Wilson over the issue of equal media coverage and released the letters to press conferences, while Neil Marten contacted figures in the media.\textsuperscript{144} It has even been argued that the anti-Marketeers’ obsession over media balance meant they elevated it ‘virtually into a campaign issue in

\textsuperscript{140} See letters sent by Francis d’Aft, Chairman of the West Country Anti-Common Market League, to Tom Neate and Sir Robin Williams between April and June 1973, CIB/7/17, BLpes
\textsuperscript{142} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Jay, 15 July 1974, CIB/9/2, BLpes; Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 16 December 1974, CIB/1/3, BLpes
\textsuperscript{143} Minutes of CMSC Branches Conference, 30 March 1974, CIB/1/3, BLpes; Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 24 April 1974, CIB/1/3, BLpes
\textsuperscript{144} Butler and Kitzinger, \textit{The 1975 Referendum}, p.108; Minutes of CMSC Executive Committee meetings, 9 July 1974, 10 October 1974, CIB/1/3, BLpes
itself’. In an exchange with Chairman of the BBC Sir Michael Swann, Marten spoke of the plans to form an umbrella movement which would ‘act as a focal point’ for providing speakers to the media, thus avoiding situations where ‘a pro-Common Market producer could invite an unattractive dunderhead to put the anti-Market case’. Anti-Marketees’ recommendations of finding a respected ‘director’ figure ‘to represent the campaign to the media’ – following the success achieved by the likes of Shelter and its media-savvy director Des Wilson in the late 1960s – and of excluding extremists from the Communist Party and National Front, accentuated the desire for unity and respectability. The NRC was thus formed as a respected co-ordinating committee ‘to be the focal point of any conversations which might be needed on the anti-Market side with the Government or the media.’

Good media relations, and presenting a respectable image to the media, were therefore central to the anti-Market campaign. Having had some limited success in attaining publicity for the anti-Market cause on television, the CMSC was aware that the referendum’s battleground would be on television and radio and in the press, as they had been in the Norwegian referendum. After the launch of the NRC, the anti-Market campaign received television features on programmes such as Midweek, Panorama and The Westminster Programme. Figures from the NRC also continued to meet with the BBC and Independent

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145 Jowell and Hoinville, p.84
146 Letter from Marten to Sir Michael Swann, Chairman of BBC, 12 November 1974, NRC/2, Parliamentary Archives
147 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Jay, 15 July 1974, CIB/9/2, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 18 October 1974, CIB/7/4, BLPES
148 Letter from Marten to Harold Wilson, 22 January 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
149 “CMSC Activities and Plans” memorandum, 21 November 1974, CIB/1/4, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 16 October 1974, CIB/1/3, BLPES
150 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 27 January 1975, CIB/7/4, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 11 March 1975, CIB/7/4, BLPES
Television Authority to ensure fair broadcasting.\textsuperscript{151} With this increased media presence, anti-Marketeers deemed it ‘essential that a united front was presented to the media’.\textsuperscript{152} Furthermore, strong emphasis was placed on the importance of a clean campaign, given the controversialist nature of some of the campaign’s figures. Marten was a particular advocate of this. Warning that the pro-Market campaign would try and discredit the anti-Marketeers and ‘play it dirty’, Marten recommended the antis ‘expose these tactics but remain absolutely clean ourselves.’\textsuperscript{153} At the launch of the NRC, Marten pledged to ‘use such influence as I have to encourage a fair debate’ and that there would ‘be no repetition of some of the nastiness which occurred in the great debate of 1971/72.’\textsuperscript{154} Emphasis was therefore laid on fighting ‘a clean campaign’ with ‘arguments... based on reality’, and even the more confrontational Get Britain Out encouraged its supporters to promote the ‘respectable case’ against membership.\textsuperscript{155}

Despite endeavouring to present a respectable, united front to the media, attempts to use the media to further the anti-Market campaign had disappointing results. David Watt attributed this to the NRC’s ‘arthritic character’ and old-fashioned approach. Watt questioned the decision to attribute so much money on leaflets and advertisements rather than the televised broadcasts, and blamed it on the ‘decidedly old-fashioned’ leadership.\textsuperscript{156} By contrast, it was reported that Britain in Europe had spent £100,000 on the television and radio

\textsuperscript{151} Press release by Neil Marten for NRC [n.d., Spring/Summer 1975], NRC/2, Parliamentary Archives
\textsuperscript{152} Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 4 February 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{153} “Some Thoughts on the Referendum Campaign”, Neil Marten, 7 January 1975, CIB/9/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{154} Statement by Neil Marten for NRC, 7 January 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
\textsuperscript{155} “Unite to Win”, Neil Marten, Resistance News, no.14, January-February 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES; Letter from W.A. Newton Jones to members [n.d., 1975], 1 NP 166-67, Get Britain Out in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
\textsuperscript{156} “A penny-farthing ride from Europe”, David Watt, Financial Times, 23 May 1975, CIB/9/2, BLPES. Goodhart also criticised the decision to spend twenty-five times more on press advertising than the televised broadcasts, for ‘reasons which are still not easy to comprehend’: Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent, p.132
broadcasts for the referendum compared to £3,000 spent by the NRC, and commented on the ‘professionalism’ and ‘domination’ of the advertising experts in the pro-Market campaign.\(^\text{157}\) The employment of film director Charles Guggenheim led to Britain in Europe producing what its President Roy Jenkins described as ‘rapid-paced, confrontation-situation, attention-gripping’ programmes.\(^\text{158}\) The NRC attempted to produce more professional and persuasive pieces by employing journalists such as Patrick Cosgrave as presenters, but opinion polls showed their programmes to be failures.\(^\text{159}\) Watt attributed this media failure to a lack of ‘willingness to draw in professionals’ and a preference to draw ‘analogies with the past – pamphlets which few people read, Press advertisements to counteract the bias of Press ‘barons’, and a contempt for the new media.’\(^\text{160}\) Parallels drawn with S.W. Alexander’s Anti-Dear Food League of the 1950s and the League of Nations Union’s Peace Pledge Ballot confirm this old-fashioned approach, but also confirm the anti-Market campaign’s position of attempting to apply political pressure in Parliament through mass mobilisation and protest.

**Countering the establishment-backed Britain in Europe**

The NRC was also compelled to appear respectable due to the esteemed position of those involved with Britain in Europe. With the group ‘led by such respected moderates as Jenkins and Heath’, the anti-Marketeers needed to emphasise its political nature.\(^\text{161}\) However, while anti-Market organisations sought the support of MPs, pro-Market organisations began to look outside of the political sphere. In preparation for a referendum, Director of the British Council of the European Movement, Ernest Wistrich, targeted ‘opinion-forming support

\(^{157}\) “Dispute brewing over advertising experts’ ‘domination’ of Britain in Europe campaign”, *The Times*, 2 June 1975, BIE/28/2, Parliamentary Archives

\(^{158}\) Jenkins, R., *A Life at the Centre* (London: Politico’s, 2006), p.408

\(^{159}\) Butler and Kitzinger, *The 1975 Referendum*, pp.197-98, p.200

\(^{160}\) “A penny-farthing ride from Europe”, David Watt, *Financial Times*, 23 May 1975, CIB/9/2, BLPES

\(^{161}\) Young, J.W., *Britain and European Unity 1945-1999*, p.119
through the spectrum of British society’. Aware that voters would receive conflicting advice from politicians, he believed they would ‘look to opinion leaders of interest groups with which they are associated or whose views they respect’. After assessing recent opinion polls, Wistrich concluded that politicians were distrusted on the issue of EEC membership and that the pro-Market campaign should therefore recruit ‘national and local personalities outside the political sphere’. The re-launch of Britain in Europe was thus a way of shifting the task from the European Movement which was seen as ‘being much too clearly a politically motivated organisation’. This was followed up by the creation of the Council for Britain in Europe, which drew around 130 prominent persons from a number of targeted fields such as art, music, literature, sport and religion. The strategy of the British Council of the European Movement and Britain in Europe was therefore a ‘strategy of many voices’ and ‘organised diversity’, as a way of avoiding being too tied in with the political establishment.

Perhaps in response to this, anti-Marketeers wished to make it clear at the launch of the NRC that it had the support of ‘all sections of the community’, and proposed to appoint Vice-Presidents drawn from these sections. The Get Britain Out Campaign also sought support from outside of politics, with writer Kingsley Amis a signatory to their 1974 manifesto, and theatre critic Kenneth Tynan and screenwriter Johnny Speight appearing

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162 “Organisation of the Education Campaign after the General Election” memorandum by Ernest Wistrich [n.d., 1974], BIE/4/1, Parliamentary Archives
163 “The Public and the Case for Staying in the EEC” memorandum by Wistrich [n.d., 1974], BIE/4/1, Parliamentary Archives
164 “Campaign for a Referendum” memorandum by Wistrich, 1 May 1974, BIE/4/1, Parliamentary Archives
166 “Strategy for the Campaign” by the European Movement Campaign Committee, February 1975, BIE/4/2A, Parliamentary Archives; Minutes of a meeting of BIE Referendum Steering Committee, 5 March 1975, BIE/28/1, Parliamentary Archives
167 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 16 December 1974, CIB/1/3, BLPES
alongside political anti-Market figures at one of its press conferences. Amis had also previously been made a patron of the CMSC alongside fellow writers J.B. Priestley, John Osborne and Robert Conquest. However, the involvement of these personalities could not disguise the fact that the anti-Market campaign was led by controversial politicians, taken from the extremist wings of the Labour and Conservative parties. It was for this reason that Britain in Europe employed a strategy of engaging with anti-Marketeers who were ‘unpopular figures in the general public’, such as trade union leaders Jack Jones, Hugh Scanlon and Clive Jenkins. Throughout the referendum campaign, on the assumption that one of the best pro-Market themes would be to tell the public to ‘Look who’s against us’, Britain in Europe thus sought to attempt to discredit the anti-Marketeers and demonstrate that they were disunited. It was perhaps because of the conclusion amongst anti-Marketeers that ‘issues have tended to be eclipsed by personalities’ that the anti-Market campaign sought to include figures from outside the political sphere.

Inability to broaden the political support base

Failure to broaden the anti-Market network and increase support by working with other pressure groups and non-governmental organisations was a major flaw in the referendum campaign. While anti-Market groups drew closer and liaised together in the early 1970s under the CMSC umbrella, and during the referendum campaign under the NRC, it was

168 GBO press release/manifesto [n.d., 1974], 1 NP 113-116, Get Britain Out in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources; GBO Press Conference notice, 8 May 1975, 1 NP 376, Get Britain Out in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
169 Jay, Change and Fortune, p.458
170 Minutes of a meeting of Britain in Europe Executive Committee, 21 May 1975, BIE/28/1, Parliamentary Archives
171 Minutes of a meeting of Britain in Europe Executive Committee, 7 May 1975, BIE/28/1, Parliamentary Archives; Notes of Britain in Europe Press Conference Executive meetings, 19 May 1975, 21 May 1975, BIE/28/1, Parliamentary Archives
unable to form alliances with other groups which did not have withdrawal from the EEC as an objective. Christopher Frere-Smith highlighted the importance of drawing in other organisations to campaign on particular issues as early as 1973 when he stated that for single-issue campaigns,

...it really is essential that we are able to bring in the outside bodies who are concerned with that particular issue e.g. child poverty action, World Development Group [sic], Transport and General Workers Union, etc.¹⁷³

Attempts were made to bring in other organisations, particularly on the issue of food policy and rising prices. Renee Short, Labour MP and CMSC member, sought to organise a campaign on food prices directed at women’s organisations, initially contacting Women Against the Common Market to persuade them to launch a nationwide campaign. However, as Women Against the Common Market lacked the resources for such a campaign, a letter was sent to 118 women’s organisations, to which only four responded.¹⁷⁴ Similarly, attempts to persuade the Consumers’ Association to work with anti-Marketeers failed, the organisation recommending a Yes vote in the referendum.¹⁷⁵ The difficulty, according to Butler and Kitzinger, was that with groups such as the Consumers’ Association and National Farmers

¹⁷³ “Some Recommendations for the Future” by Christopher Frere-Smith, 30 January 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES. It is likely that Frere-Smith was referring to the World Development Movement, a membership organisation founded in 1970 campaigning for policy change in the field of international development.
¹⁷⁵ Letter from Denis Martin to P. Goldman, Director of the Consumers Association, 20 August 1975, CIB/7/16, BLPES; Briefing note no.6, 14 May 1975, 1 NU 123-26, Labour Campaign for Britain in Europe in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources. The Hansard Society noted that the Consumers’ Association had in fact acted as a useful conduit between the government and the EEC, and was very active within the latter: Hansard Society, The British People: their voice in Europe, pp.122-125
Union in favour of entry, ‘the voice of large interest groups, apart from the trade unions, was heard almost entirely on the pro-Market side.’\textsuperscript{176}

This problem extended beyond interest groups, however. Despite all the hand-wringing within anti-Market rhetoric about the Intervention Board and the destruction of food, the campaign was unable to gain the support of humanitarian organisations. These organisations were certainly aware of the details of EEC food policies, Marten quoting Oxfam’s estimate that the £197 million spent in 1973 on making food unsustainable ‘would feed 6.5 million starving children for a year’ at a press conference during the referendum.\textsuperscript{177} The ACML also ordered ten thousand leaflets on Commonwealth sugar from the World Development Movement for distribution amongst supporters.\textsuperscript{178} However, during the referendum campaign the World Development Movement was careful not to fall on a particular side, its priorities being to ensure access to Commonwealth markets and to prevent the exploitation of third world producers.\textsuperscript{179} The complex and politicised issue of EEC membership, and the anti-Marketeers’ campaign for outright withdrawal, led to many NGOs who may have collaborated in Frere-Smith’s aforementioned ‘“one issue” campaigns’ on particular subjects wishing to avoid working too closely with the anti-Market campaign on the wider issue of withdrawal.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{176} Butler and Kitzinger, \textit{The 1975 Referendum}, p.171
\textsuperscript{177} Speech by Neil Marten at NRC press conference [n.d., 1975], NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
\textsuperscript{178} Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 8 May 1973, CIB/7/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{179} “Britain & Europe – Together? Or Apart?” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 XC 147; “In or Out – Third World Poor Go Hungry” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 XC 149-50, both World Development Movement in \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
\textsuperscript{180} “Some Recommendations for the Future” by Christopher Frere-Smith, 30 January 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES
Anti-political/anti-establishment character and rhetoric

However, the risk was that the unity of extremist, anti-establishment politicians with figures from outside of politics could give the anti-Market campaign an “anti-political” edge that would alienate support from the wider population. In their analysis of the referendum, Butler and Kitzinger play down the prominence of anti-establishment rhetoric within the anti-Market campaign. Although identifying Get Britain Out as ‘in some degree an anti-political movement’ and that its Chairman Christopher Frere-Smith wished the campaign to be ‘much more bitter with a strong anti-establishment and anti-party character’, they claim that this was nullified by the political influence of the likes of Marten and Jay.\footnote{Butler and Kitzinger, \textit{The 1975 Referendum}, p.110} As a result, the anti-establishment theme that had been prominent in the Norwegian referendum ‘drew less attention than expected’.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.186} However, as demonstrated above in relation to the populist issue of food prices, the “anti-establishment card” was often used to separate the anti-Market campaign from the elite-backed pro-Marketeers. This tension between respectability and anti-establishment populism, and between politicians and campaigners, would be ongoing and troublesome for the anti-Market campaign.

Get Britain Out’s referendum campaign, with its large number of regional and constituency groups seeking to mobilise local support, was further removed from traditional party politics than organisations that tended to mobilise on a national basis. Furthermore, the organisation was influenced by the temperament of Frere-Smith, who was ‘erratic’ in his attendance of NRC meetings and was behind Get Britain Out’s ‘tendency to go it alone’.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.106} Frere-Smith confessed to a ‘distaste for... politicians’ way of life’, and Get Britain Out’s

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{Butler and Kitzinger, \textit{The 1975 Referendum}, p.110}
  \item \footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.186}
  \item \footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.106}
\end{itemize}
rhetoric subsequently portrayed the organisation as an underdog and outsider against the well-funded, politically-backed pro-Market campaign. Advertisements warned against the ‘money and power-mad politicians’ on the other side, and press releases spoke of the ‘enormous disparity of resources’ between the pro- and anti-Market campaigns, with the former being supported by ‘the leading moneybags in the country’ and the media. Referendum campaign leaflets set the public against ‘the press bosses and the establishment politicians’, as well as the ‘politician seeking to strut on a bigger stage’, the ‘big City operator’ and the ‘big land-owner’ that would gain from British entry. Get Britain Out thus spoke of the ‘falling respect for Parliament and contempt for politicians’ in Britain, and sought to mobilise the public against ‘the politicians of this Country who have identified their own failures as the failures of the British people’.

Furthermore, Get Britain Out wished to protect the public from centralisation within politics and business, and the organisation accordingly set itself out as protecting the population from the power of the establishment. Frere-Smith, formerly a Secretary of the Cambridge University Liberal Club and ‘by conviction a free-trading Liberal’, was pivotal to continuing the liberalist ethos of Keep Britain Out founders Oliver Smedley and S.W. Alexander in the fight against centralisation of political power. Frere-Smith was influenced by the contemporary works of Ernst Schumacher, who called for smaller and decentralised
political and economic institutions under the ‘Small Is Beautiful’ motto, in the same way that antecedents such as the British Housewives’ League or the Society for Individual Freedom were influenced by the anti-statist, neo-liberalist works of Friedrich von Hayek. Get Britain Out, in claiming that ‘[t]he idea that bigger is better in politics is highly suspect’, argued that EEC membership, rather than bringing government closer to the people, would mean ‘gigantic steps in the opposite direction, making the centres of power more remote, less representative and more inhuman.’ Frere-Smith labelled this pro-Market philosophy as ‘the “big is best” school’. Using the example of the merger of car manufacturers to create ‘the appalling situation’ at British Leyland, he warned of the economic consequences of this philosophy, and likened political centralisation to a ‘1984 vision’.

While Get Britain Out fought ‘guerrilla warfare against the entrenched armies of the establishment’, other organisations in the anti-Market campaign had a similarly anti-political character. The ADFC had an anti-establishment tone to much of its rhetoric. Its aforementioned “Manifesto for Survival”, in which it set out liberalist, free-trade solutions to the British economic crisis, contained scathing criticism of ‘the conventional politicians of left and right’ who were leading the country deeper into disaster. The speeches of Chairman Oliver Smedley also distanced the ADFC from parliamentary politics. Smedley claimed that the country had become divided between ‘the real and the unreal’, and ‘the new and the out-

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190 “Get Britain Out: Democracy or Rule from Brussels”, leaflet published by NRC Dorset County Committee [n.d., 1975], NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
191 Speech by Frere-Smith to Scottish GBO conference, 19 April 1975, 1 ND 301-3, Get Britain Out in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
192 “The anti campaign: shoestring operation”, 31 May 1975, The Economist
193 ADFC press release [n.d., 1974], CIB/10/7, BLPES
of-date’. There had been ‘no differences’ between Labour and Conservative policies when in power, with each government ‘progressively worse than its predecessor’, while Liberal policies had led him to perceive ‘the whole of politics [as] out-of-date and irrelevant’. Smedley thus saw his organisation as part of ‘those who stand on the side-lines wanting to help whomsoever has the courage to emerge as leader of the political realists’. ¹⁹⁴

The ADFC used the discourse of crisis and criticism of consensus politics to call for a new leader from outside of the political establishment. It was concerned at the prospect of a political revolution, urging the government introduced deflationary policies before the public ‘start looking for a British ‘strong man’ to take over and save them from starvation’. ¹⁹⁵ As a result it listed Enoch Powell and Michael Foot as among the “constitutionalists” who could lead a democratic revolution, and called for a new party ‘united in its determination to restore Britain’s independence from rule by the Brussels bureaucracy and willing to smash the highly protected vested interests of agriculture, industry, commerce and finance...’ ¹⁹⁶ This was another example of the anti-Market campaign positioning itself in direct opposition to the wealth and power of the pro-Market political and economic establishment.

The National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations was similar to Get Britain Out in its operation via local grassroots mobilisation, in its use of fly-posting, and also in that it distanced itself from the involvement of politicians in the campaign. The debate over whether MPs should serve on the successor organisation to the NRC illustrates the politician-

¹⁹⁴ “The Great Divide”, speech by Oliver Smedley at Gloucestershire ACML meeting, 1 October 1973, CIB/10/7, BLPES
¹⁹⁵ “The Anti Dear Food Campaign says stop the collapse of the pound now!” leaflet [n.d., 1973], 1 AV 10, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
¹⁹⁶ “The Anti Dear Food Campaign Says If You Truly Believe In Free Markets and a Capitalist Society, Read This... And Vote No in the Referendum”, advertisement in The Times, 28 May 1975, 1 AV 66, Anti Dear Food Campaign in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources
campaigner divide. The Council believed that MPs, having to balance their work in the new umbrella organisation with their own position in their political parties, would ‘dampen down the activities of other members’.  

Audrey O’Reilly of the National Council stated that, while ‘not insensitive to the most difficult position in which some Members of Parliament have found themselves’,

\[\text{...many people at the grass roots have made considerable sacrifices no less important to them. Naturally, those in the public eye are more conspicuous [sic] in their efforts, and their actions are carefully watched by the public and the pro-Marketeteers alike. Because of this it is within their power to do much good and greatly enhance the cause, or by the same token do much harm, and perhaps cause us to loose [sic] battles.}\]

While some in the National Council believed that MPs, although they ‘have not been much help in the past’, should be included in the successor organisation, the majority appeared to believe it ‘unwise and unfair to ask MPs to stand for this body’. It was between these anti-political organisations and their more ‘respectable’ associates that a divide emerged within the referendum campaign, between those who believed the campaign had been ‘insufficiently militant’ and those who believed it had been ‘too militant’ and ‘had frightened Conservatives into a “yes” vote’.

The division between the more political and more protest-oriented groups within the anti-Market campaign is also reflected by their tactics in this period, particularly in their disagreements regarding mass meetings after British entry into the EEC. Those publicity-seeking organisations which consisted of more agitational activists, such as Keep Britain Out,
were particularly committed to holding mass meetings and public demonstrations. Keep Britain Out held several demonstrations to coincide with official events such as the Fanfare for Europe and the Congress for Europe, aiming to embarrass the pro-Marketeers with its presence. Similarly, Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett of the National Council for Anti-Common Market Organisations organised mass meetings such as torch-lit processions, and a local ACML group associated with the Council affirmed that ‘[t]hese mass meetings do have an effect on the Government… in spite of what you privately may think.’

