DEMOCRACY PROMOTION, NATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGY DURING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
1981-1986

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This study examines the relationship of democracy promotion to national security in US strategy through an examination of the influence of geopolitical, bureaucratic and organisational considerations on the effort to create a coherent strategic approach fusing democracy promotion and national security under the Reagan administration.

This process highlighted geopolitical and organisational tensions between democracy promotion and US national security. Groups within the administration, Congress and the private sphere disagreed over whether US geopolitical interests required the limited deployment of democracy promotion against Soviet Communism or a more expansive effort aimed at both Communist and pro-US dictatorships. These debates were linked to clashes over the credibility and effectiveness of competing state-centred or privately-implemented organisational frameworks.

The organisational resolution was the National Endowment for Democracy, which intervened on a tactical basis in dictatorships, with US assistance, to safeguard US national security by supporting pro-US democratic groups. However the concept of privately-implemented democracy promotion blocked agreement on geopolitical objectives and the creation of a coherent strategy reconciling democracy promotion and US national security. Tensions between these two imperatives continue to recur and can be resolved only on a case-by-case basis rather than at the strategic level.
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INTRODUCTION

US policy-makers have often claimed that the US has a special mission to protect and support the spread of democracy.¹ However, US actions such as support for dictatorships and hostility to democratic regimes indicate that the place of democracy in US foreign policy practice has been much more ambiguous. This ambiguity has spurred a constant and continuing academic debate between those who see the promotion of democracy as a key element of US strategy and a more critical group of scholars who argue that in practice, democratic rhetoric has been used as a tool to legitimate the pursuit of other goals.

The democracy-centred narrative of US foreign policy has been expounded most often by scholars working within a Liberal or Neoconservative framework. The most comprehensive statement of the importance of democracy in US national security policy within a Liberal framework was made by Tony Smith, who argued that “the most consistent tradition in American foreign policy…has been the belief that the nation’s security is best protected by the expansion of democracy worldwide”² and that this had been “the greatest ambition of United States foreign policy over the past century”.³ Smith cites the creation of democratic institutions in the Philippines during its period of American rule, the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson, the democratisation of Germany and Japan under the Truman administration, the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and Ronald Reagan’s crusade for

¹ Numerous examples of Presidential rhetoric covering over a century could be cited. See Wilson’s argument that the US was entering World War One in order to make the world safe for democracy in Woodrow Wilson, “War Message to Congress”, 2nd April 1917, accessed 4th June 2010, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson%27s_War_Message_to_Congress; see Harry S. Truman’s contention that “it must be the policy of the United States to…assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way”, used to justify US aid to the governments of Greece and Turkey in support of containment in 1947, in “Address before a joint session of Congress”, 12th March 1947, accessed 20th February 2013, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp; and John F. Kennedy’s promise that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty” in “Inaugural Address”, accessed 16th March 2013, http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres56.html.
³ Smith, America’s Mission, 4.
democracy against Soviet Communism in support of his argument.\(^4\) Smith is not alone in making this argument, as the neoconservative Joshua Muravchik claims that the US has been “the engine of [the] transformation”\(^5\) of much of the world in a more democratic direction, while liberal scholar G. John Ikenberry sees the promotion of democracy as one component of a US liberal grand strategy which also included the creation of international institutions and an open world economy after World War Two.\(^6\) These scholars argue that in democracy promotion idealism and pragmatism are joined in an “evolving, sophisticated understanding of how to create a stable international political order”.\(^7\) In this conception, democracy and national security are mutually reinforcing policy goals.

However, this perspective fails to engage fully with the contradictions in US practice by minimising the anti-democratic actions often taken by the United States. Thus, while Smith celebrates democratic policy initiatives undertaken by Wilson, Truman, Kennedy and Reagan he devotes far less space to Presidents such as Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon, who overthrew democratic governments.\(^8\) Similarly, Henry Nau argues that even though the US undermined democratic governments during the Cold War in countries such as Guatemala and Chile, by containing the Soviet Union, “[i]t played the key role in defending and strengthening democracy.”\(^9\) While these scholars do not ignore the contradiction between democratic rhetoric and anti-democratic foreign policy behaviour, they characterise such

\(^4\) See Smith p40-49; 84-111; 146-176; 214-236; and 266-307.
\(^7\) Ikenberry, 104.
\(^8\) Smith devotes a chapter to the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations, and does discuss the overthrow of democratic or democratizing governments in Iran, Guatemala and Chile. He also discusses Johnson’s intervention against the Constitutionalist pro-Bosch uprising in the Dominican Republic. However, these facts are placed within a general framework which is focussed on the linkage he perceives between national security and democracy promotion and do not affect the general thrust of his argument. See Smith, 178-213 and 228-232.
actions as unfortunate deviations from an overarching policy framework based on the promotion of democracy rather than enquiring more deeply into the connection between democracy and national security.

In contrast to the democracy-focussed narrative outlined above, academics working within a Leftist/Progressive or Conservative/Realist framework argue that democracy promotion has not had a significant impact on US foreign policy practice except at the rhetorical level. The use of democratic rhetoric by policy-makers is seen as a way to legitimate the pursuit of goals unconnected with democracy overseas or even antithetical to it. The use of this rhetorical tool is of key importance as “[f]or a democracy like the United States, naked power alone – even if it represents the national interest – will not suffice to mobilize domestic forces and resources”.\(^{10}\) The use of such rhetoric acts as a smokescreen which cloaks US objectives in an acceptable rhetorical guise, both domestically and on the international stage, as an element of US “soft power”. However, in reality democracy has been subordinated to other foreign policy considerations. William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko and Noam Chomsky argue that US foreign policy has been largely driven by the need to secure foreign markets, investment opportunities and supplies of raw materials, not democracy;\(^{11}\) Kolko comments that ideological declarations “were all too often scarcely more than public-relations exercises.\(^ {12}\) David Ryan and David Schmitz broaden this economic argument to include other factors such as security. Ryan argues that democracy has often been secondary to other US interests such as stability, order and the exercise of

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\(^{12}\) Kolko, 12.
hegemony, while Schmitz contends that US rhetoric on democracy and human rights has been belied by support of authoritarian regimes as a more expedient method of containing Marxist forces, ensuring that key countries pursued a pro-US foreign policy and creating a supportive environment for US business interests abroad. Stephen Kinzer goes further; noting that during the Cold War the US actively opposed foreign democrats who did not serve US interests, overthrowing democratic or constitutional governments in Iran, Guatemala and Chile. Thus, as the realist and conservative Amos Perlmutter argues, “the Wilsonian legacy of democracy and self-determination…is rooted more in philosophy than in action”.

An important factor preventing a clear analysis of the role of democracy in US foreign policy is the tendency of both of these groups of scholars to focus narrowly on the cases which support their theoretical frameworks. The fact that many of the works which champion a connection between democracy promotion and national security were aimed at prescribing future policy in these terms by providing retrospective justification for such a framework in terms of past practice has often led scholars such as Smith and Muravchik to highlight those cases in which they believed democracy and US national security had reinforced each other in the past, while minimising discussion of counter-examples. Similarly, works by scholars such as Williams, Kolko and Chomsky tend to minimise discussion of those cases in which the US has promoted democracy, or to treat democracy promotion as a rationale for policy rather than an element of it.

15 See Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006); chapters 5, 6 and 8 for information on the US role in the coups in these countries and 196 for Kinzer’s point on democracy and dictatorship.
16 Perlmutter, 134.
This problem can be approached from a different perspective by examining how the promotion of democracy was conceived within the US government and the wider foreign policy elite at the strategic level, rather than at the level of cases or specific regions. As democracy promotion has never occupied the position of a dominant and over-riding imperative in US foreign policy, a complete analysis of the role of democracy in US foreign policy would need to consider how it was meshed with other US goals such as national security in order to produce a coherent strategic approach. Decisions at this strategic level inevitably affect the choice of tactics to implement new strategies, which further translate into decisions on what organisational forms are the most effective tools to implement these approaches.

These strategic, tactical and organisational decisions do not emerge from a neutral and objective process of decision-making. Instead, they are affected and modified by struggles over the goals and control of the implementation of democratisation policies at two levels: bureaucratic struggle within the US government between departments with differing strategic and tactical objectives; and the tensions between Executive agencies and US private groups interested in the pursuit of democratisation overseas concerning the level of autonomy such groups should be given. These dimensions of decision-making will also need to be considered. Finally, such an analysis will need to examine how these factions conceived of and implemented political reform overseas in relation to US national security objectives in order to examine whether the pursuit of these other objectives imposed significant limitations on the geographical targeting, form and depth of reform.

The Origins of Democracy Promotion as a research area

The debates over democracy promotion which occurred in the early 80s constitute a case study which can be used to examine the conception and operationalisation of democracy as
an element of national security strategy. The concept of democracy promotion differed from previous attempts to intervene in the politics of foreign countries and shape the development of foreign nations carried out through previous methods such as covert CIA operations, policies of nation-building informed by Modernisation theory and the campaign for Human Rights. Support for foreign groups given by the CIA had focussed on strengthening and co-opting foreign civil society groups to wage an ideological battle against Communism. Policies of Modernisation had aimed to create modern and anti-communist nation-states in the rapidly-decolonizing Third World through a wide range of measures which aimed at socioeconomic transformations as pre-conditions to democratic reform. The Human Rights campaign had been based on a diffuse concept of reform which included social and economic rights and civil liberties and had been most commonly operationalised in the form of attempts to pressure sitting governments to scale back their most repressive practices. In contrast to these previous tactics and paradigms, democracy promotion was focussed on the creation of democratic systems overseas through an attempt to effect narrowly political change through the support of political groups overseas. These former policies had also often been concerned with the place of democracy in the US approach towards a particular case or region, and had often been imperfectly co-ordinated with other national security interests. In contrast, the debates over democracy promotion represented a unique moment of reassessment of the relationship between democracy promotion and US national security at the strategic level.

The need for such a reassessment was spurred by two trends which had developed over the 1970s: the appearance of a more threatening strategic environment for the US due to the rising power of the Soviet Union and the wave of Third World revolutions which had occurred during and after the Vietnam War; and a lack of consensus within the US foreign policy-making elite over how to confront this due to a shattering of the ideological consensus which had previously legitimated an activist foreign policy as the defence of democracy.
These trends culminated in importance during the early Reagan administration, which found its attempts to legitimate its activist national security strategy as the projection of democracy versus communism hampered by internal divisions and domestic criticism from other factions of the elite over how democracy related to US interests in specific cases.

It was the generation of the new vision of democracy promotion by a network of US private groups and individuals which made a resolution of these tensions possible. Rather than taking a case-by-case approach, this network presented the administration with the element which it lacked - a strategic framework which could subsume and integrate these problematic cases into a much wider vision which meshed democracy promotion and national security at the strategic level. The process of debate and negotiation which followed constituted the first serious attempt by US policy-makers and private groups and to take a strategic approach to the promotion of democracy in the interests of national security. This process also resulted in the deployment of new tactical approaches to democracy promotion and a new organisational dynamic between the state and private groups interested in political intervention overseas, which was institutionalised in an organisation focussed on the promotion of democracy overseas as its primary mission: the National Endowment for Democracy. 17 Although this formative period has been largely neglected by scholars examining US democracy promotion in favour of concentration on the Endowment’s actions after its creation in 1983, 18 it is an important case study for the examination of the

17 The NED is no longer the only institution which pursues democracy promotion. The post-Cold War administration of Bill Clinton saw the institutionalization of democracy promotion beyond the Endowment, as USAID took on democracy promotion as part of its mission and further bureaucratic structures were created in the State Department and Department of Defense to push the strategy forward. See William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 100. The George W. Bush administration administration created further democracy promotion programs, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative. For discussion of MEPI see Katerina Dalacoura, “US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East Since 11 September 2001: A Critique” International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2005):964-66. However, as noted, it remains the only single institution devoted to democracy promotion as its core mission. However, the NED is still the only organisation which undertakes the most controversial task of providing direct support to political parties and groups such as trade unions.

18 These analyses, much like the debate over the relationship between democracy and other interests in US foreign policy in general, has been polarised between those who see the NED and post-83 US democracy
relationship between democracy and national security in US foreign policy which allows examination of the strategic, tactical and bureaucratic/organisational dimensions of the problem.

The role of private forces in this process also presents an opportunity to expand the enquiry and to engage with scholarship connected to the “state-private network” and the role of elites in US foreign policy formation. The “state-private network” refers to the joint prosecution of political operations overseas by the US government and private groups, in which the government provides funding and overall direction, while the private groups supply the credibility and plausible deniability necessary to engage with groups overseas who would be unlikely to engage directly with the US state. This concept is applicable to the NED, which is legally controlled by private forces but which receives funding from the US government. However, the bulk of the academic studies on the “state-private network” have concentrated on the series of ad hoc covert alliances the CIA developed with US civil society groups to wage anti-communist propaganda operations in Western Europe and the Third World from the late 1940s to 1967. These studies usually terminate in 1967, often promotion policies as engines of democratisation and those who see them as aimed at ensuring US national power and national security. For an assessment that is critical over organisational issues but broadly supportive of the NED and the concept behind it, see Thomas Carothers, “The NED at 10,” Foreign Policy 95 (1994). The democracy promotion operations of the NED and the US state in the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua and Haiti in the late 80s and early 90s were critically examined by William Robinson as an element in what the author sees as a wider strategic shift towards the promotion of democracy by the US in William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US intervention and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Critical analyses of US democracy promotion in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union such as Gerald Sussman (2010), Branding Democracy: US Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe (New York: Peter Lang, 2010) and Michael J. Barker, “Taking the risk out of civil society: harnessing social movements and regulating revolutions” (refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Newcastle, 2006).
conceptualised as the end-point of the “state-private network” due to its public exposure and the subsequent proscription of such covert relationships by the Johnson administration. Study of the NED from a “state-private network” perspective would extend this field chronologically, while also allowing examination of state-private relationships which go beyond the previous “state-private network”’s narrowly conceived mission of opposing the ideological spread of communism to focus on state-private interaction in the broader mission of promoting the creation of democratic political structures overseas, a goal more deeply rooted in US political culture.

However, the largest difference between the two networks is that, whereas in the 1950s and 60s groups were recruited on an ad hoc basis by the CIA to carry out strategic and tactical decisions already decided upon by officials, during the late 70s and early 80s the private forces participated in the process of shaping the strategy and network they were to participate in. This opens up a second, wider question: whether a faction of the US elite set the agenda for democracy promotion, triumphing over the Reagan administration’s concept of a political/propaganda campaign based around a narrow anti-Sovietism.20 Such a perspective would be in keeping with elite theories of how power is exercised in the US, which postulate that the strategic, long-term options for US foreign policy are set by an elite-dominated network of foundations, policy discussion groups, think tanks and corporate institutions, leaving the “proximate policy-makers” in a particular administration to make purely tactical choices on how they will be implemented.21

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20 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 76-78
Finally, an examination of the NED’s origins presents an opportunity to engage with the academic debate over whether the political reform the US promotes overseas has been limited by competing US interests. A number of scholars have argued that US democracy promotion has resulted in “low intensity democracies” in which effective power is exercised by elites and socioeconomic reforms, such as land reform, are not pursued. However, they differ over whether this is a deliberate strategy rooted in the subordination of democracy to other US interests or whether it represents an unreflective export of US models of democracy. The present study examines this question by investigating what form the architects of democracy promotion in the 1980s expected political reform overseas to take and how far they believed it could be prosecuted in conformity with US national interests.

Plan of the thesis

The outcome of the debates did not result in a clear victory for any contending faction, as the Reagan administration and the private forces associated with the push for a strategic approach to democracy promotion were unable to generate a unified and coherent blueprint which reconciled competing strategic and ideological perspectives. Instead, the process produced a hybrid solution in which liberal political methods and structures were to be promoted to reform problematic regimes, consonant with US national security interests, on a tactical case-by-case basis through an organisation linked to the US government but not controlled by it on a day-to-day basis. This line of argument is pursued through the chapters that follow.


Chapter One examines the origins of democracy promotion during the 1970s as a privately-generated response to the crisis of US power triggered by the rise of a more threatening international situation linked to a perceived rise in the political-military power of Soviet Communism and the erosion of the domestic legitimacy of US political intervention overseas. In a period in which the US state apparatus seemed to be unable to generate a legitimate and effective foreign policy which reconciled interests and ideals, private sector academics and political organisers generated a concept of “democracy promotion” to be implemented by US private groups in the Third World to resolve some of these problems.

Chapters Two and Three examine the foreign policy of the early Reagan administration and private attempts to lobby the administration to accept differing narrow or more expansive blueprints for democracy promotion in its first year. It argues that democratic ideology was deployed by the administration early on as a tool of legitimation and as an ideological weapon to achieve a number of short term goals grounded in US national security rather than as an element in an integrated strategy. However, the administration chose at this stage to limit democracy promotion to specific cases and regions rather than to embark on a wider campaign.

Chapters Four, Five and Six consider the strategic, bureaucratic and ideological pressures which affected the efforts of the administration to create an overt democracy promotion organisation capable of mobilising private groups in the national interest. This debate emerged from its previous narrow focus on specific cases to take on a global dimension in early 1982. The strategic dimension of this debate concerned whether to pursue a universal campaign of democracy promotion aimed at friendly and hostile dictatorships, or whether to deploy democracy promotion in a limited campaign against Soviet Communism. However, the difficulties involved in solving tactical problems and in creating an organisation which could mobilise private forces subsumed the strategic debates and meant
that these remained unresolved. Increasing pressure on the administration, due to resistance from Congress, meant that the National Endowment for Democracy emerged as the ad hoc vehicle for the campaign. This jerry-built solution was presented as a fulfilment of America’s mission to promote democracy and thus was able to engineer the consensus necessary for the creation of a new, overt state-private network aimed at political operations overseas. Nevertheless, the organisation suffered from strategic and tactical incoherence and an unclear relationship with the Executive.

Chapter Seven examines the resolution of this process, as the final details of NED’s approach and relations with the government were settled on an ad hoc basis during its first few years of operation. It argues that while continuing Congressional pressure solidified the Endowment’s commitment to support forces which were pro-democratic rather than merely anti-communist, the NED’s ties to the administration meant that the Endowment was unlikely to prioritise democracy promotion in cases where this could undermine US interests. Rather than following a grand strategic design the Endowment intervened on a case-by-case basis in key states where US national security goals could be achieved through democracy promotion. The Endowment’s interventions supported democratic groups friendly to the US while limiting the extent of political reform by blocking more radical change incompatible with US interests. While democratic ideology served to ease and rationalise state-private co-operation, national security was the key driver of these operations.

Conclusions

The concept of democracy promotion which emerged from the debates of the 1980s generated a new consensus which legitimated US intervention in foreign political processes and eased the co-operation of state and private forces in such operations. However, the process was a disjointed and incoherent one that was not guided by a clear strategic concept.
The high degree of negotiation and renegotiation involved in the process of generating the NED casts doubt on the theory that US foreign policy in general, and democracy promotion in particular, has been designed by a single and unified elite. Instead, the process represented a struggle between differing elites and factions, some of whom prioritised democratic change, some a narrow ideological anti-Sovietism, some the US national security interest in pre-empting radical change in Third World states. The concept of democracy promotion acted as a rallying factor for these different factions; an idea which was deeply rooted in US political culture and thus acceptable to all, but sufficiently fuzzy to allow different groups to see it as a method for securing their interests.

While the concept of democracy promotion successfully subsumed these differing perspectives and interests and eased co-operation between factions within the administration and private groups, it also blocked resolution of the strategic debates, with the result that there was no clear victor in the process. The final outcome of these debates was not a strategic approach which finally resolved the tensions in US foreign policy between the promotion of democracy and other US interests, but the creation of a new structure which could promote political reform on a tactical basis when it was seen to be useful for the pursuit of pre-existing security interests.

The failure of this attempt to take a strategic approach to democracy promotion indicates that the relationship between democracy and national security in US foreign policy is one which requires constant negotiation and renegotiation depending on the strength of various factions within the US government and the wider foreign policy elite, the perception of US interests by policy-makers and the external political-military balance of forces. Theoretical approaches which posit a resolution of the tension between democracy and national security, either in favour of a focus on democracy promotion or on US national
security interests legitimated by democratic rhetoric, thus do not capture the continuing clash between these imperatives which has continued to affect and shape US foreign policy.

The fundamental problem which animates this continuing tension is that while the US gains a measure of strategic and ideological power from its invocation of democracy and its pursuit of some types of political reform in some states, it cannot be certain that democratic change will always be consistent with concrete US national security interests. The persistence of both the US’ rhetorical commitment to democracy and its concrete goals of ensuring its national security and economic advantage, which often require undemocratic behaviour or accommodation with undemocratic regimes, means that this tension cannot be resolved and thus continues to recur in US foreign policy.
The blueprint for democracy promotion emerged during the 1970s from a small number of academics and political organisers outside the US national security bureaucracy. The idea drew on previous modes of political intervention such as the state-private network and modernising reforms but tied these tools to a more strategic approach to the spread of democracy.

The opportunity to design and promote this new conception was created by the collapse of these previous modes of political intervention in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Before this crisis the state-private network and Modernisation policies had been deployed within an overarching framework of containment which meshed US national security and democratic ideology. However, the frequent clash between the expansion of democracy and US interests culminated in a rupture between the state and the private civil society groups which were allied to it and a downgrading of Modernisation as a US policy aim.

This rupture cleared the ground for the conception of democracy promotion, allowing private figures unconnected with the previous network to reformulate elements of the Modernisation paradigm and the state-private network. The failure of the administrations of the 1970s to regenerate an effective US capability for the reform of political structures overseas, coupled with a rise in political instability in the Third World, opened up a window of opportunity for these private figures to develop different organisational and strategic elements of the new concept. In contrast to the pre-1967 situation, when private groups had been deployed on a tactical, case-by-case basis within a strategic framework generated by the
national security bureaucracy, however, the rising network generated its own strategic
framework which deployed these reformulated organisational and tactical concepts as
elements of a program of democratisation which was far wider and more coherent than
previously implemented by the US government. By 1980 these figures had coalesced into a
loose network which was preparing to lobby the US government for funding to implement
their ideas.

Pre-existing tensions between democracy and national security in US foreign policy

The decline of containment and the instruments and strategies associated with its
implementation opened up space from 1967 onwards for new paradigms of US foreign policy,
including democracy promotion, to rise in importance. The core of the strategy was the
prevention of political change which might increase the power of the USSR or harm US
security and economic interests in other ways. Geopolitically containment, as it evolved, had
to face three problems: the rise of Soviet power; the weakness of Western Europe in the face
of this power; and, particularly after the initial phase of the Cold War in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, the power vacuum in the Third World which appeared due to the decline of the
European colonial empires. This final development brought greater instability in the Third
World and increased the threat that independent nationalist leaders would pursue foreign and
domestic policies not compatible with US interests.¹

Containment’s strength as a framework for US foreign policy was its construction and
explanation of this geopolitical and anti-communist strategy as a defence of freedom against a
totalitarian slave state.² This public explanation of the doctrine eased its acceptance by the

² See NSC, “IV The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and Values Between the US Purpose and the
Kremlin Design: A. The Nature of the Struggle”, NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National

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wider foreign policy elite and US civil society by tapping into long-standing traditions of US nationalism which conflated the fate and power of the United States with the fate and expansion of democracy, as both a political doctrine and a form of government, and saw the US as the “the project of mankind”. Democratic ideology thus consolidated containment as a framework for perceiving US foreign policy practice and goals by “translating its objectives into an understandable and compelling reflection of the domestic society’s dominant norms.”

3 The equation of US national security with the defence and spread of democracy was not cynically deployed by US officials and national security bureaucrats to legitimate a policy shaped wholly by realist security and economic concerns, however. Rather, the US’ pre-existing liberal democratic ideology functioned as a filter through which policy-makers perceived the threat from the USSR in terms of ideology as well as security. Thus, ideology and security concerns fused in the construction of the containment framework.

The practical result of this fusion was the construction of a liberal foreign policy elite which supported a US foreign policy it saw as aimed at safeguarding both US national security and freedom. This elite consensus extended into US civil society and included the leaders and members of US civil society groups which co-operated with the CIA to project


democratic ideology and the academics who advised US policy-makers on designs for political reform in the Third World. However, while democracy may have meshed with national security concerns at the ideological level, support for or construction of democracy did not serve the national security goal of containment consistently in pragmatic terms. US policy-makers were forced to recognise early in the Cold War that while it was possible to broadcast propaganda into the Soviet bloc, little could be done in practical terms to “liberate” it due to the strong political control exercised by the governments of the USSR and its Eastern European satellites.\(^7\) In the Third World, democratic processes did not always produce leaders who were willing to de-emphasise the interests of their own countries and populations in favour of US national interests.\(^8\) This meant that the application of democracy to national security policy produced tensions at the strategic level which were then replicated at the organisational and tactical levels in the projection of democratic ideology by the state-private network, and in the US attitude to democratising reforms in Third World dictatorships.

The tension between democracy and national security at the organisational level occurred in attempts to project democratic ideology through US civil society groups funded and managed by the CIA: the state-private network. This network consisted of civil society groups such as anti-Soviet committees and radio stations staffed by Eastern European émigrés, intellectuals, women’s groups, African-American groups, students and trade unions\(^9\)

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\(^7\) This was apparent from the unfocussed reaction of policy-makers to disorder in East Germany in 1953 While US propaganda had played a role in inciting street demonstrations, the US was unable to provide the demonstrators with any practical assistance. See Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union 1945-56 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 180-183.

\(^8\) This was apparent from US covert operations aimed at the overthrow of constitutional or elected governments in Iran and Guatemala. See Introduction, 4, for sources on these operations.

receiving “covert guidance and ...assistance from the Government”\textsuperscript{10}, usually the CIA. These groups were involved in distributing anti-Soviet propaganda and in political training and the education of their counterparts in other countries\textsuperscript{11}. This was a tactical alliance in which private groups lackng a clear strategic plan which transcended a commitment to democratic ideology or the needs of their particular section of civil society deployed their political skills within a strategic framework created by the state. State agencies thus acted as a co-ordinating hub for a constellation of private groups who did not function as members of a wider network independent of these agencies and did not possess a clear strategic framework of their own. This network was used in Western Europe to contain the political influence of Communist forces in Western Europe and to solidify European commitment to the NATO alliance by promoting a common Western democratic ideology. In the Soviet bloc, the network’s projection of democratic ideology was aimed at complicating the Soviets’ control of Eastern Europe and their own population. During the later 1950s and 60s the network expanded its operations to include key countries and areas in the Third World.

The role of the state in the network gave rise to ideological and organisational tensions, however. The state sought to use the democratic nature of the groups to present freedom as an attractive alternative to totalitarianism through providing examples of


\textsuperscript{11} See Wilford, The Mighty Wurltizer, 155-6, for more details on the political training programs of the Committee of Correspondence, 214 for AMSAC’s training of administrators and officials in the Congo and the texts cited in the previous reference for AFL-CIO activities.
democracy in action.\textsuperscript{12} Within the network, democratic ideology also performed an important function in rationalizing and easing the convergence between private idealists and national security managers in the bureaucracy; thus, the conflation of democracy and US national security at the strategic level was replicated at the organisational level and created the consensus which bound the state and private forces together. However, the covert role of state organisations as co-ordinators was not congruent with the democratic ideology which held it together.

This meshing of state organisations and civil society groups also produced an organisational tension. The private façade of the groups was the key to their operational effectiveness overseas. Their actions were “plausibly deniable” and could be disclaimed by the US government due to their covert funding, while the groups also possessed more credibility than the US government with their counterparts abroad, who were more likely to co-operate with an American representative of their own civil society group than a US government official. However, a measure of state guidance was necessary to ensure that the groups’ actions were consistent with the US’ anti-communist foreign policy and constituted a coherent part of this wider strategy.\textsuperscript{13} Without such a guidance function, the effort ran the risk of degenerating into a dispersed and incoherent series of private programs led by private interests or democratic ideology rather than more narrow state goals, or of proceeding beyond national security policy due to ideological fervour.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} See Lucas, \textit{Freedom’s War}, 3, for the argument that “it was the nature of American ideology that demanded a private facade”. NSC-68 also states that one component of US Cold War strategy is to “demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application”. The state-private network could be seen as one way of operationalising this goal. See NSC, “IV The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas”.

\textsuperscript{13} W. Lucas, “Beyond freedom, beyond control, beyond the Cold War: approaches to American culture and the state-private network,” \textit{Intelligence and National Security} 18, no. 2 (2003), 60.

\textsuperscript{14} This tension arose in connection with state-private disagreements over whether to pursue a policy of Liberation against the Soviet Union in the early 1950s. See Lucas, \textit{Freedom’s War}, 152-154, on splits between
This fear created an autonomy/control dilemma for the state: a measure of government control was necessary to manage clashes between ideology, sectional interest and national security policy; however, too much obvious government control of these groups would call into question their status as private entities, thus destroying their usefulness to the state. This tension was never fully resolved while the state-private network existed. The state was forced to rely on “long strings of control” that did not risk compromising its private allies such as co-opting group officials, infiltrating its own agents into the groups and maintaining control of funding by dispensing it in small amounts or tying it directly to specific projects and demanding audits and accounts.15

These tactics did not aim at controlling all the actions of a particular private group; rather, it produced a “ringed autonomy”16 in which group personnel were free to act within certain defined limits but pushing this autonomy to the point where it conflicted with US national security interests could lead to consequences such as withdrawal of funding.17 While this control function was not obvious to casual observers, the private groups resented the limits put on their freedom of action and often clashed with covert action managers over strategy and tactics.18 The clash between democratic ideology and more particular national security goals present in US foreign policy at the strategic level was thus replicated in the

government officials and the leaders of state-private organisations at the Princeton meeting on psychological warfare strategy in 1952.
15 See Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer, for a perceptive analysis of the control/autonomy tensions between the state and a host of private groups during the 1950s and 60s; in particular, 64-5 contain specific examples of the “bitter showdowns” between OPC and the AFL over funding and operational independence. Further information on this topic can also be found in Anthony Carew, “The American Labor Movement in Fizzland: The Free Trade Union Committee and the CIA,” Labor History 39, no. 1 (1998): 25-42.
17 Ibid, 16.
18 For example, early CIA consultants such as James Burnham and Sidney Hook often tried to prod the agency into more aggressive anti-communist actions. See Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer, 75-79. Private psychological warriors directing democratic propaganda against the Soviet Union also complained that the government was not aggressive enough on occasion. See Lucas, Freedom’s War, 152-154.
state’s efforts to guard against rogue private actions which may have been consistent ideologically but inconsistent or harmful strategically.

Although the tensions inherent in the deployment of private civil society groups to project democratic ideology within the context of a national security were formidable, a set of more potentially damaging tensions between democracy and geopolitics were present in the Third World as decolonisation opened up a new arena of US-Soviet competition composed of new states with weak political structures. Decolonisation triggered growing demands for social, economic and political participation throughout the Third World\textsuperscript{19} which the US saw as being at risk of capture not merely from communists but also nationalists and populists.\textsuperscript{20} These conditions led to successive waves of revolutions spearheaded by radical and nationalist forces allied to the Soviet Union which challenged the US and its allies.\textsuperscript{21} Successful revolutions could lead to changes in the Cold War balance of power, as the defection of a Third World country which was important strategically due to its location or resources could materially damage US national security. This situation led to a mismatch between a containment policy focussed on preventing change hostile to US interests and the democratic ideological basis of the policy, as it was unclear whether support of democratic political change or democratic regimes in the Third World would produce governments aligned to the United States.

These realities faced US policy-makers with two decisions. The first was whether support of Third World anti-communist dictators in order to block Soviet or radical influence

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\textsuperscript{19} Paul Cammack, \textit{Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World: The Doctrine for Political Development} (London, Leicester University Press, 1997), 10.  \\
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or the promotion of a degree of political reform in pro-US states in order to undercut demands for more radical change was most likely to guard US security interests more effectively. In situations where the US decided to follow the path of political reform, policy-makers also had to decide how far such reforms could be pursued before they began to undermine the security and economic interests they sought to protect by destabilising friendly states or open paths to power for more radical elements. This was not merely a matter of making a choice between basing policy primarily on ideology or national security; instead, the question was whether constructing democratic systems would assist the US in strategic terms by containing revolutionary forces.

The US made no definite decision on these questions before 1967 and was not able to produce an overarching policy framework towards the Third World which reconciled national security objectives and ideology definitively at the strategic level. Instead, it oscillated between support for dictators and support for reform, employing different tools and tactics in different regions and in different periods on a case-by-case basis. A policy of relying on friendly authoritarians to guard US strategic and economic interests by blocking political change calmed policy-makers’ fears that “whenever a dictator was replaced, communists gained.”22 The contradiction this created with the ideological justification for containment was elided through the argument that by supporting authoritarians in order to keep totalitarians from seizing power, the US was defending the space in which liberty might develop in the future.23 However, these governments tended to lack legitimacy, which made

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22 This point was made by Eisenhower’s Treasury Secretary, George Humphrey, in a 1955 NSC meeting. Quoted from Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 192.

23 For a concise exposition of the idea that development under authoritarian auspices was more likely to lead to democracy than a development process carried out by Communists, see State Department, “Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers,” 1959, Declassified Documents Reference System and NSC, “Discussion at the 410th meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday June 18, 1959”, 1959, DDRS, accessed 17th June 2013, 1.
their long-term stability doubtful. Support for dictatorships thus tended to open up a long-term strategic vulnerability, as when such regimes collapsed they were often replaced by revolutionary forces hostile to the US. President Kennedy articulated this link in 1963, commenting that “Dictatorships are the seedbed from which communism ultimately springs up.”

The alternative policy of fostering Modernisation was based on the idea that gradual reform could bring developing countries into a state of political, social and economic modernity without triggering major upheavals which would disturb the geopolitical balance of power and provide an alternative to radical revolutions. The end-point of a democratic society specified in models of Modernisation was also congruent with the desire of policymakers to demonstrate to Third World populations that “man’s unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions”, and thus represented an attempt to align geopolitical and ideological frameworks. This policy of reform was never deployed consistently as a coherent framework for US policy towards the Third World. However, it was deployed in countries and areas where there was thought to be a high risk of successful radical revolution, such as Latin America after Castro’s seizure of power in Cuba. This approach derived from Modernisation theory, which held that by emulating the stages of development followed by the US and Western Europe, Third World states could transform themselves into modern, democratic societies. These stages were set out by Walt Rostow, an influential development

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theorist and adviser to President Kennedy, as; traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, take-off, the drive to maturity and the age of high mass consumption.\textsuperscript{27}

This drive to Modernisation envisaged far-reaching social and economic transformations which could not be achieved through a state-private network model of political intervention based on projecting democratic ideology and strengthening pro-US civil society groups within the target country, although such programs were also mounted in the Third World in this period, several of them as an adjunct to Modernisation projects.\textsuperscript{28} Instead, the required transformation would be implemented through deploying US foreign aid and the services of US technocrats to implement socioeconomic reforms, such as land reform, tax reform, the strengthening of institutions and advanced technical training,\textsuperscript{29} which would, in turn, lead to the emergence of a strong middle class who would inevitably press for US-style democracy.\textsuperscript{30}

The process of establishing such democratic regimes in the areas targeted proved to be problematic, however, due to both the paradigm of reform the US followed and clashes with short-term national security considerations. The channelling of many elements of reform programs through existing political and social structures meant that their implementation often depended on the co-operation of indigenous ruling elites, who feared dilution of their power through large-scale socioeconomic transformations and thus resisted them.\textsuperscript{31} The US

\textsuperscript{28} For example, the AFL-CIO’s Latin American labor training centre, AIFLD, received $460,000 in US government funds to train pro-US labor leaders to complete with Communist unions as part of the Kennedy administration’s Alliance for Progress in Latin America. See Jeffrey E. Taffet, \textit{Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: the Alliance for Progress in Latin America} (New York; London: Routledge, 2007), 49.
\textsuperscript{29} ibid, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{31} Taffet, \textit{Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy}, 48, discusses this in relation to Latin America. The problem also occurred in South Vietnam, where US support of Diem, who in turn relied on the landlord class as the social base of his power, translated into the thwarting or dilution of reform programs such as land reform. See Richard
focus on structures also neglected the role of agency in the middle class-led political transformations the US hoped would result. The lack of an integrated effort to strengthen the political forces the US wished to place in power in existing dictatorships meant that the reform processes and the accompanying short-term destabilisation which accompanied Modernisation could result in the rise of more independent-minded and radical reformers who did not share the US agenda for their societies. Thus, while the end-point of Modernisation was more consonant with the wider ideological framework for US foreign policy, in the short-term its pursuit created tensions with geopolitical aims. This tension was often resolved through a return to support for authoritarian governments as a barrier against further radicalism.\(^\text{32}\) There were 16 coups in Latin America during the US’ modernising effort in the 1960s, while Latin American economies grew at only 2%.\(^\text{33}\)

From the state-private network and Modernisation to private democratisation

Before 1967 the imperfect co-ordination of democratic ideology and US national security goals within containment, both at the strategic level and at the operational level, had been underpinned by an ideological and strategic consensus among the foreign policy elite which accepted the equation of US national security strategy with the defence of freedom from Communist totalitarianism. This consensus failed to hold from 1967 onwards due to rising disillusionment with political intervention overseas. The flash point for rising criticism of US foreign policy was the conduct of the Vietnam War, which exposed the tensions inherent in a

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\(^\text{32}\) For example, the US encouraged the Brazilian army to seize power from President Goulart in 1964 due to its unease concerning his planned reforms and supposed Communist sympathies. It also made little protest when the democratically elected reformist President of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch, was overthrown in 1963 and despatched marines to prevent his restoration during a popular rebellion in 1965. See Schmitz, *Thank God They’re on Our Side* 268-282 and Rabe, *Killing Zone* 105-108 for the Brazilian case; Schmitz 258 and 282-285 and Rabe 98-103 for the Dominican case.

Cold War strategy waged in the name of democracy.\textsuperscript{34} Concerns were not limited to Vietnam but also included other factors such as US policy in Latin America and the actions of the CIA. However, the war acted as a focal point for these disparate concerns. The resulting lack of consensus within the elite, both in governmental institutions and in civil society, translated into damage to the two key tools of political intervention and reform: the state-private network and modernising reforms. This process opened up a tactical and organisational gap in US national security policy which could be filled by other paradigms and actors.

The exposure of supposedly private groups projecting democracy as recipients of CIA funding by \textit{Ramparts} magazine in 1967 brought the organisational contradiction between the projection of democratic ideology and the state’s need to manipulate and direct these impulses in the service of defined national security goals into the open. This exposure resulted in the destruction of large parts of the network due to Johnson’s subsequent ban on covert funding for US civil society groups.\textsuperscript{35} In reality the civil society groups and the US government had been drawing apart ideologically due to the impact of Vietnam before the exposure of the network; more liberal members of the network had engaged in criticism of war and the leadership of the National Students’ Association, a key organisation in the network, had been quietly working to sever its CIA connection and locate alternative sources of funding.\textsuperscript{36} This rift paralleled splits within the foreign policy establishment, as hawks and doves divided over military escalation in Vietnam after 1965.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} Guilhot, 73. Future National Endowment for Democracy President Carl Gershman discussed the long-term impact of Vietnam on the elite foreign policy establishment in Carl Gershman, “The Rise and Fall of the New Foreign-Policy Establishment”, \textit{Commentary} 70, no. 1 (1980), 13-14.
\textsuperscript{36} Wilford, \textit{The Mighty Wurlitzer}, 246, 238-9.
The exposure itself was also a product of the loss of consensus produced by the war, as *Ramparts* magazine in its contemporary form was a product of the anti-war mood, and it is unlikely that the story would have had such an impact if the wider consensus had still been effective. Structurally, this loss of cohesion produced a political climate in which the state-private network, which depended on the existence of a cohesive civil society bound by anti-communist ideology and a cohesive elite in the state willing to fund it, could not have continued in its current form. However, the problem was deeper than a short-term lack of cohesion between elites. The outcome was a product of the inherent fragility of the covert “state-private network” structure, because Americans did not see covert government subsidies to private groups engaged in promoting democratic ideology as legitimate. As Ninkovich points out, “there was a huge gap between the needed propaganda instrumentality and the possibility of its social acceptance.” Thus, the structure collapsed when it was revealed to the public.

The 1967 scandal left an organisational gap in the US state’s capacity to project democratic ideology which the Executive attempted to correct initially by resurrecting a state-private network system devoted to the ideological projection of democracy in an overt form less vulnerable to the type of shock which had damaged the previous set of relationships. The chief of the CIA’s International Organisations Division, Cord Meyer, who was the highest-ranking government official with direct responsibility for the state-private network, suggested the creation of an overt endowment to replace the CIA several months before the scandal.

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38 Wilford, 232-4.
39 De Vries, 1076, 1083-4.
40 Guilhot makes this last point; 50.
broke. A similar suggestion was made several days after the story broke by Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural and Educational Affairs Charles Frankel, who argued that placing the responsibility for such programs under a semi-autonomous foundation governed by a Board of prominent citizens would “eliminate the cloud of suspicion” surrounding government activities in the field while “allowing us to pursue long-range objectives free from immediate political pressures.”

The Katzenbach Commission, which had been set up to provide recommendations on how to proceed after the scandal over CIA funding of private groups erupted, also favoured such a solution, recommending the creation of a “public-private mechanism” for funding US private organisations in its report in April 1967.

The common theme in these proposals was that making the state-private funding relationship overt would render it more acceptable: relationships which were already public and accepted could not be destroyed through exposure.

The deliberations of the Committee on Overseas Voluntary Activities, chaired by Dean Rusk and set up to devise ways of implementing the recommendations of the Katzenbach Committee, took a different turn, however. Rather than aiming merely at the resurrection of a capability for ideological warfare, the committee staff argued that in the future the most significant operational task would be “the support of private organizations helping to build political, social and economic institutions in key areas of developing countries.” These recommendations implied a transition in state-private network operations into alternate sources of funding for the state-private network but that “seemingly more urgent problems took precedence.” DCI Richard Helms also states that as DCI he had looked into alternate sources of funding for the state-private network but that “seemingly more urgent problems took precedence.” Richard Helms with William Hood, A look over my shoulder: a life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003), 345-6.


Helms with Hood, 369

from ideological projection to a greater level of involvement in projects of modernising and
democratising reform than had previously been the case.\textsuperscript{46} The Committee argued that such
state-private network-implemented reform plans could be best funded through an Executive
branch body reporting directly to the President.\textsuperscript{47} However, the poor relations between the
administration and Congress which had developed due to the 1967 scandal meant the
legislation was not presented during Johnson’s term due to fears that it would not pass.\textsuperscript{48}

Although Rusk argued that it would be better to let a new administration attempt to
implement such legislation,\textsuperscript{49} the collapse of elite consensus in favour of Modernisation as a
paradigm of preventive socioeconomic reform which also occurred at this time made this
difficult. The paradigm’s influence was damaged by splits within the academic community
which had promoted it to policy-makers, and within the policy-making elite. In Vietnam, US
aid and Modernisation programs had not produced a “showcase for democracy” in Vietnam,
as Eisenhower and Kennedy had argued they would;\textsuperscript{50} rather, US policy had led to
dictatorship. The Modernisation paradigm also suffered from its links with US military
tactics: Rostow, Modernisation’s most visible exponent, also came to be perceived as a major
architect of policies such as the bombing of North Vietnam through his position as National

\textsuperscript{46} The state-private network had already been involved in contacts with indigenous private groups in Africa, South-east Asia and Latin America as these regions rose in geopolitical importance. However, many of these operations seem to have been focussed more on culture and propaganda rather than institution-building. However, see Wilford, 214, for the American Society of African Culture’s training of administrators and officials in the Congo and 186 for information on the Institute for International Labor Research, aimed at strengthening “democratic forces” in Latin America.


\textsuperscript{48} Dean Rusk, “Letter to the President”, 4th June 1968, DDRS.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

Security Advisor to President Johnson. The idea was also attacked from the political left in academia as the influence of counter-paradigms such as dependency theory grew.

More conservative scholars and policy-makers turned away from the paradigm due to its failure to secure US national security goals. Influential political scientist Samuel Huntington launched a scholarly attack on it from the right in the later 60s and earlier 70s, arguing that preserving political stability in Third World societies took precedence over fuzzy and ill-conceived schemes of too-rapid transformation. This line of argument had been foreshadowed in Huntington’s criticism of Modernisation policies in Vietnam under the Johnson administration. In Latin America the paradigm suffered what Taffet refers to as a slow slide into irrelevance, as the Nixon administration elevated the preservation of political stability over reform, preferring to wager that authoritarian governments would be able to contain revolutionaries in the Third World. By 1971 Nixon’s NSC had concluded that the Modernisation effort in Latin America had been oversold as a possible method of promoting development and democracy. Nixon’s overall solution to the problem of meshing democracy with US national security strategy, ideologically and strategically, was to abandon democracy in favour of negotiating with the totalitarian Soviet regime while relying on anti-communist authoritarians in the Third World to defend American security interests.

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52 Gilman, ibid; Gendzier, “Play it Again Sam”, 88.
53 Gilman, 64; Gendzier, 67.
55 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 175.
56 See Schmitz, The United States and Right-wing Dictatorships, 74-75 on the Nixon Doctrine and 87-92 on the administration’s turn towards support for military regimes in Latin America, the key region targeted by modernising reforms.
57 Ibid, 93.
58 Nixon commented in 1967 that “American-style democracy is not necessarily the best form of government for people in Asia, Africa and Latin America, with entirely different backgrounds.” Quoted in Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Rabe also notes that Nixon did not argue, as previous Presidents had, that the current
represented a de-universalising of the US’ democratic commitment, not merely in terms of cases but at the level of national security strategy.

Splits in the foreign policy elite and the severing of links between the state and liberal anti-communists in civil society provoked by Vietnam thus led to the decline of the state-private network and the Modernisation paradigm. This loss of elite cohesion, within the state and outside it, placed formidable barriers to the reconstitution of a state-private network based on a policy of ideological warfare and to the generation of a new network more devoted to Modernisation. It also prevented the resolution of the tensions involved in state deployment of private groups and in the pursuit of democratising reforms in the Third World.

Due to these blockages it was extremely difficult for the state apparatus to produce a framework reconciling containment in the Third World with democracy without sacrificing US national security considerations. Instead, that framework was proposed by a private individual. William A. Douglas, a political development academic, in his 1972 study, *Developing Democracy*, set out a framework for a democracy campaign which applied to the whole of the Third World and would be pursued through new private organisations. Douglas’ ideas set a strategic goal for private action which transcended the tactical, case-by-case approach implemented through the state-private network.

In Douglas’ view the creation of Third World democratic regimes was more in line with Western strategic interests than support of authoritarians. In contrast to authoritarian regimes, democracies had mechanisms which could incorporate new political groups into the existing system without revolutionary upheavals and a clear succession mechanism:

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policy of supporting authoritarians in Latin America was temporary and that the region could be democratic at some point in the future. Rabe, *Killing Zone*, 119.
elections. Support for the creation of democracies would create more stable and legitimate Third World governments able to contain or defuse Communist movements more efficiently than authoritarian governments. This was clearly in the Western strategic interest, as the accession to power of Communist or pro-Soviet regimes in Third World countries could lead to the West being cut off from access to supplies of vital raw materials such as oil and uranium. Support of democracies would allow the West to “meet the Communists on their own chosen ground of modern politics” and obviate the need to prop up politically weak reactionary regimes through military intervention, as had occurred in Vietnam. This argument was not ideological; rather, it was based on the utility of constructing Third World democracies in strategic terms. This scheme took in the whole of the non-communist Third World and was thus more comprehensive than Modernisation policies pursued in Latin America or Vietnam in the service of containment.

To create these Third World democracies, Douglas called for a new tactic which would break decisively with former modes of Western intervention such as propaganda programs, ideological projection of democracy by civil society groups, CIA operations economic aid, which had failed to build durable political structures. Instead, he conjoined state-private network methods of organisation and operation with a reformulated Modernisation approach which abandoned nation-building in favour of a new strategy of party-building. In this scheme, socioeconomic change would not lead to political change; rather, it would precede it and create the conditions for it. Socioeconomic development would be carried out and traditional Third World populations organised and mobilised to carry out

60 Ibid, 131
61 Quoted from ibid, 133
62 Ibid, 137
63 Douglas, 150-152
this development by regimes of “regimented democracy” led by modernised Third World elites. These “regimented democracies” would be based on strong, mass democratic parties which would be built through training promising democratic party leaders in techniques of organisation and party-building while also giving them the skills necessary to cope with the political tactics of extremist and anti-democratic movements.

These parties would be built with the help of aid delivered through a new private network focussed on political parties rather than civil society organisations. Private implementation was necessary because the programs would have to be carried out in areas of former Western colonialism. In this situation, privately-implemented programs would have far more credibility with Third World nationalists and democrats, who would fear that programs implemented by Western governments merely aimed at the control and manipulation of indigenous democratic movements. In addition private groups would be plausibly deniable, preventing the support of democratic opposition movements in a Third World country from damaging diplomatic relations between the US and the government in power. However, rather than defaulting to a state-private network model of organisation in which the state would provide the funding and strategic framework for operations and private groups would supply their political skills, Douglas aimed to divorce the programs from government by conducting them through an International League for Democracy composed of both Western democratic parties and mass democratic Third World parties.

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64 Ibid, 119-121
65 Douglas, Developing Democracy, 98-99
66 Ibid, 118-127
67 Ibid, 189
68 Douglas, 157-158
69 Ibid, 161
70 Ibid, 178-9
This organisation would provide financial and technical support to regional and national party schools which would teach Third World party activists the democratic theory and party-building skills required to turn Douglas’ vision into a reality.\textsuperscript{71} Rather than turning to governments for on-going funding that would be needed for these programs,\textsuperscript{72} with the loss of credibility and attempts at government control of the programs this might entail,\textsuperscript{73} Douglas hoped that the financial problem could be solved by governments making a one-time contribution which could then be invested by the League for Democracy to support its activities.\textsuperscript{74} This arrangement would have given contributors no continuing control over the League. He also hoped that money could be raised from private donors such as the Ford, Carnegie or Rockefeller Foundations,\textsuperscript{75} and that governments could pass laws making private donations to the League tax-deductible.\textsuperscript{76} In the US these donations could be channelled through a bipartisan foundation of Democrats and Republicans, which would then transfer them to the international organisation.\textsuperscript{77}

Douglas’ ideas are of key importance in the shift to democracy promotion, as he articulated a cogent strategic rationale for the promotion of democracy. He also suggested the modification of previous modes of political intervention to implement this vision by altering the focus of his Modernisation project from a socioeconomic, government-to-government approach to an approach focussed on working with political parties inside target states. Organisationally, he proposed the creation of a new network based on political parties rather than a resurrection of the previous state-private network of unions, intellectual circles, student groups and women’s organisations. Douglas believed that this effort would benefit the West

\textsuperscript{71} Douglas, p184
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, 186-7
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, 163-4
\textsuperscript{74} Douglas, p188
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, 188-9
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid, 187-8
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid, 188
in the Cold War, but that it would also benefit Third World populations by constructing democratic regimes capable of building modern societies. Most significantly, Douglas’ ideas constituted an overarching strategic framework for private action independent of the state’s strategy for the first time. This independence was replicated at the organisational level, as Douglas’ International League for Democracy would not rely on state agencies to provide a co-ordinating function for its campaign or to identify strategic priorities.

However, although these ideas had an important impact on US national security policy eventually, they had little impact at the time. While the collapse of the state-private network and waning enthusiasm for modernising reforms had opened up a space for new ideas to be proposed, the split between the state and private elites which had produced this situation made it more difficult for such ideas to be operationalised. Douglas’ lack of interest in continuing state sponsorship for his network provided little room for reaching an agreement with the US or other governments who could support it. In addition, Developing Democracy was published in 1972, during the Nixon administration, which had staked the prevention of revolution on the support of authoritarian regimes, not on democratisation of any type. There also seems to have been little immediate interest from private forces or factions of the foreign policy elite, possibly because Douglas had couched his recommendations in purely developmental and strategic terms, rather than using democracy promotion as an ideological rallying cry. The project would have to wait for the issue of how democracy related to US national security interests in the Third World to rise in importance, and for the organisational question of how democratising reforms could be implemented and by whom to progress.
Human Rights and democracy promotion

The rise of Human Rights as a new foreign policy approach in the latter half of the 1970s re-legitimised US intervention in political structures overseas by placing it once again in a moral context. This new approach rose in the context of strategic and organisational disarray in US policy towards the Third World. From 1974-79, 13 Third World states fell to radical forces or substantially radicalised their governments from 1974-79. These included Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South-east Asia and the Portuguese colonies in Africa, which fell to indigenous Marxist movements, the downfall of the monarchy in Ethiopia, the radicalisation of African states such as Benin and Madagascar, and the fall of pro-US regimes in Iran and Nicaragua at the end of the decade. This new wave of instability indicated the need for US intervention, but such intervention was difficult to engineer through the usual paradigms and tactics due to the eclipse of Modernisation Theory and the restrictions placed on the CIA in the wake of the Church Committee’s investigations into the agency’s covert actions, which placed sharp limits on covert paramilitary intervention and further eroded US organisational capacity to act overseas. This disenchantment with previous modes of intervention provided a more congenial political atmosphere for projects linked to the reform of foreign political structures, whether couched in terms of Human Rights or democracy promotion. It was the failure of the Carter administration to generate a coherent strategy and an effective organisational framework for the promotion of Human Rights which created a further space.

