The Rise of the German Menace

Imperial Anxiety and British Popular Culture, 1896-1903

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Introduction

In December 1902 the most prominent British imperialist of his era, Rudyard Kipling, publicly condemned British cooperation with Germany during the British-German blockade of Venezuela.

His poem, ‘The Rowers’, published in the *Times* chastised the British Government. Kipling invoked the language and ideology of the ‘German Menace’ in order to express his disgust at British association with Germany; this thesis will uncover the process by which these ideas came into being, and how they grew to become a powerful force in culture and politics.

The idea of a German Menace was not simply a product of concerns about the defence of the British Isles, but rather that it was born out of the mentality of imperialism. Between 1896 and 1903 imperial
antagonism between Germany and Britain, in various contexts around the globe, inspired the popular perception of the German Menace as a distinctly imperial threat. Where the established historiography locates the beginning of the Anglo-German rivalry within the development of the naval armaments race after 1904, this study traces the British fear of Germany much earlier and, crucially, much further from the shores of the North Sea. The German Menace emerged from the context of imperial anxiety and crises in the empire, both in formal territories and areas of informal influence. By 1902 the stereotypes of German covetousness, autocracy and efficiency coalesced to form a powerful force in British society. Furthermore, through the study of this phenomenon, the interplay between political decision-making, popular sentiment and the media will be revealed.

In the pre-war period Germany was imagined as a holistic menace to empire. For much of the long and diverse historiography of Britain and Germany before the First World War, the story has so often centred on dreadnoughts, invasion scares and European diplomacy. The ‘Age of Empire’, as Jan Rüger has termed it, is often treated as distinct from the era of Great Power politics. The imperial and global origins of the German Menace have yet to be examined within the context of domestic politics and popular debates in the imperial metropole. British domestic and imperial anxieties coalesced into a repertoire – akin to what John MacKenzie has described as an ‘ideological cluster’ – of anti-German tropes. A widely-recognised anxiety about a German Menace developed in popular culture formed out of apprehensions about German foreign policy and imperial aspirations. This impression of a threat to empire was constituted from themes common to other external imperial anxieties; the jealousy, autocracy and alleged conspiracies attributed to Britain’s traditional colonial rivals - France and Russia – were transposed onto Germany after 1896. Within existing scholarship the imperial dimensions of this menace have yet to be explored. Concerns about Germany should be viewed as part of a tradition of imperial anxiety which focussed upon both internal insecurity (revolutionary nationalism, criminality, miscegenation, degeneration and national efficiency) as well as external dangers (imperial rivalry in Africa and Asia).

During the pre-war era British media culture was periodically gripped by imperial anxieties of this nature, which were based upon deep-seated concerns about the stability, strength and durability of the British Empire. This was especially the case during international crises when such stereotypes were voiced, often angrily, by the majority. But even during periods of calm, polemics, fiction authors, politicians and journalists promulgated an anti-German message that informed, and was sustained by, nascent anti-German sentiments. The Empire was commonly imagined as a single entity; any encroachment upon the periphery was by extension an attack upon its centre. By tracing the development of the popular perception of a German Menace to Britain’s Empire and its concomitant themes, from its emergence during the Kruger Telegram Crisis (1896) until the beginnings of domestically focussed anxiety about Germany after 1903, it will be possible to reveal more about the early development of stereotypes which dominated twentieth-century perceptions of Germany in Britain.

The Kruger Telegram Crisis, along with the subsequent declaration of a world empire by the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, in January 1896, represents a paradigm shift in British perceptions. This incident, more than any other, laid the foundations for the increasing association of Germany with a threat to empire. A major contention of this thesis will be to suggest that from the popular perspective, the impact of the Kruger Telegram has been vastly underestimated. Rather than quickly dissipating, the popular anger during the crisis scarred British perceptions of Germany for a generation; it precipitated the crystallization of disparate themes into a more coherent notion of the German threat to Britain. During the period between January 1896 and the end of the Baghdad Railway Negotiations in May 1903, the German threat to the British Empire became an increasingly powerful force in British popular and political culture.

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1 Rüger, J., The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, 2007).
Introduction

Between 1896 and 1903 the German imperial menace provided an intermittent but powerful focus in British writing, across genres. In weekly and monthly reviews, broadsheet newspapers, ‘yellow dailies’, short-stories, magazines and popular literature the idea of a German threat to empire was developed and deployed for a variety of purposes. Inspiration was provided by international events, such as the German seizure of Kiaochow in 1897, attempts to establish the Baghdad Railway and expand German empire in the Pacific, anglophobia during the South African War, and brutality during Venezuela Blockade. The British press, publishers, statesmen and literary authors were provided with what they perceived to be ample evidence to nourish nascent British concerns about the seemingly nefarious aims of German foreign policy. Links will be drawn between these global events and media headline-chasing; throughout this thesis I will offer evidence to suggest that in this way international imperial issues interacted closely with domestic popular culture.

The period 1890-1914 witnessed the increasing democratisation of politics through the ‘Medialisierung’ (medialisation) of society. Nearly universal adult literacy, disposable incomes and mass consumption of the written-word, increased the importance of popular sentiment in political decision-making. Historians of the media have provided valuable analyses of the relationship between politicians and the press during moments of Anglo-German antagonism. Often detailing the relationships between newspaper editors, correspondents and cabinet ministers, scholars have focused upon the ‘top down’ mechanisms of publicity; these approaches, however, do not present a full account of popular sentiments or perceptions, and fail to fully address the texture and detail of popular discourse and imagery. By examining the way important international events directly impacted the development of stereotypes, popular imagination and discourse, this thesis will challenge the existing literature and provide new insight. Perceived popular sentiment could strongly impact upon the decisions of governments, and vice versa. In the case of Germany, anxiety about a menace to empire developed into an increasingly powerful political force. Often the assumption has been that power-brokers – newspaper owners and politicians – manipulated and held sway over mass-opinion. However, popular anger rendered attempts to force popular opinion in a particular direction both risky and often futile; the press was much more likely to play to the popular gallery, publishing sensational stories which rested upon pre-existent anxieties and appetites, aiming to subtly persuade its readership rather than forcibly coerce them.

There was a great degree of ambiguity and complexity in pre-war debates about Germans, the Kaiser and the Reich. Recent scholarship has shown how Wilhelm II could provoke both warmth and hostility from the British public. However, over time the perception of a jealous, secretive, irrational, efficient and dangerous Germany gathered prominence in literature and the media. These vocabularies increasingly moved into the mainstream of popular discourse; the imagery of the German Menace was increasingly recognisable, and powerful. I aim to provide a detailed examination of how clusters of stereotypes and ideas endure over time and gain in authenticity when real-world events seem to prove them correct. Through this process of gathering historical legitimation, such ideas acquire a more generalised acceptance and their own form of authority. Despite some ambiguity, the regularity of outbursts of anxiety involving Germany in this period helped to sustain fears of Germany’s intentions, even during periods when other political issues took priority. Importantly, previous outbursts granted legitimacy and authenticity to the opinions of those who warned of the impending German Menace.

This thesis aims to further understanding of the ambiguity of pre-war anti-German sentiment, arguing that, though there were periods where anger towards Germany and the Kaiser was less prevalent, during the period 1896-1903 there was an increasing sense of negativity and anxiety directed towards Germany. Initiated by the major outburst of popular anger surrounding the Kruger Telegram in early 1896, by mid-

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1903, the characterisation of Germany as a malevolent threat to the British Empire had become a major feature of the British cultural and political landscape. The importance of the German Menace will be indicated by examining its ability to strongly influence and even change government policy. Additionally, by tracing the issue of anti-German sentiment, this thesis will emphasise the important development of a broad and rapid process of democratisation in politics and media at the turn of the twentieth century.

**Historiography**

The historiography of the Anglo-German relationship between 1896 and 1914 is extensive; this thesis, however, aims to provide a unique and novel contribution to established literature. Since the 1980s, diplomatic historians, including Paul Kennedy and later Matthew Seligmann, have studied the intricacies and complexities of diplomacy between Britain and Germany. These historians justifiably investigated and emphasised the official importance of imperial competition upon official actors. However, they have not engaged sufficiently with the interface between politics and popular culture. Historians of the press and journalism have provided purely press-focussed analyses of the relationship between British journalists and the Kaiser over the period, while historians engaged with race and anti-alienism have remained largely aloof from debates about Germany's foreign policy and image as a rival power. We are thus faced with a need to unite disparate strands of historical study to analyse more clearly the relationships between them. The routine separation of cultural, political, economic and social history has led to significant gaps in our understanding of Late Victorian and Edwardian culture and society.

The methods adopted by historians of popular literature and empire, such as Yumna Siddiqi, A. Michael Matin and Stephen Arata, will be incorporated and a wide range of sources will be utilised, in order to provide depth to the analysis of the interface between media, politics and the public. This study will also draw inspiration from histories of popular imperialism developed since the 1980s. The works of John M. MacKenzie and Andrew S. Thompson have highlighted the pervasive and diverse impact of the British Empire upon metropolitan culture. Thus, new insight will be offered by engaging with several distinct historiographies and incorporating a wider array of popular sources, analysing British popular imagination as a real-time and constantly evolving phenomenon, and emphasising the importance of empire in late nineteenth and early twentieth century British culture.7

**Popular Imperialism**

A key methodological underpinning of this thesis is drawn from a school of history which has argued that Britain possessed an inherently imperial culture.8 The nature of imperialism in Britain has been debated

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8 Porter, R., *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (Oxford, 2004), p. 6; Hall and Rose have provided one of the most complete historiographies of the study of British imperial culture in Rose, S.O. & Hall, C. (eds), *At Home With The Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World* (Cambridge, 2006).
since the high-point of empire at the beginning of the twentieth century; great theorists such as Lenin, Schumpeter and Hobson all argued that imperialism was a predominantly non-populist phenomenon. British historians, most prominently John MacKenzie and Bernard Porter, have been inspired to investigate British ‘popular imperialism’ by these theorists. Until the 1980s, historians generally saw British popular imperialism as short-lived. Authors such as Fieldhouse, Koss and Porter argued in the 1970s that a brief surge of jingoism occurred at the end of the nineteenth century. In their view, the British were briefly enamoured with the expansion of the Empire in the 1880s, but in spite of this surge in support, it was soon in decline. They suggested this decline was generated by key turning points such as the South African War, the Edwardian age of insecurity, or the horrors of the First World War. In MacKenzie’s view, this argument was fundamentally flawed because they drew largely upon the views of the intelligentsia. Intellectuels such as Orwell, Wells, Graves and Forster had turned angrily upon empire and jingoism in the wake of the First World War, and attacked the mentality of imperialism. Such problematic assumptions about British culture drove MacKenzie to investigate whether they were indeed true or a myth developed over the twentieth century.

Beginning with Propaganda and Empire (1984) John MacKenzie searched an array of popular cultural mediums - fiction, newspapers, traditions, music hall, plays, art, oral histories, state propaganda, adverts, consumer products, television and youth organisations - for the influence of imperialism. By examining this broad range of material, which provides the backdrop to the culture of any modern society, MacKenzie’s self-ascertained aim was to ‘establish imperialism…as a core ideology in British society between the 1880s and the 1950s’. This alternative view of British culture gathered many other historians into what may be called a ‘school’ of popular imperialism. Complementing this hypothesis, 1980s accounts from historians such as Penny Summerfield have emphasised the importance in this period of popular patriotism


and the rise of a sense of national pride in the empire.\textsuperscript{15} The development of an acute sense of British nationalism in the late-nineteenth century was most clearly indicated by commonly noted and powerfully popular ‘jingoism’. This form of assertive, even aggressive, nationalism epitomised the rise of popular militarism in Britain, as argued by Hugh Cunningham in ‘The Language of Patriotism’ (1981) and Cecil Eby in The Road to Armageddon (1981).\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, the seminal work of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (1983) argued for the importance of ‘mass produced’ traditions in the same era in the development of modern nation-states.\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, the musings of Edward Said, inspired and complemented MacKenzie’s thesis. In Orientalism (1978) Said argued for the construction of the ‘Oriental other’ in the minds of Europeans, in order to deal with and dominate the empire in the East.\textsuperscript{18} Culture and Imperialism (1994) further suggested that British culture, as well as that of other imperial nations, was inherently connected to empire. Through literary examples by writers such as Dickens, Brontë, Conrad and Kipling, he sought to show that British people were impacted upon subtly by empire in their way of life and attitudes, even where these connections did not seem obvious.\textsuperscript{19} Both Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism were important in suggesting the predominance of the empire in the minds of the metropolitan population.

Bernard Porter’s Absent-minded Imperialists (2001) challenged this ‘popular imperialist’ school of thought; his title was inspired by J.R. Seeley’s oft-quoted phrase: ‘We seem to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.’\textsuperscript{20} Porter aimed to show that Britain was far from a society ‘steeped’ in empire;\textsuperscript{21} he sought to demonstrate instead that the working classes were ignorant of empire, the middle classes were apathetic, and that in truth the Empire only impacted upon the imperial elite at the top of the social ladder.\textsuperscript{22} Porter challenged the evidence cited by ‘MacKenzie-ites’, and ‘Saidists’\textsuperscript{23}, arguing that it represented isolated, over-emphasised examples, which when viewed in perspective were swamped by the other important strands in British culture.\textsuperscript{24} Porter’s book was intentionally provocative and received a polarity of reviews and responses;\textsuperscript{25} his arguments have inspired historians across the various disciplines to apply more rigorous methodologies, and to question their own assumptions. Fighting the teleological impulse is perhaps the biggest challenge for any objective historian, and Porter’s work has added immeasurable depth and assiduity to popular histories of empire. Since Porter the most prominent additions to the debate have been offered by Andrew Thompson, whose monograph, The Empire Strikes Back? (2005),


\textsuperscript{16} Eby, C.D., The Road to Armageddon: The Martial Spirit in English Popular Literature, 1870-1914 (Durham, 1987); Hiebner, J.W.M., Images of the Army: The Military in British Art, 1815-1914 (Manchester, 1988); Adams, M.G., The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War I (Bloomington, 1990); MacDonald, R.H., The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880-1918 (Manchester, 1994); The phrase was popularised by an anti-Russian nationalist song of the 1870s: During the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) G.H. MacDermot’s famous song: “We don’t want to fight but if Jingo if we do, We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, we’ve got the money too, We’ve fought the Bear before, and while we’re Britons true, The Russians shall not have Constantinople.” Hunter, A.W. and R., The Illustrated Victorian Songbook (London, 1984), pp. 180–184.

\textsuperscript{17} Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1992); Hobsbawm, E., Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1991).

\textsuperscript{18} Said, E., Orientalism (London, 2003), p. 3.


\textsuperscript{20} J.R. Seeley has been a further influence upon such historical studies. In his Expansion of England (1883) he argued that Britain had always been ‘intimately associated with her Empire.’ Seeley, J.R., The Expansion of England (London, 1883) as cited in: Rose, S.O., & Hall, C. (eds), At Home With The Empire, pp. 8–9; Porter, B., Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{21} The idea of a society ‘steeped’ in imperialism was attacked by Porter in ibid, passim.


\textsuperscript{23} MacKenzie assigned this name to followers of Edward Said in Mackenize, J.M., Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts (Manchester, 1995); as cited in Porter, B., Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. ix.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. viii.

emphasised the complex and significant impact of Empire upon British culture through a detailed analysis of economic indicators. Thompson has continued to put forward a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between Britain and its empire, suggesting the Empire’s impact upon Britain was pervasive, but Britain’s embrace of that empire more tentative.26 Thompson’s more plural and less prescriptive definition of imperial culture has been influential in the writing of this thesis.

Even Porter admitted that during the age of high imperialism (1880–1914) some form of popular imperialism – and jingoism – gripped the British populace. The debate raged less fiercely about this period, but it has nonetheless revealed the value of analytical scrutiny, even in a period which seemed to be so overtly ‘imperial’ we must continue question the nature of imperialism in all its forms. In the research for this thesis I have sought to retain a sense of careful scepticism; the quantity of coverage and discussion of empire, and the challenges to it in the press, in official sources and in literature and stage suggest that Britain was an imperial culture, and that anxieties about imperial decline and rivalry could permeate beyond intellectual debate or cabinet meetings. This constructive historiographical debate has provided a fundamental inspiration for my own work, both in terms of my understanding of the relationship between Britain and its Empire, but also in my approach to the archive. MacKenzie and Thompson in particular have strongly influenced my approach to this thesis in the way in which I have sought to investigate the imperial dimensions of popular responses to a German challenge to Britain.

**Popular ‘Germanophobia’**

Recent scholarship has revealed the ubiquity of both imperial anxieties and xenophobia in Britain during the Victorian and Edwardian ages. The British were increasingly concerned about dangerous new political and national groupings threatening social order in Britain’s urban centres. Anarchist and Irish Nationalist groups similarly posed threats to the metropolitan British civil order, especially from the 1860s until the mid-1890s, in the provincial cities and especially in London.27 While Fenian bombings were viewed largely as a domestic problem, anarchism was increasingly associated with foreign immigration. Many of Britain’s anarchists were political refugees escaping repression from other states, including France and Russia. The fear and anger directed toward anarchists was increasingly conflated with growing anti-alienism in Britain around the turn-of-the-century. At the turn of the twentieth century the large population of Eastern European Jews in London was perceived with increasing hostility,28 as were the similarly sizeable community of Germans and Austrians, and smaller number of Chinese in London and the provincial towns.29 Thus, a wider trend of xenophobia or anti-alienism developed over the course of the 1890s and 1900s, most clearly expressed in the campaign for and passing of the Aliens Act of 1905. Historians have discussed the changing attitudes towards immigration and the hardening social and political attitudes, combined with press agitation, which precipitated the act of parliament.30 Historiography in the 1970s and 1980s focussed largely on

Eastern European Jewish immigration and the resultant animosity in Britain, though other immigrant
groups did feature to a lesser extent.\textsuperscript{31}

Following on from the works of race relations scholars such as John Garrard (1971) and Bernard
Gainer (1972), during the 1990s and 2000s a substantial body of works studied the role of anti-Germanism
in Britain and the sizeable anti-German riots which occurred during the First World War.\textsuperscript{32} Panikos Panayi,
in particular, studied immigrants in Britain, with a particular focus upon the German population in London.
According to Panayi and others, German immigrants in Britain were often treated with distaste; as waiters
and bandsmen they attracted the ire of some members of Victorian society. However, they were mostly left
unharmed and allowed to prosper; whatever animosity there was, Panayi argued, ‘the main strand…was
political’.\textsuperscript{33} While it is quite correct for sceptics to suggest that there were relatively few occasions when the
German immigrants living in Britain were subjected to violence or alienation, it would be a mistake to infer
from this that popular anti-German sentiment was not an influential element in British society; the frequency
of expressions of concern, fear or anger towards Germany undermines this mode of thought. There was
a vital disconnect between the domestic anti-alienism, and the global and imperial menace of Germany
perceived in popular discourse between 1896 and 1905. The fear of a wider international challenge from
Germany as a world power did not necessarily implicate Germans ‘in our midst’ in the same framework.
Laura Tabili has suggested that there was a direct link between the decline of popular ‘francophobia’ in
Britain, and the dissipation of a French imperial challenge. This argument lends support to the suggestion
that the growing presence of an imperial challenge from Germany was a major cause for rising popular
expressions of anti-German sentiment, separate from issues of aliens and immigration.\textsuperscript{34}

Another branch of historiography has considered the more abstract and internationalised views of
Germany before 1914, as distinct from histories based in immigration and race. In 1973, Paul Kennedy’s
article ‘Idealists and Realists’ described the differing conceptions of Germany in Britain. The ‘idealist’ group,
he argued, was formed out of those who argued for peace and closer ties, and maintained that any threat
from Germany was an exaggeration or a fallacy; they were often, but not exclusively, from the left side of
the political debate. For Kennedy these ‘idealists’ swam against the ‘flood-tide of nationalism’ which
increasingly gripped society. The ‘realists’, however, were those who either genuinely believed in the danger
that Germany represented or used the threat of Germany to procure political goals. Kennedy used the
example of tariff reform, in which anger towards Germany was used to


\textsuperscript{33} Panayi, P., German Immigrants’; Panayi, P., The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World (Oxford, 1991); Panayi, P., Immigration, Ethnicity and Racism; Yarrow, S., ‘Impact of Hostility’.


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anti-German sentiment, they were increasingly swept aside by the ‘flood-tide’ of the majority. Members of the Right both admitted their belief in a German Menace, and those who argued against it grew isolated.

Kennedy’s contribution to the debate on perceptions was influential. His conception of germanophobes and germanophiles has informed many of the later contributions to the historiography of the image of Germany before the First World War. A.J.A Morris’s The Scaremongers (1984) studied journalistic ‘realists’ who propounded, from a very early stage, the fear of Germany in their articles. Morris focussed upon the private papers and reports of journalists such as Valentine Chirol and Leopold Maxse, who attacked Germany and warned the British public that Germany represented a threat to Britain’s future. The German ‘other’ has also been of particular interest to literary historians as a counter-balance to British national identity. Gisela Argyle’s Germany as Model and Monster (2002) and Petra Rau’s English Modernism, National Identity and the Germans (2009) tackled the changing image of Germany over the course of the nineteenth century, from the perception of a country of high culture – art, literature and music – towards the Prussian lash and jackboot depictions of the twentieth century. A historian of literature and national identity, Rau sought to emphasise ‘the necessity of the German other for the construction of Englishness’. It is this counterposing of the German ‘other’ that has animated so many such accounts over recent years.

The study of popular or literary ‘germanophobia’ or the perception of a German ‘other’ has for some, like Jan Rüger, reached the point at which little more can be added. The value of accounts which seek to explain only perceptions of Germany is questionable when we consider that they rarely relate these perceptions to wider issues – namely political, social and international factors. In light of these criticisms, the aim here is not only to understand the way in which the views of Germany changed over time, but also to investigate how major events and processes interacted with those changes, and how popular discourse interacted with political decision-making. In so doing, the intention will be to develop a deeper understanding of the changing role of Germany as a cause for imperial anxiety. The challenge presented by Germany in a global-imperial context mirrors periods of rumbling anti-German sentiment in popular discourse, and the sudden outbursts of anger which helped disperse this sense of looming threat into ever wider sections of the community. Rather than fizzling away, these peaks acted to move the on-going discourse in more radical directions.

Recently Krishnan Kumar drew upon the work of Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism (1995), to suggest that the concept of ‘banal imperialism’ might provide a better understanding of the endemic presence of imperialism in British lives throughout the twentieth century. Kumar suggested that ‘the nation is repeatedly and routinely drummed into the consciousness of people – but at so banal a level as to be virtually unnoticed.’ Kumar suggested further that though Porter, Cannadine and Benedict Anderson may have been correct that empire was a ‘class act’, this was not to say that it did not form a vital function in the self-image of all of its citizens. Thus using ‘banal imperialism’ as a concept, rock solid conclusions may not necessarily be drawn, but the “field of meaning” within which individuals in Britain were able to understand themselves and form some idea of their collective identities might be ascertained. Kumar’s use of the ‘banal’ provides a useful analytical tool. How do we successfully analyse latently held thoughts and opinion? When press attention was not directed towards an international event involving Germany, what happened to the German Menace? The period 1896–1904 witnessed outbursts of anti-German sentiment, provoked by major international events, especially relating to the empire. As Lothar Reinermann argued in ‘Fleet Street and the

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38 Rau, P., English Modernism, National Identity and the Germans, 1890-1930 (Farnham, 2009); Argyle, G., Model and Monster.
41 Ibid.
Kaiser’ (2008), the image of the Kaiser remained ambiguous until August 1914. That Wilhelm II could be both hated and loved begs a question about the meaning of antipathy towards Germany in this period. Similarly, prominent historians such as Catriona Pennell and Michael Neiberg have recently argued that the First World War arrived largely as a surprise to Britons, and that this therefore meant that popular anti-German sentiment was not as significant in Britain before August 1914 as previously claimed. Though their evidence for the surprised reaction to war in 1914 is convincing, there is still room for a ‘thicker’ description of the way anti-German sentiment had developed over the previous years.

In response to the arguments of Pennell and Neiberg I would argue that although, as their work shows, war was received with surprise in Britain there would have been no question as to which country that war was to be fought against. After the initial shock of war, propagandists and journalists found the images of Germany which developed after 1896 easily accessible. Well known ideas of German brutality – embodied in the image of the ‘Hun’ (latent in British discourse since 1900), absolutism, covetousness and treachery were all archetypes developed in the pre-war period. It seems that there were many continuities in the development of pre-war anti-German stereotypes, and the clear expression of anti-German sentiment during the First World War. Popular discourse was influenced strongly by this growing catalogue of shocks and crises associated in this case with Germany, which cemented the stereotypes and ideas developed during crises of popular anxiety. Anxieties and tropes were stored and recalled from past outrages, and during later crises were then drawn upon by the mass media to explain events as they occurred. In this way imagined fears can gather authenticity even in periods when there have been apparently few mentions of them. I will argue that the events and developments studied in this thesis were fundamental in the crystallization of the German Menace, a commonly acknowledged popular trope from the pre-war period, which was developed further once hostilities had begun.

Invasion Scares and Spy Fever

In discussing the presence of Germany in the British popular imagination and politics in turn-of-the-century Britain, the narrative of invasion and future war in literature must feature prominently. Another important genre of this period was the invasion or future-war novel, and its close relative the ‘spy novel’. The extraordinary success of George Chesney’s Battle of Dorking in 1871 inspired the popular phenomenon of ‘invasion scares’ in literature. Chesney’s story of invasion revolved around the events of the Franco-Prussian War; it was a tale of crushing defeat of the British metropole and the decimation of the Empire with Chesney prophesying that Britain would become a vassal state of the German Empire. Dorking laid the foundation for several generations of invasion fiction writers; until the last years of the nineteenth century on the most part the ‘dastardly’ French, ‘the old enemy’, were often portrayed as the greatest invasion threat. The German Empire gradually assumed the key role as Britain’s arch-enemy in the literature of invasion. Germany became the focus of many conspiracy theorists and sensationalist fiction writers. As early as 1899, German spies had already begun to replace the French and Russians as the enemy in these narratives; H. Hill’s The Spies of the Wight (1899), Louis Tracy’s The Invaders (1901) and Walter

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47 Tombs, R. & Tombs, L., That Sweet Enemy: Britain and France: The History of a Love-Hate Relationship (London, 2006); Novels such as The Great War of 189-191 (1892), The Invasion of England (1882) and The Great Naval War in 1887 (1887) depicted the French as the aggressor against Britain and her empire. Colomb, A.& O., The Great War of 189-191 (London, 1892); Clowes, W.L. & Burgoyne, A.H., The Great Naval War in 1887 (London, 1887); Butler, (Gen.) Sir W.E., The Invasion of England (London, 1882); Tombs, R. & Tombs, L., Sweet Enemy; Novels such as The Great War of 189-191 (1892), The Invasion of England (1882) and The Great Naval War in 1887 (1887) depicted the French as the aggressor against Britain and her empire.
Wood’s *The Enemy In Our Midst* (1906) were some of the most popular accounts. During the same period authors such as William Le Queux and E.P. Oppenheim led a long line of authors who depicted the intrigue and drama of the world of spies and secrets. While Oppenheim and Le Queux were notable for their popularity, their works were poorly written and speedily published—these were mass market authors of the finest calibre.

There have been many scholarly works analysing the ‘invasion scare’ novel; the work of I.F. Clarke is perhaps the most important of them all. Clarke’s works on future war and invasion spanned several decades. *Voices Prophesying War* (1966) detailed the long history of invasion stories, looking all the way back to the Napoleonic Wars. Clarke first focused upon the role of the French in invasion scares—a major and consistent presence in these narratives from the 1860s until the 1900s. His argument was that these stories acted as a mirror for events in foreign and domestic affairs. With each example of shock or outcry in society there followed a consequent flurry of novels and serials. Clarke placed invasion fiction at the centre of popular debate in the pre-war period; for him it was a powerful conduit for mass opinion in an age of mass literacy.

Clarke’s later works on the same broad genre, *The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914* (1995) and *The Great War with Germany 1890-1914* (1997), continued to express his conviction that a direct link could be drawn between international or domestic events, and a resultant flurry of invasion or war fiction. He also argued that these works significantly worsened the international relations between Britain and Germany, a similar argument to that of Rose and Geppert more recently. Overall, Clarke’s was very much an account of the market, and the responsiveness of publishers, editors and authors to political, strategic and cultural developments and events. His view was that writers seized upon opportunities presented for sales and repute; this was the secret to the success of authors such as Wells, Le Queux, Childers, Tracy and Shiel. These popular authors played upon pre-existing or nascent trends in popular imagination in order to publicise their stories. There is therefore a distinction to be made between military polemicists who were military or naval cranks intent on demanding governmental change, and the more successful popular fiction writers from civilian backgrounds who, it could be argued, responded to and channelled public opinion to a much greater extent.

Since Clarke there has been a regular flow of scholarship on the literature of future war and invasion. Perhaps most thought provoking amongst them has been the work of A. Michael Matin. He aimed to join literary studies with military and political history, focussing upon the circumstances surrounding the popular sensation of the invasion novel. As a literary scholar, Matin has tended to focus in detail upon certain texts—especially the work of Kipling and Conrad, amongst others—where he sought to uncover the hidden motives behind the standard reading of the narrative. In his recent article, ‘The Creativity of War Planners’ (2011), Matin sought to establish a catalogue of ten techniques which were ‘so recurrent that they comprise

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53 Clarke, I.F., *Tale of the Next Great War*, *Clarke, I.F., The Great War with Germany, 1890-1914* (Liverpool, 1997).


virtually constitutive elements of the form”. His view of these texts, echoed by others, was that in many cases they were simplistic texts, either acting as propaganda if written by ‘war planners’ or raising sales through inciting emotion and causing sensation, if written by the authors of popular fiction.

These invasion scare accounts offer insight into the Edwardian psyche of fear. It is suggested that these historical texts can provide a basis for approaching the invasion narratives of my period of interest. As Matin and Clarke have suggested, real events and narratives should be related to one-another. Few in the historiography have sought to investigate the importance of imperial rivalry as a formative influence on invasion narratives. Especially in the early period (1896-1903) these accounts can be shown to have been influenced by imperial concerns. Even later accounts, such as Saki’s When William Came (1913) consider the importance of empire and the fear that the British themselves could be subjugated; once the colonisers, now the colonised.

**Diplomatic and Political Histories:**

**The Primacy of Home Defence?**

In the historiography of the Anglo-German relationship before 1914, the naval armaments race has featured prominently. In recent historiography Robert Massie’s Dreadnought (1992) is amongst the best known. Massie presented a traditionalist study of both the naval armaments race and the foundations of distrust between Germany and Britain. Massie’s approach was to seek to assess the impact of great political leaders upon the relations between the two countries, and to determine the path to war.

However, in recent years historians such as John Sumida and Andrew Lambert have attempted to revise traditionalist accounts; new generation of historians offered alternative explanations for a variety of issues, or looked outside of the traditional diplomatic and government archives to offer a more rounded understanding of the importance of the naval armaments race. In this vein, The Great Naval Game by Jan Rüger (2007) aimed to ‘discover the cultural in politics and the politics in culture’ by prioritising the importance of naval growth in both German and British culture. Rüger’s approach was to challenge old understandings of the naval armaments race, and examine the impact of massive naval growth upon British and German culture. He argued that naval affairs became an outlet for patriotism and nationalism; ‘naval theatre’ events, such as ship launches and visits, developed ‘strong popular appeal and symbolic power…in its ability to publicly reconcile otherwise divergent strands of identification and nationhood.’ Laura Rowe commented that Rüger made important steps in showing that ‘culture, particularly how and why it came to be so constructed, cannot and should not be divorced’ from ‘battles, strategy, administration and

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57 Ibid.,
61 Rüger, J., *Great Naval Game.*
technology’. 62 Although Rüger focussed solely upon the cultural importance of the naval race,63 he offered an example of how culture and popular opinion are fundamental to understanding of this period. As a methodological approach, Rüger has set a benchmark for approaching a long-established historical narrative and improving historical understanding with a more cultural and nuanced approach to history. However, Rüger restricted his study to the later ‘Dreadnought Race’, an era of naval competition, and focussed more closely upon events in the English Channel, rather than considering wider imperial dimensions. Complementing the work of Rüger and others, I will study the period before the development of a full-blown arms race and consider the vital centrality of imperial anxiety in informing popular perceptions of Germany.

Dominik Geppert and Andreas Rose recently sought to redress the historiography of the Naval Armaments Race. Their methodology took inspiration from recent researches into world or global history. Reflecting recent trends in German scholarship, Geppert and Rose posited that political history and cultural history should be brought closer together. In their article, ‘Machtpolitik und Flottenbau vor 1914’ (2011), and Rose’s Zwischen Empire und Kontinent: Britische Außenpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (2011), it was argued that British foreign policy decisions were influenced powerfully by imperial concerns and by British domestic political discourse.64 Controversially, Geppert and Rose argued for the ‘Primat der Innenpolitik’ in pre-war Britain; Germany served mainly as a domestic political device which the British government used to generate support for the growing cost of armaments for the defence of Empire, and as a justification for alliances with Britain’s old enemies, France and Russia. Essentially, their view was for the primacy of domestic politics, and the preservation of empire. Rose’s argument, like the controversial accounts of Niall Ferguson, Keith Wilson and others, asserts that it was Russia, not Germany, which was considered the greatest concern by British planners before 1914.65 Germany remained only as an ‘economically dynamic, militarily powerful, politically restless and diplomatically uncouth’ propaganda tool.

This thesis reaffirms the presence of powerful official imperial anxieties, and increasing usage of the Germany ‘boogy’ indicates its popular currency and power as a motivating factor.66 Popular ‘russophobia’ pervaded into the twentieth century, although the agreement of the Anglo-Russian alliance in 1907 quelled many fears. However, by 1896 Germany was increasingly challenging Russia’s position as the greatest imperial threat in the British popular imagination. Between 1896 and 1904 this German imperial menace increasingly overtook concerns about Russia, which after all had been shown to be weak internally and externally during the Russo-Japanese War. Even before 1904 many British journalists and authors remarked that an agreement with Russia would be far more advantageous than one with Germany. Furthermore, whereas Russia was imagined as a colossus, it was never depicted as a threat which was on a par with Britain; the perception of Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy ruled out Russia as a threatening ‘equal’. Germany’s ‘Anglo-Saxon’ kinship was made the more threatening, as seen in the ‘national efficiency’ discourse, by its proximity. Unlike Russia and France, Germany was viewed as a fraternal equal. Germany appeared to be able to compete with Britain at her own game; Russia patently could not.

Matthew Seligmann’s recent works have sought to reinvigorate the relatively stagnant diplomatic historiography of this era. In Rivalry in Southern Africa (1998) Seligmann argued that South Africa was the inspiration for a diplomatic change of course for the Wilhelmstrasse. Seligmann argued that the strong response of the British government against the Kaiser’s interference in the Transvaal in 1896 shifted

63 Followed subsequently by another study of the cultural and political dimensions of this era: Lambert, A., Rüger, J., & Blyth, R.J., The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age (Farnham, 2013).
German imperial policy from a localised project, towards a push for a global empire. This bold thesis has been well received in historiography and furthermore, Seligmann’s recent publication, *The Royal Navy and the German Threat* (2012) challenged the established understanding of the Anglo-German naval rivalry – arguing against the ‘doctrinal ascendancy of capital ship offensive warfare’. Seligmann argued that the Royal Navy was acutely aware of the German threat to global trade – in particular there was concern about German armed merchant ships disrupting the vital commercial arteries of the British Empire. Though concerned with official policy and diplomacy, Seligmann’s approach has been to re-emphasise the importance of a German global threat to British imperial dominance. This official angle fits well with my own conception of popular imperial anxiety, and suggests some subtle or latent linkage between official fears and popular concerns.

Paul Kennedy remains the most influential historian in the field of Anglo-German diplomatic relations. In a seminal text, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (1980), Kennedy analysed a large period of diplomatic, political and cultural history in his distinctive brand of diplomatic and political history. The book studied in fine detail the process by which attitudes in Germany and Britain changed dramatically over half a century. Kennedy devoted time to studying not simply the traditional subjects of interest: the role of Bismarck, the Kaiser and the Navy; he also considered the various roles played in different periods by colonial possessions and by diplomatic interaction across the different periods between different heads of government, foreign secretaries and ambassadors. Kennedy viewed the causation of Anglo-German antagonism as two-tiered. Firstly, he argued that the meteoric rise of Germany as an economic power-house capable of not only competing with Britain, but even possibly superseding her, was the major driving force. Below this, Kennedy placed the dual roles of geographical proximity, and ideology, which helped push the international relationship from one of anxious competition, to open warfare. Kennedy took the view that had Germany been situated further from Britain, or even had she sought a *Drang nach Osten* in earnest, rather than pushing westwards and into the North Sea, Britain would not have railed as it did against Germany’s increasing influence and power. Kennedy argued that it was a clash of cultures - between ‘liberal’ England and ‘reactionary’ Prussia - which defined the ideological battleground, preparing the two countries for the inevitable clash in August 1914. He concluded that the first priority for the British government would always have been the preservation of the *status quo* in Europe and in Home Waters. The Far East, Africa and the Western hemisphere would always take second place to any consideration at home.

Kennedy’s concern was for geo-politics: the pressures upon those exercising power and the causes of major global events. The growing commercial threat posed to Britain by the booming German economy was well recognised in British political circles. Kennedy argued that in the realm of diplomacy, economics was a primary factor in engendering official antagonism between the two national structures. Kennedy’s argument is persuasive; however, the connection between the commercial competition, its global and imperial consequences, and the influence it had upon popular culture requires further investigation. Globalized commerce was recognised as central to Britain’s economy at the turn of the twentieth century; as well as the formal empire, ‘informal’ influence in South America and across Asia represented a vital source of wealth and power. For Britain to sustain its position as the prime imperial power it needed to dominate global trade. Concerns about commerce and empire overlapped and were commonly conflated in British popular discourse. Kennedy’s argument for the primacy of economic competition does not rule out the importance of empire in a cultural and social sense; global economic competition should be viewed as an issue impacting...
upon popular imperialism. The example of national efficiency, as discussed in chapter three, demonstrates how economic debates could powerfully influence public discourse and the popular imagination.

It is accepted that any history of the official relationship between Britain and Germany in this period should not seek to argue that considerations in Europe – naval expansion and home defence – were not prime factors. However, in seeking to understand a more nuanced cultural and social view of the period, these ‘power-political’ interpretations must be supplemented by other approaches. Any suggestion that the colonies and global interests were unimportant in British (or German) popular culture is fundamentally flawed. Whilst visiting incidents such as the Kruger Telegram and the Venezuela in some detail, Kennedy went on to play down their importance to his greater argument. The role of the press, and public opinion were studied in his work, but they play little part in the overall conclusions of his research. There remains much to be said about the influence of global changes and German strategic advancement in close proximity to the British Empire upon the British public mind in this period.

Methodology

In the historiography of this subject terminologies have very often been confused or carelessly employed with regard either to popular xenophobia or to foreign enemies. In particular the suffix ‘phobia’ has too often been employed by historians to denote a generalised discourse. Often, popular phobias have been used by scholars as a description of either anti-alien sentiment, or a national discourse of fear. Historians have talked variously about ‘russophobia’, ‘germanophobia’ and ‘francophobia’ during the nineteenth century. However, the terms are now loaded with historical meanings which risk conflating different, if linked, discourses about immigration and national or imperial anxieties. To talk of a popular ‘germanophobia’ before 1914 risks confusing the issues at the heart of this thesis with views about Germans living in Britain. The period 1896-1903 in particular was characterised by a latent, sporadic and abstract sense of a German Menace; significantly, little evidence exists to suggest any association between German immigrants and the generalised and abstracted German threat posed by the nation in the imperial context between 1896 and 1903. As shown by the anti-German riots during the First World War, extreme events and latent anti-German sentiment could combine to result in great damage to personal property and abuse. However, no event extreme enough to precipitate attacks on the German immigrant population occurred before 1914. Furthermore, by 1914 the British had experienced nearly two decades of anti-German expression in popular discourse; this tradition of anti-German sentiment combined with an extreme wartime situation to cause the riots which took place between 1914 and 1918. Thus, in the interest of clarity, the term ‘germanophobia’ will be avoided. Instead I consider the terms ‘anti-German’ and ‘anxiety’ to better represent what I aim to describe. Though many contemporaries talked of ‘phobia’ as opposed to ‘philia’ in terms of these nations, what they actually described was anti-German or pro-French opinion rather than the medicalised obsessive and specific fear that the word ‘phobia’ connotes.
The term ‘anxiety’ embodies an abstract sense of unease and concern;\(^7\) it encapsulates the ways in which threats to Britain were imagined and described in this imperial age. Historians such as Christopher Bayly, Kim Wagner and Yumna Siddiqi have described generalised imperial ‘anxiety’, arguing for its importance as a cultural and political factor; however, anxieties about specific menaces to the nation or to the empire also figured prominently in popular discourse.\(^8\) Ranajit Guha’s essay, ‘Not at Home in the Empire’ described the nature of the British imperial experience. Guha argued that the fundamental ‘absurdity’ of the British claim to be able to knit together ‘colonial authority’ with ‘metropolitan liberalism’ left the British feeling ill-at-ease about empire:

> A sore that refused to heal, it went on festering by being compulsively touched. Symptom of an unredeemably bad conscience, it developed the habit of insinuating itself into all manner of colonial discourse, ranging from homiletics to politics, from the novel to the lyric to the common joke.

Ruling without consent made isolation ‘a structural necessity’ and throughout imperial culture a looming sense of unease pervaded, not from a ‘nameable fear’, but more a general sense of threat and danger to the stability of imperial rule. Guha’s work has been an important influence, aiding an explanation of the anxieties which pervaded British imperial culture, some of which will be the focus of this thesis.\(^9\) It will be argued that anxieties expressed in the press and literature about Russia or France were most often based on a vague sense that they presented a danger to the empire or to Britain’s safety; the likely outcome was uncertain, and the nervousness unspecific. After 1896 a similar sense of generalised unease, imagined and investigated in various written and oral forms, developed about Germany - the new global power.

The term ‘menace’ will be used throughout to describe the developing representation of the German threat to Britain and its specifically imperial nature in the early period. The word encapsulates what Germany was increasingly seen to be in the germinal stage: unknown but apparently hostile to Britain, an implied but not explicit threat. In the period 1890-1914 a discussion of imperial anxieties might be expected to focus on other menaces to Britain, for example Russia or France. The reality of such dangers was often far from the ideas reflected in the British popular imagination and discourse; the British habitually exaggerated internal and external threats beyond the realms of reality, but these were almost always based on admittedly less threatening but altogether real enemies or issues. It is my assertion here that, as popular perceptions of the empire also figured prominently in popular discourse.\(^10\)

Not at Home in Empire; thus the authority of these ideas loomed large in the popular imagination. In this earlier period of anti-German sentiment (1896-1903) ideas of a German Menace to Britain were founded upon an ‘ideological cluster’: a set of tropes and stereotypes based upon the suspicion of underhand German territorial ambitions, assumed jealousy of the Empire and the brutality and autocricy of German society and governance. Popular anxiety about Germany seemed to be intermittently vindicated by imperial events which appeared to reveal the existence of a menace to Britain’s Empire; thus the authority of these ideas increased over time.\(^10\)

Popular Culture and Politics in the Fin-de-Siècle

This thesis will examine the interconnections between culture, media and politics for the purpose of investigating the development of stereotypes about Germany in the period 1896-1903. My approach utilises

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\(^{10}\) During this period contemporaries did refer to a ‘German Menace’, although with varying meanings; often not to describe the totality of the German threat but more focussed upon individual issues.
a variety of newspapers, images and mass-market literature, as well as official archives, in order to provide analysis of cultural transfers which occurred in the public domain. It is important to state the methodological influences on my approach to researching this period. Scholarship of popular imperialism, as discussed above, and of the press and popular literature has diversely influenced this study and provide the central methodological groundings.

A key dilemma for this study is how to engage with and describe 'popular culture' in its multiple forms. John Tosh argued that the history of popular culture 'is about more than the trickle-down from the political and intellectual elite'; he suggested that 'conventional social history' does not necessarily provide the detail necessary; nor is 'dissemination…an adequate framework' for its study. Popular cultural history is intangible, tantalising and perilous; it speaks to the human condition, but all historians who seek to practise it risk controversy and inaccuracy caused by the difficulty of ascertaining the opinions of those whom Tosh called, 'the people of the mass.' I have drawn together my own conceptions of the various aspects which combine to form popular culture from these approaches to historical study. Amongst the most prominent terms I will use are 'popular discourse' and 'popular imagination'. It is thus important that I establish what is meant by these two interlinking but distinct concepts. Though not describing identical phenomena they do interact with one another and help to describe a set of views, themes, ideas and expressions about a particular issue. I employ the term, the 'popular imagination' to embody the malleable corpus of ideas and images pertaining to a subject about which society has commonly little or no experience or at best incomplete knowledge. It represents the range of ideas - the full potentiality of images and themes - which are widely held in society, formed out of fundamental contemporary societal norms of thought and belief. The term 'popular discourse' implies the more active debate of and engagement with certain issues, all drawn from within the broader context of the popular imagination. Popular discourse focusses around a 'centre', a mean or focal point of conjecture, argumentation, opinion and debate. Such cultural phenomena, by their very nature, shift over time; in this thesis I will emphasise and analyse both gradual shifts over time, and sudden paradigm-defining shocks which bring fresh ideas and images to the popular imagination, and introduce new elements in the popular discourse.

Press and Politics in Britain

In 1896 British metropolitan newspapers and periodicals were nominally motivated by political and party stance. Whereas in the mid-nineteenth century the 'Liberal' press had dominated the national market, the turn of the twentieth century was heavily dominated by the political right; amongst the older and more established broadsheets, the Times, the Observer and the Westminster Gazette were all resolutely nationalist and right-sided. The true revolution came with the rise of the 'daily' newspaper; London-based dailies such as the Telegraph, Pall Mall Gazette and the Morning Post began writing in a new, more sensationalist style, from the 1870s. A reading of many dailies of the 1890s appears in many ways familiar to the reader of today. The years 1896 to 1914 witnessed the birth of modern democratised media as illustrated and pictorial papers surged to prominence; the Illustrated London News and later the Daily Mirror and Daily Sketch brought photojournalism to prominence in Britain. There was a rapid change towards exaggeration, sensation,

81 Tosh, J., The Pursuit of History, 4th edn (Harlow, 2002), pp. 275–280. The Annalers School was the first to seek to move away from the confines of political and intellectual history. Lucien Febvre's study of the 'history of mentalities' and the 'historical psychology' has inspired generations of social scientists and historians to seek to engage with the thoughts and perceptions of humans in the past. Febvre warned against the assumption that human thought, emotion and psychology are universal across chronologies and geographies. Febvre, L., 'History and Psychology', in Burke, P. (ed.), A New Kind of History (1973).
82 I have also been influenced by the John M. MacKenzie's concept of 'ideological clusters' Mackenzie, J.M., Propaganda and Empire; Ross, C., Media and the Making Wagner, K.A., Treading Upon Fires', pp. 159–97.
84 Ibid., pp. 117–118.
85 Ibid., p. 120.
86 Especially Northcliffe's re-launched Daily Mirror from 1904 onwards, and its competitors such as the Daily Sketch (1908); Williams, K., Read All About It! A History of the British Newspaper (London, 2010), p. 133.
Introduction

rumours, speculation and ever larger headlines and images. Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord Northcliffe, established the Daily Mail in 1896 and its sensationalist and scandalous style became emblematic of the direction that the mass press was moving. Northcliffe was the greatest press baron of his age; from the late 1880s he built up an empire of newspapers which came to include the Evening News, Daily Mail, Sunday Dispatch, Daily Mirror, the Observer (1905) and the Times (1908). The ‘Northcliffe formula’ was simple and recognisable even today; it was marked out by ‘publicity stunts, competitions and innovative journalism’. 

Northcliffe, along with other tabloid newspaper proprietors of the time, was part of a revolution in the interaction between the people, the press and politics. By 1890 huge numbers of people were discerning consumers of ‘the news’ through the vast array of cheaply available national and local morning and evening dailies, Sunday papers, and periodical magazines and reviews. Never before had so many Britons had access to such a variety of information and opinion; literacy was not yet universal – one estimate put it at 95% of adults by 1893 - but since the Education Act of 1870, men and women in Britain had both the capability and a growing desire to read the written word in many different forms.

The nature of the popular press in this period requires a deep analysis which goes past an investigation of ‘representations’. In this study, the layers of discourse which accumulated from 1896 with regard to Germany will be examined. Publicists who took an anti-German stance formed one part of a wider and more complex understanding of Germany across the press and public sphere. Real events, especially in foreign relations and economics, impacted strongly upon the ever-developing perception of the ‘new’ Wilhelmine Germany. The two-way interaction between policy and opinion is extremely difficult to gauge; here that relationship will be examined through the lens of an imperial consciousness, and a perception across society of a growing threat from Germany. In 1980 Paul Kennedy argued that with new mass electorates, and huge press apparatuses, appealing to and attempting to direct the sentiments of this vast audience became the business of all politicians, and of any group which wished to claim that it had ‘public opinion’ behind it.