However, attitudes towards holding mass meetings changed after an unsuccessful united rally held at Central Hall in Westminster in November 1973. Despite the rally being open to supporters of all major anti-Market groups and all Resistance News subscribers, with a panel including Douglas Jay, John Biffen, Michael Foot and Sir John Winnifrith, the rally’s attendance had been ‘disappointing’ and the expenditure very high. The meeting also contributed to a rift between the CMSC and the ACML on one side and Keep Britain Out and the National Council on the other, the latter two organisations having failed to contribute to the costs of the rally. After the failure of the meeting, the CMSC agreed to hold no more

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201 The word ‘agitational’ was used to describe the character of Keep Britain Out in the Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources; Butler and Kitzinger also refer to KBO ‘attracting some publicity to itself in the late 1960s and early 1970s’, The 1975 Referendum, p.98
202 Letter from Frere-Smith to KBO supporters, inviting them to demonstration at Fanfare for Europe’s vintage car rally on 6 January 1973 [n.d.], CIB/10/2, BLPES; Letter from Frere-Smith to KBO supporters, inviting them to demonstration at Guildhall in London coinciding with Congress for Europe meeting on 11 May 1973, 4 May 1973, CIB/10/2, BLPES
203 Newsletter of Folkestone & District Anti-Common Market Group, 30 December 1973, CIB/7/16, BLPES
204 The meeting was held under the auspices of CMSC, but was jointly sponsored by the ACML, KBO, British Business for World Markets and the National Council for Anti-Common Market Organisations [NCACMO]; flyer for “Common Market: The Great Mistake” meeting on 10 November 1973 [n.d.], CIB/1/3, BLPES
205 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 20 September 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 26 November 1973, CIB/7/4, BLPES
206 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 20 November 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES. In Keep Britain Out’s case this may have been a reaction to another dispute over the failure of the ACML to provide a promised contribution to the rent of an anti-Market bookshop set up by Keep Britain Out and Enoch Powell during the Labour and Conservative party conferences in Blackpool. This dispute led to the resignation of Frere-Smith from CMSC’s Executive Committee: Letter from Christopher Frere-Smith to Sir Robin Williams, 28 September
large meetings in London but instead to provide speakers and literature for local meetings, which ‘were cheaper to run and had impact’. Its view that ‘this was not the time for demonstrations but to gather strength, build up finances and local organisations’ was at odds with more demonstrative groups like GBO. It was not until the launch of the referendum campaign in 1975 that large public meetings were held by anti-Market organisations again, although, in the case of the CMSC meeting held at Conway Hall in London in April 1975 which was interrupted by National Front supporters, these still proved problematic.

**Conclusions**

After the commencement of EEC membership, anti-Market groups continued to occupy a space in the confused middle ground between spheres of protest and politics. Political but lacking in political influence, and populist but unable to mobilise mass support against entry, this tension between seeking the respectable political route and trying to inspire a mass campaign of an anti-establishment character was causing the anti-Market campaign to falter. The changes in circumstances in this period, with the arena for mobilisation shifting from parliamentary politics to public debate with the announcement of the referendum, meant that anti-Market groups needed to adopt flexible strategies. However, divisions over the aims, rhetoric and identity of the campaign limited its appeal. As a result, the NRC would neither develop into a more “insider” organisation in which the public could instil trust, or a “popular front” style campaign encouraging a groundswell of opposition to EEC membership.

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1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES. Events leading to the dispute over the bookshop’s rent are summarised in the “Blackpool Bookshop” memorandum sent to Frere-Smith, 9 October 1973. CIB/1/3, BLPES

207 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 20 November 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES; Minutes of CMSC’s Executive Committee AGM, 18 December 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES

208 Minutes of CMSC Branches Conference, 30 March 1974, CIB/1/3, BLPES

209 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 4 February 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES; “Uproar disrupts big anti-Market meeting” press cutting, unknown paper or date [April 1975], CIB/9/2, BLPES
The dispute over whether to make food prices or sovereignty its central argument reflected a wider rift, of whether to present the anti-Market message to the wider public more directly or whether to acquire greater political influence through which to gain support. The issue of food prices was a key issue during the economic recession, and attributing rising prices to EEC membership was central to the anti-Market case. Furthermore, it was a populist issue capable of attracting cross-party support, targeting those most seriously affected by price rises and playing on more middle-class concerns regarding quality and provenance of foodstuffs. However, the anti-Market case was neutered by the rise in world food prices, and by the strategy of BiE to focus on long-term economic prospects and the economic impact of leaving the EEC during the recession.\textsuperscript{210} Furthermore, the NRC’s broad appeal to the consumer often spilled into anti-producer, anti-establishment rhetoric, with the potential to alienate political support.\textsuperscript{211}

The issue of sovereignty, by contrast, was a subject of political interest and scrutiny, but issues such as the size of lorries and the profligacy of the Intervention Board failed to conjure strong public opposition. According to the Hansard Society while pro-Marketeers had neglected the sovereignty issue, ‘neither the general public, nor constitutional and political experts, really have so much faith in traditional concepts like the sovereignty of Parliament as most opponents of membership have claimed’.\textsuperscript{212} Post-mortems of the referendum differed over which argument should have been made more prominent, but one observation that the ‘central message [had] been far too diffuse’, and that the diversity of organisations and

\textsuperscript{210} Opinion Research Centre survey for the Britain in Europe Steering Committee, 20 May 1975, cited in Goodhart, \textit{Full-Hearted Consent}, p.16
\textsuperscript{211} 46 percent of respondents in a Social and Community Planning Research survey had attributed manufacturers’ increased profits as a cause of food price rises: Jowell and Hoinville, p.55
\textsuperscript{212} Hansard Society, \textit{The British People: their voice in Europe}, p.139
literature was equivalent to ‘twenty kinds of bullet for the same gun’, summed up the disunity of the campaign.\textsuperscript{213} Jay’s recollection of the campaign was that anti-Marketeers being divided over the most significant and resonant issue, combined with the ‘spontaneous gathering of all sorts of clans’ that made up the NRC, meant that ‘the propaganda impact was probably dispersed and weakened.’\textsuperscript{214}

The National Referendum Campaign name itself was an extremely broad title in order to accommodate the ‘uneasy amalgam of groups’ and figures within it.\textsuperscript{215} Believed to have been proposed as a compromise by the trade unionist Jack Jones, Butler and Kitzinger claimed the title had a ‘neutral sound... for internal harmony – but it did not indicate where its members stood on the issue at stake.’\textsuperscript{216} As a co-ordinating body, it was to be a focal point for the media, and sought to present a persuasive and respectable anti-Market case. Furthermore, it was to be a ‘focal point for co-ordinating action’, to ‘help co-ordinate and liaise with all the various organisations which oppose membership of the Common Market’ and to assist local groups with speakers and propaganda, without superseding constituent organisations.\textsuperscript{217} It therefore delegated between the different strands of the campaign. Just as before the referendum CMSC and ACML allocated leaflets to be drafted by particular people depending on their politics and expertise, the NRC assigned different people to publish pamphlets on the key issues of food prices, trade, sovereignty and alternatives to membership.\textsuperscript{218} Its televised broadcasts were also allocated individual themes of food and prices, sovereignty and regional

\footnotesize{213 Letter from Francis d’Aft to Victor Montagu, 5 June 1975, MSS Hinchinbrooke, D/MAP89
214 Jay, \textit{Change and Fortune}, p.485
217 NRC press release [n.d., 1975], NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives
218 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 3 July 1973, CIB/7/4, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 20 November 1974, CIB/1/3, BLPES; Agenda for NRC meeting on 17 February 1975, with handwritten notes by Neil Marten, MS Eng. Hist. c.1131/161, Bodleian Library}
issues, each drawing on the expertise of different personnel. Frere-Smith continued to assert the importance of organisations and personalities working at arm’s length from each other, and that the NRC should not take on ‘an executive role.’ In terms of administration, he stated ‘that organisation of events must be left to bodies which are represented on NRC’, and that the Campaign should ignore ‘territorial prerogatives’ but work to each constituent organisation’s strengths. However, by allowing a loose unity under the NRC banner and allowing groups to ‘plough their own furrow’, an uneasy alliance was formed between politicians and figures with a more anti-establishment character. Having the NRC liaise and oversee the existing organisations who continued to work separately, although in collaboration with each other, was a means of preventing a full federation of anti-Marketeers which may have led to infighting regarding the issues, tactics, and politics of the referendum campaign. This was at the expense of a fully-organised strategy, with Butler and Kitzinger claiming NRC’s Executive got ‘bogged down in administrative matters’. Frere-Smith’s suggestion of establishing ‘an ad hoc body of not more than half a dozen people [to] meet frequently to discuss strategy and tactics’ seemed to be adopted with the formation of the ‘O’ Group, but in terms of the issues of campaigning, even this group could only seem to find the consensus to ‘expound the general theme’ on which the broadcasts should be based around and on which the campaign should proceed. This image of fragmented unity, and rather loose and expedient alliance of anti-Marketeers, limited its appeal throughout the referendum campaign.

219 “For discussion: the four national TV slots”, NRC memorandum [n.d., 1975], MS Eng. Hist. e.1132/93-95, Bodleian Library
220 Letter from Frere-Smith to Marten [n.d., early 1975], NRC/2, Parliamentary Archives
221 Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p.110
222 Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p.103
223 Letter from Frere-Smith to Marten [n.d., early 1975], NRC/2, Parliamentary Archives; Jay, Change and Fortune, p.485

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This tension between the more political and populist strands in the anti-Market campaign gave it a schizophrenic image. On the one hand, anti-Market groups sought political support from MPs, particularly after the start of British EEC membership in the hope of reviving the campaign. The NRC also sought to eliminate extremist support and present a respectable case in the media, and political personalities such as Marten and Jay were at the forefront. However, up against the wide-reaching, establishment-backed support of BiE, the NRC, by incorporating organisations solely focused on opposing EEC entry, failed to make connections with social, economic or humanitarian NGOs. Faced with this elite-backed opposition, the anti-political and anti-establishment wing of the campaign was keen to portray anti-Marketeteers as underdogs – which, given the financial disparity between pro- and anti-Market campaigns, they were. However, playing the anti-establishment card sat uneasily with attempts to court the media, ensure fair coverage and to professionalise the campaign’s operations more generally. NRC’s government-funded two-thousand word leaflet, sent to every home in Britain, also sought to ‘appeal to the anti-establishment view by suggesting that a “No” vote provides the unique opportunity to vote against the leaders of all the main political parties’, despite the political names fronting the Campaign.224

This demonstrates the inherent difficulty that anti-Market organisations of appearing non-political while campaigning on an inherently political subject. Formed due to the lack of political access on the EEC membership issue, anti-Market groups publicly appeared to largely eschew the institutional political route, yet still lobbied for political influence in the hope of achieving success within Parliament as, until the announcement of the referendum, leaving the EEC would be a political decision. This highlights the contradiction within the

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aims of anti-Market groups who proclaimed themselves to be ‘non-political, the only aim being to get Britain out of the Common Market’. In another example, a local ACML group had mixed messages on EEC membership and the inflationary crisis. Its public message was to accuse political parties of a ‘failure to attack the real cause’ of inflation, which was portrayed as ‘a shocking admission of the conspiracy which surrounds any adverse points’, and the group proclaimed it ‘about time Politicians faced up and told people the truth.’ This anti-political public message sat uneasily, however, with private tactics ‘to hold as many meetings as possible throughout the Country enlisting the support of prominent Anti Common Market MPs from both the main political parties’.

The anti-Market campaign therefore remained caught between the realms of parliamentary politics and mass protest, but unable to make a significant impact in either sphere. The campaign was, however, beginning to show signs of professionalisation and develop a more “insider” strategy in this period. Central to this was an increased awareness of the importance of the use of the media, and the attempt to draw in more political personnel and a respected campaign director. Despite these attempts, however, the campaign would continue to lack both the professional expertise and dynamism to enable its transformation into a high-profile movement. The search for a campaign director was unsuccessful and frustrating, reflected in Ronald Bell’s comment that ‘[t]his leadership business is the devil’.

No figure could be found from outside the campaign that could dynamically promote and

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225 Letter from W.H. Brown, Chairman of Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML, to supporters, informing them of the formation of combined organisation Midlands Against the Common Market, 12 May 1975, CIB/7/15, BLPES
226 Letter from W.H. Brown, Chairman of Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML, to supporters, September 1974, CIB/7/15, BLPES
227 Letter from W.H. Brown, Chairman of Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML, to Margaret Coneybeare, Secretary of ACML and CMSC, 21 March 1974, CIB/7/15, BLPES
228 Letter from Ronald Bell to Victor Montagu, 10 November 1974, MSS Hinchingbrooke, D/MAP89
revitalise it whilst still commanding a degree of political respectability or prestige. Keith Joseph, co-founder of the Centre for Policy Studies, was one suggestion, but it was doubted whether he had the necessary ‘fighting spirit’ and was ‘a doubtful quantity on the Market’ – a sign that there was an inherent reluctance to relinquish control to an external figure.229

After the referendum, the campaign’s development was further oriented towards a professionalised, political organisation seeking “insider” status, as the next chapter will demonstrate. The Safeguard Britain Campaign, launched in 1976 as an umbrella organisation for the remaining anti-Market organisations, showed a focused set of aims and a general unity that had been lacking between the start of EEC membership and the referendum. It targeted the support of sympathetic politicians, but also a more moderate support base who may have been deterred by the NRC’s extremist tendencies from voting against EEC membership. The aims and personnel of the new organisation both tended towards the political side of campaigning. Neil Marten identified after the referendum defeat that for future attempts to get Britain out of the EEC, ‘[the] possibilities centre on Parliament rather than non-Parliamentary organisations.’ Therefore, while maintaining pressure on MPs through non-party organisations, Marten advocated a combined organisation with a research team to monitor events. The aim was therefore now to block moves towards federalism in Parliament, and increase support inside and outside Parliament.230 Other anti-Marketeers shared the belief that Parliament should be targeted, with the organisation developing ‘particularly close liaison with those MPs who are interested in our cause as it is in Parliament rather than the country

229 Letter from Ronald Bell to Victor Montagu, 10 November 1974, MSS Hinchinbrooke, D/MAP89
where the next hurdles will be.' 231 An article by *The Economist* reporting on the launch of the campaign, with aims ‘to combat European federalism and stop progress to direct elections to the European Parliament’, noted that it had ‘inherited some of the NRC’s staff and even some of its cash’, and was ‘made up of the stock list of known and militant antis’, including the likes of Jay, Powell and Marten. 232 The chapter will show, however, that the conflict between the political and the popular manifestations of anti-Market campaigning would continue to hinder its development, and that it could not achieve either significant political influence or public prominence.

231 Letter from James Towler, British Business for World Markets, to Hugh Simmonds, 24 September 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES

The National Referendum Campaign dissolved weeks after the comprehensive defeat of the ‘No’ campaign which it spearheaded, with only a few thousand pounds remaining in its accounts.² Its component organisations such as the CMSC and the ACML remained in existence, but a successor umbrella organisation was needed to unite the disparate strands of anti-EEC activism. Leading anti-Marketeers were thus left in a position where they wished to continue a vigilant campaign against the EEC’s encroachments upon British politics, industry, society and identity, while simultaneously accepting the verdict of the British public in the referendum and, at least for the time being, accepting EEC membership as a given. A conference was held at Central Hall in Westminster on 27 September 1975, to which representatives of all national and local anti-Market groups of all affiliations were invited to discuss proposals for the future and the creation of an organisation with the support of all major anti-Market organisations.³ The conference approved of a unified body to oversee the anti-EEC campaign, and delegates stressed the organisation should seek to defend British interests and guard against EEC developments and progress towards federalism.⁴ The Safeguard Britain Campaign [SBC], which would change its name to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign [BACMC] in early 1982, was formed in February 1976 from the discussions that followed. The organisation was in some ways a successor to the CMSC that used the same headquarters in Fulham, and which fully merged itself within SBC within a few

¹ Taken from a letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 8 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
² Minutes of a meeting of the National Referendum Campaign, 30 June 1975, MS Eng. Hist. c.1131/184, Bodleian Library
³ Letter from Sir Robin Williams and Douglas Jay to Common Market Safeguards Campaign group organisers, July 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
⁴ Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Common Market Safeguards Campaign group organisers, October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
months, yet the presence of representatives from the Anti-Common Market League, Anti Dear Food Campaign, Women Against the Common Market and other party-based organisations on SBC’s National Committee presented a broader cross-section of support than any pre-referendum organisation.5

The decade following SBC’s formation would certainly have justified its continuing role to its founders. Successive governments after the referendum took a cautious, instrumental approach to European integration, promoting a particularly British vision of how the EEC should develop, based around free movement of goods and services, intergovernmental co-operation over supranational decision-making, and an enlarged Community. In this respect, British politicians began to show a wary scepticism over the EEC’s political development while continuing to seek the maximum economic gain from British membership. Each Community development, such as the European Monetary System and the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, and the Single European Act signed early 1986, was met with little enthusiasm.6 British politicians, according to Anthony Forster, utilised ‘the language of scepticism’ while tacitly consenting to the EEC’s gradual supranational development.7

Forster is correct to say that debate over the EEC was largely ‘confined to the parliamentary arena’ in this period but the actions of SBC and BACMC, and their component

5 The party-based groups were the Conservatives Against Euro Federalism, Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee, and the Liberal ‘No’ to the Common Market Campaign: Common Market Watchdog, 3, Spring 1976, CIB/1/4, BLPES. The less influential British Business for World Markets was also represented, but after the referendum it was essentially dormant: Letter from James Towler to Sir Robin Williams, 23 August 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES.
6 The British government in fact declined to join the European Monetary system, and the difficult passage of the European Assembly Elections Bill caused European Parliament elections to be postponed from their original date of 1978.
7 Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, p.63
organisations, are absent from his study of post-referendum Euroscepticism.\textsuperscript{8} In tandem with the parliamentary debate over EEC policies and development, and the high political wrangling at successive European summits in the early 1980s over Britain’s budgetary contribution, the Campaign\textsuperscript{9} once again fluctuated between a political role and mobilising for a mass campaign, and operated in a confused position between politics and protest. Opinion polls in this period showed that, despite the referendum result, a significant proportion of the British public consistently regarded EEC membership as detrimental, and in many cases a majority stated they would vote against membership.\textsuperscript{10} Eurobarometer data shows that opposition to membership began to increase within a year of the referendum, and by the turn of the decade around a half of those polled saw membership as a bad thing and around a quarter saw it as beneficial, the high point of opposition being 54 per cent seeing Britain’s membership as detrimental in October 1979. Opposition gradually fell during the first half of the 1980s, yet the figure who regarded membership negatively only once fell below 30 per cent by the end of 1985.\textsuperscript{11} Clearly a large potential support base existed for a mass campaign against membership and in defence of British interests, yet the extra-parliamentary anti-EEC campaign dwindled in terms of both membership and influence in this period.

This chapter will assess the activity and the development of the Safeguard Britain Campaign and its successor the British Anti-Common Market Campaign, and will consider the reasons for its inability to either manifest into a popular movement against the encroachments of the EEC or to wield strong political influence with which to pressure

\textsuperscript{8} Forster, \textit{Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics}, p.63
\textsuperscript{9} The term “Campaign” will be used in this chapter when referring to both the Safeguard Britain Campaign and the British Anti-Common Market Campaign which succeeded it.
\textsuperscript{10} NOP Opinion Poll on the Common Market carried out for Neil Marten, NOP/2505, August 1977, MS Eng. Hist. c.1133/106-114, Bodleian Library
\textsuperscript{11} Data obtained from Eurobarometer, \url{http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm}, European Union, 1995-2012
governments and political parties. The reasons for this were partly down to the conscious decision on the part of SBC’s founders to utilise its limited resources more effectively by seeking to become a more political, lobbying-oriented organisation. The public’s general antipathy towards the EEC issue also played a part, as the Campaign was aware that it was hard to convert apathetic dislike of the EEC into outright opposition. The Campaign’s long-standing Secretary, Sir Robin Williams, declared that while the public ‘believes that the EEC has had something to do with the price of food and reply accordingly in an opinion poll’, it did not mean that ‘the general public is actively anti-Market nor does the general public believe that anything can be done about it.’\textsuperscript{12} The post-referendum period saw the birth of “scepticism” of EEC membership both inside and outside of Parliament, highlighting and attacking the flaws of EEC policy where they adversely affected British interests rather than calling for immediate withdrawal from the Community. These tensions between acting as a mass campaign and as political lobbyists, and fluctuations between scepticism and a more extremist position, hindered the effectiveness of the anti-EEC campaign.

The political character, foundations and aims of SBC, which would lead to future problems, will be assessed first in this chapter. The umbrella organisation was set up as a political campaign, designed to keep out political extremists and less respectable campaigners who together had tarnished the reputation of the National Referendum Campaign. Anti-EEC politicians on the committee were thus central to the campaign, and facilitated and maintained links with the Houses of Parliament. After the referendum defeat, the Campaign’s founders were aware that the public’s vote for membership had to be respected and that any withdrawal from the EEC would be the result of political action. Emphasis on “safeguards”, and acting as

\[\textsuperscript{12} \text{Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Nigel Spearing, 28 December 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES}\]
a “watchdog” – also the title of the Campaign’s journal – implied scepticism, and a continued vigilance against federalist development and protection of British interests. However, this scepticism was a façade, concealing the ultimate aim of withdrawal. The debate over the change of SBC’s name to both reflect its true aims and catch the tide of popular opinion reflected the tensions within the organisation, and the subsequent name change backfired in its alienation of political support. Backbench, party-based scepticism, within the Conservative Group for European Reform and the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee, appeared more credible, building broader bases of political support through their more effective espousal of reformist policies. Furthermore, at a time when Thatcher and other senior political figures were adopting a more hard-line policy towards the EEC and negating the opportunities for campaigns outside of Westminster, the Campaign lacked credible and charismatic leadership with which to attract support.

The chapter will then assess the conflict of strategy between this political direction, favoured by the majority of the committee, and the revival of a popular campaign favoured by grassroots supporters in affiliated local groups. As before, the Campaign put pressure on MPs during elections and party conferences, while MPs in the Committee were relied upon to lobby in Westminster and to give prestige to the Campaign, and make an authoritative case in both Parliament and the media. The Committee sought to professionalise the organisation in a political dimension, adopting a more “insider” model by targeting opinion-formers and increasingly using the press, and seeking the status of a “think-tank” in order to acquire greater funding and authority.\footnote{The term “insider” here refers to the definition from the “insider/outsider” dichotomy laid out in Grant, \textit{Pressure Groups and British Politics}.} In making its anti-EEC case, the Campaign increasingly used figures obtained from parliamentary reports or answers, or from the EEC’s own reports and

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publications. This research was used most prominently in *Common Market Watchdog*, which was aimed more at opinion-formers than the general public and was a far cry from the anti-Market newsletters of the 1960s. The Campaign also gave evidence on the EEC to a number of Parliamentary Select Committees and made legal challenges on EEC issues. However, this course of action caused local groups to feel distanced, and they called for detailed strategies, manifestoes and directions from the committee to feel involved. The Campaign thus had the combined problems of relying on supporters for income but struggling to keep them involved and active when engaging at the high political level, and balancing the political caution of the committee with the activism, dynamism and ambition of the grassroots. A revival of the popular campaign was called for, while the committee were wary of bad publicity and wasted resources. Accusations of an unimaginative campaign and attitude from the “mobilisers” within the organisation mirrored the criticisms of the likes of Christopher Frere-Smith during the referendum, and the movement was again pulled in two different directions. Its inability to engage with the continually-emerging social, environmental and humanitarian issues, and organisations campaigning for them who were similarly engaged in politics and popular campaigning, suggests the committee’s critics had a point.