78 Saull, The Cold War and After, 139.
80 By 1974 revelations regarding covert action in Chile which meshed poorly with the democratic rhetoric habitually used by the government had culminated in the passing of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which stipulated that Congress be informed of covert actions abroad “in a timely fashion”. This piece of legislation did not ban covert political operations, but it did mean that around 60 Congressmen, Senators and staffers needed to be informed of them. Due to the wider diffusion of knowledge of these operations mandated by Hughes-Ryan, there was no guarantee they could be kept secret and plausible deniability preserved. See Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation, (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 258-261, quote from 261.
for private forces interested in democracy promotion to move into by creating an independent
democracy promotion organisation.

The disenchantment with previous modes of political intervention overseas was the
product of a cultural/ideological shift in US society which also generated a new conceptual
framework for the legitimation of US intervention in other societies – Human Rights. While
the Carter administration embraced Human Rights, commitment to it in sectors of the elite
pre-dated his election and was never limited to the administration. The turn towards Human
Rights occurred from 1973-8 and was spurred by a backlash against the Vietnam War and the
amoral policies of the Nixon administration. The number of private groups involved in
Human Rights grew to 200 by the end of the decade, while prestigious institutions such as the
Ford Foundation began funding human rights work in 1973. Congress also became interested,
holding hearings on the area in 1973 and passing legislation in 1975 and 1976 which made it
possible to halt US economic assistance to countries which violated Human Rights.81 This,
together with the signing of the Helsinki Accords, which mandated Soviet compliance with
basic Human Rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe,82 placed the issue on the foreign policy
agenda.

The Carter administration engaged with this shift and embraced the issue for a number
of pragmatic political reasons. Human Rights was expected to provide domestic political
benefits by unifying liberal Democrats concerned with abuses in anti-communist authoritarian
states in the Third world and Cold Warriors who wanted to use Human Rights to criticise the

81 Summary drawn from Kenneth Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States,” The
Soviet Union around a foreign policy concept which was universal enough to include criticism of both types of regime. The concept of Human Rights was also expected to provide benefits beyond domestic consensus-building, however. It was hoped that pressure on Communist regimes to observe Human Rights would promote the growth of more open societies. The inclusion of Human Rights in Basket III of the Helsinki Accords, signed by the Soviet Union in 1975, gave the United States a legal mechanism to pressure the Soviet Union to undertake gradual internal reforms which would open up its society. The creation of a new US joint Executive-Legislative body, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, headed by Democratic Congressman Dante Fascell, under the Ford administration had put organisational machinery in place to pursue this goal.

In the Third World, it was hoped that pressuring dictators to reduce Human Rights violations would remove popular incentives to join revolutionary movements and thus increase stability. The policy would be carried on a government-to-government basis, as modernising reforms had been, but by denying US military and economic aid to regimes which abused Human Rights rather than investing in socioeconomic transformation. It would thus perform a similar function to Modernisation by instituting pre-emptive reforms which

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86 See James Earl Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Fayetteville, Arkansas: University of Arkansas Press, 1982), 143; Anonymous, “Presidential Review Memorandum 28: Human Rights”, Jimmy Carter Library, 8th July 1977, accessed 20th March 2009, http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives, 78. Further support for the idea of Human Rights as a strategy of pre-emptive reform to head off violent revolution comes from Carter administration officials such as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and UN ambassador Andrew Young. Vance stated that “Change was and is sweeping through Africa and those who identify with it will be able to influence its direction.” Young argued that, “Either we provide respect for Human Rights through democratic means, or we see the world disintegrate through violent means.” Possibly the most succinct statement of this aspect of the policy comes from the reply of an administration spokesmen to concerns raised by a Paraguayan citizen that the policy could destabilise established governments: “we believe that a policy of promoting a wide range of Human Rights can help a government achieve a broader base of popular support and this can serve to enhance, rather than detract, from the stability of that government.” All quotes from Dumbrell, 192-3.
could defuse revolutionary movements. However, the Carter administration resolved the trade-off between supporting authoritarians to block revolution or supporting democratising reforms by pressuring authoritarians to reform their worst practices rather than by seeking to alter political systems. PRM-28, the administration’s principal study of Human Rights policy stated that “we do not seek to change governments or remake societies.”

The key weakness of the administration’s Human Rights policy was its failure to produce a clear strategic framework which reconciled the promotion of Human Rights with competing US interests such as economics and security. The tensions between Human Rights and security interests which resulted from the absence of their co-ordination at the strategic level was also replicated at the organisational level within the national security bureaucracy, as the administration’s decision to take a case-by-case process to the implementation of the policy produced bureaucratic turf wars. The split between Human Rights and other imperatives was institutionalised at the bureaucratic level in the vesting of responsibility for the Human Rights policy in distinct bodies such as the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights, headed by Patricia Derian, and the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, headed by Warren Christopher, which was to review military, security and economic assistance in light of Human Rights considerations. This resulted in the Departments of Commerce, Treasury and the State Department’s Bureau for Security

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87 PRM-28, 4. It is possible that a number of Carter’s policy-makers, such as Cyrus Vance, equated Human Rights with the promotion of democracy and expected the promotion of Human Rights to result eventually in the creation of democratic governments. For this argument see Martha L. Cottam, “The Carter Administration’s Policy towards Nicaragua: Images, Goals and Tactics,” Political Science Quarterly 107, no. 1 (1992): 135-6. However, this remained an indirect way of promoting democracy and meant that the administration’s strategy did not involve remaking foreign political structures directly.

Assistance successfully lobbying to have programs within their purview removed from the Interagency Group,\(^{89}\) thus protecting their own bureaucratic turf.

The Bureau of Human Rights also found itself locked in bureaucratic battles against the State Departments regional bureaux. These conflicts arose because as a functional bureau, the Bureau of Human Rights did not often consider its policy recommendations in the light of competing security concerns, whereas the regional bureaux did. It is no accident that the most bitter clashes occurred with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, which oversaw policy towards regimes such as the Philippines, which abused Human Rights but were critical to the US strategic position in the Pacific.\(^{90}\) Thus, the effect of proceeding on a case-by-case basis was bureaucratic struggle which resulted in authoritarian regimes important to US security such as the Philippines, China, Pakistan and a host of others being provided with aid.\(^{91}\)

It is possible that the administration could have implemented more positive initiatives through developing a state-private network, which would have had more flexibility to act in support of Human Rights through non-governmental channels, even in the absence of a coherent overarching framework. However, while he gave consistent support to the US division of Helsinki Watch, formed by US private citizens with government encouragement to liaise with Human Rights campaigners in the Soviet bloc,\(^{92}\) Carter did not give his support to a proposal for an independent but government-sponsored Human Rights foundation supported


\(^{92}\) Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*, 116; 122-126.
by Democratic Congressmen such as Dante Fascell and Donald Fraser, and by the NSC.\textsuperscript{93} Instead, Congressmen and aides supportive of Human Rights moved to fill the organisational gap in the administration’s implementation machinery. As a result, they created the bipartisan political party committee that William Douglas had called for to co-ordinate US private democracy promotion projects in 1972. They also moved beyond the administration’s goal of ensuring respect for Human Rights to focus on promoting democracy.

The idea for the creation of this committee did not derive from Douglas’ work, but from observation of a real case of political foundations working to contain a revolutionary upheaval and create a democratic government. After the 1974 collapse of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship in Portugal, the homeland did not suffer the radical takeovers which had affected its colonies, even though in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the dictatorship the Portuguese Communists had seemed to be the best-organised political force. Instead, Western European Social Democratic parties channelled funding political training to the Portuguese Socialist Party, which then inflicted a decisive electoral defeat on the Communists.\textsuperscript{94}

The Portuguese crisis\textsuperscript{95} provided an example of an instrumentality which could mobilise political parties to combat the spread of Communism, thus filling the organisational gap created by the collapse of the state-private network and the restriction of the CIA’s covert action capability. Most of the aid passed to non-Communist Portuguese political parties was


\textsuperscript{95}Although Spain was also undergoing a democratic transition from an authoritarian regime in the 1970s it does not seem to have served as an inspiration for the democracy promoters and is almost never cited by them as a model. This seems to be due to the key difference between the Spanish and Portuguese transitions; in Spain the former oligarchy remained in control of the transition and there was no threat of a violent takeover from the Eurocommunist PCE, whereas in Portugal the authoritarian regime disintegrated, leaving the Portuguese Communists as one of the most influential political groups.
donated, and all of it co-ordinated, by the West German Party Foundations.¹⁰⁶ These four non-governmental political foundations were each connected to one of the four major German political parties and although they received funding from the West German government for their foreign activities, the foundations were legally independent from it.¹⁰⁷ All four foundations were active worldwide, providing a new model for political intervention which superseded both military intervention and covert action. US political leaders could not fail to be interested in developing such a useful instrument for their own use and thus making good the organisational gap in US capabilities created by the eclipse of the CIA’s capability to intervene politically abroad.¹⁰⁸

The movement to create a similar US organisation was first pressed by liberal Democrats interested in promoting the idea of Human Rights. In February 1977 Democratic Congressman Donald Fraser proposed creating an International Department for the Democratic Party to contact other democratic parties and party internationals.¹⁰⁹ Fraser, a liberal from Minneapolis, had served in Congress from 1962 and had been intensely concerned with Human Rights and democratic development during his political career. In 1966 he had proposed the Title IX Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which called

¹⁰⁶ It is unknown whether the CIA played any part in channelling funds to anti-communist forces in Portugal. According to Szulc, such transfers were rumoured at the time, however, it is difficult to see how the CIA could have transferred funds to Portuguese politicians in a plausibly deniable manner unless they made use of the West German Foundations or other Western parties involved in the effort, and this has always been denied. The question remains open. See Tad Szulc “Lisbon and Washington: Behind the Portuguese Revolution” Foreign Policy 62, no. 3 (1975): 10, for the arguments for and against this intriguing possibility. See Pinto-Duschinsky, “Foreign Political Aid”: 55-6 for the role of the West German Party Foundations and possible CIA role.
¹⁰⁷ See Pinto-Duschinsky: 33-34.
¹⁰⁸ Former International Organizations Division chief Cord Meyer was also impressed, while doubtful whether the US would be able to develop such a capability, writing in 1980 that “Whether our political parties have sufficient ideological coherence and organizational discipline to conduct a similar effort is doubtful, but at least the possibilities are worth serious exploration in view of the size and urgency of the need.” Quoted from Meyer, Facing Reality, 108.
¹⁰⁹ Donald M. Fraser, A Proposal that the Democratic National Committee employ at least one staff member assigned to follow and work with political movements abroad, 1977, Folder 6: Reports and Proposals, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, Library of Congress.
for AID to provide assistance to democratic civil society organisations in the Third World. As Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organisations he had also held the first Congressional hearings on Human Rights in 1973, which did much to raise the profile of the issue as a legitimate foreign policy consideration for the US.

Fraser was intrigued by the example the West German party foundations offered of how private groups could wield political influence over foreign political actors. The practical effect of the aid and political training dispensed to ideologically acceptable recipients in the Third World by each foundation was the spread of the ideology of the West German parties to political movements in the developing world and to strengthen the influence of the West German government overseas. Fraser was influenced by the argument that US party foundations could replace the declining CIA s conduits of US political influence and proposed that one staff member of the DNC be given responsibility for international contacts and to promote Democratic Party attendance at party international meetings and co-operation with international political movements to fill this organisational gap. The International Department would be a private instrument of political influence which would be under the control of the parties, rather than the national security bureaucracy.

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100 See Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Political Science*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 99-109 for information on Fraser and Title IX. It is unclear whether funding for foreign political groups, as opposed to merely economic groups trade unions or co-operatives, was permissible under Title IX. AID chose to implement the amendment in its most narrow, economic sense. See Packenham, *Liberal America*, 104.
103 See Donald M. Fraser, “A Proposal”. 
104 See Donald M. Fraser, “A Proposal”. 

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The project was pushed forward by a Democratic Party colleague of Fraser’s, George Agree, a former Congressional aide to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who also concurred that transnational party networks could replace previous covert methods of political influence. However, there was a crucial ideological difference in the visions of the two men. Fraser had kept his proposal within the Carter administration’s foreign policy framework by proposing that the new International Department should work in support of the Carter administration’s Human Rights policy; however, Agree went beyond the administration policy by stating that transnational party contacts could also help to defend democracy and to construct it in non-democratic states. Agree clearly aimed at deeper reform of foreign political systems than the Carter administration contemplated.

However, before the question of conformity with state goals arose, a functioning foreign outreach organisation for the parties had to be created. There were two main obstacles to US parties participating in transnational political networks on the same terms as European parties. Firstly, the two US parties were much more ideologically diverse, making it more difficult for them to take a consistent line on policy questions than parties who identified themselves as proponents of one political ideology. The second obstacle to creating International Departments for the US parties was financial. Agree calculated that the annual cost of one full-time international officer would be $100,000, a significant amount of money for a party organisation with a budget in the low millions, much of which had to be earmarked

105 George Agree, “Proposal for a pilot study of international cooperation between democratic political parties,” 9th May 1977, Box 1, Folder 6: Reports and Proposals, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
106 Fraser, “A Proposal”.
107 Agree, “Proposal for a pilot study”.
108 See George Agree “This is a plan, consistent with political realities, for the major American parties to establish a joint tax-deductible institute for communication with foreign parties”, 1977, Box 1, Folder 6: Reports and Proposals, George E. Agree Papers, LOC, for this argument.
for fund-raising efforts. Clearly organisational changes and a massive injection of finance would be required to equip the parties as channels of political and ideological influence.

Agree’s solution was to work for the creation of a bipartisan institute staffed by Democrats and Republicans. Such a structure would subsume the factionalism within each party within the bipartisan institute, with the benefit that, as both parties were so broad ideologically, it was unlikely that one would be able to do something unacceptable to the other in international affairs. The goal of promoting democracy would act as ideological and organisational glue, subsuming factional differences within and between the parties in a more inclusive concept. Although the institute was based on the institutional model of the West German Foundations the different nature of the US political parties indicated that one bipartisan institute would be more effective than the model of separate partisan institutes favoured by the West Germans.

The institute would carry out the aims outlined by Fraser, as well, as collecting information on foreign parties and their methods of organisation. The project came together over the course of 1978 and the first half of 1979. Agree secured the agreement of the RNC Chairman, William Brock, and that of the DNC chairmen during this period, first Daniel Horgan and then Charles Manatt. The new bipartisan institute, the American Political Foundation, held its first board meeting on July 18th 1979 and its existence was announced to the press in early November. The Wall Street Journal was hopeful that the APF would be able to have an impact on the perceived global turn towards dictatorship and on US foreign

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109 Ibid. 2.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid. 4-5.
112 APF “Minutes of Organization meeting of Board of Directors of the American Political Foundation”, 18th July 1979, Folder 3: APF Minutes, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
policy, arguing that although over the previous 25 years regimes hostile to democracy had proliferated, “the other day we heard about a new organization, the American Political
Foundation, whose birth gives us hope that at least someone out there knows what’s wrong
and is trying to help us recover our bearings.”

However, the financial problem remained unresolved. Although Agree applied to the
German Marshall Fund for $100,000 in seed money for the APF in September 1979, this
did not materialise due to the fund’s perception of the general weakness of the US party
organisations. Given that, at the first board meeting, an annual budget of $220,000 was
called for in the organisation’s early set-up stage alone, this left a substantial financial
deficit. Agree remained optimistic about securing funding from US businesses and
foundations from 1979-1981; however, although a small number of corporations donated low
four-figure amounts, securing a stable source of funding was a perennial problem and the
organisation was often indebted to its directors for loans they had made towards operating
expenses, and staff members for unpaid salaries.

These funding difficulties were also a consequence of the APF’s poor links with the
Executive, as the APF did not receive any funding from the NSC or the White House despite

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115 George Agree, Letter to Mr Robert Gerald Livingston, President, The German Marshall Fund of the United
States, 17th September 1979, George E. Agree Papers, Folder 1: APF Correspondence, Box 1, LOC.
116 Robert Gerald Livingston, Letter to Dr. Henning Wegener, 8th August 1980, Box 1, Folder 1: APF
Correspondence, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
117 APF, Minutes of Organization meeting of Board of Directors of the American Political Foundation, 18th July
1979, Box1, Folder 3: APF Minutes, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
118 Difficulties with securing funding were mentioned in the minutes of organisation’s annual board meetings in
Foundation”, 19th March 1980, Folder 3: APF Minutes, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC and APF,
Minutes of 1981 Annual Meeting, Board of Directors of American Political Foundation, 7th July 1981, Folder 3:
APF Minutes, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC, For the APF’s accounts for 1981, including corporate
donations and money owed to Directors and staff, see APF Financial Report, attached to Minutes of 1981
Annual Meeting, Board of Directors of American political Foundation.
initial interest from Samuel Huntington, then working as an NSC staff member.\textsuperscript{119} The organisation did receive $74,632 from USICA to carry out exchanges with Western European parties in 1980;\textsuperscript{120} however, there is no evidence that the APF was any more or less important than other private groups which received project money from USICA for their activities. The capabilities of the nascent private network were limited to small-scale programs because the split between private elites interested in democracy promotion and the state remained. The organisation was also hampered by the lack of a clear strategy which meshed its aim with a tangible national security goal: while Agree wished to promote democracy and felt that in the long-term this would be positive for the US and the world, he did not lay out a coherent plan for doing so or a list of target countries where operations could have an impact on these goals. In this, the APF and the Carter administration were much alike.

**Democracy promotion and national security strategy**

A further intervention from outside the Executive re-stated and narrowed the strategic focus of the emerging paradigm of democracy promotion, spurred by the failure of the Carter administration’s Human Rights campaign to prevent revolution in Third World states allied to the US. The Carter administration’s strategic failure was most evident in Iran and in Nicaragua,\textsuperscript{121} where the replacement of the Somoza dictatorship by the Sandinistas in July 1979 led to the creation of the first Marxist-Leninist government on the mainland of the Americas. The collapse of the Somoza dictatorship had implications for US foreign policy which extended beyond Nicaragua, as the downfall of the regime represented an episode in a

\begin{notes}
\item[119] George Agree, Letter to Dr Samuel P. Huntington, 3\textsuperscript{rd} February 1978, Folder 1: APF Correspondence, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
\item[120] See “APF Financial Report”.
\item[121] Dumbrell argues for drawing a distinction between the impact of the Human Right policy on these two countries, arguing that in Nicaragua the Human Rights policy was a reality and that Carter did take steps against Somoza because of it, whereas in Iran the policy was more rhetorical, with the administration accepting the Shah’s assurances that liberalisation was proceeding without any verification. See Dumbrell, *The Carter Presidency*, 173.
\end{notes}
wave of Third World revolutions which had begun in 1974. By 1979, 11 Third World governments had fallen to radical forces,\textsuperscript{122} and there was no guarantee that this current wave of revolutionary activity was petering out. The fall of Nicaragua thus re-opened the strategic question of whether US security could be better guarded through the implementation of reforms in order to defuse revolutions or heightened support for friendly authoritarians. The Nicaraguan case thus set the terms of the debate over the applicability of democracy promotion to authoritarian regimes allied to the United States in the Reagan administration and produced contending arguments which still appear in US democracy promotion at the time of writing. The conservative and neoconservative response to these events will be discussed in the following chapter. The crisis spurred the evolution of democracy promotion by pointing to the existence of a strategic problem which could be filled by the creation of a new state-private network devoted to party-building.

Initially, Carter had tried to pressure the Somoza dictatorship to improve its Human Rights performance through vetoing loans and arms transfers. This began five days after Carter acceded to the Presidency, when he revoked export licences to Nicaragua for rifles and ammunition; this was perceived by the Somoza regime as a signal of the administration’s intentions.\textsuperscript{123} When Somoza proved uncooperative the administration attempted to ease him out of power in favour of a government composed of middle-class liberals, fearing that “the longer Somoza stayed in power, the higher the chances were of a radical takeover”.\textsuperscript{124} It was planned that a transfer of power to the FAO, the liberal opposition organisation, would result in the preservation of the National Guard and the creation of a non-revolutionary government

\textsuperscript{123} Robert A. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition: the United States and Nicaragua, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 2002), 44.
of national unity, which would head off the approaching Sandinista victory. The liberals proved to be ineffective at carrying out these tasks due to their political and organisational weakness and the Marxist takeover proceeded. The US-supported dictatorship had proven to be unstable over the long-term; but pro-US forces had proven incapable of taking power when it collapsed.

In February 1980 George Agree, as President of the APF, received a proposal, “A Comprehensive Policy Response to Expanding US Interests in the Third World”, aimed at solving this problem. Its author was Michael Samuels, a former State Department political appointee and a current Director of the Centre for Strategic International Studies. Samuels would become one of the prime movers behind the rise of democracy promotion, and his appearance in its history represents the beginning of a link between the academics and organisers who had pushed the concept up to this point and the policy-makers whose support was required for the idea to become a reality. Samuels’ range of experience clearly informed his analysis of the problem: while at the State Department he had dealt with relations between the Executive and Congress over Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, formerly funded covertly through the state-private network and then overtly since the exposure of this relationship in 1971. He had also been part of a team sent to Portugal to assess the political situation after the collapse of the Caetano dictatorship in 1974.

125 See Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 82-99 for an account of this strategy, which was tied up with the mediation which the administration offered between Somoza and the Nicaraguan liberals. See also Morris H. Morley, Washington, Somoza and the Sandinistas: State and Regime in US Policy Towards Nicaragua 1969-1981 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), 174-181. In general Pastor provides the view from the NSC, while Morley’s account is more critical.
127 See ibid, 14, 16-17.
Samuels offered a solution to the trade-off between current support of authoritarian regimes and the promotion of democratising reforms in the interest of long-term stability by arguing for the pre-emptive creation of democratic movements in dictatorships vulnerable to instability. Rather than pressuring dictatorships to reform in order to ward off revolution and then expecting a weak and unorganised liberal movement to take power in order to head off a revolutionary victory when the regime fell, as Carter had done in Nicaragua, the US should begin organising democratic movements in vulnerable dictatorships immediately, in order to prepare for regime collapse. Samuels made this point by contrasting the success of transnational party work in Portugal with the failure of the Human Rights policy in Nicaragua and Iran in terms of US national security. He argued that in the aftermath of the fall of an authoritarian dictatorship, elements “committed to political dictatorship, monolithic politics and monolithic economies” could assume power. These elements, such as Nicaragua’s “Sandinista guerrillas” and Iran’s “non-democratic, obscurantist religious forces”, posed a danger to US foreign policy interests. However,

In Portugal, after the collapse of the Salazar-Caetano regime, democratic pluralistic elements emerged victorious, and Portugal retains at this time good relations with the United States.

It was clear that the mechanism used in Portugal was far superior to the US’ poorly thought-out eleventh hour efforts elsewhere. This success showed that the establishment of democratic

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129 Ibid, 1.
130 Ibid.
movements in unstable dictatorships would serve US interests by creating political forces which could take power in the event of a political collapse.\textsuperscript{131}

This new policy goal called for the creation of a new instrumentality to fill the organisational gap caused by the decline of the state-private network and the CIA. The solution was the creation of an overt “American Political Development Foundation”, “an autonomous, quasi-private, but government funded, foundation” to fill the gap caused by the fact that “[a]t present the US has insufficient foreign policy machinery for promoting the development of democratic-pluralist forces abroad, despite the national security need for such a capability.”\textsuperscript{132} A quasi-private institution would be more effective than a state agency in carrying out this task as it would be more credible in the Third World and avoid the “political contamination” of direct contact with the US government which could lead to the rejection of such a program “in many Third World contexts.”\textsuperscript{133}

Samuels’ conception of how democracy promotion was to be deployed and organised was clearly focussed on US needs rather than the needs of democracy or of Third World populations. In contrast to Douglas, Samuels’ argument did not refer to any benefits for Third World populations from democracy promotion and he advanced no concept similar to Douglas’ “regimented democracy”, which described a type of democracy specifically tailored for the economic development needs of Third World states. Furthermore, Samuels’ version of democracy promotion would focus on countries where the US had the greatest strategic interest, not those where democratic movements were most needed or had the greatest chance of succeeding. The democratic movements supported would be boosted only when a friendly dictatorship seemed about to lose power to anti-US revolutionary movements. Until such a

\textsuperscript{131} Michael A Samuels, “Project Proposal,” 1.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
crisis emerged, the US would be best served by maintaining its relations with dictators. In addition, in contrast to Douglas’ proposed multilateral party league, Samuels’ organisation was limited to American parties acting in American interests. For Samuels, democracy promotion was not an ideological end-goal; rather, it was a vehicle for the attainment of existing US national security interests in the Third World.

Organisationally, it is clear why Samuels had contacted Agree: his policy of maintaining simultaneous relations with pro-US dictators and democratic movements opposed to them required the plausible deniability and credibility which only a private group could provide, and as President of the American Political Foundation, Agree was in charge of the day-to-day management of such a group. However, a re-configured APF would not have sufficient resources to implement the new strategy. Samuels solved the question of access to financial support which had bedevilled private democracy promotion up to this point by pragmatically admitting the need for large-scale government funding.

Samuels’ proposal created the conditions for the forging of a state-private network on the private side of the equation by positing a program of action in support of a national security goal which could only be achieved by private groups provided with government funding. However, in order to procure the funding they required, it would be necessary to generate a new foreign policy consensus among state elites which equated democracy with US national security and legitimated political intervention abroad as the promotion of democracy and tie this to his proposal. In addition, generating a consensus within the Executive was not enough, as the creation of an overt organisation, as opposed to a covert structure, would need to be agreed by Congress in order to secure appropriations. To create this consensus, Samuels proposed launching a propaganda effort to counter the “tremendous residual reluctance to think about active American contributions to the evolution of various
political cultures around the world”\textsuperscript{134}, that is, the reduced willingness of the US to intervene in the political structures of other countries. To achieve this, Samuels recommended launching a study on how a political development foundation could be created, targeted at legislators and members of the executive connected with Third World affairs.\textsuperscript{135}

Agree’s initial response highlights the differences which existed between Samuels and himself in their conception of democracy promotion. Whereas Samuels’ proposal was geared towards convincing the US government to finance democracy promotion as a national security strategy, Agree continued to see the project as a purely private initiative and suggested “a real search for workable private sector alternatives”.\textsuperscript{136} However, he did agree to attend a follow-up meeting on the topic on February 25th.\textsuperscript{137} After this the APF as a whole seems to have supported Samuels’ strategy; possibly because it promised to provide a stable source of funding from the Executive and Congress.

The APF’s interest in Samuels’ proposal marked its transition from a purely private exchange agency into an organisation lobbying the Executive to support a policy of democracy promotion. Samuels and the APF leaders soon began an effort to convince the policy-making elite of the value of democracy promotion. In 1980 and 1981, “leaders of the APF and various academicians organized a series of intensive discussions on the idea of a new U.S. democratic assistance program.”\textsuperscript{138}

The organisational and tactical elements of democracy promotion were a reformulation of paradigms of political intervention which had been deployed by the US

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} See George Agree, “Letter to Mr Michael A. Samuels”, 15\textsuperscript{th} February 1980, Box 1, Folder 1: APF Correspondence, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
\textsuperscript{137} See ibid.
before the crisis of 1967-1975. However, it differed from these paradigms, and the recent Human Rights campaign, in several crucial ways. Unlike previous CIA operations the new state-private network envisaged was to function overtly, and so would not be vulnerable to the loss of credibility which had attended the exposure of covert relationships between the state, US private groups, and private forces in other countries which had occurred during and after the 1967 crisis. Democracy promotion’s focus on the narrowly political motors of reform replaced Modernisation Theory’s more diffuse concept, while in terms of end-goal, the concept went beyond Human Rights’ tactic of pressuring sitting governments to rein in the most objectionable features of their rule in order to defuse dissent.

Most crucially, whereas these elements had previously been deployed on a case-by-case basis, the blueprint for democracy promotion developed over the 1970s provided a strategic approach to the problem of reconciling democracy and national security. The democracy promoters’ argument that Marxist or revolutionary movements could be best contained through the creation of democratic governments provided a method of pursuing a consistent policy towards political reform in the Third World and bringing the ideological and geopolitical bases of containment into conformity. The switch from a government-to-government modernising project to party-building meant that authoritarian governments which were not open to reform could be bypassed, while the delivery of political assistance through a private organisation would be more credible to foreign democrats than government aid. Thus, democracy promotion offered a method of pursuing political reform which need not cut across US national security goals and could be operationalised without giving rise to accusations of neo-colonialism by Third World elites.

The development of democracy promotion was a product of the discrediting of previous modes of political intervention in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The failures of the
state in strategy and organisation, together with the perception of growing instability in the
Third World, had spurred further private initiatives connected to democracy promotion in
order to fill a space left by the state’s incapacity. However, by 1980 democracy promotion
had been developed as far as possible by private figures. The recognition that democracy
promotion required financial resources that only the state could provide, together with the
shift in the conception of the project from Douglas’ multilateral effort to Samuels’ more
unilateral project, opened up the possibility of a state-private accommodation which could
lead to the creation of a new, overt state-private network dedicated to democratisation.

Samuels later argued that “[w]ith the advent of the Reagan administration, the time
seemed propitious to launch a fresh effort in the field of political development.”139 While
Reagan was more ideologically committed to an identification of the US with the cause of
democracy than previous administrations, he was also far more committed to confrontation
with the Soviet Union, something the democracy promoters had not yet factored into their
blueprint, and to support for the US’ authoritarian allies. Thus, it was possible that the private
effort to re-engage the state which began in 1980 and continued under Reagan could result in
the replication of the strategic and organisational tensions which had been a structural feature
of US attempts to deploy democracy in the service of national security before the 1967 crisis.
The question of how much autonomy the new administration would be willing to grant a
privately-controlled but state-funded organisation whose long-term strategy might clash with
its own national security priorities would need to be resolved.

Washington Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1986): 164.
CHAPTER TWO

DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

IN THE EARLY REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: NO GRAND DESIGN

The advent of the Reagan administration provided an opportunity for the private democracy promotion network which had begun to take shape in 1980 to present its ideas to a new group of policy-makers. The ideological basis of the new administration was a tough anti-communism which painted the Cold War as a struggle between American Democracy and Soviet Totalitarianism, rather than Nixonian realpolitik or the Carter administration’s cautious stance of attempting to foster Human Rights without fundamentally altering foreign political systems. However, this rhetoric did not translate into a universal program of democratisation. Far from building on Carter’s Human Rights policy, the Reagan administration abandoned it on the basis that it had been harmful to US national security interests by weakening friendly and strategically important dictatorships. Initially, there was little connection between the administration’s rhetoric exalting American democracy and a coherent foreign policy design.

This lack of interconnection between democracy and grand strategy occurred for two reasons. Firstly, the Reagan administration did not possess a coherent grand strategy to which a coherent strategy of democratisation could be attached. Instead, it was divided into different factions advocating foreign policies targeted on different objectives. A strategy of confronting the Soviet Union by pressing economic, ideological and political warfare measures directly against the Soviet bloc in order to weaken Soviet power internally was championed by a hard-line “Reaganite” group, which contained many key officials such as NSA Richard Allen, Reagan’s newly-appointed Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey, Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger. This group’s proposals often appealed to President Reagan’s more hard-line and ideological instincts. In contrast, a more pragmatic
group located mainly in the State Department wanted to concentrate primarily on building up
the strength of the “Free World”, including the allied dictatorships the democracy promoters
were interested in reforming, to enable it to resist perceived Soviet pressure and to strengthen
containment. In their view, the United States should concentrate on strengthening allied
governments its own zone, especially those facing Marxist insurgencies, rather than
attempting to weaken the Soviet zone. These separate tendencies were often able to agree on
policies aimed at strengthening the US and its NATO allies, and on combatting further Soviet
advances in the Third World, goals which both shared. However, disagreements often arose
when policies aimed at more direct confrontation with the USSR were advanced. The fact that
policy-makers were unable to synthesise these competing end-goals or make a definitive
decision between them blocked the construction of a coherent foreign policy.

Secondly, the administration had no blueprint explaining how democratisation could
be compatible with US national security interests. This meant that democratic ideology and
democratisation were attached to existing geopolitical problems on a case-by-case basis as a
tool of legitimation or ideological warfare. In cases where there was general agreement on the
geopolitical goals to be pursued within the administration and the deployment of democracy
was limited to a propaganda function which did not aim at transforming political structures
overseas, there were few problems. However, in cases where policy options went beyond this
to take in political action on the ground, the administration and its different factions were
faced with ideological, strategic and organisational tensions which often acted as a brake on
the implementation of concrete policies.

The effects of these tensions on administration policy towards El Salvador impelled
one group of officials to propose a change of course in US foreign policy towards promoting
democracy to achieve national security objectives. This development opened up the
possibility that lobbying by the private democracy promoters could extend the policy beyond the specific case of El Salvador to include acceptance of a wider campaign of democratisation by the administration.

**National Security and Democratic Propaganda in Western Europe**

US policy towards Western Europe was based on the achievement of US geopolitical aims through a public diplomacy campaign which became increasingly focussed on the projection of democratic ideology in opposition to Soviet Communism over the course of 1981. The administration experienced few problems in this case because both factions agreed on the geopolitical goal of this tactic, there was no tension between the projection of democratic ideology and the achievement of US national security aims, and the fact that Western Europe was already democratic meant that there was no need to carry out political operations on the ground.

Strategic consensus over US policy towards Western Europe was possible as it was organised around a geopolitical goal which both factions in the administration prioritised; the renovation of US hegemony over the region. Throughout the Cold War the strategic denial of Soviet access to the industrialised economies of Western Europe had been of key importance to prevent their integration into a Soviet-led Eurasian bloc which would have the military and industrial resources to successfully challenge US global hegemony.¹ This calculation was still current in the early 1980s and had been rearticulated several years before Reagan’s inauguration by the Committee on the Present Danger, a private organisation consisting of conservative and neoconservative former policy-makers, intellectuals and labour leaders which had argued for tougher anti-Soviet policies under the Nixon and Carter

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administrations. The CPD had argued that a key Soviet priority was “the severance of ties between the United States and its allies, primarily in Western Europe”, via “an enormous build-up on the European frontier which has the psychological effect of intimidating European public opinion” could “bring Europe to its knees without any shots necessarily being fired”. According to a CPD analysis,

The centrepiece of the Soviet strategic view of world politics has always been that if Russia could control Western Europe and bring it under its dominion…that it would thereby control the world.

The Committee’s philosophy was extremely influential in the early Reagan administration, with many officials having been former members, including the President himself.

The administration saw the Soviet replacement of their SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate range nuclear missiles targeted on Western Europe with more potent SS-20s as an intimidating military build-up which would alter the balance of power in Europe in favour of the Soviet Union and facilitate Soviet diplomatic pressure on the US’ NATO allies. The Carter administration had tried to remedy the perceived imbalance in European Theatre Nuclear Forces by sending new Cruise and Pershing II missiles to bases in Western Europe. The decision had been made more palatable to European public opinion by casting it as two-

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2 Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment* (Boston, MA: South End Press, Boston, 1983), is the most useful source for the Committee and its positions.


5 Although Reagan had not attended the Committee’s meetings he had received regular briefings from members and used its papers and ideas as the basis of some of his radio broadcasts. See Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War* (New York: Random House, 1982), 40. The roster of CPD members in the administration also included DCl William J. Casey; NSA Richard Allen; NSC Director of Soviet and Eastern European Affairs Richard Pipes; The Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow; SALT negotiator General Edward Rowey; and Theatre Nuclear Forces negotiator Paul H. Nitze. Although Caspar Weinberger had not been a member of the CFD, he was broadly in sympathy with its viewpoint and ideas and many of his subordinates had been members, such as Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, Undersecretary of Defence Fred Ikle and his deputy, Richard Stilwell. Scheer, 39.
track process; NATO would simultaneously prepare to deploy the missiles while seeking negotiations with the Soviets to reduce the nuclear weapons deployed by both sides.\textsuperscript{6} However, substantial sections of Western European public opinion were opposed to the US deployment, fearing that the US and the USSR might engage in a limited nuclear exchange which would devastate Europe but leave the American and Soviet homelands untouched.\textsuperscript{7}

This fear was aggravated by hard-line anti-communist statements from Reaganite officials in the administration in early 1981, including the President himself. In an interview published in the French newspaper Le Figaro in February 1981 Reagan stated that he would not hesitate to use US nuclear weapons in Europe.\textsuperscript{8} The President’s much-publicised opposition to arms control negotiations also indicated that one of the two tracks of policy was in danger of disappearing.\textsuperscript{9} This fear was compounded by a speech given by the administration’s National Security Advisor, Richard Allen, in March 1981, in which he criticised European softness on Communism and opposition to the Cruise and Pershing missiles, attributing “Better Red than Dead” sentiments to European publics.\textsuperscript{10}

These publics reacted to the intensification of the war of words over Theatre Nuclear Forces deployments by demonstrating against the deployments; in April 15,000 people participated in an anti-nuclear demonstration in Bonn; by October/November the numbers had swelled to 250,000 in Bonn, 150,000 in London and 200,000 in Florence.\textsuperscript{11} The public opposition was paralleled by a rebellion of European elites; in Holland government supporters

\textsuperscript{7} Sanders, \textit{Peddlers of Crisis}, 256. 
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, 324. 
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid. 
of the deployment were defeated and in Britain the Labour Party stated that it would be opposed to deployment if it regained power. In West Germany the ruling Social Democratic Party voted for a review of the deployment decision, and a USIA survey indicated that 60% of West Germans were opposed to Cruise and Pershing II deployments.\textsuperscript{12}

The immediate nuclear issue, however, was a symptom of a deeper strategic and ideological cleavage; while the US under the Reagan administration was moving inexorably towards a policy of confrontation with the USSR, the countries of Western Europe remained in a state of détente. This was mainly due to the substantial trade which some of these nations had developed with the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{13} The level of economic exchange was disquieting to the Reaganites, who were considering imposing new sanctions on trade and the transfer of advanced technologies to the USSR and tightening existing ones.\textsuperscript{14} The Western Europeans also showed themselves less enthusiastic at backing anti-communist foreign policy positions championed by the US; for example, the European reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had been much less intense than that of the US, even under President Carter.\textsuperscript{15}

Over the course of 1981 the Reagan administration generated to a solution to its geopolitical problems in Western Europe through the deployment of democratic ideology. A clear response to the narrow problem of Western European public opposition to US missile deployments was proposed in August by USIA’s Reaganite director, Charles Z. Wick: Project Truth, a propaganda campaign aimed at blackening the Soviets as ruthless militaristic totalitarians. Wick’s proposal attributed the demonstrations against the deployment of Theatre Nuclear Forces then taking place in Europe to Soviet exploitation of the naïveté of the

\textsuperscript{12} Sanders, 325.
\textsuperscript{13} See Kahler, 310-311.
\textsuperscript{14} See Ibid, 288-290.
\textsuperscript{15} Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 1029.
younger generation, and the actions of church groups and political organisations which had been influenced by Soviet propaganda or were controlled by Soviet agents. Underlying these demonstrations was a dangerous “crisis of democracy” in the West. According to Wick, the Soviet disinformation campaign which was to blame for this was reaching a pivotal stage and the US needed to intervene, as the loss of Western Europe would represent a “strategic Dunkirk”. After presenting the situation in such apocalyptic terms, it is perhaps no surprise that Wick received the green light for Project Truth at an NSC meeting on August 17th 1981.

Project Truth first focussed on explaining the threat posed by Soviet totalitarianism to Europeans by making use of sanitised, declassified material from the CIA and DOD and visual evidence of the Soviet military build-up targeted at Western Europe. The practical outcome of this was a plan for a series of bulletins, “Soviet Disinformation Alerts”, which would provide embassy and information personnel with information on the latest Soviet disinformation campaigns and the knowledge and arguments necessary to rebut them. The plan received full support from Secretary of State Haig, who ordered State Department personnel posted overseas to co-operate.

This focus on blackening the USSR may have been a necessary first step in preserving the NATO alliance; however, to manage the wider geopolitical and ideological stresses on the alliance, the administration invoked democratic ideology. A solution to the problem which focussed more on the positive selling of democratic ideology than anti-Sovietism had been

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17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, 4.
20 Wick, 11-12.
proposed by Alexander Haig’s State Department before the USIA took over overall guidance of US ideological campaigns with the Project Truth proposal. Following a meeting between Haig and West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher in the first half of 1981 the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs proposed a major propaganda campaign to involve co-operation with Britain, France and West Germany, as “[i]t’s critical that this not be a US-only effort”.  

The campaign proposed by the bureau went further than the initial blueprint for Project Truth, however, in that it was proposed that the campaign should not only “counter Soviet propaganda” but also “sell our own policies”. This idea was stressed again by Haig in a letter to the British Foreign Secretary at the end of August. Haig argued that “…to take the initiative we need to both educate and inspire. We must be candid about the Soviet threat, and go on the political offensive with positive Western proposals.” To accomplish this, Haig suggested that

we find ways to focus much greater attention on Western values. We have for too long permitted the Soviet Union to portray itself as revolutionary and progressive, when we are the most innovative and genuinely progressive societies. We must demonstrate how the Western values of individual freedom and initiative meet material and spiritual needs better than totalitarian regimes. And we must translate these values into specific proposals in the international arena which could help create a better world.

By November the scope of Project Truth was being broadened beyond a simple tit-for-tat propaganda war to include these ideas. A memo written by John Hughes, head of the executive implementing committee, argued: “It is just as important for Project Truth to underline the common values--moral, spiritual, cultural--that bind us to our allies.”

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24 Niles, 1.
26 Ibid, 3.

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In Western Europe, US policy was dictated by the geopolitical situation and then democratic ideology was added as a tool to legitimate and mobilise a US strategy which had been shaped by the power political realities existing on the ground in Europe. The meshing of democratic ideology and national security policy which this situation generated was aimed at solidifying the US’ leadership of its allies by conflating the US’ geopolitical interests with the fortunes of democracy and stressing the collective ideological identity of the US and the NATO states as democracies.

This was a relatively low-risk strategy as there was no fundamental conflict between US foreign policy interests and backing for democracy in the Western European context, especially in the wake of Iberia’s transition to democracy. The fact that the geopolitical objectives which underpinned the policy were widely accepted within the administration, coupled with the fact that the US envisaged a purely rhetorical campaign rather than attempts to influence or modify political structures on the ground, resulted in a solid consensus in favour of the policy.

**Democracy as a weapon in the Soviet Bloc**

As in Western Europe, the administration moved over the course of 1981 to deploying the projection of democracy as a tool of its policy towards the Soviet bloc. However, the generation of a coherent strategy in this case was complicated by the fact that the administration was divided over whether wanted to pursue a defensive approach aimed at preserving the status quo or an offensive one aimed at transforming or undermining the enemy state. While attempts to project democratic propaganda into the Bloc were relatively uncontroversial, the question of whether to provide American support for dissident movements
on the ground behind the Iron Curtain was complicated by the geopolitical situation and the organisational gap in the national security apparatus caused by the state-private split of 1967.

Although the whole administration agreed that the Carter administration’s approach to the Soviet Union had been too soft, high-level officials were divided over what the final objectives of policy towards the USSR should be. The Reaganites favoured a policy of weakening the economic and ideological bases of Soviet power within the Soviet bloc itself, based on a combination of virulent ideological anti-Sovietism and on the perception of Soviet political and economic weakness. DCI William Casey, a convinced hard-liner, argued that the economy of the USSR was “showing increasing weakness”\(^{28}\) and that there was “increasing internal discontent” in the Soviet Union,\(^{29}\) with the clear implication that this should be exploited.\(^{30}\) These views were shared by the President, who perceived the USSR’s growing economic weakness and signs of popular and nationalist discontent within the bloc as “the beginning of the end”\(^{31}\) and wondered how these cracks in the Soviet edifice could be exploited to accelerate the USSR’s collapse.\(^{32}\) The Reaganite faction proposed to exploit these perceived weaknesses through an economic and political offensive against the USSR. This faction believed that discouraging Western trade with and investment in the USSR would cut off the foreign currency earnings which the Soviets used to ward off domestic economic problems.\(^{33}\) At the same time, a Western strategy of psychological warfare which aimed to support opposition elements behind the Iron Curtain could also help to weaken the USSR and vulnerable Soviet satellites. While the original design for containment proposed by George


\(^{29}\) New York Times, “Haig asserts Soviet wanes spiritually”.


Kennan had called for US actions aimed at placing the maximum strain on the Soviet system in order to foster its mellowing or gradual break-up.\textsuperscript{34} The actions proposed by Reaganite hard-liners went further than this by proposing to supplement US external pressure on the Soviet Union with programs designed to target internal economic and political variables in order to put pressure on the Soviet system.\textsuperscript{35} This policy tendency represented a tough stance towards the USSR informing a set of disparate measures, however, rather than an integrated and coherent strategy for causing the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This policy was opposed by a faction of State Department career officials led by Secretary of State Alexander Haig. These officials differed from the Reaganites in basing their policy on the geopolitical threat posed by the USSR rather than ideological anti-Sovietism, and in their perception of Soviet strength. The geopolitical, as opposed to ideological, basis of Haig’s policies is clear from his comment that ”A major focus of American policy must be the Soviet Union…not because of ideological preoccupation but simply because Moscow is the greatest source of international insecurity today”.\textsuperscript{36} Haig felt that although it might be possible to use economic and political warfare as tools to contain Soviet expansionism, they could not feasibly lead to the transformation or collapse of the Soviet Union. Haig’s views on this had continuity, as he had stated at the Republican National Convention in 1979 that ”Clearly the task ahead for this vital decade before us will be the

management of global Soviet power". If the Soviet Union was not about to collapse, it was better to concentrate US resources on safeguarding the US position in the “Free World” rather than jeopardising this for uncertain gains from economic and political warfare. Rather than focussing on an attempt to weaken Soviet control within the bloc, Haig’s foreign policy called for a tough version of containment, coupled with negotiations, which he dubbed “Restraint and Reciprocity”. The gap between the Reaganite conception of an all-out campaign against the USSR and Haig’s strategy surfaced in the Reagan administration’s first NSPG meeting on 30th January 1981 and the split continued until the Secretary of State’s dismissal from the administration in June 1982, and beyond.

Although the administration was divided over end goals, it was able to reach a degree of consensus over the broadcasting of democratic propaganda into the USSR. The administration’s hard-liners had begun pushing for a stepped-up propaganda campaign against the USSR based on democratic ideology in March 1981, when hard-line NSC officials Carnes Lord and Richard Pipes argued for an increase in the budget and transmission capacity of Radio Free Europe and for Radio Liberty. Hardliners at the Voice of America wanted to go even further than Lord, Pipes or Wick, urging that

We must strive to 'destabilize' the Soviet Union and its satellites by promoting disaffection between peoples and rulers, underscoring the lies and denials of rights, inefficient management of the economy, corruption, indifference to the real wants and needs of the people, suppression of cultural diversity, religious persecution, etc.

38 Garthoff notes that Haig’s basic policy was to counter Soviet expansionism beyond currently existing limits but not to challenge Soviet control within the bloc. See Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet relations and the end of the Cold War (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1994), 30.
40 See Schweizer, 6-7.
Again, this negative theme was to be complemented by a positive US broadcasting campaign to "extol the merits of our system of pluralist, representative democracy and free enterprise as the surest guarantor of Human Rights and proven provider of the greatest prosperity the world has ever known."\(^{43}\) This propaganda campaign deployed the concept of democracy as a rhetorical tool to inspire political disaffection behind the Iron Curtain.

It was possible to forge an administration consensus on the use of democracy as an abstract psychological warfare concept against the USSR as such a propaganda campaign did not aim at and could not have triggered the creation of democratic political structures on the ground. This meant that the strategic and organisational problems associated with such an effort did not arise. While the Reaganites believed that broadcasting democratic propaganda into the USSR could erode the regime’s internal control, it was a comparatively safe tactic to deploy. The only consequence would have been poor diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; and relations were already poor.

This consensus was harder to maintain when the administration attempted to go beyond an abstract and rhetorical use of democracy to engage in operations which involved funding and backing opposition movements in Eastern Europe. Debates on political intervention in the Soviet Bloc focussed on Poland, which was then convulsed by the political conflict between the Polish Communist government and the Solidarity trade union. Key officials such as DCI Casey and the President himself saw Poland as the weakest link in the chain of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe\(^{44}\) and Solidarity as a key anti-Soviet political movement based in the heart of the Soviet zone of control in Eastern Europe. It was hoped

\(^{43}\)Philip Nicolaides, quoted in ibid.

that US support of Solidarity could lead to the destabilisation of Communist Poland, with demonstration effects which would be felt throughout the Bloc.

Although support of a democratic organisation such as Solidarity against a dictatorship was consonant with the portrayal of the Cold War as a battle between democracy and totalitarianism advanced by the administration, there were serious obstacles which would need to be overcome for the policy to be implemented. Geopolitically, the two factions within the administration disagreed over how far US policy was capable of influencing events on the ground in Eastern Europe, and thus how far the US should press its support of Solidarity. The fact that the USSR dominated Eastern Europe militarily made political operations on the ground extremely problematic, as the Soviets had shown themselves to be quite willing to crush uprisings and political movements with military force in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968; and these movements had been indigenous rather than being linked to the US. While the Reaganites pushed for greater US involvement in the Polish situation, this course of action was opposed by the State Department and Haig, which argued that US ability to affect the balance of political forces on the ground was in fact limited in view of the geopolitical circumstances, and that US intervention could provoke a Soviet crackdown. Thus, Haig’s policy was that, “We will stay out and we want [the Soviets] to do the same.” The democratisation of Eastern Europe simply had no place in Haig’s policy framework of “Restraint and Reciprocity”.

Implementation of the policy was also limited by the organisational gap left by the collapse of the state-private network and its aftermath. Clearly the chance of a hostile Soviet

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46 Haig made these remarks to Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in the early spring of 1981. Quoted from Haig, Caveat, 242.
response could be lessened by supplying US support through a private group, as the state-private network had done before 1967. To accomplish this, the CIA attempted to re-forge the state-private network relationship it had had with AFL-CIO before the collapse of the network in 1967. The union confederation was already acting in support of Solidarity. In 1980 it had provided Solidarity with $150,000, collected through the union’s Polish Workers Aid Fund, and also typewriters and printing presses, to allow the organisation to disseminate its message more widely.47 The AFL-CIO had also provided public support by organising an Information Office on Solidarity in New York,48 which was financially supported by Albert Shanker, leader of the American Federation of Teachers.

However, when the DCI attempted to re-forge an operational relationship with the AFL-CIO targeted at Poland, he was turned down49 due to the legacy of mistrust which the 1967 exposure had left in the US civil society groups damaged by it. Although Irving Brown, the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy chief, agreed to share information on the situation in Poland with the CIA during a meeting with Casey, he wanted no direct operational links between the Agency, the AFL-CIO and Solidarity, as he feared such links would taint both the AFL-CIO and Solidarity as puppets of the CIA, providing an excuse for a crackdown on the union.50 Brown clearly wanted to take no risks in the wake of the crisis of 1967, in which a large number of CIA operations had been revealed to the world and the private groups associated with them tainted as collaborators of the US government. The US simply lacked an acceptable and effective organisational framework which could channel US funds to private groups for use abroad to match the pre-1967 state-private network as of 1981. The geopolitical and

47 Schweizer, 61.
49 Schweizer, 60.
50 Ibid, 61.
organisational problems were inter-related, as organisational problems with channelling US aid through a plausibly deniable conduit reinforced the State Department’s argument that no feasible way of intervening in the Soviet bloc existed without provoking a Soviet crackdown.

While the promotion of democracy in the Soviet bloc was ideologically congruent with US values and supported US interests, intervention on the ground in Eastern Europe the second option was far more problematic than broadcasting propaganda, as it was limited by the problems of operating in an area under the military domination of a hostile state and the lack of a plausibly deniable organisational structure. In the absence of this structure, opposition to the policy crystallised on the pragmatic grounds that the US might obtain very little return for running the risk of triggering bloodshed in Eastern Europe and a US-Soviet confrontation. These pragmatic objections limited the application of the more confrontational Reaganite strategy in 1981.

**Democracy as Containment in El Salvador**

One of the most pressing issues facing the Reagan administration when it came to power was developing a policy towards Central America. It was this case which provoked the most tensions in its foreign policy, opening up an opportunity for the pursuit of a new policy aimed at democracy promotion. The Reagan administration had inherited the problems facing it in Central America from the Carter Administration. In 1979 Anastasio Somoza, a pro-US dictator, had been overthrown by a multi-class revolutionary uprising in Nicaragua and been replaced by the Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas. The administration believed that the Sandinistas were providing support to a Marxist insurgency against the pro-US civilian-military junta in El Salvador, which seemed to be in danger of collapse. The Carter administration had supplied aid to the Salvadoran junta, on condition that it pursue democratic and economic
reforms and curb Human Rights abuses carried out by the Army, Treasury Police and various right-wing death squads linked to these.

Reagan administration policy in the region faced the question of what course of action the US should take when an undemocratic pro-US regime with a poor Human Rights record, such as El Salvador, was threatened by anti-US Marxist insurgents. Although the situation in Central America was obviously most pressing, due to the upsurge in revolutionary activity in a region which was close to the US and which it had traditionally dominated, the issue was a wider one. The administration saw the fall of Nicaragua and the insurgency in El Salvador as the latest examples of an increase in revolutionary activity in the Third World over the 1970s which included the triumph of Marxist movements in South-east Asia, Angola and Ethiopia. Administration policy-makers attributed this surge to Soviet expansionism and intervention, not to local conditions. The President’s comment in 1980 that “the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on” left little doubt about where he attributed responsibility for the recent wave of Third World revolutions. ⁵¹ This perception that political instability in the Third World was the result of a Soviet plot to outflank the United States meant that the creation of a policy which could be deployed to halt further perceived Soviet expansionism in the Third World was of key importance.

