MEMORY, UTOPIAN THOUGHT, AND GLOBALIZATION:
A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF OTHER CITIES, OTHER WORLDS: URBAN IMAGINARIES IN A GLOBALIZING AGE EDITED BY ANDREAS HUYSSSEN

by

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Abstract

This thesis argues for interdisciplinary dialogue between transnational memory studies and political and social theories of globalisation. To do so it intervenes in a particular debate that has occurred between these research fields. Opening with Fredric Jameson’s claim that memory has little contemporary significance for political action, it pits this claim against rebuttals from memory studies writers. However, this thesis also argues that Jameson’s approach ‘utopian’, future-orientated, political project offers a heightened sensitivity to questions of aesthetic and cultural representation, and that as such remains of vital importance to the field of memory studies. To unpack this proposition, this thesis compares Jameson’s utopian approach with and an edited collection by Andreas Huyssen, a seminal theorist for memory studies, titled Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age (2008) and critic of Jameson’s utopian theory. This project therefore critically explores the opportunities for solidarity with regards to questions of globalisation that an interdisciplinary reflection on memory studies and political and social theory can offer. To do this three themes common to Jameson’s work and the collected essay are investigated in three chapters: urban space, difference, and fundamentalism.
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Introduction

Both personal and collective memory have become functions in crisis to which it is increasingly problematical to appeal [supposing] as against Proust, that it is memory itself that has become the degraded repository of images and simulacra, so that the remembered image of the thing now effectively inserts the reified and the stereotypical between the subject and reality or the past itself. (Jameson 1991, pp. 123-124)

In this thesis I argue for the interdisciplinary dialogue between transnational memory studies and political and social theories of globalization, and in particular I claim that Fredric Jameson’s ‘utopian’, future-orientated approach to culture, politics, and social praxis, despite the lines cited above and his critical reception from memory studies, offers solidarity with critical approaches of memory studies and makes significant contributions to debates about globalization. To explicate this proposal I look to Andreas Huyssen. A seminal theorist for memory studies with Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (1995) and Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (2003), and someone who has been particularly critical of Jameson’s ‘hopelessly [...] futuristic dimension of utopia in its patchworking of a teleological Marxism with a Blochian utopianism.’ (1995, p. 88). However, because I am interested in the notion that solidarities are to be found by coming to terms with disagreements, placing emphasis upon the subject matter under discussion rather than the individuals at work behind them, indeed, my thesis will argue that there are many disagreements between the contributors within this text. Firstly, Huyssen lends the text a sense of peer-reviewed authority within memory studies, and this is important for identifying a case study of memory studies, but secondly there are issues regarding globalization, that are shared with Jameson’s work: urban space, difference, and fundamentalism, which make up

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the chapters of this thesis. Firstly I will introduce why I think that Jameson’s ‘utopian’
approach has important implications for memory studies.

For Jameson[, postmodern subjects are condemned to a schizophrenic
existence, bereft of memory and any sense of continuity through time.
[However] studies of memory and the media, in particular, have sought both to
develop these ideas and to challenge them by suggesting that to describe
contemporary media-ted memory as ‘inauthentic’ or debased may be to ignore
both the complexities of the relation between the media, representation, and
memory and the potential of media-ted memory for transmitting and sustaining
memory. (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2005, n. 21, p 22)

In the essay-film Sans Soleil by Chris Marker (2003 [1983]) a fictional character called
‘Sandor Krasna’ sends back video postcards of his travels abroad, in turn narrated by an
unnamed recipient:

He wrote me: I will have spent my life trying to understand the function of
remembering, which is not the opposite of forgetting, but rather its lining. We
do not remember, we rewrite memory much as history is rewritten. How can
one remember thirst?

Whilst Jameson may be sceptical about the cultural significance of ‘memory’, I want to work
with a conceptualisation of memory that Marker works with here: of a memory that is created
rather than selected from a repository of images and simulacra, degraded or not, and I believe
that this significantly resembles Jameson’s approach to representation, inherited from
Raymond Williams, that distinguishes between ‘‘residual’’ and ‘‘emergent’’ forms of
cultural production’ (1991, p. 6). Sandor Krasna discovers a means of representing the
difference between ‘emergent’ and ‘residual’ memories:

My pal Hayao Yamaneko has found a solution: if the images of the present
don’t change, then change the images of the past. […] He showed me the
clashes of the sixties treated by his synthesizer: […] Hayao calls his machine's
world the “zone”’.

In this thesis I argue that Jameson’s criticism of memory can be seen in terms of an
inheritance from the critical theory of Theodor Adorno such that whilst the corruption of
memory is posed in terms of a possibility, not a certainty. Referring to Gillian Rose’s critique of Adorno (1978) I argue that such a gesture regarding memory’s relevance has considerable potential for being construed as a totalising claim but I argue that the strategy has the aim of remaining contemporary to what is represented and what is suppressed, with the hope of initiating a post-contemporary, utopian world.

However, whereas Huyssen rejects Jameson’s utopian project outright, I believe that Hodgkin and Radstone’s critical reception of the way that Jameson limits the investigative scope of memory leaves open the possibility of solidarity with Jameson’s attempts to push at the boundaries of representation. My fear is that Huyssen’s attempt to define the position of memory in his introduction to Other Cities, Other Worlds and his earlier work assumes a position of academic authority and, therefore, sets limitations upon who has the right to engage in such debates.

Chapters

Chapter One

Huyssen argues in his introduction to Other Cities, Other Worlds that cities are ‘primary production sites’ (2008, p. 3) for interpreting globalization. Repeating his opening mantra in Twilight Memories (1995, p. 1) he argues that in themselves globalization and cities are neither panacea or apocalypse (2008, p. 19), but within their study a complex interweaving of benefits and pitfalls can be identified. I begin by critically appraising Huyssen’s introduction for the way in which it justifies the cultural significance of cities, leading me to what may seem an irrevocable problem for my research. Despite Huyssen’s position within memory studies, he lowers his commitment to the concept of memory in favour of postmodern, creative, ‘imaginaries’. Whilst this resonates with the criticism of Jameson I inherit from
Hodgkin and Radstone, and Rose (via Adorno), I explain, as I have suggested above, how the intentions behind these strategies, and their implications, are very different. I then go on to discuss essays within the collection by Yingjin Zhang, Ackbar Abbas, AbdouMaliq Simone, and Gyan Prakash before leading to Jameson’s approach to urban space with ‘cognitive mapping’ and how he applies this to a study of the film *Terrorizer* in his book *The Geopolitical Aesthetic* (1992).

*Chapter Two*

For Huyssen ‘urbanization and globalization have contributed to making “other cities” part of the way we live and perceive the world’ (2008, pp. 1-2). Similarly, Jameson argues that postmodern and global urban space demand (on their own terms, rather than for agency) new psychologies or ‘new people’. I begin by explaining how Huyssen suggests a methodology of ‘bracketing’ that places prominent psychological imaginaries of the west in the background in order to give others the stage. I then examine how AbdouMaliq Simone’s proposition that urban sub-Saharan Africa psychologies are being shaped by information technology, migration, religious community and diaspora life, and his argument that the extremity of these conditions makes such a case study of paramount importance for forecasting the psychologies of the future. I then examine how Néstor García Canclini, on the other hand, tries to make sense of what he considers to be radical incommensurability at both the local and global levels between representations of Mexico City.

In this chapter I move from the comparative underpinnings of Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping to his appraisal of theories of postmodern and globalised ‘new people’ and his identification of ‘national allegory’. Jameson suggests that the categorisation of subject-identities sets significant limitations upon political and social agency. However, in order to
reach this proposal I discuss how Jameson’s inheritance from Theodor Adorno (in *Late Marxism*, 1990) raises issues for such commitment to agency by taking a detour through the critique of Adorno by Gillian Rose.

*Chapter Three*

Finally I turn to the question of memory’s stakes by considering its relationship with ideological entrenchment, violence, and ethics, influenced in part by the pessimism regarding the possibility of representation that Jameson’s comments on memory seem to suggest. To do this I work between the name this is given within Gyan Prakash's essay on religious extremism – ‘fundamentalism’ – and Jameson's focus on postmodern ‘social simulacra’. I begin by looking at Teresa Caldeira’s work on the authoritarian legacy of Brazil’s military dictatorship and her critique of the discourse of fear and violence in Sao Paulo. I then return to Hilton Judin’s essay and consider the role he allocates to the representation of conflict and the religious in post-Apartheid South African architecture. Finally I turn to Prakash's depiction of Marathi fundamentalism and why he thinks that it shares more in common with modernist British colonialism than Marathi traditional culture or religion. Jameson's theory of postmodern “social simulacra” considers how religion has become culturally sanctified in itself rather than in the traditional sense in which it can be considered as a means of reaching, for example, via critical theologizing or piety an achievement of enlightenment or redemption. Like Prakash, therefore, Jameson identifies a rupture within the way religion is traditionally represented, and I argue that this allows us to explicate and reflect upon the pessimism of his views regarding memory in an age of postmodern simulacra.
Chapter One: ‘Urban Imaginaries’

Introduction

Andreas Huyssen identifies the main of contribution of Other Cities, Other Worlds as its approach to cities; what he considers to be the ‘primary production sites’ of global culture. In this chapter I begin by reflecting critically upon this proposal. Yingjin Zhang's essay then provides an important basis for a bringing Jameson into the equation because whilst it resonates with Huyssen’s theory regarding the role of cities it also challenges Jameson’s theory of ‘cognitive mapping’ directly by proposing a theory of ‘cognitive re-mapping’ and with a title Remapping Beijing, playing upon Jameson’s application of cognitive mapping to the Taipei-shot film Terrorizer in his essay Remapping Taipei (1992), which I return to in the second part of this chapter. However, Ackbar Abbas critically appraises what he considers to be assumptions within theories of post-colonialism that I believe highlights issues in the work of his fellow contributors. Abbas conceptualises ‘x-colonialism’ as the name for a project that traces the history of colonialism in order to empower agency with critical perspective. I then argue that just such a historical and political commitment can be found within the urban memory studies of Hilton Judin on post-apartheid Johannesburg and Gyan Prakash on post-colonial Mumbai. Turning to Jameson directly, I begin by raising issues with the way he articulates ‘cognitive mapping,’ before considering how his reading of Walter Benjamin differs to Huyssen’s in its concern with the politics of change. Finally, by looking at his essay on Terrorizer, I argue for the first time that Jameson's ‘utopian’ social thought can provide a basis for critical solidarity with memory studies.
Part One: ‘Urban Imaginaries’

“Other cities” [...] have left me with a deep sense of wonder and fascination. The more diverse my experience of cities has become over the years, the more I have begun to wonder what it is that makes up the urban imaginaries both of the cities one inhabits and of those one visits, and how such very distinct urban imaginaries reflect and contest the notion of cultural globalization. (2008, pp. 2-3)

Huyssen’s theorisation of ‘urban imaginaries’ is therefore his attempt to provide a methodological platform for multiplying the ‘wonder and fascination’ that he has felt from visiting new cities and cultures. Furthermore, however, he asserts that ‘the very notion of culture implies contestation, critique [and] conflict’ and as such any reservations we might have which suggest that ‘globalization and global culture [are reductive is] either vastly premature or simply a category mistake’. In contrast to the conceptual approach to culture, the creativity of cities persists in the ways they ‘continue to condense and thicken cultural developments and their dynamics’ (p. 4). To this question he dispels the ‘mistaken assumption’ by researchers in the 1970s that due to economic crisis, drug-abuse epidemics, and crime, the