**The political foundations of the campaign, and the problems they caused**

The National Referendum Campaign had failed in its attempts to mobilise the public into voting ‘No’ on 5 June 1975. As the previous chapter noted, figures within the component organisations gave the Campaign an “anti-political” character, attempting to mobilise and define the Campaign against its well-funded, establishment-backed “other”, Britain in Europe’s ‘Yes’ campaign. This image conflicted with its appointment of Neil Marten and Douglas Jay, as Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively, as respected and experienced
political figures to give the NRC credibility and authenticity. During the referendum campaign, Neil Marten spoke of the ‘many millions’ of ‘moderate, middle of the road people’ whom the anti-Marketeers should be targeting.\(^\text{14}\) It was these people, according to some within the anti-Market campaign, whose support had been alienated by the militant and extremist image of the anti-Marketeers.\(^\text{15}\) The organisation formed after the referendum was therefore designed to be a respectable political campaign, with more moderate aims, in order to exert more influence and attract a broad base of support. However, its political character, foundations and aims would become problematic in later years. The “sceptical” image of SBC proved to be only temporary, as it again struggled to keep its more uncompromising individuals and its local groups in line with its policy, and calls for EEC withdrawal returned. It was unable to find a respected senior political figure to promote its case in Westminster and in the media, while more dynamic but less credible individuals from outside politics were denied the leadership as the committee resolved to keep SBC politically respectable and cross-party.

The initial impetus of SBC’s formation was taken up by CMSC, who discussed the possibility of a new campaign with the respectable and moderate aims of monitoring EEC developments and laws, and protecting British interests.\(^\text{16}\) Williams and Jay called for an organisation ‘embracing all the main anti-Market groups... to defend British interests and resist proposals for merging this country into a political federation’.\(^\text{17}\) A sub-committee formed to put forward recommendations on the organisation’s constitution was chaired by Hugh Simmonds, who co-founded Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome with anti-

\(^\text{14}\) Speech by Neil Marten at Exeter, 19 April 1975, MS Eng. Hist. c.1132/345-6, Bodleian Library  
\(^\text{15}\) Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 23 June 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES  
\(^\text{16}\) Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 23 June 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES  
\(^\text{17}\) Letter from Sir Robin Williams and Douglas Jay to CMSC Group Organisers, July 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
Market MP Ronald Bell.\textsuperscript{18} Simmonds, along with Williams, Enoch Powell and Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee Secretary John Mills, made up a small formal committee excluding the likes of the National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations’ Chairman Don Bennett or Get Britain Out’s Christopher Frere-Smith.\textsuperscript{19} The larger steering committee, which had met a few months after the referendum, discussed their findings.\textsuperscript{20} Although Bennett was on the committee, Frere-Smith was not, and the committee was bolstered by more “political” figures such as Neil Marten, Shaun Stewart, a civil servant and previously a National Referendum Campaign researcher, and Ron Leighton, active in many anti-EEC organisations and Chairman of the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee.\textsuperscript{21}

In spite of Frere-Smith’s absence, Bennett and his National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations provided the opposition to the more moderate character of SBC. Letters sent to Simmonds by leading members of the National Council conveyed ‘apprehension... [that] we should accept verdict of the referendum, and take up an anti-federal position’, and ‘welcomed the statement made by Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett, that the National Council would continue its all out opposition’. It was also suggested that committee members of the new umbrella organisation sign a declaration of outright opposition to EEC membership.\textsuperscript{22}

This opposition may have been partly territorial, as it was stressed that ‘we have a perfectly

\textsuperscript{18} Hugh Simmonds was employed as an officer in Ronald Bell’s Beaconsfield constituency.
\textsuperscript{19} Report of the Sub-Committee of the Steering Committee in succession to the National Referendum Campaign, 23 October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{20} Names of Committee members taken from minutes of the Steering Committee in succession to the NRC, 22 September 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{21} Leighton had been Secretary of the Forward Britain Movement, Secretary of Keep Britain Out and the Director/Organising Secretary of its successor Get Britain Out, Director of the Labour Committee for Safeguards on the Common Market, and Director of the Common Market Safeguards Campaign and Secretary of its National Anti-Common Market Demonstration Committee. Further biographical details about Leighton, Stewart and John Mills are taken from an appendix to a Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee circular from John Mills, 10 November 1978, CIB/10/15, BLPES
\textsuperscript{22} Letter from Audrey O’Reilly of NCACMO to Hugh Simmonds, 18 October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
good organisation in the National Council, and I cannot see why the other organisations
cannot join us.'\textsuperscript{23} The National Council was, however, strongly opposed to the plans to have
MPs on the successor organisation’s committee, feeling it would give the organisation an
undemocratic character and ‘dampen down the activities of other members’.\textsuperscript{24} Its view,
therefore, was that a political campaign with MPs in prominent positions would be far more
moderate in aims and character than a popular movement in outright opposition to
membership. Audrey O’Reilly, also on the National Council of Anti-Common Market
Organisations, accepted that anti-Market MPs had been forced to make sacrifices in their
‘difficult position’, but believed that their public position meant that while they could promote
the anti-Market cause, they could also harm it.\textsuperscript{25}

Other figures consulted before the Campaign’s formation, however, preferred a more
political composition. They believed that, after the referendum defeat, anti-Marketeers should
focus their efforts on Parliament, and as such a ‘steering and liaison committee’ with ‘a
particularly close liaison with [anti-Market] MPs’ was recommended.\textsuperscript{26} Neil Marten, who was
unable to attend the first steering committee meeting but was represented by Jay, passed on
his wishes ‘to see all present bodies merge into one anti-federalist trust as a successor body.’\textsuperscript{27}
Enoch Powell, co-opted as both a sub-committee and steering committee member despite
having held no major position in any of the component organisations, also favoured a more
political course.\textsuperscript{28} Invited to report on the parliamentary scene, Powell felt that until the issue

\textsuperscript{23} Letter from Kathleen Hughes of NCACMO to Hugh Simmonds, 18 October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{24} NRC Steering Committee memorandum, 22 October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{25} Letter from Audrey O’Reilly of NCACMO to Hugh Simmonds, 18 October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{26} Letter from James Towler of British Business for World Markets to Hugh Simmonds, 24 September 1975,
CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{27} Minutes of the Steering Committee in succession to the NRC, 22 September 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{28} Powell had been a member of Get Britain Out’s council, along with a number of other anti-Market MPs, and
an Executive Committee member of National Referendum Campaign.
of direct elections became more prominent there was ‘no point bashing ahead in public’ for the time being.\textsuperscript{29} Like Marten, he favoured the formation of a more formal-sounding “trust”, suggesting the title of ‘Safeguard Britain Trust’ despite reservations from other Steering Committee members that this had the connotations of ‘a rather shady merchant bank’\textsuperscript{30}.

There was a general feeling amongst many of those consulted, therefore, that it would be beneficial to have MPs on SBC’s committee, and to ‘have friends in the House of Commons (and desirably in the Lords also) to elicit information, raise issues and gain publicity for our cause’.\textsuperscript{31} This opinion prevailed as the National Council chose at SBC’s first meeting not to affiliate, with Don Bennett resigning as its Chairman so as to play a role in the new Campaign.\textsuperscript{32} A democratic structure had already been agreed upon with the committee to encompass representatives of the component national and party organisations, elected representatives from the affiliated local groups, and a few co-opted members.\textsuperscript{33} However, it was agreed that Labour MP Bryan Gould and Conservative MP and former Get Britain Out Executive Committee member Richard Body should be approached for the position of Chairman of the Campaign. Gould, a member of the House of Commons Scrutiny Committee, was appointed Chairman in 1976.\textsuperscript{34} Most organisations agreed to affiliate with it, including the Anti-Common Market League, CMSC, the Anti Dear Food Campaign, British Business for World Markets, the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee and Conservatives.

\textsuperscript{29} Minutes of the Steering Committee in succession to the NRC, 22 September 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{30} Letter from James Towler of British Business for World Markets to Hugh Simmonds, 24 September 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{31} Letter from Peter Gohns of Chertsey and Walton ‘Britain Out’ Campaign to Douglas Jay, 18 October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{32} Agenda/handwritten notes of the first Safeguard Britain Campaign meeting, 16 December 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{33} Steering Committee recommendations as to future policy and action, 27 October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
\textsuperscript{34} Agenda/handwritten notes of the first Safeguard Britain Campaign meeting, 16 December 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES; "Try, try, try again", \textit{The Economist}, 7 February 1976, p.61,\textit{The Economist Historical Archive 1843-2006}, retrieved 20 September 2011
Against a Federal Europe.\footnote{Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 26 April 1976, CIB/1/4, BLPES. CMSC would merge entirely with the Safeguard Britain Campaign later that year. The minutes call the Conservative organisation “Conservatives Against a Federated Europe”, which I assume is the same organisation.} Only the National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations declined to affiliate.\footnote{Ibid. An invitation to affiliate was sent to Get Britain Out but, having wound up after the referendum, no reply was received from it. According to the organisational details in Harvester’s \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} collection, Christopher Frere-Smith had stated that Get Britain Out was in ‘cold storage’, with the possibility of it being revived in the future: \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945} microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources.}

Furthermore, from the outset the aims of SBC were intended to be more moderate and anti-federalist. Shortly after the referendum defeat, Marten proposed that an organisation with a research team focused on working through Parliament should block moves towards federalism. This ‘change in philosophy from being strictly anti-Market to being anti-federalist’ was designed to attract support from those with more pro-Market inclinations, through a theme of ‘co-operation but not integration’.\footnote{Letter by Neil Marten to unknown, June 1975, MS Eng. Hist. c. 1132/131, Bodleian Library} This was a view shared by many anti-Market campaigners. At a branches conference held in September 1975, Jay spoke of the anti-EEC campaign’s future task to ‘expose the damaging absurdities of the EEC and resist all further invasion of British liberties and independence’, while stopping short of calls for withdrawal. Others at the conference agreed with Jay, Williams and Simmonds and felt that opposing both federalism and economic and monetary union could ‘split the ranks of the opposition’, and that becoming a ‘ratepayers [and] taxpayers organisation’ would ‘bring into our ranks a number of people who voted “Yes”.’ While some felt that a strong organisation committed to Britain’s withdrawal would receive more support, Williams summarised the meeting by saying that to ‘get converts from the public at large and in Parliament’, the organisation should ‘concentrate on the absurdities of CAP, Common Market regulations etc.’

A representative of a local Get Britain Out branch summed up the issue by stating, ‘We must
fight on. If you are an anti-Marketeer you must be anti-Federalist.'

Throughout its early meetings, the committee consistently agreed that as an umbrella organisation it should ‘oppose federalism or union and all matters leading thereto’ and ‘monitor the activities of the Common Market’ to ‘safeguard Britain’s interests’.

A rather dismissive report in *The Economist* on SBC’s launch confirmed this anti-federalist approach, claiming it wished to stop progress to direct elections to the European Parliament. The Campaign’s main aims were defined at its launch, however, as acting as ‘an umbrella for all existing anti-Market and anti-federal bodies’ under which they could merge. It would ‘monitor the progress of events within the Common Market’, ‘provide a publicity and information service for interested persons’ and ‘campaign actively against all matters which lead towards a federated Europe including in particular direct elections and monetary union’.

SBC was therefore formed to be driven by a political nucleus, with more moderate political aims to attract more support and command more respect. Central to this respectability, however, was the way in which SBC continued to be strictly cross-party and excluded extremists. In early discussions on the formation of the post-referendum umbrella group, it was stressed that it must be founded ‘on an “all party” or “non party” basis’ and that ‘some way must be found to maintain some sort of balance over the political spectrum, and

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38 Minutes of a conference of groups and branches, Central Hall, London, 27 September 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
39 Minutes of the Steering Committee in succession to the NRC, 22 September 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES; Report of the Sub-Committee of the Steering Committee in succession to the National Referendum Campaign, 23 October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES; Steering Committee recommendations as to future policy and action, 27 October 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES; Agenda/handwritten notes of the first Safeguard Britain Campaign meeting, 16 December 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
41 Safeguard Britain Campaign press statement, 3 February 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES
some way needs to be found to prevent infiltration by extremists.’

SBC’s constitution was thus specifically drawn up so as to be comprised of representatives of those organisations which had agreed to affiliate with it and pursue SBC’s course of action, as well as anti-Market party political organisations with representation in Parliament, such as Conservatives Against a Federated Europe and the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee.

This remained something of a *modus operandi* for the Campaign, as years later Williams was still priding the organisation on its political balance across the committee and affiliated organisations, and its constitution with its ‘formulation designed to exclude extremist organisations.’ As part of this formulation, organisations ‘which, whilst opposed to British membership of the EEC also campaign for other objectives’ were also refused affiliation. This aspect of its constitution was essential to make the Campaign appear politically respectable and acquire influence at the high political level, but excluding campaigns and organisations which may have had scepticism or criticism of EEC membership amongst its secondary aims made SBC somewhat narrow. However, in the cautious post-referendum stages, a tight-knit umbrella organisation with a committee comprised of political figures was appropriate.

Leading anti-Marketees perpetuated this desire for SBC to have respectability and prestige, as shown by Oliver Smedley’s call for the appointment of esteemed presidents and vice-presidents in order to gain more support. Smedley felt that ‘distinguished men and women... would be only too pleased to lend their names to our endeavours’, and suggested that SBC’s constitution be amended so that twenty or thirty ‘good names’ could be added to

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42 Letter from unknown [possibly Neil Marten] to Douglas Jay, Margaret Coneybeare and Sir Robin Williams, 22 September 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
44 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Lord Chitnis of the Joseph Rowntree Social Service Trust, 24 February 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
the committee to improve SBC’s public appeal, as ‘People like to know in what sort of
company they are likely to find themselves.’ In addition, the Committee continued to
attribute great importance to maintaining a political balance between the Labour and
Conservative parties. Although it was not explicitly stated as a necessity in its constitution,
SBC’s cross-party nature was always made known and used as a selling point, making clear
that it was ‘not party-political’. In order to maintain this political balance, SBC needed to
make links with Conservative anti-Marketeers in order to counter the large amount of
committee members from the Labour Party, which followed an anti-Market line in the late
1970s and early 1980s. In appointing chairmen, it was felt that ‘only a MP can hope to attract
the attention of the media’, and they had to be drawn from the Labour Party ‘in view of the
strength of anti-EEC opinion in the PLP and the relative weakness among Tory MPs’.
Consequently, Labour MPs and peers such as Bryan Gould, Nigel Spearing, Lord Bruce and
Lord Stoddart occupied the chairmanship of SBC. With Scottish Unionist MP Michael Clark
Hutchinson and Conservative MPs Sir Richard Body and Sir Ronald Bell as successive joint
vice-chairmen, SBC used this arrangement of Labour chairman and Conservative vice-
chairman as evidence of its political balance.

This combination of political respectability, cross-party balance and eschewing
extremism prevented Enoch Powell, one of the most vocal opponents of British membership

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45 Letter from Oliver Smedley to Sir Robin Williams [n.d., 1985], CIB/3/2, BLPES; Letter from Oliver Smedley
to Lord Stoddart, 12 April 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES Names for potential Presidents and Vice-Presidents suggested
by Smedley included Emmanuel Shinwell, Nicholas Kaldor [only the surname was listed. Presumably Smedley
meant Nicholas and not Mary Kaldor], Air Vice-Marshall Don Bennett, Douglas Jay, Alf Lomas, Richard Body,
Teddy Taylor, Leo Price and Bryan Gould.
46 Letter from Richard Kitzinger to Nicholas Horsley, Chairman of Northern Foods, regarding the possibility of
financial support, 23 November 1979, CIB/2/3, BLPES
47 Letter from Richard Kitzinger to Bryan Gould, 22 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
48 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Lord Chitnis of the Joseph Rowntree Social Service Trust, 24 February
1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
of the EEC, from assuming a more prominent role within SBC. Powell was a co-opted member of its committee, and while he had declined to be a patron of CMSC as its name was ‘not unambiguously anti-Market’, he acknowledged the new post-referendum situation and supported the SBC name ‘as the best for our present purposes’. Powell spoke at a number of centrally- and locally-organised SBC meetings and was a popular speaker, with Williams declaring that ‘most of our members would like Mr Powell to be the speaker whether or not there is any other speaker’. However, in the same letter Williams spoke of the importance of getting a Labour MP to speak on the same platform as Powell, to maintain political balance and to protect SBC from accusations of a particular political bias. The risk of Powell attracting extremists to the meeting and ‘intruders interested in Mr Powell’s views on other subjects’ was also noted. Powell, according to Shaun Stewart, was co-opted onto the committee as his standing for election would cause SBC embarrassment. Furthermore, a regional organiser warned Powell against his proposed series of anti-Market meetings in seaside towns on the grounds that the National Front saw Powell as its ‘patron saint’, and ‘will seize upon these meetings to the disadvantage of the anti-Market cause’, and that SBC did not wish to be associated with ‘rabble-rousing’. It was clear that the Campaign wished for respectability, and equal weight between moderate politicians drawn from both Labour and the Conservatives, to be fundamental to its image and composition.

49 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Air Vice-Marshall Don Bennett, 10 May 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES
50 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Nigel Spearing, 28 December 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
51 Letter from Shaun Stewart to Bill Pearce, 12 March 1978, CIB/2/1, BLPES; Letter from Harold Fieldman, North East organiser of the Safeguard Britain Campaign, to Enoch Powell, 24 June 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES
From politicisation to professionalization

In keeping with its moderate aims and political composition, SBC also sought to professionalise in the post-referendum period. A key aspect of this was to target opinion-formers through research publications, reflecting the shift away from a public campaign and targeting parliamentary support for a campaign defending Britain from the negative consequences of EEC membership. SBC’s committee intended upon its creation to monitor and comment upon the impact of membership and events in the EEC and to provide both ‘a publicity and information service for interested persons’ and ‘a research unit which will investigate in depth the activities of the Common Market’. The committee continued to press along these lines, and by 1978 SBC’s manifesto was seeking to present research information to both the general public and ‘more significantly to the ‘opinion leaders’ in the community’. John Coleman, an SBC committee member, was an advocate of this focused approach. Whilst also seeking a more active campaign seeking more widespread support, he was aware that SBC’s role should be to research and to inform the public, and carry out ‘more of an educative than a band wagon type of campaign’. In his suggestions for the future of SBC, Coleman suggested that ‘our main thrust has to be at the inner political thinking of the major political and social groups and movements in our country’. He elaborated that the campaign needed

52 Safeguard Britain Campaign press statement, 3 February 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES
53 “Note on current strategy as agreed by the Executive at their meeting on 17 October 1978”, CIB/2/2, BLPES
54 Coleman was previously active during the referendum in Get Britain Out, and also founded the Common Market Monitoring Association after the referendum, which was affiliated with and worked closely with Safeguard Britain Campaign and the British Anti-Common Market Campaign: “John Coleman”, obituary, *Daily Telegraph*, 29 January 2010; Letter from John Coleman to Common Market Monitoring Association supporters, April 1983, CIB/2/3, BLPES
55 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 7 October 1977, CIB/2/1
...a nucleus of people who dedicate themselves to understanding the principles on which the ever changing and confusing tactics of our opponents are based. None of us can ever afford to feel that we know it all.\(^\text{56}\)

SBC’s most regular research publication was its quarterly newsletter, *Common Market Watchdog*, the title of which clearly reflected its new aims in the post-referendum period. *Watchdog* was intended to both inform existing members of events, facts and statistics relating to Britain’s EEC membership, and to attract some new members without resorting to the more explicit forms of propaganda that previous campaigns had utilised. Having learnt the lessons of CMSC’s *Resistance News* which had operated at a loss, *Watchdog* was printed in a simple format to keep costs down.\(^\text{57}\) The committee had resisted calls from John Coleman to produce a more complicated newspaper combining the activities of all national and local groups on the grounds that it was ‘administratively complicated’ and that ‘printing as it is [and] not as a newspaper’ would keep *Watchdog* in production.\(^\text{58}\) Furthermore, Williams felt that such a publication would be too large and that *Watchdog* was ‘already sufficiently lengthy for ordinary people to read’.\(^\text{59}\) However, the Common Market Monitoring Association’s *Market News*, produced by Coleman, was intended to be more populist, described as ‘a public paper’ aimed at doubtful pro-Marketeers and focused on ‘how the Common Market really affects our lives and standards of living’. Coleman described *Watchdog*, somewhat derogatively, as ‘essentially a briefing publication and house magazine’.