Any ambitious politician or pressure group was forced to recognise the need to engage with ‘public opinion’. Kennedy stated that the differences in the relationship between public, press and government were very different in Germany compared to Britain. Whereas Germany’s semi-official press and government structure allowed ‘the newspaper-influencing apparatus’ to be far more sophisticated and influential, in Britain, Kennedy argued vociferously that ‘such blatant press-influencing simply did not exist’. Gentlemanly arrangements and ‘club’ agreements might be manipulated, but could only stretch so far. There was indeed great room for press criticism of the government; there were exceptions, but as Kennedy states, for historians ‘[t]he most interesting phenomenon [was] that both establishments steadily lost whatever control they had of the arch-patriotic press.

More recently communications and media historians have argued that in Britain and Germany, mass media should be viewed as a force for democratisation and popularised politics; agencies of state power during the early twentieth century were forced to change tactics to meet new challenges.

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87 The press played a prominent role in many murder cases (Jack the Ripper), scandals (such as the Maiden Tribute Affair) and court-battles (the Dilke Affair). Both Maiden Tribute and the Dilke Affair were the result of a press campaign headed by W.T. Stad, the great investigative journalist of the 1880s and 1890s. See Jenkins, R., Dilke: A Victorian Tragedy (London, 1996); Gorham, D., ‘The “Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon” Re-Examined: Child Prostitution and the Idea of Childhood in Late-Victorian England’, Victorian Studies, 21:3 (1978), pp. 353–79; Cohen, W.A., See: Scandal: The Private Parts of Victorian Fiction (Durham, NC, 1996).

88 Williams, K., Read All About It!, p. 125.

89 For a detailed review of Northcliffe’s rise to power see Thompson, J.L., Politicians, the Press, and Propaganda (Kent, OH, 1999), pp. 3–19; Williams, K., Read All About It!, pp. 125–127.


91 Kennedy, P.M., Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 361, 362.

92 Ibid., pp. 361, 365, 366, 368.

democratisation of politics. Even in Germany, Bösch argued that increasing democratisation of society and media changed the way politicians interacted with journalists and fed information to the masses. The relatively ‘open’ press in Britain led to even greater democratisation of politics, towards a more recognisable populist model. Corey Ross’s *Media and the Making of Modern Germany* (2008) offered an influential analysis of popular media in this era. Ross questioned conventions about the role of the press and media as ‘leveling’ influences upon consumers. He argued that the masses were not passive receptors for propaganda; the assumption of the ‘universalising’ nature of mass media has been overstated. Consumers were discerning and harboured a great plurality of opinion. For Ross, attempts by the state to influence public opinion were of extremely questionable effectiveness. As a result of such recent media histories, older notions of the press and media as subject to Machiavellian political control and pressure have been debunked.

In a study of the international importance of mass media, Dominik Geppert investigated, through the case study of Anglo-German relations, the way the modern press interacted with the rest of society in his *Pressekriege* (2007). Like A.J.A. Morris in his *Scaremongers* (1985), Geppert studied the interrelationships between journalists, politicians, military men and publishing interests and how ‘press feuds’ influenced Anglo-German foreign policy between 1896 and 1914. Geppert argued that the ‘massive extension of the public sphere’ into society revolutionised the way that the press impacted upon international relations; he sought particularly to emphasise the growing power of publishers and proprietors such as Northcliffe. Geppert concluded that ‘press wars’—frenzies of media attention—impacted directly upon foreign politics. Each country viewed the other’s press as being at least partially representative of the government stance, and so a press feud could directly interfere with diplomacy, and even threaten peace.

Geppert was largely focussed upon the influence of the press upon government decision making. Such works have laid great emphasis upon the importance of the owner-proprietor-editor such as Alfred Harmsworth or Lord Beaverbrook. Although there is much to be learned from the study of such great men, I would argue that a synthetic view is more appropriate. As Bösch and Frei argued, the press in Britain and Germany were increasingly geared towards pleasing and expanding their readership. They could do so only by satisfying their interests, rather than directly challenging their beliefs and ‘educating’ them in their misjudgement. In the material I have studied it has been apparent that the traditional periodical writers were inclined to reveal their frustration that the press was increasingly focussed upon the desires and whims of the electorate, rather than around the moral or ‘educated’ stance of the elite. Geppert has provided an important study of the interaction between the press and the “Official Mind”. I am inclined to take a more pluralistic view and focus more upon the detailed narratives and notions developing within British popular culture, which were increasingly marketable for the press. Bösch’s study of ‘Medialisierung’ suggested that newspapers were able to be both a force for democratic ‘Offenheit’ (candidness) but also were subject to their owner’s prerogative. The complex picture built up in recent scholarship suggests that in the 1890s and 1900s the press was influenced by power-brokers at their head, but was increasingly focussed upon satisfying popular demands. Through the vast number of regional and national outlets, the media was too plural to be subject to the will of one man alone but there was also the possibility of subtly influencing and shifting debates. Attempts at publicity - influencing opinion and coverage - as Kennedy argued in 1980, could often lead to unforeseen consequences once the press and public began to dominate the debate.

Though newspapers and journals would happily push a political line, they still needed to be popular and representative. Their stories were written to inform, but could only do so within pre-established popular paradigms. This led to complex feedback relationships between the press and their readership, and between

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95 Geppert, D., *Pressekriege*.
97 Geppert, D., *Pressekriege*.
98 Bösch, F., ‘Katalysator Der Demokratisierung’.
99 Bösch, F., *Katalysator Der Demokratisierung*.
the press and politicians. It will be argued here that in a variety of case studies of British-German events over a decade, the mass media whipped up pre-existent trends and responded to popular views. They played upon latent themes in the popular imagination, and sought to represent what they claimed to be public opinion. Through press outbursts pre-existent ideas could develop into new and powerful popular concepts, such as the German Menace. Fundamentally the press – especially the daily press - rarely swam against the popular tide, for fear of a loss of readership in an increasingly competitive and democratised market.

**Popular Literature in Britain**

In the last years of the nineteenth century the written word, in its multiplicity of forms, was more widespread than ever before and literacy was virtually universal in Britain. To can increasingly talk of a ‘mass’ market in Britain for a variety of narrative forms. To reliably analyse literary sources it is necessary to explain what constituted popular literature in this period, who consumed it, and how they received and reacted to what they read. This is no simple task, and as many historians of Victorian and Edwardian publishing and literature accept, there is great difficulty in determining the links between circulation figures, readership, the authorial and publisher influence, and which social groups were most likely to have read them. Simply put, there is too little evidence to prove concretely who read what and why; thus our assumptions must be tempered with cautious estimations and suggestions.

### i. Literary Forms and Markets

Fiction was delivered to the consumer in a variety of formats. Over the nineteenth century the format of novels had gradually evolved. By the 1890s a vast portion of the population were demanding regular fictional entertainment. Often the same book would be published in a variety of physical formats at different prices to meet various consumer brackets. For the middle class and library-borrowing working classes, the six shilling novel had become a staple. At the lower end of the market came the sixpenny novels; such ‘yellowback’ and paperback novels were produced in large numbers. Finally, at the bottom end of the market, the ‘penny dreadfuls’, as they were commonly known, were sold in vast quantities. Little more than pamphlets, penny novels were the ‘staple diet of reading for the masses.

The most important point of access to fiction for the majority of readers was the newspaper press. Though the middle class was growing in size, the vast majority of Britons were from poorer backgrounds, with lower disposable incomes. Fiction – in the form of serials or short stories - could be cheaply accessed in monthly magazines, Sunday weekly newspapers and journals, and increasingly in daily newspapers. These magazines mixed current affairs articles with snappy sensational stories; monthly serials also allowed authors

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107 Ibid., p. 427.
and editors to often react to their audience and current events to add extra dramatic effect. 107 *Strand Magazine* and *Pearson’s Magazine* were amongst the most popular monthly journals in terms of their circulation, with Reynolds’s achievements being in the hundreds of thousands, while *Lloyds Weekly* was the first newspaper to circulate to one million readers in 1896. 108

Added to the literary fiction, the Victorian-Edwardian era was also littered with huge numbers of non-fictional polemics. Often written by journalists and politicians, these accounts could sell widely. Though many works offered dull over-detailed discussions of the economic benefits of a free trade policy, some such texts sold in unprecedented proportions and were designed for a mass market. A text of particular interest for this thesis is *Made in Germany* (1896) published by E.E. Williams. Published first in serial form for the *New Review*, by 1897 the book was already into its 5th edition. 109 Like *Made in Germany* the majority of such non-fiction was non-academic and populist; the authorial voice of the majority came in the style of the ‘new journalism’ – many writers like Robert Blatchford and Arnold White were extremely popular journalists in the ‘yellow press’ and elsewhere. 110 Whilst many were distributed as serialised opinion pieces in the periodicals, successful books, like today, received substantial coverage across the daily and weekly press. In this way, a theorist like Williams could inspire popular debate, far surpassing his already impressively large book-based readership.

The great outpouring of literary narratives into more affordable mass formats also resulted also in a change in the types of stories published. The imperial successes of Britain overseas led to great popularity of adventure novels and imperial romances – for example the fictions of H. Rider Haggard. Other authors depicted less typical imperial plotlines with works like Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1899) and *Lord Jim* (1900), and Kipling’s *Kim* (1901). 111 The 1880s and 1890s also witnessed the birth of detective fiction; writers such as Wilkie Collins and Arthur Conan Doyle were famed for their tales of murder and mystery.

In highlighting the great variety of themes and genres, and illuminating the variegated qualities of such texts, a picture develops of an intensely ‘popular’ literary culture. Popular literature hosted a vast plethora of tropes, stereotypes, memes and discourses, and directly impacted upon popular discourse, and was influenced in return; while the high canonical literature might have sold at a higher price bracket, newspaper and periodical readers of all classes could access them. This was a socially and culturally interconnected society, even if it was stratified; the working classes were more likely to read cheaper sixpenny and penny novels, and serialised fiction, but they would also have been aware of the latest high fiction too. Similarly, the upper and middle classes would have read not only the literary classics, but also railway fiction and serials. Though this was a society fundamentally divided by class and wealth, literature was one of the mediums able – at certain conduit points – to transgress the boundaries of class and wealth. The market and background of an author or publishing house is vital in order to understand the motives behind the narratives put forward, and the way they would be perceived by the readership.

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107 *The Strand Magazine* (1891) which published Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories was the first success story; many rival publishing companies were quick to enter a growing market. *Pearson’s Magazine*, and others such as the *Pall Mall Magazine* (1893), soon overtook older monthly journals such as *Cornhill* and *Temple Bar* to share in the *Strand’s* success. *Ibid.*, p. 426.


111 The turn of the twentieth century also witnessed the rise of the social critique, for example Forster, E.M., *Howards End* (London, 1910) and Robert Tressell’s socialist parable, *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists* (London, 1914).
Introduction

When thinking of the Late Victorian and Edwardian period, modern readers are most commonly aware of the works of Hardy, Forster, Zola and Twain, which represented the ‘high art’ of literature; they have often been seen as representing the spirit of the age in literary form. Though these authors and their fictions were influential and representative of some sectors of society, the works of thousands of authors who produced explicitly popular fiction are largely forgotten today. Some mass-produced authors, for example Bram Stoker and H.G. Wells, still enjoy significant recognition, while others, William Le Queux and Hume Nisbet among them, are rarely recognised today. The vast quantity of novels produced in this era represents a relatively untapped resource for getting to grips with the question at hand. Throughout this thesis I have sought to engage with both canonical and popular fiction in different forms in order to extract more detail and depth regarding the way that Germany and Germans are represented throughout a rapidly changing era. Many mass market texts, published in response to the important developments of their day, reflected and developed popular attitudes towards Germany. Such texts were designed to satisfy and entertain a large and fickle readership with serials and cheap sixpenny and six-shilling editions, and thus needed to gain popular approval. This required authors to play to the gallery and to draw upon themes most relevant and interesting to their readers.

The challenge of understanding the ‘decisive connection between art (literature) and history (the social real)’ has troubled literary historians and critics for generations.113 Roland Barthes for example was critical of reductive representations of literature as mere mirrors for historical events. Jan Pieters argued that ‘literary texts were relegated to a parallel, aesthetic circuit that stood apart from ‘real life’’. It was against such approaches to literary history that Stephen Greenblatt argued for a ‘New Historicism’; through the 1980s this ‘movement’ gathered weight as a literary critical method. Like Clifford Geertz’s anthropological ‘thick description’, ‘New Historicism’ strives to understand a whole ‘word-culture’ through the many various cultural artefacts available to researchers.114 Proponents of ‘New Historicism’ seek to understand what Paul de Man described as ‘the foreign affairs, the external politics of literature.’115 In so doing they recognised that the perceptions of the historian today are as subjective and restricted to their own epoch as the writer was in our historical researches; ‘all literary creativity involves a complex global circulation of social energies’.116 Though this history does not claim the depth of Greenblatt’s literary focus, this wider and more detailed examination of literary texts in situ provides an important basis for research and analysis.

As argued earlier, Edward Said expressed the need to connect literary works ‘not only with that pleasure and profit but also with the imperial process of which they were manifestly and unconcealedly a part’.117 Said’s argued that culture represents a ‘battleground’ or ‘theatre’ on which causes expose themselves to the light of day and contend with one another...; his aim was to expose the presence of empire in works where it had previously assumed to be absent.118 Said’s search for historical evidence in such texts, and his desire to ‘read against the grain’ to reveal more about the text are important for this study. Yumna Siddiqi’s Anxieties of Empire (2008) has also been influential to the development of this thesis. Siddiqi studied the ‘fiction of intrigue’ – detective and spy stories – and its interaction with ideological and material imperial culture; a disciple of Said, she sought to analyse the nexus between power and narrative under the British Empire, suggesting that the fictions of Conrad, Buchan et al reveal deep-seated anxieties about the Empire, but also sought to dispel those fears and to ‘resolve ideologically’ the concerns that come with policing and governing a global empire.119 Siddiqi’s work is significant not only for her understanding of imperial anxieties

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118 For Said, the British Empire was essentially the ‘elephant in the room’ in works such as Thomas Hardy’s Mansfield Park and Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. Ibid., pp. xii; xx; passim.
119 Siddiqi, Y., Anxieties of Empire, p. 8.
developing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also for the analysis of narrative for the purposes of literary criticism, and in revealing something about a wider historical discourse. Pierre Macherey’s ‘symptomatic reading’, ‘a critical attention to textual gaps, silences, and tensions that reveal the presence of ideological matter than has been transformed through the labor (sic) of literary production’, provides a useful tool for more contextualised and thorough literary analysis. Similarly, Siddiqi’s application of Carlo Ginzburg’s ‘conjectural paradigm’ - ‘the intuitive connection of clues and traces to produce knowledge that is “indirect, presumptive”’ – offers a reasoned rationale for the importance of applying logic and insinuation to less than explicit narratives by understanding the context of their creation.120

Other historians have sought to emphasise the value of the mass produced novel in highlighting the subtleties and complexities of seemingly formulaic and one-dimensional narratives. Stephen Arata (1996) discussing the perception of decline in the Fin de Siècle era, argued that debates about social issues of the day were carried out through the medium of such texts; Arata was convinced that the literary and historical focus upon less accessible literature missed the true value of these texts.121 Reeva Spector Simon’s Spies and Holy Wars (2010) similarly granted prominence to Arata’s ‘mass market texts’; Simon discussed over 800 British and American crime fiction narratives published over the twentieth century. Produced for a mass audience, these texts experienced vast popularity and thus Simon views her texts as a ‘convenient matrix for illustrating the interconnection between popular culture and politics’ from the First World War.122

Theoretically and methodologically, the approaches of Said, Macherey, Ginzburg and Greenblatt provide useful and practical solutions for how to analyse narratives from a set historical period. They all sought to avoid one-dimensional, opaque readings of literary sources, in order to offer richer description, indicating how the historian can add value to a simple literary summary or description. Arata and Simon have shown that emphasis should be placed upon both the major literary works of the time, and the works which were most popular and widely disseminated. Siddiqi’s approach to literature provides the most concrete example of how the historian can interpret and engage with literary sources. This thesis will not focus solely upon fiction and narrative, but such sources provide a vital basis for the analysis of popular culture and society in the period 1890-1914. Literary sources must be read opacity, in search of the ‘gaps’ in the text; they must also be viewed as influenced by and influencing the discourses of their time – and the epistememes within which they were conceived. Only by understanding these factors can historians reliably utilise such sources adequately. There has been considerable literary research into the popular literature of this era. Historians such as Petra Rau, Gisela Argyle and A. Michael Matin have investigated some of the key literary works of the era for the presence of themes of ‘germanophobia’ and invasion-scare sentiment. These works have doubtless merit, but few have been able to link these histories to the wider society of the period in anything more than a cursory fashion. This thesis seeks to link together these differing historiographical approaches and source-bases to provide a fuller description and better understanding of the ideas and themes held within them, within a real-world context.

Summary

This thesis straddles several bodies of work. First and foremost it should be considered as part of the historiography of popular imperialism which was established and developed by scholars such as MacKenzie,
Cunningham and Porter. The discourse of the German Menace was part of a wider trend of imperialism in Late Victorian and Edwardian Britain.

Secondly, it has been important to emphasise the importance of the histories of the press and media. This thesis will rely significantly upon the daily, weekly and periodical press. I will take a pluralistic view of the function of the press, and view the relationship between recipient and producer as based upon popularity and marketability. The press – especially popular dailies – operated in a highly competitive market and so their ability to inform and persuade was mitigated by the need to excite, entertain and retain their readership. Although press magnates and boards had overtly-stated political stances, and at times attempted to push a certain line, all of this was conducted within a pre-established popular paradigm.

Thirdly, I have been methodologically influenced by historians of literature; popular literature, closely related in this period to the press, represented an essential tier of popular culture. Literary historians and theorists such as Said and Siddiqi have provided a strong theoretical framework for analysing and investigating narratives and texts from the period of study. Popular novels and serials strongly influenced the British popular imagination and helped to inspire sensation and provoke public debate. They reflected societal norms and indicated the issues which were likely to entertain and inspire the large reading public. Like the press, authors might have attempted to persuade their readers, but ultimately were forced to abide by certain social norms in order to entertain and satisfy them.

Chapter one explores the origins of imperial anxieties in British popular culture. The subsequent rise of the German Menace after 1896 can be explained by examining the context of colonial insecurity, and widespread fears of external threats to the Empire. Chapter two offers a close study of a major imperial crisis - the Jameson Raid in South Africa and the effects of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s ‘Kruger Telegram’; arguably this incident, more than any other, established Germany as a potential foe in the British popular imagination and discourse. Themes given new life during the outburst of anger had a decisive effect on the development of imperial anxieties about Germany over the following years. Chapter three explores lasting effects of the Kruger Telegram between 1896 and 1902; there is evidence to suggest that the key themes expressed during the British reaction to the Kruger Telegram scarred popular culture. In literature and the media, these themes may be shown to have coalesced into a much clearer and more powerful unified concept of a German Menace by the end of the South African War in 1902. Chapter four will analyse the popular response to government policy during the period between the start of the Venezuela Blockade in December 1902 and the end of the British negotiations with Germany over the Baghdad Railway in April 1903. These two major international and imperially associated crises revealed the true strength of the German Menace as a popular and political force. They provide evidence for the democratisation of politics in this period, as popular sentiment forced significant changes in Government policy over foreign affairs. Although after 1903 British concerns turned inward, reflecting the increasing awareness of a German naval challenge, the imperial dimensions of the German Menace retained a grip over popular discourse over the following period. Even in the period after the First World War, these issues still featured prominently the British popular discourse.
Popular discourse in the British Empire and Metropole, was influenced by acute insecurities about security and decline. By the end of the nineteenth century these fears were gathering intensity as a result of a wider trend of national self-doubt and increasing fears about the fragility of the Empire. These internalised insecurities were directly transposed onto fears of an external threat at home and abroad. Britain in this period should not be viewed as imagining itself in dichotomy - as metropole and empire – but as one imperial whole. This holistic outlook meant that a threat to imperial possessions could easily translate into a threat to the heart of Empire.

A set of tropes developed in British culture associated with external threats. The British Empire was viewed as being over-stretched and weakened, allowing potential enemies the opportunity to take portions of the Empire and threaten its very existence. British liberal imperialism was contrasted with the supposed absolutism and irrationality of its enemies; the unpredictability of other Powers represented a key facet of these concerns. The jealousy of rival powers was assumed - France, Russia and later Germany - leading to a belief that other powers schemed in secret, plotting the downfall of the Empire. Such assumptions about the nature of Britain's competitors were readily transferred to new challenges.

The rise of the German Menace in the British popular imagination was fundamentally an imperial phenomenon; it is important to emphasise that it was part of a tradition of imperial anxiety which developed in Britain over the later nineteenth century. I will examine the key elements of imperial anxiety in British discourse and imagination to indicate certain conceptions of threats to the Empire prior to the rise of the German Menace. Firstly, the long term anxieties inspired by the imperial experience, especially in India, will be highlighted. The foreign threats which exercised British concerns during the nineteenth century will be analysed: the long-established fear of France, and ideas of a Russian threat to the British Empire. These two focuses for external imperial anxieties will help to explain the foundations from which the German Menace developed after 1896.

Colonial Anxieties and British India

As the British Empire expanded, many in Britain sought increasingly to justify their position as imperialists and to secure and maintain this position. They constantly grappled with the challenge of running a huge
disjointed empire and organising and controlling its millions of colonial subjects with only a few thousand civil servants. Central to this drive for control and stability was the quest for ‘colonial knowledge’; as Bernard Cohn and Nicholas Dirks argued, the development of colonial knowledge (a postcolonial analytical term) was the most important facet of the imperial experience. Thomas Richards similarly stated that a ‘comprehensive knowledge of the world was for most of the century the explicit goal of all forms of learning.’ It was assumed that perfect knowledge would beget perfect governance and control. The British Empire was knowledge, and knowledge was the British Empire. This fetish for knowledge and information about people, materials and processes represented a vital underpinning of the whole Empire in the later nineteenth century.

From the 1850s the value of the Empire became increasingly recognised in popular discourse; anxieties inevitably arose about how to protect and retain it. Especially after the Indian Uprising (1857-58) colonial officials put much thought and effort went into consolidating control and structure, in order to prevent the recurrence of such crises. Christopher A. Bayly has examined a particular facet of ‘colonial knowledge’. For Bayly, the British in India relied upon ‘information’ to secure and consolidate their rule, especially after the transfer of power from the East India Company to the Crown after 1858. Bayly coined the phrase ‘information panic’ to describe the failures in the British attempt to accrue universal knowledge of the Empire, and emphasised numerous occasions when such panics ‘periodically convulsed expatriate British society in India.’ Bayly particularly focussed upon the internal panics about perceived threats to Indian colonial order: the ‘cult’ of Thuggee, widow-burning (‘Sati’) or human sacrifice.

South Asian historians have taken inspiration from Bayly to emphasise the effect of such panics and rumours in British India. D.K. Lahiri Choudhury’s article ‘Sinews of Panic’ (2004), described the effect that communications technologies had in providing both the tantalising prospect of greater knowledge and information and a mechanism for rumour, dissent and intrigue during the Victorian and Edwardian eras. The desire to know everything and control information became a state obsession; the ‘fetishized telegraph technology’ and the ‘imagined state enabled by it were entangled in crisis and information panic at the start of the twentieth century.’ The state had been offered what seemed to be a miraculous new means for control and order, but with falling access costs, subaltern dissidents were offered a powerful means of subversion. Such panics, though, were not limited to the British official mind. Gautam Chakravarty (2004), Christopher Herbert (2008) and Kim Wagner (2012) have argued that information panics, subaltern violence and colonial anxieties informed the British imagination, both in the Empire and at home.

The Indian Uprising in particular left a lasting scar upon the British imagination. Quoting contemporary novelist Hilda Gregg in 1897, Chakravarty, in The Indian Mutiny in the British Popular Imagination, argued for the central importance of the ‘mutiny’ in British culture: ‘[o]f all the great events of this century, as they are reflected in fiction, the Indian Mutiny has taken the firmest hold on the popular imagination.’ Similarly, Herbert described popular ‘trauma’ caused by images of rape and murder of British civilians at the hands of imagined murderous Indian mutineers from 1857 into the twentieth century. Though these two accounts restrict themselves to a literary focus, the implications of such important ideological trends for wider British society should not be underestimated. They emphasise the potential for empire to profoundly impact upon British popular discourse. In his article, ‘Treading Upon Fires’ (2012), Kim Wagner argued that the ‘mutiny motif’ played an important role in turn-of-the-century British domestic culture; specific traumatic events,
such as the Uprising of 1857, established a precedent through which all subsequent crises would be interpreted; such events provided a blueprint for interpretation as well as for response, which led to an exaggeration of the current threat. Scares during the 1890s and around the anniversary of the Uprising in 1907 indicate this most clearly; such panics were typified by recurrent themes such as secret messages, religious fanaticism, betrayal and foreign intrigues. Scholarly examples like Choudhury and Wagner suggest that British culture by the 1890s was accustomed to imagining the potential weaknesses of its increasingly fragile empire; this imagined weakness meant that any event could ignite press, popular and political anxiety.9

Throughout the nineteenth century British imperial anxieties were most clearly expressed in the narratives of empire – in novels, but also in newspapers, plays, poems, political debates and government records. In British culture depictions of ‘mutinies’, cults of strangers, the rape of white women, cannibalism, and plots against the empire were commonplace. It is possible to suggest that these anxieties and imperial scares provided the wider context within which the image of an imperial German menace could develop. The late Victorian and Edwardian era saw rising concerns about societal degeneration, alien groups within Britain, political and economic inefficiency, and national or racial vigour and security. This increasing sense of popular self-doubt is vitally connected to the nation’s anxious fixations. Britain, as I view it, was part of an imperial whole;10 anxieties about colonial rule in India and elsewhere, rather than being a separate discourse, were in fact intrinsically connected to the mainstream of British popular culture. In the metropole and colonies, British fears evolved from the possibility of internal chaos – particularly from revolutionary groupings. These fears were closely related to developing external anxieties focussed around dangerous competitors such as France and Russia.

The French Menace

The threat of France was a key factor in the development of a British national identity during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars;11 Britain experienced mass militarization and the hundreds of thousands of citizens united in defence of the nation led to a widespread sense of defensive patriotism. The last invasion of Britain, a botched raid upon Fishguard in Pembrokeshire in 1797, also stood as a memorialized event. Fears of a full-scale invasion had been justified at that time with Napoleonic armies actively preparing for a full-scale attack on Britain; but after the defeat of France in 1815 the danger of immediate invasion passed into the realm of popular imagination, where it remained important for the next eighty years.12 Despite a lasting period of peace, the image of France as a dangerous enemy, established during this formative period, left a legacy which survived the decline of the French menace.13

Historical study of Anglo-French imperial antagonism has largely been restricted to histories of diplomacy and power politics. For example, Thomas Pakenham’s Scramble for Africa described the detail of European competition for African territory, while T.G. Otte (2006) and Martin Dockrill (2002) have recently

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11 Toms, R. & Tomsis, L., Sweet Empire.
provided traditional power-political accounts of Anglo-French relations. Relatively few historians have considered late nineteenth century British perceptions of France, or their potential as a focus for imperial anxiety. Linda Colley and Gerald Newton have, however, discussed the importance of France in the development of British national identity. Colley argued that the negative attributes attached to France – Catholicism, corruption, absolutism or revolutionism, and an oppressive army dominating society - all served as a reminder to the British that it was they, not the French, who had ‘drawn the long straw’. Considering its significance, remarkably few scholars have specifically investigated the Anglo-French relationship before the Entente Cordiale in 1904. Robert and Isabel Tombs provided an analysis of the ‘longue durée’ of Anglo-French popular relations in That Sweet Enemy (2008), but no other major account has tackled in detail the issue of British perceptions of France in the 1890s and early 1900s in an era of intense imperial antagonism. This chapter will relate popular perceptions of a French imperial challenge, and popular French invasion scares in Britain to the wider context of imperial anxiety. Through the 1840s and 1850s outbursts of panic about supposed French invasions erupted sporadically in the British press. Richard Cobden’s The Three Panics (1862) described how these panics resulted largely from rumour and conjecture, stemming from assumptions about the ill-will of France. France had occupied the position of Britain’s enemy and the primary threat to the Empire for so long that the British popular imagination was fixated upon it and the added factor of the geographic proximity of France meant that many fears revolved around potential invasion. The literary ‘invasion scare’ genre was a major feature of Britain’s fixation with the French; as will be discussed below, this genre became a major feature in popular Anglo-German antagonism before the First World War.

Anglo-French Relations, 1870-1904

From the 1870s the main theatre for Anglo-French political antagonism was outside of Europe. The European ‘Scramble for Africa’ and increasing focus upon the Eastern Mediterranean forced Britain and France into close competition for territory. Since they were the two powers which most dominated the ‘Scramble’ they were inevitably led into conflict over these newly acquired territories. Britain and France clashed over Egypt when cooperation broke down in 1882 when Britain forcefully intervened with an Egyptian civil war. The French Government was unwilling to be involved in military action and Egypt was quickly subjugated under a British ‘protectorate’. In the aftermath Britain did not compensate France for its loss of influence, leaving a lasting diplomatic issue. The developing Egyptian situation, added to various disputes in Southeast Asia and West Africa, led Britain and France into a period of diplomatic antagonism, which acted as a constant reminder to the British public that the old enmity was still present. During the late 1880s and early 1890s Anglo-French negotiations were increasingly fraught. Both Britain and France sought to connect their own African possessions in order to secure and maximize their respective spheres of influence on the continent; the British from the Cape Colony to Egypt, while the French sought to link their own African possessions in order to secure and maximize their respective spheres of influence on the continent; the British from the Cape Colony to Egypt, while the French sought to link their own African possessions in order to secure and maximize their respective spheres of influence on the continent; the British from the Cape Colony to Egypt, while the French sought to link their own African possessions in order to secure and maximize their respective spheres of influence on the continent; the British from the Cape Colony to Egypt, while the French sought to link their own African possessions in order to secure and maximize their respective spheres of influence on the continent; the British from the Cape Colony to Egypt, while the French sought to link their own African possessions in order to secure and maximize their respective spheres of influence on the continent; 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15 Colley, L., Britons, p. 368.

16 Tombs, R. & Tombs, L., Sweet Enemy.

17 Clarke, I.F., Tale of the Next Great War.


20 The so-called ‘Egyptian Question’.
conflagrations as a result of aggressive imperialism. Despite a veneer of agreement, Anglo-French competition continued to be a source of diplomatic and popular tension until the end of the century. Growing Franco-Russian cooperation, confirmed by the signing of the Franco-Russian Treaty in 1894, led to growing tension and a resultant rise in press coverage. The Franco-Russian Alliance intensified fears that Britain’s two greatest enemies would combine to crush Britain. Naval scares and fears of a two-power alliance characterised many of the invasion narratives from 1888 onwards.

The on-going competition between France and Britain for the lower Nile came to a head in 1898. The French Government refused to recognise Britain’s brutal victory over the Dervishes of Southern Sudan in early 1898 as an establishment of British influence over the area. A French expedition under Major Jean-Baptiste Marchand marched to Fashoda (south of Khartoum) on the White Nile and established a fortified position; the mission was intended as a direct challenge to British rule. A heavily armed British naval flotilla arrived at Fashoda, and the outgunned French troops dug in to wait while the governments in Europe negotiated. For both nations the stand-off was a matter of prestige, and an attempt to display strength on the international stage. During the Fashoda Incident (September-November 1898), British and French diplomats sought to decide whether this imperial incident was worth ending generations of peace for. At its peak the British press warned of a possible outbreak of war, though in reality neither the British nor French diplomats were willing to countenance war.

As an issue of national pride and a display of resilience to both the domestic press and the rest of the world, the British government was keen to emphasise its determination to hold on to its new possession. With on-going imperial rivalry, a desire to re-establish prestige and the existing fears of imperial subversion, many in Britain were pleased with the bellicose line set by the government in response to the actions of the French. The French Government was unwilling to back down, but hoped for a token concession from Britain to escape the crisis peacefully and without any admission of defeat; Foreign Minister Theophile Delcassé admitted that a war begun over ‘a country inhabited by monkeys and by black men worse than monkeys’ would not have been popular in France. When Russia withdrew its support France was humiliated, forced into retreat, and was stubbornly offered no ‘face-saving concession’ by Lord Salisbury. As diplomatic historian T.G. Otte has argued, Fashoda marked a clear dividing line in the Anglo-French diplomatic relationship, acting as a ‘purging necessary’ to allow Britain and France to move on from past disagreements. With French imperial ambitions muted by the realisation of their weakness in the face of British naval strength, they were much more willing to come to terms over Egypt. This paved the way for a wider imperial concessionary settlement by 1904.

France in the British Imagination, 1871-1904

These imperial and diplomatic developments strongly influenced the British popular imagination. In particular, Anglo-French imperial antagonism in the 1870s and 1880s inspired a wave of invasion literature, initiating a long-lasting trend. In 1871, George Chesney’s short story, *The Battle of Dorking* fuelled British

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21 Pakenham, T., *Scramble for Africa*.
26 For examples of the jingoism in Britain: *The Daily News* stated ‘The attempt to force a warlike issue on the Fashoda question continues to be made in many journals on both sides of the Channel with a persistence and determination worthy of a better cause.’ In commenting on the state of popular sentiment *The Speaker* said: ‘Public opinion seems just now to be more afraid of some act of weakness on the part of the Government than even of that greatest of all national calamities - a big war’, as cited in *The North-Eastern Daily Gazette*, 22 October 1898.
28 Ibid., p. 251.
29 See Otte, T.G., ‘War-in-Sight’, pp. 693–714; See also Chassaigne, P&D., *Anglo-French Relations*. 
fears of invasion by a foreign power and captivated a British readership. Chesney’s story of invasion and defeat was a reaction to the extreme shock of Prussia’s victory over France in 1871 in the Franco-Prussian War: the dreaded French army had been defeated by a new power. Dorking depicted the total emasculation of Britain and the decimation of the Empire and despite its defeatist narrative the story was a resounding success, becoming popular enough for Prime Minister Gladstone to denounce ‘the poisonous effect’ of the book in 1871. The book continued to influence thinking throughout the 1870s, with much debate about the potential for the events of the book to come to fruition.

The historians I.F. Clarke and Michael Matin have argued that Chesney wrote Dorking as an argument for political change, seeking improvements for Britain’s army and navy. Published in an insecure period, and exploiting British fears of other powers jealous of Britain’s imperial success, the Battle of Dorking fuelled pre-existing British concerns about invasion and had a lasting influence upon popular culture well into the twentieth century. In spite of the political motivations in the writing of many such narratives, their wider popularity was remarkable. Though Chesney’s famous tale focussed on the newly powerful Prussia (soon to become the German Empire) this was a one-off exception in the time; henceforth France was portrayed as the enemy in invasion narratives until the late 1890s. The issue of invasion, echoing these literary works, was continually raised in debates in the Houses of Parliament and the press throughout the 1880s and 1890s. Advocates for volunteer territorial forces, a greater standing army and naval reform frequently invoked the threat of invasion as a tool to further their cause, in spite of the state of peace, both between France and Britain, and across Europe. British Governments throughout this period of peace were repeatedly called upon to placate doubts about Home Defence.

Though highly popular in newspapers, treatises and fiction, the threat of invasion was never a real possibility during this period. France was no more likely to suddenly invade Britain than Britain was to invade France, yet the literary genre produced over 100 different narratives from 1871-1914. On-going antagonism between the two powers provided enough fuel to inspire popular sensation in the press and in popular literature. Particularly during the 1880s and 1890s imperial antagonism between France and Britain inspired a host of invasion narratives. Novels such as The Invasion of England (1882), The Great War of 1897 (1892), and William Le Queux’s The Great War of 1897 (1894) portrayed France as the aggressor against Britain and its empire. Often assisted by Russia, the French were depicted as easily able to mount an invasion of Britain, which was seen to be overstretched and weakened by the necessity of defending its global empire. The genre transcended the limitations of politics and developed into a mass-market phenomenon. Civilian writers such as William Le Queux and Erskine Childers made fortunes with their populist accounts. Their narratives went further than just the recognition of the need for military reform; they fed a masochistic desire to experience depictions of their own demise - a recurrent theme of this genre was the fall from great power. This suggests a latent concern about the future of imperial Britain, and played upon a wider sense of societal disorder and decline during the Fin de Siècle era. Direct links were commonly made between
imperial tension outside of Europe and in the Mediterranean, and threats to Britain. With little actual military tension in Western Europe, the Empire presented itself as a source and location for conflict and weakness. The increasing number and variety of these narratives over the later 1880s and 1890s suggests a growing sense of the plausibility of the defeat of the British Empire by foreign powers.

The peaceful conclusion of the Fashoda Incident in late 1898 symbolically marked a watershed in British perceptions of France; Fashoda represented the end rather than the beginning of press antagonism and popular fear directed towards a European neighbour. The encounter, as Michael Brown has argued, represented a clear strategic and diplomatic victory for the British over the French.40 Whereas the German challenge appeared to be steadily growing, the French peril had been revealed to be hollow, and as a consequence the image of the French ‘menace’ was decreasing in plausibility. The emasculation of French imperialism at Fashoda meant that while it was clear the French had coveted British territories in Africa, they did not have the strength or the will to challenge Britain. There was also a distinct difference in the language and tone of the press even at the height of tensions. Contrasting with the Kruger Telegram Crisis two years earlier, the *North-Eastern Daily Gazette* stated that ‘neither side desires war…it may be regarded as certain that the two Governments and the two peoples both earnestly wish for peace’.41 Winston Churchill wrote in December 1898 for an American audience: ‘[t]here is no Power in Europe which the average Englishman regards with less animosity than France.’ Though many of the nation’s newspapers called for a strong retort, there remained a substantial current of peaceful and filial feeling expressed towards France.42

After 1898 the French were regarded with decreasing anxiety in newspapers and periodicals. With the recognition politically that France had tried and failed to challenge the Empire, thoughts began to turn towards a rapprochement. During the Kruger Telegram Crisis of 1896, discussed below, the sudden realisation of a German Menace had led to suggestions of Anglo-French rapprochement, ‘with whom we [Britain] have many more points of contact, and considerably more genuine sympathy’.43 Reynolds’s *Newspaper* announced: ‘there has been a corresponding growth in the popularity of the French nation, while the party which has always favoured friendship with France has been greatly strengthened.’44 Shortly after Fashoda the *Financial Times* remarked how ‘ridiculous’ the whole incident was, and described Marchand as ‘the gallant Major’.45 Although during the South African War, France, as well as many other European nations experienced a strong burst of anti-British and pro-Boer sentiment, there was a marked difference in the way that France was imagined in comparison with Germany and Russia. While French ‘anglophobia’ was often as hateful and vociferous as any other, contemporaries chose to blame Germany above all others: ‘Germany has been from the beginning the great workshop in which the lies against Great Britain have been manufactured, with the most ingenious industry and on the most extensive scale.’46 As Robert and Isabel Tombs have recently argued, though Britons were ‘ready to imagine themselves’ as enemies, views of France seemed to lack ‘bitterness and real hatred…resentment in some circles was balanced by admiration in others.’47

Nevertheless, the French, often assisted by Russia, maintained a common, if diminishing, presence in invasion novels from 1898 to 1904; there was a distinct disconnect between invasion narratives and popular discourse. This can partly be explained by the long tradition of the imagined French threat, which went back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Many invasion narratives served the purpose of highlighting national inadequacies, and, often searching for an enemy, these largely un inventive writers were

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42 Churchill, W.S., ‘The Fashoda Incident’, *North American Review*, 167:5 (December 1898), pp. 736–43; There was recurrent reportage of French opinion. Here, British newspapers repeatedly emphasised the desire amongst many French people to grow closer, not further from Britain: *The Times*, 27 October 1898; *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1898.
44 Reynolds’s *Newspaper*, 13 January 1896.
45 *Financial Times*, 31 December 1898.
46 *The Times*, 13 January 1902.
drawn to deploy the traditional enemy.\footnote{See Matin, A.M., ‘Creativity of War Planners’, pp. 801–31.} In contrast, the more flexible and profit-driven civilian writers were increasingly drawn to the potency of the new potential threat of Germany after 1896.\footnote{For example George Griffith, William Le Queux, E.P. Oppenheim and Erskine Childers.} Although imperial anxieties were often formed out of press sensationalism and popular paranoia – exaggerating real world events into much wider and more dramatic conspiracies - the reality of imperial events could strongly influence the popular imagination. The rapid decline of the French and Russian literary villain after 1904 suggests the ease with which the British public were convinced that the threat was ended.\footnote{See Clarke, I.F., Tale of the Next Great War.}

After the end of the South African War in 1902 Arnold White argued in the \textit{Daily Express} that Britain should ‘make France a Friend’ in order to curb Germany’s aggression. A year later the \textit{Fortnightly Review} referred to the ‘unquestionable and warm desire of the whole nation’ for a ‘final reconciliation with France.’\footnote{‘The Latin Rapprochement And The Baghdad Imbroglio’, \textit{Fortnightly Review}, 73:437 (May 1903), pp. 809–26; \textit{Manchester Guardian}, 7 February 1903.} By 1904 the British public gladly welcomed the signature of a lasting alliance agreement between the two age old enemies at the same time as the German Menace rose to prominence.\footnote{Gibson, R., \textit{Best of Enemies: Anglo-French Relations Since the Norman Conquest} (Exeter, 2004), p. 213.} As will be discussed below, during the two biggest Anglo-German crises between 1896 and 1904 – the Kruger Telegram and Venezuela Blockade - British publications across the political spectrum increasingly proposed the possibility of a readjustment of views towards France. These pragmatic reactions assumed that the threat of Germany required counter-balance, and France was increasingly imagined less as the old insidious and hated enemy but more as a country in many ways akin to Britain.

The Russian Menace

Russia was Britain’s prime imperial rival during much of the nineteenth century. For Britain, Russia threatened India in the Near East –the Ottoman Empire and Persia - through dominance of the Eastern Mediterranean trade route, and in the North West of the British Raj. Russian expansion into Central Asia
over the course of the nineteenth century led British colonial officials, journalists, polemicists and authors alike to express concern about Russia’s threat to India. In 1853 Anglo-Russian imperial competition over the Eastern Mediterranean had resulted in a bloody three year conflict in the Caucasus in what became known as the Crimean War. In British political and military circles, Russian aims and intentions were a constant source of debate and discussion, while in popular discourse, the anxiety about Russia was commonly expressed, and occupied a central position in the popular imagination.

Over the nineteenth century in Britain a tradition of distrust and concern about Russia developed. Since the Crimean War (1853-56) Russia and Britain officially maintained a lasting peace, but the interests of the two empires repeatedly clashed in Central Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean, Ottoman Turkey and Persia.53 British naval dominance of the Mediterranean and Russian military dominance on land meant that the two powers were constantly aware of the potential for conflagration.54 J.H. Gleason’s Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain (1950) argued that the empire was at the heart of ‘Russophobia’, but that the ‘antipathy’ towards Russia developed most when the threat was ‘potential’ rather than ‘actual’.55 Historiographical focus upon the politics and actions of the Great Game has meant that there have been relatively few examples of studies of the popular discourse about Russia during the 1880s and 1890s.56

The Russian Menace was articulated in a variety of ways in popular culture. The idea of the ‘Great Game’ – the intrigues of Russian and British spies in Central Asia - was popularised most prominently in Rudyard Kipling’s Kim (1901). However, Kipling’s tale of the Raj represented a longer tradition of the Russian theme in British imperial literature. Through the 1870s and 1880s numerous political theses and ‘polemical histories’ sought to reveal the threat of Russia or predict how a war on the Afghan border with India might affect Britain. These works were written by military men or colonial officials and depicted various threats to India; they often demanded an active response from the imperial authorities.57 These non-


57 MacGregor, C.M., The Defense of India: A Strategic Study (Simla, 1884); Marvin, C., Shall Russia Have Peshawar? (London, 1885); Marvin, C., The Russians at the Gates of Peshawar (New York, 1884); Vamberry, A., The Coming Struggle for India: Being an Account of the Ex thermodynamicsof Russia in Central Asia, and of the Difficulties Suffered by the Europeans Therein (London, 1885); Anon., Invasion of India from Central Asia (London, 1879); Anon., Russia’s March towards India (London, 1894); Malleson, G.B., The Russo-Afghan Question and the Invasion of India (London, 1885).
fictional works were also accompanied by press debate and periodic panics. This was particularly true in 1878 when British opinion rallied at the Russian threat to Constantinople during the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) when G.H. MacDermott’s famous song gave birth to the idea of British ‘jingoisim’.58

In 1877 and 1878 Jingo-meetings were held across Britain where men met to share their patriotism and to demand intervention in the Russo-Turkish War. Hugh Cunningham viewed these events as key to the foundation of the patriotic imperialism of the 1880s and beyond. The term ‘jingoisim’ entered common usage to describe the belligerent nationalism which became prevalent in Britain in the decades before the First World War.59 Similarly, during the Penjdeh Incident in 1885 a Russian attack on an Afghan force in north-eastern Afghanistan led to a short-lived popular panic arising out of the concern that Russia might threaten the Raj – the most valued imperial possession.60 In many ways akin to Fashoda, the Penjdeh Incident was a diplomatic stand-off, which eventually resulted in an agreement between Russia and Britain and the establishment of the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission. The popular ire was commonly provoked by diplomatic incidents revolving around British imperial possessions. The two great imperial fears of Russia were firstly, that a massive Russian army might invade India; and secondly, that the Russian presence in Central Asia might inspire some kind of second mutiny within India. J.R. Seeley, in The Expansion of England (1883) argued that a Russian invasion alone could never succeed, but ‘what if a mutiny and a Russian invasion came together?’61 These two concerns became regular features of a developing fictional and popular trend in the 1890s and 1900s.

With the rise of cheaply accessible popular literature and the yellow press, more people in Britain were able to access debates about foreign threats. The old polemical arguments about the Russian threat were increasingly translated into heroic or anti-heroic imperial narratives. In 1879 during the Second Anglo-Afghan War “A. Dekhnawaiyyah” (pseud.) published the popular novel, The Great Russian Invasion of India in which a Russian invasion of India, preceded by the insidious ‘work of saboteurs’ is eventually thwarted by a wily British General.62 In Kipling’s novel, Kim (1901), the eponymous protagonist is wrapped up in the Great Game; Kim helps to inform British authorities of Russian agents in the Himalayas. In so doing he symbolically helps to maintain peace in the Empire. Kipling’s contemporary, John Buchan, wrote about the North West Frontier in The Half-Hearted (1900). His characters warned explicitly and repeatedly of a Russian invasion of India. Kipling only employed a Russo-French menace to India as the background to a novel which critiqued the complexities of Raj society, racial perceptions and a comparison between East and West. Buchan’s narrative dealt more explicitly with an immediate and dangerous Russian threat. The Half-Hearted describes clearly the anxieties of the age, employing the device of the foreign threat to Empire, and the internal problems inherent in imperial British society:

On the contrary, I honestly think that there is danger, but from a different direction. Britain is getting sick, and when she is sick enough, some people who are less sick will overwhelm its. My own opinion is that Russia will be the people.63

Though the idea of a Russian threat to Britain had long been accepted, and the key tropes long-established in political and press discourse, it was not until the 1890s that such fears could become increasingly popular. The rise of popular media of communication – cheap printed-word formats – meant that the ‘great game’ narrative could become a popular sensation where before it had been predominantly the realm of political and military men. It is no coincidence that Buchan, Kipling and other writers were publishing cheaply available and entertaining narratives about Russian invasions of India, at the same time as Childers, Le

Queux, and Oppenheim were describing German attacks in the empire at home. Buchan who later described German intrigues in India in *Greenmantle* (1916) was fixed, for the time, on the Russian threat, while Kipling wrote poems, polemics and narratives warning of both Germany and Russia. Over his career William Le Queux wrote about Russo-French and German invasions in equal measure; this context of popularised, democratised narratives of anxiety is vital to understand the contemporaneous development of an equally looming German Menace.

By the 1890s the Russian threat to India was well-known and popularised, but diplomatic relations remained relatively settled in Europe. In China, a new arena for European imperialism placed Russia, France, Britain and Germany in close contact with one another. Similar to the ‘Scramble for Africa’ a few years before, the troubled Chinese Empire was seen by many European thinkers and politicians as the next great imperial battle-ground. Until 1907 Russia remained both a popular concern and diplomatically troublesome. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) Britain was allied to Japan, the enemy of Russia, even providing military intelligence as John Chapman has revealed. During the Persian Revolutionary crisis of 1907, Britain and Russia were drawn together into an agreement in order prevent further disorder. The Persian Crisis prompted the signing of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, following which the two nations were able to put aside their differences officially; ending British and Russian antagonism, and leading to an agreement over spheres of influence in Persia. From 1907 until 1914 Russia and Britain cooperated militarily and diplomatically, ending a century of antagonism.

