A MORAL IDEA OF LANGUAGE
IN SHAKESPEARE'S THE TEMPEST

by

LOTTE TROUPP

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School of English
Faculty of Arts
University of Birmingham
Birmingham B15 2TT
England
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SYNOPSIS

Against the background of the creationist world picture and biblical beliefs about language - shared by Shakespeare and his audience - this thesis elicits the idea of language which Shakespeare deliberately presents in The Tempest.

The theme of language is attached to Shakespeare's search for a definition of man in this 'mankind' play. A triple language experiment is plotted, given that the concept of language in the Renaissance includes non-verbal communication and that language was believed to mirror the speaker's mind. The first experiment isolates the unique human ingredient, defined by its absence at the demarcation lines of the human: both the spirit Ariel and the demi-devil Caliban lack an identification with the feelings of others. Thus they lack 'the very virtue of compassion' which leads to caritas. Charity is the repair of Babel's confusion of tongues through pride, and is the content of the disciples' pentecostal language, the true communicative language of individuals and societies. A second experiment contrasts morally the speech of two children grown up together in isolation in the controlled island environment, enabling a distinction to be made between good and bad natures and the speech that reveals them. This leads into a linguistic virtue and vice characterization of all the dramatis personae. Thirdly the play is metadramatic, defining itself as an agent of the 'virtue-causing delightfulness' claimed for literature by Sidney.

Prospero's magic engages with contemporary linguistic methods of achieving knowledge of nature, predicated on God's creative Word and Adam's Eden language. His rejection of magic is paradoxically the wiser political action, through mercy and prayer.

The Tempest calls on many now nearly obsolete moral traditions familiar to Shakespeare's audience: Christian repentance doctrine, the morality drama code, traditions of the cardinal virtues, vices, sins of the tongue, the providential interpretation of nature and history, the meaning of the elements, the divine right, the millenium, the moral precepts of the rhetoricians, and a host of other literary, dramatic and interpretative modes.

This thesis contains approximately 80,000 words.
Unless otherwise stated, I have used the following editions throughout this thesis:


In quotations, with some deliberate exceptions, I have modernized the u/v, i/j and s/f spellings, as well as underlining where this was arbitrary.
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'As coral grows under the water, and exposed to air, gets hard, so also the stone'
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'Rex natans in mari'
Emblem XXXI, from H.M.E. De Jong, Michael Maier's 'Atalanta Fugiens', p. 407, see full reference above.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this introduction is to give a theoretical account of what may loosely be termed a biblical idea of language, and to indicate some of the ways in which *The Tempest* relates to it. The question of a biblical idea of language in Shakespeare's other plays is briefly raised, as well as the problem of a 400-year culture gap between Shakespeare and ourselves. The aim of my thesis is to identify a moral idea of language in *The Tempest*, and to describe aspects of the play in terms of this idea. *The Tempest* calls upon a wide range of moral traditions and contexts current in the Renaissance period. To identify these, I have mainly referred to printed texts ranging from roughly 1500 to 1700, and to Shakespeare's works as a whole, for purposes of illustration, analogy and contrast. I have referred to classical texts in modern English translations and occasionally also in English versions of the period.

Underlying *The Tempest* is an idea of language, now obsolete, which one may loosely call a biblical idea of language. This idea of language was tacitly shared by Shakespeare and his audience as a number of unquestioned - and by the audience perhaps unexamined - beliefs. These beliefs, being taken for granted, are not often explained in texts of the time, though they may be referred to or implied. In *Henry IV, Part 1* Shakespeare spends a small scene expounding this idea of language, for dramatic purposes which will be clarified below. For the modern reader or spectator there are puzzles in *The Tempest* which an understanding of this body of beliefs and attitudes clarifies. But,
secondly, language is at the same time an overt theme in The Tempest, a part of the play's main strategies of characterization and meaning. These build on this accepted biblical idea of language, but the play's exploration of language engages with these concepts in a creative and living way. One may therefore say that the biblical idea of language must be understood as active in the play, but at the same time the play itself enriches and illuminates these abstract concepts. In order to understand the strategies of the play, one must at the outset make a distinction between some modern connotations of the word 'language' and those current in Shakespeare's day, when language is neither neutral nor purely verbal. A neutral view of language is typified by such statements as Saussure's closing remark in the Course in General Linguistics:

> From the excursions made into regions bordering upon linguistics, there emerges a negative lesson, but one which...supports the fundamental thesis of this course: the only true object of study in linguistics is the language, considered in itself and for its own sake [his italics].

Such an empirical approach is alien to the sixteenth and earlier seventeenth centuries, where all concerns of life are moralized, including language, in so far as most writers look for ways of integrating their subject with the current dominant Christian concepts. Perceptions of what constitutes language include any communicative approach, not strictly limited to words. Modern semiotic theories do, of course, also acknowledge many kinds of non-linguistic sign systems.
Here, then, follows an account of the biblical idea of language. This has been mainly elicited as a coherent framework of thought by modern writers. I know of no theoretician of the time who 'packaged' this idea of language, but Donne, in at least one sermon, gathers up and makes connections between the main Bible loci that refer to language. He also frequently expounds the Bible's language references individually. On the other hand, concepts of the nature and function of language abound in the context of those widely read treatises synthesizing Christian and humanist accounts of the position of man in the divine scheme. Such are Della Casa's treatise on Maners and Behaviours, Peter Charron's book Of Wisdom, Primaudaye's complete compendium on man, society and Christianity, The French Academie, and Samuel Purchas's Historie of Man. These do not make the Bible language loci their starting point, their aims being didactic rather than descriptive. Biblical beliefs about language as a coherent idea structure have been convincingly proposed by several writers in modern times and have occasionally been applied in a detailed interpretation of works of literature (cited below).

This idea of language belongs to belief in the creationist world picture, which itself underwent a great many changes of emphasis. Finally, scientific research led to a synthesis of evolutionary thought in the latter half of the nineteenth century. This destroyed the creationist world picture, thus changing the entire perception of man and his world. In the later nineteenth century, for instance, in so far as creationist beliefs survived, the emphasis was on reconciling the
Bible account of creation with the mounting scientific evidence against it. Thus Thomas Cooper, in 1880, argues that Adam wrote the early parts of Genesis himself. Wishing to maintain the literal truth of the Bible, Cooper had to take on board the new concepts of geological time. If Adam is not to be thought in the wrong, the 'days' of creation cannot be literally meant. He proposes that Adam wrote parts of Genesis himself and that the account of the creation is God's story told to Adam over a period of six days. The first chapter and the first three verses of the second chapter of Genesis, he maintains,

is the work of our great progenitor Adam...But how was this knowledge imparted to Adam?...I cannot help concluding that this supernatural revelation...was made to Adam in a series of visions occupying the 'evening' and the 'morning' of six successive days of Adam...[but] were the days of creation like Adam's days and our days [twenty-four hours long]?

Having made Adam the writer, Cooper cannot suppose that Adam 'could write in a disjointed or disorderly manner', and therefore the literal meaning of the text must be juggled in other ways. The feared conclusion cannot be faced. If he cannot prove the Bible to agree with the new facts, evolution leaves us to gross materialism, the denial of the design argument, and of God's existence...Christianity is only a dream: there is no soul...when we die we pass into annihilation.

An idea of language is culture bound. The Renaissance idea of language relates to the later nineteenth-century experience of Genesis in reverse. In the nineteenth century the problem was how to reconcile Genesis to nineteenth-century scientific knowledge. In the Renaissance period the acquisition of that very knowledge of nature grew into an urgent desire, and Genesis seemed to point to ways in which it might be got. The Renaissance interpretation of Genesis was that Adam had had
knowledge of the inward workings of nature as appointed by God at the creation through his Word. Hans Aarsleff gives a time span of only about 150 years to the biblical language idea in the form in which it applies to Shakespeare's life time. It is a part of the Protestant consciousness and its relation to the Bible. Aarsleff's account of it 'grew out of an attempt to understand what Locke was arguing against in the parts of the Essay that are devoted to "words or language in general"'.

Locke wished to remove the consequences of another philosophy of the nature and function of language which had gained wide acceptance over the preceding 150 years....This philosophy held that language itself could yield (or by proper study could be made to yield) knowledge of nature...founded on the belief that language must somehow participate in the total harmony of creation...its fundamental text is Genesis 2:18-20.10

The concentration on the Bible in this period stems from Luther's insistence on the literal sense of scripture and the inclusion of the Old Testament in this attitude, as witnessed by Luther's lengthy commentaries on it. Waswo points out that previously the Old Testament was saved 'at the price of becoming a "shadow" or "figure" of the future' by virtue of typological and allegorical interpretation. 'The numerous problems of its actual historical past just disappeared...typology displaced the meaning of the Old Testament into the New'. Though Erasmus, too, shared in this awareness, it was Luther who apprehended 'the historical experience recorded in its words'.11 Waswo in his account of this shift concludes that 'Luther develops the "sermonis vim" that was central to humanism...words act on, produce emotions in, and should result in actions from the whole community of
hearers'. Luther's justification by faith alone is based on 'Scripture alone, which is sufficient, clear, has one primary sense and interprets itself'. Aarsleff summarizes the passages which refer to language in scripture as 'Sprachtheologie', and refers to those Bible passages about language which relates to 'The Word, Creation, Adam, the Fall; and then Babel and the final loss of the language of nature that Adam had spoken.' In the Old Testament these passages are as follows:

**Genesis 1:3**, And God said, Let there be light; and there was light.

(Also St. John 1:1-2, In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and God was that word. 2. The same was in the beginning with God).

**Genesis 2:19-20**, 19. And so out of the ground Lord God had shapen every beast of the field, and every foule of the ayre & brought them unto man, that he might see how hee would call them: for like wise as man named every living thing, so was the name thereof. 20. And the man gave names to all cattell, and foule of the ayre, and to every beast of the field: but for man found he not an help like unto him.

After the Fall comes the confusion of tongues,

**Genesis 11:4-9**, 4. And they said, Goe to, let us build us a citie and a towre, whose top may reach unto heaven, and let us make us a name, lest peradventure we bee scattered abroad upon the whole earth. 5. But the Lord came down to see the citie & towre, which the children of men builded. 6. And the Lord said, Behold the people is one, and they have all one language: and this they begin to do, neither is there any let to them from all those things which they have imagined to doe. 7. Come on, let us goe downe, and there confounde their language, that every one perceive not his neighbours speach. 8. And so the Lord scattered them from that place upon all the earth: and they left off to build that citie. 9. And therefore is the name of it called Babel, because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroade upon the face of all the earth.
For the gift of tongues, the whole of Acts 2 is relevant, as the descent of the tongues is the prelude to repentance, baptism, the remission of sins and the gift of the holy ghost to the multitude 'out of every nation'. The key passages are Acts 2:1-8, of which some are quoted here:

4. And they were all filled with the holy ghost, and began to speak with other tongues as the spirit gave them utterance...
6. When this was noysed about, the multitude came together, and were astonished, because that every man heard them speake in his owne language.

To Bacon what was lost at the Fall was the 'sovereignty and power' which man had in 'his first state of creation'. In Genesis 2:19-20, God's curiosity about the names Adam will give could easily suggest that Adam's naming is an arbitrary matter, that one name would be as good as another. The interpretation that gathered currency from Luther onwards, however, was that, in order to name the animals, Adam had to 'know' them in a special way: Loredano expresses it like this:

His Divine Majesty made all Birds and other Animals of the earth to come before Adam, that from him (who had received from God the knowledge of their Natures) they should receive their Names.

Elsewhere, he has that Adam had an infused knowledge that enabled him to understand all sciences; knowing perfectly the nature of all Plants, Stones, Herbs and animals; and understanding the vertue, and properties of the heavens, elements, and stars.

This is the common interpretation in the middle of the seventeenth century, including Milton's as cited by John Leonard from Tetrachordon:
'Adam had the wisdom giv'n him to know all creatures, and to name them according to their properties'. However, Luther was perhaps the first to make this point: 'such a light was in Adam that he at once, as he saw the animal, knew its entire nature and powers, and much better than we could do'; earlier he says that Adam knew this 'by the goodness of his nature alone'. In *Table Talk* Luther defines this interest as 'the dawn of the future life, for we are now beginning to have the knowledge of the creatures which we lost in Adam's fall'. For him it is an aspect of reform, while popery does not 'observe the creatures rightly... As [God] spoke, then it was, even in a peach stone; for though its shell is hard still it must in time give way to the tender kernel that is in it...but Erasmus looks at the creatures as a cow at a new barn door'. Southwell, a Roman Catholic and sixteenth-century contemporary of Shakespeare, in spite of Luther's comment on popery, recognizes nature's 'essence' just the same. Published as mysticism in a twentieth-century edition, it is in fact Renaissance doctrine:

The angells eyes, whom vayles cannot deceive,  
Might best disclose that best they do discerne;  
Men must with sounde and silent faith receive  
More than they can by sence or reason learne;  
Gods poure our proofes, His workes our witt exceede,  
The doers might is reason of His deede. 

A body is endew'd with ghostly rightes;  
And Natures worke from Natures law is free;  
In heavenly sunne lye hidd eternall lightes,  
Lightes cleere and neere, yet them no eye can see;  
Dedd formes a never-dyeinge life do shroude;  
A boundlesse sea lyes in a little cloude. 

Language, so it was thought, provided several routes to the recovery of this essentialist knowledge of nature. One was through 'insight', as claimed by Paracelsus and Boehme, one was by
etymologizing, and one was by 'engaging' the creative force of God's word. The latter was widespread in the early part of the seventeenth century. By finding some aspects of Adam's original language power in the holy word and letter codes of the Cabbala, or other symbolic systems and signs, some scholars hoped to have a physical 'impact'. Alchemy, too, is part of the turn-of-the-century revival of occultism, called so because we have no word for these would-be scientific systems searching for the link between the concrete world and the spirit, whether through the agency of angels, Adam's original language, God's original Word, the primary substance, the spirit signature in plants, or rosicrucianism, together with many other attempts to unlock the elemental and created world of nature. These systems had practical aims. They were endlessly expounded in books, symbolic codes, chemical laboratories and tables of heavenly influence.

Paracelsus's reading of signatures, Pagel explains, is based on the presence in all nature, of 'virtues', 'arcana', 'or Magnalia' that had always been in God prior to creation. These forces 'in natural objects are not natural but supernatural...research into natural phenomena is therefore a religious duty'. This was, however, no superstitious theory but intended as empirical research into nature, for God had lavished divine cures upon nature around us and this is in itself natural, and not to do with the virtue or spiritual state of the recipient: 'was irrisch ist...muss irrisch seyn...so dient es...guten und bösen'.'23' Boehme goes much further, actually claiming to understand a 'Natursprache', a nature language, which is directly related to the phonetics and physical processes of speech, particularly German.
If you want to understand the language of nature yourself, notice inwardly how every word comes from the heart and is gripped by the mouth, what the mouth and the tongue do with the word before the spirit ejects it. Once you have understood this you will understand everything contained in the name, why everything is called what it is called.  

An example of this is Boehme's account of the word 'Wasser':

The tongue raises itself with the spirit...and helps it to hiss...and the spirit pushes forcefully through the teeth.

That is to say, the signature and nature of water is clearly recognizable in its verbal form.  

Etymologizing from modern words backwards, in the hope of recovering the language before the Babylonian confusion, had for long been practised, but not on modern principles of etymology. Isadore of Seville's *Etymologiae* in the seventh century, for instance, traced all the nations back to the seventy-two sacred nations that must have arisen at Babel, according to the name lists in Genesis. If one could get closer to the original word, its 'true' meaning would lie revealed.  

Hebrew was often thought to be the language that Adam had spoken with God, and it is significant that scholars began to study Hebrew in England with etymological purposes in mind particularly from the end of the sixteenth century onwards. A 1593 translation by John Udall of Pierre Martinez's Hebrew Grammar, as 'Key of the Holy Tongue', from a Latin grammar published in Paris in 1567, is the beginning of Hebrew printing in England. Typically, for the beginning of the empiricist period, many were printed in England after 1650, because the Oxford Press saw the need to acquire Hebrew matrices in 1651. Loredano around this time claims that Adam had spoken Hebrew with God, a long-
standing assumption, but now this increase in Hebrew interest relates to
the early empiricists making a serious and more reasoned attack upon the
study of language. As a path to natural knowledge, language was only
gradually abandoned, and thereafter it comes in for criticism or
consideration as a vehicle for transmitting knowledge but no longer as a
source.

The New Testament had its own spiritual language to counteract
the degeneration of language from the time of the Fall and the dispersal
of language at Babel, whose cause was pride. This was the message of
love given by the disciples at Pentecost. In the tongues of the
disciples we see the spirit as paramount, miraculously creating the
form, while in the other systems, a correct form of language was
supposed to fill the word with spirit. Donne recognizes the
difference, stating that God has never ceased to speak to man
experientially,

In the seasons of the yeare, in the vicissitudes and
revolutions of Church, and State, in the voice of Thunder, and
lightnings, and other declarations of his power. This is
Gods English to thee, and his French and his Latine, and Greek
and Hebrew to others. 29

Donne says that men can know God, who speaks to all through nature and
history. Donne remains unconfused as to which is the spirit and which
is the letter. The right form of language might be found that would
tap into creation in a technical manner, but the church would know this
to be a hubristic enterprise. Yet until there could be a separation of
this conceptual trinity composed of matter, spirit and language,
inherent in God's creation of nature by the Word, it was logical to look
to language to provide knowledge of nature, and to believe in the
holiness of the task. Thus the early empiricists continued to hope that language would yield results. Aarsleff comments on the great concern of the Royal Society with language in the early years.30 'This faith in language as the first aid to knowledge is the last...of a total view of the world which we would call magical rather than scientific'; the identification of causes through repeatable experiments finally left language with the role of only recording experience.31 In these linguistic or magical searches for the knowledge of nature, adepts were conscious of the need for special spiritual preparation. De Jong reproduces a circular engraving (1598) of a studio by Henricus Khunrath Leps, theosopher, doctor and inventor, which combines approaches to divine knowledge through prayer, substances and music. The rapt seeker kneels in an oratory hung with Latin and Hebrew prayers. Research into harmony accounts for a table full of musical instruments among the furnaces and chemical apparatus, and also for the classically proportioned room, whose corridor in distant perspective leads to the centre point of the picture, an open door into space.32 In effect the regeneration sought was a reinstatement into Adam's lost power, as Bacon stated, which to some looked suspiciously like a search for the half-eaten apple.

II

The movement against Curiosity, or vain philosophy, recognizes this: religious humility 'had two foci - self-knowledge and correct
belief. Prospero's self-discovery as no better than other human beings, 'one of their kind' (V.1.23), is the anagnorisis of The Tempest, and his prayer of simple faith in the epilogue is the essence of correct belief. The Tempest exactly crystallizes the opposition between knowledge and humility. Spiritual regeneration demanded that humility of the spirit be set above desire of the intellect, to say nothing of the magical arts, which were even more reprehensibly associated with curiosity, since Satan is involved in his offer of knowledge to Eve. Shakespeare places Prospero with one foot in each camp, but nature speaks to him in both guises. Nature is 'essentialist' in the play, and speaks to man in the actions of providence and the moral world of the elements. This nature is all-powerful. It is as Donne describes it, and it is as the occultists describe what they would like it to be, spiritual and harmonious, like Ariel. In a play the latter can be shown as successful. Chapters 1B and 4 trace these concepts in the play.

There are other themes of spiritual regeneration in the play besides those associated with the knowledge seekers, or with the charity preached by the disciples. These are the quite real millenarian hopes in the early seventeenth century, particularly in relation to colonization. Thus a new Eden is literal in the play, which so often identifies the island as a potential paradise. 'Ralegh believed the opportunities of the New World were at least partly spiritual...[with] a duty to convert the Indians to the true faith'. Kathleen Firth points out how broad-based the movement had become by the time of The Tempest. By the seventeenth century the apocalyptic tradition included men of varied interests: 'mathematicians, chronologers, astrologers, a
universal historian' expecting 'the prophecies already interpreted to reach fulfilment in the nearer or more remote future'.

Chapter 3 deals with the milieu of *The Tempest* in relation to James, colonization and Edenic hopes. King James I figured prominently as a 'godly king specially saved by God' in some writings of the time, as able to 'persuade the kings of Europe to reform the Catholic Church and unite Christendom'; in 1605 in *A Premonition*, James had written proofs that the Pope was Antichrist.

There is evidence that Shakespeare understood the belief in the biblical idea of language very coherently. In *Henry IV, Part 1* the degeneration of language since the Fall is taken up as a whole complex. Language is linked to humours, and both are unstable since Adam fell. The connection between kingship and humility is made in terms of language here, through which the prince learns the nature of the people he is to govern, a somewhat sorry lot, but human. Shakespeare makes a point of having the scene explained, which marks it as an audience exposition of the prince's path to virtue, revaluing his reprehensible behaviour. Much is learned from the drawers. Poins feeds Hal a prompt: Poins: 'what cunning match have you made with this jest of the drawer? Come, what's the issue?' Prince: 'I am now of all humours...since the old days of goodman Adam to the pupil age of this present twelve o'clock at midnight' (*Henry IV, Part 1*, II.4.87). The Prince marvels at Francis the drawer, 'one that never spake other English in his life than "eight shillings and sixpence"...with this shrill addition, "anon, anon, sir!"' (II.4.20). He comments, 'that ever this fellow should have fewer words than a parrot, and yet the son of a woman...his eloquence the parcel of a reckoning' (II.4.95). The Prince
has 'sounded the very base string of humility' and the drawers have told him he 'is the king of courtesy'. Francis has little left of Adam's superior reason, shown by his impoverished language. He is like a parrot whose language has no relation to mind. Hal claims charity and humility in communicating with the lowest members of his kingdom, he is 'no proud Jack, like Falstaff' the drawers tell him. The Prince has both the humility and wisdom to identify with his people, and know them, since he has to rule fallen man. All men being fallen, all are 'pupils', re-learning virtue towards the recovery of true human status and salvation. The lessons of Henry IV are applied in Henry V, as the Prince redeems time. Accounts of his saintly kingship open Henry V. The distempered humours of fallen man 'since goodman Adam' were perfectly tempered in Adam, and perhaps they are now meant to be so in Henry V.

[Adam[,] perceiving (although composed of four Elements, and therefore subject to four contrarie qualities, which attend men till death) himselfe to be immortal by the assisting power of God... [was] free from those passions of minde, which proceed from the sensitive appetite.]

Loredano explains that the elements, at the creation, 'though proud of their variety of qualities,... united themselves for the conservation of the whole' so that Chaos could be vanquished. The Prince is learning how to juggle the contrary humours of his people to bring harmony to the chaotic kingdom. His task, too, is to help the helpless (among whom are the drawers), who are so because too poor in speech to plead their case in the world. Loredano makes the point that when God named the fishes, (who are dumb),
God first named the Fishes...[to come before Adam] to teach those in Authority, to have a more especial care of the irremotest Subjects, as those who may more easily be oppressed by their Ministers, and Officers; or to give them to understand that they take those into protection, which like the Fishes are naked, and cannot speak.

To understand his subjects the Prince must have both humility enough to identify himself with them and charity enough to take their case to heart. In Prince Hal, Shakespeare worked out a model for rulers which applies to Prospero.

Prospero learns the lesson of humility late. Humility leads to charity, based as it is on the self-identification which leads to compassion. Thus Prospero is at last able to cut the gordian knot of confrontations, by his recognition that he too is of fallible human kind. Prospero's greed for knowledge gave him control over nature through his learning, but this brought no peace with its power, until Babel was repaired with the charity of the pentecostal language. Charity paradoxically turns out to be a political force, so that Prospero had no further need of confrontational force. Man has not the wisdom to apply God's power even though he is able to usurp it, is the message. Prospero, in his new humility, recognizes that the language of reconciliation, and later prayer, will better gain harmony and brotherhood than mere knowledge, the language of man's pride. Bacon called too much time spent in study 'sloth'. Thus prayer takes over the force of arms which was represented by Prospero's control of Ariel, who could beat all the plotters, through his superior surveillance enacting all transformations through his access to elemental functions. Prayer 'pierces' and 'assaults', Prospero asserts in the epilogue (see Chapter 4, iv and v). Lacking the wisdom though not the knowledge, men
must rely on faith.

The involuntary expression of reason (or the soul, of which
reason is a part), in language, is a commonplace assumption (supported
by Matthew 12:34 and Luke 6:45). This is very fully explained by
Primaudaye. It is the basis of Caliban's involuntary cursing, which,
he says, he cannot help, though punished for it.

If wee were onely of a spirituall nature as the Angels are, it
is certaine we should by and by understand one
another...neither should we need speech...Because our soules,
being kept under our flesh as under a vayle useth cogitation
and discourses, it standeth in need of speech, of words and of
names, by means of which it may utter and publish that, that
lieth hid as it were in a deepe and darke place, where nothing
is seene (p. 377).

Unlike animals, in man

voices framed into wordes are signes and significations of the
whole soule and minde, both generally and specially, namely of
the fantasie and imagination, of reason and judgment, of
understanding and memory, of wil and affections. Wherefore
it is an easie matter to judge by his speach how all these
parts are affected, namely, whether they be sound, or have any
defect in them...So that whosoever hath not a ripe and stayed
reason, nor temperate and settled senses, he cannot have his
wordes set in good order (p. 379)...if there should be discord
betweene the heart, the tongue, and the speech, the harmony
could not be good, especially before God the Judge of most
secret thoughts (p. 380).

In the same way language form is tied to mind in the conception of the
Bible gift of tongues. If the spirit is good, comprehensibility must
follow. The spirit creates the form.

Caliban's involuntary cursing is foregrounded in The Tempest
to give notice to the audience that moral judgements are to be given to
speech styles. Comparisons with the other swearers, the courtiers, are
thus established, and contrasts with Miranda's language are made, since
much is made of their common ground in language, which Caliban failed to acquire. (See Chapter 1A. i). This is the basis of a language of virtue and vice which the audience is made aware of. Their judgement is based on many commonplaces as to moral language, and precepts about rhetoric. Miranda's tears are her involuntary speech, the sign of compassion, stated by Prospero to be 'the very virtue', the one enjoined by the disciples, the one and only basis of human brotherhood. Tears are the language of charity, and they, more than any other more studied eloquence, are a proof of true caring. They are eloquent also because they move others, including the audience. This was the moral justification for rhetoric. For though speech mirrors the mind and soul, yet these can be improved by education, and eloquence educates the soul to virtue (Chapter 5B). Primaudaye reminds his readers of the image of the Ancients, the golden chain of eloquence. Persuasion 'draweth the wills and affections of men with a sweete and pleasant kind of violence, which they follow with a great desire and cannot gainsay it'. The language of truth in love, and Caliban's 'monstrous' corruption of language, are discussed in Chapters 5C and 5A respectively, while the relation of Caliban's mind, world and language is treated in Chapter 4.

Rhetoric was not a neutral subject. Obviously this power could persuade both to virtue and vice. Thus, too, Antonio's rhetoric of persuasion, like Lady Macbeth's, wins the man of slothful spirit, as Sebastian claims himself to be. Even the example of Lady Percy's passion, who sways her father-in-law (and the audience) with the bad logic of her advice, should be considered in the light of rhetoric in the service of evil, though involuntary. In persuading Northumberland
to skulk at home a second time she causes him to be twice dishonoured. Shakespeare's scenes of persuasion are many and varied; we see Gonzalo fail in his virtuous persuasion to rally the despairing Alonso, while Antonio and Sebastian, as backbiting gallants, bait Gonzalo, the traditional figure of Charity, in the empty and damaging language of vice of the morality plays. This language, equally, is morally re-described in the definitions of the rhetoric books of the English Renaissance. Chapter 1A describes the traditions of virtue and vice language in literary and social contexts. Ariel with angel voice is also a persuader. By his emotive description of the tears of the penitents, he moves Prospero to forgiveness. His art of speaking here combines word painting with the subject of tears. Most of all the rhetoric of tears that pervades the play together with the harmonious power of music create the aesthetic eloquence of the play as a whole (see Chapter 5B). The theory of 'moving' in word painting belongs to the Renaissance concepts of the function of the sister arts, ut pictura poesis. The habit of emblem and allegorical interpretation is the subject of Chapter 1B. These, too, stress the image in the persuasive power of rhetoric. The shipwreck recalls well-known emblematic associations, while allegorical meanings reside in the ambiguities of drowning and not drowning, calling upon the more esoteric knowledge of alchemical rebirths and transformations under the water into substances of kingly virtú, such as coral, and pearl. Some of the audience will be aware of this dimension.

But Shakespeare engages on a much larger defence of eloquence in the spirit of Sidney, the subject of Chapter 2A. Sidney included the drama in his art of poesy, and strives to describe the magic power
of literature to move the reader or spectator with words. The Tempest demonstrates this power, and expounds it at the same time, delighting the audience with scenes of 'imitation' that move them with self-identification, only to surprise them by the explanation that follows them: they were enacted fictions. Each is used as a moral lesson, as to the power of the drama to move the spectator from gnosis to the praxis of virtue. The audience is to be morally guided by Miranda's compassion, defined by her tears for the shipwreck. 'The guilty and the free in the audience must be struck by the harpy and its sombre account of the moral universe of nature. But then Ariel is immediately revealed as actor, and Prospero as script-writer. The play has shown itself an effective moral agent. Many other such scenes are enacted in Prospero's game of playing the part of providence. Once aware of his own pride in 'this pupil age', he chooses, like providence, to show mercy. The play peels off every layer of seeming reality until actors and audience (and the implied playwright) recognize their kinship and joint experience in the mysterious play of life (see Chapter 2B).

III

The question arises whether a biblical and a moral idea of language must be 'looked for' in Shakespeare's plays as a whole. In the relevant context, John Leonard shows that it applies to Milton at least. He finds that Milton projects two kinds of naming and styles, differentiating the unknown pre-lapsarian and the infected and post-lapsarian language. Margreta de Grazia, in papers on different
aspects of the Renaissance idea of language in relation to Shakespeare, examines King Lear, Coriolanus and the poet in the Dark Lady sonnets in this light. Her conclusion is in each case that the language of pride and self-will are clearly demonstrated, disastrous and unredeemed in all three speakers. Her evidence supports her statement that 'if language was marred...it was because the speaker's mind or heart was flawed', and that 'Shakespeare wrote for a period informed by a traditional Christian view of language'. Shakespeare's plays themselves, and other mainstream contemporary voices, corroborate that a moral and biblical idea of language must apply in that age, however tacitly, to the whole society.

Yet language has many aspects, and the nature of The Tempest as a moral 'mankind' type of play specifically invokes all aspects of the regeneration theme. Other plays foreground other concerns linguistically, and will not necessarily need to remind the audience of the moral dimension. Genre, the depiction of social class, wit and fooling, a natural ear for dialogue, necessities of plot and exposition, all make different demands on dramatic strategies of language. If Shakespeare and his audience believed that they lived in a fallen world, then the belief must be generally taken for granted even in that admonitory age. Human beings are all to a large extent unconscious users of language, responding self-consciously only to obvious social or moral markers. Nevertheless, awareness of the involuntary link between soul and speech predicated by Primaudaye, above, as it applies to drama, must leave its mark on our understanding of characterization, even when this does not deliberately stress moral factors. The expectation of truth in speech, and presentation or discussion of corrupt speech, are
common throughout Shakespeare's plays. The humours, too, surface frequently in characterization typical of the instability of fallen man. I believe awareness of, but not obsession with, a moral idea of language in the plays will enhance our understanding.

IV

The problem of the relation of our age to the reading of old texts is expressed by Christianson:

Simple words seem to have clear meanings, but after analysis the deception of simplicity often vanishes...one experiences great difficulties when attempting to communicate with someone who inhabits a different perceptual world.⁴⁹

It is difficult to detect cultural change in the words we still use, not knowing they are now empty shells of language. We are not dealing with obvious semantic change here but the cultural fading of words. One example will serve - the fate of the word 'providence'. Belief in providence is the basis of the creationist world picture. It is important in The Tempest, the foundation of the play's structure and theme. Prospero's brief statement that 'providence divine' brought him ashore instantly gives the play its moral bearings if rightly understood. All other speakers invoke destiny, fate or powers. But 'providence' alone tells us that Prospero is in God's care, and that our play will end happily, as it should for a hero with such a name. In
Shakespeare's day the word 'providence' had the multiple meaning of God's creation, and maintenance, of the universe; providence was also the divine controlling power of individual lives and history, both as to the past and future destiny. The chief debate concerned the relation of free will to providence. A spot check in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* at four different times witnesses to the upheavals in belief over the crucial hundred years in which the paradigm changed. In the first edition (1768-1771) the confident deist entry reads in its entirety: 'providence, the conduct and direction of the several parts of the universe by a superior intelligent Being' (p. 515). In the third edition (1788) there are eighteen columns with a margin note, 'existence of providence may be proved on scientific principles' (pp. 608-15). In 1842 (seventh edition) there are six columns, including the admission that some thinkers claim that 'thought and sense are only modifications of matter, but this is atheism' (pp. 665-69). In the ninth edition (1885) the only entry for the word begins, 'A city of the United States'. There are, however, seventy-two columns on protozoa.

This historical follow-up of the creationist belief implied in the varying reception of the word 'providence' over time, raises the issue of our own relation to old texts. What understanding is possible of a Shakespeare text four hundred years later, the other side of the great divide between the creationist and the evolutionary concept of man? We may gain something by the effort required to uncover the paradigms of that age. Alan Sinfield raised this issue in a related context. 'Study of another culture is like returning from a stay in another country...[it makes us] more able to assess the constraints of our own ideology'. The past clarifies our own view of the human
condition. We may find that Shakespeare's moral judgement still retains its validity in many respects. The idea of language which I have traced in The Tempest expounds an idea of communication with man, God and nature. 'By reason of that communicable nature in which we are created', we may agree that human communities thrive best on compassion; that we should be humble in communication with an unknown God; and that we should be circumspect in our exploitation of nature, as it is dangerous in human hands.

Foucault was pessimistic about the meaning of literature in a world where life has lost agreed and definable meaning:

Maintenant il n'y a plus cette parole, première, absolument initiale, par quoi se trouvait fondé et limité le mouvement infini du discours; désormais le language va croître sans départ, sans terme, et sans promesse. C'est le parcours de cette espace vain et fondamentale qui trace de jour en jour le texte de la littérature.

Surprisingly, Prospero is made to say the same thing in a moment of despair, all is 'the baseless fabric of [a] vision' (IV.1.151), dreams 'sans promesse' ending with a sleep. Like the first Tempest audience, we should be grateful for any dream of paradise, because, as this play tells us, the time spent in the theatre is as real as any other.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


10. Hans Aarsleff, 'Language, Man and Knowledge in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries': Five Lectures Given to the Program in the History and Philosophy of Science at Princeton University on 10, 17, 24 March and 7 and 14 April, 1964, pp. 1-2. These lectures are available for reading in typescript at the Warburg Institute, London.


15. I have used the Bishops' Bible of 1588 throughout, unless otherwise stated. See introductory Note.


18. Loredano, p. 10.


24. Quoted from Wolfgang Kayser, 'Böhmes Natursprachenlehre und Ihre Grundlagen', *Euphorion*, 31, 521-62 (p. 525n). My translation is of the following: 'So du dieselbe Sprache (der Natur) verstehen willst, so merke im Sinne wie sich ein jedes Wort vom Herzen im Munde fasset, was der Mund und die Zunge damit tut, ehe es der Geist Wegstosset. Wenn du dies begreifst, so verstehst du alles in seinem Namen, warum ein jedes Ding also heisset'.

25. Kayser, p. 525; 'Die Zunge rafft sich mit zum Geiste und hilft zischen...und der Geist geht ganz mächtig durch die Zähne heraus'.


28. Loredano, p. 15.


32. H. M. E. de Jong, Michael Maier's *'Atalanta Fugiens': Sources of an Alchemical Book of Emblems*, Janus Supplements, 8 (Leiden, 1969), fig. 82, p. 457.


35. Firth, p. 251.


37. Loredano, p. 9.


42. Primaudaye, p. 383.

43. Leonard, p. 16.


i. FALLEN LANGUAGE

The concept 'fallen language' necessarily envisages 'unfallen language'. Since in this period language is a dimension of the Fall, there exists a concept of unfallen language which is the ideal. What are the features of this ideal, pre-lapsarian language?