[...] real space [of cities] would yield to virtual space [...]. The predictions, of course, did not come true. Processes of urbanization everywhere intensified and accelerated. Real cities took centre stage in social-scientific investigations of globalization. (pp. 8-9)

Despite the problems that are manifested in cities, ultimately

All cities are palimpsests of real and diverse experiences and memories. They comprise a great variety of spatial practices, including architecture and planning, administration and business, labour and leisure, politics, culture, and everyday life [...], locality is constantly produced anew by our very visible movements through the urban sphere, our recognition and renegotiation of the built space of our environment, and by all of our interactions with urban life. [...] Urban space is always and inevitably social space involving subjectivities and identities differentiated by class and race, gender and age, education and religion. (p. 3)
As a result the emphasis upon ‘urban imaginaries’ attempts to conceptualize the ‘cognitive and somatic image[s] which we carry within us[.] It is an embodied material fact.’ (p. 3 – my emphasis) This is because ‘media images, cyberspace, and global popular music connect cities with each other’, and it is politically and explicitly articulated by ‘translocal social movements around land rights, squatting, and housing or on transnational web-based grassroots efforts concerned with human rights or ecological issues.’ (pp. 4-5)

This does not mean for Huyssen that the conflict that is inherent within culture will always be manifested progressively: ‘the future of cities is neither panacea nor apocalypse’ (p. 19), but he does argue that cultural exchange:

Is all the more urgent since the giddy utopianism of the 1990s, with its celebration of global flows and limitless markets and its catchwords of glocalization and cultural hybridities, received a double blow with the market meltdown of 2000 and the attack so 9/11 and their worldwide political effects. (p. 14)

At this point I want to introduce my reservations about Huyssen’s emphasis upon cities, or rather the way he goes about it. My concern here is for the way in which he feels the need to assert the validity of his claims. I think this becomes particularly problematic when he claims that ‘[Jean-François] Lyotard’s provocative quip that any work of art has to be postmodern before it can become genuinely modern has come true in ways he could hardly have foreseen.’ (p. 13) Huyssen does not explain what he means by postmodernism here, but I think we can interpolate his essay *Mapping the Postmodern* (1984) and its identification of cultural creativity together with the way in which he considers Jameson’s critique as one-sided (cited in my introduction). As we have seen, Huyssen claims that in contrast to cities, culture is inherently dynamic and creative. If this is the case, I think this destabilises his argument that the blunting of postmodernism’s creativity by modernism can be any truer today than in the past. As a result this also brings into question his assertion that he, personally
[...] needs and cherishes accounts of urban imaginaries such as [Walter] Benjamin's [in Berlin childhood around 1900] or [Orhan] Pamuk’s [essay on Istanbul that concludes Other Cities, Other Worlds], as they conjure up and embody a certain time, thus encouraging reflections about other cities, other worlds.’ (p. 21)

My main, underlying concern is that a heightened emphasis upon particular memories or creative imaginaries places a buffer from critical inquiry because of the way in which he rebukes fears about the penetration of globalization into localities (he poses that such fears only serve to repeat the reductive dialectic of nineteenth century modernism but in reverse; the opposite to universal movements such as communism which argued for internationalism over the ‘parochial’. [pp. 11-12]) I do not mean to claim that cities are insignificant but instead believe that the rejection or suppression of anxieties is politically and socially exclusionary, no matter how reductive or uncomfortable such narratives may be.

Furthermore, however, Huyssen identifies the limitations of this parochialism within the very concept of cultural memory by arguing that, today, cities ‘depend on “cultural engineering” more than ever to attract capital, business, and power [...] even small cities depend on such “Imagineering.” ’ (2008, p. 9) Whilst he considers that imagineering is obsessed with the past; a ‘predominant spirit [...] captured by Hegel’s dictum that the owl of Minerva begins its flight at dusk’ (p. 8), by placing our critical emphasis on imagineering and imaginaries he hopes that we can tap into more contemporary discourses than memory currently offers by engaging with postmodern cultural developments. Huyssen therefore proposes that a dialectic between the local and the global; initiated by ‘bracketing’ (p. 2), whereby predominant representations are placed in the background and difference is brought to the foreground. I believe that just such a
dialectic between the local and global can be found in Yingjin Zhang’s analysis of cinematic representations of Beijing, and that this can be used to critically evaluate such a strategy.

As I indicated in my introduction, Zhang argues for a ‘cognitive re-mapping’ that, unlike Jameson’s theory, he proposes, is

[...] not conceived at a high level of abstraction, I am interested in instances of cinematic remapping that favour street level views over cartographic surveys, contingent experience over systematic knowledge, and bittersweet local histories over grand-scale global history. (p. 220)

For Zhang, Beijing is now characterized by ‘polylocality’: a locality that is represented and imagined through an amalgamation of global localities. He argues that this occurs through a process by which ‘the local enlists the national in negotiating with globalization while the national still counts on the local in exploiting cultural symbolism and popular memory.’ (p. 221) As a result, the local, the national, and the global all play a role, and the cognitive re-mapping of micro-narratives facilitates the documentation of this.

This method leads Zhang to identify the following characteristics:

Chinese cinema of the new century seems to have discovered in drifting an aesthetically gratifying, cognitively challenging, and psychologically complicating mode of urban imagination. Drifting captures a raw documentary effect, projects fantastic kaleidoscopic images, and enables incessant psychological and emotional flows; in its conceptual indeterminacy and sensory immediacy, drifting facilitates boundary crossing (local/global), class commingling (rich/poor), and cultural mixing (Chinese/foreign), although it implies a disturbing deprivation of agency that engenders a crisis in subjectivity. (p. 225)

Jameson’s essay – which I will soon discuss in more detail – is titled Remapping Taipei, but whilst Jameson means to highlight challenges to the notion of urban mapping, Zhang’s reference to ‘remapping’ is articulated in terms of a theorization of a cinematic aesthetic of drifting - or flux: ‘Beijing no longer provides a set of fixed imaginaries of imperial or socialist grandeur [but] the whirlpool of globalization […] exemplified by the virtual-world tourist
landmarks in [Jia Zhangke’s] *The World* (pp. 239-240). There is a constant overwriting of ‘previous maps and [new ones] being rewritten shortly after – a self-reflexive mode of capturing a fast-changing cityscape in a globalizing world’ (p. 225).

Zhang argues that whilst drifting can be viewed positively because it ‘questions dominant systems of thought and institutions of practices’, the dialectical exchange that Huyssen theorizes, these films often represent a feeling of ‘ambivalence, contradiction, contingency, and improvisation’ (p. 225). In order to engage with these opportunities and difficulties he therefore proposes that we should attempt to ‘move beyond the textual realm of urban imaginaries and extend critical attention to the circulation and reception of these imaginaries in polylocality’ (p. 240); identifying how cinematic drifting is indicative of a broader context of local, national, and global urban life.

However, with Ackbar Abbas’ essay appraises ‘post-colonial theory’ I believe that Huyssen and Zhang’s respective claims about the realities of global urban space and polylocality, come into question. I eventually theorise this most clearly by turning to Jameson, but I begin by considering how. I ground my reading of Abbas’ essay by briefly referring to AbdouMaliq Simone’s identification of the ‘urban’.

Simone contends that for those of us who subscribe to the idea that Sub-Saharan African cities are underdeveloped, an affirmation of its ‘urbanism’ – if somewhat ephemeral to a western gaze – allows us to acknowledge that

[...] there are in fact intense levels of urban ‘speculation’. Nothing may seem to be happening, but this often reflects a need to be ready[,] a heightened sense of engagement with all that could ensue from applying a barely indiscernible gaze, from overhearing a conversation, from securing an amongst invisible strategic proximity to others, from interrupting the flow of events ever so slightly but powerfully enough to move something in another direction (2008, p. 105)
Abbas opens by considering that whereas Gilles Deleuze’s cinema theory celebrates the ‘fragmentation’ of ‘any-space-whatever’, Mario Gandelsonas traces the ‘mutation of the suburban city into the x-urban city [whereby] global finance and service industries begin to relocate their offices to the suburbs’ (pp. 245-247). ‘X-’ signifies the question of where ‘x marks the spot’. Abbas considers how a theory of fragmentation such as Deleuze’s has the implication of contributing to what Jean Baudrillard calls ‘simulacra’ whereby the original and the fragment derive and reinforce the same genealogy and logic: ‘the original is also a simulacrum of the fake, not just the other way around’. The significance of Gandelsonas’ work is that by tracing rather than celebrating difference we can be prepared for the implications of these changes and provide for the possibility of difference in the future. In Abbas’ case he applies x-urban space to the phenomenon of fake brand-stores in post-colonial China and Hong Kong. In doing so he contests aspects of ‘post-colonialism’ and theorises ‘x-colonialism’.

Abbas considers how the post-colonial theory of Ziauddin Sardar presents the ‘fake as a form of resistance against exclusion from the global order of commodity consumption, and even as a form of ‘gentle subversion’ against globalization itself’. (p. 260) Abbas argues that this only perpetuates the gestural ‘pieties’ of colonialism (p. 249) and describes the way in which American products were mocked during the nineteenth century for attempting to imitate European products until they become desirable in the twentieth century. He also asks why fakes were virtually non-existent in the People’s Republic of China until the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, even though faking, under Sardar’s logic, might have been strategically justified in terms of Maoist resistance and equality.
Returning to the urban terms of the proliferation of fake brand-stores, Abbas argues that a post-colonial theory of the urban that demands equality on the terms of the colonial also retains the colonial ambition of striving for dominance. It therefore articulates a delivery of difference, but simultaneously sets limitations upon its potential. Abbas proposes that when China becomes known for producing originals it will finally have become a superpower. However, whilst Abbas challenges theories of fragmentary difference such as Deleuze’s that undergird Huyssen and Zhang’s theories of bracketing and polylocality, Hilton Judin and Gyan Prakash challenge the concept and name of the ‘urban’ directly. They argue that it has been used to legitimate colonialism and apartheid.

Judin’s study of Johannesburg begins by providing a genealogy of how ‘productive and consumptive spatial arrangements’ (p. 123) were imported by colonialism and modelled upon European modernism. He argues that the very concept of the ‘urban’ was used to articulate white superiority over a ‘rural’ black hinterland that sought control over technology, economics and society. In stark contrast to Huyssen’s assertion that cities are ‘privileged production sites’, Judin proposes that after apartheid there have been increasing levels of porosity between the rural and the urban, and that whilst this has fed considerable cultural and social problems, it can also be a source of reconciliation, coming to terms, and, as an architect, great creativity.

Judin inherits his theoretical approach from Raymond Williams’ study of the city/country divide in English literature (p. 131). Williams argues that since the 16th Century cities came to represent control and order, but that this representation could only stand upon claims that it controlled and ordered a dialectical other; the ‘country’. A geographically isolated city on the South African Highveld, Judin explains that Johannesburg has been economically dependent
upon the country from its birth, and that it started booming during British colonialism as it
since it began to draw in Gold on a conveyor belt in the nineteenth century. However, its
history is also intimately connected with the exploitation of black labour, and therein lays
another significant aspect of its economic dependency. Narratives of urban sanctity therefore
operated to consolidate a precarious economic position. Protective gestures about the role of
the city therefore came to be manifested in

[...]