External Imperial Anxieties

In the long-established tradition of imperial anxiety - expressed in India as the threat of internal disorder, and also the French and Russian threats to empire – it is possible to suggest key modes of expression. I would argue that when imagining threats to empire, themes of imperial overstretch, absolutist and covetous enemies were inherent in British popular discourse. In popular perceptions, after 1896 Russia’s presence in newspaper debates, paranoid articles or literary narratives was in decline. Though the British were accustomed to fearing Russia, the German Menace soon became the primary concern. It is important to state that throughout this thesis, the perception of Russia as a threat to empire is not denied. Rather, the British imagination had learned to ‘fear’ from popular Russian and French ‘menaces’, and panics about imperial order, and gradually these ‘bogies’ were transposed into German ones. The Russian Menace, in

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66 Though Britain and Russia were never close to war, the Dogger Bank Incident, where several Hull trawler-men were attacked by the Russian Fleet in the North Sea which mistook their fishing boats for Japanese torpedo boats, resulted in uproar in Britain. Chapman, J.W.M., *Russia, Germany and the Anglo-Japanese Intelligence Collaboration, 1896–1906*, in Erickson, M. & Erickson, L. (eds), *Russia: War, Peace and Diplomacy* (London, 2004), p.42.
68 Andreas Rose has recently argued the Liberal Government was able to use the growing popularity of the German Menace as a justification for huge military spending. Rose’s argument thus agrees that the potential threat of Germany to home and empire was more important than the actual threat of Russia. Rose, A., *Zwischen Empire Und Kontinent*, Rüger, J., ‘Review: Zwischen Empire Und Kontinent’, pp. 159–61; In diplomatic and high-political historiography there have been many controversial arguments such as Niall Ferguson’s, *Der falsche Krieg* (1999) (‘The Wrong War’) which suggest that although Russia was officially an ally, British planners were more concerned about the threat Russia posed, than Germany before 1914. Ferguson, N. & Kochmann, K., *Der Falsche Krieg: Der Erste Weltkrieg Und Das 20. Jahrhundert* (Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999); Wilson, K.M., *The Policy of the Extent: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904–1914* (Cambridge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 2; Nelson, K., ‘“My Beloved Russians”’. Sir Arthur Nicolson and Russia, 1906–1916’, *International History Review*, 9:4 (1987), pp. 521–54.
particular, and the German Menace shared great similarities both in the ways they were expressed, and in the types of trope and expression with which they were characterised.

Imperial overstretch

The rise of patriotic discourse and popular imperialism were accompanied by near constant reminders in the press, literature, music or poetry that Britain was the ‘New Jerusalem’ - the preeminent nation in the world. This sense of importance was used to justify Britain’s global dominance. However, the apparent ‘absent-mindedness’ of British imperialism had the consequence that British discourse also focussed upon the difficulty with which an empire of such size could be governed, and the realisation of inherent weakness in the imperial system.68 The combination of the immense size and power of the empire, as well as the apparent fragility of the whole endeavour meant that Britons could at once imagine themselves as all-powerful and weak. The dual discourses of power and weakness were not mutually exclusive, but account for combined growth of an aggressive nationalism and imperial anxieties. Before the turn of the twentieth century, Russia and France served both as targets for aggressive imperialism, and as sources of deep-seated insecurity.

Such internal anxieties were drawn from the colonial experience combined with the ‘external’ imperial threat – which for most of the nineteenth century was Russia. As Michael Matin, Heather Streets and Ann Parry have argued, European powers were important in shifting imperial focus from internal control, to external exposure.69 Russia was imagined as a threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and India. Britain feared Russia in particular along the trade route to India, and along the most extreme frontiers of the Raj. Fiction-writers and polemicists in equal proportion warned of a threat to the empire posed largely by Russia in Asia, and France and Germany in Africa, the Americas and the Pacific. Early fictional narratives, such as Arminius Vambéry’s The Coming Struggle for India (1885), and more common military polemics imagined the exposure of India to invasion from Afghanistan. In spite of the almost complete lack of plausibility, this idea did grow in popularity amongst Conservative military reformers.70

These accounts argued that as a consequence of an over-exposed empire, Britain was unable to defend itself at home or abroad against an enemy who had the element of surprise, and powerful arms at their disposal. Over the 1880s and 1890s concerns were repeatedly raised in popular and political discourse about Britain’s languishing armed forces and naval strength. Generals such as Lord Roberts and Kitchener, and politicians such as Lord Rosebery, aimed to encourage military reform through the press throughout the period.71 Invasion scares throughout the period were closely related to issues of naval strength and set against the backdrop of a sustained naval arms race between the British and Franco-Russian navies. The aim of maintaining a ‘two-power standard’ expressed by Lord Salisbury’s Naval Defence Act of 1889, and a later surge of investment in 1894, only served to provoke armaments drives in Russian and French shipyards, and failed to stretch Britain’s naval advantage.72 Navy and Army reform was repeatedly demanded from the Right throughout this era; this helps to explain the number of political treatises about invasion of India or Britain.73 The repeated expression of such political arguments impacted upon popular discourse; newspapers and novelists consistently expressed concerns about national complacency, an atrophied army

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68 This can be seen in popular debates about imperial defence, and imperial federation: e.g. Dilke, S.C. & Wilkinson, S., Imperial Defence (London, 1892); Adams, G.B., The Origin and the Results of the Imperial Federation Movement in England (Madison, 1899).
71 Streets, H., Martial Races.
and a navy spread too thinly across the empire. Imperial Britain was anxious about the extent to which the thinly spread armed forces were able to defend their newly enlarged global dominion and the European metropole.

This sense of exposure can be seen in the numerous tales of invasion or future war which depicted invasions of Britain and the dismemberment of the Empire. The Battle of Dorking (1871) described imperial troubles with the USA as the context for the weakening of Britain for a Prussian invasion. Imperial incidents often caused the outbreak of international war in many invasion or future war narratives. In M.P. Shiel’s Yellow Danger (1898), an early and influential ‘yellow peril’ narrative, a European war breaks out with Britain set against Germany, France and Russia, developing out of a dispute over China. Louis Tracy’s The Final War (1896) pitted the same alliance against Britain, the European powers plotting to defeat Britain in order to feast on its imperial possessions. The single most successful work in the genre, Le Queux’s The Invasion of 1910 (1906), depicted the invasion of Britain in war which came as a result of a dispute with Germany in Samoa; the imagined imperial threat and the invasion scare narrative were deeply imbricated. British culture was intrinsically imperial, and anxieties about European powers derived directly from the sense that its forces were spread too thinly, leaving either the metropole or the empire too exposed. External anxieties about foreign powers reflected deep concerns about the weakness of the British army, the unpreparedness of the British navy, and the inability of Britain to defend its empire against increasingly well prepared enemies.

Invasion scares and imperial threats were part of the wider anxiety about the inability of Britain to sustain the empire and metropole. Russia was imagined as the greatest imperial threat to India, Britain’s most valuable possession. Until 1898, France seemed to be the greatest threat to Britain at home, as imperial commitments weakened already underfunded national defences. However, as I will argue, Germany’s increasing global activity led the same concerns to be levelled towards them in British popular culture. The idea of an overstretched and undersupplied imperial infrastructure was juxtaposed with Germany’s economic virility and efficiency. Unlike France and Russia, in the racialised popular discourse of turn-of-the-century Britain, Germany not only menaced the weakened British Empire; it also did so with efficiency, dynamism and thoroughness. France and Russia were perceived as giant and disorganised states which seemingly lacked ‘Anglo-Saxon’ racial vigour necessary to truly challenge, but Germany seemed able and willing to take on Britain at its own game. Germany thus began to appear to represent a far greater threat than either France or Russia had ever been.

Absolutism and Impulsiveness

For most of the nineteenth century Britain experienced bursts of anxiety as a result of a perceived menace from France. Some elements of the perception of French remained case specific, especially with images of Catholic irrationality or assumed moral and financial corruption. However, other anti-French evocations were curiously influential upon later imaginings of a German threat. The image of an absolutist power was contrasted, as Linda Colley and others have argued, with ideas of British liberalism. France seemed to represent a dangerous and frightening proof of Britain’s own blessed position. Since the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had imagined itself to be diametrically opposed to the forces of absolutism. The Raj, for example, was justified by claiming to bring order and the rule of law to the Indian Sub-Continent, fitting with the British self-image of liberal imperialism. By the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of bringing

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74 Ibid., pp. 318, 321, 323-324; Streets, H., Martial Races, pp. 87-116.
civilization and reform to the colonies was a central tenet of British identity and a justification for the subjugation of others.77

The image of France and Russia as absolutist states contrasted strongly with this British sense of identity. The fear of revolutionary disorder dominated British political thinking, and though minor revolutionary or activist movements did develop amongst the working and middle classes, they remained marginal, suggesting over a long period that an inherent conservatism pervaded amongst the majority. France had always been as corrupt, repeatedly dominated by absolutist military leaders and revolutionary irrationality. The Russian Tsar was often depicted as ‘the jailor of nations’ - a cruel and heartless oppressor of free thought and expression.78 The Russian Empire was little understood, and viewed as unpredictable. The threat of Russia, as R.A. Johnson argued, derived directly from its unpredictability; the whims, grudges and fancies of the absolutist state helps to explain how British popular discourse could so regularly imagine threats from France and Russia throughout the later nineteenth century.79

In discourses of imperial anxiety, then, images of an absolutist power – whether Russia, France, or later Germany – were used to imagine enemies who followed the will of the power-hungry elite at the top of society. Wars of conquest and invasions of civilized nations were made more plausible by this imagined or real absolutism.80 Narratives of invasion depicted oppression and the loss of freedom in Britain as a consequence of absolutist occupiers; Britain’s continued prosperity, freedom and liberalism was directly challenged by forces imagined to be its antithesis. With the rise of Germany as a threat to Britain after 1896, these older images of absolutist enemies were intensified. The Kaiser was represented as ruling with an iron fist, while Germany’s imperial activities were often imagined to be results of the Kaiser’s passions, or the machinations of his undemocratic government. He was often depicted as a ‘war lord’, and at times when Anglo-German relations were at their most fraught, the Kaiser’s personal rule was attacked viciously in the British press. In popular literature, Wilhelm was regularly portrayed as an absolute monarch – sometimes positively, but often extremely negatively.81 This image of absolutist Germany fitted into pre-existing imperial anxieties. The rise of yet another absolutist power, with little regard for free-speech or other nations, was easily swallowed by the anxious British popular imagination.

Covetousness and Jealousy

On a Sunday morning in January 1885 at St. Margaret’s church in Westminster, Archdeacon Frederie Farrar delivered a sermon full of fire and brimstone warning of the perils of ‘faithlessness’ to the nation.82 In it he described the ‘National Horizon’:

Dark clouds loom now upon the horizon….Trade depressed, thousands overburdened, some of our greatest colonies dissatisfied, our navy weak, our army weak, and constantly exercised in expeditions barren, difficult, and expensive. France jealous, suspicious, and hostile; Germany irritating and unfriendly; Russia persisting in stealthy encroachment or in sullen menace. Complications far less vague than these have in past days often burst out into terrible war. We may hope that by the wisdom of our rulers, guided by the providence of God, such calamities will be averted; and yet who knows whether another 50 years may not see England as utterly humiliated as France has been utterly humiliated…83

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80 For example Saki (Munro, H.H.), *When William Came*, p. 322.
82 Archdeacon Farrar was the grandfather of Bernard Montgomery.
Farrar summed up the way nineteenth century Britons imagined their rivals before 1896. For him France, Russia, and to a lesser extent Germany, represented the greatest concerns of the age; they were imagined as jealous, unfriendly, stealthy and sullen. He warned that without faith and godly governance, Britain might end up like France had in 1871 – humiliated and bereft of power.84

The rise of ‘new imperialism’ and the increasingly nationalistic popular imperialism in Britain had resulted in a re-evaluation of what the Empire meant to Britain. As the end of the nineteenth century drew closer, Britain’s great position of strength had been significantly reduced. Britain possessed a vast empire, dominated most of the most valuable territories across the globe, and increasingly the people of Britain were learning to appreciate the value of this. The dispersal of British people in the Dominions and settler colonies in Africa had added to a patriotic desire to defend territories, and had led to an increasingly defensive mentality. The consequent assumption was that other great powers would inevitably look upon Britain’s imperial possessions with lust and envy. The idea of the Russian threat to India was based on the assumption that Britain had a jewel worth stealing. It was assumed unquestioningly that other great powers possessed an unquenchable thirst for further imperial acquisitions. Furthermore, it was common for newspapers and authors to ridicule the colonial empires of other nations – France and Germany in particular were commonly described as having failed in the great scramble for colonies. This failure was used to explain why they would wish to steal the territories of others. Arminius Vambéry, author of anti-Russian polemics and fiction, wrote for the right-wing National Review in 1898, describing, ‘[t]he sickly jealousy and the ill-conceived envy with which several of our Great Powers have for a long time regarded England’s prosperity of trade and mighty influence over the far distant regions of the globe…’ The popularity of literature of invasion and imperial subversion throughout this period helped propagate the assumption of foreign jealousy and covetousness.85

Never more was the supposed jealousy of rival nations made more explicit than during bouts of ‘continental anglophobia’ occurring throughout the age of ‘new imperialism’. In 1894 the Economist, the small but influential free-trade and market-liberal journal, explained ‘Continental Jealousy’ in conciliatory fashion: ‘We British are all over the world, and in many nations’ way.’ For the Economist this jealousy was unpleasant, but understandable due to Britain’s great success. This trope of British success and foreign jealousy runs through many of the popular sources from this period. This was a key way of rationalising Britain’s own success, but also denotes a sense of anxiety about the dark intentions of other nations. In popular literary depictions of invasions of India or Britain, and in the nascent spy fiction genre – this theme arose regularly. H.G. Wells tapped into this theme in his War of the Worlds (1898):

No one would have believed in the last years of the nineteenth century that this world was being watched keenly and closely by intelligences greater than man’s and yet as mortal as his own; that as men busied themselves about their various concerns they were scrutinised and studied….With infinite complacency men went to and fro over this globe about their little affairs, serene in their assurance of their empire over matter...86

Instead of ‘world’ and ‘globe’, read ‘empire’ and this evocative opening reveals the anxieties in imperial culture. Wells, an advocate of national efficiency, was keenly aware of the scrutiny of other nations, and the complacency of Britain.87 While the British absent-mindedly muddled through the governance of empire and nation, other ‘intelligences’ observed, scrutinised and planned. This trope of the covetous and unknown enemy was well-developed before the rise of the German Menace. The British public were attuned to

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84 It is important to recognise here that the image of Germany had not yet developed the negative attributes and strength that it would after 1896.
hearing about national deficiencies and complacencies, the envy of other nations, and the secretive planning for their national downfall.

After 1896 the rise of a new danger added another layer to these anxieties; it will be argued that the same themes which had previously epitomised the combined Franco-Russian threat – imperial overstretch, irrational absolutism, and seething jealousy – were transferred onto the image of Germany. Eventually the German challenge eclipsed the others in popular culture. The European-focused threat has been emphasised in the many histories of antagonism, popular ‘germanophobia’ and literature of future war. However the German imperial menace has been little understood, and under-emphasised. Germany would, over the period 1896-1914, occupy the position of both an imperial menace and an invasion threat. The fact that Germany encompassed both an imperial and a domestic danger (metropole and periphery) helps to explain the strength of the idea of a German Menace in popular culture before and even during the First World War.

The Context of Imperial Anxiety

In *The Expansion of England* (1883) J.R. Seeley described the rationale for British imperial anxieties before the Rise of the German Menace; the Empire, highly valued and weakly defended, was depicted as teetering on a knife’s edge. Russia, the threat in the East, could not succeed alone, but a mutiny and an invasion might prove enough to lose the Raj. An invasion in Europe might lead to the loss of the Empire. Michael Matin has argued that the imperial threat and the invasion threat were the two main fears for Britain during Seeley’s era. These two fears related to a broader sense of overall anxiety about the security of the Empire. Rather than viewing a metropolitan discourse, or an extra-European imperial one, the British Empire was viewed as an interconnected entity. An attack in one place would draw in already overstretched resources and endanger another. George Chesney, famed for his invasion tale, *The Battle of Dorking*, was also a writer of Indian ‘mutiny novels’, such as *The Dilemma* in 1872. Through the works of one influential novelist, the link between home defence and the defence of Empire is made explicit; he highlighted the weaknesses across the Empire, both at home and abroad. Chesney’s fictions enjoyed great popularity, suggesting that he reflected trends in society, as well as attempting to shape them. The British were imperially minded; it is important to recognise that this was a holistic imperial minded-ness that included the British Isles.

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Seeley controversially described Anglo-French hostility as ‘a matter of ancient history’. The French threat even in 1883 was partially dismissed with the recognition of the decline of French ‘aggressive power’. Seeley’s view of the Empire in 1883 helps to explain how the rise of a new challenger, with efficiency and military prowess to rival any power, could grip Britain so strongly. After 1896, popular discourse was increasingly engrossed by the realisation that a new and vigorous European enemy had arrived. This enemy, Germany, seemed able and determined to threaten the British Empire as a whole. It was incorporated into this anxious world-view without much difficulty. As argued below, when the sufficient shock was delivered in 1896, the British were primed to react, and to begin quickly to imagine what this new menace would mean.

This discussion of imperial anxieties aims to explain the context within which the idea of a German imperial menace developed. In the case of internal anxieties authors such as D.K. Lahiri Choudhury and Kim Wagner have emphasised the importance of imagined threats, rumours and conspiracies to the British official and popular mentality during the late Victorian and Edwardian period. More often than not, the ‘information panics’ these South Asian historians describe were based largely upon threats which were exaggerated beyond reality, often to an extreme extent. There was frequently a foundation in real events, such as the Indian Uprising, or the real existence of highway robbers for the imagined Cult of Thuggee. However, the British popular imagination during this period was easily panicked, and prone to sensationalism and exaggeration, especially as a result of the rapidly developing popular fiction and press. Thus there was often a great difference between the real threat and the imagined one.

During the later nineteenth century France was conceived of both as a domestic invasion threat, and an imperial antagonist. Through the 1880s antagonism with France in the Mediterranean and Africa was often translated into a threat to the metropole through invasion fiction. This link, as suggested by Matin, is an important one; through the example of France we see how close European rival and imperial competitor could be conceived as a threat. The image of Russia, the greatest imagined threat to the Empire for the whole nineteenth century from the official point of view, grew as a popular anxiety in the 1870s and 1880s. Popular depictions of a Russian threat to India became more common and newspapers openly debated Russia’s dangerous ambitions. The Franco-Russian alliance of 1894 solidified the working relationship between the two powers officially. From 1888-1896, and to a lesser extent until 1904, this combined Franco-Russian menace acted as a locus for imperial and domestic fears. Invasion fiction often depicted the two working in tandem to defeat the British at home and in India. This trope of emasculation at the hands of a foreign power retained a strong hold over the popular imagination from 1871-1914.

Britain was regularly portrayed as being over-stretched in literary and journalistic accounts. The challenges of governing a global empire left the dominions and colonies unprotected, and also risked the security of the British Isles. This view of the empire as a single entity was influential in developing a popular sense of exposure. This was present both in debates about the internal stability of imperial possessions, and in warnings of exposure to foreign attack. This theme underlay all other British concerns and developed in force over the last decades of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. British popular discourse attributed France and Russia with the negative traits of autocracy, irrational and aggressive decision-making, and an intense jealousy of British success. The Tsar in particular was imagined as a cruel and ruthless leader, and the French as holding pernicious grudges against Britain. As will later be argued in this thesis, the characterisation of the German Menace inherited many of the themes developed over the nineteenth century to imagine Russia and France. The Kaiser – the ‘War Lord’ – was impulsive and unpredictable; as German imperial ambitions revealed an aggressive and covetous enemy. German popular anti-British sentiment was increasingly emphasised as an indication of their jealousy of Britain’s own place in the sun.

These attributes – imperial overstretch, absolutism and covetousness - had previously made it possible to imagine a Russian army suddenly swarming over the mountains into the Raj, or a French invasion fleet catching Britain over-exposed and unawares. Between 1896 and 1904 British literary discourse increasingly characterised Germany harbouring grudges, seeking to swipe imperial possessions from Britain’s deserving
grasp, or menacing the Channel. The novel addition to these habitual anxieties was the commercial prowess and industrial efficiency of Germany. Not only had Germany subsumed both the French ability to invade, and the Russian ability to menace the empire, but also unlike them, Germany had enough Anglo-Saxon blood to make it count.89

On 30 December 1895, Dr Leander Starr Jameson, a key figurehead of the British South Africa Company (chaired by Cecil Rhodes), led a small private army into the Transvaal Republic. A force of 600 private soldiers, armed with Maxim machine guns, large supplies of weapons and ammunition, galloped into the Boer Republic towards the mining town of Johannesburg. The success of Jameson’s attempted coup rested upon an expected uprising of the British Uitlander of Johannesburg, who, the plotters alleged, were being denied basic rights by the Boer Government. After four days the blundering expedition was outnumbered and overwhelmed by better-armed Boer forces on the outskirts of Johannesburg; the surviving troops were disarmed and expelled, while Jameson and his commanding officers were imprisoned.

News of the raid was received with shock in Britain on 1 January 1896. Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, immediately sought to distance the British Government from events, issuing a full condemnation of Jameson and his forces. Along with some newspapers, the Government quickly sought to blame Jameson for what was perceived by some as a noble attempt to assist British nationals. The Financial Times and Pall Mall Gazette both referred to the ‘ill-judged’ nature of this ‘foolhardy’ invasion but refused to go so far as to condemn the motives.

On 3 January 1896 a seemingly innocuous telegram arrived in the office of President Paul Kruger of the South African Republic (or Transvaal):

I express to you my sincere congratulations that, supported by your people, and without appealing for the help of friendly powers, you have succeeded by your own energetic enthusiasm against armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, and have thus been enabled to restore peace and safeguard the independence of the country against attacks from outside.

William

Signed by the German Emperor, Wilhelm II, the telegram sparked an unprecedented storm of patriotism across Britain and its Empire, and an outburst of indignation which lasted throughout January 1896. The crisis eventually passed, but was remarkable for its effects over the following decades. Viewed through a wider lens, the consequences of the crisis were far greater for the British popular imagination. The Kruger Telegram and its aftermath had a lasting legacy, which contributed to the formation of the German Menace

1 Manchester Guardian, 2 January 1896
2 The same alleged denial of parliamentary and property rights for Uitlanders would be used by the British Government to justify the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). Judd, D. & Surridge, K.T., The Boer War (New York, 2003), p. 46.
3 Despite the potential death sentence, Dr Jameson was later released by President Paul Kruger as a sign of goodwill towards Britain. Massie, R.K., Dreadnought Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (New York, 1992), pp. 218–220.
4 Manchester Guardian, 2 January 1896; For an account of the diplomatic wrangling see Hale, O.J., 1939, Manchester Guardian, 2 January 1896.
5 Pall Mall Gazette, 4 January 1896; Financial Times, 4 January 1896.
in British popular perceptions. This short-lived but extremely pronounced popular crisis, was focussed upon a threat to the Empire as opposed to the metropole. It defined British views of Germany in the following decade and established the key themes in representations of Germany in popular discourse: aggressive German absolutism, covetousness, and the need to match the challenge.

Given the contemporary notoriety of the Kruger Telegram, relatively little recent historical research has been devoted to it. In germanophone historiography, diplomatic historians such as Harald Rosenbach have studied the role of the Jameson Raid and Kruger Telegram in the development of Anglo-German relations. In Anglophone scholarship, Paul Kennedy’s Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism (1980) remains foremost in this field. Few scholarly accounts have analysed the popular reaction to the Kruger Telegram, or its impact, in depth. Commonly the press outburst is briefly noted, before moving on to a discussion of its results in Great Power politics. Dominik Geppert’s recent Pressekriege (2007), which investigated the press-political dimensions of the crisis, stands as one of few recent approaches which detail aspects of the outburst. Geppert studied the Kruger Telegram as a ‘media event’, investigating the press management of the German and British governments and the political consequences. Though Geppert’s study revealed much about the behaviour of British and German governments towards the press during the rise of Anglo-German antagonism, his approach ran counter to historians of the media such as Bösch and Ross who have argued for the democratising influence of the growth of mass media. Further, Geppert focussed upon the intersection between official decision making and popular discourse from the perspective of those in power. Historians of race, anti-alienism and popular perceptions have also often overlooked or undervalued the Kruger Telegram, preferring to focus on later events as the catalyst for the changing views of Germany.

Lothar Reinermann, in his discussion of the relationship between the British press and the Kaiser, recently suggested that the damage done by the Kruger Telegram ‘did not last’ and that the Kaiser and Germany were soon to be redeemed by their neutral stance during the South African War. Although the British relationship with Wilhelm II remained ambiguous after 1896 – marked by shows of fraternity, anger and ridicule - the image of Germany as a whole never recovered.

There is a risk that short term ambiguity may lead to an underestimation of the longevity of the event in popular memory.

Reviewing recent approaches, there is a need to provide deeper insight into the themes and ideas arising out of the Kruger Telegram Crisis. This event had a defining impact upon the way Britain viewed Germany and itself over the next decade. Furthermore, the longer-term history of its impact has received very little attention, and so it is suggested that new perspectives may be drawn from the legacy of the Kruger Telegram. This chapter will study, in greater depth, the nature and manner of the popular response. In pursuing this path I aim to provide a novel and useful analysis of an understudied facet of British popular imperial history.

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9 Hale, O.J., 1939; Geppert, D., Pressekriege.

10 Gračenmaker, M., Britain and Germany in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 2005); Milton, R., Best of Enemies; Rau, P., English Modernism.


12 Ibid.

The International Background to the Crisis

As argued in chapter one, since the late 1880s debates about naval and military investment had preoccupied successive British governments; by 1895 the British popular discourse was gripped by imperial anxieties. Prior to late 1895 Britain’s most commonly acknowledged adversaries were France and Russia. British popular cultural was increasingly sensitive to external threats and prone to jingoistic nationalism. The crisis in South Africa was framed by three important international developments: the ‘Eastern Question’, the Anglo-American Venezuela Crisis and colonial intrigue in Africa.

During 1895 the major imperial powers had sought to negotiate and pressurize the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, to prevent abuses of Armenian Christians under his rule. The fear of Russian expansion in the area, plus acute awareness of French and British imperialism in North Africa meant that any foreign interference with Turkey had to be conducted carefully. All three powers hoped to prevent abuses under the Sultan and to bring about a stabilisation of the Ottoman provinces. The British press raised concerns about the atrocities being committed by the Turkish authorities, and through November and December 1895 the crisis appeared to be coming to a head. However, Salisbury’s government received criticism for his indecision and the European powers failed to prevent further atrocities towards the Christian Armenians, allowing the crisis to go on into 1896. The Armenian Crisis was an on-going source of tension for British diplomats throughout this period and the press in Britain regularly returned to the issue as evidence of Britain’s isolation and international state of crisis, as well as out of a Christian desire to help other Christians in need.

Added to this sense of growing crisis in Europe, Britain was embroiled in another difficult imperial situation with the United States, where public opinion had become increasingly outraged by British gunboat diplomacy in the Caribbean (especially in Nicaragua in 1895). Concerns were raised that Britain might act in contravention to the American doctrine of non-interference (the Monroe Doctrine). As a result of political pressure the American Government intervened in an Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute. On 17 December 1895 US President Cleveland delivered an address to Congress in which he vigorously reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine, and recommended that the findings of an American boundary commission in settlement of the Venezuelan dispute be enforced ‘by every means’. The message, accompanied by furious American press abuse of Britain, indicated the clear intent of America to interfere in British imperial matters forcefully, and it delivered a shock to Britain. British newspapers expressed great concern and anger at American interference, but there was a marked difference between the reaction to Cleveland’s speech and the response less than a month later to Wilhelm’s Telegram.

The two incidents were similar in form but the results were very different; it is likely that unfolding events in South Africa forced Britain to concede quickly to American demands in Venezuela. The Washington Post, an American anti-British paper, commented that the press uproar over the Kruger Telegram was made more intriguing when contrasted with the relative calm with which the British press responded to the Venezuelan Crisis. During the Kruger Telegram Crisis, the British press commonly commented upon the sense of relief that the Venezuela dispute had been settled in early January 1896. The Venezuelan Crisis of December 1895 marked a positive turning point for Anglophone relations and representations, while the Kruger Telegram Crisis had the opposite effect.

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16 Gover, JM, ‘Current Notes when contrasted with the relative calm with which the British press responded to the Venezuelan Crisis’.
19 Washington Post, 5 January 1896.
Africa too was a focus for imperial antagonism between several European powers. As well as on-going negotiations with France, over the early 1890s Britain and Germany were increasingly embroiled in ‘colonial quarrels’ in Africa and the Pacific. These largely minor incidents had not provoked much interest publicly, but did suggest to British officials that Germany was increasingly active as a colonial power. British and German interests clashed in Samoa and the Congo between 1893 and 1895, though in each case, the two powers were able to settle disputes and reach peacable solutions. During 1895 British diplomats such as Edward Malet (Ambassador in Berlin) had noted an increasingly fractious private relationship developing between British and German colonial policy makers. Britain was increasingly active in her colonial policy, refusing to back down over issues across the new empire, and the same inflexibility had gripped German foreign policy.

During 1895 as awareness of conflicting interests grew, relations gradually deteriorated from the previously cooperative one enjoyed since the 1880s (evidenced by agreements such as the Helgoland-Zanzibar Agreement, 1890). Behind the scenes the relationship between Lord Salisbury and Kaiser Wilhelm had also worsened. At Cowes on the Isle of Wight, an interview between the Kaiser and Salisbury had resulted in tension – Wilhelm treated Salisbury with disrespect, then Salisbury did not attend a scheduled meeting the following day. Such incidents, though little known to the press at the time, laid the foundation for events in 1896. As Paul Kennedy argued, the Pan-German movement and nationalist German intellectuals were calling increasingly for ‘expansionist Weltpolitik’ either with England or ‘against her’, and these influential lobbying groups fuelled Wilhelm and his Government’s global ambitions. Matthew Seligmann has argued that German strategic planners saw South Africa as a potential target for imperial expansion. The actions in 1895-96 were intended as a power-grab, which ultimately failed, and forced Germany to refigure its imperial goals, leading to the development of a more concerted globally-focussed policy as a result.

Both Kennedy and Seligmann agree that since 1893 diplomatic tensions had been raised, but public awareness and sensitivity to these matters lagged behind. British popular opinion was not yet ready to fully engage with this new imperial antagonism, as indicated by the ‘milder tone’ of the British press during the Congo dispute in 1894. The German High Command were pushing for imperial acquisitions at the cost of the British Empire. British diplomats and ministers were gradually becoming aware of potential antagonism, but the British public remained largely ignorant of such developments, and were unprepared for Wilhelm’s declaration of intent in January 1896. This goes some way to explaining the suddenness of the outburst, and the shock in German circles at the strength of popular opinion in Britain as a result.

Anglo-Boer Tensions and the Transvaal

At the end of 1895 a crisis was brewing in South Africa, one of Britain’s most coveted imperial interests. Since the British annexation of the Boer Transvaal Republic in 1877 there had been antagonism between the British and Boers. In 1880 the Transvaal Republic rejected British imperial rule resulting in a bloody conflict in which the British were forced to sign an embarrassing truce, after they experienced great difficulty against unconventional Boer tactics. The London Convention, signed on 27 February 1884, defined the
rights of Transvaal Republic as an independent state, but under overall British suzerainty.\textsuperscript{29} Until December 1895 difficulties between the Transvaal and the British Cape Colony rarely ceased. Drawn in by the huge mineral wealth of the Transvaal, over the 1880s and 1890s British immigrants, known in Afrikaans as Uitlander, grew in numbers and importance. In 1888 one British commentator described thousands of British immigrants to the Transvaal ‘swarming within its borders’.\textsuperscript{30} Conflict between Transvaaler interests and this growing immigrant population attracted global interest.\textsuperscript{31} In British circles increasing attention was drawn to the refusal of long-serving President Paul Kruger to grant equal rights to the Uitlander while there was deep concern amongst the Boer population that the small ‘Afrikaner’ republic would be overwhelmed by a flood of British immigration and expansionism.\textsuperscript{32}

The situation in the Boer Republics was fractious. Britain and Germany, were inexorably drawn into diplomatic entanglement, lured by great mining wealth in the Transvaal. Through the early 1890s the British and German Empires surreptitiously battled for the vital seaborne access route to the Transvaal gold fields, Portuguese Delagoa Bay.\textsuperscript{33} Despite imperial competition, however, Britain and Germany were largely able to maintain cordial foreign relations.\textsuperscript{34} British-Boer relations continued to worsen; since the 1870s the South African Republic had sought to establish a railway link with a ‘British-free’ port, in order to secure trade on its own terms. In 1891 President Kruger had turned to the British for a loan, through financial desperation, and in return had been forced to grant the British rights to link the Transvaal gold fields to the Cape by rail. In 1894 the ‘Delagoa Bay Line’ was completed, and Kruger announced that ‘the Cape’s rail monopoly was over’. As a result the Boers and the British South Africa Company began to conduct a railway and customs war known as the ‘Drifts Crisis’ (28 August - 7 December 1896). Cecil Rhodes (Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, 1890-1896) reacted in typically robust manner; under his instruction the British South Africa Company began to undermine the trade rules of the Transvaal, and Kruger’s government retaliated by vastly increasing the rates charged upon railway traffic using the British line in its territory. The Company responded by organising an alternative 51 mile oxen-driven wagon route from the border to the towns of the Transvaal.\textsuperscript{35} The oxen crossed the River Vaal at two ‘drifts’ (fords) (Viljoen’s Drift & Zand Drift near present day Lochvaal, Guateng, SA), and Kruger, in response to the sizeable British trade, ordered these drifts to be closed to foreign trade.\textsuperscript{36} The crisis lasted 72 days until eventually Kruger backed down. The Drifts Crisis concluded only a month and a half prior to the Jameson Raid, and, as Kenneth Wilburn argued, Rhodes and his confidants had intended to implement their plan for a ‘sub-imperial’ combined insurrection of Uitlander and a relief force from Jameson, in order to remove Kruger as a barrier to trade and wealth. By backing down, Kruger had pre-empted this plot. Nevertheless, the crisis was seen by Rhodes as a vindication of the need to remove the obstacle to trade and resource exploitation of the South African Republic; Wilburn argued this was the main cause for the orchestration of the Jameson Raid.\textsuperscript{38}


\textsuperscript{31} Porter, A.N., \textit{Origins of the South African War}.


\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Manchester Guardian}, 18 October 1894.

\textsuperscript{34} O.J. Hale pointed to the Cowes Interview and British press criticism of the Kaiser in August 1895 amongst other events as examples of moderately worsening relations. Hale, O.J., 1939; Sontag, R.J., ‘The Cowes Interview and the Kruger Telegram’, \textit{Political Science Quarterly}, 40:2 (1925), pp. 217–47.


\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 233

When news of Jameson’s failure was received in Britain on 1 January the Salisbury and the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, immediately sought to distance themselves from events, issuing a full condemnation of Jameson and his forces. Along with some newspapers, the Government quickly placed blame upon Jameson for this ‘amazing outrage’ committed by British Empire nationals. The traditionally liberal and

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Woodville, R.C., *Jameson’s Last Stand – The Battle of Doornkop, 2 January 1896*, (1900)

Marvin, C., ‘English Africa: shall Boer and German sway it?’ *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection* (1888).

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39 *Manchester Guardian*, 2 January 1896; For an account of the diplomatic wrangling between Marshall, Salisbury and Chamberlain see Hale, OJ, 1939.
anti-imperialist Manchester Guardian sought to put beyond doubt the illegality and moral wrongness of the invasion:

To levy war like garotters, without warning, ultimatum, or diplomatic statement of complaint, is almost the grossest outrage which one nation can commit against another, and when it is committed by subordinate officials of their own motion the offence against their own Government is rendered doubly flagrant by the heinousness of the imputations to which they expose their countrymen.40

However, there remained sections of the British press who were unwilling to blame Jameson for what was perceived as a noble attempt to assist British nationals. The City—of London's Financial Times and the Conservative sensationalist Pall Mall Gazette both referred to the ‘ill-judged’ nature of this ‘foolhardy’ invasion, but both refused to go so far as to condemn the motives. Many right-sided periodicals and newspapers refused to accept the fundamental immorality of this land-grab.41 Jameson had ordered telegraph wires cut between the Transvaal and Cape Colony, in order to prevent any government orders for withdrawal reaching his forces, and detailed correspondence did not arrive in London until 6 January, leading to great confusion.42

By the time full details of the raid arrived in London, events had taken a further turn for the worse; the Kaiser's telegram was dispatched to Kruger in South Africa, and relayed to Britain. The British Government condemnation on 1 January was followed by two days where no significant statement was issued. The clique of German officers and princes surrounding Kaiser Wilhelm were incensed by what they saw as a typical example of British belligerence in a German sphere of interest. Privately, Wilhelm was furious with Britain, and, though his advisors attempted to avert a major public relations disaster, as well as potential armed conflict, they eventually agreed to the release of a public telegram of congratulation to President Kruger.43

Press releases about the telegram were offered to semi-official newspapers, including the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and National Zeitung.44 The message superficially did little more than congratulate Kruger for his successful repulsion of a hostile armed raid, but the reaction of the British press and the British political establishment could not have been stronger. In particular, Wilhelm’s reference to the ‘independence’ of the Transvaal rankled in Britain, where it was widely accepted to be a British-ruled territory. The semi-official Kölnische Zeitung announced on 4 January that Germany had been prepared to mount a minor armed intervention in order to protect German interests and German civilians. Official German press releases soon revealed that a small force of German troops had been prepared to land at Delagoa Bay, in Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), with the sole and peaceful intention of marching across land to the Transvaal, in order to safeguard German interests, i.e. officials and property. This potentially disastrous blunder was narrowly averted by news of the failure of the Jameson’s Raid, but the potential German action became the subject of exaggeration and rumours in the British press, and further provoked strong British reaction.45

Accountability for the telegram was debated until the death of the Kaiser in 1941, but diplomatic historians have agreed that responsibility was shared between the Kaiser and his Government, although during and after the crisis Wilhelm was generally assumed to be the chief architect of the telegram.46 At the time the German government claimed that its intention was only to encourage and support a kindred nation

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40 Manchester Guardian, 2 January 1896.
41 Pall Mall Gazette, 4 January 1896; Financial Times, 4 January 1896.
42 Manchester Guardian, 2 January 1896.
43 Massie, R.K., Dreadnought.
44 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 January 1896; National Zeitung, 3 January 1896.
45 Kölnische Zeitung, 4 January 1896; Morning Post, 6 January 1896.
46 However, as Seligmann argued, there is evidence to suggest that it was his ministers who orchestrated the message, with Wilhelm’s eventual consent. Raymond Sontag and Seligmann are clear that Baron Marschall von Bieberstein was closely involved with both the message, but that Hohenlohe ultimately took responsibility as Reichskanzler despite his lack of support for the telegram. Marschall in particular was vital to the development of a German imperial policy in South Africa. Sontag, R.J., ‘The Cowes Interview and the Kruger Telegram’, pp. 217–47; Seligmann, M.S., Rivalry in Southern Africa, pp. 97, 112; Thimme, F.W.K., ‘Krüger-Depesche’, pp. 201–44; his views are repeated in Johannes Andreas Wüd, Die Rolle der Burenrepubliken in der Auswärtigen und Kolonialen Politik des Deutschen Reiches in den Jahren 1883–1914 (Nürnberg, 1927), pp. 101–2 as cited in Seligmann, M.S., Rivalry in Southern Africa, p. 106.
in their claim for independence. Others, including Wilhelm’s biographers, and post-WW1 accounts, argued that the act was typical of the Kaiser’s spontaneous and impulsive style of rule, and that the telegram was an instinctive reaction to the Jameson Raid, aside from German imperial policy. During the press outburst, few were willing to accept that Wilhelm and his government had acted purely out of instinctive altruism to help the poor Boer people. Matthew Seligmann recently argued: ‘A government with such definite territorial ambitions as that of Germany does not battle to obtain a say in the future political structure of a region merely for selfless ends’. In line with some older accounts, he suggested that the telegram was a considered attempt to test British resolve, and to pursue a policy of increasing informal involvement in South Africa.

In truth, there was no German plan to invade the Transvaal or to engage in armed conflict, but there was clear intent to develop Germany’s influence in Boer affairs, and to challenge British imperialism. The question of responsibility will continue to inspire historical debate, as it did in the years immediately afterwards. During the popular crisis what mattered was the way Wilhelm was perceived to have led an assault on the British Empire, and Germany was increasingly perceived as a menace to the Empire as a result.

News was limited and confusion ruled in Britain until 6 January in the absence of any clear information on the Raid. When full details of the Raid itself arrived, news of the Kaiser’s telegram had already gripped the nation for two days. Diplomatically, Salisbury and his Government recognized the need for a strong response to Germany, not only to prevent further escalation, but also as a matter of imperial pride. On 31 December, Germany had privately demanded that Britain recognise the independence of the Transvaal and it was feared that any sign of British weakness would provoke further attempts to chip away at the already stretched strategic resources of the Empire. On 8 January Lord Salisbury moved to respond to the outburst of popular anger. The Government announced that a ‘Flying Squadron’ of two battleships and four cruisers would be formed ‘ready to go anywhere’; three cruisers were later sent to Delagoa Bay to shadow Germany’s three cruisers nearby. Much of the official comment on the crisis was offered retrospectively, or filtered through the press, with Parliament not sitting throughout January. In the end the diplomatic crisis was short-lived; the robust British diplomatic response led the Kaiser’s Government to recognise their chance of gaining a valuable imperial area of influence had passed and they swiftly backed down.

The British Reaction to the Kaiser’s Telegram

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Kruger Telegram Crisis was the surge in defensive patriotism and popular anti-German sentiment expressed at all levels of society. Dominion and American newspaper correspondents commented commonly upon the British anger and the ‘tremendous outburst’ of indignation. They described large-scale public meetings in the cities of Britain where ‘the name of the German Emperor has been received with loud hissing and other striking signs of opprobrium’. Letters to the editor of the Conservative ‘paper of record’, the Times, on 6 January indicate the widespread nature of the phenomenon; Harold Finch-Hatton called it:

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51 Ibid., p. 77.
52 Massie, R.K., Dreadnought, p. 226.
53 Launceston Examiner, (Tasmania), 7 January 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, (NSW), 7 January 1896; The Times, 12 January 1896; Daily News, (Perth, WA), 9 January 1896; ‘The British Public, without exception, are most enthusiastic over the firm stand taken by Lord Salisbury’s Government, and the Prime Minister’s energy calls forth universal appearance. At many political and other meetings the name of the German Emperor has been received with loud hissing and other striking signs of opprobrium, and the war feeling against Germany runs high throughout the Kingdom - a marked contrast to the gravely peaceful attitude adopted during the recent difficulty caused by President Cleveland.’ The Mercury, (Hobart, Tas), 9 January 1896.
...one of the most universally mischievous documents that have ever been framed...in letter and in spirit a deliberate and premeditated insult to the Queen and the British nation of so gross and wanton a nature as to call for an immediate and decisive reply.

Another contributor questioned, ‘[d]oes not the blood of every Englishman boil at reading the message from the chief of a friendly nation and a grandson of our Queen…[?]’. On the same day the Manchester Guardian’s London Correspondent commented:

‘In clubs, in railway carriages, in the streets, the situation created by the message of the German Emperor to President Kruger and by the bellicose and threatening tone of the German press is discussed with varying degrees of knowledge, but everywhere with a feeling of resentment which it is impossible to mistake.’

Throughout the crisis the Guardian retained a sense of calm, discouraged patriotic anger and implored the public to control its emotions; a staunchly left-sided newspaper, it was unlikely to exaggerate such jingoistic behaviour. It often sought to discourage nationalistic urges and regularly preached a non-interventionist foreign policy. During the Kruger Telegram Crisis, however, even the Guardian was forced to admit that the British public had some justification for displeasure, suggesting that across society, people all political persuasions felt the need to announce their support for the imperial cause. The popular liberal daily, Reynolds’s Newspaper, joined the Guardian in describing the wide-scale popular response; it argued that there could be ‘no doubt of the extreme unpopularity of the German Emperor in London’. In London’s club land proposals were made to remove Wilhelm from honorary members’ lists; Reynolds’s also described ‘hissing’ at a mass gathering in Birmingham and Germans were jeered in a play in Blackpool. It went on to argue that across the Empire the feeling was the same: even in Melbourne, Australia, ‘a strong anti-German feeling’ had developed.

Across Britain sermons were delivered in churches and chapels, about the political situation. The Bishop of London selected a quote from St. Mark xiii.7: ‘And when ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars, be ye not troubled: for such things must needs be; but the end shall not be yet.’ The Morning Post, a Conservative daily, commented that ‘the future seems to be full of dangers and full of trials’ and implored Britain to continue to fulfil its ‘national responsibilities’ to the Empire. Reflecting on the crisis at the end of January while campaigning for the Montrose by-election, Liberal Politician John Morley (later a fervent ‘Pro-Boer’ campaigner) condemned the action of Germany, but exclaimed:

I do not think any right-minded man can view without disgust the sort of language - indecent and undignified - which those in some quarters of society in London and elsewhere have thought fit to use about the German Emperor. I hope that is now over.

Morley’s dissenting voice indicates the level of anger the telegram engendered, but also shows that at least some in Britain wished that the outrage had been expressed in a less bellicose manner. His condemnation of such behaviour suggests that it was a widespread and prevalent phenomenon. As a Liberal he was likely to condemn such an aggressive stance in both popular opinion and government, but Morley still felt the need to describe his own distaste at Wilhelm ‘war lord in jack boots’.

 Allegations were made in both the German and British press that the eruption of anger towards Germany had resulted in damage to personal property and ‘disturbances’ in the streets of the East End gained popular notoriety. The Times stated that conditions were still unfavourable ‘to the initiation of any German enterprise in London’. Although in reality there were few, if any, occurrences of this nature, the

54 The Times, 8 January 1896.
55 Manchester Guardian, 6 January 1896.
56 Reynolds’s Newspaper, 13 January 1896.
58 Dundee Courier & Argus, 31 January 1896.
59 The Times, 28 January 1896.
plausibility of such an occurrence reveals the state of opinion.\textsuperscript{60} The middle-class Liberal \textit{Daily News},\textsuperscript{61} reported that after sending his telegram to President Kruger ‘the Emperor William received from England, many hundreds of insulting and anonymous letters, calling him gross and rude names.’ The \textit{Pall Mall Gazette}, saw the lighter side, referring to the letters as ‘very naughty’,\textsuperscript{62} while the \textit{Daily News} took the matter more seriously, arguing that examples such as these letters, and speeches by inflammatory politicians, ‘might flatter the ear of the masses’ but risked endangering peace.\textsuperscript{63} Humorous though such hate-mail may seem, it illustrates both the extent to which ordinary people had taken the telegram to heart and the scale of public anger.

During January 1896 fervent patriotism was evident throughout the hugely popular music halls of London and across Britain.\textsuperscript{64} Music hall’s cross-class appeal and outreach made it a vital indicator of cultural trends and popular sentiment.\textsuperscript{65} During this period, music halls were often the main location for demonstrations of popular patriotism. MacDermott’s song, for example, which coined the term ‘jingo’ in its modern form, began as a popular music hall number. Music halls were frequently hosts to expressions of imperial anxiety and consequent bellicosity.\textsuperscript{66} Even before the Kruger Telegram the British public was fascinated by events in South Africa; \textit{Lloyd’s Weekly} described ‘an extraordinary scene’ which occurred on 2 January, before news of the telegram arrived, at the New Olympic Theatre. A man was reported to have shouted above the noise of the performance ‘To hell with the Boers’, which was received by an ‘electrical’ eruption of ‘pent-up excitement’ which ‘found vent in hearty cheers, raised again and again.’ The audience also heartily cheered Dr Jameson.\textsuperscript{67}

In response to the Kaiser’s telegram the music hall scene witnessed an upsurge in defensive patriotism and anti-German sentiment. The words of the sensationally popular music hall song of the time, ‘Hands Off!’\textsuperscript{68}, written in response to the telegram, reveal the variety of sentiments the telegram inspired. The ‘league of greed and hate’ against Britain emphasised both the sense of standing alone, common in the newspapers, and the theme of international jealousy which formed a key aspect of on-going imperial anxiety. The idea of the British Empire as a coveted entity formed the basis for many of the imperial anxieties invoked in response to the telegram. It was increasingly accepted that the Kaiser, his government, and the German people at large, not only desired their own empire, but that this new colonial empire would have to come at the expense of Britain. The song was resonant with the increasingly prevalent ultra-defensive popular imperialism of the period: ‘back to back’ and the ‘danger at your gate’ epitomise the embattled self-image of patriotic songs of this ilk, much as ‘Rule Britannia’ expressed the sentiment that England ‘never will be slaves’. Furthermore, through such recognisable terminology played upon jingoistic patriotism; the song called for aggressive resistance to any form of interference with Britain or her colonial possessions.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{The Times}, 9 January 1896; \textit{Yorkshire Herald}, 10 January 1896; When considering the anti-German disturbances which occurred after the outbreak of war in 1914 and 1915, involving the destruction of property of Anglo-German business-holders and shopkeepers, these incidents once again suggest that this period of anti-German ‘fervour’ saw the laying down of blueprints for germanophobic discourse and characterisation. Panayi, P (ed.), \textit{Germans in Britain Since 1500} (London, 1996), p. 90.


\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Pall Mall Gazette}, 30 January 1896.

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Daily News}, 30 January 1896.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Sheffield and Rotherham Independent}, 31 January 1896.


\textsuperscript{66} For the association of popular imperialism and music hall see: Summerfield, P., ‘Patriotism and Empire’, pp. 17-48.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper}, 5 January 1896.

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Reynolds’s Newspaper}, 12 January 1896.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
The Kruger Telegram Crisis

The Feilding Star (NZ), 11 May 1896.

A description of a performance of the song, ‘Hands Off’, at Daly’s Theatre can reveal something of the popular success of this song:

The singing of this song created the most intense enthusiasm among the audience. They cheered again and again, and more especially at the mention of Dr Jameson’s name. At the back of the pit someone waved a Union Jack. In the chorus the yeomen, who take part in the scene, draw their swords, adding greatly to the effect of a stirring and patriotic demonstration in this hour of our attempted humiliation.