A distinction must be made at the outset between modern concepts of 'idealism' in linguistic theory and the senses in which the word 'ideal' might apply to language at the beginning of the seventeenth century. A brief account of one such modern debate is useful because it clarifies an aspect of terminology. 'Idealism' in modern linguistics relates to such concepts as 'competence' in language, presupposing that there are norms - in other words ideals - for 'performance'. This, as Halliday explains, is an idealist concept of language as 'rules', and opposes a concept of language conceived of as functional 'resource'. Though this linguistic debate has social dimensions which are inapplicable to seventeenth-century concepts of society, yet it separates out two interlinked strands of thought about language which are relevant to the seventeenth century. This is the distinction between language as form and language as state of mind. Aspects of 'language as form' as well as 'language as state of mind' are implicit in the loss of a
common language at Babel. Language as knowledge, and its supposed loss at the Fall, is discussed in Chapter 4, iv.

When, at Babel, God 'trash[ed] for over_topping' (The Tempest, I.2.81) his human challengers by fragmenting their language, the incomprehension which struck them seems at first sight to be a merely technical problem, a problem of language as form. Not sixty years after The Tempest, Wilkins, for example, thought he could repair the damage of Babel. He sadly notes the variety of languages, and considers that the diachronic and dialectical variety within any one language are also defects. The more uniform the language men share, the closer would be the approach to conditions before Babel. To reach these conditions, Wilkins notes a way round the multiplicity of languages: 'There have been some other proposals and attempts about a Real universal Character, that should not signify words but things and notions, and consequently might be legible by any Nation in their own Tongue; which is the principal design of this treatise'.\(^2\) The element which recommended the scheme to his contemporaries was a practical one, and for a brief time an ideal language of unchanging form and single significance seemed to many desirable and feasible. His characters, or language of signs, Wilkins believes, would obviate the ambiguities of meaning which resulted from the curse of Babel:

As men do generally agree in the same Principle of Reason, so do they likewise agree in the same internal Notion or Apprehension of things...so that if men should generally consent upon the same way or manner of Expression, as they do agree in the same Notion, we should then be freed from that Curse in the Confusion of Tongues, with all the unhappy consequences of it.
He further believes the usefulness of his undertaking will 'invite and ingage men to the learning of it'. Evident here is the idea that, since Babel, 'language' is an ill-fitting dress for 'mind', but that mind relates in a homogeneous manner to a definable external and internal world of experience shared by all. 'As men do generally agree in the same Principle of Reason', Wilkins would get rid of all the different language dresses and clothe reason itself, once and for all. The empiricists believed in a perfectibility of knowledge which is at bottom religious, since, they believed, God had made a perfect world of nature to which man had lost the key, but once found, man would be perfected too.

The Christian emphasis, however, is on a fallen world in which, on the contrary, hard hearts witness to a lack of shared experience. Here language is synonymous with 'comprehension', which is imperfect on moral not on formal grounds. This is a concept of language as state of mind, and charity would be the cure for human divisiveness. The word used in The Tempest, 'compassion', precisely expresses caritas as communal, the idea of 'suffering with'. The Christian interpretation of the gift of tongues at Pentecost is that it is the repair of a fallen spirit and will, which, impaired by pride, has kept human beings apart from each other and from God. Though the Bible clearly claims that the disciples 'speaking in tongues' represents an acquisition of language forms, 'tongues' also stands for human communication as a state of mind. It means that a gospel of faith and love 'gets through', creating brotherhood instead of alienation among human beings. Charity promotes communication and pride destroys it. For Donne the gift of tongues opens 'spiritual
channels'. While Wilkins deplores the fact that incomprehension of languages cuts people off from 'commerce' with one another, in the sense of a general interchange of interests, Donne finds that the essentials of communication were already re-established at Pentecost:

After his death, and Resurrection, and Ascension, the holy Ghost gave a new testimony, when he fell upon the Apostles in Cloven tongues, and made them spiritual channells, in which this water and bloud, the meanes of applying Christ to us, should be convey'd to all Nations.

Donne couples Babel and Pentecost, and points out the spiritual nature of the pentecostal language, which can vary in form and yet return to the essence of the original language, which was an understanding of God.

God once confounded languages, that conspiring men might not understand one another; but never so, as that all men might not understand him. When the holy Ghost fell upon the Apostles, they spoke so, as that all men understood them, in their own tongues.

The connection is made with the language which God used at the creation:

When the holy Ghost fell upon the waters, in the Creation, God spoke so, in his languages of Workes, as that all men may understand them. For, in this language, the language of workes, the Eye is the eare, seeing is hearing.

Here, too, we have ideals of language. Each human being must cultivate the charity which will restore his communication with God and with his fellow men.

For this purpose, languages are not necessarily verbal, but necessarily social and moral. The concept of language is defined by
its moral function rather than its forms. Verbal language is only one of many 'resources' for promoting true communication. This applies to God's 'languages', as Donne shows, as well as human. Terminology that is descriptive of verbal language is regularly applied literally, not metaphorically, to what we would nowadays define as non-linguistic areas. Thus of the three 'books' that traditionally inform man about God - nature, conscience and scripture - only one could be accepted as linguistic from a modern point of view since only the Bible uses words. But the language of works, as Donne continues the sermon, is shown to penetrate into every aspect of life.

As to the non-verbal dimension of language in human intercourse, Renaissance rhetorical theory envisages body language, not only as part of pronunciatio in oral delivery, but as an autonomous dimension of language because it communicates. Shakespeare stages a wide range of non-verbal language. For instance kisses, singing and tears all come together in the marriage of Mortimer and his Welsh wife, who share no language, whereas the articulate Hotspur and Kate find it hard to express their affection and share their thoughts. The 'excellent dumb discourse' of gesture is admired in The Tempest, and Lavinia in Titus Andronicus is eloquent in silence.

We may thus note ideals of language both before and after the civil war, as well as a continued acceptance of the same biblical facts about language, yet the difference in emphasis between the early and later seventeenth century is crucial. More and more with the empiricists language becomes an object for scientific investigation, whereas any overall concept of language in the first decades of the seventeenth century attaches itself to a known purpose: the
regeneration of fallen man, individually and collectively. Thus literature, including the drama, rhetoric, education and all the other arts of language, as well as the individual speaker, must all justify themselves within this orientation.

In modern semiotic theory the idea that language has a moral dimension is seen in social terms: morality is learnt through language in socializing contexts, where one of these, the 'regulative', is 'where the child is made aware of the rules of the moral order and their various backings'. In Christian terms the morality of language should go beyond the regulative, proposing, in an ideal world of love, an untrammelled interchange in the language of the spirit, as at Pentecost. Donne points out that the holy ghost 'needed not to have invested, and taken the form of a Tongue, if he would have had thee think it enough to heare the Spirit at home, alone'. Charity reverberates beyond 'the tongues of men and of angels' and deeds speak loudly, as do the charitable acts of Gonzalo in *The Tempest*. Also tears and music win instant response according to Renaissance theories of communication. They are, indeed, among the most engaging of the rhetorical means *The Tempest* employs, in so far as a play is a communicative act, as well as an 'imitation of an action' (see Chapter 5B). Inevitably, however, the social norms of decent speech were automatically a part of moral norms, and to a much greater extent than in modern times. Society was, after all, a moral 'body', under rulers who represented God rather than a collective of their fellow countrymen. Chapter 13 in Romans is headed 'Of obedience to the rulers, who beare not the sword in vaine...Charitie must measure all our doings'. The connection between these two ideas...
is that rulers enjoin virtue upon the people. This emphasizes the moral bonds of a community headed by rulers meting out divinely sanctioned justice against transgressors. Ideally, social duty and moral duty would coincide, and in fact much of social life and language was regulated on moral grounds.

The enormous enterprise of the mediaeval church in educating the public in moral concepts really succeeded, as Wenzel shows, and remained in the public mind a long time. Preaching in terms of set systems of 'vices and virtues, punishment and glory' became statutory. The entire gamut of human behaviour and experience, including that of language, was polarized, categorized and analyzed in countless handbooks of instruction and collections of exempla, and allegorized in emblems, church carvings and other visual arts. Donne comments on these as a book for the illiterate: 'They had wont to call Pictures in the Church, the lay-mans book, because in them, he that could not reade at all, might reade much.' The common lists of vices would be pride, envy, wrath, sloth, avarice, gluttony and lechery. The order varied, and Morton Bloomfield cites a mnemonic acronym, saligia, where they are listed as superbia, avaritia, luxuria, ira, gula, invidia and accedia (sometimes called tristitia, for it included despair); siiaagi denotes an alternative order. The seven virtues might be categorized as humility, patience, love, poverty, spiritual occupation, sobriety and chastity, but these had many variations. A different system of classification might stress the four cardinal virtues, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance and Justice; to match the number of the seven vices they might go together with the three theological virtues, faith, hope and charity.
Many sources and streams and subdivisions come together with varying terminology. These concepts augment the basic teaching of the commandments, the creed, the pater noster, the sacraments and other systematized Christian material. One compiler laments that some preachers 'do not tell shortly or plainly the gospel and vices and virtues and pains and joys, but make long tales of fables or chronicles and commend their own novelties'. Among such intentionally didactic novelties must be plays like *Mundus et Infans* where the list of vices is repeated five times in the course of the play, as well as the creed and the ten commandments, while in *The Four Elements* Studious Desire offers a minute account of the natural world and man's place in it, for knowledge, that is, 'science', also belongs to moral virtue. Knowledge is a duty for beings that have the gift of reason. All this moral interpretation of the life of this world for the sake of the other - and undeniably in the interests of social harmony too - remained imprinted on the consciousness of the nation until at least the Restoration, when men wanted to put behind them the religious idiom which had become the mark of puritan fundamentalism - the language of religion had become synonymous with politics and had sprung up 'armed men'. We may read Sprat's *History of the Royal Society* as the backlash to the values of the Renaissance grown monstrous, at least as regards religion, language, and the cult of the Ancients. Sprat in 1667 deplores 'The great a-do which has been made, in raising, and confirming, and refuting so many different sects, and opinions of the Christian Faith'. He believes the scholars have now had their due and hopes 'that by what they have discover'd, amongst the rubbish of the Antients, they would not
contemn the Treasures, either lately found out, or still unknown'.

Most of all, he deplores 'the ill effects of this superfluity of
talking [that] have already overwhelm'd most...Arts and
Professions...eloquence ought to be banish'd out of all civil
societies as a thing fatal to Peace and good Manners...it is a Weapon,
which may be as easily procur'd by bad men as by good'. The
sixteenth-century Renaissance emphasis on education in the classics
and the teaching of the rhetorical arts had enormously enriched and
secularized the culture, yet this emphasis did not overwhelm the
moralistic Christian view of life, which had re-defined success and
transposed it from the worldly to the spiritual plane, even though the
reformation added further to this secularization. As the new
learning was Christianized and moralized, Lechner notes that 'in the
literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the
textbooks, instruction manuals for the prince, and commonplace books,
the theme of the praise of virtue and the vituperation of vice is
virtually an obsession'. The common places and sententia taught in
schools for purposes of invention were thought important mainly as a
storehouse of moral wisdom, as Vives intended, not for the outward
adornment of literature. This training it was which was intended to
ensure that the orator was virtuous. Don Cameron Allen analyzes
the profound Christian allegorization of antiquity as the over-riding
response to the recorded past, and to ancient literature and myth.
In forms more amorphous and varied than the earlier morality plays, a
moral tradition of drama also survived. For instance Craik's list of
interludes ends at 1589?, and a drama type which Feldman defines
according to strict criteria as the 'morality-patterned comedy of the
Renaissance' belongs mainly to the first decade or so of the seventeenth century, the last play so defined by her being dated 1635. In practice as in theory then, an intrinsic connection between language and the moral nature of man is assumed. This is borne out by the moral claims made for rhetoric; for the popular stage, for instance by Heywood; by the moral interpretations put upon the texts of the ancient world; by the claims made for literary language such as Sir Philip Sidney and Spenser make on moral grounds, to say nothing of the number of books of manners and courtesy that enjoin virtuous speech as a matter of course.

In The Tempest Shakespeare plans an investigation into the relation of language and the individual mind for specific strategic textual purposes. In order to understand the nature of Shakespeare's purpose we must ask how exactly Ariel and Caliban differ from the wholly human characters, and why, and what language has to do with this. The answers to this are not schematic, and will emerge gradually. The questions to be addressed include Shakespeare's recurrent attempt to define the uniquely human. In The Tempest, particularly, a moral characterization through speech aims at this. Shakespeare takes issue with the dramatic projection of moral language. Thus, if language, and all that it implies, is that which differentiates human beings from animals, can that essential ingredient which is uniquely human be isolated or defined in language? Is language attached to an individual person in some essential and characteristic way, or is it a common neutral tool of human communities arbitrarily learnt simply to make our 'purposes known'? (I.2.356).
We may compare Condillac's imaginary experiment in *Traité des sensations* to isolate language as the essentially human element, with Shakespeare's experiment in *The Tempest* to isolate the specifically human in language. The Renaissance conceived of man as midway between angels and animals. 'What is man?' is a question that marks Shakespeare's plays throughout:

Macbeth: I dare do all that may become a man;
        Who dares do more is none.
Lady Macbeth: What beast was't then
        That made you break this enterprise to me?
        (Macbeth, I.7.46)

Like Condillac's, Shakespeare's experiment is associated with language, but the difference from Condillac's aims and conclusions is instructive. Aarsleff recounts that Condillac, 'a philosopher of commanding position in the intellectual life of Europe in the latter half of the eighteenth century', invented an experiment whereby a statue would be given step by step all human senses and attributes except speech. The statue finally had all five senses, plus motion, and memory, and could learn from experience so that it could survive, but it remained 'un homme isolé'. Aarsleff summarizes the conclusion from this and other papers of Condillac that, without speech and language, reflection is impossible and the statue would remain on the level of animals. 'Reflection can only occur with the aid of speech and language...by signs which record experience, give structure to reality, make communication and thus also tradition possible, make past knowledge retrievable and allow the combination of ideas according to any deliberate plan. Thus language, knowledge, and the progress of mind are all functions of society'. Condillac sees
reason as the specific gift of man and the *sine qua non* of language because it is "nothing but the knowledge of the manner in which we are obliged to rule the operations of the mind". In other treatises Condillac implies that this is what animals lack, though they may be sociable. For Condillac, reason is specific to man and gives rise to language, as language in turn enhances reason. Renaissance men also thought reason the specific human faculty, and Caliban is a man with reason in that he has the capacity to learn language:

> When thou didst not, savage,  
> Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like  
> A thing most brutish, I endowed thy purposes  
> With words that made them known (I.2. 354).

'Knowing one's own meaning' is a faculty of humans not of animals, for Shakespeare as for Condillac; but a savage is deprived of this knowledge because he is a man 'isolé', without language because outside society. Dr Johnson was puzzled by this passage, for in having 'purposes' an animal knows its meaning, he maintained. He concludes that Caliban had purposes and that therefore, like an animal, he did know his own meaning but, rather, could not show it to others until he had language. He concedes that Shakespeare might mean that, like animals, he did not understand the operations of his own mind until he acquired language. But while Condillac searches out the epistemological ingredient that relates mind, language and
society, Shakespeare searches out the moral ingredient that binds society.

Since language mirrors human reason, in which moral knowledge inheres, Shakespeare makes this ingredient known to the audience through the language of the play, by means of many strategies. In this scheme, Caliban is Shakespeare's statue, as it were, but with a difference. He is deprived, not of language as such, but of one essential ingredient in human reason, and this deprivation will reveal itself in his language. The missing factor will be known by its lack in his speech and actions. Most of the characters in The Tempest will be measured against Caliban in one or other of their characteristics, and so, too, in their language. Caliban, like Condillac's statue which shows what man is not, will be a moral measuring stick, a touchstone, for all the rest. He is not the only one, for Ariel, too, lacks one essential of human nature, though superior to man in many ways. Another of the many uses to which Shakespeare puts Caliban in the play is to establish that speech does, indeed, reveal moral character, and that the speaker has ultimately no means of hiding his moral orientation from a morally discerning listener. This is a necessary starting point for a virtue and vice system of language in a play about fallen man and his regeneration, just as it was understood by the spectators of a traditional morality play that the moral state of the characters would be recognizable in their language. Shakespeare both revives lapsed conventions and creates new codes for his seventeenth century audiences. Since Caliban is pivotal, much care is spent by Shakespeare explaining him. As a born devil, Caliban is excluded from 'the subtle knot that makes
us man' in this one respect, yet it makes him a monster, as the text takes pains to reiterate many times. Caliban's language is examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5A. Here follows only a brief account of Caliban's linguistic situation, as Shakespeare expounds it in the opening sections of the play. These explain the logic by which the audience is to judge speech as moral characterization. In the most overt points made about Caliban's language, we see that Shakespeare makes the distinction between langue and parole which has been attributed to Saussure as the great seminal innovation of our time, in that it made a study of language 'per se' possible. Ricoeur explains briefly that 'langue is the code - or set of codes - on the basis of which a particular speaker produces parole as a particular message'. The code is collective, anonymous and not intended, the message is intentional and meant by someone. More than anything else a message is arbitrary and contingent, a code systematic and compulsory for a given speech community. In separating langue from parole, Shakespeare looks for the ingredient that personalizes language, and in this play places it in a moral dimension of language. The distinction provides the logical basis for Shakespeare's scheme of moral characterization which is to apply to all the characters and which the audience is to recognize. If Caliban has a good 'standard' language model, the way in which he departs from it will define the nature of that personalising component, supposing that language somehow inheres in the person once it is acquired, and this Shakespeare takes pains to establish. Though Shakespeare makes it clear that there is not an inborn, natural language, since Caliban is able to acquire it, yet Caliban is made to state that his use of
language is thereafter involuntary. He cannot help swearing. The Elizabethan commonplace that language shows the heart is thus activated for the audience.

Our first piece of information is that people of noble birth have brought him up. His main speech companion, Miranda, 'from a good womb' on her father's side and 'a piece of virtue' on the mother's, is also ideally educated:

And here
Have I, thy schoolmaster, made thee more profit
Than other princes can that have more time
For vainer hours, and tutors not so careful (1.2.171).

Prospero - the most learned man of his generation, with knowledge, as he says, that 'o'er-prized all popular rate' (I.2.92) - has given all his time and care to the education of Miranda since coming to the island. She in turn took the trouble herself to teach the much older but languageless Caliban. From the first Miranda is defined as virtuous as well as noble and educated. Her immediate characteristics are seen in two aspects of her language, in that she shows 'the very virtue of compassion' in her tears (I.2.27), which are part of body language, and in the directness of her speech. She is freely critical of her father for instance, in her first speech, for causing suffering to the shipwrecked 'fraughting souls'. Forthright criticism of uncharitableness is also a mark of Gonzalo's speech and a part of virtue (see below in this chapter). This directness, judged unfeminine, caused later editors to transfer to Prospero her speech to Caliban:  

Abhorred slave,
Which any print of goodness wilt not take,
Being capable of all ill! I pitied thee,
Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour
One thing or other. When thou didst not, savage,
Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like
A thing most brutish, I endowed thy purposes
With words that made them known. But thy vile race -
Though thou didst learn - had that in't which good natures
Could not abide to be with; therefore wast thou
Deservedly confined into this rock,
Who hadst deserved more than a prison (1.2.350).

This directness is later proved to be a typical and virtuous aspect of her speech (see Chapter 5) and is consistently a sign of her outspoken truth. For instance, by conventional standards, she is forward in her proposal to Ferdinand, but she deliberately abjures bashfulness and calls directness 'plain and holy innocence' (III.1.82). This is in the spirit of Brathwait's comment on women's rhetoric, 'if you affect Rhetorick...let your plainness witness that you do not affect it'.

26 This almost ideal pattern for language is what Caliban met in the family, and it is noteworthy that this language model, then, has a compassion and a truth component. Caliban demonstrates by cursing that he has not acquired certain aspects of Miranda's linguistic quality. Miranda defines his swearing and unrepentant desire to rape her as hereditary, according to the OED definition of 'race' (line 357) as 'natural or inherited disposition'. Furthermore, Caliban is made to assert the involuntary nature of his speech as he enters cursing, at his next appearance: 'His spirits hear me/And yet I needs must curse' (II.2.3). Swearing, resulting from anger, is too uncontrolled an expression of the passions. Donawerth discusses at length Elizabethan concepts of passion psychology in relation to language, and suggests that 'most humanist rhetoricians and educators found a purpose in speech very different from the relief of passions;
they saw speech almost entirely as an instrument of reason', as illustrated by Francis Meres's remark that '"as houses without doores are unprofitable; so are men that have no rule of their speech"'. The logic of moral characterization through language is thus established through a full initial linguistic account of Caliban's language. The audience is made to extend this principle to other characters because Caliban's swearing recalls, and foregrounds to the audience, the swearing courtiers of the opening scene. The connection between the speech of the latter and Caliban's speech is thus established. Once cursing, as the most obviously recognizable abuse of speech, is recognized, subtler perversions of good speech may more easily be expected and listened for.

In the new drama contexts of the early seventeenth century Shakespeare re-creates - and partially re-activates - a dramatic mode akin to that of the morality plays, where typical language styles and content (and character naming) represent a discriminating language of virtue and vice recognized and understood by the audience. Biblical authority validates both the belief that language reveals the moral state of the speaker, and that the connection between mind and language cannot be circumvented.

Matthew 12:34-35, 'O generations of vipers, howe can ye speake good things, when ye yourselves are evill? For out of the abundance of the heart, the mouth speaketh. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart, bringeth foorth good thinges: and an evill man out of the evill treasure, bringeth foorth evill things.

But Caliban cannot morally change for the better, while the others can and must change, as human beings specifically striving for grace:
A devil, a born devil, on whose nature
Nurture can never stick; on whom my pains,
Humanely taken, all, all lost, quite lost (IV.1.190).

Caliban's last words 'and I'll be wise hereafter,/ And seek for grace'
(V.1.294), are in the nature of a joke. Downright laughter would be expected from a contemporary audience that even the devil wants to be saved in this, the ultimate comedy. For in this comedy the stage represents the fallen world only so far; instead of setting up the likely outcome of the evil actions that are planned, the play presents an imagined outcome, the distant ideal of a regenerated society on earth. A negative outcome for the corrupt mankind figures in the play seems the more 'likely' (in the Aristotelian sense in which literature is more commensurate with experience than history or events that sometimes happen). How can an audience not remain sceptical at Gonzalo's dream of reformed mankind? Thus the process of regeneration in the play is a fiction, a dream, just as unlikely as Gonzalo's vision of innocent mankind. This is thoroughly in accordance with the Renaissance view of art as purveyor of ideals, playing its part in the regeneration of mankind. The problem of recognizing and eschewing evil, evil which in Caliban is shown to exist in a pure state, so to speak, is in human beings more acute because the person who chooses evil is more reprehensible than the rare beings who cannot help it, as Aristotle argued (see Chapter 4). Prospero makes the distinction: 'Some of you there present/ Are worse than devils' (III.3.35). In the milieu of the early seventeenth century The Tempest may be said to fulfil some of the criteria of morality plays, whose task was to guide the recognition of virtue and
As in morality plays, in The Tempest the actions and persons can be felt as allegorical as well as literal in order to fulfil this purpose.

ii. ASPECTS OF THE MORALITY DRAMA CODE

While Shakespeare's imagination in personalizing Caliban has caused admiring comment from Dryden to Auden (see Chapter 4), his handling of the courtiers has been castigated because misunderstood. In Act 2, in both scenes, Shakespeare calls upon the morality plays for their technique of showing vice through language. The stylistic conventions of the moral drama with their specific moral connotations were still capable of being activated as an understood code. Yet Dr. Johnson does not recognize it, and as recently as 1973 Patina Neuss complains that critics valued morality plays mainly as the rather 'brown and grubby roots' of 'the drama that blossomed with the Elizabethans'. Charlotte Spivack, commending Ben Jonson's parody of comic evil on the Jacobean stage in The Devil is an Ass, suggests that by the 1620's 'the venerable comic romp with the forces of evil had lost much of its real meaning. The metaphysical implications (evil as non-being, or negation) that brought about the comedy of evil and sustained it so centrally in Christian art and literature had virtually faded away'. In the group scenes of Act 2 Shakespeare
presents his mankind figures. The shipwrecked parties step ashore from the ship of fools, arriving on the island to be viewed in close-up. In Hick Scorner, Hick reports a long list of (real) ships that went down with all the virtuous 'piteous people that be of sin destroyers,' (line 347), while his ship, called the Envy, has fortunately survived, and on this ship

there were good fellows, above five thousand...
There was Falsehood, Favel [duplicity] and Subtily,
Yea, thieves and whores, with other good company,
Liars, backbiters and flatterers the while,
Brawlers, liars, getters [braggarts] and chiders,
Walkers by night with great murderers (lines 364-372).\textsuperscript{31}

These sum up as well as any the vices which are demonstrated in The Tempest either by reference or example. As Hick Scorner is both typical of the morality play in the public mind throughout the Tudor period, and relevant to The Tempest as well, it can serve as frequent example. In his edition Lancashire lists a selection of Tudor references to the play almost to the end of the century. The name 'Hickscorner' had come to be used generically, simply as a keyword denoting the abuses and vices in morality plays in general: 'There was never any Hickescorner, that jested more pleasantly at any toye in an Enterlude, than M. Jewel scoffeth blasphemously at the most holy and dreadful Mysteries'.\textsuperscript{32}

In The Tempest we have two social strata, the courtiers, and the lower orders represented by Stephano and Trinculo, together with the people they conjure up in the song and at their first meeting: the sailors and the tailor in this song, and Moll, Meg and company, and Kate; the English holiday fools; the dead Indian; Neapolitans;
and in general the drinking classes, from Hick Scornor to Shakespeare's Henry IV plays. 'What is more common these days than, when such hickscorners will be merry at their drunken banquets'.

Stephano and Trinculo comically meet in Caliban a more harmful Vice, and they take to each other hugely. These two on the one hand and Caliban on the other amuse the audience vastly by their attempts to identify each other. The 'two Neapolitans scaped' are as one until Caliban divides them. Caliban is genuinely naive. By turns he is the pathetic drunken 'monster', identified as one of the devils of the travellers' tales, the foot-licking slave, and the innocent native exposed to European corruptions such as alcoholic drink. In turn, as reported of natives, he mistakes this riff-raff from the 'civilised' world for gods: 'Hast thou not dropped from heaven?' (II.2.131). At first the laughter of the audience is nevertheless uneasy, as they have already met Caliban in a disruptive and dangerous capacity. Although here he is turned into a harmless puppy-headed monster, the reaction of the audience to the grotesque drunken song of freedom is a complex one, combining pity, disgust and laughter. Significantly Ferdinand's meditation on true service follows immediately as the next scene opens, providing a direct moral commentary on Caliban (see Chapter 5). Soon, however, Stephano and Trinculo must appear as the dupes to the audience, as Caliban leads them to murder, like a true devil. This is the typical pattern of the morality plays of minor vice progressing to major crime. Courtiers have their own world of linguistic vice in Shakespeare's plays, typically developed in The Tempest as cynical and destructive, and yet different from the prevaricating court language exposed to view by Touchstone in As You
Like It. That court language, sometimes described and sometimes enacted by Touchstone, hurts nobody in particular, because William and Corin can defend themselves very well with the simple truth - as indeed Gonzalo can against Antonio and Sebastian. Besides, Touchstone is the acknowledged fool, not the villain, and uses his folly 'as a stalking horse' specifically to reveal truth, by laying bare the language tricks that obfuscate truth. In *The Tempest* the courtiers exhibit more depravity than wit, and any incidental tediousness there may be is not unintended, since we are to hear the tedious negation by vice of virtue.

The two social groups each have their 'dialect', as well as their own 'registers' of response to the island. These social styles are also morally 'coded'. 'Dialect' applies to habitual characteristics of language use within a given group, 'register' refers to variety according to particular circumstances. These terms are useful here in a technical sense as coined for sociolinguistic analysis. Halliday also explains 'codes' in this terminology as follows: 'The social structure generates distinct linguistic forms or codes, and these codes essentially transmit the culture and so constrain behaviour'. Halliday continues, 'it is not the words and the sentence structures - still less the pronunciation or 'accent' - which make the difference between one type of code and another; it is the relative emphasis placed on the different functions of language or...the kinds of meaning that are typically associated with them'. These patterns emerge more or less strongly according to context. This is not to say that the language of the two groups mirrors real court or popular language, although it may do so. Impressions of
naturalness need not be achieved by naturalistic means. But we can conceive of text as well as of life as falling into semiotic patterns. Texts relate to genre traditions or to customary responses to certain types of text. In this case the issue is that the audience should recognize the code of the morality play in the first place, and secondly, that of the courtly and popular class within it. David Bevington makes the point that the courtly and the popular had always been differentiated in the morality and interlude tradition. The two conventions apply not only to the physical staging, but content, language and action too. His examples are, among others, Fulgens and Lucrece and Gorboduc as courtly, and Horestes as popular. In Fulgens 'the comic scenes are "to make folke myrth and game"; the serious disputations on true nobility are offered so that "gentylmen of name May be somewhat moued By this example"'. In Horestes there is a great deal of horseplay on the stage with extensive armies engaging in battle; Gorboduc is a play of moral political debat 'almost unrelieved by stage action', while spectacular dumbshows between acts replace violent realism. As example of Shakespeare's activation of dramatic modes of the recent past, the tavern play from Henry IV, Part 1 demonstrates many codes at once in order to clarify for the audience the numerous issues at stake.

Falstaff: I must speak in passion, and I will do't in King Cambyses' vein...
Hostess: O Jesu, he doth it as like one of these harlotry players as ever I see!
(Henry IV, Part I, II.4.375, 384).

The signals given in this scene slot the audience into the morality code; into the language of the court, since the scenes image the
king; into the stylized expression of passion; and they refer the
to the issues of the whole play. All these codes assume the
vignette to the issues of the whole play. All these codes assume the
audience's familiarity with drama. The euphuistic style is not in
fact in 'King Cambyses' vein' but recalls 'courtly' plays, perhaps
from Lyly's boys' plays for private and court performance. The scene
is understood by its contemporary audience as a morality debate and is
almost contrary to the modern perception which accepts 'the world'.
Cambyses itself is a morality play which relates to the Prince as a
mirror play, as Bevington describes both Gorboduc and Horestes. This
is itself a typical feature of moral drama, with a reverse relevance
in the application. Cambyses was virtuous in youth but tyrannical
after his father Cyrus's death; thus the audience will realise that
the Prince, now a renegade, is to regain his virtue and his royal
virtue. Mistress Quickly identifies the tradition as being like
'these harlotry players'. The word 'harlotry', according to the
obsolete meanings in the Oxford English Dictionary, possibly describes
the memorable ribaldry and dirty talk typical of the moral plays:
'buffoonery, jesting, ribaldry, obscene talk or scurrility (obs);
filth, trash (obs)' OED. It is associated with 'dung' in the latter
sense, referring to the typical talk of turds that the Vices enjoy in
so many moral plays in order to bait Virtue. Falstaff's intention is
to move, 'for I must speak in passion'. Armstrong points out that
Thomas Preston's King Cambyses marks a turning point from Vice as
abstraction to character actor. 'Passion, not the mischief-making of
the Vice, is the forte of Cambises', who runs 'the gamut of anger,
jealousy and lust' at a period when the Vice was being superseded as a
leading role by flamboyant character parts drawn from Classical myth

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Falstaff pleads eloquently for the world, and a modern reader approves of 'old and merry', 'sweet', 'kind', 'true' Falstaff.

Falstaff: Banish not him thy Harry's company. Banish plump Jack, and banish all the world.

'The world' thus becomes a pun, balancing the loss of life's wanton pleasure against the loss of the soul in the morality tradition of rejecting 'the world, the flesh and the devil'. Thus the word 'world' exactly holds in balance two opposed meanings. In the morality code the world is not justified by its pleasures. Thus the Prince clearly speaks in morality terms, defining Falstaff as the insidious Vice. As usual the Vice turns everything round and Falstaff claims virtue, but the Prince traps him in swearing, describes his gluttony, his vanity (which is a branch of sloth), and worst of all his power of misleading youth as in every moral play. All these are the corrupt ways of the world.

In morality style plays and in The Tempest the aim is, among others, to ensure moral recognition and discrimination in the audience. The task of moral drama is not only to show vice and virtue in action and to make clear which is which, but also, if possible, to cause the lessons learnt from the drama to be transposed to the spectators' own lives. A very brief general summary of typical morality speech techniques will be seen to have some bearing on The Tempest as a code Shakespeare can still call on. To aid recognition in moral drama, vice and virtue characters are identified morally by name, appearance, actions such as drinking, dicing,
kicking, fighting and so on, by language content and social and moral attitude, and, of course by a number of other informational systems such as labelling of characters by each other, soliloquy, or direct address to the audience. Vice and virtue are often clarified didactically by a scatter of key words in the text, or are otherwise announced. So here the names Prospero, Miranda, Ariel and Caliban have enough meaning to label the characters as the type-cast figures. 'Prospero' and 'Miranda' belong to conventional tales or romances, that must end happily for a 'Prospero' and his beautiful daughter. 'Ariel' and 'Caliban', also called 'thou earth', are associated with the elements (see Chapter 4). The names of the others will do very well for an Italian version of Tom, Dick and Harry, the rest of mankind. They are matched by the list of English girls' names in Stephano's song.

In general the styles recognizable to the audience by long tradition give polite and caring language to the virtues, in more formal style with longer or less colloquial syntactic units, often containing abstract doctrine. In the morality plays Latin-based English vocabulary, or Latin itself, as representing learned or Church language, is usually mocked by corrupted mankind and vice figures, as in Mankind and Hick Scorner for instance:

Mercy: Avoyde, goode broSER! Je ben culpable
to interrupte thus my talking delectable.

Freewill: What, master doctor dotty poll!
Cannot you preach well in a black boll
Or dispute any divinity?
If ye be cunning I will put it in a pref:
Good sir, why do men eat mustard with beef?38
The baiting of Gonzalo by the courtiers will be seen to echo this tradition (see below). The Vices and mankind figures use short sentences, direct and imperative address forms, exclamations and defiant and vulgar as well as idiomatic colloquial language. They name real local names as to places, taverns, ships. They engage in bawdry, much swearing, boasting and childish glee in dirty talk about private parts and excretion. Paula Neuss shows how subtle and relevant to each specific theme the stylistic planning of moral plays can be, in this case as regards Mankind, where active and idle language are shown in action, to define sloth in language and in behaviour.³⁹ Courtiers are aptly described by Puttenham:

Or when we give a mocke with a scornfull countenance as in some smiling sort looking aside or by drawing the lippe awry, or shrinking up the nose; the Greeks called it micterismus, we may terme it a fleering frumpe, as he that said to one whose wordes he belived not, no doubt Sir of that. This fleering frumpe is one of the Courtly graces of hicke the scorner.⁴⁰

There is also sociable cheer and humour and realism in the early parts of moral plays which delight the audience, with a distinct difference in social 'dialect'. In Hick Scornor Freewill begins an attack on Contemplation but gets carried away by a discussion of footwear for eighteen lines: yes, you know all that Latin, he says, 'but therewith can you clout me a pair of boots?...I would have them well underlaid and easily,/ For I use always to go on the one side'.⁴¹ Robert Jones shows how this audience attraction is turned to somewhat shamefaced moral repugnance as the merry fooling turns to deeper and darker involvement with crime and self-destruction: 'Insofar as we indulge in the vices' mood, we are falling into precisely the
"negligence" and "deryson" that Mercy had warned us against...the audience is expected to get caught up in that mood and [then realize] what its ultimate implications are. Titivillus joins their campaign, the pretty game continues, until we hear Newguise change his tone: 'Ye xall goo robbe, stell, and kyll, as fast as ye may gon./ "I wyll", sey ye, Mankind: I wyll, ser.'\(^{42}\) So Caliban's and Stephano's and Trinculo's merely risqué slapstick under the gabardine turns to jolly drinking until Caliban's 'eyes are almost set in his head', and from drinking to quarrelling and to stealing and killing. While butlers drink, courtiers talk, engaged in persiflage. 'This kind of merry fooling' of Antonio and Sebastian in turn leads on to their opportunist plot to kill Alonso and Gonzalo.

iii. THE LANGUAGE OF VICE IN ACT II, SCENES 1 AND 2

The opening scene of Act 2 in *The Tempest* is dissonant. It is a disappointing contrast to Ferdinand's rapt state on arrival, and an anticlimax to Ariel's description of desperation as everyone plunged overboard. The arid subject-matter and stichomythic style seem to be a downright mistake on Shakespeare's part as Antonio and Sebastian show no response to their recent horrific danger and subsequent survival. The scene has been found generally tedious and pointless by later critics, through lack of recognition of an implicit
engagement with a morality mode. Dr. Johnson's note to the opening of Act 2 from Alonso's 'prithee peace' (II.1.9) to 'you cram these words into my ears against/ The stomach of my sense' (II.1.104) runs as follows:

This scene seems to Mr Pope to have been an Interpolation by the Players. For my part, tho' I allow the Matter of the Dialogue to be very poor, I cannot be of opinion that it is interpolated. For should we take out this intermediate Part what would become of these Words of the King - Would I had never married my daughter there! What daughter? Where married?