\(^\text{60}\) A regional organiser of SBC suggested a new style for the publication which still

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\(^{56}\) Letter from John Coleman to Bryan Gould, 11 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES

\(^{57}\) Letter from Sir Robin Williams to John Coleman, 20 October 1975, CIB/2/1, BLPES

\(^{58}\) Comments on Safeguard Britain Campaign Committee Meeting by John Coleman, with handwritten notes [presumably by Williams], 16 March 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES

\(^{59}\) Letter from Sir Robin Williams to John Coleman, 15 April 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES

\(^{60}\) “Comments on my meeting with Sir Robin Williams and Mrs Coneybeare” by John Coleman [n.d., 1977?], CIB/2/1, BLPES
‘eschewed extra-bold headlines used in ‘popular’ advertising matter’ as *Watchdog* was ‘read by the committed seeking confirmation of his/her opinion’. In describing this as aiming *Watchdog* at the readership of *The Times* ahead of that of the *Daily Mirror*, the publication would continue to both target opinion-formers and to further educate existing SBC members with a well-researched and informative paper.61

The content of *Watchdog* reflected SBC’s desire for a more professional, political approach. Its first issue a few months after the referendum set the tone, reprinting large sections of both the government’s referendum leaflet ‘Britain’s New Deal in Europe’ outlining the government’s commitments and promises, and of the White Paper on renegotiation. One of its articles speculated how the EEC would gradually assume more power over British policy, and that while the referendum had ‘for the time being killed any thoughts that the government’s decision to join the EEC might be reversed by the British people’, there was still ‘scope for watchdogs’.62 *Watchdog* went on to reprint details, figures and statistics from government Bills, White Papers and Select Committee recommendations and reports, such as the Overseas Trade Statistics from the Select Committee on Trade and Industry report that spelt out the increasing trade deficit since Britain joined the EEC.63 Monitoring events in Parliament by reprinting debates, speeches, parliamentary questions and their replies, demonstrated SBC’s strategy to focus on events in Westminster. Furthermore, MPs sympathetic to SBC would obtain information through replies to parliamentary questions, such as the price of EEC import levies obtained in replies to SBC Chairman Nigel

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61 Letter from Harold Fieldman to Sir Robin Williams, 22 July 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
62 *Common Market Watchdog*, 1, Autumn 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES
63 *Common Market Watchdog*, 38, New Year 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
Spearing and Labour MP Austen Mitchell. In doing this SBC was adopting the same approach as party political organisations such as the Conservative European Reform Group and pressure groups including the Child Poverty Action Group and Shelter, who also obtained figures from White Papers and parliamentary replies to use in leaflets to further their case. Opinion poll results, trade figures, extracts and reports from the European Commission, and statistics and sympathetic articles in the Times, The Economist and the Financial Times were also reprinted in Watchdog. Having originally been promoted as a publication with ‘interesting information about how the workings of the Common Market are affecting your pocket’, Watchdog increasingly gave a broader critique of the EEC and its policies, and provided less overt and populist propaganda than previous anti-Market campaigns. The reprinting of sympathetic articles in the press, and the speeches of concerned pro-Marketeers in parliamentary debates, showed how Watchdog pursued a course and adopted a tone that was more sceptical than hostile, as it sought to broaden its political base of support.

Aside from Watchdog, Williams recommended producing other ‘briefing documents [aimed at] opinion-formers such as MPs and Lobby Correspondents’. An example where SBC produced these documents while assuming a degree of authority and expertise was the work of Sir Richard Body on the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP]. In a shift away from

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66 For example, figures on ‘Price Stability’ from a lengthy European Commission report that showed a large increase in food prices in the EEC compared to the price on the world market were reprinted in *Common Market Watchdog*, 7, Spring 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
67 Letter from W H Brown to Wolverhampton and West Midlands branch of the Anti-Common Market League, November 1975, CIB/7/15, BLPES
68 *Common Market Watchdog*, 9, Autumn 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
69 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Bryan Gould, 11 February 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES
the predominant focus on food prices during the referendum, SBC reverted to broader critiques of agricultural policy by using the EEC Commission’s own reports and figures. Press statements criticised the CAP both as ‘a dear-food policy which penalises consumers’ and as ‘divisive... [setting] consumer against farmers, and even farmer against farmer.’

Body, with his agricultural background, was the ideal choice to produce the 1978 pamphlet *The CAP Won’t Fit British Farmers*, an extensive report based on detailed research. Criticising the over-production caused by the CAP and the dumping of foodstuffs in the developing world, Body argued for a return to a national agricultural policy combined with European free trade.

Body continued to concentrate on agriculture and produced more publications on the subject in the early 1980s, which allowed the Campaign to target a specific group for support, and influence a particular sector. Body’s research publications on agriculture were seen as extremely important to the Campaign, although it was acknowledged that this work was preventing him from playing a more dynamic part in the wider campaign. At the expense of being seen as the ‘anti CAP expert’, where he believed ‘every door is now open to me for the [media] operation’, Body was unable to play a more active role within SBC and suggested relinquishing his vice-chairmanship in 1984 as a result. Yet Executive Committee member Hugh Gilmour recommended this kind of approach for the anti-Market campaign, where ‘the speaker or writer is obviously interested in the subject for itself’, in Body’s case, on agriculture and the environment. Gilmour went as far as saying there was ‘very little wrong with our Anti-Market strategy’, that ‘research has been first-class from the beginning’ and

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70 Press statement, “Food, the Green Pound and Farming”, 19 January 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES
71 “UK farming growth ‘threatened by EEC’”, unknown newspaper, 28 April 1978, CIB/2/1, BLPES
73 Letter from Sir Richard Body to Sir Robin Williams, 6 April 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES; Reply from Williams to Body, 30 April 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES
74 Letter from Sir Richard Body to Sir Robin Williams, 6 April 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES
that unpaid researchers with a passion for the subject ‘have done better than any professionals could have done for us’.

In spite of this, SBC also sought to persuade research organisations to study and publicise the negative effects of membership. A key example was the attempt in 1985 to approach both the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge to undertake a study into unemployment caused by EEC membership. SBC’s lack of finance, however, prevented this study from being carried out.

SBC therefore wished to form a ‘nucleus of people’ to counter the pro-Market case with expert knowledge through which they could influence opinion-formers. Part of its professionalization and shift towards expertise came with the evidence provided by senior SBC figures to Select Committees on European affairs. In this way it was able to occupy a position on the fringes of institutional politics and perform more of an “insider” role than in the past. The links between Select Committees and the SBC committee were manifold. Nigel Spearing, SBC Chairman from 1977 to 1983, had originally pressed for greater parliamentary control of European legislation, putting forward a motion in Parliament for further debate on legislation referred to the House by the Scrutiny Committee. Spearing would relinquish the chairmanship of BACMC upon being elected Chairman of the House of Commons Select Committee on European Legislation. Furthermore, in 1984 Shaun Stewart, a civil servant who had served on the Board of Trade who was active in SBC and BACMC and the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee, was able to use his position as an advisor to the Sub-Committee of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee to assist SBC in providing

75 “BACMC – Strategy” memorandum [n.d., late 1984/early 1985], CIB/3/2, BLPES
76 Letter from Sir Richard Body to Sir Robin Williams, 11 May 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
77 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Leo Russell, 3 July 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
78 Letter from John Coleman to Bryan Gould, 11 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
80 Letter from Nigel Spearing to Sir Robin Williams, 28 July 1983, CIB/3/1, BLPES
evidence. Stewart informed SBC in advance that the Sub-Committee would be writing to them, and according to Williams ‘doubtless had a hand in drafting the long questionnaire’ which the Committee had sent to them. Stewart, along with Jay, Body and economist Jim Bourlet, worked together to draft SBC’s evidence, with Stewart’s name omitted from the reply.  

The Sub-Committee made a specific request to approach SBC for its expertise on the economic consequences of membership rather than on any ‘[w]ider issues of a political and strategic nature’, highlighting SBC’s shift towards being an organisation based around authoritative research. The lengthy response, on the economic benefits and disadvantages of membership, highlighted the disadvantages caused by ‘the undermining of Britain’s economic structure’, traditionally based on ‘low cost food’, with EEC membership causing inflation, a trade deficit and reduced competitiveness of British industry. Citing statistical evidence from a number of official sources, the report concluded that the economic consequences had been ‘disastrous’ and recommended withdrawal from the CAP ‘and other economic contrivances of the EEC’. The following year SBC was again invited to give evidence to the same Committee, on the subject of the European Monetary System. Stewart again provided advice, recommending that SBC follow the strategy of the Labour European Parliamentary Group and submit evidence in the form of ‘an “essay” followed by crisp answers’ to the questionnaire, the latter provided in the ‘terse’ replies by Douglas Jay. The evidence stated that joining the European Monetary System would mean Britain would lose the power to

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81 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Lord Stoddart, 9 August 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES
82 Letter from S Priestley to Sir Robin Williams, 31 July 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES
83 “Financial and Economic Consequences of UK Membership of the European Communities”, report produced by British Anti-Common Market Campaign for the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee of the House of Commons, 18 October 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES
84 Letter from S Priestley to Sir Robin Williams, 28 March 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
85 Letter from Shaun Stewart to Richard Kitzinger [n.d.,1985], CIB/3/2, BLPES
manage its own currency and would hinder the development of a single European currency amongst other member states, and therefore that Britain should reject membership of it.86

Another aspect of the Campaign’s professionalised approach was to search for legal technicalities to fight the encroachments of the EEC. In the run-up to the first direct elections to the European Parliament, Leo Price QC, a barrister who had assisted the anti-Market campaign in the past, produced a memorandum challenging the legality of the elections with reference to the Treaty of Rome. SBC’s initial response was sceptical, believing that public opinion would not support a challenge which looked like ‘knockout by technical means’, and aware of the irony of the potential use of the European courts.87 Despite reservations, it sought to mount a legal challenge with Shaun Stewart, seeking Labour candidature for the elections, acting as a plaintiff, and Hugh Simmonds carrying out solicitor’s work for no fee.88 Stewart’s failure to be selected for the elections, however, meant SBC could not proceed with the case.89

A more high-profile, and more successful, action was the challenge made by Oliver Smedley in 1984 to prevent the £120 million shortfall payment by the British government to the EEC budget. Smedley, fighting the case as a taxpayer with Leo Price offering his services for free, argued that payment without a parliamentary debate and bill would be unconstitutional. The government’s announcement in early 1985 that they would seek parliamentary authority for the payment was described by BACMC as ‘a clear moral victory

86 “European Monetary System”, report produced by British Anti-Common Market Campaign for the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee of the House of Commons, 22 May 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
88 Instructions to Michael Mann QC sent by Hugh Simmonds, 30 January 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Leo Price QC, 11 May 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
89 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Norris McWhirter, 11 May 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
for Oliver Smedley and us’.  

This action combined assertive activity, ‘the biggest undertaking upon which anti-Marketeers have embarked on a long time’, with the opportunity of ‘putting a spoke in the EEC wheels’. Smedley described his motivation for challenging the payment, however, as the ‘defence of such delicate threads’ as ‘freedom of the individual’, parliamentary democracy and common law, which he perceived to be unmistakably British. Despite the drawn-out appeal campaign to meet Smedley’s legal costs which hindered the BACMC’s finance and activities, there was initial optimism at the outcome, with Smedley claiming they had created an ‘atmosphere of doubt’ and were ‘winning at last’. Such tactics combined their aims of acting as a political nucleus lobbying the upper echelons of the political sphere, and adopting a sceptical stance fighting extension of EEC power.

The Campaign also attempted to formalise links with the press during this period, attempting to use its committee’s political influence to publicise the anti-Market case. A suggestion was made shortly after the referendum for anti-Market MPs to ‘bombard the Press with correspondence’ given SBC’s limited funds. A number of press releases were subsequently produced, on one occasion under the name of ‘leading British parliamentarians associated with the Safeguard Britain Campaign’, opposing EEC policies and moves towards federalism. These press releases often commented on the performance of the government and other political parties regarding EEC policy, or dealt with other issues in the House.

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90 Letter from British Anti-Common Market Campaign to supporters – special appeal for funds, January 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
91 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Group Organisers, 4 December 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Group Organisers, 30 January 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
92 Common Market Watchdog, 38, New Year 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
93 Letter from Oliver Smedley to Sir Robin Williams, 11 January 1985, CIB/10/16, BLPES
94 Letter from Christopher Joyce, Eastbourne branch of Safeguard Britain Campaign, to Sir Robin Williams, 28 July 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
95 Safeguard Britain Campaign press release, 22 November 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES. Several other press releases from 1977 can be found in CIB/2/1, BLPES

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regarding the EEC, in an attempt to keep the issue prominent. This tactic of ‘comment by Press Release whenever anything important happens’, along with Common Market Watchdog and publications aimed at opinion-formers, maintained SBC’s active image, compensating for a lack of popular support to be a true mass movement and a lack of resources to be a fully-developed research body.\footnote{Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Bryan Gould, 11 February 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES}

It was clear, however, that SBC needed influential political figures and MPs within the Committee in order to ‘compel the attendance of pressmen at press conferences’.\footnote{Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Bryan Gould, 28 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES} As a result, working through the Press maintained the political composition of SBC’s committee. This committee-led action also differed from the actions of groups such as the National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations, which was re-launched after the referendum, whose “Operation Truth” instead involved members bombarding national newspapers over pro-EEC bias, with letters which were ‘identically worded’.\footnote{“Campaign to take Britain out of the EEC”, The Times, 24 April 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES} SBC continued to target the press in its own way with its “Campaign for Truth” series of press releases.\footnote{“Campaign for Truth” press statements, 16 May 1984, 21 May 1984, 29 May 1984, 6 June 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES} It would often be the task of the chairman, a politician as ‘only an MP can hope to attract the attention of the media’, to prepare and issue such press releases and letters to the media, but also to give an immediate response to developments in the EEC to the media.\footnote{Letter from Richard Kitzinger to Bryan Gould, 22 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES; Job specification for Chairman of British Anti-Common Market Campaign [n.d., likely to be 1984 coinciding with the resignation of Lord Bruce of Donington as Chairman], CIB/3/2, BLPES} The mid-1980s also saw a revived attempt to make stronger links with the media, with the committee looking to revise its press list and make contact with more journalists, and to find a retired journalist
sympathetic to BACMC to become its part-time press officer.\textsuperscript{101} However, a lack of resources again prevented the Campaign from forming good relations with the media, Hugh Gilmour claiming that making contact with journalists and sub-editors from the national media was ‘a skilled and arduous job which can only be done successfully by a professional.’\textsuperscript{102} The assignment of John Coleman, whose Anti-Common Market Project advertisements in the national press had attempted to revive the media campaign, to the position of Press Officer in 1986 appeared to be another step in the Campaign’s slow path to professionalization.\textsuperscript{103} A series of advertisements in the \textit{Guardian} that year sought to present the anti-Market case to a wider audience.\textsuperscript{104} However, BACMC had difficulty putting the issue of EEC membership back on the political agenda, with information obtained through parliamentary questions attracting ‘little press publicity’, leading it to conclude that skilful use of the media ‘requires the kind of expertize [sic] which requires a great deal of money’.\textsuperscript{105} This inability to successfully use the media to get the issue of EEC membership back on the agenda, compared to the likes of Frank Field at the Child Poverty Action Group and Des Wilson at Shelter who were able to successfully propagandise their causes through a number of different media, hindered the anti-Market campaign.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{101} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Lord Bruce of Donington, 21 March 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Andrew Alexander of the \textit{Daily Mail}, 5 June 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{102} “BACMC – Strategy” memorandum [n.d., late 1984/early 1985], CIB/3/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{103} Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 13 May 1986, CIB/3/3, BLPES. Coleman’s Anti-Common Market Project will be analysed later in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{104} “Jobs lost as trade deficit soars”, Safeguard Britain Campaign press release [n.d., early 1986], CIB/3/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{105} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Leo Russell, 3 July 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES; Reply from Russell to Williams, 10 July 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
Professionalization, and changing its image from a mass movement to a research-based think-tank, was one way in which the Campaign sought new sources of funding. The first move towards this was the suggestion made in 1976 to open a ‘research fund’ account financed by donations and spent on research expenditure, through which potential donors could be reassured.\(^{107}\) In 1979, SBC sought to solicit further donations towards research by registering as a charity, adopting the model of the Child Poverty Action Group by combining research with political campaigning. This again represented a desire to shift away from a mass campaign movement, and it was the political nature of SBC’s activities that prevented it from becoming a registered charity.\(^{108}\) An approach for donations made to S.E. Scammell’s McLaren Foundation in 1986 was unsuccessful for similar reasons, with the Charity Commission regarding BACMC as a political campaign.\(^{109}\) Enquiries were also made to the Inland Revenue in the 1980s regarding BACMC’s taxation status, in the hope of being classified as an organisation with charitable and research aims.\(^{110}\)

Attempts to attract wealthy backers continued to play up the Campaign’s intention of professionalising. A list of wealthy personalities who might have been sympathetic to the anti-Market cause was drawn up by Oliver Smedley, including Robert Maxwell and Rupert Murdoch.\(^{111}\) A draft letter to these personalities, to be sent on House of Commons paper and signed by the more eminent members of the Campaign’s Committee, emphasised the desire to

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\(^{107}\) Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Bryan Gould, 16 December 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES

\(^{108}\) Letter from Sir Robin Williams to S.E. Scammell, 14 February 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES. Interestingly, the desire to channel funds to a registered charity was to try and persuade Scammell, who had previously run the Referendum Before Common Market Committee, to make a large donation to the Campaign’s funds – Letter from Williams to Hugh Simmonds, 25 July 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES

\(^{109}\) Letter from S.E. Scammell to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign, 6 June 1986, CIB/3/3, BLPES. Scammell’s McLaren Foundation did, however, contribute £500 towards the appeal to meet Oliver Smedley’s legal funds: Letter from S.E. Scammell to Sir Robin Williams, 7 October 1986, CIB/3/3, BLPES

\(^{110}\) Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Lord Bruce, 21 March 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES

\(^{111}\) Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Nigel Spearing, 13 July 1983, CIB/3/1, BLPES
make EEC membership ‘the great national issue’ free from party loyalty, and laid out the plans to turn Common Market Watchdog ‘into a more professionally produced magazine which can be widely circulated, initially free, to a carefully selected list of opinion-formers’. A proposed ‘Foundation Fund’ would have the signatories as trustees to ensure the money was ‘not whittled away on unproductive administration costs’.  

The Campaign’s most serious attempt to acquire the status of a think-tank was its application to the Joseph Rowntree Fund, seeking finance ‘to extend its research activities and, in particular, to undertake in-depth studies of the consequences of membership of the EEC and of the potential consequences of withdrawal.’ SBC’s research, carried out by academics and part-time researchers, would thus make a ‘contribution to public understanding and debate’ with results which they would ‘publish and publicise widely’. After its application was rejected, Chairman Nigel Spearing appealed on the basis that SBC was the only organisation advocating the non-party case, which needed ‘hard, detailed monitoring and research’.

The aims to revive the anti-EEC movement were thus based on two different strategies, the first involving placing respected political personnel at the head of the Campaign, and the second introducing more professionalization and dynamism to its activities. The aforementioned strategy to improve the Campaign by having ‘good names’ on the committee was proposed by Smedley to elevate it from being run at ‘the petty cash-box

112 Draft letter by Oliver Smedley to potential donors [n.d., 1983], CIB/3/1, BLPES
113 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Lord Chitnis of the Joseph Rowntree Social Service Trust, 9 February 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
114 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Lord Chitnis, 24 February 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
115 Letter from Nigel Spearing to Lord Chitnis, 10 May 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES

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level’. The search for ‘notepaper patrons’ continued through scouring the letter-heads of think-tanks such as the Economic Research Council, the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Trade Policy Research Centre. John Coleman also sought to revive BACMC by getting ‘supporting bodies, business people and politicians’ on its notepaper. Other suggestions to improve the Campaign’s image centred on its organisation, with John Coleman complaining that the Committee were ‘operating a national campaign with less organisation than that of a local insurance broker’s office’. Oliver Smedley was another active proponent of professionalising the operation and administration of the Campaign. Smedley believed that the Campaign must be run on ‘a more ambitious scale’, and criticised the small-scale operation of the Campaign, which should be

...one of the most important Bodies in English history rating with the Anti-Corn Law League and certainly of far greater importance than Greenpeace, CND and many others of which the great British public are far more aware than they are of our activities.

Smedley’s experience at the Institute of Economic Affairs, the National Benevolent Fund for the Aged and the Farmers and Smallholders Association led him to believe that the Campaign needed ‘one individual... appointed who could make the success of the Organisation his or her own personal career’. A figure in the mould of Des Wilson at Shelter or Ralph Harris at the Institute of Economic Affairs, possessing ‘a background of economics, politics and PR’, was needed to re-develop the Campaign from scratch. With a detailed strategy, wealthy backers

116 Letter from Oliver Smedley to Sir Robin Williams [n.d., 1985], CIB/3/2, BLPES; Letter from Oliver Smedley to Lord Stoddart, 12 April 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
117 Letter from Jim Bourlet to Sir Robin Williams, 1 July 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
118 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, with Committee members Gordon Tether and Professor Horace E Rose copied in [n.d., 1986], CIB/3/3, BLPES
119 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 8 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
120 Letter from Oliver Smedley to Sir Robin Williams, 23 December 1986, CIB/3/3, BLPES
121 Ibid.
could be found if they ‘knew that [their money] was not going to be dribbled away in an amateurish fashion, but used to good and fruitful effect.’ What these two approaches reveal is the divergence between maintaining a professional political campaign headed by parliamentary figures, and the relinquishing of control to more dynamic personnel in order to raise the profile, support and activity of the campaign. This clash of views was endemic throughout the Campaign, particularly between local groups and the committee, and this chapter will now deal with those opposing strategies.

**The grassroots versus the Committee**

In order for the Campaign to prevent itself transforming into a purely professional lobbying body, it needed the support and input of local groups exemplifying widespread hostility to the EEC and its policies. While SBC co-ordinated or subsumed the national post-referendum organisations, local groups were invited to affiliate, although often these groups remained sub-groups of the Anti-Common Market League or the National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations. As SBC was created, supporters and branches of the Anti-Common Market League formed both the audience and organisation of its initial public meetings, and the League concurrently set about in strengthening its local and regional organisation. It soon became clear, however, that these members and groups were feeling increasingly distanced from the decision-making of SBC’s central committee.

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122 Suggestions made by Oliver Smedley to British Anti-Common Market Campaign Officers [n.d., 1986], CIB/3/3, BL Pes
123 For example, a circular sent to SBC members calling for the resignation of Sir Robin Williams as Secretary was signed by several local anti-market groups, of which many were regional branches of the ACML or listed as an ‘Anti-Common Market Group’, whereas only two were local groups of the SBC campaign: [n.d., 1979], CIB/2/2, BL Pes
124 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to ACML supporters, October 1976, CIB/2/1, BL Pes
The complaints from the grassroots centred on being treated as subscriber-members, with little financial or organisational support for their own local activism. This underlined one of the Campaign’s perpetual organisational problems – the contradiction of having paid subscribers with little campaigning to undertake, as efforts became focused on Westminster. SBC needed money for a revived post-referendum campaign, but local groups were only willing to provide considerable financial sums if a definitive action plan was devised, combining political persuasion, media work, and grassroots campaigning.

Differences between the local groups and the committee in regards to the revival of a popular campaign also became apparent. As stated above, some figures within the anti-EEC movement opposed the involvement of MPs, favouring a public campaign bypassing political obstacles and red tape. In attracting the widest range of support, however, the Campaign had to align itself with more political groupings. For example, in an attempt to gain more Conservative support, it advocated a more “sceptical” and anti-federalist rhetoric. This approach was more in line with the policies of the Conservative European Reform Group, a parliamentary grouping with ‘severe reservations’ about EEC membership terms but calling for ‘substantial and fundamental changes’ rather than withdrawal.125 Local groups and certain prominent figures within SBC favoured a more hard-line approach, leading to the name change to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign in 1983, emphasising withdrawal rather than safeguards. This change appeared to backfire in terms of alienating the Campaign’s “sceptical” supporters and precluding it from forging links with the Conservative European Reform Group. Once again, divisions over strategy, aims, and the position of the

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campaign in relation to political and public activism, stifled the progress of the anti-EEC movement.