However, the commitment to urban growth, accompanied by the presence of political
resistance movements, demanded that South Africa’s division of labour had to be drastically
restructured. Apartheid was forced to give way, and the arrival into the city of competitive
black labour, consumers, tenants, and mortgage owners, fed the demand for growth. And yet,
Judin argues, ‘the self-interest of whites remains at the core of most private commercial
enterprises and continues to dominate spatial development’. As a result, fundamental
economic, spatial, and ideological elements of apartheid remain in place (p. 128). Indeed, just
as the reach of British imperialism and its exploitative division of labour enabled white South
Africans to integrate with others in the world, globalization now panders to segregation by
making it easier to ‘get to know [people in] Los Angeles or London, for example – than those
in the immediate vicinity’, and consolidate a competitive edge that allows them to develop
strategic partnerships through enhanced connectivity to ‘global circuits of capital.’ (p. 137)
Likewise, the cultural distinction between the ‘urban’ and the ‘rural’ remains integral to
justifying white exceptionalism, serving as a platform for articulating ‘fears of invading
masses, loneliness, dirt, unemployment, crime, declining standard, lack of amenities, lack of
sanitation and overcrowding are recalled in panic’ (p. 129).
Judin therefore argues that, firstly, openness to the cultural discussion of traumatic memories is important for coming to terms with apartheid’s legacies and also secondly that a critical scope that goes beyond the binary of urban and rural is important for being open to the complexities of these memories. In this manner, Judin significantly differs from Huyssen’s rejection of memory and the latter’s emphasis upon the urban. However, I believe it is also important to consider that Judin does not just argue for the critical and social importance of coming to terms with traumatic memory. As I noted earlier, Huyssen considers how ‘urban imagineering’ uses memory to create contrived urban heritages, and I think this is particularly suggestive in light of Judin’s proposal that:

[… ] in our search for distinct architectural and urban forms we architects have to delve deeper into the complex landscape within which we work [enabling Johannesburg] to thrive in an increasingly competitive global market of unique cultural localities (pp. 144-145).

Such a commitment to an economically thriving Johannesburg therefore sits strangely alongside his Williamsian critique of the urban/rural divide and commitment to incorporating social complexity.

In the final essay that I wish to approach, Gyan Prakash challenges the agency of mourning for a lost Bombay; in the memoires of British colonialists but also those who lament a failed opportunity for a post-colonial city with revolutionary ‘dreams of universal citizenship and social equality’ (p. 182). Such bereavement for modernist ideals, he argues, leaves us ill-equipped to confront the challenges presented by hegemonic and elitist postmodern urbanism. Prakash’s tracking of hegemony can be epitomised by the way Bombay was renamed ‘Mumbai,’ largely influenced by Shiv Sena, an extremist ethnic-Marathi group. By studying this development for its role in the construction of ‘elite’ imaginaries, he documents uncanny similarities between British colonial urbanism and Shiv Sena’s anti-urban and anti-western
rhetoric, but also its renaming of streets, its reactions against cosmopolitanism, and its bloody pogroms against Muslims.

Firstly, Prakash uses Michel Foucault’s critique of history as a linear ‘rise-and-fall story’ to re-evaluate the idea of mourning for a ‘death’ of city. By doing so he suggests that

[…] the history of the modern city as a space of porosity, multiplicity, difference, division, and disruption is concealed when urban change is represented as the unfolding of one historical stage to another. (pp. 200-201)

Secondly, after Henri Lefebvre, Prakash argues that if we want to engage with heterogeneity in non-linear terms it is not simply a matter of documenting subaltern narratives of the ‘congested and miserable slums and chawls in which workers lived.’ (p. 195) In contrast he argues that first of all we need a framework that enables us to be open to such narratives. Lefebvre’s proposition, he argues, is that we investigate the rhetorical layers of political hegemony, because when we look at it critically we find that its claims to authority are articulated in response to difference, like Raymond Williams’ city/country dialectic. Lefebvre refers to hegemonic rhetoric as ‘flaky pastry’ (Lefebvre in Prakash, p. 192); presenting us with an underlying ‘social map of the city’ the more we place it under scrutiny. To go about such a study Lefebvre therefore theorizes an engagement with the ‘quotidian’ of the hegemonic which, rather than ‘meaningless facts’, provides us with comparative reflection by telling us about ‘where people are born, live, and die’. It is for this reason that Prakash’s essay is titled The Modern City in Ruins.

Whereas Judin questions the conceptual role of the ‘urban’ in order to appeal to a more flexible reception of memories, Prakash, like Abbas, commits to an analysis of hegemony. However, Prakash differs slightly from Abbas’ hunt for ‘x marks the spot’ because of the way in which he emphasizes the quotidian rhetoric of space. However, whilst the case studies I
have discussed examine how the urban promotes or obscures discussions of difference, I will now argue that Jameson’s depiction of cognitive mapping, and its critical reflection on space allows us to be even more critical and culturally inclusive than Judin and Prakash’s critiques of the ‘urban’.

**Part Two: ‘Cognitive Mapping’**

Jameson’s approach to questions of the urban and, more broadly, spatiality, is derived from a comparative approach to literature, culture, and social and political thought. As a result he describes cognitive mapping as a particular strategy of ‘emblematic or allegorical’ theory. Jameson asks whether cognitive mapping – originally devised by Kevin Lynch for promoting re-mapping of cities by alienated subjects – can provide us with comparative agency that allows us to reflect upon a ‘mental map of the social and global totality we all carry around in our heads in variously garbled forms. (1991, p. 415) However, since I have been critical of Huyssen and Zhang’s claims that we live in a postmodern, globalised and polylocal world, I need to begin by evaluating Jameson’s own ‘totalizing’ claims about society: that ‘we all carry’, whether we like it or not, a psychological connection with social and global totality. As the subtitle to Jameson’s seminal work suggests, *Postmodernism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (henceforth *Postmodernism*) inherits an economic perspective on cultural studies that most explicitly presents us with his debt to Marxism. By beginning with a description of this inheritance I will come to terms with Huyssen’s challenge, noted in my introductory chapter, that Jameson’s approach is a ‘hopelessly […] futuristic dimension of utopia’ (1995, p. 88).

Inherited from the economic theorist Ernest Mandel, ‘late capitalism’ conceptualizes a distinction from two earlier capitalist stages: primitive ‘market capitalism’, and its
geographical expansion into ‘what Lenin called the “stage of imperialism” ’ (1991, p. 410).

Late capitalism attempts to represent the development of a stage in which capitalism has started to exhaust space and is now investing within culture. However, for Jameson this does not mean that the previous stages are completely irrelevant. Like Judin, he inherits Raymond Williams’ work, and in this case he refers to residual and emergent dominance (p. xiv).

Relevant to spatial theory, Jameson asserts that late capitalism retains the way in which the ‘truth of that limited daily experience of London [ – of imperialism and colonialism’s core – ] lies, rather, in India or Jamaica or Hong Kong’.

As a result Jameson argues that cultural postmodernism thickens these geographic-cultural divisions, and a celebration of this situation represents a celebration of a breakdown in communication. However, it is my proposal that whilst this presents us with a bleak outlook on communication and culture, agency can be found in Jameson’s subtle allegorical approach. I believe that this is evident in how he utilizes Kevin Lynch’s model of cognitive mapping and yet provides critical reflection upon also.

For Lynch, Jameson notes that unlike Jersey City and Los Angeles, Boston’s modernist urbanism:

[...] with its monumental perspectives, its markers and statuary, its combination of grand but simple spatial forms, including dramatic boundaries such as the Charles River, not only allows people to have, in their imaginations, a generally successful and continuous location to the rest of the city, but gives them something of the freedom and aesthetic gratification of traditional city form. (p. 415)

As a result, cognitive mapping is far easier in Boston because the object of what we consider to be mappable is that much more abundant. The implication here is that the strength of cognitive mapping ‘is also its fundamental weakness’ (p. 416) because it comparatively highlights a rupture between modernist and postmodern space. As such, Jameson does not
argue that cognitive mapping is empowering *in itself* and nor does he valorise modernist space that preceded postmodernity. Instead he highlights spatial and architectural change. He goes on to claim, that can be transferred to his approach to memory I believe, that

[…] cognitive mapping, which was meant to have a kind of oxymoronic value and to transcend the limits of mapping altogether [but] as a concept [it is] drawn back by the force of gravity of the black hole of the map itself (one of the most powerful of all human conceptual instruments) and therein cancels out its own impossible originality. (p. 416)

The suggestion here is that mapping has also been a means by which political hegemony has been asserted, and he argues that ‘once you knew what “cognitive mapping” was driving at, you were to dismiss all figures of maps and mapping from your mind and try to imagine something else.’ (p. 409)

I want to argue therefore that Jameson is not just committed to retaining memory of mapping but that he is politically committed to challenging how culture is both erased and prevented from happening and it is upon this basis that I interpret his claim that

[…] the incapacity to map spatially is as crippling to political experience as the analogous incapacity to map spatially is for urban experience. It follows that an aesthetic of cognitive mapping in this sense is an integral part of any socialist political project. (p. 416)

Earlier in this chapter I noted how Huyssen identifies his appreciation of particular urban imaginaries such as Walter Benjamin’s in *Berlin childhood around 1900*. In contrast, however, Jameson argues that Benjamin theorises a critical and comparative approach to particularity rather than a descriptive one and I believe this provides further information about the intersection of culture and politics in his approach to cognitive mapping.

In his analysis of the architect Rem Koolhaas’ *Great Leap Forward*, a collection of edited texts on Chinese state-construction projects in the 1990s, Jameson notes that there are:
[...] thousands upon thousands of buildings constructed or under construction which have no tenants, which could never be paid for under capitalist conditions, whose very existence cannot be justified by any market standards. (2003, p 66)

Here even the shopping mall, of which ‘few forms have been so distinctively new and so distinctively American, and late capitalist, [is] in crisis, losing money and tenants, and on the verge of replacement . . . by what?’ (p. 69) This rhetorical question – ‘by what?’ – is fundamental to Jameson’s inheritance from Walter Benjamin.

With the *Arcades Project*, Jameson argues that Benjamin attempts a ‘snapshot of the nineteenth-century arcade at the moment of its decay’ – what Benjamin calls a ‘dialectical image’ – that attempted to ‘understand the present from the standpoint of an immediate past whose fashions were already just a little out of date.’ By documenting a particular time and place that is *just* out of date Jameson believes that Benjamin attempts to challenge the assumptions we have about how we interpret life, which is also to ask: how do we go about interpreting life in the future. This ‘puts us on notice what we have here to do, not merely with the archaeology or prehistory of shopping, nor even its present, but rather its future’ (p. 69).

As a result, Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping and reading of Benjamin’s dialectical image contribute to a conceptualization of a comparative approach that attempts to ready us for change by incorporating the memories and imaginaries of the past, therefore supplementing Abbas, Judin, and Prakash’s critical approach to the concept of the urban. However, I believe that Jameson also goes one step further, reflecting on the cultural representation of what I want to consider as ‘post-urban’ society in his study of the film *Terrorizer*. 
Initially for Jameson ‘Terrorizer’ is […] very much a film about urban space in general, and offers something like an anthology of enclosed dwellings, whether apartments or individual rooms’. (1992, p. 153) However, the presence of a Williamsian distinction between the urban and the rural is noticeable by its very absence. The film begins in an apartment in Taipei ‘at first light, that first vacancy of the city in early morning which will gradually be filled in by characters, business, and routines of all kinds’. Dawn is then punctured by a gun fight, and the film’s numerous character narratives unpack through

[…] chance meetings and coincidence [which] allow for a far greater variety of character-destinies, and thereby a web of relationships that can be spread out and unfolded in a dazzling array of distinct ideological effects. (p. 132)

Jameson argues that when the characters come into contact once more, these events only serve to multiply ‘unique temporal overlaps’, such that an ever larger

[…] conspiratorial network unites all these destinies without the full knowledge of any single one of them, [lifting and rotating] the gleaming polyhedron of the new form before our eyes in ways that confirm it as a unified object and exhibit[ing] the unforeseeable glitter of its unexpected facets.’ (p. 133)

In this sense the problems that the characters face can only ever be a ‘system-specific phenomenon’. Even if we suppose that the film has an ambition to represent the 'mutilations of the city' upon its subjects, Jameson argues, there is nonetheless a dependency upon and acceptance of the limitless horizon of the urban.