Johnson decides that for informational reasons the passage must belong. Modern critics seem to agree with his view that the scene is very poor, for Gail Paster, though suggesting that the courtiers react 'in morally revealing ways' when they land on the island, goes no further in discussion of it except with reference to the Dido interchange, and feels it would be difficult to 'reconcile anyone to the quibbling of Antonio and Sebastian'.

The intended spirit of the opening scene of Act 2 is that of antithesis in every respect, essentially an antithesis between virtue and vice. Scene 1 is a courtly débat, scene 2 in the popular style, but the two are closely linked in theme, plotting, and in the code by which they are to be understood. Thus Shakespeare returns to the two contrasting dramatic modes which had applied to the Tudor drama as a whole; significantly these two modes in the Henry IV plays together portray the sick body politic, leaving the audience to enjoy the experience even as they draw their own moral conclusions. But in these two scenes in The Tempest there is no leading character for the audience to identify with. Thus the scenes invite the audience to
speculate and identify their intentions. Within the apparent class antithesis there is a common thrust: both groups - conventionally recognizable types in known dramatic modes - reveal rather the old world than the new. The reactions of the new arrivals to the unknown is partly genuinely comic, but also satirized and shaming. Instead of audience identification, Shakespeare offers curiosity. The audience will recognize that together the two scenes express the arrival of a sample range of 'mankind' on the island, with a make-believe god and a comic satan already in place. Naturally these as yet briefly glimpsed persons arouse the audience's expectation. They have undergone shipwreck, and having barely survived, they arrive at this (to the audience) fabulous place (see Chapter 1B for audience responses to colonization issues).

In the event the first scene is extraordinary. A conventional and rhetorical speech of consolation to the king is acceptable but unexciting; it is the antithesis to Alonso's exaggerated language of despair:

Gonzalo: Beseech you sir, be merry. You have cause -
    So have we all - of joy, for our escape
    Is much beyond our loss. Our hint of woe
    Is common; but for the miracle -
    I mean our preservation - few in millions
    Can speak like us. Then wisely, good sir, weigh
    Our sorrow with our comfort (II.1.8).

The antithetical and didactic style is unlikely to be a panacea to Alonso whose wilful pessimism and withdrawal, an almost total negatio, call up heartless ribaldry from the courtiers. A sample of Alonso's few speeches in the scene are 'prithee peace' (II.1.19), 'I prithee, spare' (II.1.24), 'prithee peace' (II.1.164), and 'Prithee, no more,'
thou dost talk nothing to me' (II.1.164), while he refuses to accept that his son is alive, even against the evidence of Francisco's sighting of him, swimming lustily. Amazingly, Sebastian and Antonio have no reaction to the island at all. In a style of facetia or urbanitas, they undermine everything Gonzalo says in his efforts to rally the despairing King in his consolatio. Facetia is variously characterized as 'merry scoff' (Puttenham); 'a witty jesting in civil manner...void of rustical simplicity and rudeness (in the sense of 'uneducated'). .taken from divers places but chiefly equivocation...contrary and much differing from the meaning of the speaker' (Peacham), while consolatio is the kind of speech 'that brings the soul of the listener to tranquillity' (Scaliger) or aims 'to take away or diminish a sorrow' (Peacham), whose example is very like Gonzalo's approach:

'Oh mates (quoth he) that many a woe have bid and borne ere this, Worse have we seen and this also shall end, when Gods will is'.

In fact the debats Gonzalo invites the king to join in his attempts to rally his spirits are truly courtly: formally suitable in subject to the occasion, to the king, and to his own rank and function. After his opening efforts have failed he very properly attempts to entertain the king with a theme chosen from statecraft. His happy utopian dream should cheer any ruler (and it suggestively fulfils a multitude of other dramatic purposes). The talk about the real Tunis in the light of the Aeneid recalls for some the delights of the actual learned travellers of the Renaissance who thought they had found the
real Troy and brought back bits of ruin, as Don Cameron Allen recounts. Most natural of all is the contemplation of the place they have come to, also calculated to cheer the king. Here the strange stichomythia which interrupts Gonzalo's interchange with Adrian claims the audience's attention. This highly conventionalized form of antithesis is clearly a stylistic marker, indicating a formal demonstration of courtly vices of language which are also moral vices. The stichomythia of Adrian and Gonzalo is plaited on the page with Sebastian and Antonio, but on the stage the latter can stand aside. Adrian's and Gonzalo's sentences are 'the occasion' for the scoffers. Taken as continuous speech as it would be on the stage, albeit slow and contemplative, their sentences form a simple interchange as they look about:

Adrian: Though this island seem to be desert - uninhabitable, and almost inaccessible - yet it must needs be of a subtle, tender and delicate temperance. The air breathes upon us here most sweetly.

Gonzalo: Here is everything advantageous to life. How lush and lusty the grass looks! How green! (II.1.36).

Newguise, Nowadays and Naught in Mankind are staged in just such a scene, as Bevington points out in discussing the presence of a possible curtain from behind which the tempters pour scorn on Mercy. Though not exactly stichomythic, they produce a running commentary on the dialogue between Mercy and Mankind, and their scorn of Mercy is in just this spirit: 'I trow your name is Do Lyttyl... Men haue lytyll daynte of yowr pley/ Because Ye make no sportes', while Mankind keeps saying 'where spekys this felow?' G. K. Hunter comments on Shakespeare's appropriation of stichomythia from the Italian stage,
specifically II Pastor Fido, in *All's Well That Ends Well*, indeed there is much in *The Tempest* which shows a response to Guarini, not least his providential Christian and pastoral exploration of tragicomedy. The scene here has affinities with the simultaneous method in *Othello*, where two parallel groups talk past each other, as Iago guides Othello to a misinterpretation of everything that he hears and sees Cassio and Bianca say to each other (*Othello*, IV.1.143). The occasion for this technique in *Othello* is similar to that in *The Tempest*, for in both, the perversion of the truth 'maken ofte men yvele at ese that hereth hem', for it is one of the vices of the tongue. The courtiers indulge in every vice of language, as inappropriate as Gonzalo is correct. We may note their *importunitas*, - 'unfitness or undecency of the time' - in their quibbling. They might just as well be in an ante room at court. Gonzalo points it out: 'My lord Sebastian,/ The truth you speak doth lack some gentleness,/ And time to speak it in' (II.1.135). Their abuses include *humilitatio* or *castigatio*, calling Gonzalo 'old cock', *exprobatio* in scolding Alonso, and 'rubbing the sore' when they 'should bring the plaster'; *scurrus*, 'the obscene innuendo' at women, occurs in the play of words upon Temperance as a girl's name. These are, on the face of it, merely the shallow chatter of the court which Gonzalo refers to several times as 'nothing', reminding us of the mediaeval view of vice as 'non-being':

Antonio: 'Twas you we laughed at.
Gonzalo: Who in this merry kind of fooling am nothing to you; so you may continue, and laugh at nothing still (II.1.174).
It should be remembered that the spectator's school training in rhetoric was not a neutral study but loaded with moral purpose and refined in moral discrimination. The sins of the tongue in mediaeval handbooks and preaching manuals which had defined language in such precise moral terms gave way to rhetorical nomenclature and were absorbed into it. Richard Weaver nicely states the subtle and extremely slow change of emphasis that is nevertheless retrospectively identifiable:

There came a moment in the fourteenth century when teachers of rhetoric and philosophy hesitated between two aims: was it their duty to teach men vere loqui or recte loqui, in the phrases then employed. Obviously a basic question of epistemology was involved. Those who favoured the former were metaphysicians (but) empiricism was gaining strength, and the decision was to teach recte loqui, as one can discover in the manuals of rhetoric in the Renaissance.

The effect of this educational policy introduced into schools early in the sixteenth century is described in the works of Baldwin, Sister Miriam Joseph, Lee Sonnino, James Murphy, and Brian Vickers and Richard Waswo among a host of others.

In this typical contest between virtues and vices, we can give the morality name 'Detraction', or Backbiter, the name of one of the Vices in The Castle of Perseverance, to Antonio and Sebastian. Detraccio speaks:

To may not togedyr stonde
But I, Bakbyter, be þe thyrde....

All thyngys I crye agayn the pes
To knyt and knave, þis is my kende...
Cryinge and care, chydynge and ches
And sad sorwe to hem I sende... (Scene VI)

Have don Mankynde and cum doun.
I am þyne owyn page.
The quibbles which so puzzle commentators are intended to be tedious to some extent, as vice is. The Book of Virtues and Vices would describe their quibbles as serious sin:

"he turne\(^{e}\) everemore to \(\hat{b}\)e worst al \(\hat{b}\)at he se\(\hat{e}\)p and here\(\hat{e}\)p'; \(\hat{u}\)he vice is\(\hat{u}\)\]bat a man may turn good in-to evele, \(\hat{p}\)herefore it is a fals juge and untrewe', \(\hat{d}\)while detraccioun\(\hat{d}\)'bite\(\hat{e}\)p and drawe\(\hat{e}\)p...a gobet of goode \(\hat{b}\)t he hereth of opere for alway whan men speke\(\hat{b}\)p good of any wy\(\hat{y}\) to-fore hym, he fyndeth evere-more a bute and se\(\hat{e}\)p " e bute..."\(\hat{r}\).\(^{54}\)

The Book of Vices and Virtues sums up the well-known effect of such talk:

\(\hat{u}\)The word\(\hat{u}\) doth gret harm \(\hat{b}\)ou it be fair spoken and wel y-polissched and coloured. \(\hat{y}\)dele wordes. \(\hat{i}\)lesen \(\hat{b}\)e noble tyme. \(\hat{p}\)at voiden the herte af al goodnesse and brynge\(\hat{e}\)p it ful of vanite' and 'wher-of every man mote \(\hat{e}\)lde acountes to-for God at \(\hat{b}\)e day of dom as God se\(\hat{e}\)p in \(\hat{b}\)e gospel.\(^{55}\)

This refers to Matthew 12:36,37:

But I say unto you, that of every idle worde that men shall speake, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgement. For of thy words thou shalt be justified, and of thy wordes thou shalt be condemned.

Sins of the tongue are recounted in innumerable handbooks deriving in some form from Somme Le Roi, such as Mirk's Instructions for Parish Priests or Jacob's Well. According to the chapter headed 'De gula et vicijs lingue' in the latter, we might accuse Antonio and Sebastian of contempt 'as whanne on pryket\(b\)h an-other wyth vyleyn woordys for a vyleyn woord is scharpere than a rasour' - such a man is like a
'portepyn [porcupine]...he casteth out his scharpe pynnes spytefully'. Reproach, called 'werying', is more wicked than revilement, and The Book of Virtues and Vices adds 'it is more sotil and sliger' than boasting. Gonzalo charges them with both: 'You are gentlemen of brave mettle; you would lift the moon out of her sphere, if she would continue in it five weeks without changing' (II.1.180). This is nicely matched in examples of boasts - 'I wole make dounes and dales and do mervailes'. 'Raysing of dyscord fordoth the love that is betwene freendys, & fordoth pes'. There is no mistaking the principle of vice that aims to turn virtue into pitch though it may seem light and harmless.

Here is the context for the Dido debate which has caused some scholarly headaches. The courtiers remember the wedding of Claribel in Tunis as they look at their elaborate wedding clothes unharmed by the salt water. Sebastian speaks ironically:

Sebastian: 'Twas a sweet marriage, and we prosper well in our return.
Adrian: Tunis was never graced before with such a paragon to their queen.
Gonzalo: Not since widow Dido's time.
Antonio: Widow? A pox o' that. How came that widow in?
Sebastian: Widow Dido! What if he had said 'widower Aeneas' too? Good lord, how you take it!
Adrian: Widow Dido said you? You make me study of that. She was of Carthage, not of Tunis.
Gonzalo: This Tunis, sir, was Carthage.
Adrian: Carthage?
Gonzalo: I assure you, Carthage.
Antonio: His word is more than the miraculous harp (II.1.71).

Don Cameron Allen shows that the real Dido was indeed a model of chastity and widowhood, and it is the poets that have maligned her. Some of the audience would probably have understood the debate as an
old joke, though an important one for the meaning of this scene. The interchange on the subject of widow Dido is the moral watershed of the scene, and Antonio's 'Good lord, how you take it!' a kind of sententia. The thrust of the whole scene has been that all find the same world but the difference lies in the interpretation, and this is what discriminates degrees of moral evil and of good. 'How you take Dido' was to take the truth of the histories about Dido against the traducing of the poets, whether Virgil or those poets whom he seduced through the ages. Don Cameron Allen has an exhaustive account of the attitudes to Dido which lace the Christian world's engagement with antiquity. 'Few of the great women of Antiquity exceeded "Widow Dido" in historically established chastity or poetically invented tragedy' he writes. Ausonius expresses the historical but unromanticised truth in the lines quoted below and it is like this Gonzalo sees her, defending the honour of Dido's memory in his dry and factual way. It is, above all, a question of truth.

Talis eram; sed non, Maro quam mihi finxit, eras, mens
Vita nec incestis feta cupidinibus.
Manque nec Aeneas vidit me Troius unquam,
Nec Lybiam advenit classibus Iliacis (23.2).60

Don Cameron Allen shows that the two traditions ran parallel. Boccaccio, sitting on the fence, writes in one work 'a homily in the manner of Jerome's on Dido, as the model for the duties of the Christian widow'.61 This version was the one found in popular encyclopedias, but Petrarch was so puzzled by Virgil's perversion of the facts, he believed that Virgil intended an allegory of the pilgrimage of life and all the temptations that duty must resist.
Gower and Chaucer take Virgil's version, but blame Aeneas as a poor lover failing in *amour courtois*. The three Dido dramas just preceding Marlowe's (one of them by Cinthio) defend Aeneas, but blame the gods for their cruelty. In Marlowe's *Dido, Queen of Carthage* the gods are comic according to Allen - 'what gods!' - which adds another oblique reference, through Marlowe, to the theme of providence, fate and destiny which is raised throughout *The Tempest*. For Antonio and Sebastian, Dido is the epitome of illicit love and forms part of the courtiers' innuendo against chaste women, as in their snigger about Temperance. This understanding of the Dido passage as a whole gives further point to Gonzalo's vision of the ideal commonwealth (II.1.141). He values truth, defending history, the factual past. The future is in the lap of a firm destiny, which, he had asserted, would bring them all to a dry death in due time. It is he who acknowledges the ways of destiny at the end, spiritually awake to the meaning of providential history. Gonzalo's dream of paradise, a paradigm of the play, is the political utopian ideal of Gonzalo the good counsellor, and it differentiates him from such pragmatist counsellors as Polonius, whom he resembles in touches of pedantry and in an (unsubstantiated) description of him by the courtiers as verbose. If any one, Gonzalo brings his own virtue to bear on the future. It is in the nature of the virtues to seem ridiculous in the eyes of the worldly. Gonzalo is firm but measured in this rejection of Antonio's and Sebastian's way of 'taking things'. The audience can draw its own conclusions, and turn Sebastian's remark against himself: 'he doth but mistake the truth totally' (II.1.58). Then the audience can laugh at Gonzalo with pleasant relief when 'the latter
end of his commonwealth forgets the beginning' (II.1.155) and when he is carried away by the innocence of his imaginary population of regenerated mankind.

We may see in the challenging of Gonzalo by these richly dressed courtiers the remnant of the character stereotype of the gallant, 'the lusty fresch galaunts' which Davenport traces through mediaeval drama, poems, and ballads printed up to the time of Henry VIII, through Tudor interludes, and down to Osric. A paraphrase follows here of some aspects of the 'galant' type that seem relevant to The Tempest, Act II, scene I. The extravagantly dressed boaster Parolles in All's Well That Ends Well, and Lucio in Measure for Measure seem versions of the type. Lancashire quotes a pamphlet of 1566: 'And may no man be so hardy as to name him a Lucian, a Scoffer? The duke thinks to punish Lucio severely:

Duke: You, sirrah, that knew me for a fool, a coward, One all of luxury, an ass, a madman!...
Lucio: Faith, my lord, I spoke it but according to the trick...
Duke: Whipt first, sir, and hang'd after.

(Measure for Measure, V.1.498)

These trivial scoffers are greatly destructive of good. As figures of vice, mankind, or even the devil, they 'are a compound of vanity and impiety'. One knows them by their frivolous, fashionable and expensive clothing signifying worldliness and sin in, among other plays, Mankind, Like Will to Like, Hick Scorer, Wisdom and Fulgens and Lucrece, whereas virtue is in covered, sober clothes. Possibly in performance Gonzalo might be recognized by the boatswain in The Tempest storm scene as a councillor on account of a dark gown, and there is talk of the courtiers' clothes in The Tempest, perhaps as a

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major interest in court circles. In Hick Scomer and Youth the
galant is shown as antithesis and challenger to Charity. When
mankind is converted, he is often given more modest clothes by
redemption figures, whereas irresponsibility, and foolish merry
behaviour, go with newfangledness in clothing. These men are usually
the young in their pride of life, but have a sideline in seedy social
parasites, hangers-on living in vice. Such a one might the slothful
Sebastian be, a court hanger-on without function, though of higher
rank than these galants. Their catchword on arrival at the scene
'huffa, huffa, huffa', or versions of this, is often in contrast to
longwinded and sober virtue styles of speech. Davenport suggests
that 'huffa' was originally a falconer's call to flush out the prey.
Sebastian and Antonio reproach Gonzalo with longwindedness, and the
'laughter' which Antonio offers for the bet may refer back to noises
such as this, which were akin to laughter perhaps.

Sebastian: The wager?...
Antonio: Ha, ha, ha.
Sebastian: So, you're paid (II.1.33)

As in The Ship of Fools the galant represents the moral failings of
the contemporary world, and in late Tudor times the type occurs as a
minor accomplice of the devil.

The contrasts between the first two scenes of Act II are
illusory. The spontaneous emotions of the lower orders are a great
relief to the audience, who can at last respond with uncomplicated
laughter. However, both groups bring with them the attitudes and
language of their past lives. Stephano and Trinculo are servants to
the court, but are also of the city and perhaps the docks, with the

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smack of 'real life' in the tradition of popular comedy. Stephano and Trinculo are subtly differentiated, feeding each other gags and bonhomie until Caliban makes a divisive third. This fool and butler keep the audience laughing with jokes galore: Caliban smells like a fish; there is the brief interchange with the audience about England where 'a monster makes a man' (II.2.29); the two mouths under the gabardine, and Trinculo as the 'siege of this mooncalf' are in the scatological style; 'Prithee do not turn me about; my stomach's not constant' (II.2.110) will get a laugh. Both courtiers and commoners are lewd about women, each in their own register - innuendo about the wench Temperance from the courtiers, a bawdy song for Stephano, and a good laugh about venereal disease later in the play (IV.1.236). The Elizabethan audience would be strongly disposed to see in almost any comic reference to baldness an allusion to venereal disease. There are some excretion jokes, too, like those that probably made the 'harlotry' morality plays so popular. The joking continues throughout the scene, and the contrast with Caliban's wonder and seriousness - even though on mischief bent - shows up these two as idle talkers no less than the courtiers. The three songs of the scene include Caliban's grotesque song of supposed freedom. His name disintegrates as he does, just before the drink sets his eyes in his head: 'Ban, 'Ban, Ca-Caliban/ Has a new master - get a new man!' (II.2.179). Not long after, in the second appearance of the group, Caliban has discovered an art of speech whereby, like the devil, he can ensnare these jolly fellows to murder Prospero. While Antonio's rhetorical art is that of persuasion, his art is to flatter Stephano by humbling himself and dividing the friends. 'Thei gon ersewerd,
and maken hem so lowe... To hem longeth the synne... Thei purchasen hem felashipe to go preisen hem over al to-fore lordes and wommen', while 'untruthful praise' and 'servile complaisance' also apply to Caliban. Pei syngen alwey 'Placebo', 'My lord seip sop, or my lady, or Iohn or Willyam my felawe seip wel'. 'Let me lick thy shoe. I'll not serve him, he's not valiant' (II.2.21), and very soon Caliban laughs with pleasure at Trinculo's beating. Both Antonio and Caliban, each in his own register, know how to exploit the weakness of their victims.

The potential plotting of the play offers five near assassinations, one near rape (while the girls in Stephano's song would not know what it was), many recounted shipwrecks and three near shipwrecks. Swords flash out on at least four occasions in confrontation, or worse in the murder of sleepers. 'Tarquin's ravishing strides' to crime are now Caliban's: 'Pray you tread softly, that the blind mole may not hear a footfall. We are now near his cell' (IV.1.195); the secret approach of evil is the same. This list of evils omits the 'sea-sorrow' of Prospero and Miranda, the tortures of the damned suffered by Ariel, the destructive deeds credited to Sycorax (and, indeed, Prospero) upon nature, and deceit and fraud as described and implied in countless details. This is both the World of the moral plays and the emblematic image of the iron age. Culturally the audience is multilingual in allegorical approaches, and there is no need to define and narrow down the many modes and frames of reference Shakespeare draws on. Shakespeare presents four contrasted responses to survival in these two scenes. Perhaps the old word for 'register' is 'varying', that art of copia...
which Shakespeare here deploys to define the vices and virtues of these mankind characters in their responses to a potentially brave new world. Alonso suffers from accidia, despair. Gonzalo is already defined before their arrival as 'charitable' and exerts himself to rally his master by giving hope. The finely dressed, swearing courtiers, indistinguishable in Act I, Scene 1, come into focus as a kind of Naught and New Guise — even their banter has a very English un-Italian frame of reference, what with 'cold porridge' and the 'health'visitor' (II.1.10-11). Stephano and Trinculo are endearing as 'two Neapolitans scaped', and their cheerful resourcefulness warms the audience to them. But England is also consciously evoked by the girls' names, and by their visit to England. They are English petty criminals, street-wise, planning advantage, heartlessly hoping to sell or exhibit Caliban, their strange islander, and all are out for power at any price, even murder. It is enough to make 'the state totter' (III.2.6). Hope and despair is indeed the antithesis in the tragi-comic balance of the play.

iv. THE RHETORIC OF PERSUASION TO VICE

Sloth is Sebastian's sin, defined by himself as 'hereditary sloth'. Antonio offers to improve Sebastian's fortunes.
Sebastian: Well? I am standing water.
Antonio: I'll teach you how to flow.
Sebastian: Do so - to ebb
Hereditary sloth instructs me (II.1.219).

The traditional allegory of 'standing water' is explained by Brandeis, in his introduction to Jacob's Well. The title of the book refers to an allegory attached to John, 4:6, in the manner of writers of theological allegories of taking a simile from scripture and 'setting it in motion'. 'The allegory treats of a pit full of oozy water and mire, representing the sinful body of man. That pit is to be cleansed with various implements used by well-cleansers, till it becomes a fit receptacle for the limpid water of Grace'. When the firm ground of the Seven Virtues is finally reached, seven water springs begin to flow, the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The allegory continues in great detail but it suffices here to show the double sense, the spiritual and the worldly, in which 'standing water' can be applied by the audience. This is a commonplace interpretation and the treatise is one of a numerous class of manuals 'whose object was to condense the whole penitential lore of the time into a code for the use of laymen or clerical persons'.

Antonio takes a hundred lines in a grand rhetorical exercise to persuade Sebastian to murder his brother, with no motivation but the love of evil. He leads the morally sleeping Sebastian - much is made of the repeat word 'sleeping' - into sin by persuasion, much as Lady Macbeth, committed to evil, finds ways of convincing the already receptive Macbeth. Antonio misleads Sebastian doubly into sin, by persuasion and by example. 'I remember/ You did supplant your brother Prospero... Thy case, dear friend/ Shall be my precedent' (II.1.268, 288). Thus
sinning is in itself a persuasion to others, but Antonio also uses his rhetorical powers for evil purposes. Lest Sebastian have doubts - as to the feasibility of the murder, the likelihood of its being discovered, the worthwhileness of it, and his conscience - each is disposed of in turn by Antonio's persuasive powers applied in the classic rhetorical manner; his proposition creates conviction by the 'decorum of person', coherence of motive, opportuneness of time and space for the events under discussion. The style is the 'vigorous style for persuasion' as opposed to the plain style for proof and the middle style for pleasure; that is to say it is a satirical version of the grand style, 'forceful, versatile, copious and grave' as described by Vickers. We note various stages that Shakespeare observes in the rhetorical process - initiating the subject, enhancement, flattery. The perversion of virtue by vice is noticeable. All that Antonio says has been said before by others for purposes of virtue. For instance Gonzalo's persuasions to hope are recalled in the contrary sense. Gonzalo's hope for Ferdinand's survival is here the hope that he is dead.

Sebastian: I have no hope
That he's undrowned.
Antonio: 0, out of that no hope
What great hope have you! No hope that way is
Another way so high a hope that even
Ambition cannot pierce a wink beyond (II.1.236).

The miracle of survival, interpreted by Gonzalo as providential, is here also invoked, as Sebastian's destiny: 'They dropped as by a thunder-stroke, What might,/ Worthy Sebastian, O what might?' (II.1.202). Since Gonzalo too, was a persuader, to deflect despair
from Alonso, Antonio picks on the word 'persuade' as a thorn in his flesh, partly because he hates the good, but also because a surviving Ferdinand nullifies Sebastian's succession.

This lord of weak remembrance, this...
Hath here almost persuaded -
For he's a spirit of persuasion, only
Professes to persuade - the King his son's alive (II.1.230).

The grand style which decorum here demands in accordance with the subject is no less than the winning of Sebastian's soul for the devil and the death of the king, Alonso, and of his protector Gonzalo, the virtue figure of the play. In effect it denotes the defeat of Virtue itself. The audience will recognize the perversion of the noble art of rhetoric. The point Antonio makes demands hyperbole because he is on thin ground, which must be disguised. Sebastian comments on it, in case the audience was not aware of the 'grand occasion', and says that Antonio's passions are heightened - the speaker was supposed to feel what he was advocating, though this energaia could be false or sincere:

The setting of thy eye and cheek proclaim
A matter from thee, and a birth, indeed,
Which throes thee much to yield' (II.1.227).

He drily sums up Antonio's metaphysical and exaggerated proof of Claribel's distance in one matter-of-fact phrase, 'Tunis...Naples, 'twixt which regions/ There is some space', in order to clarify the audience's response to this nonsense, though persuaded by it himself (II.1.253). Cicero says of such a style 'now it storms the feelings,
If we look for the classic structure, we note that the *exordium* is by
insinuation, not direct, which has to be used when the speaker's cause
is 'shaky or downright discreditable'. By dissimulation and
indirection the faulty logic unobtrusively steals into the mind of the
auditor.72 'What might,/ Worthy Sebastian, O what might - ? No more'
(II.1.202); this technique resembles that of Iago's opening
insinuations in *Othello*, Act III. Antonio must stir the imagination
of his auditor with visual images, as Iago does describing Cassio's
dream, or in otherwise excessive terms - 'ambition cannot pierce a
wink beyond' (II.1.240). At the same time through *pathos*, he gives
to the speaker a sense of his own worth: 'And yet methinks I see it
in thy face/What thou shouldst be.../ My strong imagination sees a
crown/ Dropping upon thy head' (II.1.206). These are the new ideas
it is his business to insinuate. The second structural element of a
persuasive discourse, the *narratio*, is to put the case clearly but not
neutrally or unemotionally; the third, the *partitio*, is to refine facts
from problems; in the fourth, the *confirmatio*, the greatest skill of
all is required in Antonio's persuasion because he is on weak ground,
and opposition has to be overcome. *Refutatio* must destroy
Sebastian's last doubts, and the *conclusio* ends in agreement to the
murder. The *narratio*, introduced with Sebastian's 'prithee say on'
(being now interested) is to be 'brief, clear and plausible' rather
than proven. Here it is the fairly convincing 'Will you grant with
me/ That Ferdinand is drowned? Sebastian: He's gone' (II.1.241).
The *confirmatio* makes much of 'this hope', which is by no means proof,
but the rhetorical emphasis dulls the concomitant doubt. The weak
position is on Claribel, who is only just across the Mediterranean, the best known ocean in literature. Crossing the Mediterranean was no great problem in the contemporary view compared with the amazing voyages then being constantly reported. Antonio resorts to metaphysical hyperbole:

She that is Queen of Tunis; she that dwells
Ten leagues beyond man's life; she that from Naples
Can have no note unless the sun were post -
The man i' th' moon's too slow - till newborn chins
Be rough and razorable; she that from whom
We were all sea-swallowed, though some cast again -
And that by destiny, to perform an act
Whereof what's past is prologue (II.1.244).

Time as a child growing to manhood, distances in light years, this hyperbolical imagery is quickly linked to a winding clause reiterating the sense of destiny, precluding a pause for scrutiny. Instead, the strong end-position of the sentence is reserved for action: 'some cast again...to perform an act'. This energizes Sebastian with a task - 'what to come/In yours and my discharge' (II.1.251).

This is not formally different from the substance of Gonzalo's persuasion of Alonso, to prove to him that his son is alive because their own preservation seems miraculous and may have a providential purpose. 'Th' occasion speaks thee' (II.1.205) was also Prospero's motive for action, for the passing ship was his only chance to repair his misfortune. In Sebastian's case the sight of the sleeping men lying on the ground provides 'the occasion'. Only a clear moral judgement can distinguish vice and virtue in similar actions, and Antonio's prevaricating language and tempting promises work on a stupefied conscience, long lost to compunction. In Othello the
besotted Roderigo's 'tis but a man gone' expresses the same depraved spiritual sloth of such as Sebastian. Antonio's deceitful eloquence should be compared with Ariel's counter oration, as direct and harsh as this is slippery and 'candied o'er'. The whole purpose of persuasion being to move, some negative emotion is occasionally needed, such as indignatio,73 both in just and unjust causes. Gonzalo is felt to be the enemy and is denigrated in this spirit, as a fool 'of weak remembrance' (II.1.230), 'a spirit of persuasion' and as antithetical competitor to Satan. He 'can prate...amply and unnecessarily, this Gonzalo' for Sebastian may after all have been persuaded by him while listening to the speeches meant to reassure Alonso. The audience cannot help noting that Antonio prates amply himself. Jones, it will be recalled, described the morality technique by which the Vice's sport, at first a theatrical attraction in the moral play, is used later to turn the audience away from vice. Now the audience no longer laugh at Gonzalo and are ashamed that they did so. The audience rejects previous complicity with the Vice when the merry sport and banter has turned to dire crime. The final element before the conclusion, the refutatio, counters Sebastian's question as to conscience, affirming the pleasures of worldly ambition over the life to come. Consciences melt, whereas Antonio's own success is concrete: 'look how well my garments sit upon me/...my brother's servants/ Were then my fellows, now they are my men' (II.1.270). This perverse oration has won the befuddled Sebastian, a lost man whose life is 'standing water' and whom the devil loves. 'Slauthe...bat lyketh wel be feend. For whanne be devyl fyndeth a man ydel...banne be feend steryth hem so [to vyses] bat bei drede noht

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to do bo synnes. Shakespeare judges the type harshly, the henchmen of evil, though seeming only to be harmless 'galaunts'.

v. THE VOCABULARY OF VIRTUE

The definition of Antonio's sin lies in Christian repentance doctrine and in the drama that taught that doctrine. The Tempest aligns itself with a long tradition. Prosser makes clear that the thrust in the tradition of religious drama in England, from the earliest mystery plays, is towards repentance theology originally related to the institution of the feast of Corpus Christi, whose text is 'Repent now. Partake not of Christ's body unworthily'. This feast was instituted in 1311 at the Council of Vienne and is thought to have been celebrated in England by a mystery cycle as early as 1328, that at Chester.

The cycles were not compiled by a loose following of chronology from creation to Judgement. Episodes have been carefully constructed to fulfill a strictly theological theme: man's fallen nature and the way of his Salvation. For this reason Cain is included: the first inheritor of Adam's fall, the first murderer, the first impenitent, the first man to be damned eternally (for Adam, all knew, was released by Christ's Harrowing of Hell).
The Reformation had changed the system of confession, but the emphasis on repentance and its traditional characteristics was still central in the Anglican church, and is mirrored in *The Tempest*, where Antonio is cast as Cain, whose intended crime has 'the primal eldest curst upon it' (*Hamlet*, III.3.37). Ariel as harpy exactly describes the ladder of repentance, 'contrition, confession, satisfaction (amendment, penance)'.

Ariel: You are three men of sin, whom Destiny, That hath to instrument this lower world And what is in't, the never-surfeited sea Hath caused to belch up you... The powers delaying, not forgetting, have Incensed the seas and shores, yea all the creatures Against your peace...whose wrathes to guard you from, Which here, in this most desolate isle, else falls Upon your heads, is nothing but heart's sorrow, And a clear life ensuing (III.3.52, 72).

Contrition, in Ariel's words 'heart's sorrow', (Mirk's 'wyth sore herte' quoted by Prosser from *Instructions for Parish Priests*), takes an extreme form, according to Gonzalo:

All three of them are desperate: their great guilt, Like poison given to work a great time after, Now'gins to bite the spirits. I do beseech you That are of suppler joints, follow them swiftly, And hinder them from what this ecstasy May now provoke them to (III.3.104).

The implication is that they will commit suicide, reacting with the new sin of despair, known as 'wanhope' in the mediaeval topos, described in Susan Snyder's 'The Left Hand of God'. An act of faith must be coupled with contrition to avoid suicidal despair, since mercy and grace are won by faith. The strong position of the theme of repentance in Prospero's epilogue reinforces the centrality of this
theme in the play. Prospero's last words are an appeal to mercy as antidote to despair:

And my ending is despair
Unless I be relieved by prayer
Which pierces so that it assaulis
Mercy itself, and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardoned be,
Let your indulgence set me free. (V.1.333).

Confession of his sin is made by Alonso:

Alonso: O, it is monstrous, monstrous!
Methought the billows spoke and told me of it,
The winds did sing it to me; and the thunder,
That deep and dreadful organ-pipe, pronounced
The name of Prosper: it did bass my trespass

Gonzalo's tears of contrition move Prospero to forgiveness (V.1.20) - 'tears became the accepted sign of full repentance,' and Alonso makes amendment, 'Thy dukedom I resign, and do entreat/ Thou pardon me my wrongs' (V.1.118). Ariel is mouthpiece for the doctrine, through acting the harpy, figure of retribution, in a speech taught and directed by Prospero. Prospero as impresario and Ariel as actor nevertheless fulfil the task of the preacher. They are shown to reach the conscience of the evil-doers and Prospero forgives them in his own person (Act V). Watching the repentance process in drama has more effect on the audience than listening to a mere parable, as the church well knew. Ariel is effective through 'moving' and is praised by Prospero:

Bravely the figure of this harpy hast thou
Performed, my Ariel; a grace it had, devouring.
Of my instruction hast thou nothing bated (III.3.83).
Art, and particularly The Tempest itself, in the service of virtue, is discussed in Chapter 2. Antonio's regeneration is ambiguous. The 'blasphemy against the Holy Spirit' seems to be applicable to Antonio:

Wherefore I say unto you, All manner of Sinne and blasphemie shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemie against the holy spirite, shall not be forgiven unto men. Whosoever speaketh against the holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come (Matthew 12:31, 32).

Though the church insisted all sins could be forgiven, the 'malice' of such a perpetrator would probably prevent his contrition.

Five of the sins listed [as blasphemy of this kind in The Book of Vices and Virtues] are...presumption, despair, hardness of heart, hatred of penance, and the har assing of the grace of the Holy Ghost in others (for example, deriding another man's repentance). 82

Thus Antonio's denial of Sebastian's conscience would be recognized as particularly heinous by the audience. Prospero defines Antonio's condition of unrepentance in Act V, the scene of reconciliation. The unemended text of Fl reads:

You, brother mine, that entertaine ambition,
Expelld remorse, and nature, whom, with Sebastian
(Whose inward pinches therefore are most strong)
Would heere have kill'd your King: I do forgive thee,
Unnaturall though thou art: (The Tempest, Fl, V.1.2031) 83

'Ambition' corresponds to presumption, expelled 'remorse' is lack of contrition, and expelled 'nature' is hardness of heart. The present tense of 'entertaine' is usually emended to F2's 'entertaind' by editors. I see no reason for this; Antonio's response throughout the scene is ambiguous and silent, expressing no regrets. The Fl
version could significantly express an unregenerate spirit, as in the case of Iago's 'from this time forth I never will speak word. Lodovico: What, not to pray?' (Othello V.2.306). As in Timon, language, the bond of human community, ceases to 'mean' when that bond is wholly rejected. Antonio's one speech in the last act is a comment, aside to Sebastian, with a joke at Caliban's expense in the former dismissive court style. The last we hear about him is Prospero's perclusio, or comminatio, 'a threat, particularly at the end'.