**Criticism from the groups**

While SBC’s central committee reorganised for the post-referendum political situation, attempting to garner political support for a firm stance against EEC policy, local groups and less eminent figures, unsure of their role in the new campaign, raised their concerns. As early as 1977, John Coleman, elected to the committee as founder of the Common Market Monitoring Association, highlighted the disconnection between the grassroots and the central organisation. Coleman, who consistently favoured a more populist campaign educated and led by an informed political nucleus, reflected on his first SBC meeting with a ‘deep sense of concern’. Coleman felt that resolutions put forward by local groups were ‘dealt with in the letter but not in spirit’, and that the committee had failed to appreciate that ‘[a]ction was manifestly called for at the AGM.’\(^{126}\) He also felt that how SBC presented itself to groups, particularly those within a party organisation, was ‘tremendously important’ in maintaining support.\(^ {127}\) He perceived SBC’s role to be that of a co-ordinating body to unite the ‘apparently disparate elements’, directing the efforts of party organisations and local groups and facilitating their campaigns. By guiding public anti-Market sentiment towards ‘setting up study groups locally and building up an understanding of the Common Market and its dangers in depth’, SBC could build up ‘highly informed potential leaders and

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\(^{126}\) “Comments on SBC Committee Meeting”, John Coleman, 16 March 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES; Minutes of the SBC Annual General Meeting, 12 February 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES

\(^{127}\) Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 14 November 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
informed public opinion’, and facilitate ‘a two-way loyalty between anti-Market MPs and groups in the country.’ 128

Whether as a way of attempting to exert more influence within the committee or to direct SBC along more populist lines, Coleman continued to converse with key members of local groups and expressed their criticisms and concerns, claiming they felt ‘dangerously neglected’. 129 Coleman wrote to Gould inspired by the ‘spirit of anger’ from local groups and the ‘many forceful complaints about the inadequacy of the activities of the Safeguard Britain Campaign’. From these, the accusation arose that ‘there is no direction from the HQ of a national organisation and an almost total absence of co-ordination’. Coleman cited examples where provincial organisers had received little or no assistance from the central organisation, and that local groups were therefore ‘a little too anxious to have a bandwagon type of campaign’. Better guidance and implementation of AGM decisions was recommended to stop groups feeling ‘like ships adrift simply being told to do their own thing’. 130

By 1979, as will be assessed below, patience was wearing thin with SBC’s stagnation and its lobbyist nature, particularly with its Secretary Sir Robin Williams. In that year, Coleman would again complain of the way in which the wishes and the activities of the local groups were overlooked. In criticism of the way that Williams had responded to a local branch in Dorset, Coleman reminded Williams that the committee should ‘treat the groups, who are often starved for information, or are misinformed by our national press, with the utmost understanding’. Its London headquarters were thus accused of doing ‘much to deaden the effect of the Campaign’, alienating both its core support and some of the more prominent

128 “10 Points on Anti-Market Strategy and Organisation”, John Coleman, November 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
129 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 13 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
130 Letter from John Coleman to Bryan Gould, 11 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
political personalities. Coleman’s complaints came as a result of the ‘malaise’ within the Campaign and the ‘extreme concern of those who see the campaign as failing to achieve what they hope for.’ The Campaign was condemned as being too political and possessing an ‘unimaginative attitude’, with Coleman stating:

> The very fact that it is called a ‘campaign’ is misleading to people in the country. Had it been simply called the Safeguard Britain Co-ordinating Committee and only been intended to improve liaison between MPs and leaders and representatives of campaigning bodies the situation might have been better, and more campaigning groups might have developed spontaneously. [...] it is impossible not to draw the inference that it does not seriously wish to grow and expand, that it wishes to strangle any real campaign in the country.

These criticisms were also voiced by local group leaders. Christopher Joyce, of SBC’s Eastbourne branch and Coleman’s assistant in the Common Market Monitoring Association, also sought to reorganise and stimulate the campaign through greater dialogue between the centre and the grassroots. Like Coleman, he raised his concerns after the first AGM, in a letter to Sir Robin Williams stating the

> …general feeling among regional groups (especially the more active)... that SBC is still not sufficiently accountable to its membership and that there is an exasperating remoteness of the latter from the executive.

Resolutions were put forward by local groups at AGMs calling for more recognition, such as the Torbay Anti-Common Market League branch’s claim that SBC’s structure ‘does not give full weight to the importance of the members and groups’ and calling for more local

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131 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 20 February 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
132 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 8 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
133 Letter from Christopher Joyce, Eastbourne branch of SBC, to Sir Robin Williams, 14 June 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
representatives on the committee.\textsuperscript{134} It also accused the committee of inertness and excessive caution, leading to ‘the continuance of a half cooked organisation which uses the groups in the country as a tedious necessity’.\textsuperscript{135} The Eastbourne branch had also called for ‘a more detailed strategy’ at AGMs.\textsuperscript{136}

In response, Shaun Stewart, while accepting the need to expand membership, pointed to improvements in regional organisation and blamed ‘the constant criticism from certain groups and individuals’ for Bryan Gould’s resignation as chairman. Defending the more political approach, he predicted that those who opposed the presence of politicians on the committee would become ‘bigger fish… swimming in a very small pond’ if they succeeded, and cited his lengthy experience in the Civil Service when claiming that ‘without the political connection the organisation would have carried no weight at all.’\textsuperscript{137} Starting the post-referendum period with ‘a handful of guerrillas’, Stewart declared it vital to keep links with anti-Marketeers in Parliament ‘where the battle must eventually be won’.\textsuperscript{138} This approach was incorporated within SBC’s national strategy, which stressed that members’ efforts should be directed towards Westminster. After drawing up a list of objectives to campaign for, SBC would ‘advance these objectives in the current political scene’. As these objectives centred on parliamentary sovereignty, the statement declared that the ‘immediate priority’ was ‘our national Parliament, its members and those who seek election to it must receive our main attention’, with ‘opinion leaders’ also targeted. Aside from some general advice on the

\textsuperscript{134} Both the North Kent ACML branch and John Coleman also put forward resolutions regarding increased representation and the group-committee relationship respectively at the same AGM: Minutes of 1978 AGM of SBC, CIB/2/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{135} Letter from Bill Pearce to Shaun Stewart, 14 February 1978, CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{136} Resolutions of 1977 AGM of Safeguard Britain Campaign, 12 February 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{137} Letter from Shaun Stewart to Bill Pearce, 18 February 1978, CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{138} Letter from Shaun Stewart to Bill Pearce, 12 March 1978, CIB/2/1, BLPES
forthcoming direct elections, the statement did not provide local groups with any guidance for activism.\textsuperscript{139}

The grassroots anti-Market activists were thus left detached, and sought both greater direction and input within a two-way anti-Market campaign. Coleman therefore continued to push for ‘a new kind of campaign with a very capable and imaginative organiser’ to provide greater organisational cohesion and to revive the grassroots campaign.\textsuperscript{140} Yet these criticisms were never really addressed by the SBC hierarchy. By the mid-1980s, Oliver Smedley, perceiving Sir Robin Williams to be ‘unnecessarily defeatist’ about the campaign, cited a letter he had received from a supporter about how the recent AGM had been a successful meeting that was ‘good for morale’, and should be replicated more frequently. Smedley elaborated on the supporters’ complaints about the lack of communications and activity by stating that ‘members are not being given enough to do by their Executive Committee.’\textsuperscript{141}

The political orientation of SBC, combined with the diminished level of activity and involvement of local groups, led to questions being raised as to the overall purpose and role of SBC. Accusations from the likes of Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett of a nucleus of figures controlling the direction of the anti-Market campaign appeared to hold some truth.\textsuperscript{142} Williams’s assertion that a revival of the EEC issue would mean people would ‘re-emerge, full of energy and criticisms as to what we… have omitted to do in the interim’, demonstrated how SBC’s senior figures saw themselves as the post-referendum vanguard, eager to keep the

\textsuperscript{139} “Note on current strategy as agreed by the Executive at their meeting on October 17 1978”, 18 October 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{140} Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 8 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{141} Letter from Oliver Smedley to Sir Robin Williams [n.d., 1985], CIB/3/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{142} In a letter to Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett, Sir Robin Williams said he hoped Bennett ‘will vigorously contest the argument that there is an apparent take-over of the SBC by the CMSC’: 10 May 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES
subject alive within political echelons.\textsuperscript{143} The resignation of Lord Bruce as Chairman of the successor British Anti-Common Market Campaign in the mid-1980s led to further soul-searching as to the Campaign’s role. Its then vice-chairman Richard Body believed the time had come ‘to decide what it is trying to do, and how to achieve it’, and that it should either become a co-ordinating committee or draw up a plan of action for campaigning.\textsuperscript{144}

Williams’s response underlined one of the Campaign’s major problems. While needing to retain active officers, Williams also felt that fulfilling a purely co-ordinating role would be insufficient, and furthermore that without a level of public activism supporters would ‘lose interest in subscribing if we merely co-ordinated the activities of other bodies, i.e. we would run out of money and so finish.’\textsuperscript{145} The Campaign had thus found itself in a vicious circle, hoping to revive a campaign with increased funding and renewed vigour, but alienating its primary source of funding. Once again, the anti-Market movement was found to exist within the grey area between political pressure and public activism, attempting to straddle both but failing to succeed in either. In the early years of SBC, both Christopher Joyce and John Coleman called on the committee to issue a definitive strategy, as part of what the former called ‘a clear indication to supporters [as to] how the Campaign intends to channel its financial resources.’ Joyce argued that donations would subsequently increase, and a ‘greater sense of accountability of the Executive to supporters’ would be fostered.\textsuperscript{146} Coleman called for the production of a manifesto and ‘a much greater sense of direction’, with a national campaign organiser. In anticipation of the committee saying they could not afford to employ an organiser, Coleman asserted that local groups had stated they would finance specific

\textsuperscript{143} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Christopher Joyce [n.d., 1977], CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{144} Letter from Richard Body to Sir Robin Williams, 6 April 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{145} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Richard Body, 30 April 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{146} Letter from Christopher Joyce to Sir Robin Williams, 28 July 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
proposals but were wary of money going to a general fund.\textsuperscript{147} Williams responded with a claim that the committee were seeking £100 a year from local groups to fund a national organiser, but as explained above, they struggled to devise a detailed strategy which would fully engage and integrate grassroots anti-Marketeers.\textsuperscript{148}

The case of Oliver Smedley, a vocal proponent of the Campaign’s professionalization, demonstrates the conflicting strategies of the anti-Market movement. His ambitions in the mid-1980s echoed the calls from the likes of Coleman for a well co-ordinated, nationally-organised, active campaign. Smedley stated that he was willing to donate towards the employment of an ambitious full-time Executive, provided he ‘knew that [the money] was not going to be dribbled away in an amateurish fashion, but used to good and fruitful effect.’\textsuperscript{149} Smedley wished to improve the image of the Campaign by combining a prestigious committee of well-known names with a network of active local groups. In an attempt to move away from the ‘petty cash-box level’, Smedley believed that ‘the money will come if we go out to deserve it.’\textsuperscript{150} Yet paradoxically, it was Smedley’s action which did the most to financially cripple the Campaign and take funding away from activism, whilst also demonstrating the distance between committee and membership. After Smedley incurred substantial legal costs from the attempt to prevent a shortfall payment by the Treasury towards the EEC budget, Williams stated that raising funds for Smedley would use ‘All energies for the time being.’\textsuperscript{151} Williams relayed this priority to local organisers, stating that the ‘hard grind of collecting funds for the legal appeal’ must be undertaken, after which ‘we

\textsuperscript{147} Letter from John Coleman to Bryan Gould, 11 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{148} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to John Coleman, 3 October 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{149} Suggestions made by Oliver Smedley to BACMC Officers [n.d., 1986], CIB/3/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{150} Letter from Oliver Smedley to Lord Stoddart, 12 April 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{151} “BACMC – Strategy” memorandum [n.d., late 1984/early 1985], CIB/3/2, BLPES
can turn our attention to new positive action’. Almost a year later, Williams claimed that as most of his time had been spent on this matter, ‘our efforts have not met with the success we would like.’ While Smedley had defended the action by saying it had brought the Campaign out of the ‘Petty Cash Book mentality which was in danger of stultifying all progress’, it became clear that the legal case had revealed the distance between the tiers of its organisation. The chairman Lord Stoddart clarified the difficulty of repeatedly appealing to members for funds, including the ‘problems of explaining such a complicated problem in terms likely to get a response’. Indeed, some local branch members were angered by the sudden decision to proceed with the costly action without consultation of groups or members. The difficulty of combining high-level political action with local grassroots activism therefore continued to be a prohibitive burden on the Campaign.

**The clash over the nature of campaigning and moving away from ‘orthodox anti-marketism’**

In its position between lobbying body and public campaign, differences arose within the Campaign over the potential revival of a mass movement opposing European integration. In the initial post-referendum origins of SBC, a relative consensus as to the scaled-back operations of the anti-Market campaign was accepted, with leading anti-Marketeteers not wishing to be seen as extremists rejecting the referendum result. By the late 1970s, however, the same figures within SBC who called for greater grassroots involvement attempted to pressure the committee into a mass campaign. Once again, the future direction of the

152 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Derek Ward, 29 March 1985, CIB/10/16, BLPES
153 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Reverend John Papworth, 14 November 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
154 Letter from Oliver Smedley to Sir Robin Williams, 3 January 1985, CIB/10/16, BLPES
155 Letter from Lord Stoddart to Lady Caroline Neill, 11 June 1985, CIB/10/16, BLPES
156 See correspondence sent to Oliver Smedley, CIB/10/16, BLPES
Campaign was in a tug-of-war between the more ambitious newcomers—along with older die-hards such as Oliver Smedley—against the more cautious old hands in the committee who perceived the battle to be in the political arena, and sought Westminster personnel accordingly.

John Coleman was once more highly active in calling for a new direction for the Campaign. Although aware of the limitations both financially and in terms of the low prominence of the EEC issue, Coleman was also aware that while ‘the main battle at the moment is in Westminster’, and that a large-scale public campaign shortly after the referendum ‘would fall flat’ and be counter-productive. However, he felt that in the future ‘a campaign will be widely demanded’, and that the organisation should not proceed with a wholly political orientation. Coleman even predicted the need for a united anti-EEC party to counter any potential pro-EEC social democratic coalition government, with all the party organisation and national support which that would entail. In Coleman’s view, the rift between ambitious anti-Marketeers seeking a more populist mass campaign and cautious committee figures—evident in the ‘fundamental conflict’ between the Common Market Safeguards Campaign and Get Britain Out in the referendum campaign—was stifling the anti-EEC movement.

Other SBC figures also pushed for a more widespread public campaign. As local group leaders, they were perhaps keen to see control wrested away from the politicians in the central committee through a more decentralised operational structure. Christopher Joyce had pressed for Williams to make SBC and the Anti-Common Market League ‘more

157 “Comments on SBC Committee Meeting”, John Coleman, 16 March 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
158 “10 Points on Anti-Market Strategy and Organisation”, John Coleman, November 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
Regional organiser Bill Pearce was even more insistent on the need for mass mobilisation. In a frank exchange of letters with Shaun Stewart, he criticised the circumspect management of SBC’s activities by stating that ‘[t]actics are alright. But an organisation which consists of generals and no troops as a result has not really achieved much.’ The likes of Coleman and Smedley, in fact, acted as a buffer between those figures who opposed the presence of MPs within SBC, and the politicians themselves in the committee. Coleman warned of the activities of Patrick Holden, a demagogue within the anti-Market campaign who preferred (or was perhaps forced) to operate under the National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations banner, and his appeal to local groups who had felt ignored or ostracised. Coleman repeated one group’s accusation that the committee in London were ‘totally failing to take the lead’ and were ‘forced to share the view of Pat Holdern [sic] that the movement should kick out the MPs and get ahead with a mass movement of the people of this country.’ Believing this to be ‘a dangerously unconstitutional standpoint’, Coleman sought reorganisation and revival of SBC in order to prevent the development of a ‘bandwagon type campaign’ that could be attacked and dismantled by the media.

Coleman was thus attempting to heal the rift and decrease the distance between committee and grassroots and tackle what he called ‘the dilemma of politics’. While expressing sympathy with those Campaign members who were ‘absolutely anti-politicians and want the campaign to be run by non-political people’, he recognised the paradoxical tactic of

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159 Letter from Christopher Joyce to Sir Robin Williams, 14 June 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES; Letter from Christopher Joyce to Sir Robin Williams, 25 May 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
160 Letter from Bill Pearce to Shaun Stewart [n.d., February 1978], CIB/2/1, BLPES
161 The group in question was the Milbourne Port group – Letter from John Coleman to Bryan Gould, 11 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
of trying to restore parliamentary sovereignty while distancing the Campaign entirely from Westminster. In Coleman’s words, ‘Our aim must be not to get rid of our elected representatives but to make them do our will.’ Anti-political rhetoric, which had remained a part of anti-EEC discourse since the days of the Anti-Common Market League attacking the Macmillan Government in the early 1960s, had come back to haunt the Campaign. Inability to combine mass pressure with political support curbed the development of the Campaign in both public and political spheres, as it had done for the past two decades. Coleman’s hopes to unite the different strata within ‘a new kind of campaign’, along with Smedley’s plans to combine high-profile donors and committee members with ‘decentralisation’ including women’s and youth sections in an expanded mass campaign, represented attempts to bridge the ‘grey-area’ divide.

Countering the pragmatism and caution of the committee, however, was difficult. Attempts to expand activities on anything other than a small scale were met with reactions ranging from rebuttal to scorn. In SBC’s early years, proposals put forward to record the activities of all other anti-Market organisations in a quarterly paper were dismissed as ‘[m]uch too complicated’. Previously, having seen the losses that CMSC’s Resistance News had incurred, the committee warned Coleman of the potential costs of his own organisation’s Market News along the lines he wished to follow. Coleman and Joyce continued to press for a news-sheet that would at least collate all the activities of local groups and list the

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162 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 8 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
163 Letter from Olive Smedley to Lord Stoddart, 12 April 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
164 Handwritten notes on “Comments on SBC Committee Meeting”, John Coleman, 16 March 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
165 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to John Coleman, 20 October 1975, CIB/2/1, BLPES
publications of anti-Market organisations.\textsuperscript{166} Attempts to send summaries of committee decisions were pressed for by Joyce, Coleman and Stewart, and were eventually accepted despite some reluctance from the committee, such as Williams who felt it would be better to provide vague information about ‘the main direction in which we are trying to go’.\textsuperscript{167}

Attempts of figures within SBC to revive popular mobilisation and demonstrations proved even more difficult. While local group leaders sought to re-launch a public campaign based around a petition against direct elections to the European Assembly and a national day of demonstration, the committee were wary that low turnout could potentially backfire, both financially and in terms of media coverage. Without ‘[l]iterally vast numbers of signatures’ and ‘thousands of people’ in ‘hundreds of places’ respectively, both activities were seen as counter-productive.\textsuperscript{168} Once again, the question of how best to mount a public campaign on an emotive issue with diminished resources was the subject of controversy within the anti-Market movement. Figures such as Joyce sought ‘energetic groups in [the most] vulnerable constituencies’ where MPs were undecided or with low majorities, so as to direct mass pressure against political targets.\textsuperscript{169} The committee, however, remained pessimistic at the prospect of reviving a large-scale campaign of activism. Williams reiterated the need for those

\textsuperscript{166} “Comments on my meeting with Sir Robin Williams and Mrs Coneybeare”, John Coleman [n.d., 1977], CIB/2/1, BLPES; Letter from Christopher Joyce to Sir Robin Williams, 14 June 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{167} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Shaun Stewart, with other Committee members copied in, 3 October 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES; Letter from Christopher Joyce to Sir Robin Williams, 28 July 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Christopher Joyce, CIB/2/1, BLPES. Regular letters summarising committee decisions and discussions were henceforth sent to group organisers on a regular basis from 28 November 1977 – CIB/2/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{168} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to various group leaders, regarding AGM resolutions, 4 May 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{169} Letter from Christopher Joyce to Sir Robin Williams, 25 May 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
public meetings without the draw of Enoch Powell to be held in small halls, so as to avoid negative coverage in the media.¹⁷⁰ Stewart defended this strategy, claiming that

...if some of us have been cautious – and caution is actually foreign to my own nature – it has been because I know from long experience as a civil servant that demonstrations consisting of two men and a boy are not going to convince anyone.¹⁷¹

This was an attitude that continued into the 1980s, with BACMC unsure as to whether public meetings should be ‘designed to attract new members, or to provide a rallying point for the faithful’.¹⁷² The committee’s pessimism as to the extent of potential support shaped both their political approach and their reluctance to attempt reviving a public campaign.

Refusal to entertain suggestions on the organisation and strategy of the Campaign was unremitting. As mentioned above, many of John Coleman’s suggestions for the campaign were met with reluctance or derision, such as his ambitious idea to launch a youth campaign by getting anti-Market literature into school staff rooms and local education authorities, which the committee dismissed as ‘dreaming’.¹⁷³ The ideas of David Axton, a local group founder recommended by Smedley for employment within SBC, also clearly represented the difference of opinion between the committee and other personnel. In an attempt to bring the grassroots and the national organisation closer together, Axton proposed that activism of the former, which lay outside of party politics and ‘cannot seen to be condoned by the MPs’, should be overseen by the Anti-Common Market League while SBC fulfilled the role of a national co-ordinating body. It was hoped that grassroots membership would grow as a result

¹⁷⁰ Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Nigel Spearing, 28 December 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
¹⁷¹ Letter from Shaun Stewart to Bill Pearce, 12 March 1978, CIB/2/1, BLPES
¹⁷² Letter from Leo Russell to Sir Robin Williams, 9 March 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
¹⁷³ Written in margin on letter from John Coleman to Bryan Gould, 11 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
of local groups being ‘freer to undertake activities’.\footnote{Letter from David Axton, Founder and Secretary of Lincolnshire and South Humberside Anti-Common Market Liaison Committee, to Margaret Coneybeare, Secretary of Safeguard Britain Campaign, 23 February 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES} In a dismissive reply, Williams explained that an employed organiser’s role was to increase membership and income, rather than the ‘pure waste of time’ of making suggestions on reorganisation to ‘the existing dedicated anti-Marketeers’.\footnote{Letter from Sir Robin Williams to David Axton, 10 March 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES. Unsurprisingly, the Committee did not proceed with Axton’s appointment.} Once again, ambition and pragmatism were in stark conflict.

