SHANGHAI, CHINA’S CAPITAL OF MODERNITY:
THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND URBAN EXPERIENCE OF
WORLD EXPO 2010

by

GARY PUI FUNG WONG

A thesis submitted to
The University of Birmingham
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOHPY

School of Government and Society
Department of Political Science and
International Studies
The University of Birmingham
February 2014
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Shanghai’s urbanisation by applying Henri Lefebvre’s theories of the production of space and everyday life. A review of Lefebvre’s theories indicates that each mode of production produces its own space. Capitalism is perpetuated by producing new space and commodifying everyday life. Applying Lefebvre’s regressive-progressive method as a methodological framework, this thesis periodises Shanghai’s history to the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, ‘socialist reform era’ and ‘post-socialist reform era’. The Shanghai World Exposition 2010 was chosen as a case study to exemplify how urbanisation shaped urban experience. Empirical data was collected through semi-structured interviews. This thesis argues that Shanghai developed a ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’. The state redefined its distributive role to act as both a regulator and a market player, and manipulated its regulatory power to generate revenue from land commodification. The state thus accelerated urbanisation by relocating residents to new towns. Inhabitants’ daily routines were rearranged. Lefebvre envisaged an urban revolution to occur when urbanisation is complete. But my data illustrates that civil resistance is not widely supported because urbanisation has generally improved living quality. This thesis concludes by examining the possibility of Shanghai’s resuming its status as the site of modernisation and the critique of modernity.

Keywords:

Shanghai, Henri Lefebvre, the production of space, urbanisation, World Expo, everyday life, urban China, mode of production, Chinese modernity, Chinese modernisation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I give my deepest gratitude to my parents. They supported my study, even though they did not exactly know what I did during this unexpectedly long period of study. I would also like to express my heartfelt thanks to my girlfriend, Sze, for her love and support. In Birmingham, which Jane Austen regarded as ‘not a place to promise much’, life would be extremely hard without her as a companion.

I greatly appreciate all those who helped me in data collection, in particular Universitas 21 for sponsoring part of the travel expenses of my fieldwork. I should also thank my fellows at the Department of Sociology, for our memories in the Sociology House. I would like to extend my warmest thanks to Lynn and Chris at Birmingham, Iris and Darrel at Manchester for generously providing Sze and me accommodations.

Last but not least, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisors, Mairtin Mac an Ghaill and Ross Abbinnett. Without their supervision and encouragement, I would have already given up on writing my thesis a long time ago.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... iv

LIST OF CHARTS ............................................................................................................................... viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................. ix

GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................................... x

NOTES ON ROMANISATION AND TRANSLATION ........................................................................... xiv

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Background of this Study ............................................................................................................. 1

1.2 The Theoretical Concern ............................................................................................................. 4

1.3 The Methodological Concern and Execution Process ............................................................... 6

1.4 Research Questions and Significance .......................................................................................... 8

1.5 Organisation of Chapters ........................................................................................................... 10

CHAPTER TWO: THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN THE MODERN WORLD ...................... 14

2.1 The (Re)Production of (Social) Space ......................................................................................... 17

2.1.1 Spatial Triad .......................................................................................................................... 19

2.1.2 The History of Space ............................................................................................................. 24

2.1.3 The Survival of Capitalism .................................................................................................... 29

2.1.4 The State Mode of Production ............................................................................................... 32

2.2 Urban Experience and Urban Revolution .................................................................................... 35

2.2.1 Everyday Life in Modern Society .......................................................................................... 36

2.2.2 Social Space and Social Time ................................................................................................. 39

2.2.3 Urban Problematic and Urban Revolution ............................................................................. 42

2.2.4 Moments and the Right to the City ........................................................................................ 46

2.3 The Spatial Turn and Critique .................................................................................................... 50

2.3.1 The Spatial Turn .................................................................................................................... 51

2.3.2 A Critique ............................................................................................................................. 54
4.3.2 Post-socialist City/Global City: a Question to be Answered .......... 139
4.3.3 Political Economy and Space ......................................................... 140

4.4 Conclusion: Two Meanings of ‘Modern’ ........................................ 141

CHAPTER FIVE:
THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN SHANGHAI ...................................... 147

5.1 State-led/participation Mode of Production ...................................... 152
5.1.1 The Bureaucratic Structure of the Shanghai Expo ......................... 152
5.1.2 The Restructuring of State-owned Enterprises ............................... 156
5.1.3 The Corporatisation of the World Expo Group ............................... 160
5.1.4 Land Commodification ................................................................. 162
5.1.5 Dual Role of the State to Unify ‘Socialism’ and ‘Capitalism’ .......... 166

5.2 Spatial Practice of Shanghai ............................................................. 169
5.2.1 The Puxi/Pudong Divide ............................................................... 170
5.2.2 Spatial Practice in Puxi ................................................................. 172
5.2.3 Spatial Practice in Pudong ............................................................. 175

5.3 The Representation of Space ............................................................. 179
5.3.1 ‘The City Makes Life Better’ .......................................................... 180
5.3.2 The Shanghai Expo as a Substitute for Political Campaigns .......... 182
5.3.3 The Realisation of a ‘Century-old Dream’ ...................................... 184
5.3.4 Surpassing the West and the ‘China Model’ .................................. 187
5.3.5 The Reproduction of the Mode of Production ............................... 188

5.4 Conclusion: Rebuilding Shanghai .................................................... 191

CHAPTER SIX:
URBAN EXPERIENCE, IMAGINATION AND RESISTANCE .................... 195

6.1 Spatial Arrangement and the Lived Space ...................................... 201
6.1.1 The Reorganisation of the Social Clock ........................................ 202
6.1.2 The Demolition of the Linong ....................................................... 203
6.1.3 Alienation in New Towns and Industrial Parks .............................. 206
6.1.4 Commuting as a Repetitive Experience ....................................... 211

6.2 Imagination of the City and the Shanghai Expo ............................... 214
6.2.1 Modern Lifestyle as a Divide ....................................................... 215
6.2.2 Redrawing the Relationship between the State and the People ....... 219
6.2.3 The Shanghai Expo as the Participation in the Country’s Development ......................................................... 222

6.3 Resistance: The Possibilities and Limits ........................................ 224
6.3.1 Relocating Residents away from the City Centre ......................... 225
6.3.2 Resistance from the Civil Society ................................................ 228
6.3.3 The Individualisation of Social Problems .................................... 230
6.3.4 The Rationalisation of Social Inequalities ............................................ 233
6.3.5 Depoliticisation and the Politicised Everyday Life .............................. 235
6.4 Conclusion: The Possibility of an Urban Revolution ........................... 237

CHAPTER SEVEN:
WORLD EXPO AND CHINESE MODERNITY ................................................... 243

7.1 Modernity and Modernism ................................................................. 247
7.1.1 Modernity and Modernism as Antitheses ............................................. 248
7.1.2 Modernity and Abstract Space .............................................................. 252
7.1.3 Modernity and Everyday Life in the Modern World ......................... 254

7.2 The World Expo and Modernity ........................................................... 256
7.2.1 Exhibiting Progress and Prosperity ...................................................... 257
7.2.2 Exhibiting a Modern Life ...................................................................... 260
7.2.3 Exhibiting a Modern City ................................................................. 263
7.2.4 World Fair is Unfair .............................................................................. 265

7.3 Shanghai, China’s Capital of Modernity .............................................. 267
7.3.1 Chinese Modernity as a Western Confrontation .................................. 268
7.3.2 Encountering Modernity at World Expos ............................................. 272
7.3.3 Chinese Modernity as an Antithesis ..................................................... 275
7.3.4 The City Spirits ..................................................................................... 277

7.4 Conclusion: Shanghai as an Antithesis of Chinese Modernity .......... 280

APPENDIX I:
DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUNDS OF THE RESPONDENTS ....................... 285

APPENDIX II:
INTERVIEW GUIDE ......................................................................................... 286

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................. 288
   Materials in English .............................................................................................. 288
   Materials in Other Languages ................................................................................ 314
LIST OF CHARTS

Figure 2.1: Spatial triad .................................................................................................. 21
Figure 2.2: Periodisation of urbanisation ................................................................. 27
Figure 2.3: Spatial-temporal diagram of the history of space .................................. 44
Figure 3.1: Space-time diagram .............................................................................. 72
Figure 4.1: Sketch map of Shanghai (19th Century) .............................................. 105
Figure 4.2: Shanghai’s Spatial History ................................................................. 143
Figure 5.1: Organisation Chart of the Shanghai Expo ........................................... 155
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIE</td>
<td>Bureau International des Expositions (Bureau of International Exhibitions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>The Communist Party of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPO Bureau</td>
<td>Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPO Land</td>
<td>Shanghai World Expo Land Holding Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti Communiste Française (The French Communist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>The People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASAC</td>
<td>State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Expo</td>
<td>The Shanghai 2010 World Exposition (Expo 2010 Shanghai China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>State Mode of Production (le Mode de Production Étatique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State-owned Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Expo Group</td>
<td>Shanghai World Expo (Group) Company Limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bu zheteng</td>
<td>不折騰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of the Shanghai World Expo Coordination</td>
<td>上海世博會事務協調局</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chaiqian</td>
<td>拆遷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Pavilion (‘Crown of the Orient’)</td>
<td>中國館（「東方之冠」）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City, Makes Life Better (chengshi, rang shenghou geng meihao)</td>
<td>城市，讓生活更美好</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive national strength (chungheng guoli)</td>
<td>綜合國力</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>danwei (Gongzuo danwei)</td>
<td>單位（工作單位）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daotai</td>
<td>道台</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dianshizhai Pictorial</td>
<td>點石齋畫報</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dongqian</td>
<td>動遷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabi (Fiat money)</td>
<td>法幣</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gongren xinchuen</td>
<td>工人新邨</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grasping the big, letting go of the small</td>
<td>抓大放小</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Shanghai Plan</td>
<td>大上海計劃</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guo Songtu</td>
<td>郭嵩燾</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gudao shiqi (isolated island period)</td>
<td>孤島時期</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guojin mintui</td>
<td>國進民退</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hong</td>
<td>行</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hukou (Household Registration System)</td>
<td>戶口（戶口制度）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jiedao banshichu</td>
<td>街道辦事處</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jingji zhuyi</td>
<td>經濟主義</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
linong (longtang) 里弄（弄堂）
Lu Shi’e 陸士誥
maiban 買辦
modeng 摩登
Nanyang Encouraging Industry Exposition (Nanking South Sea Exhibition; Nanyang quanye hui) 南洋勸業會
ningyao Puxi yijianfang, buyao Pudong yitaofang 寧要浦西一間房，不要浦東一套房
nonzhuangfei 農轉非
‘One New City and Nine New Towns’ 「一城九鎮」
Promotion of red revolutionary songs anti-mafia campaign (changhong dahei) 唱紅打黑
qipao 旗袍
Riverside Scene at the Qingming Festival (Qingming Shanghe Tu) 《清明上河圖》
Sanlin Expo Homeland 三林世博家園
shang zhi jiao, xia zhi jiao 上只角，下只角
Shanghai 2010 World Exposition Executive Committee 2010年上海世博會執行委員會
Shanghai 2010 World Exposition National Organising Committee 2010年上海世博會組織委員會
Shanghai Chengtou Corporation 上海市城市建設投資開發總公司
Shanghai Eastbest International (Group) Company Limited 上海東浩國際服務貿易（集團）有限公司
Shanghai International Trade Centre Company Limited 上海國際貿易中心有限公司
The Shanghai 2010 World Exposition

Theme Development Department of Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination

Theme Pavilion

ti-yong

Up the Mountains, Down to the Villages

Urban notables (shenshang)

wenwei

World Expo of Architectures (wangguo jianzhu bolang)

xiandai

xiandia hua

xiaoqu (small district)

Zhang Deyi

zhizui jinmi (extravagant and dissipated life)
NOTES ON ROMANISATION AND TRANSLATION

*Hanyu Pinyin* romanisation was used in this thesis for Chinese terms, which was highlighted in the form of italic type. For a few exceptions that original conventional romanisation was used, *hanyu pinyin* romanisation will be provided in bracket (e.g., Peking [Beijing]). A list of the romanised terms and names and their corresponding Chinese characters was provided in Glossary.

English sources were referenced whenever possible. If English version is unavailable, translation is mine.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of this Study

This thesis examines the urbanisation of Shanghai and the urban experience of its inhabitants by engaging with the theories of Henri Lefebvre. Between May and October 2010, Shanghai hosted the 2010 World Exposition (Expo 2010 Shanghai China; the Shanghai Expo). The theme of the Shanghai Expo was ‘Better City, Better Life’, which set out to encourage reflection on ways ‘to improve the city’s role as a living place’, as well as ‘to harmonize the relationships between urban and rural areas, and between cities and nature’ (Huang, 2007, p.65). The Shanghai Expo itself was also an urbanisation project, which provided an ideal opportunity to scrutinise the urbanisation of Shanghai. In preparation for this international event, large-scale infrastructure development projects were carried out in different regions of the city. The Expo Site was located in the southern part of the city between Lupu Bridge and Nanpu Bridge, which spreads around both banks of the Huangpu River. It is 5.28km² in size, including supporting facilities in the vicinity. Temporary and permanent pavilions were constructed for local and overseas participants. Spatial transformation also took place outside the Expo Site. For instance, five new underground lines of Shanghai Metro were constructed. The Shanghai-Nanjing Intercity Rail Transit and Shanghai-Hangzhou Intercity Rail Transit were completed before the opening of the Expo. The Da Pu Road Tunnel, the first tunnel crossing the Huangpu River was refurbished; the South Xizang Road Tunnel was constructed and opened for public
use after the Expo. Roads in various regions of the city were also renovated. In 2008 alone, more than 1,400 roads, which constituted 26% of total roads of the city or 36% of city centre’s roads, were refurbished (ibid, pp.45-63).

The organisation of the Shanghai Expo speeded up the urbanisation of Shanghai. During the last two decades, the municipal government also carried out various plans to (re)develop the urban centre and the suburb (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, pp.327-328). It involved the demolition of more than 38 million square metres of old buildings and the relocation of over 2.7 million residents in Shanghai (Laurans, 2005, p.4). The massive scale of urbanisation was not restricted to Shanghai. In 1980, only 19.6% of China’s population lived in an urban region (Zhang, 2002, p.480). However, in 2011, the urban population exceeded the rural population for the first time in the Chinese history (Rong and Zhang, 2012). Urbanisation in China is nevertheless an unequal and exploitative process. Social stratification became significant in the city (Chen and Sun, 2006, p.520). For instance, the Gini Coefficient of Pudong (i.e. a statistical analysis on income inequality) increased from 0.37 to 0.45 between 1994 and 2004, indicating that the problem of income inequality worsened (Sassen, 2009, p.7).

Even though social problems, such as income disparity and pollution, are not negligible, some proclaim that China now enjoys a ‘flourishing period’ (shengshi) (Geng, 2011). As indicated by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), China replaced Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2010 (Barboza, 2011). Particularly at a time when Western countries are suffering from a global financial crisis, the economic power of China is valued as it can serve to catalyse global economic growth.
China’s political economic system has been bolstered by an uninterrupted period of growth that has been sustained by strong state intervention (Zheng, 2011, pp.100-103). Amid such a background, it is not surprising that the Shanghai Expo was regarded by the state as a display of its ‘comprehensive national strength’ (chunghe guoli) (Xiao Li and Yang, 2010), as well as the achievement a ‘century-old dream’ overtaking the West (Wen, 2009).

The World Expo is more than an industrial exhibition: early World Expos were often projected as exemplary of the modernisation of the host countries. The organisation of the Shanghai Expo also provided an opportunity to reflect on the modernisation and urbanisation of China. Since ‘opening-up’ for foreign trade in the mid-nineteenth century, Shanghai has functioned as China’s capital of modernity. It imported Western thoughts, lifestyle, economic and social systems into China. In the 1920s, Shanghai was regarded as ‘the Paris of the Orient’ or ‘the New York of the West’ for its cosmopolitanism and economic importance (Lee, 1999a, p.37; Wasserstrom, 2009, p.129). Shanghai’s urbanism and involvement in global capitalism were then concluded by the Socialist regime between the 1950s and the 1970s (Abbas, 2000, p.776). Since Western civilisations were usually regarded as the yardstick of modernity project of China (Lee, 1999b, p.45), how can we characterise the modernity of China when the ‘century-old dream’ overtaking the West is accomplished? Shanghai had a history of adopting capitalism and socialism. How would the capitalist and socialist pasts shape the mode of production in Shanghai now? The Shanghai Expo had speeded up urbanisation of the city. What are the urban experiences of inhabitants of Shanghai amid the transformation of urban landscape? Do we observe a revival of cosmopolitanism in Shanghai? This study addresses these
questions by examining the urbanisation of Shanghai and urban experience of its inhabitants today. Since Shanghai pioneered the modernisation of China and is now regarded as the ‘head of the dragon’ of the economic expansion (Li, 2009, p.27), the experience of the urbanisation of Shanghai also helps understand the urbanisation of China as a whole.

1.2 The Theoretical Concern

This study applies Henri Lefebvre’s (1901-1991) theories of the production of space and, to a lesser extent, his discussion of everyday life, to critically examine the issues above. In the English world, Lefebvre emerged as a prominent interpreter of Karl Marx (Gottdiener, 1993, p.129). Since the availability of the English version of *The Production of Space* (1991[1974]), he has established himself as an authority on urban space and established a legacy with his contribution to the ‘spatial turn’ in the social sciences and humanities (Aronowitz, 2007, p.133). He contributed to an understanding of urbanisation by establishing a theoretical framework to identify the dialectical relationship between the mode of production and the social relations of production.

However, Lefebvre’s theoretical concern is more than a study of urban space; rather he makes a major contribution to examining the perpetuation of capitalism in the modern world. He argued for a new reading of Marx, after the socialist revolution did not occur in most advanced societies (Lefebvre, 1976[1973], p.91). In order to achieve this purpose, he complicated Marxist theory by proposing the following new terms: the urban problematic, social time and social space, state mode of production,
as well as everyday life (Lefebvre, 1988, p.7). In short, Lefebvre argued that ‘each mode of production has its own particular space’ (1991[1974], p.46) and capitalism survived its internal contradictions ‘by occupying space, [and] by producing a space’ (1976[1973], p.21). A particular mode of production will produce a particular spatial arrangement in the city and shape the urban experience of its inhabitants. Such a spatial arrangement will, in turn, facilitate the reproduction of the relations of production and thus the mode of production. In particular, Lefebvre proposed a spatial triad as a heuristic tool to examine the dialectical relationship between perceived space (spatial practice; i.e. spatial arrangement of the city), conceived space (representations of space, i.e. the missions of the state or experts on the planning of space) and lived space (representational space, i.e. the expressions of the daily life of individuals) (Merrifield, 1993, p.173).

Alongside the production of space, another major academic contribution made by Lefebvre is the theorisation of everyday life. However, until the late 1990s, Lefebvrian analysis was mainly studied in the fields of political economy and cultural studies (Kipfer, Goonewardena, Schmid, et al., 2012, p.116). Only since the publication of English version of the trilogy, *Critique of Everyday Life*, in the last decade, has his work on everyday life and the implications on the theorisation of the production of space received wider acknowledgement (Aronowitz, 2007, pp.133-135). However, interpreting Lefebvre from a single disciplinary perspective would ‘risk losing sight of the complex whole’ (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.766). In this thesis, I argue that his projects on space and everyday life shared the common objective of examining how capitalism shaped the daily life (work and non-work) of people in the modern world. In particular, his ideas on festival, moment, the urban revolution and
the right to the city should be interpreted together in order to examine the survival of capitalist modernity.

1.3 The Methodological Concern and Execution Process

Urban sociology has a tradition of empiricism (Flanagan, 2010, p.269). For instance, Robert E. Park conducted descriptive empirical studies to identify ‘laws’ of causal relationships in cities (Park, 2005[1936], p.1). Although Lefebvre rejected the application of a positivist approach in conducting social research (2009[1940], pp.11-12), he acknowledged the importance of data collection techniques (2003[1953], p.117). As a part of his project to recast Marx, Lefebvre proposed the regressive-progressive method to examine space by reinventing dialectical materialism (Stanek, 2008c, p.7). In short, he argued that social space should be examined by vertical complexity (i.e. the historicity of space) and horizontal complexity (i.e. the conditions of the community at a certain period of historic time). The regressive-progressive method provides ‘a general framework, a conception of the overall process’ to investigate social space, so that various data collection techniques can be employed (Lefebvre, 2003[1953], p.117).

This study has applied such a methodological framework. On the one hand, the vertical complexity of space is addressed by periodising Shanghai’s history of space (from the ‘opening up’ to the Reform). On the other hand, the Shanghai Expo is conceived as a case study for examining horizontal complexity. Data were collected using different techniques and sources. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 13 inhabitants from Shanghai between October 2009 and October 2010 on about
their imagination, experience and perception of residing in Shanghai. Secondary data regarding the Shanghai Expo and the urbanisation of Shanghai in general were also gathered from various sources and interpreted.

There are two major reasons for applying a Lefebvrian framework to examine the urbanisation of Shanghai in this study. First, Lefebvre provided a holistic approach in theoretically linking spatial arrangement, urban experience and history. Such a ‘unitary theory of space’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.11) is useful in examining the social space of Shanghai. Shanghai’s spatial history is complicated: it emerged as the first modern city of China (Lee, 1999b, p.6) but its urban development and cosmopolitan urban culture was abruptly ended by the Socialist regime (Abbas, 2000, p.776). In the last two decades, Shanghai redeveloped as the ‘head of dragon’ of the economic expansion (Li, 2009, p.27). How did the state produce new space? How did the inhabitants contextualise their daily lives when living with such massive urbanisation? How can we understand the relationship between the political economy of China, spatial changes and the experience of the inhabitants? The application of a Lefebvrian framework has enabled us to answer these questions holistically. In fact, Lefebvre showed his interest in commenting on China. For instance, he concluded his book *The Production of Space* by comparing ‘the Chinese road’ to socialism and the Soviet Model (1991[1974], p.421). In *Everyday Life in the Modern World*, he examined the ‘Cultural Revolution’ as a Marxian concept and called for a reflection of the modern life in France (1971[1968], see Chapter 5). In *De l’État: De Hegel à Mao par Staline*, he briefly examined the Maoism to help illustrate the nature of a modern state (1988[1976], see Chapter 15). These writings provided useful resources for us to examine the nature of the Socialist regime and its persistent influence today.
A further reason for applying a Lefebvrian framework is its methodological flexibility. Urbanisation is a complicated issue that concerns spatial transformation, urban experience, history, political economy and cultural representations. Most importantly, this method provides general guidelines to examine the complexities of space. The openness of the regressive-progressive method has enabled this study to employ a verity of data collection methods, and to collect information from diverse sources to examine the urbanisation of Shanghai and understand the experience of its inhabitants.

1.4 Research Questions and Significance

The general objective of this study can be summarised as an investigation of the urbanisation of Shanghai and the experience of its inhabitants after three decades of the Reform. This is broken down into three analytical themes. The first delineates the current mode of production in Shanghai. Since China launched the reform measures of market liberalisation in 1978, there has been a state/market debate on the political economy of China, i.e. whether China is going to completely transform from a socialist mode of production to a capitalist one or not. By illustrating the organisation of the Shanghai Expo, this study examines the political economy of Shanghai today and proposes the term ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’ to characterise the current mode of production. It argues that the state manipulates its power as a market regulator to favour its activities in the market. This study contributes to the state/market debate by challenging the assumption that the Reform leads to a complete transition from a planned economy to a market-led one.
The second analytical theme describes and explains the changes in spatial arrangement in Shanghai and its impact on the experience of the inhabitants. Lefebvre argued that each mode of production has its own space and shapes the everyday life of inhabitants in the city. In last two decades, the urban landscape of Shanghai has been transformed, together with its mode of production and the experience of its inhabitants. So, how did the state manipulate the Shanghai Expo to accelerate the huge scale of urbanisation? What were the urban experiences of Shanghai’s inhabitants during the organisation of the Shanghai Expo? How did the inhabitants contextualise their daily lives when living with such a massive scale of urbanisation? How can we understand the relationship between the political economy of China, spatial changes and the experience of its inhabitants? By applying a Lefebvrian framework, this study contributes to new knowledge by illustrating how the state-led/participation mode of production produced a favourable spatial arrangement and shaped the daily experience of individuals.

The third analytical theme is the evaluation of modernity of China. Since the mid-nineteenth century, China began to search for modernity within the context of confrontation with Western countries. Western civilisation was regarded as the yardstick of such a modernisation project, where Shanghai played an important role in importing Western ideas and explored the possibility of a Chinese version of modernity (Lee, 1999b, p.45). Amid the economic expansion of China in recent years, some Chinese scholars proposed the discourses of ‘China Model’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’ (e.g., Huang, 2011; Zheng, 2011). It was argued that China has already established a comprehensive system of political economy and fundamentally
challenged the application of neoliberal capitalism in China (Huang, 2011, p.24). Moreover, it suggested that a Western model was not applicable to the Chinese context and that Chinese society had become an alternative form of modernity (Zheng, 2011, pp.86-94). So, what is the nature of modernity of China? Does modernity in China only mean ‘surpassing the West’? While the Shanghai Expo is regarded as a modernity project, its political and economic organisation provides us with an ideal entry point to reconsider the nature of the modernity of China, as well as the role of Shanghai to ‘China’s capital of modernity’, i.e. the city introducing the Western concept of modernity to China and exploring the possibility a Chinese version of modernity.

1.5 Organisation of Chapters

Alongside the present introductory chapter, there are six other chapters in this thesis. In order to develop a theoretical framework for this study, Chapter Two critically introduces Lefebvre’s theories on urban space and urban experience. First, it evaluates Lefebvre’s theorisation of the production of space, particularly drawing upon his ideas of the spatial triad, the history of space and the state mode of production. Second, it discusses Lefebvre’s theory of everyday life. I argue that Lefebvre’s examination of the everyday life should be understood together with his theory of the production of space, especially the ideas on the urban revolution and the right to the city. The chapter pinpoints the major criticisms of Lefebvre’s theoretical framework, by critically introducing the critiques of David Harvey and Manuel Castells. This chapter ends with a brief review of some current studies on the urbanisation of China and a reflection on the applicability of a Lefebvrian analysis in a Chinese context.
As discussed above, Lefebvre developed the regressive-progressive method to examine the complexities of space. Chapter Three firstly addresses the relevant methodological issues for this study. Then, I elaborate the study’s research questions, how the Lefebvrian methodological framework was applied and the data collection process. In short, this is a Lefebvrian study of the production of urban space in Shanghai and the experience of its inhabitants. The Shanghai Expo is presented as a case study. Data was collected in order to construct the Shanghai Expo as exemplary of the experience of modernisation/urbanisation of China.

Based on the above theoretical and methodological framework, I will set out the study’s research findings in Chapters Four to Seven. Chapter Four provides a historical background of the urbanisation of Shanghai by applying a Lefebvrian framework, i.e. to periodise Shanghai’s spatial history by modes of production. Rather than outlining the chronology of the city, this chapter focuses on identifying the dialectical relationship between spatial arrangement, daily life and social relations of production. It also draws on the major sociological, historical and cultural studies of Shanghai. In particular, I elaborate the ideas of Leo Lee on two different connotations of ‘modern’ in Chinese, i.e. ‘modeng’ or ‘xiandai’ (Lee, 1999b, p.5), to understand the modes of production before and after the establishment of the socialist regime.

By mainly referring to the Shanghai Expo as a case study, Chapter Five scrutinises the mode of production of Shanghai today. In short, it argues that Shanghai entered a phase of ‘state-led/participation mode of production’, thus enabling the state to maintain both a regulatory role and to participate in market activities. First, this
chapter outlines the features of this mode of production, in which land commodification played a vital role as the key driving force of Shanghai’s economic expansion and urbanisation. Lefebvre argued that each mode of production produces its own space (1991[1974], p.46). The second purpose of Chapter Five is therefore to delineate how new social space is produced by applying Lefebvre’s spatial triad. It argues that the spatial practice of Shanghai can be summarised by the Puxi/Pudong divide, where two regions exhibit different trajectories of urbanisation, as well as the different kinds of imagination that were manifested by the inhabitants. Finally, this chapter addresses the representation of space. I argue that the state employed several strategies to re-establish the relationship between the state and the people, as well as to provide the ideological justification for the Shanghai Expo and for urbanisation in general.

Chapter Six draws on the primary data from the in-depth interviews to examine how the urban experiences of Shanghai’s inhabitants (i.e. representational space) are shaped by the state-led/-participation mode of production. Their experiences are described and thematised in connection with the new spatial arrangement in the city. As I discuss in Chapter Two, Lefebvre’s theories of the production of space and everyday life should be studied together. Thus, this chapter also addresses civil resistance in Shanghai and the possibility of an urban revolution by breaking up the everyday life.

Building on discussions in the previous chapters, this thesis concludes with a reflection on the modernity of China in Chapter Seven. It elaborates Lefebvre’s idea of modernity (i.e. establishing modernity and modernism as antitheses) (Lefebvre,
1995[1962], pp.1-2) and applies this to examine the nature of the World Expo and Chinese modernisation. Shanghai is China’s capital of modernity. Not only because Shanghai is where China explores new thoughts, a new social system and everyday life, but also where it provides critiques of the direct replication of Western modernity in China. Only the former feature is propagated under the state-led/participation mode of production. Thus, I conclude this thesis by calling for the revival of Shanghai’s role as a critique of modernity.
CHAPTER TWO

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN THE MODERN WORLD

In order to understand the modern world, it is necessary not only to retain some of Marx’s essential concepts but also to add new ones: the everyday, the urban, social time and space, the tendency towards a state-oriented mode of production.

- Henri Lefebvre (1988, p.7)

As an agricultural country transforming into ‘the World’s Factory’ and as a socialist inward-looking country transforming to one of the world’s largest recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI), the urbanisation of China has attracted much attention from the academy, the media and policy makers. Profound changes in the urban landscape, social lives, governance structure, and social inequalities have occurred since the Reform in 1978. In response, a number of questions emerge: as urbanisation concerns different aspects of society, we must determine which aspects should be explained in researching urbanisation in China. So, how can we examine the complexity of the urbanisation of China? How can the urbanisation of China be theorised? Is Western theory applicable to understanding the ‘national circumstances’ of China?

In this thesis, my theoretical framework is primarily informed by Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space, and, to a lesser extent, his theory of everyday life. Lefebvre set out to postulate a ‘unitary theory of space’ (1991[1974], p.11); such a holistic approach is particularly useful for understanding urban China in which almost every aspect of society has experienced significant changes. By theorising the production of space and its impact on everyday life, he provided a comprehensive account of the
relationships between the mode of production, urban experience, spatial arrangement, urban culture and social relations of production (Elden, 2004c, pp.17-18; Merrifield, 2006, pp.xi-xiii).

As a prolific writer, Lefebvre published more than sixty-six books and numerous articles (Smith, 2003, p.xxii). He wrote extensively on a wide range of subjects, which included modernity, literacy criticism, rural sociology, the body, sexuality, violence, postmodernity, music, the arts, etc. (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.763). This chapter does not attempt to offer a complete review of Lefebvre’s academic life. For the purpose of providing a theoretical framework to examine the urban transformation of China, this literature review will focus on (1) Lefebvre’s theorisation of space and mode of production, and (2) the discussion of urban experience and the possibility of urban revolution.

Firstly, Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space will be reviewed by focussing on the following key terms: social space, spatial triad, mode of production, history of space, contradictions and relations of production. Lefebvre (1988, p.77) argued that Marxism is ‘an instrument of research and discovery’, thus his theory of space is a Marxist analysis. On the one hand, I argue that Lefebvre’s discussion of space is a theoretical and political ‘discovery’ of the ‘urban problematic’ and the emergence of, what Lefebvre referred to as, the State Mode of Production (SMP) after the Second World War. On the other hand, it is also a reinvention of the Marxist understanding of the historical development of the mode of production (Smith, 2003, p.xi). By periodising the history of space, Lefebvre has supplied historical materialism with a spatial dimension, and explained the reason why capitalism managed to survive
Secondly, after introducing Lefebvre’s theory on space, I examine Lefebvre’s discussion of urban experience and urban revolution. By proposing the concept of ‘everyday life’ (or ‘the everyday’), Lefebvre argued that the logic of the capitalist mode of production has invaded all aspects of the modern world. Alongside the workplace, alienation has extended to everyday life such that what he called the ‘bureaucratic society of controlled consumption’ has been produced (Lefebvre, 1971[1968], p.60). While Lefebvre’s theory of everyday life is usually either misread or regarded as a separate project from space, I will argue that Lefebvre’s theory of everyday life should be interpreted together with his theory of space, i.e. everyday life is constituted within the construction of urban experience, and the ‘break’ from everyday life opens the possibility of an urban revolution. In last two decades, there has been a ‘spatial turn’ in the Anglo-American academic world, in which the importance of space has been highlighted amid a global scale of urbanisation (Allweil, 2010, p.2; Withers, 2009, p.641). Together with Michel Foucault, Lefebvre was one of the most influential scholars contributing to the ‘spatial turn’ and regarded as a postmodern thinker (Shields, 1999, p.viii). Harvey has remarked that ‘[w]e owe the idea that command over space is a fundamental and all pervasive source of social power in and over everyday life to the persistent voice of Henri Lefebvre’ (1989, p.226). Lefebvre’s critical position against capitalism and his proposition of articulating everyday life, physical space, representation, political economy, the state and globalisation have opened up the possibility of understanding the nature of urban society and capitalism on a world scale (Brenner and Elden, 2009, p.786; Gardiner, 2004, pp.52-53; Smith, 2003, pp.xiv-xv). The third purpose of this chapter is therefore
to briefly discuss the influence and critiques of Lefebvre’s theory of space.

Following this, the urban transformation of China in recent decades will be briefly outlined. Since Shanghai is the regional focus of this thesis, an elaborated review of the history of the urbanisation of Shanghai is provided in Chapter Four. This chapter does not completely review Chinese urbanisation. Therefore, I will introduce some key studies and theories examining the complexity of the urbanisation of China, in which engagement with Lefebvre in analysing the urbanisation of China has been all too rare. Several questions emerge here. Is Lefebvre’s theory of space applicable to China? How can a Lefebvrian analysis open up the possibility of understanding the great transformation of China? How can Lefebvre’s theory of everyday life contribute to examine the urban experience of the inhabitants of Shanghai? How can Lefebvre’s ‘unitary theory of space’ be helpful in examining the urbanisation of China as a totality? Before attempting to answer these empirical and theoretical questions in future chapters, this chapter will conclude by evaluating the applicability of a Lefebvrian framework in examining urbanisation in a Chinese context.

2.1 The (Re)Production of (Social) Space

Before the availability of the English version of *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre was better known for his interpretation of Marx in France and the English world. He was appreciated as ‘by far the best interpreter of Marx in France’ (Poster, 1975, p.55) and even ‘a Marx for our time’ (Gottdiener, 1993, p.129). Before being expelled by the *Parti Communiste Française* (French Communist Party; PCF) in 1956, he was its leading intellectual (Trebitsch, 1991, p.x). Nevertheless, Lefebvre rejected any
dogmatic or reductionist reading of Marxism (Elden, 2004c, p.22). In *The Sociology of Marx*, he even began the book by questioning the relevance of Marx in the modern world, i.e. ‘whether today we must study Marx as we study Plato, or rather whether Marx’s work retains a contemporary value and significance’ (Lefebvre, 1982[1968], p.vii). Lefebvre’s answer is affirmative. He found Marxism pertinent, in spite of the fact that ‘Marxism has become boring’ and ‘a disappointment’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], pp.84-85).

For Lefebvre, Marxism needs to be reinvented so as to provide a plausible analysis to understand the modern world. Since the 1940s, Lefebvre began his project to ‘recast Marx’s thought’ (Merrifield, 2002, p.79). In this section, I will argue that Lefebvre has developed the Marxist project by pointing out the significance of the production of space in the development of the mode of production. By including the spatial dimension, Lefebvre then attempted to supplement the Marxist conception of the mode of production and illustrated how capitalism managed its contradictions in the post-war period. His conceptual triad of the production of social space (i.e. the spatial triad), which is an application of dialectics in examining the complexity of space, will be introduced first. Then I will discuss how Lefebvre historicised space and examined the perpetuation of the relations of production. Finally, I will discuss the impact on space under what he called the State Mode of Production (SMP), which Lefebvre regarded as an emerging ‘new state form’ in the modern world.

---

1 Lefebvre was expelled by the PCF for his objection to Stalinism. Then, he was involved in the Situational International and the student movement in Paris in 1968. His interpretation of Marx and his development of a theory of space could therefore not be isolated from his political involvement (Brenner and Elden, 2001, pp.763-764). For Lefebvre’s biography, refer to Michel Trebitsch’s prefaces for the English version of *Critique of Everyday Life* (2005, 2002, 1991).

2 Lefebvre took dialectics as a starting point that by putting an argument in a non-dogmatic approach, theories could be dialectically pushed forward. Space is the dimension that he deliberately introduced to delineate the complexity of urbanisation and to push forward the theorisation of city. In other words, the process of theorisation itself is viewed by him as a dialectical process that reality could be recreated by the ‘movement of thought’ (Lefebvre, 2009[1940], p.15).
2.1.1 Spatial Triad

*The Production of Space* is ‘a theoretical summation’ of Lefebvre’s exploration of space and his fieldwork research in rural and urban areas (from the 1940s to the 1970s) (Elden, 2006, p.192). Lefebvre began the book by rejecting the Cartesian view of taking space with ‘a strictly geometrical meaning’ (1991[1974], p.1). He argued that space should be analysed by three dimensions, which are ‘the physical’, ‘the mental’ and ‘the social’ (ibid, pp.4-5). By constructing this heuristic tool, what he called the ‘spatial triad’, Lefebvre tried to outline a theoretical triad to examine the dialectical relationship between physical space, social space (or ‘the lived’), and mental space as they are constituted in the city (Merrifield, 1993, p.173). There are three ‘moments’ in the conceptual triad, namely spatial practice (*l’espace perçu*; also referred to as ‘the perceived’ and ‘physical space’), representations of space (*l’espace conçu*; or ‘the conceived’ or ‘mental space’) and representational space (*l’espace vécu*; or ‘spaces of representation’, ‘the lived’ or ‘social space’) (Elden, 2007, p.110). Each moment established a dialectical relationship with the other two that altogether defined social space, and could not be epistemologically understood individually (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], pp.33, 38-42). Though Lefebvre provided several seemingly quite different definitions to the three moments of the spatial triad, the meanings of the terms can be summarised as follows:

3 Lynn Stewart (1995, p.610) argued that the English translation ‘representational space’ is preferred over ‘space of representation’. It is because the former translation is less confusing and closer to the French.

4 For a succinct summary of the interpretations of the spatial triad by various scholars including Elden, Gregory, Harvey, Shields, Soja, etc., see Wang (2009, p.24).
physical/built environment, which represents the overall spatial arrangement of the city. It is defined by the mode of production and facilitates the reproduction of that mode of production.

*The representations of space* (the conceived; mental space): the dominant ideology upheld by the state, and the ‘conceptualised space’ of ‘spatial experts’ such as the technocrats, scientists and urban planners. It represents the hegemony of the dominant class (in maintaining their dominance, and being mode of production specific), defining the social meanings of spatial practice and the relations of production and individuals’ social action according to the spatial arrangement.

*Representational space* (Spaces of representation; the lived; social space): the space concerns the experience of inhabitants that are mediated through cultural representation. It is linked to images, signs, symbols, art pieces or even academic studies (e.g., anthropological studies) that describe the human experience in the social space.

The dialectical relationships between these three elements in the spatial triad are represented in the diagram on the next page.5

---

5 This figure is constructed by reinventing the ‘eye of power’ of Gregory (1994, p.121) and applying some terms of Harvey’s spatial grid (1989, pp.218-222). Gregory’s conceptual map has essentially captured the dialectical relationships between spatial practice, the representation of space and representational space, especially explaining how the capitalistic logic is transformed to social relations in everyday life through commodification and bureaucratisation. However, it failed to account for the dialectical relationship between the representation of space and representational space, which is
Lefebvre argued that social space cannot be analysed merely as the natural environment (e.g., climate, geographical location) and history, but rather as it is produced and reproduced by the mode of production (Gottdiener, 1993, p.132). Lefebvre argued that his theory of the production of space can be summarised by the proposition: ‘([s]ocial) space is a (social) product.’ (1991[1974], p.26) and the spatial triad was constructed as a conceptual apparatus for examining the complexity of how new (social) space is produced. As is discussed later, Lefebvre exemplified his idea of urban revolution and the right to the city with reference to Paris (1996[1968], pp.75-79). So I take Paris in the nineteenth century as an example to briefly illustrate

---

elemental to the Lefebvrian trialectic analysis. The ‘eye’ also only looked at the mode of production as neoliberal capitalism at a certain moment in the history of space, but the temporal dimension of the production of space has not been taken into account.
how the spatial triad can be applied to analyse space. In Chapters Five to Seven, I also apply the spatial triad to examine the production of space in Shanghai, and argue that Shanghai today shares some similarities with Haussmann’s Paris.

Lefebvre argued that ‘each mode of production has its own particular space. The shift from one mode of production to another must entail the production of a new space’ (1991[1974], p.46). As industrial capitalism became the dominant form of the mode of production, the spatial arrangement of Paris needed to be transformed accordingly to serve its role as an industrial city. Factories were built and spaces for commercial activities, such as arcades and markets became the spatial practice of Paris. In other words, new social space was produced. Lefebvre also emphasised that the mode of production produces new (social) space, and that social space also facilitates the development of that mode of production. The ‘spatial experts’ (e.g., planners, technocrats, administrators) have played a role in producing such favourable spatial arrangements (representations of space). 6 When Georges-Eugène Haussmann implemented his plan to rebuild Paris in the 1860s, roads and railway networks were built to connect the capital with other provinces. An effective transportation system was essential for production, as well as delivering commodities for consumption. Paris was also envisioned as a space of consumption for the bourgeoisie. By using the renewal of the city as the rationale, old buildings were demolished and wide boulevards were built. Factories were also relocated further from the city centre to free up space for large-scale construction there.

In short, during the development of industrial capitalism, Paris transformed its space

6 In the book *Position: contre les technocrates* (1967), Lefebvre provides a more comprehensive discussion on the impact of technocrats on urban planning in post-war France (Poster, 1975, p.249).
for industrial production and the conspicuous consumption of the bourgeoisie. Walter Benjamin also made a similar observation. In the introduction to his book The Arcades Project (1999[1935]), he announced that Paris was the capital of the nineteenth century because modern urban culture firstly emerged in Paris (p.7). He argued that the emergence of arcades (the shopping walkways with glass ceiling and metal structure), as a new form of space in Paris resulted from the expansion of capitalism and was facilitated by Haussmann’s urban planning. Commercial products were displayed in arcades, as well as the World Expos, to stimulate demand and ‘glorified’ the commodification of products (ibid, p.7). The outcome was that Paris was polarised into the bourgeoisie and the working class (ibid, p.13).

This mode of production produced contradictory relations between the working class and capitalists. Alongside the physical space, Lefebvre argued that cultural changes also emerged with the change of social and economic relations in the city (1988, pp.81-82). Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.42) used the term representational space to describe the experience of social life in the city, which is mediated through ‘symbolic works’ such as artistic illustrations, writings, paintings, architectural design and other textual forms. The daily life of individuals was thus narrated. As Paris was occupied by the newly-emerged bourgeoisie and the disadvantaged working class, novels, paintings and poems were created for celebrating the newly-emerged urban culture and describing the plight of the working class, e.g., the work of Balzac and Charles Baudelaire.

It is also worth noting the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger in shaping the thought of Lefebvre on the production of space. The idea of Nietzschean
space was appropriated by Lefebvre to open up the possibility of understanding the transformation of the aesthetics of space (Elden, 2004c, p.149). Lefebvre’s interest in analysing the resistance against the control of the state through art and symbols can also be seen as a dialogue with Nietzsche’s idea on poetic art, which became an important element in his theorisation of the spatial triad (i.e. representational space). Lefebvre also extensively engaged with Heidegger, though not without disagreement, especially about his political views (Elden, 2004b, pp.78-81). In particular, Heidegger’s concept of dwelling (wohnen) attracted the attention of Lefebvre. As dwelling is the basic character of Being, the experience of the inhabitants in the city became the basic character to human existence in modern society. In The Production of Space and The Urban Revolution (2003[1970]), Lefebvre appropriated Heidegger’s concept of dwelling to develop his concept of abstract space and the lived space (Butler, 2012, pp.105-106).

2.1.2 The History of Space

Alongside theorising the spatial dimension of urban space, The Production of Space is also ‘a very historic book’ (Elden, 2006, p.195). Lefebvre deepened the discussion of the history of space, which he outlined earlier in The Urban Revolution. The history of the city is understood by him as a process of an increasing level of urbanisation (or the decreasing level of being agrarian/nature), which could be summarised as the axis below, from a zero degree of urbanisation (i.e. nature; absolute space) to complete urbanisation (100%; abstract space) (2003[1970], p.7):

```
0  ___________________________________________ 100%
Absolute space  historical space  Abstract space  Differential space
```
Although Lefebvre agreed to periodise the history of space as a development of the ‘productive process’ (1991[1974], p.48), he rejected the dogmatic Marxist perspective of historical materialism (i.e. from feudalism to capitalism). In his Marxist analysis, the history of space should not be simplified as the history of changing modes of production, but a history of spatialisation that is concerned with spatial arrangement and relations of production (Shields, 1999, p.170). Lefebvre argued that the city performed a particular set of functions during each mode of production, so a particular set of spatial arrangements (spatial practice) would be produced.

Lefebvre exemplified his periodisation of urbanisation by referring mainly to Western experience. In the earliest stage of civilisation in Europe, the city was not involved in agrarian production (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.122). Lefebvre argued that the ‘antique city’ (the ancient city) was the territorial centre where people gathered and exhibited a zero degree of urbanisation. With the expansion of the country, the territorial centre evolved to become a political city like the Greek polis or Roman city. As the political city needed to perform administrative, political and military functions, meeting halls (for decision making and administration) and symbols of the polity (e.g., a palace) were built at the centre of the city for political purposes (both functional and symbolic). The mode of production was still agricultural, but the emergence of the political city symbolised the beginning of organised social life in the city. In other words, the mode of production has produced a particular kind of spatial arrangement (spatial practice), as well as impacting on inhabitants’ daily life (representational space).
Lefebvre argued that the production of space corresponds to a ‘leap forward’ of the mode of production (1991[1974], pp.102-103). With the fall of feudalism and the rise of mercantile capitalism in Medieval Europe, a city, such as Venice, did not only perform the role as a political and military centre, but also the trading centre between different regions (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.73-75). As agriculture was no longer the dominant mode of production, the land was taken over by the bourgeoisie from old feudal states. Through real estate projects and other commercial activities, wealth was centralised by the bourgeoisie (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.66). The city also began to industrialise, so that urban fabric began to reach rural areas (i.e. ‘urban society and life penetrate the countryside’) (Elden, 2004c, p.131). The transition from an agrarian society to an urban one also began. Subsequently, industrialisation replaced mercantilism as the dominant mode of production.

Lefebvre emphasised that the new type of city (new social space) was built upon, not taken over by, the previous type of city: ‘new social relationships call for a new space, and vice versa’ (1991[1974], p.59). Factories became prominent and infrastructure for delivering raw materials and products (e.g., roads, channels) were constructed. The periodisation of the history of space is summarised in Figure 2.2.
The Production of Space should also be read as ‘a study of the history of spatial transformation’ (Elden, 2006, p.192). By applying the conceptual triad, Lefebvre illustrated changes in the spatial arrangement of (European) cities under different modes of production. However, what Lefebvre was particularly interested in were the contradictions between the dominant and subordinate classes in the city. He argued that the city provided the social space for the ‘real’ existence of such relations of production between both classes (1991[1974], p.86):

Social relations, which are concrete abstractions, have no real existence save in and through space. Their underpinning is spatial. In each particular case, the connection between this underpinning and the relations it supports calls for analysis. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.404; original emphasis)

Lefebvre considered the city as a centre of contradictions between the dominant class
and subordinate class – contradictions were produced and reproduced in the city. For example, an industrial city should not only be regarded as the centre of industrial production but also the social space where the contradictory relationship between capitalists (the dominant class) and the working class (the subordinate classes) were established. In the industrial city, both classes established a mutually dependent relation of production (Shields, 1999, p.152).

Lefebvre argued that social space should be understood as a concrete abstraction (1991[1974], p.27). A concrete abstraction (l’abstrait concret) is a Marxist concept that Lefebvre first proposed in *Dialectical Materialism* (2009[1940]) and later developed in *Logique formelle, logique dialectique* (1947)\(^7\), which means ‘a contradictory fusion of content and form, concreteness and abstraction, quality and quantity’ (2009[1940], p.xix). Social space is produced by the mode of production (i.e. each mode of production has its own space) but also facilitates the development of that particular mode of production. For example, an industrial city was produced by the capitalist mode of production (characterised by the establishment of factories and the emergence of bourgeoisie-proletariat relations), but the industrial city also facilitates the development of industrial capitalism (e.g., the comprehensive system of financial services and transportation network). The capitalists also could not employ sufficient workers to meet the demands of the production line outside the industrial city. Social relations of production are regarded as the abstract, while social space is the concrete. Social space provided the material space for the dominant and subordinate classes to establish a relation of production. In other words, only through social space can the ‘abstraction which became true in practice’ (Stanek, 2008c, p.62)

\(^7\) *Logique formelle, logique dialectique* is unavailable in English. English translation of an excerpt can be found in *Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings* (eds. Elden and Lebas, 2003, pp.57-60).
be produced in the city.

2.1.3 The Survival of Capitalism

Although Lefebvre agreed with the Marxist view that history should be periodised by mode of production, he criticised orthodox Marxists for overemphasising the temporal dimension of history, i.e. the development of history as a history of class contradictions (1991[1974], pp.10-11). Rather than a crisis of capitalism, it is Marxism that is suffering from a crisis in providing a plausible analytical model. In the modern world, political revolutions do not take place in most advanced industrialised societies as Marx predicted, so a new understanding of Marxism is particularly necessary (Lefebvre, 1976[1973], p.91). Lefebvre sided with the Nietzschean view of history that time and space should be considered together in analysing the mode of production, especially when ‘[t]he state is consolidating on a world scale’ (1991[1974], p.23). In *The Survival of Capitalism* (1976[1973]), Lefebvre argued that the crisis of capitalism has been avoided by the production of space:

Capitalism has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve) its internal contradictions for a century, and consequently, in the hundred years since the writing of *Capital*, it has succeeded in achieving ‘growth’. We cannot calculate at what price, but we do know the means: *by occupying space, by producing a space.* (Lefebvre, 1976[1973], p.21; original emphasis)

One of Lefebvre’s purposes in emphasising the importance of spatiality is to explain the perpetuation of capitalism in the twenty-first century, i.e. capitalism survived through its crisis by producing new space and occupying space. Therefore, Lefebvre
(1996[1968], p.130) made a clear distinction between industrialisation and urbanisation. Industrialisation is concerned with the means of production, while urbanisation is about the spatial arrangement and its impact on shaping daily life. In the modern world, urbanisation has also replaced industrialisation as the key problematic in modern society (1991[1974], p.89). The prevalence of urbanism in the 1960s was seen by Lefebvre as the outcome of the expansion of industrial capitalism, but more importantly, also as a facilitator of the further expansion of industrial capitalism (i.e. the reproduction of the mode of production). In other words, urbanisation has enabled the survival of capitalism by occupying space (e.g., the disintegration of the old town, the redevelopment of the city centre) and producing new space (e.g., the construction of new towns). Lefebvre argued that ‘emerging industry tends to establish itself outside cities’. Hence, new cities were produced (i.e. producing new space), but entrepreneurs found the ‘settlement outside of cities’ not to be attractive, so also extended the capitalist logic to the city centre (i.e. occupying space) (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.68-69, 81). During an interview, Lefebvre claimed that these trends of spatial transformation had prompted him to investigate space:

From the 1960s the historic centres of towns began to be refashioned under capitalist hegemony … It was at this time that there was a certain bursting forth of the urban phenomenon: the disintegration of the historic centre and its redevelopment, the expansion of the urban periphery, and, with it, all the planning projects. It is in this context that I tried to introduce the concept of the production of space, space as a social and political product, space as a product that one buys and sells. (Burgel, Burgel and Dezes, 1987, pp.29-30)

This observation of Lefebvre is similar to Harvey’s idea of the ‘spatial fix’ (Harvey, 1981, p.9), but Lefebvre’s conception of the production of (social) space is not restricted to geographical expansion. Lefebvre placed more emphasis on exemplifying
how urbanism under neo-capitalism has established itself as a superstructure to reproduce relations of production (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.163). He recognised ‘production’ and ‘accumulation’ as the ‘vast contribution’ of Marx in understanding the genesis and history of capitalism. But Lefebvre criticised Marx for failing to pinpoint the importance of the reproduction of relations of production in understanding the nature of capitalism (1976[1973], pp.43-45). Rather than the reproduction of the means of production, Lefebvre argued that ‘[i]t is the reproduction of the social relations, i.e. the ability of capitalism to maintain itself during and beyond its critical moments’ (ibid, p.70; original emphasis). For instance, the construction of an industrial park (i.e. producing new space) is a common strategy of promoting industrial production by the state. Such a strategy not only facilitates capital accumulation (by attracting investment from the private sector), but also further produces a working class (by employing more workers). Hence, the relations of production (workers and capitalists as subordinate and dominant classes) are reproduced by the production of new space.