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Prospero: But you, my brace of lords, were I so minded, I here could pluck his highness' frown upon you, And justify you traitors. At this time I will tell no tales.

Sebastian: The devil speaks in him!

Prospero: No.

For you, most wicked sir, whom to call brother Would even infect my mouth, I do forgive Thy rankest fault - all of them - and require My dukedom of thee, which (I)perforce\[^{know}\] Thou must restore (V.1.126).

An important aid to salvation was the sacrament of the Eucharist. The feast which is snatched away before the sinful courtiers can eat (III.3) has overtones of a mystical Eucharistic feast in that, immediately after, the harpy accuses them of sin. The 'dumb discourse' of the spirits had already demonstrated rejection. 'Feigning at the sacrament was the ultimate sin against the Holy Ghost'. From the beginning the Sacraments were included in the mediaeval instruction material, listed by Prosser as the Ten Commandments, The Seven Deadly Sins, the Creed, and the Seven Sacraments, to teach the penitent the correct way to examine his conscience. The Sacraments were reduced to two (Baptism and the...
Eucharist) at the Reformation. The Eucharist was one of the chief subjects of debate that divided the leaders of the Reformation, Luther, Calvin and Zwingli, but Hooker skirts the contention somewhat, stressing rather the joy and experience of the Sacrament. He places the emphasis on the heart and soul of the communicant not on the hermeneutics of the real presence:

The real presence of Christ's most blessed body and blood is not therefore to be sought for in the sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament, only in the very heart and soul of him which receiveth them.

Peter Milward suggests that there are theological echoes of sacramental joy in Gonzalo's 'O rejoice/ Beyond a common joy, and set it down/ With gold on lasting pillars' (V.1.206), recalling 'the solemn chant of Holy Saturday, the Exultet of the Catholic Mass':

Gaudeat et tellus tantis iradiata fulgoribus...
O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere
Redemptorem...
Columnae hujus praeconia novimus, quam in honorem
Dei rutilans ignis accendit.

It is not fashionable to see doctrine in Shakespeare but in The Tempest it seems 'as plain as way to the church', as As You Like It has it (II.7.52). Mushat Frye warns of a danger: 'Religion and drama in the age of Shakespeare are related in very important but also very subtle ways. The importance of the relationship is such that some critics tend to overestimate it and to distort literary texts, by treating them as though they were virtually theological treatises'. On that score I limit myself to the culturally commonplace. Frye continues that, equally, 'the relationship is so subtle that there is
a danger of ignoring it altogether'. 90 In The Tempest, at least, the subtlety need not be exaggerated. Many competing cultural modes overlap in The Tempest and the reader will hear as dominant the one he is looking for: one can hear the pastoral echoes flying between Shakespeare, Fletcher and Guarini, or trace in it Chaucer's magician and medieval ideals of love from the Franklin's Tale; David Daniell lists ten different genre concepts alone: 'Uniquely, The Tempest changes shape'. 91 No doubt Shakespeare meant it to, but there is also the issue of the semantic gap which after 400 years of cultural change makes Shakespeare progressively more inaccessible. Many readers assume 'that words and phrases meant in and about 1600 what they mean today'. 92 We now have only an inkling of the moral meanings of such words as 'providence', 'pride', 'despair', since our meanings are often wholly secularized, not attached to moral concepts, and no longer able to carry the former clarity of definition or the emotional load. Few modern readers search their souls in the vocabulary of sin as do Herbert and Donne, and few modern readers take the language of vice and virtue in the play seriously.

A modern reader/listener not alert to such fading will not make the connections between the names of virtue, for instance, that are scattered through the text of The Tempest, missing the precise clues our culture can no longer hear. As in a thesaurus, certain words scattered like signposts throughout the play come together in the listener's mind to form conceptual clusters. These clusters fall into two groups: they are either recognizable as intended key words in the play, or they are repetitions of a word or concept in varying grammatical forms. Rhetorically, they are identified by Paula Neuss...
as *traductio*, deriving from the *artes praedicandi*, by which preachers were advised to drive home important words by repetition, 'including repetition of a key-word over a long passage' under their ornaments of style. Paula Neuss finds the technique forcefully used in *Mankind*. Sonnino classes *traductio* with *abnominatio*, or *paronomasia*, the chief definition being 'that we may introduce the same word repeatedly in different cases' (Quintilian) or 'employed to distinguish the exact meanings of things as in 'this curse to the state could be repressed for a time, but not suppressed for ever' (Quintilian). Hideo Yamaguchi makes a case for key-words in *The Tempest* without recognizing that they may be part of an independent rhetorical system that Shakespeare would apply rather than invent. All the more convincing, then, is his account, by observation, of the systematic use of certain vocabulary groups in this way. Noting the many forms of the word 'gentle' scattered through the play, he realizes 'the pivotal importance of its use...we are persuaded that the term 'gentleness' is an important key-word in understanding our story of wrong-doing and atonement'. Forms of the word 'gentle' are indeed used with a foregrounding precision, frequently defined by what is not gentle, as Yamaguchi notices. Thus Ferdinand is 'gentle and not fearful' (I.2.468), Ferdinand finds Miranda 'ten times more gentle than her father's crabbed,/ And he's composed of harshness' (III.1.8). The 'noble' Neapolitan Gonzalo, who 'out of his charity' gave necessaries and 'out of his gentleness' gave books, recognizes a remarkable superhuman quality in the beckoning Spirits at the banquet: 'Their manners are more gentle-kind than of/ Our human generation you shall find/ Many, nay, almost any' (III.3.32), but they soon after
reverse their welcome. Gonzalo also defines what gentleness should be, when he upbraids Sebastian:

The truth you speak doth lack some gentleness,  
And time to speak it in - you rub the sore  
When you should bring the plaster (II.1.135).

Altogether some form of the word 'gentle' appears in seven different contexts. Yamaguchi finds that 'the use of this stock word here is certainly remarkable for its high degree of diffusion', and he is struck by the pervasive antithesis in detail, and in over-all contrasts of good and evil, and by 'a large semantic area of moral words' (remorse, inward pinches, prayer, grace, mercy; reason/fury, reasonable/muddy). 'These keywords are so strung together in the play, that they gradually get arranged into a semantic structure that frames the moral scale of redemption which the characters are supposed to climb'.

This special intentionality cannot be objectively proved, short of comparing similar concatenations for all the plays; even this would prove little, since similar moral vocabularies might be found in many of the plays.

If, however, we look for the traditional vocabulary groupings of the cardinal and theological virtues in the play, we see that Shakespeare does draw more than normal attention to the names of the cardinal virtues. Rosemond Tuve collects the chief Renaissance sources for naming and defining the cardinal virtues of Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude and Justice, but points out a certain variety in the naming. Though 'the Nicomachean Ethics was of undoubted pre-eminence for men of the Renaissance', she finds Cicero's treatment of the cardinal virtues is 'the locus classicus in De Inventione,
II.53-4', while De officiis was also widely used. The Macrobian framework provides yet another set of subheadings for the cardinal virtues based on Somnium Scipionis, 1. 8. In her appendix of comparative sources and nomenclature, Tuve shows each virtue expanded into many subdivisions. Certainly there is such a vocabulary scatter in The Tempest as part of a moral poetics, as much as of a moral characterization. The way in which Shakespeare draws attention to the virtues no doubt made the audience respond subliminally to these traditional moral frameworks as Neuss shows traductio to do.

To begin with, both the words 'Prudence' and 'Temperance' are indeed introduced with dissonant connotations, quite apart from a modern shallowness as to our understanding of the terms.

Antonio: [You] to the perpetual wink for aye might put
This ancient morsel, this Sir Prudence, who
Should not upbraid our course (II.1.283).

To the modern reader or listener there is a sense of incomplete understanding at Antonio's calling Gonzalo 'Sir Prudence', since the modern meaning of 'prudence' has shrunk to mean 'caution', at best a self-protective wisdom. Gonzalo of all the courtiers is the only one who will not 'take suggestion as a cat laps milk' (II.1.286), recalling Prospero's longer account of how Antonio

new created
The creatures that were mine, I say: or changed'em
Or else new formed'em; having both the key
Of officer and office, set all hearts i'th'state
To what tune pleased his ear (1.2.81).

The rest of the population followed these turncoats. Now the whole machiavellian process was to be repeated. Antonio tells Sebastian
contemptuously that Gonzalo, in the capacity of Prudence, will have to be killed because he alone will object, and reveal all to the people. To modern ears 'prudence' would suggest the contrary, 'lie low and play along'. Dr. Johnson, incidentally, approves of an emendation of this line by Warburton that would draw further attention to the virtues: 'For Morsel Dr. Warburton reads antient Moral, very elegantly and judiciously, yet I know not whether the Author might not write Morsel, as we might say a piece of Man'. Cicero describes honour - a word applied to Gonzalo by Prospero, 'holy Gonzalo, honourable man' (V.1.62) - as 'anything that is sought partly or wholly for its own sake...it has four parts, wisdom [prudentia], justice, courage [fortitudo], temperance. Wisdom [prudentia] is the knowledge of what is good, what is bad, and what is neither good nor bad. Its parts are memory, intelligence and foresight'.

These three together are in fact interpreted by Cicero as a sense of truth, past, present and future: the prudent man is one whose memory knows the past, ascertains what is, and can estimate the future. We now see that Gonzalo's defence of Dido deeply expresses his prudentia: 'Truth is the quality by which events in the past, present or future are referred to without alteration of material fact'. Grimalde's translation of Cicero, his Duties, puts this even more forcibly:

Now of those fowre places, wherinto we have divided the nature, and strength of honestie, that same first, that consisteth in knowledge of truth, touches mans kinde nerest of all.
Truth in this passage is associated with a judicious amount of learning, but 'virtue lies in doing', and Gonzalo has the balance right. Foresight was shown in his providing for Prospero's voyage from Milan. Gonzalo is spokesman for 'ascertaining the present', with the last word of hope ending the shipwreck scene and the first words of hope opening the scene of arrival of the party on the island. His comments are forthright, imaginative, sharp, informed and learned, and kindly by turns. And it is he who expresses deep emotion freely, whether of acute sorrow (for the sake of others) or extreme joy as he acknowledges the gods and rejoices 'beyond a common joy' (V.1.206). It is his rare knowledge of right and wrong which the would-be murderers cannot tolerate. Modern productions seem to make him little more than a slightly foolish pedant, missing the intelligence and life in this rich moral character study.

The sarcastic comment on 'Sir Prudence' makes a connection for the audience with the reference to 'the delicate wench Temperance', heard just before, because it, too, is a word in the same well-known traditional set of the cardinal virtues.

Adrian: [The island] must needs be of subtle, tender and delicate temperance.
Antonio: Temperance was a delicate wench.
Sebastian: Ay, and a subtle, as he most learnedly delivered (II.1.43).

Orgel's note for this passage interprets the lewd perversion of Adrian's admiring adjective: 'delicate' as 'given to pleasure'; 'subtle' as 'crafty' and as having 'sexual expertise'; 'learnedly' plays on the sense of 'acute or speculative' of the word 'subtle'. This is the exact reverse of the meaning of the virtue of temperance,
which has specific overtones of modesty and sexual restraint in Cicero's description. 'Temperance is a firm and well-considered control exercised by the reason over lust and other improper impulses of the mind. Its parts are continence, clemency, and modesty'.

Perhaps as a girl's name it may have been newly popular among the new puritans and thus had a special edge of cynicism. The spectator may or may not snigger with Antonio and Sebastian at Temperance distempered, but it will be with that uneasy discomfort described above, which draws the audience into the mankind circle until their moral judgment is seriously repelled at last. The morally aware spectator might now be conscious of the cardinal virtues as motif, and recall hearing the word 'fortitude'.

O, a cherubin
Thou wast that did preserve me. Thou didst smile
Infused with a fortitude from heaven,
When I have decked the sea with drops full salt,
Under my burden groaned, which raised in me
An undergoing stomach to bear up
Against what should ensue (I.2.152).

Though Prospero as ruler is associated with all four cardinal virtues, Ferdinand is the more fully developed model of fortitude. Briefly summed up as it is in De Inventione, courage is described as 'the quality by which one undertakes dangerous tasks and endures hardships. Its parts are highmindedness, confidence, patience, perseverance'. However, the analysis of it in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is more closely related to The Tempest text than that of Cicero. Parts of Ferdinand's speech (III.1.1-15) directly refer to Aristotle's example of the pleasure in pain of sportsmen. Shakespeare also lays special stress on the nobleness which is to
characterize Ferdinand. He has already been called 'gentle not fearful' by Miranda. Aristotle points out that courage when there is cause for fear is more difficult:

One who is unperturbed in the presence of terrors and comports himself rightly towards these is courageous in a fuller sense than one who does so in situations which inspire confidence...it is harder to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure. Not but what it would appear that the end corresponding to the virtue of courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the attendant circumstances. This is illustrated by the case of athletic contests: to boxers, for example, their end - the object they box for, the wreath and the honours of victory - is pleasant, but the blows they receive must hurt them, being men of flesh and blood, and all the labour of training is painful...[a courageous man will endure pain] because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so.106

Ferdinand practically quotes this:

There be some sports are painful, and their labour
Delight in them sets off; some kinds of baseness
Are nobly undergone; and most poor matters
Point to rich ends. This my mean task
Would be as heavy to me, as odious, but
The mistress which I serve quickens what's dead,
And makes my labours pleasures (III.1.1).

We may say that Ferdinand is boxing for Miranda. The 'highmindedness' of the definition is fully demonstrated by his metaphysical conversion of the physical slavery of log-carrying into spiritual freedom because, when things do not turn out as expected the merely sanguine run away, whereas the mark of the courageous man...is to endure things that are terrible to him as a human being because it is noble to do so and base not to do so.107

Ferdinand points out that he considers his slavery is indeed terrible:

'(I) would no more endure/ This wooden slavery than to suffer/ The
flesh-fly blow my mouth' (III.1.61).

Thus the collocation of virtue vocabulary opens the mind to a closer understanding and serious examination of virtue. Prospero as ruler is expected to share in all the virtues, but justice is the special virtue of kings. This hardly needs reiterating, being almost the definition of rule. For this section I quote Grimalde's *Duties*, a translation of Cicero whose common touch seems to mesh with Prospero's vagaries in his growth towards justice, as they might be understood by the audience. The premise is that kingship and law are one:

> the like cause ther was of making lawes, as of kings: for evermore an egall right hath beene sought...[therefore] they wer wonte to be chosen to govern: of whose justice the opinion of the multitude was great. And this therto adjoined, that they also might be counted wise. 108

But Prospero has failed in his prudence, having misjudged his duty - which was to govern - in his desire for truth through knowledge, and he lacked foresight as to the consequence:

> In this kinde of vertue...two faults must be avoided: one, that we take not thinges, we know not, as though we knew them, and rashlie assent to them...another fault there is, that some bestowe overgreate studie, and to much travaile, in derk, and difficult things, and thesame nothing necessarie. 109

Astrology, geometry, logic and civil law, however, are classed as 'honest thinges and worthie of knowledge'. Study, however, must give way to action, 'for virtues holle praise consisteth in doyng' yet times of rest may be used for study as well, we are told, 'as musyng of the mynde, that never ceaseth, may continue us in the studies of contemplation, even without our travail'. 110 Here we see Prospero's
faulty neglect of his kingdom analysed, his 'derk' studies considered 'nothing necessarie'. Perhaps here, too, is the genesis of Gonzalo's 'musing' upon utopian communities of the golden age. Anger is always an anxiety of moral philosophers and Grimalde/ Cicero recalls that element of dangerous anger which also appears in Prospero's administration of justice until he abjures 'fury':

Though with their high wrongs I am struck to th'quick,
Yet with my nobler reason 'gainst my fury
Do I take part (V.1.25).

In pompishing we must chieflie refrain from anger. For the angrie man that gothe about pompishment, shall never keepe that measure, that is betwene to mickle, and to litle...it is to be wished that [rulers should] bee moved to pompish offenders not upon anie wrath, but upon equitie.111

Yet finally Prospero's action is made to extend beyond even equity, for joined to justice is 'bountiefulnessse, whichsame wee may terme either gentlenesse, or liberalitie'.112 Prospero learns that the kind of virtue that 'extendeth fardest' is that 'wherein is conteined the felowshippe of men among themselves, and (as it wer) the enterpartening of mannes life'.113 The reiteration of 'gentle' through the play is subsumed in the meaning of 'civilized' in this most inclusive of all its meanings, 'the enterpartening'.

The clusters isolated here are not the only ones that call attention to themselves. Here I briefly suggest some others, which are discussed elsewhere in other contexts. They point the way to more intrinsic moral patterns in the play. Such are the words that search out the higher powers, whether named 'destiny', 'fortune', 'providence', 'the powers' or 'fate'. We may see the three
theological virtues, faith, hope and charity, 'foregrounded conceptually. The terminology has more variation than the fixed modern vocabulary triad, and thus variation must be allowed for. Thus Miranda's 'very virtue of compassion', is the same that makes her recognize a like spirit of charity in Gonzalo when Prospero describes him as charitable and gentle: 'Would I might/But ever see that man!' (1.2.168). It is Pity who opens Hick Scornor, and his characteristic is to weep, just as Miranda does:

Prospero: Tell your piteous heart
There's no harm done...
Wipe thou thine eyes; have comfort.
The direful spectacle of the wreck, which touched
The very virtue of compassion in thee,
I have...safely ordered...(1.2.15, 25).

The association between pity and tears relates particularly to the grief of Mary at the Crucifixion, and the kinship with Charity is also personified:

Pity: For I say to you my name is Pity
That ever yet has been man's friend...
Record I take of Mary, that wept tears of blood;
I, Pity, within her heart did stand,
When she saw her son on the rood...
Charity and I of true love leads the double reign;
whoso me loveth damned never shall be...
For all that will to heaven needs must come by me;
Chief porter I am in that heavenly city. 114

It was Pity that persuaded God to save mankind, 'Lo, I Pity, thus made your errand to be sped/ Or else man forever should have been forlore' (1.21). Lancashire notes that pity is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, and sometimes an image of Christ, 'as in Pieta' in woodcuts of the period. 115 We understand, therefore, why Prospero
names it the chief of virtues in his use of the word 'very' to describe it. Alonso, as figure of despair whose pained silences and hopeless pessimism mark his style throughout, is enjoined to patience:

Alonso: Irreparable is the loss, and patience
       Says it is past her cure.
Prospero: I rather think
       You have not sought her help, of whose soft grace
       For the like loss I have her sovereign aid,
       And rest myself content (V.1.140).

_Patientia_, version of Hope, is personified here, emblematic or statuesque, according to images in the spectators' mind. The third of these virtues, faith, is inherent in Prospero's epilogue prayer, and is indeed the theme of the whole play, as Prospero repairs the ruin of his life and dynasty, in one almost superhuman effort of redemption based on faith in 'providence divine'. The presence of the _Aeneid_ in the play must also count as a moral frame of reference, a marked but volatile presence which exemplifies the method by which Shakespeare has integrated virtue and vice allegory into the play. Donna Hamilton defines the manner in which the Renaissance concept of _imitatio_ explains the allegorized meaning of the _Aeneid_ in the text:

An author who uses a very familiar system (as indeed the _Aeneid_ was...very familiar), even when his use of it is extraordinarily clever and obscure offers his audience or reader the opportunity to see that from which the text has been made...for Riffaterre, the concealing that occurs in a literary work often exists as a means of calling attention to the genetics of a text and therefore to its artistic ideas.... _The Tempest_ is a work that 'conceals only in order to reveal' and it 'veils' its art 'but always points to where it is hidden and how it is to be revealed'.

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This 'concealing to reveal' applies also to the vice-and-virtue tradition. Beyond that, Shakespeare gives a full account in dramatic terms of the language of virtue that will move the audience to practice it. 'Moving' is part of the subject-matter of Chapters 2 and 5B.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1A.


20. In general terms moral speech is spare and modest, both for men and women 'The first rule is, that speech be sober and seldome....the second that it be true...the third, that it be naturall, modest and chaste'. To summarise further points, false speech betrays society; unoffending speech is the instrument of charity. For men it should be strong and generous, not effeminate; and eloquence is enjoyned, as disposing hearts and affections 'like certain notes to make a melodious harmony'. Peter Charron, *Of Wisdome Three Bookes* (before 1612), translated from the French by Samson Lennard, *The English Experience*, 315, facsimile reprint (Amsterdam and New York, 1971), pp.547-549. Brathwait, addressing women, finds that 'in much Speech there can never want sinne, it either leaves some tincture of vainglory which discovers the proud heart from whence it proceeded'; scurrility proclaims a wanton heart, violent heat a rancorous heart. 'If you affect Rhetoricke, let...your plainnesse...witness for you, that you do not affect it'. Richard Brathwait, *The English Gentlewoman* (1631), *The English Experience*, 215, facsimile reprint (Amsterdam and New York, 1970), pp. 88-91.


24. Some curious questions arise as to age relations. The impression given of Caliban's childhood (see Chapters 4 and 5) makes him seem younger than the age of eleven or twelve that he was when Prospero came to the island with the three-year-old Miranda. We know Sycorax had come to the island pregnant and left Ariel pegged in the pine for twelve years. How many years did he live in Prospero's cell, until he, or Miranda, were old enough to make, or be subjected to, sexual advances so that he had to leave the cell? Or is Shakespeare thinking of child abuse? If Shakespeare thought it out at all, Miranda might reach puberty at about twelve years old, and Caliban would then have lived with the family for nine years before being expelled at the age of twenty-one or so, and he would now be aged twenty-four.
25. Dr Johnson follows Theobald in giving this speech to Prospero:
'This speech which the former Editions give to Miranda is very
judiciously bestowed by Mr. Theobald on Prospero'. Johnson's
Shakespeare, I, p. 22.


27. Quoted from Palladis Tamia by Jane Donawerth, Shakespeare and the

28. Richard Proudfoot, 'The Virtue of Perseverance', in Aspects of
Early English Drama, edited by Paula Neuss (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 92-
110 (p. 92).

29. Paula Neuss, 'Active and Idle Language: Dramatic Images in
"Mankind"', in Medieval Drama, edited by Neville Denny, Stratford-

30. Charlotte Spivack, The Comedy of Evil on Shakespeare's Stage

31. Ian Lancashire, ed., Two Tudor Interludes: 'Youth' and 'Hick
Scorner' (Manchester, 1980), pp. 88-91.

32. Hick Scorner, p. 255.


34. Halliday, Social Semiotic, quoting Bernstein's Class, Codes and
Control (1971), p. 25; his italics, on 'dialect' and 'register', p. 35.

35. David Bevington, 'Popular and Courtly Traditions on the Early
Tudor Stage', in Medieval Drama, edited by Neville Denny, Stratford-


37. William A. Armstrong, 'Actors and Theatres', Shakespeare Survey,
17 (1965), 191-204 (p. 196-97).

38. Hick Scorner, p. 163.

39. Neuss, pp. 41-68.

40. Quoted in Hick Scorner, p. 256.


42. Robert C. Jones, 'Dangerous Sport: The Audience's Engagement
with Vice in the Moral Interludes', Renaissance Drama, New Series, 6
(1973), 45-64 (57-58).


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45. These and subsequent definitions are listed and indexed by Lee A. Sonnino, A Handbook to Sixteenth-Century Rhetoric (London, 1968), pp.188, 58.


50. Sonnino, pp. 109, 166, 104, 91.

51. Richard M. Weaver, Language is Sermonic (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1970), p. 188.


54. Virtues and Vices, p. 60.

55. Virtues and Vices, p. 55.


57. Virtues and Vices, p. 57.

58. Jacob's Well, p. 154.

60. Quoted from Don Cameron Allen, 'Marlowe's Dido', p. 56.


63. Hick Scorner, p. 255.

64. Davenport, p. 111.


66. Virtues and Vices, p. 57.

67. Virtues and Vices, p. 58.

68. Jacob's Well, p. vi.


70. Vickers, p. 69.


73. Vickers, p. 68.

74. Jacob's Well, p. 105.

75. Eleanor Prosser, Drama and Religion in the English Mystery Plays, Stanford Studies in Language and Literature, 23 (Stanford, California, 1961), pp. 21-23

76. Prosser, p. 21.

77. Prosser, p. 23.

78. Prosser, p. 33.

79. Prosser, p. 35.


81. Prosser, p. 33.
82. Prosser, p. 38.


85. Prosser, p. 39.

86. Prosser, p. 20.


93. Neuss, p. 43.

94. Sonnino, pp. 24, 278.

95. Hideo Yamaguchi, '"The Tempest": What It Tells Us', Anglica 5, no. 4 (Osaka, 1964), 87-104 (89).

96. Yamaguchi, p. 98.


100. De Inventione, p. 327.

101. De Inventione, p. 329.


104. *De Inventione*, p. 331.

105. *De Inventione*, p. 331.


111. Grimalde, p. 84.


114. *Hick Scorer*, pp. 159-60 (lines 4, 10, 25).


CHAPTER 1B

AUDIENCE RECOGNITION OF THE LANGUAGE OF VIRTUE AND VICE:
EMBLEMATIC SHIPWRECK, ALLEGORICAL DROWNING

_The Tempest_ opens with a storm. In a _topos_ so common, 'meaning is assumed on the basis of traditional interpretation and the controlling dramatic context' in the words of Daly,¹ and emblems are cited here to help establish such traditional interpretation. Emblems are defined by Dietrich Jons² as 'art form' and 'mode of thought' at once. In the opening scene the stage brings to life the _topos_, visually and verbally. The less commonplace emblems of Michael Maier, which might well be called esoteric, are also relevant for a different level of interpretation of the opening scenes of the play. Allegorical drowning is one of the themes of Maier's emblems, as it is of _The Tempest_.³ Commentary and picture in some of Maier's emblems, and the alchemical theory underlying the whole book, serve to 'place' some aspects of _The Tempest_ which seem to be alchemical - material which was available to Shakespeare's contemporaries in many books on the subject, ancient and new. _The Tempest_ has been seen as allegorical in many different ways, but the play is easily acceptable as literal and narrative, of the genre of 'a tale'. However, a traditional tale is essentially allegorical too, as Bettelheim has shown.⁶ Allegorical readings by Colin Still, Michael Srigley and Noel Cobb, to name but a few, are all defensible though they stress widely different aspects of the world's archetypal regeneration.
I do not undertake an alchemical reading of The Tempest as such, except to add some moral aspects through alchemical interpretations of 'pearl' and 'coral' in Ariel's song of sea change, and because 'kings in the water' are very aptly expounded in Maier's alchemical emblem book. Relating alchemy to Shakespeare is not new—Nicholl gives an overview of alchemical thinking at the time in his alchemical reading of King Lear. Of course alchemy is largely a tissue of words not deeds, and may itself be called an allegory of regeneration. Still, it was hopefully seen at the time as a theory capable of physical fulfilment. The moral effect of the play itself upon the audience is perhaps intended to be the true alchemical effect, the transformation of men by the less 'rough', the finer magic of the drama (see Chapter 2).

i. EMBLEMATIC SHIPWRECK

How are moral identifications made by an audience watching these naturalistic opening scenes? Act I, scene 1 is an emblem enacted, fulfilling both the multiple functions of any opening scene, as well as the moral function of the emblem. It is probable that the stage itself gave ample visual indication, by long tradition, of the emblematic intentions of a ship in a storm. Kernodle's account of the evolution of tableaux vivants into theatre in the Renaissance
describes an elaborate and traditional stage iconography deriving from pageants, street theatre as well as from European and classical sources. Far from visualizing a bare stage he postulates allegorically painted facades, classical pillars, moving structures, painted curtains, realistic and allegorical props, including ships, on the stage. This subject, however, is beyond the scope of the present thesis. Here, only some emblems in books are described as analogous or suggestive. Emblems penetrated daily life in many ways. Allegorical borders and devices had a functional purpose, intended as designs for example for metal workers, embroiderers and house decorators to copy 'as often as anyone may wish to assign fulness to empty things, ornament to bare things, speech to dumb things and reason to senseless things'. Besides this multipurpose use of the books, Ripa expressly suggests that the function of emblem books was as a handbook for preachers, orators, painters 'for the invention of conceits...and for devising...all preparations for nuptials, funerals, and triumphs, for the representation of poems and dramas, and for the figuring of them with their proper symbols.' They were ubiquitous throughout Europe, as Mario Praz shows in his bibliography of over 600 emblem books well into the 18th century. Praz finds many emblematic references in Marlowe, Marston, Ben Jonson and others. Emblems 'nourish the heart, the intellect and the fancy', calling on the viewer himself to interpret the figurative sense in a teasing combination of picture, motto and epigram. They are effective through commonly accepted symbolism, or striking figures, actions or scenes and even music in the case of Mairer. The stage, more than any static picture, could create moving and speaking tableaux and scenes.
fulfilling emblematic functions, a form of *ut pictura poesis*. Peter Daly points out that 'during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries drama...was the most emblematic of all the literary arts, combining as it does a visual experience of character and gesture, silent tableau and active scene with a verbal experience.'\textsuperscript{13} As Schöne points out (quoting Scaliger), *sententiae* are 'the supporting columns of tragedy'.\textsuperscript{14} Alciati's original set of woodcuts, mottos and epigrams, which inspired the emblem book fashion for more than a century thereafter, has page headlines mainly naming the traditional virtues and vices and such closely related themes as God, nature, love, fortune, death or marriage. The heart of emblematic representation is that both image and word — motto, subscriptio or epigram — together elucidate a many-sided conceit by both abstract and concrete means, and often the emblem writer adds a commentary. One may suspect emblematic significance behind many of Shakespeare's images, both verbal and staged, and whole scenes and characters too as Daly shows.\textsuperscript{15} Praz, expounding the emblems behind a seemingly conventional sonnet of Boccaccio, says, it is 'like polishing with chamois leather the metaphors which too much use has deprived of their splendour'.\textsuperscript{16} Praz quotes examples from Shakespeare and his contemporary playwrights, as does Doebler, who associates the storm, for instance, with symbolic meanings of Gorgione's *Tempesta*.\textsuperscript{17} Identifications can only ever be suggestions, though it is certain that the Renaissance retained a mediaeval habit of didactic interpretation: 'It is not easy to discriminate between the two tendencies, the sensuous and the didactic, which in the seventeenth century are combined in emblematic literature'.\textsuperscript{18}
that is, in this case, the visual effect on the stage, can only be guessed at here. The frequency of the ship image in emblem books, however, means that it already has an iconic presence in the minds of many spectators, albeit with varied interpretations. Thematically, the ship at sea is the main image associated with both positive and negative aspects of the workings of providence, or the gods as the case may be (see also Chapter 2A). I shall consider the realistic impact of the opening scene upon the audience in the light of both realistic and iconic associations.

Shakespeare's first scenes usually arouse curiosity by their opening in medias res and their often extreme subject matter (such as the expectation of a ghost in Hamlet), while expository clues set the audience working on identification of persons and plot. The Tempest wins the audience's engagement at once, since danger at sea was in the experience of all classes, from traders and explorers, mariners and eager would-be planters to

those wicked Impes that put themselves ashipboard, not knowing otherwise how to live in England; or those ungratious sons that dailie vexed their fathers hearts at home, which either writing thence, or being returned back...do fill men's ears with false reports of their miserable and perilous life in Virginia.19

'Plantation' would not necessarily be the automatic association with the threatened shipwreck before the audience, yet this is the context in which shipwrecks would touch many people and this indeed is retrospectively shown to be so in Gonzalo's speech 'had I plantation of this isle' (II.1.141). Act I, scene 2 should strike the audience as wondrous and magical,20 at the same time recalling the expected
terrors of the sea and the unknown world that were automatically associated with settlers. Kermode has pointed out both the topicality and the relationship of the play to the Bermuda Pamphlets, and the topical element is clearly an engaging factor. Travellers and stay-at-homes alike 'will tell you of more than all the world betwixt the Exchange, Pauls and Westminster: so it be newes, it matters not what, that will passe currant'. Johnson shows it to have been an inflamed subject as well; he refers to the shipwreck in a stage context where 'stage poets' are mentioned as giving plantation a bad name:

[The plantation of Virginia] is accompanied with manifold difficulties, crosses and disasters, being such as are appointed by the highest providence, as an exercise of patience and other virtues...by which occasion not only the ignorant and simple minded are much discouraged, but the malitious and looser sort (being accompanied with the licentious vaine of stage Poets) have whet their tongues with scornfull taunts against the action it selfe.

There is no name more 'derided and traduced...then the name of Virginia'. Things did not go well after the men from the 'other eight ships' that did reach Virginia landed, for

as they were bad and evill affected for the most part before they went hence; so now being landed...they did nothing but bitterly contend who should be first to command the rest...that in a few moneths, Ambition, sloth and idleness had devoured the fruits of former Labours.

This contention as to 'who should be first to command the rest' is specifically foregrounded in The Tempest, where Caliban, Stephano, Antonio, Seb astian and Ferdinand are all variously implicated in competing for rule, and even Ariel briefly rebels, while the boatswain
asserts his temporary right to it, and all must bow to fate, fortune or providence. Plantation is not just a neutral or merely newsworthy subject then, but a controversial one, as the spate of plantation pamphlets throughout the first half of the 17th century shows. Like Johnson's, the tone of many pamphlets suggests that plantation is a moral testing ground, and like Johnson speaking to the heads and guides of the Plantation, they cite Adam and the virtues of digging 'in which it pleased God himselfe to set the first man...Adam in his innocencie'. Images of rebuilding Eden are not far from the theme, but gain, God and nation are pretty much equated. Thus the shipwreck opening neatly subsumes a dense cultural and emotional context. Robert Coverte knows the dramatic taste for tales of disaster which the opening scene of The Tempest satisfies:

Receive, Courteous Reader, a true report of my dangerous Travels, which will (I make no question) be as pleasing to thee in reading as they were painefull to me in suffering.

In The Tempest's opening scene the manoeuvres of the boatswain and mariners (to save the ship) are protracted and technical and the audience must expect a hairbreadth escape. But there is something unexpected in the outcome of The Tempest opening scene, for in a comedy (so early on in the play, too) the disaster ought surely to be skirted. The spectator's secure expectations are shaken when the ship actually splits and he has to identify with people facing their end: 'Mercy on us!' - 'We split, we split!' - 'Farewell,/ my wife and children!' - 'Farewell, brother!/ - 'we split, we split, we split' (I.1.60). Audience identification, then, is won from the outset by 'the direful spectacle of the wreck'; fear and drowning have had to
be experienced cathartically, for the scene was unexpectedly tragic. The safety of the mimetic situation, however, has made this acceptable, though thought-provoking. Notice of the serious intent of the play has been given, yet there are comic touches which deflate this, such as Gonzalo's evaluation of the boatswain - he looks a criminal type and will yet meet his pre-destined fate on land by hanging. This is not entirely a joke for almanacs were popular and believed. But Gonzalo is learned, and he is probably referring to the debate in Cicero's *De Fato*: Cicero doubts whether divination is reliable, for if it were it would prove that Fate exists.

Well then, here is a specimen of the observations of the astrologers: If [for instance] a man was born at the rising of the dogstar, he will not die at sea.  

This sentence is bandied about in a comic debate and is the subject of convoluted syllogising which is joked about. Cicero wants to show that Fate, as predestination, can never be proved. He adduces yet another 'nameless shipwrecked sailor' who fell into a brook. Cicero can find no proof of destiny 'although in his case indeed our authority does write that he had been warned that he was to meet his end in the water'. Sailors and shipwreck are the most common example in such discussions of fate, fortune and chance. Gonzalo is taking the side against Cicero and offers his remark as a dry (and learned) joke, for Cicero continues:

if there were no such word at all as fate, no such thing, no such force, and if either most things or all things took place by mere casual accident, would the course of events be different from what it is now? What is the point then of harping on fate when everything can be explained by reference to nature and fortune without bringing fate in?
The boatswain seems to be a rather literary joke, then, the conflation of several poor, unknown sailors who are the exemplum in every debate about fate and fortune.

In any case, Miranda's words immediately after the shipwreck, showing the event to be a magical exercise - 'If by your art, my dearest father, you have/ Put the wild waters in this roar, allay them' (I.2.1) - reveal to the spectator that these painful emotions were drawn from him on false pretences. He now works to understand and to re-adjust his responses, somewhat destabilized at having been tricked like a child who is teased by adults, but he accepts with relief a non-tragic outcome, and indeed like a child expects that this exciting pair, a magician and his beautiful daughter, will give the desired information as to what now seem the new 'realities' of the play. Miranda teaches the audience the meaning of their earlier response: 'O I have suffered/ With those that I saw suffer' (I.2.5), an affirmation of what the audience felt. This is the first lesson about the moral action of drama - its power to cause belief and empathy and to pierce hard hearts. This self-identification is praised by Prospero as 'the very virtue of compassion' (I.2.27).