The implication for the concept of the urban, and the basis for my suggestion that there may be a post-urban representational focus at work, is found in the ‘degree-zero’ space of the photographic dark-room as murder scene:

[…] sealed off into darkness by the photographer: the act thereby [betrays] the essential characteristic of all these dwelling spaces, which function in one way or another, and which are somehow incomplete and spatially parasitic on it (p. 153).
The sealing off of the dark room represents an attempt to prevent communication between its contents and the outside world, and without the representation of the differentiation between the inside and the outside, the basis for the urban’s definition from the rural is destabilised such that it takes on a post-urban quality. Without this mechanism the Benjaminian method of attempting to grasp what is ‘a little out of date’ is also destabilised – and all the more urgent a task for committing to an alternative future. Whereas Huyssen argues that theories of the ascendency of cyber-space over urban space is simply untrue, Jameson highlights the limitations that this places on theories of representation and the implications that this has for the concept of the urban itself.

**Conclusion**

Despite the determinacy suggested by Jameson's reference to historical epochs and economics, I believe his Benjaminian commitment to documenting what has become out of date suggests comparative inclusivity to representation in general, and that as such this offers a place, if critical, to trajectories from memory studies. In terms of concepts of the urban, and the case studies in this chapter, this provides a platform for discussion that is open because of its criticality; to colonial and post-colonial memoires, quotidiens, and anecdotes, as well as representations that are current frameworks produce barriers to reception. The political task that Jameson presents to us is one of initiating a comparative approach on the cultural-representational level of the sort that can be found in his study of *Terrorizer*:

> [From] the most *traditional* kind of space [the police barracks] to the *national* space of the hospital, the *multinational* space of the publisher's office (the media, surely of a global range now housed in a great glass high-rise) and what I am tempted to call the equally *transnational* anonymity of the hotel corridor with its identical bedrooms.’ (p. 154) [My italics]
Chapter Two: New People

Introduction

In this chapter I move closer to the conceptual role of memory by considering the psychological connotations present in Andreas Huyssen’s assertion that urbanization and globalization have made ‘“other cities” part of the way we live and perceive the world’ (2008, p. 1) and Fredric Jameson’s discussion of postmodern ‘new people’. I will begin by again considering Huyssen’s method of ‘bracketing’ the cities of the global ‘north’ and how this translates into a focus upon the imaginaries of peoples from the ‘south’. I then move on to investigate AbdouMaliq Simone’s ominously titled essay The Last Shall be First and how it depicts psychological pressures and dynamics for Africans in sub-Saharan cities, in emigration, and within diaspora communities around the world. I then look to Néstor García Canclini and his history of spatial aporias between representations of Mexico City. In Chapter One I suggested that Jameson comes close to the historical determinism that I consider to be operating in Huyssen’s approach to postmodernity. In this chapter I propose that the question of psychological implications represents a more explicit relationship with the possibility of agency. To facilitate a study of this question I turn to Gillian Rose’s critique of Theodor Adorno (1978) because of the way in which the latter’s work has influenced Jameson’s writing. Finally I argue that Jameson’s approach to the prospect of a postmodern psychological condition offers a more rigorous approach to difference because of the way in which I believe it appeals to the act of comparatively remembering how dominant narratives operate.
Part One: ‘Bracketing’

Huyssen agrees with David Harvey’s proposition that the establishing of the Greenwich Meridian in London in the nineteenth century represented capital’s ‘need to manage the relation between temporal and spatial distance and proximity on a global scale’ (p. 6); ‘time-space compression’. However, Huyssen also considers that Harvey presents us with (‘Marxist’) economic determinism that is ‘tone-deaf’ to ‘the simultaneous expansion of time and space in the imagination’. The challenge, Huyssen argues, is to move beyond a binary depiction of this condition by emphasising a ‘time-space paradox’ in which there are both new opportunities and problems:

 [...] people in our globalizing world are not just getting closer to each other and thus potentially becoming more communal, as Marshall McLuhan had it in his catholic and ultimately anti-modern fantasy of the global village. They carry with them memories of conflicts and incompatibilities with deep historical backgrounds, animosities rooted either in imperial domination, both past and present, or simply in fears of otherness, instilled by histories of war, religious conflict, and ideological manipulation. (p. 7)

‘Bracketing’ is Huyssen’s strategy for distinguishing the negative repercussions of globalization from its positive and creative imaginaries:

Together with these developments, a new vibrant literature has emerged among political economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and urban theorists across the world. [Bracketing] seeks to capture the emerging thrust of urban developments in their changing relation to nations and regions, to social movements, and to the effects of a globalizing economy and world culture (pp. 1-2).

However, whilst Italo Calvino’s book *Invisible Cities* ‘strikes a chord’ for Huyssen because of the way the ‘the title suggests that no real city can ever be grasped in its present or past totality by any single person’ (p. 3), Huyssen appeals to us to support the facilitation of this condition because. He claims it allows us:
[... to dislocate accounts of modernity from the West [...]. It is simply based on the pragmatic idea that we need much deeper knowledge about the ways in which modernity has historically evolved in the cities of the non-western world, what urban constellations and conflicts it has created there, and what such developments might mean today for city cultures at large’ (p. 2).

Huyssen notes that bracketing is ‘insufficient’; presumably because of the way in which it is limited to critical reflection on modernity (Huyssen does not actually describe any issues). However, whilst it is important to set the limits, scope, and ambitions of an academic study, the collection’s subtitle expands upon the title’s commitment to otherness by making claims to insights about urban imaginaries in an age of globalization. As a result I believe that the method of bracketing is integral to the cohesion of the collection and requires more explanation than is offered. In this context I argue that Jameson’s comparative approach to cognitive mapping highlighted in Chapter One provides a basis for doing so. My proposal here is that bracketing’s goal of distinguishing ‘other’ imaginaries paradoxically serves to reaffirm the centrality of modernism in contemporary discourse. This is not to argue that modernism is irrelevant, but that if we are committed to investigating political and social agency through cultural forms, such as memory, imaginaries, or creativity, the project of comparing forms of modernism serves to consolidate rather than reflect upon its significance. I will now argue that this tension is manifested in two of the text’s essays.

In my last chapter I noted how AbdouMaliq Simone considers that in Douala, Cameroon, urbanism is undetectable to the Western gaze. Simone proposes that far from being ‘redundant’, sub-Saharan urban Africans

[...] must be able to conceive of a space sufficiently bounded to consolidate disparate energies in order to make things of scale happen, but at the same time conceive of a fractured space sufficiently large through which dangerous feelings can dissipate or be steered away. (p. 103)
In psychological terms, he proposes a condition characterised by an intense necessity to be ready and an observational dynamic that produces an ‘incessant present’;

A heightened sense of engagement with all that could ensue from applying a barely indiscernible gaze, from overhearing a conversation, from securing an almost invisible strategic proximity to others, from interrupting the flow of events ever so slightly but powerfully enough to move something in another direction. (p. 105)

For Simone, the reasons for this condition can be attributed to a shift from colonialism to globalization, symptomatic in the changing fortunes of secretive Cameroonian societies called ‘Femla’. In Chapter One I noted Gyan Prakash’s theory that Marathi fundamentalism owes more to British colonialism than the tradition and culture it espouses. Similar can be said for Femla, because it represents ‘the institutionalization of accumulated knowledge of the city as zones of affect’ (p. 111). However, for Simone there has been a radical change in the way in which political ‘control’ operates, such that Femla’s often gruesome methods – ‘giving up family members as labour to be sold to local plantations or trafficking rings, or as bodies to be ‘harvested’ for their parts or specific energies’ – are becoming outdated in a globalised age.

Like the theory of late capitalism presented by Jameson (identified in my first chapter), Simone proposes that globalized ‘control’ is characterised by ‘endeavours to multiply consumption opportunities’, and this means investing attention to individuals rather than heterogeneous groups or masses. This is not to say that the global solely presents favourable conditions for the individual. Simone argues that an emphasis on individualisation leads to the reduction of the horizon of desires such that, paradoxically, ‘the individual is increasingly irrelevant’. This is because capital’s goal of seeking to maximise returns from speculation has the implication that it also seeks to minimize the ‘difference between provision and consumption’, and that as a result a ‘culture of negotiation and evaluation is therefore reduced because items are increasingly valorised in the moment, in the short term.’ (p. 114)
However, when Simone moves the focus of his essay to migration and diaspora communities, his title – *The Last Shall be First* – becomes clearer. He suggests that because Africans have been faced with such intense conditions at home and in migration this has forced them to adapt to the harsher realities of the world than those who are more fortunate. As a result this has forced them to develop entrepreneurial skills in order to both survive *and* thrive.

Furthermore, despite globalization’s emphasis on individualisation, he argues that African diasporas have been supported by new societal forms such as Muslim communities; a support network and ‘form of belonging that exceeds the communitarian and the national and works toward a proficient, if yet and perhaps always incomplete capacity of collective social action.’

(p. 119) Although it is somewhat confusing as to why Simone chooses a Christian reference – ‘the last shall be first’ (The Bible, Matthew 20: 16) to symbolise the way in which Islam has provided a basis for communities faced with emerging economic issues, Simone’s argument that communities are emerging which are based on information and culture rather than colonial and post-colonial forms of authority and obedience is important in light of my Jamesonian emphasis upon social agency. However, I want to argue that Néstor García Canclini’s emphasis upon culture and representation suggests limitations for a sociological analysis of this type, its psychological underpinnings, and Huyssen’s methodology of bracketing the global north.

Canclini recounts a project in which he presented photographs of Mexico City to inhabitants from different social backgrounds; from positions within the state, and between people who require varying degrees of movement in order to live their everyday lives, including ‘street vendors, taxi drivers, students, [and] transit police’ (p. 84). The project asked participants to choose the most representative images of their interaction with Mexico City. Canclini found that their narratives did not attempt to grasp the city as a whole but instead describe how ‘they
survive by imagining small environments within their reach’. Rather than theorising ‘macrosocial transformations and the structural causes’, these events were disparately attributed to immigrants, political demonstrations, the number of cars, police corruption, tripled parking and so on and so forth. Furthermore, however, there was also an imaginary emerging within the elite that was particularly distinct in its relationship with time. The flexibility that Canclini demonstrates towards the imaginaries of the elites is a fundamental component of my argument that an emphasis upon the bracketing of modernity has limitations that should not be ignored.

Drawing upon Walter Benjamin, as do Huyssen and Jameson (discussed in my first chapter), Canclini presents an argument that the archetypal modernist city was once imagined by the elite bourgeois perspective of the ‘flâneur’, characterised by monadic play with affectation (in The Arcades Project ‘the flâneur plays the role of scout in the marketplace’ [Benjamin, 2002 [1940], p. 21]). In contrast, Canclini suggests, Mexico City’s elite imaginaries are now characterised by eye-in-the-sky TV news; a ‘new panoptic power’ in which the mobility of helicopters, like the shift ‘from literary texts to mass, audio-visual media’ promotes a shift from the ‘long-form narratives’ of the modern elites, to an urgency of ‘instant flashes’ (2008, p. 85).