The same commentator went on to describe ‘Cheer Boys, Cheer’ as ‘without doubt the patriotic play of the moment’; it was ‘[t]eeming with references to Jameson, the Chartered Company and Kruger, which was seen as ‘the cause of Jingo demonstrations.’ In the early days of the outburst Dr Jameson and the Chartered Company were synonymous with defence of the empire, in spite of their ostensibly aggressive act. At the Alhambra Theatre in Leicester Square the running order was pushed back to allow for a reading of Poet Laureate Alfred Austin’s first poem in his new role entitled ‘Jameson’s Ride’; the reading was reported as receiving ‘great applause’. Austin’s poem had initially been published in the Times and though it was immensely popular, literary critics attacked the poem and its unloved author.

Another patriotic show was performed at the Tivoli Theatre where the actor Leo Stormont dressed as a British admiral singing ‘What is our own we’ll hold’ and ‘Rule, Britannia’ nightly. According to Lloyd’s Weekly the audience stood to sing along with the choruses. Across the theatres of London many proprietors were quick to take advantage of the recent turn of events, with resurrections of the opaquely titled plays ‘Queen of the Seas’ at the Pavilion Theatre, and ‘Rule, Britannia’ at the Eastern Empire. The theatres arguably believed that reviews such as these, with their easily recognisable themes stirring up jingoistic patriotism would most excite their audiences. The theme ‘holding’ or defending the Empire against an external threat was the basis of much expression during the crisis; this is indicative of imperial anxieties discussed above.

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70 If this was not enough, Reynolds provided further description of ‘[an amusing incident] in the play whereby an actor playing ‘Lord Archie’ was seemingly greeted with rapturous applause on his entrance. Mistakenly turning to receive the adulation, the actor, Sydney Howard, was struck by the realisation that it was in fact ‘some troopers in the uniform of the Chartered Company’ entering behind him to whom the audience was devoting its passions. The commentator was evidently bemused that the audience had shouted itself ‘hoarse’ in admiration for ‘imitation representatives of Dr Jameson’s brave followers.” Ibid.

71 Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 19 January 1896.

72 The Times, 11 January 1896.

73 Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 19 January 1896.
Chapter 2

‘The Music Halls,’ Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 19 January 1896

Even the more high-brow theatres held host to their own outbursts of jingoism in the face of German aggression. The success of Anthony Hope’s novel *The Prisoner of Zenda* (1894) had led to a theatrical adaptation in 1895. The St. James’s Theatre proprietor, George Alexander, was fortuitous with the timing of the staging of the play; Hope’s ‘Ruritania’, a German-speaking central-European autocracy played perfectly to the outpouring of anti-German feeling at the time. Especially resonant was the depiction of ‘the gallant young Englishman Rassendyll in his courageous dash across Ruritania to the rescue of the prisoners.’ The *Pall Mall Gazette* recognized of the aptness of this image, declaring that if there was at that time a ‘nautical melodrama’ playing in any theatre in London, it would have taxed all the ingenuity of London’s prop designer ‘to float a flying squadron on the stage.’ Indeed, “Zenda” proved so successful that the St James’s had to run extra matinee performances, and the *Pall Mall Gazette*’s reporter declared that the audience of Saturday 15 January was the ‘heaviest the management has known.’

According to the *Glasgow Herald*, ‘so vigorous were the demonstrations of disapproval with which all allusions to Germany were received’ that the Lord Chamberlain, the Earl of Lathom, in close coordination with the Foreign Office, was forced to censor several theatres in order to calm the ‘patriotic fervour’. The words of ‘Hands Off!’ were swiftly altered so that allusions to the Kaiser and Germany were kept to a minimum. ‘Hands Off! Germany!’ became ‘Hands Off, all of you’, while “Kruger boasts and Kaiser brags” was changed to “Boers boast and Deutscher brags,” amendments which did little to allay the outburst of anger. The *Pall Mall Gazette* described in detail how the character of a German music master in “The Strange Adventures of Miss Brown” was comically booed and kicked off stage in ignominious fashion. Elsewhere, the *Pall Mall Gazette* displayed distaste at how ‘the low comedians almost fight nightly for the privilege of getting down close to the footlights and saying “Made in Germany.”’ Furthermore, it described a scene at Daly’s theatre with evident self-righteous indignation:

Mr. Harry Monkhouse, wearing a burlesque German military uniform, and carrying a toy drum and a penny trumpet, comes on with Miss Decima Moor, who is for a time taking Miss Lind’s place, and the two sing a buffoon duet, the object of which is apparently to insult the German Emperor. It succeeds. The censor would not allow “Hands off! Germany” in the song, although “Hands off! Germany” is just what the Government and the newspapers have been saying. It seems rather strange that he should have passed this insulting personal allusion, which is neither good patriotism, good humour, nor good business.

The ‘low’ humour in the music halls, as so often the case, generated displeasure in ‘high-brow’ journals. Such comments suggest that the newspaper outburst was reflected in popular sentiment amongst the

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74 *Pall Mall Gazette*, 15 January 1896.
75 Ibid.
working classes in London; the popularity of ‘Hands Off!’ in theatres in Glasgow, Sheffield and Newcastle indicates its influence across Britain.\(^77\)

There is strong evidence to suggest that the general public was outraged. The press obviously played a role in stoking anger through its fevered reports of events, but the increasingly outspoken nature of coverage during the crisis may suggest that the public and the press roused each other to new heights of sensationalism and outrage. The popularity of the music-hall's interpretation of events among working and middle classes also indicates that this was more than simply a 'press storm'. One lofty commentator chastised the 'ungentlemanly and uncalled for proceedings'.\(^78\) Some left-sided opinion did run against the grain; on 11 January, for example, the \textit{Speaker} advocated 'more self-restraint and greater leniency'. At the end of the first week of crisis, it published a diary of the past week's events in which the behaviour of the majority was criticised and criticised. The \textit{Speaker} found fault with the major newspapers, the masses and the Government, whom it accused of jingoism and war-mongering, with 'needless bluster'. It languidly advised: ‘...it would be well if people in this country would take a less passionate view of the situation.’\(^79\) Very few of the usual opponents of aggressive patriotism, overwhelmingly in the minority, felt compelled to argue against a groundswell of anger during the crisis. Regardless of party-political persuasion, the high literary journals, the traditional broadsheet newspapers, recently established 'yellow dailies', popular Sunday weeklies, monthlies and regional newspapers, all condemned the telegram. Some papers such as the \textit{Morning Post} and \textit{Evening News} were almost entirely filled with stories of the 'Transvaal Crisis'; in almost every copy of every newspaper for the whole of January, at least some mention can be found of the crisis. Dissenting voices could be heard, but they were predominantly pleas for calm in light of potential catastrophic international consequences, rather than defences of Germany or Wilhelm. It is possible to infer from this gathered evidence, added to the other commentaries presented throughout this chapter, that the Kruger Telegram outburst was both broad-based and widespread.

The Themes of Outrage

Jingoism and Overstretch

The reaction to the Kruger Telegram was coloured by both a sense of anger and unpreparedness. As discussed in chapter one, by 1896 the British public was well acquainted with the idea that the Empire was overstretched and weakened. The intrusion of Germany into British affairs presented a new external threat to British imperial possessions. Songs, newspapers and novels regularly declared that Britain should rise in time of national trial to meet its enemies. It is essential to recognise the imbrication of ideas of imperial overstretched and popular jingoism in British popular imagination throughout this period, and especially during the Kruger Telegram Crisis. The very assumption that Britain was weakened and exposed engendered such aggressive responses.

The \textit{Evening News}, the most popular London evening paper of the time and recently purchased by the press baron, Alfred Harmsworth, was amongst the most jingoistic papers during the crisis.\(^80\) It declared in Shakespearean style on 8 January that, ‘England Stands Alone’. A new time of national trial had arrived with

\(^{77}\) The Era, 1 February 1896; For music hall reports see: Poverty Bay Herald (NZ), 17 March 1896; Reynolds’s Newspaper, 12 January 1896; Glasgow Herald, 14 January 1896; Pall Mall Gazette, 15 January 1896; The Era, 25 January 1896.

\(^{78}\) The Times, 23 January 1896; The Times, 27 January 1896.


this particular ‘insult and injury of the most intolerable kind’; it argued that though England was not looking for a war, there were limits to its ‘good-humoured forbearance.’ Expressions of shock turned to more bellicose threats of reprisals; ‘jingoism’ was rife. The popularity of the phrase, ‘Hands Off!’, most obvious in the success of the famous song reveals the presence of fear in the popular imagination of losing parts of the Empire. The frequent utterances of this angry declaration indicate that the empire was emphatically something worth defending, by force if necessary. The lyrics of ‘Hands Off’ made this explicitly clear: ‘They’ll have to kill the lion first, who’d wear the lion’s skin.’

The British press was almost unanimous in its determination to stand up to Germany. The Telegraph, the best-selling daily in Britain in 1896 and described by a contemporary as reflecting ‘the average thinking and believing of one or two great layers of London life,’ and the widely respected Tory Standard, focussed a great deal of attention on the military preparations with a supportive tone. Meanwhile the Globe, a popular Conservative evening newspaper, concentrated upon ‘Activity in the War Office’, implying that a major announcement of military action was pending. Even the anti-jingo Manchester Guardian was willing to entertain the idea that the German activities in Delagoa Bay might represent a ‘direct challenge to British supremacy’, and advocated a strong Government response. When the Government ordered a ‘flying squadron’ to ready for South Africa on 8 January the press was full of praise for this strong and decisive measure. Regional dailies ran full page spreads on the Transvaal Crisis, and detailed the preparations of the fleet. Throughout the crisis broadsheets, periodicals, and especially recently established ‘yellow’ dailies, such as the Evening News trumpeted the struggle for English rights in the face of the German menaces and perils. Enthusiastic reports of the crisis in Dominion papers told of ‘great public enthusiasm all over England’; a ‘[g]reat war feeling’ had been perceptibly stirred up. The response from the colonies was, typically, more extreme than in Britain. Punch, the influential satirical weekly, celebrated this imperial response with a cartoon entitled ‘Bravo Young ‘Uns’ with the caption: ‘Well done Dad! We’ll stick to you!’

The need for a strong armed response was increasingly emphasised. National and regional newspapers reported enthusiastically on ‘warlike’ preparations in Britain’s docks, and a ‘British counterblast’. Anger toward Kruger and the Boers declined, while the Kaiser and Germany increasingly bore the brunt of British anger. Pride in the British response was plain across the printed press and amongst the general public. For several weeks there was an acceptance that war was increasingly likely; references to a ‘war cloud’ or ‘war feeling’ in Britain were common. Stories spread of mass meetings, public hissing, booing, and rumours of burnt effigies of the Kaiser, or attacks on German shops. The Globe stated, ‘[t]here is no war party here; but the entire empire would so become’ if the words of the Kaiser were followed by deeds. It was even declared that, ‘the country must administer a smart lesson to such persons as the German Emperor, and all who concoct plots and conspiracies against British dominion.’ There was an evident appetite for bold gestures and a strong statement that the British Empire was not to be threatened by any power. Left-wing and liberal papers, such as the Speaker, warned of the dangers of such public vaporising, without daring to

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81 Evening News, 8 January 1896.
84 Washington Post, 8 January 1896.
87 Evening News, 4 January 1896; Morning Post, 9 January 1896.
88 Britsham Courier, (Qld.), 6 January 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, (NSW), 6 January 1896; West Australian, (Perth, WA), 8 January 1896; Launceston Examiner, (Tasmania), 9 January 1896.
89 Punch, 25 January 1896.
90 Launceston Examiner, (Tasmania), 7 January 1896; Morning Post, 9 January 1896; The Standard, 9 January 1896; Reynolds’s Newspaper, 13 January 1896; Evening News, 10 January 1896; The Standard, 10 January 1896; Hampshire Telegraph, 18 January 1896; Berrow’s Worcester Journal, 11 January 1896; Aberdeen Journal, 10 January 1896.
91 The Times, 9 January 1896.
92 Yorkshire Herald, 6 January 1896; Pall Mall Gazette, 6 January 1896.
93 The Yorkshire Herald, 10 January 1896.
95 Yorkshire Herald, 6 January 1896.
defend Germany's actions: 'We are not drifting - we are rushing towards war.'\(^96\) For a sustained period popular sentiment ran away with this 'war feeling'.

Throughout the crisis the *Times* maintained a daily interest in German press and public attacks upon Britain. It proclaimed that the 'paramount duty of this country at the present time' considering the 'sudden explosion of unprovoked hostility' offered by a nation who, it argued, was increasingly envious and aggressive, was 'to strengthen our national and Imperial defences.' Furthermore, it stated that, '...Englishmen are in no mood to part with an iota of their rights under a threat of coercion.' This determination to defend British rights, with force if necessary, was equated to a question not only of honour, 'but a dictate of necessity.'\(^97\)

Across the press a key response to the revelations of the telegram and rumours of German interference was to immediately advocate 'increased armaments'. One regional Australian newspaper even declared, 'it is high time it is made clear to the world that England will not submit to be bullied either by any single power or by all the European powers unitedly.'\(^98\) Letters to the editors of various newspapers, identified a need, in light of the Transvaal crisis and the interference of Germany, to rearm and re-man the navy, and to strengthen the army too. Thomas Gibson Bowles, in a letter to the *Times* argued that Britain should learn quickly from this crisis and called for:

> the immediate entry of a large additional number of boys into the Navy...an immediate doubling in numbers of the training ships...; an immediate raising of the numbers of the Royal Naval Reserves...; [and] a large increase in the Marines.\(^99\)

Bowles subscribed to the view that the Navy was the key to guaranteeing the continuing security of Empire. The tone of the telegram, it would seem, was interpreted as the beginning of the rise of Germany as a new imperial threat. Thomas Judge, contributor to the *Morning Post* referred to 'anxiety' over the present circumstances and suggested '[t]his scare should convince us that it is our bounden duty to accumulate strength both on land and sea...'.\(^100\) Faced with a new imperial enemy, the rising tide of jingoism called for immediate and vast investment in the defences of the nation. Harold Finch-Hatton demanded urgent reinvestment of the budget surplus into the navy and army. Finch-Hatton argued, 'Let there be no aggression, but let the nations know that we are prepared to defend ourselves, from whatever quarter or quarters the attack may come - in Europe or in America'.\(^101\) A common sentiment, expressed here, suggested that Britain was not aggressive, but would defend herself against any aggressor, or aggressors. This echoed the words of McDermott's jingo song of the 1870s:

> 'We don't want to fight but by jingo if we do, we've got the ships, we've got the men, and got the money too!'\(^102\)

The anger was directed at Wilhelm and Germany. Nevertheless, the defiant message was directed to all powers in the world, emphasising again the link to wider anxieties about the defence of empire.

\(^96\) Speaker, 11 January 1896.
\(^97\) The Times, 7 January 1896.
\(^98\) West Australian, (Perth, WA), 8 January 1896; Bairnsdale Advertiser and Tambo and Omeo Chronicle (Vic, Aus), 7 January 1896.
\(^99\) Morning Post, 7 January 1896.
\(^100\) Morning Post, 8 January 1896.
\(^101\) The Times, 8 January 1896.
In patriotic mood, on 18 January Punch published a typically imperialist image (see above) entitled ‘Ready!’; Britannia was depicted with shield and sword, gazing out upon a stormy sea. In the caption Punch quoted Shakespeare’s ‘King John’: ‘Come the three corners of the world in arms, and we shall shock them: nought shall make us rue, if England itself do rest but true.’ By February, as the crisis calmed, Punch critiqued loud calls for armament in its piece, ‘Money No Object’; when Britannia is warned that the calls for armaments ‘will run into money’, she responds aggressively, ‘Never mind about that as long as I continue to rule the world!’ Punch made explicit the direct link between the need to rapidly improve the unprepared naval and military defences and the security of the empire. The images are striking, and the messages explicit: Britain in 1896 was surrounded by enemies, its empire threatened and dark clouds were gathering; its response was patriotic, imperialistic and aggressive.

The Punch cartoon succinctly encapsulated many of the anxieties of the age. The combination of the strong outburst of jingoism and calls for armament and military readiness indicate both the strength of the response, and the feeling that Britain was somewhat unprepared for the challenges which faced it. The press and politicians advocated heavy investment in armaments to ward off any potential threat to ‘not only our country but our possessions.’ Britain was repeatedly described as isolated and surrounded by both known and unknown foreign enemies. These nationalistic declarations in the press and public suggest that there was a desire to show jealous enemies that Britain was strong, despite concerns about its weakness. Such calls for rearmament suggest that many felt that the Empire was woefully underprepared to face its enemies. Since the 1870s debates about the maintenance of military and naval power had revolved around the idea that the Empire was overstretched. The Kruger Telegram Crisis adopted the same themes, and shaped them to meet the new German threat.

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103 Punch, 18 January 1896.
104 Punch, 29 February 1896.
The Kaiser’s Absolutism

In a period where royal personages received a great deal of attention – both positive and negative – perhaps inevitably the press and public swiftly turned their anger towards the Kaiser. Political cartoons of the day often equated monarchs of a country with their national values and stereotypes. This focus upon the monarchs, their opinions, movements and behaviour - was exaggerated in the extreme with Wilhelm II. His perceived autocratic system of rule, his youthful arrogance and, most importantly, his propensity for outrageous statements made him a target for both praise and intense criticism. In the case of the Kruger Telegram, this criticism was white hot. The sense of betrayal, and his perceived role in the drafting of the telegram allowed British newspapers to open the floodgates to a tide of personal assaults upon the Kaiser and his methods. In particular, the Kaiser’s absolute rule over his country drew much disapproval. Previous imperial anxieties were rekindled by the prospect of facing yet another absolutist enemy like France and Russia. Throughout the crisis the theme of absolutism was employed by the press to suggest that the Kaiser should be criticised and also feared; German society was imagined as a form of police state, while the Kaiser’s intentions, his impulsive aggression and desire for greatness might, it was argued, threaten the British Empire.

On 6 January the newspapers of Great Britain erupted in a torrent of abuse. The Financial Times accused Wilhelm II of being ‘bent on making a name for himself, by fair means or foul’ and of aping the ‘tradition of bygone days’ of the Hohenzollern monarchs. The Yorkshire Herald, a York-based liberal newspaper, called Wilhelm ‘arrogant’, while the Evening News declared the ‘swaggering message’ a deliberate attempt ‘to gratify anti-English feeling’. Furthermore, the Evening News went on to say that whatever the views of the British public toward Jameson and his folly, ‘there is only one view held as to the Emperor. He finds no apologists in this country’. The Daily Telegraph stated that the Kaiser had managed to outdo even Jameson ‘in startling abruptness and impulsiveness of procedure’, while the Pall Mall Gazette, never one to mince words, attacked with:

He is probably the only European sovereign who would be guilty of such a blunder, and we could afford to overlook it with a smile if it were no more than one of those childish freaks of vanity which have time and again made him the laughing-stock of the world.

Such reports suggest that 6 January represents a spike in the level of abuse directed at the Kaiser, but it was by no means isolated. Throughout January criticism was constant.

In an article discussing ‘The Amazing Telegram’, the Saturday Review, speaking for right-wing ‘educated’ opinion, argued that the German Emperor was ‘revealed as a man foredestined [sic] to failure, humiliation, and disaster. There are no longer any doubts about him.’ The ‘gratuitous insolence’ with which Wilhelm delivered his telegram was followed by a ‘calmer second thought’: that Wilhelm, and ‘the country whose misfortune it is to have him on its throne’ should be the ones ‘disturbed’ by the passage of events. The image of Wilhelm as autocratic ruler is evident in the description of him as ‘idol of all his people’. The Saturday Review concluded with a typically patriotic assertion that Britain will resist ‘with a steady nerve’, and a warning to Germany that ‘the angriest Englishman could wish him nothing worse than the outlook before him.’ This article was by no means a single call to defend ‘English’ rights, but was representative of the message peddled by many of the ‘yellow’ and periodical press. The Economist was unusually outspoken in praising Britain for ‘[t]he instinctive yet most determined resistance’ to ‘the arrogant dictation of the German Emperor’. The result was the elimination of the ‘almost universal’ myth that it was ‘safe to insult

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107 Financial Times, 6 January 1896.

108 Yorkshire Herald, 6 January 1896; Evening News, 6 January 1896.

109 Pall Mall Gazette, 6 January 1896.

or even injure Great Britain.’ The Economist’s view echoed that of the Saturday Review by insinuating that the Kaiser’s policy of bluff was a complete failure. Once again criticism of German autocratic rule is very obvious, especially in the suggestion that the Boers, in spite of Britain’s record of intrigue and imperialism, would never exchange the mild rule of Britain for the ‘German Emperor’s oppressive as well as vigorous autocracy.’

Language grew in ferocity over the first weeks of the crisis; soon, expressions of shock had turned to more bellicose utterances of reprisals and a message for Germany and the rest of the world. The Pall Mall Gazette led the self-righteous condemnation of the Kaiser and his officials with its article of January 6 entitled ‘Hands Off!’:

The German Emperor has succeeded in beating his own record. He has done many things that were foolish, and some that were undignified, but nothing quite so lacking in good sense, dignity, and wisdom as his message of congratulation to President Kruger….But this hot-blooded and eccentric sovereign has no regard for the decencies of diplomacy….

‘The Queen’s Letter to the German Emperor,’ Punch, 18 January 1896.

111 ‘The German Emperor, it would seem clear, is disinclined to follow up his threats by action, and it is more than probable, strange as the supposition may appear, that his Majesty thought menace would of itself be sufficient. He is so little resisted in his own country, and has become so convinced of his own superiority to all rivals, that the idea of serious opposition with difficulty enters his head. He will now be more moderate, and although he will probably try to avenge his repulse, and it will be necessary to be prepared against his sudden and unwise decisions, still the tension is for the moment relaxed.’ The Improved Prospect, Economist, 2734 (18 January 1890), pp. 62–3.

112 Ibid.


114 Pall Mall Gazette, 6 January 1896.
Concerns were strongly voiced about the German Emperor’s personal character, and the perceived folly of Germany’s autocratic system of rule. These would later become key distinguishing features of the British anti-German discourse. By 11 January the *Economist*, usually a sage and calm publication sought to elucidate on the reason for such extreme indignation, ‘…perhaps never since Napoleon was sent to St Helena’. The invocation of the old absolutist aggressor, Napoleon, indicates how previous anxieties about France were neatly transposed onto this new enemy. Wilhelm’s war-like impulsivity comfortably fitted this long-standing blueprint. The *Economist* was ultimately forced to declare that the telegram was a ‘wilful affront’ which William himself would have answered with ‘a declaration of war.’

By 25 January the editors of the *Economist* took an even more outspoken stance, perhaps encouraged by the continuing popularity of that approach. The German Emperor was once again criticised for his ‘peculiar temperament’, and his popularity within Germany was also questioned. He was increasingly depicted as ruling in a ‘tyannical’ fashion, ‘if we may use a word which in Germany would be strictly forbidden.’ The image that the *Economist* constructs is that of a land ‘covered with spies’ where the ‘most drunk are the most disloyal’ – evidence it is supposed for the true ‘latent feeling’. Reading this article could easily lead one to imagine a virtual totalitarian state where the masses feared to utter ‘ill-words spoken of the Emperor’. The Kaiser had, it was argued, become increasingly angry, ‘as often happens with men who are slightly histrionic and greatly value applause’, and increasingly militaristic in action and word. There is undoubtedly some truth in the piece, but there is a distinct sense of exaggeration and embellishment, which indicates the *Economist*’s desire to promote an image of an erratic autocrat – a cruel temperamental warlord. The *Economist* was exaggerating considerably, but this indicates how far the negative characterisation of Wilhelm, and of the political state of Germany, had developed. The *Economist* warned the Kaiser that his ‘beautiful dream’ of ‘world-wide dominion’ will not be accepted by his subjects as ‘full compensation for the loss they are sustaining of liberty, freedom from espionage, and that easy intellectual life which so sweetened and ennobled the old German narrowness of means.'

Reflecting upon the month that had passed, George W. Steevens, a rising star of journalism, wrote a lengthy piece entitled ‘The Indiscretion of the Kaiser,’ for the *New Review*, a literary review popular until its demise in 1897. Later in 1896 Steevens was employed as a correspondent for the newly established *Daily Mail*. His modern, sensationalist style and language for the *New Review* helps to explain why the *Mail’s* proprietor, Alfred Harmsworth (later Lord Northcliffe), was so keen:

> WHY did the Kaiser do it? It will not serve to answer that William would do anything. It is plausible, but it is not true, and it is not relevant. He meant something by that world-renowned telegram. William may be hasty, he may be swollen-headed, he may be mad, but William is not, in the ordinary sense, a fool…. If he is mad, then three million men and twenty battle-ships are mad also, and it is not easy to slip the straight waistcoat on to them.

Steevens’s article is a fitting summary of the crisis over the month of January. Themes included the initial shock (‘he seized the very moment when we could not defend ourselves to insult us’); the rumour of possible German activities in the Transvaal; and the sense of betrayal after Britain had treated him so kindly (‘He came to us year by year, and we welcomed him with friendship and respect.’). Like many others, Steevens was drawn to conclusions which attest to the Kaiser’s unpredictable temperament, his cruel autocratic rule and the future menace which he so clearly intended towards Britain. In concluding, Steevens’s message was firm and clear: ‘He preferred to kick us when we were down, and we shall never forget it. We do not recommend him to visit England again.’ Such a baldly aggressive statement indicates the sensational effect of the telegram. In spite of Wilhelm’s actions, addressing any monarch in such a bellicose manner, at a time when royal patronage and subordination was still prevalent, was an extreme measure. Attacks upon the

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Emperor and German society throughout the crisis suggest that in the popular sphere the same comparison of liberalism versus autocracy was a powerful component in the development of the idea of a German Menace to the British Empire.

**German Covetousness**

Foreign jealousy was a recurrent theme in British imperial anxieties. Germany’s actions towards the Transvaal meant that it was quickly attributed the same envy and jealousy that had previously been associated with France or Russia. The initial surprise of Germany’s interference provoked both shock and anger; a previous friend, and more importantly an underestimated threat had challenged Britain. Joseph Chamberlain remarked in late January:

A few weeks ago we were startled by an extraordinary manifestation of hostility on the part of Germany - (hear, hear) - a manifestation the more surprising because it was totally unexpected and entirely unprovoked (hear, hear).

The element of surprise and the lack of any warning of Germany’s ambitions in South Africa led to the press conducting an inquest as to the true meaning of the telegram.

The initial burst of fear and indignation was compounded by rumour-making and further revelations in press. Panic was compounded by revelations that not only had there been a verbal assault upon the British Empire, but that a physical assault had narrowly been averted. Rumour and fact were readily confused so that the truth – that a tiny force of German marines had nearly been ordered to march to Johannesburg with no further directions than to protect German property and civilians – was dismissed as cover for a much greater scheme. Even as the news of the Kaiser’s aggressive message hit British presses, rumours of conspiracy were already rife. The sensationalist *Pall Mall Gazette* ran a piece on the evening of 4 January which claimed President Kruger had been planning a coup against the Uitlander in the Transvaal. He allegedly aimed to ensure full Boer control of the Transvaal and install a proxy leader in charge of the neighbouring Orange Free State. Furthermore, it was claimed that Dr Leyds, Special Envoy for the Transvaal Republic in Europe, was ordered to Europe with a purpose of money to purchase press support for the Boer Republic against Britain. Though entirely unsubstantiated, this conspiracy theory received considerable attention across the British and wider Anglophone press over the next few days.

The German Government, as stated above, had announced that had Jameson’s Raid not failed, they were prepared to send a small force of marines to secure German lives and property in Pretoria and Johannesburg against any armed insurrection. This calculated gesture was designed by the German Government to test the resolve of the British Government. However, rumours and exaggeration in the British press provoked the public into an angered frenzy; the *Manchester Guardian*’s London correspondent observed: ‘I have not met a single person in any rank of life who has not unhesitatingly declared that if Germany were to adopt this course it would constitute a casus belli...’ Throughout the crisis a variety of conspiracy theories were developed out of this relatively minor but potentially insulting German plan. The *Sydney Morning Herald* reported upon ‘alarming disclosures’, a ‘huge anti-British scheme’ with ‘German cruisers ordered to South Africa’, William Stead’s non-partisan and highly sensationalist *Review of Reviews* referred in its February edition to ‘German Designs in South Africa: The Conspiracy in the Transvaal’. Added to the Delagoa Bay concerns, other conspiracy theories appeared. The *Pall Mall Gazette*, foreman of the rumour mill, reported an interview with ‘Mr. H.B. Abercrombie, a well-known Transvaal mining man,’

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118 *Pall Mall Gazette*, 3 January 1896.
119 *Brisbane Courier*, 6 January 1896; *Sydney Morning Herald* (NSW), 6 January 1896.
120 *Manchester Guardian*, 6 January 1896.
121 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 January 1896.
who claimed that German intrigue had ‘forced matters’. The Manchester Guardian alluded to other rumours of ‘conspiracy number two’ (following that of the Pall Mall Gazette in early January) originating in Cape Town, suggesting a deliberate ploy by the Transvaal Government to ‘whip up conflict’ between Britain and Germany. Though many of the stories contained little or no accurate information, they reveal much about the state of the popular British consciousness in this period.

Alleged ‘German-Boer Intrigue’ was commonly discussed, and the pro-Conservative Aberdeen Journal even suggested the supposed conspiracies were a distraction for a sudden invasion of Britain. The Aberdeen Journal then highlighted a letter to the Times from Major-General Alex Elliot, a veteran of the Crimean War, which claimed that a conversation with Count von Blumenthal ‘some years ago’ revealed that ‘the Germans had a matured scheme for the invasion of England’. In response to the suggestion that the British Navy would stand in their path, Blumenthal supposedly claimed:

> Oh...we should hope and expect to have diverted your navy to other parts of the world by centring interests, and of course we should be prepared for the loss of some of our columns through contact with the Channel Squadron.

The fact that this letter made it into the Aberdeen Journal’s Leaders page shows the morbid fascination which gripped public opinion during the crisis. Similarly, the Morning Post debated the likelihood of an invasion of Britain. It wished to offer ‘the assurance of unanimous support from the public’ and to prepare the public for the struggles ahead, and of the role of the Navy in preventing any invasion. The tone of the whole article was intensely patriotic, but also anxious; the Morning Post sought to reassure its readership, and perhaps itself, that Britain could stand up to any challenge. Not only does this represent an early example of anti-German invasion anxiety, but also suggests the ubiquity of rumours and the propensity of the press to intensify anxiety. Furthermore, it indicates that links were made between an imperial threat – in this case a distraction in South Africa – and a threat to the metropole. This conceptual link would grow to be increasingly important in the following decade. Many of the conspiracy stories contained little or no evidence, but their popularity reveals the state of British popular sentiment.

Many newspapers found it easy to explain German actions in terms of plots and intrigues. Rising patriotism, combined with contemporary anxieties concerning imperial defence, gave further impetus to conspiracy-related explanations of German policies. Reports from Valentine Chirol, Berlin correspondent of the Times, suggested Germany had advanced a ‘long projected scheme’ to interfere with British interests in South Africa. The theme of German conspiracy and covetousness had spread as far away in the British Empire as Tasmania; the Launceston Examiner commented:

> [i]the increase of territory gradually being obtained by Great Britain in the Dark Continent and the great increase of British population had aroused the jealousy of the Germans, and it was proposed to make a great effort to check the progress.

The Evening News commented that Germany, ‘an enemy of a very different calibre’ had ‘been worked up by jealousy of our extending Empire and the comparative failure of their own policy of colonial expansion to the point of provoking war.’ The telegram alone was not the key to this opinion, but the suspected activities around Delagoa Bay were suggested as evidence of Germany’s secret plans and brooding envy. Later the Evening News even argued that France had declined as a threat and that Britain should attempt to come to ‘a peaceful yet honourable solution’ with America; yet this was no cause to fear any less for the security of the

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124 Ibid; ‘German Designs In South Africa: The Conspiracy in the Transvaal’, pp. 137–9; Sydney Morning Herald, 6 January 1896; Aberdeen Journal, 10 January 1896.
125 Aberdeen Journal, 10 January 1896.
126 Morning Post, 6 January 1896.
127 Launceston Examiner, (Tasmania), 9 January 1896.
128 Evening News, 8 January 1896.
Empire. With ‘Germany jealous to striking point’ Britain should turn again to manning the ‘splendid’ Navy and defending its interests across the world. Evidently the *Evening News* was thinking in terms of a pan-imperial state of readiness against the assumed threat of covetous and seditious enemy powers. The *Times* remarked upon the ‘unprovoked’ hostility in Germany towards Britain, and argued defiantly that Britain had not been ‘thrown off our balance by the disclosure of unsuspected jealousy and rancour’. The link between previous imperial fears – France and Russia – and Germany’s entry emergence as a new menace to Empire was immediately made by the *Yorkshire Herald*. As soon as news of the telegram arrived, the *Herald* explained Germany’s policy originated in ‘the jealousy with which our unquestionable strength is regarded’. The *Herald* spelled out that with its action, Germany had joined France and Russia as a major threat to Empire. Thomas Gibson Bowles wrote to the *Morning Post* in order to urge that ‘the English people at last…see and understand’ that Germany was ‘the permanent antagonist of England. Many referred directly to the themes of German covetousness and jealousy, suggesting that these ideas were increasingly common, and that imperial anxieties were prevalent. When Parliament sat in February, the Earl of Rosslyn commented on the Kruger Telegram, recommending that Britons: 

remember that the very greatness of a nation such as ours is may in itself become the source of envy and hostility on the part of others, and strong though we may be, in view of all that has recently occurred, we should devote ourselves still further to Imperial Defence, to protect not only our country but our possessions, to protect not only these but our commercial interests.

Rosslyn expressed the sense of isolation felt in Britain, the recognition of an embattled position in the world, and the assumption that other nations, and especially Germany, were a menace to British imperial, as well as domestic, interests. This sense of embattlement and international jealousy was present again during debates about shipping in the House of Commons in April, when Mr. W. Allan argued that recent events made clear that ‘[t]he commercial success of Great Britain had undoubtedly created a feeling of jealousy among other nations’. Such statements convey a sense of both the arrogance of British imperialism around the turn of the twentieth century, but also the inherent contradiction of this confidence – that other powers were seeking to steal it away, and threaten Britain’s favourable position. The *Economist* commented on the mood in international affairs in March 1896, explaining that recent months had led to the ‘depression’ of statesmen, with all nations in a ‘snarling mood…fiercely jealous of each other’ and ‘armed to the teeth.’ These examples illustrate the general sense anxiety about imperial affairs, and the precarious and isolated position of the British Empire. They also show how quickly such anxieties had been transposed onto Germany. This jealous new imperial enemy seemed to covet British possessions and was willing to try to steal them away.

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130 *The Times*, 7 January 1896.  
131 *Yorkshire Herald*, 6 January 1896.  
132 *Morning Post*, 7 January 1896.  
135 ‘The Depression Among Statesmen’, *Economist* (March 1896), p. 322  
136 ‘That a deep feeling of jealousy and envy should be engendered among them by our signal success in colonizing would, if true, be hardly other than natural.’ Aegir, G., ‘A Lesson in German’, pp. 177–92.
Causes of the Unprecedented Outburst

There is no simple explanation for why the British response to the Kruger Telegram was so virulent. There had been public disputes between Germany and Britain in the few years before 1896, but these were minor, peripheral and short-lived incidents with little popular impact.\textsuperscript{137} The Kaiser had been subjected to British press criticism in the past but this was by no means consistent. There was a general sense that Germany’s ‘Neuer Kurs’ made it increasingly active both in Europe and as an imperial power. Before the Kruger Telegram Crisis, however, there had never been anything like the anger and abuse directed either at Germany or at the Kaiser himself. Before 1896 Germany had occupied the position of a rising competitor; the term ‘made in Germany’ was levelled at German firms as a term of abuse for cheap sub-standard goods.\textsuperscript{138} Similarly, there had been sporadic concern about German methods of imperialism, the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty (1890) and numerous other minor incidents. The Kruger Telegram Crisis marked a key turning point in popular perceptions, and pre-existing concerns began to crystallize into a much more cohesive cluster of ideas about a German Menace to empire.

Before 1896, Wilhelm’s ‘qualities’ as a leader were relatively well-known. He was recognized as someone young and impulsive, who had taken some dubious decisions with regard to the Ottoman Empire and the Armenian Crisis.\textsuperscript{139} In a period where royal heads of state achieved celebrity status, Wilhelm had always been one of the biggest column-fillers; his decisive and divisive acts, speeches and policies attracted international attention throughout his reign. He had nevertheless, as the grandson of Queen Victoria, been warmly welcomed to Britain. Regular visits had rendered him a popular figure, and crowds always turned out to greet him.\textsuperscript{140} This ‘kinship’ which was so often referenced prior to and after 1896, should be seen as one cause of the initial anger created by the telegram. As opinion built up in the press, on the streets and in the music hall, a sense of betrayal coloured the popular perception. This previous ‘special relationship’ had set Germany and Wilhelm up for the inevitable disillusionment which would occur as British and German interests clashed. One contributor to the Pall Mall Gazette questioned what Britain’s ‘ostentatious friendship towards Germany’ had gained them; the favours and generosity Britain had supposedly offered to Germany had been reciprocated with envy and malice. The contributor went on to criticise the British press for treating the man ‘whom you of the press persist in calling “Kaiser”,’ that “enfant terrible” with such past warmth and kindness.\textsuperscript{141} The sense of betrayal was contrasted with British friendship and neutrality, and made Wilhelm’s gesture seem even more outrageous.

A key component of the Kruger Telegram Crisis was the geographical specificity of the imperial threat. Germany had chosen to interfere in South Africa, one of the most recognisably important and highly valued British imperial assets. Over the nineteenth century the British Empire had developed from a predominantly economic enterprise, to a much more territorially focussed entity, especially in India where economic exploitation was gradually replaced by an impulse to control and to ‘improve’.\textsuperscript{142} Outside of India, however, several more recent imperial interests had developed in importance as the economic value of the ‘jewel’ declined. As well as informal interests in South America and the Far East, British imperialists increasingly
saw North Africa and South Africa as vital to the continuance of British global commercial dominance. During the 1880s Britain seized control of Egypt, and consequently dominated the Suez Canal. This was a vital move to guarantee a fast link between Europe and India, but Suez was surrounded by potentially hostile strategic powers, and maintaining another route to India was vital - both economically and strategically - to the security of Empire. The Cape Colony therefore was an essential element in the British imperial network, acting to guarantee British naval and commercial supremacy between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.143 Any potential threat to British security and dominance in South Africa was viewed as crucial by both the British Government and in British popular culture. The prestige of the British Raj was guaranteed by these vital strategic points.144

South Africa was also important because of its inherent value. A key site in this period for British emigration, it was populated by growing numbers of white British settlers; the Cape Colony and Rhodesia were increasingly recognised as valuable imperial territories. Cecil Rhodes was lauded in Britain as a great imperialist for his successes in expanding British influence northwards from the Cape. The temperate climate of South Africa made it appealing to British emigrants seeking to ‘make it rich’ in supposedly virgin territory. Of much greater value however, were the vast untapped mineral resources of the region. South Africa remains today an exporter of vast quantities of diamonds, and possesses substantial mineral deposits of gold, platinum and other precious metals. The tensions between the Boer Republics and the British between 1880 and 1902 were inevitably linked to this mineral wealth. The importance of gold, in particular, was vital to the on-going international influence of Britain, and it should not be underestimated as a factor in on-going Anglo-Boer tensions and intrigue.145

South Africa, then, was valuable to Britain both as a strategic asset, and as a possession in its own right. A year before the Jameson Raid, British Foreign Secretary Lord Kimberley had warned Berlin that, ‘the Cape Colony was perhaps the most vital interest of Great Britain because by the possession of it communication with India was assured… [it was] of even greater importance to England than Malta or Gibraltar.’146 South Africa had a special place at the heart of late nineteenth century imperialism and it was hotly defended when challenges to British control were presented. British entrepreneurs and financial interests sought the raw materials on offer there too, and their substantial influence upon the government should also be considered. South Africa was recognised by the public as the site for famous imperial triumphs under Rhodes, but even more so for its value to the imperial economy.147 This offers only part of the explanation for the strength of the reaction to the Kruger Telegram, and the surge of popular imperialism during the later South African War.

It is necessary to look to factors beyond the Anglo-German relationship to understand the nature outburst. The growing importance of imperial anxieties over the 1880s and 1890s represents a key convergence. The sense of increasing danger to the Empire, now increasingly appreciated by the British public, had pushed public perception into a state of tension. Recent events such as the 1885 Penjdeh Incident, naval scares in the late 1880s and the signature of the Franco-Russian Treaty in 1894 had impacted heavily upon popular debates in Britain. Britain’s potential enemies appeared to be moving closer together. In popular culture, the sense that Britain possessed a valuable, yet weak and bloated empire combined with the assumed jealousies of other powers. In the short term, tension during 1895 over the Armenian Crisis, continued imperial insecurity in Africa, and the Venezuela Crisis in December 1895 gave the British serious cause for concern. With America turning its ire sharply upon the British imperial project, it seemed that

143 See Mahan's influential thesis in which he described the importance of England, Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden, Cape Town, India, Singapore, and Hong Kong as key strategic points for the maintenance of imperial control; Mahan, A.T., *The Influence of Sea Power on History* (Boston, 1890).
144 This was the same case with Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands which acted as bastions of naval dominance and guaranteed the networks of Empire.
147 As seen for example during the 1906 election in which conflict over foreign labour in the Transvaal was an important electoral issue. See Auerbach, S., *Race, Law and “The Chinese Puzzle” in Imperial Britain* (2009).
almost every power of any significance had developed an acute sense of anglophobic jealousy, and a willingness to confront British interests, politically or otherwise.

The popular reaction to the Kruger Telegram was so strong because of a coalescence of several key factors: the wider imperial anxiety and defensive popular patriotism meant any threat to the British Empire was received with a heightened sense of panic and resultant aggression. The specific character traits attached to Wilhelm’s Germany in the few years before also exacerbated matters, while the seemingly absolutist nature of the Kaiser’s intervention, added to the perception of underhand German conspiracies, aligned fittingly with Britain’s past experience of external threats to the Empire. Finally, by the mid-1890s South Africa was an increasingly important imperial possession. During the South African War, both officials and the general public recognised that this potentially rich and valuable ‘white’ colony was a particularly sensitive and valued part of the imperial system, defending the route to India and producing valuable mineral wealth. An attack upon a valued imperial possession, by a new menacing power, in a period of great sensitivity produced the uproar of January 1896.

The Aftermath of the Crisis

On 18 January 1896, only a few weeks after the infamous telegram, Wilhelm II announced, in a speech celebrating the twenty fifth anniversary of German unification, that Germany was now a ‘World Empire’. The speech, in recent studies, has been seen to represent a key change in the course of German foreign policy, towards Weltpolitik, which characterised its official planning after 1896.\textsuperscript{148} As the popular uproar over the Kruger Telegram Crisis abated, and diplomatic tension subsided, this new revelation combined with existing narratives and over the following years it was increasingly recognised as a portentous revelation.\textsuperscript{149} This also represents a vital unifying factor in the establishment of the trope of an imperial German Menace. The press responded quickly to the ‘World Empire Speech’. An article in the \textit{Fortnightly Review}, an intellectual journal, offered ‘A Lesson in German’, which emphasised the treacherousness of German foreign policy over the past twenty five years drawn directly from the ‘Machiavellian school’ of foreign politics. In retrospect, the author argued, Germany followed the rule: ‘let enemies and friends perish, if only Germany can scrape together enough to live.’\textsuperscript{150} Another ‘high-cultural’ journal, the \textit{Contemporary Review}, discussed the past twenty five years of ‘Germany Under the Empire’, giving numerous examples of the cruelties of lese-majesté and terrible treatment of ordinary people in Germany.\textsuperscript{151} That same authoritarian regime also presented a danger to Britain too: ‘England is just now, with respect to Germany, in the position of the man who dare not even look over the hedge whilst another may with impunity steal the horse.’\textsuperscript{152}

The Kruger Telegram had increasingly led the press to imagine Germany as a covetous and untrustworthy enemy. Wilhelm’s speech on 18 January added to these prevailing suspicions; it was increasingly acknowledged that Germany desired her own empire and that this new colonial empire would

\textsuperscript{148} Seligmann, M.S., \textit{Rivalry in Southern Africa}, p. 119.
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Morning Post}, 20 January 1896; \textit{The Times}, 20 January 1896.
\textsuperscript{150} Aegir, G., ‘A Lesson in German’, pp. 177–92.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., pp. 167, 170, 176.
need to come at the expense of Britain. Responding to the speech, the *Morning Post* offered a summary of the current state of British imperial anxieties on 20 January:

> Russia may at any time set out on her mission of upsetting the British Empire in India; France has an old account to settle with Great Britain; and therefore the Franco-Russian Alliance may at any moment come to be directed against England. That moment will be Germany’s opportunity; that will be the time for Germany to carry out her anti-British intentions in South Africa. Nothing could be plainer. German policy is to take such parts of the British Empire as she covets, and the chosen means is, if possible, to egg on France and Russia to attack England, to give them a pledge of German neutrality, and then, when England has her hands full, to extort from her embarrassments concessions which Germany can neither claim as a right nor extort by her own exertions.

Germany was depicted as a scheming opportunist, seeking to steal away ‘parts of the British Empire...she covets’. At this time the spectre of a Franco-Russian alliance still loomed large in the popular imagination, but with the Kaiser’s two recent announcements of his imperial intentions – the telegram and the speech – Germany was included in an anxious imperial world view.

On the same day the *Pall Mall Gazette* also commented upon these new global German ambitions, scornfully dismissing life in Germany’s colonies as ‘unendurable’. Furthermore, the *Pall Mall Gazette* suggested that the speech might indicate that Wilhelm was ‘thinking of yet further annexations, the Transvaal, maybe, or India.’ Such reports indicate the way that Germany was increasingly being conceived of as a menace to all parts of the empire, even including India. If the telegram had announced Germany as a new potential enemy, the ‘World Empire Speech’ had confirmed to the British imagination that its anxieties were well founded. The speech served to crystallize many of the imagined menaces of the past month. Those who had warned of an imperial menace during the first weeks of the Kruger Telegram Crisis appeared to have been vindicated by this ignominious announcement of German imperial expansionism.

In February 1896 a revealing article, indulging in then prevalent racial theory, predicted the future path of British foreign policy. In ominous fashion “A Biologist” argued that in the coming epoch all races would face a ‘struggle to the death’; ‘when two growing nations find no room for expansion save by compression of one.’ The article warned that the most immediate threat was posed by Germany:

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153 Reynolds’s Newspaper, 12 January 1896.
154 *Morning Post*, 20 January 1896.
155 *Pall Mall Gazette*, 20 January 1896.
Here is the first great racial struggle of the future: here are two growing nations pressing against each other, man to man all over the world. One or the other has to go; one or the other will go.

The gathering fear of Germany as an imperial menace was clearly in evidence. Germany represented a world-wide existential threat to British interests and a titanic struggle was predicted before this could be revolved. This fascinating example of Social Darwinism links importantly to themes of imperial anxiety, potential degeneration and a struggle to the death for national survival.\textsuperscript{156} Here is evidence for a perceptible paradigm shift in the perception of Germany. There had been concerns about the aims and objectives of the Kaiser’s government before 1896, but the Kruger Telegram Crisis and the announcement of Germany’s ‘World Empire’ had shifted debates towards a more generalised fear of the German imperial menace. Many others joined in expressing their deep concerns about ‘an underhand influence that thwarted or hampered us wherever our interests were most deeply involved.’ German interference, claimed the \textit{Saturday Review}, had caused ‘our Colonies in Africa and Australasia [to be] wild with fear and anger’ and was universally hated throughout the empire.\textsuperscript{157} There was gathering opinion that Germany could not be trusted. In this age of imperial power struggles the inevitable conclusion was that Germany’s ambition for an overseas empire, allied to a ‘proven’ tendency for deceitfulness made her a significant threat to Britain and her Empire.\textsuperscript{158}

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The Legacy of the Kruger Telegram,
1896-1902

The end of the Victorian age was marked out by imperial antagonism, colonial wars, socio-economic disruption and international tribulations. The imperial anxieties of the 1880s and 1890s continued to feature strongly in British press, politics and literature, and reached a new high during the South African War. In an increasingly insecure international climate questions were raised about the way society, the army, the navy and the economy were organised. This chapter will describe how the British perception of an imperial German Menace developed over the period 1896-1902. The tropes about Germany, which began to rapidly crystallize during the Kruger Telegram Crisis, developed and coalesced into a more coherent idea during the following six years. Initially propounded by imperialist or conservative interest groups, persuasive and populist stereotypes gathered authenticity through a variety of domestic and international developments, to the extent that there was a much clearer and more coherent perception of a holistic German Menace to the British Empire. Contrary to past historiographical focus, imperial antagonism, particularly inspired by the Kruger Telegram, was crucial in the development of anxiety and antipathy towards Germany. Furthermore, this period, previously viewed as less central to the development of Anglo-German popular antagonism than the later naval armaments race, was in fact instrumental in laying the foundations for coherently formed stereotypes about Germany. By the dawn of the Dreadnought race (from 1904) the British popular imagination was already well versed in the themes of the German Menace.