Miranda's words at the start of scene 2 give the audience a revised version of what they saw: the scene becomes distanced or 'framed', or, in Renaissance terms, a scene for contemplation - the scene of the shipwreck becomes retrospectively iconographic. Initially the most commonplace moral emblems of ships, denoting danger or amazing survival, would be recalled; the moralizing language of the Bermuda pamphlets recognizes the wonderful ways of providence and is the standard reaction. Whitney for instance, twenty-five years
earlier, has a sinking ship with the motto Res humanae in summo declinant and an epigram:

The gallant Shipp, that cutts the azure surge,
And hath both tide and wished windes, at will...
With streamers, flagges, topgallantes, pendantes brave,
When seas do rage, is swallowed in the wave. 29

Another motto says the opposite over a picture of a labouring ship: Constantia comes victoriae. The verses beneath (quoted here only in part) say that all sail to their death at life's end according to destiny.

Though master reste, thoughe Pilotte take his ease,
Yet nighte, and day, the ship her course dothe keepe:
So, whilst that man dothe saile theisse worldlie seas,
His voyage shortes: although he wake or sleepe. 30

These are only casually relevant to the opening scene of the play, and no doubt other emblematic storm scenes are legion, one of the commonest topoi, with a biblical source in The Wisdom of Solomon, 14:1-5: 'Thou has power to helpe in all things, yea though a man went to sea without ship'. This is particularly relevant to Prospero's own voyage which says that Providence saves, as Prospero later acknowledges, being saved in 'the rotten carcass of a butt' (I.2.146). However, the providential aspect is not the keynote of the opening scene. Here 'destiny', 'the mischance of the hour', 'good fate' are invoked, and these concepts are only revised later, when Prospero names 'providence divine' as his preserver. But in scene 1 hope is abandoned, and the prayers of the mariners and various passengers are less now for survival than for their souls' sake, to die shriven: 'All lost! To prayers, to prayers! All lost!'...Let's all sink wi'
the King' (1.1.51).

Rather than aspects of chance or destiny, I would identify as motto the sententious phrase 'what cares these roarers for the name of King' (1.1.14), reinforced by an epigrammatic expansion: 'You are a councillor; if you can command these elements to silence, and work the peace of the present, we will not hand a rope more — use your authority' (1.1.20). Such pithy sayings are recognized as important choral comment in Shakespearean drama, and 'integral with the design [of the play in question] transcend the context and become an imaginative commentary upon the whole world of the drama', while 'the maxim as subscriptio pronounces the scene allegorical'.

On the face of it, the confrontation that arises on deck in the hour of death has, ludicrously, to do with rank and power among men and their equality in death. The audience must concur with the boatswain that there are no social distinctions in the face of nature. Yet there are ambiguities here. The stage shows a king and richly clad courtiers getting in the way of the mariners, and the greater impact is that the nobles speak like ruffians; Sebastian: 'A pox o' your throat, you bawling, blasphemous, incharitable dog!' (1.1.40). This does not tally with what the audience hears of the boatswain's speech. He has spoken peremptorily but effectively, and now answers only 'work you, then'. Whereupon Antonio's 'Hang cur, hang, you whoreson insolent noisemaker! We are less afraid to be drowned than thou art' (1.1.44) shows the audience 'a privileged superior discharging the burden of offences received from above [here the storm], to find compensation at the expense of a figure of lower rank'. It is the noblemen who are the cowards while the boatswain has at that moment
more power than the king. He has skill, good morale, an honest estimate of the situation though none of the obsequiousness expected by the nobles:

Gonzalo: Good, yet remember whom thou hast aboard.
Boatswain: None that I love more than myself. (I.1.20)

He admonishes Gonzalo to recognize humbly that life is a gift:

Use your authority. If you cannot, give thanks you have lived so long, and make yourself ready in your cabin for the mischance of the hour, if it so hap. (To the Mariners) - Cheerly, good hearts! (To the courtiers) - Out of our way, I say! (I.1.23).

This is a splendid fellow to sail with. His seamanship is impeccable, as Falconer's account of his skill shows. His practical and forceful speech belies Antonio's accusation: 'We are merely cheated out of our lives by drunkards' (I.1.55). The audience must judge Antonio and Sebastian themselves, revising stereotype expectations about the nobility of courtiers and the baseness of common men. The stereotype is considered later in Prospero's 'then tell me/ If this might be a brother' (I.2.117) and in Miranda's 'good wombs have borne bad sons' (I.2.119); the expectation is that nobility of rank denotes inherited nobility of spirit (and, indeed, physique: 'there's nothing ill can dwell in such a temple' (I.2.458) as she says of Ferdinand). Interestingly, throughout the Renaissance period, it is the expectation of art to copy only the best from nature; the moral justification of art is its idealism.

Thus Duerer:

We see human figures of many kinds arising from the four temperaments, yet if we have to make a figure...we ought to
make it as beautiful as we can...if you desire to compose a fine figure, take the head from some, the chest, arm, leg, hand and foot from others.

Hilliard, about a hundred years later, says the same: 'now knowe that all painting imitateth nature...but of all things the perfection is to imitate the face of mankinde'. Antonio, however, has free will, and departs from the model, to be a bad brother and son. The word 'brother', or the figure of a 'courtier', are projected as having a platonic ideal meaning - the words are moral definitions until rectified by experience of un-ideal brothers and courtiers. The opening scene, then, counters the spectator's expectations given by costume and rank without comment, and he is forced to detect his own moral reactions; he recognizes that the current order is not the expected moral order. But his judgments remain almost unacknowledged. Puzzlement or disgust are the presumed reaction to Antonio and some admiration for the boatswain. Yet customary valuations do not dissolve easily - pre-conceived labels usually predominate over experience. These confusions leave the spectator in the same unguided condition as when involved in real-life judgements, as Coleridge points out:

The characters of the dramatis personae, like those in real life...are very commonly misunderstood, and almost always understood by different persons in different ways...you may know whether you have in fact discovered the poet's own idea, by all the speeches receiving light from it, and attesting its reality by reflecting it.

Customary attitudes confused by unacknowledged perceptions awaken a malaise, by which the spectator is forced to make the crucial judgements on his own. The task of 'the poet', the moral task as
Sidney sees it, is precisely this, the awakening of the moral sense, not just the preaching of the names of sins, or even of stories to illustrate them, but the discovery of it for, and probably in, oneself. As Wenzel says, the condemnation of vices, with innumerable proof texts and illustrative stories, even in the later mediaeval period probably 'would no longer stir an audience to contrition but lull them into a peaceful doze'. Yet Coleridge notes Shakespeare's moral clarity in practice: 'Shakespeare has no innocent adulteries, no interesting incests, no virtuous vice'. The audience is bound to react to the swearing which opens the play when there is no cue for it, and which is echoed by Caliban when he arrives on the stage, to re-inforce the connection. Interestingly, in a poem of 1615, where the 'foure quarters of a Knave' are 'Flatterie, Ingratitude, Envie, Detraction', the detractor is automatically a swearer:

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This comes in last, because he comes behinde
Those whom he wrongs, though in his doing so
The divell cannot him in skill foregoe...

It makes them tremble and amaz'd to heare
How div'lishly thou second'st what thou say'st
With oaths, and curses.
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Although the boatswain is accused of being 'blasphemous', 'wide-chopped', we only once hear an expletive from him, 'a plague upon this howling!'. Antonio calls him 'cur', 'dog', thereby dehumanizing himself as well as the boatswain. For a courtier, who should be the model of courtesy, swearing is particularly ironic, according to the authority of I.Cor.15:33, 'Evill wordes corrupt good manners', and Ephesians 4:29-31, 'Let no filthy communication proceed out of your mouth'. This, then, is a ship of fools, recalling Brandt's famous
emblem book known to England through Barclay's translations. These are earlier and different in type from Alciati's, ironic and engaged, part of the reformist stream from which Luther springs. Brandt's tone is contemptuous, and here in The Tempest storm scene there is a king on board who can do nothing for anyone it seems. The human beings seem to be annihilated by their own vanity, which interrupts the boatswain's work, as well as by a punishing storm. Brandt/Barclay's Ship of Fools has a simple though relevant ship emblem, with a splitting boat with fouled rope and flapping sails, and the verse is apt to our scene:

He is a fole and greatly reprovable
Whiche sayth and falsly in his mynde
That all his dedes ar moche infortunable
And where ever he go agaynst hym is the wynde
But in his mysfortune yet is he so blynde
That he is improvydent, abydyng wylyngly
Despysynge (thoughe he myght) for to fynde remedy. 40

All these moral commonplaces may be summarized as iconographic in so far as common emblematic themes of shipwreck have been raised, and no doubt many more could be applied to the opening scene.

ii. ALLEGORICAL DROWNING

A subtle 'virtue' is associated with Alonso in Act I and II. In Scene I 'let's all sink wi' th' king' (I.1.64) seems to offer some undefined comfort. This becomes relevant to the shipwreck as a whole.
if we consider as analogous some emblems of Michael Maier's *Atalanta Fugiens*, a collection of fifty emblematic copper plates which is described in the sub-title as *Emblemata Nova de Secretis Naturae Chymica*, first published in 1617. Each emblem has a motto, an epigram, a commentary and even a fugue. Maier's material can be considered as no more than analogous to the play, but still explanatory. The many views of the wrecked 'kings in the water', together with Ariel's song of transmutation, 'Of his bones are coral made;/ Those are pearls that were his eyes' (1.2.398), do seem to clamour for elucidation. This is certainly provided by an alchemical dimension. Parts of Maier's emblem book seem almost illustrations of *The Tempest* and so it serves better here than merely verbal alchemical treatises might do. Noel Cobb was struck by the relation between Maier's emblems and *The Tempest*, but gives a Jungian commentary on the relationship not relevant to my theme. Not only Maier but other emblematists could be cited, for instance Covarrubias (1610) has an emblem on the transmutational nature of coral in several elements. Though Maier's book was published several years after the first *Tempest* performance, in 1618, the subject matter itself was well known. De Jong finds and lists direct sources for mottoes and epigrams for all the emblems in traditional alchemical material 'centuries old'. The material could well have been circulating in England for a while: Nicholl shows that not only did 'alchemy have a strong presence in England' during the 1590's, but also that, rather earlier than Maier's books, 'there was a tremendous concentration of contemporary alchemical literature emanating from Europe in the years around 1600, works at once original and inclusive'. He cites a lost
version of Andreae's Chymische Hochzeit as early as 1602–3 published in Tübingen, possibly a lost translation of Tymme's Monas Hieroglyphica of the same date; in 1605 in London the publication of Tymme's Practise of Chymicall and Hermetical Physicke; and seven important European books on the subject between 1599 and 1605 including Lambspringk, De Lapide Philosophico in Prague (1599) and Zetzner's Theatrum Chemicum in 1602. Nicholl's researches introduce his detailed alchemical reading of King Lear, and he suggests that Shakespeare knew the subject thoroughly. Maier probably knew Dee during his stay in Prague at the court of Rudolf II as early as 1583–6. Maier himself was physician to Rudolf from 1608 until Rudolf's death in 1612, and subsequently stayed in England where, Nicholl writes, he sought out older English alchemical books. He dedicated several of his books to Englishmen: his Arcana Arcanissima to the court physician of James I, Sir William Paddy, probably when in London in 1614, and his third book to Francis Antony, author of Aurum Potabile. 'These three figures known to Maier, chosen as examples, Fludd, Paddy and Anthony, represent the Rosicrucian, the physician and the alchemist, with whom Maier came into touch in England'. According to Yates, Isaac Newton copied out of the works of Maier; Atalanta Fugiens appeared under new titles in 1687 and 1708. Maier's starting point is the conviction that the retorts of the alchemists are a reflection of the material and spiritual transmutation processes in the universe, and that it must be possible for a serious, modest, pious man to get to know the structure of matter and through this to get an insight into the deepest secrets of creation and into the relationship between God and his creatures.
Though alchemy was in disrepute (because of fraudulent practices and the development of astronomy, which undermined the astrological views that supported alchemical theories), nevertheless, at this period we must take alchemy, and Prospero's 'rapt and secret studies', seriously. Frances Yates points out the 'intense interest in alchemical practice and the great spate of works on alchemical theory which poured from the presses of Europe, particularly around the turn of the century.  

De Jong shows how typical Maier is of his time, unable yet, to detach the physical world from the metaphysical though eager to seize on natural knowledge.

Maier stands on the spot where the ways of theology and science part, and he tries to bring about a synthesis in his writings: he wants to prove that science and theology are two aspects of one Divine Truth. For this purpose Maier uses old traditional alchemical pronouncements, in which both fields are undetachably united, but at the same time he takes a critical view...in that he rejects the unreal tests of the alchemists whose only aim is to make gold.

The occultism of Rudolf, his court and his visitors (which included Bruno and Kepler) was intended to be as practical a search for the facts of nature as that of the subsequent 'scientists', a search for a unified, benign society through knowledge. The alchemical belief in the 'meaning' of natural phenomena as leading ultimately to divine revelation was still part of scientific thinking; even a hundred years later Newton had Maier's books in his library (see Chapter 4). The alchemists believed the spirit would speak through matter if rightly transformed. Frances Yates calls them liberal, an open society 'within its own strange frame of reference' hoping for new 'eirenic or mystical solutions of religious problems' as against the
'repressive and doctrinaire extremists' on both the Catholic and Calvinist sides. This tallies well with the political aspects of 'sacred empire' discussed in Chapter 3.

In *The Tempest* we have three kings, Prospero, Alonso and Ferdinand (a future king) unable to fulfil their destinies. They are variously pictured on, in or under water and are all thought by their countrymen and by each other to be drowned. The wreck of the opening scene is a tissue of ambiguities as it is offered over and over again to our view. Miranda confirms the audience's impression at the end of scene 1 that the ship split: 'dashed all to pieces' (I.2.8), 'they perished' (I.2.9), the ship was 'swallowed, and/The fraughting souls within her' (I.2.13). Ariel is next, calling it 'the king's ship', describing his own fireworks, and we hear that 'all but the mariners/Plunged in the foaming brine and quit the vessel/Then all afire with me' (I.2.210). Thus Miranda saw it all dashed to pieces and the ship swallowed, but Ariel's version is of a fire storm and everyone jumping overboard to escape. We hear nothing of splitting, and Ariel has stored the ship 'safely in harbour...in the deep nook' (I.2.226). Ariel cites yet another point of view, that of the rest of the fleet who are 'bound sadly home for Naples/Supposing that they saw the King's ship wrecked,/And his great person perish' (I.2.232). Ariel's version, since he is the agent of the wreck, is the one believed by the audience. He gives Alonso the epithet of 'great' and we recall that throughout scene 1 the king inspired respect in his companions: Gonzalo 'Good, yet remember whom thou hast aboard' (I.1.19); and 'let's all sink wi' th' King' (I.1.63). Ariel's song to Ferdinand adds a new version of drowning and not drowning:
Full fathom five thy father lies,
Of his bones are coral made;
Those are pearls that were his eyes;
Nothing of him that doth fade,
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange (I.2.397).

Francisco gives yet another description of survival in a forceful piece of descriptive narratio, though Alonso imagines Ferdinand eaten by some 'strange fish':

Sir, he may live.  
I saw him beat the surges under him  
And ride upon their backs; he trod the water,  
Whose enmity he flung aside, and breasted  
The surge most swell' n that met him; his bold head  
'Bove the contentious waves he kept, and oared  
Himself with his good arms in lusty stroke  
To th' shore, that o'er his wave-worn basis bowed,  
As stooping to relieve him (II.1.112).

The sorrows of Miranda, Ferdinand and Alonso at these supposed deaths are variously felt by the audience; these are, however, tempered griefs, in affective but distanced language (see Chapter 5B). Ferdinand and Alonso are each lost to themselves in different ways as well as believing the other drowned. These 'drowned' persons, however, are merely suspended in the sea, the sea-changed Alonso and the Jonah-like Ferdinand in the belly of a strange fish seem hardly more lost in those images than they feel themselves to be in their dreamlike state of survival. Ferdinand: 'My spirits, as in a dream, are all bound up' (I.2.487); Alonso is absent in spirit because in despair at the supposed loss of Ferdinand. The play charts a regeneration which passes through a death of the old being. Naturally the audience's better knowledge also maintains a tragi-comic response; they know that those who are lost will be reunited. This
turning of the wreck in all lights - the ambiguities of drowning and not drowning, the transmutational wording of the 'sea change', the contradictory descriptions of both sea and land, Ariel's music allaying at once storms of nature and of passion - creates disjunctions for the spectator as well as the characters. 'What happened?' 'Where am I?' is answered differently by each survivor, while the audience accepts magic as the only logic, something like Macbeth's re-adjustment of perception when groping for the dagger - 'mine eyes are made the fools o' the other senses/ Or else worth all the rest' (Macbeth, II.1.44). The audience is made a participant in the high mysteries of Prospero's rapt and secret studies. Gonzalo later sums up this experience as very serious indeed, as 'fearful', tapping into the secrets of nature and the human mind:

Gonzalo: All torment, trouble, wonder, and amazement
Inhabits here. Some heavenly power guide us
Out of this fearful country! (V.1.104).

Shakespeare demands from the spectator 'those obstinate questionings/
Of sense and outward things'. Well might Rowe say

I am very sensible that he [Shakespeare] do's, in this Play, depart too much from what likeness to Truth which ought to be observ'd in these sort of Writings; yet he do's it so very finely, that one is easily drawn in to have more Faith for his sake, than Reason does well allow of. His Magick has something in it very Solemn and very Poetical.

Ariel's song and the kings in the water are the clues to an alchemical interpretation for those in the audience with a smattering of the occult. Maier's emblems explain both coral and drowned and not-drowned Kings. What happens in alchemical terms of transmutation in
the regenerative water is as follows.

In alchemy, metals are dissolved in mercury, reduced to 'the primary matter' before they can become gold. But this is a by-product. Water and mercury are thought of together both physically and metaphysically: the meaning of mercury is polyvalent: 'primordial water (on account of the lasting liquid state of mercury) from which Creation arose, the waters of destruction in which the soul perishes, and the Water of Life. In the last meaning lies the association Mercury-Christ.' Biblical passages about water in Genesis and the Psalms were also connected by alchemists with mercury. The philosopher's stone was a counterpart, or an identity of mercury, and partakes of all the elements; the motto to Emblem XXXVI, for instance, reads in de Jong's translation from Latin, 'The stone has been thrown onto the earth and lifted onto the mountains,/ It lives in the air and feeds in the rivers, that is, Mercury'. De Jong's summary of Maier's Discourse to Emblem XXXII, which shows a man lifting a branch of coral out of a stretch of water, relates in some detail how 'the stone' behaves like coral. Coral is described by Maier as a plant that becomes stone:

Moreover, the sea gives three more curative stones in various places, which are partly vegetable, partly animal, but what is more, they are formed by the secrets of nature, like for example pearls, amber and ambergris...the Philosophers' stone may be compared with all these things, and especially with coral. For just as coral grows in water and gets its food out of the earth, the Philosophers' Stone grows out of the mercury water...just as coral may be used for several potent medicines, so the Philosophical Coral bears the powers of all herbs...because the Sun...gave more [curative power] to this son and substitute than to all others. It is the Philosophical Coral, vegetable, animal and mineral which keeps itself hidden in the vast sea'.
In Emblem XXXI there is a stone in the crown of the king which has the power of healing. The emblem shows a naked king with his crown on, swimming lustily in choppy water, cities and ships in the background. His mouth is open and he seems to be calling or speaking. The motto explains the picture (De Jong's translation):

**Motto:** The King, swimming in the sea, calling in a loud voice: he who saves me will get a tremendous reward.

**Epigram:** The king, on whose head the crown presses heavily, swims in the wide sea, and continually calls in a loud voice: why do you not come to my rescue? Why do you not all rush forward, you, whom I can make happy, once I am saved from the waters? Take me back to my realm if you are sensible and no poverty nor any bodily disease will vex you any more.

I select some lines from De Jong's summary of Maier's discourse to this emblem:

The art of swimming and the knowledge of literature were the pillars of civilization in Antiquity, so that with regard to an uncivilized person the proverb would arise: 'neque nare neque literas novit'. By swimming one's body might be saved and by the knowledge of literature the happiness of one's soul might be increased... If Dionysius had not known the 'nare et literas' he would have perished as a castaway in the Gulf of Corinth...by swimming he escaped from death by drowning and opened a school for the youth at Corinth, where he taught them literature and humanities;...neither would anybody have been able to hear the cry of this royal son of the philosophers if he had not been able to swim...and he would have been drowned.59

The swimmer is called 'the royal son of the philosophers' in the sense in which alchemy speaks of a 'son' as 'a version of a derivative branch'. His swimming is described with details which recall Ferdinand's swimming:

Francisco: Sir, he may live.
I saw him beat the surges under him
And ride upon their backs; he trod the water
Whose enmity he flung aside, and breasted
The surge most swoll'n that met him; his bold head
'Bove the contentious waves he kept, and oared
Himself with his good arms in lusty stroke
To th' shore, that o'er his wave-worn basis bowed,
As stooping to relieve him. I not doubt
He came alive to land (II.1.111).

In the discourse to Emblem 31 Maier continues:

The king about whom we are now speaking keeps himself afloat
for a very long time and cries repeatedly, although he is
heard or seen only by a very few, because the sea is so wide
and choppy. Sometimes he finds the support of a rock or a
crag, to which he clings when the waves threaten to overpower
him...His ship sank...he kept his crown, which sparkled with
gems, and by which he could easily be recognized, so that he
could be taken back to his realm...but what rewards does this
royal son want to be granted to him who restores him to
power?...this king gives health, recovery from diseases,
preservation of life; he grants the horn of plenty, and
honour and love...take care that his diadem does not fall into
the sea...the Bezoar Stone, which promises health to
everybody, would have disappeared...for without curative power
the crown would not be of any value.°

The king, then, has a 'virtue' in the sense of 'power or operative
influence inherent in a supernatural or divine being, or an embodiment
of such power' (OED) and in this would reside 'the divine right'.
The passage also continues with themes of royal marriage and humane
conquest:

but what should be done with the king after he has been saved?

He is warmed and fed 'and treated with medicines of opposite effect'.

After that a royal marriage should be provided for, from
which, in due time, the much desired royal offspring will be
born, which, very beautiful and fertile, will surpass all
ancestors in power, in royal wealth, in the possession of
nations and treasures: and it will conquer its enemies not by
wars, but by humanity, not by ambition but by tolerance; a
tolerance which is inherent in it.°
The 'marriage' and the 'true peace', are the chief themes of *The Tempest* too, but both are suggestive rather of common attitudes 'in the air' of the time, in Protestant and millenial ideas of the decade, as I suggest in Chapter 3. Douglas Brooks-Davies writes that alchemical literature was widely prevalent and that the poets did indeed make an analogy of a chemical or 'mercurian' wedding for Princess Elizabeth and her Protestant betrothed. Since De Jong traces all Maier's material in detail to well known older sources, we recognize that the magical world of Prospero might be well understood by a fair minority of the courtly audience, and that what seems almost rubbish to us seemed a more scientifically based hope to them, before the empiricist paradigm for gaining knowledge of nature had crystallized. Ariel's song speaks of coral, pearl and sea change—all these have unmistakeably alchemical meanings. Ariel, the spirit of the elements in this context, tells the initiated that Alonso is the curative coral and pearl which is not lost and will continue to exert his royal powers in a chemical form. Maier connects all ancient myths and gods and goddesses to chemical meaning in his unified system. This scientific universe is above all a moral and harmonious one, such as Bacon envisaged in *The New Atlantis*. Bacon ends *The New Atlantis* with just such a redemptive vision through the true virtue (in both senses) of natural knowledge:

And when he had said this, he stood up; and I, as I had been taught, kneeled down, and he laid his right hand upon my head, and said, 'God bless thee my son, and God bless this relation which I have made; I give thee leave to publish it for the good of other nations, for we here are in God's bosom, a land unknown.'
Bacon distinguishes his scientific dreams from magic yet shows how close they are:

We have also houses of deceits of the senses, where we represent all manner of feats of juggling, false apparitions, impostures and illusions, and their fallacies. And surely you will easily believe that we, that have so many things truly natural which induce admiration...could deceive the senses if we would disguise those things, and labour to make them more miraculous. But we do hate all impostures.64

The Tempest tells of the redemption of the three rulers and their societies, briefly in 'God's bosom, in a land unknown'. Shakespeare takes Bacon's view of 'impostures and illusions' and makes Prospero break his staff, trusting to common human sympathy and faith. The text of Psalm 69 is perhaps relevant both to the imagery of the play and to Maier's emblem of the king in the water:

Psalm 69:1-2
Save me, O God: for the waters are come in, even unto my soule.
I sticke fast in the deepe mire where no grounde is: I am come into deepe waters, so that the floods runne over me.

Prospero speaks of their recovery after his magic:

The charm dissolves apace,
And as the morning steals upon the night,
Melting the darkness, so their rising senses
Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle
Their clearer reason... Their understanding
 Begins to swell, and the approaching tide
Will shortly fill the reasonable shore,
That now lies foul and muddy (V.1.64,79).

'Some subtleties o' th' isle' (V.1.124) still persist for a brief while longer until Ferdinand sums up the regenerative experience:

'Though the seas threaten, they are merciful./ I have cursed them
without cause' (V.1.178), and he asserts that he has 'received a second life' from Prospero, who is now also his 'second father' (V.1.195) through his betrothal to Miranda. Gonzalo attributes the happy dynastic outcome to the gods, and concludes the list of the paradoxes of their island experience with the recognition that 'In a poor isle...all of us [found] ourselves/ When no man was his own' (V.1.212). We may conclude that if there is an analogy between Prospero's 'rough magic' and the magic of virtue, it is the 'very virtue of compassion' which Prospero exercised in his forgiveness to his enemies. This achieved all that might ever be hoped of the philosophers' stone.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1B

1. Peter M. Daly, Literature in the Light of the Emblem: Structural Parallels between the Emblem and Literature in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Toronto, 1979), p. 139.

2. Quoted by Daly (1979), p. 58.


18. Praz, p. 16.


30 Whitney, p. 137.

31. Quoted by Daly (1979), pp. 142-43.


34. Quoted from Robert Goldwater and Marco Treves, editors, Artists on Arts from the 14th to the 20th Century (London, 1976), pp. 82, 119.

35. Quoted from Goldwater and Treves, p. 119.


38. Coleridge, p. 64.


41. De Jong, pp. 1-5.


44. De Jong, p. 337. The sources are listed on pp. 330-338.


46. Nicholl, p. 90.

47. De Jong, p. 352.


51. Yates, p. 75.

52. De Jong, p. 337.


60. De Jong, pp. 222-23, 407.


64. Bacon, New Atlantis, p. 304.
CHAPTER 2A
THE TRUTH OF FICTION:
SHAKESPEARE'S 'APOLOGY' FOR THE DRAMA

i. SIDNEY AND GNOSIS

There are many terms for 'real life' and 'fiction', and many attempts to define both the terms and their interaction, which is elusive. Susanne Langer finds some useful vocabulary in a working definition of drama: 'The total structure of acts is a virtual history in the mode of dramatic action' where 'any illusion of physical and mental activity is called an "act"'.¹ The Tempest is concerned with the nature and purpose of dramatic fiction. The play is self-referential, that is, the play is a drama about drama. It demonstrates 'in the mode of action', what dramatic fiction is and how it works: the script stakes out a 'history' about a magician who can (to a large extent) control and influence the other people in the story in a manner unknown to themselves but known to the theatre audience - they see a number of 'dramas' being enacted by the magician and his helpers upon these characters, who take them to be natural or supernatural events and do not know they are contrived. Besides this, these characters influence each other. Thus the magician is partly in the same relation to the other fictional characters on the stage as a playwright is to the fictions he invents. However, the magician is himself controlled and influenced in unexpected ways. The Tempest explores many relations between an audience and fictional
Within the terms of Renaissance thinking about fiction, I shall show that Shakespeare works in the spirit of Sidney's *Apology for Poetry* and in agreement with his tenets, and that Sidney's *Apology* can be taken as a theoretical commentary with relevance to *The Tempest*. Sidney teases out the relationship of literature to the real lives of its participants and states the values which make literature worthy (in defense against many sorts of attack or denigration). Shakespeare, in 'the mode of action', does something similar: *The Tempest* both enacts through its structure, and tells in words, about the drama's relation to 'real life' - the concept of 'real', however, is itself provisional. Sidney's main thesis is that literature (if worthy of the name) breeds virtuous action in the people who read or see it because they enjoy it in a special way: when well-made, poesy - meaning fiction or imaginative literature in general - has an irresistible power to impress people with a lasting effect on their moral being and actions, beyond the time spent in the theatre (or with the book). Sidney's peroration sums this up jocularly: 'ever praiseworthy Poesy is full of virtue-breeding delightfulness'.

There are many enigmas in Sidney's phrase 'virtue-breeding delightfulness'. How does the delightfulness of the fictional work translate into virtuous action? Sidney appeals to the reader's experience of this process and describes it but cannot explain it. In *The Tempest* Shakespeare shows exactly how the transaction occurs, what 'virtue' is when it is an experience rather than a word, how words become things, feelings and actions. Sidney outlines in theory
and gives good definitions for what Shakespeare brings to pass, for

Sidney's moral view of poesy fits *The Tempest* like a glove:

It is not rhyming and versing that maketh a poet...but it is that
feigning notable images of virtues, vices, or what else, with
that delightful teaching, which must be the right describing note
to know a poet (p.103).

unlike other branches of knowledge,

[in poesy the poet] bringeth his own stuff, and doth not learn a
conceit out of a matter, but maketh matter for a conceit...[and in]
moral doctrine, the chief of all knowledges...[the poet] for
instructing is well nigh comparable to the philosopher, and, for
moving, leaves him behind him (p.120).

'Moving' and 'instructing', on the stage above all a matter of image,
also has much to do with language, the poets 'not speaking (table talk
fashion or like men in a dream) words as they chanceably fall from the
mouth, but peizing each syllable of each word by just proportion
according to the dignity of the subject' (p.103). Orators and poets
both have 'such an affinity in this wordish consideration' (p.139);
Sidney knows English to be the equal of any tongue and to be 'fit to
express divers passions by the low or lofty sound of the well-weighed
syllable' (p.140) with qualities of 'sweetness' and 'majesty' or 'the
sweet sliding feet of verse'; it can persuade like 'Tully...with the
thunderbolt of eloquence' (p.138) or 'with a plain sensibleness...win
credit of popular ears; which credit is the nearest step to
persuasion,' where 'art is used to hide art' (p.139). All of this,
we shall find, takes on life in *The Tempest*. Though Shepherd says
that the kernel of Sidney's definitions of poetry is imitation
(p.147), the emphasis does not lie there. Sidney stretches
'imitation' to mean 'imagination' akin to Coleridge's sense of primary creation, a divine power, 'a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.' Sidney is surprisingly close; 'with the force of a divine breath he [the poet] bringeth things forth far surpassing her [nature's] doings' (p.101), and the poet 'doth grow in effect into another nature' (p.100). Rather, the fire which warms the whole Apology is the recognition of gnosis, the conviction which turns delightfulness into virtuous action: 'those skills that most serve to bring forth that, have a most just title to be princes over all the rest' (p.104). Sidney hardly defines the word gnosis but assumes we understand the word by experience, as he does; gnosis is the agent of 'moving':

for who will be taught if he is not moved with the desire to be taught? And what so much good doth that teaching bring forth (I speak still of moral doctrine) as that it moveth one to do that which it doth teach? For as Aristotle saith, it is not gnosis but praxis must be the fruit. And how praxis cannot be, without being moved to practise, it is no hard matter to consider (p.112).

The kind of conviction which gnosis implies for Sidney is the force which meshes the poet and his audience 'in the sacred mysteries of poesy' (p. 141). The creation of gnosis is the 'skill' which Sidney means. Sidney's language is infused with the experience of gnosis as the delight which justifies all his commendation: the poet 'entices'; he gives you a 'cluster of grapes, that full of that taste, you may long to pass further...with a tale he cometh to you, a tale which holdeth children from play and old men from the chimney corner' (p.113); 'hard-hearted evil men...steal to see the form of goodness...ere themselves be aware as if they took a medicine of
Geoffrey Shepherd warns readers of Sidney that 'it is best to avoid the verbal difficulties which would arise if we sought to understand what Sidney has to say in terms of later critical theory - of the creative imagination, and poetic sensibility. Terms such as these are confusing anachronisms when applied to the Apology' (p.16). But Sidney, Shakespeare and Coleridge think of the word 'imagination' in ways not unlike. Hankins shows that such a concept of the creative ability of the imagination as defined by Aquinas, for instance, was well known to Shakespeare, and he demonstrates many
exact references to the theories of external and internal senses which mediate between phantasy and the controlling but free imagination. He reminds us that 'Shakespeare had access to a rather fully developed system of psychology. For the Elizabethans it began with Plato and Aristotle, was perfected by the Schoolmen, particularly Aquinas, and was supplemented by various authors of the Renaissance'. As for 'poetic sensibility', whatever that may be, Sidney is right for all time in describing the literary experience which I have here called gnosis for want of a term. The term does not exist, perhaps, but relevant modern descriptions show what both Sidney and Shakespeare are about 'in virtue-causing delightfulness'.

A precondition for Sidney's understanding of gnosis must be what Coleridge meant by 'suspension of disbelief'. Both terms engage with modern theories of play. Sidney above all implies that gnosis is an emotional state, which one could think of as 'bonding' as well as 'identification'; this points forward to Winnicott's theory of play and cultural experience:

Play is in fact neither a matter of inner psychic reality nor a matter of external reality... (p. 96).

I suggest that the time has come for psychoanalytic theory to pay tribute to this third area, that of cultural experience which is a derivative of play (p. 102)...in using the word culture I am thinking of the inherited tradition...something that is in the common pool of humanity into which individuals and groups of people may contribute and from which we may all draw if we have somewhere to put what we find: the phenomena (of play - speaking of infants) that have reality in the area whose existence I am postulating belong to the experience of relating to objects. One can think of the 'electricity' that seems to generate in meaningful or intimate contact, that is a feature, for instance, when two people are in love. These phenomena of the play area have infinite variability, contrasting with the relative stereotypy of phenomena that relate either to personal body functioning or to environmental actuality. Psychoanalysts... have failed to state the tremendous intensity of these non-climactic experiences that are called playing (p. 98).
The third area, that of play, expands into creative living and into the whole cultural life of man. This third area has been contrasted with inner or personal psychic reality and with the actual world in which the individual lives, which can be objectively perceived. I have located this important area of experience in the potential space between the individual and the environment, that which initially both joins and separates the baby and the mother... (p. 103) The potential space between baby and mother, between child and family, between individual and society or the world, depends on experience which leads to trust. It can be looked upon as sacred to the individual in that it is here that the individual experiences creative living.

It may perhaps be seen from this how important it can be...to recognize the existence of this place, the only place where play can start, a place that is at the continuity-contiguity moment, where transitional phenomena originate. My hope is that I have begun to answer my own question: where is cultural experience located?