And yet despite Canclini’s unease about the incommensurability that he perceives, he also suggests that Mexico City’s ‘baroque’ imaginaries are not at all new and can actually be traced back to the beginning of European colonisation with the letters of the conquistador Hernan Cortes. As a result, I think that Canclini’s essay is significant in the context of postmodern ‘new people’ in at least two ways: firstly he suggests that there is a history of incommensurability the goes so far back in time that it stretches at the limits of modernism,
and secondly, in contrast to Simone, his study of imaginaries is placed firmly within the remit of cultural studies and representation rather than psychology. The implications being that

... perhaps one chooses to live in cities not only because of the richness of stimuli [but also because] precariousness and disorder give rest to our imaginary vertigos [...] against what one finds vertiginous in globalization. (p. 95)

Although Canclini frames incommensurability in psychological terms of ‘stimuli’ and ‘imaginary vertigos’, his mode of investigation, from the sociological research project of questioning photographic representations of the city to historical and literary studies is cultural. Turning now to Jameson I unpack further why I believe a cultural inquiry moves beyond the limitations of the psychological because of the way in which the former is open to differences offered by concepts of creativity, imaginaries, and memory.

**Part Two: ‘National Allegory’**

In her book on Theodor Adorno, Gillian Rose argues that it is one thing to claim, as Adorno does, that ‘capitalist society has become more total and that it increasingly controls and constrains individuals’, but another thing entirely to claim that ‘philosophy and sociology can no longer grasp the totality, neither the whole of existing society nor all its possibilities.’ (Adorno, in Rose, 1978, p. 17) I begin this sub-chapter with Rose’s critique of Adorno because I consider that it resonates with Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone’s response to Jameson’s views on memory with which I introduced this thesis.

Rose asks how political agency can be possible if ‘complete reification’ and, most relevant to this chapter, ‘the end of the individual’ has been established as an intellectual horizon (pp. 15-18). Rose’s text takes its cue from Adorno’s proposition at the beginning of *Minima Moralia* that a ‘melancholy science’ attempts to articulate an ethical responsibility to representing the
unrepresented. Rose argues that if this responsibility is dependent upon a thesis of ‘complete reification’, the question arises as to how Adorno has come to the unique position of being able to comment on the totally incommensurable. Rose deduces that this can only mean that Adorno is using irony, and that as a result this runs a significant risk of elitism and manipulation; a schoolmasterly attempt ‘to induce in his reader the development of the latent capacity for non-identity thought’ (p. 49). Furthermore, however, Rose considers that Adorno’s melancholia over totally reified society necessarily leads us to a philosophical exercise of asking or saying ‘what something is’ (Adorno in Rose, p. 45). This is important for my approach because of the way in which Jameson not only inherits Adorno’s thesis but also expands upon it.

In *Late Marxism* (1990) Jameson argues that Adorno's work provides particular

[...] information about a specific moment of the operation of the social totality in its monopoly period: the adherence, indeed, to the ‘state capitalist’ model of the economy, a model overtaken by the development of multinational capitalism today and no longer current, permits a kind of measurement of the ‘damaged subject’ [a process that] could be registered in a narrative or mimetic form by Adorno (and Horkheimer) because [...] they lived through the transitional period in which smaller business and entrepreneurship were once visible, so that their absence at a later stage remains a dramatic symptom, still perceptible to the observer. This is of course an advantage over our own period, in which social homogenization is far more compete, the past has been more definitively disposed of, and this kind of temporal or modernist dialectic seems inoperative. (p. 71)

However, whilst Jameson potentially exacerbates the problem that Rose identifies in the thesis of totally reified society by claiming that it has finally been realised, I am interested in his claim that Adorno provides insight into a particular moment in time that can be appropriated for comparative study. In Chapter One I identified issues in Huyssen’s appreciation of Benjamin and Pamuk in these terms but I am interested in the Jameson’s suggestion that a temporal or modernist dialectics *seems* to be inoperative.
In his preface to *Postmodernism*, Jameson suggests that the goal of postmodernism

[...] must remain that of coordinating new forms of practice and social and mental habits. [Just as Max Weber claimed] that new inner-directed and more ascetic religious values gradually produce ‘new people’ capable of thriving in the delayed gratification of the emergent ‘modern’ labour process, so also the ‘postmodern’ is to be seen as the production of postmodern people […]. (1991, p. xiv)

Jameson means here that the promotion of particular social and mental processes necessitates the identification of people and habits that adhere to, thrive, or fail under these conditions. In academic terms the prospect of new psychologies and/or societies requires new subjects that can be treated as case studies.

This is where the clause ‘seems’, highlighted above, becomes important because in *Postmodernism* Jameson considers these psychological questions in terms of cultural and aesthetic representation. For instance:

[...] concepts such as anxiety and alienation (and the experiences to which they correspond, as in [Edvard Munch’s] *The Scream*) are no longer appropriate in the world of the postmodern. [They have been replaced by] the great [Andy] Warhol figures – Marilyn herself or Edie Sedgewick – the notorious cases of burnout and self-destruction of the ending 1960s, and the great dominant experiences of drugs and schizophrenia. (p. 14)

The suggestion of dizzying, aleatory, and schizophrenic cultural postmodernism leads Jameson to engage with poststructuralist debates regarding ‘the “death” of the subject itself – the end of the autonomous bourgeois monad or ego or individual’, therefore tying up with Benjamin’s proposition – and Canclini’s inheritance – of the model of the antiquated flâneur.

Most importantly for social agency, and resonant with Canclini’s concern with incommensurability, Jameson distinguishes between two poststructuralist approaches to this
debate: a historicist approach which he states he ‘obviously’ leans towards (1990, pp. 14-15), and a second ‘position, for which such a subject never existed in the first place but constituted something like an ideological mirage’. He proposes that the latter position is problematic from a point of view of inclusivity. This becomes clearer when we consider his claim that ‘of all Marxist aestheticians [Adorno] is the most faithful to Marx’s own method or mode of Darstellung [aesthetic, cultural, or rhetorical representation]’: that no concept or mode of production should ever become ‘the dominant theme or motif.’ (p. 182)

The debate regarding the death of the subject is important here because it applies comparative analysis to the significance of subjectivity, and in turn provides critical insight into the concept of memory. However, this also means that in order to avoid the dominance of particular modes of production we need to investigate how they operate on their own terms (Adorno later called this ‘immanent critique’ in Negative Dialectics, 1990 [1966], p. 97), which is also to say that when Adorno refers to totally reified society, and Jameson inherits this in terms of it being fully realised by postmodernism, they are asking how these representations operate. I think that this is particularly important to bear in mind when we are considering Jameson’s pessimistic views on memory because it suggests that he is referring to how memory has been represented and does not define its historical significance.

However, it is also integral to a consideration of Jameson’s inheritance from Adorno that his critique of Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s ‘culture industry’ thesis should be acknowledged. Jameson suggests that their German expression ‘kulturekritik’ was actually articulated as ideological or aesthetic critique and not cultural in the sense in which it has come to mean today: aesthetic representation articulated within a social, communicative, and interactive context (p. 107). Adorno and Horkheimer argued that individual bourgeois monads
(Benjamin’s ‘flâneur’) were becoming ‘invested with property’ (Adorno in Jameson, p. 71), and that this was having a direct bearing upon the rise of bourgeois fascism. As a result, Jameson considers that the culture industry thesis depicts how aesthetics and ideology are filled with economic and industrial imperatives – extending immanent critique from economics to aesthetics – but does not investigate the role that culture may itself play, for better or worse, in framing the ‘realm of social life’. I will now consider how his approach to cultural studies determines that he not only treats ‘new people’ on a conceptual level, but that he approaches difference in a way that maintains a flexible approach to dominance that starkly contrasts with Huyssen’s method of applying bracketing to modernism. To do so I consider his writing on ‘postmodern difference’ and ‘third world literature’.

For Jameson, whilst ‘new people’ is theorised as a component of the cultural ideology of postmodernism, like modernism before it, he also considers that global media has presented to us the ‘emergence of new subjects; that is to say, new people, other people, who were somehow not even there before’ (1991, p. 357). However, unlike Huyssen, he continues: ‘even though their bodies and their lives filled the cities and certainly did not suddenly materialize yesterday’ (my emphasis). One cultural field in which he explores differences is within what he controversially refers to as ‘third-world literature’.

In his essay of that title (1986) Jameson argues that ‘the strategy of trying to prove that these texts are as ‘great’ as those of the [western] canon [determines that the] third-world novel tends to come before us, not immediately, but as though already-read.’ (1986, pp. 65-66) He claims that this is essentially what

[...] Edward Said, in the context of the Middle East, called “orientalism”. It does not matter much that the radical otherness of the culture in question is praised or valorised positively [...] the essential operation is that of
differentiation, and once that has been accomplished, the mechanism Said
denounces has been set in place (p. 77).

However, Jameson has also been heavily criticised for an authoritarian tone with his claim
that third-world literature should

[…] be read as what I will call national allegories, even when, or perhaps I
should say, particularly when their forms develop out of predominantly
western machineries of representation, such as the novel [and that] all third-
world texts are necessarily […] allegorical. (p. 69 – my emphasis)

For instance, Aijaz Ahmad has protested that:

[…] when I was on the fifth page of this text (specifically, on the sentence
starting with “All third-world texts are necessarily . . .” etc.), I realised that
what was being theorized was, among many other things, myself. (Ahmad in
Buchanan, 2005, p. 177)

Here I think it is important to remember Jameson’s allegorical approach, and his inheritance
from Adorno’s aesthetic, political, and social theory that no mode of production should be
allowed to be become dominant ‘s proposition, as well as how this interacts with ‘totality’;
another controversial Jamesonian concept. For Jameson, totality serves as a concept for
tracking narratives that attempt to be dominant; it ‘does not imply a belief in the possibility of
access to the totality, but rather a playing with the boundary itself.’ (1991, p. 363) Playing at
the boundary is Jameson’s approach to difference, proposing that we need to maintain a
vigilance of what the boundaries are for social agency if we are to transgress them.

Additionally. I noted in chapter one that Huyssen refers to the way that Jean-François Lyotard
links creativity with postmodernism. Interestingly Jameson also uses Lyotard’s writing on
postmodernism to theorize the implications of celebrating random difference rather than
investigating it rigorously.

Jameson argues that whilst it is certainly tempting to celebrate the irrelevance of the
pessimistic anxiety of Munch and van Gogh’s modernist psychological ‘sublime’, he argues
that what Lyotard calls ‘intensities’ produce a new form of domination characterized ‘by a peculiar kind of euphoria’ (1991, p. 16).

In his forward to Jean-François Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition* Jameson claims, contra Lyotard’s celebration of postmodernity, that we have not witnessed

> [...] the disappearance of the great master-narratives, but their passage underground as it were, their continuing but now unconscious affectivity as a way of ‘thinking about’ and acting in our current situation. (1984, p. xii)

This builds upon Jameson’s earlier proposition in *The Political Unconscious* (1982) in which he claims that the notion of politics’ irrelevance tautologically relies upon the continuing presence of the political as its binary other in order to affirm its own ‘post-political’ identity. In this sense the articulation of the silencing of difference by politics is a contradiction in terms. In *Postmodernism* Jameson argues that the pursuit of difference and presenting cultures as if they have only just arrived hides its agenda to challenge the concept of the political, and as such is a form of: […] oblivion and forgetfulness, a self-deception that does not want to know and tries to sink ever deeper into a willful involuntarity, a directed distraction’.

Moreover, he argues that this is very similar to the quantitative approach of ‘demography’ that reduces ‘the precious individual corporality to something trivially biological or evolutionary […]’ (1991, p. 358).