The administration saw democratisation and US national security objectives as being mutually contradictory in this situation; its initial approach was military. This approach was reinforced by a set of ideas which emerged from the criticisms of the Carter administration’s Human Rights policy made by neoconservative intellectuals both before and after the fall of Nicaragua. The initial approach of critics such as Daniel P. Moynihan and Norman Podhoretz in the first two years of the Carter administration had been to co-opt the language of Human

⁵¹ Quoted from Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 1050.
Rights but to argue for a particularised campaign for their enforcement directed at Soviet communism rather than the right-wing regimes which the US was allied with to contain the USSR.\textsuperscript{52} To legitimise this, such critics drew a distinction between totalitarian Communist regimes and authoritarian dictatorships, arguing that authoritarian dictatorships were more likely to evolve towards democracy in the future.\textsuperscript{53}

Attitudes hardened after the fall of Iran and Nicaragua, as exemplified by the blistering attack launched on the Carter administration’s foreign policy by Jeane Kirkpatrick in “Dictatorship and Double Standards”, an article published in \textit{Commentary} several months after the fall of the two regimes. Kirkpatrick placed the question of US policy towards pro-US authoritarian regimes squarely in an East-West context marked by rising Soviet military power and influence in the Third World\textsuperscript{54} and argued that Carter’s pressure on the Shah and particularly on Somoza to liberalise amounted to “active collaborat[ion] in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion.”\textsuperscript{55} Pressure on these strategically important regimes to liberalise had “actually facilitate[d] the job of the insurgents”,\textsuperscript{56} resulting in the weakening and then collapse of friendly regimes and damaging US interests.

However, Kirkpatrick was concerned not only with criticising the administration’s failures in specific cases but in setting out a doctrine for future policy towards pro-US authoritarian regimes. Kirkpatrick’s argument that democratic systems were complex and

\textsuperscript{54} Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” \textit{Commentary} 68, no. 5 (1979): 34.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid: 38.
took many decades to build clearly implied that in the meantime the US should abandon misguided attempts to democratise authoritarian regimes under pressure from insurgents in a bid to defuse revolutionary movements. Kirkpatrick squared this with Human Rights concerns by arguing that right-wing authoritarian regimes were capable of evolving into democracies, whereas totalitarian Communist regimes could never do so. The argument made by these neoconservative intellectuals that authoritarian regimes were more susceptible to gradual democratic transformation at some point in the future provided a moral justification for the support of such regimes in the here-and-now, which they believed that US strategic interests dictated. By supporting authoritarian regimes the US was not only defending its own strategic interests, but also safeguarding spaces within which liberty could develop in the future. However, these critics laid out no concrete plan for facilitating such transitions and so failed to deal with the long-term strategic problem: the rise of anti-US revolutionary forces which such regimes often provoked, and their poor record in defeating these forces.

This combined strategic and moral argument – the Kirkpatrick Doctrine - was extremely influential on the foreign policy of the early Reagan administration. In fact, Reagan was so impressed with Kirkpatrick’s article that he appointed her UN Ambassador, with Cabinet rank, and made “Dictatorships and Double Standards” required reading for high-level foreign policy-makers in his administration. The President’s use of Kirkpatrick’s ideas is clearly shown in his comments, delivered at a press conference in May 1981, that under the Carter administration:

we took countries that were pro-Western that were maybe authoritarian in government, but not totalitarian, more authoritarian than we would like, did not meet

57 Ibid: 37.
58 Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships”: 37, 44.
all of our principles of what constitutes Human Rights, and we punished them at the same time we were claiming détente with countries where there were no Human Rights. The Soviet Union is the greatest violator today of Human Rights in all the world.60

Similarly, Reagan’s National Security Advisor and fellow CPD member, Richard Allen, stated that

we may fervently wish that all nations adopt institutions similar to our own. But we are too sensitive to the…manifold obstacles many nations in maintaining even a modest level of political stability, to try to impose our institutions on them.61

While in Eastern Europe and the Soviet bloc an effort to set up regimes modelled on America’s form of government was thought to be in the national security interests, such an attempt in the Third World could erode the US’ strategic position and lead to Soviet gains. Instead, the goal for policy towards pro-US authoritarians was to maintain political stability through support for existing regimes, not to push for reforms.

In Latin America, this drive for stability was augmented by a perceived deterioration in US power and influence in the region over the Carter years, due to the Human Rights policy. Kirkpatrick’s follow-up article in early 1981 was more narrowly focussed on Latin America, and Central America in particular, and it sounded alarms over what she argued was a serious deterioration of the US security position in the region. Kirkpatrick stated that

The deterioration of the US position in the hemisphere has already created serious vulnerabilities where none previously existed, and threatens now to confront this country with the unprecedented need to defend itself against a ring of Soviet bases on and around our southern and eastern borders.62

60Quoted in David F. Schmitz, The United States and Right-wing Dictatorships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 201.
61Quoted in Sanders, 296.
A similar analysis emerged from the Republican Committee of Santa Fe, which held meetings on Latin American policy during Reagan’s election campaign and concluded that the Human Rights policy in Latin America must be abandoned and replaced by a non-interventionist policy of political and ethical realism. [The Human Rights policy] has cost the United States friends and allies and thus influence...”

This fear that pressuring pro-US authoritarian regimes to reform would lead to Communist takeovers was bolstered in the case of El Salvador by concerns about US credibility and geopolitical considerations. Early in the Reagan administration’s first year Alexander Haig selected El Salvador as a test case to demonstrate that the Soviet advance in the Third World could and would be halted, chiefly for two reasons. Firstly, El Salvador was seen as the US’ “front yard” and it was believed that the United States needed to react to it in such a way as to demonstrate its renewed toughness and “determination to control world events”. Secondly, the conflict in El Salvador was thought to be winnable, leading to an easy victory for the US which would re-establish US credibility without a great deal of sacrifice. In this way the situation was “fortuitous” as " a specific crisis already was under way in which Reagan could demonstrate his resolve”; by defeating the supposed Soviet-Cuban attempts to take over El Salvador, Reagan would be “send[ing] a message to

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65 William M. LeoGrande argued that “Because the war in El Salvador looks like an easy victory, it provides a perfect opportunity for the new administration to demonstrate its willingness to use force in foreign affairs, its intent to de-emphasize Human Rights, and its resolve to contain the Soviet Union.” See William M. LeoGrande, “A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador,” International Security 6, no. 1 (1981): 27. See also Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 1053.
Moscow that further intervention in the Third World would not be tolerated, thus strengthening containment.

Conversely, it was believed that failure in El Salvador would touch off a “domino” effect in the rest of Central America which would be damaging to US strategic interests. According to Haig:

What we are watching is a four-phased operation of which phase one has already been completed—the seizure of Nicaragua. Next is El Salvador, to be followed by Honduras and Guatemala ... I would call it a priority target list—a hit list, if you will, for the ultimate take-over of Central America.  

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders further spelled out the geopolitical implications of a Marxist victory in El Salvador:

If, after Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority, who in Central America would not live in fear? How long would it be before major strategic US interests—the [Panama] Canal, sea-lanes, oil supplies—were at risk?

This set of geopolitical fears, coupled with the ideological anti-communism of many Reaganite policy-makers, combined to create a situation in which maintaining a non-Marxist government in El Salvador was perceived as vital; there was no margin for error. This elevation of what was essentially a civil war of no more than regional importance at most into a situation of key importance for US geopolitical interests and credibility produced an atmosphere of crisis in which the strategy of the Reagan administration differed sharply from that of the Carter administration, which had tied military aid to the Salvadoran government to

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68. Quoted in Ibid.
calls for increased respect for Human Rights and land reform measures “as a means of alleviating the underlying causes of leftist revolutionary pressures”.

In contrast, in the first half of 1981 the Reagan administration argued that reforms in El Salvador should be pursued at some unspecified future time after US national security objectives had been fulfilled. Reagan argued that “You do not try to fight a civil war and institute reforms at the same time. Get rid of the war. Then go forward with the reforms.” The administration’s policy was based on the fear that calling for reforms during a period of conflict and thus weakening the regime would lead to its collapse and a guerrilla takeover, in a repeat of what policy-makers believed had happened in Nicaragua under Carter.

This fear of the national security consequences of pressuring a dictatorial US ally to reform was reflected in the administration’s initial military approach to the conflict. In March 1981 the administration granted $25 million in emergency military aid to El Salvador, an amount larger than the previous military aid for 1946-1980 combined. Although the State Department gave rhetorical support for free elections and condemned the terror wielded by the army and rightist death squads in February 1981, at the same time the administration removed the conditions which had been placed on military aid by the Carter administration to

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71 Ibid, 16.
72 Quoted in Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua 1981-1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 27. Some members of the Reaganite faction believed the reforms proposed by Jose Napoleon Duarte, the civilian Christian Democrat leader of the Salvadoran junta, to be pointless; meeting with Duarte in Washington in 1980, NSA Allen told him that he “wasn’t much impressed with land reform” and “didn’t think land reform was such a key to stability”. See ibid.
73 Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 17.
encourage reform, arguing that defeating the insurgency should take first priority. The administration gave rhetorical support to reform and elections while jettisoning the very leverage which would have allowed it to pressure the Salvadoran army to support these objectives. US support for democracy was thus reduced to negative anti-communism, as the administration and its supporters argued that a Marxist victory would be more damaging to the cause of democracy than the status quo.

However, this policy proved to be unsustainable in its initial form due to ideological and political pressures within the United States and military stalemate in El Salvador. The domestic problems which the administration encountered were a product of the raised profile of Human Rights in the thinking of Congress and the general population due to the Carter administration’s championing of the concept, coupled with uncertainty that a solely military approach could be effective, produced by the US defeat in Vietnam. The administration, in attempting to return to a pre-1967 policy framework towards pro-US authoritarians threatened by revolutionaries, had failed to factor the political and ideological changes which had occurred during the Vietnam War and due to the rise of Human Rights as a legitimate US foreign policy concern under the Carter administration into its thinking. While Carter had lost the 1980 election, the Human Rights current in US society had not begun with him, and advocates of a Human Rights approach remained in Congress after his fall.

The administration experienced a low level of support for its policy among the US population, with many Americans rejecting greater US involvement in El Salvador due to fears that US aid would inevitably lead to the introduction of US combat troops, as it had in

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76 Goshko, “White House stresses”.
78 Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 242.
Vietnam, and greater concern over Human Rights abuses by allied governments. While the administration was internally united in its military approach to El Salvador, this lack of support from the general population was exacerbated by a strategic disagreement with Congress, which argued that rather than being damaging to US national security objectives, pursuing a policy of pressuring the junta to enact reforms could help to achieve these objectives. In Congress’ view the US should pursue a strategy of reform to draw the people of El Salvador away from support for the guerrillas, rather than putting off reforms to some future date when the danger of a Marxist victory had disappeared. The initial policy came under increasing assault from Congress during 1981 as the legislature attempted to push the administration closer to a policy more focussed on support for Human Rights and political reform. This pressure began in the House, where Democrats on the Foreign Affairs Committee restored the conditions which the Carter administration had attached to aid to El Salvador. In May the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called for Reagan to certify, every six months, that the Government of El Salvador

Is not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of Human Rights treatment of its people.
Is moving to achieve control over all elements of its own armed forces.
Is making continued progress in implementing essential economic and political reforms, including the land reform program.
Is committed to the holding of free elections at an early date.
Has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate with opposition groups an equitable political resolution of the conflict.

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before aid would be released. While Congress may have been influenced in this stance by
moral considerations connected to Human Rights, the disagreement was primarily over
tactics, with the debate being over “how best to isolate and deal with these terrorists [the
Salvadoran left], through military assistance or through reforms that eliminate the grievances
upon which they depend for sustenance.”81

The hard-line faction of the Reagan administration continued to believe that such
reforms would result in the collapse of the Salvadoran junta, as it believed Human Rights
reforms had helped to topple Somoza, thus further worsening the US strategic position in
Central America. Several Reaganite policy-makers, such as Richard Allen, William Clark, the
Deputy Secretary of State, and Fred Ikle, the Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, argued
that the administration should maintain its original policy to provoke a confrontation with
Congress over the management of US foreign policy. If the administration won such a show-
down it would be able to make foreign policy in Central America and other areas of the world
without Congressional interference; however, if Congress won it would then have to take the
blame for losing El Salvador to Communism.82 Winning the war had to take priority over the
promotion of democracy, which might turn out to be unachievable and lead to another US
defeat.83 It was clear that unless the policy was changed, the Executive and Legislature were
moving towards a serious confrontation over El Salvador, sparked by disagreements over
whether pursuing a policy of democratisation would enhance or detract from the achievement
of US national security objectives.

81 Quoted from Schmitz, *The United States and Right-wing Dictatorships*, p209
83 Ibid.
At the same time, State Department officials were coming to believe that the purely military policy was proving ineffective on the ground. A State Department assessment of the situation in El Salvador produced in early July 1981 stated that

Neither the Armed Forces nor the guerrillas are strong enough to defeat the other decisively in the near term. The struggle has evolved into a war of attrition.  

With no immediate government military victory in sight, detaching the population from the guerrillas assumed more importance. The government needed to broaden its “narrow base of support” and end the political fragmentation which gripped the country:

All the major actors – the Armed Forces, the Christian Democrats, the business sector, labor and peasant organizations – are highly suspicious of each other and face sharp internal divisions.

These domestic political and strategic pressures impelled State Department officials to advance a new approach to the conflict in El Salvador based on the support of democratic processes. On July 16th Thomas Enders, the highest-ranking State Department official with direct responsibility for policy towards Central America, called for US support for free elections in El Salvador. In part, this change was motivated by “a growing feeling within the administration that that its policy in El Salvador had gained little popular support”. To secure such support from Congress and the population, Enders’ speech stressed US support for concrete democratisation measures, a position which was likely to resonate ideologically with Americans.

Enders also tied democratisation to the need for military aid, stating that “the search for a political solution will not succeed unless the United States sustains its assistance to El Salvador.”

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86 Ibid, 4.
Salvador"\textsuperscript{88} and that “[w]e can help by…[s]tanding by our friends while they work out a democratic solution.”\textsuperscript{89} Therefore, democratisation was offered as a quid pro quo for the maintenance of military aid for El Salvador, as the administration feared that without reform Congress might simply pull the plug on funding. Enders’ speech deployed the spread of democracy as a legitimating concept to rally Congress and the American public behind US government support for the government of El Salvador and headed off a possible confrontation between the Executive and the Legislature.

The new policy went beyond the rhetorical use of democracy often deployed by the Reagan administration, however, by proposing the creation of democratic structures on the ground for geopolitical reasons. According to the Assistant Secretary, the best way to produce a stable government with popular legitimacy was through elections, which would act to dampen down the insurgency:

> We believe that the solution must be democratic because only a genuinely pluralist approach can enable a profoundly divided society to live with itself without violent convulsions.\textsuperscript{90}

Democracy would contribute to the future stability of El Salvador, rather than undermining it, by producing a government which was seen as legitimate by the population and removing the conflict from the battlefield, where the US and its client government were just about holding the line, into the political arena.

Enders had a great deal of difficulty in building a consensus for the support of elections in El Salvador in the administration due to the fear of other policy-makers that the outcome of elections would not necessarily be in line with US interests. The Assistant


\textsuperscript{90} Carothers, 20.
Secretary recalled: “People said they don’t know what will happen. Who’ll win. How can we tell?”91 This fear underlined the essential contradiction between US support for the autonomy of foreign populations and security interests; such populations, given autonomy, might choose a government which was incompatible with US interests. However, the State Department had decided to run this risk in the hope that greater stability would result from democratic elections.

The Department had not changed the objective of US policy towards El Salvador: this still remained the containment of the insurgency and maintaining a stable pro-US government in power in San Salvador. However, State Department officials had come to believe that in the case of El Salvador a democratic regime would be a more efficient tool of containment, as it would be more stable and more legitimate with both the Salvadoran population and with Congress, and thus a stronger barrier to Marxism than the current ruling junta. This was a pragmatic decision, not an ideological one, aimed at resolving the political problems the policy was facing in Washington and securing a more stable and legitimate regime capable of facing a protracted guerrilla war on the ground.

However, Enders’ speech did not touch on one real difficulty of the policy: it specified no mechanism to ensure that the elections it called for would be credible enough to be accepted as legitimate by the population of El Salvador. This was a very real difficulty considering El Salvador’s political history of rigged or stolen elections. The State Department paper commented that:

The process for establishing a legitimate successor regime through elections is underway, but its success is far from assured. Owing to their experience with “stolen” elections, few Salvadorans have faith in the democratic process.92

91 Gutman, 60.
Ratification of the elections as free and fair by a US government agency would not be convincing in propaganda terms, as the US was supporting the government in the civil war. This was an organisational gap in the State Department’s political strategy.

Despite the existence of this organisational gap, however, it is important to stress the novelty of the State Department’s strategy; rather than deploying democratic rhetoric to legitimate US tactics which had little or no connection to democracy as a functioning political system, the Department was calling for the creation of functioning democratic processes in a friendly state threatened by an anti-US insurgency. Furthermore, the Department saw this action as a way of protecting US national security interests, not as sacrificing them to ideology or the need for legitimation.

Although the Reagan administration deployed democratic rhetoric in support of its foreign policy in 1981, it failed to meld this democratic rhetoric with a coherent national security strategy which operationalised democracy promotion in support of US objectives. Instead, the administration remained divided into two factions pursuing particularist strategies of heightened economic and political warfare focussed on weakening Soviet control of the Bloc in Europe, or containment. The starting point for these strategies and the focus on the particular cases tied to each one was geopolitics and, more so for the Reaganite faction, fervent ideological anti-communism, not a universal democratic ideology. Rather than informing the formation of policy, democratic ideology was deployed on a piecemeal basis in cases where it was thought to be in line with US national security interests.

While the administration was able to agree on the tactical use of democracy in cases where both sides prioritised the same short-term geopolitical goal and the use of democratic ideology was limited to propaganda, the question of whether attempts to alter political
structures on the ground were congruent with US national security interests and how this could be achieved was more divisive. In the case of Poland, pragmatic difficulties such as disagreements over how far US attempts to intervene politically could be effective, coupled with the organisational gap which continued to exist in the national security apparatus, conspired to halt implementation of a more interventionist policy. In the case of El Salvador, the administration became embroiled in a dispute with Congress over whether democratisation would further or damage US national security, while its allies became bogged down in a military stalemate on the ground. The State Department’s final decision to support elections was taken on a pragmatic basis to break both the political impasse domestically and the military impasse in El Salvador, rather than on ideological grounds. Thus, while democracy was deployed in different cases to achieve different outcomes in 1981, there was no attempt by the Reagan administration to operationalise a universal democratic ideology.

In addition to strategic and political/ideological problems, the administration as a whole also faced an organisational problem which it was just beginning to perceive. What is striking is that the policies of both administration factions in those areas where the primary mode of struggle was to be political, such as Poland and El Salvador, were hampered by the lack of a plausibly deniable organisation capable of supporting political forces abroad. It was precisely this organisational gap that the democracy promoters aimed to fill.
CHAPTER THREE

PARTICULARIST VERSUS EXPANSIVE VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

The State Department’s change of course to supporting democratic processes in El Salvador in July 1981 had been preceded by calls for democracy promotion programs from private figures. In the first half of 1981 these figures advanced two blueprints for democracy promotion which were based on the ideas advanced by William Douglas, George Agree and Michael Samuels over the 1970s. The first was set out by Constantine C. Menges, a conservative intellectual and former analyst for the RAND Corporation and critic of the Carter administration’s policies in Iran and Nicaragua.¹ The second was set out by William Douglas and Michael Samuels and marked a further phase in the private democracy promoters’ attempt to gain Executive backing for their proposals. These plans deployed similar tactical and organisational ideas; however, they differed in their targeting. Menges’ vision focussed primarily on El Salvador and perhaps Nicaragua, with the proviso that it might be useful in other Latin American countries. It represented a particularist strategy which had been generalised from pre-existing national security cases. In contrast, the second approach began from a more expansive strategy targeted at all non-democratic states in the Third World and fitted existing current crises into this framework.

Despite this key difference, both of these blueprints went beyond the pre- and post-July 1981 Reagan administration policy in a number of ways. Firstly, they went beyond the use of democratic rhetoric as a tool of legitimation and an ideological weapon to advocate serious efforts to construct functioning democratic systems in other countries. Secondly, they went beyond the State Department’s focus on El Salvador as an isolated case where the support of democracy was possible and permissible. Thirdly, they proposed the creation of

new instrumentalities to pursue the creation of democratic systems through democratic political tactics.

This was far more coherent than the Reagan administration’s practice of attempting to legitimate a disparate group of strategies and tactics arising from different cases under the banner of “democracy”. In contrast, the private sector visions advocated an internally coherent approach which married together a strategy aimed at genuine democratic transformations with tactics for achieving these transformations based on democratic methods of political organisation, to be implemented by an organisation which could credibly claim to be democratic in form.

In the wake of the State Department’s policy shift on El Salvador, there was a clear window of opportunity to push for a more expansive and coherent strategy on the model of the private blueprints. However, this opportunity was not taken. Strategically, intra-administration policy debates continued to be framed in terms of containing Soviet power or weakening the USSR and its allies through political warfare initiatives, with democratic rhetoric being exploited to support policies which had little connection to promoting democracy in reality. More generally, the administration tended to meld democracy with Human Rights and to continue to attempt to use this as both a tool of legitimation and an ideological weapon, avoiding serious discussion of how and whether to aim at the transformation of existing political structures in countries beyond El Salvador. By the end of 1981, democracy promotion still remained confined to the Americas, with immediate implementation restricted to El Salvador at the most limited.
The Particularist approach

Although the core group of private sector democracy promoters had been active in promoting its ideas in Washington through presentations given by Michael Samuels and William Brock of the APF, who had recently been appointed the US Trade Representative in the Reagan administration, a more particularist vision was put forward by Constantine C. Menges in January 1981 at a Woodrow Wilson Centre symposium on the future of US foreign policy. Although he had not been connected with the APF or with William Douglas or Michael Samuels in the 1970s, his proposal articulated many ideas that had emerged from these individuals and organisations. Furthermore, Menges’ memoirs make clear that he was aware of the source of the ideas he was deploying, and may have had prior contact with their proponents.²

In the January 1981 paper, several months before the State Department’s shift towards supporting democracy in El Salvador, Menges explicitly identified the support or creation of functioning democratic governments as a US national security interest in terms that paralleled the arguments made by the democracy promoters in the 1970s, arguing that “social reform and democratic political development are not only intrinsically in the US interest, but that these ultimately provide the best defence against Communist success.”³ However, in contrast to the visions put forward by William Douglas, George Agree and Michael Samuels in the

² Although Menges had authored a New York Times editorial, “Democracy for Latins,” calling for a policy of supporting democracy to defeat the Soviets in Latin America in June 1979, while George Agree was still in the process of setting up the APF and chasing funding, his prescription for how to accomplish democratic reforms in Latin America clearly came from the nexus of ideas propounded by the American Political Foundation, William Douglas and Michael Samuels. Indeed, Menges states in his memoirs that the idea of a “National Foundation for democracy” to help genuinely democratic groups in foreign countries...was only shared at that time by a small group of Republicans and Democrats and by the leaders of the AFL-CIO and the US Chamber of Commerce,” indicating that he was aware of the history of the idea, and had possibly had contact with its proponents. See Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 141 for details of the article and Menges, Inside the National Security Council, 46 for Menges’ prior knowledge of the democracy promoters.

1970s, Menges limited the sphere of his suggested strategy to the crises immediately facing the US in Central and Latin America. In El Salvador, Menges called for provision by the US of “more political and economic support for peaceful reform…”, thus pre-empting the State Department’s change of course in July. In Nicaragua, Menges argued that

Genuinely democratic groups still exist and there is still some chance to prevent a Cuban-style totalitarian state being consolidated – but only if much more help (a la Portugal) is given to the democratic forces…

In addition, the US could also provide democratic assistance to liberalisation programs beginning in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile.

In a line of argument clearly indebted to Samuels, he suggested that the best method of supporting democratic forces in Central and Latin America would be through semi-private organisations. One example of such an organisation was the AFL-CIO’s American Institute of Free Labor Development, a trade union training organisation running programs in union organising techniques and anti-communist ideology across Latin America. AIFLD had been founded 18 months after the Cuban revolution of January 1959 to strengthen pro-US unions in Latin America and so prevent further revolutions. It had been funded by the Kennedy administration as part of the Alliance for Progress, in the hope that “the talents and experience of the US labor movement could be brought to bear on the danger that Castro…might undermine the Latin American labor movement.” Throughout its history the organisation had received funds from US government agencies, either AID or the CIA, and

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4 Ibid, 64.
5 Ibid, 63.
6 Ibid, 58.
7 The union centre was granted $460,000 by the Kennedy administration to train Latin American trade unionists in organisational methods and democratic practices. Jeffrey E. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 45.
8 Tom Barry and Deb Preusch, AIFLD in Central America: agents as organizers (Albuquerque, NM: Inter-Hemispheric Education Center, 1990), 4.
had acted in support of US foreign priorities either through its training centres or through affiliated Latin American unions in Brazil in 1964, the Dominican Republic in the 1960s and Chile in the 1970s, before, during and after the right-wing coups these countries experienced.\(^{10}\)

Menges stated that “[t]his private organization…has worked for years in some Latin American countries to help the genuinely democratic trade union community…become more effective and compete with the Communist-dominated unions and mass action organizations.”\(^{11}\) This recommendation may also have specifically been designed with the situation of El Salvador in mind, as AIFLD was at that moment already active in El Salvador providing assistance to peasant groups in support of the Duarte government’s land reform.\(^{12}\)

However, Menges’ plans went beyond stepped-up funding for AIFLD to include a new “semi-autonomous organization” modelled on the West German Party Foundations\(^{13}\) which had intervened in Portugal to prevent a Communist takeover in 1975-6. Such a semi-private foundation could provide a focal point for the creation of a network of US-friendly democrats; help the leaders of democratic groups to ward off attempts to capture their organisations by extremists;\(^{14}\) and even “provid[e] advisory help in the conduct of fair elections”.\(^{15}\) This organisation would clearly need to be American to make certain that it acted in the US national interest; while one of the West German party foundations, the socialist Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, was already involved in political work in El Salvador, it was providing assistance to anti-government leftist groups linked to the guerrillas, not the

\(^{10}\)See Barry and Preusch, 13, for AIFLD director William C. Doherty’s comments on AIFLD’s role in the 1964 military coup in Brazil. See Spalding: 57 for AIFLD actions in Chile and 58-61 for details of programs in the Dominican Republic.

\(^{11}\)Menges, 59


\(^{13}\)Menges, “The United States and Latin America in the 1980s,” 59.

\(^{14}\)Ibid, 60.

\(^{15}\)Ibid.
government itself. While the methods deployed by the FES were worthy of emulation, clearly the targeting of its assistance was a problem.

The semi-private nature of this foundation would be integral to its ability to operate abroad in support of pro-US democratic groups in Central America, as its non-governmental nature meant that it would be able to “act separately from the official diplomatic presence”\(^{17}\) in “specific countries of interest”.\(^{18}\) Assistance with the conduct of elections by such an organisation could be vital in the context of El Salvador, with its history of stolen or rigged elections, to convince the populations of both El Salvador and the United States that any elections held as part of a transition to a democratic regime were credible. The semi-autonomous nature of the proposed organisation would be suitable for performing this function, as it was clearly preferable that elections be certified as credible by an ostensibly private organisation rather than an agency of the US government, which was supporting the government of El Salvador in the civil war.

Menges’ proposals were in direct contradiction to the administration’s foreign policy framework for dealing with dictatorships, which were rooted in Jeane Kirkpatrick’s arguments that support of authoritarian regimes accorded more closely with US interests than attempts to reform them from the outside. The organisation he recommended was clearly intended to produce political transformations in its target countries through direct assistance to political sectors by yet-to-be-founded instrumentalities and organisations, linked to previous state-private network participants such as organised labour. This proposal was more tactically and organisationally coherent than the administration rhetoric of the time, as it called for the creation of democratic systems abroad through the support of democratic

\(^{16}\) Ibid, 68-9.

\(^{17}\) Menges, “The United States and Latin America in the 1980s,” 59.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
groups rather than aid to military-dominated regimes, connecting the end goal which the administration professed to support – democracy – with the tactics to be used to achieve it.

Menges’ proposal was strategically less comprehensive than the other models put forward outside the Executive in the 1970s. Geographically it was limited to the Western Hemisphere, and clearly emphasised a focus on countries within the region where national security crises were already in train at that time, such as El Salvador, giving the strategy an immediate emphasis on short-term national security goals rather than a transformative approach which aimed to alter pro-US dictatorships before such problems began. Nevertheless, the proposal took many of the tactical and organisational ideas of the democracy promotors and applied them in detail to an existing national security crisis, which could provide a way to secure administration support of the concept.

A coherent approach to promoting democracy in the Third World: beyond the Kirkpatrick Doctrine

Whereas Menges’ proposal had been particularist, a program of democracy promotion aimed at the Third World as a whole was set out by two of the original proposers of democracy promotion in the first few months of 1981. The authors of this proposal were William Douglas, who had originally proposed a private campaign of democracy promotion in the Third World in 1972, and Michael Samuels, who had narrowed the concept to focus on US national security interests. In 1981 they amalgamated their ideas in a paper which was given at the International Studies Association\(^\text{19}\) and then published as an article in August 1981 in order “to further focus policymakers' attention on the need for a political development program.”\(^\text{20}\) The two campaigners set out a strategy for democracy promotion which was far

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wider than Menges’ ideas, both in terms of geographical reach and transformative strategy. They set out a clear strategic need for the US government to support democracy promotion which went beyond the case of El Salvador, arguing that “US security is jeopardized when dictatorial leftist movements are likely to succeed in overthrowing conservative authoritarian regimes that have been pro-West.”21 The remedy for this was to be US support for democratic parties, interest groups and coalitions who could act as “bulwarks against Marxist revolutionaries or militarists”,22 thus averting successful Marxist revolutions and replacing unpopular dictatorships with more stable and legitimate democracies. This agenda was clearly compatible with the evolving administration priorities in Central America; indeed, Samuels and Douglas cited “El Salvador and Guatemala” as countries “where the presiding regimes are shaky, the democratic center is miniscule, and dictatorial leftists lead the opposition”,23 indicating that these countries would benefit from a democracy promotion approach. In common with Menges, they also suggested that democracy promotion would be useful in Nicaragua, where “democratic pluralist elements have been fighting a rearguard action to try to prevent the installation of a totalitarian dictatorship” and argued that the independent newspaper, La Prensa, labour and business organisations and “a private sector Commission on Human Rights” should be given assistance to co-ordinate their efforts and make them more effective political opponents of the Sandinistas.24

However, whereas the administration as a whole began with particular cases and then deployed universalist democratic ideology to legitimate its particular approach to those cases, Samuels and Douglas began from an expansive strategy focussed on the Third World as a whole, and then showed how it could be applicable to the current crises which the Reagan administration was prioritising. Their strategic conception of using guided democratic

21 Samuels & Douglas, “Promoting Democracy”: 52
22 Ibid: 60.
23 Ibid: 52.
transformations to ward off anti-American revolutions clearly went beyond anything the administration had in mind at that moment, as it was primarily focussed on preventing national security crises before they arose. This approach went beyond immediate national security priorities in Central America, as Douglas and Samuels’ argument that initial “activities not be limited to purely short-term targets of opportunity” and that “[m]any of the program’s activities should focus on the longer range development of political institutions”\(^{25}\) showed clearly that their approach was aimed at fostering change over the long-term. This is further shown by their argument that the US should begin to build democratic groups in pro-US authoritarian regimes such as “Zaire, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and Honduras”\(^{26}\) as “countries in which there is an apparent danger of imminent political collapse”\(^{27}\), since “US interests would be furthered by strengthening democratic pluralist forces of countries facing political collapse before such a collapse occurs.”\(^{28}\) The authors’ final aim was to create “programs to assist development of democracy in the Third World.”\(^{29}\) This provided the coherent approach to Third World political systems which had been missing from US foreign policy throughout the Cold War.

It is clear that democracy promotion had an internal coherence as a strategy which was lacking in the worldview of both administration factions. For the strategy to be effective, however it would need to be implemented in a manner that was tactically and organisationally sound, and credible to foreign democrats. The authors argued that the best organisational structure for such an effort would be a “new semiprivate foundation specifically for political work abroad”\(^{30}\) which could act as an “umbrella organization”\(^{31}\) for several US private groups carrying out democracy promotion programs. Almost all, if not all,

\(^{25}\) Samuels & Douglas, “Promoting Democracy”: 64.  
\(^{26}\) Ibid: 52.  
\(^{27}\) Ibid: 64.  
\(^{28}\) Samuels & Douglas, “Promoting Democracy”: 64.  
\(^{29}\) Ibid: 52.  
\(^{30}\) Ibid: 65.  
\(^{31}\) Ibid: 63.
of the funding for this foundation was expected to be provided by the US government.\(^{32}\) The foundation would provide training rather than financial support to political parties overseas, as Samuels and Douglas felt purely financial support could attract opportunists who wanted to benefit financially from the program rather than committed democrats.\(^{33}\) Instead of merely disbursing funding, a US democracy foundation would offer training to party leaders and activists and seek to strengthen the organisation of political parties, as “organisation, more than black bags full of dollars or rubles, change[s] the political course of a nation”.\(^{34}\)

The new foundation would also incorporate US private groups which had previously participated in state-private network operations, such as the AFL-CIO and the US business community.\(^{35}\) Samuels and Douglas sought to co-opt these influential sectors into their democracy promotion campaign by arguing that they needed to expand their focus from spreading US economic practices to spreading the political model which they claimed supported this economic framework. They pointed out that although the US Chamber of Commerce was active in advocating the economic value of free enterprise in its publications, little is said about the fact that free enterprise can flourish best only under democratic pluralist conditions. Free enterprise is part and parcel of pluralism, but dictators of all kinds prefer centralization, regimentation, and hierarchy.\(^{36}\)

\[^{34}\] Ibid: 62.
\[^{35}\] In common with organised labour, the US business community had also previously been involved in covert operations. This included involvement in and agitation for covert operations by individual companies such as IT & T, who pushed the CIA to take a strong stance against Allende. See Church Committee, *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973*, 18\(^{th}\) December 1975, accessed 24\(^{th}\) April 2006, [http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp#C. Covert Action and Multinational Corporations](http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp). In addition to this, representatives from important US companies such as Anaconda, Pan American Airways and Standard fruit had sat on the board of AIFLD, the AFL-CIO’s Latin American trade union foundation, while others, such as United Fruit, IBM and IT & T had contributed funding to the organisation. See Barry & Preusch, *AIFLD*, 7. When Lane Kirkland became President of the AFL-CIO in 1980 corporate representatives were asked to step down, as Kirkland reportedly felt the business connection had become too embarrassing for the union. See Lane Kirkland, interviewed by James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle, “Kirkland Remembers,” The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Labor Series, *The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Selected and converted*, American Memory, Library of Congress, 13\(^{th}\) November 1996, accessed 17\(^{th}\) May 2012, [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?fmfinder68:/hemp-ammem_9Dmv::](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?fmfinder68:/hemp-ammem_9Dmv::).
\[^{36}\] Samuels & Douglas, “Promoting Democracy”: 56.
In a similar way the authors acknowledged the work done abroad by the AFL-CIO’s institutes – AIFLD in Latin America, together with a similar instrumentality for Asia, AAFLI, and for Africa, AALC – but complained that these organisations’ training programs for foreign unionists tended to focus on the economic role of unions rather than their political role and did not provide sufficient ideological guidance.37 “In contrast,” the authors argued, “their labor colleagues who graduate from communist labor training courses have no such doubts about where they stand ideologically.”38 Labour and business would have their overseas operations re-politicised and their sectional interests subsumed into a wider project of democracy promotion as a result of their incorporation into the new state-private network the authors wanted to construct.

The form of the proposed organisation, as a project to be managed by private groups rather than government bureaucracies or intelligence agencies, was ideologically consistent with the idea that what separated democracy as a political system from its competitors, such as Soviet Communism, was the autonomy of individual citizens and the vitality of the sphere of civil society. This was the same logic which had prompted CIA officials to construct the pre-1967 state-private network of civil society groups. The authors refer to these operations in their article,39 but there were several key differences between this previous model of political intervention and the new network being proposed. Firstly, whereas previously private groups had been deployed on a tactical basis within a strategic framework set by the state, the strategy proposed in the article was based on priorities set by intellectuals working outside the Executive, not the state. Although there was some crossover between the immediate target countries for democracy promotion in Central America, such as El

37 Ibid: 55.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid: 54.
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, and the current geopolitical concerns of the Reagan administration, it is clear that the program of democratisation advocated by the democracy promoters was wider than the Reaganite’s sphere of concern in the Third World. The aim of democratising pro-US authoritarian regimes was also out of step with the fact that most administration policy-makers accepted the Kirkpatrick Doctrine’s contentions that support of political reform and the achievement of US national security objectives were often mutually contradictory, especially in pro-US authoritarian states. In addition, while the Reagan administration was also concerned with the projection of democratic ideology in Western Europe and the Reaganites in particular wished to support anti-communist political movements behind the Iron Curtain, these concerns are not mentioned by Douglas and Samuels. This omission of plans for activities in the Soviet bloc prevented the vision advanced by the two campaigners from being a truly universal one aimed at all non-democratic states. These strategic differences between state and private priorities translated into differences in organisational form between the old and new networks, as the fact that democracy promotion would function within a strategic framework which did not exactly correspond to the immediate national security concerns of the state indicated the need for more autonomy for the democracy promotion instrumentalities than the previous state-private network had enjoyed. Significantly, while Douglas and Samuels accepted the need for “a government policy input” into democracy promotion, they specified that the new democracy promotion foundation would be “free from government control”. This indicates that the foundation, rather than a government agency such as the CIA, would serve as the co-ordinating centre for democracy promotion.

A further key difference between the old and new state-private organisational models was that the new democracy promotion foundation would provide assistance to foreign

40 See ibid: 52, 60-61.
41 Ibid: 63.
groups openly, rather than covertly. This overt method of operation was necessary, as “Covert political aid provided directly by the US government is limited in its effectiveness by the fact that political movements are uncomfortable with such direct contacts, fearing that their independence could be compromised.”\footnote{Samuels & Douglas, “Promoting Democracy”: 54.} This formulation was undoubtedly correct, as shown by the AFL-CIO’s response to offers of CIA co-operation over Poland and its prediction of Solidarity’s likely response, discussed in the previous chapter. However, in common with the previous state-private network, almost all, if not all, of the funding for the foundation was expected to be provided by the US government.\footnote{Ibid: 62.} This begged the question of why overt assistance from a private group disbursing government money and with a policy input from US government officials would be seen as any more credible than the pre-1967 organisational model. Douglas and Samuels did not discuss this question in depth in their article, but there are indications of their thinking on this matter. They believed that their tactic of providing foreign groups with assistance and training in organisational methods would be seen as more credible to foreign populations than simply providing funding, as “[a]n organization dependent on foreign funding could have difficulty convincing the local citizens that it speaks for local interests, not foreign interests.”\footnote{Ibid: 61-2.} In addition, they mentioned other organisations which combined private management and government funding and were already operating effectively, such as the Asia Foundation, the Inter-American Foundation and the West German party foundations\footnote{Ibid: 63.}, as models for their own foundation. However, there does not seem to have been any systematic thinking on this matter; when the two authors do raise the matter of credibility, they dispose of it rapidly by asserting that “Political development abroad is a legitimate function for the US government.”\footnote{Ibid.}
In the first half of 1981, private sector intellectuals had made two differing proposals for a democracy promotion policy and an instrumentality to implement it through. While both could be applied to immediate US national security crises in Central America, the blueprint set out by Douglas and Samuels was more comprehensive than that of Menges, both in terms of the tactical and organisational blueprint offered, and in terms of going beyond immediate national security crises to develop a pre-emptive approach to democracy in the Third World by building democratic movements in dictatorships before revolutionary seizures of power. Douglas and Samuels also went beyond the Reagan administration’s concepts by arguing for a concrete attempt to build functioning democratic movements abroad\(^47\) rather than seeing the promotion of democracy as a rhetorical tool for the legitimation of policy or as an ideological weapon.\(^48\) If accepted by the administration, the attempt to operationalise this blueprint would re-open the question of how attempts to promote political reform overseas could be meshed with US national security objectives at the strategic and organisational levels.

**The Governmental limitation of Democracy Promotion**

Irrespective of whether the State Department was influenced by the proposals of Douglas and Samuels or by Menges, on El Salvador the Department was moving towards a strategy of democracy promotion. This change presented the private sector democracy promoters with an important opportunity to push for the implementation of a wider policy of democracy promotion and the creation of a democracy promotion foundation to implement it. The opportunity arose from the fact that Enders’ policy speech had not addressed the organisational gap which had been pointed out by Menges, Samuels and Douglas: the speech specified no mechanism to promote democracy in El Salvador, or to build up civil society groups favourable to the United States.

\(^{47}\) ibid, 52.

\(^{48}\) The authors argued that, in the USIA, the US already had an organisation capable of disseminating ideas. Samuels & Douglas, “Promoting Democracy”: 53.
This organisational problem and the opportunity for the democracy promoters to overcome it through their tactical and organisational concepts created an incentive for the State Department to champion a policy of democracy promotion. However, the question facing the Department in the second half of 1981 was whether it would widen its new strategy of democratising El Salvador to strengthen containment to embrace the whole of the Third World, as Douglas and Samuels were advocating, or whether it would treat the country as an isolated particular case and limit the deployment of the strategy geographically. The administration as a whole failed to generalise a policy from the Salvadoran example and continued to conduct its strategic discussions in terms of containment of Soviet power or the undermining of existing Communist regimes, and to see democracy as an ideological tool for the legitimization of its policy in its own zone and for launching ideological attacks on the Soviet bloc, rather than as a guide to practical action.

The obvious next step in widening a strategy based on democracy beyond El Salvador would have been to institute support for pro-US political and civil society groups in Nicaragua, as Menges had advocated in January and Douglas and Samuels had discussed several months later. Political methods of intervention in Nicaragua, such as the funding parties or trade unions, were initially championed by the US ambassador to Managua, Lawrence Pezzullo. These methods may have feasibly produced some change or disruption in Nicaragua in early 1981, as the Sandinistas were still consolidating their position and did not yet have total dominance over Nicaraguan political life. Although the FSLN was a powerful political force in Nicaragua at this point, pro-US political actors still held a small number of positions in a coalition government, and anti-Sandinista labour unions and business organisations existed. Pezzullo hoped that measures of support for the internal opposition such as action to build up the independent news media and political parties would encourage key opposition figures to remain within Nicaragua, where they could exercise some influence.
on the course of political events, rather than having them flee outside the country.\textsuperscript{49} Under the Carter administration, 60% of the US government’s aid to Nicaragua had been ear-marked for the private sector of the economy, in the hope that this would boost moderates within the country.\textsuperscript{50} However, no section of the administration advocated continuing and building on this policy. Instead, the Reagan administration first suspended and then terminated US aid to Nicaragua’s private sector in April 1981,\textsuperscript{51} leaving these potential internal political allies to go it alone over the protests of Pezzullo and pro-US opposition leaders such as Alfonso Robelo.\textsuperscript{52}

Assistant Secretary Enders’ stance on Nicaragua was consistent with a policy of containment, but not one of democracy promotion. This was in contrast to the emerging policy on El Salvador, in which the two imperative had merged. During negotiations with the Sandinistas Enders de-emphasised the question of democratic reform in favour of a proposal that the Sandinistas would cut off support for the insurgency in El Salvador in return for acceptance of their regime by the United States,\textsuperscript{53} to the regret of Ambassador Pezzullo.\textsuperscript{54}

The accord fell through partly due to the fact that the Sandinistas felt that Enders had not made a firm enough commitment that the US would close down training camps for anti-FSLN Nicaragua exiles on American soil,\textsuperscript{55} but they were also undermined in Washington by the steadfast opposition of Reaganite policy-makers who used concerns about democracy in Nicaragua as a tool to discredit the State Department’s containment policy and to promote their own policy of rollback. William Casey, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Clark and State


\textsuperscript{51} Gutman, \textit{Banana Diplomacy}, 36.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, 36-7.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, 68-70.

\textsuperscript{54} Gutman, 71.

Department counsellor Robert McFarlane criticised Enders for not placing enough emphasis on the democratisation of Nicaragua in the talks and for stating that the United States accepted Nicaragua’s revolution and its present internal order. These objections were then used to call for a rejection of the policy and a renewed emphasis on support for a militarised covert program aimed at overthrowing the Sandinistas.

This process had already begun in August, and was couched in terms of bringing democracy to Nicaragua. When Dewey Clarridge, a CIA official working under Casey, met military leaders in Honduras in August 1981 and pledged US support for the Contras he cast this US commitment in the language of spreading democracy, declaring to the Hondurans that “We must change the government of Nicaragua to give the Nicaraguan people the chance to democratically elect its own government.” The process culminated in NSDD-17, signed by the President in November, which allocated a $19.95 million program of support for the Contras.

However, the Reaganite policy was no more an endorsement of Douglas and Samuels’ vision of democracy promotion than of the State Department’s pragmatic containment policy. The fact that the Reaganites had not shown a serious degree of commitment to democratic transformation in El Salvador indicates that their use of democratic rhetoric in support of the Contras was purely tactical, and that their calls for democracy in Nicaragua masked their geopolitical objective: the overthrow of the Sandinista regime. This objective was to be achieved, not through political methods but through the support of a violent insurgency whose commanders had a commitment to democracy which was shaky at best. Reaganite officials used an abstract concept of democracy which identified

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56 See Gutman, 71.
57 Quoted in ibid, 87.
59 See Gutman, 71-72.
the pursuit of democracy with the pursuit of US national security interests to legitimate a policy of supporting an anti-democratic force. Rather than taking on board democracy promotion as a coherent policy framework, the administration was still divided into factions which deployed democratic rhetoric when needed to prosecute or legitimate their own policies but which remained uninterested in the wider framework advanced by private sector democracy promoters.

This continuing focus on legitimation rather than serious programs of political reform was showcased in the administration’s new Human Rights policy, produced in late October 1981, which sought to provide its foreign policy with a moral basis which extended beyond anti-Communism. The Reagan administration had not been greatly interested in Human Rights in its first few months, as it blamed the strategy for the perceived erosion of US power in the Third World under the Carter administration. Moreover, it had experienced problems in staffing the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Its first nominee for head of the Bureau, Ernest Lefever, had not been confirmed due to Congressional belief that he was not interested in promoting Human Rights. This meant that the Bureau did little, and had little clout within the administration, until the Reagan administration’s second choice, a young Reaganite neoconservative called Elliott Abrams, was confirmed. Abrams later played a role in managing support for the Nicaraguan contras after his subsequent appointment as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs in 1985 and later returned to government in the George W. Bush administrations as an NSC official with responsibility for the Middle East and then democracy promotion. The transfer of the Bureau into friendly hands after this hiatus provided an opportunity to codify a Human Rights policy.

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61 Ibid, 1066.
policy for the Reagan administration, which had up to this point devoted little attention to a policy area seen as tending to damage US national security through weakening pro-US dictators.

This new doctrine, outlined in a memo produced within the State Department on 27th October by the Reaganite Deputy Secretary of State William Clark and Under Secretary of State for Management Richard T. Kennedy, showed some signs of bringing Human Rights closer to democracy promotion by narrowing the Human Rights agenda which had been pushed by the Carter administration. Whereas the Carter administration had conceptualised Human Rights as containing economic and social dimensions and as not exclusively geared towards exporting democracy, the authors of the memo favoured a narrower concept which limited Human Rights to political rights and civil liberties, and even considered changing the name of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to reflect this. The memo recommended that “we should move away from 'human rights' as a term, and begin to speak of "individual rights," 'political rights' and 'civil liberties.'”

This narrower concept, shorn of the social and economic rights which the Carter administration’s conception had included, allowed a closer identification between Human Rights and more traditional American ideas of democracy and foreign policy ideology. However, the memo put forward no program to advance Human Rights or to spread “political liberty” in the world on a practical basis and did not engage with the issue of promoting democracy. Instead, it was a continuation and systematisation of the administration’s practice

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67 Ibid.
of using democratic ideology to legitimate its own foreign policy, both domestically and in Western Europe, while criticising the Soviet Union.

The new doctrine had been prompted first and foremost by attacks on the administration’s foreign policy both by Congress and by allies, rather than a concrete plan to push for global political reform. This is made clear in the document, which states that:

We will never maintain wide public support for our foreign policy unless we can relate it to American ideals and to the defence of freedom. Congressional belief that we have no consistent human rights policy threatens to disrupt important foreign policy initiatives…. Human rights has been one of the main avenues for domestic attack on the Administration’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{69}

The administration also planned to use Human Rights as a propaganda concept to maintain the bonds between the US and its democratic allies, as it had been using democracy in Project Truth:

We must continue to draw the central distinction in international politics between free nations and those that are not free. To fail at this will ultimately mean failure in staving off movement toward neutralism in many parts of the West.\textsuperscript{70}

Furthermore,

Our audience is not only at home but in Western Europe and Japan and among electorates elsewhere.\textsuperscript{71}

To accomplish the aims of combating neutralist sentiment in Western Europe and restoring the US’ moral and political leadership of the Western bloc, State’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was given the role of providing policy guidance on Human Rights to USIA, highlighting how US ideological power and the concept of Human Rights were

\textsuperscript{69} “Extracts from State Department memo on Human Rights,” 1 (my italics).
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid (my italics).
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
becoming ever more tied together.\textsuperscript{72} Thus, the new Human Rights doctrine would support propaganda initiatives already under way, such as Project Truth.

The concept of Human rights was also to be used as an ideological weapon against the USSR, as the memo stated that “‘Human rights’ - meaning political rights and civil liberties – conveys what is ultimately at issue in our contest with the Soviet bloc.”\textsuperscript{73} The ideology of Human Rights was thus a tool in the “battle of ideas” which the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was expected to wage.\textsuperscript{74} In practical terms this meant “[e]xpounding our beliefs and affirmatively opposing the U.S.S.R. in the U.N., C.S.C.E. (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and other bodies.”\textsuperscript{75} Thus, the US would continue to engage with the processes and machinery to monitor Human Rights abuses in the Soviet bloc which had been set up in the wake of the Helsinki Accords in 1975.

Human Rights could play a key role in legitimating the administration’s foreign policy to the American public and US allies while also being a useful propaganda weapon against the USSR, as in these areas the pursuit of Human Rights did not clash with national security objectives. However, the administration a more difficult challenge in the Third World, where it had to balance its fear that the promotion of Human Rights in pro-US dictatorships could weaken existing governments and lead to Communist advances with measures to placate its domestic critics. The administration’s Human Rights policy towards the Third World allowed more room for criticism of the US’ authoritarian allies, while essentially preserving the policy of working through and with existing regimes to safeguard US national security interests.

\begin{flushright}
\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{72} Ibid, 3.
\bibitem{73} “Extracts from State Department memo on Human Rights,” 1.
\bibitem{74} Ibid, 3.
\bibitem{75} “Extracts from State Department memo on Human Rights,” 2.
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The memo recognised that “A Human Rights policy means trouble, for it means hard choices which may adversely affect certain bilateral relations….” However, the fear was that failing to criticise authoritarian allies would delegitimate US foreign policy, not that failing to press for real reform of their regimes could lead to anti-US regime changes, with the document arguing, “There is no escaping this [need to criticise authoritarian allies] without destroying the credibility of our policy, for otherwise we would be simply coddling friends and criticizing foes.” Rather than proposing a policy of supporting reform, the memo concentrated on how the US could rationalise its further support of such allies, arguing that:

our response or retaliatory actions should result from a balancing of all pertinent interests. Human rights is not advanced by replacing a bad regime with a worse one, or a corrupt dictator with a zealous Communist politburo.

The positive measures put forward for improving Human Rights in dictatorial allied states, such as limited embargoes of riot control equipment, amounted to little more than cosmetic measures to reassure Congress and did not constitute a strategy of political transformation. It kept the essential core of the Kirkpatrick doctrine, while providing space for criticism and limited sanctions on authoritarian regimes at the margins.

The new Human Rights doctrine represented an attempt to systematise the administration’s justification of its foreign policy initiatives in Western Europe, the USSR and Central America in terms of abstract democratic ideology into one rhetorical framework for the legitimisation of its incoherent policy, not a genuine attempt to connect the promotion of political liberty in the world to US foreign policy aims. It seemed clear that while the State Department, and the administration as a whole, might be prepared to deploy democracy
promotion in the particular case of El Salvador, it remained uninterested in the wider project
advanced by Douglas and Samuels.

The Department’s subsequent policy initiative on democracy promotion limited the
policy to Latin America in its widest interpretation, and confined it to El Salvador in its most
limited. In a speech to a meeting of OAS foreign ministers on December 4th on the island of
St Lucia, Haig called for the creation of a democracy promotion organisation but tied it
clearly to the need for credible elections in El Salvador. In his address, Haig laid out a 3-point
“agenda for co-operation”:

First, to reaffirm and promote democracy; second, to create new economic
opportunity, and third, most urgently, to oppose interventionism by strengthening the
principles of nonintervention and collective security.\(^{79}\)

Opposing “interventionism”, by which the administration meant
Soviet/Cuban/Sandinista support of revolutionary movements, was the true objective, with
the other two points listing being methods to achieve this. Haig tied this support for
democracy specifically to support for elections in El Salvador:

Specifically, we hope that the countries of this hemisphere will support the
government of El Salvador as it leads its people through the electoral process toward a
political solution of the conflict there.\(^{80}\)

Haig gave his proposals concrete form by calling for “an institute for the study of
democracy in the Americas” to provide a “regular exchange of ideas and experiences among
democratic leaders”\(^{81}\). It is unclear from Haig’s speech what the exact duties and parameters
of the new institute would be and documents fleshing out this plan have yet to be located;
however, Haig seems to have had in mind some sort of central focal point for the political
training of Central American democrats, similar to Menges’ proposal of January that year,

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\(^{80}\) Ibid, 2.