We may note the mention of 'trust' as a form of 'belief'; this well describes an aspect of gnosis and of 'suspension of disbelief', that relation between play and audience which permits 'bonding'. The words 'intensity' and 'experience' point to the mysterious magic of the communal act in literature which Shakespeare aims to achieve. Langer praises some Hindu concepts on this subject:

Some of the Hindu critics, although they subordinate and even deprecate dramatic art in favor of the literary elements it involves, understand much better than their Western colleagues the various aspects of emotion in the theater, which our writers so freely and banefully confuse: the feelings experienced by the actor, those experienced by the spectators, those presented as undergone by characters in the play, and finally the feeling that shines through the play itself - the vital feeling of the piece. This last they call rasa; it is a state of emotional knowledge, which comes only to those who have long studied and contemplated poetry. It is supposed to be of supernatural origin, because it is not like mundane feeling and emotion, but is detached, more of the spirit than of the viscera, pure and uplifting. Rasa is, indeed, that comprehension of the directly experienced or 'inward' life that all art conveys.
Shakespeare's play is speculative as to 'truth' or 'real life'. Rather than 'imitation' which pre-supposes a 'reality' outside the play, Shakespeare 'teaches' the audience about the engaging and affective power of drama to create lastingly relevant experience. At specific points the play also stresses the oneness of play time and life time in the face of the unknowns of eternity, providence and death. These issues are discussed later in this chapter. Yet, though speculative, Shakespeare nevertheless assumes the ideology he and his audience share, the Christian ideology of his age and society, albeit in a manner which is archetypal rather than strictly doctrinal.

ii. THE MORAL CONTEXT OF SIDNEY'S APOLOGY FOR POETRY

Since, then, the Renaissance period is a period of Christian ideology, every task finds its place within its moral world; a few random examples here will illustrate this. It will be seen that the passages cited below represent commonplace attitudes and are of a piece with the implicit moral assumptions of the earlier seventeenth century, and that the consciousness of The Tempest audience is of this temper. The moral orientations in these passages are ubiquitous in the social writings of the time. Whatever the subject, a reader browsing through prefaces and dedications is hard put to it to find
any book that justifies itself only in a secular light. Naturally, since these passages are culled from books, they emphasize the moral value of books as a beneficial form of communication. Writers on most subjects are pleased with themselves and see the increase of knowledge as a godly task. The few examples that follow will serve as contrast—in supposing that they will have a welcoming reception—to the apologists for literature, like Sidney, Harrington and Heywood who are on the defensive against many kinds of attack. Paul Rabinow expounds Foucault's distinction between the changing historical importance of the author in literature and science; Foucault finds that up to the seventeenth century 'those texts that we now would call scientific—those dealing with cosmology and the heavens, medicine and illnesses, natural sciences and geography—were accepted in the Middle Ages as 'true' only when marked with the name of their author', but a change occurred when formal scientific methods seemed to validate truth anonymously. The reverse was true of the literary text: 'narratives, stories, epics, tragedies, comedies were accepted, put into circulation, and valorized without any question about the identity of the author; their anonymity caused no difficulties since their ancientness, whether real or imagined, was regarded as a sufficient guarantee of their status'. I suggest that literature perceived as modern or topical seemed thus all the more threatening or shocking. Francis Meres and Heywood, for instance, attempt to validate contemporary writers or plays by their naming of moderns paired with named ancients, and Ben Jonson gives Shakespeare the ultimate accolade in his list of the classical masters who now 'but antiquated, and deserted lye/ As they were not of Natures family'.
A moral purpose would be another way of forestalling opprobrium—this is Sidney's defence, as it is the ground of The Tempest's power to warm our ears and to charm (to paraphrase Ben Jonson). So, for example, Banister has to make no apology for improving practical medical knowledge, yet he finds it necessary to introduce a sober, factual book on surgery with a statement of the moral purpose of his work:

Nothing has a peculiar life. Nothing ioyeth without peculiar Societie of other. Wherfore there ought to be one purpose, and inclination in all men, that a like utilitie, and of all thinges, may be to everyone. Which if any man do snatch unto himselfe, all humane felowship is dissolved.

Writing and publication is itself a moral act. Here language is given a moral function as communication in the service of the community; only when publicized can medical knowledge benefit society. The Tempest happens to share the view that the preservation of knowledge is a noble task; Gonzalo recognizes that a miracle should be 'set down in gold on lasting pillars' (V.1.207). Books, too, are monuments. Most of Banister's book thereafter for the 'fellowly Fraternitie of Chirurgians' is in the plain and concrete style that we would call scientific. So, too, William Harvey in his epoch-making The Circulation of the Blood (1628) is aware of his value in extending knowledge, but the knowledge he offers is controversial. He has two prefaces, one in an elaborate imagery of cosmic correspondences apparently flattering the king, the other plain, in a manner we would accept as scientific even today. In passing it may be noted that, whereas there was no serious contradiction between natural knowledge and religion before Darwin, what crystallized as the seventeenth
century progressed was the dichotomy between Aristotelian beliefs and empirical science. This was not least due to Bacon, 'one great Man, who had the Imagination of the whole extent of this Enterprize' (the Royal Society) as Thomas Sprat acknowledged. It is in his contradiction of the Aristotelian humours that Harvey met opposition. An extract from Harvey's prefaces is here given in a modern translation of the original Latin:

Most Serene King!
The animal's heart is the basis of its life, its chief member, the sun of its microcosm; on the heart all its activity depends, from the heart all its liveliness and strength arise. Equally is the king the basis of his kingdoms, the sun of his microcosm, the heart of the state; from him all power arises and all grace stems. In offering your Majesty - in the fashion of the time - this account of the heart's movement, I have been encouraged by the fact that almost all our concepts of humanity are modelled on our knowledge of man himself, and several of our concepts of royalty on our knowledge of the heart.

Excellent Doctors! On several occasions in my anatomical lectures I revealed my new concept of the heart's movement and function and of the blood's passage round the body. Having now, however, for more than nine years confirmed it in your presence by numerous ocular demonstrations...and in this small book have published it for all to see...Over many centuries a countless succession of distinguished and learned men had followed and illumined a particular line of thought, and this book of mine was the only one to oppose tradition and to assert that the blood travelled along a previously unrecognized pathway of its own.

The preface to the king is not a cynical sop to Aristotle, though bowing to the 'fashion of time'. Far from expressing a hypocritical double ideology, the correspondence of microcosm and macrocosm is not taken as contradictory to factual knowledge about nature. Harvey rather strengthens the concept of the human body as a microcosm. Science had not yet discarded the creator of nature in favour of an evolutionary process. In The Tempest, too, this correspondence is
central. The play deeply considers man's power over nature through knowledge, and here magical hopes merely pre-date empirical hopes for achieving this but are not different in aim. Such knowledge is put in its place in *The Tempest*. The play's concentric structure makes the action of Providence — which governs nature and man — the true drama within which all human endeavour is enacted. Harvey, too, recognizes a cosmic order which science would support, not destroy. To acknowledge Providence, of course, is standard for sea-farers, as the translator of Gerrit de Veer acknowledges, translating some Dutch voyages '81 Degrees of Northerly Latitude' for the benefit of future English explorers in the interests of trade. Providence must be praised for the success of these explorers, 'for ought I know, of all Adams Posteritie' the first to see these parts of the world, and also for putting the English into so superior a place. To omit this labour were 'little lesse than Sacriledge':

And were it for nothing else but to register the miraculous providence of the Creator, and his admirable and unspeakeable works in these congealed Climates, unknown utterly to the Ancients, and to demonstrate how much we are obliged to his omnipotent favour, for planting us in so temperate, so civill, and so Religious a part of the World as this blessed Island.

Only the poets seem hard pressed to defend themselves from the charge of ungodliness which Harington cites, quoting Cornelius Agrippa: 'That it [poetry] is a nurse of lies, a pleaser of fooles, a breeder of dangerous errors, and an inticer of wantonnes'. But Harington discredits Agrippa for a 'generall libeller' and defends literature, as Sidney does, possibly in answer to Stephen Gosson, as being the most morally effective of all the branches of knowledge.
Yet Harington makes the hierarchy of values clear in his 'Apologie of Poetrie' prefacing his translation of Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*:

> [Poetry] is to soften and polish the rough and hard dispositions of men, and make them capable of virtue and good discipline. I cannot deny but to us that are Christians in respect of the high end of all, which is the health of our souls, not only Poetrie but all other studies of Philosophy are in a manner vaine and superfluous.  

Heywood defends actors on moral grounds in 1612 against which a *Refutation* appeared in 1615. Sidney justifies literature because 'the ending end of all earthly learning [is] virtuous action' (p.104).

It is left to Sidney to convince the reader that imaginative literature leads precisely to this. Thus the secular world in all its variety nevertheless fitted its activities into the Christian value system as the overriding principle of life.

The moral context of these more general protestations of Christian principle is, however, of a different order from that which Sidney - and others such as Harrington and Heywood - claim for literature against much opposition. David McPherson's researches give particular precision to charges against playwrights, concluding that 'the crown and its courts considered almost any utterance that they did not like as libel' while it was the puritans who were obsessed with bawdy, 'whereas it was given scant attention by the government's censors. Both puritans and censors opposed blasphemy...The pressures on playwrights, both legal and moral, were intense'.  

Literature, claim these defenders, is not just part of a general good, as for instance one might claim that it is good to cheer people up, as Guarini does. Sidney's claims bring literature close
to the pulpit in being the moral agent, indeed above preaching. Speaking of Erasmus and his innovations in text exegesis, Waswo finds Sidney's methods similar and his contribution a turning point in attitudes to fiction:

The medieval tradition found scriptural meaning in the 'things' that the words of the story could be said to 'represent'...in his [Erasmus's] exegetical practice, the meaning of the biblical text was not what it 'stood for' but what happened in it...he applied the [techniques] of secular rhetoric to the interpretation [of the sacred text]. To be ravished by eloquence, the archetypal humanist delight, is becoming co-extensive with moral instruction. To urge the teaching of virtue, not in addition to, or in spite of, or wholly apart from, but rather by means of the emotional engagement of the reader was the contribution, probably original, of Sir Philip Sidney's Apologie for Poetrie.¹⁷

Sidney's ideas can be traced to many sources but his synthesis and emphasis are his own. His approach belongs to the world of widespread 'reading', though throughout Sidney's essay there are references to eloquence and the spoken (or sung) word. Yet books dominate over performance and witness to the growing readership which is the harvest of printing technology and its texts in the Christian-classical education of the grammar schools. It is paradoxical, and not irrelevant, that television, the new technology of our age, has had the contrary effect, of fictionalizing the actual world - the sufferings of our fellow men appear daily on our screens and our response is numbed, whereas that of Sidney's generation was sensitized by fiction, so Sidney asserts, to moral action in the real world. The relation to the real world is, of course, the crux of the relation between fiction and morals, and it is Sidney's trump card:

For if it be, as I affirm, that no learning is so good as that which teacheth and moveth to virtue, and that none can both teach and move thereto so much as Poetry, then is the conclusion

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manifest that ink and paper cannot be to a more profitable purpose employed (p. 123).

Weinberg, Craig, Kathy Eden and Waswo, to name only some of many commentators, all trace the sources of Sidney's synthesis differently. Craig cites Italian mannerists, neoplatonists and Protestant theology, but most of all he finds Sidney's central tenets follow the Northern humanists and their ideal of active wisdom. 'Sidney's composite theory of the image...borrowed a rational basis of operation from Aristotle and an earthly ravishment from Plato to strike, pierce and possess the sight of the soul'. Kathy Eden sees Sidney as combining two different streams from Aristotle: 'When Sidney defines poetry not only as an art of imitation but also as an instrument of knowledge he does so in view of The Poetics and its tradition'. When on the other hand he 'claims for poetry the special task of feigning images designed to inspire the will to virtuous action he echoes the De Anima and its tradition'. W.S. Hett summarizes Aristotle's account of the operation of the soul in this respect as follows: 'the rational will seeks the ultimate or real "good" apprehended by intellect through calculative imagination'. These streams aid us in reading Sidney's meaning for gnosis, referring to emotion, intellect, and to the soul as well: 'Reading and interpretation, for both Erasmus and Sidney, were to "inflame our souls"' says Waswo:

What Erasmus called the 'sermonis vim' becomes in both scripture and literature the power of language to constitute experience in and for the reader, which is its meaning.
This is ultimately an 'affective semantics'. In Sidney the philosopher 'who bestoweth but a wordish description' fails; what he says 'does neither strike, pierce nor possess the sight of the soul' (p.107). The poet, Sidney suggests, creates experience; the poet would supply a perfect picture for someone who had never met an elephant, for instance, or he would make some marvellous building vivid for someone who should be impressed by, rather than informed about it. A mere describer, like the philosopher, 'should never satisfy his inward conceits with being witness to itself of a true lively knowledge' and though giving 'infallible grounds of wisdom', he would not be able to communicate his conceits which 'still lie dark before the imaginative and judging power if they be not illuminated or figured forth by the speaking picture of poesy' (p. 107). Craig explains 'inward conceits' and 'the imaginative and judging power' as drawing on 'Aristotelian faculty psychology....this depicted the mind as a succession of faculties between the senses and the inmost seat of reason, faculties consisting of the common sense, the imagination, the fantasy, the judging power, and the memory. All these five 'inward wits' work on sense-phantasms'. Hankins describes the process in detail and shows that Shakespeare, too, thinks in terms of this classification: 'In a number of passages he shows a close observation of the process of perception as explained by Aquinas and La Primaudaye, among others' who follow this tradition. Hankins shows how precisely Shakespeare follows these psychological schemes in the Midsummer Night's Dream speech where 'apprehend' and 'comprehend' are thus distinguished, and Hankins clarifies the precise 'exstasy' Prospero suffers from in his revels speech. Sidney, in praising
the poet's creative power, probably has some such scheme as the following in mind:

Phantasy is completely uncontrolled, flitting skittishly from one impression to another, giving a multitude of different conceptions of an object presented to it by the common sense. Imagination involves a more orderly sequence of impressions and has a collecting and combining power not present in the phantasy. For example, it has an impression of gold and an impression of mountain; by combining these it creates a phantasm of a golden mountain, though no such object ever existed.25

Yet Sidney labours to explain gnosis throughout the Apology as transparent knowledge, aiming to describe an experience rather than analyse one, not unlike Langer's hindu Rasa: in the great writers, says Sidney, 'all virtues, vices and passions...we seem not to hear of them but clearly to see through them (my italics; p. 108). Sidney acknowledges language as, next to reason, the greatest gift bestowed upon mortality' which when handled by the poet has a harmony and forcible quality which strikes the soul as music does - 'the most divine striker of the senses' (p. 122).

Sidney had only Gorboduc as example of English tragic plays and rather conventionally carps about the three unities, in relation to that play, but only because he approves of it, and wishes it were technically a 'perfect' tragedy. Nevertheless Sidney's theory applies to the drama equally as well since he includes it in his examples of poetry. The Jacobean period in the drama most fulfils Sidney's theories, returning to a moral stage in a new mode; it was a refined period of tragicomedy, though Sidney never experienced a good one, and cannot conceive of mixing 'hornpipes and funerals' (p. 136). The period saw the rise of the masque, and was in general an
idealizing stage, associated with the rise of the private theatres. Sylvia Feldman lists at least seventeen popular plays as belonging to a category which she defines as morality-patterned comedies of the Renaissance, most of them belonging to the first decade or so of the seventeenth century. The companies are described as of 'grave and sober behaviour' and the plays as 'instructive and moral'. A passage (1699) quoted by Bentley, recalls that age with a nostalgia like Aubrey's and characterizes those 'better days':

Truman: If my Fancy and Memory are not partial...I say that the Actors whom I have seen before the Wars, Lowin, Tayler, Pollard and some others were almost as far behind Hart and his company as those were beyond these now in being...

Lovewit: (The old manner of) Action is now lost. So far, that when the question has been askt why these Players do not revive The Silent Woman, and some other of Johnson's Plays, (one of highest esteem) they have answered, truly, Because there are none now Living who can rightly Humour those Parts, for all who related to the Black-friers (where they were acted in perfection) are now Dead, and almost forgotten.... But pray Sir, what master parts can you remember the Old Black-friers Men to Act, in Johnson, Shakespear and Fletcher's Plays.

Truman [names former actors and characterizes seven playhouses of Shakespeare's time and later]:

All these Companies got Money, and Liv'd in Reputation, especially those of the Blackfriers, who were men of grave and sober Behaviour.

Lovewit: Which I admire at; That the Town much less than at present, could then maintain Five Companies, and yet now Two can hardly Subsist...

Truman: But consider, That tho' the Town was then, perhaps, not much more than half so Populous as now, yet the then Prices were small (there being no Scenes) and better order kept among the Company that came; which made very good People think a Play an Innocent Diversion for an Idle Hour or two, the plays themselves being then, for the most part, more Instructive and Moral.
When Sidney was writing, *Gorboduc* was the best English drama he could think of. He pleads that though there are bad poets, it does not invalidate his theory. He does not really engage with Agrippa's charge that literature is an 'inticer of wantonness' or with Gosson's monotonous invective. Considering that Bentley quotes a *dialogue* a hundred or so years after Sidney's *Apology*, that found the drama debased still or again debased, we must suppose that playgoers have always been after something other than virtue, and that only the most skilled can administer 'the medicine of cherries'. Edmund Gayton describes 'in the three *London Apprentices*...the spectators frequently mounting the stage, and making a more bloody Catastrophe amongst themselves, then the players did'. These forceful audiences at festival time would change the appointed play 'to act what the major part of the company had a mind to, sometimes *Tamerlane* sometimes *Jugurth* sometimes the *Jew of Malta* and sometimes parts of all these'. It all ends with the actors having 'to put off their Tragick habits' dancing with the merry milk-maides'.

Nevertheless, as Shepherd suggests, Sidney formulated the needs of the future: 'We shall often understand Sidney better...if we have grasped what his successors in poetry, Spenser, Ben Jonson, Milton and Pope achieved when they wrote at the top of their bent' (pp. 16-17). In almost everything Sidney's main concerns could be applied to *The Tempest*; indeed, *The Tempest* could be said to be Shakespeare's own *Apology* for the Drama, for Shakespeare both exemplifies what Sidney says almost as though he were illustrating Sidney, and at the same time the play is itself didactic - through its structural and verbal metaphor of 'the play'. *The Tempest* teaches how the dramatic fiction brings about many kinds of
gnosis, ultimately leaving the spectator with a faith and cheerfulness that carry forward into their lives by their universal application, and by the force of the dramatic experience.

iii. THE TEMPEST AS 'METADRAMA: SHAKESPEARE'S 'APOLOGY FOR THE DRAMA'

a) Verisimilitude, Realism and Metadrama

Sidney contradicts himself in his demand for the unities in drama. Though Gorboduc climbs 'to the height of Seneca's style' and 'is full of notable morality...it is faulty both in place and time, the two necessary companions of all corporal action' (p. 134). Yet Sidney has no trouble with the suspension of disbelief in discussing the kind of truth 'not affirmatively but allegorically and figuratively written' i.e. imaginative literature, 'What child is there that, coming to a play, and seeing Thebes in great letters written on an old door, doth believe that it is Thebes?' Since the narration is 'but as an imaginative ground-plot of a profitable invention' (p. 124). Sidney implies that the child need not literally believe but it seems the adults cannot cope with Gorboduc's 'Asia on one side and Afric on the other...then we must believe the stage to be a garden...then we hear news of a shipwreck in the same
place...then we are bound to take it for a cave' (p. 134). These settings are so like The Tempest's island loci that one would think Shakespeare is replying to Sidney; but then they are standard settings, reinforcing yet again The Tempest's typical place in the culture. Shakespeare observes the unities only to show them irrelevant, penetrating the idea of dramatic illusion (which the unities are supposed to maintain) in a more meaningful manner. In passing, it may be said that Prospero's anxiety about getting the action completed in four hours is a send-up of this type of shallow understanding, perhaps an aspect of the play's self-referential 'delightfulness'; presumably Prospero's stars which demanded the four-hour action could equally have required the 16 years which the character of Time postulates for the completion of the plot in The Winter's Tale. A playwright naturally knows that apparent 'realism' is only another approach to the audience in the construction of his scenes; the intention of realism is to hide the sense of construction. In Othello and Macbeth, for instance, the characters are shown so deeply embedded in their specific societies that their contingencies and passions seem to belong to Venice or Scotland; but Shakespeare builds up these persons and locations verbally no less than Gonzalo rebuilds Carthage by giving it a local habitation and a name in Tunis.:

Gonzalo: This Tunis, Sir, was Carthage...
Adrian: Carthage?
Gonzalo: I assure you, Carthage.
Antonio: His word is more than the miraculous harp.
Sebastian: He hath raised the wall, and houses too.
Antonio: What impossible matter will he make easy next?
In the Renaissance the story of Amphion is of course the standard allegory for the creative power of 'poetry' and music that issue in action; Gonzalo's words indicate the essential process of fiction, that interchange of art and nature which so fascinated the Renaissance. It is a short step to the theatre of the absurd as Sebastian continues: 'I think he will carry this island home in his pocket and give it his son for an apple' (II.1.88), incidentally a process not unlike Antony's: 'Realms and islands were/ As plates dropp'd from his pocket' (Antony and Cleopatra, V.2.92).

Reflexiveness is inherent in the play because Prospero is shown as manipulator of the action and characters. In modern terminology, it can be defined as metadrama. What Waugh says about the novel can be applied to drama:

Metafictional novels tend to be constructed on the principle of...opposition: the construction of a fictional illusion as in traditional realism and the laying bare of that illusion. In other words, the lowest common denominator of metafiction is simultaneously to create a fiction and to make a statement about the creation of that fiction. The 'illusion' in traditional 'realism' suppresses 'the variety of discourses' which go to the making of a fiction through their subordination to the dominant 'voice' of the omniscient godlike author.

The play does suppress the godlike author insofar as this is Shakespeare himself, but Shakespeare characterizes an author in the person of Prospero, who is like Shakespeare in the persona of playmaker, if in no other respects. However, when the actor playing Prospero steps forward to speak the epilogue he speaks as actor as well as Prospero, and like Chaucer in his retractio, Shakespeare is implicated, in the hope that a god-like author might exist who would
be willing to play out a merciful game with us all. In practice, Prospero stands in for the godlike author, and lays bare the fictional illusions he constructs. We may compare *The Tempest* to the Pompidou Centre, which is itself a meta-building. Its glass walls and revealed girders are a comment in a different mode — on the teasing relations between contained and open space. Just as the glass walls at the Pompidou Centre remove the usual secure illusion of interior space, so in *The Tempest* the framework of dramatic illusion is laid bare, to show that there is not much more than a glass-like division between our sense of the play space and our existential sense of self. It should be noted that imagery of 'frames' and 'glass' is common in the discussion of metafiction: 'Everything is framed whether in life or in novels'; 'the pane and the transparency that is the work of art'.

Prospero has been shown as a controller of time, space, the bodies, minds and actions of other people. This is what a playwright controls in creating his fictions; this play by implication, then, is about an author who tells the audience about playmaking. At the same time his story is the realistic action which typically engages the audience's identification, the tale of Sidney that 'holdeth children from play and old men from the chimney corner' (p. 113). At the end, through the prologue's projection of Prospero, actor, and writer as one, the audience realizes more consciously the multiple levels on which art and reality have co-existed. The audience at the end of the play, as in the Cornish Miracle play described by Glynne Wickham, has fused miraculously into a single image of reality...this is achieved stylistically by the frank exploitation of pretence. It is a play and not in earnest...The arena is
thus neither itself, nor Paradise, nor the Red Sea nor Jerusalem: it is what the actors say it is at any given moment and what our eyes tell us it has become, as trees are replaced by a ship or a ship by a temple. St Peter is dressed as a Cornish fisherman, but he is also Christ's disciple: and for that matter he is also the actor who played the part of Adam and of Moses\textsuperscript{31}.

Thus there are many approaches to gnosis in the complex discourse relations agreed upon in a play, (or for that matter in 'playing') which are by no means related to the degree of verisimilitude. The agreement is a pre-condition fulfilled by the act of going to the theatre - Coleridge's 'willing' in the suspension of disbelief; the old men and the children in Sidney's image, who find 'the tale' more entertaining than the chimney corner or other sorts of play. Gurr points out that identification with the fiction is strengthened when a play within that play is performed: after the player's speech, 'the fictitious Hamlet rails at the fiction of the player. Shakespeare's refinement is to make this paradoxical situation not a joke but an emphatic assertion of Hamlet's reality.\textsuperscript{32} This is not only Shakespeare's special skill, but the typical effect of a fiction within a fiction. It seems to bond the primary protagonist in with the audience in a common act of elucidation. Thus Sly in framing the enactment of The Taming of the Shrew seems less fictitious than the rest, being half a spectator and on the stage, half like the dramatic characters; a link who guides the interpretative aspects of the play. Such a figure corresponds to the designated narrator of a novel, such as Nelly in Wuthering Heights. Nelly is the 'teller' who has won our confidence though she is very much a character whom we see reacting with the other fictional characters for she tells tales...
and judges and influences the course of events, often unwisely. Prospero wins our confidence as 'teller' and judge of others though the audience notices in passing his apparent exoneration of his own laxness in Milan, the possibility of a different viewpoint on Antonio and Caliban, his harshness, and his dubiousness in uprooting 'the strong-based promontory' and opening graves. The bond of knowledge between Prospero and the audience make its identification strongest with Prospero, whereas the characters he acts upon appear 'observed' and fictional.

b) Prospero's Manipulation of the Audience

Shakespeare's special refinement is, much more, to put the audience into Prospero's power on the same terms as the characters he acts upon. Prospero, as puppet master, so to speak, moves the audience's emotions at will, but then reveals how it is done. He thus demonstrates the dramatist's power to make the play space and play time real as a place for experience, as in Winnicott's description above. According to Sidney, this gnosis has a lasting effect, which is added to the spectator's other life experiences and therefore affects his praxis. Sidney claims a moral result from good literature, while the opponents claim an immoral one, such as the loosening of sexual inhibitions. In the latter case a play is seen as setting a bad example, while in Sidney's view the effect of drama is the very opposite. The sense of experience of either vice or virtue clarifies an inward knowledge and thus protects from future evil:

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Anger, the stoics say, was a short madness: Let but Sophocles bring you Ajax on a stage, killing and whipping sheep and oxen, thinking them the army of Greeks...and tell me if you have not a more familiar insight into anger than finding in the Schoolmen his genus and difference. See whether wisdom and temperance in Ulysses and Diomedes, valour in Achilles, friendship in Nisus and Euryalus, even to an ignorant man carry not an apparent shining (p. 108).

Two of Prospero's plays within The Tempest are presented not as in Hamlet, framed as play acting, but as primary, realistic scenes. That is to say, they occur as events, and are not prepared for as 'scenes to watch'. One of these is the opening scene and the other is the harpy scene. These scenes belong to a tragic world and are powerfully troubling for they move the audience to pity and terror. They also demonstrate the techniques of realism, which allow no return to the spectator's 'self' while the scene is in progress. In each case these scenes are revealed only afterwards as having been staged by Prospero and enacted by Ariel. Retrospectively, therefore, each of these scenes is revised, or deconstructed, for the audience, and revalued as illusion not 'event' (within the terms of the main accepted fiction of course). In each case the audience has been violently responsive, the scenes having to do with man's suppressed and archetypal fears and guilts. The spectator is both relieved and angry at having to engage with these emotions, 'for nothing' as it were. Both of these scenes are felt to have been a trap on two levels: for the audience, who was quickly relieved from suffering with it, but yet these feelings cannot be annulled completely; and for the characters, who are to be reformed and who, while seen by the spectator to be entirely surveilled and manipulated, yet undergo acute suffering. After the framing of the realistic scene as 'artificial',

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the audience identifies with Prospero and suffers with the other characters in a more distanced manner, as observer. The effect is of a change from a close-up to the long shot in films; in fact, Shakespeare gives distancing instructions which should be observed in staging or filming. Such an instruction is implicit, for example, in the by-stander aside 'it goes on, I see/ As my soul prompts it' (I.2.420); or, within the action, 'all three of them are desperate' (III.3.104), which groups 'the three' at a distance from Gonzalo, as they dart off distracted. The game of chess, of course, demands literally a recess or other discovery space.

Why did Prospero play these tricks upon the audience? The commentary he makes on both these scenes teach in a didactic manner how drama creates gnosis and for what moral purpose. The scene of the shipwreck which Miranda watched, and for which she upbraids her father with tears, is stressed as being visual, while the oration Ariel delivers on Prospero's behalf, with 'grace devouring', strikes the ears of the guilty lords with words. The drama both shows and tells. Pity is aroused in the audience by the first scene, terror by the harpy speech. Thus Prospero demonstrates the power of drama in its special combination of 'speaking' and 'pictures', to pierce the heart, by involving the audience in these emotions. In case this key dramatic effect of causing compassion should be passed over, Prospero identifies the experience as scenic: 'The direful spectacle of the wreck, which touched/ The very virtue of compassion in thee/...' (I.2.26). Thus the experience, reinforced with a subsequent metadramatic explanation, becomes a paradigm for and a lesson about the nature and purpose of dramatic illusion. The second instance of
the moral power of drama stresses the force of eloquence, achieving gnosis through oratio; Ariel's harpy speech is to bring home a recognition of self: 'For if oratio next to ratio, speech next to reason, be the greatest gift bestowed upon mortality, that cannot be praiseless which doth most polish that blessing of speech (not only...by his forcible quality...[words] carrying even in themselves a harmony' (pp. 121-22). The deconstruction of each of these two scenes immediately after, by Prospero's revealing their contrived nature, partially destroys the suspension of disbelief, thereby also reversing the tragic identification of the audience. This re-affirms the tragi-comic tone of the play.

Miranda sympathized with the drowning men and identified with them: 'O I have suffered/ With those that I saw suffer:...O the cry did knock/ Against my very heart' (I.2.5). The 'very virtue of compassion' which Prospero recognizes in her is the power of identifying with another's pain. In turn, her tears are important for moving the audience, because they show feeling, and tears are 'fellowly drops', themselves causing tears in the spectators. The subject of tears in the play is more fully pursued in Chapter 5B. Whereas Miranda's heart is by nature tender, the task of eloquence in the harpy speech, on the other hand, is to move stony hearts.

Language is efficacious, Sidney says: 'A feigned example hath as much force to teach as a true example' (p. 110), since 'the feigned may be tuned to the highest key of passion' and 'those hard-hearted evil men who think virtue a school name...will consent to be delighted' because even terrible things 'are made in poetical imitation delightful' (p. 114). He cites how Nathan won David with a
parable 'as in a glass to see his own filthiness, as that heavenly psalm of mercy well testifieth...' (p. 115). The two points he makes together can be applied to the effect of the harpy speech on the audience and on the usurpers in the play. The speech is intended to arouse conscience by creating terror and pain. The reverberations of Ariel's sombre and severe speech establish anew the values that were 'candied' and 'melting' in Antonio's dismissal of twenty consciences. God is not mocked, Ariel says. He invokes Destiny, Fate and the Powers, a Virgilian pre-Christian version of Prospero's 'providence divine' and an echo of the 'chance' and 'destiny' in the opening scene. Surely conscience awakes in the spectators as well as in the sinning lords, as when Alonso speaks of memory returning:

O it is monstrous, monstrous!
Methought the billows spoke and told me of it,
The winds did sing it to me; and the thunder,
That deep and dreadful organ-pipe, pronounced
The name of Prosper: it did bass my trespass (III.3.95).

Nature speaks to Gonzalo because nature exemplifies the moral order. Ariel, whose harpy guise and words threaten retribution, identifies the moral world with the natural world, a world of elemental matter and time: 'the elements of whom your swords are tempered' cannot attack the other elements and cannot 'wound the loud winds, or with bemocked at stabs/ Kill the still closing waters' (III.3.61). Man is part of a harmonious world of matter, or 'nature' in Renaissance terms. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 4. Through greed and killing men become outlaws from orderly creation, so that nature rejects them: the powers have 'incensed the seas and shores, yea all the creatures' (III.3.73), so that, like Cain, they are outlawed from
creation, a punishment which Cain found greater than he could bear. Ariel's business was to tell the would-be brother murderers this: 'but remember, for that's my business to you'. Heart's sorrow was enjoined upon them, itself the acknowledgement of their guilt; 'whose wraths to guard you from,/ ...is nothing but heart/sorrow,/ And a clear life ensuing' (III.3.79). Heart sorrow is a pain so acute that the evil doers become suicidal.

Pain is the common factor in the tragic emotions of pity and terror. Compassion is allied with experience of pain in oneself before one can imagine and sympathise with the pain of others. This is shown in Prospero's anagnorisis:

Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling
Of their afflictions, and shall not myself,
One of their kind, that relish all as sharply
Passion as they, be kindlier moved than thou art? (5.1.21)

This speech marks Prospero's conversion to compassion. This scene is the third of the dramatic events that particularly move the audience to identify their own existential situation with that of the play. Ariel, who had been actor in the harpy speech, speaks here on his own account as angel voice, prompting Prospero to cut the gordian knot, through the 'very virtue of compassion'. Prospero speaks for all mankind in identifying, as the uniquely human gift, the pain of the human condition, and through it compassion. The audience recognizes its dramatic experiences in the play to be central to the experience of living. Gnosis and praxis go hand in hand here. Ariel finds words that move Prospero in his account of grief visible: 'his tears run down his beard like winter's drops/ From eaves of reeds' (V.1.16).
Interior grief is for Prospero to comprehend. Thus the drama sensitizes the human heart to itself and others; upon this moment of insight the play pivots in its didactic and narrative structure simultaneously. Prospero's own 'discovery' of compassion and the play's climax and 'reversal' are one. Prospero's speech of recognition is also the moment of peripeteia. Forthwith the action moves from revenge to reconciliation, from punishment to mercy, and exile and injustice are forgiven and repaired.

A reverse situation in the sonnets records a missed opportunity for the recognition of a hardened heart.

O that our night of woe might have rememb'red
My deepest sense how hard true sorrow hits,
And soon to you, as you to me, then tend'red
The humble salve which wounded bosoms fits! (Sonnet 120).

In this sonnet the poem itself now becomes the salve; language itself, like music, has a forcible quality and is itself the merciful action. The play's power to move, too, is partly a question of its poetics (as discussed in Chapter 5B). On a large scale the play as a whole, like the sonnet, has conjured up pain in order to teach conscience, compassion, humility and forgiveness.

These scenes have together taken the spectator into that world which Caliban cannot seize upon though 'in dreaming/The clouds methought would open and show riches/Ready to drop upon me' (III.2.138). This is a world of moral order and grace for which, as Sir Philip Sidney says, 'The application is divinely true, the discourse feigned' (p. 115). Prospero has staged two scenes and proved them capable of moving the spectator to an essential
understanding of pity and terror. The connection between *gnosis* in
drama and *praxis* in life is the pain that human beings are able to
feel in the 'third area', described above by Winnicott, the space
'sacred to the individual for creative living'. Shakespeare points
over and over again to the alliance of personal pain and the capacity
to feel compassion: 'Let the superfluous and lust-dieted man/ That
slaves your ordinance, that will not see/ Because he does not feel...
(King Lear IV.1.68). In *Love's Labour's Lost* and *Much Ado About
Nothing* the shallow young men are taught to understand the feelings of
others through the growth of their own experience of suffering. But
joy and an image of the fulfilment of human desires is, equally, the
gift of poetry, and this, too, *The Tempest* provides.

iv. IDEALS AND DREAMS

One of the chief moral effects of literature according to
Sidney is the presentation of images, 'not what is but what should
be'. These poets

be they which most properly do imitate to teach and delight,
and to imitate borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall
be; but range into the divine consideration of what may be
and should be...and delight [will] move men to take that
goodness in hand which without delight they would fly as from
a stranger (pp. 102-03).
This can stand as motto for the dreams of the play, pointing out the need for 'a speaking picture of poesy' (p. 107). In The Tempest ideals of human society and human nature are presented as dream in many guises, ideal 'speaking pictures', of which the least enacted is the narration of Gonzalo's ideal commonwealth. The handling of Gonzalo's vision of an ideal society of the golden age illustrates a related point made by Sidney, who contrasts the poet's image with the weak effect of the philosophers' presentation, which Sidney says will not sink in. The discussion of the courtiers to cheer up Alonso takes the form of precisely what courtiers ought to be thinking about - government and society, but the affected courtiers are naturally not interested - it is unrealistic and old hat. Neither Gonzalo's audience in the play nor the spectators in the theatre will be persuaded to institute a golden age by Gonzalo's analysis, yet it is the paradigm for the play itself which, in the end, convinces - but till we get to that end, 'to be moved to do that which we know or to be moved with desire to know, hoc opus, hic labor est' (Sidney, p.113). In effect Gonzalo represents Sidney's hopeful philosophers, who will fail to persuade where literature succeeds.

Learned men have learnedly thought that where once reason hath so much overmastered passion as that the mind has a free desire to do well, the inward light each mind hath in itself is as good as a philosopher's book' (p. 113).

Gonzalo is learned for he knows all about Carthage and, implicitly but learnedly, he applies Cicero's enquiry in De Fato into the nature of fate to the Boatswain, whom fate has reserved for hanging. His Sancta simplicitas, '...all men idle, all,/ And women too, but
innocent and pure' (II.1.152) is bound to cause a guffaw. Though we accept Ferdinand's and Miranda's 'innocent and pure', we need the 'tale' and 'the divine image' to convince us, otherwise we are inclined to scoff with Antonio - 'whores and knaves'. Gonzalo's inconsistency in abolishing sovereignty though he imagines himself King is met with mockery:

Sebastian: 'Save his majesty!