Moreover, in modern society (roughly from 1950 to 1970 in France), the nature of capitalism changed. Capitalism was not only a system of wealth accumulation, but also the accumulation of ‘techniques, information, knowledge in general’ (Lefebvre, 1976[1973], pp.111-112). Sciences were incorporated into production (through technology and machinery) to promote economic growth and social sciences became the tools of political control (by selling social data to private and public users) that ultimately were organised under the state apparatus (ibid). As there was no history in the new towns, the spatial practice was almost completely designated by the state and its technocrats; the daily life of individuals was ‘programmed’ under the vision of the
state and its technocrats (Elden, 2004c, p.133). Lefebvre argued that:

It was only after the Second World War that capitalism succeeded in thoroughly penetrating the detail of everyday life. We need new concepts in Marxism if it is to retain its capacity to help us both understand and transform this radically commodified contemporary world. (Lefebvre, 1988, p.70)

Before proceeding to the discussion about how capitalism invaded everyday life to reproduce the relations of space in Section 2.2, I discuss the concept of the State Mode of Production, in which Lefebvre ‘situates his earlier work on the urban, the production of everyday life and space within a more political context’ (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.765).

2.1.4 The State Mode of Production

By reinstating the importance of social relations being exhibited in social space, Lefebvre’s dialectical approach has supplemented Marxist analysis of history. While he did not rule out the materialistic basis of social relations, he emphasised that it is its contradictory spatiality that characterises the nature of the city. Therefore, it is not surprising that Lefebvre disagreed with the simplistic classification of ‘capitalist city’ and ‘socialist city’. In modern society, he argued that state capitalism and state socialism become the ‘species of a single genus’ (2009[1975], p.111):

The collapse of free competitive capitalism has come about, through the concentration and centralisation of capital; but this process has given capitalism an unexpected elasticity and capacity for organisation. It resists crises and revolutionary convulsions – and especially in the advanced countries, contrary to Marx’s predictions. This collapse has given rise to an original and contradictory ‘socialist’ process in several economically
(industrially) backward countries, and to neo-capitalism in the highly industrialised countries. Marx's unitary conception has disintegrated. (Lefebvre, 1976[1973], p.47)

Lefebvre pointed out the importance of the state in the production of space, especially in the post-war period. In the four volumes of *De l'État*, (1978-1976)\(^8\), he elaborated the theorisation of the role of the state by proposing the ‘new state form’: the State Mode of Production (*le Mode de Production Étatique*; SMP). Differing from the Capitalist Mode of Production (CMP) that was predominant at the time of Marx, Lefebvre argued that the state under SMP plays a much greater role in the modern world. Firstly, the state has become managerial (*gestionnaire*) and administrative in nature to facilitate economic activities. Secondly, the state assumes the power to protect and ensure security (*securisante*). Thirdly, the state also has the power to kill (*mortelle*), which includes repression, the monopoly of violence, national spending on the army and military, as well as the possibility of declaring wars (2009[1979], p.129).

In other words, the state not only controls economic growth (which is insignificant under CMP), but also dominates other aspects of society (relations of production).

Under SMP, the spatial arrangement of cities is not only produced by the contradictory relations between dominant and subordinate classes, but significantly influenced by the state. Lefebvre (2009[1980], pp.212-216) observed the following features under SMP:

1. Homogeneity: there will be a strong point (centre) and dominated bases (weak peripheries) in the city;

---

\(^8\) The whole volume of *Le l'État* has not yet been translated into English. Hence, the discussion of Lefebvre’s ideas on the state is mainly based on the selected essays in *State, Space, World* (2009; edited by Brenner and Elden), the Chinese version of volume II (1988; on Hegel, Stalin and Mao), as well as other secondary sources, such as (Brenner, 2001; Brenner and Elden, 2009).
(2) Fragmentation: space is strictly quantified and commodified

(3) Hierarchisation: a hierarchy is established for the space, e.g., the different kinds of housing situated between the strong point and the dominated bases.

In particular, Lefebvre (2009[1975], pp.106-107) exemplified SMP by examining Stalinism, which is consistent with his earlier endeavour in rejecting Stalinism during his membership in the PCF. Rather than putting the principle of proletariat dictatorship into practice, the Soviet party-state controlled the means of production and determined the relations of production. The power of the state also pervaded different realms of society; for instance, political meanings were given to sports championships. Lefebvre therefore did not take Stalinism as a model of socialism but termed it as SMP.

Another application of this new term was to critique the social democratic movement in the post-1968 era. Whilst an increasing role of the state to control economic growth could be observed in left/labour governments, Lefebvre argued that the outcome of the nationalisation of industries, for example, was not the transfer of power to the workers but state control (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.791). By quoting the examples of Keynesian economic policy in Britain and the New Deal in the US, he argued that the advocates of these policies were liberals, but that the state had played a similar crucial role in Stalinism. State productivism was favoured by them. Hence, putting aside the debate between the Right and the Left, state socialism and state capitalism, Stalinism and neo-liberalism could all be seen by Lefebvre as two faces of the same coin (ibid, pp.798-799).
2.2 Urban Experience and Urban Revolution

‘In order to understand the modern world’, Lefebvre argued that ‘it is necessary not only to retain some of Marx’s essential concepts but also to add new ones’ (1988, p.7). This comment was made in his late eighties, which could be seen as a recapitulation of his academic career. His list of new concepts included: the everyday, the urban, social time and space, as well as the ‘the tendency towards a state-oriented mode of production’ (ibid, p.7). The conceptual triad for the production of space, the urban problematic and SMP have been discussed in an earlier section. I argued that the theory of the production of space has complicated the Marxist understanding of historical materialism in the modern world. In this section, I will discuss the concept of everyday life, which Lefebvre regarded as his foremost important contribution to the development of Western Marxism (Elden, 2004c, p.xv).

In 1947, Lefebvre published the first volume of the trilogy Critique of Everyday Life (reprinted with an elaborated preface in 1958 that the current English version is based on). The second and final volumes were published in 1961 and 1981 respectively, with the book Everyday Life in the Modern World published in 1968. During this long interval of publication, Lefebvre switched his fieldwork research focus from rural sociology to urban sociology, as well as producing texts on space and urban revolution. Rather than regarding his theories on everyday life and the production of space as separate projects, I argue that both projects share a common objective of reinventing Marx in understanding modern society. His theory of everyday life, as a distinctive urban experience in modern society, should be understood together with his discussion of space and his vision of urban revolution.
2.2.1 Everyday Life in Modern Society

As pointed out by Frederic Jameson (2003, p.78), everyday life is a ‘relatively new postwar concept’ that was ‘pioneered by’ Lefebvre. In a society of ‘abundance, leisure, and consumption’, alienation seemed to disappear after the Second World War (Lefebvre, 1969[1968], p.10). The revolutionary spirit of the working class also disappeared, because the ‘center of interest’ changed from work to leisure (Poster, 1975, pp.243-244). But the Europeans began to find ‘a loss of meanings and an increase in repetition in their lives’ (Shields, 1999, p.65). Although work shaped daily routine and occupied a significant portion of the social clock, Lefebvre pointed out that in the modern world, ‘workers do not only have a life in the workplace, they have a social life, family life, political life; they have experiences outside the domain of labour … alienation in leisure just as in work’ (Lefebvre, 1988, p.78). He argued that alienation in the modern world is no longer an isolated experience on the factory production line, but pervades other aspects of everyday life. Lefebvre defined everyday life as:

The everyday can therefore be defined as a set of functions which connect and join together systems that might appear to be distinct. Thus defined, the everyday is a product, the most general of products in an era where production engenders consumption, and where consumption is manipulated by producers: not by ‘workers’, but by the managers and owners of the means of production (intellectual, instrumental, scientific). The everyday is therefore the most universal and the most unique condition, the most social and the most individuated, the most obvious and the best hidden. (Lefebvre, 1987, p.9)

With the transformation of the capitalist mode of production, Lefebvre (1988, p.79)
argued that there are three historical stages in the development of everyday life. During the first phase, capitalism was restricted to industrial production that was separated from everyday life. After the Second World War, under the ‘grand movement in the areas of technology and urbanism’ capitalism began to invade everyday life. Volume II of Critique of Everyday Life (2002[1961]) has provided a lengthy sociological survey on the conditions of life, analysing how everyday life is programmed by urbanism. Since the 1960s, it entered a third phase, in which everyday life is ‘entirely mediated and mass mediated’ (Lefebvre, 1988, p.79). Lefebvre argued that daily life is ‘insidiously programmed by the media, advertising, and the press’ (2005[1981], p.26; original emphasis). In short, the everyday is about banality and repetition (Shields, 1999, p.63). Referring to James Joyce’s Ulysses, Lefebvre argued that ‘a great novel can be boring … and “profoundly boring”’. It is because ‘the report of a day in the life of an ordinary man had to be predominantly in the epic mode’ (1991[1958], p.27).

As acknowledged by Lefebvre, his concept of the everyday is similar to Lukács’s concept of Alläglichkeit (trivial life or everydayness) (Trebitsch, 1991, p.xvii), even though he denied the influence of Lukács in a private letter to Guterman (Elden, 2004c, p.49). He also argued that his discussion of the everyday is a Marxist analysis of the modern world and even proclaimed ‘Marxism, as a whole, really is a critical knowledge of the everyday’ (1991[1958], p.148). As I discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, Lefebvre also engaged with other philosophers, including Hegel, Nietzsche, as well as his contemporaries, including Sartre, Heidegger and Althusser, in providing a new reading of Marxism in modern society (Elden, 2007, p.102). Critique of Everyday Life was envisioned by Lefebvre as a philosophical and
To confront philosophers with life – simple life – and its problems, to immerse them in this human raw material and to ask their help in mastering it, in scraping away the coating of mud to reveal the gems within, would that be a breakthrough, a new direction? How should we situate the critique of everyday life in relation to classic philosophy? Is there room in Marxist philosophy for a critique of everyday life considered as a philosophical discipline? Are we dealing with a sociological undertaking in the narrow sense of a specialized discipline, or of an undertaking with a philosophical meaning and a set of concrete contents and social objects to support it? (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.84; original emphasis)

Although Lefebvre’s concept is closer to Nietzsche, the notion of everyday life has complicated the Marxist analysis of alienation. Lefebvre’s concept of everyday life ‘replaced Marx’s work-place as the vulnerable heart of society’ (Poster, 1975, p.246) and pointed out that alienation pervaded beyond the workplace. But Lefebvre’s idea was not generally accepted by French Marxists when the first volume of Critique of Everyday Life was first published, and received the following challenge: ‘[w]hat was the point of analysing bourgeois everyday life, the style (or the absence of style) imposed by the dominant class?’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.6). Lefebvre illustrated that such an examination of bourgeois society is important in understanding modern capitalist society. He argued that in post-war France, the capitalist logic has extended from the workplace to everyday life. Communal bonds are replaced by isolation, egoism and fetishism; everyday life becomes banal, repetitive and meaningless. It produced what Lefebvre called a ‘bureaucratic society of controlled consumption’ (1971[1968], p.75)9:

9 Trebitsch (2005, p.ix) translated it as ‘bureaucratic society of managed consumption’.

… this society’s rational character is defined as well as the limits
set to its rationality (bureaucratic), the object of its organization (consumption instead of production) and the level at which it operates and upon which it is based: the everyday. (Lefebvre, 1971[1968], p.60; original emphasis)

In a bureaucratic society of controlled consumption, ‘social relations are enclosed and concealed within these economic subjects’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.79). Therefore, Lefebvre’s theory of everyday life is also an appropriation of the Marxist concept of commodity fetishism. It is a ‘programmed everyday life’ because work and all other aspects of life are ‘looked after, cared for, and told’ by the capitalist logic of commodification (Merrifield, 2002, p.79). Alongside modern media, urban planning also shapes daily routine (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.96-97) and produces a repetitive way of life.

2.2.2 Social Space and Social Time

During the ‘spatial turn’ of the 1990s, everyday life was mistakenly appropriated by the Anglo-American community as equivalent to social space (Trebitsch, 2005, p.xxv). Such a reception has oversimplified Lefebvre’s understanding of the production of space and the impact of capitalism on everyday life. On the one hand, Lefebvre’s notion of social space is not limited to physical space for inhabitants’ lived experience, but also includes two other moments (the perceived and the conceived). According to Lefebvre,

[Social] space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products … It is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object … Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting others. (Lefebvre 1991[1974], pp.73, 65, 85-88, 412ff.;
As discussed above, social space was regarded as a concrete abstraction by Lefebvre. Everyday life should be viewed as the concrete, while economic production is the abstract (Goonewardena, 2008, p.118), where such a dialectical relationship is (re)produced in social space. In other words, the everyday should be understood as inhabitants’ experience, who are produced by the mode of production in urban society. Lefebvre argued that everyday life ‘figures in’ and ‘forms’ representational space (1991[1974], p.16). As Lefebvre argued, representational space is the dimension of urban inhabitants’ lived experience:

Representational space is alive: it speaks. It has an affective kernel or centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or: square, church, graveyard. It embraces the loci of passion, of action and of lived situations, and thus immediately implies time. Consequently it may be qualified in various ways: it may be directional, situational or relational, because it is essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.42)

At the same time, everyday life is more concerned with the temporal dimension (cycles and repetition), i.e. with how the capitalist logic has programmed daily routine (2005[1981], p.130). Rather than the Hegelian or Marxist view of a linear ‘teleological progression’ of time, Lefebvre’s conception of time is closer to the Nietzschean understanding of cycle (Elden, 2004c, p.xi). He argued that there are two kinds of repetition, which are cyclical time that dominates in nature (day and night, seasons and harvest, activity and rest); and linear time is that produced by work and consumption (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], pp.47-49):

Linear time is both continuous and discontinuous. Continuous: its beginning is absolute, and it grows indefinitely from an initial
zero. Discontinuous: it fragments into partial time scales assigned to one thing or another according to a program which is abstract in relation to time. It dissects indefinitely. Techniques which fragment time also produce repetitive gestures. These do not and often cannot become part of a rhythm: the gestures of fragmented labour, actions which begin at any time or cease at any time. (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.48)

As discussed above, capitalism was mainly concerned with industrial production in its early phase of development. Cyclical time (nature) did not produce any significant impact on linear time (time and consumption). However, in modern society, there is a conjunction between linear and cyclical time, in the way that daily routine has become increasingly determined by the capitalist logic of commodification. In other words, in modern society, inhabitants’ urban experience is constructed by both social space and social time. Generally speaking, the trilogy of *Critique of Everyday Life* is a philosophical and sociological attempt to analyse how capitalism has constructed daily routine, while the theory of space is an investigation of how social space is produced by the mode of production.

However, Lefebvre’s most successful attempt to unify his discussion on social time and social space can be found in the small book *Rhythmanalysis* (2004[1992]), which was co-written with his last wife, Catherine Régulier, and published a year after his death. Regarded as ‘de facto the fourth volume’ of *Critique of Everyday Life* (Elden, 2004a, p.viii), in this book they further explored rhythm and repetition. They argued that rhythm is ‘the way social time actually behaves’, and there is no rhythm without repetition (2004[1992], p.73). In other words, by identifying the organisation of daily routine (i.e. when and where to travel), the purpose of the rthymanalytical project was to examine repetition in daily life.
2.2.3 Urban Problematic and Urban Revolution

As I have argued, Lefebvre’s projects on space and everyday life shared a common theme, i.e. to develop Marxist theory in order to examine modern society by introducing new elements. In *The Survival of Capitalism*, Lefebvre clarified the theme of *Critique of Everyday Life*:

The everyday, and not the economic in general, is the level at which neo-capitalism has been able to establish itself. It has established itself upon the soil of the everyday, i.e. upon something solid, the social substance maintained by political authorities. (Lefebvre, 1971[1968], p.58)

Lefebvre went on to argue that the discussion of the reproduction of the social relations of production was ‘implicit’ in the discussion of the everyday, which could only be explained with ‘full clarity’ when it is discussed together with urban phenomena and economic production (1971[1968], p.58). As discussed above, social space is a concrete abstraction, where the social relations of production are established. In modern society, although there is still a contradiction between the dominant and subordinate classes, the nature of such a contradiction should not be dogmatically interpreted as a class struggle. Lefebvre (1976[1973], p.63) argued that there are two aspects of such contradiction, with the social aspect concerning class relations (bourgeoisie-proletariat), and the political aspect concerning the relations between the state and individuals (governing-governed). By occupying and producing space, the state sustains economic expansion without intensifying the contradictions between the governing and the governed. In a bureaucratic society with controlled consumption, urbanism as a way of life has also deceived the working class.
Therefore, the relations of production can be reproduced and capitalism has survived through the production of space.

However, Lefebvre maintained that urbanisation has also produced a new crisis in modern society, i.e. the urban problematic. As discussed in an earlier section, Lefebvre argued that the history of space is the increasing level of urbanisation. Along the axis of the history of space, he used the terms ‘abstract space’ and ‘absolute space’ to designate both extremes, where abstract space means nature and community life in rural areas, and absolute space means built environment and urban culture in urban areas (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], pp.15-16). In Figure 2.3, I have presented Lefebvre’s axis, by combining the periodisation of the history of the city and the spatial triad. The vertical axis is about the temporal dimension, while the horizontal axis represents the spatial dimension. The longitudinal dissection along the vertical axis represents the social space of that specific mode of production. In Chapter Three, I further discuss the importance of both the temporal and spatial dimensions of space in Lefebvre’s social-historical studies. This diagram will also be revised in Chapter Four, when the urbanisation history of Shanghai is periodised.
Urbanisation can be seen as a process of spatial transformation from an absolute space to an abstract space. When urbanisation has reached 100%, the city enters the phase of a ‘critical zone’ that Lefebvre foresaw as a time when urban revolution would occur (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], pp.5, 16-17). According to orthodox Marxists, revolutions are the outcome of class struggle. Although Lefebvre agreed that the dominant class and subordinate class are in a contradictory position, for him the underpinning of the contradiction is spatial. By producing new space (e.g., the creation of new space in rural areas) and occupying space (e.g., urban renewal in urban areas), urbanisation results in the marginalisation of the working class from the
city centre to the periphery. Class contradiction is therefore converted into the contradiction in space within the city. Lefebvre used the term urban phenomenon to emphasize that urbanisation itself, rather than industrialisation, is the key problematic of modern society (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.89).

Urbanisation is a process involving a move from absolute space to abstract space. Nevertheless, Lefebvre (1991[1974], pp.352-354) observed that the state and its technocrats also produced the space that is seemingly natural and communal. For instance, holiday resorts were developed in the countryside for city-dwellers to relax and enjoy the natural environment and old buildings in the city were revitalised for showcasing the history of the city and communal value, under the facilitation of the state (e.g., by constructing roads and providing funding for revitalisation). Lefebvre argued that these measures are not the production of abstract space, but imitations of nature that should be regarded as part of the process of urbanisation (i.e. not a process of rewinding abstract space to absolute space). For instance, in France in the 1960s villages were commercialised to become tourist spots only for enjoyment and old buildings were revitalised, not truly for the preservation of history and improving the quality of life of the community, but for a social space of nostalgia and gentrification. The purpose of the state in facilitating the production of such space is to ideologically transform both the middles class (e.g., by providing them with an easily-accessible resort) and the working class (e.g., by creating false needs for those leisure activities). The space of consumption has become the consumption of space (ibid, pp.352-353)

As gentrification increases the cost of living, the poor are pushed out from the city centre to the periphery (e.g., newly-developed areas on the outskirt of the city).
as the space for the working class in the city centre may be commodified for other uses (e.g., to demolish old buildings in poorer districts for new property development), they may be relocated to new towns. The working class becomes spatially excluded from the city centre. Urban revolution therefore is about the struggle for reclaiming centrality (Merrifield, 2002, p.85). Lefebvre described this urban revolution in the following terms.

I refer to the transformations that affect contemporary society, ranging from the period when questions of growth and industrialisation predominate (models, plans, programs) to the period when the urban problematic becomes predominant, when the search for solutions and modalities unique to urban society are foremost. (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.5)

In other words, class-based Marxist theory is no longer directly applicable to understand modern society. As Harvey noted with ‘Lefebvre’s vision’, the ‘revolutionary working class is not always the factory working class, but also urban’ (2012, p.xiii).

### 2.2.4 Moments and the Right to the City

In modern society, everyday life has become the modality of the capitalist mode of production, as well as a way of managing society. By controlling social time and social space, a ‘repetitive way of life’ has been produced to serve as the basis for exploitation and domination (Lefebvre, 1988, p80). However, Lefebvre argued that everyday life is ‘a primal arena for meaningful social change’ (Merrifield, 2006, p.10). For Lefebvre, the antithesis of ‘alienated man’ is ‘total man’, which he borrowed from Marx’s *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscript* (Merrifield, 2002, p.78; Poster,
The concept of total man was originally introduced in *Dialectical Materialism*, which means a man who ‘appropriates his integral essence in an integral way’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.173).

In the second volume of *Critique of Everyday Life*, Lefebvre discussed the theory of moment, which he proposed earlier in *La Somme et le Reste* (Merrifield, 2006, p.27). The moment is ‘the attempt to achieve the total realisation of a possibility’ (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.348 cited Merrifield, 2006, p.27). In order to become a total man, Lefebvre argued that there needs to be a break with everyday life:

> A break with the everyday by means of festival – violent or peaceful – cannot endure. In order to change life, society, space, architecture, even the city must change. (Lefebvre, 1987, p.11)

Lefebvre’s discussion of the transformative moment is particularly related to his discussion of urban revolution. More specifically, he applied the ideas of moments in examining the upheavals of the Paris Commune in 1871 and the student movement in 1968 (1971[1968], p.36). He argued that both upheavals were urban in nature. Lefebvre examined the Paris Commune in his book *La Proclamation de la Commune* (1965). In the 1860s, working class Parisians moved away from the city centre to the outskirts of the city because of the relocation of the factories. Haussmann’s plan of rebuilding Paris also replaced the working class by the middle class through urban renewal projects. The cost of living in the city centre also increased rapidly to an unaffordable level. While the Paris Commune was concerned with occupying space in the city centre, the upheaval of May 1968 was concerned with producing new space at
the periphery of the city. In the 1960s, some Parisian students moved to the new towns in areas just outside the city, such as Nanterre. Buildings were built with an emphasis on their function as a production site, so the isolated landscape produced an alienated habitat and a sense of being segregated from the city.

In *The Explosion: Marxism and the French Revolution*, Lefebvre argued that the ‘foremost cause’ of May 1968 was urban (1969[1968]). In short, Lefebvre’s major argument is that ‘the marginalised seek to reclaim the centre’ (Elden, 2006, p.193). Both upheavals are urban in nature but not class-based. The subordinate classes were spatially marginalised from the centre to the periphery of the city. The primary objective of the insurrections was to ‘re-conquest the city’ (1971[1968], p.76) but not against capitalism. Lefebvre referred to it as an ‘implosion-explosion’ (1996[1968], p.71), which means ‘the tremendous concentration (of people, activities, wealth, goods …) of urban reality and the immense explosion … (peripheries, suburbs, vacation homes, satellite towns) into space’ (2003[1970], p.14).

Lefebvre maintained that there are four kinds of central-periphery relations in urban society, which are: underdeveloped countries (especially the ex-colonial ones, the world proletariat), regions (which are distant from the centres within capitalist countries), urban peripheries (the inhabitants of suburbs), as well as social and political peripheries (e.g., youth, women, homosexuals) (1976[1973], pp.115-116). They occupy marginal positions in urban society. Therefore, in his book *Le droit à la ville* (1968; *The Right to the City*)11, Lefebvre advocated ‘the right to the city’ that each member of society should have equal rights in accessing and participating in the

---

10 For a lengthy record of Lefebvre’s involvement in May 1968, see Trebitsch (2005).
11 The English version of *Le droit à la ville* can be found in *Writings on Cities* (eds. Kofman and Lebas, 1996, pp.63-181)
planning of spatial arrangements in the city:

In the face of this pseudo-right, the right to the city is like a cry and demand. This right slowly meanders through the surprising detours of nostalgia and tourism, the return to the heart of the traditional city, and the call of existent or recently developed centralities … … The right to the city cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life. (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.158; original emphasis)

As well as reclaiming centrality, the right to the city is also about bringing a change to everyday life. Harvey argued that Lefebvre’s vision of the right to the city was ‘a response to the existential pain of a withering crisis of everyday life in the city’ (Harvey, 2012, p.x). However, the revolutionary spirit of the working class was obscured by the individualist mode of consumption. Even though young people revolted against the programming of everyday life by an urban revolution, Lefebvre admitted that ‘the ideology of consumption was not altogether ineffective’ (1969[1968], p.12). Only a break with everyday life can bring about changes in the reproduction of social relations. In The Production of Space, Lefebvre emphasized that his project of postulating a ‘unitary theory of space’ (1991[1974], p.11) is an examination of the reproduction of the relations of production in modern society:

Our chief concern is with space. The problematic of space, which subsumes the problems of the urban sphere (the city and its extensions) and of everyday life (programmed consumption), has displaced the problematic of industrialization. It has not, however, destroyed that earlier set of problems: the social relationships that obtained previously still obtain; the new problem is, precisely, the problem of their reproduction. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.89; original emphasis)

Lefebvre envisioned a future in which urban society should develop ‘differential
space’; a space that respects difference, so contradictions could be held together in the city (1991[1974], pp.302-303). In order to change the reproduction of the relations of production, Lefebvre proposed autogestion (self-management) as an alternative (1976[1973], p.120; 1969[1968], pp.84-87). Autogestion is also an organisational principle by which people can reclaim the means of production and participate in management, which can be viewed as a critique of the dominance of the state (2009, pp.146-147). When commenting on the possibility of autogestion, Lefebvre made a brief comment that ‘[t]he Chinese model of commune – in spite of vast differences – exhibits the same orientation’ (1969[1968], p.100). In Chapter Four, I will briefly comment on China’s experience of collectivisation during the 1950s.

2.3 The Spatial Turn and Critique

As argued above, Lefebvre’s theory of space should be interpreted together with his theory of the everyday. Both theories shared the same objective of supplementing Marxist analysis in understanding the nature of capitalism in the modern world. However, Lefebvre’s work has received different responses in different places and during different periods (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.764). His ideas are still not well understood even today. Generally speaking, the French reading of Lefebvre is more Marxist and philosophical (Elden, 2006, pp.195-198). His ‘cry and demand’ for the right to the city also brought about an impact on the French government during the Mitterrand years (Gilbert and Dikeç, 2008, p.250; Trebitsch, 2005, p.xxi). However, his ‘paradoxical reunion with a declining PCF’ in 1980s has been accompanied by the suggestion that ‘the Communist Press was virtually the only one to attend to Lefebvre’ in France (Trebitsch, 2005, pp.xxiii-xxiv). Lefebvre’s discussion on space was
generally ignored in Germany until recent years (Ronneberger, 2008, pp.142-143), but it received more favourable responses from Latin American academics.

During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Lefebvre travelled and lectured in different countries. In particular, his ideas had significant influence among Californian Marxist geographers and literary theorists (Shields, 1999, p.143). Before the ‘spatial turn’, social theories mainly emphasised the temporal dimension (Martin and Miller, 2003, p.147). In the English-speaking world, Lefebvre was primarily engaged in discussion of space, postmodernity and urbanisation (Kipfer, Goonewardena, Schmid, et al., 2008, p.3), mainly among geographers, urbanists and architects (Trebitsch, 2005, p.xxi). For instance, Edward Soja reinvented Lefebvre’s spatial triad to postulate the concept of ‘third space’ (1996, pp.35-48). Neil Smith criticised the insufficiency of Lefebvre’s work in understanding the influence of scale in the production of space, and developed a theory of uneven development (Kipfer, Goonewardena, Schmid, et al., 2008, p.7). David Harvey is perhaps the most important social theorist in promoting and engaging with Lefebvre’s ideas. Hence, in this section, I will briefly discuss Harvey’s theorisation of urban experience under global capitalism, followed by Manuel Castells’ critique.

2.3.1 The Spatial Turn

Like Lefebvre, Harvey insisted that the city is central to the study of modern society and criticised the over-emphasis on the time dimension of history, arguing that the spatial dimension should be introduced to Marxist theory. He maintained that the accumulation of capital is location specific. After capital has been initially
accumulated, the state enforces institutional arrangements (law, contract, private property and individual juridical rights) so the capitalist system can be reaffirmed (Harvey, 1989, pp.273-297). Capitalist activities and technological change are then seen as favourable and inevitable, and growth is sustainable by exploitation of labour. However, the capitalist system is intrinsically contradictory (though class struggle is not presently threatening), and a crisis of over-accumulation will occur and lead to a ‘temporal shift’ (e.g., large scale public work) (Harvey, 1982, p.393) or a ‘spatial fix’ (exporting capital and labour surplus to more profitable space) (ibid, p.415). As technology itself cannot guarantee sustainable profit (because of the possibility of being copied and surpassed), capitalists transfer their capital to advantageous places (coercive law of spatial competition), and this process of ‘annihilating space’ is speeded up by technology. However, the built environment (infrastructure) which connects both the state and capitalist enterprises to key sites is immobile. Various kinds of capital are then concentrated in these key sites to rule out competitors by monopoly, so ‘global cities’ are formed and uneven distribution development results.

Although Harvey appreciated that Lefebvre is ‘the most persistent in … incorporating a spatial dimension into Marxian thought’ (Harvey, 1982, p.337), he criticised Lefebvre’s discussion of urbanism as ‘general’ and ‘incomplete’ (Harvey, 1973, p.303). He argued that the process of urbanisation remains incomplete after incorporating rural areas into urban areas. He maintained that Lefebvre ignored the importance of the ‘rural problem in city’ (1973, p.307), particularly the problem of urban poverty resulting from the migration of rural Black and Appalachian Whites to inner cities. Harvey also provided a more detailed analysis of urban experience under post-Fordist production. In the late 1970s, Lefebvre published De l'État to illustrate
the state’s new role in facilitating economic activities. Although this series of books represents an initial account of the dismantling of the Fordist regime in France during the 1970s, it does little to articulate the global factors involved in this transformation and the impact on people’s experience in the city (Brenner, 2001, p.798). Such a ‘sea change’ from Fordism was picked up by Harvey (1989, p.vii). He argued that ‘spatial rigidity’ was created under a Fordism-Keynesian ideology. He suggested that such a spatial barrier is overcome by technological advancement (e.g., communication and transport technology).

Harvey’s theory helps us to understand the dialectics of capitalism from a global perspective (1989; 1982; 1973). However, he proclaimed that the objective of his project is to explore a ‘middle course’ between ‘spatial fetishism’ and space as a ‘mere reflection of the processes of accumulation and class reproduction’ (Harvey, 1982, p.374 cited Elden, 2004c, p.142). He emphasised that urban experience is constructed by the spatial and temporal dimension of capital accumulation and social reproduction; summed up by the term ‘space-time compression’ (Shields, 1999, p.143). In the Post-Fordist economy, the increased mobility and internationalisation of capital (e.g., a global financial system) leads to the ‘compression of time and space’: geographical boundaries are swept away and the sense of time is speeded up (Harvey, 1989, p.240). Individuals then experience the postmodern feeling of ‘placelessness’.

In *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1989), Harvey further elucidated how social space and individuals’ urban experiences are affected by the circulation and accumulation of capital under post-Fordism. By rewriting Lefebvre’s spatial triad with his own ideas about ‘accessibility and distanciation’, ‘appropriation and use of space’,
‘domination and control of space’ and ‘production of space’, Harvey attempted to formulate a more complicated ‘spatial grid’ to theorise individual experience in social space (1989, pp.218-222).

### 2.3.2 A Critique

In the 1970s, ‘only he [Lefebvre] has broken the silence in Marxism about the city’ (Katznelson, 1992, p.93). But Lefebvre’s Marxist analysis of space has only received limited attention, even from Marxists. The first reason is Lefebvre’s marginal position in the French intellectual circle in 1970s, as described above. Another reason is Castells’ critique, among other structuralist Marxists, of Lefebvre. The English translation of *The Urban Question* (as a direct response to Lefebvre’s theory on space) was available before that of *The Production of Space* and *The Urban Revolution*. Castells’ ‘hostile reaction’ has therefore further marginalised Lefebvre among English speakers (Kipfer, Kipfer, Goonewardena, Schmid, et al., 2008, p.6). In *The Urban Question*, Castells commented on the ‘spontaneity and lack of formalism’ of Lefebvre’s analysis (Burgel, Burgel and Dezes, 1987, p.28):

… when Lefebvre speaks of generalised urbanisation, including Cuba and China, he is quite simply ignorant of the statistical and historical data of the processes he describes, particularly in the case of China, where urban growth has been limited to the natural growth of the towns (without peasant immigration) and where, on the contrary, one is witnessing a permanent and massive shift towards the countryside, reinforced by the constitution of the people’s communes, as forms that integrate town and country. Although the absence of information about the Chinese, Cuban, Vietnamese experiences does not warrant overly affirmative conclusions, we know enough to reject once and for all the notion of the generalisation of the urban as the only form, characteristic both of capitalism and socialism. (Castells, 1977[1972], pp.90-91)
As a former assistant of Lefebvre at Nanterre, Castells has also commented that ‘Lefebvre doesn’t know anything about how the economy works, how technology works … but he had a genius for intuiting what really was happening … he was probably the greatest philosopher on cities we have had’ (Merrifield, 2006, p.xxii). However, these critiques are only partially grounded. It is a fair evaluation that Lefebvre’s philosophical and ‘explosive’ writing style has often brought about difficulties for readers (Elden, 2004c, p.142; Smith, 2003, p.xxii). But Lefebvre did emphasise the importance of empirical studies, as well as carrying out or leading fieldwork. For instance, when working on his doctoral thesis in Campen, he carried out participant observation in the community and carefully read archives at the town hall (Merrifield, 2006, p.4). When he worked at Strasbourg and the Institute of Sociology at the University of Nanterre in the 1960s, he encouraged doctoral students to carry out empirical research for community groups or unions (Shields, 1999, p.90). He also conducted fieldwork in other places, including South America, Canada, North Africa, New York and Japan (Elden, 2006, p.192). Alongside overlooking Lefebvre’s emphasis on empirical data, Castells also neglected Lefebvre’s idea on everyday life (Elden, 2007, p.113). Therefore, an isolated reading of The Production of Space and The Urban Revolution will inevitably lead to ignorance of Lefebvre’s endeavour in postulating a theoretical-empirical examination of space and its relationship to everyday experience. My thesis represents a response to the criticism, insofar as it maps the impact of local spatial reorganisation as the experience of everyday life. In the next chapter, I further discuss the importance of empirical studies in Lefebvre’s theorisation of space.
During an interview, Lefebvre commented that his interest in space emerged not as an academic concern (‘neither from the point of view of philosophy, nor sociology’), but due to the observation of ‘the emergence of a new social and political practice’ (Burgel, Burgel and Dezes, 1987, p.28). Since the Reform in 1978, China has witnessed significant changes in the urban landscape. Before that, China underwent a period of industrialisation by collectivising the means of production. Individuals in urban areas were organised to work, socialise and participate in political activities through the *danwei* (work unit). Since the liberalisation of the economy, urban landscapes, organisation of social life, economic structure, urban culture and individual lifestyles have changed drastically. Several questions emerge here. Are there any new ‘social and political practices’ in China? What major changes has urbanisation brought about? When examining urbanisation, what are the concerns among academics? In this section, I briefly introduce the background to the changes in urban China after the Reform, as well as some key trends of theorising urbanisation.

### 2.4.1 The Great Urban Transformation

The Reform in 1978, or the Open Door Policy, is often regarded as the most important event in China’s development since 1949. It indicated the ending of socialist idealism and egalitarianism: centrally-planned socialism has been transformed into a market-led ‘Chinese socialism’ with capitalistic features. Before the Reform, China

---

12 The Reform was announced in The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the
adopted the former Soviet Union model of industrial production; government-led industrial production was emphasised from the 1950s to the Reform in 1978. In order to increase efficiency and social control, private ownership was eradicated, work was collectivised and individuals were organised centrally by the danwei to work in urban areas (Lü and Perry, 1997, p.10). As I discuss in Chapter Four, alongside serving as the unit of production, administrative, political and social functions were also performed. Individuals in urban areas were organised by the danwei through the allocation of public housing (Lü and Perry, 1997, p.14). Political campaigns and social activities were carried out and upward social mobility was almost only possible in the danwei as the labour market was basically absent (Bian, 1994, p.51). Social stratification was also kept at a minimal level. The gradual breakdown of the danwei brought about significant difference in the daily life of individuals (Logan and Fainstein, 2008, pp.11-12), the nature of which is explored in Chapter Four.

Rather than adopting the shock therapy approach practised by Eastern European countries, gradualism was valued by the Reform in 1978, with the nature of the reformative policies largely controlled by the party-state. At the beginning, the Reform was restricted to rural areas, then extended to urban areas along the eastern coast. Since then, the level of urbanisation has increased steadily. While the urban population only counted for 17.9% of the national total in 1978 (Zhang, 2007, p.5), it

---

Communist Party of China, in which the Committee holds the highest power in the country, in December 1978 to rebuild the economy through the permission of individual ownership and foreign investment. Earlier in March in the same year the goal of 'Four Modernisations' (modernisation in agriculture, industry, science and national defence) was also been integrated into the revised Constitution of the PRC at the Fifth National People’s Congress (NPC) for national advancement (Spence, 1999, p.643). Political struggle and socialist idealism during the devastating ‘Cultural Revolution’ were replaced by pragmatism (Fan, 1997, p.622).

13 It is generally argued that the danwei was either adopted from the Soviet Union industrial production model or was a continuation of the baojia household registration system originating in imperial China (Lü and Perry, 1997, p.4). Most scholars believe that the CPC adopted the danwei system in the pre-Liberation period in 1950s (Warner and Zhu, 2000, p.18). For further discussion on the historical origin of the danwei, see Lü (1997), Perry (1997) and Yeh (1997).
has increased to 51.3% by 2011 (Rong and Zhang, 2012). Urbanisation is also one of the major driving forces of economic development since the 1980s. Economic activities in urban areas have accounted for 31% of GDP and 65% of FDI (Yu, 2005, p.23). Today, urban areas still contribute to more than 60% of GDP and 85% of GDP growth (The World Bank, 2013).

2.4.2 Theorising Urban Transformation

The theorisation of the current wave of urbanisation is not an easy task. Though China is experiencing the largest scale of urbanisation in human history, uneven development between regions has complicated academic research (Ma and Wu, 2005, pp.20-21). The speed of continuous changes has also made many local scholars hesitate to propose a comprehensive theoretical framework. When the economy was moving from a Maoist redistributive model to an uneven development one, local scholars tended to take a reserved stance in critiquing the policy change (Fan, 1997, pp.620-621). As such, overseas Chinese and foreign scholars have, arguably, paid a relatively greater effort to the theorisation of the Chinese experience of urbanisation (Ma, 2006, p.372). Some scholars have paid more attention to the influence of globalisation on the urbanisation of Chinese cities, especially after the entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001, by mainly referencing Saskia Sassen’s thesis on global city (Friedmann, 2005, p.xvi). Others have focused on the role of the state in the uneven development across the country and within the city, such as the dual role of the state (being regulator and participant of the market economy), dual track urbanisation resulting from the presence and absence of the state (Shen, 2006, p.498), as well as the outcome of institutional change (Quan, 2006, p.328). The effect of
regional competition and cooperation (Yu, 2005, p.33) and rural-urban dynamics have also attracted the attention of some scholars (Hung, 2009, p.6).

Various social implications have resulted from urbanisation (Chen and Sun, 2006, p.520). With the decline of the danwei, urban inhabitants’ social life is no longer organised by the government. Together with the emergence of the property market, people have greater freedom in choosing where they live. During this process, the commodification of land has further caused housing differentiation; people from different sectors of society are scattered into different districts. Social stratification has become significant in the city, a new middle class has emerged, and rural migrants face inequalities. Sociologists are also interested in understanding the relative role of the state and the market and the importance of social networks.

As a non-Western post-socialist developing nation state, several theoretical approaches could readily be and have been applied by different scholars to understand China’s urban transformation (Logan and Fainstein, 2008, p.2). A first approach is ‘modernisation’ theory that has been argued mainly by Western researchers. This presumes that urbanisation is one of the facets of modernisation, and predicts that urbanisation in developing countries will copy the ‘modern practices’ of western cities upon the creation of the market economy. Urbanisation is also expected to fuel industrialisation. This approach is similar to the neoliberal view of uneven development distribution when post-Fordist capitalism dominated during the Dengist era (Fan, 1997, p.633). Such conservative views about the general benefits of the free market have been challenged in the post-Deng period. Research showed that respondents became increasingly dissatisfied with the outcome and pace of the
Reform from the late 1980s to the late 1990s (Tang, 2001, pp.906-907).

A second approach, the dependency and world system theory, can be seen as a critique of ‘modernisation’ theory (Logan and Fainstein, 2008, p.4). It addressed the issue that urbanisation could not resolve social problems, such as unemployment in many developing countries, through industrialisation. Moreover ‘over-urbanisation’ has been observed in some Third World cities, and it is argued that this might occur in China. The peripheral position of developing countries in the world market and the state’s inability to change this situation are presented as the primary causes of urban degradation.

A third approach references the success of newly-industrialising countries in East Asia. Developmentalist state theorists (Logan and Fainstein, 2008, pp.13-15) argue that the state has taken a facilitative role to speed up economic development by measures, such as rapid land reform. As previously discussed, there are a number of studies addressing the role of the state, and some will be discussed and evaluated in greater depth in later chapters.

A final approach is the political economy perspective (Logan and Fainstein, 2008, pp.20-23). This theory focuses on the impact to social structure of the institutional changes from socialism to capitalism by referencing the experience of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries (e.g., French and Hamilton, 1979, pp.9-12). Yet, post-socialist countries are not perfectly comparable, because China’s economic reform took place gradually (not through shock therapy) and without a fundamental alteration in the political system (Wu and Ma, 2005, p.246).
2.5 Conclusion: A Lefebvrian Analysis of Chinese Urbanisation

Urban China is undergoing a remarkable transformation; the process of urbanisation is influenced by numerous factors and has resulted in significant changes in various aspects. How are we to understand this urban phenomenon within a comprehensive theoretical framework? Is Lefebvrian analysis, as a Western theory, applicable and helpful to better understand such a complicated issue?

First, an understanding of the current mode of production in China and its influence on individuals can be reconsidered by systematically analysing the mechanism of the interactions between the elements in Lefebvre’s spatial triad. Ever since the announcement of the Reform in 1978, there has been a constant debate about the transformation of the Chinese economic system: whether it is socialism, capitalism, something in between, or a combination of both. The Reform concluded the period of a centrally-planned inward-looking economy. Urban morphology was quickly transformed by marketisation. Ma and Wu (2005, p.6) observed the creation of the space of globalisation (e.g., high-tech, financial districts and global image-enhancing projects, usually with landmarks designed by internationally known architects) and the space of elitist consumption (e.g., shopping centres, posh hotels and fancy restaurants) in the Chinese economy.

However, such policy change is gradual, largely controlled by the government, and complete marketisation is arguably not the ultimate target (Ma, 2002, p.1546). Government control over its market and participation is still salient and it can be
observed through spatial arrangements. Furthermore, the financial districts and global image-enhancing projects are usually planned or approved by the government and the active participation of the public sector is also manifested through space. For instance, in almost every Chinese city, government buildings are built in prime locations and promoted as landmarks (Hung, 2001, p.461); industrial plants are also constructed to facilitate industrialisation and the development of the property market (Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, pp.908-909). Rather than being determined by the needs of the individual city, the construction of the high-speed rail system is a national policy written in the Twelfth Five-year Plan (Ash, Porter and Summers, 2012, p.78), in which companies operating the high-speed rail system are usually state-owned.

Alongside the space of globalisation and the space of elitist consumption, Ma and Wu (2005, p.6) argue that there is also the production of the space of differentiation and marginalisation (e.g., gated communities and dilapidated migrant enclaves), which is similar to the space of illegality and irregularity (e.g., ‘urban village’, illegal buildings) as proposed by Smart and Tang (2005, p.73). The inequalities and contradictions are produced and manifested by space. Another contribution of Lefebvrian analysis is reinstating the significance of class contradictions between the dominant class and subordinate classes. Even though class struggles appear to be much less significant in modern society, contradictions that result from urbanisation can easily be identified in the social space of Chinese cities. For instance, a growing number of shopping centres have been constructed with the emergence of a middle class (Bian, 2002, pp.97-98). At the same time, ‘urban villages’ are also found in many first-tier cities, including Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, which are made invisible by being surrounding by newly-built modernist high-rise architecture. ‘Urban villages’ are the squats of mainly
internal migrants from rural areas or other provinces. They moved to urban areas amid a huge demand for workers. Under the household registration (*hukou*) system in China, people are allocated an urban or rural account (*hukou*) in accordance with their location of birth. People with a rural *hukou* will be entitled to less social welfare in urban areas, and vice versa. Therefore, internal migrants are not entitled to access a comprehensive coverage of social welfare (including education) in the city (Du and Li, 2010, p.95). In other words, inequality will be perpetuated among the next generation because of the rural-urban binary.

Since the reform, egalitarianism is no longer assumed in China and a more complicated social stratification system has emerged. The Gini Coefficient has increased from 0.33 in 1980 (Chang, 2002) to 0.474 in 2012 (Xinhua, 2013) which reflects that income inequality has widened. How can China resolve the contradictions emerging during economic development? As I discuss in Chapter Five, land commodification (i.e. the process of commodifying state-owned land for property development through the legal process) becomes an important financial resource for sustaining economic development and infrastructure development in the city. By producing new space, the economy continues to expand, and so provides legitimacy for the party-state. This is particularly significant when relocated residents use their compensation to further invest and generate profits.

However, the benefit from economic growth is unequally shared and political stability is not unchallenged. As expected by Lefebvre (1991[1974], pp.376-379), resistance also results from the process of the production of space itself. In 2011, there was a major demonstration in the village of Wukan in the Guangdong Province. The protest
was caused primarily by the unreasonable compensation offered by the local government when it sold land for property development. The protest resulted in a series of elections for local administration (Chin, 2012). Another example is the relocation of local residents in the Shanghai Expo site that is discussed in Chapters Five and Six. While sometimes the residents make use of the compensation to invest in property and the stock market, thus further fuelling economic growth, sometimes they are brutally relocated by the authorities without a satisfactory level of compensation (Laurans, 2005, p.9). When the government attempts to construct the meaning of space (representation of space), resistance will typically result from the individuals affected (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.379).

Though the state maintains a strong regulatory and participatory role in the post-Reform period, the mobilising power of the state and the linkage between the individual and the state is weakened when compared with the revolutionary era. Economic development has replaced political struggle to become the shared goal, usually through implementing national and international events and infrastructure projects. As I argue in Chapter Five, the Shanghai Expo should not only be regarded as an international expository event, but a campaign to provide a common goal for society and justify major urbanisation. The theme ‘Better City, Better Life’ has clearly demonstrated the affirmative image of urbanisation that the government has attempted to construct. However, the space conceived by the urban planner (the representation

---

14 No major political campaign similar to those in the revolutionary era has been carried in the post-Reform era. Yet, in the megacity, Chongqing, the ‘promotion of red revolutionary songs anti-mafia’ campaign (changhong dahei) was carried out in recent years. State-subsidy was provided to attract foreign direct investment for economic growth, social housing programmes were targeting for internal migrants for political stability, the local mafia was fought and ‘revolutionary songs’ were promoted for establishing a new collective ethos. Such a populist campaign for establishing government authority is referred to as ‘Chongqing Model’ (Godement, 2011, p.2). However, the ‘Chongqing experiment’ is arguably concluded with the resignation of party secretary Bo Xilai (Montlake, 2012).
of space) is different from the space lived by individuals (representational space), which is the third dimension that a Lefebvrian analysis helps in theorising the urbanisation of China.

With the increasing proportion of private housing in urban areas, and with the emergence of the labour market, the control of individuals through the *danwei* is no longer practical. The social life and social clock of individuals are reorganised so that new meanings of community and work become necessary, because working in the *danwei* no longer contributes to the revolution or political campaigns (Lü and Perry 1997, p.14). Lefebvre took a pessimistic view that everyday life in urban society is becoming banal (Shields, 1999, p.63). By briefly engaging with Lefebvre’s concept of everyday life, Duanfang Lu (2006, pp.144-151) examined the influence of the expansion of the private sector of the *danwei*. He carried out ethnographic research in Beijing and Auhui. With the breakdown of the *danwei* system, leisure time became independent from work and political participation, and new recreational activities (including dancing and doing martial arts in the garden) emerged in the city. Through observation and interviews with local residents, Lu argued that a hierarchy of leisure was established (e.g., Western-style and traditional dance were generally regarded as the leisure activities for the middle and lower classes respectively).

While new urban culture is passionately promoted, for example, by fashion magazines (Ma, 2008, pp.71-72), the government is also attempting to define the imagination of city through the planning of space. Urban renewal is the primary strategy for relocating local residents, demolishing or revitalising old buildings and constructing new images. Gentrification is usual or the residents are relocated to newly-built
properties; both resulting in the change of neighbourhood, urban landscape and living environment (He and Wu, 2007, p.186). Another important strategy is the creation of new towns, which is also noted by Lefebvre, as an important process of urbanisation in France (Lefebvre, 1971[1968], p.59). Local residents are taken from an inner district of the city (usually because of urban renewal) to a new town (usually at the margin, between urban and rural areas). The daily routine of inhabitants is reorganised after relocating from the city centre to new towns. Differing from urban renewal projects, the creation of new towns usually begins from nothing, as the existing urban landscape is destroyed. Most infrastructures (including roads, transportation, locations of hospitals, markets and shopping malls, etc.) are newly built. This means that the spatial arrangement of the new towns is almost entirely planned by the government; and new meanings of urban living constructed. Having said that, social space is not completely controlled by the state, individuals can negotiate with the new spatial arrangement and express their views on new urban living through the representational space.