\(^{81}\) Ibid, 2.
which might be combined with the technical assistance and observer missions to Latin American elections which he also called on the OAS to carry out. This program seemed to represent an immediate response to the crisis in El Salvador, and it is uncertain how far its operations would have extended beyond this.

Organisationally, the proposal cut out the US private groups which the private democracy promoters wanted to mobilise under a semi-autonomous umbrella foundation. While Douglas and Samuels had argued that this organisational form would make democracy promotion more credible to foreign democrats and serve to clearly separate it from previous covert operations, Haig’s proposal resolved these concerns in a different way. Rather than creating a private organisation which could not be seen as part of the government’s foreign policy bureaucracy, Haig’s strategy was to cast the effort as a multilateral one involving all Latin American countries. To this end the Secretary of State began his speech by invoking Simon Bolivar and stated that “by making the [OAS] secretary-general [the Institute’s] director, we would insure a cooperative effort.” Haig also proposed that the Institute should be named “The Betancourt Institute” in honour of the famous and respected Venezuelan democratic leader Romulo Betancourt, a further attempt to give it a Latin American image.

Although the proposed Betancourt Institute represented a more concrete vision of democracy promotion than had been achieved thus far, it was still an element of a particular strategy rather than an expansive one, and the proposed organisational framework was too limited to accommodate a strategy of democracy promotion which embraced the wider transformative project urged by the private sector democracy promoters outside the Western Hemisphere.

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82 “Excerpts from Haig’s address at OAS meeting,” 2.
83 Ibid, 2.
84 Ibid, 2.
While in 1981 the different factions within the administration had attempted to mobilise democratic ideology in support of their own particular geopolitical goals, the private democracy promoters had used these immediate crises as examples to convince the administration of the value of their own pre-existing strategy. This strategy had clear applications to existing national security crises in El Salvador and Nicaragua, but went beyond them to propose a long-term transformative project aimed at the whole of the Third World conducted through privately-managed instrumentalities funded by the US government.

However, these proposals did not impel a shift in the way the Reagan administration viewed the interconnection of democracy and national security strategy. With the exception of El Salvador, the administration as a whole and the factions within it continued to mobilise democratic ideology as a cover for the implementation of policy options which had no clear link to the creation of democratic systems, as in Nicaragua, as a tool of legitimation domestically and in Western Europe, and as a weapon of ideological warfare to be used against the Soviet Bloc, while reproducing Kirkpatrick’s justifications for support of authoritarianism in its policy towards the Third World. The only exception to this was the State Department’s policy towards El Salvador. A decisive shift in US policy produced by a further catalytic event would be needed to enable democracy promotion to transcend the State Department’s corralling of the concept to Central America.
The declaration of martial law by the Polish government and its suppression of Solidarity on 13\textsuperscript{th} December 1981, a few days after Haig’s speech recommending a Central American democracy institute to the OAS, was the catalytic event which brought the idea of a wider campaign of democracy promotion into the policy-making debate within the administration. The more strident calls for the support of dissident movements in Eastern Europe which resulted from the Polish government’s actions triggered a process which resulted in the proposal of a government-sponsored strategy of democracy promotion to be implemented by US private groups.

This proposal, in turn, brought the strategic and organisational tensions involved in pursuing such a campaign to the forefront of the policy debate and resulted in horizontal conflicts within the administration between competing groups of policy-makers. Although the struggle was largely between officials based in the State Department and the NSC, the primary reason for this conflict was not bureaucratic politics but competing visions of how such a campaign for democracy could be used as a vehicle to pursue US national security interests. The primary tension was strategic and brought the pre-existing policy differences between these two departments over policy towards the Soviet Union and pro-US authoritarian regimes into the open and intensified them.

The debate turned on which regimes a campaign for democracy should target and the end-goals of such a campaign. The NSC wanted to prosecute a particularist campaign aimed at using democracy promotion to weaken and undermine pro-Soviet governments and the government of the USSR internally, while maintaining support for pro-US dictatorships. In contrast, the State Department felt that democracy promotion could be used to enhance
containment in the Third World by transitioning illegitimate pro-US dictatorships to more stable democratic governments, while creating internal problems for the USSR in its zone through the support of dissident groups and movements. These Soviet bloc operations aimed to strengthen containment by focussing Soviet attention inwards and away from external expansion, not to destroy or transform pro-Soviet governments or the USSR itself. This vision was far more universalist than that of the NSC. Tensions over democracy promotion were incorporated into the strategic debate over whether to pursue the containment of Soviet power or a project of weakening Communist regimes internally through political warfare.

The move to political operations on a wide scale required the creation of a state-private network to implement them. However, the injection of US private groups into the campaign complicated the strategic tension by adding an organisational one. While the use of private groups had operational advantages for the United States government, some degree of government control would clearly be needed to manage the gap between private interests, whether these were expressed as the ideological promotion of democracy or the sectional interests of the groups concerned, and the particular national security interests of the US. The choice of either a particular strategy based on operations against the Soviet bloc only or a more universalist one based on the containment of Soviet power through the support of democratic movements globally, including the Soviet bloc, implied the exercise of different degrees of control over the private groups by the government. Each contending faction within the administration engaged in bureaucratic warfare to institute a pattern of state-private relationships favourable to its own strategy, while blocking other solutions. It was the distribution of power in the administration and the attitude of the President which would exercise the most influence on the model of democracy promotion which emerged from this struggle.
Martial law in Poland and the shift towards democracy promotion

The declaration of martial law in Poland had a profound impact on the development of democracy promotion. The emergence of the crisis in Eastern Europe brought the disagreements over anti-Soviet strategy within the administration between those who were focussed on weakening and undermining Communist control of the Soviet bloc internally and those who gave priority to strengthening the “Free World” instead into the open and made it a matter of urgency to resolve them. It was this raising of the stakes in Eastern Europe which resulted in the proposal of a strategy of democracy promotion which would operate in both the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

The immediate effect of the crisis was to strengthen the Reaganites in their calls for a political and economic assault on the Soviet bloc. This campaign could be prosecuted as a crusade for democracy, as in the Polish case US national security interests and pro-democratic rhetoric intersected and reinforced each other instead of working at cross-purposes. Richard Allen, who had recently left the administration but continued to serve on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, showed this link when he asked rhetorically: “Are we not now presented with a beautiful opportunity to raise the cost suddenly and dramatically and seize the high ground?”85 In addition to this ideological reinforcement, the Reaganite faction found they had more space in which to push for punitive actions against the USSR and Poland, because while the US government as a whole had been preparing for a Soviet invasion, there was no pre-existing consensus on what action to take in the event of a crackdown by the Polish government.86

The Reagan administration in fact imposed a range of sanctions on Poland in the wake of martial law, suspending talks over a long-term grain agreement with the USSR and placing an embargo on the export of scientific and technical equipment to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{87} Dobson argues that President Reagan’s motivation in imposing these measures was to send a clear message of disapproval to Moscow;\textsuperscript{88} however, the Reaganite faction in the administration wanted to go further. This hard-line group, composed of Casey, Clark and Weinberger, together with second-tier policy-makers such as NSC staffers Richard Pipes and Norman Bailey, Weinberger advisor Richard Perle and Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Lawrence Brady\textsuperscript{89} wanted to institute more punitive measures, including declaring Poland in default on the debt it owed to Western banks. The aims of such a policy were to wage economic warfare\textsuperscript{90} by reducing the Soviets economic capacity to build up and maintain its military forces\textsuperscript{91}. This Reaganite desire for economic warfare preceded the Polish crisis, as Casey had argued that economic problems and political unrest made the Soviet bloc vulnerable in May 1981,\textsuperscript{92} long before the Polish crisis had come to a head.

The Reaganites had found a tangible target for US economic warfare measures in the Urengoi gas pipeline, which was intended to transport Soviet natural gas to Western Europe and was being part-financed by a number of Western European countries. It was thought that embargoes on the equipment the Soviets needed to construct the pipeline would hurt them by depriving them of foreign currency earnings and damaging the Soviet economy.\textsuperscript{93} However,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} Alan P. Dobson, “The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to Close Down the Cold War,” \textit{Diplomatic History} 29, no. 3 (2005): 552.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Ibid, 534 and 537.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Michael Mastanduno defines economic warfare as actions which seek to reduce the military capacity of a state indirectly by damaging its economy in all sectors. See Michael Mastanduno, “Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet Union,” \textit{World Politics} 37, no. 4 (1985):506-7.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Raymond L. Garthoff, \textit{The Great Transition: American-Soviet relations and the End of the Cold War} (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1994), 549.
\item \textsuperscript{92} See Chapter Two, 81.
\end{itemize}
the administration had never been able to agree on the parameters for restricting the export of the technology the Soviets required to complete the pipeline: Haig had pressed for the adoption of the least restrictive guidelines possible in order to gain Western European support for the policy, while NSA Richard Allen pushed for tougher measures. The Polish crisis changed this dynamic and allowed the hard-liners to push for the harsher measures they favoured on the grounds that sustained economic warfare could cause the collapse of the USSR. On December 29th, the Reagan administration suspended export licences for pipe-laying equipment to the Soviet Union. The Department of Commerce then decided, seemingly unilaterally, that the sanctions would be retroactive and would apply to US subsidiaries. While these actions were insufficient to meet the maximal program of the Reaganites, they were certainly a step in the right direction.

This decision opened up a potential fault-line between the US and its allies, as it meant that companies in Western Europe manufacturing pipe-laying equipment under licence from US firms would also be subject to the ban or risk having secondary sanctions imposed on them, and that contracts already signed would have to be abrogated. However, the largest fault line which the decision opened up was in the administration itself. While Weinberger, Casey and others in the administration wished to forge ahead with tough sanctions, up to and including a complete Western trade embargo on Poland and the USSR, Haig was initially cautious, fearing that too strong a response could trigger direct Soviet intervention in Poland. He also felt that the Soviet Union’s political and economic

95 See Dobson, “The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to Close Down the Cold War:” 537.
96 Haig, Caveat, 254.
98 Haig, 251.
vulnerability was being greatly exaggerated.\(^{99}\) In general, Haig, while in favour of some sanctions, recommended more incremental measures.\(^{100}\) Although, as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, he had also opposed the pipeline when it was first begun, and for the same reasons as the Reaganites,\(^{101}\) as Secretary of State he recognised that the Western Europeans had already invested a great deal in the pipeline project, both in terms of money and planning, and that they were unlikely to withdraw from it or buckle to US sanctions.\(^{102}\)

In Haig’s view, US pressure on Western Europeans to abrogate economic relations which they stood to profit from greatly in the service of an uncompromising anti-Sovietism which was not part of their ideological worldview would probably serve the interests of the USSR more than the USA in the long run by driving a wedge between the US and its allies.\(^{103}\) Preserving the NATO alliance was more important than spending valuable allied goodwill to achieve a goal which might prove to be unattainable. Haig managed to delay the imposition of tough sanctions by sending a State Department mission to Western Europe to persuade the Western European leaders to fall into line with the US approach,\(^{104}\) but he was not hopeful, seeing the whole controversy as damaging to the NATO alliance.\(^{105}\) Haig was supported in this stance by State Department officials with responsibility for foreign economic policy such as Meyer Rashish, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Robert D. Hormats, his successor, who argued that US attempts to impede the pipeline

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\(^{99}\) Haig argued in his memoirs, written soon after, that “In the Polish crisis we were not seeing the collapse of the Soviet empire. Moscow’s difficulties with the Poles were a sign of trouble and decay, but the situation was not irreversible.” See Haig, 250.

\(^{100}\) This was the basic thrust of his message to Margaret Thatcher of December 19th 1981. See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 257.

\(^{101}\) Haig, Caveat, 252.

\(^{102}\) Ibid, 252-3.

\(^{103}\) Haig, 255

\(^{104}\) Dobson: 544

\(^{105}\) See William P. Clark, “Memorandum for the President: Terms of Reference for High-Level Mission to Europe on Soviet Sanctions,” undated, DDRS, accessed 7th July 2013, for a summary of Haig’s and the State Department’s case against the application of an export ban on US subsidiaries in Western Europe.
could result in a rupture of the Western alliance. However, the State Department was not unified on this question, with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff taking a more hard-line position. This brought the Reaganites and more pragmatic State Department officials into direct collision; one faction wanted to push for economic warfare in the belief that this could weaken the Soviets and possibly begin the process of destabilising the regime; the other saw little prospect of seriously harming the Soviets through sanctions and believed it was more important to preserve the Western alliance.

The conflict within the administration went beyond sanctions to include the issue of political operations in the Soviet bloc itself, as the Reaganites also began to push for greater US support of Solidarity now that the worst possible consequences of such support becoming known to the Soviets had materialised anyway. A proposal by Richard Pipes, the NSC’s hard-line anti-communist Director of Eastern European and Soviet Affairs, that the US government should begin covertly funding Solidarity was strongly supported by Weinberger, Casey, Clark and the President. Pipes argued that Solidarity must be kept going at all costs to spread its example to the rest of the Soviet bloc, while Casey argued more practically that the organisation would need help with command, control and communications systems and equipment to survive martial law. In mid-February Casey submitted a proposal for US covert funding of Solidarity to the President. Although proposals to channel US government aid to Solidarity were strongly opposed by Haig, who felt that the Soviets would not tolerate such actions, the crackdown had invalidated his previous arguments against US support of Solidarity to a large degree. The argument that if the Soviets discovered links

107 See Funigiello, ibid.
108 Schweizer, Victory, 69
110 Ibid, 75.
111 Schweizer, Victory, 69.
between the US and Solidarity they would launch a crackdown lost its force once the crackdown was already in train, as the US had little to lose.

This move to greater militancy in supporting anti-Soviet democratic groups behind the Iron Curtain was paralleled in the sphere of policy and ideology by a shift in the US’ Human Rights doctrine from the use of Human Rights as a rhetorical framework to criticise foreign governments to a policy of intervening politically to support private democratic groups. The new doctrine was announced in the State Department’s annual “Country Reports on Human Rights and Practices” for 1981,\(^\text{112}\) which stated that the goal of punishing abuses must be accompanied by a second track of positive policy with a bolder long-term aim: to assist the gradual emergence of free political systems. It is in such systems that we can most realistically expect the observance of human rights across the board.\(^\text{113}\)

Whereas the administration’s previous guidelines for the use of Human Rights in US foreign policy, laid down in November 1981, focused on the rhetorical use of the concept to solidify the Western alliance system and blacken the USSR internationally, the modified doctrine unveiled in January 1982 called on the US to take positive steps to alter political systems abroad. This ideological melding of Human Rights and democracy promotion co-opted the task of safeguarding Human Rights to the promotion of democracy abroad and transformed the campaign for Human Rights into a struggle over the shape of political systems in foreign countries. As a leading neoconservative analyst of Human Rights policies argued several years after this shift, “The struggle for human rights, far from being, as Carter and his aides proclaimed, indifferent to political systems, is fundamentally a struggle about

\(^\text{112}\) Although such Country Reports were normally submitted to Congress at the end of the year in question, the 1981 Country Reports were submitted at the end of January 1982 rather than December 1981, clearly placing them after martial law had been declared in Poland. The reason for this late submission was the disorganisation on the State Department’s Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs caused by the fact that the administration had been unable to get its own appointee, Elliott Abrams, confirmed until the end of October 1981.

Thus the doctrine of Human Rights was transformed into the legitimating ideology for US intervention in the internal political structure of other countries which had been missing since the scandals and crises of the late 1960s and 1970s. However, while this was a significant shift, impelled by the Polish crackdown, it was not the defining shift towards a policy of democracy promotion. Instead, it opened up further questions about whether such a policy should and could be pursued against all dictatorships on a universalist basis, or whether it would be limited to enemy states.

While the rhetoric underlying the policy was universalist, its targets were not. While this new Human Rights doctrine was couched in universal terms, its real strategic focus was determinedly particularist in targeting the USSR and its allies. The Country Reports had been produced under the aegis of Elliott Abrams, the recently-confirmed head of the Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs, a strongly anti-Soviet neoconservative who believed that “The greatest threat to Human Rights is the Soviet Union and its allies”. The announcement devoted a great deal of criticism to the Soviet Union, arguing that

…it is a significant service to the cause of human rights to limit the influence the USSR (together with its clients and proxies) can exert. A consistent and serious policy for human rights in the world must counter the USSR politically and bring Soviet bloc human rights violations to the attention of the world over and over again.

It also singled out Poland’s actions for criticism, stating that “The recent suppression of the Solidarity labor movement in Poland constitutes a massive violation of the [Helsinki] Final Act.” In contrast the document did not devote such harsh criticism to violations in friendly countries, beyond reiterating the position of the November 1981 memo that “hard choices” between Human Rights and other US objectives were sometimes necessary in dealings with

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such regimes.\textsuperscript{118} The impression is of a policy which remained more concerned with the Soviet bloc than friendly dictatorships.

This impression is strengthened by Abrams’ subsequent explanation of the policy in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations several days after the Country Reports had been published. While Abrams spoke about the need to influence pro-US dictatorships in the direction of democracy, he argued that the interests of the US and Human Rights were served through maintaining strong relationships between the US government and pro-US dictatorships. This was important to prevent Communist takeovers which, he argued, would be more damaging to the cause of Human Rights than the current regimes.\textsuperscript{119} The speech outlined no concrete strategy for promoting democracy in non-communist dictatorships, instead making an argument for the support of such regimes which was based on the short-term strategic interests of the United States. This was the Human Rights doctrine towards allied dictatorships advanced in the memo of 1981, not the new doctrine articulated in early 1982. Abrams’ actions were consistent with his words; one of his first acts as head of the Bureau was to certify that the Human Rights situation in El Salvador had improved, thus allowing military aid to be disbursed in January 1982.\textsuperscript{120}

The second key aspect of the doctrine was that it outlined a method for building democracy in dictatorships through connections with private groups abroad which it called “Building Freedom”. This meant that the US would lend support to private “pockets of freedom” which could then spread to the whole society. These “pockets of freedom” included

\begin{footnotes}
\item[Ibid, 97.]
\item[See The National Journal, “Abrams, State's Human Rights Chief,” 5.]
\end{footnotes}
labor unions, churches, independent judicial systems, bar associations and universities. *Where we do not have leverage over the shape of an entire society, we can nourish the growth of freedom within such institutions.*

Further support for the idea that the policy of promoting democracy and Human Rights was focussed on the Soviet bloc is the inclusion of “labor unions and churches” as “pockets of freedom” to be supported by the US, as these institutions constituted the leadership of the anti-communist movement in Poland. The doctrine would thus supply a rationale for US government funding of the AFL-CIO, which could then act as a conduit to Solidarity. However, neither the Country Reports nor Abrams himself spelled out exactly how such private groups could be mobilised or what role US private groups might play in linking up with foreign democrats. While Abrams conceded the freedom of US private groups to protest against Human Rights abuses in allied states if they wished, his speech contained no ideas on the role of private groups in building democracy in such countries or how they could be deployed.

The Polish crisis had impelled a shift towards a more confrontational posture towards the Soviet bloc which was tied to a conception of supporting private groups overseas to build democratic systems. However, it had not resulted in the delineation of a coherent strategy utilising foreign private groups. Instead, this shift served to open up the strategic and organisational questions connected with any such effort to further discussion. While the impetus seemed to be behind a particularist strategy of democracy promotion focussed on the USSR and its allies the idea of “Building Freedom” offered room for manoeuvre as it only articulated the policy in general terms and contained no organisational blueprint for how the policy could be implemented in co-operation with private groups. These omissions were used to argue for a much more universal campaign of democracy promotion implemented by private groups.

122Abrams, *“United States Human Rights Policy,”* 87.
A strategic and organisational model for universalist democracy promotion

Up until March 1982 it seemed that the initiative within the administration had passed to the narrowly anti-communist Reaganite faction. However, the fact that they had advanced no organisational solution to the problem of “Building Freedom” through private forces provided space for others to push their own priorities. A solution to the organisational problem was offered by Alexander Haig in a memo to Reagan in early March; however, rather than seeking merely to enable the Reaganite policy, Haig proposed his solution in the context of a strategy of democracy promotion which was far wider and more universalist than anything proposed previously, by either the government or the private sector democracy promoters.

Haig’s proposal was based on two geopolitical cases which preoccupied the administration – Poland and El Salvador – and generalised the approach to be deployed in each into a more universalist strategy. Haig’s argument that “In non-communist countries we need to help moderate democratic forces as the best long-term protection against communism”123 was clearly an expanded version of the State Department’s approach to the conflict in El Salvador which had been generalised to encompass a new US approach to Third World dictatorships. It also reversed the usual response of the national security bureaucracy to political change in allied states by arguing that, rather than opening the way to Communism, greater political freedom would actually create more stable regimes which were better able to withstand Communist pressure. Such an approach would go beyond the Kirkpatrick Doctrine and begin to implement the Bureau of Human Rights’ more positive policy in the Third World.

123 Alexander Haig, memo to the President, 8th March 1982, DDRS, accessed 11th December 2006, 2.
However, Haig went beyond this focus on the Third World to take in the Soviet bloc by arguing that “[w]e can help to keep the Soviets preoccupied with problems inside their existing empire (rather than expanding further) by giving practical assistance to democratic and nationalistic forces and thus going on our own political offensive”\textsuperscript{124}, with Poland cited as the concrete example. This expansion of democracy promotion to take in the Soviet bloc went further than the proposals of the 1970s, or Douglas’ and Samuels’ article of 1981.

This citing of the Soviet bloc as a possible target of political operations appears to indicate that Haig had abandoned his opposition to the tougher Reaganite policy. However, it is clear from a close reading of the memo that Haig’s acceptance of anti-Soviet political operations was motivated by his desire to limit and manage their impact, rather than a genuine conversion to the Reaganite viewpoint that such operations could help to undermine Soviet control of the bloc and the USSR. Haig’s formulation in the March proposal makes it clear that the support of democratic forces within the Soviet bloc was aimed at boosting containment by tying the Soviets up with domestic difficulties, not overthrowing or transforming Marxist governments. Haig accepted the proximate goal of the Reaganite strategy – disorder and instability in the Soviet bloc – as part of his own strategy but did not believe that the US was capable of overthrowing bloc governments. Thus, the State Department’s general strategy had not evolved from a policy of containing the USSR to one of undermining the internal control of Communist governments within the bloc.

Given the disagreements between the US and its NATO allies which he feared over the issue of economic sanctions, Haig might have agreed to political operations to head off the more serious threat of the tough sanctions the Reaganites proposed, which he believed to be dangerous to the Western alliance. This idea is supported by the next sentence in the document, which argues in regard to the anti-Soviet political offensive that

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, 2.
The use of this political tool [of containment] is no less effective than military and economic leverage, and is much less costly and risky.\textsuperscript{125}

Haig’s proposal of a gradualist approach was also aimed at limiting the political dangers posed by a democracy campaign. Haig called for a gradual approach to the targets of the strategy as a whole, as “[o]bviously there are constraints as to what we can do towards both communist and non-communist countries in the immediate future”. However, specifically, a “pragmatic and careful” approach would be best to avoid pushing the Soviets into dangerous counter-actions or “alarming our European allies with visions of an all-out effort to destabilize Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself”;\textsuperscript{126} all consequences of a more aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union which Haig had predicted and feared. Thus, the long-range approach advocated by Haig would make political operations within the Soviet bloc more acceptable to himself and other State Department officials. He also argued for a gradualist campaign in the Third World, stating that an immediate and all-out campaign might “destabilize non-democratic friends”\textsuperscript{127}. Such an approach might also make a campaign in the Third World easier to sell within the administration, as the Reaganite NSC was intensely worried that pushing pro-US dictatorships into liberalising measures precipitately would only weaken them and lead to seizures of power by anti-American forces, as these policy-makers believed had occurred in Nicaragua in 1979.

The new universalist strategy required a new instrumentality to implement it, as the expansion of the remit of democracy promotion from Central America to take in Eastern Europe rendered the organisational form which Haig had championed to the OAS in December 1981 – a democracy training institute to be run as multi-governmental organisation through the OAS – insufficient; such a limited institute could not be used to carry out democracy promotion operations outside the Western Hemisphere.

\textsuperscript{125} Haig to the President, 2 (Haig’s underlining).
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, 2.
Instead of this multi-governmental approach, Haig turned to the solution which had been advocated by the private sector; a non-governmental democracy promotion organisation. There were clear strategic and operational reasons for the shift to a private sector instrumentality which would be more flexible, plausibly deniable and credible than a government-run campaign. A strategy of democracy promotion which was to be deployed simultaneously in the Third World and in Eastern Europe needed as much freedom of action as possible, both from bureaucratic constraints within the policy-making apparatus and from interference from other countries. This freedom of action, which would be used to achieve US national security interests and not those of a coalition such as the OAS, would clearly best be provided by an organisation located outside the executive, and one which was solely American rather than a multi-governmental one of limited geographical scope.

The use of a private organisation could also solve the problem of plausible deniability inherent in mounting a program to alter the political structures of both allied and enemy dictatorships. The fact that the actions of such a private instrumentality could not be blamed on the US government would defuse accusations of American political or cultural imperialism or neo-colonialism in the Third World, as Douglas had originally argued, “fend[ing] off charges of interference from other countries.”\(^{128}\) It would also serve to fend off charges of interference from Poland or the Soviet Union, or at least make them less credible to the rest of the world. In addition, outsourcing democracy promotion to a non-governmental body would allow the US government to maintain working relationships with friendly dictators until they fell or the time came to replace them. A non-governmental instrumentality would also be more credible; as Douglas and Samuels had previously argued, such an institute would be more acceptable as an ally to the foreign private groups it sought to shape and influence than a government program. Whereas foreign democrats might be reluctant to

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^{128}\ Haig to the President, 3.
accept help from a foreign power, it might be easier to convince them to accept help from US private citizens. The fact that the new private organisation would require Congressional funding, as well as private money, to engage in a “major, sustained and professional effort”\textsuperscript{129} seemed to pose a threat to its ability to act in a credible and plausibly deniable manner; however, Haig did not consider this question in depth, merely asserting that “[t]he Europeans and the Soviets use such ‘private’ institutions for political operations without serious problems.”\textsuperscript{130}

Haig’s choice of a non-governmental instrumentality to implement democracy promotion opened up the prospect of closing the organisational gap in the national security apparatus by generating a new state-private alliance to replace the one which had ended in 1967. In fact, this new state-private network was already in the process of formation. State Department personnel were in contact with the private democracy promoters, who noted that State’s proposal “reflects a line of thinking developed in the State Department with some input from the APF” as a result of “several private meetings which included Doctor Michael Samuels, International Director of the Chamber of Commerce and Mr Mark Palmer, Deputy to the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department”.\textsuperscript{131} This is clear from the fact that many of the points made by Haig in his proposal were derived from arguments used by the private democracy promoters previously. Haig’s argument that “the United States is organized to give economic and military assistance, but we have no institutions devoted to political training and funding”\textsuperscript{132} was derived from the article co-authored article by Michael Samuels and William Douglas in 1981.\textsuperscript{133} Haig also uses the analogy of Western European political assistance to the Portuguese Socialist party used in Samuels’ proposal and refers to

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid, 3
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid
\textsuperscript{131} See APF, Minutes of 1982 Annual Meeting Board of Directors of American Political Foundation, 6th April 1982, Box 3: APF Minutes Folder 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC, 1.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid, 1.
other European efforts, possibly the West German foundations whose example was championed by George Agree. He also proposed a non-governmental Institute for Democracy along the lines previously suggested by Samuels.\footnote{134} Haig remained unhappy with the more militant ideas of the Reaganites about what policy the US should pursue in the Soviet bloc; however, he had converged with them over the use of private groups to conduct political operations overseas. Superficially, Haig’s proposal showed how the Reaganite blueprint could be carried out; however, his emphasis on implementation through a private group in the context of a gradualist campaign showed a desire not to empower the Reaganite vision but to limit and manage it.

This proposed recourse to a state-private institution to implement national security programs re-opened the strategic and organisational questions which had bedevilled the previous state-private network. The President’s response to Haig’s proposal clearly showed the strategic and organisational tensions which would have to be negotiated to make privately-implemented democracy promotion a reality. This response took several weeks to materialise and when it did, on 2nd April, it was channelled through William Clark, the administration’s new Reaganite National Security Advisor and a longstanding collaborator of the President. While Reagan was interested in the concept he was unsure how a universalist strategy based on building democracy abroad could be implemented in conformity with the particular national security interests of the United States. Strategically, Reagan wanted to know how the operations of the institute could be squared with the US need to maintain good relations with friendly dictators; this was a prime concern for the Reaganites within the administration, who feared any policy which might weaken such dictators in the face of Marxist insurgents. This was linked to the organisational question, as the President also wanted to know how the actions of a private organisation could be tied to US national

\footnote{134} Ibid.
security priorities while remaining credible enough to be effective and who would make operational decisions. Clearly, the administration did not want to create a private democracy institute which might escape Executive control and pursue actions which were not in line with US national security interests as it conceived them. All of these questions had a bearing on whether a non-governmental institute for democracy could be used effectively to support US national security interests.

Designing a new state-private network

Reagan’s queries led to further meetings between State Department representatives and the private sector democracy promoters. These discussions were not aimed at resolving strategic questions, as there was a considerable degree of overlap between the agenda of both groups. Instead, the focus was on how a credible and effective state-private organisation could be created to implement a campaign of democracy promotion.

On April 6th the APF directors met with Mark Palmer, the Deputy Undersecretary for Political-Affairs. Palmer had played a role in bringing the democracy promoters to the attention of the Department, meeting with Michael Samuels before Haig’s proposal of March 8th. Born in 1941 in Ann Arbor, Michigan, as a student Palmer had been a civil rights activist for the Student Nonviolent Co-ordinating Committee and a Freedom Rider for the Congress of Racial Equality before spending time in the Soviet Union as an exchange student. He had joined the Foreign Service in 1964 as a career official and was posted to Moscow as a consular officer, before returning to Washington to continue work in the State Department. Palmer was committed to the APF’s cause and believed that change within the USSR and

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136 Biographical information taken from Robie M. H. “Mark” Palmer, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy for The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 30th October 1997, accessed 31st July 2013, http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Palmer,%20Mark.toc.pdf. On Palmer’s civil rights activism see transcript, 5; for his time as a student in the USSR, 8; for information on his posting in Moscow, 27-39; for his work in the Reagan administration, 93-146

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Poland was possible. However, he also believed that such change needed to proceed in tandem with negotiations, and that it should not be pushed so obviously or rapidly that it led to Soviet countermeasures which would destroy the groups the United States was trying to help.¹³⁷

For these reasons, and to decide how operations could be carried out under similar constraints in the Third World, discuss at the APF meeting turned on how an effective, credible and plausibly deniable government-funded private democracy foundation could be created. The problems to be solved were similar to those which had led to the creation of the initial state-private network organisations in the late 1940s; the US state needed private allies whose actions would be more flexible, plausibly deniable and credible than the actions of national security agencies. These requirements had led to the provision of covert funding by the CIA to maintain credibility for the programs. However, the problem was more complex in the 1980s, as the shift to an overt relationship with the government threatened to tar any new democracy foundation as merely an arm of the national security bureaucracy. George Agree stated the problem neatly in a memorandum he circulated to the APF directors prior to the meeting:

An American institution for contact with democratic forces abroad along the lines of the State Department memo will need the utmost credibility to be effective. Attacks on its motivations and insinuations as to its control are inevitable. These can be minimized and their damage limited by careful preparation and structure.¹³⁸

Palmer concurred with this analysis, arguing that “the initiative should be independent or outside the executive branch”.¹³⁹ To avoid tension between the government funding of the organisation and its stated goal of promoting democracy, Agree and Palmer believed that it

¹³⁷ For these views see ibid, 99 and 134.
¹³⁸ George E. Agree, memo to APF Board of Directors 5th April 1982, Folder 3: APF Minutes Box1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC, 1.
¹³⁹ See APF, Minutes of 1982 Annual Meeting, 2.
should grow from the APF.\textsuperscript{140} As this organisation already existed, its enlargement into the umbrella organisation called for by Douglas and Samuels in 1981 could be presented as a natural development, helping to duck controversy. This covered the state to an extent in terms of plausible deniability, as it could argue that as its private allies had been active in their fields for a long period, they were not controlled by the state.\textsuperscript{141} The APF was already known to foreign party leaders, giving the state influence over a network which was already being constructed. It would also be more easily accepted overseas and domestically than a totally new institution. In addition, it already had the tax-exempt status necessary to make the most of any government funding.\textsuperscript{142} To further deflect suspicions of government manipulation of the organisation or allegations that it was being funded by the CIA, it was agreed that all financial records of the democracy institute would have to be open to public scrutiny.

Government funding of the APF alone was insufficient to wage a democracy campaign which was to include actions by other groups such as unions and business associations, however. What was needed was an effective umbrella structure which would be credible and would allow a number of different private groups to fold their sectional interests into a coherent strategy to promote democracy. Both the State Department and the APF agreed in principle with the State Department’s idea that:

While the American Political Foundation would be one beneficiary of funds from this new Institute….clearly the Institute needs to be a separate and much larger effort. But both parties should be on its board, along with other important elements like the AFL-CIO, a representative of the press, etc.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{141} This was an approach often followed in the previous state-private network. Before 1967 the CIA often chose private organisations which already existed and had credibility in their fields as partners in its covert operations. One such example was the AFL, which began anti-Soviet political operations in Western Europe before partnering with the CIA. See Hugh Wilford, \textit{The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 53-4.
\textsuperscript{142} See APF, Minutes of 1982 Annual Meeting, 3.
\textsuperscript{143} State Department, “American Support for Democratic Forces,” attached to Minutes of May 1982 Meeting of Board of Directors of American Political Foundation, Folder 3: APF Minutes Box1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC, 4. Haig’s March memo makes it clear that the Department had already entered into informal discussions with the AFL-CIO about its plans to promote democracy, and that the AFL-CIO was enthusiastic about joining
The State Department and George Agree fixed on the example of the West German party foundations as a model of how US private groups could act together to promote democracy overseas in a credible way.144

Agree had first lobbied for instrumentalities on the pattern of the West German foundations in 1977 and rearticulated his arguments in favour of them now. These foundations, although they were in fact and in the public perception, party-connected, were legally separate entities to the parties, operating independently of the parties, and able to receive private as well as government funding. Agree argued that the US institutions should be structured in exactly the same way, as this would facilitate their acceptance in countries in which the German foundations already operated; moreover, it would be difficult to attack the credibility of the US entities without also attacking that of the German foundations.145

The structure also needed to effectively corral private interests into a campaign to promote democracy. For the APF, the choice was between partisan government-funded party institutes along the lines of the West German instrumentalities, or one bipartisan foundation. It was this question which provoked disagreement. Agree and the Palmer argued that the US should create one bipartisan party foundation rather than following the West German model of a separate foundation for each party. Agree had argued for this when setting up the APF originally and Palmer’s position on this was clear; the State Department supported the creation of a bipartisan institute on the model of the APF, arguing that a bipartisan structure would help to overcome factional differences between and within the parties, as the promotion of democracy could act as an ideological rallying point which all the participants

the effort. According to the memo, “The AFL-CIO is positive” about the project. See Haig, memo to the President, 3. This was clearly a separate meeting with the AFL-CIO, not a meeting with a coalition of private groups. However, the APF seems to have made no objection to the widening of the democracy promotion field to include the AFL-CIO or other actors.

144See State Department, “American Support for Democratic Forces,” 1 for the Department’s interest in the West German foundations.

145See Agree, memo to APF Board of Directors, for these arguments.
agreed with. Of the APF’s most important Republican and Democratic leaders, Republican Chairman William Brock also supported the idea, believing a bipartisan institute would be more acceptable to Congress. It would also serve to maintain the focus of operations on democracy promotion rather than sectional group interests, as neither of the two parties would be able to conduct any democracy promotion operations the other was opposed to. While the position was generally accepted, Charles Manatt, the Democrat Vice-Chairman of the APF, questioned the viability of the idea of a bipartisan foundation and argued for separate party foundations.

While these conflicts over the connection between democracy promotion and private interests would grow in importance in the future, however, they were muted at this stage. All agreed that the most pressing matter was to convince the Reagan administration to back the creation of a private democracy promotion organisation. To accomplish this, the State Department accepted the game plan put forward by Michael Samuels in his proposal of 1980; a study which would help to build political consensus in favour of the plan. Palmer offered $200,000 from the Human Rights division of AID to finance the study. The commission would employ area and political specialists and would report in the first quarter of 1983. It would investigate existing international political activity by others, problems and opportunities for the US, and recommend pilot projects, a 3-year plan of operations, structure and a financing plan. Finally, Palmer urged haste, as the State Department wanted to include an announcement of the study in Reagan’s forthcoming speech to the British Parliament in June.

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146 See APF, Minutes, 6th April, 2.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid, 3.
149 See George E. Agree, “ Developing a Democratic Support Institution”.
150 See APF, Minutes, 6th April 1982, 1.
Policy conflicts over democracy promotion

Although the State Department and the APF had managed to come to an agreement over how private groups could be operationalised in the emerging campaign for democracy relatively easily, the Department’s attempt to sell its design within the administration encountered resistance. The primary difficulty was strategic disagreements with the Reaganite NSC, which feared that the Department and its private allies would press pro-US dictators hard enough to destabilise them while being too soft on the Soviets. These strategic disagreements translated into competing organisational models for the democracy promotion effort, as the degree of the state control required was directly linked to how far a universalist democracy promotion campaign was seen to clash with particular US national security interests.

Some progress had been made towards convergence between the different factions. The State Department’s acceptance of the Reaganite’s proximate goal in the Soviet bloc – to support anti-communist political movements – opened the way to some accommodation over Soviet policy. By April 1982 the NSC had also come to accept, however reluctantly, the State Department’s strategy of containment in Central America, with a policy summary dated April 6th stating that

We have an interest in creating and supporting democratic states in Central America capable of conducting their political and economic affairs free from outside interference. …In the short run we must work to eliminate Cuban/Soviet influence in the region, and in the long run we must build politically stable governments able to withstand such influences.\(^\text{151}\)

However, although the Reaganites had acknowledged the logic of State’s position in the case of Central America because a strategy of “[b]uilding democratic political institutions capable

of achieving domestic political support”\textsuperscript{152} could ease the passage of the military aid the NSC sought for the pro-US Salvadoran junta through Congress, this grudging acceptance of the need to build democracy in an allied state in one strategic case did not mean these Reaganites were willing to have this strategy generalised to other right-wing dictatorships in the Third World.

The fact that the APF’s organisational history, Douglas and Samuels’ article and the Department’s plans before martial law had been declared in Poland had focussed on democratising allied Third World dictatorships may have made Reaganites in the NSC suspicious that State’s plans for political warfare against the Soviet bloc were a fig leaf covering an obsession with toppling pro-US dictators. This debate emerged in full force after the Department reported to the NSC on its response to Reagan’s three concerns after its meeting with APF, on April 13\textsuperscript{th} 1982.

State’s reply tried to manage the Reaganites’ concerns by restating the anti-communist rationale for the democratisation of Third World dictatorships, arguing

While we often need to support non-democratic friends in the near term, over the long term most dictatorships are unstable and we should lay the foundation for a stable democratic successor. If we do not, we are leaving the field open for the communists.\textsuperscript{153}

The State Department also attempted to distance itself from the Carter administration’s Human Rights campaign, which many in the administration blamed for “losing” Iran and Nicaragua:

\[ \text{[t]he long-term institution-building nature of the institute’s programs would be a far cry from the human rights policies of the previous administration, which were punitive in approach and demanded immediate results.}\textsuperscript{154} \]

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{153} L. Paul Bremer, memo to William Clark, 13\textsuperscript{th} April 1982, Folder OA 90304 (5), Box 11, Kimmitt, Robert: Files, RL, 2.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, 3.
The policy of promoting democracy in the Third World would be a long-term effort aimed at building the private institutional precursors of a democratic regime from the ground up rather than a top-down attempt to pressure unsavoury dictators to reform or to dispense with them rapidly if they refused to do so. NSC staffer Dennis Blair summed up the “basic idea” of the project as “to give the United States an additional instrument for dealing with authoritarian regimes…We need a way to operate openly in support of moderates who are trying to build the structure of democracy – political parties, trade unions, media, etc.”

While DCI Casey was a strong supporter of the idea, however, the NSC was split over it, with some staffers fearing that promoting democracy in allied regimes would damage the national security of the United States. NSC official Norman Bailey, a hard-liner who had championed tough sanctions on the USSR in the wake of Polish martial law, feared that such programs would damage relations with friendly dictatorships, arguing that

[State’s memo] does not answer the question of how one trains labor leaders, journalists and others from friendly dictatorships without damaging our relationships with those dictatorships. In fact, a statement is made that “we should lay a foundation for a stable democratic successor.” I know of no dictators who would take kindly to that particular suggestion.

Bailey also objected that such a campaign would dilute the US government’s focus from contending with the Soviet Union: “[State’s memo] ignores the problem of building democracies in communist countries completely.” The State Department had not been asked to expand on this topic in William Clark’s memo of April 2nd, which the report of April 13th was written in response to, so the criticism was unwarranted, but it does show the centrality of narrow anti-Sovietism to the Reaganite world view.

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155 Blair was a naval officer on secondment to the NSC. He later served as Director of National Intelligence during Barack Obama’s first term, from January 2009 to May 2010.
156 Dennis Blair, memo to William Clark, 19th April 1982, Folder OA 90304 (5), Box 11, Kimmitt, Robert: Files, RL.
157 Norman A. Bailey, memo to Dennis Blair, 14th April 1982, Folder OA 90304 (5), Box 11, Kimmitt, Robert: Files, RL.
158 Ibid.
These strategic disagreements had a direct bearing on debates over what the relationship between the private groups and the state should be. Some level of government control would be needed, as there was no guarantee that once the organisation had been built and the private groups had received government funding they would pursue the national interests of the United States rather than carrying out actions based on their own ideologies or interests. However, a level of government control that was too visible would erode the advantages the democracy institute was expected to provide. Such a group would be more credible to foreign democrats as a source of assistance and advice than a US government organisation, especially in a Third World which had recently emerged from colonial domination by Europeans. The democracy institute would also be more capable of acting in support of democratic groups overseas without provoking credible accusations of a US government-led destabilisation campaign from sitting governments.

This problem recalled the tension between exercising the control of private groups receiving government funding necessary to ensure their actions conformed to national security objectives and providing them with the level of autonomy required for them to appear fully independent of the government which had been a constant and unresolved feature of the state’s relationships with private groups before 1967. However, this tension was more difficult to resolve in the early 1980s because the state-private relationship could not be kept covert due to the lingering effects of the 1967 crisis. The challenge was then to create an institution which would receive government funding overtly but which “could avoid being seen as an agency of the US government, while acting in a complementary way to government policies.”

The lack of strategic consensus within the administration over the targets and end-goals of a democracy promotion campaign complicated this task, as different administration

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159 L. Paul Bremer, memo to William Clark, 2.
factions proposed organisational models with differing mixes of state control and private autonomy commensurate with their own strategies. The State Department’s more geopolitically expansive strategy meant that the US government would have to exert less control over private partners, as the fact that both the State Department and the APF agreed on the promotion of democracy in both enemy and allied states meant that the private groups would not need to be warned out of activity in specific regions. In contrast, the NSC’s focus on a more narrowly anti-Soviet strategy indicated that a greater level of control would be needed in order to restrain private actions in pro-US dictatorships which the hard-liners feared might be weakened by democracy promotion programs. Significantly, no faction in the administration called for full private autonomy.

The State Department’s solution to the autonomy/control dilemma was to begin building long strings of control into its relationship with the APF which would not be apparent to a casual observer but which would enable the “light touch” direction needed to deploy private groups within the Department’s more universalist strategic framework. One method of exercising this control would be through government funding of the organisation. The Department also attempted to gain government leverage over the internal political dynamics of the organisation by recommending that the new democracy foundation’s voting procedures be structured so that a two-thirds majority of board members would be required to approve operations, with each party being given 40% of the votes, to ensure the party of the administration could ensure consistency with government policy.160 State’s April 13th report reassured other government officials that

The Foundation is viewed as independent, as are similar but government-funded foundations of the German political parties. However, it cannot as a practical matter stray far from government policy.161

160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.

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This mode of control was similar to the “ringed autonomy” which Stonor Saunders argued the CIA had used to manipulate its private partners in the 1950s and 60s;\textsuperscript{162} private groups would be given latitude over day-to-day operations, but rogue actions could be effectively vetoed due to the government’s influence over the foundation.

Some Reaganite staffers felt that this mode of control would be either unworkable or too damaging to the US’ existing relationships with pro-US dictatorships, however. According to Norman Bailey, the State Department’s suggestions for controlling the democracy foundation would only serve to destroy its credibility:

[The State Department memorandum’s] suggestions as to maintaining the myth of independence from the government are ludicrous.\textsuperscript{163}

Two other NSC officials, William Stearman and Carnes Lord, argued that “the body will be ‘tainted’ as an arm of the US government”, thus destroying its credibility, “yet the government will not have complete control”,\textsuperscript{164} increasing the possibility of rogue actions. These criticisms implied that the project was unrealisable because the autonomy/control problem was unresolvable.

The NSC’s solution, rather than abandoning the project, was to sacrifice credibility to control and to devise an organisational solution for corraling a private democracy promotion foundation into its own particularist anti-Soviet strategy in May. The power of the organisation, together with its ability to impose its Reaganite views on the other foreign policy-making agencies in the Executive, had been greatly increased by the departure of Richard Allen as NSA in November 1981.\textsuperscript{165} Unlike Allen, who had reported to the President through White House aide Edwin Meese his replacement, William Clark, reported to Reagan

\textsuperscript{162} See Chapter 1, 19-22.
\textsuperscript{163} Norman A. Bailey, memo to Dennis Blair.
\textsuperscript{164} Dennis Blair, memo to William Clark.
directly. Clark’s relationship with the President and his access to Reagan made the NSC a far more important player in the administration.  

In May, Clark tied the strategy of promoting democracy, and so the proposed institute, to the NSC’s budding anti-Soviet democracy campaign, the Council’s plan for a concerted ideological offensive against Soviet communism. Clark did this by embedding his call for “political training, organization and financial support for pro-Western forces” with “international campaigns on issues like Afghanistan and Poland”, “covert political action programs” and “USICA communications efforts”, elements of the NSC’s campaign and of Project Truth.

This action diluted State’s more ambitious universalist project by connecting it explicitly with a strategy focussed exclusively on direct anti-Sovietism, rather than the creation of democratic regimes as firewalls to Soviet expansion. It also diluted the emphasis on building democratic systems abroad by merging it with programs which aimed to deploy democratic ideology as an ideological rallying cry against communism in a way which was more reminiscent of the pre-1967 state-private network’s approach of projecting democracy ideologically than the new proposals which Douglas, Agree and Samuels had made in the 1970s. The targeting of the campaign was determined by the imperative of confronting the Soviet Union, rather than a strategy focussed on the creation of democratic systems in both friendly and enemy dictatorships. In contrast to this focus on anti-Sovietism, Clark made little mention of an anti-authoritarian dimension to the strategy aside from an isolated reference to “strengthen[ing] democracy in both communist and non-communist countries.” Thus, as of May 1982 the Institute for Democracy was contained within a larger program which

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167 William Clark, memo to the President, 12th May 1982, Folder OA90304 (5), Box 11, Kimmitt, Robert: Files, RL.
168 Ibid.
emphasised political and propaganda confrontation with the Soviet Union, not a balanced campaign to support democratic groups in both friendly and unfriendly dictatorships.

While Clark’s action forged an organisational link between the proposed private democracy promotion foundation and the Reagan administration’s narrowly anti-Soviet world view, the link between democracy promotion and anti-Soviet strategy was made clear in NSDD-32. This document was the Reagan administration’s first attempt at a coherent national security strategy, after over a year in office. The process of drafting it had begun in February 1982, when Reagan signed off on an NSSD which tasked Clark’s NSC to develop an overarching framework for national security policy.\footnote{Paul Lettow, \textit{Ronald Reagan’s Quest}, 63.} While the preparatory study which it was based on had been carried out by carried out by an interagency group consisting of the NSC, the State Department, CIA, JCS and Department of Defence,\footnote{Ibid, 64.} the document reflected the views of the Reaganite faction.\footnote{ibid, 68.}

The objectives for US national security policy outlined in NSDD-32 clearly went beyond the State Department’s focus on containment to include more aggressive anti-Soviet campaign which posited different objectives towards different elements of the Soviet Empire. The policy contained in the NSDD envisioned a campaign of rollback directed against Soviet-allied states in the Third World, with the document calling upon the US to “contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world”.\footnote{NSC, NSDD-32: Basic National Security Strategy, FAS, 20\textsuperscript{th} May 1982, accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} May 2007, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-032.htm 1, 1.} Within the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the administration would conduct political action to “encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies”\footnote{NSDD-32: Basic National Security Strategy, 2.} – a formulation which echoed Haig’s language in his 8\textsuperscript{th} March proposal. The campaign also included efforts to weaken the USSR domestically “by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic...
shortcomings”, as NSC hard-liners had called for in the wake of the Polish declaration of martial law. White House aides, speaking to journalists after a rare speech given by William Clark at Georgetown University on 21st May 1982 to explain the new strategy, further characterised the policy towards the Soviet bloc as an “active … campaign aimed at reform in the Soviet Union and dissolution or at least shrinkage of the Soviet empire”.

The basic objectives of US national security policy towards the Soviet Empire were to contain further Soviet expansion, roll back the spread of Soviet influence in the world, and weaken Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the power of the ruling elite in the USSR itself through economic warfare and support for political movements behind the Iron Curtain. Beyond these objectives, the bulk of the document consisted of discussion of US military posture, and a clear strategy for achieving these objectives was not laid out. However, NSDD-32 clearly indicated the beginning of a move beyond the policy of containing the USSR through external measures to one of rolling back Soviet advances and seeking to affect the balance of political forces within Eastern Europe and the USSR itself through political intervention within these states. While the document did not set out a clear strategy for political operations within the Soviet bloc, it did posit objectives which such operations could be used to attain.

Clark’s Georgetown speech clarified the ideological basis of the policy by couching it in the context of an ideological struggle for democracy in the Soviet bloc. Clark stated that “….collectivism and the subordination of the individual to the state” constituted a “bizarre and evil episode of history…We have something better to offer – namely freedom.” He was also forthright about the administration’s goal of using US national security policy

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174 Ibid.
177 Quoted from Lettow, Ronald Reagan’s Quest, 69.
encourage reform in the USSR by “convince[ing] the leadership of the Soviet Union…to seek the legitimacy that only comes from the consent of the governed…” 178 It was clear that private democracy promotion programs would play a role, alongside other forms of intervention, in the administration’s anti-Soviet strategy.

Despite this democratic rhetoric and the similarity to Haig’s language in the description of the political operations to be conducted, however, the document had incorporated democracy promotion into a particularist strategy, not a universalist one. The objective of pressuring regimes to reform or altering regime types was not set with regard to non-communist dictatorships in the Third World. There was some recognition of the roots of Third World instability and the Soviet exploitation of it:

Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient economies, and the persistence of traditional conflicts create opportunities for Soviet expansion in many parts of the developing world. 179 However, the document detailed no strategy to solve this problem which included the ideas of Douglas, Samuels or the State Department. Instead, the paper remarked blandly that

encourag[ing] and strongly support[ing] trade, aid and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World 180 would be sufficient. Nowhere in the document were the political problems of Third World regimes analysed or a solution proposed, beyond this piece of economic determinism. Thus, democracy promotion in the Third World was not an integrated part of this Reaganite grand strategy; in contrast, democracy promotion activities in the Soviet bloc were clearly linked to attempts to reduce Soviet power or alter the regime through propaganda and the support of anti-Soviet political movements.

178 Ibid, 70.
180 Ibid, 1.
This integration of democracy promotion into the administration’s pre-existing plans for a campaign to deploy democratic propaganda against the Soviet Union and its allies and then the codification of this particularist strategy in the administration’s new national security framework diverged from the State Department’s vision, which called for a wider campaign, and that of the APF. The document represented a defeat for the State Department’s strategy of tough containment and did not have a great deal of support from higher-level Department officials, especially Haig.\textsuperscript{181} However, the Secretary of State’s power within the administration was declining, and there was little he could do to block it at this stage.\textsuperscript{182}

The tussle between these two visions, one more particular and one universalist, also occurred over the drafting of Reagan’s speech to the British Parliament, to be delivered on June 6th 1982, in which Reagan was to unveil a coherent vision of the administration’s attitude towards Human Rights and the spread of democracy in the world. State had wanted to announce the APF study, which would lead to a campaign of democracy promotion in both the Soviet bloc and the Third World in the course of the speech, and a draft was prepared by the State Department and submitted in April, with no Reaganite participation.\textsuperscript{183} Richard Pipes claims that the President rejected this draft as being too moderate because it did not focus strongly enough on the Soviet Union’s internal structure\textsuperscript{184} and that the final draft, produced by Reagan’s main speechwriter, Anthony Dolan, was based partly on a paper on anti-Soviet strategy which he wrote in May 1981 and was then forwarded to Reagan in November of the same year.\textsuperscript{185}

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{181} Lettow, \textit{Ronald Reagan’s Quest}, 68.
\item \textsuperscript{182} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Richard Pipes, \textit{Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger} (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), 199.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Pipes, \textit{Vixi}, 196-197, 199.
\end{footnotes}
Reagan’s speech to the British Parliament on 8th June followed the strategic and organisational course set out by Clark and in NSDD-32 in May. The speech set democracy promotion through the support of private groups overseas as a goal of US foreign policy:

The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.\textsuperscript{186} However, the speech tied this effort to a particularist campaign aimed at the Soviet bloc, not a universalist one. The theme running through Reagan’s remarks was an ideological struggle against the USSR based on democracy. Reagan’s remarks were uncompromisingly anti-Soviet, claiming that communism would be left on the “ash-heap” of history by a worldwide democratic revolution and fiercely criticising Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and particularly Soviet repression in Poland.\textsuperscript{187} However, he made little mention of democracy in the Third World, preferring to keep the focus on the Soviet Bloc. Regarding democratisation of the Third World, Reagan stated that

Some argue that we should encourage democratic change in right-wing dictatorships, but not in Communist regimes. Well, to accept this preposterous notion – as some well-meaning people have – is to invite the argument that once countries achieve a nuclear capability, they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror over their own citizens. We reject this course.\textsuperscript{188} While this might suggest an even-handed desire to democratise both types of regime, the fact that the speech was devoted almost completely to discussion of the Soviet Union suggested that the Soviet empire was uppermost in the President’s mind, rather than right-wing regimes allied to the US. While Reagan made some reference to “the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries” he made little reference to the specific need to build democracy in Third World states. The only reference to political


\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{188} Reagan, “Speech to the British Parliament”.