Britain and Germany in International Context

Mit einem Worte: wir wollen niemand in den Schatten stellen, aber wir verlangen auch unseren Platz an der Sonne.
Graf Bernhard von Bülow, Speech to the German Reichstag, 6 December 1897

From February 1896 to mid-1897 British foreign and colonial policy was focussed upon imperial matters, such as on-going wars in Sudan and Ghana. The Eastern Question continued to trouble European foreign offices and governments, outwardly Anglo-German international relations were placid, though there remained lingering resentment both diplomatically and more open aggression in popular discourse. This

2 The Times, 1 January 1896; Manchester Guardian, 9 September 1896; Observer, 9 February 1896.
relatively peaceful period in international events was ended by German activities in the Far East; between 1897 and 1899 the German Government moved toward an overtly imperial and global foreign policy, so called ‘Weltpolitik’. Chancellor Bülow’s famous ‘Platz an der Sonne’ speech was one of a number of stark announcements that Germany was now a world power with global interests. Germany pursued an increasingly aggressive course in various areas of the world.  

The cycle of German expansionism and British press anger became well-established. Germany’s actions provided the ammunition for British press and literature to exaggerate, embellish and criticise Germany and its actions and methods. These outbursts of anxiety then laid the foundation for greater sensitivity to each following act of German foreign policy.

In the winter of 1897 the German Reichsmarine forcefully established a new imperial possession on Chinese soil. The murder of two German missionaries by locals in the Shandong peninsula provided the excuse necessary for the German Navy to occupy the Chinese city-port of Tsingtao and the harbour of Kiaochau. After landing marines under the guns of a fleet of cruisers on 14 November 1897, Germany established de facto commercial and organisational control over first the port, and then the wider Shandong peninsula. The newly modernised port became a vital strategic possession for Germany, with a strong harbour acting as a base of operations for the German Pacific fleet, as a bonus it became a hub for economic activity and trade acted as the main port for the whole region. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the newly appointed Secretary of State for the Imperial German Navy was instrumental in the selection and acquisition of Kiaochau. The establishment of a colony at Tsingtao was a well-aimed propaganda coup, and played a key role in the eventual passing of the First Naval Law in March 1898. In Britain, this new German imperial activity was well noted, and concern grew over the character of Wilhelm’s autocratic expansionism. Russia, France and Britain soon responded by seizing their own territories along the Chinese coast in order not to miss out on any potential imperial ‘scramble’.

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4 Schrecker, J.E., Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism: Germany in Shantung (Cambridge, 1964); Moses, J.A. & Kennedy, P.M. (eds), Germany in the Pacific and Far East, 1870-1914 (St Lucia, Queensland and Hemel Hempstead, 1977); Howe, K., Kiste, R., & Lal, B., Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century (Honolulu, 1994).
7 Massie, R.K., Dreadnought, p. 171.
8 Ibid.
9 See Britain: Wei-hai-wei; France: Kwang-Chou-Wan. Kennedy, P.M., Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 234. Salisbury’s British Government were disturbed both by the increasing threat of Germany to China, and by Russia’s increasing dominance in Northern China. As T.G. Otte has argued, the British move to seize Wei-hai-Wei in 1898 was not so much a challenge to Russian imperialism, as a plan to check German expansion in the area. In the British press the actions of Russia and Germany were met with equal concern. Otte, T.G., ‘Far-Eastern Crisis’, pp. 115–79.
Across the world, in China, the Middle East, the Caribbean, Africa and the Pacific, Imperial Germany was an increasingly active force. In the Caribbean, German naval and colonial policy showed its increasingly aggressive nature during the Lüders Affair in Haiti. The bullying tactics of the German Navy in the Caribbean and the Pacific attracted attention in many British press articles. During the Spanish–American War (1898–99) Germany provoked Anglo-American suspicion with her jockeying for control of the Spanish Philippines. The global posturing of Germany was both noted and deplored in the British press. In 1899 Wilhelm and his advisors succeeded in procuring rights from the Ottoman Government for the construction of a railway which would eventually link Berlin to the Persian Gulf. The Kaiser’s continuing warmth toward the Turks went against the wishes of the other European imperial powers, who viewed Turkey as a major problem for continuing peace, and continued to battle for the rights of Armenian Christians. Through 1898 and 1899 another imperial clash in the Pacific islands of Samoa saw British, American and German imperial endeavour faced against one another. Although a peaceful settlement was achieved, a storm of German press attention surrounded these discussions, and was only worsened by Kaiser Wilhelm’s visit to Britain in November 1899. There was increasing recognition that the German public clamoured for greater colonial possessions and Britain was the power which stood most in its path. During the South African War, the German press and public indicated their antipathy towards Britain with loud declarations of hatred for Britain. At Britain’s weakest moment, Germany seemed to have shown itself to be spiteful and jealous.

11 McMurray, J.S., Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, CT, 2001), p. 32.
12 Through the 1880s and 1890s Germany had established colonial occupation of several islands across the South and Mid Pacific, but the islands of Samoa generated the greatest debate in German, British and American press and politics. Britain, Germany and USA all laid claim to the islands over the course of the nineteenth century. Competing interests there generated a great deal of debate in the British press regarding the islands, and their strategic and commercial importance. After ten years of shared rule of Samoa from 1889, the widespread unrest across the islands led the three interested powers, Germany, Britain and the USA to resolve their territorial disputes once and for all with the Tripartite Convention of 1899. A failed international conference in 1887 led to armed conflict in the Samoan islands, with nationals of Samoa over the course of the nineteenth century. Competing interests there generated a great deal of debate in the British press regarding the islands, and their strategic and commercial importance. After ten years of shared rule of Samoa from 1889, the widespread unrest across the islands led the three interested powers, Germany, Britain and the USA to resolve their territorial disputes once and for all with the Tripartite Convention of 1899. A failed international conference in 1887 led to armed conflict in the Samoan islands, with nationals of Samoa generating the greatest debate in German, British and American press and politics. Britain, Germany and USA all laid claim to the islands over the course of the nineteenth century. Competing interests there generated a great deal of debate in the British press regarding the islands, and their strategic and commercial importance.
14 Kennedy, P.M., Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American Relations, 1878-1900 (Dublin, 1974).

The Landing of Troops at Kiao Chau, November 1897

Although a peaceful settlement was achieved, a storm of German press attention surrounded these discussions, and was only worsened by Kaiser Wilhelm’s visit to Britain in November 1899. There was increasing recognition that the German public clamoured for greater colonial possessions and Britain was the power which stood most in its path. During the South African War, the German press and public indicated their antipathy towards Britain with loud declarations of hatred for Britain. At Britain’s weakest moment, Germany seemed to have shown itself to be spiteful and jealous.
Events during the Boxer Rebellion reemphasised the autocratic and brutal nature of Germany and its own brand of imperialism.

In the established historiography the naval race, which commenced in full after 1904, has been allowed to colour events prior to the outbreak of open strategic antagonism. The calls for naval expansion in the German Reichstag between 1897 and 1903 should not, however, be seen as the domestic or home defence issue that it later became. Instead, the attention paid to the German Naval Bills in 1897 and 1900 was marked specifically by imperial anxiety. Germany avowedly desired a navy to protect its ‘World Empire’ and to project global influence. Thus, the British press conceived of German naval expansion in terms of a global and imperial threat. Predominantly Conservative naval theorists warned of the globalised aggression and ambition of Germany; these polemicists warned that Germany had designs across the world: South America, South Africa, the Ottoman Middle East, China, the Pacific and even the Balkans. Such views were closely associated with the themes developed during the Kruger Telegram crisis, and their fears, though based on naval power, were part of a tradition of imperial anxiety. Unlike the later naval race, the German Menace in this period remained resolutely imperial, seen in terms of global perspective rather than home defence.

The development of this imperial anxiety was aided by real changes in the outward face of German imperial policy and in radical changes in the British domestic and imperial situation. The increased activity in German foreign policy combined with significant domestic social and cultural insecurity provided the ammunition for popular cultural outlets to expand upon the ideological archive of anti-German tropes firmly crystallized in January 1896. By indicating how active Germany became after 1896 and the stresses placed upon Britain during the South African War, this chapter aims to demonstrate the links between stereotype formation and real-time events. Although the Kruger Telegram was a vitally important event in changing perceptions of Germany, these tropes would be unlikely to maintain lasting importance without the repeated warnings and prophesies offered in popular discourse, and the authenticity they were able to draw from German foreign policy.

The German Economic Menace after the Kruger Telegram

Austerities, simplicities, and a common danger breed virtues and devotions which are the parents of prosperity. Prosperity breeds arrogance, extravagance and class hatreds. Opulence and pride in their turn breed national disasters.


In the wake of the Kruger Telegram Crisis this anxiety about Germany as a new economic powerhouse gained popular currency through a number of popular books and a barrage of press coverage. The most successful proponent of this perceived menace was Ernest E. Williams who became something of a national celebrity as a result of his most successful work, Made in Germany (July, 1896). Though there was an awareness of growing commercial rivalry, until 1896 German goods were viewed as substandard and unthreatening. However, the phrase ‘Made in Germany’ assumed a much more threatening implication in January 1896. On 4 January 1896 the Pall Mall Gazette revealed its initial reaction to the Kruger Telegram

15 Times of India, 25 November 1897; The Times, 30 November 1897.
16 The Times, 7 December 1897; The Times, 8 December 1897; The Times, 17 December 1897; Morning Post, 29 November 1897; The Times, 3 December 1897; The Times, 28 December 1897.
20 Kennedy, P.M., Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 56–57.
with the headline: ‘Made in Germany’.21 In a call-back to the previous debates over German competition and interference, the Pall Mall Gazette reinvigorated the old catchphrase.

E.E. Williams’ book Made in Germany, first serialised from January in the New Review and published as a book in July 1896, posited that Germany was fast overtaking Britain in every statistical aspect and soon Britain’s power and influence would be subverted in favour of Germany.22 The events of January 1896 pushed Williams’ argument to the forefront of the national debate. It caused a great stir across the newspapers, received both criticism and praise, and continued to sell and be debated for years afterwards. Williams was a trade protectionist and used the threat of Germany to sell his argument. He was determined to counter the opinion that he was merely a protectionist reformer, arguing that the threat of Germany transcended the debate. By deploying Germany as his antagonist, Williams gave birth to a popular narrative which gathered pace from 1896. It helped to inspire the later Tariff Reform movement and the ideas behind ‘national efficiency’, and also pushed the menace of Germany towards the mainstream of British popular imagination.

In his first article, ‘The Departing Glory’, Williams opened with the Wellsian prophesy: ‘The industrial glory of England is departing and England does not know it.’23 He was concerned that Britain was sitting idly by whilst other more vigorous nations superseded them. The old usage of the phrase ‘Made in Germany’ was ‘raw material for a jape at the pantomime...But the nation at large is yet as little alive to the impending danger as to the evil already wrought.’ Williams’ concluded with comments typical of the sensationalist and depressive malaise often associated with fin-de-siècle British thought:

> We have seen agriculture...hopelessly depressed, and as little able to save us as the faded deities of Rome the falling Empire. Now we see our new gods deserting us for other nations. Industrial depression has of late years been the rule, instead of the exception. Our population is still waxing, and our means of providing it with an income are dwindling. Is it not time to look things squarely in the face?24

This mind-set was increasingly popular; as mentioned above, there was much agitation for reform during this period, embodied in the movement for national efficiency, army, naval and educational reform, calls for conscription and tariff reform. Invoking the rhetoric of decline and regeneration, Williams tapped into a popular debate, increased in its popular appeal by the employment of the ‘German’ as the foil. The sudden arrival, as it seemed, of Germany to the international ball-game had inspired a great interest in their affairs.

Williams utilised the increasing sense of a looming German danger to great success; by 1897 his book was already in its fifth edition with a great deal of popular support. Naturally some criticised Williams; including notable politicians such as John Morley (outspoken Liberal anti-interventionist); Joseph Chamberlain (at this time opposed to tariff reform, although a later U-turn in 1903 was of great significance); and Charles Ritchie (Conservative MP and President of the Board of Trade) driven by their support for free trade and laissez-faire politics.25 The fact that such major personalities felt it necessary to

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21 *Pall Mall Gazette*, 4 January 1896.
23 Williams, E.E., ‘Made in Germany: I. The Departing Glory’, p. 14; Later made the introduction of *Made in Germany* which was later released as a short book in June 1896 and Williams’ arguments were firmly laid out.
24 Williams was among a number of British commentators and journalists concerned by the long depression which Britain had been suffering since the early 1880s. He claimed to have ‘no brief of doctrine or remedy’ but was soon recognised by peers to stand in favour of protectionism – some method of defending British markets from unequal foreign competition. The central chapters of the book studied the five key industries where Britain lagged behind, and applied statistics and data to emphasise this. According to Williams, being soundly beaten in iron and steel, shipbuilding, machinery, textiles, chemicals and many other trades. The key areas of industry, perhaps most importantly in textiles, ships and steel, were what had granted Britain its privileged position; the implication was that if Britain lost out in these categories the results would be catastrophic. Williams blamed Germany for ‘national efficiency’ and their obsession with efficiency. He claimed his remedies were simple and easy to implement: to bring about ‘fair trade’ (protection for British goods); to form an Imperial Federation to protect British trade and guarantee a beneficial reciprocal relationship; provide subsidies for Transport; to overhaul the international British consular system to place well-trained men at industrial centres; and most importantly to improve education in order to provide a more productive workforce. Williams, E.E., ‘Made In Germany: IV. Textiles’, p. 376.
25 *Pall Mall Gazette*, 2 February 1897; *Pall Mall Gazette*, 23 January 1897; *Pall Mall Gazette*, 8 February 1897.
challenge Williams, both in his insinuation of British failings, and also in his usage of the German ‘menace’ as a motivating factor, indicates the importance of the ‘Made in Germany’ debate.

Many others joined Williams in warning of the doom which Britain would face as a result of the attitude of denial. April 1896’s edition of the National Review critiqued the ‘Made in Germany’ articles, arguing that they although it was ‘triumphantly proved by the clever critics to contain many confused statistics, and…obviously vitiated by its author’s prejudice in favour of Protection,’ the message should not be ignored. In reporting this article the Review of Reviews argued that ‘many good ostrich-like citizens have gone to sleep thinking that the German scare was baseless’; these ‘slug-a-beds’ would do well to heed Sir Philip Magnus’s warnings, which were a ‘timely reminder’ of ‘the danger of German competition.’ Magnus was not original in his arguments that technical education, lower wages and government assistance were the key to German success, but both his article, in the view of the Review of Reviews give a clear indication of the concern amongst some in society about this growing menace, and the influence of the ‘Made in Germany’ dispute.26

In August 1896 the Daily Chronicle, a working-class liberal imperialist newspaper,27 inspired by Williams, published its own account of ‘the great peril’ in a series of articles entitled ‘The Truth about German Competition’; in response, the Saturday Review was delighted to remark that the Chronicle had joined Williams in highlighting the menace that German commercial competition posed. The underlying factor in all discussions of German trade and competition was undeniably the debate about continuation of free trade or a turn towards tariffs and state protection. The Saturday Review, although frustrated to find that the Chronicle had failed to see the true realities of German competition - that state-protection was the real answer to Britain’s economic woes - was pleased that another publication had joined the outcry against Germany.28 The Saturday Review and Daily Chronicle were amongst a growing number of periodical and daily publications to join the increasing body of opinion which expressed anxiety over the threat of a German ‘menace’ to British commerce and industry. In spite of the right-wing bias, even left-wing dailies and periodicals were forced to admit to some of the points raised, and many liberals were lured by the ideas of efficiency and the need for reform.

In this period commerce and industry were equated to world influence and security. If Britain was to remain the strongest power in the world it needed global trade networks and domestic industries protected in order to provide the goods to facilitate that trade. Lord Rosebery, Liberal Prime Minister (1894-1895) and political firebrand, was also amongst a number of prominent proponents of such views. At the opening of a new technical institute and art school at Epsom on 25 July, he was described by the Economist as speaking in ‘a somewhat alarmist way’ about German ‘encroachments upon our former industrial supremacy’. A strong advocate of Williams, Rosebery announced:

We are threatened…by one very formidable rival, at any rate, who…is encroaching on us as the sea encroaches on weak parts of the coast – I mean Germany.

The Economist was conceretly anti-Williams in its stance. It had previously attacked Made in Germany for the holes left in the statistics, something Williams disputed vociferously, but which was undoubtedly a fair criticism, given the volume of such critics.29 Nevertheless, the Economist was willing to look past its numerous misgivings in accepting that overall ‘German competition [was] a formidable factor’. But it did not believe that ‘the dolorous dirges of departed greatness in which it is so much the fashion to indulge’ were justified overall.30

30 ‘British V. German Trade’, Economist, 2762 (1 August 1896), pp. 996–7.
The high profile nature of this debate over a German Menace shows the change that had occurred in British popular discourse over the year following the Kruger Telegram. The debate moved towards a more widespread acceptance of the German desire to undermine Britain, and revolved more around whether or not this desire had reached fruition. After the Kruger Telegram Crisis debates in Britain had evidently shifted towards an increasing awareness of Germany and her growing global importance. As shown here, the menace was conceived in terms of global competition situated within the general pessimism engendered by the Great Depression which was still rumbling on. The manifestation of a Germany ‘boogy’ at the heart of British economic fears and consciousness implies its deep extent. This economic debate tying Germany and free trade versus protection together continued into the second half of the next decade; it was a key element in a complex of cultural and ideological aftershocks in the aftermath of January 1896.

As a result of the German seizure of Kia Chau British ‘theorists’ began to debate and predict the true meaning of Germany’s changing attitude. In January 1898’s Blackwood’s Magazine an article appeared entitled, ‘The German Peril’. As has been shown, there was an increasing tendency to couple ‘German’ with words such as ‘peril’, ‘danger’ or ‘menace’ in regard to a variety of events and areas of interest. Drawing on the ‘Made in Germany’ debate again, Blackwood’s piece began with the assertion that Germans ‘are simply eating into us in the vital parts, intercepting and draining off for their own use the stream of our national life, which is trade and manufactures’. This article is also strong evidence for the solid formation of the German stereotypes so commonplace in the next century:

…it appears that whichever way we turn we are confronted with a compact body, inspired by a definite purpose, to which we have to oppose a nebula of loose atoms…The whole situation is too plainly suggestive of a mob against an army.

In the view of this author Britain was a mob, too busy fighting itself to face such a ‘compact body’ with a definite purpose; the model of efficiency is depicted as a looming, faceless machine which has made a target of British trade and strength and is determined to meet it. Furthermore, Blackwood’s continued to argue that this overwhelming force has also been attacking British predominance all over the global empire: ‘They swarm over the South and Central American republics, over every British colony, and throughout the dominions of Islam. India is their happy hunting ground.’ For British thinkers and the public, Britain was constituted from its industry and dominated the world by trade. Without global commercial control the Empire could not exert its dominance; trade, the navy and the empire all represented constituent parts of the wider imperial whole. Concerns about German economic competition were one and the same as concerns about imperial antagonism.

The German Menace in Africa

After the Kruger Telegram, imperial competition and intrigue in South Africa continued to hold popular focus; as a result of the Kaiser’s interference in British African affairs, the British press were increasingly drawn to discuss Germany’s conduct in Africa. Germany was increasingly represented as an untrustworthy and dangerous influence upon British imperial interests. From 1896 to 1899 Germany was a regular topic for concern and criticism in the British press. Then, following the outbreak of the South African War, Germany continued its presence in popular discourse thanks to its popular anglophobia, and its importance

as a foil for campaigners for national efficiency. The South African War should be viewed as a specifically imperial period of crisis; in various ways Germany was seen as an increasing malign influence.

The Public Inquest into Germany after the Kruger Telegram

As argued in chapter two, a key theme to arise during the Kruger Telegram was the suspicion that Germany sought, through plots and conspiracies, to undermine and attack the British Empire. Especially focussed upon the Transvaal, over the following years this theme was drawn upon in various contexts; in fictional accounts, as well as in journalism, the recurrence of this theme suggests that the Kruger Telegram helped to establish an association between Germany and the idea of anti-imperial conspiracies. During this period British newspapers and authors became increasingly used to using terms such as ‘schemes’, ‘plots’, ‘ambitions’ and ‘aims’ in reference to Germany and her imperial ventures.  

Following the Kruger Telegram the negative stereotype of the ‘filching’ German ran through much of the commentary of Germany's imperial endeavours. Many commentaries on German colonial endeavour attacked Germany's colonies while complaining of the numbers of Germans stealing British trade from within the Empire's borders. The free trade which Germans enjoyed in the British Empire was lending them the upper hand in trade deals, as Germany protected its own commerce with preferential tariffs. A key aspect of this was the perceived clandestine nature of German colonial expansion; it was suspected that German merchants were the vanguard for German imperial expansion. William Greswell wrote in the Fortnightly Review that with ‘Official Germany’ only becoming a colonising power very recently, its influence in South Africa had been gained ‘mainly by intrigue’. This surreptitious action was something to be feared, Greswell continued:

We are reminded of the old story of the Hanse Cities and the merchants of the Steelyard over again. In the days of the Tudors enterprising Germans of the Free Towns came over to London, amid availing themselves of our insular supineness, began, under the protection of royalty and dynastic considerations, to filch away British trade from under the very noses of British merchants in London.

The filching German was cause for bitterness for a contributor for the Times, who complained that Britain had opened up all the global trade routes, postal services and frontiers and the Germans 'were enabled to take advantage of this' without any of their own investment. The writer used the example of Burma, where Germans were allowed to settle in droves and Africa; the British allowed Germans to trade in their ports and live freely amongst British colonialists. In light of the recent rift between the countries, the writer questioned whether these 'favourable terms' should be withdrawn. The Saturday Review was similarly 'conscious of an underhand influence that thwarted or hampered us wherever our interests were most deeply involved.' German interference, it was stated, had caused 'our Colonies in Africa and Australasia [to be] wild with fear and anger'. The awareness of a new enemy had the result that 'from London to the most distant Colony the name of Germany has become a thing of dislike and distrust quite as intense as that entertained towards France a century ago'. The strength of this opinion shows the extent of change in popular discourse over 1896, and concluded with a sting: 'She has only shown us how very ill-mannered and untrustworthy her diplomacy is, and how necessary it is for us to maintain in her regard an attitude of watchful distrust.'

The idea of Germany as untrustworthy and covetous swept into British popular discourse: many argued that Germany leched off Britain's hard earned imperial gains, aimed to subvert British imperial activity, and

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34 The Times, 8 January 1896.
35 'The Failure of Germany', p. 434.
had deliberately undermined British colonial rule in South Africa. After the Kruger Telegram at the beginning of 1896, there was a brief lull in official Anglo-German imperial antagonism; during this period journalists and authors, predominantly of an imperialist and nationalist persuasion, reminded the public of Germany’s treachery and untrustworthiness. Suspicions had been thoroughly raised by Germany’s actions, and the expectation was that Germany would attempt to strike again in future; talk of military spending and armaments was rife as a result. Britain’s most valued asset – the Empire – was worth the cost in the minds of many. With the rhetoric of industrial decline, and the perception that Germany had surpassed Britain in that aspect, the Empire was growing in ideological importance as a vestige of ‘greatness’ for Britain; it took special focus in the increasing popular distrust of Germany, and therefore lay at the heart of the growing image of Germany in the popular mind as a key foundation stone.

Less than a year after the crisis, as the first ‘histories’ were being written about events at the beginning of 1896. Many focussed upon the ‘African Crisis’ seeking to reveal the context and reasoning behind Jameson’s blunder, and the failure of the Uitlander of Johannesburg to rise up against Boer ‘oppression’. Such accounts helped to perpetuate the tropes established in January 1896. In June 1896 George Seymour-Fort sought to explain the ‘true’ motive for Jameson’s Raid. It was Seymour-Fort’s assertion that a ‘secret…German-Boer alliance’ was the true reason for the ‘rush to Pretoria’. He purported to know a secret truth: that behind Kruger ‘stood an ambitious and potentially aggressive German ally’. The German negotiations over Delagoa Bay were allegedly part of a much wider plot, not only to throw out British influence from the Transvaal using a combination of a fifth column of over 1000 German reservists already in the Boer Republics, and a force marched over from German South-West Africa, to pose a ‘menace to Rhodesia’. Seymour-Fort was convinced of his theories, despite admitting possessing no ‘documentary evidence’; the conclusion was thus that Rhodes and Jameson’s extreme actions were justified in the defence of empire. Furthermore, he warned that Germany’s ‘ambitions…are still alive…and she intends in the future to be a dangerous and inimical Power to our Imperial interests’.

By 1897 it was becoming increasingly plausible that Germany was an imperial threat equal to France and Russia. In September 1897, in an article entitled the ‘Partition of England’, the Spectator described in detail how the European powers would seek to attack the British Empire and divide up the spoils. France would gain West African territories, Russia of course would take India, and Germany would control the whole of East and South Africa, and influence over the whole of Australasia. The Spectator did not even countenance the possibility that these schemes were in doubt. Though such imperial anxieties had been common before 1896, Germany had clearly been promoted to the highest level of threats to the British Empire. Both in the Cape and across the Empire, Germany joined France and Russia as a perceived holistic threat to the Empire.

Also in 1897, F.E. Garret referred specifically to a ‘complot’ and a ‘subterranean intrigue’ The Story of an African Crisis (1897). This conspiracy, between Dr Leyds (Boer envoy to Berlin) and Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, involved the shipping of Krupp guns to the Transvaal, and assumed German desires to establish their own ‘protection’ over the Transvaal. Garrett, editor of the Cape Times quoted his own paper: ‘It is upon South Africa at large…that the Government’s Hollander clerk and German officers turn the guns of their Continental policy, in maniac hatred…’ Garrett emphasised the same rumours and conspiracy tales as highlighted so loudly during the raid; the image throughout was of Germany as a subversive antagonist with a secretive desire to steal Britain’s valued possessions. Similarly, William Stead, the celebrated journalist

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36 “Germany is still governed by a military caste whose ways of thinking and feeling are greatly at variance with what in this country are considered just.” Conflict Of German And English Opinion’, pp. 1524–5.
39 Spectator, 25 September 1897.
41 Cape Times, 31 December 1895 as quoted in Ibid., p. 241.
and editor of the *Review of Reviews*, published in the same year what proved to be a popular but divisive account entitled *The History of the Mystery*. In reviewing the book, the *Speaker* claimed that Stead had sought to cheaply ‘sensate the public’ and proffer from popular outrage after the Kruger Telegram;\(^{42}\) it referred to the book as a ‘damp squib’ but still accepted that on the issue of ‘German intrigue in South Africa’, the second theme of the book, ‘we are not so far apart.’\(^{43}\) Stead’s emphasis upon German conspiracies had struck a chord even with an outspoken Liberal journal; in recent scholarship Liberals have often been considered as dismissive of anti-German sentiment and British jingoism, but the suggestion that even part on the left accepted the truth of German ‘intrigues’ indicates the extent of the impact of the Kruger Telegram Crisis.\(^{44}\) P.E. Aston picked up the theme of a German conspiracy against imperial interests in the *Raid on the Transvaal by Dr. Jameson* (1898). Aston spoke of ‘anxious and disturbed’ popular sentiment in England and the ‘most disquieting rumours’ that the Transvaal Republic was arming in secret; others warned of ‘armed Germans in Pretoria’ and anti-British European alliances.\(^{45}\) Similarly, F.E. Younghusband commented that undoubtedly Germany had been trying to undermine Britain in South Africa. If Britain was to maintain its position of primacy in South Africa and all over the world: ‘[s]he must keep at a distance all rivals.’\(^{46}\)

From 1896 to 1899 Germany was increasingly a subject for debate and anxiety in British popular discourse. As a direct result of the Kruger Telegram Crisis, Germany was portrayed as aggressive, autocratic, plotting and insidious in popular non-fiction and across the press. Germany’s interference in the Transvaal meant that these arguments were inevitably focused around British South Africa. Throughout the sources described above, authors seemed to accept without doubt that Germany jealousy desired to take away portions of the British Empire, or indeed to undermine the whole imperial project. Thanks to such narratives, by the beginning of the South African War in 1899 the British were well-versed in the idea of a deliberate and dangerous German Menace to the British Empire in Africa.

### The South African War and German Anglophobia

The South African War had a profound cultural, political and economic impact on the British Empire. In the opening months of the war the public was shocked by the news of numerous military defeats. British military units in South Africa were poorly prepared to fight a war against guerrilla tactics. Following the events of ‘Black Week’, in which the public learned of defeat after defeat, opinion about the war was divided between a patriotic and jingoistic ground swell on the right side of politics, and dissent and Pro-Boer sentiment from some of the Liberal opposition, and some trade union movements.\(^{47}\) The war led to a national inquest into the inadequacies of the armed forces and military organisation. Across Britain the press reminded ordinary people of the failings in South Africa; into 1900 news that British forces had turned the balance and all but defeated Boer forces in several victories was received with intense patriotic joy. The Unionist successes during the ‘Khaki’ election of 1900 revealed the nationalist fervour which had gripped Britain.\(^{48}\) With the continuation of the war and mounting national economic problems, politicians, journalists and authors continued to raise questions about British ‘efficiency’.\(^{49}\)


\(^{43}\) *The Speaker*, 12 December 1896.

\(^{44}\) Kennedy, P.M., ‘Idealists and Realists’, p. 137.


\(^{48}\) Cunningham, H., ‘Language of Patriotism’, pp. 8–33.

Though the period of the South African War has been studied in detail from a popular perspective, few studies have considered the role of Germany, German fundraising and volunteering for Boer Commando corps and press anglophobia in Britain. The era of the South African War has been seen, especially from a German perspective, as pivotal for changing Anglo-German relations and perceptions. During the South African War, British popular awareness of German ‘anglophobia’ was an increasingly powerful presence in domestic discourse; as Kennedy argued, this anti-British sentiment impacted heavily upon both British official decision-making and popular opinion. Pauline Anderson’s study, The Background of Anti-English Feeling in Germany, 1890-1902 (1969), climaxed with a discussion of wartime ‘anglophobia’, and the fever pitch which was reached as a result of the pro-Boer perspective of the majority of the German press. Steffen Bender recently sought to examine the German press and ‘Boer Mania’ during the South African War. Bender argued, like several previous German authors, that in terms of popular perceptions, the South African War marked a watershed moment in the ‘Anglo-German estrangement’; he went on to argue that the outpouring of anglophobia had a direct impact upon the actions of the German imperial government. His conclusions were limited to the German popular viewpoint, although the transnational impact of this turning point in German opinion should not be underestimated. Perhaps understandably British scholarship has been dedicated to British popular concerns such as patriotism and volunteerism, so that few have considered the role of Germany. Through the conflict Germany maintained a carefully neutral diplomatic stance, although unofficially many Germans volunteered to fight for the Boers, donated money to fund Boer armaments and demonised the British as brutal repressors. The reception of these factors in Britain has yet to be covered in detail.

The swelling abuse of Britain by the foreign press became a major issue in popular discourse. Britain appeared to stand alone in an increasingly hostile climate; imperial anxieties were heightened to extreme levels as anglophobia raged around the world against British imperialism. In spite of the welcoming of the German Government’s outwardly amiable stance, and continuing public negotiations about the formation of a defensive alliance, the British press paid close attention to ‘German interests’ in the Transvaal in the build-up to the South African War. Even before the outbreak of war major sections of the German press, particularly the right-wing papers and Pan-German publications, expressed support for the Boers, and strong anti-English sentiment. Throughout December and January 1899-1900 the British press assumed that noisy right wing Pan-Germans and Agrarians were representative of the whole body of German opinion, which in turn led more neutral sections of the German press to turn against Britain’s colonial war. Attempts by Joseph Chamberlain to garner opinion for an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ alliance proved exceedingly

52 Kennedy, P.M., Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 214, 239, 252–25, 255, 266.
53 Anderson, P.R., Background of Anti-English Feeling.
55 Bender, S., Der Burenkrieg, Rüger, J., ‘Revisiting’, pp. 579–617; See for example Meinecke, F., Geschichte Des Deutsch-Englischen Bündnisproblems, 1890-1901 (Munich and Berlin, 1927); Rosenbach, H., Das Deutsche Reich, Großbritannien Und Der Transvaal (1896-1902); Anderson, P.R., Background of Anti-English Feeling.
56 Rüger, J., ‘Revisiting’, p. 590
57 Anderson, P.R., Background of Anti-English Feeling (Originally published 1939).
58 Between 1897 and 1900 British and German diplomats sought regularly to come to agreements over individual imperial issues; they even discussed the possibility of a more formal defensive alliance. Joseph Chamberlain was one of the major British proponents of such an agreement, and he publicly announced his desire for Anglo-Saxon alliance on several occasions. These attempts to come to some formal agreement were doomed to failure. Britain, particularly, was unwilling to bow to Germany’s costly terms. British opinion was divided on the issue. During the Boer Rebellion, Britain and Germany had once again negotiated over terms, this time the British position in the Yangtze Valley. See for example Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, January 1, 6, 22, 1899, in Anderson, p. 286.
59 National Zeitung, 1 October 1899; Vossische Zeitung, 1 October 1899; Alldeutscher Blätter, 1 October 1899; Vossische Zeitung, 4 October 1899; Anderson, P.R., Background of Anti-English Feeling.
60 Due to reports from British papers assuming that all German opinion was represented in the Pan-German press, particularly The Times the Nationalzeitung, October 28, 1899 featured an article which argued that alliance with England was no longer in Germany’s favour as cited in Ibid.

Much of the British press, while commenting on the outbreak in other countries, reserved their greatest criticism for Germany; the \textit{Daily Chronicle} and many other daily papers found grim satisfaction in reporting the abuse of British politicians in the German press.\footnote{Kennedy, P.M., \textit{Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism}, p. 247.} Chamberlain and Kitchener were depicted in German cartoons as demons with horns, fangs and tails; Kitchener was even depicted as a child murderer.\footnote{Daily Chronicle, 4 January 1902, as quoted in Hild, p. 247.} Over the course of the South African War German anglophobia underwent numerous peaks, over the seizure of German merchant ships in Africa during 1900 or as a response to Joseph Chamberlain’s rumoured comments about the brutality of German soldierly conduct in the Franco-Prussian War. The British newspaper reader was constantly reminded of this anger, and even hatred.\footnote{Daily Express, 27 November 1901; Miller, W., \textit{‘The Prussian Bicentenary’}, \textit{Gentleman’s Magazine}, 290:2041 (January 1901), p. 17; \textit{The Times}, 3 September 1901.}

In particular German attacks upon the conduct of British soldiers against civilians, and the painting of Britain as an imperialist aggressor caused great sensitivity in the British press. German stories of wanton British slaughter and brutal treatment in the concentration camps enraged sections of the press.\footnote{Daily Express, 27 November 1901; Miller, W., \textit{‘The Prussian Bicentenary’}, \textit{Gentleman’s Magazine}, 290:2041 (January 1901), p. 17; \textit{The Times}, 3 September 1901.} In response, papers and contributors retaliated with ‘stories of the war of 1870-71’ in which the sarcastically entitled ‘Gentle Germans’ were reminded of their past misdeeds and their current hypocrisy. No doubt the memory of the German behaviour during the Franco-Prussian War was a vital factor in their association with brutality in the British press; however, it had been increasingly common to associate Germany with aggression and autocracy since the Kruger Telegram.\footnote{Markham, V.R., \textit{South Africa, Past and Present; an Account of Its History, Politics and Native Affairs, Followed by Some Personal Reminiscences of African Travel during the Crisis Preceding the War} (London, 1900).} The trope of German brutality became more common as a result of the rise of Germany as an imperial challenge; through the period before 1902 British newspapers were increasingly ready to refer to German methods as barbaric. It is possible to link to this ‘slinging match’ between the press in Germany and Britain during the South African War and the accusations of war crimes after the outbreak of war in 1914. It seems that in both countries this wartime tactic of undermining and demonising their adversaries was rooted in older imperial rivalries.

Increasingly note was taken of German methods of colonial governance and the treatment of its subjects. Referring to the potential for a German-Boer agreement in her 1900 account of the history of South Africa, Violet Markham reflected the falling stock of Germany: ‘A taste of Teutonic rule might have taught the Boers a few unpalatable but highly instructive lessons as regards so-called British oppression in South Africa.’\footnote{‘German Policy in Central Africa’, \textit{Anti-Slavery Reporter and Aborigines’ Friend}, 17:4 (January 1897), pp. 30–3; ‘Slavery in German Colonies’, \textit{Anti-Slavery Reporter and Aborigines’ Friend}, 21:2 (March 1901), pp. 71–2.} Anti-Slavery journals referred to the barbarity of German colonial methods and the continuation of slavery under their control.\footnote{Kingsley-Kent, S., \textit{After shocks: Politics and Trauma in Britain, 1918-1931} (Basingstoke, 2000).} The view that Germany was unfit to rule colonised peoples grew increasingly prevalent, in spite of the respect their methods generated amongst British imperialists who admired the harder tactics that Germany utilised.\footnote{Daily Express, 27 November 1901; Miller, W., \textit{‘The Prussian Bicentenary’}, \textit{Gentleman’s Magazine}, 290:2041 (January 1901), p. 17; \textit{The Times}, 3 September 1901.} The brutality and autocracy of Wilhelmine Germany was a running debate in British culture during this period, and a common riposte to German anglophobia.

Sustained German anglophobia led many British commentators to seek to understand it. The most common explanation of the intense anger in Germany was the assumed jealousy of the British Empire; the \textit{Yorkshire Herald} commented, ‘They [Germany] are jealous of our Colonial Empire’ and even prophesied that in the unlikely event of a British defeat, ‘Germany would attempt to exercise a protectorate’ over the
Boer Republics. A letter to the editor of the Morning Post similarly discussed the likelihood of ‘an attack on England by her jealous and watchful rivals.’ Similar explanations were offered across British regional papers, such as the Blackburn Weekly Standard which argued that the other powers and Germany were ‘jealous of our greatness’.

The Pall Mall Gazette wrote an article in March 1900 strongly condemning German abuse:

…wherever Germans have been gathered together in any part of the world the news of what they describe with the exaggeration of hatred and envy as English disasters in South Africa has been hailed with uproarious satisfaction…Suffice it to say that we are not in a mood, just now especially, to stand by and tamely see our eagerly patriotic Volunteers and our gallant soldiers vilified and held up to ridicule of our bitterly jealous Continental friends?

The Pall Mall Gazette was not the first to imagine that the press abuse of Britain was representative of the German ‘public voice’. The assumption that Germany’s press was heavily influenced by the Government meant that anglophobia was explained as both the popular view, and also a semi-official stance.

In January 1902 “Patriae Quis Exul” (hence “P.Q.E.”) wrote for the Contemporary Review, stating that the anglophobia of Germany was ‘consistently and maliciously more hostile than that of France’ and that this was cause for deep concern; citing the political or personal explanations for anglophobia “P.Q.E.” argued that ‘underlying and embracing the whole’ was envy…’. In a warning tone “P.Q.E.” argued that few had recognised the importance of this anti-British sentiment; British decision makers and the public should advised to heed this prophecy: ‘If envy is akin to hatred, the genesis of Anglophobia contains a real source of danger. It is in this sense disquieting.’ The intent of the article is revealed with the final line:

But mark this. The Germans are hostile, increasingly so: and they believe we are degenerating, Let us not…pass on unmindful. Let us strengthen our fleet. It behoves us to be ready.

This passage invoked both ideas of British inefficiency and the vocabulary of the German Menace, as had developed over the past years. In dramatic prose, “P.Q.E.” imagined that Germany, with its global ambitions, jealousy and planning was a future threat to Britain for which it should be ready.

Throughout the war and afterwards, German anglophobia was repeatedly explained in terms of jealousy and envy. The British perceived themselves as a coveted and hunted power and the insecurity provoked by the failures of British military organisation, combined with the nationwide outburst of patriotism helps to explain the strength of the language of such newspaper reports. George Peel’s The Enemies of England (1902) offered a narrative which revealed the insecurities of the Edwardian ‘temperament’; his final chapter examined the growing divide between Germany and Britain. Peel set himself the task of unravelling what he viewed as the ‘strange phenomenon of national hatred’ – a ‘melancholy revolution in the mind of a great and kindred people’. Peel argued that Germany had become the ‘great workshop in which the lies against Great Britain have been manufactured, with the most ingenious industry and on the most extensive scale.’ Evidently the recent surge in German Anglophobia, prompted by international events following from the Jameson Raid in 1895 informed such opinions. The hard-line views espoused in parts of the German press were taken by sections of the British press as a statement of intent.

By late 1902 few in Britain would have been unaware of the worsening perception of Germany in Britain. When, in November, the new British Prime Minister, A.J. Balfour, was forced to assure the public
that there was ‘no prospect of any disturbance of the peace between any of the Great Powers’, the Daily Express was sure that Mr. Balfour ‘had Anglo-German relations in his mind’. The increasing perception of Germany as an imperial threat, a power which coveted British imperial possessions and sought to undermine them, helped to solidify anti-German opinion. The German press seemed to show that Germany hated Britain, and hoped for its downfall; the development of anti-British sentiment cemented themes of conspiracy and jealousy in the British popular imagination.

National Efficiency and the German Imperial Challenge

Nothing can prevent the United States and Germany at least, who are much further from their limit of production, from pursuing an economic evolution like our own. Theirs is commencing. Ours is complete. Our ideals are consolidation and resistance: theirs are extension, and in the commercial sense, aggression…and the extraordinary interest of our national problem is that it presents the widest possibilities between ruinous decadence and magnificent endurance that an Empire has ever offered at any single moment in history.

The deepening economic and social concerns of the later 1890s grew into a forceful tide of national angst which came to a head during the South African War (1899-1902); at the heart of these concerns lay Germany’s increasing presence as an imperial threat. The South African War was represented a crisis for British imperialism. During the ‘Black Week’ in December 1899 British fears of industrial and commercial decline and the imperial overstretch seemed to be confirmed. Apparently covetous enemies, a weak and inefficient army, and an overextended empire led to what Geoffrey Searle termed ‘a psychological shock, shattering national complacency and creating an intensified sense of national danger.’ Many feared that the humiliations in South Africa might entice enemies, old and new, to seize the opportunity to attack the Empire while it was weakest.

In October 1900 the Daily Mail questioned whether England was ‘In Decadence?’ British capitalists and businessmen compared ‘to the newer type that is leading the way in America and Germany’ were ‘simply amateurish and incompetent’. This attitude was echoed by contemporary historian G.C. Brodrick’s own assessment of Britain as ‘A Nation of Amateurs’ in an increasingly professionalized international environment: ‘the same amateur spirit which cripples the Army pervades nearly the whole of what is called professional and public life in this country.’ As had been the case with Made in Germany in 1896, a solution was demanded to this decadence and decline in all aspects of British society. An article in the Fortnightly Review at the end of 1900, entitled ‘Reconstruction or Catastrophe’ put the issue in black and white: would Britain respond to the patent decline it was experiencing, or be doomed to imperial destruction?

A solution was soon proposed by campaigners for ‘national efficiency’. During the darkest days of the South African War, politicians and journalists began to call for greater efficiency across the British state and society. Major personalities in Britain devoted their energies to answering the calls for national soul-searching. The popular journalist Arnold White and the former Prime Minister Lord Rosebery, a famed orator and Liberal Imperialist, were amongst the most prominent advocates connected with the ideals of efficiency. White’s articles and books generated great popularity for his publishers, and Rosebery delivered his mantra of efficiency across the country to crowds of thousands, some in excess of 5,000 people; the rhetoric of national efficiency seems to have had wide appeal. Many key efficiency advocates argued that

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76 Daily Express, 11 November 1902, p. 4.
81 White, A., Efficiency and Empire (London, 1901); Daily Mail, 15 October 1900, The Sunday Sun, 5 August 1900.
an escape from party politics was the kind of radical change needed to rescue Britain. Members of the ‘Co-Efficients’ Dinner Group from across the political spectrum – including notable socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb, H.G. Wells, R.B. Haldane (future Home Secretary), Sir Edward Grey (future Foreign Secretary), Leo Amery (famed Times War Correspondent) and Leo Maxse (editor of the right-wing National Review) – sought to use their influence to advance this popular philosophy. The ‘national’ non-party political ideal was modelled, according to Amery, on the idea of the German General Staff which could bring about the necessary reforms to save England. Although the dining group itself declined in importance by 1904, the mantra of efficiency continued to have a lasting influence in British politics and its advocates were responsible, at least in part, for many political successes (including the Education Act of 1902, Army Reform, founding the Committee for Imperial Defence, the London School of Economics, and the conversion of a number of colleges of education into the first ‘red-brick’ Universities across Britain’s cities).

The ideas of efficiency achieved national repute thanks to the wide based appeal and provocative language used by proponents. Efficiency was also socially inclusive, calling for improvements to the living standards of the working classes, and spoke to the new found patriotism of early Edwardian society. The South African War shocked the public into taking note of the ideals of national efficiency, and even after the end of the war concerns continued about the next challenge to the British Empire. Germany was a constant figure in these debates; the German economic and military model played a crucial role. From the time of Made in Germany it was apparent that Imperial Germany was becoming an economic powerhouse. In 1897, Lord Rosebery explained his views on Germany:

I am afraid of Germany. Why am I afraid of the Germans? Because I admire and esteem them so much. They are an industrious nation; they are, above all, a systematic nation they are a scientific nation, and whatever they take up, whether it be the arts of peace or the arts of war, they push them forward to the utmost possible perfection with that industry, that system, that science which is part of their character.

This ‘fear’ of Germany was based largely upon Germany’s ‘systematic’ nature being applied to all aspects of modern industry and trade. However, from 1896 concerns over German economic competition were conflated with strategic and military ones. The weaknesses exhibited during the South African War, combined with Germany’s increasing interests across the world began to influence upon efficiency thinkers. If Britain did not act, its empire would be vanquished by a better-prepared, more scientific, and ruthlessly efficient rival.

Writing in October 1902 Arnold White warned that Britain should ‘Make France a Friend’ and pursue an alliance with Russia. White dismissed France as a serious threat, describing the Fashoda incident as ‘not a conflict of serious interests.’ Perhaps unwittingly echoing Wells’s War of the Worlds White argued:

The German nation, and more especially the highly-trained thinkers and experienced officials, watch the inefficiency of our rulers and the absence of directing ability with watering mouths. British official incompetence is German opportunity.

84 Ibid., pp. 58, 63–65.
86 Many of the most invasion fictions explicitly referred to national inefficiency and decadence as the pretext for the invasion of others powers. Over the first years of the twentieth century the genre of invasion fiction became a popular sensation. Still known today, Wells, H.G., War of The Worlds provided a morality tale of the decadence and complacency of the human world, dominated in this time by the British Empire. The alien invasion presented a powerful new enemy, with better technology and brutal murderous efficiency. William Le Queux was much less subtle about his motives for sensationally popular novel, The Invasion of 1910 (1906). In the preface he explained his motive for writing: ‘...to illustrate our utter unpreparedness for war from a military standpoint; to show how, under certain conditions which may easily occur, England can be successfully invaded by Germany; and to present a picture of the ruin which must inevitably fall upon us on the evening of that not far-distant day’ Queux, W. Le, Invasion of 1910, p. 1.
87 Lord Rosebery, speech at Colchester as cited in (Williams, 1896g (comments published in 5th edition, 1897), inside cover.
White’s argument explained succinctly the part Germany played within the rhetoric of efficiency. British inefficiency was all the more frightening because of Germany’s jealousy and covetousness. The relative efficiency of Germany with scientific ‘thinkers’ and planner was in stark contrast with bumbling British efforts in the South African War. The centrality of Germany to this point of view indicates the change that had occurred since 1896. Established scholarship has yet to make explicit the connection between national efficiency and the German imperial menace. Most newspaper articles discussing the German ‘question’ reflected upon efficiency; and conversely, concerns about national efficiency were rarely voiced without some veiled or overt reference to the German imperial challenge. Following the Kruger Telegram, Germany was increasingly discussed in British popular discourse. The press and non-fiction writers described the conspiracies and plots of Germany in the Transvaal and elsewhere and depicted Germany as ‘fileching’ from the British Empire. The experience of the South African War taught Britain to doubt its supposed invincibility, to be wary of Germany’s efficiency, anglophobia, expansionism and covetousness. Over the years 1896-1902 Africa, then, was an important site for the development of the imperial menace of Germany.

The German Menace in China and the Far East

China was the other key site for British imperial anxiety about Germany in the period following 1896. The view of Germany as autocratic and brutal developed simultaneously with British anxieties about German conspiracies and plotting. Through several events in the realm of international politics the British popular imagination was provided with evidence of the dangerous impulsive autocracy of Germany’s ruling class, the brutal aggression of German armed forces and its jealous desire to secretly undermine and attack British interests. These interlinked stereotypes, traditionally associated with other focuses for imperial anxiety, especially Russia, provided ammunition for the belief that Germany could become a serious danger to the British Empire, and would be a powerful and frightening adversary if it did.

The German Seizure of Kiao-Chau

In the case of the German ‘grab’ in Shandong in Northern China, their conduct was represented negatively from its inception; the landing of troops at Kiao Chau on 14 November 1897, combined with continuing debates in the Reichstag about the extension of the German Navy, led the British press to refer to the experience of the Kruger Telegram. The Hampshire Advertiser wrote in a scathing article in early December 1897 that, ‘since that famous little cablegram…we have heard little of Emperor William’s exploits at sea’. Clearly nodding to contemporary ‘Made in Germany’ debates, the Advertiser wondered if Wilhelm had been maturing ‘some sinister design for secretly introducing prison-made mops into England, as a first step towards breaking down the power of the British Empire.’ The Kaiser was abused and ridiculed, and beneath this layer of humour, the anxieties about the secret plans of Germany to undermine the British Empire were openly voiced.