As discussed above, regional difference is significant in China, and so any discussion without a specific geographical focus can only be general. The above observation will be discussed in greater detail with the specific focus on the urbanisation of Shanghai, resulting from the Shanghai Expo. In Chapter Four, the history of urbanisation in Shanghai is periodised. The contrast in different views towards the ‘modern’, urbanisation and urban culture under a different mode of production during different historical periods can serve as a useful background to understand the issues involved.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Is not dialectical materialism therefore both a science and a philosophy, a causal analysis and a world-view, a form of knowledge and an attitude to life, a becoming aware of the given world and a will to transform this world, without any one of these characteristics excluding the other?
- Henri Lefebvre (2009[1940], p.91)

Following the publication of the English version in 1991 of The Production of Space, Lefebvre’s theory on space influenced ‘an entire generation of architects and social geographers in Europe, Latin America, the US and Britain’ (Aronowitz, 2007, p.133). Lefebvre was regarded as one of the social theorists triggering the ‘spatial turn’ in social science and humanities (Allweil, 2010, p.2; Soja, 1980, pp.9-10). Nevertheless, Stanley Aronowitz, the founding editor of Social Text, argued that the ‘Anglo-American reception of Henri Lefebvre … is a classic case of mis-recognition’ (2007, p.133). Before the availability of the English version of his other works on space such as The Urban Revolution (2003[1970]) and Writings on Cities (1996), ‘the English language audience has had a very narrow view of his interests’ (Elden, 2004c, p.5). The philosophical essence of his theory of space was not meticulously reviewed and was appropriated in a non-sophisticated manner (Gottdiener, 1993, p.133). His engagement with and contribution to Marxist theory was also undervalued. Even though Lefebvre was originally better known in the English world as the interpreter of Marx as the author of Dialectical Materialism and The Sociology of Marx, it is argued that only a limited number of sociologists were able to fully appreciate Lefebvre’s interpretation of Marxism (Gottdiener, 1993, p.129).
The influence of Marx on Lefebvre is both philosophical and methodological. The Lefebvrian analysis of the city is not only a Marxist perspective scrutinising urban space, but also a Marxist approach of theorising city as a totality. As Aronowitz commented, Lefebvre ‘did not follow sociology’s methodological imperative, or what C. Wright Mills called the “abstracted empiricism” (discrete small studies with no discernable implications for social theory) that afflicts the discipline’ (2007, p.134). Lefebvrian analysis of urban space differs sharply from most work in the discipline of urban sociology in terms of his understanding of methodology. As a reaction to the immense changes in urban landscape and its impact on social lives, resulting from the Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America, urban sociology emerged in the late nineteenth century. Cities were usually negatively narrated as centres of crime, exploitation, alienation and pollution, with most early theorists emphasising human conditions in cities in contrast to rural areas (Sennett, 1969, pp.13-15). Under the influence of scientism during this period, early urban sociologists generally shared the epistemological view of natural science that human behaviours should be regarded as subjects for ‘objective’ observation, explanation, prediction and generalisation. For example, Robert E. Park, one of the key figures of the Chicago School of Sociology, argued that the patterns of social space, the movement of individuals and social practices are all the reflections of the human condition. Similar to the rules of natural science, the moral order was seen to be naturally produced in the ‘ecology’ of city. The analysis of ‘human ecology’ was seen as similar to the strategies of understanding ‘the interrelations of plants and animals’ (Park, 2005[1936], p.1). The purpose of conducting descriptive empirical studies was therefore to identify the ‘laws’ of causal relationships. Similarly, his colleague Louis Wirth also applied a positivist approach
to identify the different levels of experience and the structural factors in the city by conducting extensive studies on Jewish migrants to American cities, such as the ghettos in Chicago (Sennett, 1969, p.14).

Although Lefebvre shared empirical tools, such as participant observation and interviews, with early urban sociologists, he upheld a different view of the philosophy of social science. He critiqued positivism for being ‘suspicious of theory’:

> For positivist thought, it is irrelevant whether the findings from which it proceeds result from division or illumination, whether or not there is an ‘object’ before it. Facts are classified and specified as being part of a given science and technology. (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.63)\(^{15}\)

In order not to be constrained by any discipline, Lefebvre developed the theoretico-empirical approach, a regressive-progressive method to examine space by reinventing Marx’s dialectical materialism (Stanek, 2008c, p.75).\(^{16}\) This dialectical method was argued by Jean-Paul Sartre as ‘so clear and so rich’ that it could be applied (with modifications) ‘in all the domains of anthropology’ (1968[1963], p.52, note 8). The first objective of this chapter is, therefore, to discuss how Lefebvre applied this method to theorise and empirically examine the production of space. The methodological significance of this method as well as some previous studies of Lefebvre will also be discussed.

Another objective of this chapter is to introduce the research questions and the data

---

\(^{15}\) Despite his reservations about applying a positivist approach to examine space, Lefebvre was also involved in ‘scientific research’. For example, while working for Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale (DATAR), Lefebvre was involved in ‘scientific projects’ with descriptive results, as well as ‘accurate prediction’ (Burgel, Burgel and Dezes, 1987, p.28).

\(^{16}\) It was also translated as the ‘projective-retrojective’ method (Shields, 1998, p.132).
collection methods applied in this study. As a research with limited scale, it was not feasible to engage with every dimension of Lefebvre’s theory. Specific focuses were necessary. As explained below, by focussing on applying Lefebvre’s theory of production of space and everyday life, this thesis regards the urbanisation of Shanghai during the Shanghai Expo as a case to examine the production of space in China. The data collection method employed (secondary data analysis and semi-structured interviews), the execution process and related methodological issues including reflexivity and the role of researcher will also be addressed.

3.1 Regressive-progressive Method

The philosophy of social science is ‘the study of the logic and methods of social science’ (Little, 1995, p.704). In Dialectical Materialism, Lefebvre critiqued formal logic and reviewed Hegelian and Marxian dialectics. He rejected the application of formal logic in understanding the social world and history, because the relationship between content and form in formal logic is ‘ill-defined and debatable’ (2009[1940], p.11). He cited Hegel’s critique of formal logic that ‘the movement of thought seems to be something separate, which has nothing to do with the object being thought’ (ibid, p.9). For instance, under the transitive law in mathematics, ‘A is A. If A is B and B is C, then A is C’ (ibid, p.9). The content of the object of observation (A, B and C), could be separated from the form (transitivity). The positivist approach to investigating ‘social laws’ overlooks the content (i.e. social reality). Therefore, a method in social research needs to address the concern of how to unify the form and

17 Dialectical Materialism is regarded as ‘a thinking radical’s assault on the “official” party Marxism of the day’ (Merrifield, 2002, p.78), which received heavy criticism from the PCF. Lefebvre originally planned to publish eight more books on it, but only Logique formelle, logique dialectique was published in 1947 with the censorship of PCF (Elden, 2004c, p.28; Kipfer, 2009, p.xxvi).
content (ibid, p.12). With space situated at the centre of the investigation, Lefebvre postulated the regressive-progressive method to answer this question.

3.1.1 Space as Concrete Abstraction

Although Lefebvre argued that dialectical materialism should replace formal logic in explaining social reality, a dogmatic reading was rejected. He emphasised that Marx’s understanding of dialectical materialism ‘is not an economism’, but ‘analyses relations and then reintegrates them into the total movement’ (2009[1940], p.73). The social relations of production were investigated through space in his socio-spatial dialectics. As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.162) argued that every mode of production would produce a particular kind of spatial arrangement, because space is (re)constructed by the state and the dominant class to facilitate the development of that particular mode of production. The everyday life of the individuals (or the subordinate class as a collective) would be shaped by the mode of production and be narrated. During the process of urbanisation, the interactions between the dominant class and subordinate class (re)constructed and (re)defined new (social) space. Therefore, urban space is produced by the material and socio-political, as well as cultural and quotidian practices (Stanek, 2008c, p.76). In Marxist terms, space is a concrete abstraction. Space is concrete because it is the product of social relations; space is also abstract because it is a manifestation of social relations (Gottdiener, 1993, p.130; Stanek, 2003c, p.76).

In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre further argued that space can be divided three levels: Level G, which means ‘global logic and political strategy of space’; Level M
represents the ‘mixed, middle, mediator’; and Level P represents the personal level
space-time diagram (i.e. Figure 2.3) can be redrawn as shown below:

![Figure 3.1: Space-time diagram](source: Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.100)

Urban space lies in the intermediate level of the spatial axis, which connects ‘the large
social order’ at Level G and ‘the contradictory level of everyday life’ at Level P
(Kipfer, Saberi, and Wieditz, 2012, p.119). Therefore, by conducting an empirical
study on space, the everyday life of the individuals and the political economy can also
be identified. The (re)production of the social relations can also be explained.
3.1.2 Regressive-progressive Method as a Social-historical Method

Although Lefebvre is better known for his analysis of urban space, the regressive-progressive method was formulated when he conducted fieldwork in France’s rural area in the 1950s. In the article ‘Perspectives on Rural Sociology’, he criticised rural sociology as a discipline that failed to methodologically relate social reality to history (2003[1953], pp.114-115). He argued that, the history of villages and rural inhabitants’ ways of life should be evaluated more comprehensively to understand the present and envisage the future of the peasant community (Stanek, 2008b, p.53). Lefebvre maintained that the regressive-progressive method enabled sociologists to explain such a historical change in a holistic approach through the observation and analysis of social reality, as well as to engage sociological study with other relevant disciplines. This ‘simple method’ (Lefebvre, 2003[1953], p.116) is composed of the following three moments:

*Descriptive*: Observation, but with an eye informed by experience and a general theory. In the foreground: participant observation of the field. Careful use of survey techniques (interviews, questionnaires, statistics).

*Analytico-regressive*: Analysis of reality as described. Attempt to give it a precise date (so as not to be limited to an account turning on undated ‘archaisms’ that are not compared with one another).

*Historico-genetic*: Studies of changes in this or that previously dated structure, by further (internal or external) development and by its subordination to overall structures. Attempt to reach a genetic classification of formations and structures, in the framework of the overall structure. Thus an attempt to return to the contemporary as previously described, in order to rediscover the present, but elucidated, understood: explained. (Lefebvre, 1953[2003], p.116)

---

18 In the house journal of *Centre National de la recherche Scientifique*, Lefebvre further argued that the historical investigation of rural space is even more important than in urban space. The reason is that ‘the history can remain much more hidden’ in rural space but ‘persists and acts in the present moment’ (Elden, 2004c, p.135).
Lefebvre claimed that the regressive-progressive method is ‘indispensable for research on space’ (Stanek, 2008c, p.159), in which its significance was highly appreciated by Sartre. In his book *Search for a Method*, Sartre commented that Lefebvre ‘has provided a simple and faultless method for integrating sociology and history in the perspective of a materialist dialectic’ (1968[1963], p.51, note 8). He particularly appreciated Lefebvre’s suggestion of researching social space by horizontal and vertical complexities.¹⁹

Horizontal complexity was regarded by Lefebvre as the formation of a particular mode of production and social structure during ‘the same historical date’, particularly ‘those determined by large-scale contemporary social and political phenomena’ (2003[1953], p.112). By using sharecropping as an example, Lefebvre argued that a sociological study should begin with identifying a village community as the focal point of investigation. The communal life of the inhabitants could be surveyed through different data collection techniques such as interview and observation (‘descriptive moment’). Lefebvre particularly argued that a questionnaire survey itself is insufficient to describe the habitat in urban space, but other details such as ‘houses, moveable immovable property, clothing, faces and behaviour’ should be included (Lefebvre, 2003[1966], p.128). Alongside rural regions such as the Pyrenees, Lefebvre also applied the regressive-progressive method to investigate urban areas including Mourenx, a new industrial town in southern France. In his article *La Revue Française de Sociologie* (1960), Lefebvre described the everyday life of the

---

¹⁹ As noted by Elden (2004c, p.136), Lefebvre originally argued that the principal stages of investigation involve ‘problems of origin’, ‘problems of filiation, succession, sociological causation’, and ‘historical problems: the interaction of forms’. But such an idea was not further developed.
inhabitants of Mourenx, with reference to the data collected through interviews and participant observation (Stanek, 2008c, pp.66-67). The purpose of conducting a sociological study is therefore to understand the ‘conditions’ of the whole community, including social structure, agricultural/industrial productivity and population movement at ‘the same historical date’ (Lefebvre, 2003[1966], p.128).

Alongside horizontal complexity, that enabled a researcher to understand the ‘conditions’ of the community at the present time, Lefebvre also emphasised the importance of the temporal dimension of space, i.e. vertical complexity. As discussed in the last chapter, Lefebvre argued that new space is produced upon the existing space. So, there are ‘sociological fossils’ that ‘differ in age and date but which coexist’ (2003[1966], p.113). Lefebvre did not clearly define the meaning of ‘sociological fossils’, but the following comments demonstrate how ‘sociological fossils’ could be read at Navarrenx, a historical town next to Lefebvre’s hometown (Hagetmau) (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.391 note 1):

In Navarrenx, where ‘I know every stone’. In these stones I can read the centuries, rather as botanists can tell the age of a tree by the number of rings in its truck … History and civilization in a seashell, this town embodies the forms and actions of a thousand-year-old community which was itself part of a wider society and culture, ever more distant from us as the years pass by. This community has shaped its shell, building and rebuilding it, modifying it again and again according to its needs. Look closely, and within every house you will see the slow, mucous trace of this animal which transforms the chalk in the soil around it into something delicate and structured: a family. (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.116)

By examining these ‘sociological fossils’, the researcher could analyse how previous

---

20 For example, Lefebvre conducted a study in Lacq-Mourenx in the Pyrenees in 1959 (Entrikin and Berdoulay, 2005, p.133; Stanek, 2008b, p.66).
mode(s) of production were preserved and still exert influence on the spatial arrangement and urban experience at the present time (Stanek, 2008c, p.113) (‘analytico-regressive’). In other words, the regressive-progressive method is a social-historical method that balances historical and sociological studies:

… in order to elucidate modern industrial society, the analysis must go back to older societies. These it determines in their relation to the concrete totality as given today, inasmuch as they are original totalities that have been transcended, that is in the only historical reality that we can conceive of or determine. In the past this analysis finds, under specific forms, certain relations (such as that between Master and Slave for example, which Marx called ‘the exploitation of man by man’) or else typical modes of thought or social existence, such as Fetishism. Dialectical materialism's field cannot therefore be restricted to the present day; it extends over the whole of sociology. (Lefebvre, 2009[1940], p.94)

After description, observation and analysis, the final movement of the regressive-progressive method (‘historico-genetic’) concerns explanation. For instance, Lefebvre argued that the history of a village is the history of changing modes of production: from slave and feudal modes of production, to the agricultural revolution, then capitalism and finally the industrialisation of agriculture. The periodisation of the history of space by modes of production provides the researcher with a more comprehensive historical background to elucidate the economic structure and everyday life of the present (2003[1970], p.113). As the purpose of applying the regressive-progressive method is to decipher the dialectical movement of the changing modes of production, Lefebvre did not follow ‘abstracted empiricism’ but embraced different techniques of data collection. ‘Sociological fossils’, for instance, are collected from various sources, including folklore, mythology or literature (Elden, 2004c, p.137). By intertwining, intersecting and interacting between vertical and
horizontal complexities, the regressive-progressive method provides a general methodological framework to situate sociology within relevant fields and disciplines, including human geography, political economy and statistics (Lefebvre, 2003[1953], p.113).

3.2 Research Questions and Methodology

Lefebvre was primarily concerned with identifying the dialectical relationship between the mode of production, the production and arrangement of (social) space and inhabitants’ everyday life. By critically engaging with Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space and applying the regressive-progressive method, this study examines the ‘conditions’ and ‘sociological fossils’ in urban China. The study aims to critically examine the changing mode of production in China since the ‘Chinese road to socialism’ was announced for more than 30 years. It also aims to identify how the political economic system interacts with urban inhabitants and shapes their daily life.

As indicated above, the application of the regressive-progressive method should begin with identifying a community for investigation. Shanghai during the organisation of the Shanghai Expo, is chosen as the ‘community’ in this study. With its complicated history of urbanisation and urban culture, as well as its symbolic meaning as the miracle of China’s recent economic success, Shanghai provides an ideal location for scrutinising the political economy of Chinese urbanisation and its influence on the urban experience of its inhabitants. More specifically, this study sets out to address three research questions outlined below.
3.2.1 Research Questions

Firstly, what is Shanghai’s mode of production after 30 years of reform? This question will be addressed mainly through illustrating the process of the production of space for organising the Shanghai Expo. As a city-based, as well as government-led mega event, the urban (re)development projects of the Shanghai Expo were supervised by the Central Government and executed by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government through urban planning and resource allocation. It involved the participation of the private sector with state-owned enterprises heavily involved. Through demarcating the spatial arrangement of Shanghai, this research aims at analysing the vision of experts. As the organisation of this mega-event also involved the mobilisation of individuals for urban (re)development and the participation in the event, I have taken the model of the Shanghai Expo as an ideal type to illustrate how the daily life of individuals was affected by the rearrangement of space. This also facilitates a more general examination of whether China is pursuing a capitalist, a socialist system, or a combination of both.

Secondly, what were the experiences of Shanghai’s inhabitants during the Shanghai Expo? As Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.26) asserted, mode of production defines social relations and produced social space. With the transformation of urban space in the city centre and the urbanisation of rural areas, the inhabitants’ experience and imagination were also expected to change. How does the change of spatial arrangement affect the daily routine and experience of the inhabitants? How do the inhabitants imagine a modern city life? As the negotiation between the state and individuals took place through space, the importance of locality should be emphasised in a Lefebvrian
analysis. This study will thematise the inhabitants’ experience as being shaped by the mode of production. In addressing these questions, this research may also help to evaluate the applicability of a Western theory to a non-western context.

Thirdly, the research addresses the modernisation and modernity of China. As I discuss in Chapter Seven, when the early World Expos were held in Europe in the late nineteenth century, the host countries set out to showcase their industrial achievement and national strength. The promising aspect of modernity (or modernism as referred to by Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.2) was reflected in the human inventions that were constructing a ‘modern’ lifestyle. The organisation of the World Expo was even regarded as the ‘birth of modernity’ of the country (Barth, 2008, p.33). The Chinese government also regarded the Shanghai Expo as the accomplishment of ‘a century dream of modernisation’ (Wen, 2009). Is the modernisation of China completed? How can we characterise the modernity of China today? In addressing these questions, what parameters should we reference and what dimensions should we pay attention to? These questions will be critically explored by examining the reorganisation of urban space by the state and its impact on individuals’ daily life.

3.2.2 Data Collection Methods

As Lefebvre argued, the regressive-progressive method is ‘a general framework, a conception of the overall process’ (2003[1953], p.117). This method provided a general framework for social research (e.g., three moments, vertical and horizontal complexities). The openness of the method enabled researchers to employ different data collection techniques and appropriate theories to describe and explain the object
of investigation. In this study, several data collection methods were applied to address the above research questions within a Lefebvrian theoretical framework. This section discusses the data collection methods employed in the study and the methodological concerns of each method, while the execution process is addressed in the following sections.

As indicated above, the regressive-progressive method begins with the selection of a community for investigation. In this study, Shanghai, during the organisation of the Shanghai Expo, was chosen as that focal point for two main reasons. First, Shanghai was regarded by the Chinese government as the showroom of the Reform. An examination of the social life and spatial arrangement (i.e. horizontal complexity) helps evaluate the ‘conditions’ of community in the ‘model city’ of China. The second reason is the urbanisation history of Shanghai (i.e. vertical complexity). As I discuss in Chapter Four, although Shanghai has a shorter history than the country, it was where Western modernity was introduced to China (Bergère, 2009, pp.4-5). Modern urban infrastructure facilities, a capitalist economic system, new philosophical thought and lifestyle, etc. were firstly introduced to and/or promoted through Shanghai (e.g., Lee, 1999b, p.38). Together with the obliteration of urbanism during the socialist construction period and market liberalisation in recent decades, its rich history of urbanisation provided a perfect site in understanding how different modes of production influenced China.

There are horizontal and vertical complexities in Lefebvre’s typology of space. In order to provide accurate descriptions of both complexities, the following data collection techniques were applied, as set out below:
1. By focusing on the Shanghai Expo, secondary data including economic data, financial reports, regulations and the political system were referenced to depict the mode of production in Shanghai (mainly discussed in Chapter Five).

2. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with the inhabitants of Shanghai to collect data on their daily practices, experience, perception and imagination about the urbanisation of Shanghai (mainly discussed in Chapter Six).

3. Concerning vertical complexity, the urbanisation history of Shanghai was periodised by applying Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space to provide a historical backdrop, in order to examine how the ‘sociological fossils’ exerted influences on the production of space in Shanghai. A literature review on socio-historical studies of Shanghai was conducted (mainly discussed in Chapter Four).

Alongside the methods mentioned above, whenever appropriate, ‘sociological fossils’ from other sources were also gathered in a less systemic manner. Since a pragmatic principle was upheld during the construction period under the Socialist regime, urban space was not reconstructed as massively as the Soviet Union. There is therefore a ‘thick layer of presocialist legacy’ in Chinese cities (Wu, 2002, p.1594). In terms of physical space, ‘sociological fossils’ were not difficult to be spotted for investigation. In Chapter Five, I discuss how spatial practice can be characterised by these built forms of the Republican and the socialist period.
Since the 1990s, there has been a wave of ‘Shanghai nostalgia’, with the history of Shanghai referenced to re-imagine history and narrate a new discourse among intellectuals (Zhang, 2002, p.148). These studies provide a wide range of sources to examine how ‘sociological fossils’ exert influence on the present. For instance, in Chapter Four, when periodising Shanghai’s history, novels about Shanghai and old travel guidebooks, etc. were also referenced.

3.3 Methodological Issues and the Executive Process

When commenting on Lefebvre’s regressive-progressive method, Sartre argued that the horizontal and vertical complexities of space ‘react upon one another’ helping empirically to evaluate space in a comprehensive manner (1968[1963], p.52). The openness of the regressive-progressive method provides a general framework to relate content and form in social research. Nevertheless, the regressive-progressive method does not address the methodological concerns of each data collection technique. Therefore, in this section, the methodological issues of the data collection method, i.e. secondary data analysis and semi-structured interview, will be evaluated. The execution process will also be introduced.

3.3.1 Secondary Data Analysis

Secondary data analysis is the further analysis, interpretation of or addition of knowledge to existing data, usually with the lack of resources to collect first-hand data as the primary drive (Hakim, 1982, p.12; Hyman, 1972, p.3). In this study, with limited time and resource, secondary data about the Shanghai Expo and the
urbanisation of Shanghai, e.g., urban (re)development projects, data about economic activities in Shanghai and demographic data were gathered to evaluate the influence of the mode of production on urban development.

In the past, the credibility of government data has raised concern when the observation or analysis within a study has been solely based on official figures. Researchers using government data have been sceptical of ‘official figures’ that might have constructed for political reasons. The reliability of data collection processes has also been of concern (Hakim, 1982, pp.22-23). In particular, under political pressure, Chinese official data has been criticised as unreliable, e.g., economic data usually seen as exaggerated to ‘maintain’ economic growth (Holz, 2005, pp.22-24; Movshuk, 2002, pp.5-8; Takahashi, 2006, pp.89-90). However, by evaluating the quality of the data of the Chinese Statistical Yearbook and the institutional structure of the data collection, it is also argued that economic figures in recent decades are generally reliable (Chow, 2010, pp.4-7). Researchers on China therefore need to be more cautious when applying and interpreting official data.

The distrust of government data can generally be avoided by clearly distinguishing the data deriving from administrative records, household surveys or other collection methods by independent agents (Hakim, 1982, pp.22-23). Alongside government data, this study also used information from other sources, such as data collected by independent researchers, etc.

3.3.2 Semi-structured Interview
As discussed above, Lefebvre regarded urban space as the intermediate level; the ‘mediating relationship to everyday life and state-bound and global social institutions’ (Kipfer, Saberi, and Wieditz, 2012, p.117). For him, the mode of production can be observed through describing the experience of inhabitants. In this study, semi-structured interviews were therefore conducted with inhabitants to understand their subjective experience of living in Shanghai (the lived space) and their views on the transformation of the city and the Shanghai Expo. As a form of ethnographic fieldwork, semi-structured interviews involved the documentation of respondents’ beliefs, meanings and practices from their own perspectives (Riemer, 2009, p.203). As an informal conversation, it enabled greater flexibility during the interviews, enabling the researcher to seek clarifications of the respondents’ accounts (Leech, 2002, pp.667-668). The application of semi-structured interviews as a data collection method enables the researcher to understand and interpret the subjective experience of individuals and allows in-depth discussions more than other data collection techniques (Fetterman, 2009, pp.1-2). In other words, the purpose of carrying out interviews in this study is not limited to describing the thoughts, practices and interpretations from the individuals’ perspectives, but, perhaps more importantly, providing a systemic and theoretical analysis of what individuals experienced, perceived and imagined. The study can also be regarded as a ‘work describing a culture’; investigating respondents’ beliefs and practices through verbal conversation and observation of non-verbal practices (Spradley, 1979, p.3).

Ethnography was first applied by anthropologists in the nineteenth century on non-Western societies, typically focussing on community life and kinship of tribal groups. It then became more widely applied to understand different social groups’
experience in urban areas. For example, the Chicago School of Sociology portrayed the patterns of social life in the city and theorised the social conditions that shaped behaviours, through conducting ethnographic fieldwork in urban areas (Hammersley and Atkinson, pp.2-5). The Birmingham School of Cultural Studies further promoted its application in areas including youth studies and gender studies (Johnson, 1986, pp.70-72). Ethnographers might have different objectives when carrying out ethnography. For example, each ethnographer might take different steps, apply different techniques or even uphold different views in terms of their theoretical position and the subjectivity of the research object, but most would agree that ethnography begins with a problem or an issue. Bronislaw Malinowski coined the term ‘foreshadowed problem’ to argue that every ethnography begins with a problem or a topic of interest, in which the problem or topic of interest can originate from theories, social issues or personal interest, etc. (Riemer, 2009, p.206). However diverse the method is, ethnography can be viewed as a critical response to the advocacy of objectivity and, in particular, the literature on the ethnographic interview from the 1980s onwards can also be viewed as a challenge over positivism (Heyl, 2001, p.372).

As discussed above, positivists argued that ‘objective’ research study should be based on observable social actions with the absolute absence of the researcher’s bias. Such objectivity could be achieved if and only if social actions could be objectively observed and the researcher maintains an objective and value free theoretical position. As the data from semi-structured interview is not ‘collected’ but ‘produced’, the key methodological concern of semi-structured interviews is hence the theoretical dualism between subjectivity and objectivity (Berg, 2001, pp.134-135). The concern cab be
summarised into two questions: are we able to collect objective data from the research subject? How can we ensure the research subject is expressing his/her true thoughts in his/her mind?

Unlike ‘social facts’ that positivism aimed to observe, the data from semi-structured interviews are ‘produced’, because there would be no ‘data’ available unless there is an intervention from the researcher. In other words, the data collected can be regarded as an outcome of the researcher’s intervention. Lefebvre argued that the researcher’s personal judgement would inevitably influence the way and the nature of data being ‘collected’:

> Every observation is an interpretation. Every observation, up to and including those that give the greatest sense of being immediate and patently obvious, in fact contains all the thought processes of the person making it. (Lefebvre and Guterman, 2003[1933], p.80)

In this study, the respondents were asked about their experience of living in Shanghai as well as their perception and imagination of the city. The role of the researcher was therefore to discover the understandings and interpretations of the actions of individuals and social structure, in which these aspects are usually not possible to be addressed by quantitative study (May, 1993, pp.191-194). Autobiographic reflection of the researcher is generally practised to address such a methodological concern, which is discussed below.

### 3.3.3 Execution Process

In this study, snowball sampling was employed for recruiting the respondents for the
semi-structured interviews. The interviewees were mainly recruited through my personal networks that were established during the fieldwork for my M.Phil. study. Interviews were conducted with 13 respondents between October 2009 and October 2010, when I made visits to Shanghai at least every two months, with each stay lasted for two days to a month. As the Shanghai Expo was held between May to October 2010, this extended fieldwork period also enabled me to observe the changes in the urban landscape before the Shanghai Expo and when it took place. Respondents included permanent residents of Shanghai, internal migrants from other provinces of China and a foreigner working and residing in Shanghai during the fieldwork period. The profiles of respondents are listed in Appendix I. Pseudo names were listed to keep the personal information of the respondents confidential.

As the interview questions might sometimes be too conceptual, vague or abstract to the interviewers (Riemer, 2009, p.206), an interview guide was prepared to aid the interviews (refer to Appendix II). Alongside demographic backgrounds, the interview questions can be categorised into the following areas, with the ‘foreshadowed problem’ about how the experience, perception and imagination of Shanghai’s inhabitants were shaped by (re)development in Shanghai in recent decades:

- Experience: daily life being shaped by the urban (re)development in Shanghai and the Shanghai Expo;
- Perception: subjective interpretations of the influence of urban (re)development in Shanghai on their daily life; and
- Imagination: the expectation of living in Shanghai and what kind(s) of changes that they imagine taking place in Shanghai.
In establishing the *Critique of Everyday Life* as a sociological project, Lefebvre outlined some ‘axioms’ for conducting sociological studies. In particular, he reminded sociologists that he/she should speak ‘the same language as the men (individuals; members of a group) he is seeking to reach and whose way of life he wishes to understand’ (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.102). As the use of language is important in understanding cultural meanings during semi-structured interviews (Leech, 2002, pp.666-667), all interviews were conducted in Mandarin; the only exception was an expatriate with whom English was our only common language. On occasions when the respondents suddenly spoke in Shanghainese (the dialect of Shanghai; the *Hu* dialect), clarifications were sought.

Concerning the interview as a data collection method, Lefebvre also noticed that usually there is ‘a period of awkwardness’ at the beginning of the conversation. He argued that:

> Beginners would like to avoid or shorten this period; they do not realise how fruitful it is. That such awkwardness cannot be avoided, that uneasiness arises almost of necessity when a living contact is established, is something which techniques of group dynamics and psychotherapeutic interviews would confirm, were confirmation needed … The interview starts with a sort of tacit challenge to the interviewee by the interviewer (to reach him, to grasp him, to know him) and to the interviewer by the interviewee (to put him off track, to elude him). (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.102)

However, Lefebvre (2002[1961], pp.102-103) immediately recognised that such an approach might become similar to a police interrogation with an accompanying psychological investment if it was not applied carefully. Rather than posting
challenges to the interviewee, I adopted James Spradley’s suggestion to begin the interview with ‘grand tour questions’ (1979, p.86). General and broad questions about their daily life and opinions of the Shanghai Expo were among the first questions I asked before deeper and more focused ones. In order to establish a rapport between the interviewees and myself, I tried to create a favourable atmosphere through introducing new elements (e.g., moving from general discussion to specific topic) slowly to prevent the loss of rapport and the interview becoming a ‘formal interrogation’ (Spradley, 1979, p.58). I hoped that such an approach lessened the differences in the power relations between myself and the interviewee, encouraging the interviewees to express themselves.

All interviews were conducted face-to-face and on an individual basis, which each lasted for between 45 and 90 minutes at the location which was convenient for the interviewees and free from disturbances. There was an exception that one interviewee exchanged ideas with me after the interview. This interviewee spent several days with me wandering around the Expo Site, during which time, we discussed his expectation and participation of the Expo and Shanghai’s changing urban landscape. When audio recording was not always possible, reflexive journals of the conservation were prepared as an alternative tool. This interviewee has been informed and agreed to include these conversations into the research. In fact, the experience of wandering around the Expo Site gave me a chance to talk more deeply with the interviewees in an informal setting, which is one of the advantages of an ethnographic study (Fetterman, 2009, pp.33-34). All interviews were audio recorded and kept confidential and anonymous. I ensured that the respondents did not experience any physical or psychological harm. Consent was sought before all interviews.
3.3.4  Autobiographical Reflexivity

In this section, I discuss how I addressed the methodological issues of the data collection method. As a member of society, a researcher’s personal background, academic training and relationship with a research subject inevitably affects how the research study is conducted as well as how the findings are presented and analysed (e.g., Alvesson and Sklöldberg, 2000, p.266; Johnson, 1975, p.112-113). Over his sixty years of an academic/writing career, Lefebvre’s thinking was in active dialogue with his experience of changing social environments (from Vichy France, post-war Europe to neo-liberalism), his affiliations (the PCF, the Situationist International), as well as during debates with other academics (e.g., on structuralism, phenomenology) (Elden, 2004c, pp.21-22). Lefebvre also noted that sometimes ‘ideology and knowledge are barely distinguishable’ (1991[1974], p.45).

As a ‘sociologist is socially situated’, Pierre Bourdieu called for reflexivity about three kinds of bias during data collection and interpretation. Firstly, similar to other social theorists, he argued that social background, including the class origin, ethnicity and gender of the researcher influences his/her interpretation of the research subject. Secondly, the position of the researcher within his/her field(s) in the academia limits the methodology and direction of interpretation. Thirdly, and the most important aspect of reflexivity for him, is intellectual bias of the discipline the researcher is associated with (Wacquant, 1989, p.32). He argued that the professional skills and knowledge of researchers constitute the most significant difference from the position of a research subject.
Autobiographical reflection of a researcher’s personal academic journey is the common approach to exhibit his/her social and theoretical position (Maton, 2003, pp.54-55). As a second generation immigrant from the Fujian Province of China to Hong Kong, I completed my college schooling a few years after the resumption of sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China from the United Kingdom in 1997. As the policy makers neither hoped to evoke an anti-colonialism sentiment nor Chinese nationalism, education before the Handover was ‘largely-depoliticized’ (Mathews, Ma and Lui, 2008, p.82). Some might argue that local born Hong Kong people, though ethnically Chinese, could not entirely appreciate the development of Mainland China with the lack of experience in and identification with Mainland China. During fieldwork, two questions frequently emerged from the respondents: (1) You came from Hong Kong, why do you conduct research on Shanghai? (2) Can Hong Kong people understand Mainland China?

However, I tend not to agree with such a sceptical view. The colonial history had isolated Hong Kong from most political struggles in the Chinese Mainland. Indigenous Hong Kong identity has also emerged on the basis of being politically ‘not Communist’ and culturally ‘not Mainland China’ (Mathews, 1997, pp.5-8). From a Mainland Chinese perspective, Hong Kong people are ‘others’ but also ‘us’. Hong Kong people can be viewed as ‘others’. Culturally it is also at the periphery (Lingnan region) of the country (Siu, 1996, pp.178-179). Such detachment from political struggles and debates has also provided a relative neutral space to discuss and observe the social changes of Mainland China. The experience of rapid economic growth and urbanisation of Hong Kong in the 1980s can also be served as an example of
understanding how a Chinese society can modernise and adapt Western ideas, particularly about the emergence of urban culture (Ma, 2006, p.349). Hong Kong researchers may also be better positioned to avoid Orientalism, to which many Western researchers might need to pay more attention. Hence, I would argue that the specific position of Hong Kong as ‘apart from China’ and ‘a part of China’ can facilitate rather than hamper Hong Kong researchers to understand China. Furthermore, Hong Kong and Shanghai are typically regarded as twin cities by social theorists and commentators when analysing the social changes.

3.4 The Empirical and the Theoretical

According to Bruce Berg (2001, p.225), a case study involves ‘systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how it operates or functions. The case study is not actually a data-gathering technique, but a methodological approach that incorporates a number of data-gathering measures’. As the Shanghai Expo was the focal point of investigation and different data collection methods were applied, this research could be categorised as a case study.

Lefebvre also conducted several case studies in rural and urban areas with his team at the Institut de Sociologie Urbaine and the University of Nanterre21. However, the regressive-progressive method is more than data-gathering measures. It is a dialectical method that is ‘both a science and a philosophy’ (2009[1940], p.91). In this section, I further discuss how the regressive-progressive method combined the empirical and

21 Some examples include the case studies of workers in Lacq-Mourenx peasant communities at Pyrenees and Tuscany. For a detailed review of Lefebvre’s empirical studies, see Stanek (2008a; 2008b).
the theoretical elements for Lefebvre’s theorisation of space, and how this method was applied in this study.

3.4.1 Regressive-progressive Method as a Theoretical-empirical Method

As discussed above, Lefebvre emphasised that the production of space could be investigated by researching daily life. The regressive-progressive method served as a theoretical and methodological framework to enable the application of different data collection methods. However, he noted that all empirical studies have their limits. At a certain point, description, no matter how detailed turns out to be inadequate, and the limits of morphology and ecology are soon reached. Description is unable to explain certain social relations – apparently abstract with respect to the given and the ‘lived’ – which appear concrete but are only immediate (Lefebvre 2003[1970], p.46; original emphasis). He criticised empiricist and positivist sociology as only producing a ‘vicious circle’ of superficially accepting the predominance of problems caused by town planning (urbanisme) itself (2003[1966], p.121). In contrast to the Chicago School, Lefebvre went further than the description of inhabitants’ experience, linking experience in the city to the Marxist discussion of the mode of production and social relations of production.

The regressive-progressive method provided a holistic theoretico-empirical framework to understand the dialectical relationships between space, urban experience, state, social relations and mode of production in temporal and spatial dimension (Stanek, 2008c, p.75). As a prolific writer, Lefebvre ‘did not write in isolation, but lived the life of a Parisian intellectual and participated in lively debates
with others’ (Gottidiener, 1993, p.129). As discussed in the last chapter, he was influenced by Nietzsche’s concept of the everyday. The purpose of describing the everyday life of inhabitants (horizontal complexity) is more than phenomenological description, but rather to analyse the production of social space. When he identified the isolated experience of inhabitants, Lefebvre went further than relating it to the flaws of urban planning (e.g., the lack of facilities in new towns), linking the boredom of inhabitants’ everyday life to the process of spatial production under capitalist mode of production (Stanek, 2008c, p.67). The purpose of the regressive-progressive method can therefore be seen as a call for reinstating everyday life in philosophical discussion (Elden, 2004c, p.180).

The suggestion of vertical complexity can similarly be regarded as a response to structuralists’ lack of interest in history (Elden, 2004c, p.137). As discussed in the last chapter, Lefebvre’s purpose in theorising space is to decipher how capitalism survived its internal contradictions through occupying and producing space (Elden, 2004c, p.236; Soja, 1980, p.214). His ‘grand project’ is ‘to discern the consequences of modernity in its late capitalist incarnation for the multiplicity of forms of social life and for (social) being itself’ (Aronowitz, 2007, p.134). In order words, the purpose of depicting the vertical complexity of space is to historicise the city, through which the dialectical movement of the mode of production can be explained.

3.4.2 The Application of the Regressive-progressive Method

While the methodological issues of the data collection techniques have been discussed above, below are the strategies that this study applied to describe, analyse and theorise
the production of space in Shanghai:

*Descriptive:* The *descriptive* moment serves as the basis for analysing the social reality and theoretically explaining it. It involved different data collection techniques. As indicated above, semi-structured interviews were carried out with the inhabitants of Shanghai. Specific foci were addressed to understand their perception, experience and imagination of residing in Shanghai during the Shanghai Expo (horizontal complexity). Their urban experience is explored in Chapter Six. Also, the spatial arrangement of Shanghai is outlined in Chapter Five.

*Analytico-regressive:* The second moment involved analysis of social reality (*analytico*), with reference to vertical complexity (*regressive*). In Chapter Four, the history of the urbanisation of Shanghai is periodised to briefly outline the changing modes of production and its influence on the present. Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space is applied to understand the political economy of the Shanghai Expo, as well as (the production of) social relations of production (by mainly referring to the secondary data analysis).

*Historico-genetic:* The final moment concerned explanation. This study attempted to answer three questions (mode of production, urban experience and Chinese modernity). In Chapter Five, I postulated the current mode of production in Shanghai by relating it to a discussion of the history of Shanghai, spatial arrangement and the political economy of Shanghai Expo. Then, in Chapter Six I discussed how the daily life of the inhabitants was shaped by the transformation of urban space. In Chapter Seven, I concluded the thesis by a discussion on Chinese modernity, and evaluated the
applicability of Lefebvre’s theory in a non-Western context.

3.5 Conclusion: A Dialectical Method Uniting Content and Form

This chapter began with Lefebvre’s critique of formal logics, followed by a discussion of the regressive-progressive method as a dialectical method to unite content and form. Considering space as a concrete abstraction, Lefebvre argued that space was produced by, and manifested, the mode of production. In volume 1 of *Critique of Everyday Life*, Lefebvre further emphasised the importance of empirical studies of everyday life in Marxist analysis of political economy:

The method of Marx and Engels consists precisely in a search for the link which exists between what men think, desire, say and believe for themselves and what they are, what they do. This link always exists. It can be explored in two directions. On the one hand, the historian or the man of action can proceed from ideas to men, from consciousness to being - i.e. towards practical, everyday reality - bringing the two into confrontation and thereby achieving criticism of ideas by action and realities …

But it is equally possible to follow this link in another direction, taking real life as the point of departure in an investigation of how the ideas which express it and the forms of consciousness which reflect it emerge. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.145; original emphasis)

Shanghai, and other regions of China, is under drastic transformation in its spatial arrangement, cultural practices and social relations, etc. in recent decades. By focusing on the secondary data about the Shanghai Expo, China’s political economy after 30 years of Reform is delineated. The mode of production of Shanghai was explored in Chapter Five, mainly exemplified by demarcating the organisation of the Shanghai Expo. During rapid urbanisation, the inhabitants also experienced
frustration, joy, boredom, anger, excitement or anxiety, etc. ‘Taking real life as the point of departure’, this study also aimed to contribute to the field of analysis by describing, analysing and explaining the urban experience of inhabitants. In Chapter Six, I explored the daily life of the inhabitants of Shanghai by engaging with a discussion of a new mode of production in the city. It is argued that a regressive-progressive method ‘helps us go forward and onward’ by ‘going backward’ (Merrifield, 2006, p.19). Therefore, before proceeding to the analysis of the spatial arrangement and daily life during the Shanghai Expo, the urbanisation history of Shanghai was periodised in Chapter Four, so as to serve as a background for relating social reality to history, (the analytic-regressive moment), thus examining how the ‘sociological fossils’ are affecting the present.
CHAPTER FOUR

A SPATIAL HISTORY OF SHANGHAI

The ‘Chinese road’ testifies to a real concern to draw the people and space in its entirety into the process of building a different society. This process is conceived of as a multidimensional one, involving not only the production of wealth and economic growth but also the development and enrichment of social relationships – implying the production in space of a variety of goods as well as the production of space as a whole, the production of a space ever more effectively appropriated. The rift between strong and weak points would have no place in such a process. Uneven development would disappear or at least tend to disappear. This strategy means that political action will not result in the elevation of either the state or a political formation or party above society. This is the meaning generally given to the ‘cultural revolution.


Although the mode of production was agriculturally based, feudal China has a very long history of urbanisation. During the Shanghai Expo, the animated version of the Riverside Scene at the Qingming Festival (Qingming Shanghe Tu), regarded as an ‘Expo treasure’, was exhibited in the China Pavilion (CNTN, 2010). The Riverside Scene at the Qingming Festival is a Chinese scroll painting portraying the rich urban and commercial life of Bianjing (the capital of the North Song Dynasty) in the twelfth century. It depicted the urban landscape, commercial activities (e.g., ‘woodsmen leading donkeys carrying fuel to market’), the complicated market system (e.g., large and small enterprises, the use of the world’s first paper money), ‘many pleasures cities offered’ (e.g., ‘taverns, restaurants, stores …lively crowds’), as well as government control on business activities (e.g., officials closely monitored the business hours of the market) (Hansen, 1996, p.2). The animated version is a giant multi-projector display digitising the still painting and showing the urban life from morning to night (Pan, Liu and Li, 2007).
When compared with other ancient Chinese cities, the history of the urbanisation of Shanghai is relatively ‘short’. According to the Shanghai Municipality (2011b; 2011c), Shanghai as an administrative unit was established in the thirteenth century. Around that period of time, the population of Hangzhou (the capital of the South Song Dynasty) had already reached a million, which made it the world’s most populous city (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, p.92). Shanghai then developed as a textile production centre and regional market town. However, Shanghai is regarded as the first modern city of China (Wang, 1997, p.89). Under the Treaty of Nanjing, Shanghai was ‘opened up’ for foreign trade in 1843. Since then, Western capitalism began to develop and became Shanghai an important treaty port and financial centre in Asia. The self-sustained economic system of China was then replaced by a treaty port system (Bergère, 2009, pp.15-18).

In terms of city planning, infrastructure development, spatial arrangement, economic structure and urban culture, Shanghai developed in a different way from any ‘traditional’ Chinese city (Yeh, 1997, p.378). Since much foreign thought, lifestyles, consumer products, as well as economic system were first introduced to China through Shanghai, the city has been regarded as ‘China’s gateway of modernity’, where ‘Chinese civilization and Western modernity took a pragmatic form’ (Bergère, 2009, p.4). A travel guide in 1935 stated that:

Shanghai, sixth city of the World!
Shanghai, the Paris of the East!
Shanghai, the New York of the West!
Shanghai, the most cosmopolitan city in the world, the fishing village on a mudflat which almost literally overnight became a great metropolis. (The University Press, 1935, p.1)
Since the mid-nineteenth century, Shanghai experienced rapid changes in its mode of production – it became ‘the most cosmopolitan city in the world’ (ibid). The socialist revolution in 1949, however, caused drastic changes in both spatial practice and everyday life in urban areas of China. With negative views and hostility towards urban life, the Communist Party of China (CPC) applied the rural areas’ organisational forms and policies to urban areas (Whyte and Parish, 1984, p.15). Shanghai was ‘punished for its colonial and imperialist past, fell victim to a policy that curbed urban development while advocating industrialization’, and ‘entered a long period of disgrace’ until the Open Door Policy was implemented (Bergère, 2009, p.367).

In this chapter, I will periodise the spatial history of Shanghai within a Lefebvrian framework. Lefebvre argued that whenever there was a change in the mode of production, new space would be produced upon the original social space. Under a new mode of production, new social relations would also be produced and the ‘underpinning’ of such social relations is spatial (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.404). A particular mode of production would produce corresponding social relations, as well as a dialectical relationship between the planning of spatial arrangement (spatial practice), individual experience (representational space) and cultural representation (representations of space). A similar strategy is adopted in this chapter in order to examine the underpinning of the dialectical relationship between the mode of production and social relations.

First, by applying this Lefebvrian analytical framework, the spatial history of
Shanghai will be periodised into a ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ (cosmopolitan and national city), a ‘socialist reform era’ (socialist city) and a ‘post-socialist reform era’ (post-socialist/global city). This periodisation is based on the modes of production in Shanghai, which correspond to the periods from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republican era (1843-1949), then the socialist construction period after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (1949-1978), and finally the reform period (1978 to now). As it could be a thesis topic in itself, this chapter does not attempt to review a complete history of Shanghai. Thus, I will concentrate on addressing how spatial arrangement, urban experience, the daily life of the inhabitants and cultural representations changed with the alteration of the mode of production. In other words, this chapter outlines the political and cultural history of Shanghai by answering the following three questions within the Lefebvrian framework: How did the mode of production produce the specific spatial arrangements in Shanghai? How did the mode of production shape the daily life and experience of the inhabitants? How were these changes represented culturally?

As discussed in Chapter Three, Lefebvre proposed the regressive-progressive method to examine the vertical and horizontal complexities of space. It is a social-historical method investigating how new social space is built upon the existing one, and how previous modes of production still exert influence on social space today (Lefebvre, 2003[1966], p.113). The second purpose of this chapter is to serve as the second moment of the regressive-progressive method (i.e. analytic-regressive moment) (2003[1953], p.117). By periodising the spatial history of Shanghai, this chapter provides a historical background of Shanghai to examine the vertical complexity of space. As I illustrate in detail in Chapters Five and Six, the capitalist past of the city
was reconstructed to provide an ideological justification for the reform policies of recent years. The inhabitants’ experience during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ was also re-imagined to construct the identity of local Shanghaiese today. The history of the urbanisation of Shanghai is therefore particularly pertinent in examining Shanghai’s contemporary production of space. As Lefebvre mainly referenced European examples, the applicability of his theory to a non-Western context will also be evaluated during the periodisation of Shanghai’s history of space.

4.1 A Gateway to Modernity: 1843-1949

On the 17th November, 1843, ‘Shanghai was formally opened to foreign trade’ (Wakeman and Yeh, 1992, p.1). Under the Treaty of Nanjing in 1843, the Qing Empire was forced by Great Britain to ‘open up’ Shanghai and another four cities for foreign trade and military presence. Since that time, Shanghai has quickly developed from a feudal town to a capitalist cosmopolitan city. In the 1920s, Shanghai was even praised as the ‘Paris of the Orient’ and the ‘New York of the West’ for its ‘vernacular’ urban landscape, importance in the global economy and cosmopolitanism (Lee, 1999a, p.37; Wasserstrom, 2009, p.129). The English writer, Aldous Huxley, travelled to Shanghai in 1926 and made the following comment about Shanghai:

In no city, West and East, have I ever had such an impression of dense, rank, richly clotted life. (Huxley, 1926, p.271 cited Lu, 1999, p.25).

This section will outline Shanghai’s history of space between 1843 and 1949. During this period of time, Shanghai served as a ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial capitalist cosmopolitan city’ (during the late Qing Dynasty; 1843-1911), where Western
capitalism was introduced to China and established cultural exchanges and economic linkages with foreign countries. It then developed into a ‘nationalist city’ (during the Republican era; 1911-1949), where the Republican government hoped to establish national identity through the spatial transformation of Shanghai. However, this section will not provide a chronicle of Shanghai. My discussion will only focus on the emergence of Western capitalism in Shanghai and its impact on producing social space for the emergence of a new urban culture. By applying a Lefebvrian framework, I illustrate how the capitalist mode of production produced a new spatial arrangement to facilitate the growth of western capitalism in Shanghai, and how new social classes (e.g., capitalist, compradors, bourgeoisie and working class) and urban life emerged.

4.1.1 From a Market Town to a Cosmopolitan City

In feudal China, the economy was predominantly agriculturally-based. Cities mainly served as centres of political, commercial and cultural activities, usually located near farmlands or at the junction of rivers, so agrarian products could be exchanged and delivered more efficiently (Skinner, 1977, p.4). Taking advantage of its geographical location, Shanghai has functioned as a market town and port in the Jiangnan region (in eastern China) since the fifteenth century. Agricultural and craftsmen’s products (e.g., cotton, woven fabrics, silk) were delivered from the farms of Shanghai around the Yangtze River Delta to Suzhou through the rivers and extensive networks of canals (Bergère, 2009, pp.23-24).22 It has been argued that this waterway system is ‘more efficient than those normally found in advanced premodern economies’ (Elvin, 2009, pp.23-24).22 Suzhou, a historical city about 110km away from Shanghai with travel time less than half an hour after a High Speed intercity railway was constructed, was once the agricultural and manufacturing centre (including silk and other craftsmen’s products) of imperial China. However, during the Taiping Rebellion the city was occupied and quite significantly destroyed, and Shanghai then overtook the leading role as a trading centre (Bergère, 2009, p.42).
1977, p.444), and therefore facilitated Shanghai to play an important role in the economy in the Jiangnan region. After the ‘opening up’ in 1843, Shanghai was transformed from a market town to a capitalist cosmopolitan city, and the economic composition, administration, polity and cultural practices of the city changed dramatically within decades.