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conditions in Central America is criticism of the FMLN and comments on their lack of participation in the elections of March 1982.\textsuperscript{189}

The Reaganites in the administration who had influenced the content of the speech clearly saw the campaign for democracy as primarily an anti-Soviet strategy, and wanted to present it to the world in this light. This ideological strategy was intertwined with actions: on June 7\textsuperscript{th}, the day before he gave the speech, Reagan had visited Pope John Paul II in Rome to discuss the situation in Poland and increase co-operation between the US and the Vatican over assistance to Solidarity.\textsuperscript{190} While Reagan described his call for a democratic campaign against the Soviet Union as a "plan and hope for the long term"\textsuperscript{191} rather than an effort that would bring immediate results, there could be little doubt that the final goal was to transform the Soviet regime.

The speech said little about how a campaign for democracy could be organised. Reagan’s words on building the infrastructure of democracy contained references to many of the private groups which the democracy promoters had argued should be supported through a non-governmental foundation, such as political parties and unions. However, it is clear from Reagan’s speech that these private groups were to be expected to function in co-ordination with governmental organisations, as Reagan stated that

\begin{quote}
It is time that we committed ourselves as a nation – in both the public and private sectors – to assisting democratic development.
\end{quote}

This represented an endorsement of the idea Clark had put forward in May, of a campaign which was to embrace both governmental and private instrumentalities.

The campaign presented by Reagan was at odds with the original vision of private sector democracy promoters and the APF leadership. The organisation had clearly become

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{190} Schweizer, Victory, 107.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
aware that the power centres of the administration had become more focussed on a vision of
democracy promotion which tied it into a particularist anti-Soviet strategy rather than their
own universalist conception. To head off the danger of the universalist dimension of the
policy disappearing, the APF’s Republican and Democrat leaders, together with APF
Chairman William Brock, who was also a member of the administration due to his position as
US International Trade Representative, wrote a letter to Reagan on June 4th outlining the
rationale and aims of the APF’s study into democracy promotion, as agreed with the State
Department in April. The APF leaders made no reference to authoritarian or communist
regimes, preferring to state diplomatically that the study aimed at investigating “how to
handle the tension between maintaining friendly relations with current governments while
sowing the seeds of democratic successors” and “how to encourage domestic pluralistic
forces in totalitarian countries”.192 It was a plea for the reinstatement of the more universalist
vision which the APF and the State Department had converged over earlier in the year.
Although the appeal did not change Reagan’s mind over the thrust of the strategy it clearly
had some effect, as the President did announce the study which the APF and the State
Department had lobbied for:

The chairman and other leaders of the national Republican and Democratic Party
organizations are initiating a study with the bipartisan American [P]olitical [F]oundation
to determine how the United States can best contribute as a nation to the global campaign
for democracy193

The entry of the concept of privately-implemented democracy promotion into the
policy debate within the Reagan administration had brought the strategic and organisational
tensions inherent in the effort to the surface and divided policy-makers over how a campaign
aimed at building democratic structures overseas through the support of private groups could
be integrated into the national security strategy of the United States. Behind these divisions

APF Correspondence, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC. 2.
193 Reagan, “Speech to the British Parliament”.

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lay two competing policy visions; the strategy of tough containment espoused by State and the more aggressive strategy of rolling back Soviet influence and pressuring the USSR to reform championed by many Reaganite policy-makers in the NSC. Both groups wished to limit the campaign proposed by the private sector; the Reaganites by focussing on the Soviet bloc rather than non-Communist dictatorships, the State Department by seeing democracy promotion operations in the USSR as an additional tool of containment rather than a serious attempt, no matter how long term, to liberalise the system.

Attempts to limit the campaign, either in terms of geopolitical focus or final objectives, translated into attempts to exercise control over private sector democracy programs to bring them into conformity with US goals; however, the different objectives of groups of policy-makers called for differing modes of control. The State Department’s more universal campaign called for light methods of control, while the Reaganites’ more narrow vision of a campaign focussed on Communist regimes required a stronger dose of government intervention and supervision. The merging of the original private conception with the administration’s anti-Soviet strategy, as laid out in NSDD-32 and Clark’s plan for a range of political action and propaganda programs, together with Reagan’s focus on the narrowly anti-Soviet dimension of democracy promotion in his speech, indicated that as of June 1982, the more particular vision was ascendant in the administration. This placed the anti-authoritarian element of the strategy, which had emerged before the widening of the campaign to include the Soviet bloc, in danger of being abandoned. However, the President’s announcement of government funding for the APF’s study meant that there was still an avenue through which a more universal strategy could be pursued.
CHAPTER FIVE
BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Reagan’s speech to Parliament of June 8th had left little doubt that he saw USSR as the primary target of the democracy promotion program, as he called for a campaign for democracy that would “leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history”.¹ This laid down a marker, both publicly and within the bureaucracy, that the US should pursue a narrow anti-communist strategy. In contrast to the anti-Soviet thrust of the speech, Reagan made little mention of the need to democratise the US’ dictatorial allies.

However, rather than ending debate, Reagan’s announcement opened up further areas of contention which threatened to push the project beyond the administration’s concept of a campaign focussed on the Soviet bloc in terms of strategy and objectives. Reagan’s anti-communist crusade was particularist in intent; however, the deployment of universalist democratic rhetoric to legitimate it opened up the question of whether an American campaign for democracy should be and could be limited to enemy totalitarian regimes or whether it would also encompass friendly authoritarian countries. The President’s announcement that private forces would also be deployed and his offer of support for the APF’s study of democracy promotion methods created a space for these forces to advocate a campaign which stretched beyond the President’s focus on anti-Soviet propaganda in two ways. Firstly, the private democracy promoters wished to go beyond the anti-Soviet focus to work in pro-US authoritarian regimes. Secondly, they wanted a campaign which went beyond propaganda to include programs aimed at building democratic structures overseas.

The fact that Reagan had announced his policy publicly and indicated that private groups would have a role within it triggered a wider public debate which gave an opportunity

for groups outside the administration to agitate for their own wider conception of democracy promotion. Up until this point, private forces had spread their ideas in restricted circles or been involved in consultations with the bureaucracy behind closed doors, but this dynamic was changed by the speech. Divergences between the administration and forces outside it became public after the policy had been announced, as the President’s concept was publicly contested by both the private groups committed to democracy promotion, centred on the APF, and also a wider foreign policy elite outside the administration consisting of the press, former government officials and Congress. All these groups had visions of democracy promotion which went beyond the particularist anti-communist strategy which the President had announced in London. The fact that the creation and operation of the new democracy campaign would proceed on an overt, rather than a covert, basis opened up the space for these different visions to be articulated.

To advance the project, it was necessary to engineer consensus over both the strategic role of democracy in US foreign policy and the organisational relationship between private groups and the government. Although debate on both strategy and organisation proceeded concurrently, the key factor was the role of democracy promotion in US strategy, as the agreement reached on this factor would determine the organisational framework. Strong convergence between the administration and private democracy promoters meant that the latter could be trusted with more autonomy; conversely, serious divergences on strategy between these two groups would lead the administration to attempt to keep tighter control of the process. Organisationally, the need for a measure of control had to be balanced against the need to create an effective organisation which would be credible with foreign democrats as a democratic institution rather than an arm of the national security bureaucracy.

The resolution of these questions required the construction of a consensus between the administration and the private groups who would play a role in executing it similar to that
which had allowed the state-private network to function before 1967. However, the overt nature of the policy also made it necessary to engineer a bipartisan consensus with Congress to obtain funding for the project. While all groups accepted that promoting democracy was a legitimate function of US foreign policy, the administration’s failure to engineer this consensus placed the project in jeopardy.

Differing visions of democracy promotion

After the speech both the administration and the private democracy promoters began to define and focus their visions. The wider foreign policy establishment weighed in immediately before and after the speech in favour of a more expansive democracy promotion campaign carried out under private auspices. On June 6th The New York Times supported the idea of “a quango to promote democracy in developing countries and, where possible, in communist countries.”

2 Far from seeing the project as solely an anti-Soviet campaign, the Times believed that democracy promotion should be aimed at dictatorships of both the right and left. 3 David Newsom, a former Carter administration official who had served as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, argued that the Reagan administration’s insistence on targeting Eastern Europe and the USSR would only increase Soviet paranoia with little chance of success. He was also sceptical over the administration’s willingness to support democrats in allied dictatorships such as Argentina, Chile, Pakistan and the Philippines but argued that a refusal to do so would destroy the credibility of the campaign. 4 These tensions could only be overcome through a campaign for democracy deployed exclusively through private groups, as

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3 See ibid.

It is when we move out from the campuses and the think tanks within this country to the rhetoric and guided programs of a government-financed effort abroad that we increase the risks and lose credibility.  

The founders of democracy promotion also entered the debate. However, rather than becoming embroiled in a strategic discussion over whether the campaign should be implemented in a particularist fashion against Communism or in a more universalist fashion to also take in friendly dictatorships, they articulated a vision which went beyond these considerations. In an interview given in early July, George Agree stated that “We would be building democratic structures, not becoming involved in electing specific individuals.” According to Agree, democracy promotion activities would consist of support to civil society groups such as training of local democrats to run voter registration campaigns, efforts to boost union organising and conferences on democracy. This concept went beyond the Reagan administration’s concept of a propaganda campaign. It also side-lined the question of whether democracy promotion should be used to pursue tangible strategic goals such as containing Soviet power in the Third World through support of democratic forces in pro-US Third World dictatorships or more direct confrontation of the Soviet Empire through political operations. Instead, Agree’s formulation subsumed these issues within a pro-democratic campaign which would secure the US over the long-term by building a world order in conformity with its internal system. Such a campaign was in line with the more universalist instincts of the wider foreign policy elite, but not limited by it.

The democracy promoters and the wider foreign policy establishment also agreed that the best implementing mechanism for the campaign would be a private structure similar to the West German party foundations. Taking the democracy campaign out of the hands of government would make the effort more credible to foreign democrats and also

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5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
institutionalise a wider approach, not the narrow anti-communism of the NSC. The APF provided the organisational model for a privately-implemented effort by promoting the advantages of the West German party foundations, which were now explained to a wider audience in a newspaper article written by William Brock at the end of July. According to Brock, such an organisation would be more effective than existing foundations and instrumentalities in carrying out democracy promotion activities:

> West Germany, like the United States, has many academic, business, church, labor, and other organizations engaged in cultural and social development work overseas. But only its party-related foundations have the motivation and expertise to help critically important institution-building in the political area that other foundations shy away from.  

Although Brock mentioned the fact that the West German foundations had aided democratic parties against the Portuguese Communists in the 1970s, his discussion of the utility of the foundations was couched primarily in terms of building democracy, not merely opposing Communism.  

This approach was compatible with Congressional Democrats’ suspicions of the narrow anti-communism which characterised the Reagan administration. An aide to Senator Edward Kennedy stated Congressional concerns succinctly:

> Our concern is that it not become an exercise in Reaganitis… We want to see the sophisticated European model adopted and not a return to the 1950s hardline anti-Communist politics.  

There was clearly substantial support in Congress and among elite opinion leaders for a democracy campaign which would function on a universal rather than a particular basis. This in turn fitted in with the more idealistic conceptions of idealists such as Agree, which aimed at a global campaign of democracy untied to either containment or a tougher policy of confronting the Soviet Empire. Furthermore, in terms of organisation some sections of private

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9 Ibid.
10 Quoted from Trausch, “Private US group would aid young democracies”.

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opinion saw private and governmental programs as competing models for the implementation of the project, rather than complementary ones.

Within the government, on the other hand, democracy promotion was conceived of as an umbrella concept for a campaign of public diplomacy and political action aimed at combatting Soviet Communism in the Third World and Western Europe and US financing of opposition forces in the Soviet Empire in the minds of the administration principals. NSA Clark, reporting on a meeting between the new Secretary of State, George Shultz, Casey, Wick and McFarlane on implementing the President’s speech, described the objectives as “strengthen[ing] the forces of democracy throughout the world and...more effectively engag[ing] in the competition of ideas and values with the Soviets and their allies.”

The grounding of the campaign in national security priorities rather than democracy is clear from the fact that, rather than focussing exclusively on nations which did not have existing democratic systems, one of objectives of the new democracy policy was to counter Soviet propaganda aimed at undermining the US’ democratic allies. An August 1982 explanation of “The Democracy Initiative” states that

In addition to supporting democratic principals [sic] worldwide, it is designed to counter Soviet attempts to weaken the democratic institutions of our friends...

This effort to guard against increasing Soviet influence in states which were already democratic was clearly linked to safeguarding US national security interests rather than the private conception of creating democratic systems overseas in countries which were not yet democratic on a global basis.

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The administration was also at odds with the private consensus in its conception of the role of private groups in the emerging campaign. It wanted the co-operation of private groups in its effort for reasons of credibility. Clark, reporting on the meeting between high level officials after the speech, reported, “Some of the public funds…would be allocated to private US organizations which could conduct certain programs overseas more easily than the USG.”\(^{13}\) However, in the administration’s conception these private forces were expected to work alongside government instrumentalities as part of the administration’s campaign rather than being in control of an autonomous universalist effort. Clark’s memo makes this clear, stating, “We…have to create some new programs…to provide support and training to democratic forces. The private sector must be energized to join us in this effort.”\(^{14}\) The implementing structure for the campaign for democracy would be a Special Planning Group composed of representatives of government agencies such as the State Department and the USIA, not a private board directing a US version of the German Party foundations. The campaign was seen as a retooled state-private network effort with a command centre located in the administration, not within a private institution.

State-private consensus was difficult to achieve due to the different visions of democracy promotion held by these groups. For state-private co-operation to function effectively there needed to be a measure of convergence between the two. This convergence was easiest to achieve when the government and private groups were able to focus on specific and limited programs and most difficult to create when the actors involved focussed on their differing frameworks for democracy promotion.

State-private agreement proved easiest to engineer in the case of the AFL-CIO, which had officially joined the APF’s democracy promotion coalition in the wake of the President’s

\(^{13}\) William Clark, memo to the President 1-2.

\(^{14}\) Ibid, 1.
speech. The AFL-CIO was eager to join the new political action effort in order to regain the level of funding and operational flexibility it had enjoyed as a member of the CIA-guided state-private network before 1967. Although the union had received US government funding through AID after the collapse of the network, legal restrictions had limited it to funding projects which were ostensibly non-political and had also barred it from funding anti-communist unions in Europe. AFL-CIO officials had tried to evade this handicap in the 1970s by proposing the creation of a non-governmental foundation on the pattern of the West German Party foundations. Participation in the democracy project was a way for the union to gain the funding it required to pursue its more political objectives.

However, an agreement over targeting with state officials was necessary because although the union was strongly anti-communist it was also engaged in a universalist project which was not necessarily connected to US national security objectives: the building of a global network of “free trade unions” patterned after the AFL-CIO itself and under its influence. American labour had its own priorities and interests, and disagreements between the union and the national security bureaucracy stretched back to previous programs carried out in co-operation with the CIA. These disagreements continued into the 1980s; a State Department briefing paper on AALC, the AFL-CIO’s training foundation for African trade unionists, noted that

15 Tom Kahn, an assistant to AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland with special responsibility for organising support for Solidarity, was quoted speaking in support of the initiative, along with George Agree and Mark Palmer, in a newspaper article published one month after the speech. See Trausch, “Private group would aid young democracies”. The union had also been involved in informal consultations with Alexander Haig over the democracy promotion project before his proposal to Reagan in March 1982. See Alexander Haig, memo to the President, 8th March 1982, DDRS, accessed 11th December 2006, 3.
AALC, because of its strong fraternal outlook on union-to-union linkages with African unions, has on occasion appeared to view advice from State, AID, and/or Labor Department as making unwarranted intrusions into African labor union matters.¹⁹

Such tensions might re-emerge within the democracy project. However, when the union began to submit requests for funding for political operations in August 1982 under the democracy campaign, it and the administration were able to reach a limited consensus over specific operations without having to give ground on their wider strategic objectives.

This convergence was strongest over the AFL-CIO’s proposed programs for Western Europe, where the union and the US government had worked together since the beginning of the Cold War on programs to support pro-US unions and undermine communist political and cultural influence. There was also minimal disagreement between the State Department and the NSC over US objectives. The AFL-CIO requested funds for the backing of pro-US and anti-communist unions and parties such as the centre-right French trade union Force Ouvriere in its campaign against the Communist-led CGT and the Inter-University Union (UNI), a small youth group composed of French faculty and students which contested university elections with Communist groups and distributed propaganda in favour of Solidarity and the mujahedeen.²⁰ Funding these groups also served the interests of the AFL-CIO, which had begun funding Force Ouvriere in the late 1940s first with its own money and then with assistance provided by the CIA.²¹ The union also wanted to heighten Western consciousness of the plight of Solidarity. The operations would also clearly serve the larger US purpose of strengthening Western European allegiance to NATO, a key objective of the administration.

¹⁹ State Department, “The African American Labor Center and Its Activities in Africa,” undated, Folder 11/82, Box OA91162, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.
Convergence over the Soviet bloc was also comparatively simple because the AFL-CIO and the administration held the same near-term goal of supporting dissident organisations. Both had already been working towards these goals, although separately. The AFL-CIO was already involved in providing low-level private support for Solidarity in Poland, and requested funds from the administration to be conduited to the Solidarity Co-ordinating Committee in Brussels to the Solidarity leadership in Poland. Reaganites within the administration had been seeking such an arrangement since 1981 while the State Department had agreed to a degree of democracy promotion in the Soviet bloc in Haig’s March 1982 memo to Reagan. This co-operation built on previous state-private operations behind the Iron Curtain which had been carried out in the late 40s and 1950s, although such operations had not included the AFL-CIO.

Convergence over operations to be carried out in the Third World was the most difficult because the history of state-private co-operation here differed to that in Western Europe and the Soviet bloc. Whereas in these regions US interests clearly dictated the support of pro-democratic forces, the US had had no political grand design for its intervention in Third World political systems and had supported democrats or dictators as short-term US interests dictated. Thus, while the AFL-CIO had been implementing political operations in the Third World since the 1950s, as had the US government state apparatus, the approach taken was a more disjointed one in which domestic groups were supported purely on the basis of anti-communism. Policy towards the Third World was also more subject to intra-administration disagreement due to the uncertainty over whether such operations should merely continue the previous focus on combatting Communism or be widened to include the support of democratic successor groups in pro-US authoritarian states.

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22 See Chapter Two, 71.
24 See Chapter Two, 71-72.
25 See Chapter Four, 127.
Explicitly anti-communist programs put forward by the AFL-CIO seem to have provoked little debate within the administration. One example of this is the union’s plan to conduit funds to Nigerian trade unions to help them combat the Communist leadership of the National Labor Centre:

There exists within Nigeria a non-communist pro-Western group with the potential to turn the tables and take control of the NLC, or barring that to at least establish a counter-force in the country. They obviously cannot do this without assistance from their friends outside.26

A State Department assessment of possible programs to run through AALC, the AFL-CIO’s own African labour foundation, written a few weeks later supported the AFL-CIO’s assessment:

the leadership of the [NLC] came from the communist union. This could be turned around with money. One half the affiliates of the current National Center are friendly moderates who could build their support and dominate the National Center.27

The picture was the same in Latin America, where the AFL-CIO requested funds to support “The Seaman and Waterfront Workers Union of Grenada, headed by Eric Pierre, [which] is the only organized opposition to the Marxist government of Maurice Bishop.”28

The State Department agreed: “A person who runs the Seamen and Waterfront Dockworkers Union – powerful union – is the only hopeful opposition to Bishop. This union should be helped.”29 The AFL-CIO and the State Department also agreed on the need to support pro-US unions such as the CTP in Peru against its Communist and leftist competitors and the CUS

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against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. These operations would have appealed to the NSC’s strong anti-communism as well.

While the state and private actors were able to converge over union programs directed at Third World communists, programs aimed at dictatorships allied to the US had the potential to be much more divisive. In contrast to operations against enemy states such as Grenada, NSC support of AFL-CIO programs in countries such as Chile and South Africa could not be taken for granted due to the organisation’s fears that mounting democracy promotion operations in friendly dictatorships could destabilise them and open the door to Communist seizures of power.

In South Africa, the AFL-CIO requested money to support newly-formed black trade unions, arguing that these organisations would probably have “an immense impact on the economic, social and eventually political structure of the country.” The union also requested funds to support a Chilean union, the UDT, described as “only democratic and anti-communist workers organization in opposition to the Pinochet government” The State Department supported the funding requests for these operations, arguing that they would strengthen containment by building up democratic forces ready to take power and keep opposition movements from being dominated by communists. The Department agreed that “AALC should be building a union inside South Africa which could be an organization to help change the government to a more democratic system,” explaining that

[t]he objective would be to keep the trade unionists pro-West as the government changes instead of combining leftist political organizations with labor to form an opposition to apartheid…During eventual blow-up, we want to have labor stay in our camp.

31 Ibid, 2.
32 Ibid.
33 State Department, “AFL-CIO Labor Institutes, Attachment: African American Labor Center (AALC), undated, Folder 12/82 Box OA91162, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.
34 Ibid.
The Department saw South Africa’s apartheid system as unstable and believed it would one day end; by supporting black trade unionists in the meantime, the US could assert its influence over South Africa’s future rulers and prevent them from allying themselves too closely with communism. Regarding the proposal for Chile, the Department commented that “We need to do the same thing we did in Venezuela in the ‘50’s.”\textsuperscript{35} Expanding on this, the Department noted that ORIT, a Latin American labour confederation funded by the AFL-CIO in the 1950s had employed large numbers of organizers, particularly democratic elements forced into exile by the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in Venezuela. These individuals were instrumental in setting Venezuela on a pro-Western course when the Perez Jimenez dictatorship fell and democracy was re-established.\textsuperscript{36}

The State Department was clearly in favour of AFL-CIO programs aimed at supporting groups in pro-US authoritarian states. While administration hard-liners based in the NSC and other agencies had historically tended to be unconvinced that such programs were in line with US national security objectives, a basis for agreement existed due to the fact that these programs were aimed at preparing democratic groups to compete for power with Soviet-funded groups after the collapse of pro-US dictatorships, not at funding them to destabilise the sitting regime. The basis for an agreement between the union and the bureaucracy clearly existed if a list of operations could be agreed upon and definite limits to these set.

This accommodation over specific cases was a useful starting-point for the development of consensus between the state and the private groups. However, it did not amount to the generation of the strategic framework which the campaign for democracy

\textsuperscript{35} State Department “American Institute for Free Labor Development”.

\textsuperscript{36} Anonymous, “Labor Programs: Overview: (4) Assistance to International Labor Bodies,” undated, Folder 11/82, Box OA91162, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.
required to avoid the prosecution of operations on a piecemeal basis. It was here that tensions emerged between the anti-communist approach of the administration and the more universalist, pro-democratic ideological frameworks articulated by other elements of the private coalition for democracy promotion coalition.

This tension occurred in administration relations with the leaders of the APF. Unlike the AFL-CIO, the parties had put forward no clear program proposals besides the vague statement in the APF’s letter to Reagan of 4th June that they would focus on building democratic movements in totalitarian states and preparing democratic successors in other regimes. They also lacked an extensive track record of foreign operations which officials could scrutinise for clues to their future behaviour. This lack of specificity, together with the lack of a grand strategic framework, caused concerns among Reaganites that the APF would be “soft on communism” rather than pursuing actions in line with their own hard-line anti-Sovietism.

This led to attempts to establish informal control over the organisation’s projected study of democracy promotion to co-opt the APF into the strategic priorities of the Reaganites. To this end, former Reagan administration NSA and current Republican National Committee foreign policy advisor Richard Allen attempted to keep William Brock, Chairman of the APF, from playing a leadership role in the study announced in Reagan’s June speech. Brock was viewed by the Reaganites as being “an ideological soft spot in the Republican Party”37. This was probably because he was insufficiently hawkish on communism, as shown by his decision to back Haig against the NSC hard-liners over the question of more extensive sanctions on the USSR in response to the Polish declaration of martial law in the early

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months of 1982, together with the fact that he was linked to the State Department’s more even-handed approach to dictatorships of both the left and right. This view is reinforced by a comment by an anonymous member of the APF study group that “Dick Allen doesn’t want Bill Brock and the State Department playing a role in this thing.” Allen was nominated as a member of the study board by Richard Richards, Chair of the RNC, apparently with White House backing, but did not succeed in excluding Brock from involvement. This episode illustrates the fears of hard-line anti-communists over the direction of private democracy promotion operations.

Even more threatening than this lack of specificity from organisers such as Brock, however, were the views of intellectuals who had helped to shape democracy promotion such as William Douglas and George Agree. These figures had a tendency to outline grand, ideologically-driven frameworks for democracy promotion focussed primarily on the needs of democracy and not US national security, rooted in the ideas both had put forward in the 1970s, when democracy promotion had existed as a grand concept divorced from day-to-day US national security concerns. The effect of this was to highlight the disjuncture between the state and private democracy promoters even further.

An example of this is the framework for democracy promotion which William Douglas set out in an article published in September 1982, which was clearly determined first and foremost by the need to promote democracy on a global basis as a form of government rather than US security needs. While Douglas began by arguing that democracy promotion could help to stabilise pro-US dictatorships, as he had done previously, he then went beyond this by arguing that a US democracy promotion organisation should also concentrate on areas

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39 Ibid.
40 APF, Minutes of 1982 Third Meeting Board of Directors of American Political Foundation, 19th August 1982,” Folder 3: APF Minutes, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
or countries where democracy was in decay or where sectors of the population felt inadequately represented by existing democratic structures. Douglas argued that such a lack of representation was a long-term danger because it could lead to groups or classes abandoning electoral politics in favour of armed struggle, creating instability and, if they won, a dictatorial state. This could be averted by studying the political system of such a country for gaps of representation and then building political parties to fill them. Douglas gave the example of Honduras, where there was no leftist party to represent the poor majority and argued that the construction of such a party with finance and political technology imported from the United States would help to stabilise the Honduran political system and avert another insurgency in Central America.

This analysis was extremely far-sighted, but Douglas’ recommended action in Honduras went far beyond the concept of a propaganda campaign aimed at combatting Soviet influence which was taking shape in the administration. It also went beyond the focus of the State Department on containment in US dictatorships threatened by insurgencies, as Honduras was already a democracy dominated by a pro-US elite. Douglas’ ideological perspective - which put forward no strategic framework and was divorced in some respects from immediate national security concerns - showed that the NSC’s fears that an autonomous private effort to promote democracy would waste government funds on ideological projects instead of guarding US national security were not groundless.

This problem was not limited to Douglas, as a September newspaper interview with George Agree and an unnamed government official showed clear differences in their understanding of the nature and goals of the democracy project. In contradiction to Agree’s earlier emphasis on building democratic structures rather than supporting individual

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43 Ibid, 18-19.
candidates, the official stated that “Some elements [of the democracy campaign] involve sophisticated campaign tactics” and mentioned CIA support of the Christian Democratic Party in the Italian elections of 1948 as a precedent for the democracy project. This operation had been clearly geared at electing pro-US forces to safeguard US national security interests and block the Italian Communists from taking power, rather than building democracy. While the official went beyond a purely anti-Soviet framework in conceding that the democracy crusade could function in authoritarian states allied to the US, it was clear that to the administration the campaign was aimed at resolving near-term US security issues. This showed a clear difference in how the groups associated with each conceptualised democracy promotion. The private intellectuals saw democracy promotion as a global transformative project, although Agree conceded that “We can’t be doing things that would be seriously harassing to our own government’s foreign policy, or it would jeopardise its own success.”

This strategic and ideological disagreement inevitably led to differences over how the project was to be organised and implemented. According to Agree the campaign would be implemented through groups outside the government and foundations rather than the government. However, the official restated the administration consensus that it would be managed by an interagency group based in the White House rather than privately-controlled. The fact that the interviews with Agree and the official quoted in the newspaper story had been separate indicated both a lack of co-ordination between the state and private

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46 See NSC, memo to Scott Thompson, 4.
47 See ibid.
48 See ibid, 3.
49 See ibid.
democracy promoters of the emerging democracy crusade and the conceptual differences between them.

Managing the conceptual gaps which existed between the administration and private groups had proven problematic by autumn 1982. Consensus was possible in cases where the NSC, State Department and private groups could focus on specific tactics and programs to be run in specific countries to achieve clear national security aims. However, when this was not possible due to a lack of specific program proposals by the privates or a private focus on grand ideological frameworks, the rift between the government and the private democracy promoters widened. These disagreements over strategy were, in turn, linked to different organisational conceptions; whereas the administration, and particularly the Reaganites, believed that a campaign focussed on US security needs would be best implemented under government supervision, private groups favoured an autonomous implementing structure for their wider campaign. What was lacking above all was a clear strategic framework which incorporated the private groups into administration priorities.

Creating a strategic framework for democracy promotion

The administration moved to create this strategic framework in the second half of 1982. This required not only agreement between the administration and private forces but also between contending factions within the administration over these aims. The administration held two consensus-building events in October and November 1982 to resolve these problems; a closed anti-Soviet strategy conference at the end of October and a public Conference on Free Elections in early November. Although both of these gatherings reached provisional agreements on how democracy promotion would be implemented tactically, the larger problem of reaching a consensus over grand strategic issues such as the final objectives of a
campaign for democracy directed at the USSR or the targeting of democracy promotion in the Third World were not solved.

The anti-Soviet conference, the Conference on the Democratization of Communist Countries, was held in the State Department and focussed on generating tactics and programs which the government and private groups could co-operate on to promote democracy in the Soviet Empire. In addition to government officials it included representatives of interested private and quasi-private groups. This private and quasi-private contingent included organisations which had functioned as part of the covert state-private network in the 1950s and 60s before becoming quasi-autonomous overt organisations in the 1970s, such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. John Richardson, a former director of RFE and the President of Freedom House and future Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy also attended, along with prominent US academics and Sovietologists. This private contingent also included the AFL-CIO but not representatives of the APF, highlighting the fact that the private democracy promotion coalition, which the union had joined shortly after Reagan’s speech to Parliament, was a diverse group in which some members had closer ties to the administration’s more narrowly anti-Soviet vision than others.

The Conference was focussed on “develop[ing] suggestions for more effective US Government and private sector program— to implement the broad initiatives set forth in the President’s address to the British Parliament” with regard to the USSR, Eastern Europe and Third World Communist countries. The participants recommended a two-pronged campaign of propaganda and political operations be launched against the Soviet Empire using both

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51 George P. Schultz, cable to all diplomatic posts, Folder 9/82-10/82, Box OA91162, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.
52 Weintraub, “Shultz Kicks off a ‘Crusade for Freedom’”.
53 George P. Schultz, cable, 1.
governmental and private agencies.\textsuperscript{54} The suggested strategy made a clear distinction between the Soviet Union itself and vulnerable satellites such as the Eastern European countries and Nicaragua.

The propaganda element would be a long-term campaign focussed on developing consciousness of the benefits of the democracy in populations under Communist rule without provoking a violent response.\textsuperscript{55} This element was clearly focussed on the USSR itself and was to be accomplished through governmental and quasi-governmental propaganda organisations such as the VOA and RFE,\textsuperscript{56} as increasing US broadcasting was seen as a key way to play on Soviet vulnerabilities. A November 1982 introduction to a program book of democracy promotion operations stated that

\begin{quote}
Centrifugal forces abound within [the Soviet] empire, and our broadcasting, the largest component of our agenda, is the key weapon in encouraging these forces.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

The campaign would deploy further traditional methods of exerting psychological and cultural influence such as exchanges; the setting up of an institute as a home base for the most recent wave of Soviet émigrés; and the distribution of literature through both official and non-official channels, as “most considered books and journals to be basic weapons in the competition of ideas.”\textsuperscript{58}

The strategy towards client states and satellites such as Nicaragua and Poland was more politically-focussed and required greater deployment of US private groups. Secretary of State Shultz, when speaking at the conference, clearly supported US aid for Solidarity, stating that he saw the rise of the organisation as beginning a new era of democratic reform and

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid 1.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Anonymous (1982), Introduction to Program Book: Political Action, Raymond, Walter: Files, Folder 9/82-10/82, Box OA91162, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL, 4.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
revolution,” and promised that the US "will not ignore the individuals and groups in communist countries who seek peaceful change.” It was also felt by the conference attendees that “In transitional states like Nicaragua, the US (especially private groups) should be providing far more support to those elements still fighting for democracy.” In general “the participants advocated a substantially expanded role for non-governmental organizations; these can often be more effective than government.” Private involvement was clearly required, as the actions against Poland and Nicaragua were far more political than those aimed at the USSR and so required greater plausible deniability to avoid harsh Soviet counter-actions.

The conference was able to produce a rough consensus over tactics and individual programs by leaving the final strategic objectives of the policy unresolved. However, when the US government attempted to define a more cogent policy internally, the struggle over end-goals continued. The State Department’s cautious approach to the idea of promoting democracy in the Communist world was evident in administration discussions over NSDD-75, the administration’s statement of anti-Soviet strategy, which had been drafted largely by NSC Reaganite Richard Pipes. Pipes, who was working for the NSC while on leave from his position as a Professor of History at Harvard, was a confirmed hard-liner. He had previously conducted consultancy work for the US government in 1976 as the Chairman of Team B, a group of analysts from outside the intelligence community who had been brought in to review the CIA’s intelligence data and conclusions on the USSR by the Ford Administration. The Team’s conclusions on the threat posed by the USSR were far bleaker.

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60 Weintraub, “Shultz Kicks off a ‘Crusade for Freedom’”.
61 Ibid, 2.
62 See George P. Schultz, cable, 1.
than those of the CIA’s analysts. Pipes had also written extensively on the threat posed by the Soviet Union for the Committee on the Present Danger. The hard-line NSC Director of Eastern European and Soviet Affairs was soon to leave government service and return to his teaching position at Harvard; the NSDD on US Soviet strategy was to be his legacy to the administration. However, the process of creating the document proved to be contentious.

Disagreement centred over the goals for US policy outlined in NSSD 11-82, the policy study which NSDD-75 was based on. This study envisaged a confrontational posture towards the USSR which included ideological warfare and support for political movements within the Soviet Empire. In terms of Soviet client states the study echoed the objective of “contain[ing] and revers[ing] Soviet expansion” by “encourag[ing] long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries” contained in NSDD-32. According to the study, the US should “not accept the idea that Communist rule is irreversible” in Soviet client states in the Third World and follow a policy of rollback by supporting “democratic movements…to…bring about political change” in Third World allies. There was a clear role for democracy promotion instrumentalities in this policy, as

Long-term political cadre and organization building programs, long a strongly emphasized instrument of Soviet policy, must become a regular, and more developed, part of U.S. policy.

However, the policy outlined towards the Soviet Union itself was more far-reaching than previous objectives. The drafting of the new NSDD on Soviet policy proceeded on the assumption, drawn up by Pipes, that

Soviet international behaviour is a response not only to external threats but also to the

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64 Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 143-144.
67 Ibid.
internal imperatives of the Soviet political, economic, social and ideological system.\textsuperscript{68}

This implied that US national security could be enhanced by an effort to change the Soviet Union’s internal system, and the study that set the ambitious goal of “promoting change within the USSR itself” through support for “internal forces”.\textsuperscript{69} This objective was to be accomplished through putting pressure on the USSR through economic sanctions\textsuperscript{70} and a US ideological and political offensive, as “US policy towards the Soviet Union must have an ideological thrust which clearly demonstrates the superiority of US and Western values” such as “political democracy”.\textsuperscript{71} This policy went beyond previous US conceptions of Cold War strategy, a fact that the study acknowledged:

By identifying the promotion of evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself as an objective of U.S. policy, the United States takes the long-term strategic offensive. This approach therefore contrasts with the essentially reactive and defensive strategy of containment…\textsuperscript{72}

To accomplish this, the US would have to strengthen its political action capability, including “The President’s London initiative to support democratic forces”\textsuperscript{73} and to consider how political action could be used to influence Soviet policy.\textsuperscript{74} It was clear that both governmental and private programs aimed at the projection of American ideology and democracy promotion would play a part in such a project.

The novelty of this new strategy of “encouraging antitotalitarian [sic] changes” within the USSR itself was stressed by Clark in his presentation of the policy to Reagan and the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{75} However, this goal went beyond the State Department’s

\textsuperscript{68} NSC, “NSSD 11-82: US Relations With the USSR,” 21\textsuperscript{st} August 1982, DDRS, accessed 20\textsuperscript{th} March 2009.
\textsuperscript{69} NSC, “Response to NSSD 11-82,” 23.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, 26.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, 30.
\textsuperscript{72} Quoted from Ibid, 23.
\textsuperscript{73} NSC, “Response to NSSD 11-82,” 31.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 32.
\textsuperscript{75} Paul Lettow, \textit{Ronald Reagan’s Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons} (New York: Random House, 2005), 79.
previous agreement, contained in Haig’s memo to the President of March 1982, that support
for democratic forces in the Soviet bloc could assist the containment of Soviet power by
focussing Soviet attention on domestic stability rather than expansion. The study recognised
its goal of fostering change in the USSR to be a long-term project which would interact with
internal Soviet factors rather than a goal which the US could achieve alone and over a short
span. However, the Department still attempted to limit this goal by objecting to the more
extreme provisions for economic pressure and demanding changes to water down the goal
of democratic transformation of the Soviet Union in the document. This goal was summed
up in the second objective listed for the administration’s Soviet policy in the policy document
which resulted from the study, NSDD-75:

To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the
Soviet Union towards a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the
power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The US recognizes that
Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system…

Pipes’ original draft had been more radical and had not included the phrase “within
the narrow limits available to us”, which had been inserted at the insistence of the State
Department after a hard-fought battle between the two agencies. CIA officials even feared
that State would resist the implementation of the policy completely. Pipes regarded State’s
editing of his document as “timorous”, while NSC hard-liner Norman Bailey complained
that the policies contained in NSDD-75 were “bitterly opposed by other high-level

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76 See Alexander Haig, memo to the President, 8th March 1982, DDRS, accessed 11th December 2006, 2.
77 NSC, “US Relations With the USSR,” 21.
78 Pipes, Vixi, 201. This pressure was exerted on Pipes by Mark Palmer, the State Department official most
connected to the APF and the democracy campaign.
79 NIO USSR-EE, “Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence: NSC meeting on US policy toward
the Soviet Union”.
81 Ibid.
82 Pipes, Vixi 201; Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan’s Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random
House, 2005), 78-79.
83 NIO USSR-EE, memo to Director of Central Intelligence.
84 Pipes, 201.
administration figures and by whole bureaucracies in the Departments of State and Commerce. While both the State Department and the NSC favoured mounting a political/ideological campaign for democracy against the Soviet bloc, they were divided over how this campaign was connected to US grand strategy towards the Soviet Union, how far to prosecute it and what its end-goals should be. The result was a compromise document which was not as hard-hitting as Pipes had hoped. However, the rough consensus over operations enabled the policy to move forward within the existing broad framework, even though problems of consensus over grand strategy remained.

A framework for democracy promotion operations in the Third World was also difficult to negotiate due to Reaganite fears that attempts to spread democracy in pro-US dictatorships would lead to their collapse and replacement by Communist regimes. To build consensus on political operations in the Third World, the administration held a public Conference on Free Elections at the beginning of November, several days after the Conference on the Democratization of Communist Countries. In contrast to the anti-communist event of October, which was held behind closed doors, this event was public and was attended by representatives from 34 countries, many of them newly-returned to democracy or from Latin America.

There was a clear role for private groups in the emerging campaign, as the conference took as its starting point an idea that had been generated by the private democracy promoters in the 1970s and early 80s and agreed that a process of democratisation of Third World dictatorships could begin by forging links between exiles, parties, labour

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groups, foundations and their US counterparts. US private groups would have to take the lead in these initiatives, as only they would have the necessary credibility to liaise directly with foreign democrats. This decision again widened the room for manoeuvre which the private democracy promoters had been provided by Reagan’s June speech. However, it did not resolve the issue of whether the targets should be pro-US dictatorships threatened with communist revolution, Third World communist states such as Nicaragua and Grenada, or all non-democratic Third World states.

This fuzziness was shown in the remarks addressed to the conference by the President and Secretary of State George Shultz. The opening address given by Reagan stressed a non-partisan democratic idealism and avoided the sweeping denunciations of the USSR contained in the President’s London speech in favour of putting forward a more inclusive and acceptable vision. This approach was also followed by Shultz who chose to stress the democracy campaign’s positive aspects, stating that “We are not here to challenge other countries but to offer our expertise”. Shultz made no reference at all to the USSR, Communism or Marxism-Leninism during his speech. Elliott Abrams, the administration’s Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Human Rights, took a more focussed approach, arguing that “democracies tend to have the best human rights practices, Communist regimes and military dictatorships tend to have the worst.” However, Abrams did not stress the need for US authoritarian allies to reform and thus did not engage with the continuing strategic debate.

Jeane Kirkpatrick, on the other hand, took a clear position in her speech and advocated a strategy of anti-Soviet particularism. Kirkpatrick couched the promotion of

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88 Ibid.
91 Ibid, 5.
democracy as an anti-Communist project and inveighed strongly against Communism and Leninism in her speech, stating that

The idea that the will of the people can be better expressed through a revolutionary elite than through free elections is, of course, a fundamental tenet of Leninism. It is incompatible with democratic elections and democratic government… \(^{92}\)

Kirkpatrick devoted much of the second half of her speech to criticism of the Marxist FMLN for opposing the March 1982 elections in El Salvador and of the Sandinistas for as yet failing to hold elections in Nicaragua.\(^{93}\) The speech was focussed very much on existing US security concerns in Central America and on the US’ leftist enemies, not its rightist friends. In Kirkpatrick’s formulation the enemies of democracy and the enemies of the US were one and the same. The outcome of the conference was general agreement on a gradualist policy of building up foreign civil society organisations such as unions and parties; however, as the targets of this initiative were not specified, each administration faction could read into it an affirmation of its own agenda.

By December 1982, the administration had moved into a rough internal convergence on a strategic framework and the role of private groups within this design. Rather than an independent effort which subsumed anti-communist operations in the Soviet bloc and efforts to build democratic movements in Third World dictatorships under the banner of promoting democracy, it envisaged a larger Project Truth which would go beyond Western Europe to launch a political and ideological assault on Soviet Communism. Although this agreement was sufficient to allow the program to move forward, there were still areas of tension over the strategic objectives of the campaign which had not been fully resolved, such as whether actions against the Soviet bloc were to be aimed at the containment of Soviet power through stirring up internal dissent or a promoting gradual change in the bloc countries’ societies. In

\(^{92}\) Ibid, 4.
\(^{93}\) See ibid 3-4.
the Third World, the option of prosecuting a wider campaign which aimed at fostering the emergence of democratic systems in all Third World countries, including pro-US authoritarian governments, had not been adequately examined. While some officials spoke of a more even-handed campaign, others remained fixed on attempts to undermine Third World Marxist states opposed to the US, such as Nicaragua. However, despite this strategic fuzziness in regard to both regions, there was enough general agreement within the administration that programs should be mounted in them to allow the project to move forward. What the administration also required was an organisational structure to carry it out.

**Bureaucratic consensus and the organisational structure for democracy promotion**

Concurrently with the debates over strategy discussed above, the administration turned its attention to creating an organisational structure to implement its democracy campaign. This structure would need to be able to co-ordinate state and private programs aimed at both public diplomacy and political action. It would also need to be able to supervise any programs which emerged from the APF’s study of democracy promotion methods. The administration’s clear preference was for a governmental structure to co-ordinate government and private programs in the interests of US national security. This solution would limit the autonomy of private groups involved in the project and allow the administration to manage any strategic tensions between it and these groups which arose, much as CIA funding and co-ordination of state-private network organisations had done before 1967.

The outcome of the 1967 crisis indicated that in operational terms an overt structure would be more acceptable domestically than a covert one and more durable, as it could not be destroyed by public exposure. However, the decision to pursue an overt, governmental structure to co-ordinate and fund the democracy campaign opened up a number of problems which the CIA had not had to face when co-opting private groups. Firstly, the decision to
locate the co-ordinating centre within the government made the process hostage to problems such as bureaucratic manoeuvring or non-co-operation which had previously been mitigated by giving responsibility for such operations to a covert agency. Secondly, an overt program would need to be acceptable to Congress in order to be voted the appropriations it needed to function. The CIA’s covert program had not faced such a requirement.

Finally, there was an issue of credibility involved in disbursing US government money overtly to US private groups who would then channel these funds to private groups overseas. Before 1967 private groups had been able to secure co-operation from their counterparts overseas more easily than government agencies because their receipt of government funds had been covert. The shift to overt funding in this case might make foreign private groups less willing to accept funding which they knew had ultimately originated in the US government. Overt funding of private groups overseas could also affect relationships with foreign governments. This tension was further complicated by the fact that several of the programs under consideration went beyond the pre-1967 state-private network’s aim of projecting democratic ideology to focus on the more controversial objectives of training foreign opposition movements and providing groups and individuals overseas with the support and skills needed to alter foreign political structures.

The administration’s need to take note of Congressional opinion had an immediate effect on its choice of implementing structures for the campaign. The CIA’s involvement was seen to be unacceptable to Congress due to the lingering effects of the 1967 crisis and the Agency was ruled out as an implementing structure for the campaign by Lawrence Eagleburger, State Department Undersecretary for Political Affairs and Robert C. McFarlane the Deputy National Security Advisor at the end of August 1982, with the rationale that “if
we have the C.I.A. in this we can call it off right off the bat”. The obvious solution was to pass responsibility for supervision to another component of the bureaucracy; however, this opened up bureaucratic problems which the original decision to vest control of state-private operations in the CIA had side-stepped.

A key difficulty in carrying out an overt global campaign embracing political programs was that the geographical operating mandates for other national security agencies did not allow for this. In the wake of the CIA’s exit from the program, one possible option might have been to fund and co-ordinate the programs through AID, the Agency for International Development, which had conducted funding to the AFL-CIO’s foreign operations after and to an extent a few years before the 1967 collapse of the state-private network. However, AID was not a sufficiently flexible conduit to channel funds to private groups operating globally. If private groups accepted AID funding they would only be able to operate in countries which agreed to host AID programs. This meant that, for example, the conduit could not be used by the AFL-CIO in either Nigeria or South Africa, which the union saw as the key African countries for its strategy, as neither hosted AID programs at that time. In addition, AID’s mandate to provide funds for developing countries meant that the organisation could not be used to conduit funds to any European programs, whether in the West or the East. Thus, funding the Solidarity Co-ordinating Committee, would have been ruled illegal under AID’s mandate. This would also apply to any other private groups attempting to fund operations outside the Third World with AID money, such as the APF.

These problems appeared before any operations had been specified, in relation to the APF’s democracy study, which was supposed to be funded from AID’s human rights budget.

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95 Anonymous, Document beginning “In response to request…,” Attachment II, 2.
In August George Agree had sent an outline and proposed budget for the study, however, no contract was signed until the beginning of December 1982, due to conflicts with AID’s geographical mandate and mission. The APF proposed language in the contract which would legitimate funding for a study into methods for promoting democracy in “other countries”, however, AID proposed the language “developing countries” or “non-developed countries”, in conformity with its mandate. This distinction was crucial, as the APF’s study was not focused only on the Third World, and would include the Soviet bloc as well. Thus, the basic problem was that the AID funding conduit was not flexible enough to implement either the expansive campaign favoured by the democracy promoters and the State Department or the more narrowly anti-communist strategy favoured by the Reaganites.

A further problem was that no national security agency had an operating mandate which allowed it to fund programs aimed at the political transformation of other countries. AID’s mandate authorised it to conduct programs related to social and economic development, not political engineering which meant that such political programs would not be legally fundable by AID. In addition, many State Department officials believed that their organisation did not have sufficient legal authorisation to house or pass funding to political programs. This applied especially to those elements of the campaign which went beyond promoting the idea of democracy to encompass the support and training of political forces, such as the proposed Institute for Democracy in Central America, a key part of the government’s strategy. In early November Walter Raymond, the NSC’s Director of

96 See George E. Agree, “Support for Democracy Outline Feasibility Study,” attached to letter to Peter McPherson, 27th August 1982, Folder 1: APF Correspondence, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
97 Compare L.E. Stanfield, “Letter to George Agree Subject: Grant No. OTR-0098-G-SS-3029-00,” 1st December 1982, with same document, “APF PROPOSED REVISIONS,” both attached to APF, Minutes of 1982 Fourth Meeting Board of Directors American Political Foundation, 16th December 1982, Folder 3: APF Minutes, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
98 APF, Minutes for the Fourth Meeting Board, 3.
International Communications and a member of the Working Group charged with co-ordinating the emerging campaign, argued that

Part of this [implementation and funding] will be based on ensuring that the items selected are consistent with the authorization that comes with the money that will be available...We may have difficulty creating democracy institutes in Central America...if there is no existing authorization to which this can be tied.\(^{100}\)

Added to this problem of legal authorisation was bureaucratic resistance by national security agencies to taking on more responsibility outside their key functions. A further concern for AID, as with the AFL-CIO programs mentioned above, was that funding political programs would take it too far outside its core mission. Raymond commented that “Part of AID’s concern is that a grant to the American Political Foundation would be somewhat ‘out of character’ for AID.”\(^{101}\) AID’s obstructionism and attempts to limit the scope of the study and control the disbursement of funding continued into December, when Raymond intervened:

…I suggested dumping AID and turning to State to fund the study. When this view was known in State, they pushed AID to complete the contract work.\(^{102}\)

Most agencies also feared that taking on some responsibility for democracy promotion would force them to fund the programs out of their own budgets, at least initially. The State Department was reluctant to extend its mission to democracy promotion, due to concerns “about the impact on its budget if there is heavy pressure for resources.”\(^{103}\) The NSC acknowledged that all other bureaucratic agencies were likely to make the same

\(^{100}\) Walter Raymond & Peter Sommers, memo to Robert McFarlane, 3\(^{rd}\) November 1982, DDRS, accessed 11\(^{th}\) December 2006.

\(^{101}\) Walter Raymond, memo on Project Democracy, 24\(^{th}\) November, DDRS, accessed 11\(^{th}\) December 2006.


argument. However, even if a solution to this problem of mandates had been found, such a solution would not have resolved the credibility problem which stemmed from funding such initiatives overtly through the government.

One possibility for resolving problems of bureaucratic management and credibility, particularly with the more explicitly political programs, was private funding, which had been mentioned by William Clark in the meeting after Reagan’s speech. This idea was fleshed out into a “Fund for Democracy”, to be created through donations from prominent industrialists and foundations, by Gerald Helman of the State Department, a member of the Working Group organising the democracy project, towards the end of November. Helman argued that government funds should go largely to government-sponsored and controlled projects, but that a private “Fund for Democracy” could be used to fund non-governmental groups. The Fund should be created using a fund-raising campaign headed by the President, with letters distributed to potential donors. Once a core group had been formed, there would be a conference at the White House.

This option was supported by USIA, which believed that it provided a way to get around the problem of bureaucratic mandates and solve the credibility issue. USIA argued that the Fund should be used for programs which would be “legally ambiguous” if executed by the US government. In addition, the arrangement would serve to boost the credibility of more controversial projects by minimising their connection to the US government; USIA stated that any connection between the government and these projects should be avoided “for obvious credibility reasons.” A lack of direct funding links to the US government would

105 See William Clark, memo to the President, undated, 1982, 1-2.
106 Gerald Helman, “Paper on private sector funding,” 22nd November 1982, Folder 12/82, Box OA91162, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.
107 Robert Kiernan, memo to W. Scott Thompson, 28th December 1982, Raymond, Walter: Files, Folder 12/82 Box OA91162, RL, 1.
enhance the credibility of several of the more controversial programs listed for financing under the private fund, including the Free Market Institutes which would later become the NED’s Centre for International Private Enterprise and the ever-problematic Institute for Democracy in Central America,\textsuperscript{108} eventually incarnated as the NED’s School for Democracy in Venezuela.\textsuperscript{109}

In the end the initiative turned out to be ineffective, as private donations were insufficient. This is clear from the fact that many of these contentious programs were eventually included in the administration’s list of programs requiring government funding, discussed below. The administration was unable to avoid the bureaucratic strictures on the deployment of more controversial programs and had to place them under government supervision for the lack of a better option. This opened the door to legal problems and involved a loss of credibility for the programs due to their clear links to a government project.

By the end of 1982 the administration had run out of time to adequately resolve the problems of bureaucratic mandates, bureaucratic resistance and credibility issues which the interagency process had thrown up. Its decision to include the appropriation for democracy promotion programs in its 1984 budget, to be submitted to Congress in early 1983, was almost certainly taken because the administration calculated that the program was more likely to be approved by Congress in an off-election year.\textsuperscript{110} The campaign was to be presented as a bipartisan initiative, and this strategy had more chance of succeeding before campaigning for the 1984 Congressional elections began in earnest. It thus decided to forward the programs it had already decided on to Congress for an appropriation vote, placed in one package: Project

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, 2.