Lacking Montaigne's persuasive and passionate discussion (which claims real proof of such a society in the man from Brazil), the vocabulary of the speech is comically tedious. Like a government white paper it is abstract, full of harsh consonantal phonetics 'execute', 'traffic', 'magistrate', 'contract', 'succession' and, like legal jargon, it is exhaustive: 'succession, Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none' (II.1.150); Polonius could not better it. In this case Shakespeare guides the audience's reaction through humour; though the spectators share Gonzalo's desires they cannot take him seriously. Shakespeare forstalls yawns by the witty and ribald handling of Gonzalo's contradictions and naïveté, yet he keeps the audience on the side of Gonzalo. When it is time to curtail this demonstration of the counsellor's approach, Alonso puts him down and answers: 'Prithee no more. Thou dost talk nothing to me', and we can only agree that Sidney advises well: 'Even in the most excellent determination of goodness, what philosopher's counsel can so readily direct a prince, as the feigned Cyrus in Xenophon?' (p. 108).

Just as the player's speech in Hamlet is one version of many
of the sack of Troy, so we have commonwealths in many guises here, shaped as the dream of life each man would wish for himself. Marion Trousdale gives a sample of the many sackings of Troy that everyone probably had to write at school according to the rules of copia, by which many different rhetorical approaches to the imagination were taught. For the lords, their dream of the brave new world is contrived by the gentle shapes who bring in the fairytale banquet. Since we accept the shapes, the mythical unicorns and phoenixes also instantly become credible, including the harpy whose horror is increased, as if half-credited sightings of the Yeti and the Loch Ness monster were suddenly proved true. The feast has many levels of significance - one obvious surface sense is the image of what the colonizers found when kindly natives treated them well and gave them of their abundant food. Another is the Colloquy of Erasmus, Convivium religiosum, the Godly Feast, well known throughout the period. Here the texts and discussions, interspersed with the pleasures of simple food in an ideal garden setting, are directly concerned with ideals of existence and with rulers, based on Proverbs 21:1-3, 'the King's heart is in the hand of the Lord...the Lord pondereth the hearts'. In the discussion it is suggested that 'God sometimes uses their madness or wickedness to correct sinners'. The second text the guests discuss is also relevant, from Matthew 6:24-25, 'ye cannot serve God and mammon...take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat'. Ultimately the lords are not ready for any ideal feast, which resembles the taking of Communion, since they are men of sin. The Shapes and music touch both audiences - the lords, and the spectators in the theatre - with the wonder of a fairy tale; however,
the universal desire for free meals rightly implicates the spectators in the shame of frustration when the banquet disappears in a thunder clap. This gracious group of islanders - whose 'excellent dumb discourse', their language, 'is more gentle-kind than of/ Our human generation you shall find/ Many, nay, almost any' (III.3.32) - could be a hidden, holy people, the ideal of mankind, so far off any ship's course that they might still be barely corrupted after the Fall, or they might be thought of as Edenic creatures near to man, but not tainted at all; the phrase could imply pre-lapsarian as well as non-human generation. The belief in devils as a literal element in the travel literature is matched by Utopian hopes, as we see in Montaigne, and figuratively in Bacon's *New Atlantis*. If so, the juxtaposition of these evil men is sinister, as Prospero says: 'Honest lord,/Thou hast said well; for some of you there present/ Are worse than devils' (III.3.34). The heaven which the harpy shows them is a just heaven: 'the powers, delaying not forgetting...do pronounce by me ling'ring perdition' (III.3.73). Not for them, then, the brave new mythical world of the explorers and free living. The evil colonizers' dreams of owning the earth is answered by their being outcasts of the earth, as long as they are impervious to the right knowledge of mankind and nature.

Caliban's inchoate heaven of desire is the opposite of Gonzalo's.

And then in dreaming
The clouds methought would open and show riches
Ready to drop upon me, that when I waked
I cried to dream again (III.2.138-141).
It is touching because we are surprised at Caliban dreaming, and it is one of the most morally stretching experiences of the play that we must give him his due. Yet his dream is materialistic, he thinks of riches (these might, indeed, release him from labour) yet his image of the heavens opening suggests a flood of light, too. His dream is beautiful because it affects him so passionately, but it is indistinct, in this resembling Bottom's dream: 'Masters, I am to discourse wonders - but ask me not what' (Midsummer Night's Dream, IV.2.26).

The charming joke as to Caliban's dream is that in the masque the heavens do open, for on the stage this dream within a dream (or play within a play) gives the palpable satisfaction of fulfilled desires, such as all betrothals envisage. For once the play within the play is frankly defined as an entertainment: 'no tongue! all ear! be silent! else', as we are afterwards told, 'The spell is marred' (IV.1.127). 'Spell' refers to the enchantment of drama, as well as to Prospero's own magical power in bringing about the illusion. 'I must use you in such another trick' Prospero says to Ariel: 'I must Bestow upon/this young couple/ Some vanity of my art: it is my promise, And they expect it of me'(IV.1.39). 'Trick' is defined as something slight, not serious, with an aspect of both 'illusory' and 'sham' in the OED. The many meanings of 'trick' associated with tricher, 'to cheat', shade into 'emptiness', 'worthlessness' when 'vanity' is added. The words 'trick' and 'vanity' thus also sound the note of doubt which is developed to the point of despair in Prospero's mutability speech immediately after. 'They expect it of me' deprecates the enterprise (though possibly in
mock modesty). Prospero does not stand by it as a product of his own choice. He suggests it is impromptu when Ferdinand praises him:

Ferdinand: This is a most majestic vision, and
    Harmonious charmingly. May I be bold
    To think these spirits?
Prospero: Spirits which by mine art
    I have from their confines called to enact
    My present fancies (IV.1.118).

If Shakespeare follows Aquinas in taking 'phantasy' to be 'uncontrolled', 'present fancies' suggests spontaneous composition; the spirits instantly interpret his 'fine frenzy', keeping pace with it as it 'invents'; the phrase denotes both the creative idealizing power of the playwright/magician's mind and an excuse that it is not more weighty. Ferdinand's 'majestic' deflects any royal members of the audience from considering it as too lowly. Ever more show would be needed to impress audiences used to the minimal plots and simplified attitudes of court masques and their growing displays of wealth, laboured stage machinery and architecture - which possibly was brought on in this masque as well. All this was admittedly in the interests of 'delightfulness'. Little artifice besides poetry, singing and dancing seems to be needed in The Tempest masque, even if the Folio direction of 'Iuno descends' indicates that Crane - perhaps describing a performance he saw - was impressed by some flying machinery. Ferdinand and Miranda drink it in. As impromptu, this modest masque is charming to all the senses, and in the pastoral mood - prosperous communities, many children, men living in harmony with the nature goddesses of classical mythology - the heavens open to nothing more supernatural than the eternal spring of the golden age,
fecundity and food; the place conjured up is the *locus amoenus* or pleasance, cited by Curtius, as well as many varieties of landscape, as Iris roams over the domains ruled by Ceres. (The significance of these is discussed in Chapter 4.) The poetic diction of one defining adjective per noun and the rhyming couplets bear out the generalising intention of the scene, it reproduces the known and expected. This surely has the function of Sidney's defence of idealizing painters:

The more excellent [sort of painters] who having no law but wit, bestow that in colours upon you which is fittest for the eye to see: as the constant though lamenting look of Lucretia when she punished in herself another's fault; wherein he painteth not Lucretia whom he never saw, but painteth the outward beauty of such a virtue (p. 102).

It was left to Wordsworth to break down the idealization expected of art, as Burney's critique shows, comparing Wordsworth's *Lyric Ballads* to the painters of the 'Dutch boors' instead of Raphael.

The scene takes up the two extremes of Gonzalo's 'innocent and pure' and Antonio's 'whores and knaves'. The Venus and Juno contretemps narrates the defeat of uncontrolled sexual passion in favour of Juno's *agape*, and Cupid's regression to childhood:

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Here thought they to have done
Some wanton charm upon this man and maid,
Whose vows are that no bed-right shall be paid
Till Hymen's torch be lighted; but in vain.
Mars's hot minion is returned again;
Her waspish-headed son has broke his arrows,
Swears he will shoot no more, but play with sparrows,
And be a boy right out. (IV.1.94)
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This is a reference to the didactic dialogue just before, where Prospero asserts dire consequences if sexual control is loosened. When warned not to break Miranda's 'virgin knot' before marriage,
Ferdinand asserts that far from behaving like Dido and Aeneas in 'murkiest den', he will wait for the 'edge of that day's celebration;/ When I shall think or Phoebus' steeds are foundered/ Or night kept chained below' (IV.1.29). The deflowering topos elevated to moral status is unattractive to modern readers - of desire whetted through delay while waiting for a bumper defloration of the objectified virgin. However, Ferdinand and Miranda have been previously developed as a mutual and equally attractive pair. Shakespeare habitually develops love and marriage as 'Friendly Fellowship' as Alan Sinfield suggests: 'Protestants legitimized sexual expression but without the male bravura of Ovidian love, and promoted idealism but without the frustration of romantic love. In Measure for Measure at least one pre-marital lapse is judged more kindly than in Prospero's warning of the subsequent loathly marriage bed:

Your brother and his lover have embraced.
As those that feed grow full, as blossoming time
That from the seedness the bare fallow brings
To teeming foison, even so her plenteous womb
Expresses his full tilth and husbandry.

(Measure for Measure, I.4.40)

The ideal lovers of The Tempest masque are to enjoy an earthly heaven of fruitfulness and harmony, which prompts Ferdinand to call it paradise (IV.1.124). This stands against the repressive concept of sexual virtue enforced in Vienna by Angelo on the one hand and against the image of universal sexual debasement as represented by the stews in that play and in Pericles. As often, The Tempest summarizes themes extensively explored in previous plays. The question of freedom as control is discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to Ferdinand
and Miranda. De Grazia notes this theme as a central one in *The Tempest*: 'Concerned with the possibility of an harmonious state or society, the play asks if action can be controlled without physical goads and checks'. Thus the play itself is a dream play, concerned with the human dream of paradise voiced by Gonzalo, and with perfect and mutual love as explored by the uncorrupted and uncoquettish Miranda. In contrast the potentially tragic plot shows the real world disastrously disordered and corrupt. At any rate the masque corresponds to Sidney's description of the ideal pastoral scene,

> nature never set forth the earth in so rich tapestry as divers poets have done; neither with pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet smelling flowers, nor whatsoever else may make the too much loved earth more lovely. Her world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden (p. 100).

When Prospero remembers Caliban, the extreme 'golden' fictionality of Prospero's masque comes home to him. In the flight of his 'present fancy', Prospero's poet's eye has literally been 'in a fine frenzy rolling', quite literally, 'glancing from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven' (*Midsummer Night's Dream*, V.1.12). But Prospero is returned to the common world in his memory of evil, which destroys the *gnosis* and *energeia* of the poet's golden world. Prospero's stroke of memory is akin to that realization which he himself orchestrated for the lords. Lulled and credulous at the banquet of Shapes, they were off their guard and thus receptive through shock; the banquet served as a cunning *exordium* condoning a dream, all the more to 'unsettle their fancy', so that Ariel's words will 'bite their spirits'. Prospero in turn pays for his masque dream with an antimasque - a stripping away of all fiction. Hankins
suggests that when Prospero remembers Caliban he experiences a sense of disorder which is akin to a kind of ecstasy: 'Ecstasy is a form of excessive feeling including madness but not limited to madness'. 'Before Prospero spoke, Ferdinand noted that he felt strongly moved, and afterwards Prospero felt faint, "a turn or two I'll walk/ To still my beating mind" (IV.2.143).' Though the word 'ecstasy' is not used, Shakespeare is illustrating the elevation of mind described by Aquinas and ascribed to the poet in Theseus' speech. This elevation of mind may reveal flashes of insight beyond the ordinary perceptions of reason and sense. Gonzalo uses the word for a different frenzy, for the recognition of evil that the lords feel: 'hinder them from what this ecstasy/May now provoke them to' (III.3.110). The poetics of the speech searches out a vocabulary of deconstruction, exploiting three topoi that themselves deconstruct reality: 'the ruins of time', theatrum mundi, and 'life is a dream'. The activities of man are expressed as buildings which denote sociable man - 'the cloudcapped towers, the gorgeous palaces,/The solemn temples, the great globe itself'; in the pun on the Globe as theatre and as the earth the theatrum mundi is summarized, and the theme underlined: life is no more real than the evanescent masque they were so enchanted by:

Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits, and
Are melted into air, into thin air,
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep. Sir I am vexed (IV.1.148).
The nouns cluster in semantic groups, moving from the solid to the vanished in the dimension of space: the bodily 'actors' were themselves illusions in the play within the play, and become invisible as 'spirits', from 'spirit' to 'air' and less - 'thin air'. The verbs conceive of matter as turning liquid, gaseous and being gone; they 'melt', 'dissolve', 'fade', 'leave [nothing] behind'. The masque was 'fabric', though without the stone foundations of the other buildings, which are as solid as man can build; it is merely a 'vision' that has the sense of mirage, because the 'pageant' was a show, not substance: it was so 'insubstantial' that there is not even a 'rack', a cloud of vapour to show for so subjective a thing. 'We' begin as 'stuff', but are 'dream', which is a mere image of stuff in a sleeping mind, until 'sleep' alone without dream represents the classical 'endless night'. Man's existential position in time and space is undermined by infinity. Time has no meaning, the sky is not the heaven from which goddesses descend, but vacant space. It is Prospero's speech of despair because it denies spiritual meaning to life, like Antonio's judgement on the sleeping Alonso: 'Here lies your brother,/ No better than the earth he lies upon,/ If he were that which now he's like - that's dead' (II.1.279). These sceptical topoi are by no means exhausted to this day - in the field of semiotics current concepts assert relativity of meaning and being. If Prospero fears life is a dream, life is fiction in such concepts as 'technologies of the self'. However, in the non-final position in which Prospero's despair speech occurs, it has a lyrical dimension which gives the audience a peculiar pleasure. There is a sense of community in that the actors (as characters) and audience together
identify a 'world sorrow' which they savour within the 'safe' time of
the play, much as Jaques 'can suck melancholy from a song as a weasel
sucks eggs' (As You Like It, II.5.11). and as Sidney gets pleasure
from the ballad. Sidney makes a point of the 'safety', in asserting
Plato's method as poetic: 'though the inside and strength were
Philosophy, the skin as it were and beauty depended most of poetry:
for all standeth upon dialogues wherein he feigneth many honest
burgesses of Athens to speak of such matters, that, if they had been
set on the rack, they would never have confessed them' (p. 97). The
quality of the elegiac is its power to move:

Is it the lamenting Elegiac [which is misliked]? Which in a
kind heart would move rather pity than blame, who bewails with
the great philosopher Heraclitus the weakness of mankind and
the wretchedness of the world; who is surely to be praised,
either for compassionate accompanying just causes of
lamentation, or for rightly pointing out how weak be the
passions of woefulness (p.116).

Shepherd points out that Sidney presents elegiac verse as primarily
reflective, moralizing verse (p. 187 n.28). Certainly Prospero's
speech falls in with Ecclesiastes: 'All is but most vain vanitie, saith the
preacher'. More than this, Sidney attributes a divine power to
poetic language: 'that same exquisite observing of number and measure
in words, and that high flying liberty of conceit proper to the poet,
did seem to have some divine force in it' (p.99). Sidney takes a
liberty in proclaiming the Bible as poetry 'which is among us thrown
down to so ridiculous an estimation' when he asserts that the Psalms
of David 'with his telling of the beasts' joyfulness, and hills
leaping (are) a heavenly poesy, wherein almost he showeth himself a
passionate lover of that unspeakable and everlasting beauty to be seen

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by the eyes of the mind, only cleared by faith' (p.99). Prospero's language in the despair speech is still heavenly poesy (in many senses). Prospero is looking for heaven, but it is faith that has deserted Prospero. Yet only after a sceptical acceptance of man's little life can faith be known. This crisis of despair is salutary for Prospero and subsequently he revalues all his learning through it. When later he relinquishes his staff and book he understands that he has paradoxically found what he was looking for in his pursuit of knowledge. The insights of his speech showed him the 'little life' of man, but they do not necessarily imply an anti-intellectual view. This is something Hooker warns against: 'An opinion hath spread itself very far in the world, as if the way to be ripe in faith were to be raw in wit and judgement; as if reason were an enemy unto Religion, childish Simplicity the mother of ghostly and divine wisdom'. Rather, Donne defines the 'giddy and vertiginous circle' in which Prospero finds himself in his search for meaning:

The University is a Paradise, Rivers of knowledge are there, Arts and Sciences flow from thence...bottomlesse depths of unsearchable counsels there. But those Aquae quietudinum, which the prophet speaks of...they flow à magistro bono, from this good master...All knowledge that begins not, and ends not with his glory, is but a giddy, but a vertiginous circle, but an elaborate and exquisite ignorance.

Prospero is shaken in those certainties which allowed him to control nature and the lives of others. In relinquishing control he finds his place as an equal of men rather than an equal of God. In the epilogue the drama is presented as a communal act, in which Prospero defines himself as powerless and equal with all mankind. The word
'despair' is not raised again until the epilogue, when the solution to the despair is spelt out:

And my ending is despair  
Unless I be relieved by prayer,  
Which pierces so that it assaults  
Mercy itself, and frees all faults (V.1.333).

Inside and outside the fictional time of the play this must apply. The prayer both begs and asserts faith, a circular logic which defines the nature of faith: one must have faith to pray but faith is what one prays for. Margreta de Grazia quotes Thomas Wilson in *The Rule of Reason* where 'the cuckoo's song' describes the attempt by 'thynges doubtful...to prove thynges that are as doubtfull'. She refers this logical cancelling out to Othello, who 'believes what he sees, and sees what he believes'. Faith, the converse of doubt, we might say, follows the same illogical principle. Thus the play offers no view of reality to counter Prospero's despair that is not contingent on 'if', 'unless' - 'your "If" is the only peace-maker; much virtue in "If"' (*As You Like It*, V.4.99). Faith is self-fulfilling in life as in art and is an act of will. This, too, is the conclusion as regards love's truth that Miranda comes to in the scene of mutual wooing. Truth, too, is an act of faith and will (see Chapter 5C). This faith is the subject of the last plays: these all explore the faith which activates fiction, and which in turn maintains and teaches faith in life and love - Sidney's *gnosis* which is also *praxis*. 'It is required you do awake your faith' (*The Winter's Tale*) meets the case. The statue of Hermione can live if the spectator wills his faith - the suspension of disbelief - to give it life, the spectator being both
Leontes and himself. This is the magic of the mutual faith exchanged by those who come to the play and those who make and enact it in a common search for the experience of meaning. Therefore Prospero is the magician, perforce standing in also for Shakespeare, as a maker of plays and a maker of faith. Prospero ends with an assertion of faith in the last of all the dreams of heaven, in which prayer succeeds, and Mercy is herself.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2A


2. Sir Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry or The Defence of Poesy, edited by Geoffrey Shepherd (London, 1965), p. 141. In this chapter, all subsequent quotations from this edition will be indicated by a page reference only, in brackets after the quotation.


13. Harington, sig. 4.


15. Harington, sig. ¶ 3.


23. Craig, pp. 199-200 and notes 51 and 52.

24. Hankins, p. 90.


30. Waugh, p. 28, and Ortega y Gasset, quoted in Waugh, p. 28.


Two women...we tooke. The olde wretch, whom divers of our Saylers supposed to be eyther a Divell, or a Witch, had her buskins plucked off, to see if she were cloven footed, and for her ougly hewe and deformitie, we let her goe.

37. Hankins, p.91.


43. Hankins, pp.94-95.


CHAPTER 2B

THE TRUTH OF FICTION:

THE EPILOGUE

The epilogue is the densest of all the speeches in the play. In its punning vocabulary and imagery, it is semantically multi-functional in different layers of the stage/audience relationship. It is the moment when the bonds of play loosen and again 'thy state is taken for a join'd-stool, thy golden sceptre for a leaden dagger, and thy precious rich crown for a pitiful bald crown' (Henry IV, Part 1, II.4.370):

Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
And what strength I have's mine own,
Which is most faint. Now 'tis true
I must be here confined by you,
Or sent to Naples. Let me not,
Since I have my dukedom got,
And pardoned the deceiver, dwell
In this bare island by your spell,
But release me from my bands
With the help of your good hands.
Gentle breath of yours my sails
Must fill, or else my project fails,
Which was to please. Now I want
Spirits to enforce, art to enchant;
And my ending is despair
Unless I be relieved by prayer,
Which pierces so that it assaults
Mercy itself, and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardoned be,
Let your indulgence set me free (V.1.319).

As the unity between players and audience dissolves, the speech keeps in play the triple identity of fiction. In this complex task, the octosyllabic couplets sound unstrained; the triple puns, which are at once serious and arch, confer easy insight on complex awareness. The triple
identity of fiction intertwines speaker, language and audience in a 'three-way relationship', to borrow a phrase from Robert Payne which he applies to the classical view of rhetorical discourse. In applying this to dramatic fiction, I here include under 'speaker' the 'maker', both actor and playwright; and under 'language' the whole action, text, or game that is performed. Sidney, it will be remembered, worries about mixing up oratory and fiction: 'But what? methinks I deserve to be pounded for straying from Poetry to Oratory' (p.139) but Payne points out that 'the gradual evolution of one branch of rhetorica into poetria in the Middle Ages is first the blurring and then the redefining of the ways language mediates between speaker and audience'. This triple world of fiction represented simultaneously in the puns, then, mirrors the story in which actors and audience have lived for a few hours. The passage clarifies the main thrust of the play, and calls the audience back from the fictional world - it was the actors (and playwright) whose art realized the fiction. This transition now ensures the right mood of release in the end game, neatly inviting a plaudite. The prayer unites the real world and the story world for actors and audience alike, forcibly asserting the moral, that one must be merciful and forgiving. By the parallelism of Prospero asking for God's forgiveness while the actor asks for the indulgence of the audience because they in turn will need pardons, the moral stresses the identity of the play and the real world. It is not a play the audience may leave behind, the Epilogue implies, but one they have to incorporate into their future living. The fictional characters, the actors in their given relation with the public for a 'play' occasion, and the public are all three in the theatre of the world which has no walls, and whose ruler, God, rules all of them for eternity. It is because men all want mercy
that the fiction was predetermined - Prospero had to 'pardon the deceiver' (V.1.325). Ralegh's verse sums up the relationship neatly, except that the threat of punishment rather than mercy ends his analogy of life as a play:

What is our life? a play of passion,
Our mirth the musicke of diuision,
Our mothers wombes the tyring houses be,
Where we are dressed for this short Comedy,
Heaven the Judicious sharpe spectator is,
That sits and markes still who doth act amisse,
Our graves that hide us from the searching Sun,
Are like drawne curtaynes when the play is done,
Thus march we playing to our latest rest,
Only we dye in earnest, that's no Iest.4

The Prospero actor tells the audience that he has acted a comedy, for which the bargain was a happy ending, but it was no 'Iest'.

Prospero begins the epilogue with 'please you draw near', thus wiping out the demarcation line of the play space; now audience is itself actor, playing with Prospero who is simultaneously acknowledged as actor. 'And what strength I have's mine own/ Which is most faint' (V.1.320) applies both to Prospero and the actor, no longer hallowed by the separated play space; furthermore his speech leads up to an invitation to clap, which clearly marks the dual persona of the speaker. The text of the epilogue maintains the time/place location of the fiction, but points out the theatre location as well. What remains to be done is to get Prospero off the island and the actor off the stage in the same moment of time both fictional and 'real' (Shakespeare, however, asserts the equal reality of both by the end of the epilogue). The two locations are signified by 'bare' denoting the stage, and 'island' denoting the fiction: 'Let me not...dwell/ In this bare island by your spell' (V.1.323). There is a
transfer of power from the actor in his glory to the audience as judging consumer, and from Prospero the manipulator to Prospero who has humbly identified himself with mankind, well represented by the audience, to whom he now humbles himself as well. It is now the audience who can wield spells, but 'Prospero has pardoned the deceiver' (Antonio), so they in turn should accept Prospero's 'deceptions', the magician's illusions - which incidentally parallel the illusions proper to drama which have been thematic throughout the play. The audience, half in and half out of the play as though waking from a dream, needs both to feel, and to understand, if they are to applaud spontaneously with a sense of fulfilment. Clapping and bravos - 'gentle breath', not hissing and booing - has to be orchestrated, in the face of the hybrid emotional reaction to tragicomedy. In the comedies the audience is in high spirits at a happy ending, with occasional song or dance, and laughter. A comedy takes audiences out of themselves. The momentousness of tragedy commands awe and assent. Is tragicomedy to have a heavy or a light stress at the end? Shakespeare opts for both with a Chaplinesque mixed tone. Prospero is a sadder, wiser man, and his spirits are low when 'every third thought shall be [his] grave' (V.1.311). However, the actor is merry with his punning, and direct in wanting 'to please'. The continuing fiction after the end energizes the audience with a personal and positive involvement with Prospero, the magician, which adds just enough new tension, like being invited on to the stage to assist the conjurer. Sidney is half dogmatic on the 'mingling' of plays that are 'neither right tragedies nor right comedies', yet he allows a qualification - mingling kings and clowns could be justified when 'the matter so carrieth it', but not when the clowns are 'thrust in by head and shoulders...so as neither the admiration and
commiseration, nor the right sportfulness, is by their mongrel tragi-comedy obtained. Sidney is right in principle - who could foresee the tragic fool of Lear? The ending of tragicomedies is problematic. In The Tempest the tone is in balance from beginning to end. The choice for The Winter's Tale is to juxtapose the finding of the baby by the shepherds upon the tragic ending of the first half, to mark a transition from court to country, age to youth, dying to birth, punishment to forgiveness. Time is the catalyst for the change here. In The Tempest Shakespeare is clearly working to create a single tragicomic tone. Guarini may be right when he suggests that tragicomedy is essentially Christian and religious. 'What need have we today to purge terror and pity with tragic sights, since we have the precepts of our most holy religion?' The Tempest, in openly being a repentance play, certainly conforms to Guarini's view. The audience is guided towards a better understanding of the inwardness of the play: vocabulary clusters set the issues of the play against each other: 'art', 'spirits', 'strength', which 'enforced', 'enchanted', are now termed 'faint', 'overthrown', 'wanting'; Prospero at the end of the fiction and the actor at the end of the play speak as one - the play event itself has been the magical illusion as paradigm for Prospero's own magical effects which are and are not Nature. 'Despair', 'faults', 'crimes' seek 'pardon', 'mercy', 'indulgence'. This could refer partly to Warburton's suggestion that necromancers were in despair at their last moments, but that their friends' prayers could be efficacious, although Kermode argues that this is inconsistent with the harmless theurgist that Prospero has been, not a Faustian goetist; however, Orgel points out that the ambivalence is there throughout the play. The latter tallies with my view that the audience's understanding and rapport is built on traditional
responses to begin with, though these become qualified and refined through the course of the play (see Chapter 1B). The speaker of the epilogue in his triple persona of actor, playwright and Prospero pleads for pardon for different aspects of this drama about a necromancer and one of these pleas for pardon is likely to be about necromancy. The word 'crime' cannot apply to anything as light as a badly performed play. The epilogue, then, reinforces the ambiguity - 'charms', 'spell', 'enchant', 'spirits', 'art' are words which give a pleasant colouring to the magic. 'Crimes' seem to hedge bets, just in case a dark view is taken of the magic. Is the judge God, the King, members of the audience? Several critics suggest that The Franklin's Tale of Chaucer influenced Shakespeare. In Chaucer the magical illusions make exciting reading, but are somewhat scorned.

At Orliens in studie a book he say
Of magyk natureel...
Which book spak muchel of the operaciouns
Touchyng the eighte and twenty mansiouns
That longen to the moone, and swich folye
As in oure dayes is nat worth a flye -
For hooly chirches feith in oure bileve
Ne suffreth noon illusioun us to greve.

At the same time the revival of Hermetism at just the period of The Tempest allows a contrary view of magic as an 'ancient divinely inspired, and proto-Christian religious wisdom'.

The epilogue speaker fears confinement by the audience just as most of the characters had been variously confined during the course of the fiction and begs to be 'released', as well as 'set free' from faults. The punning continues: the power of words in prayer, which encode the power of spirit, is set against 'Spirits' - 'now I want/ Spirits to enforce, art to enchant' (V.1.331); a true word, however, which is one containing spirit,
does 'enforce'. Prayer 'pierces' the ear of God, 'assaults' the heights of heaven, not 'the cloud-capped towers', in a battle where the meek inherit the earth. The meekness is exemplified in the reference to the Lord's prayer: 'As you from crimes would pardoned be,/ Let your indulgence set me free' (5.1.337). This last couplet, though also referring to clapping, logically raises the epilogue to a religious act, particularly as 'crime' is an unequivocally strong word. OED entries for the period illustrate definitions of 'an act punishable by law' and 'a sin, especially of a grave character'. The two meanings of the word 'indulgence' are both secular and doctrinal at once. The OED gives the meaning 'favourable forbearance' and 'remission of sin'. This pun identifies church and theatre as one, where audiences are congregations and actors are preachers, because the human condition before God applies at all times - the theatrical space/time of the fiction has aimed to indicate its infinity and ambiguity. The fiction has not shown us a world in little as much as expanded our sense of the world. Thus the prayer in the epilogue takes us beyond death to the day of judgement. In the play, too, the grave awaits Prospero in Milan, where 'every third thought shall be my grave' (V.1.311). A long dynastic history of colonization awaits his child, figured in the game of chess. Miranda encourages Ferdinand to play false if need be - for 'a score of Kingdoms you should wrangle' (V.1.174). The Powers are mentioned by many names, yet Prospero's vision after the masque acknowledges the possibility of an eternity of Nothing.

The prayer which Prospero recounts is both a statement of faith and an act of belief. Thus it is praxis, an efficacious act. It is enjoined upon the audience too. They must do as the Lord's prayer says, asking for forgiveness. The clapping audience then, in one self-same
action pardons Prospero the necromancer, rewards the actor for his work, and acknowledges faith on three levels – in this play, in prayer, and in mercy. The bravos are the 'auspicious gales' that will send Prospero to Naples, and augur well for the next performance. The word clusters centre on power, crime, constraint, reversed to meekness, pardon, freedom. This is the Christian paradox which gives power to the humble and humbles the powerful. The play has proved itself a virtuous discourse such as Sidney expects, though aware of accusations against poesy: 'For I will not deny but that man's wit may make Poesy, which should be eikastike, which some learned have defined, "figuring forth good things", to be phantastike, which doth contrariwise infect the fancy with unworthy objects.¹²

There remain questions about Shakespeare's presence in the play. Behind every text which is read or enacted there looms an author, even if sublimely unacknowledged, like the writer of the book of Job who confidently records conversations between God and Satan. In so instructive a play about the nature of drama, is Shakespeare demonstrated there as rhetor in any deliberate way? Certainly he is one degree more revealed to the audience in the epilogue when the actor speaks directly to the audience, albeit still in the guise of Prospero. In speaking directly to the audience the actor stresses the fact of his impersonation, his own actor-presence, now that the audience is being asked to clap. The author is perforce acknowledged along with the actor in this applause. In fact Shakespeare makes a point within the play, of the relation between the actor and the author. At the end of the harpy speech Shakespeare had outlined exactly what portion of the work is due to the actor and what to the writer:
Bravely the figure of this harpy hast thou
Performed, my Ariel; a grace it had, devouring.
Of my instruction hast thou nothing bated
In what thou hadst to say; so with good life
And observation strange my meaner ministers
Their several kinds have done (III.3.83)

This describes pronunciatio and memoria, delivery and memory, as the task of the actor: 'grace' for delivery, and 'nothing bated' for memory. It is made crystal clear that Prospero gave instructions and that 'what [thou] hadst to say' was planned by him, through the processes of inventio, Dispositio and elocutio may or may not have been left to Ariel. At any rate Prospero has had the central planning within the five categories of discourse. Not only text but instructions have been provided for Ariel, as well as the scene with 'meaner ministers' as the Shapes. Ariel is the servant, not the master, but still the master is invisible and can do nothing without the actor. Through the play Ariel performs several tasks on his own initiative or in his own way, but in this important speech - the least certain, the most vital in its effect in all of Prospero's plans - there is no improvisation but a successful planned performance. It is uncertain in its effects because the court party are to recover their consciences, not by enchantment but as free agents. Both doctrine and eloquence are necessary to pierce these hardened hearts after so many years. The eloquence required has to be, and is, something quite out of the ordinary. Prospero's conjuring illusions of the banquet scene, calling Virgil's high art to his aid, prove to be as great a success as his arranged plotting for Miranda and Ferdinand's spontaneous falling in love. The 'persuasion' in this example could be a paradigm for the whole play. It lies in the combination of carrot and stick, pleasure and pain, which characterizes Shakespeare's play as a whole, with storms and survival, the
iron age and the golden age, threats and promises - a perfect realization of the tragicomic form. The aim of the harpy speech is to achieve a moral effect on the courtiers and this, we have seen, is also true of the larger structure of the play as a whole in its effect on the audience. The harpy scene encapsulates the relation of playwright and actor, and their intentions, in the persuasive act. When the epilogue speaker repents, the dramatist is implicated.

And my ending is despair
Unless I be relieved by prayer,
Which pierces so that it assaults
Mercy itself, and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardoned be
Let your indulgence set me free (V.I.333)

Since the dramatist is inseparable from the actor who speaks the dramatist's words in the epilogue, the repentance must also be his. Prospero speaks as a character now acknowledged to be fictional, and he represents the embodied invention of the playwright more openly.

Is the prayer put there to relieve Shakespeare's guilt at writing about the necromancer Prospero, or a general guilt as playwright, or as a man? Is this acknowledgement of guilt a rettractio by Shakespeare in the manner of Chaucer, in which he includes himself in the image of Prospero, who has given up but did practise the dubious art of illusion? Is it by implication, therefore, Shakespeare's farewell to the stage? The puns plait together the religious humility of Prospero with an equally submissive stance by the artist to a judging but merciful audience. But the audience is not God - playmakers and audience are conscious of 'crimes' and join Prospero in prayer. The moral and artistic values are thus considered together in this epilogue but they exist separately in moral philosophy, and could be re-named 'prudential' and 'productive' according
The double aspect of 'doing well' is the subject of this debate - as a man, and as an artist who is possibly writing 'well' but potentially about evil subject matter. 'Doing well' in the two different senses characterizes the problem of an author's moral responsibility. Trimpi points out the distinction between the prudential and productive faculties in the concepts of the arts in the thinking in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, which accounts for the ambivalent situation in Chaucer's retractio, too. It is 'the distinction between the judgement of an artist with respect to the quality of his product and the judgement of him with respect to his actions as a moral agent'. This discussion is traced by Trimpi through Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Augustine, Plutarch and Cicero among others, before reaching Christian considerations for Boccaccio and Chaucer. In general terms, the distinction led to a separation of art and morality, the former then being defined as an activity of the productive faculty, while 'morality' writing was an activity of the prudential faculty. 'While the resulting amorality of the arts did much to render them suspect, it also could provide them, to some extent, with a doctrinal immunity'. Plutarch develops Aristotle to the effect that what pleases us is not whether the object imitated is beautiful or ugly in itself but the likeness the artist achieves technically. In the case of dramatic actions as well, the reader distinguishes the morality of the content...from the art...with which it is imitated...Aristotle asserts, one cannot reject the art of rhetoric just because in the wrong hands it can be abused...the artist as artist loses all his immunity from prudential criteria only when his potentially harmful product can be used in no possible beneficial way.

This is the line taken by the Christian mediaeval writers cited by Trimpi. Quintilian is taken as cogent backer for the view that "justice becomes
yet more manifest from the contemplation of injustice" and "many are the things proved by their contraries". The artist, then, has a double position, as an artist bound to 'imitate well' and as a man bound to do good. It is up to the consumer to respond to the evil that might be shown in art and to make his own prudential moral choices and avoid corruption. Thus Chaucer, like the later Sidney perhaps, leans towards a prudential viewpoint. He retracts all but 'certain works written for our doctrine' because, Trimpi suggests, the latter have an explicit prudential value 'for the man who - like himself from then on (it is his farewell to literature) - is simply to be a member of the community he has been addressing. Earlier, works such as Troilus and Criseyde and The Canterbury Tales appeared to take no ethical responsibility for their audience'. An unequivocal position, however, is stated by the Parson:

'Thou getest fable noon ytold for me;
For Paul, that writeth unto Thymothee,
Repreveth hem that weyven soothfastnesse,
And tellen fables and swich wrecchednesse'.