Returning to the question of third world literature, Jameson claims that:

> I take the point of criticisms of this expression, particularly those which stress the way in which it obliterates profound differences between a whole range of non-western countries and situations [but] I don't, however, see any comparable expression that articulates, as this one does, the fundamental breaks between the capitalist first world, the socialist bloc of the second world, and a range of other countries which have suffered the experience of colonialism and imperialism. (p. 67)
By stressing the ‘breaks’, I believe that Jameson is tacitly appealing for a *remembrance* of the role of imperialism and colonialism, and politics and power relations more broadly, so that we can pursue an approach that is even more thoroughly attentive to difference. He argues that such an approach would allow us to consider that despite the racist and totalitarian manifestations of nationalism it has also played an important political rallying point for resistance by communities faced with the imposition of imperialist and colonial culture.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have investigated a division between a psycho-social conception of new people articulated by Andreas Huyssen and AbdouMaliq Simone, and an aesthetic, cultural, and representational approach articulated by Néstor García Canclini and Fredric Jameson (via Theodor Adorno). I probed deeper into the basis for Jameson’s claims that memory has become insignificant. Whilst I think that Jameson’s comparative and allegorical approach attempts to reflect upon the most vocal cultural manifestations and therefore offers significant opportunities for social agency, I also believe that Gillian Rose’s claims regarding Adorno’s elitist manipulation is important to bear in mind. I agree with Hodgkin and Radstone’s claim that Jameson undermines the role that memory can play for critical cultural inquiry. However, I also believe that memory studies would be done a disservice if it were to ignore Jameson’s contributions to the study of culture’s implications in the context of political and social agency. For Huyssen, a commitment to difference can be facilitated by working to give voice to creativity that is to be found, as if ready-made in a Warhol object, within postmodernity’s specific alterity to modernity. I believe that Huyssen’s emphasis upon this dialectic limits our critical and creative possibilities by affirming an underlying binary determinism of the sort that Jameson identifies at work in Lyotard’s thesis of postmodernity. The implication of this
critique is that alongside Canclini’s study on Mexico City, a comparative cultural analysis raises the prospect of limitations in sociological and psychological findings such as those of Simone. Like Huyssen, Simone’s study places a barrier between authoritative academic expertise and dialogue, whereas Jameson and Canclini’s emphasis upon working from narratives that espouse dominance allows us to test the boundaries in a rigorous yet inclusive methodological manner.
Chapter Three: Fundamentalism

Introduction

At the conclusion of n Alain Resnais’ Holocaust film Night and Fog the narrator asks ‘who among us keeps watch from this strange watchtower[?]’ (2003 [1955]). The emphasis that film makers such as Resnais and Marker (who were frequent collaborators) have placed on memory for ethical commitment and to political and social agency is integral to my approach to the concept. However, the essays in Other Cities, Other Worlds, including Huyssen’s introduction (and theory of ‘time-space compression’), frequently cite the way in which memory can be a source of conflict and violence. Furthermore, Jameson’s claim that memory has become a ‘degraded repository’ leaves space for the suggestion that it can be appropriated by violence and not just cultural industries; ‘the question about poetry after Auschwitz has been replaced with that of whether you could bear to read Adorno and Horkheimer next to the pool.’ (1990, 248) By reflecting upon this tension in my final chapter I attempt to draw out how precarious it can be to work with memory. However, whilst my concern is with this tension between an ethical responsibility to avoid atrocity and the manipulation of memory for violence, Gyan Prakash’s essay frames this concern in a context that is unexpected but both timely and in a manner that provides access to discussion with – and explication of – Jameson’s utopian thought; the context of religious extremism or ‘fundamentalism’, However, before I reach this concept and its debate, I firstly look at Teresa Caldeira’s analysis of the discourse of fear and violence in Sao Paulo and its implications for democracy. By returning to Hilton Judin’s call – investigated in chapter one – for an approach traumatized memories, the importance of the religious – or ‘sacred’ – comes onto the horizon. I then finally return to Prakash’s essay and expand upon his theory – again introduced in Chapter One – that Marathi
fundamentalism has more in common with modernist British colonialism than traditional Marathi culture or religion, providing a critical appraisal of Max Weber’s claim that modernism radically demystifies religion. Using this as a platform I then look at Jameson’s dialectic between the sacred and the decadent, and identification of a quasi-religious, postmodern form of fundamentalism that he calls ‘social simulacra’ and comes to be manifested in the deity of ‘high technology’.

**Part One: ‘Fundamentalism’**

Writing about Sao Paulo, Teresa Caldeira considers that ‘crime and violence have become the most important factors for the articulation of a new pattern of segregation’ (2008, p. 63). Caldeira attempts to challenge this discourse, despite ‘fear of crime and violence [being] well grounded.’ (p. 64) Caldeira argues that ‘fear is productive’, that it is repetitive by its very nature and feeds a cycle in which ‘violence is both counteracted and magnified’. However, she also argues that whilst catharsis and trauma management serve to proliferate the demands for public justice they legitimate private, illegal reactions and acts of revenge ‘like hiring guards or supporting [police] death squads and vigilantism’, therefore feeding into ‘the expansion of a booming industry of security services’. I want to consider Caldeira’s concern that an obsession with violence serves to restrict ‘people’s movements and shrink their universe of interactions’ (p. 64) but I also want to ask whether treating catharsis and trauma management in this way is antithetical to social agency. As a result this will also lead me to question Caldeira’s approach to concepts of democracy and the political.

Caldeira explains that the economic crisis of the 1980s destabilised the ideology of economic progress that had legitimated both Brazilian populist governments and military dictatorships, instigating calls for democratic inclusion in political decision making. However, Caldeira also
proposes that this fractured citizenship lit a fuse for psychologies and discourses of fear and violence.

For Caldeira and her colleague, James Holston, Brazilian democracy, post-economic crisis can be characterised as ‘disjunctive democracy’, a contradictory democracy marked by the expansion of political citizenship and delegitimation of civil citizenship.’ (p. 65 - my emphasis) As a result, Caldeira equates politics with selfishness, conflict, fear and violence, by suggesting that it is counterproductive to the social, communitarian praxis of the ‘civic’.

To substantiate these claims she argues that the effects of political citizenship can be tracked by studying spatial, material, and aesthetic developments in Sao Paulo, and in particular ‘postmodern fortified enclaves’ and how they are accompanied by ‘aesthetics of security’. For example:

*Place des Vosges*, a gated theme park that imitates the plan of the original square and announces its advantages: ‘The only difference is that the one in Paris is public. Yours is private.’ (p. 65)

The irony of these fortified enclaves is that despite their emphasis upon security and consolidation they are actually expanding by forcefully removing economically insecure people –the ‘Favelados’ – and undertaken by the city administration in partnership with private investors (p. 65). Caldeira argues that forced removal was nothing new to Sao Paulo, but that in the past it was veiled by ideological justifications of hygiene and development; of ‘public responsibility’. In this case ‘the true goal of getting rid of the favelados to increase real-estate value was rarely disguised’. (p. 68)

Caldeira proposes that luxury enclaves have been marketed in terms of distinction from the favelas that they cleared, epitomised in the ‘phantasmagoria’ of a restaurant bar called ‘Bar Favela’. Furthermore, this bar does not just trivialise the favelas by decorating its walls with
murals depicting stereotypical favela crime and violence. The oblivion of how the favela came to be replaced by a tacky bar feeds into the issue of social incommensurability that I have documented in Canclini’s essay in my second chapter. However, Caldeira uses this case study to claim, more broadly, that discourses about trauma, conflict, and politics have inherently negative civic implications, and she argues that public institutions should ‘enforce principles of social justice’ (p. 75 – my emphasis). In contrast I believe that the process of airing traumas, memories, imaginaries, no matter how simplistic or problematic we may find them to be, is a vital aspect of the process of opening up to the possibility of difference. Indeed, I believe Caldeira undertakes such a task in her focus upon the aesthetics and phantasmagoria of security.

In stark contrast, I introduced in Chapter One that Hilton Judin argues for an engagement with traumatic memories. He considers that idealized conceptions of unity have little substance unless they can be related to issues and challenges in a contemporary South Africa that is so thoroughly defined by racial memory. As I mentioned earlier, he considers that their traumatic memories are probably the only things that South Africans share;

Individuals in Johannesburg must ask how one is able to deal with loss living in the city, if you can’t confront it. What exactly does one see in the city? What is each of our dominant experiences? Estrangement, maybe, if one is white. Discomfort. Invasion. And fear. And if one is black, it might be access. Arrival. Also anxiety. […] Each is afraid of the other, and in fear becomes for the other that anxiety, reflecting the traumas and prejudices anticipated in each other. (p. 128)

Judin describes a legacy of authoritarianism in Johannesburg from British imperialism through apartheid, echoing Caldeira such that memories are:

[...] divided still by white racist constructions, real and imaginary, South Africans are unable to share the others’ concerns and aspirations. Whites still refuse to step outside their moral vacuum and offer even a simple conciliatory gesture (p. 124).
Memory in Johannesburg is therefore fortified within racial nostalgia; a ‘nostalgia for an irrecoverable past [that] serves to hide an uncomfortable present for which we are responsible.’ (p. 130) It can therefore also be considered a neglect of our responsibility to the present. Furthermore, he argues that ‘the self-interest of whites remains at the core of most private commercial enterprises and continues to dominate spatial development’.

Judin looks at nostalgia as a survival mechanism. He considers that it has been used to maintain power relations after the collapse of apartheid and in broader conceptual terms as a strategy for negotiating a ‘city that shifts and changes with enormous social movements [...] yearning for lost and unspoiled places is especially strong, as we perceive ourselves caught in a present over which we have little control’ (pp. 129-130). In this light he looks to the work of Raymond Williams who argues that ‘if the real childhood memory is projected, unqualified, as history’ – thus becoming what Williams considers in Marxist terms the ‘dominant mode of production’ – this ‘teaches, impresses, offers to make normal and even rigid, modes of detached, separated, external perception and enjoying people and things.’ (Williams in Judin, pp. 131-132)

The question then arises as to how to go about tracking ‘traumatic’, ‘nostalgic’, or ‘dominant’ memories so that we can come to terms with them. This leads Judin to the role of religion, or rather the ‘sacred’. However, Judin’s essay is written from the explicit perspective of an architect, and how architecture can make a difference to both South African society and economic growth. The sacred is important here because of his claim that ritualistic ‘movements of influence in both directions offer us new conventions ’ (pp. 144-145). In contrast, Gyan Prakash’s essay articulates the role of the sacred in political and social terms rather than those of business.
Like Caldeira and Judin before him, Prakash also depicts an authoritarian spectral legacy. However, whilst Judin differs from Caldeira’s approach by explicitly asking us to work with the politics of the past, he also asks, contra Judin, to work primarily from a critique of the imaginaries of the elite, a critical method, rather than document the heterogeneity of traumatic memories.