\textsuperscript{110} As discussed in the following chapter, the same considerations determined the timetable of the APF’s Democracy Study. See General Accounting Office, Events Leading to the Establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy, 6th July 1984, accessed 27th December 2006, http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-84-121, 13.
Democracy. This decision tied the project to the administration’s relations with Congress and had an impact on the management structure chosen for the campaign as the choice of a “lead agency” to manage the Congressional appropriation would determine the strategy the administration chose to present the initiative to Congress.\textsuperscript{111}

This timetable meant that the administration needed to quickly decide on a “lead agency” to manage the appropriation for Project Democracy.\textsuperscript{112} The administration chose to channel Project Democracy funding through the USIA to solve the problems of legal mandates encountered with other bureaucratic agencies, as it was believed that the administration could argue that the bulk of Project Democracy fell under USIA’s existing mandate.\textsuperscript{113} Although USIA did not have a mandate to conduct political activities, it did have one to conduct public diplomacy, which the administration defined extremely widely as being “comprised of those actions of the US government designed to generate support for our national security objectives”.\textsuperscript{114} This definition was vague and could have incorporated activities from propaganda programs to training of political figures abroad.\textsuperscript{115} A further reason for placing the program under USIA supervision was USIA Director Charles Wick’s close relationship with the President.\textsuperscript{116}

USIA, in turn, would be supervised by a multiagency Special Planning Group under the chairmanship of the National Security Advisor, which had been created by NSDD-77,\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{111} See Walter Raymond, memo to Robert McFarlane, 8\textsuperscript{th} December 1982, DDRS, accessed 11\textsuperscript{th} December 2006.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Walter Raymond, memo to Robert McFarlane, 3\textsuperscript{rd} December, 2.
\textsuperscript{115} The definition of public diplomacy given in one of the most influential recent treatments on the subject would include contacts with foreign nationals overseas under the rubric of “relationship building,” but this is not aimed at providing them with political training and support to take power in their societies. See Mark Leonard, Catherine Stead & Conrad Smewing, \textit{Public Diplomacy} (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 18. On the other hand, according to Carothers the Reagan administration believed that political training could be interpreted as a feature of public diplomacy. See \textit{Thomas Carothers In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years} (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 201.
\textsuperscript{116} Carothers, 201.
signed by the President in January 1983.\(^{117}\) The SPG was designed to co-ordinate all aspects of the US government ideological campaign through four subcommittees, including: activities carried out to support INF missile deployments in Western Europe and against the nuclear freeze movement in the US, to be co-ordinated through the Public Affairs Committee;\(^ {118}\) management of international radio broadcasting, an important component of the administration’s anti-Soviet campaign, which would be overseen by the International Broadcasting Committee;\(^ {119}\) and the International Information Committee, which formalised the Project Truth Working Group.\(^ {120}\) The committee designated to manage Project Democracy was the International Political Committee, chaired by the State Department, with USIA as vice-chair.\(^ {121}\) The IPC was to be responsible for “planning, co-ordinating and implementing international political activities” and countering “totalitarian ideologies and aggressive political action moves undertaken by the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates”.\(^ {122}\) The committee was also authorised to co-ordinate “aid, training and organisational support for foreign governments and private groups to encourage the growth of democratic political institutions and practices” through “close relationship[s] with those sectors of the American society – labor, business, universities, philanthropy, political parties, the press – that are or could be more engaged in parallel efforts overseas.”\(^ {123}\) This placed both governmental and private programs under the supervision of the International Political Committee and ultimately the Special Planning Group.

This command structure, which linked Project Democracy to efforts to persuade Western Europeans to accept INF deployments and the administration’s broadcasting assault

\(^{118}\) Ibid, 2.
\(^{119}\) Ibid, 3.
\(^{120}\) Ibid.
\(^{121}\) Ibid, 2.
\(^{122}\) Ibid, 2.
\(^{123}\) Ibid, 2.
\(^{124}\) Ibid, 2.

on the USSR, was clearly designed to implement an anti-communist agenda shaped by immediate national security crises rather than one tied to either an expansive strategy connected to national security or a global campaign to build democracy. It also placed the democracy campaign under government supervision. It remained to be seen whether this arrangement would be acceptable to Congress.

Executive-Congressional Consensus

The program of democracy promotion placed before Congress by the Reagan administration in February 1983 contained many of the initiatives discussed during this time, such as a stepped-up book publishing program and an Institute for Democracy in Central America, and was described as an effort to promote democracy through “leadership training, education, building of democratic institutions, informational programs and bolstering ties between American individuals and organizations and their foreign counterparts” in Africa, Asia and Latin America and to promote an “evolution...toward democracy’ in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe”.

The program included participation by private organisations; however, rather than distributing block grants to private groups who would then work autonomously, the administration had created a government command centre for the program and proposed to dole out money for specific projects in fixed amounts. This mode of control was similar to that employed by the CIA to manage its private partners before 1967. To obtain the funds to begin the campaign there was a need for convergence between the administration’s vision

125 Compare George P. Schultz, cable to all diplomatic posts, 1 and Anonymous, “Project Democracy,” undated, Folder 6: Reports and Proposals, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC, 29 on the book publishing program. The Institute for Democracy in Central America is discussed on p9 of the Project Democracy program list. See “Project Democracy,” 9.
and that of elements of the legislature which favoured a privately-implemented universal campaign and were deeply suspicious of the administration’s hard-line anti-communism. An examination of the Project Democracy programs indicates the disjuncture between the Executive’s proposals and what these elements in Congress might find acceptable.

While Project Democracy represented the significant strengthening of US political action capability sought by NSDD-75, it did not constitute a coherent strategy for promoting the growth of democratic parties and political structures overseas. The concept of democracy deployed in the Project was an abstract one and its programs were a compendium of propaganda and exchange programs, connected haphazardly with more political initiatives such as the Institute for Democracy in Central America, which was primarily targeted on the US’ particular national security interest: combating communism. These programs were largely geared at using democratic ideology as an abstract concept to wage a “battle of ideas” with Soviet Communism, rather than building democratic systems overseas on a global basis.

This was clear from the geographical targeting of the project, which included programs focussed on Western Europe, a region that was already democratic. In terms of the administration’s stated rationale for Project Democracy, activities in Western Europe had no justification; the only purpose of such activities could be to counter Soviet propaganda and support the strategic goals of the United States, not to promote democratic forms of government. The “Full Cycle” program in which European students were invited to the US on exchange visits and then encouraged to form committees to recommend participants for the next cycle of exchanges, and the proposal for teacher-training workshops and secondary school materials to create more support for NATO, which was effectively contracted out to a
British educational institution, were aimed at drumming up support in Western European civil society for the US rather than a campaign for democracy.

The Project’s activities focussed on the Third World were also largely geared towards a vision of democracy promotion focussed on contesting communist ideology. An example of this was the Central American Media Program which consisted of a newspaper and radio facilities targeted at rural populations, i.e., those social sectors most likely to support the insurgents the US was fighting against. This activity was clearly aimed at indoctrinating Central American peasants against Communism, not empowering them as democratic citizens. The exchanges proposed in the program were also directed at Marxist ideology and seemed to equate democracy with the United States. The rationale advanced for African-US scholar exchanges was that, while African universities were rapidly becoming foci for political thought and debate was based on anti-communism rather than democracy promotion:

…African faculties and significant segments of the student population tend to view the world through Marxist lenses and have little understanding or sympathy for democratic values and processes.

Funding for AFL-CIO operations was included within the program, but with the purely anti-communist rationale that

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131 Ibid, 25.
A strengthened national and international labor movement would bolster democracy both in countries where the Soviets are engaged in overt and covert political action programs in the labor sector to shift the balance of power (e.g., Western Europe and Oceania), as well as those regions where the Soviets are supporting communist and radical insurgents in an effort to undermine stability and the democratic labor movement (e.g., Central America and southern Africa).  

In contrast to this focus on anti-communism, Project Democracy presented no clear plan to transition pro-US right-wing dictatorships to democracy and had few concrete programs aimed at building democratic successor movements capable of taking power in these states. One of the few concessions to the danger of right-wing authoritarianism in the clutch of propaganda initiatives was a program of seminars on democracy for military leaders, based on the idea that

Military-led interruptions of the political process can retard the development of a democratic form of government. Democratization often depends on building positive attitudes towards democracy in present and future military leaders.  

Project Democracy would also contribute $1.7 million to the government of Samuel Doe in Liberia for an election to return to civilian rule and the problematic Institute for Democracy in Central America, which was now to be funded directly by the US government despite the legal ambiguity of this. However, the Liberian program was an isolated case, not an example of a grand strategy at work, and the Institutes for Democracy mentioned for other areas of the world were discussed only as future possibilities, not concrete realities. These programs were ad hoc responses to current problems and were not tied to a wider or more strategic approach. The administration needed to exercise caution when presenting this package to Congress due to the disjuncture between its narrow focus on

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134 Ibid, 17.
135 Ibid, 15.
136 Ibid, 9.
anti-Sovietism and Congress’ vision of a democracy initiative which would work for
democratic change on an expansive basis.

Project Democracy ran into immediate problems in Congress during hearings held by
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organisations and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee due to the lack of strategic and organisational consensus between the
administration and the legislature. While both Republican and Democrat legislators criticised
the project in organisational terms, many of the harshest strategic criticisms came from the
Democrats. The core disagreement between the administration and Congressional Democrats
was over whether the campaign should be a focussed on at combatting Soviet ideological and
political influence, mainly through the type of public diplomacy initiatives which had been
conducted earlier in the Cold War through USIA and the CIA, or whether it should be a
universalist one focussed on promoting changes in political structures in enemy and allied
dictatorships through new forms of political intervention. The fact that programs were to be
conducted in Western Europe, a region which was already democratic, made no sense in
terms of the stated rationale for Project Democracy and so was clearly aimed at combating
either communism or the European peace movement; Democratic Party Senator Christopher
Dodd summed up the incongruity of launching programs to promote democracy in Western
Europe by commenting that “If [the Western Europeans] don’t believe in democracy, we’re
in real trouble”.\(^{137}\)

Congressmen on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International
Organisations were concerned about the larger issue of “how US national interests and the
even-handed spreading of democratic ideology might be reconciled in the conduct of the

\(^{137}\) Patricia Koza (March 3\(^{rd}\) 1983), “untitled,” United Press International, 3\(^{rd}\) March 1983, Nexis UK,
project”. The fact that the administration had put forward a number of anti-communist proposals but few initiatives focussed on building democracy in right-wing dictatorships was also a serious stumbling block to the acceptance of the plan by Democrats on the House and Senate Committees. Democrat Congressman Stephen Solarz questioned Shultz over whether the US would limit democracy promotion to unfriendly governments or whether it would promote democracy in allied dictatorships such as the Philippines, Chile, Taiwan and South Korea during his Congressional testimony in support of the program, arguing that a policy of selective democracy promotion would destroy the credibility of the whole effort. Shultz attempted to sidestep the issue, which was controversial within the administration as well as in the legislature, by stating that the aim of the campaign was not to support dissidents but to support democracy in general. However, his answer was unsatisfactory to some, and the project began to be tagged as “Project Right-wing Democracy” by Senator Paul Tsongas and as a “conservative ideological crusade” by Congressional Democrats.

In contrast, conservative Republican senators complained that the right-wing private organisations they favoured were not slated to receive funding, while a Republican Representative feared that friendly regimes in Asia, Africa and the Middle East would see the program as being aimed at destabilising their governments. These objections were a direct

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consequence of the administration’s decision to create an overt network, as under the pre-1967 model of covert funding provided by the CIA the national security bureaucracy had not had to make a case to Congress for the targeting of its programs or the groups that would receive support.

These objections indicated a lack of strategic consensus between the Reagan administration and some committee members, Democrats in particular. This lack of strategic consensus led to a lack of organisational consensus. Some concerns over the organisational model for the program were connected to disapproval of its anti-communist strategic bias. The problem was that the program was to be managed by a close collaborator of the President and a man famed for his anti-communist pronouncements: Charles Wick. Wick could be expected to focus on anti-communism to the detriment of a more universal approach and was unpopular with many legislators due to their perception of his conservative bias. Walter Raymond frankly admitted this problem in a memo to William Clark on Congressional strategy:

There is deep suspicion over the direction of USIA. Part of this stems from the Director and his approach to propaganda…in terms of the “democracy project” [Congress] do[es] not see either the Director or his staff as being sufficiently politically nuanced to manage this intricate program.147

Congressmen believed that Wick, with his black and white view of a world divided into communist enemies and US friends, would prosecute the project in a strident and propagandistic manner. This stemmed from Congressional discomfort with previous USIA propaganda operations such as Project Truth and the agency’s “multi-media blitz ‘Let Poland

146 During Wick’s testimony to Congress on the program, Senators raised a completely unrelated grant which USIA had made to an organisation headed by the hard-line Ernest Lefever. See McGrory, “Promoting the ‘Infrastructure of Democracy,’ With Charts,” 2.
Be Poland”\footnote{Ibid.}. Wick’s description of the project as aimed at waging “a war of ideas with the Soviet Union” clearly did not dispel this impression\footnote{See Patrick E. Tyler, “USIA Chief Questioned On ‘Project Democracy,’” The Washington Post, 3\textsuperscript{rd} March, 1983, Nexis UK, http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis, 1.}.

This problem extended beyond Wick, however, as legislators were also unhappy about the co-ordinating role of the NSDD-77 committees and the degree of government control of the project this implied. Both Republicans and Democrats feared that government involvement could damage the credibility of the enterprise and of US information and exchange programs in general.\footnote{See the criticisms made by Senators Christopher Dodd (Democrat) and Charles Percy (Republican) in Tyler, “USIA Chief Questioned”.} This management of democracy promotion by the national security bureaucracy also heightened concern that the program represented a resurrection of the previous state-private network, rather than a new approach completely divorced from covert operations. Wick was questioned closely on whether the CIA was involved in Project Democracy and, if so, to what extent.\footnote{McGrory, 2.} The USIA Director stated that the CIA had participated in initial discussions on Project Democracy, but would not be involved in the program itself.\footnote{McGrory, 2.}

Wick was also questioned over a plan by USIA, as part of Project Democracy, to “funnel $50,000 through an intermediary organization to the Inter-American Press Association because that group's rules prohibit funding by governments.” As far as one member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was concerned, "This would appear to be a rather indelicate attempt to launder $50000,” meaning that funds were to be transferred illegally and covertly.\footnote{Tyler, 2.} This action fuelled suspicions that the administration was attempting to resurrect the secretive and illegal actions which the CIA had pursued through its alliances with private groups before 1967. Such actions would lead to a gap between the democratic
message of the Project and its operating principles, similar to the ideological gap which had
destroyed the state-private network in 1967.

Rather than a serious effort to build democracy in other countries, legislators began to see
Project Democracy as simply a multimillion dollar propaganda campaign that was “sure
to give us trouble” or that other countries would merely consider it “mischief making”, with
these criticisms emerging from both parties. Several Congressmen argued that it would be
better to administer the democracy campaign through a “semi-autonomous non-governmental
organization” rather than the national security bureaucracy, with Representative
Kastenmeier opining that “[Project Democracy] may have legitimate functions if it were in
private, non-governmental agencies”. At the end of the Senate hearing, Wick had to
decline the offer of a shredder for his organisational charts from its Republican Chairman.

From this point onward Project Democracy seemed unlikely to be approved by Congress. The opposition to it expressed by legislators derived from the failure to solve the
tension between the promotion of democracy and US national interests by the administration.
This failure was partly due to the bureaucratic constraints faced by the administration in its
attempts to resurrect a state-private network previously run through the CIA and to
implement it overtly through bureaucratic structures which had not been designed to manage
such a program. The unwieldy structure of a lead agency distributing funding to other
participating agencies under the supervision of two committees at different levels led to
Congressional feeling that such an organisational framework simply could not work. The
government funding and co-ordination of the project also risked destroying the credibility of
the project as a serious attempt to promote democracy, rather than a propaganda effort

155 USIA, “Testimony of Secretary of State George Shultz,” 2.
157 McGrory, “Promoting the Infrastructure of democracy,” 3.

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directed at achieving US interests. There was no guarantee that private groups or political movements overseas would be willing to accept government funding dispensed by an initiative managed and co-ordinated by the US national security bureaucracy.

However, the overarching reason for the failure of Project Democracy was a lack of consensus between the Executive and Congressmen, especially Democrats, over how democracy promotion was related to US national security objectives. The campaign presented by the Reagan administration used the concept of democracy promotion to combat the spread of Soviet communism and to legitimate propaganda and political initiatives which had little connection to creating democratic systems in dictatorial countries, such as the programs focussed on Western Europe. The narrow nature of this campaign required the command centre within the government, which was proving so detrimental to the project’s credibility, to supervise and limit the actions of the private groups mobilised by it to conform to these priorities. In contrast, Congress favoured an expansive campaign aimed at creating democracy in dictatorial regimes friendly to the United States as well as enemy dictatorships, and believed that this campaign would be best implemented by removing day-to-day control from the Reagan administration and vesting it in private groups. The problems experienced by Project Democracy opened a space for the private democracy promoters to put forward their own implementing structure – the National Endowment for Democracy – which was tied to a wider campaign of democracy promotion.

After the problems caused by the Committee hearings in February and March 1983 the NSC attempted to secure the support of leading figures involved in private democracy promotion by contacting Frank Fahrenkopf, then Chairman of the Republican National Committee and a co-chair of the Democracy Program study board, and asked him to secure the support of Charles Manatt, Lane Kirkland and Michael Samuels, the leaders of the study project, for Project Democracy. The Council offered $10 million of the $65 million
appropriation to help launch the National Endowment for Democracy. This could smooth the passage of the program through Congress, as key critics of the administration’s vision such as Dante Fascell and Senator Christopher Dodd were members of the APF study board. This explicit linking of the private democracy promoters’ initiative, which many in Congress supported, to Project Democracy could be expected to increase the credibility of the administration’s effort with the legislature. It would also tie the private foundation more securely to Project Democracy through funding linkages and the command and control structures created by NSDD-77. It remained to be seen whether the private democracy promoters would accept this linkage.

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158 USIA, “Talking Points for Chairman Fahrenkopf”, attached to United States Information Agency, “Project Democracy: Guidance for Consultations with Congress,” undated, Folder: Project Democracy (2), Box 9, Executive Secretariat NSC; Subject Files, RL, 3. Although the USIA document is undated, references within it to Wick’s briefings of Congressional committees and the questions they raised about Project Democracy place it as having been drafted after the hearings.

CHAPTER SIX

THE FOUNDATION OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

The lack of consensus over Project Democracy threw the campaign for democracy into disarray. Congress’ objections to a government-supervised program aimed largely at combatting Soviet Communism spurred a re-thinking of the effort which created an opportunity for the private groups associated with the APF study to present their own vision to Congress.

The private coalition responsible for the Democracy Program study had broadened beyond the two parties in the wake of Reagan’s speech, when the Republicans and Democrats had been joined in their project by the AFL-CIO. These three were then joined by representatives of the US Chamber of Commerce in January 1983, after Michael Samuels had sold the idea of a role for US business in democracy promotion to the Project Democracy Working Group. In order for this group to make its vision reality it would have to engineer consensus both with the administration and the legislature over its private solution to democracy promotion.

This private study group was successful where the national security bureaucracy had failed; it produced an organisation capable of carrying out political operations abroad which would be acceptable to private groups, the administration and Congress. The study group’s concept of a global campaign for democracy, coupled with the time pressure facing the study, meant that rather than investigating and promoting a strategic framework for democracy promotion, it concentrated on an organisational solution to the problem. The fact that the ideological concept of global democracy promotion de-emphasised debates centred on

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whether to pursue a particularist anti-Soviet strategy or a more universalist one also focussed on friendly dictatorships meant that all groups could see the program as acceptable in terms of their own priorities, while the private nature of the initiative served to defuse the bureaucratic problems which had complicated Project Democracy. Through this approach, the study group was successful in convincing both the administration and Congress to support the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy.

However, the organisational solution which emerged differed from the previous state-private network and the administration’s vision in important ways. The vesting of the campaign in a private body to be funded by Congressional appropriations replaced the pre-1967 organisational model, in which funds proceeded from the CIA to the private groups, with a triangular model including the Executive, Congress and the private groups, giving the legislature influence over the overt campaign which had not been present in the covert funding model. In addition, the vesting of the command and control function which was to have been carried out by the International Political Committee in a private body which had been shaped by partisan manoeuvrings by the private groups within the democracy promotion increased the danger that democracy promotion would prove to be a fragmented enterprise driven by a mix of democratic ideology, private interests and private perceptions of US interests.

The private conception of Democracy Promotion

The Democracy Program study proceeded concurrently with the administration’s planning for Project Democracy. Although the idea for the study had emerged from the APF, it was overseen by an Executive Board consisting of, among others, private sector democracy promoters such as William Brock, Charles Manatt and Michael Samuels along with former NSA Richard Allen and legislators Dante Fascell and Christopher Dodd. The study was
directed by Professor Allen Weinstein of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a respected historian. Weinstein was also Executive editor of the *Washington Quarterly*, which had published William Douglas’ and Michael Samuels’ article, “Promoting Democracy”.

The study was predominantly an instrument for building consensus in the Executive and Congress to support the creation of a private democracy promotion foundation. In this, it closely resembled the study which Michael Samuels had called for in 1980 to foster consensus for a new policy of political intervention in the Executive and the Legislature. The group began from a conception of a campaign for democracy which was not anchored in a specific strategic framework but aimed at building democratic structures globally, in contrast to the administration’s concept of a propaganda campaign which used democracy primarily as an ideological weapon to combat Soviet communism. This inclusiveness minimised debate over the strategic aspect of democracy promotion. Its primary tasks were to generate program plans for the beginning of the campaign and create a private structure to implement the concept which would subsume the partisan interests of the four core groups in a wider program of democracy promotion.

Due to the time constraints under which the study was operating and the substitution of the goal of promoting democracy for a specific strategy, the study group de-emphasised consideration of specific targets and tactics in favour of generating an organisational blueprint. It spent little time considering how democratic successor groups could be built up in authoritarian regimes, although, according to the program’s leaders, it did consider how such movements could be helped in totalitarian states. This information was omitted from the

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3 The legislative timetable for the program was discussed in the first Executive Board meeting on 16th December, 1982. In March 1983, Weinstein sent a memo to the study staff cautioning them that “we are racing the Congressional clock in completing our work.” See General Accounting Office, *Events leading to the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy*, 6th July 1984, accessed 27th December 2006, http://archive.gao.gov/d6t1/124606.pdf, 14.
interim and final reports presented to Congress in April 1983, presumably so as not to re-open the strategic question with legislators and thus jeopardise the organisation’s funding.

The study also recommended the organisational structure of the NED – an umbrella group sheltering four separate core foundations, to be run by the Democrats, Republicans, AFL-CIO and US Chamber of Commerce – based on the previous preconceptions of the democracy promoters, rather than basing it on a strategic concept or an assessment of what structure would be most effective in promoting democracy. By the time that recommendations on the NED’s structure had been submitted to the study board on March 16th, none of the regional reports on prospects for democracy promotion in Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America and the Middle East had been completed and the group had done no more than cursory research on the US government agencies and programs already functioning in its areas of interest or consider whether the new endowment might end up duplicating one of these programs. In addition to this the taskforce reports on the roles of business and labour in democracy promotion were also uncompleted, along with the report on elections. Reports on the role of the Democratic and Republican parties in democracy promotion had not even been begun. The NED was recommended with no clear strategy underpinning it, no cognisance of how it would fit organisationally with governmental efforts, no clear understanding of what programs it would follow to promote democracy on a regional basis and no clear conception of the role the four core groups would play in promoting democracy.

This inattention to strategic and practical questions was because the outcome of the study – a private group allying the parties, unions and business in foreign programs to

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5 Ibid, 11.
6 General Accounting Office, 12.
7 Ibid, 11-12.
promote democracy - was pre-determined by the concepts that private democracy promoters had elaborated before June 1982. This tendency to see the study as purely a vehicle for the creation of a political action capability for the four core groups was reinforced by its domination by staffers linked to these groups. Aside from Weinstein, the only full-time staffers on the study were four Assistant Directors, each of whom had been chosen by and owed allegiance to one of the four core groups. These four Assistant Directors were: Republican Keith B. Schuette, a former aide to Alexander Haig; Democrat politician John P. Loiello; John D. Sullivan of the US Chamber of Commerce; and AFL-CIO designee Eugenia Kemble, assistant to Albert Shanker of the American Federation of Teachers. These staffers “were nominated by, and intended to represent the interests of, these four groups” and later stated that the study:

was not a feasibility study in the academic sense but instead was a study to work out a mechanism by which labor, business, and the two political parties could conduct programs abroad promoting democratic institutions and processes.

Given the dominance of the four core groups within the study, the key issue was whether the organisational structure which resulted from it would be determined by the participants’ perception of what was best for democracy promotion, or the interests of these groups. This tension erupted in disagreements over whether two party foundations should be created, or whether the Republicans and Democrats should work together in one bipartisan foundation. This disagreement had first emerged in a low-key fashion at the APF’s meeting of April 1982, when George Agree and State Department official Mark Palmer had argued


10 Ibid.


12 General Accounting Office, 13.
that the interests of both democracy promotion and US security pointed to the creation of a bipartisan foundation which would be able to overcome partisan differences between the parties by focussing on the common goal of promoting democracy, whereas Charles Manatt, the APF’s Democrat Vice-chairman, had argued in favour of partisan foundations.\textsuperscript{13}

The initial agreement over a bipartisan party foundation began to change in February 1983, as the prospect of creating organisations which would receive government funding grew more apparent. Agree, who was no longer connected with the day-to-day running of the study, became concerned about the direction it was heading in. In a letter to Brock and Manatt, he raised a series of questions about what type of structure would be most appropriate for conducting party-related activities through the NED. Although Agree proposed three possible organisational options - partisan institutes, one bipartisan institute or some combination of these two options\textsuperscript{14} - it is clear that he favoured one bipartisan institute. This supposition is confirmed by a later letter to the APF Board of Directors in which he argued

\begin{quote}
...the preponderant considerations in terms of the interests of democratic forces in foreign countries, American national interests, the continuity and bipartisanship of American foreign policy, tempering factional disputes within the parties, etc, strongly favour the bipartisan approach.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Agree had been a supporter of a bipartisan institute since the foundation of the APF, which was itself a bipartisan organisation, and he offered a series of arguments for the creation of a bipartisan NED party institute connected to the operational effectiveness and credibility of the NED. A bipartisan structure would minimise factionalism within the parties by joining both together in a common goal – promoting democracy. It would also enable a long-range,

\textsuperscript{13} See Chapter Four, 135-136.
\textsuperscript{14} George Agree, memo to William E. Brock, Charles T. Manatt, 22\textsuperscript{nd} February 1983, Folder 1: APF Correspondence, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
\textsuperscript{15} George Agree, memo to the Board of Directors of the American Political Foundation,” 30\textsuperscript{th} August 1983, Folder 1: APF Correspondence, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC, 2.
consistent policy to be pursued through alternations of party control of the Executive and Congress. In addition to this, it would enhance the operational effectiveness and credibility of the institute for democracy; the party of the administration could not be seen as its agent and would not, in fact, be able to undertake rogue actions dictated by the short-term policy of the administration represented by it. At the same time, a bipartisan institute meant that there was less chance of the parties drifting into embarrassing ideological alliances overseas, or of their actions being used as campaign issues. Thus, a bipartisan institute would serve the wider cause of democracy promotion and hopefully be more credible, both inside and outside the US. Finally, Agree warned his opponents that partisan party foundations might prove unacceptable to Congress and damage the chances of creating the NED.\textsuperscript{16}

In February, Agree only recommended that competing structural models be placed before the Executive Board, which would then be able to make an informed choice.\textsuperscript{17} This was the limit of his power as a merely ex-officio member of the Executive Board; however, he was supported by Board members such as Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, and William Brock.\textsuperscript{18} These structural suggestions provoked a rift between Agree and Charles Manatt. The issue was not the respective operational merits of a bipartisan versus partisan party foundations for promoting democracy. Instead, Agree’s opponents were most concerned that under his scheme their own party foundation would be unable to act alone to pursue its partisan interests. Agree’s perception of this issue is clear from the compromise solution he suggested; the creation of international departments for the two parties through which they could pursue these interests, leaving the democracy institute untainted by partisan operations.\textsuperscript{19} It is also clear from the interim report to Congress of April 1983, discussed

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{17} George Agree, memo to William E. Brock, Charles T. Manatt.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{19} George Agree, letter to William Brock, 10\textsuperscript{th} March 1983, Folder 1: APF Correspondence, Box 1, George E. Agree Papers, LOC.
more fully below, which argued for the creation of partisan party foundations and stated that
the conduct of political exchanges would enable the parties to promote their own interests
abroad.20

Despite Agree’s efforts the two competing models were never put before the
Executive Board of the Study or the APF Board in order to enable board members to make an
informed choice, as he had asked.21 Neither were the arguments for bipartisan versus partisan
foundations ever put to Congress, as the question was omitted from the interim report.
Instead, the decision on the matter was made behind closed doors “through unofficial
dealings among a few leaders”.22 The supporters of partisan political institutes, chiefly
Democrat leader Charles Manatt, carried the day. The study board reacted to the threat to its
consensus over organisation by removing the most strident proponents of a bipartisan
foundation. Several months later Agree was fired as President of the APF by a small group of
directors, which included Manatt,23 while a Republican APF director who had supported his
ideas was also pressured into resigning by RNC Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf. He did so,
while commenting that the APF had “drift[ed]…far from its original mission” and followed a
“policy of secretness and stealth”; the organisation was “clearly being used as a vehicle for a
few rather than as a champion of a cause.”24 It was clear that the wider project of promoting
democracy was being diluted by more partisan considerations, even if, as Agree had warned,
this placed the approval of the organisation by Congress in jeopardy.

The dominance of the interests of the four core groups was further shown by the
legislative framework for the National Endowment for Democracy itself, which was designed

21 George Agree, memo to William E. Brock, Charles T. Manatt.
22 George Agree, memo to the Board of Directors, 3.
23 Ibid, 4.
24 Eddie Mahe, Jr, letter to Charles Manatt, 7th October 1983, Folder 1: APF Correspondence, Box 1, George E.
  Agree Papers, LOC. Mahe was a Republican Director on the APF board who had joined the organisation only in
  December 1982.
to reduce structural constraints on the operations of these four groups. The legislation which created the NED prohibited no activities to its constituent groups, gave the Endowment no control over the money which would be disbursed to the four cores and provided no safeguards against misuse of its funds by them.\(^{25}\) The four groups were not accountable to the NED, or to Congress, and did not have to either obtain advance approval for their activities or report them after the fact; unlike the West German party foundations which the NED’s Republican and Democratic Party institutes claimed to have modelled themselves on.\(^{26}\) In addition, although there was a requirement for the NED itself to be audited, there was no such requirement for the four groups.\(^{27}\) One critic pronounced “the Endowment is a toothless tiger”, “merely a pass-through with no control whatsoever over the use of funds by the party institutes, or the business and labour institutes for that matter.”\(^{28}\) Clearly the power lay with the four core groups, who would gain funding, autonomy and credibility through the Endowment.

The guiding consideration of the Democracy Program study was not the creation of a strategic framework connecting private democracy promotion and US national security, or the organisational requirements for democracy promotion itself, for the study group largely ignored these questions. Instead, the core groups were most focussed on creating an instrumentality which would offer them the maximum amount of operational independence to pursue their own interests under the umbrella of democracy promotion. This course was pursued even when it impeded the creation of a functional organisation, or the prospect that the privates’ blueprint would be acceptable to Congress. These actions on the part of the dominant groups blocked the creation of an organisation which would meld the interests of

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\(^{25}\) See Anonymous, A Critique of the proposal to give political parties Federal funds to promote democracy overseas, July 1983, Folder 6: Reports and Proposals, Box 1, George e. Agree Papers LOC, 1-2 and 4-5.

\(^{26}\) See section on “The West German Analogy,” 7, in ibid.

\(^{27}\) See ibid, 2.

\(^{28}\) ibid, 5.
the four core groups together in a campaign to promote democracy and instead resulted in a weak umbrella organisation which would pass funds to instrumentalities controlled by these groups. The weakness of the supervisory powers granted to the National Endowment for Democracy increased the likelihood that rogue actions unrelated to the promotion of democracy would be undertaken by one or more core groups. However, in the rush to create the organisation the private groups failed to consider the possible outcomes of their decisions on the Endowment’s structure, particularly Agree’s warning that partisan party foundations might be unacceptable to Congress.

Consensus between the private sector and the administration

The Reagan administration, particularly its Reaganite faction, had previously shown reservations about allowing democracy promotion operations to be carried out by private groups without government supervision due to fear that these groups would carry out rogue actions which did not contribute to US national security. However, when the study group submitted its findings to Congress, it was able to include a letter from William Clark, dated 14th March, which stated that the effort to create the NED was strongly approved by Reagan.29 In addition, when the NED legislation later came under fire in Congress dissenting legislators received phone calls from Reagan administration officials urging them to change their minds.30

The administration’s strong support for the Endowment was largely a pragmatic response to its need for an organisation which could carry out political programs overseas. With Project Democracy in trouble on the Hill, the administration needed another option, and the Reagan administration may have seen the National Endowment for Democracy as a more

Congress-friendly channel for political operations. This impression is strengthened by the NSC’s offer of funding from the Project Democracy budget to set up the National Endowment for Democracy after Wick’s ineffective testimony to Congress in March 1983.\(^{31}\)

However, the administration envisaged the creation of both programs using the same pot of funding and the same command and control structure: the International Political Committee. In contrast, the private democracy promoters subsumed elements of Project Democracy within their own organisation. The interim report presented to Congress on private democracy promotion as part of the effort to create the NED in April 1983 makes this plain by arguing that:

> Several of the bipartisan programs previously recommended in the Reagan Administration’s “Project Democracy” initiative, for example, could be administered and overseen by each instrumentality while still being co-ordinated through the Endowment.\(^{32}\)

The administration could have accepted this as the only realistic way in which certain programs could be implemented, given Congressional opposition to Project Democracy. Thus, the government and the private democracy promoters reached consensus primarily over an organisational framework, rather than a strategic focus or specific tactics.

Beyond this general picture, the design for the NED mobilised many of the same sectors which the administration had included within the framework of Project Democracy. For the Reagan administration the ideological promotion of free enterprise was part of the “battle of ideas” against Marxist ideology, and the Reagan administration had included “Regional Free Market Institutes” in Project Democracy. Such a focus on the anti-communist uses of pro-free enterprise propaganda seemed to dovetail well with the core mission of the

\(^{31}\) See USIA, “Talking Points for Chairman Fahrenkopf,” attached to United States Information Agency, “Project Democracy: Guidance for Consultations with Congress,” undated, Folder: Project Democracy (2), Box 9, Executive Secretariat NSC; Subject Files, RL, 3 and discussion of this offer in Chapter Five, 197-198.

Centre for International Private Enterprise, NED’s business foundation, which aimed to strengthen the organisational capabilities of business organisations abroad and expose “political leaders to private enterprise economics”.  

This overlap between the two programs also existed in regard to labour, as AFL-CIO activities had been a prominent part of the programs to be carried out under Project Democracy. The union had submitted detailed proposals for operations to be carried out in Poland, Grenada and other enemy dictatorships to the Reagan administration in August 1982, and the final program list for the Project had contained a multimillion dollar lump sum appropriation to be given to the AFL-CIO to carry out such programs.

This convergence between the administration and the union was also facilitated by the ideological anti-communism which both shared. Many of the proposed activities for the FTUI, the AFL-CIO’s democracy promotion foundation, were described in the report to Congress in anti-communist terms; for example, the case for expansion of labor exchanges was made by stating that “The size and scope of the Soviet bloc operation in this field should offer a clear incentive.” FTUI planned to go on the offensive with “Efforts to counter the WFTU” and, most importantly, “Aid to efforts to organize independent unions in communist countries” because “the Solidarity experience may foreshadow possible future events elsewhere in the communist world”. When supporting the proposal of the NED to Congress the administration displayed a clear bias towards the FTUI. When the NED

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33 If the administration did make such a calculation, it was partly incorrect. CIPE’s mission was not limited to promoting the free market in Communist dictatorships, as the foundation’s leaders also believed free market reforms needed to be implemented in right-wing dictatorships and gave Somoza’s Nicaragua as an example of a dictatorship which was not fully free market. See Michael A. Samuels & John D. Sullivan, “Democratic Development: A New Role for US Business,” *The Washington Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (1986): 167-8.
34 The Democracy Program, Appendix C: Democracy Program Staff and Consultants, 51.
35 See Chapter Five, 160-164, for details of AFL-CIO programs proposed for inclusion in the administration’s democracy campaign.
36 See Chapter Five, 190-191.
38 Ibid, 49.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, 50.
legislation was introduced to Congress it already contained budget amounts earmarked for the use of the four foundations and, at the Reagan administration’s insistence, FTUI was given the lion’s share of the money\(^{41}\) - $13,800,000, as compared to $5,000,000 each for the Republican and Democrat party foundations and $2.5 million for CIPE.\(^{42}\)

The party institutes could also help to achieve foreign policy goals, as they would serve to staff some version of the regional institutes for democracy the administration had included in its proposal for Project Democracy. They would be of particular importance in Central America, where the whole administration supported a strategy of promoting democratic reform in allied dictatorships. This particular strategic rationale for democracy promotion represented an enduring convergence between the government and the private sector: it had been cited in Alexander Haig’s first proposal for a private democracy promotion instrumentality in March 1982, in Thomas O. Enders’ speech on Central American policy of July 1981 and in Douglas’ and Samuels’ article of several months before.

In fact, the State Department and the APF study group did co-operate over a program aimed at democracy promotion in Central America. This initiative, “Inter-American Leadership Development”, consisted of “seminars and training for politicians and staffs of democratic political parties and other democratic organizations in the respective regions”\(^{43}\) on democratic party organisation, fund raising, fiscal management, and campaign planning, organisation and execution,\(^{44}\) all of which would clearly strengthen the organisations whose representatives attended them, giving them an advantage in the struggle to take power in their home countries. It had been developed by State Department officials in the Bureau of Inter-

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\(^{42}\) See Congressional Record – House, 9\(^{th}\) June 1983, H3812.

\(^{43}\) George P. Shultz, cable to all American Republic diplomatic posts, January 1984, Folder 9, Box OA91698, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL, 1.

\(^{44}\) Ibid, 1.
American Affairs from a program proposed by ARA in March 1983.45 The project seems to have shifted from governmental to private sponsorship between March and May 1983; whereas at the end of March it was discussed at an International Political Committee meeting as a governmental/State Department initiative,46 on May 21st the project was being formally discussed in Caracas by a state-private delegation consisting of State Department officials, Allen Weinstein and Congressmen Barnes and Lagomarsino, who were enthusiastic supporters of the NED in the House vote later on that year.47 The Central American program indicated that there was a basis for co-operation between the administration and the NED.

However, the program had been generated in the State Department, not by the study board, which had not created a list of specific democracy promotion programs. More than convergence over one program or core foundation, this lack of specifics worked to the advantage of the privates, who were able to offer wide statements about continuing Project Democracy, promoting free enterprise and opposing Communism but not specifics on strategy or programs which the administration could disagree with. The fact that the study group had ignored the strategic question and its failure to produce proposals for specific programs in specific countries minimised flashpoints for disagreement between it and the Reagan administration. While uncertainty about what the private components of the nascent democracy promotion network would do had contributed to administration reservations about the project previously, the atmosphere created by Congressional reluctance to support Project Democracy over-rode these concerns and transformed the private groups’ strategic fuzziness into a strength.

47 George P. Shultz, cable to all American Republic diplomatic posts, 2.
Selling the National Endowment for Democracy to Congress

After reaching agreement among themselves and with the administration, the private groups had to engineer consensus with Congress over their concept to receive funding; an action that private groups receiving covert government funding before 1967 had never had to undertake. This was the point at which Project Democracy had failed, due to its links to the state, which had made Democrats wary that it would pursue a strategy determined by the Reagan administration’s strategic preoccupations rather than broader American interests. There was also concern that these links would damage the project’s credibility and effectiveness by making it appear to be the puppet of the national security bureaucracy to foreign populations. In order to foster Congressional approval for their design, the private democracy promoters had to de-link the NED from the state and the Reagan administration as far as possible, while portraying the organisation, which had been designed first and foremost to accommodate their own sectional interests, as a vehicle for the pursuit of America’s mission to promote democracy.

The vehicle used to persuade Congress to agree to government funding of the NED was an interim report of the Democracy Program study group, “The Commitment to Democracy”, which was presented to Congress on April 18th after being hurriedly drafted the preceding weekend by the Democracy Program staff. The document was created at the insistence of Dante Fascell, a key supporter of private democracy promotion who was a member of the Executive Board overseeing the Democracy Program study and also the Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Organisations. The democracy promoters managed to guide their proposal through the minefield which had

swallowed Project Democracy by using this report to foster a consensus over their own vision of democracy promotion.

The interim report was able to generate a consensus in favour of the creation of the NED through an appeal to the US sense of a democratic mission shared by Congress. This ideology served as the basis for the bipartisan consensus necessary both among US elites and between elites and the population for new strategic commitments and/or new policies to be pursued during the pre-Vietnam period of the Cold War. It was also a concept which could be readily deployed in the absence of hard data on specific programs and on the role of the four cores, an outcome of the time pressure on the study group.

To forge such a consensus, the interim report opened with a collection of five quotes on the subject of democracy and the promotion of democracy overseas by the US, beginning with Abraham Lincoln, progressing to President Truman, 1940s Republican Senate leader Arthur Vandenburg, then moving on to a quote from Reagan’s June 8th speech expressing his support for the study and Democratic Speaker of the House Thomas O’Neill, who also expressed his support for the Democracy Program study.50 These quotes portrayed a continuum of US thought on democracy stretching from the Gettysburg address to the foreign policy problems of the 1980s, while the choice of quotes from both Republicans and Democrats conveyed an impression of bipartisanship. The introduction to the report also deployed this ideological tactic, linking the democracy promotion organisation proposed by the study group to the US’ historic mission to promote democracy:

Throughout our national experience, Americans have rarely asked whether they should assist democracies elsewhere in the world, only how such support could be provided most effectively. …From the early years of the American nation to its recent decades of global involvement, the United States has honoured a commitment to

50 See The Democracy Program, “The Commitment to Democracy ,” 5.
supporting the democratic ideal and those who uphold it, first in Europe, and more recently throughout the world.\textsuperscript{51}

This deployment of democratic idealism appealed to the view of the US possessed by members of the legislature and also performed an important function in providing an alternative rallying point to agreement over a list of specific programs. This was of key importance because questions surrounding the targeting of Project Democracy programs had been responsible for a great deal of Congress’ unhappiness with the program, due to the suspicions of Democrats that the program was primarily aimed at Soviet Communism, not a universalist one aimed at all dictatorial regimes. It had also led to Congressmen engaging in criticism of the whole project based on the fact that they disagreed with particular programs to be run under it, such as the democracy promotion programs to be run in Western Europe. The report avoided this problem almost completely by including no specifics on the strategy or programs the NED would pursue. As noted above, the only substantive strategic issue which the study discussed was how to foster democratic forces in totalitarian states, meaning the USSR and its clients and allies. However, discussion of these issues was omitted from the report presented to Congress, as it was felt to be “inadvisable”.\textsuperscript{52}

The proposal of a number of democratic tasks for the NED rather than a strategic framework or specific programs also de-emphasised strategic or tactical disagreements. These tasks were “to encourage free and democratic institutions throughout the world through private sector initiatives”, “to facilitate exchanges”, “to promote United States nongovernmental participation...in democratic training programs”, “to strengthen democratic electoral processes abroad” and “to encourage the establishment and growth of democratic development in a manner consistent with the broad concerns of United States national

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{52} General Accounting Office, Appendix IV, 50.
interests”. These broad missions gave little clue as to where the Endowment would focus its efforts, what type of regimes it would target and what programs it would run to promote democracy. The missions could be interpreted in a number of ways and represented broad goals rather than ways of achieving them, giving a hazy picture of what the endowment would actually do in practice.

Similarly, the organisation of the report into sections dealing with the structure of the Endowment itself and that of each of its four core foundations, rather than other possible organising frameworks such as a discussion of the prospects for democracy promotion by region, served to focus Congressional attention on organisational structures rather than strategy or programs. The NED’s vagueness on this score meant that Congressmen and Senators could read their own strategic preferences into the organisation’s list of missions and rhetoric. This vagueness helped to generate consensus over the basic organisational concept of a private umbrella foundation linked to institutes staffed by officials of the four core groups. The report also de-linked the proposed Endowment from the foreign policy of the Reagan administration and the national security bureaucracy organisationally. The report argued that the organisational structure of the NED would guard against its co-optation into a particularist campaign by the state, arguing that:

The independent nature of the Endowment will insure that the programs it funds promote the long-term, bipartisan interests of the United States rather than short-term partisan ends. This public de-linking of democracy promotion from the Reagan administration organisationally was necessary to ensure that Congress would not block the proposal for fear that it would be used to pursue the administration’s particularist policy goals.

For the NED to be credible both with foreign democrats and with the legislators who were to vote on its funding appropriation, the study group also needed to avoid linking democracy promotion with the discredited CIA covert operations carried out before 1967. This was extremely important as the method by which democracy promotion was to be funded - government money disbursed to a private umbrella foundation, which would then distribute the money to private groups - could have seemed remarkably similar to previous state funding of private groups through foundations manipulated by the CIA. Project Democracy’s model of government funding being disbursed to private groups who would be overseen by a committee within the national security apparatus had also drawn this parallel. This organisational problem had been responsible for many of the problems which the government-run program had faced; NED would need to side-step this problem if it were to succeed.

The report was careful to not discuss previous covert funding of US private groups at length. Although the document included a short history of previous private sector efforts to promote democracy abroad, the question of CIA funding of these initiatives was never raised, not even to criticise it as being morally incorrect or operationally inadequate.55 The only time the CIA and the collapse of the previous state-private network is even mentioned in the report is in the context of explaining Dante Fascell’s motivations for proposing the creation of an “Institute for International Affairs” in early 1967, in a section dealing with the background to the study; the reference was fleeting and the point was not enlarged upon.56 Although the report also contained a short history of the AFL-CIO’s democracy promotion efforts, the question of CIA funding was not raised.57 The picture produced in the report was that of a citizen group committed to a project of democracy promotion which had no immediate links with specific US national security goals or the national security bureaucracy.

56 See The Democracy Program, 12.
57 See ibid 1, 20-21.
Beyond producing domestic credibility with Congress, the report also had to argue that the organisational model which it put forward for democracy promotion would be both credible overseas and effective in the task of building up democratic systems. The report disposed of the problem of the credibility of the effort overseas by stressing the autonomy of the NED from the national security bureaucracy:

If aid came from a foundation with genuine autonomy, supervised by a board of respected American and foreign figures,” The New York Times editorialized shortly after the President’s London speech, “it could be as uncontroversial as that already provided by private foundations…Change “foundation” to “Endowment”, provide for an American board but one which would work in “cooperation with foreign figures” on jointly agreed upon programs, and the description matches the proposal before us.58

Clearly a private instrumentality would be more credible than actions undertaken by government agencies and would be more likely to gain the co-operation of foreign democrats:

Within the political climate which characterizes a number of Third World countries…the existence of a National Endowment for Democracy – openly receiving and dispensing public funds to its grantees – might be perceived as a more recognizable, and hence more acceptable, source of funding than, for example, a political foundation functioning as a State Department, USIA, or AID grantee.59

Such a private arrangement would also serve to defuse accusations of neo-colonial behaviour which could accompany efforts by a US government agency to promote US values or alter foreign political systems in the Third World. To make the NED’s private status more credible, it was set up by the private groups themselves rather than by Congress, with legislation only being required to provide funding for it.60 The four core groups also set up their own democracy foundations, which would shelter under the NED umbrella, independently of Congress. Both the National Republican Institute (NRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) were set up in April 1983,61 while the Centre for International

58 Ibid, 33-34.
59 Ibid, 35-36.
60 General Accounting Office, 9-10, tracks this change in the concept of the Endowment structure.
61 Ibid, 21.
Private Enterprise (CIPE) was set up in June of that year. The AFL-CIO’s Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) pre-existed the NED, having been set up during World War Two to channel funding to European trade unionists, firstly from the AFL-CIO and then from the CIA in the early years of the Cold War. The FTUI was resurrected in 1978 but had been troubled by a lack of funds, which it had become largely dormant due to lack of funding, a problem which the NED could solve. Thus, all of NED’s constituent foundations had been set up before the Endowment was passed into law at the end of 1983.

The creation of the NED and its core groups by private forces rather than the American government was done to avoid accusations that the NED was a government instrumentality. This organisational model removed the International Political Committee, and the command and control function it was to exercise on behalf of the national security bureaucracy, from the equation, a change which could be expected to enhance the credibility of the organisation both with US legislators and with private groups and movements overseas. However, this credibility was built on the argument that government money which first passed openly through the NED and then either directly to foreign groups or indirectly, to one of the Endowment’s four core groups and then to a foreign group, would cease to be government money on this journey. One of the key functions of the National Endowment for Democracy itself was to serve as a “pass-through” which put another private structure between the government and the private groups which received funding.

The report also omitted debate over whether one bipartisan or two party foundations would be more credible and effective at promoting democracy overseas. The report attempted to head off this question, which had created such division within the democracy promotion community, by stating that:

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64 See General Accounting Office, 20.
This proposal for creating two political foundations under the National Endowment for Democracy umbrella, therefore, rejects the question – “Why have a Democratic and a Republican foundation?” – in favour of another query: “Why were they not created long ago, considering their utility in our own political system?”

The recommendation to create two partisan party foundations could have seemed out of place in a report which spent much of its time appealing to bipartisanship in order to create a Congressional consensus in favour of the Endowment. However, the invocation of democracy as an abstract concept de-emphasised difficult questions about whose interests the proposed NED would act in. The report proposed a particular organisational structure which had been designed to cater to the needs of the four core groups as the obvious way to promote democracy, subsuming sectional interests within the universal ideal of democracy promotion.

The status of the NED as a private foundation, while serving to render the effort credible overseas, would also solve the bureaucratic problems which the government had experienced when trying to devise a method of funding more political programs such as the Free Market Institutes and the Institute for Democracy in Central America, such as the lack of legal authorisation for national security agencies to implement such programs. The problem was that:

Questions of perception aside, such direct government grantees would probably be precluded by State, USIA or AID enabling legislation from engaging in many of the political exchange, training and democratic institution-building programs called for by the charter of the National Endowment for Democracy…

The study group solved this problem by simply recommending that all funds appropriated for the Endowment and disbursed by it to other private groups be exempt from legislative restrictions and limitations existing in the charters of the State Department, USIA or AID which would impair the ability of the Endowment or its four core groups to achieve their

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65 General Accounting Office, 40.
66 This is clearly the intent of the report’s title and sub-heading “The Commitment to Democracy: A Bipartisan Approach”. The final section of the report is titled “Why Now? Toward a New Bipartisanship”. See Democracy Program, “The Commitment to Democracy: A Bipartisan Approach”, 44.
67 See The Democracy Program, 36.
objectives. The hiving off of such programs to a private instrumentality solved the bureaucratic problems which had bedevilled attempts to institute new state-private network relationships which had occurred both in the aftermath of the 1967 scandal and the Reagan administration’s more recent attempts to design an effective operating framework for Project Democracy.

The report’s contextualisation of the NED as being devoted to democracy promotion, together with the de-linking of the Endowment from the state machinery, connected the NED’s organisational blueprint to enduring US ideological concerns about spreading democracy. This obscured weaknesses in the organisation of the project. The NED’s organisational structure had been determined more by partisan negotiations between the four cores than the needs of democracy promotion, while the fact that the NED was to receive government funding meant that it was still linked to the state and vulnerable to attacks on its credibility. However, this approach was successful in shaping the Congressional debates over whether to approve funding for the National Endowment for Democracy which took place in the second half of 1983, when the administration introduced NED funding legislation as part of a more general bill to appropriate funds for the remaining programs and institutions of its public diplomacy campaign.

While Congressional supporters of the NED such as Dante Fascell and Congressmen Barnes and Lagomarsino referred to the Endowment as a modification of Project Democracy, Congressmen possessed almost no information on the concrete programs it would run. According to various Congressmen involved in the debate on the National Endowment for Democracy Act in the House of Representative in June, the targets of the NED were, variously, “authoritarian governments”, “totalitarianism”, “Marxism” and “international communism”, and various examples of the utility of private groups in promoting democracy

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were advanced in regard to El Salvador and Poland.\textsuperscript{69} Without program data legislators could not be sure of this and were merely making assumptions.

This vagueness served a positive function, as without detailed information regarding what the NED would do, there was little for strategic critics to challenge. Concrete issues such as the strategic framework and the programs the organisation would implement were subsumed under the concept of democracy promotion. Clement Zablocki, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, argued that if Congressmen supported an amendment to the bill tabled by a critic of the Endowment, “they will be supporting totalitarian, undemocratic, nondemocratic countries.”\textsuperscript{70} This vague terminology, which could have referred to the USSR or to Chile, or both, framed the debate as a simple question of whether Congressmen were in favour of or opposed to the promotion of democracy. Thus, democratic ideology minimised discussions over strategy and provided a focal point for the generation of consensus in support of the Endowment.