Shanghai was not the first Chinese city that ‘opened up’ to foreign trade. Before Shanghai, Guangzhou (the provincial capital of Guangdong in southern region) was ‘opened up’ for foreign trade with the Europeans. The activities of foreigners in Guangzhou were restricted to designated areas, so that encounters and cultural exchanges with the Chinese were limited. Some foreigners were requested to live on the bank along the river outside the city centre (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, p.195). However, under Article 2 of the Treaty of Nanjing, ‘British subjects with their families and establishment, shall be allowed to reside … without molestation or restraint’ (Thomas, 2001, p.7), which guaranteed foreigners’ rights to live in Shanghai. The Intendant of Shanghai (Daotai; the head of local administration) hoped to segregate foreign communities from locals, and came up with the idea of a ‘concession area’. In 1845, an agreement of Shanghai Land Regulations was reached between Daotai of Shanghai and the Consul of Britain to establish a British Concession Area (referred as the British Settlement) (Bergère, 2009, p.28; Wei, 1987, p.38). The United States and France also established their respective concession areas in 1846 and 1849 (Liang, 2010, p.11; Smith, 2011, p.236). The map below shows the locations of the concession areas and the original walled-city of Shanghai (‘the Chinese city’):
Concessions were similar to colonies because the foreign settlements were assumed to have independence over public finance, law and order, education, healthcare and urban planning but not sovereignty. The extraterritorial rights of the foreign communities were formally recognised by the Qing government (Wei, 1987, p.6). Shanghai therefore was in a ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period during which the city was partly administered by the empire (the walled Chinese city) and partly by foreign countries (concession areas) (ibid, p.2).

Concession areas formed a new space in Shanghai. All concession areas have now become the central districts of Shanghai, but these areas were ‘truly rural’ in the mid nineteenth century (Lu, 1999, p.26). For instance, the British Settlement was located at the north of the walled-city and along the bank of the Huangpu River, where a Shanghai-based English newspaper described it as ‘in the shape of sundry reed-beds, swamps, ponds and other malarious constituents’ (Wakeman and Yeh, 1992, p.1).
Different from the European experience that Lefebvre cited, new social space in Shanghai was not built upon the original space (the walled-city) but in the concession areas (a newly-produced urban space above farmland). As shown in Figure 3.1, the concession areas were located outside the walled-city of Shanghai, but its size expanded and quickly exceeded that of the walled-city (Gamble, 2003, p.3). During the Republican era, the walled-city accounted for only about one-twentieth of the city’s size. Rather than evolving from the existing space (the walled-city), modern Shanghai ‘did spring from obscure rural origins’ (Lu, 1999, p.26).

From 1843 to the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), Shanghai underwent a transformation from a market town (for domestic trade; feudalism) to a capitalist cosmopolitan city (for regional and international trade; capitalism). The Chinese merchants could legally trade with foreigners, which meant China was integrated to the global economic system. A new treaty port system between China and European countries was established (Bergère, 2009, pp.15-18). At the beginning, tea, textile products and opium contributed to the majority of the trade volume but later extended to other manufactured products and other consumer goods such as cotton goods, soap and cigarettes (Thomas, 2001, pp.13-14). Foreign trade grew rapidly and Shanghai emerged as an important regional trade centre in Asia. For instance, the foreign ships entering the port increased from 44 in 1844 to 437 in 1855. The total value of the silk trade reached over US$20 million by the mid 1850s (Spence, 1999, p.162). The transaction volume of the gold market also ranked third in the world in the 1930s, second only to London and New York (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.273).

With the growth of regional trade, a financial system also gradually emerged in
Shanghai that was a pioneer in the country. Sectors, including banking, insurance, accountancy and legal services began to grow, and Shanghai’s first share market was established in 1866 in the International Settlement (Thomas, 2001, p.92). During the early stage, the stock market was dominated by foreign companies, but these later were surpassed by Chinese companies (most were privately-owned). In 1920, Shanghai’s Stock Exchange was established with the growing share of Chinese companies in the economy (Bergère, 2009, p.151). By the 1930s, Shanghai became the third largest financial centre and the sixth largest city in the world. In order to facilitate the development of the financial system, new laws and regulations relating to the financial system were established in the concession areas. This strengthened the role of Shanghai as a financial centre and also distinguished Shanghai from the rest of the country. Hence, a modern capitalist system began to develop in Shanghai during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ (ibid, see Chapter 3).

4.1.2 Spatial Practice: The World Expo of Architectures

Lefebvre’s discussion on colonialism is mainly found in the book series De l'État, which is ‘a little discussed aspect’ of his work (Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007). Lefebvre argued that colonisation is an aspect of the urbanisation of the production of space through which ‘the new political organization of territorial relations’ is produced (ibid). As discussed in Chapter Three, he regarded urbanisation as the process of marginalising the working class (the subordinate class) from the city centre to the periphery (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.14). Similarly, colonialisation also produced a new centre-periphery relation between the coloniser and the colonised. The coloniser exerted domination over the territory of the colony, and the space
related to the new political order and economic logics became the new centre (Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007). In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre commented on the impact of colonialism on the spatial arrangement of Spanish-American towns (refer to Figure 3.1):

Their urban space, which was instrumental in this larger production process, has continued to be produced despite the vicissitudes of imperialism, independence and industrialization. It is an urban space especially appropriate for study in that the colonial towns of Latin America were founded at the time of the Renaissance in Europe – that is to say, at a time when the study of the ancient world, and of the history, constitution, architecture and planning of its cities, was being resumed. The Spanish-American town was typically built according to a plan laid down on the basis of standing orders, according to the veritable code of urban space constituted by the *Orders for Discovery and Settlement*, a collection, published in 1573, of official instructions issued to founders of towns from 1513 on. These instructions were arranged under the three heads of discovery, settlement and pacification. The very building of the towns thus embodied a plan which would determine the mode of occupation of the territory and define how it was to be reorganized under the administrative and political authority of urban power. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.151)

Since the colonial powers conceived Shanghai as their settlement rather than a ‘rented’ space, similarly, they planned to transform the concession areas into a European modern city (representation of space) (Arkaraprasertkul, 2010, p.238). Alongside Western architecture, different kinds of ‘modern facilities’ were also imported into the concession areas before other regions of the country. Between the mid-nineteenth century and the 1910s, Western style streets, gaslights, electricity, telephones, running water system, automobiles, and trams were introduced to the concession areas (Lee, 1999a, p.77). A racecourse was also built in 1848 at the centre of the International Settlement to provide entertainment, and more importantly for social occasions for the foreign community (Smith, 2011, p.236). A travel guide published in 1904 even
proclaimed that it is ‘quite possible for the traveller to visit all the places and see all the sights mentioned in these pages [i.e. this travel guide] without knowing a word of Chinese’ (Darwent, 1904, p.i).

Alongside the transformation of political power, the capitalist mode of production also facilitated the production of new social space. Since opening up as a treaty port, trade was no longer limited to regional areas within the country (e.g., Jiangnan) but extended to foreigners under the treaty system. Located at the mouth of the Yangtze River, Shanghai was geographically more convenient than Suzhou for international trade and replaced the latter as the most important regional trading port with overseas in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Liang, 2010, p.113). The Bund, at the waterfront of Puxi (west bank of the Huangpu River) near Suzhou Creek remains the most potent symbol of Shanghai’s global economic status (representational space). With the presence of buildings with western architectural styles, the Bund was referred to as the ‘Ten-mile-long foreign zone’ (shili yanchang) which ‘marked the hegemonic presence of foreign powers’ (Lee, 1999b, pp.8, 32).

However, the iconic skyline of the Bund was not originally part of the plan of the colonial powers. When the British Settlement was established, the Bund was not the primary focus of urban development and only the consulate and a few western residential houses were built there. The Bund mainly served as the port for loading goods between China and the Far East (Arkaraprasertkul, 2010, p.238). With the growth of foreign trade and the financial sector, there was increased demand for office space and new buildings (with Western architectural styles) in the Bund. Only after the headquarters of the trading companies were built and became the centre of
commercial activities, the British began to have more comprehensive planning on that area (Wu, 2008, p.17). In 1863, the British Concessions and the American Concessions were combined to establish the International Settlement. The Bund further developed as a commercial and residential area, as well as a political centre under imperialism. Alongside the facilities for the reception of trade goods, the headquarters of foreign and nationalist banks, ‘hongs’ (foreign trading companies), accountancy firms, hotels and embassies were also located at the Bund (Arkaraprasertkul, 2010, p.238). The Customs House, the office of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, was also located at the Bund (Bergère, 2009, p.246).

The Bund became the new spatial centre under colonialisation. Rather than simply being produced by colonialisation, the Bund, as an iconic space, was created by the role of Shanghai as a leading trading centre between China and the international market. Although Lefebvre argued that the production of the colonial town was ‘by political power – that is, by violence in the service of economic goals’ (1991[1974], pp.151-152), in terms of urban development, the transformation in Shanghai produced a much more hybrid social space that Lefebvre’s theory would predict. Leo Lee commented that:

… by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Shanghai concessions already had the infrastructure of a modern city even by Western standards. By the 1930s, Shanghai was on a par with the major cities of the world. (Lee, 1999b, p.6)

Lefebvre argued that ‘each mode of production has its own particular space; the shift from one mode to another must entail the production of a new space’ (1991[1974], p.46). During the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, the space of feudal China and
colonial power coexisted in Shanghai. On the one hand, buildings with different architectural styles, such as baroque, Roman Classic, Renaissance, art deco and contemporary design, were found along the Bund (Bergère, 2009, p.246; Lu, 1999, p.110). These concrete structures with marble and metal established the modernist skyline of Shanghai by the 1930s (Rowe and Kuan, 2002, pp.57-58). Therefore, the Bund is also referred to as the ‘World Expo of Architectures’ (wangguo jianzhu bolang) (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.197), which is the physical symbol of the presence of colonial power, as well as the emergence of western capitalism in Shanghai. On the other hand, Shanghai was also regarded as ‘a museum of global architecture’. Alongside new buildings with Western, Japanese or Islamic architectural styles, the city’s urban landscapes were also dominated by the presence of linong and the shantytown (Lu, 1999, p.110). The space of colonialism and feudalism produced a sharp contrast, which showed ‘the hegemony of the West’ and the distinctive status of Shanghai as a city being ‘free from the control of a debilitated and inefficient agrarian bureaucratic state’ (Abbas, 2002, p.42).

4.1.3 The Emergence of New Social Classes

With a new mode of production, Lefebvre predicted that new social relations would be established (1971[1968], p.58). From the establishment of a concession in late Qing Dynasty, new space (concession areas) was produced with the emergence of a new mode of production (from feudalism to capitalism) in Shanghai. New social relations were established with the transformation from feudalism to capitalism, and new social classes further transformed the city.
It is observed that an early form of capitalism emerged in urban China around the eleventh Century (the Song Dynasty), which was depicted in the scroll painting *Riverside Scene at the Qingming Festival* (Hansen, 1996, p.2). However, commerce was deliberately inhibited by the feudal state after the Song Dynasty to restrain the political potential of businessmen (Huang, 1987, see Preface). In *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism* (1951[1920]), Max Weber identified the factors favouring and inhibiting the development of capitalism China. Even though there were favourable factors like a general peaceful social environment, effective control over rivers to reduce flooding, the socio-political environment of China constrained the development of capitalism (Bendix, 1977, pp.103-104). Without a religious organisation with strong binding power (comparing to Christianity in Europe), the emperor and statesmen upheld a supreme power of the empire. He used the terms ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘officialdom’ to describe it a centralised bureaucracy of the Chinese empire, and argued that it inhibited individual autonomy and the development of commercial associations (Ritzer, 1992, pp.132-133). Weber also pointed out that cities in ancient China were not political and socially independent from rural areas. The inhabitants in urban areas maintained a strong tie with the relatives in the rural areas, so that ‘the fetters of the kinship group were never shattered’ (Weber, 1951[1920], p.14 cited Bendix, 1977, p.100). As cities were the political and administrative centres of the empire, it further reduced the possibility of developing an autonomous business group there. The state therefore maintained its ultimate control over the country and sustained feudalism. Even though Chinese cities had a rich history of urban and commercial activities, capitalism did not further develop.
However, Western capitalism began to develop in Shanghai since it was ‘opened up’. The emergence of treaty port trade between China and the West in the late nineteenth century produced a new social group called the comprador (*maiban*; also found in Guangzhou and Hong Kong). With their understanding of Western culture and foreign language(s), compradors acted as agents between Chinese and foreign merchants (usually on behalf of ‘*hong*’ or local banks), sometimes also participating in negotiations between governments, at the initial stage of foreign trade (Yeh, 2007, p.13). However, the compradors represented just a very small group of new rich, and most disappeared with the opening up of world trade after the Second Sino-Japanese War (Hao, 1970, p.62).

Between the establishment of the Republic of China and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1912-1937), Shanghai entered a golden age of capitalism and a new group of elites emerged (Bergère, 2009, see Chapter 7; Yeh, 2007, see Chapter 2). The elites included the entrepreneurs who owned factories, department stores, banks, etc. Unlike the urban notables (*shenshang*) in feudal China, these new entrepreneurs distanced themselves from authority. They played a key role in introducing Western technology and management culture to China, as well as sustaining economic growth without the presence of an effective government (Bergère, 2009, pp.155, 158-159).

Alongside the entrepreneurs, the development of capitalism produced an urban middle class, or the petty urbanite, which included professionals like lawyers, brokers, bankers and accountants, who were involved in the capitalist economy (Yeh, 2007, p.30). With their consumption power and cultural display, the Chinese bourgeoisie produced a new social space, including cafés, dance halls, cinemas, department stores,
etc that created new social lives among the rich and cultural elites (Lee, 1999b, p.38). Last but not least, a working class was also produced with the establishment of factories, shipyards and workshops in Shanghai. The number of people working in these sectors increased from about 37,000 in 1895 to about 150,000 in 1911 (Bergère, 2009, p.103). The working class then became the basis for a labour movement in the city (Yeh, 2007, p.3).

4.1.4 The Emergence of a New Urban Culture

As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that urban experience is constructed by both social space and social time (1988, p.80). For instance, alongside spatial rearrangement, the social clock of the inhabitants was also altered by the introduction of western capitalism in Shanghai in the late nineteenth century. As Wen-hsin Yeh (1995, p.99) noted, ‘Shanghai was a place where mechanical timepieces of European origin achieved prominence in public space’, the clocks ‘not only made a necessity of the habits of punctuality but also turned standardized measurements of time into basic units in the structure of everyday life’. In the International Settlement, the ‘clock was omnipresent’ (Bergère, 2009, pp.261-262). The clock at the Customs House ensured that the employees could strictly follow office hours.

Alongside office buildings, the capitalist mode of production also transformed the everyday life of the inhabitants of Shanghai by producing new social spaces, including department stores, cinemas and dance halls. Briefly referring to Lefebvre’s contribution to the discussion about everyday life, Lee commented that:
The problem of everyday life has received considerable theoretical attention in the field of cultural studies, because, among other reasons, it addressed directly the problematic of the (Western) culture of modernity and postmodernity … in the Chinese context of the early twentieth century, the theme had gradually become an ‘imagined reality’ as created by print media. The everyday life depicted therein was modern and urban, no longer seen as traditional and unchanging. When we look into the basic content of such a new form of everyday life, we realize that it is very much structured and governed by a semiotic of material culture. The contours of such a material world can be detected, again, in the advertisement and magazine. (Lee, 1999b, p.74)

The presence of new social space, such as department stores, cafés, cinemas and dance halls, which celebrate individual lifestyle, leisure and consumption, was successfully introduced into Shanghai as a result of the new economic logic. These social spaces were then crucial in shaping the experience of individuals through the representation of space. The emergence of urban culture was celebrated by a ‘new literature’ (including magazines and novels) and movies, with most leading cultural elites at that time living in Shanghai. Such a representational space has narrated and aestheticised urban spatial practice and further facilitated its development. For instance, Lin Wei-yin, a Shanghai-based famous script-writer working in the banking industry in the 1930s, is among the best writers providing a sensitive depiction of the life of ‘leisure class’ (Chen, 2009, p.66). Lin illustrated the combination of Chinese and Western lifestyles, such as Chinese casinos, French barracks and western style cake shops, located on Avenue Joffre (located at the French Concession, the French name of the street Xia Fei Lu). The rich and cultural elites could also enjoy night life on the Avenue. This Shanghaiese writer once wrote:

After watching a movie, or after the cafés are closed at two o’clock, if you still want to go somewhere, you could go to Black Eye. At Black Eye you could stay till sunrise. You could feel free to have any drinks, listen to wild music. If you want to dance,
there are Russian and Gypsy mistresses waiting for your invitation. You can feel free to choose anyone you like. Then, she is yours for the whole night, if you do not leave for the whole night. (Lin, 1996[1935], p.142)

Urban culture emerged with the production of new social space. In literature, illustrations and moving pictures, Shanghai was portrayed as a cosmopolitan Chinese society with a significant presence of foreign communities, where extravagant businessmen, petty bourgeoisie and diplomats enjoyed themselves in dance halls, and elegant and educated intellectuals wandered in Western-styled streets with Western parasol trees on both sides. Chinese women wearing a qipao, a close-fitting Chinese-styled dress with side vents, in particular, is the typical representation of such a new urban culture. Cosmopolitanism, as opposite to the traditional inward-looking view of Chinese culture, was also a feature of Shanghai, contributing to the emergence of China’s modernity (Lee, 1999b, p.315).

The publishing industry burgeoned in Shanghai amid the peak of urban culture that Shanghaiese writers constructed within the context of a new urban lifestyle in cosmopolitan Shanghai. Alongside literature, publications on Western and Japanese thinking and modern literature also circulated in Shanghai. Fuzhou Road in the International Settlement, which is just next to the commercial street, Nanjing Road, was the national publishing centre where key publishing houses were located. For instance, more than a hundred books on science and technology were translated into Chinese in late the nineteenth century (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, p.218). Lee (1999b, see Chapter 4) has outlined how the publishers consciously introduced foreign intellectual thinkers alongside promoting urban culture. New ideas from Europe, the United States and Japan, such as socialism, social Darwinism and
Romanticism were translated and published. These publications were part of a process of cultural modernisation in China which accompanied the development of science and technology.

In short, from the late Qing to the Republican era, Shanghai served as the capital of modernity for China in three aspects. Economically, capitalism encouraged individual investment and state-led industrialisation, such that a new mode of production began to grow. For instance, although the customs revenue of the Qing government was managed by the British in the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, Chinese employees made use of the chance to acquire modern knowledge from Westerners (Chang, 2013, see Chapter 3). The concept of modernity also entailed adapting a model of technological advancement from Western civilisation. Another aspect is the cosmopolitan outlook that contrasts with the traditional Chinese worldview. In Chapter Seven, I further discuss the role of Shanghai in the modernisation and modernity in China. Lastly, on a cultural level, Shanghai introduced new urban lifestyles into China, which advocated leisure, foreign cultures, extravagance, individual expression and cosmopolitanism rather than labour, tradition, prudence and an inward-looking perspective.

4.1.5 Contradictions in the Capitalist City

Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.86) argued that the city provides the social space for antagonistic classes to exist together and facilitates the development of a corresponding mode of production. So, who were the dominant and subordinate classes in Shanghai during the semi-feudal/semi-colonial era? Foreigners and Chinese
were the obvious pair, through whom social, economic and political contradictions were exhibited and imagined through space. After the *Shanghai Land Regulations* were enacted, Chinese people were prohibited from entering the concession areas, to avoid cultural encounters with foreigners. However, the walled-city of Shanghai was occupied by the rebel group, Small Swords (*Xiaodaohui*), in 1853 (Bergère, 2009, p.37). Within 17 months, the population declined from around 300,000 to around 30,000, with most of the residents fleeing to the concession areas or outside Shanghai (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.61). The colonial powers allowed the ‘refugees’ to enter the concession areas by amending the *Shanghai Land Regulations* in 1854 without the prior consent of the feudal administration (ibid, p.62). The motive was not humanitarian or political but economic: the huge influx of people had created a major housing demand (Smith, 2011, pp.250-252). Hence, businessmen in the French Concession constructed a new kind of housing built on a narrow lane, *linong* (or *longtang*), for sale to the Chinese:

The urban form itself, comprising single dwelling units, had a number of variants based on the European row house, and placed in a parallel format similar to the nineteenth century’s housing in the industrial cities of England, but with consistent southern orientation for all main rooms. The houses themselves represent a traditional characteristic of the Chinese dwelling as a private walled enclosure with an internalised courtyard … In many cases the external street frontages were designated for commercial uses, effectively enclosing the residential blocks and incorporated gateway access to the lanes behind. (Smith, 2011, pp.250-251)

The *linongs* were usually gated by a stone-wrapping gate, or *shikumen*, which also became a distinctive architectural style of Shanghai (Pan, 2008, p.216). As I discuss in Chapter Six, *linong*, as a Western-style of building for Chinese ‘refugees’, ironically is currently regarded as the origin of indigenous Shanghaiese identity. The property
market developed quickly and further speeded up the growth of capitalism (Bergère, 2009, p.58). In the 1900s, the distinction in daily life between locals and foreign communities became ‘increasingly blurred’ (Wasserstrom, 2009, p.72). Lefebvre pointed out that ‘[d]ominated space is usually closed, sterilized, emptied out’ (1991[1974], p.165). Even though the borderline between the walled-city and the concession areas became less rigid, Chinese people were still separated from foreign communities in some designated places within the concession areas. A typical example is the Public Garden in the French Concession, the first garden open to the ‘public’ in China, which was restricted to the foreign community. Though the sign at the gate did not display the phrase ‘Chinese and Dogs Not Admitted’ at any time, such spatial segregation was generally symbolised as colonial invasion and discrimination (Bickers and Wasserstrom, 1995, pp.450-451). Discrimination also existed in the racecourse in the International Settlement where Chinese was not allowed to enter (except grooms and servants) (Xiong, 2007, pp.106-107)

Despite discrimination, the population expanded with the further influx of migrants and capital which speeded up the development of capitalism in Shanghai. Social problems including crime, gambling, mafia presence and prostitution also became increasingly serious (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, pp.313-321). For instance, about one in thirty residents ‘sold sex for a living’ (Wakeman and Yeh, 1992, p.7). While foreigners and Chinese existed within contradictory relations, the Chinese in Shanghai could be further divided into another contradictory pair – the bourgeoisie and working class – during the golden age of capitalism in the 1920s and the 1930s. When Shanghai industrialised, it gradually produced a working class mainly constituted by the Chinese migrants from outside Shanghai. While the bourgeoisie enjoyed a
splendorous modern lifestyle, the working class lived in linong with poor living conditions and suffered exploitation in the factories (Bergère, 2009, p.103).

Lefebvre would most probably not be surprised that the CPC was officially established in Shanghai (in the French Concession), because only in a capitalist city could the bourgeoisie and the working class exist together. Marie-Claire Bergère (2009, p.5) argued that Shanghai is ‘the most ‘foreign’ of all Chinese towns, but also the one where nationalist awareness and revolution involving the mobilization of the masses first developed. Alongside industrial strikes (e.g., 30 May Incident in 1925), Shanghai became the centre of the political activities of the CPC and the dissemination of new ideas (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, pp.235-240). It is observed that Shanghai experienced ‘one of the most aggressive labour movements in world history’ (Perry, 1994, p.1).

4.1.6 Industrialisation and the Nationalist City

Different from colonies such as Hong Kong, where cultural encounters and foreign trade were also significant, Shanghai was a ‘semi-feudal/semi-colonial’ cosmopolitan city where the Chinese government (the Qing Empire or the Republican government) sustained its sovereignty. Shanghai exhibited such a complicated character because of the coexistence of the spaces for feudalism, colonialism, and capitalism, as well as nationalism (Lee, 1999a, pp.101-102). In Shanghai, the Chinese government and colonial powers co-existed, where the Chinese government maintained partial the control of the city and was not isolated from the development of the city. The economy was also mainly dominated by the Chinese (Murphey, 1953, p.24). Even
though the Chinese and foreigners existed within contradictory relations, both facilitated the transformation of the city. On the one hand, Shanghai was regarded by the colonisers as a stepping stone for colonial expansion and exploration of new markets in China. On the other hand, the Chinese government carried out reform measures in Shanghai to explore the Chinese road to modernisation.

Alongside the development of the financial sector, Shanghai also underwent a period of industrialisation. Both light (e.g., textile manufacturing) and heavy industries (e.g., mining) were introduced. Industrialisation was firstly led by the private sector, but later the national experiment of modernisation was implemented mainly by the government. During the period of the Restoration of the 1860s, the feudal state carried out a range of reforms for national revitalisation, with industrialisation and modernisation of the military force as the main goals (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, p.212). For instance, the Jiangnan Machinery Manufacture Arsenal, the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company and the Shanghai Machine Weaving Plant were established in Shanghai to promote state-led industrialisation (Xu, 2001, pp.27-28). Capitalists also played a significant role in industrialisation by opening up factories. Since industrialisation was regarded as a solution of ‘rescuing the country’, the emergence of the capitalist class neither received strong suppression from the feudal state capitalists nor built up contradictory relations with the working class.

In 1911, the feudal empire (Qing Dynasty) was overthrown by Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party). The Republic of China was established. Although Shanghai was still a semi-colonial city, it was in transition from a feudal society to a capitalist

---

23 The office of the Jiang Nan Machinery Manufacture Arsenal is located now in the Expo site. The organiser of the Shanghai Expo has built a pavilion, and will turn it into a museum, to consciously write it as an official record and construct a historical legacy of the event (Gu, 2006).
modern city. A capitalist mode of production continued to develop, but the roles of the state and capitalists changed as Shanghai entered another phase of history of space as a ‘nationalist city’. The nationalist government envisioned Shanghai as the symbol of national development and against colonial powers (representation of space). Concerning the spatial arrangement of the city, between the 1920s and the 1930s, the Republican Shanghai government launched a ‘Greater Shanghai Plan’. Large scale infrastructure (re)constructions including public facilities and new roads were built in Wu Jiao Chang, the northern region at the creek of the Suzhou River where colonial powers exerted no significant influence, to compete with the concession areas and rebuild national pride (Wu, 2008, pp.164-165).

In 1937, Japan launched an invasion in China. The ‘Greater Shanghai Plan’ and the blossoming of the urban culture were brought to an end by the Second Sino-Japanese and Chinese Civil War between 1945 and 1949 (Lee, 1999b, p.106). However, because of the ambiguous stance of the colonial powers, the concession areas maintained ‘independence’ before they were occupied by Japanese troops in 1941. Indeed refugees and capital were moved in from other regions during this ‘isolated island period’ (gudao shiqi) and economic activities became even more expansive. For instance, the annual turnover of real estate business rose from 12 million yuan (in fabi; Fiat Money issued by the Nationalist government) in 1938 to 55 million in 1939 and 100 million in 1940 (Ji, 2003, p.205). New banks and financial institutions were established resulting from economic growth. People in Shanghai enjoyed an ‘extravagant and dissipated life’ (zhizui jinmi), when the country was war-torn. Capitalists no longer played a role in national revitalisation but became purely profit-oriented. Capitalists lost their legitimacy and established contradictory relations
with the working class and provided the background for the emergence of the socialist movement in Shanghai (Yeh, 2007, p.3).

Economic activities essentially stopped with the Japanese occupation in 1941. After the end of the second Sino-Japanese War, inflation became a serious problem across the country. In Shanghai alone there were 1,600 factories closed down and 300,000 workers unemployed in 1946 (Wu, 2003, p.1682). The stock market was also closed. The entrepreneurs fled to Hong Kong or overseas to escape from collectivisation under the socialist regime. Hence, urban culture, entrepreneurship and cosmopolitanism were brought to a temporary halt. Shanghai then entered ‘a long period of disgrace’ during which it was ‘punished for its colonial and imperialist past’ (Bergère, 2009, p.367).

4.2 The Aversion of Urban Culture: 1949-1978

The People’s Liberation Army gained control of Shanghai a few months before the People’s Republic of China was established in October 1949. On the 27th May, 1949 ‘Shanghai was liberated’ (Huang, 2008, p.2) and entered the ‘socialist reform era’. With the immense fear over the CPC, many businessmen fled to Hong Kong and Taiwan, taking with them capital, machinery, skills and talent. Most foreigners, including diplomats, businessmen and missionaries, also left the city (Bergère, 2009, p.347).

As Lefebvre noted, ‘Marxist-Leninist thought in China denounced the city as a centre of despotic power (which is not without an element of truth)’ (2003[1970], p.112). In
1939, Mao Zedong collaborated with other comrades and wrote *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Community Party* (1939) to illustrate the major objectives of the socialist revolution in China. It has been argued that the condition of Chinese society at that time was ‘colonial, semi-colonial, semi-feudal’, the ‘chief targets or enemies’ of the revolution were therefore ‘imperialism and feudalism, the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our country’ (Mao, 1939). Shanghai was denounced as ‘a centre of despotic power’ because of the presence of the ‘chief targets or enemies’ (ibid). As Mao noted:

> Since China’s key cities have long been occupied by the powerful imperialist and their reactionary Chinese allies, it is imperative for the revolutionary ranks to turn the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural bastions … victory in the Chinese revolution can be won first in the rural areas and this is possible because China’s economic development is uneven (her economy not being a unified capitalist economy), because her territory is extensive (which gives the revolutionary forces room to manoeuvre) … Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the necessity of using rural districts as revolutionary base areas, to neglect painstaking work among the peasants, and to neglect guerrilla warfare. (Mao, 1939)

With its history as a semi-feudal, semi-colonial cosmopolitan city, Shanghai was therefore regarded by the socialist regime as the centre of corruption and as parasitic on the rest of the country. The development of urban culture in Shanghai was brought to an end by the regime, and was planned to be transformed from a ‘foreigner-dominated city’ to a ‘truly prosperous new people’s city’ (Fung, 1981, p.280). In the following section, my discussion is focused on how the capitalist cosmopolitan city was transformed by the state to become a socialist industrial city, and how the urban life of Shanghai inhabitants was reorganised by the state.
4.2.1 The Production of Socialist Space

Even though Shanghai was the most developed city in China, the urban development of Beijing as the capital city became more important during the early phase of the socialist regime. While various iconic buildings were built in Beijing (the capital of feudalism) to construct a new ‘socialist space’, urban development in Shanghai (the capital of capitalism) was limited. Until the Reform, ‘Shanghai was never allowed to transform its physical surroundings’ (Lee, 1999a, p.106). The state planned to transform Shanghai from a consumption city to a production city, through the implementation of the housing registration system, allocation of material resources and restraining the supply of consumer goods (including housing), etc. (Wu, 2003, p.1683). During the phase of the ‘socialist city’, Shanghai experienced a rapid period of state-led industrialisation and collectivisation during which the development of cosmopolitan urban culture was brought to an abrupt halt (Abbas, 2000, p.776).

Since 1953 under the First Five-Year Plan, with the participation of Russian experts, the socialist government adopted the Soviet Union model of state-led industrialisation for economic growth, with the purpose of converting cities from consumption centres to production centres (Bergère, 2009, p.173) and centralising industrialisation in key cities (Rowe, 2004, p.274). Production (including the means of production and variety of products) and resources allocation (e.g., raw resources, labour and consumer goods) were controlled by the Party-State. Shanghai was chosen as the key-point city in the First Five Year Plan (Fung, 1981, p.280). Individual property was nationalised or collectivised. Virtually all kinds of communication with the ‘outside world’ were banned under the socialist regime. By the early 1950s, most foreign companies in
Shanghai had been nationalised or closed down (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, pp.505-506). In other words, under the socialist mode of production, China became separated from the economic system of the capitalist world. With the decline in foreign trade, financial activities and the absence of a foreign community, Shanghai’s role as a capitalist cosmopolitan city could no longer be performed.

From the perspective of policy makers, the transformation of Shanghai from a regional financial centre (a capitalist city) to a socialist industrial production centre was successful. Heavy industries such as steel production and the manufacturing sector grew rapidly. Between 1952 and 1978, the contribution to GDP of tertiary industry reduced from 41.7% to 18.6%, while that of secondary industry increased from 52.4% to 77.4% (Xu, 2008, p.6). Only between 1957 and 1958, the number of workers employed in heavy industry sharply increase from 4.5 million to 17.5 million (Bergère, 2009, p.369). During the 1970s, Shanghai contributed one-seventh of national industrial output and about a quarter to one-sixth of national fiscal revenue (Huang, 2008, p.4).

Under the new mode of production, new social space was produced. Unlike Beijing, new space was not produced in Shanghai through large-scale constructions but mainly by transforming the usage of the dominant space of the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’. For instance, Western style architecture on the Bund, the icon of foreign occupation and regional trade, was confiscated for government use. From the 1950s to the 1970s, no new buildings were completed on the Bund. It is reported that there was a plan to destroy the buildings at the Bund during the ‘Cultural Revolution’, but it was prevented by Zhou Enlai (Smith, 2011, p.267). While the absence of urban
development and urban renewal symbolised the representation of space during this mode of production, the Renmin Park and the People’s Square, both adjacent to the pedestrian street, Nanjing Road, were the few exceptions of a large-scale development plan for producing ‘socialist space’. Before their construction, the land was occupied by the racecourse – the social space of foreign communities in the concession areas. In 1951, the racecourse was demolished and transformed into the People’s Square, for political gatherings like Tiananmen Square (Smith, 2011, p.268). Another example was the construction of the China-Russia Friendship Building at the Jingan District, as a symbol of socialism. Alongside this, the streets were also renamed to eradicate colonial connotations. For instance, the Bund, Avenue Joffre and Edinburgh Road were renamed to Sun Yat-sen Avenue, Huaihai Street and Jiangsu Road respectively (Bergère, 2009, pp.377-378; Wei, 1987, p.91).

The socialist economy emphasised planning by the state and such an idea is also reflected in the pattern of urban development. Agglomeration, integration or grouping towns nearby to major cities was practised for the expansion of socialist cities in the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries to facilitate industrial expansion (French and Hamilton, 1979, pp.9-12). Factors such as history, geographical location, existing economic structure and built infrastructure influenced the degree of agglomeration and urbanisation. Yet the presence of strong state intervention on economic structure and social and spatial development was one of the key features of the socialist city. A similar strategy was practised in Shanghai. With the participation of Russian experts, about ten counties of the Jiangsu Province were merged administratively into the Shanghai municipality (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.532).
4.2.2 Industrialisation without Urbanisation

Massive industrialisation and expansion of the administration area of the Shanghai Municipality, however, did not bring about large-scale urbanisation or significant change in the urban landscape of ‘old Shanghai’ (the walled city and the concession areas). Shanghai experienced the slowest rate of construction and urban renewal in China from the 1950s to the 1970s with living conditions declining (Xiong and Zhou, 2007 pp.554-555). Firstly, despite massive industrialisation, the spatial arrangement of Shanghai remained more or less unchanged. The huge influx of migrant workers created a housing problem. New building blocks called worker estates (gongren xinchuen) were built for migrant workers; although they were developed mainly outside of the city centre or in Pudong, they became the dominant form of urban architectural space (Bergère, 2009, p.379). Migrants were either distributed to the newly-built worker estates or instructed to share homes with local residents by the state. Together with the danwei system, these arrangements invaded the social space of the Shanghaiese and created a lot of social problems (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.555).

Secondly, social space, such as cafés and cinemas that facilitated the growth of urban culture in the 1920s and the 1930s was converted for other purposes. For instance, prostitutes, once regarded as the symbol of the cosmopolitan city (Yeh, 2006, see Chapter 7), received brutal prosecution. Casinos, dance hall and opium dens were also banned (Bergère, 2009, p.347). Hollywood movies and national productions celebrating capitalism, individualism, consumption and Western lifestyles were
restricted. People were directed to cinemas to watch ‘revolutionary movies’ that glorified the party, leaders, labour, egalitarianism, class struggle and industrial modernisation. Publications, movies and cultural performances were also closely monitored; any deviation from official doctrines was banned and very often publicly criticised (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, pp.525-529). Shanghai could no longer play the role of introducing foreign ideas and lifestyles. In addition, most foreign countries withdrew their diplomatic representatives and citizens, and most foreign companies stopped trading in Shanghai from about 1950. Hence, the cosmopolitanism of Shanghai was brought to an abrupt end. The Italian journalist and politician Maria Macciocchi made the following comment on the streets of Shanghai during her visit in 1972:

In contrast to Peking [Beijing], all the stores of Shanghai are well stocked and one can spend hours window-shopping in Nanking Road [Nanjing Road], once the site of the most luxurious shops – like Via Condotti and Via Veneto in Rome, the Champs-Élysées in Paris, Fifth Avenue in New York – the ones no Chinese used to be able to enter, like the restaurant, unless he was dressed European style. In Nanking Road there is a large store which sells nothing but pictures of Mao, badges, tapestries, calendars, and greeting cards citing Mao’s thoughts … The only gifts the Chinese exchange are these Mao badges. (Macciocchi, 1972, p.310)

The outcome of the aversion to urban culture was massive industrialisation with a limited degree of urbanisation and the eradication of urban lifestyle. As discussed, few buildings were built. Linongs were also preserved (Bergère, 2009, p.347). In terms of spatial development, Shanghai witnessed her slowest stage and preserved the spatial arrangement of ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, though industrialisation took place at its quickest pace in her history.
During Mao’s period, the urban was generally regarded as capitalistic, parasitic, and aristocratic. Officially, the dominant ideology at that time understood industrialisation as modernisation and ‘bourgeois’ urban culture as the opposite to the advancement of socialist thought. The ideology of anti-urbanism and anti-urbanisation pervaded the country (Ran and Berry, 1989, p.111). Wide support in rural areas is recorded as being one of the major reasons for the CPC winning the Chinese Civil War; such a history is typically taken as the reason for Mao’s aversion to urban culture. Lawrence Ma (2002, p.1558) however argued that anti-urbanism and counter-urbanisation during the Maoist period was not the goal set by Chinese socialism, but an ideological means to achieve the egalitarian pledge of the Party-State. Under socialism, every individual across the socialist state, is assumed to have the same access to resources, yet, inhabitants in cities usually possessed better access to resources. Hence, anti-urbanism and counter-urbanisation were held by the CPC as a dominant ideology to combat the growth of the city. The Household Registration System (*hukou*) was established to manage internal migration between rural and urban areas. The pledge of egalitarianism was to be achieved by removing the inequalities between rural and urban areas. Urban lifestyle, represented by the petty urbanites of Shanghai, was also contradictory to the notion of egalitarianism. As I discuss below, the social life of urban inhabitants was organised through the *danwei* system to restrain unauthorised urban culture. In other words, the aversion to urban culture during the Maoist era was not only a political strategy to foster its support from the ‘rural base’, but also a strategy to achieve the promise of egalitarianism.

Is it possible for a society to experience industrialisation without urbanisation? Lefebvre’s account of the relationship between space and capital would compel him to
answer no. As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre made a clear distinction between urbanisation and industrialisation – the former concerns the production of social space and its impact on inhabitants’ daily life, while the latter is about the means of production. Lefebvre argued that urbanisation and industrialisation form a ‘dialectical unity’, which means that the ‘industrialisation of society always implies urbanisation’ (Ronneberger, 2008, p.137). In *The Right to the City*, Lefebvre argued the *urban problematic* will emerge during this double process:

Until now, in theory as in practice, the double process of industrialization and urbanization has not been mastered. The incomplete teachings of Marx and Marxist thought have been misunderstood … Marx did not show (and in his time he could not) that urbanization and the *urban* contain the *meaning* of industrialization. He did not see that industrial production implied the urbanization of society, and that the mastery of industrial potentials required specific knowledge concerning urbanization. Industrial production, after a certain *growth*, produces urbanization, providing it with conditions, and possibilities. The problematic is displaced and becomes that of urban *development*. The works of Marx (notably *Capital*) contained precious indications on the city and particularly on the historical relations between town and country. They do not pose the urban problem. In Marx's time, only the housing problem was raised and studied by Engels. Now, the problem of the city is immensely greater than that of housing. (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.130; original emphasis)

Lefebvre argued that the history of urbanisation is the transformation from the rural (zero degree of urbanisation), to an industrial city and finally an urban society (Ronneberger, 2008 p.137). The ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-1976), in the eyes of Lefebvre, was a ‘Chinese road’ to experiment with the possibility of ‘building a different society’ (1991[1974], p.421). History tells us that this socialist experiment was not successful. Alongside other political and economic factors, socialism’s failure to create a new everyday life is a major reason.
4.2.3 The Danwei and Organised Social Lives

As suggested in Chapter Two, Lefebvre regarded his discussion about everyday life as his most important contribution to Marxist analysis. He argued that the concept of the everyday has enriched an understanding of capitalism in modern world, i.e. alienation occurred beyond the workplace and penetrated everyday life. This produced a ‘bureaucratic society of controlled consumption’ in post-war Europe (Lefebvre, 1988, p.80). Alongside capitalist society, Lefebvre also argued that the success of socialism should be examined in the context of the everyday:

To put it another way, socialism (the new society, the new life) can only be defined concretely on the level of everyday life, as a system of changes in what can be called lived experience. Now, half a century of historical upheavals have taught us that everyday relations between ‘lived experience’ – change more slowly than the structure of the State. And in a different way, at a different rate. Thus in the history of societies modifications in the different sectors take place unevenly, some ahead of their times, others lagging behind. The fact that one sector is ahead does not mean that there is immediate progress in another. And vice versa. (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.49)

In order to increase efficiency of production and social control, private ownership was eradicated, work was collectivised and individuals were organised centrally by the danwei in urban China. Gongzuo danwei, usually abbreviated as the danwei, was more than a space for production, and functioned as the ‘centre of social activities’ (Lü and Perry, 1997, p.14). It was a nation-wide social institution, so supposedly people in Shanghai would share similar urban experience with their counterparts in other urban areas. Urban life in socialist Shanghai during the ‘socialist reform era’ could only be understood through the danwei system.
Literally, the *danwei* can be translated as the ‘work unit’, or sometimes known as the ‘workplace organisation’ (Li and Wang, 1996, p.63). Alongside delivering production command, the *danwei* is a system performing multiple functions. The state exerted social control through the *danwei*, e.g., controlling the appointment and removal of employees (through the dossier system) and the allocation of communal facilities (including housing and other social welfare). Individuals working for the same *danwei* were usually directed to share the same housing estate. Political campaigns were also carried out through the *danwei* to achieve mass mobilisation. Political study sessions were very often organised after work (Lü and Perry, 1997, pp.5-8; 61-62). The *danwei* became the centre of social life for urban residents. It is so important that ‘one could be without a job, but not without a *danwei*’ (ibid, p.3). By 1978, the *danwei* employed over 99% of workers in Shanghai and 78.5% of them worked and lived in their work unit (Fujita, 2010, p.306). The outcome was the emergence of an organised social life in the workplace and in everyday life. As Lefebvre pointed out:

So the New China, from the lowliest peasant girl to the highest Party chief, dresses up in blue overalls. She has given up the mandarins’ silks, for hundreds of millions of peasants the direct opposite of their own rags. She has relegated them to museums or turned them into export items, along with the magic dragons and ivory buddhas. She is becoming austere, her mind bent on being victorious on the labour front. Solid Republics are founded on virtue. (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.44)

It terms of the relations of production, the socialist experiment targeted the eradication of class differences. With the absence of the private sector, access to consumption products and employment could only be sought through the *danwei* system. Thus, individual life was not possible as social life was collectivised. Leisure
activities also ‘took the form of group action in the name of “collectivisim”’ (Wang, 1995 cited Lu, 2006, p.145), including team sports and standardised exercise over loudspeakers. People’s work life and social life were under close surveillance by the state, through the censorship by their colleagues in the workplace and neighbours in the neighbourhood committee, to ensure political loyalty (Bergère, 2009, p.388). In other words, everyday life of the urban inhabitants was ‘colonised’ by socialist economic logic through the danwei system. A former reporter at the New York Times therefore described the danwei as ‘feudalism in industrialisation’ (Dutton, 1998, p.42).

4.2.4 Eradicating Class Differences?

As illustrated above, socialist planning during this period of time was spatial. First, the socialist government speeded up industrialisation by agglomerating the districts in the vicinity of Shanghai. Second, the danwei system was a social-spatial institution reorganising the social lives of the people (Fujita, 2010, p.306). Third, the hukou system was established to eradicate uneven development between rural and urban regions. The socialist economic development of Shanghai was interrupted by political struggles during the ‘Cultural Revolution’\(^{24}\). With limited available information, Lefebvre commented on the ‘Cultural Revolution’:

Some have claimed that the cultural revolution in China will eliminate the difference between city and country, between the agricultural labourer and the industrial labourer, between the manual and intellectual labor. Their approach resembles that of

\(^{24}\) For instance, in 1967 during the early phase of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, Zhang Chunqiao of ‘the Gang of Four’ established a Shanghai Commune, arguably based on the model of the Paris Commune, to institutionalise this power in the party, army and the mass. The Shanghai Commune lasted for less than a month, but similar revolutionary committees were established across the country for political struggles (Bergère, 2009, pp.403-405). Lefebvre briefly commented that the Shanghai Commune is an extreme yet rich ‘violent festival’ (1988[1976], p.244).
Marx and Soviet ideological claims. There is little novelty, however, in sending intellectuals to the countryside for a dose of manual labor, to work in fields or neighboring factories. Does this overcome the division of labor? Hardly. (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], pp.111-112)

By reorganising space in the city and organising social life through the danwei, the socialist regime attempted to eradicate class difference and produce homogeneity among individuals. Socialist construction campaigns were also carried out across the nation to eradicate the difference between urban and rural areas. For instance, under the political campaign of ‘Up the Mountains, Down to the Villages’, millions of educated young people were ‘sent to the villages’ from cities to ideologically edify them with the value of labour (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, p.402; Mitter, 2004, p.201). Hence, during ‘socialist reform era’, the government produced space through the absence of urbanisation, the creation of the danwei system, as well as integration with other counties. Urban space and hence social lives were re-organised. Industrialisation in Shanghai from the 1950s to the 1970s was more than a change in economic structure, with social space and individuals’ practices also altered.

However, the promises of egalitarianism and the elimination of ‘the difference between the city and the country’ (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.111) were entirely undelivered. Some former bourgeoisie and elite groups in Shanghai managed to sustain their luxurious lifestyle, and even passed on their status to their children (Bergère, 2009, pp.393-394). Individualism, consumption, cosmopolitanism and capitalism were eradicated, in the sense that at a personal level, such values could not be pursued or practised within the spatial arrangement brought about by the implementation of the danwei. However, the danwei system did produce ‘superior living standards’ in urban areas, because employees in the danwei were guaranteed to
receive better job security, medical care and housing than the people in rural areas (Lü and Perry, 1997, pp.5-8).

Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.54) commented that a successful revolution should not only produce a new space, but also transform the daily life of the people. Under the socialist mode of production, urban life was deliberately restrained through limiting urbanisation and providing new meanings of social space. Although the state managed to reorganise the social lives of the people, Liu Kang (2000) argued that the socialist experiment was not successful. This was because the state failed to revolutionise the daily life of the people by providing a meaning to their everyday life:

… after the city (rather than the countryside) again became the locus of social life after the establishment of the revolutionary regime, the vision of the everyday in Mao’s culture of the masses failed to provide a stabilizing and enduring point of reference for ‘everydayness’, that is, the tangible, the concrete, and the countless individual routine activities – eating, dressing, sleeping, working, lovemaking, et cetera – in a vastly complicated and diverse urban environment. Instead, the everyday was constantly transformed into spectacles of the noneveryday – stories of violence, death, catastrophe, revolutionary martyrs, and counterrevolutionary villains and enemies abounded. (Liu, 2000, p.141)

The reform of economic liberalisation was announced in 1978, but it was not until 1992 that major reform measures were implemented in Shanghai (Wu, 2003, pp.1683-1684). Since then, the state designated Shanghai to play the role of the ‘head of the dragon’ of the Chinese re-entry into the global economy (Li, 2009, p.27). Upon the withdrawal of totalitarian social control by the state, urbanism within Shanghai quickly resumed (Wu, 2011, p.709). ‘Nightlife has recovered all its dazzle’, the skyline is ‘again ablaze with multicolored neon light’, karaoke bars, dance floors and
discotheques were also opened (Bergère, 2009, p.426). The ‘Chinese road’ of the socialist experiment was unsuccessful in revolutionising the everyday life of people, so that organised social life quickly disappeared once the danwei system began to breakdown.

4.3 A Post-socialist City or Global City: 1979-Now

I have reviewed the recent academic debates on China’s urbanisation in Chapter Two. In Chapters Five and Six, I will examine Shanghai’s current mode of production, as well as the urban experience of the inhabitants which was the focus of my fieldwork. Therefore, this final section provides only a brief review of recent discussions about the urbanisation of Shanghai in the ‘post-socialist reform era’. In 1978, Open Door Policy, or usually referred as the Reform, was officially announced. It was introduced in rural areas before being implemented in the cities. Shanghai began to implement reform measures in the 1980s but it was only after the Central Government announced the planning of the Pudong Development Zone in 1992 that the urban landscape and the daily life of the inhabitants experienced drastic transformation (Wasserstrom, 2009, p.122).

4.3.1 Daily Lives in Post-reform China

Applying the theoretical framework of social contract theory, Wenfang Tang and William Parish carried out extensive fieldwork and gathered data to understand the impact of the Reform on individual life in urban China (Tang and Parish, 2000, p.51). They agreed that the Reform was a fundamental change of the social contract from a
socialist to a capitalist one. Hence, social lives were altered accordingly. Widening income inequality was observed (not equally distributed), employees were promoted by performance (not seniority or the particularised relationship with seniors in the workplace) and education become a commodity in the workplace (not determined by class or status background).

As discussed earlier, the danwei system was the medium between the state and individuals under socialism. In terms of (social) space, it was the reform of the work unit, or the danwei, that brought significant changes. Full employment through the danwei has not been guaranteed since the reform. The ‘three irons bowls’ were ‘broken’, that is, the three promises of the original employment relation (iron rice-bowl, iron wages and iron position) no longer existed (Warner and Zhu, 2000, pp.25-26). But the vanishing of the danwei system also freed individuals to seek employment in the labour market or invest on an individual basis. In Shanghai the educated population returned, financial services were restored and the ‘old Shanghai’ urban culture was soon reconstructed as a glorious past. The history of the ‘Paris of the Orient’ was re-narrated, so as to valorise Shanghai’s re-entering the global market. The inhabitants ‘escaped the previous social and spatial constraints’, because ‘the work unit no longer had a monopoly on the organization of everyday life’ (Lu, 2006, pp.156-157). For example, in a study of bars in Shanghai, it is argued that globalisation has influenced the everyday life of individuals. Shanghai’s inhabitants imagined a foreign/global lifestyle and the capitalist past of Shanghai by hanging out at bars (Bao, Wang, Zhu, et. al, 2001, see Section III, Chapter 6).
4.3.2  Post-socialist City/Global City: a Question to be Answered

The debate about the influence of globalisation on Shanghai draws upon the concept of the global city (Chen, 2009, p.xxii). As proposed by Saskia Sassen (2000, pp.7-8), in the age of globalisation, global cities differ from world cities in the early twentieth century, that now function as a node for a global economic system by providing professional services for global conglomerates. Infrastructure in terms of transportation and communications in the global city has to be well constructed for the facilitation of the flow of capital and people and connections to other parts of the world. As such, it will bring a critical amount of middle and upper class expatriates and the lifestyle that they prefer. Income polarisation will result in the creation of local communities based on relative wealth. In terms of urban space, skyscrapers will be constructed and gentrification will mean that local communities will be forcefully relocated from the city centre.