Partly as a result of such stubborn dismissals from Williams, a campaign was briefly launched in the late 1970s to remove him as Secretary of SBC, in order to adopt a more imaginative approach. Coleman laid the blame for SBC’s stagnation on the activities of Williams and the tone of his letters, while Joyce also complained of the ‘atmosphere of acrimony’ at committee meetings.\footnote{Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 8 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES; Letter from Christopher Joyce to Sir Robin Williams, 3 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES} An ‘urgent circular’ signed by a number of local anti-Market groups and associations was sent out in early 1979. It protested at the ‘obstructiveness and discourtesy’ of Williams, with one group describing his actions as ‘overbearing and rude’ and calling for his resignation. Members were asked to vote against him at the next committee elections, on the grounds that SBC needed ‘energy, imagination and absolute commitment’.\footnote{“Urgent circular: Safeguard Britain Campaign Executive Committee elections” [n.d., February/March 1979], CIB/2/2, BLPES} Coleman perceived this attitude to exist in the majority of the committee, which had ‘done much to deaden the effect of the Campaign’ and to alienate some useful members.\footnote{Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 20 February 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES}

Williams would survive as Secretary of the Campaign for several decades, yet the calls for a new approach continued to be made. Coleman launched attempts in the late 1970s and 1980s to broaden the scope of the anti-Market movement and to raise the profile of the

\footnote{Letter from David Axton, Founder and Secretary of Lincolnshire and South Humberside Anti-Common Market Liaison Committee, to Margaret Coneybeare, Secretary of Safeguard Britain Campaign, 23 February 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES}
anti-Market case in the media. The latter, a venture dubbed the Anti-Common Market Project, drew inspiration from campaigns that combined public activism with social, economic and political concerns. Working in collaboration with Richard Wiggs and Professor Horace Rose, the Anti-Concorde Project was the predominant influence upon this scheme, the former being its founder. Both campaigns operated through soliciting donations from concerned members of the public to fund half-page and full-page advertisements promoting their cause in the national press, becoming self-perpetuating and self-financing media projects. Coleman and Wiggs drew parallels between the Anglo-French collaboration over Concorde and becoming a member of the EEC; both were anticipated to be forays into modern European enterprise but were perceived, in the groups’ opinions, as failures.\textsuperscript{179}

The Anti-Common Market Project aimed to both keep what was becoming a lapsed issue alive in the mainstream press, and to gain the support and involvement of people opposed to EEC membership who were reluctant to join movements or organisations. The advertisements were both a ‘public education programme’ and timed for maximum political influence, such as during party conferences.\textsuperscript{180} The project’s founders saw it as a way of preventing the anti-Market campaign from falling into ‘the trap of ‘preaching to the converted’ and providing a way to ‘present forcefully the common ground of the anti-Market case and to avoid all party political and other associations.’\textsuperscript{181} Within a few years, Coleman was aiming for the project to have a membership of thousands making it ‘a force that the major parties can only ignore at their peril’.\textsuperscript{182} Although BACMC collaborated with the

\textsuperscript{179} Letter from John Coleman to Common Market Monitoring Association members, July 1980, CIB/2/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} Letter from John Coleman to Common Market Monitoring Association and Safeguard Britain Campaign members, July 1980, CIB/2/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{182} Letter from John Coleman to Common Market Monitoring Association members, April 1983, CIB/2/3, BLPES
project, Coleman now perceived it as ‘enormously successful’ as ‘a parliamentary liaison and co-ordinating committee’, but believed the project had potential as a ‘national campaigning body’. A series of advertisements in the *Guardian, The Times, the Spectator* and *Tribune*, was therefore the new anti-Market strategy to attempt to combine public and political pressure. Reactions to the first advertisement in the *Guardian* – including a strong rebuttal in a leader column in *The Times*, and published responses from the Conservative Group for Europe, British Chambers of Commerce and the European Commission, the latter reporting the advertisement to the Advertising Standards Authority over alleged inaccuracies – demonstrated the political weight of the project.

The Anti-Common Market Project’s advertisements attempted to both increase support for the mass campaign against EEC membership and also broaden the campaign by incorporating other social and political issues. However, the first advertisement, in an attempt to cover the aforementioned ‘common ground’, was similar to the majority of previous anti-Market literature, dealing with a number of issues such as unemployment, trade, food policy and sovereignty. The Project’s propaganda came to be more focused in later advertisements, particularly regarding the increasingly prominent issue of unemployment. As the British-EEC dialogue focused increasingly on Britain’s budgetary contribution and the CAP, Coleman sought to publicise the ‘soft-pedalled’ issue of unemployment ‘loud and clear’ through advertisements, with information and examples of firms that had suffered or closed

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183 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 12 January 1983, CIB/2/3, BLPES

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during EEC membership and ‘the movement of plant by the very big firms and multinationals to the Continent’.\footnote{Letter from John Coleman to Common Market Monitoring Association supporters, 14 December 1983, CIB/2/3, BLPES} A full-page advertisement, titled ‘Brussels and the dole queues’, was subsequently drafted.\footnote{“Brussels and the dole queues”, pre-print of Anti-Common Market Project advertisement, enclosed with letter from John Coleman to Common Market Monitoring Association members, 31 July 1984, CIB/2/3, BLPES}

Coleman, along with other figures on the fringes of the committee, had sought to tailor their propaganda and campaigns to specific groups, issues and campaigns for some time. The Common Market Monitoring Association’s newsletter, Market News, was intended to appeal to the wider network of anti-Market sentiment beyond the realm of the existing activists, with Coleman attempting to ‘create overlaps with the interests of others [sic] significant organisations’. As well as targeting political parties and trade unions, links were forged with environmental and peace movements, in part due to the first issue’s article by the academic Mary Kaldor which, according to Coleman, led the newsletter to be ‘distributed nationally through CND and various peace organisations’.\footnote{“Comments on my meeting with Sir Robin Williams and Mrs Coneybeare” memorandum, John Coleman [n.d., 1977], CIB/2/1, BLPES} His attempt to gain support through ecological and anti-nuclear groups, as well as more conventional organisations such as the National Federation of Self-Employed, was part of a wider strategy to transcend what Coleman dubbed the ‘orthodox anti-marketism’ which had stifled the anti-EEC campaign. At the turn of the decade, Coleman was scathing in his criticism of SBC’s lack of imagination, complaining that ‘[n]othing effective is being done to draw together all the various groups of people threatened by the EEC’. Just as pro-Marketeers targeted specific interest groups, it was suggested that the anti-Market campaign tailored its message toward producers, consumers and the third sector. Thus, anti-nuclear groups would be warned of the ‘extreme threat’ of
EEC energy policy, propaganda would target the ‘alternativist movement’ and ‘anti-big technology view’, and organisations from political parties to animal welfare movements would be seen as potential bases of support. As Coleman stated to Williams,

> I would like to see Safeguard Britain Campaign supplying its supporters with appropriate literature for every kind of political meeting from right-wing environmentalists to the mass of Trade Union meetings which recently took place in London.

Other fringe members of the Campaign shared this view. The committee invited the activist Reverend John Papworth to play a greater role within BACMC based on his ideas for increasing fundraising and public support. Whereas Williams had previously dubbed him the ‘collarless cleric’ who ‘talked excitable rubbish’, Papworth’s ideas began to be seen as useful. In a lengthy memorandum advocating ‘a massive campaign’ for withdrawal, Papworth advocated tailoring BACMC’s messages to appeal to different support bases, stating the need to ‘define more exactly at whom our literature is directed’, from academics to activists, ‘and to sharpen the contents accordingly’. Unemployment was again a key theme to be utilised, in order for BACMC to ‘think forward’ and show how it is ‘related to the problems of people, especially young people, today.’

As well as suggesting BACMC organise around specific interest groups and occupations, Papworth recognised the burgeoning social movement sector and the ‘New Left’, in part due to his experience in pacifist and civil rights movements. Acknowledging ‘the profound transformation in consciousness’ where young radicals would join counter-cultural

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190 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 8 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
191 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 20 February 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
192 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Nigel Spearing, 10 January 1983, CIB/3/1, BLPES
193 Memorandum by John Papworth, addressed to members of the British Anti-Common Market Campaign, December 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES

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movements rather than socialist or communist parties, he encouraged BACMC to reach out to these causes and movements.\textsuperscript{194} Furthermore, inspired by the works of E.F. Schumacher and Leopold Kohr, Papworth felt it should cater to the former’s ‘small is beautiful’ mantra.\textsuperscript{195} As with the liberal anti-Marketeers who saw EEC membership as an expansion of ‘big government’, Papworth felt BACMC could secure the support of the radical, educated youth in Britain’s post-materialist society whose ethos was for ‘a human scale approach’ and in favour of ‘non-centralised forms of power’.\textsuperscript{196} Coleman shared this liberalist critique of the EEC, calling in the late 1980s for ‘a Europe based on co-operation, not on coercion’, with individual liberty made paramount rather than ‘superimposed common policies and artificially contrived harmonisation’. The ‘distinction between European co-operation and European institutions’, and a favouring of intergovernmental agreement over supranationalism, echoed the traditional anti-EEC rhetoric from the early 1960s onwards, as did Coleman’s vision of a ‘new Europe [protecting] the interests of 250 million consumers’ – a case of old wine in new bottles following the free-trade liberalist arguments of the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{197}

BACMC took some of these suggestions on board, and began in the mid-1980s to target particular groups by evoking certain contemporaneous issues. Central to its propaganda in this period were the issues of the EEC budget and Britain’s trade deficit, and the effects of EEC membership on unemployment. While BACMC campaigned against increased EEC taxation during the 1980s via its “More Down The Drain” leaflet, Sir Robin Williams and

\textsuperscript{194} Memorandum by John Papworth, addressed to members of the British Anti-Common Market Campaign, December 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{196} Memorandum by John Papworth, addressed to members of the British Anti-Common Market Campaign, December 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{197} Letter from John Coleman to BACMC members [n.d., 1987?], CIB/3/3, BLPES
Richard Body began to plan a campaigning theme based on unemployment to supplant it.\footnote{“More Down The Drain” leaflet, BACMC [n.d., 1983], CIB/3/1, BLPES; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Richard Body, 30 April 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES} When the committee met at the end of 1984 to discuss future strategy, emphasis was once more on a public and parliamentary campaign based around the subject of unemployment, with Douglas Jay again advocating emphasis on issues which were ‘easily understood’ and resonated with the public, sidestepping the problem of limited resources with ‘a steady drip-drip of propaganda over a longer period’. Hugh Gilmour echoed these sentiments, developing his aforementioned endorsement of detailed research with calls for expertise on certain related subjects ‘where the speaker or writer is obviously interested in the subject for itself – Peace, Unemployment, the Third World’. Richard Body’s aforementioned works on agriculture were presented as examples of a domestic problem presented with an anti-EEC solution.\footnote{“BACMC – Strategy” memorandum [n.d., late 1984/early 1985], CIB/3/2, BLPES} Williams subsequently approached Body – who had ‘given up hope of persuading BACMC’ to press the issue of unemployment – to devise a study on this issue undertaken by a research organisation such as the Institute for Economic Affairs.\footnote{Letter from Richard Body to Sir Robin Williams, 11 May 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Richard Body, 26 April 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES} Williams’s approach was motivated by the suggestion of veteran anti-Marketeer Leo Russell, who had seen a Common Market Watchdog article on the effect of membership on the motor industry, and suggested an industry-by-industry study.\footnote{Letter from Leo Russell to Sir Robin Williams [n.d., spring 1985], CIB/3/2, BLPES; Letter from Leo Russell to Sir Robin Williams, 9 March 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES} Predictably, however, BACMC lacked the funds to commission a willing research organisation to undertake the study.\footnote{Letter from Wynne Godley, Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge University, to Sir Robin Williams, 24 June 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Leo Russell, 3 July 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES}
The Campaign’s interaction with emerging issues espoused by new social movements was also extremely limited. Whereas some interest in these issues had been expressed by the committee, this awareness was not developed into formal or informal connections with groups and movements potentially sympathetic to the anti-EEC cause, preventing the opportunity to expand its own support base. Lack of any working relationship with the global poverty and third world movement is one telling example. After its initial application for a research grant to the Joseph Rowntree Social Service Trust, a disagreement arose between Williams and the Campaign’s chairman, Nigel Spearing MP, on how to resubmit the application. At a committee meeting, Richard Body had suggested launching a specific project related to third world development for which they could receive a research grant. Spearing had understood that the project had been given approval, but Williams and the committee had deemed it ‘periferal [sic] to our main purpose’ for which the Campaign ‘need money now’. An application was subsequently resubmitted for a grant to put the wider anti-Market argument across, with the third world project left as ‘a fall-back position if rejected’.203 Some effort to connect the anti-EEC campaign with the ongoing third world famine was made via the press, including comments on the ‘appalling reality of thousands of people dying of starvation in Ethiopia and elsewhere while there is food in grotesque abundance mouldering in expensive European storehouses’.204 An approach was also made to the editor of the Panorama television programme to return to the issue of the CAP and linking it with the issue of proposed further integration.205 However, despite keeping track of arguments and figures

203 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Nigel Spearing MP, 9 June 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES. The letter refers to a committee meeting of 18 May 1982, minutes of which can also be found in CIB/3/1, BLPES.
204 Letter from Lord Stoddart to The Times, 30 October 1984, CIB/3/2, BLPES
205 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Peter Ibbotson, editor of Panorama, 14 August 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
utilised by groups such as the World Development Movement, no formal links were made with organisations connected to international development and global poverty.\textsuperscript{206}

Inability to engage with the network of social movements on a variety of different issues is further demonstrated by the failure to work with the Greenham Peace Camp protestors. BACMC had utilised figures from a \textit{Guardian} article in a \textit{Common Market Watchdog} piece on the EEC’s destruction of food.\textsuperscript{207} The \textit{Guardian} article, however, was predominantly about the demonstrations outside the Intervention Board headquarters at Reading by the women of the nearby Greenham Peace Camp. The ‘broad conscience’ of the protestors led them to use the ‘network of consumer, peace, political and women’s groups’ to campaign against the hoarding and destruction of food. Inability to form a working relationship with the ‘Mountain Movers’ of the article, or the wider activist network, represented a fundamental inability to engage with the emerging issues which Coleman and Papworth had highlighted the importance of.\textsuperscript{208} Refusal to relate anti-EEC propaganda to the nuclear issue on the grounds that ‘anyone who takes an anti-nuclear line is liable to be considered a crank or a communist’ also limited the Campaign’s outlook.\textsuperscript{209}

This desire to exclude political extremists or mavericks, as set out in the SBC’s foundations, may have contributed to its inability to branch out to other movements and issues. It was felt by most of the committee that by focusing on the issue of EEC membership

\textsuperscript{206} List of quotes from World Development Movement leaflet, “Vote for the World’s Poor”, included with letter from John Coleman to BACMC Committee members, Gordon Tether and Professor Horace Rose, 13 May 1986, CIB/3/3, BLPES
\textsuperscript{207} “A blot on the landscape”, \textit{Common Market Watchdog}, 41, Autumn 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES. Lord Macleod wrote to the Campaign disputing the figures, but the Campaign replied that the figures had come from \textit{The Guardian} – Letter from Lord Macleod to BACMC, 31 October 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES; Reply from BACMC to Lord Macleod, 14 November 1985, CIB/3/2. BLPES
\textsuperscript{208} John Cunningham, “Mountain Madness”, \textit{The Guardian}, 9 September 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{209} Letter from Richard Kitzinger to John Coleman, 22 September 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
alone, the Campaign was less likely to repel leaders or supporters on political grounds. Some anti-Marketeers, including Oliver Smedley, lamented the ‘political balancing act’ inherent in this approach.\(^{210}\) However, this desire to bridge the party political or ideological divide led to the Campaign basing propaganda on ‘the general case against the EEC’ and ‘arguments… which are suitable for all audiences’.\(^{211}\) Along with the Anti-Common Market Project’s aforementioned presentation of the ‘common ground of the anti-Market case’, the Campaign and its publication stuck to the ‘orthodox anti-marketism’ which Coleman had criticised, ensuring propaganda was confined to the issue of the EEC.\(^{212}\)

Coleman’s strategy to ensure the Campaign’s cross-party character was to develop working relationships with party political anti-EEC groups. He suggested that the Conservative and Liberal parties should have a ‘Common Market Safeguards Campaign’ like Labour’s, in order to ‘foster an inter-party consciousness among anti-Marketeers’ and make the Campaign a co-ordinating body heading the wider anti-Market movement.\(^{213}\) Along with targeting ecological, anti-nuclear, peace and alternativist movements, it was proposed that the Campaign appeal to members of political parties for support, by emphasising the EEC’s ‘threat to true Conservatives, […] true Liberals, […] true Socialists, [and] Communists’.\(^{214}\) However, with the majority of its key political figures belonging to the predominantly anti-Market Labour Party, the Campaign needed to target the increasingly sceptical Conservative

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\(^{210}\) Letter from Oliver Smedley to Sir Robin Williams, 30 April 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES

\(^{211}\) Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Mrs S Donaldson, 16 August 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES

\(^{212}\) See letters from Sir Robin Williams to Rev John Papworth and Arthur Robyns, both 14 November 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES. For the ACMP and Coleman, see letter from John Coleman to Common Market Monitoring Association and Safeguard Britain Campaign members, July 1980, CIB/2/3, BLPES and letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 8 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES respectively.

\(^{213}\) “10 Points on Anti-Market Strategy and Organisation”, John Coleman, November 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES

\(^{214}\) Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 8 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
rank-and-file, and find ‘means of identifying Conservatism with the anti-Market case’.\textsuperscript{215} The final section of this chapter will analyse the attempt to gain Conservative support through the prism of the Campaign’s own changing position between scepticism or “safeguards”, and outright calls for British withdrawal from the EEC.

**The fluctuation between scepticism and outright hostility**

While there was some opposition to the more moderate foundations of SBC, based around anti-federalism and scepticism of further European integration, the majority of anti-Market leaders formed a consensus on the ‘safeguarding’ tactics. The activities and rhetoric of SBC in its first few years mirrored its initial aims of seeking to ‘reduce the damage to Britain from the more unacceptable and unfair consequences of membership’ and embracing those ‘in favour of co-operation with our European partners within the present framework, but who have little sympathy with the sillier excesses of that tiny but vocal minority of Euro-fanatics’.\textsuperscript{216} Press statements therefore presented critiques of harmful or unacceptable policies, including those ‘imposing a federal superstructure which no one wants, and… harmonising everything in sight’.\textsuperscript{217} As a result, much of SBC’s early focus was on the first direct elections to the European Assembly, seen as ‘a major step’ towards a federal Europe opposed by the British government and public.\textsuperscript{218} This position reflected the attitudes of much of the wider anti-Market campaign, such as the Labour Common Market Safeguards

\textsuperscript{215} Letter from Christopher Joyce to Sir Robin Williams, 28 July 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES  
\textsuperscript{216} SBC press release upon launch of the organisation [n.d., February 1976], CIB/2/1, BLPES  
\textsuperscript{217} SBC press statement, 3 June 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES  
\textsuperscript{218} Press release by ‘leading British Parliamentarians associated with the Safeguard Britain Campaign’, 22 November 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
Committee whom the Campaign commended for ‘holding the fundamentalists at bay’ in the production of a draft pamphlet.\textsuperscript{219}

However, dissent regarding the Campaign’s title and objectives continued to manifest in the late 1970s. Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett was a particular critic who, in addition to believing SBC had been subject of a ‘take-over’ by personnel of the Common Market Safeguards Campaign, favoured a more militant name. Williams defended the Safeguard Britain Campaign title, which was chosen with ‘the fewest objections to it for our purposes’ and to attract the more moderate support it had failed to win over during the referendum. The ‘different situation’, according to Williams, meant that ‘other names more attractive to straightforward anti-Common Market fighters’ were to be temporarily shelved.\textsuperscript{220} These included Bennett’s suggestion of British Independence Campaign, and David Axton’s proposed revival of the ‘Get Britain Out’ slogan as there were many who felt it ‘would be a much more effective name for the movement as a whole.’\textsuperscript{221} Figures within SBC were therefore forced to defend its name and position, including Coleman who believed Safeguard Britain Campaign was ‘a good and appropriate title’ and felt ‘the campaign against the title has been set in motion to weaken and split our campaign’, and Williams whose letters to supporters stated that while withdrawal was still favoured, ‘the best tactics at this stage would be to adhere to the [Campaign’s] statement of aims’.\textsuperscript{222}

\textsuperscript{219} Letter from Shaun Stewart, of SBC and LCMSC, to Sir Robin Williams, 3 May 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{220} : Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Air-Vice Marshal Don Bennett, 10 May 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid.; Letter from David Axton to Margaret Coneybeare, 23 February 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES. The organisation would change its name to Campaign for an Independent Britain in 1989, almost identical to Bennett’s suggestion.
\textsuperscript{222} Letters from Sir Robin Williams to Mrs A E Cowley and Major Armstrong-Wilson, 16 August 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES
This uneasy compromise between strands of the Campaign unravelled with the row in 1979 over the membership of Hugh Simmonds on SBC’s committee. Simmonds, instrumental in SBC’s formation, had come under criticism for speaking at a pro-Market Conservative Party meeting. He explained that while wholeheartedly against membership, he felt that anti-Marketeers should ‘accept that for the present we are members of the Market, an institution which needs radical change, and an institution within which we should fight most vigorously against federalism.’ As a result, he was willing to adopt an anti-federalist position within the Conservative Party, but his support of Conservative candidates in the direct elections was in conflict with the SBC’s policy of boycotting the elections. Several committee members defended Simmonds on the grounds that SBC should cover ‘the widest possible range of opposition’ and ‘a fairly wide spectrum of views’. Williams felt that Simmonds ‘was doing more good for our cause by opposing federalism at that particular meeting than by raising the straight Common Market issue of “in” or “out”’. Other members, on the other hand, expected Simmonds to resign, and Williams’s defence of Simmonds was the catalyst for the circular calling for the removal of Williams as Secretary of SBC, signed by twenty-one different anti-Market groups, including Coleman’s Common Market Monitoring Association. This conflict over SBC’s principal objective and tactics led to Simmonds absenting himself from committee meetings in this period, and would continue to divide members of the committee in the following decade.