While ideology was successful in securing Congressional consensus on the basic idea of a foundation to spread democracy, it failed to silence debate over the NED’s organisational structure. Jack Kemp, a conservative Republican Congressman, feared the NED would be too independent of government supervision, arguing that:

\begin{quote}
USIA is the natural existing organisation, fully staffed and qualified, to manage Project Democracy…the committee bill would remove Project Democracy form [sic] USIA control….I do not think that the creation of an autonomous bureaucracy serves the purposes of the project.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

However, the NED’s key weak point was its funding by the US government, which called its independence and credibility into question. It was this issue of government funding for US democratic civil society groups, and the state control and direction of these groups

\textsuperscript{69} In order, from Congressional Record – House: Gilman, H3812; Zablocki, H3815; Hyde, H3820; Edwards, H3820; Lagomarsino, H3820; Burton, H3819.
\textsuperscript{70} Congressional Record – House, H3815
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, H3804.
which such funding implied, which had made the continuation of covertly-funded state-private network operations unacceptable in 1967. Similar accusations were now made by Republican Congressman Hank Brown, who argued that while he supported private attempts to promote democracy overseas with private money, “there is a real problem on making [democratic civil society groups] dependent upon…and…answerable to the Government”.72 In Brown’s judgement the government funding of private groups, especially the political parties, posed “a real danger to the whole concept of democracy itself”.73

As well as the threat to democratic institutions, there was also the danger that government funding would “destroy [the groups’] effectiveness”74 at promoting democracy overseas. This point was enlarged upon by another opponent of the Endowment, who argued that such government-funded institutes linked to the parties, AFL-CIO and Chamber of Commerce “will be viewed…as an extension…of the Federal Government.”75 Despite the study group’s attempt to create a new approach to overseas political operations that was more credible than previous covert approaches, the issue of government funding remained the weak point of its design and could not be disposed of unless the private democracy promoters were willing to rely completely on private donations. These objections to the NED’s general organisational principle were supplemented with more specific criticisms of the political parties, which were seen as lacking in foreign party expertise and liable to take partisan positions in overseas elections.76 The structure chosen by the study group over George Agree’s objections meant that this was theoretically possible, whereas choosing to found a bipartisan democracy promotion institute would have avoided this difficulty.

72 Ibid, H3812.
73 Ibid, H3812.
74 Congressional Record – House, H3812.
75 Ibid, H3818.
76 Ibid, H3816.
These criticisms led to the tabling of amendments by the NED’s opponents to excise it from the measures proposed in the same legislative package. The first amendment, aimed at striking the NED completely from the law, was defeated due to legislators’ acceptance of the goal of promoting democracy overseas.77 However, support for the amendment had been broadly bipartisan, and it was defeated by only 19 votes.78 Amendments were then tabled to accomplish the same goal by striking the funds earmarked by the Reagan administration for each of the four core institutes under the NED umbrella. The amendment to terminate the earmarking for CIPE and FTUI failed due to the prestige the AFL-CIO enjoyed on the Hill for effective conduct of foreign political operations.79 However, the amendment to eliminate the earmarking for the party institutes, NDI and NRI, was passed rapidly.80 Brown’s amendment to de-fund the parties was supported by liberals, moderates and conservatives, rather than being supported by one political current only.81 Although this funding was subsequently restored by the Senate, it was deleted again by the House just before the NED Act was signed into law.82

The NED’s opponents had aimed at eradicating the Endowment as a whole, not merely its funding for the party institutes. However, the parties proved to be the soft underbelly of the Endowment due to Congressional concerns about whether they would institute partisan programs abroad. George Agree had been correct in arguing that a bipartisan party institute would be more acceptable to Congress. This decision cut the financial ground out from underneath the parties and strengthened the position of the AFL-CIO within the democracy promotion apparatus as the group with the largest amount of funding.

78 Ibid.
79 One Congressman argued that “In the international arena, organized labor has been an effective ally of everything that we are trying to do to protect the security of this country and our allies.” See Congressional Record – House, 95th June 1983, H3820.
80 See Ibid, H3818.
Although funding for the party institutes had been deleted, the private groups had succeeded in creating a democracy promotion organisation where Project Democracy had failed. The concept of democracy promotion helped to produce the necessary consensus between the private groups, the administration and Congress by subsuming the debate over whether to follow a policy of containing the USSR or promoting a gradual change towards democracy within it, and replaced them with a global campaign to promote democracy with no clear strategic focus, while the fact that the study group had not generated specific programs served to minimise areas of specific disagreement. This fuzziness over targeting allowed the privates to secure administration backing for their chosen organisation as a pragmatic alternative to Project Democracy and also de-emphasised the strategic debate in Congress. Consensus developed around the concept and the NED itself, rather than around a clear strategic framework for democracy promotion.

The creation of the NED allowed the reconstitution of the bipartisan consensus necessary to underpin US intervention in foreign political structures which had been missing since Vietnam and provided a vehicle for it to be implemented through. However, this did not amount to a resurrection of previous CIA capabilities disguised by more appealing rhetoric, as the shift from a covert to an overt state-private relationship fundamentally changed the dynamic for the management of political operations overseas in two key ways. Firstly, the decision to create a Congressionally-funded foundation brought the legislature into a new, more open process for the management of political operations overseas and provided it with a share of the leverage over the funding of operations which had been exercised only by the state under the covert model of funding proceeding covertly from the CIA to its private partners. Congress had already shown it could wield this power by deleting funds for the party institutes, and could use it in the future to police NED operations. Secondly, whereas in the pre-1967 network the national security bureaucracy had exercised the supervision
necessary to harness private efforts into a coherent campaign in support of national security interests, political operations were now to be overseen by a private body, the NED itself, with extremely weak powers to carry out such a co-ordinating function. This weak command and control risked producing a disjointed private campaign in which the core groups pursued their own interests in a way which did not accord with either US national security objectives, or the promotion of democracy, or either. It remained to be seen whether this new organisational model would produce a campaign focussed primarily on US national security, the promotion of democracy, or the achievement of the interests of the private groups themselves.
CHAPTER SEVEN
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

The foundation of the NED in 1983 had created an organisation for democracy promotion operations but had not generated a strategic framework for it. This left unresolved whether the targeting of these operations would be most influenced by democratic ideology, national security objectives, or private, partisan interests. It also left open the larger question of whether the effect of democracy promotion operations would be to foster popular empowerment and development, or whether democratic change would be limited by the need to safeguard US interests in societies in which the Endowment chose to intervene. The record of the initial operations from 1984 to 1986 shows that while democratic ideology had an impact on the NED in terms of legitimating, limiting, and shaping its tactics, and while private groups sometimes supported foreign civil society organisations based on partisan reasoning or ideological affinity, the key driver behind its operations was national security.

The concept of democracy promotion allowed the private groups, the administration and Congress to converge over the creation of an overt organisational structure for democracy promotion operations, whereas Project Democracy’s had failed due to its focus on anti-communism and national security. The organisational outcome was a new structure for the management of overt state-private operations in which Congress played a role, as the provider of funding, which it had not played in the pre-1967 covert organisational structure. This role gave Congress leverage which it could use to enforce its understanding of democracy promotion as the support of democratic forces in dictatorships through democratic methods. Elements of the private coalition who had paid lip-service to democracy promotion to gain funding soon found that operations which were rooted in national security but lacked

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1 Joshua Muravchik noted that the NDI tended to support democratic groups from a wide range of political currents, while the NRI tended to support foreign forces which shared or were close to its own ideology. See Joshua Muravchik, “US Political Parties Abroad,” The Washington Quarterly 12, no. 3 (1989): 93-4.
a clear democracy promotion rationale could result in Congressional sanctions which constrained the NED within the pro-democratic framework which had legitimised its creation. Such sanctions laid down a marker that legitimising operations through an abstract democratic ideology was insufficient; such operations should genuinely aim at strengthening democratic forces through democratic methods.

However, these Congressional sanctions did not lead to a policy of pursuing operations based solely on the imperative of promoting democracy overseas. Instead, the list of countries where the NED carried out politically significant interventions - Grenada, Guatemala, Poland and the Philippines - tallies with the national security concerns of the Reagan administration and points to a clear subordination of democracy promotion operations to US security interests. This subordination was partly due to the fact that, organisationally, the Endowment relied on support from the US state to secure funding from Congress and to conduct large-scale operations aimed at altering political structures. It was eased and rationalised by the fact that, rather than seeing democracy promotion and US national security as contradictory the Endowment’s leadership conflated the universal ideology of democracy promotion with the particularist national security interests of the United States and so tended to pursue their operations within the overall framework of national security priorities which had been set by the state.

The outcome of the double limitation of the Endowment’s freedom of operation by Congress and the administration and the ideological conflation of democracy and national security was the pursuit of political operations overseas through democratic methods on a tactical basis in situations where the promotion of democracy was believed to enhance US national security. The effort to create democratic regimes in friendly dictatorships was driven by the perception that such regimes would be less vulnerable to anti-US revolutions and could provide the stability which US interests required. Similarly, the effort to build
democratic movements in enemy dictatorships was driven by the perception that transitions to democracy would remove the threat to the US that such regimes posed. Thus, the extension of democracy and the interests of the United States were seen to be intertwined.

This conflation of the interests of the United States as a nation-state with those of democracy also had an effect on the selection of foreign groups for NED support. In friendly dictatorships the overall goal of securing stability, coupled with the perception of the Endowment’s leadership that groups focussed on radical democratic restructuring of their societies were undemocratic and thus undeserving of support, meant that the groups supported were elite-led forces friendly to the United States. The outcome of the NED’s actions was a form of democracy run by pro-US elites who enacted surface reforms to dampen down popular unrest but did not embark on the fundamental restructuring of their societies required to resolve the injustices which had given rise to political instability in the first place. In enemy dictatorships such as Soviet bloc states, the Endowment supported groups who advocated the transformation of their societies in ways which followed Western political and economic models and meshed with US interests rather than challenging them.

Democracy promotion was a conservative project arising from a fusion of ideology and national security concerns which allowed the United States to mould pro-US successor elites in both friendly and enemy states to preserve or extend its strategic position. This tactic was pursued on a case-by-case basis rather than in accordance with a grand design. In no case were these national security goals subordinated to the goal of promoting democratic revolutions, especially where change might damage US interests.
Democracy promotion and the national security bureaucracy

Although the administration had supported the creation of the NED in 1983 as the best possible organisation for implementing a campaign for democracy at that time, the Endowment’s relationship with the national security bureaucracy was ill-defined.

The question of control surfaced soon after the creation of the Endowment, in a struggle over the terms of the grant agreement which the Endowment needed to sign with the USIA to access the $18 million which had been awarded to it by Congress. The grant agreement produced by USIA clearly aimed at tightening the agency’s control over the NED. In January 1984, as the grant negotiations were breaking down, NED’s lawyers charged that USIA’s draft grant agreement “contains at least nineteen explicit instances of attempts to change the NED’s independent, private-sector status through unauthorized governmental control”.

Among these nineteen objectionable proposals were stipulations that the NED be subject to USIA’s normal conditions for other private sector grantees, that USIA have powers of oversight and inspection over the Endowment, that the agreement of a USIA officer be required for funding transfers and that USIA have the right to terminate any grants which it believed were not in the interests of the US government.

These provisions were clearly aimed at regaining the control over democracy promotion which USIA had lost when the NED replaced Project Democracy as the organisational framework for the campaign. As the NED was effectively a pass-through which was taking money from USIA and then handing the bulk of it to four non-governmental organisations, who would then hand funding over to other groups, who could then hand it over to other groups if they wished, it was possible that the money would be diverted to groups which did not serve the interests of the United States as USIA saw them;

2 Stuart Philip Ross & Buel White, memo to Allen Weinstein, 10th January 1984, Folder 14 Box OA91698 Raymond, Walter: Files, RL, 3.
3 Ibid.
these provisions for inspection and grant termination could be used to minimise such problems.

The Endowment and its supporters within the administration recognised the agenda behind the provisions in the grant agreement, with Acting President Allen Weinstein noting that “[s]imply put, the issue is one of control”. The NSC’s Director of International Communications, Walter Raymond, echoed this analysis: “I am afraid the key issue here is a matter of control.” USIA’s demands effectively usurped the freedom of the NED board to manage the operations of the Endowment. This posed a threat to the board’s conception of how democracy promotion should work, as the Endowment’s leaders had gone to a great deal of trouble to design a structure which could avoid such governmental micro-management during the Democracy Program study, for reasons of both private autonomy and to safeguard the credibility of private democracy promotion operations by de-linking them from the state.

The Endowment and those administration officials who held to a wider vision of democracy promotion moved swiftly to advance arguments for a more autonomous model of democracy promotion. Idealistic democracy promoters such as William Brock argued that too close a degree of government control would be damaging to both the US government and the Endowment and recalled that

the National Endowment Board and its charter were structured to be independent of any government agency for the simple and obvious reason that those of us involved in its genesis felt an urgent need to insulate any Administration from its activities, and vice versa, in order that the larger goal of building democratic institutions could proceed as quickly and effectively as possible.

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5 Walter Raymond, memo to Robert McFarlane, 25th January 1984, Folder 14 Box OA91698 Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.
6 William E. Brock, letter to Charles Wick, 26th January 1984, Folder 14 Box OA91698 Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.
The long-range effort to build democratic structures abroad would be more effective if it were de-linked from the immediate national security concerns and diplomatic considerations of the US government, which sometimes needed to co-operate with dictators or at least avoid offending them for pragmatic reasons.

However, this sophisticated argument was unlikely to impress national security officials working on a shorter time-scale. Instead, the NED’s Acting President, Allen Weinstein, chose to focus on an immediate national security concern, the upcoming Presidential elections in El Salvador, to break funding loose:

[t]ime is running out. Without a grant agreement in hand within the next few days, for example, it will be impossible for the Endowment and the four Institutes to send representatives to El Salvador…to consider President Magana’s request that we take a leading role in the observer process during the elections.\(^7\)

According to the Acting President preparations for the mission would have to be at least put on hold, as the Board had ordered him to close down the Endowment within a few days if no satisfactory grant agreement were reached.\(^8\)

This program was of key importance to all of the actors, as both the Reaganites, State Department and more moderate NSC officials and the NED itself agreed that the Endowment should intervene in the Salvadoran elections. The certification of the upcoming elections as free and fair would remove an obstacle to moving military aid through a Congress which was concerned about the Human Rights situation in El Salvador. Furthermore, this certification would be far more credible if it were made by private observers rather than administration officials.

This argument was successful in motivating sympathetic NSC officials\(^9\) to support the Endowment against USIA, and in resolving the larger question of relations between the

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\(^{7}\) Weinstein, letter to Robert McFarlane, 2.
\(^{8}\) Ibid.

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Endowment and the administration. The NSC informed USIA that “This is a Presidential program which we must get implemented as soon as possible. We need it not only in Central America but elsewhere.” The organisation also stated that “[We] do not want the negotiations to break down over the question of control; that should not be the issue.”

The course of this debate has several implications for understanding the NED’s relationship to the Reagan administration and its national security objectives. Firstly, although sections of the administration wished to secure a level of control over the administration that went beyond the “light” control proposed by the State Department in April 1982 they were unable to secure it. Secondly, Reaganite fears that the NED would pursue an ideological project which undermined national security interests were clearly overblown. While idealistic democracy promoters such as Brock had advanced arguments for NED autonomy based on the organisation’s long range mission, it was the arguments based on a short-term national security interest – El Salvador – which galvanised the Endowment’s supporters within the administration. This position may have been advanced tactically, as the best rationale for securing the Endowment’s autonomy at that time. However, the fact that the NED’s highest priority and that of the administration coincided showed the importance of US national security considerations as a key driver of Endowment strategy.

There were both practical and ideological reasons for this. The Endowment’s status as a government–backed organisation meant that it would be extremely difficult for it to take actions which contradicted the policies of those who made funding requests to Congress on its behalf. In addition, the fact that the NED was already working on a program which aimed

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9 Although the NSC had previously been a strong institutional base for the Reaganite faction, the replacement of William Clark with Robert McFarlane as NSC, together with the departure of Richard Pipes, had tilted the balance within the organisation in favour of the more expansive conception of democracy promotion held by the State Department.

10 Both quotes are from “Talking Points for USIA,” attached to Walter Raymond, memo for Robert McFarlane, 28th January 1984.

11 See Chapter Four, 142-143.
to resolve one of the key national security difficulties faced by the administration showed that the Endowment’s leaders identified democracy promotion and national security rather than seeing a conflict between them. This was to be expected, as the leaders of the Endowment and the national security apparatus were both drawn from the same narrow elite and tended to share the same assumptions about US interests.

In addition, many of the idealists who could have been expected to diverge further from US national security policy, such as George Agree, were no longer connected with the project at this point, having given way to former US government personnel such as John Richardson and Keith Schuette, and functionaries of the two political parties such as John Loiello.\footnote{At this point John Richardson, a former Nixon administration State Department Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, was the NED’s treasurer. See Chapter Six, 203, for further details on Schuette and Loiello, who were now the Chairmen of NRI and NDI, respectively.} Thus, the chances of the Endowment launching a rogue action which would undermine national security policy in the name of promoting democracy were low. This is clearly the strategic calculation which the NSC had based its decision to support NED autonomy on. Government influence over the Endowment could be wielded, but it would be a subtle matter of manipulating funding and assuring that leadership positions were held by those who could be trusted, rather than corraling the Endowment into a legal framework which would hamper its operational effectiveness on the ground by making it appear to be too close to the US government.

This did not mean that no further scope for conflict between the imperatives of democracy promotion and national security which could lead to disagreements between the Reagan administration and the private democracy promoters existed. Rather, any conflicts which arose between these two actors would turn on discussion of whether promoting democracy in a particular case would serve to enhance US national security aims or detract from them, not on whether to prioritise one over the other. However, the question of whether
covert or undemocratic methods were a permissible element of democracy promotion was still to be resolved.

**National Security versus Democracy**

Congress’ power to approve or deny funding appropriations for the National Endowment for Democracy provided it with a degree of leverage over the new overt political operations which it had not possessed over the previous covert state-private network. The Endowment quickly discovered that Congress was prepared to use this power to ensure that its operations did not merely deploy democracy promotion as a legitimating concept for operations rooted in national security priorities with little democratic content. The limits of the NED’s remit to act in support of national security objectives when these clashed with democracy promotion ideologically were illustrated by Congressional reaction to the Endowment’s early operations in Panama, the UK and France. These operations were all funded by FTUI, the AFL-CIO’s democracy promotion foundation, and in each case they appeared to be driven by national security concerns and sectional interests rather than the NED’s mission to promote democracy.

The fact that these cases involved either democracy promotion in countries which were already democratic and had been so for some time, or support of political forces whose commitment to democracy was questionable, was not in line with Congress’ understanding that the NED’s operations would be genuinely aimed at supporting democratic movements and structures rather than merely acting to support US national security objectives which had little connection with this goal. When these cases became public, they led to Congressional sanctions which limited the NED’s operations to situations in which support for democracy and the achievement of national security objectives at least appeared to be related and mutually reinforcing.
The first of these problematic cases involved an early AFL-CIO operation in Panama clearly motivated more by union and US interests than democracy promotion. During this operation FTUI passed $20,000 of its Endowment funding to a Panamanian union which then used it to hold a rally in support of Nicolas Ardito Barletta, one of the candidates in the Presidential election; Panama’s first since Omar Torrijos had seized power in 1968. Barletta was the favoured candidate of Colonel Noriega, who wanted to put a civilian face on his dictatorial rule; his main opponent was Arnulfo Arias, a charismatic conservative nationalist and populist who had been President on three previous occasions and had been overthrown by the army each time. There was a clear US national interest in an election victory by Barletta, a candidate who was seen as “friendly to Washington”, as the CIA predicted that “a Barletta victory would be characterized by continuing strong relations with the United States [and] support for US policy in Central America and the Caribbean…” US bases in the Canal Zone played a role in supporting US policy in El Salvador and in channelling aid and intelligence to the Contras, although these actions were illegal under the terms of the Carter-Torrijos canal treaty. This co-operation could be expected to continue under a President linked to Noriega, while Arias had built his political career on opposition to the US role in Panama and was likely to take a different attitude. The fact that both the AFL-CIO

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16 Ibid. 
20 The union funded speaking tours by contra leaders to the US to drum up support for contra aid and supported domestic opposition forces within Nicaragua. See Tom Barry & Deb Preusch, AIFLD in Central America: Agents as Organizers (Albuquerque: The Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Centre, 1990), 51 and 25-30.
and the administration supported the Contras thus led to support for Barletta’s campaign, despite the fact that he would be little more than a front for the military. The AFL-CIO’s funding of Barletta was linked more to anti-communism than a strictly pro-democratic policy.

The FTUI’s funding operation in Britain was also led by anti-communism. Soon after the NED began to receive its grant money from USIA in March, FTUI forwarded a grant of $49,000 to the Labour Committee for Transatlantic Understanding in Britain, which was used to send a delegation to a NATO defence seminar in Brussels. The Committee was a section of the British Atlantic Committee, an organisation lobbying for NATO positions in Europe, rather than an organisation concerned with promoting democratic processes. The Committee had long-standing connections with both the US government and the AFL-CIO, having been founded in 1976 by Joseph Godson, a former US labour attaché to Britain and a senior consultant on the Democracy Program study which had recommended the creation of the NED. It had been funded secretly by NATO until 1980, when the British government admitted the source of the funding. The Committee also had strong links to the AFL-CIO, as AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland was one of its vice-presidents. This program was undoubtedly directed at the same ends as parallel but unconnected US government efforts, which included exchanges organised by the USIA and the State Department; to propagandise the British centre-left in favour of US nuclear policy in Western Europe, especially in the

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wake of the Labour Party’s 1983 anti-nuclear manifesto commitments.23 The Labour Committee for Transatlantic Understanding was mentioned in the Project Democracy program list, under the heading “Foreign and Defence Information”, as one of a number of AFL-CIO-connected committees important in countries “whose democratic labour movements and parties…have drifted apart from the United States on security issues.”24 This, coupled with the Committee’s connections to the Labour Party’s right-wing,25 makes it likely that the aim of the program was to generate Labour party support for US strategic initiatives in Western Europe such as INF deployment by countering pacifism and perceived Soviet propaganda. Although this program was in line with US national security interests, it could not be justified as a contribution to the cause of democracy promotion.

FTUI’s two operations in France followed a similar pattern. These operations were on a much larger scale than the program in Britain; taken together, they involved grants of over $1 million over 1984-1985. The first set of grants, totalling $830,000, went to the AFL-CIO’s long-standing ally, Force Ouvriere,26 an anti-communist union which the AFL had helped to create and finance at the beginning of the Cold War. The fact that the purpose of the funding was uncertain made the operation seem even more questionable. Irving Brown was quoted in a French newspaper as saying that Force Ouvriere did not need the money for its domestic operations in France; rather, “The funds that we send are used outside the regular trade union work. Bergeron (FO leader) explained to me that it was used to help the refugees, the Polish

24 See “Democracy and Public Diplomacy: An Inter-Agency Program,” 12, attached to Steve Steiner, memo to Robert Blackwill, Acting, Folder: Democracy Initiative (2), Box 91753, Steiner, Steve: Files, RL.
trade unionists and the immigrants.” However, in the same article Brown stated that Force Ouvriere had to be supported “[b]ecause the apparatus of the CGT [a left-wing French trade union confederation] is still here and it can destroy France…” Brown had also requested support for FO to allow the union to wage a domestic political campaign against the Communist-dominated CGT in elections linked to the French social security system as part of his submission of programs for Project Democracy in August 1982. This put the NED in the position of being seen to interfere in the domestic politics of an already-democratic country and a US ally.

The destination of the second set of grants was even more problematic. Instead of being used to support a democratic organisation, this money went to a group which had questionable democratic credentials. The organisation, funded to the tune of $575,000, was the UNI (Inter-University Union), a small but rabidly anti-communist sect of French university professors and students. The UNI had run propaganda campaigns highlighting Soviet forced labour and Human Rights violations and also published a magazine, “Solidarite Atlantique”, devoted to exposing Soviet disinformation and human rights abuses. These actions were clearly in line with US interests. Irving Brown, the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy chief, was a keen supporter of the group; referring to an anti-Gorbachev rally the organisation had participated in Paris while the Soviet leader was visiting, he stated, “I think that what UNI did in Paris against Gorbachev and the Gulag was a positive thing; we have to help

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28 Ibid, 4. This murkiness was exacerbated by Force Ouvriere leader Andre Bergeron’s explanation of what the funds were used for: “We hold funds which are used to help persons forced to leave their countries, like refugees from Southeast Asia, Poland or Chile… the money helps to provide board and lodging for people, for getting them out of prison. As for the rest, that's our business.” Quoted from The Guardian, “Union receiving secret US funds,” 1.
31 Ibid.
democratic forces that are fighting against them.”32 He had also asked the US government for $250,000 to finance UNI in his list of proposed Project Democracy programs for Western Europe of August 1982 and praised the organisation’s anti-Soviet propaganda.33

In terms of simple anti-communism support for the UNI may have represented a worthwhile investment. However, the organisation also had an anti-democratic reputation within France; it had dubious links to the Service d’Action Civique, a Gaullist paramilitary group which had been dissolved in 1982 by order of the French Parliament after a number of its activists had been executed gangland-style during factional struggles within the organisation, and its leaders also had ties to the fascist Front National.34

FTUI’s hard-line anti-communist approach was enabled by the NED’s new President, Carl Gershman.35 Gershman joined the NED from a position in the Reagan administration’s mission to the United Nations under Jeane Kirkpatrick, which had become “a centre for lots of these ideas on the ideological confrontation with communist totalitarianism”36 and espoused a tough anti-communist world view. The new NED President owed his position to the AFL-CIO. According to Madison, the deletion of the earmarking of funding for the political parties by Congress in 1983 gave Lane Kirkland a strong hold over the organisation, as the AFL-CIO now had the lion’s share of the funding, while NDI and NRI had nothing. Kirkland proposed to divert some of labour’s funding to the party institutes if they would allow him the final choice of President. Gershman would have been acceptable to the AFL-

32 Brown, 4-5.
35 The exact reason for Weinstein’s removal from his position at the NED in February 1984 has never been made clear; however, the Reagan administration’s patience with him may have been at an end after the drawn-out controversy with USIA over the grant negotiations. In addition he had “reportedly alienated some board members” and the NED, by now, had a history of purging trouble-makers – witness the treatment of George Agree, Chapter Six, 206. See Christopher Madison, “Selling Democracy,” The National Journal, 28th June 1986, Nexis UK, http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis, 7.
CIO, since he also had strong ties to the labour movement. While Dante Fascell and the AFL-CIO denied that such a deal had ever taken place, others connected with the NED confirmed it.

Once in power the ideologically anti-communist and AFL-CIO-friendly new President agreed not only to allow FTUI to pursue the anti-communist operations described above; he also agreed to allow the foundation to keep these operations secret from Congress. The rationale for this secrecy, as explained by FTUI’s Director, Eugenia Kemble in a memo to Gershman, was that

The beneficiaries of these funds would be in danger or in trouble if the financing was made public ... because repressive governments or groups of communists could use this information against the individuals or the unions that we want to help.

Kemble also argued that some of the organisations FTUI intended to dispense funding to had already been promised secrecy by the AFL-CIO, which could not now go back on this agreement. France was on the list of 13 countries where grants were to be kept secret, along with Poland and various Latin American countries. In FTUI’s first report to the NED the foundation stated what type of programs it was funding through what type of organisations – e.g. trade union, foundation – but did not give the names of any of its partner organisations.

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37 Madison, “Selling Democracy”, 5; Guilhot, The Democracy Makers 89.
38 See Madison, Ibid.
42 The Associated Press, “Agency Suspends Grant To Right-Wing Student Group,” 2.
43 See FTUI, Europe and Selected US-based Asian and European Projects, Folder 13, Box OA91698, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.

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These actions, and the rationale for conducting them covertly, made sense in terms of the CIA-funded operations which the AFL-CIO had conducted before 1967. These operations had been guided fundamentally by the objective of combatting Communism, not promoting democratic forms of government, and Western Europe had been a key battleground in this campaign. They would also have been an acceptable element of the Reagan administration’s more nakedly anti-communist Project Democracy: indeed, several of them had initially been proposed for inclusion in this program by the union in August 1982. However, they made little sense in terms of the pro-democratic campaign which Congress believed it had approved in preference to Project Democracy.

Kemble’s rationale for secrecy made a mockery of the idea of democracy promotion as a transparent alternative to the covert operations of the past and indicated that the AFL-CIO had not integrated the concept of democracy promotion into the conduct of its foreign operations. Instead, it seemed to view democracy promotion as a convenient formulation which allowed it to extract funding from Congress to pursue anti-communist covert operations, just as it had done in partnership with the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s. The AFL-CIO’s failure to fold its own interests into a coherent program to promote democracy was due to the fact this problem had not been considered adequately during the planning for the Endowment, which had focussed purely on creating an organisation which would be able to channel funding to the four core groups.

The union soon discovered that the new, more open mode of management for state-private operations, which took in Congress, effectively ruled out such operations. Congress’ role in appropriating funding for the NED provided it with influence which it had lacked under the previous, Executive-managed, covert framework, and when the operations became public the Congressional response was swift and punitive. Details of the Panama operation

44 See Chapter Five, 160.
were the first to leak out when US ambassador to Panama Everett Briggs sent Washington a cable accusing the AFL-CIO of meddling in the 1984 election. "The embassy," he said, "requests that this harebrained project be abandoned before it hits the fan." This cable leaked to Congress, triggering a funding crisis for the Endowment. On 31 May 1984, the House voted to remove all Congressional funding from the NED, resulting in a fevered attempt by both the Endowment and the Reagan administration to lobby senators to vote against the motion. This effort included direct intervention from the President, who wrote to key senators that "At a time when the opponents of democracy lavishly support their allies, we cannot abandon the field of political competition. The cause is too important. The stakes are too great."

The Senate restored the NED funding; however, it was clear that a catastrophe had been narrowly averted. This danger was underlined by the exposure of the grants made to French organisations by the French daily Liberation in November 1985. Although the general problem was that Congress could not understand why the NED was promoting democracy in a country which was already democratic, it was the funding of the UNI, which was perceived as an extremist neo-fascist group, which did the most harm to the Endowment’s credibility as a supporter of democracy. This event forced a reassessment of the secrecy policy by Gershman, who ruled that the practice of making secret payments had to be abandoned. However, by this point the damage had been done, as Congress had already

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46 The Economist, “Exporting democracy; Crusaders fall out”.
47 Ibid.
48 See Robert McFarlane, memo to the President, 12 June 1984, Folder 1 (NED 1984-5), Box OA91698, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL, for details of the NSC lobbying campaign.
49 Robert McFarlane, letter to Senator Mark Hatfield, 12 June 1984, Folder 1 (NED 1984-5), Box OA91698, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.
50 See Franklin, “Democracy Project Facing New Criticisms”. The House Subcommittee on International Operations Staff Director, Richard W. McBride, stated that "Today, I think one has to ask the question whether the limited funds available to the N.E.D. should be going to Europe at all, rather than to Central America and the third world countries." 2.
voted to reduce the AFL-CIO’s disproportionate share of the NED’s funding due to its “uncertainty about Endowment operations”. In late 1985, the Endowment limited the amount of funding any NED grantee could receive to 25% of the total in response to a suggestion from Congress, ending the disproportionate influence the AFL-CIO had wielded within the organisation.

Congressional anger resulted from the fact that the operations in Panama, the UK and France strayed outside the consensus position that had allowed the NED to be created in 1983. This consensus position, which had allowed the administration, Congress and the private groups to converge, was that while democracy promotion would enhance the long-term national security of the US, it would do so through democratic methods aimed at building democratic governments abroad. In contrast, the AFL-CIO’s actions were based on the idea that democracy promotion was primarily a battle against Soviet Communism and that operations could be prosecuted covertly. Congress had dismissed this framework for democracy promotion when it favoured the NED over Project Democracy. It was only by appealing to Congress using arguments based on democracy rather than anti-communism that the administration was able to avoid the complete de-funding of the Endowment. Even so, the most anti-communist component of the NED – the AFL-CIO – emerged from these controversies with its power reduced.

Congress’ response to these operations laid down a clear marker that future operations would need to be pro-democratic not only in terms of rhetoric but also in terms of intent and form. Congress had also proven that while it was unwilling to remove funding from the NED as a whole, it was willing to punish individual foundations which did not follow this line. In

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this way the legislature set out clear limits to NED operations and showed that it had the power to enforce these limits. Thus, while the Reagan administration and elements within the Endowment prioritised national security over democracy, the influence of Congress reinforced the idea that democracy promotion should attempt to achieve national security objectives through democratic methods.

Operating within the Consensus

While a strategy blending political operations justified as democracy promotion with national security considerations was ideologically unjustifiable in Western Europe, democracy promotion operations in Central America and the Caribbean, and those directed against the Soviet Empire, proved to be relatively uncontroversial. In both of these theatres democracy promotion and national security were seen to be mutually reinforcing frameworks for policy rather than antagonistic ones. In addition, there was a degree of consensus between the administration, Congress and the NED over strategy and tactics which translated into a lack of friction between these actors.

In 1984 and 1985 the NED played a role in transitions to democracy in two countries within the Central American and Caribbean region: Grenada and Guatemala. In both cases the Endowment worked alongside the administration in programs aimed at the creation of governments which would be stable enough to fend off challenges from the left and legitimate enough to dampen down dissent within the respective societies. In Guatemala, a further objective was to create a government legitimate enough to expedite the passage of economic and military aid through a Congress which remained concerned about Human Rights abuses in the country. In neither case were national security interests subsumed by the objective of creating participatory democracies aimed at fundamental reform of society.
The US invasion of Grenada, a long-standing target of the Reagan administration, was a response to a perceived opportunity to take advantage of political confusion and instability on the island caused by the hard-line coup against the Marxist Bishop government to roll back Communism in the Caribbean. While a small number of US troops continued to occupy the island after the initial victory, plans were laid by the Reagan administration for elections which would result in a pro-US democratic government. The danger in pursuing this course was that an election could be won by Grenada’s corrupt and unstable former Prime Minister, Eric Gairy, which it was believed might trigger a leftist coup attempt by remaining elements of the revolutionary New Jewel Movement.

Rather than being at loggerheads over the priority to accord national security objectives versus democracy promotion in this situation, the NED and the US government cooperated in an effort to produce a pre-determined outcome by supporting the campaign of Herbert Blaize, a candidate thought to be moderate and pro-US. Two NED foundations, the NRI and FTUI, which channelled funding to AIFLD, the AFL-CIO’s Latin American labour foundation, acted as part of a political program co-ordinated by the State Department and the NSC which included US government agencies, other US private groups and political consultants from other Caribbean nations, worked successfully to influence achieve this outcome.

The US Government clearly supported Blaize’s party, the NNP. An NSC memo written in the run-up to the December 1984 election notes that “Careful coordination and selective polling is underway to ensure that the best NNP candidate is selected for each of the

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56 See Walter Raymond, Constantine Menges & Raymond Burghardt memo to Robert McFarlane, 5th October 1984, Folder 8, box 30, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country Files, Latin America, Grenada, RL.
15 [electoral] districts”,\(^57\) with the “political operation” being co-ordinated with the NNP’s Jamaican political consultants, and predicted that “a coordinated, well managed and effectively funded political campaign can be successful in Grenada.” The NRI and AIFLD were key players in the political process and were linked to the Reagan administration through an additional State Department officer who had been sent to Grenada “with the explicit purpose of facilitating co-ordination” of the political program.\(^58\) The NSC also brought in solidly Republican private citizens such as Clifford White, a former Republican campaign manager, and Joe Canzeri, a former White House aide, to raise further election funds for the NNP coalition.\(^59\) Sections of the NED coalition had a pre-existing commitment to political action in Grenada, as the AFL-CIO had proposed operations in support of anti-communist Grenadian unions to the administration in August 1982;\(^60\) however, in 1984 the two NED foundations involved were clearly acting as a part of a wider effort co-ordinated by the administration.

Congress raised few objections to these NED programs, which seemed to be geared at the creation of a democratic government through democratic processes. This was complacent, as rather than acting in an even-handed manner to ensure that democratic processes were observed by all sides in the election, the NRI and AIFLD carried out a “get-out-the-vote” campaign which benefitted only Blaize. NRI and AIFLD ran programs to encourage a heavy turnout in the election, with NRI granting $20,000 to a supposedly non-partisan organisation, the Grenada Civic Awareness Organisation,\(^61\) and AIFLD disbursing $80,000 to the

\(^57\) Ibid.
\(^58\) Ibid, 2.
\(^59\) Walter Raymond, memo to Robert McFarlane, 16th October 1984, Folder 8, box 30, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country Files, Latin America, Grenada, RL, 2.
\(^60\) See Chapter Five, 162.
Grenadian labour movement. The AIFLD money was spent on “get-out-the-vote” publicity, posters and bumper stickers, while the NRI-funded Grenada Civic Awareness Organisation ferried potential NNP voters to the polls in taxis.

This campaign worked against the other serious contender, Gairy, who was more likely to win if turnout was low. The NNP’s secretary, Keith Mitchell, commented, “If we get a heavy turnout he, Gairy, is in trouble. For him to win, there has to be a light turnout.” Although Gairy’s potential support base was small, it was hardcore and more likely to actually vote on election day. The actions of the NED were aimed at securing victory for Blaize rather than Gairy and thus securing US national security objectives in Grenada. The US effort as a whole, which NED participated in, was aimed at securing the election of a specific candidate who it was believed would provide stable and pro-US government, not at ensuring an electoral process in which all groups had an equal chance to compete.

The NED’s operations were criticised by ever-persistent Congressional critic Hank Brown, who charged that the NED foundations had carried out “a ‘get-out-the-vote’ effort on behalf of one side in Grenada”, “…in spite of a NED policy prohibiting funds from going to election campaigns in other countries.” However, the fact that this effort had been carried out within a framework of democratic processes muted Congressional criticism, in contrast to the serious disagreements over operations in Panama and in Western Europe.

The following year the NED carried out an important electoral program in Guatemala which also had a direct bearing on US national security interests. The political and military

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63 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
situation shaping policy towards Guatemala was similar to that of El Salvador; a civil war between a military junta and a Marxist insurgency was raging, while the Reagan administration pushed for greater support for the military and Congress held up aid due to concerns about Human Rights abuses by the Guatemalan army and death squads linked to it. As in El Salvador, the Guatemalan junta decided to engineer a transition to civilian rule as part of its counter-insurgency campaign, an effort that the US government supported. US policy towards democratisation in Guatemala fitted into the consensus which had emerged from debates between the administration factions and Congress over El Salvador and then generalised into a framework for Central America in early 1982. The State Department saw such transitions as strengthening containment by replacing unpopular and therefore possibly unstable dictatorships with democratic governments which would have more internal legitimacy. Reaganites calculated that the problems they had experienced getting military aid through Congress would disappear once democratic governments acceptable to the legislature had been installed.

In Guatemala there was little need to support a specific candidate, as in contrast to Grenada there was little chance that anti-US forces would triumph. None of the guerrilla parties or organisations were allowed to take part in the elections, with the PSD being the most leftist party allowed to field a candidate. The State Department described both of the front-runners, Vinicio Cerezo of the Christian Democrats and Jorge Carpio of the UCN, as “political moderates with whom we could work.” An electoral victory by either would not threaten US objectives.

While the US government had no need to support a specific candidate to guard its national security interests, it did require the elections to be, and to be seen to be, as legitimate as possible to guarantee Congressional approval of aid for the Guatemalan government. This calculation was highlighted in a July 1985 State Department paper which stated that “our ability to get Congress to accept increased economic and military aid levels depends on successful elections.” The same argument was made in other policy memoranda and in a letter from President Reagan to Guatemalan President General Oscar Mejia, which had been prepared by the National Security Council staff. Robert McFarlane also reminded Reagan in October that “the successful conduct of the elections is vital for the credibility of our policy of supporting democratic governments in Central America.” The NED also had its own reasons for becoming involved in Guatemala, as the country had been listed by Michael Samuels and William Douglas in their 1981 article, “Promoting Democracy”, as a place where a transition from a right-wing military junta to a democratic regime would serve US national security interests by creating a more stable government.

NED programs were used in Guatemala to ensure that the elections were procedurally clean and technically well-organised to elect a government which would be acceptable to Congress. The administration requested NED assistance in July 1985, with the NSC proposing that “The State Department and AID should encourage the National Endowment for Democracy to fund projects related to the upcoming elections” such as the training of poll watchers. Several weeks later the State Department reported that the Endowment was to disburse $152,450 to Caribbean/Central American Action, a private organisation founded at President Carter’s request to combat revolution in the region, to be spent on polls and get-out-

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70 Nicholas Platt, memo to Robert McFarlane, 18th July 1985, DRRS, 16th July 2012, 2.
the-vote activities.\textsuperscript{74} A grant of $100,000 in NED funding was also channelled through FTUI to AIFLD and then to the Study Centre of the CUSG, a key Guatemalan union, for get-out-the-vote and voter mobilisation activities in the run-up to the 1985 election.\textsuperscript{75} These NED projects meshed with US government initiatives such as the provision of ballot paper and the training of Electoral Tribunal officials and poll-watchers through US and Latin American organisations financed by AID, as well as a raft of economic support measures designed to keep the Guatemalan government afloat during the elections.\textsuperscript{76}

While the NED programs served US national security interests, they also served to safeguard the interests of the private groups involved. AIFLD’s funding of the CUSG allowed the AFL-CIO to channel support to a client union. The CUSG had strong links to the AFL-CIO; it had been set up by AIFLD before the creation of the NED\textsuperscript{77} with some of the $300,000 which the organisation received annually for operations in the country from AID.\textsuperscript{78} The CUSG had been initially set up as a pro-government union; both the US ambassador and the Guatemalan President at that time, Efraim Rios Montt, spoke at its inaugural conference in 1983.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, while supporting broad US national security objectives in the country, FTUI was also able to channel its funding in such a way as to increase the influence of its Guatemalan partner organisation.

These expenditures prompted no Congressional criticism, and the elections were seen in the US as legitimate. NED President Carl Gershman proclaimed in 1986 that “Guatemala

\textsuperscript{75} Barry and Preusch, \textit{AIFLD in Central America: Agents as Organizers}, 23.
\textsuperscript{76} Platt, memo to McFarlane, 23\textsuperscript{rd} July 1985.
\textsuperscript{77} Barry & Preusch, \textit{AIFLD}, 21.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid, 22.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
has moved from a transitional to a post-transitional situation of democracy under Cerezo”. However, there were several problems with portraying the Guatemalan elections as fully democratic. Firstly, the elections were not aimed at empowering the population. Instead, they constituted a phase in the army’s counter-insurgency strategy and had been carried out to stabilise the country politically and increase the government’s international legitimacy so as to secure economic and military aid from the US and other potential donors. The 1985 constitution, under which the elections were conducted, enshrined into law the military’s powers to run the “self-defense patrols” and “model villages” which had allowed the army to regiment rural populations and led to Human Rights abuses. No candidate in the election criticised the military for Human Rights abuses, suggested investigations of such abuses, advocated reducing the power of the military or called for negotiations with the insurgents, placing important issues outside the scope of the political debate. Secondly, the elections did not address the socioeconomic inequalities which had first given rise to both the power of the oligarchy and the insurgency; all candidates pledged not to pursue socioeconomic reforms, such as land reform. Finally, the fact that participation in the elections was restricted to forces within a political range which included the extreme right but excluded the extreme left, coupled with the fact that political executions and disappearances continued throughout the process, meant that the range of political options on offer was limited and undoubtedly contributed to the candidates’ compliant attitude towards the military and the oligarchy.

The transition left the military with substantial powers to prosecute the war against the insurgents and did not end Human Rights abuses by the army, which continued under the

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80 Quoted from Jonas, “Elections and Transitions: Guatemala and Nicaragua,” 133.
82 Jonas, 139.
83 Ibid, 135.
84 Trudeau, 106; Jonas, 136-7.
85 Trudeau, 106; he further comments, “meaningful land reform remains an illusion”; Jonas, 135.
86 Jonas, 138.
elected Cerezo government, and even increased. Thus, while an important goal of supporting the electoral process for the Guatemalan military and for sections of the Reagan administration was to increase political stability, the process also functioned as a “demonstration election” to increase the legitimacy of the Guatemalan government and thus the administration’s ability to expedite aid through Congress. The NED programs associated with the election fitted into this framework, rather than challenging it. However, outwardly the NED had acted to support a democratic transition away from a military government.

This equation of democracy promotion with national security also characterised the anti-Soviet democracy promotion operations carried out in this period. In terms of democratic ideology, there was little ambiguity to negotiate in the targeting of the Soviet empire, where the enemies of democracy were also America’s enemies, and America’s friends were generally democrats. The NED pursued operations within the tactical consensus which had been generated by the Conference on the Democratization of Communist Countries, which had been held by the administration in October 1982 and attended by AFL-CIO representatives and by John Richardson, who was now NED Chairman. This approach differentiated between communist countries based on their degree of openness to Western influence and agreed that the government should follow a dual policy of launching propaganda measures against the USSR, some through NGOs, to increase the flow of information to Soviet citizens while using private groups to support movements in the more vulnerable countries such as Poland. In line with this approach, the NED pursued the

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88 A “demonstration election” is defined by Herman & Brodhead as an election “organized and staged by a foreign power primarily to pacify a restless home population, reassuring it that on-going interventionary processes are legitimate and appreciated by their foreign subjects.” Quoted from Edward S. Herman & Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: US-Staged Elections in The Dominican Republic, Vietnam and El Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1984), 5.
political/ideological offensive aimed at the Soviet bloc called for in NSDD-75 to promote
gradual democratisation,\textsuperscript{89} in concert with propaganda campaigns by semi-autonomous
instrumentalities such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and a US government policy
of conditioning aid for Eastern bloc countries on their willingness to protect and implement
political and economic reforms.\textsuperscript{90}

NED’s operations against the Soviet Union were mainly aimed at supporting émigré
groups based in other countries and assisting them to smuggle written propaganda into the
USSR. One of the NED’s first grants was made to a group of Russian émigrés called the
Sakharov Institute based at the Hoover Institute in Stanford University. The Institute was
named after Andrei Sakharov, the dissident Soviet physicist who had helped to found the
Moscow Human Rights Committee, although Sakharov had no connection with it. The
Institute held a conference in September 1984 aimed at generating support for the
establishment of a "Center for the Democratization of the Soviet Union".\textsuperscript{91} The NED sent a
representative to the conference, which was also attended by Richard Pipes, then retired from
the NSC, and Soviet émigré Vladimir Bukovsky, who had also spoken at the Conference for
the Democratization of Communist countries.\textsuperscript{92} The Sakharov Institute conference discussed
ways to democratise the USSR, with Pipes commenting that "Radio broadcasting is the most
obvious vehicle, as well as smuggling in books to Soviet citizens".\textsuperscript{93} The Institute
subsequently received NED funding.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{89} See Chapter Five, 174-175.
\textsuperscript{92} See George P. Schultz, cable to all diplomatic posts, Folder 9/82-10/82, Box O/A91162, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.
The Endowment also put this plan directly into operation itself by channelling funds to US private groups which used them to finance the publication of books and journals by émigrés based in the West which were then smuggled into the USSR. These materials were concerned with history, politics and culture and many were targeted at the Soviet elite. One example of this type of material was Syntaxis, a Russian language quarterly edited by the dissident Andrei Sinyavsky and funded by grants passed through a group called “The American Friends of Free Speech Abroad”. Syntaxis “seeks to encourage alternative political, social and economic thought in the Soviet Union” and was distributed there through unofficial channels.\(^{95}\) Another such journal was “Internal Contradictions in the USSR”, a quarterly published by émigrés using funding passed through Freedom House which was aimed at “higher levels of the Soviet bureaucracy”.\(^ {96}\) The Endowment even financed the publication of a new Russian translation of Animal Farm.\(^ {97}\)

The NED also financed propaganda projects targeted at specific demographic groups within the USSR, consistent with Alexander Haig’s original vision of sending aid to nationalist groups within the Soviet Union to create instability and disruption. Money was passed to the Joint Baltic American National Committee, an umbrella organisation for Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian émigrés based in the US, which passed the money to groups based in Sweden which distributed books and films on the period of Estonian independence and current news to young Estonians.\(^ {98}\) The Baltic States had a stronger sense of nationalism than some of the other Soviet republics, so feeding nationalist feeling there might have served to aggravate centripetal tendencies within the USSR. Soviet workers were also not neglected; a grant of $129,000 was made to finance the publication of “Soviet Labour Review”, an anti-communist newsletter containing information on Soviet labour law and working conditions.

\(^{95}\) Ibid, 21.  
\(^{96}\) Ibid, 22.  
\(^{97}\) Ibid, 23.  
\(^{98}\) Ibid.
The newsletter was published in London by the NTS, a right-wing émigré organisation which had previously participated in some of the CIA’s operations at the beginning of the Cold War. Although the NTS’ democratic credentials were as questionable as those of UNI, this seems to have passed unremarked on by the Endowment’s critics. Thus, the goals and tools which had been agreed at the state-private conference in 1982 to be carried out by Project Democracy and codified in NSDD-75, after an interagency struggle which left their parameters vague, were now transferred to a private body being funded by the NED, which used them to pursue an evolutionary approach to democratisation of the USSR which alarmed neither the State Department nor the Soviets.

In the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe, the Endowment’s programs went beyond distributing propaganda to include the support of dissident groups. This was particularly true of Poland, which had been a Reaganite priority for several years. From 1981 onwards, the President and hard-line policy-makers such as William Casey had seen Poland as the weak link in the chain of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, and Solidarity as a movement capable not only of destabilising the Polish communist regime but also of spurring the growth of similar movements in other Eastern European countries.

The Endowment’s aid to Solidarity was aimed at allowing the organisation to continue to spread its message. To do this, NED money was channelled through the AFL-CIO to the Solidarity Co-ordinating Office Abroad in Brussels to buy printing equipment and computers. The NED also provided legal and material assistance to Polish political prisoners through the Aurora Foundation and the Polish American Congress Charitable

101 See Chapter Two, 69-70.
Foundation, with the clear political rationale that if activists knew that they or their families would be supported in the event of imprisonment, the deterrent effect of repression on the movement would be lessened. The Endowment also passed money to other US private groups such as Freedom House to be spent on publications to be distributed within Poland and also carried out programs aimed at publicizing Solidarity and Human Rights violations by the Polish government in the West through grants from FTUI to the Committee in Support of Solidarity, a US organisation which had been set up by the AFL-CIO in 1981 to propagandise in favour of the Polish union. According to a US House Intelligence Committee Member speaking after the end of the Cold War:

In Poland we did all of the things that are done in countries where you want to destabilize a communist government and strengthen resistance to that. We provided the supplies and technical assistance in terms of clandestine newspapers, broadcasting, propaganda, money, organizational help and advice.

In Grenada, Guatemala, Poland and the USSR, programs carried out by the NED remained within the consensus negotiated by the NED groups, Congress and the administration. All occurred in dictatorships or countries emerging from dictatorship, none were covert and none channelled funding to non-democratic forces. In addition, none caused damage to a regime allied with the US, while the Soviet bloc programs helped to undermine enemy states. On the surface, the national security interests of the United States and the promotion of democracy meshed perfectly. This was not necessarily the case in Grenada, where the US interest in supporting the election of a pro-US candidate led to a partisan campaign of support for that candidate, or in Guatemala, where the imperatives of legitimating and stabilising the regime led to support of a democratic process which was

104 Ibid, 19.
105 Ibid, 18-19.
flawed and limited. These facts indicate that at bottom the process was being driven by national security, not democratic imperatives. However, there was wide agreement on the operations within the US elite. This was not to be the case with the NED’s next significant program.

**Democracy Promotion versus the Kirkpatrick Doctrine**

In contrast to the consensus displayed over previous operations, US policy towards the Philippines was riven by disagreement over whether the promotion of democracy would enhance or undermine US national security interests. In this case the US elite confronted one of the most important foreign policy issues of the Carter and Reagan Presidencies: the question of what policy to follow towards a pro-US dictator whose misrule was damaging US national security interests.

Although this debate was conducted in terms of whether or not to push for democratic reform in the Philippines, the substantive issue was not democratic idealism or hostility to democracy; it was fear of the damage a seizure of power by the Marxist New People’s Army guerillas, who were becoming stronger due to Marcos’ corruption and misrule, would do to US economic and geopolitical interests in the Philippines. The most important of these were the US naval base at Subic Bay and air base at Clark Field, which allowed the US to project its geopolitical power into Asia. The growing power of the NPA led to a split both within the administration and between policy-makers, Congress and the NED. Hard-line administration officials still blamed the Carter administration’s policy of pressuring pro-US dictators to reform for the success of the anti-American revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua in 1979 and believed that the best course of action was to follow the Kirkpatrick Doctrine by supporting Marcos against the Communists. However, an alternate policy to this had been proposed by the democracy promoters in 1980 and 1981; the use of US private groups to nurture
democratic successor movements and then the fostering of a transition to democracy which would create more stable and legitimate regimes, robbing insurgencies of their target and popular support. Such a transition to democracy was advocated by mid-level policy-makers in the State Department and NSC and by liberal Congressmen. This policy was complicated by the fact that, unlike the military dictatorship in Guatemala, Marcos was not prepared to foster such a transition, which would have to be carried out over his opposition.