By referencing data of foreign direct investment, import/export, numbers of foreign companies and number of skyscrapers, some have argued that Shanghai has shown the features of a global city (e.g., Wei, Leung and Luo, 2006, p.232; Ye, 2004, p.17). Table 4.1 also shows that Shanghai’s tertiary sector has become increasingly important to the economic structure, which reflects her role as a global city. However, some empirical studies showed argued that Shanghai can be regarded as a global city, as the status of being a command site of international economic activities has yet to be achieved (Ma and Wu, 2006, pp.8-9). It is pointed out that it still mainly serves the region around the Yangtze River Delta, though some features of the global city are exhibited and the influence of globalisation on urban development in Shanghai,
similar to other regions of China, is apparent. More importantly, local urban development has involved a process of ‘place making’ (Cartier, 2005, p.58) or ‘(re)turn to the local’ (Chen, 2009, p.xxi) and influences from the local political economy are of more significance than forces from globalisation.

Table 4.1: Economic structure of Shanghai (1978-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of Primary sector in GDP (%)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of Secondary sector in GDP (%)</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of Tertiary sector in GDP (%)</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of Primary sector in employment (%)</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of Secondary sector in employment (%)</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of Tertiary sector in employment (%)</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (USD)</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>2,368</td>
<td>3,219</td>
<td>3,841</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,558</td>
<td>7,116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chen and Zhou (2009, pp.13-14 Table 0.1)

4.3.3 Political Economy and Space

The political economy of Shanghai’s urban space is also of concern to scholars, with a particular interest in delineating the transition of the economy from socialism to capitalism. Upon the Reform, individuals were gradually released from the *danwei* and free to choose their housing. The government legalised the purchase and release of property and individual property rights were acknowledged, though officially individuals only have the right of transfer but not ownership of the property. Lin and Ho (2005, p.420) argued that there are three kinds of practices of land development since the late 1990s, namely state land supply, collective land supply and land supply.
in the black market, which are characterised by different modes of proviso. State intervention is salient in the first kind of practice that they name as state land supply. Land, whether state-owned or collectively-owned, was banked through a governmental agent. As I discuss in Chapter Five, a similar strategy was adopted for constructing the site of the Shanghai Expo.

Xu, Yeh and Wu (2009, pp.908-909) argued that the commodification of space is central to the finance of economic reform in China by citing Shanghai as an example. In the early 1990s, when the Pudong district was announced by the State Council (Central Government) to be zoned in order to attract foreign investment and establish it as an international financial centre, the Shanghai municipal government actively contributed funding to speed up progress, for example, through investment in infrastructure construction. Gradual and greater participation of foreign companies is later observed. More recently, a land leasing system was practised by the local government as a new finance model. By Constitution, all land is owned by the Party-State if it is not collectively-owned, in other words, the government has complete control of land resources. Through controlling land allocation, the government has assumed the power to decide urban development and through leasing the land to developers, the government can fund its infrastructure development. Land has been commodified. To conclude, marketisation has reduced the role of government but the state has transformed its role to resource allocation, so significant intervention can be still be made in the market economy.

4.4 Conclusion: Two Meanings of ‘Modern’
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, although Lefebvre rejected a dogmatic reading of Marx, he did not completely disregard the Marxist view of historical materialism. He agreed that history can be periodised into different stages by mode of production with a spatial dimension considered:

Historical time can be broken down (periodized) by mode of production: Asiatic, slave, feudal, capitalist, socialist … Moreover, each mode of production has ‘produced’ (not in the sense of any ordinary thing but as a privileged work) a type of city, which ‘expresses’ it in a way that is immediately visible and legible on the environment, by making the most abstract relationships – legal, political, ideological – tangible. (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.24)

Applying this Lefebvrian framework in this chapter, the spatial history of Shanghai was outlined according to the alterations of the modes of production from feudal China, the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ (including the Republican period) to the ‘socialist reform era’ and then the ‘post-socialist reform’ years. I also illustrated the dialectical relationships between spatial arrangement, cultural representation, everyday life and mode of production. Shanghai’s spatial history can be summarised in the diagram below:
Even though Lefebvre conducted fieldwork outside France, his reference for the periodisation of the history of space was predominantly European (e.g., Rome, Paris, Venice) (2003[1970], pp.9-15; 1991[1974], p.41-58, 73-77). This provides an epistemological challenge when a Western theory is applied within a Chinese context. As discussed in Chapter Two, Castells (1977[1972], pp.90-91) criticised Lefebvre’s theory of space as too general with statistical details being largely ignored. He particularly cited the People’s Commune in China as an example to counter Lefebvre’s deterministic view of the development of history (i.e. China underwent a period of collective production or industrialisation without considerable urbanisation). Is it possible for a city to industrialise without urbanisation? If it is the case, does it
mean that Lefebvre’s theory cannot be universally applied?

Rather than questioning the applicability of Lefebvre’s analysis of space in a Chinese context, I argue that his discussion on industrialisation and urbanisation has provided an insightful theoretical framework to examine the complexity of Shanghai’s history of space. Lefebvre argued that industrialisation and urbanisation should be regarded as a double process:

… the term ‘industrial society’ is exact in a different sense from that given to it by its promoters. Industry or the economic capacity for material production has not been rationally mastered; the theory is still incomplete, even where socialism is concerned; industrial expansion is only meaningful (acquires orientation and significance) when understood as this double process and through it. … Urban existence gives significance to industrialization, which in turn contains it as a second aspect of the process… What scope has an ‘industrial society’ if it fails to produce a fruitful urban life? None, unless it be to produce for the sake of producing. (Lefebvre, 1971[1968], pp.47-48; original emphasis)

As illustrated in this chapter, Shanghai industrialised rapidly during both the periods of a ‘semi-feudal, semi colonial cosmopolitan’ city and a ‘socialist city’. However, Shanghai performed different roles under capitalist and socialist modes of production, and with accompanying different meanings of being ‘modern’. In Chinese, ‘modern’ can be translated into ‘modeng’ or ‘xiandai’; the former is a linguistic transcription, while the latter is a literal translation. Both translations mean ‘modern’ but with different connotations. ‘Modeng’ is more concerned with cultural and social aspects, while ‘xiandai’ is the term usually used to describe the institutional and materialistic aspects of modernisation (Lee, 1999b, p.5). The former translation is used to describe the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, while the latter can be linked to the goals of socialist campaigns.
On the one hand, Shanghai’s urban culture during the semi-feudal/semi-colonial era was usually described as ‘modeng’, which means Western practices were for the first time being introduced into China. The capitalist mode of production produced the social space for the emergence of urbanism in this coastal city. New social classes also emerged under a new mode of production, with new daily routines and lifestyles (e.g., the petty urbanite). The concession areas of Shanghai (as a new space under China’s sovereignty) also provided a social space for urbanism, as well as for different ideas to be promoted and debated. Such extravagant ‘modeng’ urban culture (representational space) was celebrated even when the country was experiencing colonial invasion. Hence, the first dimension of ‘modern’ means ideas and practices being imported from overseas (Western countries or Japan), which are dichotomous from the traditional Chinese worldview. Hence, urban culture in Shanghai would not be regarded as ‘modernisation for safeguarding the country’ but the celebration of capitalism and cosmopolitanism.

On the other hand, ‘modern’ is usually translated as ‘xiandai’, when discussions are about technological and economic modernisations (xiandai hua in Chinese), as well as national revitalisation. For instance, the Chinese governments (feudal state and the Republican government) launched industrialisation or infrastructural development programmes in Shanghai, not only to experiment with technological modernisation and institutional reform but also to reinstate national pride. Not without grounds, urban life in the Republican Shanghai was criticised by the socialist regime. Though the motive may have been political, the aversion to urban culture during the Maoist era clearly demonstrated another meaning of being modern, which concerned
technological and economic modernisations. In other words, ‘xiandai’ could be regarded as a critique of capitalism.

However, urbanisation in Shanghai was suppressed during the ‘socialist reform era’. Together with restrained consumption, it therefore ‘failed to produce a fruitful urban life’ and ‘produce for the sake of producing’ (Lefèbvre, 1971[1968], pp.47-48). In other words, without urbanisation (including the production of urban social space, urban life, expansion of the urban fabric to rural area, etc.), industrialisation during the ‘socialist reform era’ became meaningless. The history of urbanisation in Shanghai is distinctive from the rest of China, with Shanghai being the birthplace of modernity in China. The feudal system and Confucianism have been replaced by ‘modern’ institutions and western thinking; the socialist experiment was also vigorously carried out. How can the two meanings of ‘modern’ during the urbanisation of Shanghai, from a traditional Chinese city to a capitalist cosmopolitan city and then to a (post)socialist city, contribute to the debates about the modernisation and modernity of China? Can we observe ‘sociological fossils’ in Shanghai today? How does the history of space in Shanghai exert influence on the current mode of production? I discuss these issues in the following Chapters.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN SHANGHAI

The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the fundamental law of nature and of society and therefore also the fundamental law of thought ... According to dialectical materialism, contradiction is present in all processes of objectively existing things and of subjective thought and permeates all these processes from beginning to end; this is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction.

- Mao Zedong (1937)

In his essay *On Contradiction*, Mao Zedong (1937) urged for political struggles by beginning with the above assertion. Applying dialectics, he proclaimed that contradiction exists in, and is *a priori* to every kind of historical development. Things in opposites (e.g., bourgeoisie vs. proletariat; the Communist Party of China vs. the Nationalist Party) must come in pairs. The ‘process of development’ in history is produced by the contradictions between the oppositional pairs. In 1956 when China began to implement its first Five-Year Plan, Mao outlined his vision to develop a socialist country by identifying the ‘Ten Major Relationships’ (i.e. the ten major contradictory relations of the country) by also applying the above ‘dialectical thought’. Although his personal agenda (by advocating political struggle to sustain his personal legacy) needs to be critically addressed, his writing still provides a helpful lens to understand how early Chinese communists strategically applied dialectics in outlining practical policies.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre proposed the term State Mode of Production (SMP) to characterise the growing involvement of the modern state in production
after the Second World War (Lefebvre, 2009[1975], p.105). Lefebvre was also drawn to Mao’s writing. Referring to the articles, including *On Contradiction* and *On Practice*, Lefebvre briefly examined Mao’s theorisation of the state in the second volume of *De l'État* (1988[1976], see Chapter 15). For Lefebvre, Mao’s application of dialectics to analyse the ‘oppositional pairs’ was an erroneous appropriation of the Marxist theory for *realpolitik*. He also criticised Mao for not successfully developing a theory of the state. The roles of the party, the state and the military force were undivided, so Mao could maintain his ultimate control over the country/his people/China (ibid, p.238). Lefebvre criticised the People’s Commune, as a production and administrative unit in rural areas, that failed to actualise its potential of sharing the functions of the state. The state therefore remained the dominant force in production. Lefebvre cautiously argued that the possibility of China establishing a state mode of production (SMP) should not be ruled out (ibid, p.247). Even though Lefebvre tended to romanticise the ‘Cultural Revolution’, he accurately evaluated Mao’s application of Marxist theory. On the one hand, Marxist theory was applied as a theoretical basis to understand the historical development of China, social relations of production and the possibility of replacing feudalism by a socialist mode of production. On the other hand, the class struggle dimension of Marxist theory was heavily emphasised and appropriated for practical politics. Marxist theory was manipulated by this veteran comrade as an ideological tool for initiating political struggles (ibid, pp.243-244).

In the same year that the second volume of *De l'État* was published the ‘Cultural Revolution’ ended, and the Reform was announced two years later. The reformatory policies under the Reform were essentially a rejection of Maoism and an affirmation
of a neoliberal capitalist logic, so that the Reformists faced challenges from loyal Maoists within the Party and in from academics. Similarly, the veteran comrade, Deng Xiaoping, who was regarded as the ‘architect of the Reform’, also appropriated Marxist theory for political struggle. He ended the debate by creating the term ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (People’s Daily, 2007). The implementation of policies with capitalist features could be rationalised as the manifestation of socialism in a Chinese way, while the preservation of existing policies could be regarded as the continuation of socialism. Applying dialectics, the oppositional pair – socialism and capitalism – was also brought into ‘unity’.

More than 30 years after the Reform, the refusal against economic reform is no longer central to political struggle. China’s development is also widely regarded as an economic miracle. ‘Has China completed the transition from socialism to capitalism?’ This is a typical question that concerns scholars, the business sector, the media and the general public, which presumes that China is undergoing a ‘transition’ from socialism to capitalism. However, China’s Reform is more complicated than a simple transition from one system to another. For instance, Laurence Ma argued that the Reform should not be regarded as a ‘transition’ but a ‘transformation’:

… the concept of ‘transition’, as used in the literature on postsocialist development, assumes a process of change toward a preconceived and fixed target, it is not entirely appropriate for China where economic reforms seem to have aimed at a number of moving targets. Instead, I prefer the concept ‘transformation’, which avoids the implication of the inevitability of ‘transition’. Moreover, China’s economic transformation away from state socialism should be viewed as a prolonged process of change with unpredictable consequences, instead of as a transitory short phase leading to a Western capitalist system of production. (Ma, 2002, p.1546)
Similar to Mao’s ‘law of contradiction in things’, socialist and capitalist logics coexist in the ‘post-socialist reform era’. It involves the abandonment, preservation and modification of some features of the socialist system, as well as the incorporation of new features of the capitalist system. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the contradictory features were brought into ‘unity’. What is the mode of production in China after over three decades of economic reform? What are the roles of the state and the market? How can the features of socialism and capitalism coexist in a system? What is the process of the production of (social space)? What are the implications for the social relations of production? These are the guiding questions of this chapter. I examine the China’s current mode of production within a Lefebvrian framework by investigating the Shanghai Expo as a case study. This chapter argues that Shanghai has developed what I call ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’. In the first section, the role of the state, as the definitive feature of SMP, will be depicted by a detailed examination of the bureaucratic structure of the Shanghai Expo and the implications of the restructuring of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It argues that the state maintains a high degree of control of society amid economic liberalisation. Secondary data from policy papers, government statistics and economic data are also used to illustrate the state-market relations.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre asserted that each mode of production produces its own (social) space (1991[1974], p.46). The second objective of this chapter is therefore to illustrate the production of space within Shanghai under the state-led/-participation mode of production. What kinds of spatial arrangement have been produced in Shanghai? What kind of space did the state plan to construct? How did the state provide ideological justifications for the urbanisation project? How was
the urban experience of individuals affected? How did individuals respond to the changes in spatial arrangement? In Lefebvrian terms, what are the spatial practice (arrangement of physical environment), representation of space (the social space the state attempted to construct) and representational space (the articulation of the experience of individuals) in Shanghai? While the spatial practice (strategies of urbanisation and its spatial implications) and representation of space in Shanghai (the state’s vision of the production of space and ideological justifications) will be discussed in the second and the third section of this chapter, the representational space of Shanghai will be illustrated in Chapter Six by drawing reference to the data collected in my ethnographic interviews.

As Lefebvre emphasised the trialectical relationship among the three moments in the spatial triad (1991[1974], p.36), the examination of the production of space in this chapter will therefore go beyond the descriptions of the transformation of spatial arrangements in Shanghai, and will articulate how such a production of space facilitates the development of the state-led/-participation mode of production. Specifically, I argue that land commodification, as the key driving force of Shanghai’s economic expansion and urbanisation, played the vital role in the state-led/-participation mode of production. A pro-growth interest bloc of the state and the non-public sector was established and reinforced the mode of production. However, such a process also produced a contradictory space in urban China, i.e. it commodified space and produced inequalities among the inhabitants. This chapter ends with a discussion on how the state-led/-participation mode of production is reproduced. The urban experience of Shanghai’s inhabitants under such a dramatic transformation of space and the possibility of an urban revolution will be discussed in
5.1 State-led/-participation Mode of Production

This chapter deciphers the state-led/-participation mode of production that Shanghai has developed since the late 1990s. We begin by asking, what is a ‘mode of production’? As Harvey (1973) suggests, mode of production is at the centre of Marxist theory, though its meaning is ‘seemingly somewhat ambiguous’ (p.197) it is easier to grasp through ‘its constituent features’ (p.199). In this chapter, I illustrate the constituent features of a state-led/-participation mode of production by mainly referring to the Shanghai Expo. As the Shanghai Expo was a state project speeding up land commodification, urban renewal, infrastructure development and involved the relocation of a large number of residents, it provides an ideal example to demonstrate how (social) space is produced. The organisational structure of the Shanghai Expo also helps to illustrate the role of the state. Therefore, before proceeding to discussion on the spatial practice and representations of space under a state-led/-participation mode of production, it is necessary to briefly introduce the background to the Shanghai Expo.

5.1.1 The Bureaucratic Structure of the Shanghai Expo

New space has always been created by a new economic logic. As briefly introduced in Chapter Two, special economic zones (SEZs) were established during the early phase of the Reform in order to attract FDI, as well as to set a physical boundary controlling the impact of the economic experiment (Tommaso, Rubini, and Barbieri, 2013, p.62).
However, the export-driven economy was challenged by the outbreak of Asian Financial Turmoil in 1997. With the instability of the global financial market and shrinking demand from the overseas market, China’s economic growth began to slow down in the late 1990s. The state therefore needed to explore other driving forces to sustain its economic growth.

In the midst of shrinking export demand, and together with other motives such as nation and city branding, different Chinese cities began to bid for hosting mega-events (Wang, 2000, p.154). However, as I discuss in Chapter Seven, the World Expo originated as a national project for showcasing the national strength of the host country. The current regulation still requires the organiser of the World Expo to be a country. Therefore, Shanghai Municipality needed the approval from the State Council to bid for a World Expo. In May 1999, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government proposed to the State Council to organise a World Expo in 2010, and received approval in March 2000.25 The Shanghai Expo is thus a national project under the direct supervision of the State Council, through the Shanghai 2010 World Exposition National Organising Committee (Organising Committee) and under the chairpersonship of the Vice Premier. At the executive and local level, the Shanghai 2010 World Exposition Executive Committee (Executive Committee) was established to report to the Organising Committee, and provided ‘guidance’ and ‘assistance’ to local governments in Shanghai. ‘Guidance’ in a Chinese political context means that policies will be legislated for the execution by the governments at the district level (Huang, 2007, p.46-48).

---

25 Shanghai’s application was approved by the Bureau des International Expositions (BIE; the organisation supervising World Expo) on 3 December 2002 and the registration was completed in 2005 (Huang, 2007, pp.41, 83).
At the local level, the Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination (EXPO Bureau) was established, under the Executive Committee, as the daily operation unit for the preparation, organisation, operation and management of the event. The Shanghai Municipal Government has also established the Shanghai World Expo Land Holding Corporation (EXPO Land) and the Shanghai World Expo Group (World Expo Group), in which both organisations are governed by company law and under the supervision of the Expo Bureau. EXPO Land was established mainly for infrastructure development within and outside the Expo Site, the relocation of residents and raising funds to finance the Shanghai Expo. The main functions of the World Expo Group were the construction of key pavilions and the operation of the Expo (Huang, 2007, p.47). The bureaucratic structure can be summarised in the diagram in Figure 5.1:
Figure 5.1: Organisation Chart of the Shanghai Expo

Information based on: Huang (2007, pp.46-48)
It is not uncommon for a government to establish a private company for organising a one-off event to achieve greater flexibility, efficiency and revenue generation. What is distinctive about the ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’ of Shanghai is the manipulative power of the state through economic activities in a state-controlled market. Similar to Lefebvre’s notion of SMP (2009[1979], p.129), the Chinese state was also managerial (gestionnaire). In order to demarcate the constituent features of this mode of production, it is necessary to address the changing role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as an economic apparatus of the state in the last decade.

5.1.2 The Restructuring of State-owned Enterprises

When individual investment was prohibited during the ‘socialist-reform era’, SOEs were practically the only possible workplace in urban areas other than working as a civil servant (Lü and Perry 1997, p.14). During the early stage of the Reform, with the lack of incentives and flexibility, SOEs usually showed limited adaptability in responding to the market situation and generated many social problems, including unemployment (Geng, Yang and Janus, 2009, p.155). The transformation of SOEs was usually regarded as one of the key obstacles to the Reform. Corruption and profiteering activities were also serious among government officials that resulted in student demonstrations and political instability in the late 1980s (Fenby, 2008, p.594).

However, SOEs should not be regarded as a residual element of the socialist system. Rather than being completely wiped out, the economic role of SOEs has been
strengthened by the state since the late 1990s. With the economy shifting from an export-driven to an urbanisation-driven one, the state took an active role in promoting economic growth through the reorganisation of SOEs. Under the policy of ‘Grasping the big, letting go of the small’, the unprofitable SOEs were released to the market but the state maintained the dominant shares of the profitable ones (Chiu and Lewis, 2006, p.66). Through marketisation and corporatisation, SOEs were given greater flexibility to adapt to market competition and released from political and social functions (ibid, p.399).\textsuperscript{26} As shown in Table 6.1, the proportion of enterprises and the number of employees of SOEs in Shanghai reduced by more than half between 2000 and 2007, and been maintained at a steady level in recent years. At the same time, SOEs still contribute about more than one-third of the Gross Output Value (GOV) of the city, which means that the efficiency of SOEs has improved over the last decade. In 2010, the proportion of total tax and duty paid by SOEs even exceeded the level at the turn of the century. The proportion of loss-making enterprises and total losses made by SOEs are also kept at a comparatively low level now.\textsuperscript{27} All figures indicate that the transformation of SOEs was successful.

\textsuperscript{26} Management reform was also carried out. Most SOEs are now registered and operate as private companies so greater autonomy and flexibility in daily operations were made possible. However, the marketisation and corporatisation of SOEs could not be taken as the same as privatisation. The purpose of the formation of joint-stock companies (as the most popular kind of transformation of SOEs), for instance, is not to privatisate the business, but to serve as a means for capitalising investment from the market and financing its reinvestment (Nakaya, 2006, pp.33-34).

\textsuperscript{27} According to the direct communication between Janos Kornai and the director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 203 out of 205 firms were bailed out by the state in 1988 (Kornai, 1992, p.490, refer to Table 21.5).
### Major economic indicators of enterprises in Shanghai with state as the major shareholder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000 %</th>
<th>2002 %</th>
<th>2006 %</th>
<th>2007 %</th>
<th>2008 %</th>
<th>2009 %</th>
<th>2010 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Enterprises</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year-end employees</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Output Value (GOV) of Industry</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Tax and Duty</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of loss-making enterprises</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total losses made by enterprise-in-red</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The privatisation of the unprofitable SOEs is the first reason for the success, while state monopolisation in the market is another. As Lefebvre noted, under SMP, the state would take control over energy, information technology and the connection with the world market (2009[1979], pp.130-135). A similar strategy was applied by the Chinese government to dominate the access to natural resources and the respective markets. In 2003, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was established at both central and local levels to administer SOEs and maintained the majority of the shares (Naughton, 2008, p.4). Under the policy of ‘Strategic Adjustment and Reorganisation of the State-owned Economy’, some SOEs were merged for ‘natural’ monopoly (Nakaya, 2006, p.36). In some ‘strategic industries’ including electricity, petroleum and refining, coal, tobacco, telecommunications, military, transportation equipment and iron and steel manufacturing, SOEs shared around 60% to 80% of the national total economic activities (Nakaya 2006, p.31).

---

28 The statistics for other years are unavailable. Many SOEs are not entirely owned by the state now. The table here shows the enterprises that the state owned the majority of the shares. These enterprises are referred to as SOEs in this thesis for convenience sake.

29 Before the establishment of the SASAC, SOEs were owned and managed under the Asset Management Agency. The SASAC was established in 2003 under ‘Interim Regulations on the Management of Enterprise State-owned Assets’ that clearly clarified the ownership of SOEs at central and local government levels (Naughton, 2006, p.16).
Although the SASAC was established by the State Council as a governing entity, it took a comparatively greater effort to facilitate the market activities of SOEs. SOEs enjoy preferential treatment including favourable tax treatment, lower interest rates (offered by the state-controlled banks) and the contribution of capital by the state when necessary (Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011, pp.44-47). With preferential policies, better access to state resources and ‘natural’ monopoly, huge profits were generated by SOEs. The credit crunch during Asian Financial Tsunami in the late 1990s also facilitated the restructuring of SOEs by squeezing out the small and rural enterprises (Andreas, 2010, p.72). In 2005, central SASAC enterprises generated a profit of 628 billion (RMB, the same below unless otherwise stated), which accounted for 3.4% of the revised GDP.\textsuperscript{30} However, SOEs were required to remit 10% of its after-tax profit (at most) to the State Council and the rest was retained by the SOEs (Naughton, 2008, p.1). As the top executives of the central SASAC enterprises were usually the key personnel of the Party or somebody having close ties, the appointment of top executives of SOEs was usually directly instructed by the central Community Party Organisation Department but not the SASAC.\textsuperscript{31} Some party or government officials could receive huge income by having a position in these key SOEs. SASAC therefore failed to perform the regulatory role but SOEs became the tool of a bureaucratic interest group (Naughton, 2006, p.14).

\textsuperscript{30} As at June 2012, there were 117 central SOEs being subordinated to SASAC; some notable enterprises with huge profits include Baosteel Group Corporation, China Eastern Air Holding Company, China Mobile Communications Corporation, Sinochem Group (SASAC, n.d.).

\textsuperscript{31} Sometimes, the same government official would also take up different positions at the same time. For instance, the Director of Personnel for the City of Shanghai and the Party Committee with Shanghai SASAC (Naughton, 2006, p.5).
5.1.3 The Corporatisation of the World Expo Group

The strategy of exercising the advantages of SOEs to generate profit from the market can be demonstrated by deciphering the organisational structure of the Shanghai Expo. As suggested above, the World Expo Group was established by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government in 2004 for the construction of major pavilions (the Expo Centre, Theme Pavilion and the early stage of the construction of China Pavilion) and the operation of the Expo during the exhibition period. This company was restructured from Shanghai Eastbest International (Group) Company Limited, together with investment mainly from the Shanghai Media & Entertainment Group and The Orient International (Holding) Company Limited. These three companies, which were all state-owned, provided a start-up fund of 1.1 billion for the World Expo Group. Although Dai Liu, the chairperson of the Board and the party secretary of the World Expo Group, emphasised that the company operated with market principles (Shanghai World Expo (Group) Co., Ltd, 2008), public funding still contributed about two-thirds of the total operational costs. The World Expo Group also raised capital from the market through issuing bonds, but the credibility of the bonds was mainly based on the state-owned status of the company. In 2010, the operational scale of the World Expo Group reached 40.3 billion with a profit of 3.7 billion, which already exceeded the start-up fund. In 2011, the company recorded an annual income of 55 billion and was listed among the top 200 Chinese enterprises. In August 2011, the municipal government approved to rename the World Expo Group to its original name: the Shanghai Eastbest International (Group). In other words, with the organisation of the Shanghai Expo as the justification, Shanghai

32 The Shanghai Eastbest International (Group) Company Limited is a SOE established by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government in 1997 with foreign trade and exhibition service as the key areas of business (Shanghai World Expo (Group) Co., Ltd., n.d.).
Eastbest expanded its market size and generated more profits by utilising state resources.

When introducing SMP as a ‘new state form’, Lefebvre emphasised that the state in the post-war era played a much stronger role than at the turn of the last century (2009[1979], p.124). The capitalist states actively promoted economic growth through economic stimulus or pro-growth measures (e.g., New Deal, Fordism), while the socialist state (Stalinism, Eurocommunism) centralised the apparatus of production (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.765). In other words, Lefebvre abandoned the dogmatic dichotomy of socialism and capitalism, and argued that the state became much more involved in production in both the socialist and capitalist political camps.

Similar features of SMP can be observed in the state-led/participation mode of production in Shanghai. With an increasing proportion of market activities and upon entry to the World Trade Organisation in 2001, the state began to withdraw from absolute control of the market and comprehensive planning in production and consumption. The collapse of the Soviet Union also alerted China to be more cautious but practical when privatising SOEs (Sheng and Zhao, 2013, p.260). As illustrated above, the state maintained the dominant shares on the profitable SOEs. The ‘leading role of corporate public ownership’ in these SOEs was also emphasised, so that the state would exert close control over these companies (Nakaya, 2006, p.33). The transformation of SOEs was a heavy burden on the state during the early stage of the reform, but has become an advantage for its domination in the market now. Even though some SOEs (or their subsidiaries) have been listed on the stock market, the state exerted
close control via the SASAC (Naughton, 2008, p.13). Rather than transforming the state from the role of production to regulation, the government still deliberately maintained a major role in public participation in economic activities. Through SOEs, the state does not forfeit its ultimate control of the economy, but has transformed the allocation and production roles to the regulatory body and monopolistic player in the market.

As a result, the state still upholds control of the market by skilfully manipulating the features of the old system (socialist) and incorporating new features (capitalist). The economy is state-led and ‘socialist’ characteristics of the economic system are valued. Even though the market becomes more open to individual and foreign investments, the state creates a favourable market environment for SOEs through legislation, regulations and favourable policies, as discussed above. The state also participates in market activities and values the importance of market competition. SOEs operate as companies in the market, thus profit maximisation can be legitimised and retained by SOEs under the state-led/-participation mode of production.33

5.1.4 Land Commodification

As illustrated above, the state began to perform both the regulatory and participatory roles since the late 1990s. By utilising its regulatory and legislative power, SOEs were facilitated to enjoy comparative advantages in market competition or even ‘natural’ monopoly. SOEs were reorganised to become the medium for the state to retain its indirect control in the market. Similar to the reorganisation of SOEs, the process of land

---

33 For the mechanism and process of relocation in Shanghai, see Lee (2006).
commodification was also facilitated by the ‘unity’ of socialist and capitalist features. 

Article 10 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states the ownership of land in China in the following terms:

Land in the cities is owned by the state. Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions which belong to the state in accordance with the law … The state may in the public interest take over land for its use in accordance with the law. (Gov.cn, 2004)

As the land was state-owned, land market was absent in China until the Reform was carried out. The Constitution also enabled the state to expropriate land in the public interest whenever it wished (Lin and Ho, 2005, p.418). This fundamental understanding of public ownership generally has remained unchanged after the Reform, so that individuals or organisations are only assumed the rights of land use and land transfer. In other words, land can only be leased, but not be sold, to individuals. Lefebvre argued that land, capital and labour established a ‘trinity in the capitalist society through the production of space (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.282). A similar trend can be observed in Shanghai now. This ‘persistence’ of the socialist system is particularly important in the production of space in urban China. As private ownership and the lease of land were prohibited before the Reform, the state virtually became the only land owner when the land market was created in the late 1980s. In the early phase of the Reform, urbanisation (i.e. turning rural areas to non-agricultural use) contributed significantly to the expansion of the economy through land sales (Zhang, 2002, p.483). In recent years, land sales still account for between 30% and 70% of the revenue of many municipal governments (Lin and Ho, 2005, p.423). Table 6.2 shows the income received by the Shanghai Municipality from the transfer of land use rights. The revenue in 2009 and
2010 was 8.37 billion and 29.21 billion respectively. In 2010, the fiscal revenue of Shanghai from tax was 800.34 billion, but 500 billion was remitted to Central Government. As the income from land sale was regarded as non-tax income that was not required to be remitted to the Central Government, land commodification therefore became an important income source for local governments.

### Income from Transfer of Land Use Rights of Shanghai Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009 (RMB billion)</th>
<th>2010 (RMB billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income from the transfer of land use rights</td>
<td>67.57</td>
<td>194.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cost for the transfer of Land Use Right (e.g., compensation for land appropriation and relocation, land development, service charge etc.)</td>
<td>47.71</td>
<td>124.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Revenue expenditure (e.g., expenses for city development, urban subsidiary rental house, compensation)</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>41.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>29.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shanghai Municipality (2010, 2011a)

Since the late 1990s, different policy reforms, including the land-banking mechanism, were introduced to better protect individual property rights and restrain urbanisation (or to slow down economic growth), but land commodification is still an important means for capital accumulation. Land banking means the advance acquisition and reservation of land by the state or private companies before development (Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, p.896). Its vision is to regulate land sale, provide fair and stable land supply and intervene in urban development, but with the monopoly of the state in land ownership in China, in practice it has become a mechanism for the state to generate further income by commodifying land.

Rather than directly raising capital from the market through the transfer of land use...
rights, land commodification at local government level is more complicated and involves different interest groups. Land is expropriated by the land banking agency, and conveyed to the land user (other government body or developer) through administrative allocation, negotiation, tender, auction or quotation. Then, the land users are responsible for financing the projects through land trading or mortgaging with banks or other companies in the secondary market. This is an important practice particularly for the municipality with capital shortage. As these banks and other enterprises are reliant on these businesses, the economy is thus ultimately dependent on land commodification. Rather than regulating urban development and land price, the state makes more effort in sustaining such a model of economic development. This is because the contraction of the property market will damage the economy and reduce the income of local governments (Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, pp.908-909)

This process of land commodification is smooth due to the dual identity of the state. Alongside its regulatory role (land banking and legislation power), the state also participates in market activities (e.g., directly playing the role, or through SOEs, as a land developer). A similar strategy has been adopted for the organisation of the Shanghai Expo. Alongside the World Expo Group, the Shanghai World Expo Land Reserve Centre was established by the municipal government to raise funds for infrastructure development, relocation of residents and enterprises within the Expo Site, as well as being responsible for the ‘utilisation’ of the Expo Site after the event (Huang, 2007, p.47). Through land sale, issuing bonds and loans from banks, the Land Reserve Centre has generated revenues to sustain infrastructure construction (inside and outside the Expo Site) through market activities. The state can avoid being a direct sponsor or
participation in urban development projects. Funds can be raised through the market operation of the SOEs.

The start-up fund of EXPO Land came from the Shanghai World Expo Land Reserve Centre (3.4 billion), Shanghai Land (3 billion) and the Shanghai Chengtou Corporation (3 billion). Shanghai Land is the operating body of the Shanghai Land Reserve Centre, established in 2004. The Shanghai Chengtou Corporation was established in 1992 with the approval of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government and funded by the Shanghai Municipal State-owned Assets Administrative Office, responsible for fundraising and management of urban development. A total of 8 billion ‘Expo Bonds’ were issued by the World Expo Group and Expo Land in 2005 and 2007 respectively to raise capital from the market, to fund the construction and operation of the Shanghai Expo. EXPO Land is also responsible for the future use of the land and revitalisation of heritage (Huang, 2007, p.139).

5.1.5 Dual Role of the State to Unify ‘Socialism’ and ‘Capitalism’

As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that State Mode of Production (SMP) as a ‘new state form’ should not be simply be categorised as socialist or capitalist. Given the fact that the tetraology *De l’État* was written in the 1970s and Lefebvre’s lifelong involvement in political commentary, Brenner and Elden argue that the sociopolitical environment in the 1970s should be considered so as to fully understand the meaning of SMP (2001, pp.763-764). Rather than merely a critique of Stalinism, they argue that Lefebvre’s main intention was to examine Western European countries, when a growing
role of the state in economic development was observed in the 1970s. There was a planetary phenomenon of growing similarity of the productivist states and Lefebvre responded, as pointed out above, to such change by proposing the term SMP. Therefore, his writings during this period should be ‘read as an expression of his sustained efforts to clarify both theoretically and practically the possibility for transformative political praxis under the highly fluid global, European, national, and local conditions of that tumultuous decade’ (ibid, p.784).

Although the Reform in China is now regarded as a miracle, the transformation was not entirely smooth but shaped by the tumultuous local and global environments. Alongside the Asian Financial Tsunami, referred to above, the Russian experience of privatisation also alerted the Chinese government to carry out economic liberalisation measures more cautiously (Sheng and Zhao, 2013, p.260). In order to avoid the national assets becoming concentrated in oligarchs, the state tightly upheld its strategic assets through the SASAC, during the restructuring of the SOEs and created monopolies for the SOEs through legislation. However, the outcome was the dominance of the corporatised SOEs in the market. Some named the resurrection of the SOEs as ‘guojin mintui’ (the entry of the state and the withdrawal of individual investment) to describe the increasing involvement of the SOEs by superseding individual investment as the most significant market player (Hong, 2012). In other words, the economic liberalisation measures (e.g., marketisation and corporatisation of the SOEs) were not transitional to establish a well-regulated free market without state intervention, but to maintain the regulatory role of the state without sacrificing its economic benefit.
Nevertheless, the coexistence of capitalist and socialist features is not eclectic and transitional, and the process should not be regarded as a transitional stage from socialism to capitalism. The state did not retreat from market intervention and participation, but actively contributed to economic development (Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, p.896). Bringing the opposites (capitalist and socialist features) into ‘unity’, the state strategically manipulated the advantages of both systems to achieve rapid economic growth. As discussed above, that state became managerial and administrative in facilitating economic activities under the SMP. The state of China also demonstrates similar features under the state-led/-participation mode of production. As illustrated above with the example of the Shanghai Expo, the state actively participates in a market that it regulates, so as to generate benefits during market liberalisation. Even though the market continues to liberalise, the state still retains its ultimate domination in political, economic and social realms. Rather than simply considering the Reform as a transition from socialism to capitalism, it should be regarded as a transformation of bringing the contradictions between socialist and capitalistic logics into ‘unity’ by the state. Therefore, I slightly revise the term ‘state mode of production’ to state-led/-participation mode of production to emphasise the dual role of the state in production, especially its participation in the market. By having the double roles as a regulator and a participator, the state has the absolute power in creating favourable conditions for its commercial operations. In the next section, I further decipher how the state manipulated its legislative power to facilitate land commodification and produced a specific spatial arrangement under such as mode of production.
5.2 Spatial Practice of Shanghai

As discussed in Chapter Three, Lefebvre regarded social space as a concrete abstraction. Social space is the medium where production takes place and the social relations of production are established and reproduced (Gottdiener, 1993, p.130; Stanek, 2008c, p.76). In order to fully understand social space in a city, the architecture, physical environment, history, daily life of inhabitants, role of state, as well as cultural representation needs to be considered. Therefore, Lefebvre proposed the spatial triad (spatial practice, representation of space and representational space) to theorise how space is produced by the mode of production and how the production of space reproduced the mode of production.

I argued above that the state plays the roles of regulator and also as participant, in order to manipulate the market under the state-led/participation mode of production. Under such a mode of production, what kind(s) of space does the state plan to produce? What kind(s) of new space has this mode of production produced? In this section and the next, I apply Lefebvre’s spatial triad to identify the spatial practice and representation of space of Shanghai. As discussed in Chapter Three, Lefebvre argued that new space is produced upon the existing one, so that there are ‘sociological fossils’ that coexist in the city (2003[1966], p.113). The application of a regressive-progressive method is therefore needed to identify the influences of the previous mode(s) of production on the urban space and the urban experience of the present (Stanek, 2008c, p.113). In Chapter Four, I periodised Shanghai’s history of space by modes of production to address the vertical complexity of space of Shanghai. I argued that Shanghai during the
‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ served as China’s capital of modernity to introduce Western modernity to China, and experimented with socialism during the ‘socialist reform era’ as a critique of Western capitalism. Based on such a historical background, this chapter discusses how the history of space currently exerts influence on the spatial practice of Shanghai. Following this, the relationship between spatial arrangement and mode of production will be discussed.

5.2.1 The Puxi/Pudong Divide

As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre (1991[1974], pp.38-42) introduced the term ‘spatial practice’ to summarise the spatial arrangement (including built and physical environments) of the city. Spatial practice is mode of production specific, because it is produced by and further facilitates the reproduction of that particular mode of production. Alongside human activities, Lefebvre also noticed the significance of the natural environment on the production of space because the perception of the natural environment would influence the way that individuals settle in and plan the city (ibid, pp.48-49). Geographically, Shanghai is ‘naturally’ divided by the Huangpu River into two regions, Puxi (west of the Huangpu River) and Pudong (east of the Huangpu River). Spatial practice of Shanghai under the state-led/-participation mode of production can be summarised by such a ‘Puxi/Pudong divide’. Puxi is where the historic walled ‘Chinese city’ and Bund were located. The Western architecture at the Bund is typically regarded as the icon of ‘old Shanghai’ with a capitalistic and cosmopolitan history. Pudong was barren land dominated by farmland and fishing villages (Wasserstrom, 2009, p.1). Since Shanghai began to urbanise in the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’,
different imaginaries have been attached to both regions. Such a difference can be summarised by the popular Chinese saying: ‘A single room in Puxi is better than a whole apartment in Pudong’ (ningyao Puxi yijianfang, buyao Pudong yitaofang) (Lu, 1999, p.359). It meant that people much preferred to live in Puxi than in Pudong, because the westbound was much more developed and properties were much more valued.  

With different trajectories of urbanisation, different strategies were practised by the state to transform urban space during the preparatory period of the Shanghai Expo. The capitalist past of Puxi was imagined through the revitalisation of heritage and the skyline of Pudong was celebrated as the achievement of the state. Pudong was taken as an icon of the miraculous economic development within a short period of time. However, such an impression changed since the State Council announced the establishment of a special economic zone, the Pudong Development Zone, for foreign investment in 1992 (Wasserstrom, 2009, p.122). With the facilitation by state policies and foreign investments, Pudong rapidly urbanised with Lujiazui developed as the new central business district of the city. Lujiazui is concentrated with skyscrapers and two of the world’s top ten tallest buildings, namely the Shanghai International Financial Centre and the Jin Mao Tower, are located there. The Asia and the World’s second tallest building, the Shanghai Tower, are also expected to be completed in 2014. These skyscrapers produced a modernist skyline in Pudong that is a drastic contrast with the

---

34 Spatial arrangement is always an important factor in shaping the identity of the Shanghaiese. As discussed in Chapter Four, Shanghai was divided into the walled ‘Chinese city’ and concession areas during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ (Wet, 1987, p.6). The ‘Chinese city’ was further categorised into the ‘higher corner’ (shang zhi jiao; the city’s fine neighbours) and the ‘lower corner’ (xia zhi jiao; the city’s poor neighbours) to represent the differences in resident composition in both regions. However, such a spatial segregation is insignificant to non-locals (Lu, 1999, p.15).
historic buildings at the Bund across the River, and are celebrated as miracles of economic liberation by the state (Wu, 1998, p.140). Such a divide highlights two kinds of spatial practices under state-led/-participation mode of production in Shanghai. In this section, the spatial practices in Puxi and Pudong will be outlined as a cognitive map that will allow understanding of the different trends of spatial (re)construction that are happening in Shanghai.

5.2.2 Spatial Practice in Puxi

Due to its proximity to the mainland, Puxi was the administrative region of Shanghai when it developed as a market town in the thirteenth century. It was where the Concession areas, the Bund and Wu Jiao Chang was located. As discussed in Chapter Four, the social space of Puxi can be regarded as the showroom of modernisation during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’. For examples, modern urban infrastructure, such as gaslighting, electricity, cafés, cinemas, dance halls and Art Deco buildings were introduced to China through Puxi (Lee, 1999a, p.77). The Bund exhibited the presence of global capitalism; and nationalist icons such as the stadium were also built in Wu Jiao Chang, as a national symbolic confrontation to imperialism.

With a relatively longer history and the lack of comprehensive planning during the early phase of urbanisation, roads in Puxi are generally narrow, serving to stratify the region into relatively small districts. Along the Bund are the façades of the headquarters of banks, insurance companies, trading companies, the Customs Office and foreign embassies. Not far away from these western structures, located at the end of Nanjing
Road, is the first department store in China, and located at Fuzhou Road are the publishing houses. Puxi was the political, cultural, economic and social centre of the city, so that the built heritage of Shanghai is mainly concentrated in Puxi (Diglio, 2005, p.112). The spatial practice in Puxi is therefore dominated by urban renewal and heritage revitalisation projects. Under these projects, space is commercialised and gentrified with the purpose of reconnecting the city to her capitalist past and at the same time provide justification for economic liberalisation.

Lefebvre particularly emphasised the importance of the history of space. Not only because it helps understand changing class relations, but also the rearrangement of social space could only occur on the foundation of the existing one (Shields, 1999, p.170). In Chapter Two, I briefly discussed that the production of new space was enabled by the disintegration of the old towns (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.68-69, 81). In this thesis, I therefore only include the ‘old districts’ in the city centre of Shanghai in my categorisation of Puxi to examine how new space is produced on the existing one. In spite of their geographical location at the west of the Huangpu River, countryside areas or new towns such as Jiading and Baoshan are not included in my categorisation.

During urbanisation, history and nature are usually manipulated by ‘spatial experts’ (e.g., the state, property developers, urban planners) to promote a bourgeois lifestyle. A feeling of being ‘natural’ and ‘historical’ for the dominant class is constructed by urbanising space (e.g., constructing resorts in the countryside). For the regions which originally experienced a certain degree of urbanisation, history was also reconstructed in accordance with the ideology of the mode of production. The historic buildings in Puxi
were usually revitalised to promote a sense of ‘Shanghai nostalgia’. For instance, Xintiandi, a heritage revitalisation project of *linong* completed in 2001, was promoted by the municipal government as one of the best showcases of ‘Old Shanghai’ for the tourists who visited the city. Revitalisation projects such as Xintiandi attempted to reconnect the city to the capitalist and cosmopolitan past of old Shanghai in the 1930s through the façades of new buildings. It was imagined as Shanghai’s cultural roots, which provided a historical connection to the current turn to capitalism. The daily life of ordinary inhabitants was also glorified as the ‘the history of the city’. Ironically, this representation of history became possible only because the revitalisation project forced the relocation of Puxi’s original residents (Wai, 2006, p.250).

Alongside heritage revitalisation projects, individuals’ urban experience was also shaped by other initiatives of urban renewal. For instance, Wujiao Road, a vibrant street at Jingan District with restaurants and local food stalls on both sides, was reconstructed and expanded by the local district government. Under the plan, more shops opened in the street with more rental space available, which brought a rise in their commercial value. However, the distinctive features and local memories of the space were eradicated. The reconstruction of Wujiao Road is only one of the reconstruction projects in the bigger district along Nanjing Road West. Under the urban renewal vision of the Planning Bureau of Shanghai Jingan District (2011), Wu Jiao Road was zoned as the ‘media and culture district’ (because the headquarters of some media organisations are located there), thus the street was reconstructed in order to comply with this vision. Before the Reform, social areas were arranged by land use (e.g., universities, factories), so the residents of various districts of Shanghai were relatively homogeneous. But
greater spatial differentiation is observed now (Wu, 2002, p.1594). By replacing ‘old’ districts and streets with an organised, clean and managed commercial space, a highly rationalised new urban experience is constructed for the consumption of the Chinese new rich.

Although the state identified different themes for the urban renewal of Puxi, the imagination of Puxi is predominately connected with its history. The imagination of daily life in Puxi is closely linked to the ‘sociological fossils’ that are represented by linong. For instance, the communal experience of living in linong was regarded as where local Shanghaiese identity was produced (Bao, Wang, Zhu, et al., 2001, pp.147-148). Therefore, any change in the spatial arrangement would predictably result in the alteration of the inhabitants’ perception and experience of the city. In Chapter Six, I further discuss how the demolition of linong changed the urban experience of Shanghai’s inhabitants today.

5.2.3 Spatial Practice in Pudong

The Chinese saying shiniān hédōng, shiniān hēxi is a metaphor of cycles. It means that the prosperity on the eastbound will eventually vanish but the westbound will flourish some day. When Puxi underwent extensive spatial rearrangement during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, Pudong was dominantly agricultural. From the 1950s to the 1970s, when Shanghai witnessed a rapid phase of industrialisation under the national policy, a number of immigrants from other provinces were settled in the poorly-built public housing in Pudong. With the lack of efficient transportation across
the River, most people regarded Pudong as a ‘remote’ area from the old district. Thus, Pudong was also commonly referred to as a rough district with internal immigrants, non-Shanghai, rural, less developed or even undeveloped. However, Pudong had rapidly urbanised in the 1990s. The Pudong New Area was also envisioned as a ‘new Manhattan’ (Gamble, 2003, p.x). Lujiazui, where there are many skyscrapers now, was planned as the central business district (CBD) of Shanghai and presented as a landmark of the ‘economic miracles’ of China’s market liberalisation. Some rewrote the above metaphor to ‘ten years on Puxi, ten years on Pudong’ (shinian puxi, shinian pudong) to describe the alternation of economic centres from Puxi to Pudong.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that urbanisation enabled the survival of capitalism by occupying space and producing new space (1996[1968], pp.68-69). While the spatial practice in Puxi is linked to the occupation of an urbanised space (urban renewal and heritage revitalisation), the spatial practice in Pudong concerns the creation of new space from absolute space. With its shorter history of urbanisation and the urbanist vision of planning, most urban development projects in Pudong are about the building of new centres, the development of industrial parks, as well as the creation of new towns and gated communities. When the establishment of the Pudong Development Zone was announced, Pudong was planned with a modernist vision and became a new centre of Shanghai (Arkaraprasertkul, 2010, p.248). Rather than the narrow roads and ‘disorganised’ spatial arrangement of Puxi, wide and long roads were constructed in Pudong. For instance, Century Avenue, the main road of Pudong from Lujiazui to Century Park, is 5.5km long and 100m wide.\footnote{Before Pudong was extensively urbanised in the early 1990s, the Mayor Zhu Rongji has referenced the} Eight lanes were built in each direction.
for the inhabitants to commute by car or public transport. The eastern end of the Avenue is Lujiazui (Bergère, 2009, pp.418-419). Alongside the headquarters of SOEs, local and global banks and financial institutes, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and shopping malls are also located here. The western end leads to Century Park and Century Square, where public facilities, including the Office of Pudong New Area Government, the Shanghai Oriental Arts Centre, the Shanghai Pudong EXPO, the Pudong New Area Archive Centre are located nearby. Not only do these iconic buildings play the role of showcasing the achievement of the development, but also nurture the city’s new political, economic and cultural centres.

The administration area of Shanghai is also expanding and producing new centres. As noted above, Puxi conventionally refers to the old districts in central Shanghai, but not the districts newly included in the municipality. These new districts usually have a lower level of urbanisation than development projects which were planned during the expansion of the administrative region. Similar to the urbanist planning vision of Lujiazui, new space is aimed to be produced. For instance, within the framework of the Master Plan of Shanghai (1999-2020), the Shanghai Municipal Government announced the ‘One City, Nine Towns Development Plan’ in 1999: nine towns with about a 30,000-100,000 inhabitants and a major city with about 500,000 residents were to be built by 2020. Each small town was to be given a theme of a European and North American country, e.g., Thames town, Dutch town and German town. Although the plan was shelved during the Eleventh Five Year Plan, similar plans of creating new cities
were carried out in Jiading, Songjiang and Lingang (Hartog, 2010a, pp.30-34). As these areas concerned with the creation of new space, I included these areas under the Pudong heading when categorising the spatial practices in Shanghai (though some districts are on the westbound of the Huangpu River).

In contrast to the high density of buildings in Puxi, skyscrapers, shopping malls and housing estates are scattered along Century Avenue in Pudong. As the scale increases, different regions in the districts are connected by public transport, including an underground system or buses. In Chapter Six, I illustrate how the urban experience, particularly the daily routine, of the inhabitants living in Pudong is shaped by the expansion of the city. The creation of new space also produced another kind of urban experience, which could be demonstrated by the differences between the gated communities and linong. Unlike linong, the ‘modern’ residential estates in Pudong, also built in Puxi but more prominent in new towns, are built as a gated community. These housing estates are fenced and usually monitored by property management companies (Wu, 2002, p.1595). Lefebvre argued that ‘new social relationships call for a new space, and vice versa’ (1991[1974], p.59). The emergence of the new rich in China has also demanded an improvement in living standards. The ‘modern’ residential estates are built with better facilities, thus no facilities such as toilets and kitchens are shared. However, interactions between neighbours become limited. In contrast to the communal bond in linong, social cohesion between neighbours in the gated community is almost non-existent. In Chapter Six, I further illustrate how such a spatial practice constructed the urban experience of the inhabitants.
5.3 The Representation of Space

After sketching the spatial practice of Shanghai, this section deciphers Shanghai’s representations of space and its dialectical relationship with spatial practice under the state-led/participation mode of production. In Chapter Two, I elaborated on the meanings of representations of space (‘conceived space’), which can be summarised as the hegemony of the dominant class to define spatial practice, so as to define the social relations of production (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.41). Lefebvre argued that representations of space ‘have at times combined ideology and knowledge’ to facilitate the production of space:

The area where ideology and knowledge are barely distinguishable is subsumed under the broader notion of representation, which thus supplants the concept of ideology and becomes a serviceable (operational) tool for the analysis of space, as of those societies which have given rise to them and recognised themselves in them. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.45; original emphasis)

In other words, representations of space can be regarded as the meaning, justification or rationalisation provided by the ruling class to contextualise the spatial practice of the city. It is a ‘conceived space’ because it represents the dominant class’s visions of the rearrangement of physical space (spatial changes). By manipulating the planning and construction of spatial arrangement in the city (through the knowledge of ‘spatial experts’) and supplanting ideology (to justify such a spatial arrangement), the dominant class shapes the urban experience of the city’s inhabitants.