After the landing of German marines, the German Imperial government was keen to make a bold military gesture to reinforce its claim. Thus in December 1897 the Kaiser’s brother, Prince Heinrich, was

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88 Daily Express, 28 October 1902.
89 G.R. Searle has emphasised the importance of Germany to national efficiency, but did not target the specifically imperial nature of the Challenge. See Searle, G.R., Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 55-57.
90 Hampshire Advertiser, 8 December 1897.
sent to China with a small fleet to strengthen German control. On the eve of Heinrich's journey, the Kaiser found occasion for a characteristic outburst: the infamous 'mailed fist' speech of 15 December. The speech and Heinrich's reply became as infamous as the actual seizure of Germany's Chinese coaling station; in a characteristic outburst of aggressive nationalism he ordered Prince Heinrich:

Let it be clear to every European out there, to German merchants above all, to foreigners whose soil we may be on or with whom we may have to deal, that the German Michael has firmly planted on that soil the shield emblazoned with the Imperial eagle… [Should] anyone ever attempt to affront us, or prejudice us in our good rights, then strike out with your mailed fist…

This strong statement was representative of the increasingly global focus of German foreign policy; filled with enthusiasm, the Kaiser unwittingly opened himself up to a torrent of criticism and mockery by the British press who tore the speech apart. In a time when public speakers and politicians prided themselves in their reserve, Wilhelm's ebullient performances made easy targets. Regional papers such as the Liverpool Mercury (Liberal), Glasgow Herald (Liberal Unionist) and Freeman's Journal (Dublin, Irish Nationalist), reported with sarcastic glee on the phrase which would last longest in the minds of the British: 'Strike out with your mailed fist.' The 'mailed fist' would eventually become synonymous with German ruthlessness and aggression. The Liverpool Mercury accused the Kaiser of 'making himself ridiculous… to make all Europe explode with laughter', while the Aberdeen Journal suggested that though the world was used to being 'surprised and amused' by Wilhelm, this particular 'exhibition' was without comparison.

Whilst at the time the British press sought to mock Germany and the Kaiser, there was also a growing sense of concern coloured by the memory of the Kruger Telegram. The Economist attacked the 'extremely illjudged and unusual language' used at Kiel, had 'spread through Europe an impression that he intends to commence a career of conquest in China'. The Morning Post was dismayed at the 'barefaced action of Russia and Germany' fearing that the two powers were conspiring to shut Britain out of China. The Morning Post also predicted that there were those amongst Britain's enemies who dreamt of 'a grand combination against the quondam Mistress of the Sea.' This fear of alliances stretched further for some commentators; the Saturday Review, in an article entitled 'The War Scare,' described England as 'ill at ease about these doings', and even suggested that many believed 'we may be at war with Germany, or with Russia, or with both, before we have recovered from the Christmas feasts.'

With Britain's traditional enemy Russia following Germany with its own seizure of Port Arthur in Manchuria, there was concern and rumour about the potential implications for Britain. As it became clear that Germany and Russia were determined to keep their new Chinese possessions many British commentators complained of a generation of British inactivity and 'isolation' which had left Britain exposed to such aggression. Germany's seizure of Chinese territory led to fears of a 'scramble for China.' One British customs official in Peking was convinced that 'the Kiaochow [sic.] business', if 'England means business', would 'spell war' with a 'combination of three Powers against England.' The journalist, Archibald Colquhoun, agreed that there was a serious prospect of rapprochement, at least in the Far East.

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92 Aberdeen Journal, 18 December 1897.
93 Glasgow Herald, 17 December 1897; Liverpool Mercury, 17 December 1897; Freeman's Journal, 17 December 1897.
95 Aberdeen Journal, 18 December 1897.
98 'Letter: Alfred E. Hippisley to G.E. Morrison Tientsin, 23 December 1897; Morrison to Hippisley, Tientsin, 23 December 1897 in Lin, H.-M., Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, pp. 56-57.
100 'Letter: Alfred E. Hippisley to G.E. Morrison Tientsin 23 December 1897; Morrison to Hippisley, Tientsin, 23 December 1897 in Lin, H.-M., Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, pp. 56-57.'
between Germany and the Dual Alliance. It was Colquhoun’s theory that an entente ‘based upon mutual interests’ had been intended to quash British interests in the Far East. He pleaded that the Salisbury government ‘drop all this “all is well” theory’ and match the seizures of land in China, instead of wasting time and energies in Central Africa. Common to all observations on the ‘Chinese question’ was the assumption that Britain had let its hold on China slip and would lose out to the other powers who had gained the ‘inside track’ on Britain.

Australian and Hong Kong newspapers watched developments during the ‘Scramble for China’ closely. The Hongkong Telegraph repeatedly announced suspicions of a possible Franco-Russo-German pact against Britain, or suspicions of Germany’s goals in China. According to such reports, across British territories in the East, Germany’s actions were the subject of much discussion and concern; Germany’s recent record was a major cause to be concerned for the future success of the colony. One account questioned Germany’s actions with overt anxiety:

What does Germany want with a big fleet and soldiers and a fortified station here? Not to overawe China, for a dozen men in a jollyboat can do that. It is some European war that Germany has in mind; and any European war may be a matter of life and death to the British Empire.

It urged that Britain prepare for this potential threat, of a ‘35cm Krupp gun saluting us from Kowloon cone’, in times of peace, before it was too late to act. The Review of Reviews expressed similar concern toward the developments in China. The seizure of Port Arthur and Kia Chau were viewed as equally significant, playing upon the long established Russophobia in the press, as well as the nascent fears of Germany. In spite of the traditional anti-Russian or Francophobic stance there was added cause for concern as a result of Germany’s impulsive and unpredictable behaviour. In the Contemporary Review, contributor William Des Voeux argued that in spite of the fact that ‘russophobia runs in the blood’, Britain should look to a closer alliance with her. There seemed a growing acceptance that Germany desired more than just an expansion of its trade. Germany was increasingly antagonistic towards Britain and other powers (USA, France, Russia), and unlike older enemies, her motives and techniques were new and unpredictable.

In a reminder of the recent past, the Times questioned, ‘What would the German Emperor and the German Press have to say of any person unrighteous enough to formulate such doctrine as this, say, in South Africa?’ The Pall Mall Gazette joined in the criticism of Germany’s move in the Far East, naming German Admiral Von Diederichs the ‘German Jameson’. The Pall Mall Gazette sought to remind Germany of the outcry heard in Germany when Britain last mounted such an armed coup – the Jameson Raid:

We were under the impression that if there was one thing the Kaiser could not stand it was Raids. The incursion of armed bands into the territory of a friendly State was, we fondly imagined, a most reprehensible proceeding.

The cutting article ended with the happy declaration that Britain, ‘being less sensitive about international rights’ would not protest to Berlin and ‘The German Dr. Jim can go his own way so long as it does not cross ours. When it does, we shall know how to stop him.’ This aggressive attitude was present in many press responses to German naval expansionism and actions in China; the Kaiser and Germany had touched a nerve – the jingoistic responses gave away the anxiety and insecurity prevalent in Britain. Wilhelm, Germany and the Kruger Telegram were umbilically linked; his speeches and telegrams constantly related

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101 Times, 20 December 1897.
102 Ibid.
103 Border Watch, (Mount Gambier, SA), 15 January 1898; Hong Kong Telegraph, 7 January 1898; Hong Kong Telegraph, 22 December 1897; Border Watch, (Mount Gambier, SA), 15 January 1898; Wagga Wagga Advertiser, (NSW), 11 January 1898.
104 Times of India, 25 November 1897.
106 The Times, 17 December 1897.
107 Pall Mall Gazette, 6 January 1898.
The Legacy of the Kruger Telegram

back to January 1896. The usually guarded attention applied to Wilhelm and Germany indicated an undercurrent of concern, and this speech and the association of Germany with naval expansion and global influence resulted in a surge in this concern. Though newspapers outwardly sought to ‘laugh off’ the German desire for world power, their outward mocking suggests a strong inner insecurity and doubt. Growing fear of Germany’s economic might and imperial interference helps to explain the reaction of the British public to the ‘mailed fist’ speech. As with the economy, would Germany, the rising power in the world, seek to overtake Britain there too? In 1897 the British press boasted of the naval superiority of Britain, but such noisy announcements were a likely cover for deeper anxieties about Britain’s power in the world.

The Contemporary Review viewed the seizure of Kiao Chau as indicative of Germany’s aggressive intent. It argued that Shantung would serve as ‘a base for offensive operations in trade and war’. The article adjudged Wilhelm to be two-faced: ‘his public acts are those of hostility, every day becoming more clear and more confident.’ The piece went on to argue that Russian action in the Far East is ‘legitimate development of a policy as old as our own’, while Germany’s own actions represented ‘intolerable interference’:

The German Emperor wishes to pose as the arbiter of Europe’s destiny; he thinks he can array Europe against England more effectually than Napoleon ever did. With a man holding such views, illumined by the wisdom of God’s anointed, as he conceives, there could be no durable understanding….and, such being the case, it is safer to base all our calculations on his hostility.

Wilhelm’s methods were modern, brash and uncouth and Germany’s desire to play in increasing role in the affairs of world politics did not sit well with the already fraught British imperial outlook.

Between 1896 and 1898, there was a change in tone in discussions about Germany and her Emperor. In spite of the attempted rapprochement by the German government which was underway during this period, responses to the actions of Germany as publicised in the British press since 1896 had spread set in and could not be uprooted. In January 1898 the Economist admitted that ‘Germany will probably, in the end, show herself unfriendly’ and the Financial Times indicated deep suspicion of Germany’s motives for action in the Far East. Indeed at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in June 1898 fears that Germany would attempt to usurp US power in the Philippines led British newspapers to debate the future of Anglo-German relations again. The Economist to suggest that with the Emperor ‘advertising himself in his usual way’ Britain would be forced to step in to assist the United States. This anti-German stance was swiftly becoming an established theme amongst the British journals.

In July the Conservative periodical, the Outlook questioned, ‘Is Germany about to ‘Kiao-Chow’ in the Philippines?; it stated amongst the ‘facts’ that the entire German Eastern squadron was positioned there, there had been ‘open talk’ in diplomatic circles of the ‘essential’ need for a coaling station in the Pacific for German ships. Once again, British affiliation with America was firmly stated: ‘The Anglo-American understanding is already a fact; it becomes a pact the moment Germany shows her hand at Manila.’ British popular imagination remained in the thrall of imperial anxiety, and the British press was keen to remind its readership of Germany’s continuing aggression abroad.

109 ‘Germany In The Philippines’, p. 902.
111 ‘China and the “Times”’, Outlook, 1:6 (12 March 1898), p. 177; The Times, 28 March 1898.
The Boxer War of 1900

During the latter half of 1900 European imperialism in China was faced with a crisis of unforeseen proportions. Over the latter half of the nineteenth century growing European influence in China and the growing presence of Protestant and Catholic missionaries and their converts had been a point of contention. The German seizure of Kiaochau had initiated a European race to seize of territory during 1898, and the subsequent surge in railway construction provoked the already perturbed Chinese populace into violent rejection of foreign presence. From late 1899 Chinese rebels of the Yihetuan Movement, popularly known as Boxers due to their martial arts training, attacked European missionaries and Chinese Christians across China; the uprising led to thousands of anti-foreign and anti-Christian outrages, and challenged the European presence in China. In June 1900 the Boxer forces marched on Peking (Beijing) and besieged the European Legations. A few thousand Europeans and Chinese Christians were besieged and outnumbered by large Boxer army, which was joined on 21 June by the Chinese Empress Dowager Ci Xi’s forces. Small numbers of British, French, German, Italian, Austro-Hungarian, American, Russian and Japanese civilians and soldiers, as well as several other nations, desperately held out against far superior forces. In the confusion German Envoy Clemens von Ketteler was murdered brutally on the streets of Beijing; the Governments of the interested powers immediately began negotiating their response.

As a result of the murder of Ketteler, the German Government, and especially Wilhelm, felt that German troops should play a central role in any military campaign; as a result, large numbers of German troops were despatched for China, and the Kaiser succeeded in persuading and coercing the powers into nominating his Field Marshall Count von Waldersee as Commander of the troops of the eight nation alliance (Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Russia, and the United States). Nevertheless, before the shiploads of Germans, or their Commander in Chief could arrive, other European forces under temporary British command had succeeded in relieving Tianjin and Beijing, and affecting the surrender of the Dowager Empress. In essence, when von Waldersee finally arrived in September the fighting was over; unperturbed he set about conducting at least 75 ‘punitive expeditions’ into the Chinese countryside resulting in countless civilian deaths.

The Boxer War gripped the newspaper reading public of all the nations involved. In Britain, press coverage during the second half of 1900 was dominated by descriptions of troops in China, while the British defeats in the South African War had abated and national confidence was somewhat restored. As a result, the particular behaviour of Germany during the rebellion provoked a substantial amount of interest in Britain; helping to confirm the developing idea of Germany after 1896, German troops were viewed in this important international event, as behaving in a brutal manner, and once again Wilhelm announced himself to the world as an instinctive and aggressive autocrat intent on world importance.

It was at the ceremony marking the departure of German troops for China at Bremerhaven on 27 June 1900 that Wilhelm II delivered his infamous ‘Hunnenrede’ or ‘Huns Speech’; the speech soon attracted a great deal of outrage, both in Germany and abroad. On 28 June British newspapers reported a version of the speech in which Wilhelm ordered his troops to behave with efficiency and bravery, but not cruelty. However, as Bernd Sösemann’s (1976) study showed, in fact Chancellor Bülow had the transcript of the speech doctored and delivered a toned down version to official news agencies. Despite Bülow’s attempts to suppress the wording of the speech, a more accurate account of the speech began to trickle through the global communications network. On Monday 30 June the Daily News reported a more accurate version:

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116 Liverpool Mercury, 28 July 1900.

When you come into contact with the enemy, strike him down. Quarter is not to be given. Prisoners are not to be made. Whoever falls into your hands is into your hands delivered. Just as a thousand years ago the Huns under their King Attila made for themselves a name which still appears imposing in tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in China in such a way that never again will a Chinese dare look askance at a German.\textsuperscript{118}

This time the reaction in the British press was much stronger. Wilhelm’s message was clear: revenge was to be exacted cruelly and swiftly. The reference to the ‘Huns’ was seized upon by both the German left, and in Britain, as evidence for the cult of brutal war craft advocated by Wilhelm and his Junker cliques. Wilhelm the militaristic autocrat was criticised and mocked.\textsuperscript{119} In the House of Commons the outspoken MP Dr Charles Tanner questioned whether British troops could possibly be committed to the command of a nation who advocated such barbaric acts.\textsuperscript{120} Others criticised Wilhelm for his impulsivity, blunders and autocracy. Wilhelm’s speech had a lasting effect on the popular consciousness; two years later Rudyard Kipling famously referred to Germany as ‘the shameless Hun’ and though the term was little-used in the years preceding the First World War, it became one of the most common colloquial and propaganda terms for Germany, synonymous with cruelty and barbarism.\textsuperscript{121}

Robert Bickers recently argued that the Boxer Uprising had a similar effect to the Indian Uprising in Western popular culture, helping to popularise the ‘yellow peril’ in the decades following it.\textsuperscript{122} Popular discourse was gripped by events in China. Contemporary British accounts of the ‘rebellion’ showed Germany and the conduct of its troops in a resoundingly negative light. G.A. Henty in his memoir, \textit{With the Allies to Pekin} referred to the ‘sudden greed for colonizing’ of Germany, and the conduct of German troops in heightening the ‘hatred felt by the Chinese for the “foreign devils”’.\textsuperscript{123} German cruelty during Waldersee’s punitive expeditions was condemned in such accounts and helped persuade British opinion that the misgivings which had crystallized since 1896 were typical of this Germany. In his 1902 the \textit{Manchester Guardian’s China Correspondent} during the crisis, H.C. Thompson, referred to the Germans in China as cruel seeking ‘unwise humiliation’ of the Chinese; for Thompson the Germans used ‘first the sword and then the horsewhip; they never let the people down at all; they embitter their daily lives far more than the Russians do.’ Harsh words, made harsher in comparison to the accepted stereotype that Russians were amongst the cruellest soldiers in the world.\textsuperscript{124} Similarly, the journalist B.L. Putnam Weale populated his own popular memoir with unpleasant and brutal Germans; behaving cruelly, their revenge was only limited by the presence of other nations.\textsuperscript{125}

In November 1900 the \textit{Times} reported domestic German debates about the behaviour of German forces in China.\textsuperscript{126} The German opposition, especially the Social Democrats, drew attention to so-called ‘Hunnenbriefe’, letters home from German soldiers which depicted the cruelties and atrocities committed by German soldiers on punitive expeditions.\textsuperscript{127} The revenge that the reference to the Huns implied from the Kaiser’s speech left a lasting impression on the way the main stream of British press opinion represented German behaviour. Though the evidence suggests that the German troops indeed did behave in a punitive and vengeful manner during the Boxer War, the effect upon the British popular imagination was nevertheless important; it helped to confirm existent stereotypes of German military brutality, and tied them closely to the leadership style of Wilhelm II. His perceptibly autocratic style continually confirmed the contrasting

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Daily News}, 30 July 1900.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Birmingham Daily Post}, 30 July 1900; \textit{Daily News}, 30 July 1900; \textit{Londo Mercury}, 30 July 1900.

\textsuperscript{120} HC Deb, Hansard, 87:1818 (30 July 1900).


\textsuperscript{122} Bickers, R., \textit{Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism}, 1900-1949 (Manchester, 1999), p. 34.

\textsuperscript{123} Henry, G.A., \textit{With the Allies to Pekin, a Tale of the Relief of the Legations} (New York, 1903), pp. 371-372.


\textsuperscript{126} The Times, 21 November 1900.

\textsuperscript{127} Whether these letters were entirely accurate or were embellished by left wing journalists remains debateable, but Chinese accounts corroborate many such massacres as the letters recorded. Bozemcke, M.F., Chickering, R., & Förster, S. (eds), \textit{Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914} (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 467.
nature of German rule to British ideas of liberal imperialism, and fitted with pre-existing ‘enemy’ stereotypes common to long-running imperial anxieties. Furthermore, the menace of such leadership and their evident lust for power through strength was a source for concern. The *South Australian Register* wrote in January 1900: ‘It is generally recognised that the Government is prepared to go to almost any Constitutional length that will be of real service in giving effect to the Emperor’s imperious will.’ Such views suggest a belief the Emperor’s whims, and his power over state and society could potentially presage future conflict; the same paper predicted that it was unlikely that the Kaiser’s will would result in benefits for Germany ‘in which the mother country [Britain] will have no direct share.’

The *South Australian Register*, (Adelaide, SA), 27 January 1900.

The intelligence from China as to the attitude of the German officers towards the Chinese is apt to come as a shock to humane minds…This attitude of mind is characteristic, we will not say of German, but of Prussian politics, which are and have been frankly based on the Machiavellian doctrine of creating the sensation of fear.

The *Spectator*, relenting from its previously neutral stance towards Germany, expressed its concern about Germany while reflecting upon ‘German Characteristics’ in late 1900:

Both articles explicitly unite the Kaiser, the Prussianization of German politics, and the attitude of cruelty, revenge and ‘the sensation of fear’ which Germany seemed to be increasingly engendering. This link between German autocracy, brutality and aggression in imperial policy, and British imperial anxieties is fundamental to understanding the development of the idea that Germany was viewed as an imperial menace to Britain before 1902.

The procession of autocratic pronouncements from the Kaiser about China throughout this period and the increasingly imposing *Weltpolitik* of Germany added a new layer to pre-existent British concerns about Germany. Despite his seeming rehabilitation in 1901 during the Kaiser’s visit to Queen Victoria’s deathbed, such anxieties were only temporarily allayed, and an undercurrent of distrust ran throughout press discourse. Germany’s behaviour in China during 1897 and 1898 seemed to prove the fears of German aggression and planning developed in the aftermath of the Kruger Telegram Crisis. Germany’s actions fitted into the pre-existent narrative of aggression, autocracy and covetousness. Throughout Germany’s involvement in the Boxer War doubters were provided with further evidence, and in commentaries of these events it is possible to discern a more clearly established view of German autocracy and military brutality. It has been important to identify two clear occurrences when the Kaiser’s personal brand of rule and its association with aggression and brutality were attacked in the British press. As argued in chapter one, the British were well accustomed to fearing autocratic and cruel enemies who jealously conspired against them, and the increasing association of Germany with these stereotypes helped the German Menace to permeate popular discourse. Though not yet fully developed, the inception of the ‘Hun’ appellation and reminders of the misdeeds of Germany in the wider world provided additional evidence of the growing menace of Germany.

The German Menace in Fiction, 1896-1902

Popular contemporary literature from the period 1896-1902 can provide further evidence of the development of the German Menace in British popular imagination after the Kruger Telegram. As argued above, in the popular press and non-fiction – a major element of British popular discourse – Germany was

128 *South Australian Register*, (Adelaide, SA), 27 January 1900.
129 *The Spectator*, 10 November 1900, p. 9.
a regular focus for debate and anxiety. In the literary world the rise of Germany as an imperial power and the implications this had for Britain became a common trope. Increasingly Germany was depicted as a nascent threat to the whole British Empire. Added to ideas of the commercial, economic threat of Germany, the evident anti-British sentiment, and perceptions of German conspiracies in British imperial territories, authors popularised the view that the German Empire increasingly targeted the seemingly weakened British Empire.

In one popular fictional account, Louis Tracy, one of the most popular authors of his age engaged directly with current events. Tracy’s work is one example of how literary culture and events were closely related, and the popularity of The Final War, both during and after the Kruger Telegram period indicates the longevity of popular anxiety after a crisis. From December 1895 to August 1896 Tracy wrote a popular story of future war, The Final War; serialized in the successful magazine, Pearson’s Weekly, the novel meandered through various stages, depicting Britain in all-out battle with European alliance of France, Russia and Germany. The story began as a reflection of wider anxieties of empire:

a determined attempt was now being made by her great commercial rivals to take from her some...of the advantages gained by centuries of enterprise...130

Tracy even described the powers sharing out the empire, ‘Canada falls to France. East Africa to Germany...’ and naturally the Russian’s claimed India.131 By the time he submitted his third instalment, news of both the Jameson Raid and the Kruger Telegram began to influence the story-line; clear in these early chapters was the desire of the powers to attack Britain in order to gain this imperial booty. From the outset the British were depicted as far superior to their enemies heavily defeating a Franco-German invasion fleet. Britain’s enemies were portrayed as hateful and jealous, their brooding envy justifying their emasculation at the end of the novel.132 The influence of the Kruger Telegram Crisis began to show as the story went on; chapters entitled ‘How Germany Was Outwitted’ and ‘The German Emperor Gets a Lesson’ indicate the desire of Tracy to dole out fictional punishments for the insolence displayed in January 1896. Tracy even depicted ‘Dr. Jim’s Second Raid’ in which Jameson successfully captures the German Emperor. Britain was joined in its war by the faithful Anglo-Saxon blooded Americans, and handed a heavy thrashing to all of its enemies:

The insuperable power of the British race confronted him [Kaiser Wilhelm]. It was hopeless longer to dream of a happy encounter.133

Tracy, at the wish of his proprietor, C. Arthur Pearson, surreally depicted the successful British invasion of the capitals of France, Germany and Russia.134 Tracy’s account was very popular but was heavily criticised by literary commentators.135 Tracy reimagined Jameson as a national and imperial hero; like many future war narratives of this era the plot was garbled and fanciful. He attempted to throw in as many recognisable figures, themes and plotlines in order to entertain the readership of Pearson’s Weekly. Regardless of the lack of narrative coherence or the inherent exaggeration and patriotic bombast, the story was popular and was published as a novel in 1896.136

George Griffith, another popular author of his era, sought like Tracy to capitalize on popular passion about South Africa in Briton or Boer? A Tale of the Fight for Africa (1897). Griffith’s tale was serialised immediately after The Final War in Pearson’s Weekly from August 1896 to January 1897; it depicted a war

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131 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
132 Ibid., p. 72.
133 Ibid., pp. 154, 375, 397.
136 Tracy, L., Final War.
between Britain and the Boer Republics which shared some similarity with the outbreak of war in 1899. However, Griffith imagined that a malevolent Russian influence is behind the instigation of war, seeking to benefit from Britain’s misfortune. Though Russia, an old imperial foe, lay at the heart of Griffith’s narrative, it was Germany who financed the Boers and trained their troops:

Not less than a quarter of a million had been spent in their construction and arming, nearly every penny of which had found its way into German pockets… All the available forces, including strong detachments of artillery and the German-drilled, uniformed troops which had been raised under the name of police…

At the heart of the story are the imperial anxieties which I have argued were common in British culture during this period. Griffith’s narrative reads like a lesson in national defence:

As the history of all empires has shown, the day upon which any integral portion of a dominion is torn by hostile force from the imperial body, is, for that dominion, the day of Fate and the beginning of its ruin.

Like Tracy and many other future war authors, Griffith handed the final victory to the British. The Boers, abandoned by the European powers, are crushed in a bloody conflict, and Britain learns ‘terrible lessons’ about the forces needed to guarantee its empire. Griffith even stretched to providing a ‘shopping list’ of military and naval forces needed to guarantee the security of South Africa. The ‘jealousies and conflicting ambitions’ of the European powers (France, Russia and Germany) are crushed by ‘a whole race in arms;’ elements of national regeneration, racial rhetoric, imperial insecurity, anti-German sentiment and jingoistic imperialism ran throughout this tale.

In 1898 two popular narratives were published to substantial success which emphasise the manner in which the themes of the Kruger Telegram Crisis had been stored and redeveloped in the ensuing two years. M.P. Shiel is often associated by historians with the development of the racialised imperial concern. The Kaiser is attributed much of the blame for the outbreak of European war. Shiel described France as a decaying and unthreatening ‘old’ power, while...
Russia was powerful - but ‘raw, new, and not, I don’t think, a nation at all.’ Finally, Germany was viewed as the ‘young’ enthusiastic aggressor, dangerous, covetous and willing to take what it could; throughout the novel, Germany was treated with mocking distain: Shiel ridiculed Prince Heinrich’s ‘absurd mailed fist’, the German acquisition of an underwhelming possession at Kiaochau, and called the Kaiser the ‘German Cock-of-the-Walk’.

Eventually the Germany and France are taught a hefty lesson by British sea power and order is restored. Then, somewhat strangely, Wilhelm II is handed command of a British regiment. The possibility of redemption for Wilhelm played upon the idea that he could be rescued from his ‘bad’ German heritage and restored as a ‘good’ British Prince; despite the Kaiser’s rehabilitation, Shiel blamed Germany’s training of the Chinese armies for the rise of the East:

> So great was the necessity for Western methods, and Western science, in the Government of China, that the Chinese were actually compelled at the very time to over-come their shuddering racial abhorrence of the white man, and to pay large salaries to white experts, in various departments, to plan and to administer. Germans drilled China’s army…

In the end, Britain emerges victorious, defeating the eastern forces, conquering Europe and so possessing world dominion. Like his friend Louis Tracy in *The Final War*, Shiel was tempted to portray British triumph out of adversity. His tale warned of dangers on all fronts, but could not countenance an ultimate British defeat. With the rhetoric of the finest national efficiency campaigners Shiel announced in the final chapter, ‘England, no doubt, will, in truth, absorb the world; the Loadstone is within us. But we must change.’ Within one novel the combined themes of imperial anxiety, the German Menace, and the desire for national efficiency were presented to a popular audience.

These themes had clearly coalesced in E.P. Oppenheim’s *Mysterious Mr Sabin*, which stands as an early example of invasion fiction with Germany as the aggressor. Oppenheim described an elaborate German plan for the invasion of England, provoked by an imperial crisis. There was an indisputable link in the plot line to the themes of the Kruger Telegram Crisis with thinly veiled allusions: ‘Extraordinary Telegram of the German Emperor to Moenig!’ and the British despatch of ships to ‘Delamere Bay’. The stereotypically named German Foreign Ambassador, Baron von Knignstein reveals to Mr Sabin, the spy, the motive and detail of the German plot:

> “It is the ties of kindred,” he continued, “which breed irritability, not kindliness! I tell you, my friend, that there is a great storm gathering. It is not for nothing that the great hosts of my country are ruled by a war lord! I tell you that we are arming to the teeth, silently, swiftly, and with a purpose. It may seem to you a small thing, but let me tell you this—we are a jealous nation! And we have cause for jealousy. In whatever part of the world we put down our foot, it is trodden on by our ubiquitous cousins! Wherever we turn to colonise, we are too late; England has already secured the finest territory, the most fruitful of the land. We must either take her leavings or go a-begging! Wherever we would develop, we are held back by the commercial and colonising genius—it amounts to that—of this wonderful nation. The world of to-day is getting cramped. There is no room for a growing England and a growing Germany! So! one must give way, and Germany is beginning to mutter that it shall not always be her sons who go to the wall… In military circles to-day a war with England would be wildly, hysterically popular; and sooner or later a war with England is as certain to come as the rising of the sun and the waning of the moon! I can tell you even now where the first blow will be struck! It is fixed! It is to come! So!”

> “Not in Europe or in Asia! The war-torch will be kindled in Africa!”

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143 Shiel, M.P., *Yellow Danger*.
“The Transvaal!”

The themes of German covetousness, jealousy, aggression and conspiracy against the British Empire are present in this extract and throughout the book. Oppenheim characterised the Germans as angry and frustrated by Britain; German spies and clandestine tactics feature heavily throughout the novel. Indicating the endurance over two years of the tropes exposed in January 1896, Oppenheim armed his Germans with insidious imperial plans to undermine the British Empire. We see here one of the clearest examples of the coalescence of various stereotypes into a clear conception of the new Germany.

In another future war story from 1898 J.N. Hampson described a great European war. In ‘Great Britain v. France and Russia’ Hampson described the war of 1900 in which France and Russia seek to attack Britain and her Empire. Although the war itself sees France and Russia attacking Britain both in the Channel and across the Empire, Hampson’s moral was made clear: ‘Germany’s attitude towards England during the war, though neutral, has been consistently inimical’. In spite of the more obvious conflict between the Franco-Russian alliance and Britain, in fact the greatest winner from the war is Germany, which gained much of Britain’s trade, shipping and commerce. Thus Germany’s covetous nature had enabled it to filch away Britain’s imperial power:

> It has been evident for some years that this Power [Germany] has been preparing to dispute our commercial, colonial, and maritime supremacy, and there is a great danger that, now that we are just at the end of an exhausting war...she may take the opportunity of pressing claims which we could not but resist, with the result of another war...

Hampson’s concern was both with the immediate menace of Russia and France, but also the true threat to Britain – Germany; its commercial standing, pragmatic policy and scheming official made it a greater and more lasting threat to Britain than France or Russia, which could be defeated by British sea power. Tying together the linked concerns of the German economic and imperial menaces, Hampson’s article sent a clear message about the enemies of Britain for the future. The theme of Germans as underhand arbiters of imperial downfall was a recurrent theme in early examples of spy novels and fictions of future war; furthermore, the trope of an invasion begun by a crisis in the Empire became a common literary device in invasion scare novels. William Le Queux, in his immensely popular novel, *The Invasion of 1910* (1906), described a disagreement in Samoa resulting in a massive German invasion of England. Writers regularly made the link between a threat somewhere in the Empire and an invasion of Britain; any threat to the Empire was a threat both to the periphery and to the centre.

The outbreak of the South African War in 1899 led to a surge in interest in the events leading up to the crisis; the Jameson Raid and the Kruger Telegram were given much greater prominence, and viewed as instrumental to the outbreak of war three years later. Violet Markham, writing in 1900 during the South African War, reflected a broad body of opinion that Germany and the other European powers had no desire to help the Boers and in reality sought to use them as a vehicle to snatch portions of the British Empire. Through these popular histories and pseudo-factual accounts, the idea of German interference in the Transvaal was a minimum requirement. German-Boer intrigue was widely suspected in such accounts.

In popular literature, the German interest in the Transvaal and British imperial affairs became instantly recognisable; serials in journals were quick to draw upon a current theme. In 1897 the pulp-fiction writer, Fred M. White, broke briefly from depicting murderous Sikhs and exotic crimes in his series ‘The Master Criminal’; in the chapter entitled ‘The ‘Morrison Raid’ Indemnity’, White’s protagonist, the cat burglar Gryde, steals a case of money sent by Germany to procure arms for the Boers in the Transvaal; the heroic Gryde subverts an imperial threat, whilst humiliating both the Boers and the Germans. The tale involved

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a series of negative and timely German stereotypes; largely they are portrayed as insidious and plotting. A mass-market author, White's interest lay in writing material to please consumers suggesting that such a theme was required to be recognisable and the storyline gripping.\footnote{White, EM, ‘The “Morrison Raid” Indemnity’ (First published in The Ladgate, London, Sep 1897) in \textit{Ibid.}}

Hume Nisbet's successful South African War adventure novel \textit{The Empire Makers} (1900) contained a mixture of anti-Semitism and anti-German stereotypes and blamed German influence for ‘our past failure’ in the Transvaal. Nisbet referred to the 'gallant raid' of 'Dr Jim', and the lack of 'bona fide Britishers' amongst the Transvaal Uitlander. The rest of the population of the Transvaal, he stated, were 'Germans mostly...and they made no secret of their deep and violent hatred of everything British.' Nisbet accused Kruger of behaving with 'greed and tyranny', supported by German soldiers introduced 'wholesale into their country.' Published in 1900 at the height of South African War mania, the novel fed upon the popular interest in South Africa, whilst propounding these anti-German stereotypes. Nisbet targeted an imperialist audience by attacking 'anglophobia', jealousy, and the scheming Germans who had wormed their way into a position of influence in the Boer Republics. He even depicted German soldiers commanding Boer Commandos. His references to the Jameson Raid indicate the legacy of the South African Crisis of 1895-96 in colouring the representation of Germany as an interfering and nefarious influence. Nisbet's angered, jingoistic stance was representative of a significant body of British opinion during the South African War.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

Seizing upon popular sentiment during the South African War Nisbet resuscitated previous narratives of German brutality; \textit{The Empire Makers} described in detail the brutal nature of colonial Germans. Nisbet's Germans were either Judeo-Capitalist exploiters intent upon wresting British control for their own Machiavellian purposes, or brutal jack-booted Prussians. The German Uitlander in the Transvaal were described as making 'no secret of their deep and violent hatred of everything British' picking up upon the perception of German jealousy and covetousness. Nisbet also seized the opportunity to assert his views upon the potential of German colonial endeavour; British rule allegedly 'liberates and advances every land which she protects’ while German rule was quite opposite:

But when Germany seizes a land she treats it as the warlike Kaffirs did. She butchers the original owners, and insists on all outsiders relinquishing their private rights, and becoming subjects. As the Kaiser has truly said, “On whatever land the German Eagle fixes its talons, that land is German.” This means, it is no longer free, only a German is entitled to civil rights.

Nisbet went on to describe more brutal behaviour: 'German mercenaries knock down, kick, and baton the citizens without the slightest provocation'. Nisbet's novel was populated with the most prominent enemies of the British Empire – the Boers and their German helpers. The protagonists cover under German and Low Dutch whips, and avoid beatings at the hands of 'exaggerated German metal soldiers' who set about their business with cold mechanical precision. Evidently Nisbet harboured deep prejudices about the behaviour of Germans in Africa; by indicating the potential for Germany to undermine Britain in this imperial context, Nisbet's tale suggested the need for concern about German actions and intentions.\footnote{Nisbet, H., \textit{The Empire Makers: A Romance of Adventure and War in South Africa} (London, 1900), pp. 1–112.} In this popular novel Nisbet condensed the growing concerns about German efficiency, imperial intentions and the contrast between German autocracy and British liberalism; in so doing he linked long-developed imperial anxieties with the nascent German threat. In the context of an overstretched empire, Nisbet evoked a new, unpleasant and dangerous new challenge in a time of national trial.

These literary narratives, based roughly around the period 1896-1900 indicate that British readership had regular access to stories depicting Germany at least as insidious, and at the worst as a threat to the Empire. They helped to provide a solid grounding for Germany's new role as the British public's most feared nation. Russia continued to influence such fictions, but as I.F. Clarke and Michael Matin have argued, Germany became the most frequent enemy of choice in future war fiction; the narratives of Tracy, Shiel,
Griffith and Oppenheim were instrumental in portraying this new enemy in mass-market narratives in the post-Kruger Telegram era.

In a variety of literary forms, journalists and authors portrayed Germany as a future naval threat to British global supremacy, as an unpredictable, impulsive and aggressive imperial power, and as a secretive and menacing enemy, not yet revealing the true extent of its plans. These tropes were most common amongst nationalist and imperialist commentators and fiction writers, of whom there were many in perhaps the most jingoistic and imperialistic of periods in the long history of the British Empire. After 1896 the German Menace was developed and reinvigorated into a more fixed concept, so that by 1902 mainstream media outlets and popular imperial celebrities – Kipling and Rosebery for example – were tempted to engage with this new force in British popular discourse.

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By late 1902 the German Menace, in its layered complexity, was being much more clearly articulated. On 8 November 1902 the *Daily Express* discussed the Kaiser and the German Menace in detail across several articles, while he visited Britain. The *Express*, established as a rival to Northcliffe’s *Daily Mail* by the great publishing magnate C. Arthur Pearson (of *Pearson’s Magazine* and *Pearson’s Weekly*), argued, ‘We like the Kaiser, for in his character we see many of the best of our British qualities’, reminding readers that Wilhelm was in fact half British. However, conflicting with Wilhelm’s British side was his duty to the German empire; that duty was made more problematic due to the fact that ‘the interests of Germany clash with the interests of Great Britain in every quarter of the globe.’ Germany, the growing global and imperial threat, meant that Britain and the Kaiser could no longer maintain the bonds of friendship they had cherished in the past:

> Germany cries aloud for expansion, but every desirable dumping ground for her colonists we already hold. She longs to establish a great merchant navy, and finds in us her stoutest competitors. She strives to procure new markets for her manufactures, but we have to be ousted first. So she hates us, with a slow, bitter, Teutonic hatred that bursts out in disgusting cartoons, newspaper lies, and pro-Boer demonstrations. The *Express* went on to warn that any discussion of a treaty with Germany would be ‘folly’ because Germany had ‘no great reputation for her faithfulness or honest in treaty matters.’ Emphasising Germany’s potential treachery chimed with the themes of conspiracy and intrigue which had intermittently been discussed since 1896. Finally, the intention of Germany to establish a navy was evidence to suggest that the fears of a German Menace were justified. Several articles in the same edition debated the future relationship between Britain and Germany, detailed the naval and imperial ambitions of Germany, their jealousy, covetousness, the will of the Kaiser and the danger of German efficiency versus British inefficiency. In so doing the *Express*, which often proclaimed itself to be avowedly neutral in its stance toward Germany, described the growing sense of unease in Britain. The view that, ‘The average German…looks forward to the decay of England and to the German inheritance of the succession’, indicated clearly the association of British decline and the German desire to steal Britain’s imperial heritage. In answer, the *Express*, looked to the language of efficiency for the answer. Britain faced a choice: either ‘the good old plan of shutting our eyes and drifting,’ or ‘put our own house in order, and to concentrate outlay and intellect’ in preparing Britain for war, in order to prevent it.153

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153 *Daily Express*, 8 November 1902.
As Britain emerged from the South African War a commonly acknowledged concern about the intentions of Imperial Germany prevailed in popular discourse. From December 1902 to April 1903, Germany featured prominently in British popular discourse, as a result of two major international collaborations: the blockade of Venezuela and the possible construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Both cases involved vast sums of private and public money, and, more importantly, the foreign policy interests of the two nations. The newly formed British Unionist Government under Prime Minister Arthur Balfour sought twice to come to mutually beneficial agreement with Germany, and was twice confronted by an unprecedented popular rejection of their policy from across the political spectrum. In some ways Venezuela and Baghdad represented a reversal from previous years, insofar as the negative images of Germany in popular culture broadly supported official policy during the 1890s, but now thwarted it. The issue of British-German relations shows how the processes of the ‘medialisation’ of politics, increasingly prevalent in this period, could act both to endorse Government policy, as it had during the later 1890s, or in this case to challenge it. Governments in this era walked a fine line with popular sentiment, and the issue of relations with Germany indicates how closely intertwined politics and culture were.

Although there was a range of causes for this popular rejection of state policy, I will argue that the perception of the German Menace in Britain was decisive. The danger represented by German efficiency, brutality, autocracy, covetousness and insidiousness helped to foment the popular outburst. Though it is more difficult to establish precisely the extent to which the British public agreed, there is also evidence to suggest that the press and literary attacks on Anglo-German cooperation were popularly supported, especially if we take the view of the press as at least partially driven by consumer demand. The right wing press attacked their own political parties (Conservatives and Unionists), suggesting that pragmatic editors positioned themselves in line with the popular consensus, despite their political allegiances.

The intransigence of press and popular discourse between December 1902 and April 1903 indicates how crucial the Kruger Telegram Crisis of 1896 was in entrenching hostility towards Germany. As argued in the previous chapter, by late 1902 there was a much wider perception of a German Menace to Britain, and a clearer sense of what constituted that menace. This chapter will indicate how powerful a factor the German Menace had become both in popular discourse, as well as in influencing political decision-making. During two international crises, Germany was ruthlessly attacked, and the Balfour Government was forced into two foreign policy U-turns, and a decisive move away from any association with Germany.
After 1896, with the goal of realizing a world empire, the Kaiser’s government began to look both East and West for areas into which it could expand informal and formal influence.1 As well as China and the Middle East, the Americas were increasingly important to German strategic planners.2 With the purchase of the Carolines from Spain in 1898, Germany announced clearly its interest in the Philippines in competition with the USA; following this, German attentions turned toward the Caribbean.3 German interest in South and Central America during the period before 1914 has received substantial scholarly coverage.4 During the 1970s and 1980s historians from Germany and America investigated the German-American competition for the Americas during the age of imperialism. As Matthew Seligmann more recently summarised, these historians argued for a geographically focussed German policy of expansion, though there were those in opposition to this stance.5 Miriam Hood and Ian Forbes, in particular, investigated the influence of European, and particularly German, finance capital and informal imperialism in Venezuela.6 Holger Herwig later argued that the Venezuela Blockade figured as part of a wider attempt to establish German imperial influence in Venezuela and South America in Germany’s Vision of Empire in Venezuela (1986).7 Nancy Mitchell opposed the view, propounded by Herwig and Forbes, that Germany had a concerted expansionist imperialist policy in South and Central America. Mitchell argued that a teleological approach had them into attempting to make sense of German actions as part of some wider plan, as evidenced by Fritz Fischer’s thesis about German war aims.8 Mitchell argued that the German threat to the hemisphere was overblown, constructed from ‘a potent mix of German bombast and American paranoia’; instead, German action in the Americas was ‘timid’ rather than aggressive.9 The debate about German expansionism revolved largely around this dichotomy between the realities of German plans and their perception in America.

Few scholarly accounts have sought to understand the popular perceptions and implications of the Venezuela Blockade from the British perspective. There remains scope for investigation of the reasoning behind the press uproar and the impact this had upon the development of anti-German sentiment in Britain. Little attention has devoted paid to the popular dimensions of the Venezuela Blockade and the Baghdad Railway Withdrawal. However, these two linked events represent a key moment in the British popular demonization of Germany. After 1903, British Governments never looked toward active cooperation with Germany on any substantial issue. By the end of April 1903 the popular view of the German Menace, engendered by the Kruger Telegram Crisis, was even more firmly established as an important factor in British society and politics. It was these pre-existing anxieties that essentially shaped the more familiar discourse of the naval race; the imperial menace provided the essential lens through which these subsequent developments were viewed.

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The Venezuela Crisis, 1902-03

By the end of 1902, amid the debate raging about British efficiency and societal regeneration, a crisis was developing in South America which would involve Germany and Britain. European financial houses had invested heavily in Venezuela over the later nineteenth century, in railways, mining and agriculture and by 1896 British financiers had invested more than £11m, equivalent to over £600m today, and were the largest stakeholders. German and French combined investment accounted for a similar total. Over the 1890s a series of coups d'état and civil wars had ravaged Venezuela, severely interrupting trade and payments to the European banking houses and investment companies. In October 1899 the rebel leader, Cipriano Castro, launched a coup from the Colombian border, successfully occupying the capital Caracas and establishing a new revolutionary government. Once in power Castro refused to pay the huge outstanding debts owed to foreign investors by the Venezuelan government and private borrowers, prompting outcry from European inhabitants of Caracas. Although by December 1900 Castro had consented to paying back half of the full monthly bond instalment, the Venezuelan economy could barely cope, with a total debt estimated at £26.5m (c. £1,500,000,000 today).

With Venezuela’s economy ‘dogged by almost continuous revolutions and lack of revenue’ it was clear that European bond holders and money lenders would not easily regain their funds. Venezuela was also important to British imperial interests due its closeness to Trinidad and its dominance of the mouth of the Orinoco River – a major trade route. Relations between Britain and Venezuela were further soured by British-Trinidadian support for Colombian attempts to foment a new revolution in Venezuela, and heavy Venezuelan tariffs on Trinidadian products resulted in several public clashes. Britain and Trinidad supported attempts to ruin Castro’s government, including offering shelter to Columbian pirate ships which raided Venezuelan trade. Against this turbulent back-drop the European powers and the United States were locked in debate about what should and could be done. In much the same way as over Egypt in 1882,

References:
16. Ibid.
throughout 1900-02 the European powers deliberated over what action should be taken to gain reparations for the debts owed by Venezuela. Resolutions for action by individual powers were delayed due to the possibility of a change of Venezuelan Government during 1900 and 1901, and concern over the position of the USA also led to indecision by the British, German and Italians.

Before the crisis the British Government was concerned that Germany might act alone in Venezuela to recoup its claims; as Nancy Mitchell argued, this might ‘embarrass’ Britain and so the British Foreign Office, now under Lord Lansdowne, began to subtly communicate with Germany over the possibility of joint action. Germany was positive and the ambassador in London, Count Metternich, contacted Lansdowne in July 1902 to suggest that cooperation would be ‘thoroughly favored [sic.]” by Germany.\(^{17}\)

They were keen to have the involvement of Britain in this venture, and as Kennedy and Mitchell have argued, desired to improve Anglo-German relations publicly through joint action. Kennedy argued that this desire for popular approval came as a result of a desire to prevent future panic over Germany’s growing fleet in Britain. Once cooperation was agreed, Britain took the driving seat.\(^{18}\) In early November Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Britain and met with members of the British Government and King Edward VII, and at Sandringham on 11 November Lansdowne and Bülow came to a formal agreement that Britain and Germany would coerce Venezuela to recoup outstanding claims and would not sign a peace treaty separately. Britain had willingly agreed to act, and the Unionist Government expected that the United States Government would not take issue with the act, nor would it cause any great stir in the press.\(^{19}\)

Discussing the Kaiser’s mysterious visit to Britain in November 1902 the *Spectator* invoked Germany’s past record of betrayal and conspiracy by raising suspicion of its aims and objectives:

> We may dislike the Emperor’s autocratic and tyrannical spirit, his restless ambition, and his determination to take from Britain if he can the proud position that is now held by her, yet we cannot but admire the eager, active spirit in which he pushes and presses every point to the utmost as long as it is to the advantage of his own Empire…But our admiration for the German Emperor must not prevent us watching him and his designs closely, and endeavouring to make clear what those designs are.

The article was rich with the themes of the German Menace, as developed since 1896. Wilhelm was ‘autocratic’ and ‘tyrannical’, had ‘restless ambition’ and would eventually seek to take from Britain what it held dear. Allusions were made to the ‘deeply hostile’ German people, and their desire for ‘sea-power’ and ‘world-empire’. The *Spectator* warned, with remarkable foresight, that Wilhelm was likely seeking support for one of his imperialist pet projects - the Baghdad Railway.\(^{20}\) The article was widely reported across the British press and had the desired impact in drawing debate. Balfour responded to it in a speech at Mansion House the following Monday referring to the ‘wildest and most fantastic inventions’ in the British press.\(^{21}\) Yet Balfour’s attempts to allay increasingly negative comment about Germany in the British press were futile.

On 7 December Germany and Britain issued a joint ultimatum to Venezuela demanding the repayment of outstanding debts; a British fleet of 8 was joined by four German ships.\(^{22}\) On 9 December with no response from Castro’s Venezuelan Government, acted to seize the entire Venezuelan fleet, capturing all but one ship within two days. During the action Germany scuttled two Venezuelan ships leading to criticism in the British press. Under British leadership, the two fleets bombarded the town of Puerto Cabello as punishment for an insult to the British flag; this too was unwelcome news.\(^{23}\)

Expecting President Castro to quickly capitulate under this display of strength, Germany and Britain were surprised when he arrested hundreds of Germans and Britons in Caracas, and on 13 December submitted a claim for arbitration to the

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\(^{17}\) Ibid., Kennedy, PM., *Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, p. 257.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., Mitchell, N., *Height of the German Challenge*, p. 189.

\(^{19}\) Mitchell, N., *Height of the German Challenge*, p. 190.

\(^{20}\) *Daily Mail*, 8 November 1902; *Kalgoorlie Western Argus* (WA), 30 December 1902.

\(^{21}\) *The Times*, 12 November 1902.

\(^{22}\) Italy, encouraged by Britain to participate, issued its own ultimatum on 11 December. On 9 December the British Government was also instrumental in encouraging Italy to offer its own ultimatum. Mitchell, N., *Danger of Dreams*, pp. 84–6.