The NED became involved in this situation in 1984 due to a request from Michael Armacost, the US ambassador to the Philippines. Armacost proposed that the NED provide $1 million to a Filipino organisation called NAMFREL which trained and organised poll-watchers to guarantee a “fairly-conducted Philippine parliamentary election” in May 1984. When proposing this program, Armacost asked a careful question:

Is the Endowment likely to look with favor upon a proposal for financial support to a non-partisan civic effort to ensure free and fair elections in a friendly/allied country?\(^{107}\)

Armacost’s 1984 request was not motivated by an ideological faith in democracy promotion, but was a result of growing fears among mid-level State Department officials that the Marcos dictatorship was becoming a liability to the United States. This was a shift from the policy put in place at the beginning of Reagan’s first term, when President Marcos was thought to be a pro-US dictator who the administration should support rather than tear down because of liberal sensitivities about Human Rights.\(^{108}\)

The aftermath of the assassination of Marcos’ most popular and threatening political opponent, Benigno Aquino, in 1983 had a significant impact on these calculations. The Marcos regime was already facing a well-organised and dynamic insurgency prosecuted by

\(^{107}\) Michael Armacost, cable to George P. Schultz, 25\(^{\text{th}}\) February 1984, Folder 9, Box OA91698, Raymond, Walter: Files, RL.

the New People’s Army and faring poorly against it. Aquino’s death was followed by popular protests against the regime which extended far beyond the alienated urban and rural poor to sectors which the administration had considered loyal to Marcos. The following month saw an anti-regime march through Makati, the financial district of Manila, by 100,000 businessmen and office workers.\textsuperscript{109} This opposition from the general public and the business community, coupled with the expanding NPA insurgency in the countryside and the fact that around 20\% of the population already supported the National Democratic Front, the left’s political umbrella group, conjured up fears in the State Department that a centre-left revolutionary alliance of the same type as that which had toppled Somoza in 1979 was being formed.\textsuperscript{110}

Fear that the Philippines was in a pre-revolutionary situation prompted a reassessment of the policy of uncritical support for Marcos by embassy personnel on the ground in Manila and mid-level officials in Washington. In Manila, Armacost began to meet with representatives of the opposition and in November gave a speech at the Makati Rotary Club praising Aquino’s commitment to free elections.\textsuperscript{111} In Washington the administration created an interagency group to monitor the situation in the Philippines. This group was dominated by mid-level officials such as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage, and mid-level conservative NSC Asian specialists such as Gaston Sigur and Richard Childress. Although this did not represent a removal of US government support for Marcos, it did indicate that mid-level officials were now carefully considering the US’ options and waiting to see how the situation developed.

\textsuperscript{110} See Ibid 160.
In addition to this subtle shift in attitude in the bureaucracy, more liberal Congressmen also began to query the basic assumptions of US policy towards the Philippines; in October Congressman Stephen Solarz, who had proposed greater US support for democratisation in the Philippines and other friendly dictatorships during the Project Democracy hearings, shepherded a “Sense of the House” resolution through the lower chamber which called for an investigation of Aquino’s killing and “genuine, free and fair elections to the National Assembly”. In contrast to this, the upper level of the administration drew the opposite lesson from the previous US experience in Nicaragua and maintained its support for the Marcos regime. On October 6th the Vice-President stated that the US would not “cut away from a person who, imperfect though he may be on human rights, has worked with us.”

The NED was brought into this policy controversy by Armacost’s request for electoral assistance for the democratic opposition. This was hardly the first US electoral intervention in the Philippines. The poll-watching organisation which Armacost wanted the NED to fund, NAMFREL, had first been formed by the CIA in the 1950s to prevent the corrupt and ineffective President Quirino from stealing the 1953 elections and to secure the election of the pro-US Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay, who Washington believed would be more effective at combatting the Marxist Huk insurgency. The organisation was now being reactivated. Armacost feared that if steps were not taken to ensure a fair election, there was a possibility of a “widespread election boycott and then increased confrontation and

112 See Blitz, 160-161.
113 Quoted from ibid, 160.
114 The CIA had dispatched New York lawyer Robert Kaplan to Manila in 1953 with instructions to make sure Magsaysay won the election. Kaplan’s solution was to set up NAMFREL, a supposedly neutral civil society organisation which in fact campaigned for Magsaysay against the incumbent President, Elpidio Quirino. See Bonner p39-42; Nick Cullather, “America’s Boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the Illusion of Influence,” The Pacific Historical Review 62 no. 3 (1993):326. See Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale's Cold War (Amherst & Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 32-7 for CIA support of Magsaysay during the 1953 election campaign.
polarisation." If the population believed there was no way to change the government through the political system, they might abandon it, and the NPA would benefit from this.

Armacost’s invitation was accepted by the Endowment. This was unsurprising, as the Philippines had been listed as an authoritarian regime which would benefit from democracy promotion programs in Douglas and Samuels’ article of 1981. The AFL-CIO was already involved in giving aid to the TUCP (Trade Union Congress of the Philippines), a conservative union which had originally been set up by the Marcos regime, and the Endowment as a whole began to broaden its political work in the Philippines beyond trade unionism by beginning to focus on election monitoring. The subsequent legislative elections may be counted as a defeat for Marcos, due to the fact that despite serious fraud around 60 opposition delegates were elected to the National Assembly.

Neither mid-level officials nor the NED were at this point committed to removing Marcos from power; however, the growing disquiet over the policy of supporting Marcos in the bureaucracy, Congress and now the NED was given a further boost in June 1984 by further evidence of the threat posed by the Filipino Left. According to a report written by Manila embassy political officer James Nach the NPA was becoming a serious threat; in fact, in some areas of the Philippines the communists had effectively replaced the central government. Nach argued that the insurgency was being fuelled by social and economic inequalities which the Marcos regime had done little to address and much to exacerbate and so serious reforms were needed to win civilian support away from the NPA. Without these reforms, “ultimate defeat and a communist takeover of the Philippines” was “a very

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115 Armacost, cable to George P. Schultz.
118 Bonner, *Waltzing With a Dictator*, 360-3.
possible scenario”. However, he had little confidence that the corrupt and ineffective Marcos regime would be able to implement the necessary reforms. Nach’s conclusions were supported by Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who visited the Philippines and reached the same assessment of the situation, and by two staffers attached to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who returned from a visit convinced that a dangerous communist insurgency was underway.

Although the picture of growing communist strength was alarming, the administration was divided over what action to take to remedy the situation. Mid-level officials such as Armitage and Wolfowitz, Michael Armacost, who had been recalled from Manila to become the State Department’s Undersecretary for Political and Military Affairs, and US embassy personnel in Manila, believed that democratic reform was necessary now to ward off revolution later. The new ambassador, Stephen Bosworth, explained to the Makati Rotary Club in October 1984 that “it is not a question of how to avoid change; it is rather a question of how change can be managed.”

In contrast, high level officials such as Casey, Weinberger and the President himself believed that the safest course was to stand by Marcos, with the President commenting in October that “there are things [in the Philippines]...that do not look good to us from the standpoint...of democratic rights...what is the alternative? It is a large Communist movement to take over the Philippines.” Most of the administration’s high-level policy-makers still believed that stability in the Philippines could best be achieved through support for Marcos.

119 Quoted from ibid 360.
120 Blitz, The Contested State, 163.
121 Blitz, The Contested State, 163.
122 Ibid, 165
123 Quoted from Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 124.
124 Blitz, 163.
125 Quoted from ibid, 164.
This split led to the adoption of a compromise position put forward by State Department officials and set out in NSDD-163 in February 1985. The document called for political, economic and military reform but not the immediate replacement of Marcos. Instead, the goal was the “revitalization of democratic institutions to assure both a smooth transition when President Marcos does pass from the scene and longer-term stability”. However, no timetable for Marcos to leave power was given. The policy was clearly informed by policy-makers’ perceptions of what had occurred in Nicaragua in 1979, as it stated that “Our goal is not to replace the current leadership of the Philippines” and that “We are not promoting the dismantling of institutions that support stability – as occurred in Nicaragua during the collapse of the Somoza regime”. This was a compromise between those who feared that Marcos was exacerbating an insurgency he could not defeat and thus should be replaced, and those who feared a repetition of Nicaragua. This stalemate continued throughout the first half of 1985, with US officials descending on Marcos to urge serious reforms, which he ignored.

The administration’s position that Marcos should be pressured to reform dove-tailed with the stance towards pro-US dictatorships outlined in the original proposals for democracy promotion made by Samuels in 1980 and Douglas and Samuels in 1981. These proposals had argued that the best policy in such cases was to pursue a long-range strategy of fostering the growth of democratic successor groups who could be prepared to compete for power with radical opposition groups after a regime breakdown. The NED’s actions in the Philippines at this time conformed to this strategy.

128 Bonner, 368.
During this period of stalemate within the administration, the NED continued to expand its political operations on the ground, pouring $3.2 million into AAFLI programs in the Philippines in 1985.129 These funds went to a conservative Filipino union originally set up by the regime, the TUCP,130 and were aimed primarily at combatting the influence of the left and the NPA in Filipino civil society, not the Marcos government. The Executive Director of AAFLI, Charles Gray, made this clear in 1985, stating: "The political opposition to Marcos is not well organized, so the only alternative social program is that of the communists. We're trying to develop the TUCP to fill the void if Marcos goes."131 If this occurred, it was hoped that the TUCP would act as a bulwark against the Leftist KMU union federation, which the Americans believed was connected with the communist party and the NPA guerrillas.132

The fact that radical unions rather than the Marcos regime were the targets of this program is given further backing by the comments of an AAFLI administrator in the Philippines, who stated: “Some of the regional labour leaders receiving AAFLI money are becoming powerful politically. Imagine if you have $100,000 to give out to families in $500 chunks. Your stock goes way up, faster than the stock of any of the militant labour groups”.133 Thus, the NED was building up a “Third Force” of “democratic successors” who would be able to compete politically with the Filipino left if Marcos fell from power.

The fragile consensus within the administration ended in mid-1985, again due to increased fears of leftist/communist political strength in the Philippines rather than increasing ideological fervour for democracy. In July a joint study on the Philippines carried out by the CIA, DIA and State Department predicted a growth of left-wing military and political power over the next 18 months if the Marcos dictatorship remained in power until the next national

129 Shorrock & Selvaggio, “Which side are you on AAFLI?”.
130 Robinson, 135.
131 Bernstein, “Is Big Labour playing global vigilante?,” 5.
132 Shorrock & Selvaggio.
133 Ibid.
elections, scheduled for 1987. At the same time, it became clear to mid-level officials that Marcos was not prepared to reform his regime. The time frame for resolving the crisis and building up a possible successor regime was narrowing.

The situation led to a meeting of officials from the State Department, CIA, DIA and independent academics and businessmen at the National War College in August to discuss policy options. The administration remained divided, with pragmatic conservatives such as Wolfowitz, Armitage and Armacost called for US covert funding for key opposition organisations such as NAMFREL and the Reform the Armed Force Movement (RAM), a group of reformist officers within the Armed Forces of the Philippines headed by Defence Minister Enrile and General Fidel Ramos. Armacost even attempted to promote the idea of launching a coup against Marcos; however, this proved to be unpopular, as policy-makers remembered the chaos caused by the coup against President Diem in South Vietnam in 1963. Congress also intervened in the form of a Senate amendment to the foreign aid bill linking aid to the Philippines to progress on Human Rights and democracy, much as the legislature had demanded certification of such progress before aid would be released to El Salvador in the early 80s.

However, although pressure was growing within and outside the administration for the removal of Marcos there was still no policy consensus, as high-level Reaganite policy makers such as Casey, Weinberger, White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan and the President believed that the most prudent course to follow was to provide Marcos with US backing to defeat the NPA. These conservatives feared a repeat of Nicaragua, where they believed the Carter administration had undermined the friendly Somoza dictatorship and

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134 See Robinson, 125.
135 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, 379-80.
136 Blitz, The Contested State, 169.
opened the way to a Marxist seizure of power. To these policy-makers the moderate opposition beginning to cluster around Corazon Aquino was an unknown quantity which might prove unable to stand up to the communists or might call for the US to vacate its geopolitically-important bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field. The struggle between the ideologues in the upper reaches of the administration and mid-level pragmatists remained unresolved.

Marcos’ own attempt to resolve the crisis, the announcement of “snap elections” in November 1985, pleased the Reaganites and alarmed the State Department and its allies. The Reaganites believed that “snap elections” would end the political crisis, as a Marcos win would give the Filipino President the stability he needed to deal strongly with the NPA. This group was more interested in such stability than the integrity of the election process. Two weeks before voting Donald Regan stated that even if Marcos were re-elected through “massive fraud” the administration would have to do business with him, pointing out that “[t]here are a lot of governments elected by fraud”. For this reason the Reaganites were lukewarm on the idea of a Congressional observer mission, as it would be easier to maintain support for Marcos if Americans did not witness the massive fraud the regime would need to survive. Although the White House eventually agreed to a 20-person Congressional observer mission to be headed by Senator Richard Lugar, it attempted to pack the delegation with reliable conservatives.

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138 Bonner, 384.
140 Bonner, 383-4.
141 Quoted from Schmitz, The United States and Right-wing Dictatorships, 237
142 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, 416
143 Ibid, 417.
In contrast, the State Department believed that if Marcos won through fraud only the NPA would benefit, as the elimination of the possibility of peaceful change would swell its ranks with disaffected moderates.\textsuperscript{144} It also feared that the moderate opposition would not be organised enough to seriously contest Marcos in the time available. However, this turn of events gave the Department and the NED the opportunity to foster the democratic transition which they believed would stabilise the Philippines.

To capitalise on this opportunity the US embassy Manila and the NED both increased their support for the opposition on the ground, going beyond a long-term policy of preparing democratic successor organisations to supporting a transfer of power to opposition groups in the near future. US Charge d’Affaires Philip Kaplan spurred the opposition on in its preparations for the elections, emphasizing to a gathering of key leaders “the need for the opposition to get its act together given the limited time left before a campaign starts.”\textsuperscript{145} At the same time, the embassy made certain that an Aquino victory would be in the interests of the United States by pushing her to nominate a conservative and former Marcos loyalist, Salvador “Doy” Laurel, as her running-mate.\textsuperscript{146} Doy was trusted by the Americans and had much more reliable instincts on the issues of anti-communism and US access to the bases than Aquino.\textsuperscript{147} This alliance forged a centre-right opposition ticket and warded off a key danger – that Aquino would make an electoral alliance with the left and be captured by it. Aquino’s rightwards shift on anti-communism and the bases, under the guidance of Laurel and the embassy, precluded such an alliance.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid, 391.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid; Bonner, \textit{Waltzing}, 396-7.
\textsuperscript{147} Robinson, 127. Doy had not signed a political statement signed by 12 other key opposition leaders which called for the removal of US military bases.
\textsuperscript{148} Blitz, \textit{The Contested State}, 172.
The NED supplemented the embassy’s exhortation of the opposition to campaign with its skills of political organisation by funding NAMFREL to reprise its poll-watching role in the elections. Although NAMFREL was juridically a non-partisan organisation it was no more neutral than was COMELEC, the Marcos regimes’ election commission. Any step towards effective monitoring of electoral fraud was implicitly a step away from Marcos and US funding for NAMFREL represented another facet of a State Department strategy described by Armacost after the elections as “encourage[ing] the constraints” on Marcos, which also included the US government observer mission.\(^{149}\)

Altogether, NAMFREL received funding of $1 million through the NED and also through AID.\(^{150}\) This funding had to be passed through smaller Filipino civil society organisations which made up the NAMFREL coalition to conceal it.\(^{151}\) NED money was channelled through FTUI, then AAFLI, then the TUCP, whose Secretary General, Ernesto Herrera, was a member of NAMFREL’s Executive Council.\(^{152}\) 7000 TUCP members also acted as NAMFREL poll-watchers for the February elections.\(^{153}\) NAMFREL’s poll-watchers operated a “Quick Count” system which would enable them to keep their own tally of votes cast for each party in the elections\(^{154}\); thus, if the Marcos regime slowed or stopped the count to falsify results, NAMFREL or the Endowment’s official observer delegation, sponsored by NRI and NDI,\(^{155}\) would be able to present accurate figures to the US government.


\(^{151}\) Bonner, 413; Schmitz, 175.


\(^{154}\) Bonner, 412-3.

Reagan administration hard-liners accepted the funding of NAMFREL because they believed Marcos would win the elections, and having this victory confirmed by a watchdog not linked to the regime would increase its credibility.\textsuperscript{156} In addition, the NED had assisted in and certified elections in line with the conservative foreign policy viewpoint previously in Grenada and Guatemala, so the conservatives had little reason to believe it would diverge from their policy. This calculation proved to be flawed. It was the alternative vote tabulation system operated by NAMFREL, which produced different results to those announced by the regime,\textsuperscript{157} together with the electoral irregularities and intimidation of voters reported by the organisation throughout the election,\textsuperscript{158} which allowed the opposition to convincingly demonstrate the high levels of fraud which had occurred on election day.\textsuperscript{159} Lugar’s election observation team concluded that widespread fraud had occurred, with Lugar calling NAMFREL “our eyes and ears.”\textsuperscript{160} The NDI/NRI sponsored observer mission also released a report citing fraud and intimidation.\textsuperscript{161} The public nature of this fraud created a crisis for Reaganite policy from which the only exit was acceptance of a democratic transition.

The fact that the elections had been stolen in the glare of US media attention gave pro-democracy forces the opportunity to put pressure on the Reaganites to live up to their democratic rhetoric. In Washington, Congress threatened a cut-off of all aid to the Philippines unless Aquino was recognised as the new President.\textsuperscript{162} In the Philippines, Aquino called on the Reagan administration to support her, stating that “Those who are prepared to support armed struggles for liberation elsewhere discredit themselves if they obscure the nature of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[156] Bonner, 415.
\item[158] Blitz, 175.
\item[162] Blitz, 177.
\end{footnotes}
what we are doing peacefully here”\textsuperscript{163}. The Secretary of State, George Shultz also swung definitively into the anti-Marcos camp for pragmatic reasons after deciding that “The protection of our strategic interest lies in the fostering of a transition to a more democratic government.”\textsuperscript{164} This democratic rhetoric was given force by Aquino’s preparations to bring her followers out onto the streets and a mutiny by RAM, the anti-Marcos officers’ organisation. However much Reaganites might invoke the spectre of Khomeini’s seizure of power in Iran to argue that the US should continue to support Marcos,\textsuperscript{165} the game was clearly up and the democratic transition which the NED, Congress and the State Department had been pushing for followed quickly.

As in Grenada and Guatemala this democratic transition had been carried out for reasons of national security, not an ideological commitment to democracy. The anti-Marcos faction within the US elite had fostered a transition, not because of an ideological fervour for democracy, but because they believed it was the best way to achieve the primary US national security goal; a stable and anti-communist Philippines. Each progressive hardening of the anti-Marcos faction’s position, from a policy of pressuring Marcos to reform while building up anti-communist civil society organisations to one of supporting Aquino politically against the dictator, had been prompted by a growing fear of the military and political power of leftist Filipino groups who, if they took power, could be expected to order the US to vacate the bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay and to pursue an anti-American foreign policy. This faction’s nightmare was a cross-class opposition alliance linking moderates and leftists, such as had occurred in Nicaragua in 1979 and it acted at crucial junctures to ward off this possibility. Armacost commented several weeks after Aquino’s victory:

\textsuperscript{163} Quoted in Bonner, 437.
\textsuperscript{164} George P. Schultz, \textit{Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State} (New York: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1993), 628.
\textsuperscript{165} Bonner, 442.
Our objective was to capture...to encourage the democratic forces of the centre, then consolidate control by the middle and also win away the soft support of the NPA. So far, so good.\textsuperscript{166}

It is unlikely that these officials would have become so hostile to Marcos in the absence of the threat they perceived from the NPA.

Although this transition was described by the NED as “dramatic triumph of democracy” in its 1986 report, its depth was limited. The opposition forces which the State Department and the NED supported aimed at a conservative and elite-dominated democracy rather than a radical transformation. These forces were successful: 5 years after the fall of Marcos, 85% of the 200-member House of Representatives consisted of the political clans who had traditionally governed the Philippines under the period of corrupt, oligarchic democracy from 1946-1972.\textsuperscript{167} US pressure on Marcos to step down was aimed at containing the popular mobilisation then taking place on the streets, which the policy of fostering a democratic transition had been designed to avoid.\textsuperscript{168} RAM’s eleventh-hour rebellion against Marcos, whether encouraged behind the scenes by US officials or not,\textsuperscript{169} helped to preserve the military as a repressive force to be used later if necessary, rather than allowing it to be weakened by the fall of the dictatorship. Aquino’s government remained under the shadow of this military after the transition, a factor which limited its freedom of action.

While many of these limiting factors were a product of Filipino political culture and US policy in general, the NED also acted after the transition to contain the mobilisation of popular forces which could have pressed for more radical socioeconomic reforms, rather than

\textsuperscript{166} Quoted in Robinson, 139.
\textsuperscript{168} This policy continued in the interregnum between the fraudulent elections and Marcos’ resignation, as State Department envoy Philip Habib urged Aquino not to bring her followers out onto the streets. See Robinson, 127.
\textsuperscript{169} Bonner argues that DCI William Casey would not have authorised such a policy without Reagan’s approval; Blitz is noncommittal. See Bonner, 441, Blitz, 178. However, contacts between RAM and NAMFREL existed, and some of the NED and AID funding passed to NAMFREL was passed on, in turn, to RAM. See Bonner, 415. It is uncertain whether the US government or the Endowment knew of this diversion of its funding, but such a policy of passing funds to one private organisation through another was consistent with NED practice due to the organisation’s poor oversight and auditing rights over its four core foundations.
to empower them. It did this by funding Filipino civil society groups to allow them to combat groups which it saw as dangerously radical or leftist. The FTUI continued its funding of the TUCP to “strengthen pro-democratic unions in the Philippines so that they will become the pre-eminent representatives of workers under the umbrella of the TUCP”\(^{170}\) and to “allow the TUCP to supplant the [leftist trade union federation] KMU as the spokesman for working men and women in the Philippines”\(^{171}\) This was significant because the KMU wanted the US to leave its bases and Clark Field and Subic Bay, and also supported stronger land reform measures than the TUCP. The issue of land reform was linked to the security situation, as the fact that in the mid-80s 20% of the population owned 80% of the land\(^{172}\) was a clear cause of the NPA insurgency. Aquino’s land reform bill, drafted with the backing of a Congress controlled by the landed oligarchy and businessmen, exempted 75% of all land from redistribution. In the first 3 years of the campaign only 7% of this eligible land was redistributed, with agrarian reform subsequently grinding to a halt.\(^{173}\) Thus, the accession of a populist but conservative President, a conservative legislature and action in civil society to combat radical forces acted to block a key reform.

The NED also funded other conservative civil society groups to shape the transition and maintain the elite in power. It combatted GABRIELA, a left-wing feminist organisation by funding KABATID, a conservative women’s group dominated by members of the elite which it hoped would act as a counter-weight.\(^{174}\) CIPE began funding the Philippines Chamber of Commerce (PCCI), to help it to create a nationwide organisation\(^{175}\) which would unify it as an interest group sector and convert it away from the “crony capitalism” of the

\(^{170}\) Robinson, 136.
\(^{171}\) Ibid, 137.
\(^{172}\) Robinson, 142.
\(^{173}\) Ibid, 143.
\(^{174}\) Ibid, 131-4.
Marcos era and towards “private enterprise values”. 176 Thus, rather than aiding popular forces the NED and the US government acted to contain them, easing Marcos out of power to preserve a state and military apparatus which served US interests from the threat of revolution. The strategy of creating stability through a democratic transition had been proven effective, while the threat of more radical change from below had been warded off.

The NED’s operations under the Reagan administration were not conducted in accordance with an overarching strategic framework which prioritised democracy promotion over short-term national security objectives. Instead, while these operations did support democratic groups and did aim to create democratic systems, democracy promotion was deployed as a political/organisational tool to achieve pre-existing US national security objectives in specific cases. This double character of the NED’s political operations, democratic in form but oriented towards security concerns, is partly attributable to the fact that several private leaders conflated the spread of democracy with US national security, an orientation which was reinforced after the Endowment was created by the appointment of NED officials who had previously held positions within the national security bureaucracy. 177

However, it was also a product of the limitations on the Endowment’s freedom of action produced by the triangular management model for democracy promotion operations which provided Congress and the administration with leverage over the NED. While the Endowment was formally autonomous, this organisational framework constrained it in two ways. Firstly, Congress’ leverage as the provider of funding ensured that operations would aim at the support of democratic forces, rather than groups which were simply pro-US or

176 Ibid.
177 The NED’s Chairman, John Richardson, was a former director of Radio Free Europe during its period of covert CIA funding; the NED’s president, Carl Gershman, was a former Jeane Kirkpatrick aide and a hard-line anti-communist; NRI’s founder, Keith Schuette, was a former aide to Alexander Haig. Furthermore, John P. Loiello’s successor as NDI President, J. Brian Atwood, was a former Foreign Service Officer and Assistant Secretary of State who later joined the Clinton Administration as the Director of USAID. While the AFL-CIO had fewer personnel interlocks with the national security bureaucracy, it had a long history of co-operating with it as an institution.
anti-communist. Congress had not hesitated to threaten the funding of individual foundations which gave support to foreign groups it disapproved of. Secondly, the fact that the NED needed support from the administration to operate, secure funding and conduct large-scale operations aimed at altering political structures led to the Endowment targeting countries where US national security priorities were at stake and could be achieved through the use of democracy promotion. When the Reagan administration, or factions within it, requested NED assistance in Grenada, Guatemala or the Philippines, the Endowment quickly obliged.

These ideological and organisational factors resulted in the subordination of democracy promotion to national security objectives and its use as a tool to achieve these objectives, rather than an independent strategy or element of policy. National security objectives were the deciding factor in the choice of which specific countries would be targeted for large-scale operations aimed at altering political structures. In these cases, democracy promotion was used as a tactic to preserve or extend strategic positions important to the US. NED actions in the Soviet bloc served to delegitimise enemy governments and foster the growth of dissident movements, weakening Soviet power and control. In Latin America and Asia, democracy promotion was deployed in pro-US dictatorships suffering from the threat of radical revolutions as a tool for generating consent among the masses of the population for political arrangements shaped by domestic elites, action by the US state and the NED itself. Successful transitions to democracy legitimised new pro-US regimes which were less vulnerable to revolution and would act in US interests. While this tactic was contentious in the Philippines, it proved to be a more effective approach to securing US interests than the Kirkpatrick Doctrine.

These political outcomes were achieved through democratic methods; however, the depth of reform which was pursued in these new democracies was limited by the subordination of democracy promotion to national security imperatives. The practical effect
of democracy promotion programs was to entrench pro-US elites in power rather than to promote democratic transitions which could have resulted in far-reaching socioeconomic change. Instead, popular empowerment was limited through US and NED support of forces who could be relied on to act in ways consonant with enduring US interests and who would not upset the political, economic and social structures which preserved stability and US access to strategic positions.
CONCLUSION

The promotion of democracy has not formed an overarching theme of US foreign policy, nor has it formed an element in a coherent strategy fusing the export of democracy with US national security. Instead strategic incoherence, the use of democracy as a tool to achieve pre-existing national security goals on a case-by-case basis, and the pursuit of a limited degree of democratic reform designed to place friendly political movements in power represent persistent patterns in the relationship between democracy promotion and US national security.

The relationship between the export of democracy, as both an ideology and a political system, and US national security policy has traditionally been conceptualised through several frameworks which have sought to explain the relationship between the two imperatives in US foreign policy over a period extending from the present moment back to the beginnings of the Cold War, and on occasion to the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. The Liberal framework sees democracy as a key element in US national security policy which serves to further US interests, while acknowledging US support for some dictatorships and minimising these instances as unfortunate deviations from the mainstream of US foreign policy. The Leftist/Progressive framework sees the policy pronouncements of US officials on America’s commitment to democracy as a rhetorical device to obscure support for dictatorships and the pursuit of power and economic interests. Conservatives and Realists have either seen US support for democracy as a rhetorical device, in common with Leftists and Progressives, or as

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utopianism which can serve as a dangerous distraction from the pursuit of real and tangible interests based on power realities.\(^3\)

I have examined this debate through a case study of the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy in the early 1980s. These debates represent a key moment in the conceptualisation of the relationship between democracy promotion and US national security, and in its institutionalisation. Many of the assumptions about democracy promotion and national security which were formulated and articulated during this period have recurred in US foreign policy rhetoric and practice.\(^4\) The creation of the NED, although the Endowment was privately-run, also represented the beginning of a process which led to the creation of democracy promotion programs and offices within the state apparatus. This was the outcome of a policy-making process which represented an effort by the US elite to create a strategic framework fusing national security and democracy promotion superior to previous case-by-case efforts; thus, examination of it enables an analysis of a conscious process of decision-making on the relationship of democracy promotion to US national security objectives which can be used to inform wider conclusions on the relationship between these two key imperatives.

The participants in this debate did not conceive of democracy promotion as merely a smokescreen for the pursuit of power by other means; instead the democratisation of other


\(^4\) George W. Bush’s call for democratic reform across the Middle East on the basis that “[a]s long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export” linked democratic reform and US security in a way similar to those democracy promoters and State Department officials who feared that continued US support for dictatorships in the Third World would lead to insurgescies and the collapse of friendly government. See George W. Bush, “Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy”, 6th November 2003, accessed 31st August 2012, http://ned.org/george-w-bush/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-20th-anniversary.
societies was seen as a concrete US goal. However, the policy debate was riven by tensions between the pursuit of democracy and US national security. The result was not the generation of an overarching strategic framework which meshed democracy promotion and US national security, as the elite was divided into contending factions which proposed different strategic objectives and targets for democracy promotion. These divisions could not be overcome, only de-escalated. The outcome was a privately-managed but government-linked institution, the National Endowment for Democracy, which pursued projects of democratisation consistent with US national security objectives in both friendly and hostile dictatorships on a tactical basis. This was a compromise solution which left tensions between democracy and US national security unresolved systematically at the strategic level, at the level of organisation, where a private, democratic organisation remained tied to short-term state goals, and at the level of programs.

The failure to resolve the contradictions which arose between national security interests and democracy promotion in US foreign policy during this debate indicates that a final resolution of the tension at a strategic level is not possible, despite arguments put forward by policy-makers or academics that such a resolution has been or can be achieved.\footnote{George W. Bush came close to positing a complete fusion of US national security and democracy promotion, stating in his second inaugural that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” See George W. Bush, “Second Inaugural Address”, 20th January 2005, accessed 22nd August 2013, http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-george-w-bush-2005. Mark Palmer, the State Department official most closely associated with the APF, also later published a book calling for a concerted push by the United States and the global community to remove all dictators from office by 2025. See Mark Palmer, \textit{Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World’s LastDictators by 2025} (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005). Muravchik, cited above, also take a prescriptive approach in advocating democracy promotion as the basis of future national security policy.} Neither can one of these imperatives be removed from the equation. Instead, the relationship between them is fluid and influenced by external geopolitical conditions and the strength of conflicting groups or actors within the state apparatus. Due to this continuing tension an
accommodation between the two is probable only in policy towards specific cases and countries.

The strategic framework

Private individuals and groups took the lead role in generating a framework for democracy promotion during the 1970s and in the first year of the Reagan administration. It was these actors, not the US government, who generated the concept of promoting the growth of democratic systems overseas through aid to foreign political parties and civil society groups and produced ideas for an organisational blueprint, a tactical approach, and the general principles for a strategic framework to achieve this. This framework was not constructed purely for ideological reasons, but because these individuals and groups believed the promotion of democracy would create more security for the US. However, far from being able to simply impose these ideas on “proximate policy-makers”, these private forces encountered pre-existing attitudes and agendas in the policy-making machinery which forced negotiation and modification of their original concepts.

The process of generating a strategic framework reconciling democracy promotion and national security led to disagreements between factions with differing conceptions of the relationship between democracy and national security objectives located within the administration, in Congress, and within the private sphere. The state apparatus was divided into two groups: a Reaganite faction which was motivated by the concept of anticommunism rather than a universal commitment to democracy promotion; and a State Department-based faction which favoured a strategy of containing the perceived rise of Soviet and Communist political power in friendly dictatorships such as the Philippines through pre-emptive democratic reform, while weakening the USSR through support for dissident and nationalist
groups, and propaganda broadcast through Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Each faction was concerned that an indiscriminate campaign to wage democracy too focused on the opposing agenda could harm US national security by destabilising friendly governments or provoking crackdowns in enemy states which could destroy friendly groups the US sought to empower.

The requirement that democracy promotion be overt, a legacy of the covert state-private network’s implosion in 1967, meant that such debates could not be limited to the national security apparatus, however. Congress’ role in appropriating funding for such a new initiative provided leverage over the process to Congressmen and Senators, especially Democrats, who favoured a more even-handed campaign rather than the use of an abstract concept of democracy promotion to legitimate the pursuit of a campaign focused primarily on the Soviet Empire, while the more open process also provided a platform for private groups to push for the adoption of their concepts.

The concept of democracy promotion proved to be capable of generating a consensus among this fragmented elite which allowed political operations to be pursued such as the support of Solidarity in Poland, dissident groups within the USSR, and friendly democratic forces in the Philippines. This shift in the rationale for US political intervention overseas from the anti-communist conception which had characterised the pre-1967 period of the Cold War and the Reagan administration’s Project Democracy to a conception focused explicitly on concrete support for democracy and democratic forces provided an ideational grounding for these activities which was far more enduring and far more rooted in US political culture. However, this accommodation over democracy promotion actively led to failure to resolve the strategic question. A policy conceived and articulated in terms of this vision of democracy promotion could not be limited either to a focus solely on building democracy in the USSR
rather than friendly dictatorships or to pursuing operations to create political difficulties for the Soviet regime while failing to push for more wide-ranging democratic reforms when opportunities to do so arose. Instead, the concept included both containment through the creation of democratic systems in friendly dictatorships and attempts to transform enemy regimes while prioritising neither goal and subsuming both under the concept of democracy promotion.

The fact that the disagreements within the private coalition which led to the departure of idealists such as George Agree turned on the structure of the Endowment and its relationship to state and private interests rather than a division over whether to follow a policy of containment or the transformation of enemy regimes indicates that this strategic fuzziness was intrinsic to the concept of democracy promotion, rather than being imposed from the outside by factions in the Reagan administration or Congress in an attempt to engineer consensus. Instead of being used to support a clear strategic option, the concept superseded differing agendas and so transcended the strategic issues. This convergence led the state and private groups to focus on the creation of the NED as a pragmatic solution to the problem of how to carry out political operations abroad rather than on resolving their differences over strategic agendas. This resolution de-escalated policy conflicts within the elite over democracy promotion, but no single faction, whether the private democracy promoters or factions in the administration or Congress, was able to triumph completely. The result was a compromise which led to the creation of an organisation which could pursue democracy promotion on a case-by-case basis, not a coherent strategic framework.
Democracy promotion, autonomy and credibility

Although the fact that the NED received government funding invites parallels with the pre-1967 CIA-guided state-private network, the shift from a set of covert relationships based on a shared anticommunism to an overt relationship conceived as being aimed at the promotion of democracy created a new dynamic for the management of operations. Congress’ rejection of a supervisory role for the International Political Committee,6 necessary to secure the credibility of the NED under the new overt funding relationship, had removed formal command and control by the national security bureaucracy. This removal of a government command centre for the effort to promote democracy removed one possible mechanism for resolving the tensions between national security and democracy which remained due to the failure to generate a strategic framework. Instead, these tensions were resolved on a case-by-case basis through the new, open management structure for political operations which provided the Executive and Congress with different methods of influence over the Endowment.

The NED’s financial dependency on Congressional appropriations provided the legislature with leverage which it used to enforce the Endowment’s compliance with its own vision of democracy promotion. Congress used its “power of the purse” to ensure that the NED foundations did not deploy democracy promotion merely as a concept to legitimate anticommunist operations by punishing individual foundations which engaged in this. These Congressional threats to the Endowment’s funding affected the balance of forces within it.

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6The International Political Committee was set up and met intermittently from 1983-1986, but without a large program such as Project Democracy to manage, its power and influence was limited. See Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin America In the Reagan Years (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 205.

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strengthening the position of those private leaders who stressed the use of democratic tactics and forms.

In contrast, the administration used its influence to strengthen the NED’s orientation towards national security. This was partly a product of the interchange of personnel between the national security bureaucracy and the Endowment, which tended to create a leadership group which conceived US national security interests within the framework constructed by this bureaucracy. However, the administration exerted more tangible influence due to the fact that it recommended the funding levels which Congress voted on, generated the national security framework which the NED pursued its operations within, and provided the pressure on other states and support for NED actions on the ground needed to carry out large-scale regime change operations.

This double dependency on the Executive and Congress acted to more clearly define and institutionalise the new mode of political intervention pursued by the NED as being aimed at the fostering of democratic groups and systems compatible with US national security interests, rather than as a resurrection of previous CIA capabilities. The shift from a covert to an overt operating structure helped to lock in this change, but the continued dependence of the NED on government funding and support meant that it did not result in complete autonomy for the Endowment. The result was that the NED was flexible enough to pursue a double mission of transforming enemy states and fostering democratic transitions in friendly

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7 See Chapter Seven, 275.
8 This was apparent in the case of the Philippines, where the NED required the support of the State Department to prosecute its operations effectively and where the support of the Reaganites was required for the final ouster of Marcos. This pattern of state-private co-operation was repeated more smoothly in subsequent operations during the Cold War, when the US state exercised diplomatic and economic pressures on the right-wing Pinochet regime in Chile and the Marxist Sandinistas in Nicaragua to hold elections which were won by NED-supported political forces. See William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention & Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 167-175 for discussion of US economic pressures on the Pinochet regime in the mid-80s and 235-239 for a discussion of the economic, military and diplomatic pressures applied to the Sandinista regime by the US state which acted alongside democracy promotion operations to remove the FSLN from power.
dictatorships on a case-by-case basis, and to respond rapidly to take advantage of developing opportunities to promote democracy, for example in Eastern Europe from 1989 onwards. However, this autonomy only functioned within the limits set by the national security bureaucracy and Congress, and much of the funding it disbursed to indigenous groups in such rapidly developing situations originated with Congress or government agencies such as USAID.  

The tension inherent in this arrangement was that while a private group had been preferred due to the plausible deniability and credibility which it could bring to democracy promotion operations, neither the Executive nor Congress proved willing to provide the NED with complete autonomy. This continuing tension has begun to undermine the credibility of democracy promotion as a politically neutral project, and that of the NED as a private organisation. The continuing credibility problem posed by the NED’s links to the state has been exacerbated over the preceding decade by developments which have strengthened the perception of a link between democracy promotion and US interests. These include the

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9 According to NED annual reports, in 1988 the Endowment disbursed $2,010,000 to organisations active in or linked to Eastern Europe, with $1,000,000 in funding Solidarity originating from a special Congressional appropriation. In 1989, the year of the Polish elections which established Solidarity as a political force, the amount was approximately doubled to $4,065,826, with $2,000,000 of this being channelled to the Polish opposition from special Congressional appropriations, $308,868 from USAID, and $235,000 being channelled to Hungarian organisations in USAID funding. In 1990, the total amount for Eastern Europe was $11,365,720, $995,700 of this amount originated from Congress, while $8,467,462 was contributed by USAID. See National Endowment for Democracy, *Annual Report 1988*, 21-25 *Annual Report 1989*, 19-24, and *Annual Report 1990*, 23-30, accessed 27th July, 2013, http://ned.org/publications.

10 The NED board has remained linked to the national security bureaucracy through personnel interchanges. The interchange of personnel between the US national security apparatus and the Endowment continues to be a structural feature of the NED at the time of writing. The current NED board contains: Zalmay Khalilzad is a former George W. Bush administration ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq; Anne Marie Slaughter, former Director of Policy Planning in the State Department under the Obama administration; Stephen Sestanovich, a former policy planner in the State Department under Reagan and ambassador at large for the former Soviet republics under Clinton; Robert B. Zoellick, former US Trade Representative and Deputy Secretary of State under the George W. Bush administration; and Ellen O. Trauscher, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security under Obama. The current board also includes representatives of the AFL-CIO and the political parties, along with academics with expertise in democracy promotion. See http://ned.org/about/board, accessed 3rd August 2013. Thus, the leaders of the Endowment and its core groups are often members of “the Establishment”, “the group of powerful men [and women] who know each other...who share assumptions so deep that they do not need to be articulated.” See Godfrey Hodgson, “The Establishment,” *Foreign Policy* 10 (1973), 4-5, for quote.
Endowment’s embedding in the wider US “democracy bureaucracy”, consisting of offices and programs in USAID, the State Department and the Department of Defence, established after the Cold War, and the involvement of these agencies and the NED in highly public regime changes in Serbia, Venezuela, Haiti, Georgia and Ukraine. Due to this, the suspicion articulated in 1983 by several Congressmen that democracy promotion was a smokescreen for the covert pursuit of geopolitical goals has spread to authoritarian regimes, and even groups of democracy activists in the Third World.

Many authoritarian governments have become deeply suspicious that democracy promotion and programs to develop civil society are an instrument for the pursuit of US geopolitical objectives. This has led to legal restrictions such as an NGO law passed in Russia in 2006 which gave the government the power to close the offices of foreign NGOs working within the country if they were deemed to violate “Russia’s sovereignty”. Furthermore, the legitimation of the US invasion of Iraq in terms of democracy promotion has led to the growing perception that the NED and other democracy promotion agencies directly serve US interests by some groups of democracy activists in the Middle East. Such groups may refuse

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NED assistance due to the fear that if they do so they will lose their credibility as independent actors in the eyes of their domestic constituencies or lay themselves open to accusations of being manipulated by the US. These developments may hamper the effectiveness of the NED in carrying out its projects in the future, along with that of other democracy promotion groups such as George Soros’ Open Society Foundations.

National security and political reform

The limitation of the NED’s autonomy through its dependence on and ideological congruence with the state resulted in the use of democracy promotion on a tactical basis to achieve pre-existing US national security interests. Through its operations, the Endowment was able to contribute to the resolution of two long-term tactical problems in US foreign policy by assisting in the transformation of hostile states and by supporting transitions in friendly dictatorships to more legitimate democratic governments which were less vulnerable to insurgencies and revolutions. Democracy promotion proved to be more effective at accomplishing these goals than Modernisation or the Carter administration’s Human Rights campaign. This led to the promotion of democratic reform in the target states; however, the promotion of democracy was a means for securing US national security interests, not an end in itself. Furthermore, the co-optation of democracy promotion to serve national security ends resulted in the promotion of a form of democracy which was compatible with US interests.

Democracy is a contested political concept, and democratic theory recognises a number of different models of democracy which vary from a narrow definition focussed on

14Kefaya, an Egyptian pro-democracy protest movement, refused to accept assistance under the Bush administration partly due to disagreement with US foreign policy in the Middle East, but also because it wanted to preserve its legitimacy as an authentically Egyptian organisation and felt that foreign funding would jeopardise this. See Erin A. Snider & David M. Faris, “The Arab Spring: US Democracy Promotion in Egypt,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011): 55. On accusations of disloyalty, see the case of Egyptian activist Ahmed Maher, who was accused of “treason” by other activists for accepting aid and training from Freedom House. See Nixon, “U.S. groups helped train Arab dissenters”.
procedures and institutions to forms which emphasise higher degrees of direct participation and redistributive reform.\textsuperscript{15} The US and the NED have promoted a form of liberal democracy which is based on the US model and does not embrace deeper levels of redistributive reform, or the welfarism associated with post-war models of liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{16} This outcome was partly a result of an ideological identification by policy-makers and democracy promoters of democracy with the particular system which developed in the United States. However, it was also a result of how national security bureaucrats and private operators conceptualised the link between democracy promotion and US national security interests, which in turn had an impact on the type and extent of reform promoted.

Democracy promotion’s focus on the importance of regime types and its limiting of the concept of reform to remove the social and economic rights which had formed a part of the Carter administration’s Human Rights approach made it a more effective tool against Communism. Whereas Communist states such as the Soviet Union could argue that they were in compliance with the social and economic aspects of Human Rights, the narrowing of the concept to political liberties served to delegitimate these regimes. This narrowing of the concept was already under way in October 1981, when the Reagan administration put forward a new doctrine of Human Rights which, in emphasising political liberties, was conceived as a


more effective weapon of ideological warfare against the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{17} This shift, more fully realised in the concept of democracy promotion, provided both an ideological rationale for the dismantling of these regimes and an end-goal to be achieved.

This goal was pursued through the support of anti-communist dissident forces. US aid to Solidarity helped to preserve the movement during the period of martial law as an alternative political force for when the Polish United Workers’ Party was ready to negotiate a transition to democracy. As political space in Eastern Europe opened up the NED supported other dissident forces, such as the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia and the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria, which contested the dominance of Communist governments.\textsuperscript{18} The political and economic dismantling of the Communist systems these groups conducted brought the Cold War to an end, not merely as a geopolitical competition but as an ideological one.

In allied dictatorships in the Third World, the US supported the construction of “low intensity” democratic systems\textsuperscript{19} characterised by political contestation between elites, rather than a more populist political dynamic and redistributive socioeconomic reforms.\textsuperscript{20} This de-

\textsuperscript{17} See Chapter Three, 106-109.

\textsuperscript{19} The term “low intensity democracy” was proposed by Barry Gills and Joel Rocamora to describe the governments of states which had recently returned to democracy via US-supported transitions such as Guatemala, the Philippines and South Korea. See Barry Gills & Joel Rocamora, “Low Intensity Democracy,” \textit{Third World Quarterly} 13, no. 3 (1992).

emphasis of socioeconomic change was ideologically consistent with the promotion of liberal democracy. It was also a result of a shift in the concept of democracy promotion. The original vision of democracy promotion by Douglas in 1972 represented a continuation of the Modernisation paradigm of conducting socioeconomic reform but sought to implement this through direct political means, as the mass democratic parties which he called for were to carry out such deeper reform measures when in power. However, the concept was narrowed by Michael Samuels and then government officials such as Alexander Haig into a political tool for aiding pro-US groups in blocking the ascension of radical forces to create stability in the national security interests of the United States. This focus on building up friendly political forces reduced the danger of destabilisation which had accompanied Modernisation-focused attempts to foster deeper reforms and the Human Rights approach of punishing pro-US dictators through cutting military aid, but it also de-emphasised socioeconomic objectives.

This shift had practical consequences. It resulted in US and NED support for transitions which occurred within restrictive parameters set by undemocratic forces such as the military, as in Guatemala, or favoured right or centre-right forces uncommitted to wider social and economic reforms, as in the Philippines. In general the US has favoured orderly transitions rather than mass action, which may upset existing social and economic structures. The political assistance provided by the NED helped to legitimate these

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21 William A. Douglas, *Developing Democracy* (Washington DC: Heldref Publications, 1972), 119-121. This is not to argue that Douglas’ model was any more universally applicable to different countries and societies than the model eventually promoted. However, it had been designed with some consideration of the needs and conditions of developing states.

22 See Chapter One, 50-52 and Chapter Four, 126.

23 This was certainly the case in Chile, where the US successfully fostered a political transition from the Pinochet regime to a centre-right government led by the Christian Democratic Party during the 1980s. In 1986, US officials pressured this centre-right alliance, then in opposition, to sever all links with the strikes and street protests being organised by the left at that time. See Morris Morley & Chris McGillon, “Soldiering On: The Reagan Administration and Redemocratisation in Chile, 1983-1986,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 25, no. 1 (2006): 14. In the Philippines, mass protests in the wake of the fraudulent elections in 1986 strengthened Aquino’s hand but went ahead against the wishes of the US, which disapproved. More recently, mass protests played an important role in fostering democratic transitions in Georgia and Ukraine. However, Hobson notes that
transitions or impacted on their outcome. In addition the civil society groups supported by the NED also played a role in limiting the wider impact of such transitions by opposing other groups advocating more radical reform, as NED grantees such as the TUCP did in the Philippines. There was little attempt to support forces aiming to accomplish tasks which academic theorists of democracy promotion such as Carothers consider to be important in creating a substantively democratic system, such as “breaking down…entrenched antidemocratic power structures” or “reducing entrenched concentrations of economic power”. The narrower process carried out in these countries avoided the continuation of unstable dictatorships without destabilising the wider society or opening political systems to forces likely to challenge US interests.

US democracy promotion, in practice, has favoured the export of a procedural model of democracy which has de-emphasised consideration of alternative types of democracy and redistributive reforms and has been consistent with US national security interests. In the Soviet bloc it provided a method of undermining and dismantling enemy regimes while attempting to avoid the accession of successor elites who could also threaten US national interests. In the Third World, democracy promotion was more tactically effective in creating stability than Modernisation or Human Rights, as its narrow focus on building up pro-US political forces allowed the US to ensure that the type of political change which occurred would be consistent with US national security interests. The idea of democracy promotion provided a way in which two different projects, the undermining of enemy regimes and the stabilisation of friendly states through political reform, could be integrated conceptually; however, the channelling of funding and support to pro-US groups which constituted the crowds of protestors supplied pressure which political leaders could use to negotiate with the regime, rather than determining the shape of the transition themselves. See Hobson, 388.

democracy promotion in practice tended to favour types of reform which were consistent with US national security interests.

Democracy and US foreign policy: Persistent Patterns

The policy debates over the place of democracy in US foreign policy of the early 1980s had consequences which extended beyond the Cold War, and the ideas concerning the relationship between support for the creation of democratic systems and US national security continue to inform US policy today. In ideological terms the outcome of these debates was the adoption of a rationale for US political intervention overseas, democracy promotion, which appealed both to liberals concerned with Human Rights and conservatives concerned with national security. This rationale transcended previous conceptions rooted in anticommunism and so survived the Cold War as an important prism for conceiving US foreign policy. However, the debates did not produce a coherent strategy which meshed democracy and national security, but a compromise between the two imperatives at an organisational and tactical level. At the organisational level, the NED was largely autonomous on a day-to-day basis; however, the orientation of its senior officials towards US national security goals and the institutional constraints on full autonomy ensured that its actions, especially those aimed at large-scale political change, were compatible with US national security interests. At the tactical level, the NED supported democratic groups rather providing aid to groups which were anti-communist but had no commitment to the creation of functioning democratic institutions. However, these democratic groups were committed to a type of liberal democracy consistent with US interests rather than wider or differing reform projects which might clash with such interests.

This outcome reflects the persistence of the clash between the two imperatives of exporting democracy and pursuing national security interests at the operational, as opposed to
conceptual and rhetorical, level of US foreign policy, rather than a resolution of this tension. The idea of the US as guardian and exporter of democracy plays an important part in policymakers’ conceptualisation of America’s role in the world and in the legitimisation of an active US foreign policy with Congress and the American people. However, the universal export of democracy, which could lead to the undermining of friendly regimes or the destabilisation of key geopolitical areas, is not always reconcilable with particular US national security interests.

This tension leads to conflicts over the relationship of democracy to US national security, as some policy-makers prioritise the democratisation of particular countries or regions, while feeling that democratisation projects in other areas are compatible with US interests but of lesser importance, and that in still other areas democratisation may actively threaten US interests by opening up the political systems of key states to hostile forces. These calculations are not fixed but are altered by changes in external geopolitical conditions and by shifting balances of power within the national security bureaucracy or other institutions, which are sometimes linked to these geopolitical shifts. Due to this there can be no fixed overarching strategy which fuses democracy and US national security. The Carter administration did not manage to create such a strategy for its Human Rights campaign; the debates of the early 1980s did not create one; and despite the greater prominence given to democracy promotion in the rhetoric and national security strategies of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations,25 there is still no such overarching framework and no

command centre within the government charged with developing and implementing one.\textsuperscript{26} This has led to continued incoherence and turf wars.\textsuperscript{27} In place of a strategic approach, there has been a constantly evolving process of negotiation between different factions of policy-makers and other interested parties, in which accommodation over specific countries on a case-by-case basis is the only realistic outcome.

This process of calculation and negotiation means that efforts to promote democratic reform have not occurred on a global scale with the same level of intensity; nor have specific areas been targeted in line with a grand strategy or commensurate with their need for assistance to build democratic structures. Instead, US democratisation programs and policies have been concentrated in states where the US has key national security objectives which can be safeguarded or accomplished through such efforts. Democracy has been a policy goal in enemy states where policy-makers believe that the national security threat posed by the state is traceable to the dictatorial nature of the system, and that there is a good prospect of altering this system through pressure for democracy, whether external or internal. In friendly dictatorships, a transition to democracy has been pursued when the current government is in danger of collapsing and where there is a good prospect that strengthening a pre-existing political movement compatible with US interests can pre-empt a seizure of power by forces hostile to the US. In these circumstances the US support of democracy is a concrete policy goal, not merely a rhetorical trope. However, the fact that democracy is used as a tool for the pursuit of US interests means that US support is distributed only to political groups with

\textsuperscript{26} See Melia, “The Democracy Bureaucracy: The Infrastructure of American Democracy Promotion,” 2, 9. The 2007 Advance Democracy Act failed to remedy this situation, as it was largely focussed on the State Department and did not result in the creation of a bureaucratic structure to co-ordinate the programs of the Department, Department of Defence, USAID, NED and other actors. A summary of the provisions of the 2005 draft of the Act and the 2007 Act can be found in Eric Patterson, “Obama and Sustainable Democracy Promotion,” International Studies Perspectives 13 (2012): 30-31.

reform projects consistent with these interests, reproducing the strategic clash between democracy and US interests at the level of cases and countries.

Beyond any surface reconciliation of democracy and national security in US foreign policy which occurs, the deeper tensions involved in the pursuit of both of these imperatives continue and cannot be resolved. Democracy cannot be abandoned as a component of foreign policy and replaced with a focus on pure realpolitik in terms of national security or economic interest, as this would be unpalatable in terms of domestic politics and would dissipate the measure of soft power which the US gains from its disjointed support for democracy. Equally, a policy focussed on the unqualified promotion of democracy as the highest and most constant of goal of US policy would soon encounter the reality that US national security in some cases or regions is dependent on relations with dictatorial regimes, and that not all foreign populations, if given full political autonomy, would make choices consistent with US interests. The tension between democracy and US national security is not one which is susceptible to resolution, but a recurring feature of America’s engagement with the world.
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