Under this new mode of production, the state needed to establish a new relationship
between the state and individuals. What are the representations of space that the state constructed? What are the new ideologies upheld by the state? What are the visions of ‘spatial experts’ of reconfiguring the spatial arrangement of the city? Similar to the previous sections, I address these questions using the Shanghai Expo as an example.

5.3.1 ‘The City Makes Life Better’

As discussed in Chapter Four, urban areas were demonised as capitalistic, parasitic, and aristocratic during the ‘socialist reform era’, in particular the urbanism of Shanghai that flourished in the 1930s (Fung, 1981, p.280). The state therefore needed to provide ideological justifications for rapid urbanisation for the reversal of policy in recent decades. During the early phase of the Reform, urbanisation faced relatively little challenge as urban development after the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was generally agreed. But the drawbacks of urbanisation, including pollution, income disparity, uneven distribution and the destruction of cultural heritage, etc. were of much more concern in recent years. Economic expansion alone is no longer sufficient to defend urbanisation. The state therefore employed several ideological strategies to justify urbanisation.

The first ideological strategy was rather straightforward: urbanisation was promoted by the state as favourable and inevitable. Such a strategy was applied during the preparation stage of the Shanghai Expo. While early World Expos emphasised technological advancement, the theme of the Shanghai Expo was ‘Better City, Better Life’ (Huang, 2007, p.65). There were five subthemes addressing different aspects of the city, which included: ‘blending of diverse cultures in the city’, ‘economic prosperity in the city’, ‘innovations of science and technology in the city’, ‘remodelling of
communities in the city’, and ‘interactions between urban and rural areas’ (Huang, 2007, pp.69-73). However, the meaning of the Chinese version of the theme, *chengshi, rang shenghou geng meihao* (literally translated as ‘City Makes Life Better’), is not exactly the same as the English one. The English version emphasises the solutions to improve the quality of life by developing a better city, but the Chinese version simply justifies the city as a place which improves the quality of life. In a book with the subtitle *The Interpretation of the Theme of Shanghai World Expo* that was edited by the Theme Development Department of Bureau of Shanghai Expo Coordination, it is argued that urbanisation is a trend of history by referring to the increasing size of the global urban population:

> From the theoretical perspective, can a city make life better? Absolutely it can! Otherwise, why were there ten thousands of people rushing into the city when there were a thousand people complaining about city? (Editorial board of Expo Magazine, 2009, p.41)

Urbanisation was represented as favourable because it facilitated economic, social, cultural, and technological progress. Even though urbanisation produced social and environmental problems, it was seen as an inevitable global trend that could be challenged. The Shanghai Expo, which speeded up urbanisation, was paradoxically promoted as the state’s efforts to address these problems. For example, the exhibition at the China Pavilion did not focus on reflection about urbanisation, but rather focused on confirming China’s re-entry to the world and the official ideology of building a

---

36 The theme ‘Better City, Better Life’ was originally proposed by the BIE for a then withdrawn World Expo in Japan. This theme was adopted up by Shanghai upon a mutual agreement (Editorial board of Expo Magazine, 2009).

37 The official English title of this unit is somehow different from the Chinese version. Rather than ‘Theme Development Department’, the Chinese title (*Shanghai shibohui zhuti yanyi bu*) should be literally translated as ‘Theme Interpretation Department’.
‘harmonious society’ (Nordin, 2012, pp.243-244). Under such a representation of space, the visitors (whom were dominantly locals) were ‘educated’ to appreciate the benefits that urbanisation brings about to their lives, but not to critically evaluate the impact of urbanisation.

5.3.2 The Shanghai Expo as a Substitute for Political Campaigns

As discussed in Chapter Four, physical space was particularly important in establishing the social relations of production and restraining urban culture in China during the ‘socialist reform era’. The state exerted its control through danwei, where ‘the state controls the economy and monopolises all social resources’ (Sun, 2004, p.31 cited Wu, 2011, p.702). The urban population was also compulsorily assigned to a danwei, where they were employed. Housing and other social welfare were also allocated by the local government through the respective danwei. In other words, individuals were spatially, politically and socially organised by the state with danwei being positioned at the centre of the social relations of production. Entering the ‘post-socialist reform era’, the state began to restructure SOEs and employment outside danwei became possible. Together with the emergence of the private property market (as a direct result of land commodification), residential location in urban areas became no longer allocated by danwei. The decline of danwei entails two implications. First, there was a transformation of social relations of production. Danwei was no longer the physical space where the social relations of production were produced. The liberalisation of spatial arrangement in the location of residences means that the inhabitants were liberalised from a centrally-planned economy. The urban population was also stratified
into different social classes (Bian, 2002, pp.92-93). Second, the social life of urban inhabitants was no longer organised by the state through *danwei* and tied to political campaigns.

Although an anti-urbanisation policy was carried out in the Maoist era, the socialist regime was always aware of the political implications of urban space. When Beijing was developed as a socialist capital, for instance, Tiananmen Square was purposely reconstructed on a grand scale. This impressive scale provided the physical space for political gatherings, including army parades and people gathering during National Day (Hung, 2001, pp.458-459). Parades were less frequently organised in recent years, and more importantly, political campaigns were less readily organised after the collapse of *danwei*. Therefore, mega-events like the Shanghai Expo were promoted as a national event. Chinese cities began to organise international events since the late 1990s. For instance, Kunming held the World Horticultural Expo in 2001, Beijing held the Olympic Games in 2008; the Asian Games 2010 and the Summer Universiade 2011 were held in Guangzhou and Shenzhen respectively. Similar to the Shanghai Expo, these events were ‘place-branding spectacles’ (Dynon, 2011, p.186). More importantly, these events are represented as a national project for the people to participate in the country’s development. For example, the Shanghai Expo Bureau (expo2010.cn, 2010) emphasised that there were about 80,000 volunteers contributing to the event. Alongside the concern of recruiting people to execute the event, it also mobilised the people to take part in the state through a national project. With the collapse of *danwei*, the state re-established its relationship to the people through mega-events. Therefore, the Shanghai Expo, as well as other mega-events, served as substitutes for political campaigns as strategies for mass
5.3.3 The Realisation of a ‘Century-old Dream’

The collapse of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) in the early 1990s alerted the leaders of the CPC to the political implications of economic reform. Li Jingjie, the director of the former Soviet-Eastern Europe Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), identified eight lessons for the CPC to learn. Alongside improving productivity, the material life of the people and incorporating capitalist features into the economic system, Li argued that the state should be ‘ideologically flexible and progressive’ because ‘there is no set model for a socialist society’ (Shambaugh, 2008, p.76). When idealistic socialism began to be questioned in the early 1990s, one of the strategies of filling such an ideological vacuum was the promotion of patriotism through the national education programmes in campuses and the media. By confronting national enemies (e.g., militarism and rightist movements in Japan), emphasising the history of humiliation (e.g., the invasion of colonialism since the late Qing Dynasty) and glorifying national achievement (e.g., achievement in the Olympic Games and space programme), national identity was fostered, especially among younger generations (Zheng, 2008, pp.791-792). Similarly, urbanisation was also glorified as a national achievement by the state. For instance, the urban development of Lujiazui at Pudong (material space) was represented as a symbol of the success of the Reform, and perhaps even more importantly, the achievement of the CPC in accomplishing the country’s dream during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’:
As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, Dr. Sun Yat-sen envisioned a great ‘Oriental Harbor’ in Shanghai, including Pudong, but his vision was not realized. In the last decade of that century, dramatic changes took place in this area. Farmland and villages were turned into an export-oriented, multi-functional, modern new urban district. Pudong became known as a ‘symbol of Shanghai’s modernization’ and a ‘symbol of China’s reform and opening’. (Shanghai Municipality, 2011d)

The visually powerful scenery of a modernist skyline at Lujiazui was manipulated to justify the Reform, as an effective means to revitalise the country (i.e. accomplishing the dream of Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China). Similarly, the Shanghai Expo was also represented as a symbol of patriotism by the state. In an opening speech to the seventh World Expo International Forum, Wen Jiabao (2009), the former Premier of the State Council, described the World Expo as a ‘remote dream’ of China:

In 1910, a young man by the name of Lu Shi’e wrote a fictional novel A New China, envisaging how a universal exposition was held in Shanghai’s Pudong area 100 years later. Liang Qichao, a leader of the Reform Movement of 1898 in China, also expressed his desire for Shanghai to host the World Expo so that his motherland, ‘the sleeping lion’, ‘can be woken up from the deep dream and cured of its protracted illness’. But, in those days, to host the World Expo was nothing but a remote dream for the Chinese nation, as it had to grapple with domestic problems and foreign invasion and declining national strength … Since the founding of New China, especially the introduction of the policy of reform and opening-up, China has seized the historic opportunities and realized a three-decade-long rapid growth, with remarkable achievements in its socialist development. China is opening wider to the outside world. It is back on the stage of the World Expo, and its increasingly important role in the Expo is widely welcomed and appreciated by the international community. (Wen, 2009)

Since Premier Wen delivered the speech, the discourse of ‘the realisation of a century-old dream’ became widely circulated in the Chinese media. As it is a ‘remote
dream’ being aspired to when China was ‘humiliated’ by Western powers, the Shanghai Expo was elevated as the revitalisation of the Chinese nation. Alongside a ‘remarkable achievement of socialist development’, the Shanghai Expo and accompanying urbanisation projects were also projected as ‘the realisation of a century-old dream’.

Such a representation of space, firstly, established the relations between the inhabitants and the state: the inhabitants of Shanghai should take part in the Shanghai Expo because it is a contribution to the modernisation of the country. It implies that the inhabitants should not disagree with the relocation plan of this mega-event – it is because the relocation was also a part of the country’s modernisation project. Secondly, this representation of space also established the legitimacy of the state. The time frame of the ‘dream’ is perhaps more important than the ‘dream’ itself. The ‘remote dream’ was written one hundred years ago, yet the weak empire and the Republic could not actualise it. As such, the Communist regime is glorified in accomplishing the dream after ‘a hundred year of humiliation’.

Such a ‘century-old dream’ of organising a universal exposition at Pudong was, however, mistaken. In the novel, *Lu Shi’ē* did not make any prediction that Shanghai would hold a World Expo in 2010. But he only randomly dreamt of Shanghai organising a large-scale national exposition in 1928. The mistake could be identified easily by referring to the original novel (Chen, 2010, pp.350-354). The Expo Bureau recruited a special team of researchers to conduct research on the World Expo especially about China’s participation in early World Expos. Thus, it is not unreasonable to postulate that such a mistake is somehow purposeful, so as to manipulate knowledge as a ‘serviceable tool’ to provide justification for the production of space.
5.3.4 Surpassing the West and the ‘China Model’

On the official website of the Shanghai Expo, the following figures were presented on the front page:

- Size of Expo sites: 5.28sq km
- Number of participants: 246
- Number of visitors: 73 million
- Number of events: 22,290
- Number of volunteers: 79,965

These figures are ranked number one in this history of the World Expo. The urbanisation of Shanghai in the last decade was also promoted as the modernisation of city infrastructure and having surpassed that of Western cities. The assertion of ‘150 years for London, 15 years for Shanghai’ was frequently used as propaganda, proclaiming that Shanghai took only 15 years to construct a comprehensive underground system that took London a century and a half (China News, 2010). While ‘a hundred years of humiliation’ is self-victimisation, ‘surpassing the West’ emphasised the national achievement. The Shanghai Expo was regarded a milestone, which is visualised by the transformation of physical space.

Such an ideological justification is particularly important to justify a state-led/-participation mode of production as a specific model of China. In 1989, there
were student movements across different regions of the country to protest against corruption, which ended in the Tiananmen Incident. The regime was challenged and therefore this led to the temporary suspension of economic liberalisation and the state took a stronger role in both economic and political realms. The reason for maintaining a totalitarian state was therefore both economic and political. Especially amid the global financial crisis, the rising economic power and political influence of China has attracted attention from the international media and scholars. While deregulation is generally regarded as the reason for the crisis (Crotty, 2009, p.564), China’s New Left intellectuals proclaimed that the combination of the market economy and government intervention is the reason for China’s economic success. As I briefly pointed out in Chapter One, they escalated the discussion to an ideological level by suggesting that a ‘China Model’ or ‘Beijing Consensus’ was developed as an alternative to neo-liberalism and the Washington Consensus (Zheng, 2011, pp.100-103). Adopting a similar line of thought, the Shanghai Expo was regarded as a symbol of ‘surpassing the West’ (e.g., attracting the highest number of visitors). In general, the urbanisation of Shanghai also provided ‘proof’ that the socio-political system in China is superior to Western countries.

5.3.5 The Reproduction of the Mode of Production

When Lefebvre outlined the history of space (of Western societies), he emphasised that the relationship between (social) space and social relations of production is dialectical. Each mode of production will produce a corresponding (social) space. Dialectically, the (social) space itself will also reproduce the social relations and the mode of production
For example, as a typical strategy to stimulate economic activities, the government attempted to attract investment by constructing an industrial estate. When more factories were built, more workers would be attracted to work and live in/around the industrial estate. This in turn created further demand for the production of spatial arrangement. Lefebvre then applied the spatial triad to illustrate how the conceived space (representation of space) shaped the material space (spatial practice) to facilitate the reproduction of the mode of production and shape the experience of the individuals (ibid, p.50).

The state-led/-participation mode of production in Shanghai also reproduced itself through the production of new space. In this chapter, I highlighted the role of the state in such a mode of production, i.e. it did not transform to a pure regulatory institution for market competition but continued to uphold ultimate control on the pace and direction of liberalisation. Whenever necessary, it also played a dominating role in the market through legislation of market regulation and participation in market activities. As explained above, through its power of legislation, the state created a land market for fundraising capital from the market but also kept the autonomous market limited. Albeit the process of economic liberalisation appears to continue, a ‘natural’ monopoly has been created by the state through the reorganisation of SOEs. Paradoxically, the marketisation of SOEs has facilitated its monopolisation of the market.

This process of ‘monopolisation through marketisation’ is possible only with the lack of a supervision system or resistance in society. When Max Weber examined the bureaucracy of the Chinese empire, the term ‘patrimonialism’ was applied to describe
that the emperor and statesmen took the state as their personal property (Ritzer, 1992, pp.132-133). Although government officials, at whatever level, could no longer exert absolute power like an emperor, the state still showed some features of patrimonialism. As illustrated above, strategic industries are still controlled by the state through the SASAC, in which the top officials of the SASAC and senior management of SOEs are the senior officials in the party branch or somebody with close ties to them. As SOEs are required to remit a limited proportion of the profit to the state, SOEs could easily become the tool of some senior officials to generate income for themselves. Consequently, vested interest lured officials to further strengthen the mode of production by promoting favourable policies for the SOEs.

Alongside the personal interest of officials, the state and the private sector also established a pro-growth coalition (Zhang, 2002, p.475). As identified by Tingwei Zhang, after the Asian Financial Turmoil, the land commodification projects in China became a new investment opportunity for international financial institutes when other economies shrunk. Land commodification was thus speeded up since the late 1990s; a strategy of capital accumulation. The infrastructure and property development were costly, competition from individual investment was therefore prevented and the pro-growth coalition could sustain its monopoly (ibid, pp.487, 493). When the income from land commodification became increasingly significant (especially for local governments), the state further strengthened this mode of production and even participated in the market. In the late 1990s, when the vacancy rate in Shanghai arguably reached 40%, there was alarm that a property bubble had built up (Haila, 1999, p.108). However, the property market continued to expand as the local government
continued to implement policies favouring the development of the property market (He and Wu, 2005, p.10).

Lefebvre predicted that new space also reproduced a mode of production (1976[1973], p.63). As illustrated above, the Shanghai World Expo Land Reserve Centre generated greater income with policy favours. When the land was commodified, the local residents needed to be relocated and this was usually resolved by monetary compensation. After receiving compensation, individuals would further invest in the property market with their compensation, which further strengthened this property-led development. In the next chapter, I further illustrate in greater detail how the property market shaped inhabitants’ urban experience and the resistance that emerged with relocation.

5.4 Conclusion: Rebuilding Shanghai

It has been argued that Shanghai experienced ‘the most dramatic spatial transformation of any city anywhere’ in the last two decades (Chen, 2007, p.1). The colossal scale of urbanisation of Shanghai in the last decade easily made people recall and compare the redevelopment project of Paris by Haussmann during the French Second Empire (Wong, 2009, p.15). As introduced in Chapter Two, Haussmann was commissioned by Napoléon III to rebuild Paris, with measures, including the widening of streets, constructing boulevards, replacing old buildings by new ones with standard heights, as well as constructing intercity railways, etc. Similar projects were carried out in Shanghai during the ‘post-socialist reform era’, especially catalysed by the Shanghai Expo. As discussed above, examples included, linongs were demolished and replaced by
‘modern’ residential apartments, Century Avenue was constructed, new towns were
developed, and infrastructure facilities, such as bridges, railways and highways were
constructed.

Under Haussmann’s plan, Paris was strategically rebuilt, with the purpose of
ascertaining the authority of the Empire, to provide easier access for the army, as well as
replacing the working class by the bourgeoisie (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.75-76).
Similar to Haussmann’s plan of renovating Paris, the rapid urbanisation of Shanghai
was also functional (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.312). In this chapter, by delineating the
restructuring of SOEs, the spatial practices and the representations of space, I argued
that the state-led/-participation mode of production has been developed. Through the
double roles as a regulator and a market player, the state manipulated its power to
closely control society and generate benefits from market liberalisation. Land
commodification facilitated such a mode of production, and in turn resulted in the rapid
urbanisation of Shanghai during the last decades. By ‘unifying’ the features of socialist
and capitalist logics, the state was also able to sustain economic growth to justify the
mode of production itself, as well as the legitimacy of single party rule. The state has
played a heavy role in facilitating the mode of production. Under the
state-led/-participation mode of production, land commodification played the central
role in capital accumulation. Land commodification is the process of producing an
abstract space from concrete space with the exchange value of the land being valued
over use value (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.296). As revenue from land sales contributed
significantly to the local government’s income, rural areas of Shanghai (especially in
periphery of city the centre or satellite towns) were rapidly converted for urban
development (Liu, Zhan and Deng, 2005, p.453). Even though the State Council enacted several regulations to control urban expansion in the late 1990s, the regulations were not effectively implemented. Farmland continued to be converted for urban land use for economic purpose (ibid, pp.453-454). In the terminology of Lefebvre, urban fabrics spread across the country, which means ‘all manifestation of the dominance of the city over the country’ (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], pp.3-4). In this chapter, I identified the spatial practices under Puxi/Pudong divide, and the representations of space that the state constructed to provide ideological justifications for the emergence of new spatial arrangement and establishing the relations between the state and individuals.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that urbanisation is the process of transforming an absolute space (0% of urbanisation) to abstract space (100% of urbanisation) (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.7; 1991[1974], see Chapter 4). The urbanisation of Shanghai also demonstrated such a trend of complete urbanisation. As Lefebvre argued, abstract space is contradictory in nature (1991[1974], pp.356-357). The city is where the contradictory social groups established their tragic relationship, and an urban revolution will occur when urbanisation entered a critical phase.

Both the redevelopments of Paris and Shanghai were large in scale, rapid, ambitious and involving large number of inhabitants and led by the state. Lefebvre argued that the working class was pushed away from the city centre and replaced by a bourgeoisie consumption space under Haussmann’s rebuilding of Paris (1971[1968], p.36). Similar observations can be found in Shanghai. The production of space in Shanghai has also produced differences – China is no longer egalitarian and inequalities become
increasingly visible in city. How will spatial arrangement shape the experiences of inhabitants living in a city under rapid transformation? How will inhabitants perceive such a spatial transformation and the ideological strategies of the state? Lefebvre argued that the modern state ‘neutralises whatever resists it by castration or crushing’ (1991[1974], p.23). Will the state ‘neutralise’ the resistance in Shanghai? In the next chapter, I further apply the third moment of the spatial triad, i.e. representational space, to examine the urban experience of the inhabitants of Shanghai, as well as exploring the possibility of civil resistance against urbanisation.
CHAPTER SIX

URBAN EXPERIENCE, IMAGINATION AND RESISTANCE

A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself, but has merely changed ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses. A social transformation, to be truly revolutionary in character, must manifest a creative capacity in its effects on daily life, on language and on space — though its impact need not occur at the same rate, or equal force, in each of these areas.

- Henri Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.54)

A number of revolutions were declared in China in the last century, e.g., Xinhai Revolution in 1911 against imperial rule, the Socialist Revolution against the Nationalist Party and capitalists, as well as the ‘Cultural Revolution’. The country’s political system, social stratification, economic structure, diplomatic relations, as well as cultural practices and familial relationship were all reshaped (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, pp.241-245; Spence, 1999, pp.271-273) by these upheavals. As examined in Chapter Four, prior to the socialist revolution, Shanghai took a leading role in promoting revolutions in both political actions and daily lives by introducing and adapting Western thought, cultural practices and an economic model (e.g., Bergère, 2009, p.4; Yeh, 2007, p.378). Capitalism and cosmopolitanism had emerged in this coastal city, yet the golden period was concluded by the Second Sino-Japanese War and then the socialist regime. Due to the aversion of the party-state to urbanism, the economic composition (from a financial centre to a manufacturing one) and urban lifestyles were restructured. The political campaigns during the socialist construction period had ‘realised its full potential’ with the daily life of the inhabitants undergoing
drastic changes, from admiring an individualistic bourgeois way of life to an organised social life under close state supervision.

Although it did not involve any alteration of the ruling party, the Reform in 1978 was regarded by Deng Xiaoping as the ‘Second Revolution’ of the socialist China that produced social transformations in economic life, social life and spiritual life (Xinhua News, 2004). Alongside the morphology of city space, the daily lives of the inhabitants of Shanghai also underwent drastic changes, since the state began to withdraw from absolute control. In what ways have this ‘Second Revolution’ manifested ‘a creative capacity in its effects on daily life, on language and on space’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.54)? In what ways did the inhabitants experience and perceive the changes? How did they respond to the urban transformation of the city? In Lefebvre’s spatial triad, social space can be examined in three moments – the perceived space (spatial practice), the conceived space (representations of space) and the lived space (representational space). In the last chapter, I outlined the political economy of the state-led/-participation capitalism: how it shaped spatial practice to facilitate the perpetuation of the mode of production, as well as the ideological justifications (representations of space) for land commodification. In this chapter, I focus on describing the urban experience of the inhabitants (representational space) and demarcating its dialectical relationship with spatial practice and representations of space under the state-led/-participation capitalism.

The inhabitants of Shanghai have different urban experiences during different periods of the city’s history. In recent years, there has been a wave of ‘Shanghai nostalgia’,
meaning that historical memory of ‘Old Shanghai’ was reconstructed to rediscover the past, critique the present and prepare for future development. In 2005 and 2006, the movie and the TV drama Everlasting Regret were broadcast, which invited another wave of Shanghai nostalgia. The movie and TV drama were adapted from the novel Song of Everlasting Sorrow (2008[1995]), written by a Shanghaiese novelist Wang Anyi with the subtitle A Novel of Shanghai. Setting the scene in the periods between the 1940s and 1980s, the novel described the ‘heart of the dreams, fantasies, and everyday rituals of a Shanghai that ceased to exist after 1949’ (Zhang, 2000, p.369). The story portrayed the life of a Shanghaiese woman, Wang Qiyao. Growing up in the Republican era when the social atmosphere was relatively liberal, Wang built up an adventurous personality. She won the title of Miss Shanghai in a beauty contest, and then became a mistress of an influential bureaucrat of the Republican government. However, as discussed in Chapter Four, symbols of ‘corrupt’ Western capitalist lifestyle, such as Mandarin popular music (shidaiqu) and ballroom dancing were banned by the socialist regime, while revolutionary songs and dancing were promoted. The social life of urban inhabitants became organised by the danwei system, so that the bourgeois lifestyle of Wang Qiyao was no longer possible. Her properties were nationalised and allocated by the state and were shared among migrant workers during the period of state-led industrialisation. Since the economic reform measures were adopted in Shanghai, she took up her hobbies again, as quickly as the city revitalised its capitalist past. However, the story concluded with a sad ending: a young man whom she fell in love with murdered her.

Though probably not as dramatic as the story of Wang Qiyao, the daily lives of the
inhabitants in Shanghai have been also (re)organised by the economic reform measures in last three decades. The Reform has manifested its ‘creative capacity’ on ‘daily life, language, space’. When the Reform began, new communal relationships, new lifestyles as well as new urban culture emerged. How did the inhabitants experience, perceive and respond to the production of new (social) space? As discussed in Chapter Three, in answering this question, Lefebvre emphasised the importance of describing the experience of inhabitants by referencing different sources of data and applying appropriate survey techniques (e.g., participant observation, interviews, etc.) (2003[1953], p.117). Lefebvre criticised empiricist and positivist sociologists who usually failed to examine, while only describing the impact of urban planning on the experience of urban inhabitants (2003[1966], p.121). Only through understanding the communal life of the inhabitants, can the ‘conditions’ of the whole community be evaluated. More importantly, he also argued that narrating subjective experience of inhabitants is an essential element in providing a holistic analysis of urban, as well as rural, space. Such a description of urban experience served as the first moment (‘descriptive’) of the regressive-progressive method, which provides the empirical background for further analysis of space at a theoretical level (Lefebvre, 2003[1953], p.117).

The first aim of this chapter therefore, is to describe daily life in Shanghai under the state-led/-participation mode of production, based on the data collected through in-depth interviews and other secondary sources. When the Shanghai Expo accelerated the transformation of the urban landscape, in what way have people’s daily lives been further reshaped? In what way did such inhabitants perceive the urbanisation of
Shanghai? What did they feel about the rapid social transformations? These questions are to be approached through scrutinising the perception, experience and imagination of the inhabitants of Shanghai.

The first part of this chapter examines how the experiences of the inhabitants of Shanghai were shaped by spatial practice, as well as how urbanisation further produced inequalities rather than providing a ‘better life’ for the people. Alongside the urban landscape, the Shanghai Expo had also speeded up the transformation of social relations of production. Some people benefited from market liberalisation, but the reform also produced and deepened social inequalities. This chapter will examine how the inequalities were produced through social space and everyday life.

Following this, the relationship between representations of space and representational space will be examined. In Chapter Five, I introduced several strategies that have been applied by the state to re-establish the relationship between the state and the people, as well as to provide the ideological justification for the Shanghai Expo and urbanisation in general. Lefebvre argued that each mode of production has its space and its social relations of production (1976[1973], pp.43-45). When the state began to refrain from the allocation role in production and formulated policies favouring the private sector, the relationship between the state and individuals was altered. In this chapter, I will further elaborate the responses for the spatial arrangement by the inhabitants. Particular focus will be placed on how the respondents in my semi-structured interviews imagined their relationship with the state in their daily experience.
Finally, the possibilities and limits of resistance will be addressed. When reviewing Lefebvre’s spatial triad with reference to the discussion of Gregory (1994, p.121) in Chapter Two (c.f. Figure 2.1), I pointed out the coercive nature of representations of space (i.e. the state attempted to construct individuals’ daily life through the conceptualisation and rearrangement of space). Hence, resistance from the urban inhabitants occurred (representational space) as a response. The possibility of resistance is particularly relevant to Lefebvre’s periodisation of urbanisation. He foresaw an urban revolution to reclaim centrality when a city entered the critical phase (2003[1970], pp.15-17).

Under the state-led/-participation mode of production, the social space of Shanghai became more fragmented (e.g., the production of new centres with the expansion of administrative areas) and contradictory (e.g., the rural-urban divide). Land commodification is vital to sustain the current mode of production, and relocation is usually involved. The urban renewal scheme also resulted in a higher cost of living. The Shanghai World Expo has intensified such process. Are these the signals that Shanghai has entered a critical phase? In recent years, ‘maintaining stability’ (weiwen) has become one of the major concerns of the Chinese government, in which the budget for internal security (US$111.4 billion) even exceeded military expense for national defence (US$106.4 billion) (Lawrence and Martin, 2013, p.14). In particular, the protests against relocation and land expropriation were regarded as one of the major threats to the stability of the regime (Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, pp.890-891). Has Shanghai entered the critical phase? Will the ‘Second Revolution’ produce an urban revolution? Is Lefebvre’s theory applicable to explain this Chinese city? This chapter will conclude
with a discussion on these questions.

6.1 Spatial Arrangement and the Lived Space

Even before publishing his theory on space, Lefebvre had already pointed out the close association between spatial arrangement and urban experience. In his book *Everyday Life and the Modern World*, Lefebvre noted that ‘the disintegration of traditional town and the expansion of urbanism’ have facilitated the emergence of ‘a programmed everyday life’ in France in the 1960s (1971[1968], p.65). Similar strategies of producing new (social) space can also be observed in Shanghai today. New space was created by new towns in the peripheries (the spatial practice of ‘Pudong’) and the urban renewal projects in the city centre (Puxi). In the last chapter, I described the spatial practices of Puxi and Pudong.

Alongside producing specific spatial arrangements, Lefebvre noted that the mode of production also shaped our daily life through rearranging the social clock. He argued that our daily life in modern society can be divided into three categories: *pledged time*, *free time*, and *compulsive time* (1971[1968], p.53). *Pledged time* means time spent on production (i.e. work time), *free time* stands for leisure time or non-working hours, while *compulsive time* means ‘the travelling time or time for bureaucratic formalities’.38 He argued that alienation in modern society does not only exist in production (*pledged time*), but also in everyday life (*free time*). Class consciousness was then obscured by the invasion of the capitalist logic into the everyday life (e.g., consumption,

---

38 Elden (2004c, p.115) translated the terms as ‘required time, free time and constrained time’.
advertisements) and produced what he called a ‘bureaucratic consumption of controlled society’ (1971[1968], see Chapter 2). The rearrangement of daily routine is particularly noticeable in post-Reform China. With the decline of the danwei, social life is no longer under direct control by the state, and wider choices of occupations and locations of residence are possible. Before examining the urban experience, therefore, the reorganisation of the social clock will be outlined to serve as a background to understanding the changes in everyday life.

6.1.1 The Reorganisation of the Social Clock

Urban inhabitants were organised by the danwei before the Reform, where their jobs and residences were allocated. Political study groups were organised after work so that the separation between work and social life after work was not clear (Lu, 2006, p.58). Danwei is primarily a socio-spatial arrangement, but it also has temporal implications for daily life.39 As discussed in Chapter Four, alongside being a production unit, jobs, housing, social activities and social welfare were planned and allocated by party officials through each danwei across urban China. Therefore, the danwei became ‘the basic unit of urban social … and urban spatial organization’ (Bray, 2005, p.124). The separation between workplace and social areas was also not always clear. Therefore, work, family and social life were ‘intermingled’ and work time and domestic time were also not clearly separated (Lu, 2006, p.58). In other words, the distinction between pledged time, free time and compulsive time was insignificant before the Reform, and

39 Most studies of danwei focused on its functions (e.g., Bray, 2005; Lü and Perry, 1997), historical origin (e.g., Perry, 1997; Yeh, 2007), as well as the impact on urban life (e.g., Tang and Parish, 2000). However, its implication on the daily routine was usually ignored. One exception is Lu (2006, see Chapter 3). For a succinct review of the some key studies on danwei, refer to Bian (2005).
the social relations of production were closely organised by the state. Individuals were organised spatially, they dwelled and worked in the same housing block or somewhere nearby. As housing was centrally allocated and managed under the party branch, the private sphere was politicised. *Danwei* was also where the social relations of production based that social statuses were defined within. Thus, when the state transformed its role in housing allocation, not only was new space created but also new social relations.

The diminishing role of the *danwei* system is an immediate outcome of the changing role of the state in the ‘post-socialist reform era’, and produced the most significant change in the reorganisation of social life. Political study sessions became less common and choices for leisure ‘multiplied’ (Davis, 1995, p.3). As their social life and work are no longer attached to the *danwei*, the people now enjoy greater freedom in determining their daily schedule. Although the state still maintains its decisive role in controlling economic activities, there is no direct intervention on daily life. *Pledged time, free time, and compulsive time* began to be differentiated. With the emergence of personal life and private housing, the arrangement of life during the Maoist era was ‘repudiated’ after the Reform (Davis, 2003, p.27). Research showed that 51% of the inhabitants in Shanghai chose their own residential location (Cevero and Day 2008, p.10). In the following sections, I will discuss how the new spatial arrangement in the city affected the urban experience of the inhabitants.

6.1.2 The Demolition of the *Linong*

Lefebvre argued that the ‘disintegration of the traditional town’ has facilitated the
‘programming’ of everyday life in modern French society (1971[1968], p.65). While Shanghai has a relative short history, the linong in the city centre of Puxi could be regarded as the ‘traditional town’. As discussed in Chapter Four, the linong was introduced by French developers during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ to meet the housing demand of the Chinese ‘refugees’ in the French Concession. Ironically, the ‘poor’ living conditions of the linong are frequently narrated as the foundation of the local identity of Shanghaiese. In the *Song of Everlasting Sorrow*, Wang Anyi began the novel by providing a lengthy description of the linong from an aerial view of point, which summarised the urban morphology of Shanghai in the pre-Reform period:

Looked down upon from the highest point in the city, Shanghai’s longtang — her vast neighborhoods inside enclosed alleys — are a magnificent sight. The longtang are the backdrop of this city. Streets and buildings emerge around them in a series of dots and lines, like the subtle brushstrokes that bring life to the empty expanses of white paper in a traditional Chinese landscape painting. As day turns into night and the city lights up, these dots and lines begin to glimmer. However, underneath the glitter lies an immense blanket of darkness — these are the longtang of Shanghai … Countless reefs lurk beneath this swelling ocean of darkness, where one false move could capsize a ship. The darkness buoys up Shanghai's handful of illuminated lines and dots, supporting them decade after decade. Against this decades-old backdrop of darkness, the Paris of the Orient unfolds her splendour. (Wang, 2008[1995], p.1)

Because of official suspicion towards urbanism, urban (re)development projects were limited so the urban morphology remained generally stable after the establishment of the socialist regime (Lee, 1999b, p.106). The ‘series of dots and lines’, constituted by narrow roads (when comparing with the Century Avenue at Pudong) and the linong, have constructed a ‘complicated’ network of space in Puxi that is familiar to local residents but unrecognisable to ‘foreigners’. After outlining the urban landscape, Wang
moved on to describe everyday life in this iconic residential space of Shanghai. She depicted that the *linongs* ‘exude a sensuality like the intimacy of flesh on flesh — cool and warm, tangible and knowable, a little self-centered’ (Wang, 2008[1995], p.6). As the facilities in *linong* were shared, it produced a lot of opportunities for the *amah* to gossip at the ‘grease-stained rear kitchen window’ (ibid, p.6). She argued that *linong* is the ‘*genius loci* of Shanghai’s alleys’ (ibid, p.9). A respondent concurred that the unique characteristics of the Shanghaiese were produced by the spatial arrangement of the *linong*:

> ‘Their social skills are acquired from the living experience of living in the crowded *linong*. Because the facilities are shared, they need to be calculative and astute, so will not be disadvantaged. In Beijing, if you try to borrow money from friends, you will find it very easy. However, if you borrow it from a Shanghaiese friend, you will not feel the same. Therefore, Shanghai people will give others an impression of being calculative. In addition, as they live very closely with neighbours, they developed interpersonal skills when they are very young.’

As discussed in Chapter Five, the ‘sociological fossils’ of the communal life in *linong* was imagined by the writer and inhabitants to construct a collective identity (Bao, Wang, Zhu, et al., 2001, pp.147-148). For instance, there was a lot of rivalries and calculations during daily encounters with the neighbours because public facilities were shared in *linong*. Astuteness is hence became ‘the most distinctive characteristics’ of Shanghaiese
(Lu, 1999, p.15), and ironically developed a strong communal bond through the experience of sharing public facilities. However, the total area of linong reduced from 35.4 million square metres in 1990 to 23.8 million square metres in 2005 (Shih, 2010, p.353). With the demolition of the linong, the above communal experience is no longer common or widely shared among the inhabitants of Shanghai. As the spatial arrangement of Puxi and the living experience in linong were regarded as the foundation of local Shanghai identity (Arkaraprasertkul, 2009, p.26), the demolition or revitalisation projects are eradicating or reengineering their identity and experience.

Alongside the demolition, the ‘preservation’ of heritage has further restructured the inhabitants experience and identity. Since 2000, buildable space in the city centre became scarce, which speeded up the heritage revitalisation projects (Laurans, 2005, p.4). For instance, I have argued in the previous chapter that the developer and local government intended to reconnect the city’s capitalist history through the heritage revitalisation project of Xintiandi. Similar examples of reconnecting history for the purpose of tourism included the First National Meeting Site of the Communist Party of China, Rui Jin Hotel, Duolun Road, as well as the Ohel Rachel Synagogue (Diglio, 2005, p.118). However, these projects usually focused on the renewal of the façades. The districts were gentrified with local residents becoming relocated or became socially excluded from the renewed district (Lu, 2008, p.156).

6.1.3 Alienation in New Towns and Industrial Parks

As introduced in Chapter Three, Lefebvre carried out an empirical study in Mourenx.
Located in the Pyrenees, Mourenx was a new town established in the 1950s next to Lacq, where oil wells and refineries were newly-discovered. The rapid development of Mourenx alerted Lefebvre to the impact of urbanisation (Elden, 2004c, p.128; Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.391 note 1). In Mourenx, and new towns in general, Lefebvre argued that (social) space is planned and arranged around production. The functions and locations of the facilities are clearly defined by the planners who programme the everyday life of the inhabitants:

The *new town* was the typical significant phenomenon in which and on which this organisation could be *read* because it was there that it was *written*. What, apart from such features as the negation of traditional towns, segregation and intense police surveillance, was inscribed in this social text to be deciphered by those who knew the code, what was projected on this screen? The organisation of the everyday, neatly subdivided (work, private life, leisure) and programme to fit a controlled, exact time-table. (Lefebvre, 1971[1968], p.59; original emphasis)

As discussed in Chapter Four, the Soviet model of developing agglomeration and integration of city cluster was implemented in the 1950s. Alongside integrating counties in vicinity to the Shanghai Municipality (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.532), five satellite towns were developed to support industrialisation (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, p.327). However, in 1990, over half (58%) of the Shanghai’s industrial output was still produced by the factories in the inner city (McGee, Lin, Marton, et al., 2007, p.133). More new towns and industrial parks were therefore built in outer Shanghai in the post-reform period for releasing space in the city centre, as well as to attract capital for industrial development. The newly-developed industrial parks were scattered across different remote districts of Shanghai. In Chapter Five, I introduced that new towns were established under the revised plan of ‘One City, Nine Towns Development Plan’. A

207
similar strategy has been adopted for the development of the Shanghai Expo. The local residents of the Expo Site have been relocated to three newly-developed Expo Estates scattered around the remote areas of Pudong. Compared to the village houses (where the relocated households originally resided), the multi-storey residential buildings in the Expo Estates are better furnished than the linong in Puxi or village houses in Pudong.

For example, organiser of the Shanghai Expo emphasised that the development of Sanlin Expo Homeland, located at Sanlin Town in Pudong, is well planned to suit the needs of the inhabitants.

The basic concept for township development is to provide a balanced and self-contained community, including infrastructure, community facilities and some basic facilities for daily life. Based on this model, the Sanlin Expo Homeland will optimize the layout of the public facilities such as public transport, commercial entities, cultural establishments, banks and post offices. All the functional areas will be connected with corridors to create a human-oriented urban space. (Cen, 2006)

Under the theme of ‘one axis, two centers, three zones and four belts’, a main road was built with two ‘public service centers’ located at the northern and southern sides of the estate. It is said that the centres will be ‘ideal grounds for living, shopping, recreation, entertainment and meeting’, which includes ‘a large supermarket, an indoor grocery, banks, a community health service center, a cultural center, a nursing home, a civic recreation square and some small commercial facilities’. The residential areas are divided into ‘three zones’ with the buildings in each zone having a similar architectural and aesthetic pattern (e.g., heights, colours and shapes). The ‘four belts’ refer to green areas (Cen, 2006). In general, these new towns in China were built with the vision of ‘connecting with global economy’, though the construction of high-end buildings and a

Nonetheless, there are discrepancies between the vision of the ‘spatial experts’ (conceived space) and the lived space of the inhabitants. Although it is supposed to be self-sustained, public facilities in new towns are usually too small in scale (in catering for the needs of the whole community), mono-functional, and located inconveniently for the residents. During an interview with a middle aged housewife who had relocated from a village house at Pudong to Expo Estate, she complained that her daily necessities were more expensive than in the city centre, even though she agreed that the living quality has improved (e.g., better security as a gated community). She attributed such an increase in living cost to the lack of competition in the new town – there is only one wet market in the estate. A survey with the residents of Shanghai also found that ‘Expo will increase product prices and transportation fee’ was the most negative impact of the Shanghai Expo (Ye, Scoot and Ding, 2012, p.1101).

As discussed in Chapter Five, Puxi and Pudong displayed different spatial practices. The urban space in Puxi is dominated by narrow and crisscrossed roads. The roads in Pudong are generally much wider and easier to get to know (e.g., zones with different colours). Tourists might easily get lost in Puxi, but travelling between different areas in Pudong is usually beyond walking distance. Similar to Jane Jacobs (1964, see Chapter 2), Lefebvre also reminded planners of the importance of streets:

In the town, the street is not a wasteland, nor is it the only place where – for good or ill – things happen … Spontaneous and transitionary, it is not simply there so that people can get from A to B, nor does it lay traps for them with lighting effects and displays of
Lefebvre argued that alienation does not only exist in production, but also in everyday life. The creation of new towns has illustrated the alienation of urban society (Elden, 2004c, p.171). With wider roads, fewer pedestrians and similar buildings, new towns such as the Sanlin Expo Homeland look more organised and spacious than the city centre of Puxi. However, if we took a photo in the new town, the photo would look empty because no social lives or history can be read from the streets without pedestrians and buildings with little difference. Similar example could be found in Anting, located in northwest Shanghai. The new town was built for 8,000 families, but only 200 families actually resided there. The rest of properties were purchased for real estate speculation but not residence. The inadequacy of public transport further alienated the residents without a private vehicle. A representative from the design company of Anting New Town also admitted that ‘it is a dead city quarter that will collapse’ (Hartog, 2010c, p.90). In the new towns, streets are no longer occupied by pedestrians. Public transport, within the estate or between districts, has become a necessity in daily life now, and daily routine is then programmed by the route and schedule of the bus lane. Even though the public transport station is said to be ‘conveniently integrated with the supermarket, the civic square and other facilities’ (Cen, 2006), the inhabitants still experienced the inconvenience of living in new towns almost every day. One housewife in my semi-structured interviews complained that:

‘the wet market here (the Sanlin Expo Homeland) is very small, [so]

I need to travel to somewhere else to buy food. However, there are
Although research has shown that the relocated residents are generally satisfied with the new living environment, they are usually less satisfied with the new neighbourhood (Li and Song, 2009, p.1104). This housewife also valued social contact with her neighbours. Before conducting the interview, she was chatting with her neighbours, arbitrarily sitting at the front exit of her building. To them, the ‘ideal grounds for living’ are not the planned areas in the public service centres but somewhere social lives are really lived out.

6.1.4 Commuting as a Repetitive Experience

As discussed in Chapter Five, the economic centre of Shanghai was relocated from the Bund to Lujiazui; new cultural facilities and government buildings were also built in Pudong. Multi-centres were produced when Shanghai expanded with the population continuing to grow. Residential regions were no longer concentrated in the old districts of Puxi but are dispersed across the city. When the facilities are not clustered within walking distance, travel becomes necessary. More importantly, after the withdrawal of the danwei system, the location of work is not always near to workers’ homes, thus commuting becomes a daily routine. Official statistics show that the daily commuting volume in Shanghai Metro has reached 17 million in 2013 (Shanghai Daily, 2013).

The routine of daily life has been shaped by spatial practice, and so compulsive time
becoming an important common experience of living in urban China. In the late 1970s, public transport and private vehicles were small in number, so that cycling and walking were common (Lu, 2006, p.73). Under the modernist vision of the urban planning of Shanghai, various regions were now connected by transportation system. From 1991 to 2002, the number of registered private automobiles increased from 200,000 to 1.4 million (Cervero and Day, 2008, p.1). The average time for commuting among Shanghai inhabitants is 50.4 minutes (eChinacities, 2011). This form of tedious, routinised travel is, for Lefebvre, one of the primary modes of characteristic of modern society (Lefebvre, 1987, p.10). A respondent informed me how exhausting commuting could be:

‘I usually spend more than half an hour. It’s relatively short, because I am living close to my office. But if I choose to live in flat with cheaper rent, then perhaps I need to spend around 1 hour or more than 1 hour on public transport. So I need to spend 2-3 hours to-and-fro, it’s actually very tiring. In other words, you have to spend much time on the road, so less time on making food and need to dine out all the time. It’s actually bad for your health.’

Urbanisation not only promoted geographical mobility within the city, but also between cities. Shanghai was planned as the ‘core city’ of the extended metropolitan region (EMR) of the lower Yangzi River delta (McGee, Lin, Marton, et al., 2007, p.121). With the expansion of the transportation system, mobility between cities within a ‘one-hour transportation circle’ was promoted. A ‘One-hour transportation circle’ means the area
within one-hour of driving or travel distance with public transport which covers another
two cities, Hangzhou and Suzhou (China Daily, 2010). Amid the surge of property
prices, the government promoted ‘regional integration of the cities’ in order that the
inhabitants could commute between cities, i.e. work in Shanghai but live in other
regions in the EMR (McGee, Lin, Marton, et al., 2007, see Chapter 7).

One of the respondents, a young man born in Shanghai who works in an investment
bank has tried to put this into practice. He purchased a flat with a mortgage in Kunshan,
an industrial town located between Shanghai and Suzhou, at a much lower rate than in
central Shanghai. He commuted between Kunshan and Pudong with his wife by driving
every morning and evening. After half a year, he released the flat in Kunshan and
moved back to Pudong because such a commuting experience was far too exhausting
for them. He chose to stay in Shanghai, because this is the only city in China where he
could find opportunities:

‘It is because I’m still curious about finance, and hope to develop
my career in finance. Shanghai is the first in the finance field,
except going to Beijing or Shenzhen. Actually Shanghai is more
close to my home town. It is also saying that Shanghai is going to
develop as a financial centre, I think it’s the best choice for my
future. So I finally chose to stay in Shanghai.’

Research about relocation behaviour in Shanghai has showed that residents have fewer
options of employment within the ‘one-hour mobilised travel time’ after relocation. But
the net income increased even after deducting their extra monthly expenses on commuting (Cervero and Day, 2008, p.11). Even though the experience during compulsive time is being ‘programmed’ by commuting as a routine, the economic structure of Shanghai is still attractive to the people who are looking for opportunities. Lefebvre (1976[1973], p.70) argued that urban space facilitated the perpetuation of the social relations of production. This is because only in the city the subordinate and dominant classes can meet to establish social relations. This is confirmed by surveys on the reasons for migrating to Shanghai. For instance, it is found that family financial need is one of the main reasons for migrating to Shanghai among female rural migrants (Fan, 2003, p.24). There are also ‘money boys’ (male migrants who engage in same-sex activities for money) looking for socioeconomic rewards in Shanghai (He, Wong, Huang, et al., 2007, p.105).

6.2 Imagination of the City and the Shanghai Expo

After applying the concepts of spatial practice (perceived space) and representational space (lived space) to illustrate the shaping of urban experience by the spatial arrangement of the city, this section will continue to examine the urban experience of the inhabitants by identifying the dialectical relationship between representations of space (conceived space) and representational space. Lefebvre noted that there are always discrepancies between the conceived space of the dominant class and the lived experience of the inhabitants, but that these also overlap. Besides culture and ‘work of artistic creations’, Lefebvre suggested that representations of space and representational space overlap through ‘imagination’ – the ‘imaginations’ of the dominant class as well
Based on their imagination of a city, the ‘spatial experts’ (e.g., government officials, planners, urbanists, technicians) have tried to manipulate the spatial arrangement and shape the daily life of the inhabitants. Among the inhabitants, representational space is the ‘space that the imagination seeks to change and appropriate’ the social space (1991[1974], p.39). In the city, inhabitants experienced the coercion from the representations of space (e.g., shaping their daily routine by an expanded network of public transport system), and then contextualise and tried to change it. The Shanghai Expo has speeded up the transformation of the urban landscape of Shanghai and produced new daily experience of the inhabitants. In response, how do the inhabitants ‘seek to change and appropriate’ such spatial (re)arrangement through their imagination? In this section, I will discuss the emergence of a new political imaginary among the inhabitants of Shanghai city.

6.2.1 Modern Lifestyle as a Divide

In the *Song of Everlasting Sorrow*, Shanghai was narrated as a Chinese cosmopolitan city with a capitalist past. Cosmopolitanism and capitalism were replaced by collectivism and socialism under the socialist regime. Now, the nostalgia for Old Shanghai is been manipulated to speed up heritage renewal projects. What the planners conceived was shared by a respondent who enjoyed the modern lifestyle of Shanghai:
'Yes, it’s a petty bourgeoisie (xiaoziyi), modern feeling ... Oh you said Puxi ... Puxi gives an old street feeling. You know modern people are nostalgic now, unlike before, nowadays old stuffs are good, or the older the better. Old stuffs in Puxi are actually quite well preserved, they are not destroyed by modernisation. Therefore, when you go to Puxi, there are many Chinese parasol trees ... you hardly find any in Pudong, but there are many in Puxi. Additionally, the roads are narrow, it gives you a strong feeling when walking under the Chinese parasol trees, like recalling the childhood memories, the feeling of the past.'

However, the beginning of the Reform also meant the end of egalitarianism. The commodification of land has stimulated economic growth but the economic return is not equally shared among individuals or social groups. In Pudong, for instance, the Gini Coefficient increased from 0.37 to 0.45 between 1994 and 2004, indicating that income inequality worsened during the period of most rapid urbanisation (Sassen, 2009, p.7). Under the socialist regime, inequality is always spatial: birthplace determined the life chances of people under the hukou system. Every citizen is allocated an official hukou account by location of residence (urban or rural) and socio-economic eligibility (agricultural or non-agricultural). Even after the State Council granted approval of policy of nonzhuangfei (i.e. the transfer of agricultural hukou to non-agricultural hukou) to local government in late 1990s, the policy only brought about limited impact on facilitating the integration of rural migrants into urban communities (Chan and
Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.86) argued that the city is where the dominant and subordinate classes assembled and established contradictory social relations. Shanghai, as an emerging economy with rapid urbanisation, has attracted migrants from other regions to seek job opportunities. National statistics showed that 27% of the total population of Shanghai is a floating population (internal migrants) (Liang and Ma, 2004, p.472, see Table 1). Most of them are involved in jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, with 80% of the ‘dirty, heavy, and dangerous jobs’ performed by rural migrants (Li and Wang, 1996, p.22). Urbanisation has worsened the inequality between the inhabitants with and without an urban *hukou* account. From 1994 to 2004, urban-rural income inequality increased from 2.3:1 to 3.3:1 (Chen and Sun, 2006, p.521). Research also shows that the *hukou* system has been considered as the one of most important factors constraining life chances, alongside gender, age, and income (Chan and Buckingham, 2008, p.582).