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223 Letter from Hugh Simmonds to Sir Robin Williams [n.d., early 1979], CIB/2/2, BLPES
224 Letter from Richard Kitzinger to John Coleman, 2 March 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES; Letter from Nigel Spearing to Caroline Neill, 18 January 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
225 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Francis d’Aft, 24 January 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
226 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Hugh Simmonds, also sent to Nigel Spearing, Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett, Richard Kitzinger, Barbara Fellowes and Christopher Joyce, 29 January 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES; “Urgent circular: Safeguard Britain Campaign Executive Committee elections” [n.d., February/March 1979], CIB/2/2, BLPES
A number of resolutions at the 1980 AGM calling for a more hard-line programme focused on withdrawal set the tone for a shift in the Campaign’s policy. Shortly after, Shaun Stewart suggested a change of the Campaign’s name may be beneficial, yet the majority of the committee, led by Sir Ronald Bell and Enoch Powell, felt such a change was premature and the subject was deferred. The subject arose again the following year, as more uncompromising names for the organisation were discussed. Readers of Common Market Watchdog were invited to submit suggestions for an alternative, or to state their support for the existing name. A slender majority voted for a name change, the most popular suggestions being a title incorporating ‘Anti-Common Market’ or ‘Against the Common Market’, followed by suggestions incorporating ‘independence’/‘independent’ or ‘freedom’/‘free’, demonstrating the desire for a campaign toward withdrawal. While the committee voted to retain the name later that year by eight votes to three, Bennett moved a resolution at the 1982 AGM for a name ‘to mention the Common Market and to express clearly… opposition to it.’ Despite some opposition from committee members on the grounds that the present name ‘had more appeal for the unconverted’, the resolution to change to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign was carried by forty-seven votes to seven, demonstrating the more hard-line sentiment amongst the Campaign’s rank-and-file. Combined with the name change, the Campaign’s objectives changed to include ‘restoration

227 Minutes of the 1980 AGM of the Safeguard Britain Campaign, 23 February 1980, CIB/2/3, BLPES
228 Minutes of a meeting of the SBC Executive Committee, 15 April 1980, CIB/2/3, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of the SBC Executive Committee, 17 June 1980, CIB/2/3, BLPES
229 Minutes of a meeting of the SBC Executive Committee, 23 January 1981, CIB/2/3, BLPES
230 Common Market Watchdog, 23, Spring 1981, CIB/2/3, BLPES
231 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Nigel Spearing, 15 July 1981, CIB/2/3, BLPES. Interestingly, the Campaign’s future title ‘British Anti-Common Market Campaign’ was only suggested by two people; ‘Get Britain Out’ was the most popular suggestion.
232 Minutes of a meeting of the SBC Committee, 21 July 1981, CIB/2/3, BLPES; Minutes of the 1982 AGM of the Safeguard Britain Campaign, 27 February 1982, CIB/2/3, BLPES
233 Minutes of the 1982 AGM of the Safeguard Britain Campaign, 27 February 1982, CIB/2/3, BLPES
of full national sovereignty’, repeal of the European Communities Act and free association with other nations including Commonwealth members.\(^{234}\)

Figures within the Campaign perceived it to be an opportune time to move towards such an uncompromising stance. The change was explained to supporters as ‘both a reflection of our true convictions and of the growing strength of opposition to British membership of the EEC.’\(^ {235}\) It was also described as ‘the signal to redouble our efforts’ and increase membership in support of British withdrawal from the EEC.\(^ {236}\) With opinion on the EEC hardening in both the Labour and Conservative parties, anti-Marketeers had as early as 1980 been advocating that the Campaign should become more hard-line, ‘when all factors seem to be working in favour of withdrawal or major changes in the EEC and voting public [of] all parties is with us.’\(^ {237}\) The 1980 Labour Party Conference passed a resolution calling for a commitment to withdrawal to be included in the next manifesto, and a statement outlining a twelve-month withdrawal timetable was passed even more overwhelmingly the following year.\(^ {238}\) The party’s 1983 manifesto, as part of a radical socialist programme, was committed to EEC withdrawal. The Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher had also toughened its stance towards the EEC during the ongoing impasse regarding Britain’s budgetary contribution.\(^ {239}\) In this political climate, along with the opportunity to ‘square up to the Common Market’ over the Falklands Crisis and the loss of Britain’s veto, a move to a

\(^{234}\) “Statement of aims” (revised), British Anti-Common Market Campaign, February 1983, CIB/2/3, BLPES
\(^{235}\) Letter from Michael Stokes, Honorary Treasurer of BACMC, to ‘Anti-Marketeers’ (members of BACMC), 23 May 1983, CIB/3/1, BLPES
\(^{236}\) Common Market Watchdog, 27, Spring 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
\(^{237}\) Letter from Colonel Douglas Kennedy, National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations, to Sir Robin Williams, 13 March 1980, CIB/2/3, BLPES
\(^{238}\) Broad, Labour’s European Dilemmas, pp.146-48
\(^{239}\) Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, p.63
stronger anti-Market position appeared the most logical way to revive the campaign.\textsuperscript{240} In addition to his suggestions to target specific groups for support, Reverend John Papworth believed clarification of purpose was central to revival, as

\ldots the state of public opinion in relation to Britain’s membership of the EEC is sufficient to warrant, with considerable chances of success, a massive campaign to secure Britain’s withdrawal... [...] All public utterances and all propaganda needs to be based on that clear-cut objective. We must not indulge in fudging of this basic principle by entering into any discussion about improving the terms of ‘membership’ or similar exercises which can only result in creating confusion of purpose.\textsuperscript{241}

Around the same time as the Campaign’s stance hardened towards withdrawal, a group of MPs within the Conservative Party was taking an increasingly sceptical stance towards the terms of EEC membership. The Conservative European Reform Group, founded in November 1980, brought together thirty-six Conservative backbenchers with ‘severe reservations about the effect of the terms of membership of the EEC and certain trends and developments within the Community.’\textsuperscript{242} Support outside of Parliament came from Conservatives for European Reform [COFER], which was later allied with the parliamentary group.\textsuperscript{243} The Conservative European Reform Group sought ‘fundamental reform of the Common Market’, particularly the CAP and Britain’s budgetary contribution, and the restoration of limited powers to national parliaments.\textsuperscript{244} The group caused controversy within

\textsuperscript{240} Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Mrs G Dennis, Secretary of Eastbourne and District Branch of BACMC, 9 June 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{241} Memorandum by John Papworth, addressed to members of the British Anti-Common Market Campaign, December 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
\textsuperscript{242} Conservative European Reform Group leaflet [n.d., December 1980], THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge
\textsuperscript{243} COFER campaigned ‘for a fairer deal in Britain in the EEC’ on the same points as the Conservative European Reform Group – “How To Win the Next General Election”, Conservatives for European Reform leaflet [n.d., 1985?], CIB/3/2, BLPES
\textsuperscript{244} Conservative European Reform Group leaflet [n.d., December 1980], THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge

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the party, with its objectives described as ‘irreconcilable with the settled policies of this party and this Government’ and ‘a dud prospectus’. Policies such as ‘the complete wind-up of the Common Agricultural Policy’ were seen as ‘clearly beyond the possibility of being negotiable’.

The party hierarchy thus sought to temper the group’s position. Discussions at Conservative Central Office led to agreement that individual members of the group would be warned, and that despite its ‘innocuous name’ the group should be ‘actively discouraged from the top’. A subsequent meeting with Thatcher served to both clarify and moderate the group’s policies. Various members of the group presented themselves as sceptics challenging the wisdom of EEC policies, with Teddy Taylor proclaiming them ‘reformers, not apologists’ for the EEC. Others asserted the need to defend British interests, with one MP describing the group as ‘fighting for a Gaullist Europe’. The only two members to voice opposition to continuing British membership of the EEC were Sir Ronald Bell and Richard Body – both involved with SBC – and it was suggested that their stance was incompatible with membership of the group. The fact that half of the group had been elected for the first time at the 1979 election arguably made these MPs more persuasive to direction from the leadership, and Thatcher’s claim that she had only been upset by ‘the way the press had reported the purposes of the Group’ demonstrated a lack of concern regarding the group’s outlook. The wording of the group’s aims was modified so that previous references to fundamental changes

245 Hansard Oral Answers, 3 December 1980, in THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge
246 Memorandum from Lord Thorneycroft to Ian Gow, Private Parliamentary Secretary to Margaret Thatcher, 5 December 1980, THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge
247 Memorandum from Lord Thorneycroft to Ian Gow, Private Parliamentary Secretary to Margaret Thatcher, 5 December 1980, THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge
248 Minutes of a meeting between Margaret Thatcher, Sir Nicholas Bonsor, Chairman of the Conservative European Reform Group, and thirty-six members of the Conservative European Reform Group at 10 Downing Street, 15 December 1980, THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge
made ‘either in the basic structure of the Common Market or else in the relationship that Britain has with the Community’, to the ‘ending of the CAP’, and the ‘reassertion of power of national Parliaments over the institutions of the Community’ were omitted.249

Therefore, the Campaign’s aim of withdrawal conflicted with the more moderate, sceptical aims of the Conservative European Reform Group. While the latter was able to present itself as a group for Conservative sceptics in favour of fundamental EEC reform, the Campaign retained a more extreme image that prevented it from gaining political influence. Sir Robin Williams had in correspondence quoted a speech by Enoch Powell in 1977 claiming there was no difference between repeal and modification of the European Communities Act, as ‘[t]he modifications which Britain requires would, if accepted by the Community, render repeal superfluous’ and ‘[t]he minimum of these modifications is to regain for Britain the status of an independent nation state’.250 Powell’s aforementioned acquiescence regarding the Safeguard Britain Campaign title, however, demonstrated the support for a sceptical image and objectives, whilst simultaneously working towards the hidden objective of withdrawal or entirely different terms of membership. John Coleman shared this view, believing that attracting anti-federalist pro-Marketeers necessitated ‘playing down our ultimate objective – to get our [sic] or destroy the Common Market.’ Coleman cited the example of the Scandinavian anti-Market campaigns which had succeeded in harnessing ‘the wider pressure of anti-federalism’ instead of ‘purely negative-seeming anti-Market appeal.’251 While the Conservative European Reform Group were accused of ‘masquerad[ing] as reformers’, its

250 Letters from Sir Robin Williams to Mrs A E Cowley and Major Armstrong-Wilson, 16 August 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES
251 “Comments on SBC Committee Meeting”, John Coleman, 16 March 1977, CIB/2/1,BLPES

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members, even in private correspondence, asserted their belief that the group’s objectives were not incompatible with membership, highlighting the pressure for reform from other member states as evidence.\textsuperscript{252} In the case of the Campaign, however, the mask was beginning to slip before its name change, as seen in a \textit{Common Market Watchdog} article criticising ‘those that believe that the EEC can be reformed from within’, who were unable to ‘counter the pure doctrine of the EEC’.\textsuperscript{253}

As a result, the new approach and title of BACMC alienated political support from Conservatives, who may previously have been attracted by the sceptical, anti-federalist, patriotic approach of the Safeguard Britain Campaign. Once again, the anti-Market movement had failed to find the correct balance between political recognition and the basis for a popular movement. The need to correct the mistake of the referendum campaign by attracting more Conservative support was identified in the earliest moments of the Safeguard Britain Campaign, as it looked towards the forthcoming direct elections legislation. The charge of ‘identifying Conservatism with the anti-Market cause’ was seen as one of its most pressing tasks.\textsuperscript{254} Coleman’s suggestions included an aforementioned ‘Conservative Common Market Safeguards Committee’, to act as

\begin{quote}
...a focal point for the whole gamut of doubts about the Common Market from the total doubt of the anti-Marketees, through the partial doubts of anti-federalists down to those with specific hostilities to particular Brussels directives.\textsuperscript{255}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{252} Letter from Anthony Meyer to Editor of \textit{The Times}, 22 May 1986, CIB/3/3, BLPES; Letter from Richard Shepherd MP to Margaret Thatcher, 15 December 1980, THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge

\textsuperscript{253} \textit{Common Market Watchdog}, 24, Summer 1981, CIB/2/3, BLPES

\textsuperscript{254} Letter from Christopher Joyce to Sir Robin Williams, 28 July 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES; Reply from Sir Robin Williams to Christopher Joyce, 4 November 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES

\textsuperscript{255} “10 Points on Anti-Market Strategy and Organisation”, John Coleman, November 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES
This ‘arena of partial dissatisfactions’ was where Coleman felt the Campaign should be drawing its support.  

The Campaign’s new title immediately saw some of that support begin to desert it. Hugh Simmonds, one of the more pragmatic committee members, swiftly declared his opposition to the ‘simple and strident call for withdrawal’ reflected in the British Anti-Common Market Campaign name, and resigned his membership of both the committee and the Campaign.  

Seeking support of Conservative politicians both inside and outside of the European Reform Group would also prove difficult. A reply from Peter Lilley to BACMC, which had pressured candidates on their views regarding the EEC in the run-up to the 1983 election, summed up the position of many within the party. While Lilley shared the attitudes of BACMC on issues such as the budget, the CAP and parliamentary sovereignty, he declared that he was not in favour of withdrawal and instead sought to ‘modify the EEC and make it work in our interest if we are prepared to be sufficiently robust about it.’  

Approaches to the Conservative European Reform Group were similarly unsuccessful. Most of these were concerned with finding Richard Body’s successor as vice-chairman of BACMC between 1984 and 1985. Williams, however, discovered that MPs within the Conservative European Reform Group had declared that ‘it would be counter-productive for them to become a Vice-President within the context of the work they are doing within the Conservative Party’.  

When Body was asked for suggestions on his successor, he was similarly pessimistic on the chances of persuading a European Reform Group member and suggested approaching a Conservative

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256 Letter from John Coleman to Sir Robin Williams, 20 February 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES
257 Letter from Hugh Simmonds to Sir Robin Williams, 9 May 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
258 Letter from Peter Lilley, Conservative Party election candidate for St Albans, to Charles Starkey, 7 April 1983, CIB/3/1, BLPES
259 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Oliver Smedley, 8 May 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
A similar approach to COFER was also unsuccessful. Smedley had suggested inviting its secretary, John Rattray, to run a youth section of BACMC, but Rattray refused due to the ‘possible conflict with the reformist approach of COFER’, and was unable to recommend anyone from the Young Conservatives for the position. The tactics of the reform groups, which Williams described as ‘avoiding outright opposition to the EEC but undermining it by reform’, were therefore in stark conflict with BACMC.

The change in name and objectives of the Campaign were therefore increasingly perceived to have been an ill-timed mistake. After the clear rejection of the Labour Party manifesto in the 1983 election, of which EEC withdrawal was a major part, the inability to attract support to a hard-line position stifled the Campaign. Furthermore, the issue of the Falklands War served to divide anti-Marketeers, with the Anti-Common Market League’s longstanding president Victor Montagu resigning in the belief that campaigning against the EEC would be ‘inopportune and counterproductive’ after its support of British military action. As BACMC’s committee convened to discuss strategy in the mid-1980s, Williams stated his belief that the change in name may have backfired as it had now had ‘tactical disadvantages’ and ‘precludes us from pursuing the undermining approach of the Conservatives for European Reform.’ The priorities, therefore, were to ‘[m]obilise the widespread dislike of ordinary people that is at present inert and resigned’, and encourage the government to push for reforms so that the Campaign would be ‘pushing at a door already beginning to open.’

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260 Letter from Richard Body to Sir Robin Williams, 10 July 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
261 Letter from John Rattray, Secretary of COFER, to Sir Robin Williams, 11 May 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
262 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to John Rattray, 8 May 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES
263 Letter from Victor Montagu to Sir Robin Williams, 14 February 1983, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP86, Dorset Record Office
and contributor to the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee, also reached
the same conclusions.

Previously a hardliner and advocate of Labour’s withdrawal policy, Jones now believed that the Campaign must change its title as ‘[a] name that limits our options is a luxury we cannot afford.’ In light of the new political situation and the limitations of the Campaign’s resources, Jones suggested changing to ‘European Reform Campaign’ in order to broaden the base of support, following in the footsteps of Conservative MPs whose own organisation was ‘now the strongest and healthiest component of the anti-Market movement.’ A broad campaign comprising many different opinions and political persuasions, he argued, would be more likely to attract political and press interest, but would falter if based on ‘uneasy compromise’ and ‘rigid orthodoxy’.

By 1986, however, little had changed. John Coleman, now BACMC’s press officer, felt the Campaign’s name was leading to its output being immediately disregarded. By contrast, the Conservative European Reform Group was ‘listened to both by politicians and the public’, the latter being more receptive to the solution of reform rather than withdrawal. More constructive titles were suggested to put them ‘more in line with both the Labour and Conservative anti-Market groups’ and to resolve the current ‘absurd situation’ where ‘[w]e are the umbrella project and yet the Conservatives cannot support our Media Project.’

Coleman would raise the issue again a year later, advocating policies based around a ‘new Europe’ of co-operation and democracy. A positive approach and title was proposed to reinvigorate the organisation and bring in Eurosceptics, such as Teddy Taylor of the

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267 Notes on organisation, included with letter from John Coleman to BACMC Committee members, Gordon Tether and Professor Horace Rose, 13 May 1986, CIB/3/3, BLPES
Conservative European Reform Group who ‘made it quite plain… that he cannot operate under an anti-Common Market Banner.’

In the minds of some leading figures in the Campaign, the difference between withdrawal and fundamental reform of the EEC may have been minor. The inability to bring together advocates of withdrawal and reform, however, prevented the Campaign from forging links with anti-Marketeers operating within political parties. Oliver Smedley’s belief that the 1983 general election result had freed the issue of EEC membership from party loyalty and ideology had been misguided; MPs and party workers were reluctant to work within a non-party organisation unwilling to stop short of calls for immediate withdrawal from the EEC.

In attempting to cater to grassroots extremism, the Campaign alienated political support and once again found itself unable to incorporate public campaigning with application of pressure at the top tiers of British politics.

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268 Letter from John Coleman to BACMC members [n.d., 1987?], CIB/3/3, BLPES
269 Draft letter from Oliver Smedley to potential BACMC donors [n.d., July 1983], CIB/3/1, BLPES
CONCLUSIONS

By 1987, the anti-EEC movement as led by the British Anti-Common Market Campaign was in disarray. John Coleman, by now the Press Officer for the Campaign, reported that it was ‘declining’ in terms of both funds and membership, and an entire restructuring of the campaign was needed.¹ Perhaps most importantly, it lacked a sense of purpose, identity and direction. On the one hand, some committee members felt that to change the Campaign’s uncompromising title would be ‘a mistake’ and ‘completely counterproductive’, inviting criticism from pro-Marketeers and diluting the Campaign’s ‘message to the nation’.² This strand of the Campaign, favouring consistently high levels of activism campaigning toward the ultimate aim of British withdrawal from the EEC, sat uneasily with those on the committee who saw the Campaign’s future in professionalization and political connections, seeking to exert influence from a narrower base of support than the mass membership organisations envisaged in the 1960s. Indeed, one account of the founding of the Anti-Federalist League (later UKIP) states that the impetus came from discontents within the audience at a meeting of Campaign for an Independent Britain (previously BACMC), where the political speakers addressing the meeting downplayed the aim of EEC withdrawal.³ The decision of the Campaign in the early 1990s to not put forward a by-election candidate on the grounds that it ‘would break up the organisation’ as Labour and

¹ Letter from John Coleman to BACMC members [n.d., 1987], CIB/3/3, BLPES
² Letter from Marie Endean to Sir Robin Williams, 30 June 1986, CIB/3/3, BLPES
Conservative MPs in the Campaign ‘would not go along with it’ further emphasises this division between being a political or public campaigning organisation.  

Oliver Smedley’s suggestion to professionalise the organisation along the lines of the Institute of Economic Affairs, under the leadership of an ambitious and highly active individual, implied that the Campaign’s future lay as that of an insider think-tank, making the case for British independence from the EEC based on research publications and expertise to influence opinion-formers and politicians. Yet in his comments that the Campaign should be ‘of greater importance than Greenpeace, CND and many others of which the great British public are far more aware’, Smedley still envisaged a groundswell of popular support whose interests were to be defended as part of a wider mass movement. Compared to certain other non-governmental organisations and social movements, who bridged the insider-outsider dichotomy through representation of a particular sectional interest or specific base of support with an engagement with Westminster politics, anti-EEC organisations envisaged themselves as the last line of defence in preserving British independence, meaning the confusion between exerting influence on the wider public or higher echelons of power would always remain prevalent. 

The decline in influence of the Campaign, like the UEM and FU before it, means that this study into popular movements for or against British involvement in European integration, from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s, is ultimately a story of a study of failure. These campaigns and organisations were unable to locate their position within the broad spheres of

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4 “Sked missile”, The Times, 22 February 1993
5 Ralph Harris, general director of the IEA and one of the figures Smedley was looking to oversee the campaign, would become founding chairman of the Bruges Group in 1989, the sort of research-oriented organisation that Smedley had been seeking.
6 Letter from Oliver Smedley to Sir Robin Williams, 23 December 1986, CIB/3/3, BLPES
politics and activism, and unable to translate a highly emotive issue into an effective political or mass movement. These campaigns failed for a number of different reasons. A continual lack of financial backing, particularly in comparison to the wealthy technocratic pro-Market campaigns such as the Britain in Europe or the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement, hindered the campaigns’ effectiveness and often accentuated their amateurish image, a particular problem on the anti-Market side where individuals and aims were often regarded as politically disreputable. The problem of leadership and personality was another ongoing problem, with the campaign unable to find a figurehead with both charisma and political credibility, who could exemplify the campaign’s cross-party character and also reach out to a wider support base.7

The prevalence of party political fringe groups on European integration also stifled the growth of non-party campaigns and organisations, with both politicians and supporters reluctant to step outside of party politics on the EEC issue in the same way that was evident for campaigns on environmentalism, human rights, or peace and disarmament led by non-governmental organisations. Pro- and anti-integration movements were thus unable to depoliticise the issue of British membership of the EEC, a subject that continued to hold roots in the policies, legislation, and debates of governments and political parties. Decision-making on a governmental and Community level also contributed to the rise and fall in salience of the EEC issue within Britain. Popular campaigns for and against European integration ebbed and flowed in synchronicity with external events, and by lacking the resources to force the issue to prominence, organisations were compelled to be opportunist and try and catch the tide of popular opinion as much as mobilise it. For example, the aforementioned difficulty after the

7 See Kavanagh, D., Crisis, Charisma and British Political Leadership: Winston Churchill as the outsider (London: Sage, 1974)
referendum of turning a general public dislike or antipathy towards the EEC into anti-Market sentiment was reflected by opinion polls which showed the majority of respondents were not much interested in matters relating to the EEC. The fact that ‘opponents of entry included many who thought the issue unimportant’ further demonstrates the inert nature of anti-Market opposition, and the fact that a majority of poll respondents believed that, as an EEC member Britain, would have less say in here affairs and the Six would benefit most had little influence on the referendum result.