Prakash also argues that memory has a relationship with survival, explicating his thesis that contemporary Marathi fundamentalism is a legacy of pressures to either adhere to British colonialism or negotiate its presence; ‘there was never any doubt that entry into this urban order was conditional on the acceptance of colonial authority’ (p. 188). By tracking the dictates of authority Prakash therefore provides a means of becoming alert to contemporary social issues such as the way in which – despite their explicit nationalism – Shiv Sena continue the legacy of the British by


 […] renaming streets, public institutions, and Bombay itself, [...] through religious and political processions and celebrations [and the] use of violence in daily political activity and in bloody spurts of communal pogroms against the Muslims, as in 1992-93 [...] (p. 199)

Prakash develops his research on the basis of a conceptualisation of cities, after Michel Foucault, as inherent spaces of political ‘collision and confrontation’. In order to uncover these conflicts he proposes, following Henri Lefebvre, that we should firstly investigate ‘quotidiens’, because ‘to understand the present imaginary it is necessary to discover the shape of the imaginaire it now remembers as its past’ (p. 185), and secondly, again after Lefebvre, he considers that we need to begin from elite imaginaries rather than those of the oppressed. His suggestion is that the fragilities and inconsistencies of authority become apparent when placed under scrutiny because of the way in which it needs to adapt to disparate circumstances if it is to remain significant. By investigating authority we are
provided with a means of remaining ready to accept difference. To spearhead such a study, Prakash uses the dialectic of the sacred and the evil. Contra Max Weber he asks the rhetorical question: ‘was modernity not the space of new gods and new myths?’ (p. 187)

**Part Two: ‘Social Simulacra’**

To approach the significance of fundamentalism in Jameson’s work I want to consider his argument in the essay *Marx’s Purloined Letter* (1995) for a common political project between his own work, that of Karl Marx, and Jacques Derrida that has otherwise not been considered. I want to propose that in their respective approaches to the question of the sacred that this becomes difficult for the theory of utopian political thought I am putting forward.

Derrida’s *Specters of Marx* (2006 [1993]), to which Jameson’s essay responds, refers to the famous opening words of Marx and Engels’ *Communist Manifesto*: ‘a spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of communism’. Jameson interprets Derrida’s text as a proposition whereby ‘the absence of the problem of materialism [and] the impossibility of posing it as a problem as such and in its own right [...] generates the figure of the spectre.’ (1995, p. 83) This does not intend to give ‘materialism’ or Marx’s works a particularly privileged theoretical access to political agency. Rather, Jameson argues that it is Derrida’s project to investigate the ethical implications of what it means to assert Marxism’s death after the collapse of the Soviet Union (p. 78): Marx ‘who seemed living, is now dead and buried again, what does it mean to affirm this?’ (p. 78)

Indeed, for Jameson the conceptualisation of the ‘spectre’ intends to provide critical reflection upon materialism by making ‘the present waver: like the vibrations of a heat wave through which the massiveness of the object world – indeed of matter itself – [shimmers] like a mirage.’ (p. 85) It is this commitment to questioning assumptions about the present that
suggests for Jameson how Derrida’s conceptualisation of ‘spectrology’ – ‘a wandering signifier capable of keeping any number of conspiratorial futures alive’ (p. 109) – offers a utopian politics, despite his acknowledgement that Derrida explicitly rejects this concept (pp. 103-104). Jameson therefore uses ‘spectrology’ as the thread with which he develops contiguity between himself, Marx, the disparate ‘discipline’ of Marxism, and Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’. I now want to argue that this is difficult in light of Jameson and Derrida’s respective views on religion, the sacred, and the social. However, I also want to assert that the concept of the spectre – of ghostly apparitions and visitations from the past – is also significantly synonymous with memory, and that the difficulty of identifying contiguity between these authors has a bearing on how we approach this concept.

Jameson argues that ‘the religion of art [and] the art of religion’ has become interchangeable, such that, for example, aesthetic artefacts are given ‘the illusion of substance (of “having content”)’ (p. 98). Jameson approaches this via Jean Baudrillard’s theory of ‘simulacra’ – the evocation of representation over the necessity or desirability of reality (1991, p. 34) – and then modifies this into ‘social simulacra’: the production of a group cultural identity. The basis for a postmodern sacred therefore comes into view. However, in addition he proposes that this is also manifested in ‘new kinds of representational technology, or at the least (since I will want to posit that none of these operations is particularly new) a newly specialized kind of aesthetic technology.’ (1995, p. 98)

Jameson explains that this is in one sense a ‘return’ to older forms of aesthetic ‘sublime,’ but also distinct from ‘modernist sublime’ whereby art attempted to evoke that which was otherwise absent from view (Edvard Munch’s depiction of alienation in *The Scream*).

Building upon his theory of postmodern ‘hysterical sublime’ that I discussed in Chapter Two
with regards to Lyotard by combining with the social concept of ‘social simulacra’, he argues that we are presented with ‘religious motifs[;] a neo-ethnic pluralism of free choice and the free reinvention of small group adherence.’ The contradictory combination of free choice and adherence is the reason why ‘religion is once again very much on the agenda of any serious attempt to come to terms with the specificity of our own time’. (1995, p. 98)

Since my thesis has been advocating Jameson’s comparative and utopian approach to cultural studies and political and social agency, the question then arises as to how this relates to social simulacra and the postmodern sacred. In Postmodernism Jameson situates, like Prakash, ‘fundamentalism’ with regards to a dialectic between the sacred and the ‘decadent’, and by doing so he identifies a sacred element in the representation of ‘high technology’.

Remembering how Prakash challenges Weber’s claim that modernity demystifies the social, Jameson considers how Marxist historical dialectics have celebrated the spectre of religion’s demise. For instance: remember ‘the pages of The Communist Manifesto devoted to the celebration of the new and historically unique dynamics of capitalism itself.’ (1991, p. 379)

Yet Jameson argues that there is also an alternative reading of the manifesto that can be gleaned that uses the dialectic between feudalism and capitalism and a more particular dialectic within this framework of the sacred and the decadent. Jameson proposes that we can read the manifesto and the critical importance of these two dialectics as an allegorical ‘laboratory’, a social, pedagogic space that provides an opportunity for discussion and interpolating ideas about change, or warn about developments that are on the horizon, such as capitalism; the new ‘structural tendency Marx famously described in terms of separation and disjunction, reduction, disaggregation, divestment, and the like.’ (p. 380)
It is in this comparative light that I think it best to read Jameson’s claim that Derrida misses an important difference between Marx’s views on religion in *The German Ideology* (1977 [1846]) and in *Capital* (1977 [1867]). Derrida claims that Marx’s writings ‘may be tainted as a concept by outworn conclusions’ (Derrida in Jameson, 1995, p. 99). However, Jameson considers that this fails to consider the way in which Marx’s earlier work attempts to specifically gesture towards ‘the institutional relationship […] of state religion to state power’ and, most importantly for my thesis, that Marx’s later work with ‘commodity fetishism’ was distinct from such a reduction to ideology in its utopian intent that feeds from his paradoxical view of capitalism;

[…] for pre-capitalist societies and modes of production are by definition never transparent, since they must assure the extraction of surplus-value by extra-economic means. [Capitalism] inherited from the triumphant bourgeoisie and the great bourgeois revolutions, is the first social form to have eliminated religion as such and to have entered on the purely secular vocation of human life and human society. Yet according to Marx, religion knows an immediate ‘return of the repressed’ at the very moment of the coming into being of such a secular society, which, imagining that it has done away with the sacred, then at once unconsciously sets itself in pursuit of the ‘fetishism of commodities’. The incoherency is resolved if we understand that a truly secular society is yet to come, lies in the future […]. (p. 100)

Jameson deviates from Derrida because he argues that Marx’s critique of religion and the importance of the sacred/decadent dialectic relates to an ambition to remain contingently prepared for the future – for agency, and therefore utopian thinking; not a vendetta against religion. Indeed, it is important to remember Jameson’s claim that Derrida’s spectrology seeks to ask what it means to affirm the death of Marxism, because Jameson suggests that Marx is asking the same question about religion.
It is in these representational terms that Jameson approaches the question of postmodern religion. Firstly he argues that ‘not all [postmodern fundamentalisms] are reactionary – witness liberation theology’; referring to a South American Roman Catholic movement that called for democracy, resisted poverty, and evoked early Christian communes (1991 p. 388). Nonetheless the emphasis upon the representation of content, manifested here by the simulation of the past, the basis for ‘social simulacra’, is problematic for him because it sustains particular representations to the neglect of agency.

Furthermore, using social simulacra enables Jameson to identify coherences between religion and technology, manifested with his interest in science fiction literature and culture. By tracking a dialectic between the sacred and the decadent he identifies ‘high technology’ as an aesthetic that relates to the religious concept of the apocryphal. For instance, in the Australian film *Mad Max* (he uses the US title *Road Warrior*) a post-apocalyptic outback is defined by a lack of resources and violent anarchy. He claims that the film obtains its claims to significance by operating as a ‘utopian wish fulfilment wrapped in dystopian wolf’s clothing’ and technological aesthetics of ‘delight with the very breakdown of that machinery.’ (pp. 383-384) Furthermore, the martyrdom of the character of Kyle Rees in *Terminator*, having conceived of the saviour of mankind is a considerably christological motif.

However, I believe that a more fundamental break between Jameson and Derrida’s approaches to religion and technology is to be found with the latter’s essay *Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’* (2001 [1996]). In contrast to Jameson’s concern with religion in terms of its utopian implications, Derrida approaches it in terms of a concern to politically challenge that there are in fact two forms of religion: ‘relegere’ articulating the scriptural religion, and ‘religiare’ representing communitarian religion. Applying this to
contemporary events, Derrida urges us to remember that ‘Islam is not Islamism and we should never forget it’ (p. 46). By distinguishing scripture from community he challenges the notion that the opportunity for difference is uprooted by religion.

Whilst this demonstrates Derrida’s commitment to a future that attempts to leave open the possibility of difference, my concern here is the way in which he uses genealogy to make claims about the correct and incorrect way to interpret religion. I believe that this resonates with the implications of Theodor Adorno’s theory of totally reified society that I discussed in Chapter Two, by setting limitations upon the role of social pedagogy and agency. Indeed, Derrida argues that whereas ‘relegere’ suggests a scriptural attention to critical reflection – ‘bringing together in order to return and begin again’ – ‘religare’ was

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\text{[\ldots] `invented by Christians,’ as Benveniste says, and linking religion to the link, precisely, to obligation, ligament, and hence to obligation, to debt, etc., between men or between man and God. (pp. 73-74)}
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As a result Derrida considers that the social aspect of religare should be tracked for the way in which it ‘deracinates’ the difference offered by the scriptural, and in this manner I think that we return to the issue that Jameson raises regarding Adorno and Horkheimer, touched upon in my last chapter: that the social interactivity of culture is not considered in terms of difference. Not only does this contradict Jameson’s distinction between aesthetics and culture but also Marx’s social theory; in *Alienated Labour*, for example, that ‘Man is a species-being’ (1977 [1844], p. 81).

This does not to diminish the insights that Derrida provides. He uses the social to argue that instead of concerning ourselves primarily with Islamist fundamentalism we should consider how Abrahamic religion has been globalised by Christian and Latin ‘religare’; that ‘everything done or said in [the name of `religion’] ought to keep the critical memory of this
appellation. European, it was first of all Latin.’ (p. 45) It is in this context that he modifies globalization into ‘globalatinization’. Indeed, this brings Prakash’s claims that Marathi fundamentalism owes more to British colonialism into an interesting relief. Furthermore, however, like Jameson he argues that ‘relegere’ is not necessarily ‘religious’; it could be technological. However, rather than tracing the similarities and differences, he argues that this is to be uncovered in a study of the Abrahamic religions, since in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism God created the world. Philologically he notes that the ancient Greek word ‘techné’ can be translated as origins.