Space is social, because social space ‘permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.73). Perhaps more importantly, inequalities are perpetuated throughout everyday life. During the Shanghai Expo, there were media reports of ‘uncivilised’ behaviours including littering, spitting, jumping the queue, shouting, sleeping on the grassland, as well as insulting policemen in the Expo Site. Though such behaviours can also be found around the city, a local Shanghaiise respondent confidently argued that they were perpetrated by visitors from

---

40 A succinct review of income inequalities and its relationship with spatial arrangement in China in the last twenty years can be found in Gustafsson, Shi, Sicular, et al. (2008).
other provinces or internal migrants:

‘In this country, people’s quality (shuji) has yet reached this standard. Taking subway for instance, it will be very troublesome, there is no concept of ‘let passengers leaving the train first (xian shang hou xia)’ in the country. People will normally squeeze [into the train]. It’s the same in public buses – [people] won’t let passengers off first. People are quite impatient. It might be due to the fact that there are many people in China, Shanghai. Because of urbanisation, people are rushing to the city. During office hours, people are rushing from different places to 2-3 [central] districts. They are in hurried.’

As a splendid, modern and extravagant urban culture is imagined as the manifestation of being ‘modernised’, the behaviour of the internal migrants from other provinces are regarded as ‘uncivilised’. The classifications between ‘civilised Shanghaiese/urban dwellers’ and ‘uncivilised internal migrants/rural farmers’ are represented as a result of rural/uncivilised lifestyle. The organiser of the Shanghai Expo has published a pamphlet titled _A Handbook of a Civilised Visit to the Expo (wenmin guangbo shouce)_ (2010). The pamphlet defined the ‘appropriate’ manners in public transport, greeting visitors, visiting relatives’ home, etc. The inequalities are therefore perpetuated through daily experience, and strengthened by the state.
6.2.2 Redrawing the Relationship between the State and the People

As illustrated above, during the ‘socialist-reform era’, the state shaped the daily life of the people through the *danwei* system (Lu, 2006, p.58). Therefore, ‘politics, society and ideology are highly overlapped with each other’ (Sun, 2004, p.31 cited Wu, 2011, p.702). Since the reform, there was a process of depoliticisation in the *danwei* system, which means ‘a process that reverses the efforts to turn a work unit into a political institution’ (Ji, 1998, p.19). State withdrew its direct intervention on economic activities and the promotion of official ideology through the *danwei* (ibid, pp.19-20). Therefore, daily life is no longer understood as a revolutionary contribution or political action. People enjoy a higher level of freedom in choosing their living places, occupations and lifestyles. However, the distance between the state and the people widened after the state began to withdraw its direct influence on work and everyday life:

*‘The distance between the ordinary people and the government officials becomes more far away nowadays. The officials are making money only. They are no longer getting together with the people.’*

This comment was made by a local resident, on the differences in the distance between the state and people before and after the Reform. She worked for a SOE and currently works in a private company since the SOE closed down in the early 1990s. She remembers that government officials were working together with, and working for, the people before market liberalisation. There were more opportunities to have direct communication with government officials in the workplace and the housing block, now
they were regarded as working for their personal fortune or career development now. Her comment is not unjustified. As the state maintains an ambivalent role in market regulation and participation, a general distrust towards the state has been established. Officials of the party and the government are usually regarded as making their own fortune (e.g., through policy formulation and corruption), but not performing the role of providing social security for the people. Such view was confirmed by a territory-wide survey being conducted in 2009. It is found that 30% of the respondents rated the government officials as incompetent, and 40% respondents claimed that the government officials are only ‘looking after their own interest’ (Saich, 2011).

Since work and political contribution became separated, the official ideology in SOE was reduced to ‘economism’ (jingji zhuyi). The ‘belief system’ in China also went ‘largely bankrupt’ (Ji, 1998, p.20). In Chapter Five, I argued that the state has applied several strategies to provide ideological justification for urbanisation. However, the ideological justification for the notion that the ‘City, Makes Life Better’ was not unquestioned by people when urban space was commodified (from absolute space to abstract space). In another survey about the perception of the impact of the Shanghai Expo, it is found that ‘increase price of real estate’ and ‘increase speculation of real estate’ were ranked as most negative outcomes (Yang, Zeng and Gu, 2010, p.169). In the last chapter, I have illustrated that the pro-growth coalition between the government and private sector heavily invested on property development, even without sufficient housing demand (He and Wu, 2005, p.10). However, with only a few properties were sold in the property development projects, this produced an empty new town, which is referred to by the media as the ‘ghost city’ (BBC, 2012). For example, under the plan of
‘One City, Nine Towns’, Thames Town was built with ‘mock-Tudor buildings and red phone boxes’. But it is reported that the city is ‘a virtual ghost town, with empty shops and unused roads’ (ibid). Similar examples were found across the country.

The distrust towards the state has been further developed by scandals that arose by land commodification. For instance, Hu Jing, the former deputy director of the Shanghai Planning, Land and Resources Administrative Bureau and the director of the Planning Bureau in Shanghai’s Jingan District, was imprisoned in 2012. He was prosecuted for the briberies at RMB5.04 million for providing favourable land sale price to developers and intervening planning project competition, etc. Two other deputy directors of the Land Bureau of Shanghai were also prosecuted for corruption (Zhao, 2012). A survey also found that corruption is perceived as the most serious problem to governance. People generally found the performance of local government less satisfactory than the Central Government (Saich, 2011).

Lefebvre argued that urbanisation is the process of turning absolute space to abstract space (1991[1974], see Chapter 4). The relationship between the state and the people was redefined after the social space in Shanghai was commodified. During the interviews, one of the most frequently discussed issues was the property market. Questions about the property market were not originally included in the interview guide, but the topic usually emerged ‘naturally’ when the respondents were asked about their experience of living in Shanghai. Since the state withdrew its role in housing allocation, the direct intervention in everyday life became less observable to people. The property market has therefore replaced the danwei as the main ‘connection’ or ‘intersection’
between the state and the people as politics, society and ideology are no longer overlap in daily life. During Twelfth Five Year Plan, the government is going to build one million ‘indemnificatory apartments’ for lower and middle income families (Xinhua, 2011). But official statistics showed that over 80% of people cannot afford private housing across the country (Hartog, 2010b, p.69). Research on property prices also shows that housing in Shanghai has become increasingly unaffordable (Chen, Hao and Stephens, 2010, p.890). The real estate speculation market has widened the income gap, producing wealth only for a small group of people. Therefore, it has produced an ambivalent attitude towards of the property market and public housing reform among the public.

6.2.3 The Shanghai Expo as the Participation in the Country’s Development

In modern society, Lefebvre argued that *monumental space* will be produced to offer ‘each member of a society an image of that membership, an image of his or her social visage’ (1991[1974], p.220). His observation could also be applied in analysing the production of space in Shanghai. With the disintegration of the *danwei* system, work is no longer revolutionary or a participation in the development of the state. The state needs a monumental space to establish ‘a consensus’ among everyone in society (ibid, p.220). As discussed in the last chapter, mega-events such as the Shanghai Expo and the Olympic Games were regarded as a substitute for political campaigns to foster national identity during a period of acute social, political, and economic dislocation. These mega-events were carried out to establish national pride within the country and showcase its return to world affairs in the international community (Callahan, 2012,
Alongside being a mass mobilisation campaign, the Shanghai Expo differs from the Olympic Games that it was also a construction project. Exhibition centres and museums such as the China Pavilion (‘Crown of the Orient’) were built. As the distance between the state and the people widened, the landmarks of Shanghai Expo such as the China Pavilion have served as monuments connecting the state and the people, i.e. to confirm the sense of belonging to the Chinese nation state. For instance, the China Pavilion is even imagined to be comparable to the other iconic buildings of World Expos such as the Eiffel Tower (Theme Development Department Bureau of Shanghai Expo Coordination, 2009). As William Callahan (2012, p.254) noted, the gigantic architectural design of The China Pavilion was visually striking, so as to establish a ‘centre of nationalist pride’ to foreign and local visitors. Inside the Pavilion, the exhibitions also projected the images of ‘Confucian aphorisms’ and a dream to ‘urban modernity’:

Through films and exhibits, the pavilion celebrates China’s past, present, and future – especially the achievements of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening campaign since 1978. It explains that China has developed so quickly because Chinese people engage in a fruitful dialogue between the old and the young, the past and the future, traditional wisdom and scientific innovation, and the countryside and the city. The result of this conversation, the pavilion tells us, is the all-around development of a harmonious society that values tradition and the family. (Callahan, 2012, p.254)

As I argued in Chapter Five, the Shanghai Expo substituted political campaigns to provide a means for the people to participate in the development of the country, and thereby reconnect the state to individuals and to obscure the contradictions of the mode
of production. The organiser of Shanghai Expo emphasised the participation of volunteers. This was not only because of the need to reduce the cost of the operation, but as an engagement of the people with the state through a national project. The Shanghai Expo was an ephemeral event, but the long process of organisation has provided a meaning within the banality of everyday life.

6.3 Resistance: The Possibilities and Limits

As indicated in Chapter Five, the scale of urban development in Shanghai should remind us of the period of rebuilding Paris in the nineteenth century. Lefebvre noted that Paris experienced the following changes in urban landscape and social relations before it reached its ‘greatest intensity’:

A number of magnificent houses disappear, workshops and shops occupy others, tenements, stores, depots and warehouses, firms replace parks and gardens. Bourgeois ugliness, the greed for gain visible and legible in the streets take the place of somewhat cold beauty and aristocratic luxury. (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.75)

In analysing the Paris Commune in 1871, as well as the upheaval in 1968, Lefebvre argued that both revolutions are urban in nature. The outcome of urban renewal is pushing the working class away from the city centre and replacing them with the bourgeoisie. The nature of the contradiction is therefore spatial, so that the purpose of the urban upheavals was regaining the centrality of the city (Merrifield, 2002, p.85). Lefebvre’s observation on Haussmann’s Paris is pertinent to describe Shanghai today. As illustrated in Chapter Five, a state-led/participation mode of production has reshaped the urban landscape of Shanghai. Urban renewal projects have been carried
out in the city centre which gentrified the districts (e.g., the revitalisation of the Jingan District). Residents have been relocated to new towns, so as to vacate the space in the city centre for more profitable property development and landmark constructions. So, if the spatial practice and urban experience of Shanghai today can be comparable to nineteenth century Paris, we might ask whether a similar urban revolution take place in ‘the Paris of the Orient’? If yes, when and how will it happen? If not, what are the concerns of the affected residents? This section will address the above questions by using Lefebvre’s concept of ‘the Right to the City’. With specific reference to the relocation of the Expo Site, I will discuss the civil society movement that resulted from land politics, and evaluate how such contradictions were obscured such notions as ‘the rationalisation of social inequalities’ and ‘the individualisation of social problems’.

6.3.1 Relocating Residents away from the City Centre

As discussed above, the China Pavilion was constructed as a *monument space* to establish ‘nationalist pride’. As Lefebvre argued, *monument space* is repressive in nature. It is ‘a seat of institution’ where ‘conquerors and the powerful’ were glorified (2003[1970], p.21). In the China Pavilion and the Shanghai Expo in general was manipulated as a ‘propaganda media’ (Dynon, 2011, p.194) to sustain the legitimacy of the CPC (ibid, p.185). Only official ideology of ‘harmonious society’ was promoted. The repressive nature of the Shanghai Expo was also demonstrated through the relocation of residents. For the construction of landmarks at the Shanghai Expo, the relocation of the Expo site involved one of the biggest developments of urbanisation in the history of Shanghai. Official figures show that there were ‘10,420 households and
28,000 people in the three neighbourhoods of Zhoujiadu, Shanggang and Nanmatoulu’, as well as 272 enterprises being relocated (Cen, 2006)\textsuperscript{41}.

The Shanghai Expo is only one example of the recent history of relocation in Shanghai. Between 1991 and 2002, the city authorities have demolished 38 million square metres of old buildings for infrastructural and property development projects, etc. Over 2.7 million residents in Shanghai, or over 800,000 families, have been relocated (Laurans, 2005, p.4). Under the so-called ‘Double Increase and Double Decrease’ policy in around 2000, the municipal government forced the developers to release land in the city centre and develop the suburb that further speeded up the trend (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, pp.327-328). In other words, the urbanisation of Shanghai is a process of pushing residents away from city centre.

In 1991, the Shanghai Municipal Government enacted the ‘Shanghai City Housing Demolition and Relocation Administration Implementation Detailed Regulation’ to protect the rights of residents in negotiation and compensation (The World Bank, 1993, p.195). The rights of individual and collective ownership of land were further protected after the amendment of the Constitution in 2004 and the new Property Law in 2007 period. However, land politics is still central to politics in urban China and relocation often produces conflicts (Laurans, 2005, p.3; Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, pp.890-891). As illustrated in Chapter Five, the state-led/participation mode of production retained some socialist features of economic production and incorporated some capitalist features. The state continues to uphold its ultimate control in market regulation,

\textsuperscript{41} Another source reported that a total of 18,452 households and 272 enterprises were relocated (Xinhua News, 2010).
participates in market activities through SOEs, but withdrew from comprehensive planning. Land appropriation therefore operates in a capitalist logic, so that the state is not involved in on a daily basis. Typically, New Town Development Corporation, as a semi-public developer, will be established for each new town development project (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, p.328). The negotiation between the developer (either from the public or the private sector) and displaced residents is also mediated through relocation companies (Laurans, 2005, p.6). Even for national projects such as the Shanghai Expo, the state shouldered the responsibility of land appropriation for these private companies to liaising with residents on the compensation claims. Since these semi-public developers dominated the public resources (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, p.328), the rights of affected residents were therefore not well protected. The process of land appropriation sometimes produced conflicts (because of an insufficient amount of compensation and procedural injustice). It is also reported that some relocation companies treated the displaced residents with violence (Laurans, 2005, p.9).

As most new communities were not located in the city centre or somewhere close to the original site, relocation meant the removal of the inhabitants from the centre to the peripheries, from a place with memory to a place without history. Lefebvre proposed the term ‘The Right to the City’ to demand a return to the centre of the city by the proletariat. In other words, the right to the city is the right to centrality (Harvey, 2012, p.xvii). Referring to his experience of living in Paris, Lefebvre argued that city centre has been ‘museumfied’ for the gaze of the tourist by pushing the residents to the peripheries:
… left behind for peripheries which have been places of production, business and residence … But it is lively in this liveliness is due mostly to passers-by who are in transit. (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.209)

Similar trends have been observed in Shanghai. However, where is the city centre of Shanghai? In the Twelfth Five Year Plan of the Shanghai Municipality, it is planned that the city will be clustered into four centres between 2010 and 2012, so as to thematise the roles in economic development. In New Pudong, as the flagship plan of the ‘Post-World Expo construction’, an ‘Expo New Town’ will be constructed with the Sanlin Expo Estate as the focal point (expo2010.cn, 2009). The contradictions between the conceived space of the planner and the lived space of the displaced residents is therefore also about temporality. For the current residents, the Sanlin Expo Estate is a new town at the periphery of Shanghai today. They are experiencing the problems brought about by the production of a new space (e.g., alienation in everyday life when the town was empty). In the vision of the planner, the Sanlin Expo Estate will be the centre of a new centre of Shanghai in the future. During this early phase of the development, not all facilities in the new town are ready (e.g., the lack of a comprehensive public transport system). The lived experiences of these newly-relocated residents were often ignored in the plan (Hartog, 2010c, p.90).

6.3.2 Resistance from the Civil Society

Lefebvre argued that ‘[t]here is a politics of space because space is political’ (1991[1974], p.192). Resistance is produced because the conceived space and lived space are contradictory in nature – the conceived space of the dominant class attempts
to shape the lived space, but the subordinate class will defend their daily life. During the process of urbanisation, Lefebvre argued that space would become contradictory:

Cities are transformed into a collection of ghettos where individuals are at once ‘socialised’, integrated, submitted to artificial pressures and constraints … and separated, isolated, disintegrated. A contradiction which is translated into anguish, frustration and revolt. (Lefebvre, 1972, p.168 cited Shields, 1999, p.178)

Lefebvre (2009[1979], p.124) argued that state and civil society are two fundamental features of modern society. He was optimistic that the resistance of the people will be mediated through civil society. In the history of China, civil resistances were mainly organised through kinship and village rather than social groups such as class, ethnicity and gender. However, the disputes emerging from land expropriation have become one of the key reasons for social movements in recent years. Even for the people who are not residing in the regions of the relocation plans, they are still influenced by spatial and social changes brought about by state policy.

There are two main reasons for the displaced residents to resist the relocation of. Firstly, they hoped to defend their homes. *Dongqian* is the Chinese term for relocation. However, another term, *chaiqian*, is also frequently used to mean that the home is ‘torn down’ during relocation (Westendorff, 2008, p.512). Although Pudong is usually regarded as lagging behind in its development, there are villages scattered across the regions. Some traditional houses have more than 100 years of history and the residents have lived there for several generations. The civil society movement fundamentally challenged relocation, as their home, memory and history are eradicated. A second reason is that some households are dissatisfied with their compensation. They found the
relocation compensation not sufficient enough to afford another property in Shanghai.

When civil society began to develop in the post-Reform period, it acted as a stabiliser rather than a contender for the government legitimacy. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in China are usually organised or closely monitored by the government. According to the civil administration law, all NGOs are required to be ‘sponsored’ by a party-state organisation. In recent years, there is a trend of an alternative civil society movement (Callahan, 2012, pp.252-253). Resistance against land appropriation (especially in rural area) is also getting more common. Although the primary purpose of the civil society movements against relocation was to safeguard their property rights, it received brutal suppression from the state, often involving prosecution and violence. It is because these movements were regarded by the government as a potential threat to the social stability of society (Shi and Cai, 2006, p.315).

### 6.3.3 The Individualisation of Social Problems

Although the civil society movement against relocation for the construction of the Expo site has received international attention, not all inhabitants are supportive of civil resistance. On the contrary, some residents and owners of enterprises are in favour of relocation, for the compensation provided by the relocation company, has improved their financial situation. As discussed in the last section, the relationship between the state and the people has been drawn under the state-led/-participation mode of production, and the property market has become the new ‘connection’. Alongside the improvement in the quality of living in the gated communities, some displaced residents
have also further invested the relocation compensation in the stock market or property market. Average land prices have increased by over 20% since the Reform, because of real estate speculation (Diglio, 2005, p.1). Some displaced residents welcomed the compensation and re-invested it in the property and stock markets.

Since the late 1980s, the municipal government launched the plan to privatise the work unit houses and allow private sector to carry out property development projects. By 2006, it is estimated that about 80% of Shanghai families owned private residential properties (Forrest and Izuhar, 2012, p.30). Housing is no longer a in the post-reform era. However, with the state and pro-growth coalition generating revenue through land commodification, property prices have surged to an unaffordable level in recent years (Chen, Hao and Stephens, 2010, p.890). According to a report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2009, 85% of families in the country cannot afford an apartment. A survey by the People’s Bank of China also found that 67.2% of respondents were ‘dissatisfied with housing prices’ (People’s Daily Online, 2009)

However, the ‘social problem’ about housing policy during the market transition period was then ‘transformed’ into a ‘personal issue’. This process of ‘the individualisation of social problems’ has obscured the unequal nature of the state-led/participation mode of production, because the people agreed with this dominant ideology. Thus, problems are personal rather than collective and so are solutions. As social problems are regarded as personal problems, individuals need to rely on their personal strategies to deal with them. Rather than carrying out collective actions, such as bargaining for better policy formulation (or compensation in the case of relocation), individuals normally seek
personal strategies to handle the social problems that they faced. When the respondents were asked about their views on the civil resistance movement in Shanghai against relocation and the surge of property price, the movement was usually regarded as a means to defend personal interest but not societal goods. One respondent argued that:

‘They [the protestors] are facing some problems, so they will resist. They have their own reasons, but it is only something that concerned them only. There are many problems in this country, we cannot deal with all.’

‘The individualisation of social problems’ also concerned the social relations of production. The withdrawal of job allocation means that individuals need to find jobs for themselves but not relying on the allocation by the state. For instance, although the official rate of unemployment is comparatively low (around 5%), the number of jobs created cannot significantly reduce the unemployment rate (Chen, 2007, p.5). Unemployment is not regarded as a social or economic problem, but a personal issue of individuals who cannot compete in the labour market. Despite the unfair nature of competition and state intervention promoting the idea of competition and growth, the responsibility is shouldered by individual citizens.

When Tang and Parish (2000, p.51) conducted fieldwork in urban China, they applied the concept of social contract in theorising the change of urban living during the transition from socialism to capitalism. Under the socialist social contract, the role of the state was to ensure full employment and comprehensive social welfare. Under the
capitalist social contract, individuals have free choices to pursue their personal life, but security is sacrificed. The role of the state is to provide a fair environment for competition by regulating market activities. By applying this concept, they outlined the change from an organised urban life to a more diverse one with the withdrawal of the state from daily life.

As discussed above, the civilised/uncivilised divide is produced by policy and everyday life. Policies have helped to create social inequalities rather than a fair social environment. The disadvantaged social groups should only blame themselves for their situation under such competition. Even among those who recognised the unequal nature of urbanisation, there was little will to challenge the state, as they are benefiting from the inequalities. Therefore, the policy-originated problems are personalised and rationalised, and the reproduction of the exploitative social relations is justified. The Chinese saying ‘the pitiful people must have some aspects hateful’ (ke lin ren zi you qi kelin zhi chu) accurately described the view toward the exploitative and unequal nature of urbanisation.

6.3.4 The Rationalisation of Social Inequalities

Another mystification is the ‘rationalisation of social inequalities’. The exploitative and unequal nature of urbanisation is visible in Shanghai. When wandering around Nanjing Road, one of the busiest pedestrian streets in China (Yang and Xu, 2009, p.89), one can find beggars, very often being controlled by underground society, sitting in front of the chain fashion boutiques waiting for good fortune. One night during my fieldwork period,
I saw a blind old man playing a harmonica when I left The Paramount, the dance hall symbolising the ‘despotic’ night life of old Shanghai. The neon light of the newly revamped historic buildings and the despairing face of old man, produced a sharp contrast.

One can see social inequalities virtually everywhere in Shanghai. As a researcher and tourist, I found the above scenes made a big impact and reminded me of the coexistence of extravagant urban lifestyle and the plight of the disadvantaged – both of which can be regarded as an outcome of the Reform. However, the respondents, who witness such social inequalities in everyday life held a different view, which I have termed ‘the rationalisation of social inequalities’. Rather than defending the rights of the disadvantaged, and demanding better social welfare and challenging the unequal nature of economic growth, the presence of social inequalities is rationalised by the respondents. Some respondents regarded inequality as a necessary evil of economic growth and urbanisation, that would require the efforts of several generations to solve. Some argued that it is natural outcome in any competitive city like Shanghai. Some defended social inequality by claiming that ‘Western societies also cannot solve the problem’. The short quote below from a respondent might best summarise the above views:

'I won’t feel sorry for them, because I am not the poor one.'

Similar to ‘the personalisation of social problems’, the seemingly unsympathetic view of social inequalities originates from the dual roles that the state plays under the
state-led/state-participating mode of production. Although the life chances of individuals in China are still heavily influenced by policies, the withdrawal of the absolute control of the state has indisputably produced opportunities and mobility (geographically and socially). As discussed above, it has created a more open social structure with some individuals experiencing upward mobility and better material standard of living. Despite its unfair nature, openness and competition are promoted as a beneficial outcome of the Reform, so disadvantaged groups are themselves to blame for their inability to compete.

6.3.5 Depoliticisation and the Politicised Everyday Life

As referred to earlier, Lefebvre distinguishes everyday life from daily life by pointing out the importance of *free time* and *compulsive time* in modern society. The capitalist logic is not only restricted to the workplace, but also permeates everyday life (*free time*). The dominant class has managed to mystify the exploitative nature of production through consumerism and the promotion of ‘lifestyle’ (1971[1968], p.53).

Since the Reform, the state has retreated from authoritarian control in China. The diminishing role of the *danwei* has begun to depoliticise the daily life of the people. Wang Hui described this as a ‘de-revolutionary process’ (2009, p.29). There is less direct control from the state under economic liberalisation, but the daily routine is programmed by spatial practice. In this chapter, I have examined how the experience of the people was shaped by the spatial arrangement of the city. Surveillance and control in everyday life is still noticeable through the management of space. Since 1996, some of
the power in operating community services, education, sanitation and social security has been passed on to the governance of the local district. The establishment of the gated community is closely related to the conception of xiaoqu (small district). Within each xiaoqu, there is a neighbourhood committee, ‘street offices’ (jiedao banshichu), which performs the role of fostering cooperation among residents, as well as surveillance (Wu, 2002, p.1595). Such system of streets office originated in the 1950s as a means for bureaucratic control. For instance, visitors needed to report to police station for ‘temporary household registration’ (Whyte and Parish, 1984, pp.18, 22-23). The people enjoy a better-protected private sphere today, but the inhabitants also experienced surveillance in their daily experience. During the period of organising the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai Expo, the street offices became the basic unit of monitoring migrant residents. A similar strategy was practised today. Sometimes, street offices even manipulated their administrative power to facilitate the relocation company (Zhang, 2002, p.489).

Though political participation is no longer compulsory, everyday life is permeated by politics. The entertainment industry, for instance, is very closely ‘supervised’ by the propaganda department. Deviations from the dominant ideology would be banned. For example, the English rock band Oasis planned to perform in Shanghai and Beijing in 2009, but forced to cancel. The official statement of the band proclaimed that the tour was cancelled by the Chinese Ministry of Culture after they found that the lead singer Noel Gallagher had appeared at a Free Tibet concert in New York in 1997. The organizer denied this and argued that the reason was purely commercial (Ransom and Graham-Harrison, 2009). Another example is the concert of Jay Z, an American rapper,
was banned from performing in Shanghai because of ‘profane references’ in his song (BBC, 2006). During the Shanghai Expo, a Japanese music group, SMAP, planned to hold a concert, but the concert was cancelled because of the Chinese government’s conflict with Japan over the sovereignty of Daioyu Island (Senkaku Islands). Hence, everyday life is still highly politicised.

The ‘Second Revolution’ has transformed the daily life of people. Lefebvre urged for a critique of everyday life because everyday life is revolutionary (Merrifield, 2006, p.12). The study of the everyday is undertaken in order to actualize the ‘the total man’ – liberation from alienation and economic fetishism (Trebitsch, 2005, p.xxii). However, most people would not form a collective force to launch an urban revolution against the state. Not only because they are wary of the brutal suppression, but also because of their worries about losing material benefit if the state does not sustain rapid economic growth.

6.4 Conclusion: The Possibility of an Urban Revolution

As quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Lefebvre asserted that a ‘revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential, and a truly revolutionary social transformation ‘must manifest a creative capacity in its effects on daily life, on language and on space’ (1991[1974], p.54). Regarding the impact on the daily life of the people, the ‘Second Revolution’ in China has not been unsuccessful. In Chapter Five, I outlined how the state-led/participation mode of production produced new spatial arrangements to facilitate its development with the Shanghai Expo as a case study. This
chapter described the urban experience of the inhabitants in Shanghai (representational space; lived space), as well as explaining how their experiences were shaped by spatial practice (perceived space) and representations of space (conceived space). The contradictions produced by the differences in the representations of space and representational space were also evaluated. By applying Lefebvre’s conceptual apparatus, my thesis examined the dialectical relationship between spatial arrangement, social relations of production, representations, governmental structure and everyday life. I hope to deepen the understanding of the urbanisation of China with a social-historical, empirical-theoretical approach, in which the application of Lefebvrian analysis in the field of Shanghai studies is used.  

As discussed in Chapter Three, Bourdieu called for the reflexivity of disciplines, as the ‘intellectual bias’ of the discipline might produce bias in data collection and interpretation (Wacquant, 1989, p.32). By reviewing Chinese and English books and journal articles on the urbanisation of Shanghai, Jackie Kwok, a scholar based in Hong Kong, pointed out that two different trends in the observation and analysis of Shanghai’s urbanisation can be identified. Among the English articles, the discourse of ‘globalisation’ and the ‘global city’ were commonly applied, implying that Shanghai has been excluded from the list of a successful the neoliberal economy. The articles in Chinese were generally more critical of the impact of globalisation on the developing countries, but showed a more affirmative stance towards the drastic spatial transformation of the city (Kwok, 2011, p.309).

42 Exceptions included the study by Bao (2005) and Lu (2006).
Alongside academic writing, the government also maintains a cautious stance towards the application of western model(s) in a Chinese context, but were more positive to the outcome urbanisation and the Reform. The ‘China versus the West’ debate will further be discussed in Chapter Seven. In the ceremony commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the third plenary session of the eleventh Central Committee of the CPC (i.e. the meeting announcing the Reform), the former President, Hu Jingtao argued that ‘[t]he significant changes prove that the direction and path of reform and opening-up are completely correct … standing still and regressing will lead only to a dead end.’ In confirming the direction of the Reform, he also proclaimed that the Reform should apply the principle of ‘bu zheteng’, so as to ‘achieve our grand blueprint and ambitious objectives (on realising modernisation in the middle of the twenty-first century)’.

*China Daily* translated ‘bu zheteng’ as ‘we don't sway back and forth, relax our efforts or get sidetracked’ (*China Daily*, 2008). While there is a debate on the possibility of translating the term, it is generally believed that ‘zheteng’ means the political campaigns during the period of socialist construction and in particular the Cultural Revolution (*Xinhua*, 2009). Thus, ‘bu zheng’ could mean that the country should not engage in ‘senseless/pointless endeavours’ (Li, 2010, p.14). The positive outcomes of the Reform (e.g., the modernist skyline at Lujiazui that was discussed in Chapter Five) were manipulated to justify the perpetuation of the mode of production and disprove any resistance against the Reform. Although the Reform was regarded as a ‘Second Revolution’, and reshaped people’s daily life, it is indeed a social engineering programme that is in opposition to any revolutionary spirit. It is because any questions against the Reform could be considered as ‘getting sidetracked’. Land commodification
is an unequal process. However, the outcome of land commodification is the generation of a significant amount of revenue for the government and profit for the private sector. Such economic success then legitimised further expansion of urbanisation and land commodification.

‘To criticise everyday life is to begin with to theorise the complaint that “life is boring”’ (Shields, 1999, p.66), however, what if the people do not consider their lives as boring? In this chapter, I have described the experience of the inhabitants of Shanghai, most of them are not uncritical of the impact of the Reform on the landscape thus on their daily life. Most of them are not uncritical of the slogan, ‘Better City, Better Life’, but the Shanghai Expo is not a ‘drastic and disruptive’ moment. For a country and a city having ‘too many’ revolutions in last decades, the revolutionary spirit is not difficult to undermine – especially when people generally experience an improvement in material life. Even if they recognised that the everyday is revolutionary, where and how should the revolution begin? Ubiquitous social control is no longer practical after the collapse of the danwei, but everyday life is not depoliticised. Any contradiction of the dominant ideology of the ruling class will be immediately challenged. The cancellation of the concerts by Oasis, Jay Z and SMAP has well illustrated this. It is therefore beyond the ‘radical imagination’ of ‘ordinary people’ to participate in any kind of resistance amid close state monitoring.

In the song Don’t Look Back in Anger, Oasis suggested that we should begin a revolution from our beds (‘so I start a revolution from my bed’). However, the song could not be performed in Shanghai as the concert was banned. Noel Gallagher admitted
that the lyrics were ‘taken from’ John Lennon (BBC, 2005). In 1969 during Vietnam War, Lennon and Yoko Ono launched a ‘bed-in’ campaign. They sat on their hotel bed for two weeks to call for world peace during this media event (Archer, 2009). The non-violent nature of the ‘revolution in the bed’ reminds us of the Occupy Movement across more than 100 cities in the world – including Hong Kong and Taipei, but none of the cities in the Chinese Mainland. Both are non-violent protests against the establishment, taking place outside the establishment, by disrupting the daily routine to demand a response from the establishment. Although the outcome is still unknown, the Occupy Movement is argued to have opened up our ‘radical imagination’ (Graeber, 2011). Three decades earlier, Lefebvre has also called for a critique of everyday life, precisely because the acceptance of our daily routine means the rejection of the imagination of a new life:

Acceptance involves much more than consenting to trivial acts: buying and selling, consumption, various activities. It implies a ‘consensus’: acceptance of society, the mode of production – in a word, a (the) totality. In this way, people (who? Each and every one of us) condemn themselves to not desiring, conceiving, or even imagining possibilities beyond this mode of production! (Lefebvre, 2005[1981], p.1)

A revolution from the bed sounds somehow hedonist (Archer, 2009), but it is a significant moment of breaking the daily routine. As Lefebvre argued, social clock is arranged by the capitalist logic (1971[1968], p.53). Our bedtime, i.e. when we sleep and when we get up, is determined by our work, thus the mode of production. The inhabitants of Shanghai found their daily life very exhausting. But the social clock is determined by the market position under capitalistic logic; the social clock is manipulated by working hours in offices and factories. Sitting on your bed for two
weeks is therefore more difficult and revolutionary than imagined.

As discussed in Chapter Five, the saying ‘A single room in Puxi is better than a whole apartment in Pudong’ was popular before the 1990s to summarise the differences in spatial arrangement and perception between Pudong and Puxi. Twenty years after the announcement of the New Pudong Development Plan, village houses were replaced by highrise buildings, but the rent in Pudong has increased to an unaffordable level (Chen, Hao and Stephens, p.890). It is not easy to secure a bed even in Pudong nowadays. Even if the inhabitants of Shanghai acknowledged the inequalities being brought about by urbanisation, it is beyond their imagination to envision Shanghai as a fairer city. It is the acceptance of life that limits their imagination, but the previous experiences of revolution and political campaigns keep alerting them to the cost of resistance.
Welcome, Europe ... What is a World's Fair? The world as neighbours. We talk a bit together. We come to compare ideals. An apparent confrontation of products, in reality a confrontation of utopias.

- Victor Hugo (1867)\(^{43}\)

In 1867, Paris hosted the *Exposition Universelles* (World Expo)\(^{44}\) for a second time. The government of the French Second Empire commissioned famous French writers and artists to contribute original work to a guidebook, *Paris Guide*, for overseas tourists (The New York Times, 1867). The excerpt above is quoted from the introductory chapter that Victor Hugo contributed (1867). As he accurately suggested, the World Expo in the nineteenth century was ‘a confrontation of products and utopias’. It was a confrontation of products because industrial products were displayed and competed for awards. Companies were eager to promote their products to the public and potential business partners through the World Expo (Tamilia, 2007, p.230). As an international exhibition, the ‘utopias’ of various participating countries were also displayed through manufactured products, art pieces, and temporarily-built pavilions with different architectural styles, sometimes as well as human beings, etc. (Parezo and Fowler, 2007, see Chapter 8). For instance, Eugène Rimmel, the Assistant Commissioner of the 1867 *Exposition Universelles*, argued that ‘every-day life in its most minute details’ of foreign countries was showcased in the World Expo (1868, p.1). ‘[W]ithout undertaking long

---

\(^{43}\) The original text is in French, see Hugo (1867). This translation was edited based on West (n.d.).

\(^{44}\) *Exposition Universelles* (The Universal Exposition) is the French title of the World Expo. The World Expo is also referred to as the ‘Great Exhibition’ in Britain, and the ‘World’s Fair’ in the United States.
and perilous journeys, without running the risk of being frozen in the North, or melted in the South, visitors could see the ‘utopias’ of different countries in the purposefully-built expo site (ibid, p.1).

However, Paris in the nineteenth century was not a utopia to every Parisian. As suggested in Chapter Six, by replacing ‘winding but lively streets’ with long avenues, Haussmann transformed Paris for bourgeois consumption and more convenient access for the army (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.75-76). Between the two *Exposition Universelles* in 1855 and 1867, land prices on the Left Bank doubled. The property price in old Paris also increased about three-fold (Harvey, 2003, p.134). The outcome was that the bourgeoisie ‘conquered the capital’ (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.74) and ‘much of the working population was dispersed to the periphery’ (Harvey, 2003, p.136). Four years after the 1867 *Exposition Universelles*, the upheaval of the Paris Commune took place. The Commune occupied *Champ de Mars* (Fetridge, 1995[1871], p.287), where the 1867 *Exposition Universelles* and most other international exhibitions in Paris were held (Barth, 2008, p.23). In the book *The Right to the City*, Lefebvre argued that the Paris Commune demonstrated the strength of reclaiming the city centre (1996[1968], p.76).

The World Expo is a project of modernity. More specifically, it is the symbol of ‘a dawning modernity’ (Barth, 2008, p.33). For instance, the 1867 *Exposition Universelles* was regarded as a ‘pathway to modernity’, which ‘accelerated technological modernisation and modernism’ (Plessen, 1990). Around the same period, China began to explore the route to modernity. Similar to other East Asian countries, the pursuit of
Chinese modernity originated as a reaction to the challenges from Western civilisations (King, 2002, p.139). The ‘spiritual and material manifestations’ of Western civilisations were therefore regarded as the yardstick of such a modernity project, during this ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period (Lee, 1999b, p.45). Since the traditional economy, cultures, and values were destroyed, the search for modernity was not limited to economic growth and military strength, but included the re-establishment of its ‘civilisation order’ (King, 2013, p.ix).

In this final chapter, with reference to the Shanghai Expo, I will discuss Chinese modernity by applying a Lefebvrian framework. In the book *Introduction to Modernity*, Lefebvre made a distinction between ‘modernism’ and ‘modernity’. He argued that ‘modernism’ and ‘modernity’ should be established as antitheses, so as to understand the nature of modern society (1995[1962], p.1). To him, the ‘maieutic of modernity is not without a certain utopianism’ (ibid, p.45). Modernity involved a utopian vision of the future. Modernism represented the ‘triumphalist images and projections’ of such a utopian vision of modernity. Lefebvre’s conception of modernity is ‘a reflective process, a more-or-less advanced attempt at critique and auto-critique’ of modernism (ibid, p.1). In this chapter, I will begin by elaborating Lefebvre’s argument on modernity, and its relations to his studies on social space and everyday life in modern society.

In that the second section of this chapter, I will discuss the relationship between the World Expo and modernity. The World Expo provided an arena for the confrontation of products and utopias, as indicated above. The 1867 *Exposition Universelles*, for example, displayed ‘an exemplary product of art, trade, and industry … the newest
technologies and the most advanced methods of production’ (Plessen, 1990). More importantly, the World Expo also presented a utopian future of modern society to the public. ‘Progress’ is the theme of the first World Expo, the 1851 Great Exhibition in London, which summarised the primary goal of the event (Opie, 2008, p.83). As Robert Rydell noted:

Progress is a positive value linked to change … the exposition builders promised that continued growth would result in eventual utopia. Therein lay the mythopoetic grandeur of the fairs: an ideology of economic development, labelled ‘progress’, was translated into a utopian statement about future. An ideology, a complex idea tied to socioeconomic cleavages in a particular historical era (Rydell, 1992, pp.4-5).

In other words, the World Expo can be regarded as an event showcasing the triumphalist nature of modernism. The second objective of this chapter is therefore to apply Lefebvre’s conception of modernity to the relationship between the World Expo and modernity, in particular in nineteenth century Europe. I will also evaluate the sociological meanings of the World Expo on urban development and everyday life.

The third section will address the debate on Chinese modernity will be addressed. The pursuit of Chinese modernity is also about progress, which is the process of ‘marking a rupture with the past and forming a progressive continuum toward a glorious future’ (Lee, 1990, p.111). Beginning with the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period, the weak Chinese Empire began to be confronted by the products (‘the material manifestations’) and the utopias (‘the spiritual manifestations’) of Western civilisations. Western civilisation was the yardstick of the Chinese modernisation project. A key issue of Chinese modernisation is therefore whether to replace its traditional worldview and
cultural practices with those of Western civilisation, or adapt the technological advancement of the West for practical use (Spence, 1990, p.225). As discussed in Chapter Four, many ideas, lifestyles, technologies, social institutions, as well as urban infrastructure, were first introduced from the West to China through Shanghai. Hence, it was where Chinese modernity emerged (Bergère, 2009, p.2; Lee, 1999b, p.1; Yeh, 2007, p.377). Therefore, Shanghai can be regarded as China’s capital of modernity. Chapter Four periodised the spatial history of Shanghai by modes of production, and examined the vertical complexity of that space. By delineating the political economy of the Shanghai Expo in Chapter Five, I argued that Shanghai in the ‘post-socialist reform era’ transformed to a ‘state-led/participation’ mode of production. The everyday experience of the inhabitants of Shanghai during the current phase of rapid urbanisation was described and explained in Chapter Six. In this final chapter, I will present a theoretical discussion of Chinese modernity with reference to the empirical data mentioned above. So, if the World Expo is a ‘pathway to modernity’, does the Shanghai Expo symbolise the completion of the modernity project of China? What is the role of Shanghai in the pursuit of Chinese modernity today? If Shanghai today resembles nineteenth century Paris, is it a utopia for all inhabitants of the city? Do we need an antithesis of the World Expo? If it is so, what is the antithesis of the Shanghai Expo? I will conclude this thesis by responding to these questions.

7.1 Modernity and Modernism

As discussed in Chapter Two, when Lefebvre identified the manipulation of capitalist logics with everyday life in the late 1940s, his project of examining the conditions of
Life in modern society was overlooked and criticised by his comrades in the PCF (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.6). After his membership was taken away in 1958, Lefebvre began to carry out a theoretical project to situate ‘daily life in a fresh social theory of modernity’ (Poster, 1975, p.243). His books *Introduction to Modernity* (1995[1962]) and the second volume of *Critique of Everyday Life* (2002[1961]) can be regarded as an announcement of his project (Shields, 1999, p.90).

Even though expelled from the PCF, Lefebvre still regarded himself as a Marxist (Elden, 2004c, p.3), and applied a dialectical approach in his analysis of modernity. He established modernity and modernism as antitheses in order to scrutinise the nature of modern society (1995[1962], p.1). His interest in the theoretical discussion of modernity persisted over the rest of his career – with the third volume of *Critique of Everyday Life* given a subtitle ‘From Modernity to Modernism (Towards a Metaphilosophy of Daily Life)’. Alongside everydayness, his discussion of modernity was also ‘scattered through’ *The Production of Space* (Thacker, 2003, p.21). As a concluding comment on Lefebvre’s theoretical explorations, this section will discuss his concept of modernity and its relevance to the production of space and everyday life.

### 7.1.1 Modernity and Modernism as Antitheses

As discussed in Chapter Three, Lefebvre criticised the inadequacy of formal logics in researching the social world. For him, the weakness of applying a positivist approach in social research is that ‘sciences are external to philosophy … and their methods of discovery have nothing to do with rigorous logic’ (2009[1940], p.12). The ‘movement
of thought’ (i.e. the reasoning process) and ‘the content’ (i.e. social reality) are therefore separated (ibid, p.9). He argued that a dialectical approach should be applied in social studies, so that the ‘movement of thought’ could relate to the content under investigation. The dialectical movement of thought is therefore an essential step of producing new ideas:

The dialectical movement (the duplication of every thought into two contradictory thoughts, positive and negative, yes and no, and the fusion of these thoughts) gives rise to groups or series of thoughts. (Lefebvre, 2009[1940], p.68)

Lefebvre applied such a dialectical approach in examining modernity. In *Introduction to Modernity*, he began his analysis by challenging the view that ‘modernity should require no theory’ (1995[1962], p.1). He established modernity and modernism as antitheses, and argued that modernity and modernism should be understood as two ‘contradictory thoughts’ in examining the nature of modern society:

Modernism is a sociology and ideology fact. Its pretentions and fanciful projects can be seen in the press in *statu nascendi*. Exhibitions are mounted to reconstruct it.

By modernity, however we understand the beginnings of a reflective process, or a more-or-less advanced attempt at critique, a bid for knowledge … Modernity differs from modernism just as a concept which is being formulated in society differs from social phenomena themselves, just as a thought differs from actual events. (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], pp.1-2)

As a conceptual apparatus, Lefebvre argued that modernism stands for ‘certainty and arrogance’ (1995[1962], pp.2-3). Modernism represented the promising aspect of modernity. With the advancement of science and technology, everything in nature
appears to become controllable. Modern society is an obsession with controlling nature and the outside world (ibid, p.192). However, there is a strong sense of social progress. Everyday life becomes predictable. This strength, creativity and innovation of human beings made the uncertain certain. Modernism as a concept therefore represented a triumphal view of conquering nature through science and technology (ibid, p.183).

Lefebvre’s conception of modernity is a ‘historical category’. It can be dated, or at least ‘located at a moment of fundamental historical trauma’ (Trebitsch, 1991, p.xxvii). He argued that modernity began with the emergence of industrial society. There was an enthusiasm for modernity, i.e. scientific revolution transformed daily life and envisioned a future of as the end of dehumanising work (2005[1981], pp.91-92). His view is similar to Marshall Berman’s understanding of the impact of technology on modern experience in nineteenth century modernism in Europe (Berman, 1982, pp.18-20). Berman argued that modernists in the nineteenth century conceived the modernity project in Europe to be ‘capable of everything except solidity and stability’ (ibid, p.19). People were fully aware of the drastic impact on their daily lives being brought by new technologies like stream engines, railways, telegraphs and telephones. Lefebvre shared the view that the technological progress in Europe had impacted on everyday life (Trebitsch, 1991, pp.xxvi-xxvii). He also emphasised that ‘the State, and everything that it concerns and implies, is to be found at the heart of modernity and the so-called modern world’ (Lefebvre 2003[1986], p.61 cited Brenner and Elden, 2009, p.2). However, there was a ‘relative stagnation for everyday relations’ between people and institutions, such as, the state and bureaucracy (1995[1962], p.230). In De l'État, Lefebvre examined the role of the modern state in the development of capitalism on a world scale, through the process
of what he called *mondalisation* (Brenner and Elden, 2009, pp.2-3).

On the other hand, Lefebvre considered modernity as an antithesis to modernism. In his typology, modernity stands for the scepticism and critical review of what modernism stands for (1995[1962], p.2). Upon reflection, the uncertainties of nature have not yet been controlled by science and technology. For instance, the impact of human activities on nature is unknown; the great transformations of social structure and living conditions have caused psychological distress to individuals. Modern society is neither completely predictable nor following a known and favourable destiny. Such a strong sense of uncertainty is contradictory to the premise of modernism as progress (ibid, p.189).

Lefebvre’s discussion of modernity as an antithesis is similar to Giddens’ reflexivity of modernity (Giddens, 1990, pp.36-44). By the late twentieth century, people began to be sceptical of most aspects of social activity and material relations with nature, as well as questioning the application of knowledge, especially the intervention of technology into daily life (ibid, p.38). Giddens referred to this as reflexivity and argued that it is the reflexivity and uncertainty of the consequences of modernity that led to the sense of mortality and the existential anxiety of individuals. Lefebvre argued that such scepticism towards modernity (which he called ‘modernism’) emerged in the early 1900s. During this period, ‘a silent catastrophe’ took place in Europe as the ‘main reference systems of social practice … disintegrated and even collapsed’ (Lefebvre, 2005[1981], p.46). Euclidean and Newtonian space was replaced by Einsteinian relativity; Cezanne’s impressionism was replaced by Picasso’s cubism. More importantly, the first Russian Revolution took place to offer an alternative to capitalism.
The original worldview of modernism began to disintegrate, and modernity, as an antithesis of modernism, emerged ‘from the mists of history’ (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.178).

7.1.2 Modernity and Abstract Space

Lefebvre’s understanding of modernity is closely related to space. He argued that modernity is the abstract space where ‘spatial experts’ tried to ‘homogenise social space’. The modernist view of urban planning helped to shape everyday life (Thacker, 2003, p.21). In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre illustrated the relationship between modernity and spatial practice by referring to the Bauhaus Group and Le Corbusier (1991[1974], pp.124-128, 146). Since the 1920s, architecture and urban planning became increasingly related to urbanist and industrial research. The relationship between the functions and the aesthetics of buildings, or even furniture, was emphasised. The Bauhaus group and modernist architects, such as Le Corbusier purposely created a specific type of space for their imagination of a specific mode of life. They contributed to the emergence of a new modern life (ibid, pp.124-125). Lefebvre even proclaimed that the ‘historian of space who is concerned with modernity may quite confidently affirm the historic role of the Bauhaus’ (ibid, p.125).

Lefebvre was also commissioned by the French government to carry out a series of empirical research projects when working at the *Institut de Sociologie Urbaine* in the 1950s. He pointed out that functionalist urbanism was a means for the Fordist reorganisation of society (Stanek, 2008b, p.60). In particular, such a modernist view of
urban planning was comprehensively implemented in new towns. As discussed in Chapter Six, Lefebvre identified the impact of urbanisation in Mourenx, a new town in southern France (Elden, 2004c, p.128). He also argued that ‘modernity opens its pages to me’ in Mourenx, where he ‘cannot read the centuries, not time, nor the past, nor what is possible’ (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.119). Even though new towns promised an improvement in quality of life (i.e. a triumphal aspect of modernity), Lefebvre maintained that modernism in urban planning will only programme the everyday life of inhabitants:

Whenever I step foot in Mourenx I am filled with dread. Yet the new town has a lot going for it. The overall plan (the master blueprint) has a certain attractiveness: the lines of the tower blocks alternate horizontals and verticals. The break between the landscape - wooded hills, moorland, vineyards - and the city may be rather abrupt, but it is bearable; it is relatively easy on the eye. The blocks of flats look well planned and properly built; we know that they are very inexpensive, and offer their residents bathrooms or showers, drying rooms, well-lit accommodation where they can sit with their radios and television sets and contemplate the world from the comfort of their own homes … Over here, state capitalism does things rather well. (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.118)

Alongside planning with function, these architectural avant-gardes also emphasised the importance of the new procedures of planning. Lefebvre argued that they facilitated the perpetuation of state capitalism in postwar France as both shared similar ‘logics of bureaucracy and productivity’ (Stanek, 2011, p.148). ‘Are we entering the city of joy or the world of unredeemable boredom?’, Lefebvre asked when visiting Mourenx (1995[1962], p.119). His view is obviously pessimistic but he argued that ‘the sociology of boredom could well disclose an important aspect of modernity’ (ibid, p.195).
7.1.3 Modernity and Everyday Life in the Modern World

As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre periodised the development of everyday life into three stages. At the beginning, capitalist logic had yet to dominate everyday life. After the Second World War, capitalism began to exert its influence beyond workplace and shape everyday life (Lefebvre, 1988, p.79). Lefebvre’s purpose in scrutinising modernity is therefore to examine individuals’ living conditions in the twentieth century, when capitalism extended its influence to everyday life (Butler, 2012, p.109). By examining the nature of modernity, such ‘movement of thought’ can uncover the urban experience in the modern world:

The everyday is covered by a surface: that of modernity. News stories and the turbulent affectations of art, fashion and event veil without ever eradicating the everyday blahs. Images, the cinema and television divert the everyday by at times offering up to it its own spectacle, or sometimes the spectacle of the distinctly noneveryday; violence, death, catastrophe, the lives of kings and stars those who we are led to believe defy everydayness. Modernity and everydayness constitute a deep structure that a critical analysis can work to uncover. (Lefebvre, 1987, p.10)

In modern society, or what Lefebvre called the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption, alienation is no longer restricted to the workplace but permeates everyday life. ‘Modernity is triumphalist’ (Lefebvre 1995[1962], p.183) but everyday life is boring. Especially in new towns, life is ‘just boring’ and occupied by ‘the pure essence of boredom’ (ibid, p.118). Therefore, modernity produced a contradictory feeling of happiness and fear, banality and spectacles: ‘the contradiction between individual loneliness and the bringing-together of crowds or masses in gigantic cities’ (ibid, p.189). Urban experience in modernity is about loneliness, banality and repetition, but such a
feeling of banality and repetition is masked by spectacles in the cities (e.g., images, cinema, television) (Poster, 1975, p.246).