However, the primary factor contributing to these issues of finance, leadership and support was that in operating across the spheres of institutional politics and popular mobilisation, these organisations were continually struggling to define themselves and their position within politics and public activism. Anti-EEC organisations, particularly after Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973, struggled to effectively unite the moderate wing of the campaign, aiming for more political influence and support, with the more anti-establishment section whose paradoxical stance was to eschew Westminster politics while seeking to preserve British political sovereignty. This led to disunited campaigns and internal power struggles, as highly active individuals within the anti-EEC movement saw its future in different sites of activism. FU had similar strategic disagreement in the 1950s over whether to continue public campaigning or to become a smaller intellectual pressure group targeting opinion-formers.

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8 This was the most popular response, with answers consistently between 42 and 50 per cent between September 1973 and November 1986: Data obtained from Eurobarometer, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm, European Union, 1995-2012
9 Jowell and Hoinville, p.49, pp.57-58
In failing to fully define their position, aims and tactics, these organisations oscillated between two differing identities. On the one hand anti-Market organisations sought to define themselves by their populism and demagoguery, based on more emotional responses to the issue of British EEC membership concerning national identity and heritage, patriotism, and the more ‘popular’ notions of sovereignty. Portraying themselves as the true guardians of British sovereignty and the protectors of individual democratic rights against the increasingly distanced machinery of political parties and the globalisation of politics, their image as political outsiders within a grassroots insurrection was reinforced. On the other hand, politicians and pragmatists within the campaign sought to define it around political respectability and distance the campaign from the more troublesome image of political extremism. This was particularly prevalent after the referendum, where the committee of the Safeguard Britain Campaign and its successor organisation sought to influence opinion-formers through expertise and research publications of a high standard, emulating the models of Thatcherite think-tanks such as the Centre for Policy Studies which were rising to prominence at that time. Attempts to find wealthy financial backers in order to carry out economic studies into the impact of EEC membership signalled a desire to move away from the self-funding model of grassroots activism and demonstrations. FU and UEM similarly sought to target the public directly, basing their messages around the lofty ideals of pacifism and common European values, and hoped for groundswells of support from the bottom up. Both, however, were too removed from the political sphere, and the British government’s decision to stay out of the European integration process led to both organisations going into decline and division over strategy.

The distance of these campaigns from the political sphere contributed to another cause of their failure, that of the lack of charismatic and professional leadership or directorship. In the late 1980s, Oliver Smedley had called for the anti-Market movement to be reconstructed around an ambitious professional organiser, highly active and well-connected in the realms of policy-making and fundraising. A large part of the anti-Market movement’s problems from the 1960s to the 1980s was precisely the lack of this sort of figure. While groups such as the Common Market Safeguards Campaign and the Safeguard Britain Campaign had the support and leadership of some fairly competent backbenchers, the ability to find one or more individuals to bridge the divide between the spheres of Westminster and public protest prevented campaigns from captivating both MPs and the electorate. Charismatic figures existed within the wider movement, but whether due to internal rivalries, organisational incompetence, a predisposition to be involved in a number of different organisations and causes (in the case of Oliver Smedley), or a disreputable connection with an unsavoury support base (in the case of Enoch Powell), no natural leader emerged to take the campaign forward.

This thesis has sought to broaden the historiography on Britain and Europe by moving the focus away from analyses of the formulation of governmental and party policy. Furthermore, however, it has analysed the campaigns and organisations on European integration outside of the framework of party management. Institutional studies by the likes of Mark Aspinwall, Paul Taggart and Simon Usherwood, perceive anti-EU movements from the 1990s onwards as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ externalised from intra- and cross-party consensus
on European integration.\textsuperscript{11} This, however, pays little heed to the preceding decades where non-party movements were actively seeking to influence the major political parties. Usherwood’s brief overview of the pre-Maastricht anti-EEC movement references its internal divisions and ‘continual change and mutation of organizational forms [that] reflects the diversity of the backgrounds of those opposing European integration and the problems of finding common ground’.\textsuperscript{12} This study has investigated this fundamental division within the anti-EEC movement in detail, in a period in which Usherwood claims anti-EEC organisations were ‘rare’ and had ‘no appreciable impact’.\textsuperscript{13} It has shown how the different strands of the campaign sought to find a common ground in the populist case against EEC membership, and demonstrated how internal disagreement between its individuals and factions over the running of the campaign contributed to its failure.

Furthermore, analysis of the externalisation of Eurosceptic opinion from the perspective of party management presents it as a process of political rebels ‘using non-party groups’ to voice their opinions.\textsuperscript{14} This has been in lieu of an analysis from the perspective of the organisations themselves which attributes them with more agency than a mere release valve for intra-party dissent, and assesses how they sought to approach MPs and gain political influence whilst directing their message to the general public. A more detailed focus on the internal machinations and perceptions of these organisations sheds more light on their

\textsuperscript{11} Taggart, P., “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems”; Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management”; Aspinwall, “Structuring Europe: Powersharing institutions and British preferences on European integration”

\textsuperscript{12} Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management”, pp.226-227


\textsuperscript{14} Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management”, p.212
position and aims, and their concerns and arguments become more defined. Additionally, there has previously been little analysis of the individuals within these organisations whom Usherwood states ‘crop up again and again’. On the pro-Market side, the continued presence of the likes of Victor Gollancz, Lady Juliet Rhys Williams, Edward Beddington Behrens and Stephen King-Hall within non-party organisations was emblematic of the combination of humanitarianism and pacifism with liberal, planning-minded “middle opinion”. Their anti-Market counterparts, such as Sir Robin Williams, Oliver Smedley, Christopher Frere-Smith and Sir Ian Mactaggart, represented an amalgam of liberalism and conservatism on the fringes of politics, drawn from middle-class professions of business and law.

The longitudinal approach employed has broadened the analysis of Eurosceptic mobilisation and opinion beyond specific periods, such as Dewey’s focus on the first application and the number of works on the referendum. In doing so it has analysed beyond the parliamentary battles that Forster calls the ‘key events’ in the development of the anti-Market campaign. Of equal importance has been the anti-Market organisations’ reaction to these key events, either when the EEC issue is off the agenda or after a defeat. For example, after both the commencement of British EEC membership in 1973 and the referendum defeat in 1975, anti-Marketeers sought to focus on the issues of sovereignty and EEC legislation, acting as a political watchdog, in contrast to focusing more on populist issues and employing more anti-establishment rhetoric during the referendum in an attempt to win public support. This is mirrored by the soul-searching that FU and UEM undertook after Britain’s decision to

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15 Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management”, p.226
17 Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, p.1
Schuman Plan led to a rapid decline in interest in European integration. The long-term analysis has also furthered the initial, contemporary analyses of the anti-Market organisations by the likes of Lieber and Kitzinger.\(^{18}\) Studies such as Kitzinger’s and Goodhart’s are useful snapshots of the actions of these organisations, but place too much emphasis on the imbalance between their resources and those of their pro-Market counterparts.\(^{19}\) This thesis has assessed the internal activities and debates within these organisations more closely, to assess how they sought to address this imbalance – with divisions over whether to try and match the respectability of the pro-Market organisations, or to emphasise their difference in anti-political, anti-establishment rhetoric.

The long-term analysis of anti-Market organisations has also demonstrated how their opposition evolved. Dewey’s focus on the first application rightly places national identity at the heart of the anti-Market case, and he claims that a process of othering the EEC into a ‘traditional “us” versus “them”’ dichotomy was accompanied by xenophobic arguments that ‘further marginalised the anti-Market case’.\(^{20}\) However, the anti-Market case would become more sophisticated as organisations sought to professionalise and to attract political influence. The “insider” strategies employed by the SBC were far removed from the mobilisation of anti-Market groups in the 1960s, and a longer analysis than Dewey’s shows how anti-Market activity developed beyond solely “low political” protest and populism’ as it gravitated toward the political fringes.\(^{21}\) In the 1970s, the “us versus them” argument deployed by the anti-Marketeers was to present themselves as fighting an elite-backed campaign that would

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\(^{18}\) Lieber, *British Politics and European Unity*; Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion*

\(^{19}\) Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion*; Goodhart, *Full-Hearted Consent*


increase the democratic deficit and harm the British consumer. It was this anti-establishment rhetoric, rather than xenophobia, than would risk alienating widespread support.

Furthermore, in the 1960s, as chapter two demonstrated, organisations such as the ACML were in the process of moving away from their party political origins and seeking support on a cross-party basis. The issues that anti-Marketeers focused on – sovereignty, national identity, prices, the Commonwealth – were all populist, non-party issues that formed the basis for an umbrella organisation at the end of the decade. As chapters three and four show, it was disagreements over strategy and leadership of the campaign rather than party political ideology that prevented a truly united anti-EEC organisation from emerging in the 1970s. The clash between the more “respectable” political side of the National Referendum Campaign, represented by Neil Marten and Douglas Jay, and the activist strand led by Vice-Chairman Christopher Frere-Smith and veteran anti-Marketeer Air Vice-Marshall Don Bennett, created a very fragmented sense of unity within the Campaign. While Butler and Kitzinger’s study of the referendum points out that many of the local activist organisations, particularly those within the Get Britain Out organisation, were dominated by the hard left, the sheer number of examples of cross-party collaboration cited suggests that political affiliations were not as much of an obstacle as expected.22 At the head of the Campaign, particularly, the efforts of Marten and Jay – first in the creation of the Common Market Safeguards Campaign with Sir Robin Williams and Ron Leighton, then with Jack Jones and other leading anti-Marketeers in the creation of the National Referendum Campaign – led to the creation of a respectable core within the anti-EEC movement.23 This continued, as shown in chapter four, with the creation of the Safeguard Britain Campaign as a successor to the

22 Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum
23 Jay, Change and Fortune, pp.442-44, pp.478-80
Common Market Safeguards Campaign, designed to be a respectable and positive campaign free of extremist and anti-establishment individuals. As the chapter argues, the problems of the Safeguard Britain Campaign were not problems of party ideology, but of balancing the demands of ambitious activists within the grassroots and local groups with those of a more conservative and politically-oriented committee.

This strategic dispute, furthermore, adds a further layer of complexity to the development of Euroscepticism than has rarely been analysed before in the historical context. Forster broadened the term “Euroscepticism” to include scepticism of all moves ‘towards supranational European integration’, comprising everything from expressing doubts to calling for outright withdrawal. However, while he claims that this ‘multi-faceted nature’ was a source of division, he states that this was down to party political ideology and allegiances.

This thesis has shown that, outside of the Westminster framework, there was a politician-activist divide, which was often evident in conflicting aims and strategies. During and after the referendum campaign, anti-federalist arguments were put forward in the hope of attracting moderate public and political support. This shift from an anti-Market to a Eurosceptic position camouflaged the SBC’s long-term goal of British disengagement from the EEC. Yet local groups, dissatisfied with the Campaign’s lack of activity and favouring a more hard-line strategy, helped push through the name change that advocated immediate withdrawal. This division between moderates and hardliners mirrors those in other contemporary British NGOs and non-party campaigns, and was unrelated to issues of party ideology.

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24 Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, p.2
25 Ibid., pp.2-3
26 For example, see the dispute within the National Council for Civil Liberties in the 1980s, the tensions within the National Festival of Light, and the divisions between CND, the Direct Action Committee and the Committee of 100: Moores, “From Civil Liberties to Human Rights?: British Civil Liberties Activism, 1934-1989”,
Whilst Crowson and Forster, in stretching their analysis back to 1945, have demonstrated that Euroscepticism is not just a modern-day Conservative phenomenon, this thesis has argued that was not the preserve of any ideology.\textsuperscript{27} Despite accusations of political bias, anti-Market organisations consistently sought to appeal to the public on a non-party or cross-party basis. If there was any particular ideological strand that ran through the anti-Market campaign in this period, it was liberalism. Anti-Market organisations were often predominantly a base for Liberal Party defectors, and it was liberal themes which were utilised as potential mobilising factors for cross-party support. While the foundations of the ACML in 1961 were definitively Conservative, the free-trade origins of KBO defined many of the qualities of the anti-Market movement throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Its founder S.W. Alexander, who had been close to liberal Conservatives in the Tory Reform Group and been instrumental in founding the Society of Individualists in the 1940s, was a champion of free trade and core Liberal values.\textsuperscript{28} Together with Oliver Smedley, according to Richard Cockett, ‘they sought to keep the flames of Gladstonian Liberalism burning’, with the former chairman of the London Liberal Party and the latter leaving the Liberal Party in 1962 over the issue of the EEC application.\textsuperscript{29} Smedley, as an active opponent of governmental intervention through his organisations the Cheap Food League, the Farmers and Smallholders Association and Council for the Reduction of Taxation, railed against the ‘controls of the centrally

\textsuperscript{27} Crowson, \textit{The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945}; Forster, \textit{Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics}

\textsuperscript{28} Cockett, \textit{Thinking the Unthinkable}, pp.69-70, p.125

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}, p.127
planned economy’ and the increasing centralisation of governmental power. It was these liberalist themes – the desire to protect national sovereignty, small government, direct democracy, individual rights, and free trade – from the post-war trends of centralisation, nationalisation and increasing state powers, which lay at the heart of the anti-EEC campaign.

Anti-EEC organisations ultimately attempted to combine campaigning on these issues in the form of a citizens’ movement, distanced from substantial political support or endorsement, with a more professionalised approach as a pressure group impacting upon Westminster politics. In the post-war period until the 1990s, however, these organisations failed where other social movements and pressure groups with a political dimension succeeded. Their position between that of a mass movement and of an organisation with more political aims necessitated them to constantly balance widespread support of a public they claimed to represent with political respectability and legitimacy, and to seek a figurehead who could unite these two strands with charismatic leadership and political credibility. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the reasons why the anti-EEC movement was unable to expand its support and have more impact was its inability to make connections and alliances within the wider networks of NGOs, movements and pressure groups. This is particularly relevant with regards to those organisations which sought to speak for, and mobilise, the general public on issues where they were perceived to be politically disenfranchised. The aforementioned liberalist themes that underlined the anti-EEC campaign – individual liberty and democratic rights, small government, and decentralisation of political powers – lay at the heart of numerous NGOs across the political spectrum. For prominent personnel within right-leaning civil liberties groups, opposition to the EEC was an extension

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30 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, p.127
of the anti-statism upon which their groups were founded. Yet despite some of these figures working within anti-EEC organisations, collaboration between campaigns, be it formal or informal, was absent.

In addition to the aforementioned activities of Smedley and Alexander, Sir Ian Mactaggart combined Chairmanship of the Society for Individual Freedom with Vice-Chairmanship of Keep/Get Britain Out, as well as positions within the National Referendum Campaign, Anti Dear Food Campaign and Open Seas Forum. The Society for Individual Freedom’s support base, comprised of right-wing Conservatives and classical liberals, would doubtless have had the potential to overlap with that of anti-EEC organisations. The National Association for Freedom – renamed the Freedom Association in 1980 – was similar in its objectives and support base. Yet despite the rise of neoliberalism in the late 1970s associated with rightist think-tanks such as the Centre for Policy Studies and the Institute of Economic Affairs, with which these libertarian organisations were associated, the anti-EEC movement never capitalised on these themes or support bases. The same can be said of environmental and organicist causes, which bridged left-liberal concerns with classical liberal anti-statism. For example, in her study of the British anti-flouridation movement in the 1950s and 1960s, Amy C. Whipple showed how the British Housewives’ League, with parliamentary support, mobilised against the ‘erosion of personal freedom’. A BHL pamphlet produced in 1959, before the first EEC application, echoed the sentiments of the anti-EEC movement in that it perceived the fluoridation issue to ‘cut across party politics’ as ‘an invasion of fundamental human rights against which people of all parties must stand together as they would against a

31 Moores, “From Civil Liberties to Human Rights?: British Civil Liberties Activism, 1934-1989”, unpublished PhD, p.149
foreign invader.’\(^{33}\) Once again, the issues of food quality and consumer choice, alongside defence of individual liberties, formed part of this liberalist movement’s agenda. Membership of the EEC, and the resulting policy directives that would affect the British public, was an extension of this increasing loss of individual liberty.

However, despite the anti-EEC movement’s connections with the British Housewives’ League, it made no formal connections with the environmental or organic movements, despite the rise of the former in the late 1970s and 1980s. One exceptional individual within the campaign was Sir Richard Body, owner of a farmhouse near Newbury in Berkshire.\(^{34}\) A strong parliamentary advocate of environmental and organic causes, Body wrote several anti-EEC books and pamphlets from an agricultural point of view and, as noted in chapter four, he became the campaign’s authority on all matters relating to the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy. Another figure, John Papworth, sought to associate the anti-EEC campaign with the emerging network of social movements focusing on peace, the environment and feminism, all united by their ‘human scale approach’ and grassroots character.\(^{35}\) Despite this, however, the anti-EEC movement failed to make strong links with such organisations and causes that opposed the increasing centralisation of power and loss of sovereignty caused by EEC membership.

This thesis has also added to the increasingly broad and complex historiography on NGOs, pressure groups and social movements by focusing on curious examples that do not easily fit categorisation in existing frameworks. Arguments which emphasise the development


\(^{34}\) “Euro Chasm”, The Times, 30 April 1993

\(^{35}\) Memorandum by John Papworth, addressed to members of the British Anti-Common Market Campaign, December 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES
of professionalism, expertise and insider strategies seem reinforced by the tendencies of pro- and anti-Market organisations to attempt more political pressure group strategies.\(^{36}\) Initial populist and idealistic campaigns for European integration were less successful than resourceful and elitist political and economic pressure groups, and FU’s social movement characteristics were challenged by alternative strategies to mass membership being put forward. Anti-Market groups increasingly sought to professionalise to attain greater political legitimacy through insider strategies. Yet the emotive arguments upon which the anti-Market case rested ensured a dedicated activist base would continue to push for bolder public campaigning. In some ways, they therefore share some characteristics with the conservative campaigns and NGOs that have recently attracted scholarly attention, utilising what Whipple describes as ‘the public demonstration strategies of “the left” and by its “rightist” claims of victimization by a governing elite’.\(^{37}\) They also shared similarities with “in-between” non-party organisations, such as the National Council for Civil Liberties, in being comprised of middle-class ‘public-minded professionals’, attempting to shift from the politics of ‘popular front movements’ to ‘NGO model’ activism, and combining the old and new forms of politics.\(^{38}\) However, while the National Council for Civil Liberties was led by ‘progressive professionals’ working on a radical issue with new social movements, anti-Market organisations had a conservative agenda.\(^{39}\)

\(^{36}\) Jordan and Maloney, *The Protest Business*; Hilton *et al*, *The Politics of Expertise*


\(^{38}\) Moores, “From Civil Liberties to Human Rights?: British Civil Liberties Activism, 1934-1989”, unpublished PhD, p.6, p.7

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p.31
The anti-Market organisations’ duality of public and political campaigning, combined with their conservative agenda, make them hard to place on the political map. In being concerned with ‘cultural, ethnic, national, and linguistic heritage and identity’, and sharing values of ‘opposition to manipulation, control, dependence, bureaucratization [and] regulation’, anti-Marker organisations fall into Claus Offe’s definition of new social movements and ‘new politics’. 40 Their protest tactics and their unwillingness to negotiate (or moderate their aims down from EEC withdrawal) reinforce this image.41 Yet this thesis has shown that their protests and structures were old-fashioned, and they were guided by the models of nineteenth-century organisations such as the Anti-Corn Law League.42 Furthermore, according to Dewey, many of those involved in the anti-Market movement were born in the late Victorian age.43 Their protests were not as innovative, militant or visible as the radical, left-liberal social movements of this period, and old-fashioned tactics and an inability to utilise the media contributed to the lack of impression they made on public opinion. Furthermore, they shared some similarities with Kitschelt’s definition of social movements as being ‘oppose[d to] the bureaucratisation of society’ and invoking populist ‘direct democracy’ against unresponsive ‘elite’ political institutions. 44 Yet the presence of politicians within the anti-Market campaign, and the aim of preserving parliamentary sovereignty meant that with the possible exception of groups like the PFM, no radical overhaul of institutional politics was sought. These organisations therefore fell between old

41 Ibid., pp.830-31
42 This inspiration continued to guide anti-Marketeers into the early 1990s, with Dr Alan Sked founding the Anti-Federalist League and basing its identity and aims on ‘the example of the Anti-Corn Law League’: Sked, A., “Confessions of a Eurosceptic” in Baimbridge (ed), The 1975 Referendum on Europe: Volume 1, p.143
43 Dewey, British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63, p.218
44 Kitschelt, “Social Movements, Political Parties, and Democratic Theory”, p.15
and new political paradigms, insider and outsider strategies, and definition as pressure groups and social movements.

The development of pressure groups for or against European integration in post-war Britain shows a developing aspiration to gain support through sophisticated arguments and increased political connections and recognition. This, however, was combined with an ongoing desire to remain outside of traditional political avenues and apparatus, aiming to develop a broad mass movement to demonstrate the weight of public opinion. Just as pro-Market groups had in the late 1950s, anti-Market groups sought to establish political connections and gain more influence, prestige, and access to the political sector that had often been denied to them. Similarly, they attempted to concentrate more on research publications than mass-distributed propaganda as they planned to adopt a more think-tank based model in the 1980s. As a result, anti-Market groups constantly sought more financial, political and research resources in order to expand their campaign.

However, these moves were often met with hostility by a proportion of anti-Market support who wanted a more populist, anti-political and anti-party campaign driven by grassroots activity. In targeting the general public directly, the campaign would often use old-fashioned methods of pamphleteering, disseminating propaganda, newspaper advertisements and mass meetings, in the belief that the campaign would escalate and expand by merely stating the facts and spreading the message. A mass membership base making frequent donations, rather than outside financial influence, was to be the source of the campaign’s funding. Compared to wealthy pro-Market organisations, groups like ACML, according to Dewey, ‘wore its financial difficulties as badge of integrity’ and prided itself on being driven
by ‘ordinary private individuals’. However, the problem, as stated by Uwe Kitzinger, was that EEC entry meant that ‘the rich stood to gain, the poor to lose; and the poor cannot give large donations.’ The campaigns needed numbers in the hundreds of thousands or millions in order to both wield powerful influence and be financially viable, and in the absence of large-scale support groups were torn between public campaigning and political lobbying.

The pro-Market groups of chapter one demonstrate the difficulties of attempting an idealistic campaign built on mass support, and based along the lines of the associational movements of the nineteenth century and the inter-war period, in a post-war era and during the rise of professional society when professional and technical NGOs were gaining the public’s trust. Other “inbetweener” groups operating across the spheres of political lobbying and public activism and support, such as the Child Poverty Action Group, Shelter and a number of environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth, have shown how utilisation of effective marketing and public relations strategies combined with high-profile and dynamic leadership allowed them to make an impact in Westminster and on public opinion. On the issue of EEC membership, which remained rooted in Westminster politics, groups with confused positions, on the fringes of Westminster but oscillating between insider and outsider strategies, struggled to make an impact at the political level.

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45 Dewey, British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63, p.121
46 Kitzinger, U., Diplomacy and Persuasion, p.236
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