United States. Venezuela, officially under the protection of the USA under the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, therefore sought to embroil Germany and Britain in a much wider crisis. Britain reacted quickly seeking to pre-empt the American response and attempted to quickly establish a blockade of Venezuela. However, deficiency in communication led to much confusion, and by the time British ships instituted their blockade on 20 December, the British Government informed Washington that they would willingly submit to American arbitration, closely followed by Germany.\textsuperscript{24}

The negotiations between the British and German governments over Venezuela had been achieved without alarm in Britain.\textsuperscript{25} However, the sinking of the ships and the bombardment of Puerto Cabello had soured the public mood. Most notable amidst the growing popular anger toward the government’s actions was Rudyard Kipling who exerted his considerable public influence with his poem, ‘The Rowers’, published in the \textit{Times} on 22 December 1902.\textsuperscript{26} Kipling’s evocative and impassioned verse both articulated and informed British popular opinion; the German ‘anglophobia’ of only months before was neither forgiven, nor forgotten: ‘The dead they mocked are scarcely cold’. Furthermore, Kipling expressed the common fear that Britain had placed itself ‘at the will of the breed that wronged us most’. Finally, Kipling evoked memories of the Boxer War of 1900, the Kaiser’s bullish ‘Hunnenrede’, with his reference to the ‘the Goth and shameless Hun’. The language and imagery he used was powerful, and appeared to capture and crystallize a widespread public mood. ‘The Rovers’ marked the beginning of two months’ sustained press agitation against cooperation with Germany.

In early December the \textit{Manchester Guardian} immediately called for clarification of German plans. The \textit{Guardian} was usually one of the least aggressive of British newspapers, though it agreed with the justification for action on the basis of recouping illegally seized loans.\textsuperscript{27} The \textit{Economist}, which generally took a more critical line, wrote about the contrasting foreign policies of Britain and Germany: ‘There are almost always two opinions upon the amount of severity which it is right or expedient to use, and the German opinion seldom leans to the milder side.’ Furthermore, whilst claiming not to ‘pass judgement upon them’ The \textit{Economist} also stated that ‘it is permissible not to wish to be associated with them.’\textsuperscript{28} American newspapers delighted in the British press reaction to the Anglo-German agreement over Venezuela. The \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, for example, listed reports in Britain’s daily press; it quoted the \textit{Daily News’s} accusation that the Kaiser had ‘stolen’ British ‘independence’ and its criticism of the Government for involving Britain in ‘operations little removed from piracy.’ Other British dailies argued that any alliance risked enraging America. The \textit{Daily Mail}, \textit{Standard}, \textit{Spectator}, \textit{Speaker}, \textit{Saturday Review}, \textit{Echo} and \textit{Outlook} all argued that Britain should either act alone, or more commonly go straight to the US Government for arbitration in the issue.\textsuperscript{29} The \textit{Mail} in particular grew increasingly opposed to the alliance with Germany in this period, questioning whether the hapless government actually had a ‘plan’ at all.\textsuperscript{30} The \textit{Yorkshire Post} joined calls for a swift resolution of an increasingly risky situation, stating ‘Germany is not so popular in this country at the present time…’\textsuperscript{31}

Sir Robert Giffen, a famed British economist, wrote a public letter to the \textit{Times} in which he argued that no worse ally could have been chosen for ‘this fatuous business’. Giffen stated that Germany was ‘a fatal partner’, and a ‘deadly rival’ that intended ‘an attack upon England at a convenient opportunity’; his espousal of ideas concomitant with the German Menace concluded with the warning that Germany would seize Venezuelan territory with no fear of American hostility - the only solution was to escape the alliance as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{32} Increasingly newspapers and contributors warned of the ‘danger’ of cooperation, or even allowing Germany to ‘lead us by the hand’ into a catastrophe.\textsuperscript{33} By the end of December the British

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 196–97.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 190.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{The Times}, 22 December 1902.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Manchester Guardian}, 9 December 1902.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, 13 December 1902; \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, 13 December 1902.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Daily Mail}, 15 December 1902.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Yorkshire Post}, 16 December 1902.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{The Times}, 18 December 1902.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Daily Mail}, 18 December 1902.
press was briefly placated by the news that Germany had agreed to submit to American arbitration, as a result, the Daily Mail claimed, of public pressure.\textsuperscript{34}

The uproar was explained by contemporaries in various terms. Firstly, it was felt that Britain, standing to recoup the smallest share of the money owed, should act quickly and leave once it had secured its own share. Increasingly it was recognised that Britain was acting as much to gain retribution for the seizure of British ships (which had been rumoured to be carrying contraband) as it was to recoup Venezuela’s debts. Secondly, a common motif was concern that interference might provoke the anger of the United States. Many refused to contemplate any regression in recently improved relations with the USA; American sensitivity was, at least initially, the greatest concern for newspapers across the political spectrum. The third factor, and the one which became most prominent as the Blockade wore on, was British association with Germany. It is important to understand that although the anger at any collaboration with Germany was the leading force in the popular outcry, the other factors are inseparable from it. The lack of any real possibility of recouping the finances of British bankers, added to concern about relations with America, helped to catalyse anti-German opinion; during this crisis, Germany was an unwanted and undesirable partner.

In early January, continuing in the belief that the blockade would soon be settled, newspapers began to offer their verdict on the crisis. Increasingly the themes of the German Menace were offered as the major motivation for leaving the alliance. The Manchester Guardian reminded its readership that blame lay with the whole Unionist Government for repeatedly seeking flawed and perilous deals with Germany.\textsuperscript{35} ‘Patriae Quis Exul’, wrote for the Contemporary Review that:

> Germany can never be our friend…[e]conomically, because she has the same aims as we have…; politically, because her position between France and Russia…she must make for expansion and for command of the sea-coasts… [and] ‘psychologically, because the German peoples are by nature envious, hostile to England, and tend to become more so.

The lengthy article summed up in plain English that which is latent in many other expressions of opinion at the time: ‘This one thing let us remember. Could Germany crush us, she would.’\textsuperscript{36} For this proponent of the German Menace, no alliance or cooperation could be contemplated because of the economic competition, expansionism, and the natural jealousy and hostility of the German people. The Daily Express reported a fictional tale published in ‘the Berlin daily with the largest local circulation’, in which ‘an Imaginitive German Captures the British Navy’ using magnetism. Oskar Klaussman’s story, whilst of poor literary quality, seemed to indicate the ‘mutual unfriendliness’ felt in both camps, and was used by the Express to show the untrustworthiness of their supposed partner in Venezuela.\textsuperscript{37}

These examples indicate how, across press coverage of the crisis, themes about Germany’s conspiratorial and untrustworthy nature were present throughout the crisis. On 30 January Viscount Cranborne, under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, publicly acknowledged to the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce that the press had been at least partially justified in their criticism:

> It was a mess (Hear, hear)...undoubtedly it was a mess, but we must not be afraid of that. It was necessary in order to defend our interests.\textsuperscript{38}

Cranborne was then heckled by the crowd; the Manchester Guardian remarked that an audience member exclaimed that ‘he had no objection to our coercing Venezuela, but why did we make a German alliance? (“Hear, hear,” and a voice “Why?””).\textsuperscript{39} Cranborne’s admission of the mess only encouraged the newspapers to attack the Government’s ineptitude more viciously. Many publications sought to explain how Britain had become embroiled in the ‘mess’; in spite of the fact that in reality it had been the British government who

\textsuperscript{34} Daily Mail, 22 December 1902; Daily Mail, 27 December 1902.
\textsuperscript{35} Quis Exul, P, ‘Our Relations with Germany’, Contemporary Review, 83:Jan./June (January 1903), pp. 100–11.
\textsuperscript{36} Manchester Guardian, 6 January 1903.
\textsuperscript{37} Daily Express, 6 January 1903.
\textsuperscript{38} Manchester Guardian, 31 January 1903.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
had sought the collaboration with Germany, for several weeks the *Mail* ran the line that Britain had somehow been co-opted into a situation which would only benefit Germany.⁴⁰ “The Trap” into which Britain had been lured could only end in failure and a potential diplomatic conflagration with the United States.⁴¹ Insidious Germany had sought to damage British relations with America and so to weaken the two powers.⁴² The *Manchester Guardian* summarised the talk of the streets:

> It is often suggested that Germany is deliberately edging us into this dilemma, hoping that our Government’s promise to her at the opening of the “war” will be kept, that England and the United States will be alienated from each other, and that Germany, the all-invading Germany of the dreams of nervous Imperialists, will then tackle the divided might of the Anglo-Saxon race by sections in a great bid for the supremacy of the world.

Following this succinct summary of the themes of the German Menace, the *Manchester Guardian* sought to dismiss such rumour-mongering.⁴³ However, it was alone in suggesting that association with Germany was not perilous. Until long after the ending of the Blockade, public and press were seemingly united in consternation over the ‘alliance’ with Germany.⁴⁴ The London correspondent of the *New York Times* described the uneasiness felt in Britain ‘owing to the aggressive action of their partner in this unfortunate business.’ Furthermore, the *New York Times* claimed that the British public could be regularly heard exclaiming, ‘If only we could escape from this entanglement with Germany!’⁴⁵

After the agreement to arbitration on 18 December, the most significant event of the crisis was the German bombardment of the Fort of San Carlos, provoked, the Germans claimed, by Venezuelan bombardment of the *Panther* as it entered the Maracaibo lagoon. The Germans flattened the fort town, killing several civilians in the process; their actions caused outrage with both the British naval command in the Caribbean and with the British and American press.⁴⁶ This minor military event only went to prove to the British that Germany could not be trusted – an upstart, aggressive and cold-hearted ally. Despite the relatively smooth procedure of the blockade itself the press coverage and public outcry could not have been more outraged. Reports spoke in terms of cruelty, suffering and the German murder of ‘harmless Indian fishermen’.⁴⁷ The *Times* correspondent reported on 21 January that according to correspondence from Berlin, ‘There were no orders…; the German commander used his discretion. Perhaps it was his indiscretion that he used.’⁴⁸ The heavy-handedness of the German ships in Venezuela had been repeatedly mentioned during the first month of the crisis, and this bombardment of the Venezuelan coast appeared to vindicate such views; German military brutality was viciously attacked across the British press. The signposts of the German Menace were ever more present with attacks upon cruel and brutal German methods. Rumours even spread that the association of Britain to ‘so high-handed and so ill-advised’ a power as Germany might even have resulted in war if President Roosevelt had not remained so ‘cool-headed’ during the crisis.⁴⁹ Such reports imagined that Britain, dragged at Germany’s heals, might be dragged into a war with a friendly nation due to the aggression and autocracy by now commonly associated with Germany.

As the ‘muddle’ came to its diplomatic conclusion, criticism shifted towards the foreign secretary, Lansdowne, and the Government as a whole.⁵⁰ Balfour’s Conservative-Unionist Cabinet fought to defend its position but were heavily criticised, less about the acts of coercion than the ‘alliance’ with Germany. Austen Chamberlain, the Postmaster General, and soon to be announced Chancellor, attempted to defend the actions of the government at the annual dinner of the Birmingham Jewellers and Silversmiths’

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⁴¹ *Daily Mail*, 6 January 1903; *Daily Mail*, 23 January 1903.
⁴² The Guardian referred to the common opinion that Germany sought to alienate Britain and the USA and tackle them separately. *Manchester Guardian*, 26 January 1903.
⁴⁸ *The Times*, 21 January 1903.
⁵⁰ *The Times*, 24 January 1903.
Association on 2 February 1903. He was forced to admit that ‘[i]t would be idle for him to affect to ignore the unpopularity of that co-operation or to pretend surprise that it was not very popular in this country.’ He took the step of warning ‘those who lightly used the great powers of the press and the sources of public information to poison the relations between two great nations’ from creating further difficulties in international relations.

Balfour, Lansdowne and other prominent ministers consistently argued that although co-operation with Germany had proved to be deeply unpopular, it would be folly not to honour the agreement early, based on ‘sentiment alone’.51 When Prime Minister Arthur Balfour returned to the public eye after a period of ill-health, he attempted to distance himself from the decision-making surrounding the Sandringham meeting in November. Nevertheless, he was forced to defend Government policy; like Austen Chamberlain, he also chastised the press for ‘fomenting international animosities’, which the New York Times argued was ‘the obvious resource of a statesmen at a loss to find argument wherewith to combat the legitimate criticisms of the recognized organs of public opinion’.52 Balfour also sought to employ an argument similar to Chamberlain’s in his public address in Liverpool on Friday 13 February:

I do not in the least understand, and I have never been able to understand, the causes which have produced it [animosity] in Germany, but I do understand the causes which have produced it in this country. They are intelligible enough. They are causes with which it is impossible not to sympathise. - (Hear, hear.)…If I could influence public opinion in this direction it would be to implore all those who have any command over the sources of public opinion to remember that a great responsibility attaches to any man who indulges in the easy, the facile task of embittering the relations between two countries.53

Balfour found it impossible to argue that the British public was anything other than set against Germany, and was unable to challenge that animosity; he only pleaded with the press to keep them quiet. Balfour was aware of the ‘international jealousies’ of other powers, and the chance that ‘a possible danger may arise in consequence of the jealousies of one of the great European States in connection with these less civilised communities’, i.e. colonial possessions. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of the time clearly acknowledged the power of the press and popular opinion to sour international relationships; he naively hoped that by persuasion he could inspire a change in popular discourse, but was to be disappointed. Sir Edward Grey reflected later the same year:

I will say this—that really public opinion is the great factor in these matters, and if two peoples really convince each other, through the Press and other channels, that they wish each other well, it is worth more to those two nations than if a treaty of alliance were made.

Two of the greatest politicians of their age both admitted, in reflection upon the Venezuela and Baghdad Railway crises, that ultimately British popular opinion was a vital factor in any political decision-making; even, Grey suggested, more important than formal alliance agreements.54 Balfour tried, and failed, to counteract the increasingly powerful currents of popular opinion presenting; this appears to be strong evidence of the increasingly pervasive democratisation of politics.

The Prime Minister’s Liverpool Speech failed to convince the public of the justification for an alliance with Germany, and led to heavy criticism from an angry Tory press; national confidence in policy-making was damaged as a result: ‘The Ministry rushed into the alliance without having the slightest idea what it was doing, and refused to abandon it because of pledges carelessly given to Germany.’55 To the London Correspondent of the New York Times the press outcry was seen to be less a press creation than a ‘mirror of public thought and sentiment.’ The correspondent claimed that Balfour’s ‘lofty philosophical disdain’

51 Manchester Guardian, 2 February 1903.
52 New York Times, 15 February 1903.
53 Manchester Guardian, 14 February 1903.
54 HC Deb., Hansard, 126: cc91-109 (23 July 1903).
55 Daily Mail, 13 February 1903; Evening News, 14 February 1903; Daily Mail, 14 February 1903.
made clear his detachment from the British public mood. His critics sought to make clear to Balfour and his Government that the majority of the British public would not countenance any alliance with Germany.\textsuperscript{56} The Liberals joined in the criticism of the Government and in spite of past dismissals of anti-German sentiment, evidently sought to follow ‘public opinion’. Sir Edward Grey, an increasingly influential Liberal opponent, remarked that, ‘He was not surprised that co-operation with Germany was not popular in this country at the present time’ and that though Germany should not be treated unfairly, Grey was relieved that ‘public opinion… was pressing upon our Government that they must not pledge their word again lightly in a matter of this kind…’\textsuperscript{57} Similarly, Lord Tweedmouth, an outspoken Liberal Peer, attacked Government policy for combining with a country:

whose claims were totally different from our claims, whose methods were different from our methods, whose idea of policy was different from our idea of policy, and whose ulterior objects with regard to that part of the world were different from ours.\textsuperscript{58}

Those ulterior motives, it was inferred by the Manchester Guardian, were the seizure by Germany of colonial territory in South America, a policy which would have seriously endangered Britain’s future friendship with the USA and encroached upon Britain’s trade.\textsuperscript{59} These Liberal statements were likely intended as a message to the Government that Germany, based on its record of untrustworthiness, should no longer be considered as a potential partner in any enterprise.

In spite of the attempts of the Unionist government to save face, the press and public figures continued to be vocal in their attacks upon Germany, and Government collaboration. The Conservative MP Ian Malcolm even attacked his own party colleagues. Malcolm claimed that the Government had allowed Britain to be ‘dragged at the heels of Germany’ and in future it would be ‘very difficult for him to follow the policy of a Government in favour of German co-operation.’\textsuperscript{60} The Mail led a self-righteous crusade against the ‘morass’, ‘imbroglio’ and ‘entanglement’ in which Britain had been ensnared. Concerns in leading articles varied from threatening warnings of increasing American hostility, warning of the menace of Germany and repeatedly stating the terrible ‘net results’ of the ‘mess’ for Britain.\textsuperscript{61}

With articles typical of the Edwardian malaise of pessimism, the Mail, which sold 850,000 copies per day throughout January and February 1903, continuously reminded the public of Britain’s disgrace.\textsuperscript{62} Furthermore, it claimed the ‘preposterous alliance’ had resulted in Germany controlling British policy ‘entirely’. At the will of Germany, ‘with her truculence and Machiavellian devices’, the affair could have drifted ‘into anything’.\textsuperscript{63} The example of Venezuela was used to further the argument that the Kaiser and Bülow’s desire for a greater fleet and a world role could only be a bad thing; the Mail argued:

that while great naval power in the hands of Britain cannot constitute a menace, in the hands of Germany it will be a grave peril to the world, the more so as the recent history of German policy is one of daring aggression, and as the want of space at home compels Germany to conquer colonies of others or perish.

Germany’s colonial and global ambitions were foremost in the British popular sphere. Naturally, concerns increasingly turned toward home waters after 1903, as Kennedy himself argued, but this ‘colonial’ ‘menace’, and ‘grave peril to the world’ is an underestimated element in the mind of the British paranoiac.\textsuperscript{64}

In mid-February the American arbitrator, Herbert W. Bowen, laid the foundations for a final settlement of British, Italian and German claims against Venezuela but the British press outburst showed no sign of

\textsuperscript{56} New York Times, 15 February 1903.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.; Daily Mail, 9 February 1903; Manchester Guardian, 7 February 1903.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.; Hansard, 1880–1903, 3 March 1903.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Manchester Guardian, 10 February 1903.
\textsuperscript{61} Daily Mail, 4 February 1903; Daily Mail, 5 February 1903; Daily Mail, 13 February 1903.
\textsuperscript{62} Daily Mail, 12 September 1903.
\textsuperscript{63} Daily Mail, 2 February 1903.
\textsuperscript{64} Daily Mail, 5 February 1903.
abating. The *Mail* was joined by commentators from the *Times*, *Fortnightly Review* and even the liberal *Manchester Guardian* in announcing their own condemnation of the ‘miserable affair’, many lengthy articles summarised attitudes towards Germany. British author and critic, Sydney Brooks, discussed the ‘Venezuelan Imbroglio’ at length in his diatribe in February’s *Fortnightly Review*. Brooks captured the general tone of the period: ‘the aloofness of Government, the way in which Government…runs from time to time full-tilt against the almost unanimous opinion of the country.’ This comment was indicative of the sense of frustration felt in the British populace; Brooks argued that ‘nearly all’ of the current Cabinet had ‘quite astonishingly failed to gauge the feelings of the public.’ Although he did not advocate the American ‘glass-house’ style of governance, which he equated to ‘subjugation to the ‘incorrigible mob’, he stated that British ‘democratic fact’ was distant from British democratic ideals. Even stronger, Brooks argued that the current administration had, due to ‘Court influence’ (i.e. King Edward VII), a natural pro-German stance, allied to ‘an immense ignorance of public sentiment’.

Brooks related his broader points to the current situation, claiming that there had ‘not been a moment since 1895 when they [the British public] were not interested in the matter of Anglo-German relations.’ Indeed, he went as far as to say that British opinion had ‘been steadily revolting from the pro-German tendencies that have directed her foreign policy for the last thirty years’; on the Venezuelan issue, Brooks was even willing to question ‘whether the English masses have ever been more determined on any great, and more or less abstract, question of external politics than they are on this.’ The reasons he offered reflect the ideas I have argued were inherent in the German Menace since 1896:

They have not forgotten the Kaiser’s telegram to Mr. Krueger…Still less have they forgotten the ‘foul and filthy lies’ poured out upon the British Army,…upon all Englishmen. They realise that though the Kaiser may personally be friendly to England, his people are not. They see that public opinion in Germany has for years past been openly and viciously hostile…The savagery of German hatred and contempt.

Brooks went on to remind the reader of the indignation felt in Britain as a result of the Kruger Telegram, and the disrespect and disdain with which Chancellor Bülow referred to Great Britain. To further his point, Brooks stated that the ‘immense majority of Englishmen’ agreed:

that an agreement with Germany is no longer possible as a basis for British policy abroad; that what Germany wants is what England now possesses; that her longing for sea-power, colonies, and commercial dominion can only be realised at England’s expense;…that the aims of Great Britain and Germany are too much alike for their interests to be identical; that the countries, in short, are natural rivals, and not natural allies.

From these comments it is evident that Brooks believed that colonial competition and global antagonism were the ultimate reason for the ‘sense of outraged national dignity’ currently being expressed in Britain.

Brooks’s view was symptomatic of the coalescence over the past seven years of the perception of a more generalised German threat to British interests. He was not the only proponent of this outlook; British opinion had increasingly been concerned by Germany’s activities across the world, and the rejection of Government policy during the Venezuela Blockade represented key point of intensification. At the least, by the end of 1903 the political Right was dominated by men warning loudly of a German Menace to the British Empire. However, newspapers, spokesmen and politicians of all persuasions were increasingly drawn to recognize the popular mood and declare their own distaste for cooperation with Germany. Brooks was by no means alone in emphasising the tarnished reputation of Germany in British eyes.

The *Times*’ leading article on 17 February dismissed the ‘imperfectly’ developed Government understanding of popular opinion – that it was ‘a passing wave of resentment, aroused by the anti-British
demonstrations in Germany during the late war. Rather, Germany’s Anglophobia had only served to force the British public, ‘to review their relations with Germany for some years past’ from which they drew ‘the conclusion…that the general trend of German policy has not been favourable to British interests.’ The Times echoed the Mail and others in stating, ‘Until that impression is removed by something more convincing than fair words the unwillingness of this country to enter into further engagements with Germany is not likely to disappear.’ The Times directly referred to the increasingly popular perception of Germany as a danger to Britain. The Mail similarly argued: ‘It is all-important for the Cabinet to recognise that Germany cannot be counted as a friend, but as a secret and insidious enemy.’

The Venezuela Blockade provides strong evidence for the suggestion, made in the previous chapter, that by late 1902, Germany was widely perceived as a menace to Britain and its Empire. The extent and unanimity of anti-German press views from December 1902 to February 1903 suggest that the popular attitudes had shifted decisively over the past seven years to a resoundingly negative stance. The stereotypes typical of British imperial anxieties from the 1880s and 1890s – enemy jealousy, conspiracy and autocracy – were inherent during the Venezuela blockade press outburst. Articles referred to the open desire of Germany to undermine the British Empire and eventually to steal it away from the English. Germany was variously discussed as a malign and untrustworthy partner, or even plotting to attack and undermine Britain. At other times the brutality, aggression and dangerous impulses of the German Government and its military were feared and attacked. These themes could be found juxtaposed in many newspaper formats and from all political persuasions. Finally, the change of government policy that the press and public engendered suggests that by this time the Government, despite its desire to cooperate with Germany and keep its options open, was forced to follow the tide of popular opinion and back down from unilateral action with Germany. The desire to maintain a strong relationship with America was without doubt a key factor in the initial press reaction, but the clear distaste and concern about Germany was inseparable from these other factors. The widespread popular perception of a German Menace had influenced political decision-making, pushing the Government to submit to American arbitration.

The British Withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway Negotiations

Following the finalisation of the Washington Protocols, the image of Germany in British popular discourse had soured to the extent that the press now actively looked for other causes to vent, and play upon, popular anger and fears. In the two months following the Venezuela Crisis, the British press began for the first time to draw significant attention to the growth of the German navy. Though this particular fear slowly grew to dominate the imagination of the British – especially with the spiralling naval armaments race of the later 1900s – attention was soon diverted back to another global and imperial issue. At this stage, the British Navy was still vastly superior and concerns about a naval challenge remained based in the long-term. However, the fact that Germany increasingly became viewed as a challenger to the British navy provided further evidence to press commentators of the growing German Menace to the British Empire.

As the furore over Anglo-German collaboration in Venezuela cooled during March 1903, the Conservative-Unionist Government – led by its ill-fated Prime Minister Balfour and Foreign Minister Lansdowne - were once again dealing with Wilhelm II’s Germany in negotiations over the construction of a Railway line connecting Berlin to the Persian Gulf – known commonly as the Baghdadbahn or Berlin-Baghdad Railway. The ailing Ottoman Empire – the ‘sick man’ of Europe – had been at the centre of ‘Great

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69 The Times, 17 February 1903.
70 Daily Mail, 9 February 1903.
Power politics’ for the past decade and more. Central to the concern and competition for hegemony in the Near East was the issue of rail transport – connecting the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire and access to the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe. As Bradford Martin stated, the nineteenth century was the age ‘of great railway construction’ and in his view ‘imperialism and railway construction ran parallel’. For most of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia had been the two external powers vying for influence over Ottoman lands and Persia. As a result of this cold conflict, little infrastructural investment had been put in place by either power, so that both Persia and Ottoman territories were left poorly connected at the end of the century. With the rising importance of Germany and the overt efforts of Wilhelm’s governments to build a relationship with Turkey, the ‘game’ quickly became ‘three-cornered’.

Since the mid-1890s German strategists had been contemplating an extension of the railway line from Konia in Eastern Turkey, to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. The Ottoman leadership wished to connect its eastern provinces with Haidar Pasha (Istanbul/Constantinople) and in so doing strengthen its own internal cohesion. To the Turkish Sultanate, Germany represented a new force, untainted by the experiences of the past century; France, Russia and Britain had repeatedly placed pressure onto the Ottomans under increasing territorial competition. Sultan Abdul Hamid II hoped that Germany could be used as a vital ally and investor for connecting the Ottoman territories and combating European colonial hegemonic interests.

German motivations were manifold. Firstly, Germany’s growing industrial economy of the late-nineteenth century was resource-hungry, and a cheaper, quicker route to markets in Asia and Africa would be a major boon. Furthermore, a faster route to the riches of India was highly coveted. Claims were made that the route could shorten the journey by up to three days. Power-politically, the Baghdad Railway was seen as a prestige project. By gaining the concession from the Ottoman authorities in 1899, Wilhelm had succeeded in trumping a British tender. And finally the Berlin to Baghdad railway was the first instance when Wilhelm II’s Weltpolitik ‘took concrete form’. Germany’s desire to push eastwards - the Drang nach Osten – was lauded as the reasoning for this ambitious grand project. Finally, strategically, McMeekin argues, like many British thinkers of the time, that the Baghdadhahn was seen by Wilhelm and his government as a strategic asset. Any future war, be it with Britain, or any other Great Power – the United States for example – would doubtless be dominated by a fight for resources. Germany’s position in the centre of the European continent left her prone to blockade. A route to the Persian Gulf, across land and protected from naval bombardment, would provide a vital route for supplies.

In spite of Germany’s successful acquisition of construction rights, the Imperial Government failed to attain enough financial capital for the project. With this failure to finance the railway alone, they were forced to seek financial backing outside of the German market. As early as 1901 the German government had approached Britain with proposals for British financial investment in the railway project. Initially the British Government, in light of the war in South Africa, were unwilling to incur the anger of Russia by unbalancing the situation in the Near East. However, with the end of the South African War in 1902 the Marquis of Lansdowne, the new Foreign Secretary in Balfour’s Government, was convinced that Britain should be involved in this ‘international’ venture. His thinking was that Britain should hold a stake in the seemingly inevitable construction of the railway – a potential counterbalance to Russian power in the Middle East. Aloof to the change in popular attitude towards Russia, the British Government was still mostly concerned by Russian, not German, ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.

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73 Ibid.
74 McMeekin, S., Berlin-Baghdad Express, p. 5.
75 FO 78/5322, Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways. Vol. 3; Lord Lansdowne, Foreign Office Correspondence, April 14, 1903.
77 The Times, 29 April 1903.
79 Kennedy, P.M., Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 260.
The Kaiser’s focus upon the Middle East as an imperial project has been the topic of many historical and popular studies. As early as 1917 Morris Jastrow argued that the Baghdad Railway itself should be seen as a major cause for the start of the war.\textsuperscript{80} Up to the 1980s scholars debated the link between international tension caused by the Baghdad Railway in the pre-war years and the outbreak of hostilities.\textsuperscript{81} Recent historical accounts have been limited in number with significant room for further study in a variety of areas, including popular perceptions of the Baghdad Railway. Peter Hopkirk’s popular history, \textit{On Secret Service East of Constantinople} (1994), and Sean McMeekin’s \textit{The Berlin-Baghdad Express} (2010) described the Kaiser’s dreams to for German expansion into the Middle East and to bring down the British empire’ via the Middle East.\textsuperscript{82} Both argued that the Kaiser desired to eventually invade India and secure ‘world power’.\textsuperscript{83} Others have examined German policy toward the declining Ottoman Empire as an example of ‘Finanzimperialismus’ (financial imperialism).\textsuperscript{84} Donald McKale studied Germany’s interests in the Near and Middle East and showed how Germany was covertly involved in Egypt, Persia and Ottoman Turkey.\textsuperscript{85}

There has been, then, some recognition that the Middle East, as a whole, constituted an important part of Germany’s developing plans for empire. The Kaiser’s repeated attempts to gain closer relations and concessions from Turkey during the late 1880s indicate this most clearly.\textsuperscript{86} However, Richard M. Francis’s 1973 article represents the only detailed discussion of the British withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway negotiations in 1903. Francis suggested that more than simply responding to public pressure, as argued in the historiography before him,\textsuperscript{87} the negotiations were hijacked by Joseph Chamberlain to launch his
campaign for Tariff Reform. Contemporaries and participants all believed in the efficacy of the press campaign, and the popularity of the withdrawal from the agreement, even if doubts have been raised by some about the subtleties of reasoning behind the Unionist government’s U-turn. In recent historiography the event has received little recognition. Nevertheless, it represented a peak of interest in Britain towards German informal imperialism before the beginning of a clearly defined international antagonism.

Negotiations over the relative share of the parties involved – including German, French and British financial groupings backed by governments – were on-going. The British group was led ‘by London investment banks, Barings and Morgan, under the supervision of the Foreign Office’. In February 1903 Lansdowne repeated his will that railway shouldn’t be built ‘without a sufficient participation on the part of this country’, and that ‘the line should, as far as possible, be placed upon an international basis, so that no part of it would be controlled or guarded by a single Power’. Calling for negotiations in Paris, in February 1903 the German government offered an improved agreement on the Baghdad Railway board:

The Anatolian Railway Company 10%
The French Group 25%
The German Group 25%
The British Group 25%
The other countries, Austria, Switzerland, etc., 15%

Through March and into April, terms of cooperation were hammered out between Arthur Gwinner (Chairman of the German-backed Anatolian Railway Company) and the British consortium, although no acceptable terms could yet be established.

At the end of March and beginning of April rumours spread amongst the British press that Britain and Germany were once again drawn into discussions. On 4 April the Spectator warned:

This being so, the Government, if they are wise, will allay public anxiety by giving the country an early assurance that the rumours as to their contemplated action have no foundation; and that if at any time they are approached by Germany on the subject of the Baghdad Railway they are determined to meet all projects of co-operation with a decided negative.

Days later a question to Balfour in the House of Commons revealed to the general public that the British government was once again in collaboration with the interests of the German government. This disclosure prompted a sharp press outcry akin to the Venezuela blockade. The Spectator and the right-wing National Review led the press attacks – yet the outburst was not limited to the journals. Again, the same anti-German themes reared their head; the project itself was imagined as some kind of conspiracy to undermine British influence, and to further the plans of Germany for World Empire. On 8 April the Daily Telegraph sensationaly exclaimed: ‘Nothing can now prevent them [Germany] from planting themselves across the shortest overland route to India.’

The Manchester Guardian stated that any negotiation with Germany would ‘inspire considerable uneasiness’ in Britain; it argued involvement in the Baghdad Railway would represent ‘a far more perilous adventure than the Venezuelan “mess”’. Across Britain, daily newspapers condemned the Government’s policy of negotiation. The Chronicle and the Globe argued that a vote in Parliament should

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90 FO 78/5322, Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways. Vol. 3.
92 FO 78/5322, Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways. Vol. 3.
93 Ibid.
94 Daily Mail, 17 April 1903.
95 HC Deb, Hansard, 120:cc224–8 (7 April, 1903).
96 Daily Telegraph, 8 April 1903.
97 Manchester Guardian, 9 April 1903; Manchester Guardian, 9 April 1903.
be required before any Government action. The Dublin *Freeman’s Journal* warned that working again with Germany would represent an ‘unparalleled blunder’. The *Daily News* sarcastically questioned:

> Would it not be better for us to become tributaries of Germany at once? Would not Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cranborne look better in German uniforms?  

The *Liverpool Daily Post* expressed its dismay that the Prime Minister seemed aloof to ‘the strong feeling of hostility in this country to any co-operation with Germany’. The *Daily Mail* repeated its warnings from the Venezuela Crisis; it emphasised the insidiousness of Germany and prophesied that the only reason Germany sought Britain’s help was to act as financier, ‘scapegoat’ and ‘buffer’ against Russia. Furthermore, Germany’s plans supposedly represented a ‘grave danger’ to Britain:

> Then to admit the “pushful” German on to the Persian Gulf would be as great a sacrifice as to see Russia installed there. England’s policy has been for years to preserve India from any menace such as the possession of a port in the Persian Gulf, and we are now asked to abandon that policy.

In press coverage a key concern was the possibility that involvement in the railway would cause anger in Russia. British publications argued that to keep Russia happy was a primary concern; many even argued that seeking closer relations with France and Russia was far more desirable than any association with Germany. This represented a clear step-change from the ‘russophobia’ of the 1880s and 1890s. Beyond the concern of a conflagration with Russia in the Near East, it was increasingly common to refer to the plans of Germany as an imperial power; Germany was increasingly “pushful” and aggressive.

The *Fortnightly Review* wrote despairingly that there was good reason to believe ‘a Venezuelan partnership in the Near East’ was seemingly inevitable. The *Fortnightly’s* belief was that ‘the events through which we are passing must mark some definite point of departure in our international relations’. The *Fortnightly* predicted that the nation’s future depended upon the foreign policy decisions made at this international fork in the road: a choice between a rapprochement with the ‘Latin’ Portuguese and a ‘final reconciliation’ with France – which represented the ‘unquestionable and warm desire of the whole nation’ – or further unpopular and potential perilous entanglement with Germany. The British had been lured into a scheme through the ‘masterly skill’ of the German Government which had ‘taken cover behind the Deutsche Bank’ in order to disguise the needs of ‘one of the Kaiser’s most essentially political and far-reaching schemes’. A Venezuelan partnership in the East’ would result in ‘the definite subservience of this country to the whole scheme of German policy’. Furthermore, dismissing the advantages of a shorter route to India as piecemeal and insignificant, the patriotic diatribe evoked the suspicion of German aims by warning that aiding Germany in the Baghdad issue ‘would be like nothing so much as bringing in the wooden horse to strengthen Troy’.  

On 7 April in Foreign Office memorandum Lord Lansdowne indicated his deep frustration at the popular response to negotiations with Germany:

> a serious attempt...to discredit the enterprise, and to render it impossible for His Majesty’s Government to associate themselves in any way with it upon the ground that it was closely connected with the German Government and detrimental to British interests.

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88 Daily News, 21 April 1903; Daily Mail, 22 April 1903; The Globe, 21 April 1903; Daily Chronicle, 22 April 1903; Freeman’s Journal, 21 April 1903.
89 Liverpool Daily Post, 21 April 1903.
90 Daily Mail, 18 April 1903.
91 Daily Mail, 21 April 1903.
92 Daily Mail, 18 April 1903.
94 Ibid., pp. 809, 810, 825.
96 FO 78/5322, Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways. Vol. 3.
Lansdowne referred with frustration to the ‘anti-German fever from which the country is suffering’ without which, he was ‘convinced that we should be unanimously supported in holding and acting upon these views’.107 These statements provide evidence to suggest that the popular and press response directly influenced Government decision-making. Lansdowne’s private recognition of the impossibility of negotiations with Germany reveals high-level Cabinet sensitivity to popular sentiment. In Parliament over the following days Balfour, Cranborne and Lansdowne attempted to argue for the financial incentives of investment by British banks in the Baghdad Railway Company, as well as the importance of making it an ‘international’ endeavour.108 The Government insisted that the project was not purely a German one – merely led by a German bank.109

The Economist dismembered the Government’s defence, dismissing emphatic denials of the German nature of the scheme: ‘the right honourable gentleman [Balfour], who could persuade most people of most things, could persuade himself of almost any thing.’110 The Economist revealed its suspicions of Germany’s intentions for the Baghdad Railway:

the whole scheme is of German origin and inspiration, that the German Government is the only Government so far which has displayed any interest in it, and...the result will be the intimate association of His Majesty’s Government with that of Germany in a manner which may very seriously hamper our general liberty of action in the treatment of Turkish affairs.111

The Economist commented upon the worsening popular view of Germany: since December 1902 it argued that ‘a most striking demonstration of the distaste with which any intimate association with that Power was regarded by the great body of English opinion.’ Recent events proved that ‘nothing has happened in the interval to modify that temper of the public mind’. The New York Times agreed that British eyes had been opened to the true nature of the scheme in spite of the assurances of Balfour in the week previous. Its London Correspondent asserted that it was believed amongst the public that the railway was in fact ‘designed to serve the ends of German diplomacy at the expense not only of British investors, but of British imperial interests.’ The more the issue was debated, claimed the New York paper, the stronger the conviction that the Baghdad Railway served German aims. Those aims were well known and documented – the goal of shifting the balance of power, not only commercially but militarily and strategically away from Britain and into German hands.112

In spite of Government efforts to ‘de-germanise’ the Baghdad Railway project, the British public were un-swayed in their anger. The press outburst continued in spite of Government attempts to persuade the populace of the benefits of such a venture. Publications across the political spectrum were unanimous in their distaste for British involvement, and Germany’s involvement was commonly the most unattractive element. With the tide of opinion against them, the Conservative Government was forced to announce its withdrawal from negotiations. Although some historians have disputed the Government motivation for withdrawal, from the comments of Lansdowne throughout April, the popular outcry seems to have proved extremely problematic for the negotiations. Even those, such as Richard Francis, who argue that the withdrawal was caused by internal cabinet disagreement led by Joseph Chamberlain, accept that the popular outcry had a strong influence upon events, at the very least in part.113 Unlike the Venezuela Crisis which lasted over two months, the 1903 Baghdad Railway outcry was short and sharp; two weeks of press and public indignation had proved to the government that any cooperation with Germany – be it the Imperial Government, private companies or German interests in general – was inadvisable.114 The anger of the...

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107 The Times, 29 April 1903.
108 Ibid; FO 78/5322, Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways. Vol. 3.
109 HC Deb, Hansard, 120:cc1358
111 Ibid.
114 There is some debate about the motivation for a withdrawal from the project. However, whether the Government were forced to withdraw, or shrewdly chose to play to the public gallery, the views of the British populace were indisputably important for decision-makers. Francis, R.M., ‘British Withdrawal’, pp. 168–78.
British populace and the popular press seemed to have won a victory; popular criticism was not worth ‘further encouragement’, as Lansdowne put it.\(^{115}\)

British newspapers unanimously announced a ‘long breath of relief’…‘drawn by the British nation’. The strength of British opinion on the matter in the Near East seemed to have resulted in a U-turn in foreign policy. The Times announced: ‘This nation, in a word, does not want the German partnership…on any terms’.\(^{116}\) On an issue of such ‘vital importance to our Imperial system’ as the Persian Gulf, the British public had made clear that any association with Germany would not be tolerated. The Prime Minister and the conduct of his Cabinet during the past months had resulted in ‘very considerable uneasiness in regard to his clearness of view and his appreciation of the forces of public thought and sentiment on external questions.’ What was more, it argued that Germany’s failure to secure the cooperation from Britain which ‘they undoubtedly sought’ was not as a result of ‘any independent recognition on the part of the British Cabinet of the manifold embarrassments’ which had resulted from recent events. The Economist warmly thanked the British public for forcing the Government U-turn.\(^{117}\) Thomas Gibson Bowles, MP and self-professed foreign affairs expert, joined the Economist in rejoicing at the ‘delayed’ danger and the avoidance of any association with the German conspiracy. Speaking at a meeting of the Central Asian Society, and reported in the Times (where he was a regular contributor), Gibson Bowles claimed to cheers that ‘he felt very much indebted to the Press for the high-spirited attitude which they had adopted with regard to the matter.’ Similarly, regular Times commentator Edward Sassoon MP exclaimed:

> It seems astounding that the Government could have entertained or coquetted with the notion, instead of courteously giving it its coup de grâce the moment it was mooted…we may now shed crocodile’s tears on the none too premature jettisoning of this egregious abortion.\(^{118}\)

Such exclamations of relief at the rejection of the scheme continued in the following months. From the tone of the chorus of opinion crowing at the change in tack, it was largely felt that a disaster had been narrowly averted. A land route to India had been closed; the German imperial plans had for the time been obstructed; and a message had been sent to France and Russia that collaboration with Germany was no longer on the table.

The Spectator, a critic of the Government’s negotiations with Germany since November 1902, gleefully welcomed the announcement of the British financial consortium’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway negotiations. The barbed article professed ‘utmost relief’ at Balfour’s eventual change of support, and argued: ‘we can recall no instance in recent years in which the nation as a whole showed itself so full of anxiety lest the Government should adopt a particular line of policy.’ The Spectator suggested that had the Government not followed public opinion the force of anger ‘would have been enough to sweep the Government away.’ The insidiousness of German planning was explained in satirical terms. Put in homely terms, Germany had said:

> Unless you are determined to show yourself grossly rude, hostile, and unfriendly to me, you will not only lend me a five-pound note at once and back a bill for me, but also stand outside my house and act as a lightning conductor.

Following up on its article from November 1902, the Spectator also reminded Balfour of his undue criticisms of their prediction of dealings over the Baghdad Railway:

> We do think...that a British Prime Minister should take care to know his facts before he makes a contradiction of that sort...those who charge newspapers with the manufacture of wild inventions should be specially careful of their facts.

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\(^{115}\) FO 78/5322, Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways. Vol. 3.

\(^{116}\) The Times, 24 April 1903.


\(^{118}\) The Times, 29 April 1903.
The Spectator's fears had been proved correct, and its advice went unheeded. The Daily Mail and the Spectator reminded Balfour of these two humiliating facts, completing the embarrassment of his troubled Government.¹¹⁹

The British outburst over the revelation of British participation in the Baghdad Railway negotiations indicated the strength of anti-German feeling in Britain. With the Venezuela Crisis fresh in the memory, and after seven years development of the German Menace in British popular culture, the threat of a German imperial project to British interests was a cause for national outcry and Government criticism. The effects of the paradigm shift which occurred during the Kruger Telegram Crisis were being felt more powerfully than ever before. This withdrawal provides evidence to suggest that a decisive change had occurred in British perceptions about Germany in the period after 1896; henceforth, it seems, the British would aggressively reject any association with their menacing rival.

The press at the time firmly believed that popular clamour had precipitated an ignominious withdrawal by Lansdowne's consortium; Lansdowne's own comments on the issue through April 1903 seem to corroborate this, without records of private dealings between Cabinet ministers, definitive evidence is difficult to ascertain. The popular relief at this anti-German U-turn, however, indicated clearly the political poison that Germany had become, and the Baghdad Railway negotiations marked the last attempt between Germany and Britain to cooperate significantly in international affairs. The political decision-makers had received sufficient warning of the anti-German stance of the British people. What is more, the insidiousness of Germany, as shown in press comment above, had become widely accepted in popular discourse. The traps, tricks, and Trojan horses that Germany had laid at the feet of the British Government were cause for popular anxiety and consternation. The German Menace was clearly asserted as a powerful popular and political factor by April 1903.

Over the summer of 1903 the press turned to the 'Tariff War' between Canada and Germany for further evidence of the German Menace.¹²⁰ Since 1896 and E.E. Williams' Made in Germany the idea of imperial protectionism became increasingly popular in British popular politics, and the Canadian-German Tariff Dispute provided an opportunity for protectionists to prove that the British Empire should look out for its own benefit.¹²¹ The resurgence of interest of this issue in the immediate aftermath of the Venezuela Crisis and the withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway, only added to popular awareness of British frailty expressed by national efficiency campaigners, and the danger that Germany increasingly represented. The dispute with Germany, and the popularity of the withdrawal from negotiations with Germany over the Baghdad Railway allowed Joseph Chamberlain, a man 'adept at creating prejudice in order to strengthen any cause which he may be temporarily supporting', to noisily launch his Tariff Reform campaign;¹²² his previous advocacy of an Anglo-German alliance was swiftly forgotten. Chamberlain's 'Tariff Reform' campaign is well covered in British historiography; but the importance of it as an expression of 'imperial' values - deriving a large part of its emphasis from global competition with Germany - has been understated. Recently, eminent historian of imperial culture, Andrew Thompson, sought to counter the argument that Tariff Reform was intrinsically domestic in its orientation. By emphasising the 'Imperial Strategy' of the movement, Thompson showed the importance of Empire both to those advocating the policy and those decrying it.¹²³ Though this is a matter demanding much greater detailed discussion, it indicates the

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¹¹⁹ Daily Mail, 25 April 1903; Spectator, 25 April 1903.
¹²⁰ After April 1903 the running trade dispute between the imperial British Dominion of Canada and Germany provided fodder for Britain's newspapers who continued to provoke interest in the German Menace. In 1898 Canada elected to give Britain preferential trade tariffs, while the German Government felt that, as a result of the Anglo-German Trade Treaty of 1865, they were entitled to the same terms of trade as granted to Britain. From 1898 to 1910 this dispute was unsettled and continued to provoke press indignation. See Conybeare, J.A.C., Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (New York, 1987).
¹²³ Ibid.
continuing association of Germany as a threat to the British Empire in later 1903. The demand for a pan-imperial protectionist policy came as a direct response to the perceived threat posed by Germany’s bullying attitude.

The popular anger during the Venezuela Blockade and Baghdad Railway Withdrawal seemed to have proved publicly that the British people did not desire a relationship of any kind with Germany. After April 1903 the press continued to discuss and analyse Germany’s behaviour in relation to popular sentiment in Britain.\(^{124}\) In May 1903 the *Saturday Review* published an article decrying the British Germanophobes for their desire to reach a ‘general understanding’ with Russia. Though the article, ‘Russian Realities and German Bogeys’ claimed to preach sense, it seems that the prevailing flow of opinion was that anti-German opinion had won the argument: ‘Unfortunately the British press is never really happy unless it has a bogey to make the flesh creep…now it is Germany.’ The *Saturday Review* was pushed to announce that the ‘notion that Germany is to embark on the enterprise of conquering and appropriating our colonies is surely too ridiculous;’ yet, by its presence, such a suggestion indicates that people in Britain were increasingly persuaded that this was in fact the case. In future, assertions that the public should ignore the ‘ink-beasts’ of the Berlin daily press, and push for a closer relationship with Germany, would become increasingly rare and unpopular.\(^{125}\) The June issue of the *Saturday Review* added with evidently growing frustration:

> If, even in the days of [Cardinal] Retz, the discussion of public affairs by the uninformed was something more than ridiculous, it has become a serious danger to-day when the majority of mankind is, or easily can be, partially informed on most matters connected with foreign affairs. An active, and not always very scrupulous, press can now supply the fragmentary information and then play on the bad feeling which it has itself aroused.\(^{126}\)

This point most of all indicates that the newspaper reading public craved its ‘bogey’ – as a “‘nip’ to the habitual dram-drinker’. Sensation, popular scares and imperial intrigue were what sold newspapers; in this period fed by a general distaste and even hatred for Germany. Increasingly, ‘informed’ opinion, as this high-minded writer would have it, was influencing state policy. As the German chancellor Bülow had exclaimed ‘the days when national policy was conducted by Cabinets are past; popular passion is all-important in the modern world.’\(^{127}\)

### The Changing Role of Germany in Popular Literature

During 1903 literary depictions of the German Menace to Britain became increasingly commonplace. As argued in chapter three, literary narratives had increasingly been populated with insidious and covetous Germans. This literature experienced a step change during 1903; as anxieties about the German Menace received unprecedented levels of popular and political acknowledgment, so authors and publishers sought to capitalize on this ubiquitous theme. Sold both in both cheaply available six shilling formats, and as serials in popular magazines such as *Pearson’s Weekly*, producers of popular fiction appear to have responded to an increasing desire for information and stimulation involving Germany.

A variety of authors and publishers sought to exploit anxiety about Germany in the period during and after the Anglo-German Crisis of 1902-03. There was further evidence in the publishing world for the changes that occurred over 1903 to the perception of Germany in Britain. Allen Upward, a popular British

\(^{124}\) ‘Germany and British Trade Policy’, *Saturday Review* (July 1903), p. 68; *Speaker*, June 1903; *Manchester Guardian*, 11 May 1903; *Manchester Guardian*, 29 April 1903; *Manchester Guardian*, 2 July 1903; ‘Canada and the German Tariff’, *Economist* (5 September 1903); See Kennedy, P.M., *Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, p. 262.

\(^{125}\) ‘Russian Realities And German Bogeys’, *Saturday Review*, 95:2481 (May 1903), pp. 608–9.