Lefebvre’s discussion of everyday life was particularly shaped by the political atmosphere of postwar France and his political affiliation. Shortly after the Second World War, the PCF received strong public support and became the second largest party. Such public support however declined gradually with the emergence of consumer society. Class-based Marxist analysis and a teleological view of proletariat revolution were in crisis. By the late 1960s, Lefebvre ‘was no longer convinced about an absolute end to alienation’ (Poster, 1975, p.244). Alongside the production of space, the theorisation of everyday life is therefore another effort by Lefebvre to reconstruct Marxism.

After leaving the PCF, Lefebvre began to have a closer association with the Situationalists, the Maoist left and other leftist groups (Elden, 2004c, p.3). As discussed above, Lefebvre argued that modernity is promissory: it promised happiness and the satisfaction of every need of the people (Lefebvre, 2005[1981], pp.49-50). But everyday life in modern society is characterised by boredom and repetition. Such a contradiction between technological progress and alienation made the need for disalienation the most urgent question to be addressed. Rather than class-based revolution, Lefebvre urged a creative rupture from the routine of everyday life (2005[1981], pp.49-50; 1995[1962], pp.230-231).

Lefebvre’s intellectual interaction with Guy Debord on the discussion of moments and
spectacles ‘helped shaped one another’ (Merrifield, 2008, p.176). As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre proposed the necessity of breaking with routine satisfactions of everyday life, and illustrated it with examples from the Paris Commune and the upheaval in May 1968 (Merrifield, 2006, p.27). Lefebvre disregarded a class-based analysis of the May 1968 movement, arguing that an urban revolution could only be understood through the concept of everyday life (Poster, 1975, p.388). In other words, moments/events replaced class-based revolution as the mode in which individuals are liberated from alienation and economic fetishism, so that they can become a ‘total man’ in Lefebvre’s imagination (Poster, 1975, p.56; Trebitsch, 2005, p.xxii). When modernity’s promise of happiness is in crisis, spectacles can no longer cover the invasion of capitalist logic into everyday life. Lefebvre argued that ‘the career of modernity as ideology is over’, and a transformation will happen with a break of everyday life (Lefebvre, 2005[1981], p.50).

7.2 The World Expo and Modernity

As indicated above, Hugo (1867) accurately described the World Expo as a confrontation of products and utopias. Industrial exhibitions originated in Europe as an arena for displaying industrial advancement and national strength. The earliest industrial exhibitions in Europe can be dated back to 1683 in Paris or 1754 in Vienna. But these early exhibitions were small in scale, drew limited attention and did not provide any ‘sense of progress which so excited the 19th century’ (Carpenter, 1972, p.466). In 1798, the First French Republic organised the *Exposition Publique des Produits de l’industrie Française* at *Champ de Mars*, which is generally regarded as the first modern exhibition.
Although only 110 exhibitors participated in this three-day long national event, it successfully attracted public attention and demonstrated the industrial achievement of the Republic in less than a decade after the French Revolution (ibid). The Exposition not only displayed ‘a mix of the martial and manufactures’, but also promoted ‘progress’ as a ‘universal aspiration’ (Rosendorf, 2009, pp.1-2). From the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War was the ‘golden age of exhibition’, when more than 50 World Expos were organised (Greenhalgh, 2012, p.13). Even though the World Expo received less attention after the Second World War, it is still one of the biggest international events today.

Industrial exhibitions, particularly the World Expo, are a widely researched topic. Areas of interest include history of early exhibitions, architectural design of pavilions, cultural representation of the exhibits, its relations to urban development, capitalism, nationalism and colonialism, as well as tourism and mega-event studies, etc.45 In recent years, there has also been a growing number of studies in Chinese, Japanese and Korean (Lu, 2005, p.38-43)46. This section does not attempt to provide a complete review of all studies about the World Expo, but focuses on the relationship between the World Expo and modernity by applying a Lefebvrian framework.

7.2.1 Exhibiting Progress and Prosperity

Lefebvre argued that the ‘maieutic of modernity is not without a certain utopianism’

---

45 For a resourceful list of studies about the World Expo, see Geppert, Coffey and Lau (2006). A general review of all registered World Expos can be found in Findling and Pelle (eds.) (2008). For a bibliographical review of industrial exhibitions in Europe before 1851, see Carpenter (1972).
46 For a review of Chinese and Japanese literatures, see Lu (2005) and Yoshimi (2010[1992]) respectively.
Such a utopianism was made possible by technology, which ‘makes the end of work possible (in the long run)’ and ‘what seemed abstractly utopian yesterday is now taking shape’ (Lefebvre, 2005[1982], p.91). By displaying machinery and manufactured products, the World Expo provided opportunities for the country to display its utopian vision of the future to the public. In 1851, London organised the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations, which is the first official World Expo registered under the International Exhibitions Bureau (BIE). Historians generally regard it as a symbol of ‘peace, progress and prosperity’ (Auerbach, 2008, p.ix). Queen Victoria noted such a utopian vision after visiting the machinery section of the 1851 Exhibition:

... we [The Royal Family] remained 2 hours, & which is excessively interesting & instructive, & fills one with admiration for the greatness of man’s mind, which can devise & carry out such wonderful inventions, contributing to the welfare & comfort of the whole world. What used to be done by hand, & used to take months doing is now accomplished in a few instants by the most beautiful machinery ... But, it would take too long to explain all the pieces of machinery we were shown. (Royal Archives, 2012)

The World Expo was usually organised during the phase towards high capitalism (hochkapitalismus) of the host countries (Yoshimi, (2010[1992], p.247). Benjamin commented that World Expos ‘are places of pilgrimage to the commodity fetish’ (Benjamin, 1999[1935], p.7). Different from the 1798 Exposition in Paris, the Great Exhibition was an international event with exhibitors from foreign countries and British colonies. Even though it was later regarded as ‘the first great utopia of global capital’ (Sorkin, 1992, p.209), many British industrialists originally had reservations in spite of the Royal family’s support for the event. Protectionism was pervasive in the
mid-nineteenth century and their interest was local. Alongside the worries about free trade, they preferred fostering local business networks around their production and consumption centres than expanding to a national or even a regional network. However, the event’s economic success swept away reservations over free trade within Britain (Young, 2008, p.7).

Lefebvre argued that capitalism managed to ‘attenuate (if not resolve) its internal contradictions’ for a century since the writing of Capital … by occupying space, by producing a space’ (1976[1973], p.21; original emphasis). Before the first volume of Capital was published in 1867, the organisation of the World Expo and similar exhibitions already displayed prosperity and facilitated the development of capitalism on a world scale. The commercial network between various colonisers in Europe and colonies were strengthened through exhibitions. For instance, London organised the Colonial and Indian Exhibition in 1866 to display the economic value of the colonies (Douglas, 2008, p.17). The French Third Republic organised an exhibition in Hanoi in 1902 (*Exposition de Hanoi*) to attract investment in Annam (Lu, 2004, p.11). The outcome of these exhibitions was also political. By applying Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined community, Peter Hoffenberg (2001, pp.2-3) argued that the 1851 Exhibition provided Britain with the first occasion to showcase all its colonies at once. With the visual impact of the exhibits from the country and the colonies, it symbolised the sovereign and included colonies in the imagination of the community and national identity of the British Empire.

The World Expo displayed a sense of progress – the possibility of creating a modern life
through science and technology. Especially after the First World War when the legitimacy of imperialism was questioned, ‘progress’, ‘modern’ and ‘tomorrow’ were emphasised ‘at the height of modernism’. Some examples of the themes included ‘A Century of Progress’ (Chicago, 1933-1934), ‘Peace and Progress’ (Paris, 1937) and ‘The World of Tomorrow’ (New York, 1939-1940) (Winter, 2013, pp.33, 43). However, the themes of ‘progress and future’ were brought to ‘logical conclusions’ after the Second World War (Greenhalgh, 2012, p.13). The ‘confidence of conquering nature’ of the World Expo was replaced by the care and respect to the environment, such as ‘Oceans: a heritage for the future’ (Lisbon, 1998), ‘Humankind – nature – technology, a new world arising’ (Hanover, 2000) and ‘Nature’s Wisdom’ (Aichi, 2005) (Winter, 2013, p.34), as well as, the Shanghai Expo’s ‘Better City, Better Life’.

### 7.2.2 Exhibiting a Modern Life

As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that the history of everyday life could be periodised into three phases. The first period lasted until the mid-twentieth century, which roughly corresponded to the ‘golden age of exhibition’. Lefebvre argued that capitalism during this phase ‘was busy constructing locomotives, ships, cannons, and so on’ (1988, p.79). Capitalist logics had extended to everyday life, yet daily routine was still dominated by nature (linear time). However, technology (e.g., electricity, the internal combustion engine and other transport technologies) began to modify people’s daily life at about the turn of the twentieth century (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.178). Such a modern life was popularised through the World Expo. Many new inventions, including the telephone, photography, telegraphy, television and the steam engine, were for the
first time widely exhibited to the public at the World Expo. The application of these new
inventions to daily life was demonstrated to the public at the expo venue. For instance,
the electric bulb was widely used in the 1889 *Exposition Universelle* in Paris, with the
availability of the industrial use of electricity. There were 5,700 coloured light bulbs
illuminating *Champ de Mars*, so that the expo venue became an ‘Electrical Palace’. The
availability of the electricity-powered train in *Champ de Mars* also shortened travel time.
Electricity was seen as ‘the regenerative goddess of the modern’ that transformed
Victorian people’s daily routine (Blyth, 2009, p.34). In other words, this early World
Expo provided a specific social space during a particular period of time for exhibiting
modern life. It is therefore not surprising that the organiser of the 1889 *Exposition
Universelle* even proclaimed the expo venue as ‘a temple of modern life’ (Mitchell,
1989, p.220). In the United States, the World Expo was also regarded as a ‘rites of
passage’, in which ‘the full acceptance of a new way of life, new values, and a new
social organization’ were made possible (Susman, 1983, p.7).

The World Expo is an exhibitionary event: it provides a social space for exhibiting
industrial products to the people. The preface to the guide book of the 1934 World’s Fair
in Chicago clearly stated its spectacular nature that ‘[a]ll the world has been drawn upon
to contribute to the spectacle … No amount of money or the travel of a lifetime could
give you the opportunity of seeing all these things brought together, except at an
International Exposition’ (A Century of Progress International Exposition Chicago,
1934, p.15). However, with the growing popularity of international communications,
tourism and theme parks, such as Disneyland, the World Expo began to lose its
attractiveness in displaying foreign cultures and products after the Second World War.
(Rosendorf, 2009, p.6). The World Expo was regarded as ‘the most direct ancestor’ of Disneyland (Sorkin, 1992, p.208), but the opening of theme parks such as Disneyland in the 1960s replaced the World Expo as a more spectacular tourist attraction (Rosendorf, 2009, p.6). Moreover, the development of mass media further reduced the World Expo’s role as a spectacle and exhibition of modern life. As Lefebvre argued:

Is it correct to say that television gives the everyday a world-wide dimension? Yes it is. Television allows every household to look at the spectacle of the world, but it is precisely this mode of looking at the world as spectacle which introduces non-participation and receptive passivity. (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.76)

There are now publications and information which ensure that everyone is aware of all that is to be done … everyone knows how to live in 1981 … Magazines and weeklies, particularly those directed at women and even those that defended the ‘cause of women’, work out complete daily schedules – buying and selling, shopping, menus, clothing. From morning to evening and evening to morning, everyday time is full to bursting: fulfilment, plenitude. (Lefebvre, 2005[1981], p.81)

Lefebvre argued that everyday life entered the second and then the third phase after the Second World War, in which everyday life is programmed and mass-mediated by a capitalist logic (1988, p.79). Mass media became a more convenient and powerful channel in exhibiting modern life. Therefore, the World Expo could no longer be projected as ‘a temple of modern life’. However, the spectacle nature of the World Expo continues to be significant. For instance, the 1986 World Exposition on Transportation and Communication in Vancouver was originally not widely supported due to its huge cost of investment, which resulted in a low level of support to the provincial government by the general public (Ley and Olds, 1988, pp.209-210). However, the Exposition produced a ‘lingering memory of a spectacle’ among the public. Such a
‘vivid and positive’ personal experience then converted the 1986 Expo from a political debate to a personal event (ibid, pp.209-210). As reflected in an opinion poll, public support to the government reversed since the Exposition began.

7.2.3 Exhibiting a Modern City

As I discussed in Chapter Five, the Shanghai Expo is an urban development project that facilitated land commodification. Other World Expos were also closely related to urban development. In the United States, some host cities applied the European model of urban planning when drafting the plan for the construction of the expo venue. Since the Festival of Britain in London in 1951, urban planners also realised the potential of promoting urban regeneration by organising mega-events (Geppert, 2010, p.145). Alongside the development of the built environment, the World Expo also shaped the representation of a modern city. As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that ‘industrialisation and urbanisation’ are a double process. Both processes must take place together, because ‘urban existence gives significance to industrialization’ (1971[1968], pp.47-48). As illustrated above, the World Expo exhibited modern life; it also exhibited a modern city to the public:

The fairs also became models, adopted visionary urbanism as an aspect of their agendas, both offering themselves as models of urban organization and providing within their pavilions, panoramic visions of even more advanced cities to come. (Sorkin, 1992, p.210)

By applying Lefebvre’s spatial triad, Alexander Geppert (2010, pp.4-6) examined the relationship between early international exhibitions (from the late nineteenth century to
the 1930s) and the representation of a modern city. He argued that international exhibitions, such as the World Expo, is an ‘exhibition city’ within the ‘real’ exhibiting city. The World Expo is a confined physical space within the host city, where urbanism was represented in the expo venue. Exhibitions are therefore spaces of representation for displaying urbanism. For instance, the 1851 Exhibition was held in a purposefully-built modernist steel structure, Crystal Palace at Hyde Park, and became a national icon (Hobhouse, 2002, p.xix). The ‘Electrical Palace’ of the 1889 Exposition also demonstrated modern nightlife.

However, most built structures in the expo site were planned to be demolished after the events; Geppert also termed the World Expo as a ‘fleeting city’ (Geppert, 2010, p.5). The 1851 London Exhibition lasted for six months, and most pavilions except Crystal Palace were demolished. The Shanghai Expo followed this tradition; the exhibition was held from May to October and most pavilions were temporary in nature. Lefebvre argued ‘the tendency of modernity toward the ephemeral’ (2009[1975], p.116). In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre commented on the ephemeral nature of space in modern society by referring to the 1967 International and Universal Exposition in Montreal:

An admirable example of such a conjuncturally modeled space, modified by group action, is the large exhibition space, especially the one in Montreal. An ephemeral city rose up from a transformed site, a magnificent city, where everydayness was absorbed in festival, where the urban was transparent in its splendour. (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.130)

Early World Expos celebrated the progress that resulted from industrial and technological advancement. More often, the host city organised this mega-event for the
branding of the city (Monclús, 2009, p.2) and justifying urban development (Ley and Olds, 1988, p.199). Therefore, the World Expo no longer played the important role of exhibiting progress, prosperity and a modern life, but transformed to become a ‘space of consumption’ or even a ‘consumption of space’ dominated by the bourgeoisie. Even though the 1967 Montreal Expo showcased such complex buildings as ‘Habitat 67’ to envision the future of the city, the utopianism of the World Expo was questioned (McDonough, 2010, pp.88-96).

7.2.4 World Fair is Unfair

In the United States, the World Expo is referred to as ‘World’s Fair’. World’s Fair is however not fair: it exhibited the ‘dark sides’ of modernity (Rosendorf, 2009, p.3). First of all, the World Expo facilitated the growth of capitalism on a world scale. Marx and Engels argued that the 1851 Exhibition is ‘a striking proof of the concentrated power with which modern large-scale industry’ is invested (Marx and Engels, 1850 cited Young, 2008 p.21):

> By putting on show the massed resources of modern industry in a small concentrated space, just at a time when modern bourgeois society is being undermined from all sides, it is also displaying materials which have been produced, and are still being produced day after day in these turbulent times, for the construction of a new society. With this exhibition, the bourgeoisie of the world has erected in the modern Rome its Pantheon, where, with self-satisfied pride, it exhibits the gods which it has made for itself. (Marx and Engels, 1850 cited Young, 2008 p.21)

Alongside promoting capitalism on a world scale, the dark side of the World Expo also included ‘justifying colonialism’ and ‘codifying and encouraging racism’ (Rosendorf,
2009, p.3). For instance, even though the French tradition of expositions put much heavier emphasis on craftsmanship and artistic objects (like the sculptures of Rodin), the 1867 Exposition Universelles was the first exposition that included human mankind as an exhibit. A large-scale temple replica ‘complete with a row of skulls hanging from the cornice and a cast of mother of the gods, Coatlicue, standing in the central portal’ were imported from Mexico as a display of foreign cultures (Honour, 1975, p.185 cited Parezo and Fowler, 2007, p.23). The French Third Republic then organised the Paris Exposition Coloniale Internationale (Paris International Colonial Exhibition) in 1931 (Blake, 2002, p.35). Similarly, various colonial exhibitions were held in Belgium, Britain, France and Germany to demonstrate their triumphs of conquering foreign lands (Douglas, 2008, p.18). In the 1904 St. Louisiana Purchase Exposition, ‘Anthropology Villages’ and ‘Indian Villages’ were even built to display native people from foreign societies (Parezo and Fowler, 2007, see Chapter 3). The 1904 Exposition was the first World Expo with the participation of the Chinese government (Huang, 2007, pp.19-20). Alongside wooden architecture, silk and porcelain, the Chinese Village also displayed a woman with bound feet, a Buddhist monk and carved wooden figures of prostitutes, beggars, prisoners and drug addicts (Zhang, 2010[1904], pp.124-126). In other early World Expos, the images of Australia, imperial China, Egypt, Meiji Japan, Middle East India and Muslim civilisations were all distorted in accordance with the dominant representations of the European and American organisers.47

Lefebvre argued that modernity is ‘an endeavour’ of ‘the discovery and appropriation of

47 For a discussion on the representation of Australia and India in the exhibitions in Britain, see Hoffenberg (2001). For a discussion of the representation of imperial China, Egypt, Meiji Japan and the Middle East in World Expos, see Lu (2005), Çelik (1992), Yoshimi (2010[1992]) and Davis (2002) respectively.
desire’ (1995[1962], p.191). The World Expo provided the social space for displaying ‘the discovery and appropriation of desire’ of European countries. Amid the Industrial Revolution and colonial expansion, manufactured products and colonies were the new ‘discoveries’. Hence, it is not surprising that subjects from their colonies were included as an ‘exhibit’ alongside industrial products. Timothy Mitchell described it as a ‘world-as-exhibition’; that Europe’s worldview was displayed through World Expos (1988, p.13). By engaging with Michel Foucault’s discussion on disciplinary power, Tony Bennett argued modern society developed an ‘exhibitionary complex’. The industrial exhibitions ‘completed the evolutionary picture in representing the history of industry and manufacture as a series of progressive innovations leading up to the contemporary triumphs of industrial capitalism’ (1988, p.90).

The World Expo is an exhibition of a modern country. While countries such as Britain and France organised World Expos to demonstrate their success in industrial development, urban infrastructure and colonial expansion, other European countries and the United States organised expositions to demonstrate that they have accomplished the required level of modernisation. Regardless of its dark side, the World Expo still became the parameter for comparatively less developed countries to present their achievement of modernity.

7.3 Shanghai, China’s Capital of Modernity

Chinese modernity is an outcome of western confrontation. In Europe, modernity emerged during the Enlightenment and peaked during the Industrial Revolution. The
advancement of knowledge (science) and its application (technology) ontologically challenged the traditional worldview and daily lives of individuals. It resulted in institutional changes in society, the questioning of tradition, and a transformation of individual experience of space and time. The driver of modernisation in China was however external. Though modernisation was a pragmatic project to strengthen the nation against foreign invasion, it had to respond to Western confrontation. Chinese modernity went beyond the challenge of tradition, with the whole ‘structure’ of China been re-evaluated.

As I argued above, Western modernisation is typically considered as the yardstick or even the goal for Chinese modernisation. The key issue therefore was whether to replace its traditional worldview and cultural practices with Western those of civilisation, or to adapt the technological advancement of the West for purely practical use (Spence, 1990, p.225). Thus, a series of Lefebvrian questions arise: Can China modernise adopting her own route? Has China accomplished its search for modernity? How can Chinese modernity be examined within a Lefebvrian framework? What is the role of Shanghai in relation to Chinese modernity? In this final section, I will address these questions making reference to the World Expo.

7.3.1 Chinese Modernity as a Western Confrontation

The debate on the modernisation of China can be summarised in the ideas of ‘ti-yong’. Ti (literally translated as ‘structure’) means the traditional Chinese worldview and ethics of societal relationships; while yong (‘function’) means ‘practical use’ (e.g., the
application of science and technology). The focus of the Chinese modernisation debate is whether to completely substitute Chinese traditions with Western ones (i.e. regarding Western ideas as *ti*), or to restrict the imitation of the western model to technological advancement (i.e. regarding Western products as *yong*) (Spence, 1990, p.225).

The ‘structure versus function’ debate is the ‘China versus the West’ debate operating within academia and elite circles. Some senior officials of the empire (the Westernisationists) support the former worldview and the pursuit of military and economic industrialisation (Western Learning for practical use) without involving institutional reform (Chinese Learning as the fundamental structure). The Jiang Nan Machinery Manufacture Arsenal was established in Shanghai against this historical backdrop. On the other hand, the revolutionists, such as Sun Yat-sen, fundamentally question the ‘structure’ of the empire and call for modernisation to encompass the cultural and political organisation of the Chinese nation state (Spence, 1990, pp.197-198).

However, whether or not China’s modernity project is merely a response to Western Confrontation is an ontological question that needs to be carefully examined. Around the same time that China faced colonial invasion, Japan, the neighbouring empire which shared many of Chinese cultural traditions, also experienced Western coercion. By comparing the different views towards modernisation and institutional changes of Japan and China, a simplistic account of China’s modernisation as merely a response to Western modernity is disproved. By comparing the respective attitudes of Japan and China towards modernisation, I will show in this section that the latter’s route to
modernisation was not simply a response to Western expansionism.

Toshimi Takeuchi (2005[1948], pp.56-57) argued that the modernisation of China and Japan resulted from Western coercion. Both countries showed similar ‘Oriental Resistance’; but it is the difference in their approaches that has resulted in their different versions of modernity. He demonstrated the difference by referring to the argument of Lu Xun, a leftist writer arguably the founder of modern Chinese literature, on slave and master. The ‘slave and master’ relationship is the analogy of the relationship between Asia and Europe in the nineteenth Century. In the interpretation of Takeuchi (2005[1948], p.72), Lu Xun called for an awareness of the violent nature of the struggle to become the master, and suggested that the liberation of China could not be pursued by becoming European. Lu Xun clearly disagreed with the direct duplication of the colonial expansion model of Western powers, even though he is also well known for critiquing the corrupting aspects of Chinese tradition. Japanese intellectuals, argued Takeuchi, had failed to problematise the response to Western modernity. Even though the total abandonment of tradition was not advocated, the proposal of a comprehensive replication of a Western model overwhelmed Japanese culture.

Takeuchi attributed such a difference to structural differences between Chinese and Japanese histories (2005[1948], pp.76-78). In the long history of China, there were always alternations of dynasty. The ‘old’ dynasty was replaced by a ‘new’ one, then ‘the new’ would become the ‘old’, and would be replaced by another ‘new’ dynasty. This cycle repeats and is viewed as a law of nature. ‘The new’ will not be better than ‘the old’, as it will eventually be overthrown by another dynasty. This explained why Lu
Xun has excluded the possibility of liberation from Western coercion through becoming master/Europe, as this will just be the beginning of another cycle of the alternation. On the other hand, despite the wars between the emperor and the hans (the feudal lords) and among the hans, Japan has no history of alternation in dynasties in the past 2,600 years.

The Chinese view of ‘new versus old’ did not exist in Japan as the dominant dynasty persisted despite internal and external challenges. Because of this, Japan was not wary of foreign cultures but quite dynamically integrated them into her own. Seemingly antagonistic, the tradition of Japan would not be fundamentally shaken by foreign cultures because of the emphasis on continuity. Faced with Western confrontation, Japan responded in the same way: by imitating the Western model and by absorbing it into its own system. However, as Lu Xun predicted, becoming European (the master) did not help Japan (the slave) resolve the problem arising from modernity, as it inherited the violent nature of the master. Japan’s colonial and imperial war can be viewed as a response to Western modernity and a search for her own modernity, but it only resulted in what Takeuchi called ‘Japanism’ (2005[1948], p.142).

Takeuchi’s thesis has drawn considerable attention from academic communities in Asia because of the importance he attributed to cultural factors. The modernisation of China began with scepticism towards tradition, but the cultural and institutional aspects should not be confused. Culturally, modernity is opposite to tradition; but institutionally modernity can also be opposite to feudalism. Unlike modernity in Western civilisation, the purpose of China’s modernisation is not solely for progress – if the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ appeared and disappeared in a cycle, what is the meaning of ‘progress’?
Modernisation means technological progress, but more importantly China’s modernisation is also liberation from feudalism, liberation from the alternation of dynasties, as well as liberation from the ‘slave and master’ relationship. Hence, the relationship between Chinese tradition and Western coercion is dialectical. The military strength and the advancement in science and technology of colonial powers have exposed China’s backwardness in science and technology. Something traditionally regarded as ‘clever but useless tricks’ is now regarded as the goal.

7.3.2 Encountering Modernity at World Expos

In the opening speech to the seventh World Expo International Forum that I referred to in Chapter Five, Premier Wen Jiabao (2009) summarised the involvement of China in the history of the World Expo and argued that the organisation of the Shanghai Expo ‘brought into reality the century-old dream of the Chinese nation’. Such a ‘century-old dream’ emerged when China was still under feudalism and Western societies began to industrialise:

The first World Expo was held in London in 1851 at a time when China's feudal rulers were totally unaware of the rapid development of science and technology or the historical changes to the political and economic patterns of the outside world. They regarded Western science and technology as ‘clever but useless tricks’ and called the World Expo a ‘competition of strange things’ … China’s later involvement with the World Expo was eye-opening to many Chinese. It exposed them to modern civilization and aroused in them a strong sense of mission to learn from and catch up with the West. (Wen, 2009)

The early World Expos displayed the wealth and strength of the host countries. China’s
early encounters with the World Expo emphasised technological inventions, urban
development of the host city, as well as the economic contribution of the World Expo.
For instance, Guo Songtu, the ambassador to France, found the invention of the
visited the Crystal Palace and was astonished by the sophisticated architectural design
and the urban development of London:

Being commissioned by the government, this Palace was built
thirteen years ago by Sir Paxton. The column is made of iron, the
roof and walls of four sides are inlaid with glass. It looks
magnificent and breathtaking when viewing from a distance, it is
therefore named as Crystal Palace.48 (Zhang, 2010[1866], p.6)

London covers over 100 miles of surrounding areas, with two
millions of residents, roads are plain, gardens are luxuriant, streets
are tidy, markets are prosperous. All buildings are six to seven
storeys high, with different colours in white or red.49 (Zhang,
2010[1866], p.4)

The World Expos provided occasions for the Chinese to have firsthand experience of
Western technologies and urban development. However, such encounters were mainly
restricted to government officials, businessmen and overseas students. The experience
of visiting the World Expo was distributed through the printed media in Shanghai. For
instance, Wang Tao, a reformist from Shanghai, visited Champ de Mars and the Crystal
Palace. Based on Wang’s notes on his visit, Dianshizhai Pictorial, an illustrated
newspaper published in Shanghai, drafted illustrations of these two expo venues to
showcase their imagination of sophisticated architectural design and urban developement

48 The original text reads as: 此宮係在十三年前，官派伯爵柏四屯所建，以鐵為樑柱，上下四旁鑲
嵌玻璃，遙望之金碧輝煌，悅人心目，故名為水晶宮。
49 The original text reads as: 倫敦周可百里，居民二百萬，道路平坦，園林茂盛，街巷整齊，市廛
繁盛。樓高皆六七層，其色紅白各異。
in Western cities (Chen, 2010, pp.16-17). These overseas experiences of visiting the World Expo also attracted further responses in the country. Alongside intellectuals, the feudal ruler also began to realise the ‘rapid change of the outside world’ and the need for modernisation. In order to demonstrate its determination and capability in industrial modernity and encouraging industrialism, the Qing Government organised various domestic agricultural and industrial exhibitions across the country (e.g., Sichuan in 1905, Tianjian in 1907 and Wuhan in 1906) (Fernsebner, 2006, p.100). In 1910, the year before the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the Nanyang Encouraging Industry Exposition (Nanyang quanye hui; or the Nanking South Sea Exhibition) was held in Jiangning under state sponsorship and with donations from the private sector.

Lefebvre argued that modernity is two sided: the speeding up of technological progress and the transformation of everyday life (1995[1962], p.230). Even though similar exhibitions were organised in China at the turn of the last century, these events focused only on industrialism but not the vision of a modern life. These industrial and agricultural exhibitions did not display any vision of the modern city and modern life to the public. However, Shanghai during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period provided a more ‘vernacular landscape’ (Lee, 1999b, p.37). Since Shanghai emerged as a capitalist cosmopolitan city, the concession areas, and Shanghai in general, became China’s ‘exhibition city’: it exhibited a modern city and modern life to the country. As discussed in Chapter Four, Western architecture and ‘modern facilities’ were imported to the concession areas of Shanghai since the mid-nineteenth century. The Bund is even regarded as the ‘World Expo of Architectures’ (wangguo jianzhu bolang) (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.197). Shanghai therefore provided the physical space for implementing a
Western urban development plan. However, Shanghai also provided the social space for experimenting with new modern life. Shanghai displayed ‘the imagination of an emerging urban constituency’ and displayed a new kind of ‘norms and practices of everyday existence in a widening circle of Chinese society’ (Yeh, 1997, p.394). Therefore, Shanghai could be regarded as the ‘temple of modern life’ for the transformation of everyday life within a Chinese context.

7.3.3 Chinese Modernity as an Antithesis

As I indicated in Chapter Six, Mao (1937) argued that the laws of ‘contradiction in things’ and the ‘unity of opposites’ are fundamental to nature and society, i.e. things must come in pairs and produce a unity. Even though Lefebvre pointed out the lack of philosophical vigour in Mao’s application of dialectics (1988[1976], p.243), the latter’s discussion on the ‘law of unity’ can help understand the nature of Chinese modernity that emerged in Shanghai. Shanghai is the capital of Chinese modernity; it is also the home of the antithesis of modernity. Lefebvre (1995[1962], p.178) argued that ‘the contours of modernism and modernity begin to emerge from the mists of history’ at around 1905 – the first Russian revolution took place as resistance against feudalism and capitalism. The contours of the antithesis of modernism also emerged in Shanghai when it was entering the phase of the golden period of capitalism. In July 1921, the Communist Party of China was officially established in Shanghai with the assistance of the Communist International (Comintern). Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, leading scholars of the May Fourth Movement, took key leadership roles (Spence, 1990, pp.303-307).
Wang and Karl (1998, pp.13-14) argued that socialism in China is an anti-modern theory of modernisation. Mao strongly supported the search for modernisation by overthrowing Chinese tradition, but disagreed that capitalism was the synonym of modernity. The destruction of Shanghai’s urban culture during the revolutionary era was carried out under the direct domination of this view of socialism. It is this third Chinese version of socialism which is important in complicating Chinese modernity.

As Lefebvre pointed out, Western modernity is constituted by triumph and fear (1995[1962], pp.1-3), but, as we have seen in the venue of the World Expo, only the positive side was valued. However, when China was confronted by (Western) modernity, the bright and dark sides of modernity were introduced, though at different speeds. Therefore, Shanghai modernity is complicated. For instance, the infrastructure development and urban culture of the French concession areas in Shanghai were celebrated by Shanghaiese writers, as the pre-eminent aspect of modernity (i.e. Lefebvre’s concept of modernism). Nonetheless, with diverse western theories being brought into China (with Shanghai as the publishing centre), critiques of the exploitative nature of capitalism and the theory of class struggle were also imported into China (Lee, 1999b, p.322). Thus, Western experience provided Chinese scholars with an immediate critique of the pursuit of modernism in China.

Therefore, the Chinese version of socialism is neither about ‘structure versus function’ nor ‘China versus the West’. It neither supports the preservation of Chinese tradition nor a complete replication of the Western model. Socialist revolution provided a possibility of liberating the nation from both feudalism and Western coercion, as well as avoiding
the internal contradiction of capitalism in western societies. It is also an intellectual critique of capitalism and class domination, as well as a political campaign offering the old civilisation an alternative route to modernisation. Rather than just the dialectical relationship between ‘the weak and traditional imperial China’ and ‘the strong and industrial modern West’, Chinese modernity is an antithesis of Western capitalism. Chinese socialism, as a ‘critique of (Western) modernity’, is another antithesis that further complicates the modernisation of China. Only through this ‘trialectical’ relationship can we understand the modernisation of contemporary China.

7.3.4 The City Spirits

Similar to the 1867 Exposition Universelles, the organisation of the Shanghai Expo also published a Shanghai City Guide as a ‘tourist guide’ and a ‘pocket encyclopaedia’ for all ‘new Shanghaiese’ (Wang, 2007, front flap). Unlike the Paris Guide, Shanghaiese writers and artists were not commissioned to contribute to the guidebook. But it was written by the vice Chairperson of the Shanghai Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Wang Ronghua, who was also the president of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and delegate of the 15th and 16th CPC National Congress. The author argued that Shanghai showed an ‘enterprising city spirit’:

The spirit of a city is cultivated over time. Therefore, it varies from city to city. Before Shanghai opened to the outside world as a commercial port in the late mid-19th century, the city was characterized by mercantilism, affluence, and tolerance. After 1949, however, the spirit of Shanghai gradually changed to patriotism, conformity and national pride.
Since the central government kick started the opening-up of Pudong in 1990, the city of Shanghai has stayed at the forefront of China’s reform and opening up. A new city spirit has been nurtured as Shanghai grows into an international metropolis. The new spirit can be summarized as a broad mind like the vast ocean that takes in all rivers, the readiness to serve the entire nation, and the dedication to working hard and pursuing excellence. (Wang, 2007, pp.80-81)

The ‘enterprising city spirit’ was essential to the development of Shanghai as a capitalist cosmopolitan city. As Yeh concurred, Shanghai’s modernity emerged with ‘the workings of commercial interest through the city's cultural industries’ (1997, p.393). However, Shanghai also demonstrated a ‘revolutionary city spirit’. As Bergère noted, during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period, Shanghai was ‘the most “foreign” of all Chinese towns, and was also one where nationalist awareness and the revolutionary mobilization of the masses first developed’ (2009, p.5). It was the official birthplace of the CPC with many industrial strikes being organised (Perry, 1994, p.1), as well as the cultural centre promoting different ideas (Lee, 1999b, pp.42-42). Such a ‘revolutionary city spirit’, which could be regarded as the antithesis of modernism in Lefebvre’s terminology, is implicit to Shanghai modernity.

Therefore, ‘enterprising spirit’ and ‘revolutionary spirit’ are the antitheses of the modernity of Shanghai, in which ‘enterprising spirit’ means the spirit of situating the Western in a Chinese context and ‘revolutionary spirit’ means the critique of such a pursuit. Both city spirits constituted Shanghai modernity. In Chapter Four, I showed that Shanghai served as the capital of Chinese modernity from the late Qing to the Republican era because it also mediated foreign ideas in China. Without the ‘revolutionary spirit’, Shanghai would have functioned merely as a treaty port for economic benefit but not cultural encounters with foreign countries (similar to
Guangzhou in the early nineteenth century). During the socialist construction period, the spirit of ‘patriotism, conformity and national pride’ was brutally enforced in Shanghai by the socialist regime at the expense of the ‘enterprising spirit’. Shanghai then retreated from its role as Asia’s financial centre and the centre of Chinese intellectual life.

When the Shanghai Expo was organised in 2010, Shanghai revived its ‘enterprising spirit’. The pursuit of capitalism was symbolised by the revitalisation of the First National Meeting Site of the CPC in Shanghai as a tourist spot (Diglio, 2005, p.118). As I illustrated in Chapter Five, the Shanghai Expo was a land commodification project that speeded up urbanisation and generated economic benefits to the state. The venue of the Shanghai Expo is also planned to be developed to become a new business centre for state-owned enterprises (Xinhua, 2011). A state-led/-participation mode of production will persist with such a land commodification model. However, Shanghai has not revived its ‘revolutionary spirit’ yet. Rather than being a ‘vast ocean that takes in all rivers’ (Huang, 2007, p.81), as discussed in Chapter Six resistance from civil society will be suppressed. In Chapter Five, I also discussed that the Shanghai Expo did not focus on the reflection of the impact of urbanisation on the environment and urban experience. But it manipulated the Chinese theme ‘City, Makes Life Better’ to justify urbanisation by such an international event. Lefebvre envisioned the ‘Chinese road to socialism’ as an experiment of ‘building a different society’ (1991[1974], p.421) but he would be disappointed by the Chinese modernity - ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ in China today is no longer an antithesis of Western capitalism.
7.4 Conclusion: Shanghai as an Antithesis of Chinese Modernity

In the translator preface of the Chinese version of *De l’État* (Volume II), Lefebvre was regarded as ‘one of the most famous philosophers and social theorists in French Marxism’. But the translator immediately noted Lefebvre’s marginal position as a ‘non-dogmatic and non-official’ interpreter of Marx (Li, 1988, p.2). To summarise, Lefebvre extended Marxist theory by emphasising the importance of ‘the urban, the everyday, social space and social time’ (1988, p.7). He argued that capitalism managed to survive through its internal contradictions ‘by occupying space’ and ‘by producing space’ (1976[1973], p.21). Proposing the spatial triad as a conceptual tool and applying a ‘regressive-progressive method’ as his methodology, Lefebvre theorised the dialectical relationship between physical environment, mental space and cultural representation under different modes of production. He was also concerned with how the logic of the capitalist mode of production was extended to everyday life in post-war Europe, i.e. alienation is no longer limited to production but to everyday life.

Since the Reform was announced in 1978, China has been undergoing a ‘Second Revolution’ that set out to transform economic, social and spiritual life (Xinhua News, 2004). This thesis applied a Lefebvrian framework in investigating the production of space and urban experience in Shanghai during such a transformation. Various methods of data collection were employed to address my research questions, which included: (1) What is the mode of production in Shanghai now? (2) What are the urban experiences of the inhabitants of Shanghai during the organisation of the World Expo? (3) How can we characterise Chinese modernity today? I argued that Shanghai entered the phase of a
‘state-led/participation mode of production’, in which the state plays a dual role in market regulation and market activities. The organisation of the Shanghai Expo exemplified the role of the state and the importance of land commodification, as a production of new space, in sustaining such a mode of production. Upon the withdrawal of state control in the workplace and residential allocation, the daily routine and social clock of the inhabitants were also reorganised. I also periodised Shanghai’s history of space and argued that its past as a capitalist cosmopolitan city was reconstructed to connect the socialist regime to capitalism.

Alongside facilitating the production of space, the Shanghai Expo also exhibited China’s achievement in pursuing modernisation. As the Chinese road to modernisation originated as a reaction to Western civilisations, the latter were regarded as the yardstick of such a modernity project (Lee, 1999b, p.45). It is therefore not surprising that the organisation of the Shanghai Expo was projected as a ‘century-old dream’ (Wen, 2009) and glorified as a ‘nationwide jubilation’ (Huang, 2007, p.35). Together with the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the military parade on National Day in 2009, the Shanghai Expo exhibited ‘a rejuvenated and unified nation that returned to its rightful place at the centre of world affairs’ in the world (Callahan, 2012, p.254). Similar to the Exposition Publique des Produits de l’industrie Française, the Shanghai Expo demonstrated China’s achievement of three decades after the ‘Second Revolution’.

As a modernity project, is there any antithesis of the World Expo? Yes, at least one. In 1931, the French Third Republic organised the Paris Exposition Coloniale Internationale (Paris International Colonial Exhibition) to display the colonies and
national superiority of the participating countries through ‘crude caricatures of the art of colonized people’s ancestors’ (Saumane [Narcisse Danaé], 1931, p.1 cited Blake, 2002, p.35). Some members of the PCF and others organised a counter exhibition ‘The Truth about the Colonies’ (*La Verite sur les Colonies*). The purpose of the exhibition was to counter ‘the French government's use of the arts in support its civilising mission’ (ibid, p.38). However, the dark side of World Expos (e.g., justifying exploitation under capitalism, colonialism and racism) were ignored by the official publication *Shanghai EXPO* (2007). The author argued that the buildings at the Chinese Village and the Chinese exhibition hall at the 1904 St. Louis Exposition were ‘both rich in Chinese traditional characteristics and style’ (Huang, 2007, p.19), but distorted images of the Chinese were not mentioned. This book is referred to as ‘the only book on the 2010 World Expo endorsed by the Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination’ (ibid, front flap), in which the nature of the World Expo was described as shown below without critical evaluation:

The World Expo is a gathering of nations from all over the world to showcase their products and craftsmanship, to share with pride information about their hometowns and motherlands. It is an epitome of the great achievements of human civilization, possessing unparalleled appeal. (Huang, 2007, p.3)

The Shanghai Expo is an exhibition for the achievement of Chinese modernisation. Lefebvre argued that modernity ‘promised happiness, the satisfaction of all needs’ (2005[1981], p.49), and that such a concept of happiness was new to France and the world after the French Revolution (1971[1968], p.206). After decades of revolutions, ‘the concept of happiness’ is also new to China now. Before the opening of the Shanghai Expo, a series of books were published to popularise the event. One of the books has a
A Grand Banquet of World Civilisations (2009), with a promotional movie released at the same time. Similar to all banquets, all worries, fears and problems were temporarily disregarded. The Shanghai Expo focused on the host country’s achievement in promoting economic progress, technological innovations and urbanisation. As described in Chapter Six, although not without complaints about land appropriation, Shanghai’s inhabitants are generally happy with the improvement in their quality of life in the post-Reform period. However, Lefebvre also reminded us: ‘to be aware of being unhappy presupposes that something else is possible, a different condition from the unhappy one’ (1971[1968], p.206). Similar to Paris when it organised the 1867 Exposition, Shanghai is not a utopia for every Shanghaiese. This thesis also examined the social inequalities and the exhausting urban experience that the Shanghai Expo produced and worsened.

As pointed out above, Lefebvre argued that urban experience in modernity is about loneliness, banality and repetition. Such an everydayness is ‘absorbed’ by spectacles, so that people will not reflect on their lives and social inequalities (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.130). A similar trend is taking place in China now. About half a year before the Shanghai Expo opened, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) approved the project of the Shanghai Disney Resort, at a suburban area in Chuansha Town in Pudong. The investment of US$ 3.5 billion arguably exceeded that of the Shanghai Expo (The Economic Observer, 2009), which reconfirmed the state-led/-participation mode of production being perpetuated by the production of space, and China’s need of spectacles in exhibiting its achievement in modernity and absorbing everydayness. By establishing modernity and modernism as antitheses, Lefebvre
examined how capitalist logic is shaping our everyday life, and called for a transformation of the world with a break from everyday life (2005[1981], p.50). China also needs an antithesis today. Can Shanghai, as China’s capital of modernity, play such a role in mediating a critique of modernism? It does not seem likely, when most people are satisfied with an improvement in material enjoyment and justified social inequalities. Rather than an ‘enterprising spirit’, this city needs to revive its ‘revolutionary spirit’ – a critique of the search for modernity.
## APPENDIX I

### DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUNDS OF THE RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Residence in Shanghai</th>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ms. Song</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>Pudong</td>
<td>Wuxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ms. Ting</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Financial Controller</td>
<td>Pudong</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mr. Yin</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Fund manager</td>
<td>Pudong</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mr. Tian</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>Retired engineer</td>
<td>Baoshan</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mr. Akbulut</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Architect and lecturer</td>
<td>Puxi</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Mr. Shang</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>Pudong</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Mr. Pan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>Owner of a food manufacturing company</td>
<td>Kunshan</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Mr. Shen</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>Factory worker</td>
<td>Puxi</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Mr. Zhi</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>A member of Shanghai Committee of CPPCC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Mr. Wang</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Computer engineer in finance industry</td>
<td>Puxi</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ms. Huang</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>About 30</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Magazine editor</td>
<td>Puxi</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Ms. Wei</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Magazine editor</td>
<td>Puxi</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Mrs. Fang</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Above 50</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Sanlin Expo Homeland</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Name: ____________________  Age: ____________________
Sex: ____________________  Occupation: ____________________
Education: ____________________  Place of birth: ____________________
District of Residence: ____________

Part 1: Experience

1. How do you travel to work? What do you usually do during your leisure time?
   你怎樣工作？你在閒暇時通常會做甚麼？

2. How often do you visit ‘linong’ (traditional Shanghaiese residential cluster)? How often do you visit the tourist sites?
   你有否到過里弄？你有多經常到遊客區？

3. Has your daily life changed in recent years? [For migrants] Is there any change in your daily life after moving to Shanghai?
   你覺得你近幾年的生活有沒有改變？[只向移民提問] 你在搬到上海後，生活上有甚麼改變？

4. Has the Shanghai Expo made any changes to your daily life? Why?
   你覺得上海世博有沒有改變你的生活？為甚麼？

Part 2: Perception

5. How do you feel about living in Shanghai?
   住在上海給你甚麼感覺？

6. How would you compare Shanghai and other cities?
   住在上海，與住其他城市有沒有分別？

7. Are you aware of the urban development projects in Shanghai? What do they mean to you?
   你有沒有注意到上海有不少大型的城市發展工程在進行中？你有甚麼感覺？

8. What does the ‘Old Shanghai’ sentiment mean to you?
   你對「老上海」有甚麼感覺？

9. What does the Shanghai Expo mean to you?
   對你來說，上海世博有甚麼意義？
Part 3: Imagination

10. Why do you live in Shanghai? What are your expectations of living in Shanghai? Have your expectations been realised?
你為甚麼住在上海？你對在住上海有甚麼期望？你所期望的有沒有實現？

11. How would you define ‘modern city life’? What does ‘modern city life’ mean to you?
你會怎樣定義「現代都市生活」？對你來說，甚麼才是「現代都市生活」？

12. Do you agree with the Shanghai Expo’s slogan ‘Better City, Better Life’? Why?
你是否同意上海世博的口號「城市，讓生活更美好」？為甚麼？

13. What changes do you hope to see in Shanghai?
你希望上海將來會有甚麼改變？
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Materials in English


Allweil, Y. (eds.) (2010). Beyond the spatial turn: architectural history at the intersection of the social sciences and built form. UC Berkeley: (Spaces of History / Histories of Space: Emerging Approaches to the Study of the Built Environment)


Yale University Press.


Darwent, C.E. (1904) *Shanghai: a handbook for travellers and residents.* Shanghai, Hong Kong; Singapore & Yokohama: Kelly and Walsh, Limited.


Fan, C.C. (1997) Uneven development and beyond: regional development theory in


Lefebvre, H. (1971[1968]) Everyday life in the modern world. New Brunswick:


Pan, Z., Liu, G. and Li, Z. (2007) “Virtual presentation and animation of Qingming Festival by the Riverside” In: *Second Workshop on Digital Media and its Application in Museum & Heritages*. Chongqing,


304


Siu, H.F. (1996) “Remade in Hong Kong: weaving into the Chinese cultural tapestry”. In: D. Faure and T. Liu (eds.) *Unity and diversity: local culture and identities in China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. pp.177-197


Materials in Other Languages

包亚明，2005年。《后大都市与文化研究》。上海：上海教育出版社。

包亚明、王宏图及朱生坚等，2001年。《上海酒吧——空间、消费与想象》。南京：江苏人民出版社。

陳占彪（編），2010年。《清末民初萬國博覽會親歷記》。北京：商務印書館。

陳子善，2009年。上海的美麗時光。台北：秀威資訊科技股份有限公司。


《上海世博》雜誌編輯部，2009年。《世博文明的盛會──走進中國2010年上海世博會》。上海：上海人民出版社。

世博網，2010年。＜志願者＞，http://www.expo2010.cn/abzyz/indexjn.htm，於2013年6月1日登入。

耿付生，2011年。<大家談中國：盛世是一種傳說>，http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/indepth/2011/01/110126_coc_chinaeconomy.shtml，於2013年6月1日登入。


金耀基，2013年。《中國的現代轉向》（增訂版）。香港：牛津大學出版社。

郭恩慈，2011年。《東亞城市空間生產：探索東京、上海、香港的城市文化》。台北：田園城市文化事業有限公司。

亨利•列菲弗爾，1988[1976]年。《論國家－－從黑格爾到斯大林和毛澤東》。重慶：重慶出版社。


李青宜，1988年。＜中譯者序＞。載亨利•列菲弗爾，《論國家－－從黑格爾到斯大林和毛澤東》。重慶：重慶出版社，頁1至32。

林微音，1996[1935]年。《林微音集：深夜漫步》。上海：漢語大詞典出版社。

呂紹理，2005年。《展示臺灣：權力、空間與殖民統治的形象表述》。台北：麥田出版。


呂紹理，2004年。＜展示殖民地：日本博覽會中臺灣的實像與鏡像＞。東京及台北：財團法人交流協會日台交流中心。


陸士譯，2010[1910]年。＜宣統二十年浦東開設大博覽會＞，載陳占彪編，《清末民初萬國博覽會親歷記》，頁335 至 354。北京：商務印書館。


上海靜安區規劃局，2011年。＜南京西路五大功能區建設——締造優雅時尚真生活＞，http://www.shjagh.gov.cn/seconds/deve_plan/new3_1.htm，於2013年6月1日登入。


上海市人民政府，2011b年。＜上海建城＞，http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node3766/node3767/node3769/userobject1ai1.html，於2011年1月6日登入。


上海市人民政府，2011a年。＜近代上海＞，http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node3766/node3767/node3769/userobject1ai1.html，於2011年1月6日登入。


上海市人民政府，2010年。＜2010年上海市國有土地使用權出讓收入使用情況表＞，http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/node25489/node25491/node25493/u21ai540395.html，於2011年1月6日登入。


孙立平，2004年。《转型与中国社会结构的演变》。北京：清华大学出版社。

上海世博会主题演绎部（编），2009年。《城市，让生活更美好--上海世博会主题解读》。上海：东方出版中心。

王志弘，2009年。《多重的辯證：列斐伏爾空間生產概念三元組演繹與引申》，《地理學報》（55）：頁1至24。

黃培烽，2009年《上海：大工地——狂奔世博新上海》，《amPost》，第72期，頁15至17。

吳江，2008年。《上海百年建築史1840-1949》（第二版）。上海：同濟大學出版社。


新華網，2004年。《改革是中國的第二次革命》，

熊月之及周武（主编），2007年。《上海：一座現代化都市的編年史》。上海：上海書店出版社。


“迎世博講文明樹新風”志願服務活動組委會辦公室及上海市世博會籌辦工作領導小組志願者組（編），2010年。《中國2010年上海世博會文明觀博手冊》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社。


吉見俊哉，2010[1992]年。《博覽會的政治學－－視線之現代》。台北市：群學出版有限公司。


張德彝，2010[1904]年。《六遊水晶宮》，載陳占彪編，《清末民初萬國博覽會親歷記》，頁1至12。北京：商務印書館。


鄭永年，2011年。《中國模式：經驗及困局》。杭州：浙江人民出版社。