In this context Derrida argues that technology, like religion, should not be considered in negative terms without bearing in mind whether it attempts to assert itself socially or not. Such an implementation, he considers, would come to equate to numeric demographics, a form of

Calculability: question, apparently arithmetic, of two, or rather of n + One, through and beyond[]. The more than One is this n + One which introduces the order of faith or of trust in the address of the other, but also the mechanical, machine-like division (testimonial affirmation and reactivity, ‘yes, yes;’ etc., answering machine and the possibility of radical evil: perjury, lies, remote-control murder, ordered at a distance even when it rapes and kills with bare hands). (p. 100)

In doing so he makes a stark warning (written in 1996) about the role of demographics and its relationship with globalatinization; what he calls the ‘wars of religion’:

This question [of demographics] is perhaps the most grave and most urgent for the state and the nations of Israel, but it concerns also all the Jews, and doubtless also, if less obviously, all the Christians in the world. Not at all Muslims today. And to this day, this is a fundamental difference between the three original ‘great monotheisms.’ (p. 91)

The difficulty that I find in this distinction from the scriptural criticality of relegere and religare is therefore how it is any less susceptible to calculability, and that we must know, in
advance, the true genealogies of religion such as Islam. I believe that this stands in stark contrast to inclusiveness of the Marxist laboratory that Jameson offers.

Conclusion

Teresa Caldeira’s essay chapter opened this chapter by suggesting the difficulties of approaching silencing. Arguing that this operates to the detriment of her historical analysis of the discourse of violence, I then headed in the opposite direction with Hilton Judin’s ambition to address trauma. However, when he alludes to the sacred and the ritualistic he considers them in flux, flux that destabilises the bureaucracy at work preventing people from creating new opportunities. Considering his critique of the history of the urban as a concept through Raymond Williams, as well as a Williamsian critique of nostalgia and the dominant mode of production, I am concerned by his entrepreneurial interest in fragmentation and economic expansion of the city. In contrast there is no such concern for economic growth in Prakash’s chapter, and I think that he offers a flexible commitment to studying how authority obscures difference when he indicates the convergence between contemporary Marathi fundamentalism and the British colonial legacy. This distinction between Judin and Prakash is integral to reading Jameson’s approach to Derrida. Whilst both authors provide stunning insights into the landscape of fundamentalism, and its coherences with technology, I think that Derrida’s critique of social thought is highly problematic for my concern to engage in terms of cultural and social agency.
Conclusion

Whilst acknowledging that *Other Cities, Other Worlds* is a collection of writers who have different views and methodologies, my ambition has been to contribute to interdisciplinary dialogue between critical inquiry into memory and theories of political and social agency because of the questions and contributions regarding globalization that travel between these academic fields. I have argued in favour of Fredric Jameson’s comparative form of cultural inquiry because I believe in the hope that such a utopian political and social theory drives towards. I certainly do not believe that Jameson’s writings are always clear or accessible, and that along with Theodor Adorno he makes claims that suggest pessimism that require a nuanced reading that is not conducive to discursive inclusivity; to the pedagogic laboratory that Jameson takes from *The Communist Manifesto*. More specifically, I think that Jameson does indeed fly close to historical determinism that I find problematic in Huyssen’s work. However, I also believe that by undertaking such a nuanced close reading an ethical commitment can be found to registering cultural forms that have been silenced and those that are prevented from gaining a voice in the first place. As such, this is the debate in which I would like memory studies to be a part of, and to which I believe many contributions are currently being made such be writers such as Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, as well as Marianne Hirsch on family and photographic ‘postmemory’ (2008) and Michael Rothberg on international ‘multidirectional memory’ (2009) that I wish to engage with in future work.

In Chapter One I considered the role of the urban and started to unpack the differences between what I now consider to be aspects of determinism in Huyssen’s approach to modernism and Jameson’s comparative and contextual approach with cognitive mapping.
This initiates my argument that memory is a fundamental part of Jameson’s utopian project because of the way in which it necessarily incorporates rather than rejects narratives that may otherwise struggle for empirical verification by so-called experts and scholars. To consider these implications in case studies, I initiated my study of the essays of *Other Cities, Other Worlds* by documenting the theoretical tensions between them.

Yingjin Zhang’s essay was therefore undoubtedly interesting because of the way in which, unlike any other text in the collection, it directly engages directly with Jameson’s work by challenging the determinism that I identified above. I did not attempt to claim that my reading was correct, but instead engage with the implications of a ‘cognitive re-mapping’ that attempts to consolidate the significance of polylocality whilst claiming that it operates from the level of micro-narratives. In contrast to Zhang and Huyssen, I documented how Ackbar Abbas puts forward an investigative approach that asks to scour for the ‘x- marks the spot’ of power. As a result, I argued that this flexibility towards power conditions breaks from their methodological focus upon modernity and polylocality in broader commitment to context. Finally, with Hilton Judin and Gyan Prakash I discussed how the history of the concept and name of the ‘urban’ has problematic and complex implications in colonial, post-colonial, apartheid, and post-apartheid history because of the way in which it reduced debates and facilitated claims to authority.

I argued that the emphasis that Abbas, Judin, and Prakash place on context and change can be carried over to Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping and expanded because of the way in which he emphasises a Williamsian approach to emergent mode of productions and how he discusses this in social rather than only political terms. This is not to diminish the vital role of political gestures for an ethical commitment to difference – indeed a commitment to the social
is often a political gesture – but by also stressing the social I believe that the ‘dominant’ mode of production comes to be defused of a necessarily confrontational gesture that can make hysterical and bellicose appeals for justice to the detriment of other voices. In this sense, the role of articulating spatial dominance can be seen as an opportunity to realise what is different, out of view, neglected, or beyond the horizon. By beginning with the question of the urban and the spatial I wanted to provide a more cognitively visual introduction to the value of a comparative and utopian approach. In the following chapters I moved closer into the complexities of memores and imaginaries with debates about changes in postmodern and global psychology and the way it effects the possibility of difference, and then to the violent entrenchment of fundamentalism.

I began Chapter Two by considering Huysen’s strategy of ‘bracketing’. Although this applies to the urban as well as to imaginaries, I was concerned at the possibility that the concept has an unintended implication of confining political and social agency through the definition of what it means to be different. Although Huysen acknowledges that there are limitations to this strategy, he does not describe what these are, and in order to contextualise it within a discussion of globalization I considered that this was an important explanatory task that should not be treated so lightly.

Furthermore, however, Huysen ties bracketing to a concern with modernism. I argued that a Jamesonian approach stresses the importance of remaining open to cultural representations in the past in order to remain open to creativity in the future, and that as such I do not wish to negate the critical importance of modernism. However, I also argued that Jameson’s critical reflections on Jean-François Lyotard’s postmodernity thesis suggest an underlying
determinism that locks analysis into a binary debate between modernism and postmodernism, as well as a debate about the empirical reality of modernity and postmodernity.

I unpacked this concern by highlighting a difference between AbdouMaliq Simone’s analysis of sub-Saharan Africans in Douala, Cameroon, in migration, and within global diaspora communities, and Néstor García Canclini’s study of different representations of Mexico City. Whilst I found that Simone’s analysis provides insights into pressures and interconnections between ideologies; from European colonialism to Femla secret societies and finally to diaspora Muslim communities, I argued that the title of his essay - *The Last Shall be First* - indicates an authoritarian presence within his psychological and sociological methodology.

Simone does not clarify the use of this Biblical citation, and I did not mean to argue that his approach is authoritarian because it is Christian. In contrast I was concerned about the underlying message that the difficulties that sub-Saharan Africans face provide them with experiences which are invaluable for becoming successful entrepreneurs. Even if the title is meant to be ironic, it nonetheless seems, to me, to simplify the complexities and challenges within their stories.

In contrast, Canclini works with a concept of imaginaries but does not confine his project to defining what these are. Rather, he works with the fractures in cultural representation and I believe that this portrays an underlying commitment to dialogue between otherwise disparate voices. Like Judin and Prakash in the first chapter, Canclini stretches at the significance of modernism and also works with a Benjaminian theory of history to maintain openness towards different narratives.

I therefore argued that Canclini’s essay provides a platform for Jameson’s approach to subjectivity and difference. I noted how his ‘third world literature’ thesis has been
controversial for the way in which it seems to confine difference to a particular form of
otherness. However, I argued that third world literature and national allegory attempt to
remember the ways in which imperialism and colonialism have been manifested aesthetically
and culturally; memories that a commitment to a different and more inclusive future would
undoubtedly benefit from.

Finally, in Chapter Three I addressed how high the stakes can be with memory by considering
the way in which it can be used to entrench political opinions, and that this can be tracked in
global repercussions. I began with Theresa Caldeira’s critique of discourses of fear, violence,
trauma management and politics. I argued that not only does Caldeira’s demand that ‘civic
society’ be enforced have tautological implications in light of her critique of Brazil’s
authoritarian legacy, but that her call to silence difficult narratives (even if they are as
distasteful as Bar Favela) is an exclusionary strategy that is both problematic from a research
point of view (since Caldeira herself relies upon their articulation for her essay) and more
importantly from an ethical point of view.

In contrast, Hilton Judin’s analysis considers that working through traumatic memories is
vitally important for South African society because it may be the only thing that is shared
across racial divides. However, I also raised concerns with the intentions behind such a
project. On the one hand, Judin espouses a concern with the way in which whites remain in
control of so many instruments of power, and appeals for a united South Africa through
practical goals rather than hollow idealism. However, on the other hand, he speaks from the
perspective of an architect and an businessman As such, Judin celebrates the fractures that are
offered between entrenched and diverse ‘rituals’ as forms of creativity that allow South Africa
to compete within a global market. Although Judin uses rituals to track these differences, we
are, yet again, tied to the framework of modernity and postmodernity that I argued is central to Huyssen’s theory of bracketing in Chapter Two.

In addition to Judin’s emphasis on the sacred, Gyan Prakash focuses his approach to the city in terms of the political. With inheritances from Michel Foucault and Henri Lefebvre he considers that politics is the means by which we can track difference, and that the sacred has been an important manifestation of this in colonial and post-colonial times. As such he considers that in political terms, contemporary Marathi ‘fundamentalism’ shares more in common with the spatial authoritarianism of British colonialism than Marathi tradition. Although Prakash’s title is ‘The Modern City in Ruins’ his Foucauldian inheritance leads him to distance from a linear approach to history. This means that he works with the modernist ruins of British colonialism to identify overlaps with Marathi fundamentalism, and by doing so he attempts to leave a space for the articulation of voices that respond to such challenges.

In the last part of this thesis I used the sacred as a means of concluding my argument that memory remains significant in Jamesonian terms by considering the way in which he incorporates Jacques Derrida’s theory of ‘spectrology’. Since the spectre has synonymous qualities with ghosts, spirits, and visitations, I had no doubt that memory can be added to this framework. To trace the relationship between a Jamesonian appropriation of spectrology in terms of the sacred I looked closer into his relationship with Derrida because of the way in which Jameson considers that despite Derrida’s protestations, he does indeed offer a utopian approach. By working with this claim I wanted to look closer at what utopian theory means under such high stakes.

With Derrida’s essay on the two origins of ‘religion’ I was confronted with an eerie prediction about a world twelve years down the line of America’s long war on terror in light of its
publication in 1996: Derrida’s theory of ‘globalatinization’ that would bring the Abrahamic religions into demographic conflict due to a genealogical inheritance from Roman imperialism. However, by working with this theoretical thread I came to the position that the contiguity that Jameson identifies between Derrida, Marx, and himself in terms of the utopian is harder to maintain than he suggests.

Indeed, both Jameson and Derrida theorise the prospect of cohesion between the sacred and technology, and neither come to binary conclusions, but whereas Jameson theorises this in terms of a utopian Marxist commitment to the possibility of political as well as cultural and social agency, indicated in his critical response to Adorno and Horkheimer’s culture industry thesis in which he identifies the social limitations of an aesthetic analysis, I documented how Derrida places the cultural and the social at the heart of the uprooting of difference - and globalatinization. In contrast, I argued that Jameson’s social commitment, inherited from Marx, is open to the possibility of futurity in community and not just scripture.
Bibliography