\(^{127}\) *Ibid.*
novelist and self-imagined philosophe, published his account of ‘Who Sent the Telegram That Made the Boer War’ in Pearson’s Magazine, January 1903.\textsuperscript{128} The collection from which it was extracted, The Secret History of Today: Being the Revelations of a Diplomatic Spy, was advertised in the Daily Express as ‘The most absorbing, interesting series of stories ever published.’ A reading of what was essentially pulp-fiction of the purest form will quickly undermine that claim. However, reaching a significant audience, the stories focussed upon and reflected the major events of their day. Published in the midst of the Venezuela Crisis of 1903, in which Germany was attacked heavily in the British press, Upward’s stories indicate some of themes which were increasingly common in British expressions pertaining to Germany. Upward initially acquires the Kaiser in his first story, ‘The Telegram Which Began the Boer War’, and blames the effect of the fateful telegram on a ‘Muscovite’ plot to worsen relations with Britain. This curious story indicates the ambiguity felt in Britain with regard to Germany and the Kaiser, but also somehow links the Kruger Telegram to the start of the South African War – despite there being nearly three years between them. Depicted in this first story as impulsive though not anti-British, the Kaiser is an absolute monarch isolated from the rest of his government. Though the plot turns out tellingly to be originated by a dubious Russian-Anarchist, doubts are cast upon the Chancellor and the Bismarck family. In a later chapter ‘The Policy of Edward VII’ published in July 1904 the American super-agent protagonist sneaks into the Kaiser’s private quarters at the request of a suspicious King Edward. British fears are confirmed when the ‘diplomatic spy’ uncovers first a suspicious map of the British Empire marked out with red flags, before uncovering a vast plot to establish a European Zollverein and conspiracy to unite Europe against the British Empire.\textsuperscript{129} The twin themes of the Kruger Telegram as a vital event in world history and of a German plot against Britain, are clearly visible. In just over a year, the themes of the same author changed, from ambiguity towards the Kaiser with a negative portrayal of Germany to a much clearer sense of a pan-imperial threat from Germany. Even in January 1903 suspicions of Germany were high and the Kruger Telegram was very fresh in the popular imagination, as argued in chapter three. A year later Upward felt his readership was even more receptive to the ‘truth’ of a German Menace to the British Empire.

However, in popular literature after Venezuela and Baghdad, the German Menace began to shift from the imperially focussed phenomenon it had been since 1896, into the more commonly recognised domestic danger that dominated part of British culture in the decade before 1914. Though the Empire retained an important point of focus, the German threat to Britain itself grew inexorably to match and eventually overwhelm it. On May 27 1903 Smith, Elder & Co. published undoubtedly the most enduring and successful Edwardian invasion novel: The Riddle of the Sands by Erskine Childers. In preparation through 1902 and early 1903, the narrative depicted the discovery of a dastardly German invasion plot by brave English amateur yachtsmen. In spite of the glut of information on the practicalities of sailing boats, Childers’ novel was received with admiration in Britain and was highly popular. The timing of this novel provides insight into the changing popular attitudes in Britain during 1902-03. Written during the period in which the German Menace was undergoing its full germination, The Riddle of the Sands was published only a month after the end of the anti-German outburst surrounding the Baghdad Railway. Childers picked up themes of conspiracy with his depiction of secret German plans for a shock invasion, and of German jealousy and a global challenge:

We can’t talk about conquest and grabbing. We’ve collared a fine share of the world, and they’ve every right to be jealous.

His publisher advertised the novel sensationally as ‘An account of the Cruise of Yacht “Dulcibella,” being a page hitherto unwritten but of vital interest to all Englishmen, in the recent history of our relations with Germany.’ Such a tag-line suggests the marketability of the idea of a threat from Germany and the book was a great sales success both in the short term, and over the following decades.\textsuperscript{130} However, The Riddle of

\textsuperscript{130} Eby, C.D., Road to Armageddon, p. 26.
The Sands, published shrewdly in the wake of such widespread anti-German sentiment also indicated a change in the way Germany was imagined. The secret German plans for invasion inspired fear of both a European war and a direct threat to the British way of life. This was in marked contrast to previous fictional depictions of Germany. Though Germany had featured in some traditional invasion narratives prior to the Riddle, the themes and success of Childers’ novel indicate a growing association of Germany with a domestic, as well as an imperial danger.

_The German Imperial Menace_

In a sign that the topic of the German Menace was becoming increasingly marketable, the shrewd editor-proprietor of the Spectator, St Loe Strachey, commissioned a book composed of a series of articles written by William Arnold published under the title *German Ambitions As They Affect Britain and the United States* (25 May 1903). Arnold’s articles were written for the Spectator over the months before and during the Venezuela Blockade. The Speaker granted a glowing review but warned:

> Read by excitable persons, the book might be a stimulus to panic or to passion; to observers possessed of composure and capable of clear and masculine reasoning it is in no sense an invitation to hasty and vehement conclusions.\(^\text{131}\)

The issue of the USA was central in Arnold’s mind. Arnold summarised his argument with a message to save both Britain and the United States from imminent peril: ‘the supreme moral of these chapters’ was to ensure ‘friendship, and, if need be, mutual aid, between the great twin brethren of Anglo-Saxondom.’\(^\text{132}\) His sentiment may seem with hindsight to prove strangely augural in light of the events of the twentieth century.

Another such example of the popular mass-market anti-German narrative was *The Boy Galloper* by L. James.\(^\text{133}\) This archetypal invasion story described an invasion of England by German forces and was targeted as a boys’ novel:

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\(^{131}\) *The Speaker*, 27 June 1903.  
\(^{132}\) Arnold, W., *German Ambitions As They Affect Britain and the United States* (London, 1903); *The Bookman*, December 1903.  
\(^{133}\) James, L., *The Boy Galloper: By the Intelligence Officer* (Edinburgh, 1903), p. 319.
To say that this book will make every boy who reads it want to go out and enlist, is to tell the truth, as far as one may tell it by prophecy—every boy who reads it will be on tenter-hooks until he has organised, or become one of, a cadet corps, whether in his school or his town...

In its review the Bookman warned that if any books should be bought for British boys for the Christmas of 1903, The Boy Galloper must be one. The reviewer evidently believed that the novel had struck a chord, and that the message of volunteerism and military preparedness was increasingly important in this new era of insecurity. William Le Queux, already a famous author for invasion novels and sickly love stories, later achieved his greatest success with a novel which depicted a German attack on Britain: The Invasion of 1910 (1906). In October 1903 Le Queux, by then a hugely popular mass-market author, followed the latest trend for depicting the German enemy in ‘The Secret of the Fox Hunter’, a chapter. In this story of love and intrigue, Le Queux described a secret alliance between Germany and Russia ‘the effect of which would be to break British power in the Far East’. The Russo-German conspiracy, though menacing in scale, was averted by the self-sacrifice of Le Queux’s patriotic heroine.

During 1903 such popular novels played upon and reinforced the increasingly powerful image of the German Menace. Childers and James brought the German imperial threat home to Britain in their invasion narratives, indicating the future development of the German Menace into a more domestically focused anxiety. Nevertheless, the Empire in this period was still fundamental to anxieties about Germany. Drawing upon the themes of British imperial anxieties which pervaded comment about Germany after 1896, in the epilogue Childers revealed his imperially-minded concerns:

We have a small army, dispersed over the whole globe, and administered on a gravely defective system. We have no settled theory of national defence, and no competent authority whose business it is to give us one.

Britain was imagined as overstretched and undefended, poor in comparison with their German adversaries. Le Queux more explicitly played upon the imperial fears of a German conspiracy in China and Allen Upward indicated his own concerns about a global German Menace. William Arnold’s non-fictional account, warned of the global ambitions of Germany, and the threat to the British Empire. The simultaneous release of Arnold and Childers’s works goes to show the increasing currency that fears of Germany had gained, in whatever form.

These diverse literary accounts show that by 1903 the German Menace was an established as a literary trope which sold in mass quantities, and piqued the imagination of the British reading public. The imperial nature of the German Menace, established during the Kruger Telegram Crisis and developed and intensified over the next seven years, was highly influential in 1903. However, due to the scale and importance of Germany as an imagined enemy, British anxieties gradually changed focus from the Empire to the metropole. If Germany wanted to take Britain’s position as the great imperial power, a weakened and exposed Britain was viewed as weak and ready to be overwhelmed by Germany’s superior army. German efficiency, and aggression, combined with an impulsive autocrat and a scheming High Command, might bring about a swift victory by a shock invasion of Britain. The end result remained the same – imperial destruction – but increasingly the threat moved from the periphery to the centre of Empire.

135 Le Queux, W., Secrets of the Foreign Office (London, 1903).
136 Childers, E., Riddle, p. 328.
After 1903 Germany increasingly took precedence as the bête noire of the British popular imagination. Eminent historians have devoted numerous volumes to the development of popular anti-German sentiment in the press, literature, theatre and in political circles. In brief, British concerns increasingly came to focus upon the race for naval supremacy and invasion and spy-fever. There remained some, especially in Liberal circles, whom Paul Kennedy has named ‘idealists’, that fought against a ‘flood-tide of nationalism’; ultimately they were drowned out by a growing acceptance of anti-German narratives.

In spite of the increasing focus upon armaments and European War, the imperial German Menace – and thus British imperial anxieties - retained an important influence in British society, as a point of reference and authenticity. The specific example of the Kruger Telegram – the single most important event in the development of the German Menace - reveals this most clearly. From 1903 to 1941 the Kruger Telegram and the crisis of confidence it provoked in Britain was a regular point of reference for understanding and deriding the Kaiser and Germany. This one incident, hugely important in the development of anti-German sentiment in Britain, can indicate how, in spite of the other major events of this period, a fixed point of collective memory can act as a lens through which a society views threats and dangers, both real and imagined.

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The durability of the Kruger Telegram in the popular memory can be seen during the catalogue of new scandals involving Germany which accumulated up to August 1914. During the First Morocco Crisis (1905), for example, British journalists drew from the Kruger Telegram tropes in the ideological archive to

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reflect upon Germany’s latest action. The Kaiser and Germany’s attempt at another ‘imperial grab’ necessitated references to the Kruger Telegram once again: ‘It must be admitted that these German tests, like the Kruger telegram and the Imperial visit to Tangier, are very radical and thorough. They suggest the action of a man who applies fire to the houses of his neighbours in order to see whether they will burn.’ The Kruger Telegram commonly topped the lists of grievances; regardless of the on-going debates about the authorship of the telegram, the Kaiser’s ‘impulsive acts’ were regularly and repeatedly associated with the Kruger Telegram and authoritarian rule were repeatedly emphasised in press and fiction.

In 1907 J.L. Garvin, writing under his pseudonym, “Calchas”, discussed ‘The Kaiser and the Future’ for the *Fortnightly Review*; he sought to discourage the popular scaremongering about Germany so rife in this period, and to promote better relations between Britain and Germany. Garvin’s article reveals much about the way events had already been catalogued and re-imagined with a decade of retrospect; he provided a summary of events since the accession of the Kaiser, paramount among which was the Kruger Telegram which changed ‘everything in our political attitude…in an instant.’ Garvin referred to the alarm caused by ‘the utterly unexpected and yet dangerous character…of the act’; he evidently felt that 1896 had revealed the global threat of Germany. Garvin saw the Kruger Telegram as a key turning point; if Wilhelm’s plans had been left unhindered by the British then, ‘German policy would dominate the continent…and would soon be in a position to arbitrate upon the fate of the British Empire.’ Garvin’s article indicates the longevity of the imperial anxieties about Germany established in the British press and public sphere after 1896; he cited Kiao-Chau, the Baghdad Railway negotiations and other examples as evidence for the plotting, conspiratorial nature of German foreign relations. Garvin called for calm amidst an atmosphere of ‘blind, unreasoning, and hysterical Jingoism’ and ‘Teutophobia’ and although he avowedly stood against popular antagonism of Germany, his article indicates the growing strength of anti-German sentiment, which drew its legitimacy from specifically imperial and global concerns.

Other newsworthy events in foreign affairs in the pre-war period led to further reminders of 1896. In 1908, the Kaiser’s famous Daily Telegraph Affair had caused a major storm of indignation in German popular opinion for Wilhelm’s ‘impulsive declaration of friendship’ to Britain. Responding to the interview, a member’s speech to the Manchester Reform Club referred to the ‘knife-edge’ which Britain walked along in its relationship with Britain. If the Kaiser’s sudden U-turn in relations could generate such a fluctuation in British sentiment, what might be the result, ‘of a harsh word, or a bitter criticism, or another Kruger telegram?’; as Lothar Reinermann has argued, though the event provided brief respite for Wilhelm in the British press, it had only a short-lived impact on overall sentiment to Germany. Germany, and especially the Kaiser, would seemingly never escape the representation of his impulsiveness, and its connection to the Kruger Telegram as the primary example. ‘Impulsive’ Wilhelm and Germany were portrayed again as a danger to peace of ‘Africa, or Persia, or China, or…the Balkans’. Since 1896, each latest action by Wilhelm was seen in light of his past endeavours. The importance of the Kruger Telegram was that it placed each event into clearer perspective as British opinion drew on its past experiences to lend authority to ever growing fears about the possible results of the Kaiser’s will and whims.

In the wake of the 1911 Morocco Crisis, where the Kaiser’s Germany had once again stirred the international anxiety with strong and sudden action, British journalists were once again led to remind themselves of the Kaiser’s record. Sydney Brooks commented in the *Fortnightly Review* that any sense of a ‘philio-German’ tradition which had ‘undoubtedly obtained in Downing Street’ was washed away by the ‘Kaiser’s telegram to President Kruger’. Brooks then suggested that in German eyes the years before 1896 was an ‘epoch’ of ‘latent ill-will’ changing to a period of ‘open and deliberate policy of hostility’ thereafter.

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140 *The Times*, 27 June 1905.
141 *The Times*, 9 November 1906; *Daily Express*, 7 March 1908; *The Times*, 15 September 1909.
142 *The Times*, 9 November 1906; *Daily Express*, 7 March 1908; *The Times*, 15 September 1909.
143 *The Times*, 9 November 1906; *Daily Express*, 7 March 1908; *The Times*, 15 September 1909.
144 *The Times*, 9 November 1906; *Daily Express*, 7 March 1908; *The Times*, 15 September 1909.
145 *The Times*, 9 November 1906; *Daily Express*, 7 March 1908; *The Times*, 15 September 1909.
This rather simplified rendering suggests a willingness to forget any previous attempt to align with Germany.147

In April 1914, just months before the outbreak of the First World War, A.G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily News, published the popular book, Prophets, Priests, and Kings (1914), in which he discussed the ‘great men’ of the day. In his mini-biography of the Kaiser, Gardiner expressed some of the ambiguity popularly felt toward the Kaiser typical of the time.148 The Kaiser, for Gardiner, was ‘the symbol of medievalism’ for the modern world; emotional, impulsive and energetic, it is the autocratic rule of the Kaiser which had engendered this depiction.149 Gardiner described the Kruger Telegram, the Kaiser’s most famous exploit, as ‘perhaps the most momentous and disastrous incident in the history of Europe in our time, for it was the seed of all the bitterness of after years.’ To grant such importance to an event almost two decades previous reveals the importance with which it was still perceived. Even before the outbreak of the First World War the Kruger Telegram was produced as the prime example of Wilhelm’s ‘artistic temperament’ and impulsiveness. It is important to recognise the context of April 1914 in which Gardiner wrote. Gardiner described Wilhelm as ‘[i]mpulsive, imperious, dramatic, a militarist from his cradle, a statesman trained in “the indirect, crooked ways” of Bismarck, governed by one passion, the passion to make his land great and powerful…’ The themes of anti-German sentiment were attached implicitly to the Kaiser’s own personality. The Kaiser, and thus Germany, were unpredictable, plotting and desire a global dominion.150 The Kaiser and Germany were perceived, from 1896 onwards, as seeking power and greatness; their plans were secretive, and their menace unknowable.

The First World War and After

After the outbreak of the First World War, many in Britain sought to establish a turning point at which the calamity could have been averted; commentators regularly sought to provide insight into the ‘Psychology and Motives’ of the Kaiser and Germany in their collective ‘war-madness’. The Kruger Telegram was regarded commonly as an early revelation of the Kaiser’s lust for world domination, after which he ‘never looked back.’151 In October 1914 the English Review debated the greatest of the ‘Kaiser’s Failures’; the Kruger Telegram ranked highest and was viewed as the point at which ‘the Kaiser gave formal expression to the new policy which has ever since been the corner-stone of the Imperial design.’ The English Review made a drastic error, not only by placing the Kruger Telegram (4 Jan 1896) after the Kaiser’s ‘World Empire’ speech (19 January 1896), but in fact stating the Kruger Telegram as an event of 1897, as ‘the first political act of the Kaiser in assertion of his views’.152 This glaring example of the flexibility of history in meeting the demands of good copy also indicates the detachment of events from popular memory; the threat of a newly announced ‘World Empire’ was inseparable with the British popular outburst in January 1896.

An inevitable desire arose to establish war-guilt. Inevitably, Germany and the Kaiser were viewed as the chief culprits. Pseudo-historical accounts tended to place the Kruger Telegram at the beginning of an unstoppable slide to war. According to the Saturday Review in October 1914, the Kaiser had grown to hate Britain ‘with a rancorous and envious malice’, indicated from telegram of 1896 onwards. The ‘sudden inspiration’ which epitomised the Kaiser’s international actions drew upon the trope of ‘Kaiserly’ surprise and volatility going back to 1896.153 His impulsive behaviour was clearly blamed not only for such international blunders, but seemingly for the entire global conflict. The paradigm shift precipitated by the

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150 Ibid., pp. 64, 70, 71; Revealingly, the Adelaide Register posted a cutting from Gardiner’s book on 14 August 1914, with a textual pregnant pause, a lack of any comment on this declaration of the Kaiser’s peaceful intentions: The Register, (Adelaide, SA), 14 August 1914.
151 English Review, September 1914.
152 English Review, October 1914.
Kruger Telegram Crisis in January 1896 influenced the British imagination in the opening months of the First World War.

In 1916 Winston Churchill, recently returned from active service on the Western Front, offered his views on the difficulty of predicting the war before its outbreak for the *Sunday Pictorial*: ‘Very wise men with full knowledge of all the facts, came to the wrong conclusion; and very foolish men, giving rein to their prejudices, came to the right conclusion, and are entitled to boast of it for ever.’ Churchill’s ‘foolish men’, the ‘scaremongers’ of the pre-war era retorted quickly their various reflections: contributors highlighted a number of events as the key indicator of Germany’s intentions: the widening of the Kiel Canal, the ‘Great Naval Bill’ (1907) or the Agadir Crisis (1911). Inevitably, the Kruger Telegram was employed as the key turning point. Shirley Benn, MP, for example, argued that ‘unprejudiced men who had visited Germany ever since the episode of the Kruger telegram were well aware that war was inevitable’. Benn’s recollections were flagrantly imprecise, but the inclusion of the telegram as the first and prime example of this shift in policy is evidence of the seminal importance of that event as a shared cultural reference-point.

Thus a trope developed in which the Kruger Telegram was envisioned as a missed opportunity for Britain; journalists expressed in ever-more doleful tones that the crisis should have ‘opened the eyes of British statesmen’. Thomas Seccombe that the ‘Kaiser’s telegram to Kruger roused us for a moment’ but nevertheless Britain ‘went on whistling, “splendid isolation,”’ and did nothing. The debate about the responsibility for the telegram itself was linked directly to this vision of 1896 as a key turning point.

Before 1914, debates had raged between those who attributed the telegram to the Kaiser’s turbulent moods, and those who proclaimed it as an act of state. Many of pre-war apologist accounts argued that the telegram was coordinated as an act of state, rather than an outburst by Wilhelm. In May 1918 Valentine Chirol, a veteran journalist, debated the origin and meaning of the Kaiser’s message in the *Times*. Chirol first attacked the memoirs of Otto Hammann, (former Director of the German Foreign Office Press Bureau) as possessing questionable ‘historical value’ on the matter of the telegram. That this debate went on into the 1920s indicates the longevity of the Kruger Telegram in the popular imagination.

Even with the post-war rise of the ‘Spirit of Locarno’ and the welcoming of a new Germany to the international community, the issue of the old ‘Prussian’ Germany dogged journalists. Indeed, the issues of German brutality and ‘Prussianism’ continued to provoke soul-searching about Britain’s own imperial heritage. Through the 1920s many factual and critical accounts attacked German colonial methods, forming a justification for the Protectorates Britain established over Germany’s old enemies. A flurry of publications from British authors, such as M.C. Cariston’s *The Prussian Lash in Africa* (1918), focussed on the destruction of communities of the Namaqua, Herero and others under German colonial rule. Many began to discuss the end of the German colonial endeavour and its implications for the future of Africa and the British Empire. Wartime atrocity propaganda soon transformed into debates over ‘Germany’s lost colonies’. After the end of hostilities, it was unclear whether Germany would have her previous colonies returned to her in the eventual peace settlement, but authors such as René Puaux and G.B. Fletcher were amongst many...
who urged decisions makers against doing so. Fletcher spoke with strong condemnation of ‘unimaginable cruelties’, ‘slavery for the men and concubinage for the women’ and of the mass murder of thousands of Hereros and other tribes. The unsettled nature of the British Empire in the period after the First World War led to fears that the British themselves might be infected by German colonial methods. In reflecting upon the brutality of Britain’s General Dyer in the aftermath of the Amritsar Massacre in 1919, fears were expressed that imperial rule could precipitate ‘Prussianism’ in colonial policing. During this period, such evidence suggests that the German Menace deeply influenced Britain’s own self-imagine, even in the intervening spirit of cooperation and rapprochement.

Throughout the 1920s an increasing number of historical accounts began to appear which placed the Kruger Telegram at the heart of the path to war. In 1924 H.E. Barnes claimed that the incident resulted in the alienation of England, with ‘good feeling was not restored until June, 1914.’ “Augur”, writing in the same year for the Fortnightly claimed that ‘[t]he War did not come suddenly’ and that since the Kruger Telegram, ‘the coming conflict was a menace ever present in the minds of those few British statesmen to whom we owe that in 1914 we were neither quite unprepared nor without friends.’ In an account simplifying an intensely complex and turbulent period into a steady slide to war from 1896 to 1914, we see the reproduction of the German Menace and its close association with the telegram crisis.

Also writing in 1924, the journalist and popular historian, J.L. Garvin, wrote once more about the Kruger Telegram: ‘Irreparable damage was done…But the probe was portentous. Between Britain and Germany was opened a gulf of hostility never bridged.’ The telegram was invested with vital significance in a post-war generation seeking to grapple with history through the wreckage of war. Garvin’s historical account is tinged with the spirit of the post-war age; he wrote a melancholic, cataclysmic history filled with deep regret. Garvin granted the crisis primacy as the inspiration for the German 1897 Naval Law, and sparked the plans for world domination: ‘The Germans…waited and worked for a day of power and reckoning as against England.’ Thus he invested the incident, a peripheral moment of imperial antagonism, as having epochal significance.

Garvin had tapped into the constant current of opinion inspired by the Kruger Telegram. Though international relations ebbed and flowed, the British perception of Germany was fundamentally altered by the crisis and the subsequent development of fears of a German Menace. The ‘Prussian’ rule of the Kaiser, Germany’s secretive plans for world dominance and the imposition of its cruel methods upon Britain and its Empire scarred the popular imagination, and in the inter-war period, this scarring revealed itself through debates about the Kruger Telegram, as a point at which Germany could have been stopped, and the fate of German colonial subjects, which might have befallen Britain’s own colonies had Germany acted as the British feared.

Through the later 1920s and 1930s historians began to revise popular understandings of the Kruger Telegram Crisis from the later 1920s. In 1925 Raymond Sontag argued that previous accounts had ‘hitherto felt their way more or less blindly’ sought to analyse events which appeared to have led ‘with the inevitability of a Greek tragedy’ to the ‘debacle’ of the Great War. The recent opening of the German archives allowed Sontag and others to explore with more accuracy the reality behind events which had been so commonly debated. Anthony Steel, in his contribution to The Cambridge History of the British Empire (1929), agreed

165 ‘Germany cannot be allowed to return as master of her late possessions…” Fletcher, C.B., Stevenson’s Germany: The Case against Germany in the Pacific (London, 1920); Puaux, R., The German Colonies: What Is to Become of Them? (London, 1918); Clifford, H., German Colonies.

166 Fletcher, C.B., Stevenson’s Germany, pp. 4–6.

167 Kingsley-Keent, S., Aftershocks, p. 85.

168 Le Queux, W., German Atrocities, Vol. 3 (London, 1915), pp. 253–64; Calvert, A.F., South-West Africa: During the German Occupation, 1884–1914 (London, 1915); Schnee, D.H., German Colonization Past And Future The Truth About The German Colonies (London, 1920); Churchill, W., ‘Germany’s Lost Pacific Empire’ , American Geographical Society, 102 (1920), pp. 84–90; “Africa nova,” The Adjustment of the German Colonial Claims: Dedicated to the American and British Delegates of the Peace Conference (Bern, 1918); Townsend, M.E., Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871–1883 (New York, 1921); “Africa nova” & Carisbon, S.M.C., Prussian Lady; Clifford, H., German Colonies; Spanton, E.F., ‘In German Gaol’; Maclean, F., Germany’s Colonial Failures; Calvert, A.F., German East Africa; Zimmermann, E., German Empire; Fletcher, C.B., Stevenson’s Germany; Puaux, R., German Colonies.


that ‘the importance of this incident is often over-rated’; furthermore he cited Garvin’s famous *Life of Chamberlain* as a major culprit for this exaggeration. Steel and Sontag would doubtless agree that the perils of the retrospective in history, and of the dangers of personal accounts and reminiscences to cloud judgement, are particularly present in some such accounts. Even into the 1930s, the Kruger Telegram was still granted far greater prominence as a ‘turning point’ than it deserved in popular accounts. To the exasperation of contemporary historians, accounts from the *Pall Mall Gazette* continued to draw upon the same tropes and up upon a popular trend for attributing added weight to individual ‘turning points’.

On 3 June 1941 Wilhelm II Hohenzollern died at Huis Doorn, in the Netherlands. An obituary was announced in a full-page *Times* spread: ‘The Last Great Kaiser’ referred to the Kruger Telegram Crisis as the first indication of Germany’s intent to grasp “World Dominion”. In the British imagination the Kaiser, and his Reich, were never separated from his fateful telegram. The obituary depicted Wilhelm’s life, in sum, as a failed quest for world mastery. In the *Contemporary Review* George Gooch offered his own epitaph, reflecting that the ‘crazy Kruger telegram’ tore open a ‘wound’ that ‘never really healed’. Gooch made the same link between the crisis and the recognition that the event was crucial to the true beginning of Germany’s ‘risky game of Weltpolitik’.

Many similar accounts made the same links between the Kruger Telegram Crisis and the beginning of a serious German imperial challenge. The link symbolizes how many of the tropes powerfully established or re-established during the outburst of January 1896 were solidified in the British popular imagination to gain much greater importance in light of later events. After 1896 Germany was increasingly seen as a ‘menace’ to British interests, and this imperial insult had formed the foundations for a serious and sustained sense of imperial anxiety, coloured by the depiction of Germany as a plotting and unpredictable menace, much as Russia had been throughout the nineteenth century. Following this point the Kruger Telegram acted as a key point around which British writers and journalists based their arguments. Their readerships, we may suggest, were expected to instantly recognise the Kruger Telegram as evidence of the German Menace. In terms of the popular imagination and popular discourse, the crisis of January 1896 was a seminal moment in developing perceptions of a German Menace. Until 1903 this menace was imagined to be directed at the British Empire. Inevitably, as the threat grew it focussed in upon the British mainland, but despite this the Empire retained an important influence over the British popular imagination throughout this period.

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174 For example: *The Observer*, 20 November 1921, p. 4; *The Times*, 14 December 1924.
175 *The Times*, 5 June 1941.
Conclusion

I write these articles because I believe that Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire; and because I know that we are not able or ready to defend ourselves against a sudden and formidable attack.

The Empire is in danger, but the people do not believe it. They have been taught to regard the German menace as a wild scare of invasion, and they believe the Navy can protect them while they make their money or take their ease…But the danger of invasion is not the greatest or the only danger; and the strongest Navy in the world could not save us from disaster should the lowering war clouds break before we are prepared.

Germany is preparing to attack us because we stand in the way of her ambitions….For the Pan-Germanic ambition is the ambition for empire; the ambition to dominate and exploit the world. It is the old, old lust for power and glory, the old, old greed for trade and wealth…World-domination, conquest!

Robert Blatchford, Daily Mail, 13 September 1909

In 1909 Robert Blatchford, famous ‘English Socialist’, wrote a series of articles for the Daily Mail in which he warned of a serious German threat to Britain. Blatchford was sent to research Germany by Lord Northcliffe, the most important and influential British press baron of his era; the results seemed ominous and received great attention in the British press. Blatchford’s articles were written in the sensational, modern style which had helped the Daily Mail to achieve a daily circulation of close to one million by the start of the First World War. He warned of a great danger to the British Empire: Germany was preparing to annihilate the British Empire and Britain was frighteningly unprepared. Furthermore, he argued that the concerns which so exercised the British public in 1909 – the threat of the German Navy and invasion – were secondary to the real danger: the German lust for world domination.

Blatchford professed deep concern about the ambition of Germany to steal away Britain’s Empire and to dominate the world. This popular attitude, expressed at the height of Anglo-German naval antagonism, stemmed from a previous era of imperial antagonism. The turbulent imperial relations between Britain and Germany during the period 1896-1903 profoundly influenced popular attitudes, to the extent that it was widely assumed in Britain that Germany was actively planning to undermine and overwhelm the Empire. The realities of international diplomacy combined with the insecure British imperial mind-set to produce a consistently growing sense of danger, which came to dominate popular discourse about Germany. In 1909 Blatchford claimed to be the only one to know the secret and frightening truth about the imminent threat
to British imperial survival. In reality, he had seized upon a long-established popular attitude by invoking the long tradition of the German Menace to the British Empire - the phenomenon which has been the primary focus of this thesis.

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The British idea of the German Menace had adopted all of the themes of the various other British imperial anxieties by the beginning of the First World War. Typically, historians of popular culture have focussed upon the German threat in connection with the naval race after 1904; in fact, it is possible to suggest that all of the key elements of the conception of a German Menace to Britain were in place before that point. Many of the features of the German threat were drawn from imperial confrontations after 1896, but some of key influences were in fact derived from past imperial anxieties (about France and Russia), and transposed upon the newly emergent Germany. The origins of the German Menace lay in the Empire and in parts of the world under British imperial influence: South Africa, China, Venezuela and the Middle East. It was because of imperial antagonism that Britons first learned to distrust Germany, and this imperial colouring remained present past the Armistice in 1918.

The Kruger Telegram Crisis of 1896 was brief; the press storms and popular anger calmed within a month of the event. However, though the crisis was relatively short-lived, the impact was substantial. The affront to British suzerainty in the Transvaal inspired deep jingoistic anger, displays of patriotism, and aggressive threats. The fact that a nation, who had previously been viewed as friendly (at least in comparison to other potential enemies), had confronted Britain in such an overt and aggressive manner was a major reason offered for the outpouring of anger. The entry of a new contender into the matrix of imperial anxieties had a strong impact on the British popular consciousness. Furthermore, it was the special position of South Africa as a uniquely valuable imperial interest which played an important contributory role in inspiring such emotion in the popular outburst. Its intrinsic value allied to its strategic importance marked it out as a vital imperial asset.

Increasingly the British viewed themselves as standing alone against the world, fitting with the ‘splendid isolation’ of Lord Salisbury, but more importantly tied to the common themes of imperial anxieties over the past decades. In the first weeks of the crisis press and public called swiftly for a robust response, and even cries for war. The idea that Britain was overstretched, a key feature of the theme of imperial anxiety, played an instrumental role; politicians, the press and popular attention turned to the armaments debate with renewed vigour. Germany was represented as a jealous, covetous and insidious enemy. Themes of jealousy, of their own imperial inadequacy and of long-running schemes to undermine the British Empire began to grip the popular imagination. Conspiracy theories could be found amidst the daily reports on the Transvaal Crisis and thoughts soon turned to German-Boer intrigues and secret alliances. The Kaiser’s absolute rule was attacked; Wilhelm was perceived as the malevolent force behind this deliberate insult, and was abused with an astounding level of vitriol. His ‘Kaiserly’ impulsiveness and his potential for secret conspiracies were feared and through these a collective German Menace was constructed in popular imagination.

These themes of imperial overstretch, German covetousness and the Kaiser’s war-mongering absolutism were crystallized into a set of tropes – stored as a collective ideological cluster – to be reused and redeveloped. The Kruger Telegram was a vital point of historical reference. In each future occurrence of Anglo-German tension, the crisis was used as a vindication of theories propounding the German Menace; over the following years, these tropes would be augmented to include the spectre of German national efficiency, a factor which helped eventually to propel the German Menace into a position of greater prominence than any other single threat. The imperial nature of the German threat remained an important
factor even when debates shifted to the more imminent imagined threat of invasion and to fears of a German naval challenge.

In the seven years after the outburst of anger in January 1896 tropes about Germany as a threat to Britain developed and coalesced into a much clearer view of what constituted the German Menace. These themes were first established during the Kruger Telegram Crisis as a disparate set of accusations and rumours. The image of Germany which crystallized during the January 1896 had a strong influence over the mood of the following years; negative responses to German Weltpolitik were defined within the new paradigm which developed as a result of the crisis. The shock to Britain caused by the South African War hardened those attitudes and encouraged the widespread acceptance of both the perception that Germany was a threat and a clearer sense of what constituted that threat. British debates about Germany were increasingly influenced by the German economic challenge, and its apparent jealousy, conspiracy and autocracy, themes which began to coalesce in January 1896.

Debates about the lack of efficiency and decadence in Britain were symbolic of attitudes across this period. The South African War provided evidence to the pre-existing argument that Britain was failing against her main rivals. The popularity of ideas of national efficiency demonstrated both the lasting effect of the shocks of the South African War, and the continuity of the imperial anxieties of the 1880s and 1890s. Many in Britain perceived the Empire as overstretched and weakened; Britain was in need of drastic action to secure its future as a world power. The spectre of Germany lay at the heart of this culture of self-doubt; it represented both a model for efficiency and organisation, and also a rival which should be feared and countered. The increasingly aggressive German foreign policy and developing ideas of German economic efficiency caused perceptions to evolve from an isolated argument in favour of protection in 1896, into a more generalised conception of a menace to the British Empire.

Whilst debates about efficiency and the danger of German commercial power raged on, the other themes of the January 1896 crisis continued to be developed and re-imagined. Through the development of the German colonial empire and the push for global influence evidence was repeatedly provided suggest that the fears expressed about Germany during the Kruger Telegram crisis were correct. Especially in respect of Africa and China - the two imperial spheres where Britain and Germany came into closest and most regular contact - it was increasingly apparent that Germany was ruled by an impulsive and unpredictable autocrat, desirous of world power. The brutality of German military methods and the impulsiveness of its High Command made it a power to be feared, and anathema to the British liberal self-image. The British increasingly imagined this dangerous new world power; as covetous and jealous of Britain's position as the primary power in the world. Furthermore, it was argued that Germany would seek in the future to undermine and attack Britain at every opportunity. Polemicists and authors repeatedly warned that Britain was Germany's prime target; across the world its soft, overstretched underbelly was prime meat for the Imperial German war machine.

Over time, and nourished by international events which seemed to provide vindication to such theories, these more complex arguments were more regularly and assertively voiced together, and often expressed as a summing-up of Germany as a whole. Britain emerged from the South African War a nation which perceived itself to have been shaken awake - rescued at the last minute from imperial collapse. Ideas of national reawakening were connected directly to this lustrous and virile German danger, and the lessons learned since the Kruger Telegram about German insidiousness, covetousness, brutality and autocracy combined to create a much more simplified and easily accessible cluster of stereotypes.

The major announcements and actions of Imperial Germany during this period were ammunition for the development of stereotypes about Germany. These tropes did not develop in a political vacuum, but rather were closely tied to developments across the world. Britain's literary culture was founded upon a global and imperial consciousness, and these views filtered through to influence the popular imagination. Readers of the daily, weekly and monthly newspapers in this period, of whom there were millions, were exposed to a regular flow of comment upon Germany's conduct which was increasingly negative. Positive
views were also increasingly rare and Liberal newspapers, the minority in the market, were more likely to dismiss anti-German views as sensationalist, rather than defend Germany outright. Through the example of Germany, it is possible to indicate how important international affairs in this period were in influencing national identity and popular perceptions of national rivals. Furthermore, by tracing the development of these loosely connected stereotypes into a more coherent and simplified whole, it also possible to emphasise the profound impact of national crises, and to understand how new discourses are formed out of sudden shocks to popular consciousness.

These markedly imperial concerns should be viewed as being linked to the later development of naval race anxieties. Established scholarship has failed to emphasise that the German Menace to the British Empire was already a well-established popular phenomenon before the rise of domestically focussed popular Anglo-German antagonism from 1904. This specifically imperial anxiety helps to explain much about British popular sentiment in this period, and was tied to wider processes of national self-doubt, social change and economic decline.

However, it is important to recognise that Germany was very much a focus for a more holistic imperial anxiety between the time of the Kruger Telegram and that of the Anglo-French Entente. Later invasion scares, and a change to focus solely upon the threat to the British metropole, can be traced back to the development of imperial anxieties over this earlier period. Germany served as a focal point for British fears of imperial decline; the German Menace provided a tangible and recognisable lens through which British inadequacies, doubts and anxieties could be explored. This fixation helps to explain how it was possible for Germany to be imagined as a pervasive threat to the British Empire while being fundamentally unable to pose a real threat to imperial stability in this period. The German Menace had persuaded many in Britain that Germany could not be trusted, that it was an unsavoury power and a direct threat to British global dominance; at the end of 1902 and beginning of 1903, the British public was primed to aggressively reject two government attempts to cooperate with Germany.

The examples of the Venezuela Crisis and the Baghdad Railway show how prominent the anti-German paranoia developed in the aftermath of the Kruger Telegram had become by late 1902. The characterisation of Germany as a malevolent threat to the British Empire was a major feature of the cultural and political landscape in the imperial metropole by mid-1903. The imagery and themes inherent in the responses to the Venezuela Crisis and the Baghdad Railway negotiations indicate how perceptions of a German imperial menace were directly connected to the Kruger Telegram Crisis in 1896. The nascent stereotypes burst into the limelight with the onset of these two popular crises. German naval actions during the Venezuela blockade seemed to provide authentication for views of Germany’s autocratic and brutal nature; the impulsivity of the Kaiser and his aggressive militaristic methods were associated with thrusting and ruthless German military tactics. The bombardment of Fort San Carlos consequently fitted within the narrative of German autocracy and aggression. Germany was repeatedly accused of insidiousness and conspiracy; even a temporary alliance was viewed as dangerous - it was unpredictable with ambitions directly conflicting with Britain’s own.

News that the British were participating in negotiations with Germany over the Baghdad Railway caused panic; Britain would supposedly be providing finance for Germany to dominate a project which could directly challenge Britain’s influence in the Near and Middle East, and threaten imperial security in India. Whatever the political persuasion of the newspaper, Germany’s tactics and ambitions were cause for criticism and concern. British popular discourse had been so influenced by the development of this menace - partly imagined, partly real - that it was a matter for discussion whenever the subject of Germany was raised. That Germany potentially menaced Britain’s Empire became an accepted norm; those who did not accept the threat nonetheless actively acknowledged the dominance of the idea itself. In the press, periodicals and popular literature, Germany was increasingly vilified after the withdrawal from the Berlin-Baghdad Railway negotiations. Evidence suggests that popular mass-market fiction and non-fiction writers and publishers were desperate to capitalise on this newly radicalised anti-German atmosphere. This heralded
the initiation of the characterisation of the German bète noire in spy and invasion novels, with popular writers such as Childers and Le Queux in the vanguard.

The importance of the German Menace was also indicated by its influence upon political decision-making. The realization of the marketability and popularity of this imagery gave it a degree of its own momentum to the point that it tied government hands. The press, and popular sentiment, arguably provoked changes in Government policy during the Venezuela and Baghdad Railway episodes. The popular anger about cooperation with Germany delivered clear messages to the Balfour Government, which was for a time threatened by these foreign policy blunders. Any association with Germany in an imperial context would be electorally poisonous. In this era the British press increasingly acted as a democratising medium, which enabled popular sentiment to influence decision making. Whilst the press would subtly aim to persuade its audience, it was forced, in such a competitive mass-market, to feed the demands and desires of the general public. The outbursts over Venezuela and Baghdad stand as a clear example of the increasingly complex relationship between the people, the media and the government. These political crises and the popular anger they fomented made clear that in Britain, Germany was politically poisonous; the safest policy for future Governments would be tacit avoidance, while the press and publishers soon recognised the increased potential of the German Menace as a mass-market phenomenon.

The popular outbursts during 1902-3 marked a new high for the imperial German Menace; henceforth anxieties about Germany were increasingly directed toward the imperial metropole. Until later in 1903 the German threat had little association with the British Isles. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the reason for this transfer to a domestically focussed phenomenon was in fact the very prevalence of the imperial threat. The seriousness attributed to the German imperial threat facilitated its development into a more direct threat to Britain itself. Before Childers’ Riddle of the Sands in mid-1903, narratives about Germany were much more commonly associated with imperial antagonism. As argued in chapter three, literary depictions of war with Germany often revolved around imperial wars (e.g. The Mysterious Mr Sabin, the Yellow Danger) or secretive and clandestine tactics to undermine Britain’s imperial control (The Empire Makers). Childers’ novel marked the beginning of the rise of a craze for German invasion scares in popular fiction, spanning many genres and formats.

From this period onwards, British fears would inevitably focus upon the domestic sphere, out of perceived necessity. But the Empire, so central to the British popular identity and imagination in this period, was the focal point for the development of Britain’s fear of Germany, and it was here that the imperial menace laid the key foundations for all perceptions of Germany in the pre-war armaments race, and the aggressive anti-German sentiment and activity during the First World War. The Kruger Telegram as an incident lingered long in the memory, as did the term ‘Hun’, the autocratic and aggressive image of Germany, and the view of Germany as an insidious and nefarious danger to Britain.

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The findings of this study suggest a need to reconsider a number of interpretations and emphases in our understanding of this period. By drawing links between abstract stereotypes, popular outbursts of anger or anxiety and real domestic or international events, it is possible to augment approaches to popular culture. Too often in historiography the lure of the Anglo-German Dreadnought Race (1906-1914) has led to an over-emphasis upon this later period. This thesis has aimed to present new insight to the scholarly understanding of British attitudes towards Germany, and also to challenge assumptions about the pre-war

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1 See Geppert, D., Pressekriege.
2 As argued by Nicholas Hiley, these invasion scares were so influential as to inspire vast quantities of supposed ‘spy spottings’ through the 1900s and 1910s, and contributed to the establishment of Britain’s anti-espionage forces. Hiley, N., ‘The Failure of British Espionage against Germany, 1907-1914’, Historical Journal, 26:4 (1983), pp. 867–89; Hiley, N., ‘Decoding German Spies’, pp. 55–79; HO 317/44, Suspected German espionage in United Kingdom: letter of introduction to Chief Constables for Captain Kell from Home Secretary.
period. It has been commonplace to assume that Anglo-German antagonism – both popular and diplomatic – only began in the decade before the First World War. From a popular cultural perspective, the period between 1896 and 1903 is just as important for the birth and foundation of the key stereotypes and modes of expression which dominated the following decades.

Too little has been made of the prevalence of negative imagery and stereotyping of Germany during this earlier period, before the Dreadnought Age. Some authors have even used the Kaiser's intermittent popularity to question the popularity of anti-German sentiment. I would argue that though the British did express intermittent appreciation of the Kaiser, Wilhelm II and the image of an aggressive and militaristic Germany were interchangeable and flexible. Even when the Kaiser's friendship was welcomed, this was expressed with hope rather than conviction, and the continuities in expressions of opinion about the German Menace suggest that such fears were not allayed by these brief occurrences. Furthermore, when the Kaiser was 'in fashion', British discourse changed focus to attack German anglophobia or military brutality. I would suggest that a constant undercurrent of anti-German attitudes permeated the press and literature during this period.

Historians such as Dominik Geppert and Frank Bösch have contributed greatly to our understanding of the relationship between press and politics in this period; such accounts, however, have tended to focus more upon either the influence of powerful individuals, or upon the wider structures or information networks. This study complements such histories by investigating how political events and decision-making interacted with wider popular culture. Such factors as international affairs, wars, state crises, or economic change play a profound role in the formation of xenophobic or nationalistic stereotyping; this is an association which requires clear assertion when combining press and literary approaches. Case-studies such as the Kruger Telegram Crisis or the German Seizure of Kiao Chau show how events involving British interests across the world could help form stereotypes or add layers to pre-existing ones. Furthermore, these crises were later used by journalists and authors as evidence for further plots or conspiracies; such popular panics or crises provided the basis of lasting authenticity for proponents of xenophobic and anxious sentiments. Stereotype-formation should be viewed as inspired and powerfully influenced by the processes of political and societal change; but once initiated by such major developments, stereotypes and ideological constructs then attain their own unique essence – tied to elements of reality but prone to extreme exaggeration and sensation.

The negative image of Germany steadily accrued authority and authenticity until 1902, at which point it burst onto the political scene. Popular anti-German outbursts over the Venezuela Blockade and the Baghdad Railway contributed to changes in Foreign Policy, making Germany a toxic partner for the Balfour Government. In an era where British and German officials were attempting to improve relations, the press and public stood strongly opposed, and made their opinion about Germany explicit. This adds to the scholarly view of politics in Britain during this period; evidence suggests that politicians were increasingly prone to the sway of popular debate and opinion. We should indeed view this as a society in the throes of political democratisation. Certain shock events appear to have caused paradigm shifts in popular attitudes; following these crises, such seminal events form points of historical authenticity through which all future events could be viewed. Nevertheless, without reminders of Germany's Weltpolitik and unattractive diplomatic methods, the concept of the German Menace would have found less fertile ground in British popular discourse.

This thesis also contributes to the debate about British popular imperialism; the Empire lay at the heart of the early development of popular anti-German sentiment. I have found strong evidence to suggest that the British popular imagination and popular discourse were powerfully influenced by global and imperial events; they had a globalised popular consciousness which was defensive, jingoistic and often xenophobic in the purest sense of the word. Public debate and popular discourse was regularly provoked by imperial crises and international antagonism. During the period from 1896 until the First World War, the people of Britain were aware of, and anxious about their empire. The growth of nationalism, patriotism, and
xenophobia – aimed at targets both within Britain and without – typify this period. Imperial anxiety, as argued by Siddiqi, Wagner and others, influenced high-politics and mass culture; increasing literacy, the rise of a mass newspaper press and huge rises in the popularity and accessibility of popular fiction meant that the British increasingly participated in a genuinely popular culture which was repeatedly washed over by outbursts of patriotism, concern, jubilation and aggression throughout this period. It is with this swelling mass of opinion and anxiety that rising British popular imperialism clashed with an increasingly active German expansionism.

My work has revealed more about the fractious and febrile atmosphere of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain; this was a society permeated by self-doubt and a growing defensive nationalism. The British were increasingly drawn to seek out potential enemies both in Britain and abroad; anti-German sentiments revealed here relate to the xenophobia which surrounded the Aliens Act of 1905. This indicates a much more general trend in popular attitudes: Britain was increasingly imagined as exposed and endangered throughout this period; fears of Germany and other imperial enemies were part of this wider development.

In historical scholarship the popular press and literature have rarely been considered and examined together within the same context. We should view the different aspects of modern popular word-culture as fundamentally entwined; serials in newspapers, popular novels, opinion pieces, editorials, journal articles and political polemics all shared one culture of information. Authors, publishers and consumers were not isolated from one another, boxed off into insular or singular genres; rather the mass market for literature and information meant that the many currents of thinking, imagination and opinion were imbricated with one another to the extent that it was not always possible to isolate one from the other.

Works of literature should always be considered within the context of their creation and consumption. Authors and publishers were extremely sensitive to popular trends and shifts in opinion; they were capable of reacting quickly to seize upon the new sensational topics which excited their readership. Without situating oneself firmly within the context and chronology of one’s work, it is possible to miss the subtleties of these developments. By incorporating a broad base of primary sources from a variety of archives, formats and genres it is suggested that historians of popular culture can provide a more detailed and accurate account of the development of ideas and the networks of information. This approach to popular cultural study can tell us much, not merely about the fin-de-siècle period, but also about a variety of societies across chronologies and settings.

Popular stereotypes and the dynamics of paranoia have a profound importance in modern societies, and perhaps that has ever been the case. I have aimed to reveal more about the transfer and development of such ideas, their interrelationship with unfolding events, and the interaction between the people, the media and the state. It is suggested that using these techniques we may trace networks of information, the impact of popular stereotypes and anxiety upon society, and the impact of global events and developments upon popular culture. By conducting a deep analysis of the development of stereotypes during this period it has been possible to reveal more about how such stereotypes and ideas form and develop over time. Moments of crisis precipitate paradigm shifts which can leave legacies in thought, expression and debate over considerable spans of time. In the short term such paradigmatic change can release currents of opinion which persist and develop, gathering momentum and historical authenticity, into powerful political and cultural issues. In the long term stereotypes created by sudden shocks can profoundly influence popular memory, and leave a lasting impression upon national and cultural identities.
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