Payne points out that, at the other end of opinion on 'literary value', the Pardoner makes a good case. 'For though myself be a ful vicious man/
A moral tale yet I yow telle kan'. Trimpi shows Chaucer defending himself as in the The Miller's Tale, 'men shal nat maken ernest of game'. But, says Trimpi, 'the period of artistic immunity is delimited [when Chaucer retires] after which the artist must soon function again in a communal world'. Yet both Parson and Pardoner are extremes in this respect. The middle position is that the artist is justified because it is precisely through 'his release from ethical and historical circumstances that the artist can establish a temporary order of events and emotions
which has the power to increase the listener's understanding of the communal world after he has returned to it'. The Tempest epilogue exploits this transition stage. It applies the moral of the play to the moral world of the audience's life. Shakespeare is implicated, in having responsibility for the text, but its very theme is crime and punishment/forgiveness, not crime condoned. Furthermore, it contains essential doctrine, which should grace him in his prudential dimension. The hope must be that the evils shown in the story produce a powerful effect towards virtue in the audience. But now the triple speaker is half in and half out of the fiction, stepping back into the world where the moral, prudential values are to be observed, and in this in-between stage these evils are to be apologized for - Shakespeare has already done this with a fine irony in the last scene where the devil Caliban says 'I'll be wise hereafter, And seek for grace'. On both productive and prudential levels, the play has moved the audience to sound moral responses. The ambiguity has concerned the demonstration of the acts of magic, but the play is triumphant in its demonstration of the magical ways of art which teaches virtue. Yet in a Christian community of that period the conjurer and the artist share the suspect art of illusion as an infringement of a simple, single truth. After all Robinson envisages for Chaucer a farewell suggesting a change of heart about fiction, such as Sinfield suggests Sidney was moving towards:

It seems that puritanism was gaining ground on humanism in Sidney's last months...he began to translate the Psalms and Du Plessis-Mornay's treatise on The Trueness of the Christian Religion...Greville tells us that on his deathbed Sidney wished to destroy the book [the revised Arcadia] altogether'.

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Robinson says of Chaucer, 'Such a repudiation of most of his life work...can hardly be regarded as impossible, or even improbable' citing a list of Christian writers who did just that, including Boccaccio, St Augustine and Chaucer's friend Sir Lewis Clifford. I suggest Trimpi's distinction of the writer taking off his 'singing robes' and changing into his 'prudential' self is a possible way of seeing Shakespeare's self in the figure of Prospero. The cloak, though not exactly a singing robe, confers a special power: 'Lie there, my art' says Prospero after the storm, as he takes off his cloak, and then speaks as a father and as merely a disappointed human being. Perhaps the double intent of Gower's leave-taking is closer to Shakespeare's:

And now to speke as in final,
Touchende that y undirtok
In englesch forto make a book
Which stant betwene ernest and game.

The case for Shakespeare's farewell to the stage in Prospero's breaking of his staff and drowning of his book is not proven in the shadowy author whom we cannot detach from his character Prospero. Rather, the epilogue stresses the oneness of the triple figure speaking for character, actor and author as he draws in the audience to digest the experience. The epilogue emphasizes the indivisible wholeness of the play and the community, and rather asserts the moral efficacy of the playwright's art than the contrary.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2B


13. William Armstrong gives examples of the use of the words 'instruction' and 'counsell', and recorded memories of Shakespeare as both maker of text and guide to actors. William A. Armstrong, 'Actors and Theatres', Shakespeare Survey, 17 (1965), 191-204 (p. 195).


20. 'The Parson's Prologue', lines 31-34, in Robinson's *Chaucer*, p. 228.
22. 'The Miller's Prologue', line 3186, in Robinson's *Chaucer*, p. 48.
25. Robinson's *Chaucer*, p. 16.
CHAPTER 3

EDEN THEMES

As shown in Chapter 1, language is made to figure forth the social and moral fabric of the play's community. The concept of Eden, above all, is the concept of a community blessed by God (or the gods) and inspired to harmony, and this is the controlling vision of \textit{The Tempest}. Themes and images connected with a return to paradise abound. The play shows Prospero's maturing as a ruler preserved by providence for the recovery of his kingdom, but free to succeed or fail. His intentions are tested both against Gonzalo's shallower but idealistic speculations concerning a golden age society, and against Christian ideals of rightful and harmonious rule. Individual perfection is envisaged for love and lovers and the families that spring from them. Another aspect of man's return to happiness, common to all the last plays, is the apparent resurrection of a loved one believed to be dead - here Ferdinand restored to Alonso, and Prospero restored to his 'poor Milan'. The spirit of epiphany in which these reunions occur is intensely communicated to the audience in these plays, but the joy that is enacted is nevertheless weighted with past suffering. Beyond this there are dreams, visions, glimpses and doubts of divine revelations. Pericles alone among the sufferers in the late plays hears the divine music, but Caliban too has his vision of the heavens opening, though only in a dream. Like Catherine's vision of a banquet in \textit{Henry VIII}, with its eucharistic implications, the banquet image in \textit{The Tempest} suggests a similar
significance and is snatched untasted from the undeserving lords, to underline their unreadiness for the insights of grace. The masque of goddesses is an 'insubstantial pageant' and remains unfinished. The dream or vision images suggest an unimaginable revelation which cannot be enacted, lying beyond the plays and human knowledge.

Idealist themes and images are counterpointed in equal measure by political pessimism. Most of the characters seek the power which the play insists is by divine right Prospero's, and which they do not comprehend, yet Prospero himself learns to balance justice and mercy with difficulty, and his rule remains precarious, while Gonzalo's image of the ideal society naively ignores the corrupt nature of men demonstrated by the play. The island, the place where these men display their social relations and intentions, is partly an image of the garden, with protean flora and fauna, but it also represents an Eden where nature is enslaved and abused; it is finally freed not only from the perversions of Sycorax but also from Prospero's exploitation of it for his own ends through the enforced service of Ariel. Thus images of a perfect world place the problems of society, rule and land in a moral perspective, enabling the play to measure Prospero's political achievement or failure, and to estimate difficulty and hope.

Inevitably, ideas of new Eden are political; since they are concerned with perfecting society they must deal with concepts of rule. The self-contradictory would-be king Gonzalo, ignoring the Fall, thinks that the state will wither away along with other evils of society, needing 'no sovereignty' (II.1.154).

I'th Commonwealth I would by contraries Execute all things, for no kind of traffic Would I admit; no name of magistrate;
Letters should not be known; riches, poverty,
And use of service, none;...
All things in common nature should produce
Without sweat or endeavour. Treason, felony,
Sword, pike, knife, gun, or need of any engine
Would I not have, but nature should bring forth
Of it own kind all poison, all abundance
To feed my innocent people (II.1.145, 156).

The contrast between this and Prospero's task of rule is implied throughout the play and is the subject of this chapter. It is through labour that Prospero redeems his own past and the evils of his population. Labour, not ease, is the means for all the characters to reclaim paradise. Ferdinand, whose physical log-bearing is a simple metaphor for this, as well as a lesson in humility, believes he can taste paradise already when he is freed from his task to live with Miranda as his Eve. He begs for nothing more - 'let me live here ever' - and finds that 'so rare a wondered father and a wife/ Makes this place paradise' (4.1.123). He is puzzled when Prospero interrupts the masque to fight further evils that he is not aware of.

In this chapter Prospero's task of rule is examined in terms of the sacred ideas of kingship current at the time, and in relation to the courtly milieu of James I. As a Christian king James was the focus for both literal and literary hopes for an ideal society. These hopes relate at this time to millenarian beliefs, to colonization, and also to the person of James (or to his family) as leader of a sacred empire. New Eden is in the air - as belief, dream or ideal.
i. CHRISTIAN CONCEPTS OF RULE

Concepts of rule at this date are necessarily Christian. Beginning with Tyndale's *The Obedience of a Christen Man*,¹ the identification of religion and kingship is everywhere evident in England throughout the period from the early 16th century onwards, reinforced by frequent Acts of Uniformity and Supremacy.² It is clear that in Shakespeare's plays kingship is considered sacred: the body politic is seen as a microcosm of a heavenly order, and disorder in rule automatically disorders both natural phenomena and social bonds in that kingdom. Shakespeare's attitudes to kingship in his plays appear to be representative of the common viewpoint of his time. A few examples of the many available will suffice to illustrate some relevant aspects of the Christian view of kingship, stretching over a hundred years from Wilson's *Rule of Reason* in 1551 to Hobbes's *Leviathan* published in 1651.

Hobbes's interests and attitudes are those we see active in *The Tempest*. Hobbes, only a generation younger than Shakespeare, writes from an understanding of the same society as he; the years of Shakespeare's maturity were the years of Hobbes's education. He published his political doctrine, in different versions but with no substantial changes, from 1640 onwards. He defines his purpose:

> to set before mens eyes the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience; of which the condition of Humane Nature, and the laws Divine (both Naturall and Positive) require an inviolable observation.³

Half of *Leviathan* is concerned with a specifically Christian commonwealth and the 'Kingdome of Darknesse'; Hobbes's authority is
mainly the Bible treated as historical truth. Angels and daemons are seriously discussed and the world view does not seem to differ from that of *The Tempest*. Hobbes's analysis of the identity of civil and religious rule is forcefully stated:

But where God himselfe, by supernatuarall Revelation, planted Religion...the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Domination, hath there no place (*Leviathan*, p. 178).

The question of the Authority of the Scriptures is reduced to this, Whether Christian Kings...be absolute in their own Territories, immediately under God; or subject to one Vicar of Christ, constituted over the Universall Church; to be judged, condemned, deposed, and put to death, as hee shall think expedient, or necessary for the common good (*Leviathan*, p. 427).

A Christian Commonwealth and a Church are all one: Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their Lawfull Soveraign (*Leviathan*, p. 498). 4

It is self-evident from this that political action should follow Christian principles. In this spirit a practical example of Christian rule is enacted in *The Tempest*. Prospero's Christian action turns on a rather risky reliance on forgiveness and faith: 'Go, release them, Ariel./ My charms I'll break, their senses I'll restore,/ And they shall be themselves' (V.1.30). The last line carries a certain irony, since Prospero's enemies were dangerous when they were themselves, but he takes an optimistic Christian view, believing in true conversion and a change of heart. Before this moment, Prospero had shown himself capable of subduing his enemies. His attack upon them began with the shipwreck, continued with the psychological warfare that vanquished the lords at the banquet, and
with the pursuit of the other villains by dogs. These acts of control, justice and punishment are indeed part of a Christian ruler's duty - the word 'terror' is included in Shakespeare's list for an ideal reign: 'Peace, plenty, love, truth, terror' (Henry VIII, V.5.47). However, Prospero indicates that his own anger would turn any further punishment into an act of personal revenge -

Yet with my nobler reason 'gainst my fury
Do I take part. The rarer action is
In virtue than in vengeance. (V.1.26)

The alternative to 'virtue' is 'vengeance' in a double meaning: the word probably means primarily 'just retribution', associated with the 1611 meaning of 'revenger' as used in Romans 13 where it is simply 'one who administers justified punishment' such as a king must; but here the word 'fury' adds the idea of 'vengefulness' as an excessive unforgiving desire for retribution to the neutral meaning of 'vengeance'. Mercy at this point is doubly great in that punishment would have been just. His passions would have dictated the satisfaction of reasonable further punishment but he masters his passions by means of a new Christian empathy and humility. Prospero must believe that the Christian mercy that he accords his evildoers is politically right, 'they being penitent'. From a machiavellian point of view however, the political fault in this Christian motivation would be in the optimism:

It is much safer [for the Prince] to be feared than loved...because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous...and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared...fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.
Whether wisely or not, Charles I seems to interpret his role in just such a morally discriminating way as Prospero. Charles seems almost to be echoing him in his interpretation of Christian rule - he finds generosity to be good politics but hard on pride, in this letter to his son written from Newport, 25 November 1648:

Shew the greatness of your mind if God bless you...rather to conquer your enemies by pardoning than punishing. If you saw how unmanly and unchristianly the implacable disposition is in our ill-willers, you would avoid that spirit. Censure us not for having parted with so much of our own right. The price is great, but the commodity was...peace to our people...never to affect more greatness or prerogative than that which is really and intrinsically for the good of subjects...not doubting but God's providence will restrain our enemies' power...to conclude, if God give you success, use it humbly and far from revenge.6

'The...letter deserves to be preserved in letters of gold,' says Clarendon, 'and gives best the character of that excellent king'.

The justification for the Christian autonomy of kings is already clear-cut at the beginning of the Protestant period in England. We may deduce this from a passage in Wilson's Rule of Reason (1552) where the word 'magistrate' is defined. The nature of this passage in a textbook demonstrating an exercise in rhetoric makes it particularly suitable for showing accepted attitudes to the subject, rather as a dictionary entry might. The 'store of matter' in the word is revealed as Wilson takes it through 'the places of invention', as an aid to composition. Thus the content is likely to be a statement of the obvious (or of the party line) and we may read it as the accepted Protestant view of the time. Some extracts follow:
The definicion
minister of God for a good ende, to the punishyng of naughtie
persons, and to the comforting of godly men...

Adiacentes necessarily ioyned
Wisdom, earnest labour, cunning in sciences...

Adiacentes ioyned casually
To be liberall, to be frugall, to be of a temperate life

Deedes necessary
To defende religion, to enact godly lawes, to punishe
offendours, to defende the oppressed

The thyng conteinyng
Moses, David...Edwarde the vi of that name, Kyng of Engelande

The efficient cause
God himself, or els the ordinaunce of God...

The effect or els the thynges done
Peace is made, the realm enriched[,] all thynges plenteous

The aucthoritie
The xiii to the Romaines 7

We may note, then, that a magistrate is defined as a minister of God, put there by God himself in order to make a peaceful and prosperous realm and to defend religion, and that his Protestant king, Edward VI, is one of the examples. Many of the personal qualities of a ruler seem to tally well with Prospero: for instance 'wisedome, earnest labour, cunning in sciences'. Later in the exercise, in 'Things compared', Wilson notes: 'Servauntes must be obedient and Subject to their maisters...how muche more then should subjectes be obedient to their king'; under 'the auctoritie' Wilson refers to Romans 13: 1-2, in which this relation between king and subjects is clarified: 'Let every soulebee subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be, are ordained of God'. A summary of Romans 13 will show how closely The Tempest matches its thinking: All
rule is from God and those who resist a ruler resist God. It is a text that supports the divine right. 'The powers that be, are ordained of God...they that resist, shall receive to them selves damnation' (Romans 13: 1-2). The good need not fear, but the ruler is 'revenger of wrath on him that doeth evill. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for feare of punishment: but also because of conscience' (Romans 13: 3-5). The epistle preaches love: 'Charitie worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore the fulfilling of the lawe is charitie' (Romans 13: 8-10). Millenarian ideas get support: 'it is time that we should nowe awake out of sleepe: for now is our salvation nearer then when we beleeeved./ The night is passed, the day is come nigh' (Romans 13:11-13). Romans 13 thus relates to the Eden themes and points out the two opposing strands of a king's relation to his subjects: one is the task of scourging evil, which Prospero manifestly does; the other strand is the desire for a relation of love with his people, who are to be good for the sake of goodness itself and not for fear of punishment. It is Prospero's aim to win the hearts of his enemies - the last act is a feast of loving forgiveness, a taste of the promised time - 'now is our salvation nearer than we believed'. The people's change of heart, the brotherhood of ruler and people 'for conscience sake' is the achievement of Prospero's kingship in the play.

The position is still problematic for Prospero, since Antonio does not acknowledge any guilt. The audience's belief in Prospero's goodness and Antonio's evil hinges on their not questioning the divine right of Prospero. The idea of divine right is not specifically Jacobean but is inherent in Wilson's 'efficient cause' and 'the
authoritie', and Shakespeare projects it in *Macbeth* and other plays of Christian kingship. The divine right was particularly stressed by James, however, which he claimed by hereditary right, and whose absolute power rested on the *Arcanum Imperii*, the mystery of 'the king's two bodies'. McIlwain's introduction to James I's political works gives a full account, quoting an illuminating speech in the Star Chamber, 1616: 'That which concerns the mysterie of the Kings power, is not lawfull to be disputed; for that is to wade into the weaknesse of Princes, and to take away the mysticall reverence, that belongs unto them that sit in the Throne of God'. Orgel warns against equating James and Prospero since there is no proof that the play was written for the court though the first recorded performance was at Whitehall. Yet Shakespeare is writing of society and Christian rule, and it is permissible to think of him responding to his own society at that date, particularly as he uses other current material—certainly the events of the Bermuda shipwreck are topical. And there are similarities between Prospero and James which suggest some effect of Shakespeare's milieu upon his work. Recent writers bear witness that James saw himself reflected in literature and that he read himself into it. Thus James is quoted as saying that Sir Walter Ralegh in *The History of the World* was 'too sawcie in censuring princes' by what he took as an implied parallel in the account of 'the great Queen Semiramis and her incompetent successor Ninias ("esteemed no man of war at all, but altogether feminine, and subjected to ease and delicacy")'. In any case analogy was the intellectual habit of the age. As for plays, 'representation inevitably represents the audience'. For *The Tempest* this was, to say the least, composed of
James's subjects, and even if James was not specifically envisaged as part of that audience when the play was written, he did see the play and must have accepted this image of kingship. It is hard to exaggerate the publicity the Union controversy gave to the theory of 'the King's two bodies', says Marie Axton, between his royal proclamation of the union of Scotland and England in 1603 and its ratification in 1608, after five years of intense debate. James clearly identifies his body politic with his physical body in the following image, hoping to convince thereby:

Hath not God...united these two kingdoms?...I am the husband and the whole isle is my lawful wife; I am the head and it is my body...I hope therefore that no man will be so unreasonable as to think that I, that am a Christian king under the Gospel, should be a polygamist and husband to two wives; that I, being the head, should have a divided and monstrous body.

But, though 'James persisted in his parliamentary addresses and messages in drawing attention to his second invisible body, it looked, to a sceptical House of Commons, like a suit of the Emperor's new clothes'. James sometimes took an extreme position on absolutism, sometimes not. He interprets Psalm 82:1,6 'God standeth in the congregation of princes....he is a judge among gods' and 'I have said, Ye are Gods' in a literal manner, though the psalm continues 'But ye shall die like men: and fall like one of the princes'. Thus, too, in a speech of March 21st, 1609/1610 James makes absolutist statements on this subject:

The State of Monarchie is the supremest thing upon earth; For Kings are not onely Gods Lieutenants upon earth and sit upon Gods throne, but even by God himselfe they are called Gods....God hath power to create, or destroy,...to give life or send death, to judge all and to be judged nor accowntable to none...and the like power have kings.
There was some reaction to this, 'yet MPs did not object to the concept of the divine right as such - they supported the divine right of all duly constituted authority - merely to some extravagant statements which the king made on the basis of it'. Goldberg traces contradictions in James's appeal to mutual conscience between sovereign and people while at the same time asserting unquestioned authority for himself and obedience for his subjects: In the *Basilicon Doron* James proclaims 'the equality of all souls before God and assumes that he and his readers share upright consciences. James invites the loving reader to view his intentions; the king's conscience is as available to his subjects as his subjects' consciences are available to him'. But the language shifts to patriarchal assertions. The king 'aims to win all men's hearts to a willing and loving obedience', the kind a son owes to his father; 'this becomes the "fatherly authoritie" on which absolutism rests'.

Shakespeare in *The Tempest* presents precisely this contradiction present in James's attitude, insisting on absolute power yet wishing to win all men's hearts to a loving and willing obedience.

There is a case only just off the stage, so to speak, for seeing Antonio's rebellion as partly justified because of Prospero's neglect of his dukedom. Antonio seizes on Prospero's shortcomings as Bolingbroke does on Richard's. But little is made of Prospero's fault, and much of Antonio's betrayal.

To have no screen between this part he played
And him he played it for, he needs will be
Absolute Milan. Me, poor man, my library
Was dukedom large enough (I.2.107).
'Him he played it for', that is Prospero, has given 'th' outward face of royalty/ With all prerogative' (I.2.104) away, so what is left is the idea of kingship alone attaching to him, leaving a mystical kingship ratified by God but detached from its exercise of rule. That other, being Antonio, is accused of betraying the trust which Prospero put in him as 'a good parent' might. The logic of statecraft of the type advocated by Machiavelli, however, would suggest that sons supersede their retiring parents, and Lear, at least, is to blame for his ill-defined distribution of power when he retires. Fathers, it would seem in James's view, however, are absolute. Conscience is the abstract presence which gives allegiance to that other abstract presence, the divine right, the 'fatherly authoritie' that James claims. So too Prospero claims conscience from Antonio, the permanent recognition of his fatherly authority, even though, like Lear, he neglects his duty. As in Lear, machiavellian expediency is set against abstract moral imperatives. The rights and wrongs of a slothful king and an active usurper are forcefully addressed in Richard II and Henry IV, but not so in The Tempest - perhaps indeed the issue is less relevant in The Tempest since the play demonstrates Prospero successfully redeeming his slothful negligence through his determined labours in the play. The 'part he played' and the 'screen' suggest the imagery of a stage play - Antonio resents being a stand-in for the invisible Prospero behind the scenes, possibly imagined as standing behind a curtain drawn across the stage, an inner shrine housing the mystical 'true' duke. Antonio would draw this curtain away and play sole king on the open stage by removing Prospero from Milan. But the image also insists
on the screen between the Sovereign's human body - now inhabited by Antonio - and his mystical body, otherwise there could be no conceivable guilt in Antonio's being the 'man on the job', since the people accepted Antonio. Besides the usurpation, there is, of course, Antonio's guilt as a would-be fratricide, but his guilt as a usurper is what Prospero stresses:

Being once perfected how to grant suits,
How to deny them, who t' advance, and who
To trash for overtopping, new created
The creatures that were mine, I say: or changed 'em,
Or else new formed 'em; having both the key
Of officer and office, set all hearts i'th' state
To what tune pleased his ear, that now he was
The ivy which had hid my princely trunk,
And sucked my verdureout on't...

He did believe
He was indeed the duke, out o' th' substitution
And executing th' outward face of royalty
With all prerogative (I.2.79,102).

The chief guilt which the play apportions to Antonio then, its arch villain, is for the denial of the divine right. For Prospero his 'princely trunk' is immovable but smothered outwardly by Antonio's 'ivy' parasitically sucking power based on the mystical right belonging to Prospero, in yet another image of the divine right. The tree image, that of a cedar, is applied to Cymbeline too - perhaps it denotes the family tree of hereditary right. Such a drawing is in fact attached to an accession panegyric by Drayton (see below). However, there are other deliberate ambiguities in the play - one of these concerns the evaluation of Prospero's magic. So, too, Prospero's 'and to my state grew stranger' (I.2.76) raises questions never aired in the play. Antonio's opposition makes itself felt through his striking silence when accused, which, together with

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Prospero's non-admission of guilt in allowing scope to Antonio, invites subordinate interpretations in the audience questioning Antonio's guilt and the basis for the rights of a failing ruler.

These questions were not undebated. McIlwain quotes Robert Parsons's assertion 'that Lawful Princes have oftentimes by their Commonwealths been lawfully deposed for misgovernment; and that God hath allowed of'. Equally, the ambiguity refers also to the obduracy of the lost soul of Antonio who 'expelled remorse and nature' (V.1.76). Like Iago and Timon, he is silent at the end signifying in rejection of speech the rejection of all bonds of the human community, that is, all bonds of 'nature'. If Shakespeare is flattering James in this figure of the two bodies, then perhaps Shakespeare may be seen as admonishing him too. The divinely right ruler must abjure all arbitrary motivation such as revenge, and work only by right conscience, which wins, not commands, obedience. Prospero achieves virtue by his recognition of himself as a brother to all the evildoers, a man like them. He forcibly points out that the doubleness of the king's body is composed not only of the divinity but the undifferentiated humanity of the king:

Shall not myself,
One of their kind, that relish all as sharply
Passion as they, be kindlier moved than thou art? (5.1.20-24)

Not the least taint of human vengeance or favouritism must colour the king's judgements, and beyond this, mercy is in itself godly, besides being incumbent on a charitable and fallible human being in power. The king's body and the body politic are (almost) one in the
harmonious exchange of willing obedience and royal mercy in the last scene.

ii. BUILDING THE IDEAL STATE

Prospero's decision to bury his staff implies that he will build a city of God through a change of heart in his population; he will no longer need to maintain the social order by force. Shakespeare explores the theme of a perfect society with irony and faith equally mixed. Such a society was not entirely felt to be a pipe dream in early Jacobean England. Since people believed in the Bible and the garden of Eden as revealed fact, there were many at this period who thought that Christian societies could find the key to peace, prosperity, justice and knowledge of the secrets of nature at some not too distant date. Calvin, after all, aiming to establish the city of God at Geneva, had indeed believed his Christian theocracy could bring this about.

The millenarian movements envisaged a different means of reaching the moment of breakthrough when all truth would be revealed. They put the emphasis on the last struggles foretold in the Apocrypha rather than on the gradual improvement of mankind. They meant to proceed through spiritual and sometimes physical warfare, which was a real possibility. Sir Philip Sidney had fallen in the Protestant
cause, and the thirty-years war was to rage from 1618 onwards for 20 years. Milton in 1642 still speaks approvingly of warfare:

If our magistrates would take into their care...our public sports...such as may inure and harden our bodies by martial exercises to all warlike skill and performance, what a benefit this would be to our youth and gentry.\(^{22}\)

He saw this as part of the ideal Christian state he would help to create through his epic. Christianson describes the common attitude at this time:

All believed...that Christ would work through human instruments to accomplish [the overthrow of the powers of darkness]...some reformers stressed the role of magistrates [be they princes or parliaments]...especially of the 'godly prince'. Looking back to the example of Constantine I and glorying in the imperial crown of England, these men advocated an imperial tradition of apocalyptic thought.\(^{23}\)

Christianson suggests a sense of urgency: 'Towards the close of the sixteenth century the passion for chronological calculation of the future' was a new element in apocalyptic thought. 'Increasingly precise predictions of the future combined with prophecy fulfilment by the religious wars of the sixteenth and, later, the seventeenth centuries worked to heighten expectations'.\(^{24}\) James himself had written on the subject. He noted in his work upon Revelation 20:7-10, published in 1588 and reprinted in 1616, that 'all men should be armed spiritually and bodily to fight against antichrist and his upholders'.\(^{25}\) In James's second decade, as Christianson points out, 'James would not always seem so militant; however, his subjects would keep his early sentiments alive...commentators not only refined the chronology of holy warfare in history but they calculated the dates of the stages of the final struggle and even of the victory itself'.\(^{26}\)
In *The Tempest* the idea of just war is briefly raised in Miranda's word 'wrangle': 'Yes, for a score of kingdoms you should wrangle' (V.1.74). More particularly pinpointing the years around 1609-1613, Frances Yates connects Shakespeare with specifically English religio-political hopes. She associates the last plays as a group with the children of James I and the hopes of sacred empire which were attached to their future, since earlier Elizabethan hopes and symbols concerned with Britain's sacred position in history revived as the young prince and princess grew up. Other hopes centred on a recovery of the supposedly lost knowledge of Eden, which might be achieved through the espousal of alchemy or other pre-empirical approaches to natural knowledge, or through language research that would lead back to Adam's language with its 'insight' intact. In the same spirit, at this time of colonization, there were genuine hopes of realizing utopias.

Gonzalo's utopian dream is a contrast model to Prospero's situation as a ruler. The island has protean characteristics. Gonzalo finds the grass green, the air temperate, while Sebastian and Antonio find the ground tawny and barren. The reference is to Psalm 107, a psalm for those who find dry land to settle in after storm: The whole psalm has detailed relevance, in which those who 'went astray in the wildernes' are saved and led back to 'the citie where they dwelt'. But before that, 'foolish men are plagued for their offence: and because of their wickednesse' to the point of suicide until 'they cryed unto the Lord' who 'sent his word and healed them'; it is the psalm of the shipwreck when 'they are carried up to the heaven, and downe againe to the deepe' and yet are saved. 'O that men would therefore praise the Lord for his goodnesse: and declare
the wonders that he doeth for the children of men'. But equally 'A fruitful land maketh he barren: for the wickednesse of them that dwell therein.' Antonio and Sebastian do not praise God, as Gonzalo and Adrian do, and see only barrenness; therefore God will 'let them wander out of the way in the wildernesse'. But 'who is so wise will ponder these things [God's kindnesse]', and this Gonzalo does. Gonzalo makes the best of everything, imagines the island as a new colony, and the setting for a new golden age. His vision of himself as king is harmless compared with the wish for power which Stephano, Caliban and Sebastian show when they in turn believe they could govern.

'Had I plantation of this isle, my lord - /.../ And were the king on't, what would I do?'(II.1.141). Gonzalo wants to abolish all the arts of civilization together with their evils while nature provides, and imagines 'all men idle, all'/ And women too, but innocent and pure;' (II.1.152). He takes his stance from Montaigne, who is enchanted with the happy cannibals:

I have had long time dwelling with me a man, who for the space of ten or twelve yeares had dwelt in that other world, which in our age was lately discovered in those parts where Villegaignon first landed [Brazil]...I am sorie, Lycurgus and Plato had it not...they could not imagine a genuitie so pure and simple, as we see it by experience; nor ever beleve our societie might be maintained with so little art and humane combination.28

Many documents relate to such hopes, and as many to the strife which arose in some of these communities.29 The imagined sovereignty of Gonzalo is derided by Antonio and Sebastian as is the 'innocent and pure' of his population:
Seb: No marrying 'mong his subjects?
Ant: None, man, all idle — whores and knaves (II.1.163).

The audience cannot but agree with them, yet the passage awakens a longing and relates it to the real hopes of the planters.

Prospero on the contrary welcomes all that civilization offers. He values education, learning, religion, chastity, loyalty, not forgetting that he likes a tidy cell — all are documented in the text. It is order and human combination — rejected by Gonzalo — that composes a civilized society. Duke Senior in As You Like It, a pastoral prototype of Prospero, describes some essentials of civilization, all of them closely bound up with language: they are human conversation and fellowship, learning and religion, which are the sociable and virtuous uses of language in societies. They can be found in the book of nature too, as listed in 'tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,/ Sermons in stones, and good in everything' (As You Like It, II.1.16). The Duke does not set nature against civilization as Wordsworth does:

Enough of Science and of Art;
Close up those barren leaves;
Come forth, and bring with you a heart
That watches and receives.

Rather, both nature and virtuous language — in the form of knowledge, revealed religion in the Bible, and human fellowship — comprise two of the three books of God's revelation to man. The philosophical Duke can read of the same God in either 'book'. This is made clear by the Duke in answering Orlando's violent approach to the table to ensure that he will get food for Adam:
The human bonds of 'sacred pity', such as the weeping Miranda and 'fellowly drops' of Prospero show are paramount in good men's feasts as remembered by the Duke, and the Duke reminds Orlando that even in the 'savage' forest that Orlando expected to find, human virtue is still composed of caritas. Prospero's own list matches that of Duke Senior: 'The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples' (IV.1.152), these bespeak the social arts, of feasts in beautiful palaces, of religion in temples, and of the noble art of defence in the towers without which the other arts cannot thrive. At the same time they are images of human glory that must fade because these achievements are only earthly 'in respect of the high end of all'. In the revels speech Prospero mourns the transience of earthly achievements, 'the ruins of time'. In the epilogue, the incipient despair is different; it is for the gap between the cloud-capped towers and heaven: 'And my ending is despair/ Unless I be relieved by prayer' (V.1.333). Earthly glory does not translate into salvation. In Gonzalo's commonwealth the works of man are of no interest or positively undesirable for his unlikely population, that does not need civilization.
iii. TIME AND LABOUR

Time is a complex factor in Prospero's aims. In the Renaissance concept of time man is still at the centre of creation, and time runs in a circle from the Fall and back to 'fetch the age of gold'. Thus writers seeking to give a factual account of the world engage with biblical concepts of time. For instance the Portuguese explorer Antonio Galvao dates his discoveries very exactly from the flood, and Sir Walter Ralegh takes the History of the World from the creation and the Garden of Eden. Rosalind thinks the world is very old, almost six thousand years (As You Like It, IV.1.10), and in that time man has degenerated more and more, though not nature, so Ben Jonson thinks; 'the return' can be effected through Christian striving: 'Christ's Crosse, and Adams tree, stood in one place'. Prospero is linked with the providential view of history which, for instance, Ralegh expounds. Miranda: 'How came we ashore?' Prospero: 'By providence divine' (I.2.159). The tradition which Ralegh espouses sees history 'as a progressive manifestation of the divine purpose in a linear movement extending from the creation to the last judgement'. Patrides traces its exponents: originating with the prophets 'who looked on history as the arena where God acts in judgement or mercy', it was forcefully formulated by Augustine, espoused by Luther and other Protestant reformers, and is the view shared by Holinshed and many contemporary English chroniclers. Ralegh, like Hobbes later, 'serves notice that historical events may not be sundered into "sacred" and "secular" history'; nations arise as part of God's purpose:
Though (speaking humanely) the beginning of empire may be ascribed to reason and necessitie; yet it was God himselfe that first kindled this light in the minds of men.37

Like Hooker, Ralegh balanaces the mystery of providence and free will; the outcome for man is not certain.

We ought all to know that God created the starres, as he did the rest of the Universall whose influences may be called his reserved and unwritten lawes. But let us considere how they bind: even as the laws of men doe...yet these laws do not deprive kings of their natural or religious compassion...as that there should be nothing left of libertie to judgement, power or conscience: the Law being in his owne nature no other than a deafe tyrant.38

In particular Spenser's elaborate time scheme encoded in Epithalamion and such 'poemes of the worlds vanitie' as The Ruins of Time, offer some detailed grounds for comparison against which to measure concepts of time in the play. Hieatt finds hidden in the numerical system of the verse structure of Spenser's Epithalamion 'the sun's daily movement through the skies and its apparent movement around the earth during the year. The daily and yearly movement of the sun among the fixed stars symbolizes the seasons of man's life in relation to eternity.'39 In The Tempest the immediate present, the destiny and lifetime of Prospero, and 'man's life in relation to eternity' are three time schemes set out in a similarly deliberate manner, though less cryptically. The play, too, has presence both in a four-hour time-span and in the long time-span of art. The action of The Tempest encompasses the destiny of Prospero's kingdom and Miranda's succession to ensure its survival. The moment for redeeming time misused in sloth is determined by the immediate influence of the stars, which Prospero can read and therefore act
upon: 'I find my zenith doth depend upon/ A most auspicious star' (1.2.181). Like Spenser's sense of triple time, The Tempest time system is also concerned with eternity in the revels speech, and thoughts of Prospero's death and afterlife. The play transforms 'short time' for audience and characters alike in the perepeteia of the play. Previously the exact time scheme of the performance of Prospero's task has been insisted upon:

Prospero: Ariel, thy charge
Exactly is performed; but there's more work.
What is the time o' th' day?
Ariel: Past the mid-season.
Prospero: At least two glasses. The time 'twixt six and now
Must by us both be spent most preciously (1.2.39-41).

The importance of immediate time is again stressed after one of Prospero's tasks is seen to succeed - promoting the growth of love between Ferdinand and Miranda:

Prospero: I'll to my book,
For yet ere supper time, must I perform
Much business appertaining (III.1.94.)

The audience is reminded that the play is nearly over, and again attention is drawn to the exact time taken to fulfil the action. It is tempting to think that the timing of the action coincided with the audience's time, and (in the absence of wrist watches) perhaps there was at least an approximate co-ordination.

Prospero: Now does my project gather to a head.
My charms crack not, my spirits obey, and Time
Goes upright with his carriage. How's the day?
Ariel: On the sixth hour, at which time, my lord,
You said our work should cease (V.1.1).
The audience expects an imminent end since Prospero's enemies are in his power; they do not expect that in that moment Prospero will abjure his power. The play's peripeteia is the recognition of spiritual dimensions which completely redefine the nature of Prospero's success and with it a spiritual measure of time.

Dramatically, good and evil are running neck and neck up to this point. Parallel to Prospero's short time scheme the villains pursue theirs. In the longer term, Ferdinand being thought dead, Claribel's right to the succession is to be set aside since she can have no knowledge of the usurpation and the murder about to be committed by Sebastian and Antonio. Meanwhile the king is asleep and Antonio suggests concerted action: 'Then let us both be sudden' (II.1.304). This moment being interrupted by Ariel, Prospero's next business is to improvise the harpy scene, and hard upon, the masque that is expected of him. It is not surprising that Prospero forgets Caliban's foul conspiracy, but a quick consultation with Ariel, who brings on the 'glistering apparel' traps two of the conspirators in their own greed. The hounds having pursued them, and the lords being 'spell-stopped', the play seems to be over. Prospero has the advantage of Ariel's services and can hardly be felt to have been near failure at any given moment. Both Prospero and Antonio recognize that fortune must be 'taken at the flood'. There is little difference between Prospero's and Antonio's concept of destiny in this. Prospero's destiny is related to the work he must do within the given time - everything is at stake in the four hours the stars favour him. Caliban too plans a murder and is racing against time: 'The minute of their plot is almost come' (IV.1.141).
Prospero's sudden identification of himself as being at one with mankind in suffering and pity perforce abolishes the stage illusion. Audience and actors accept and share the eternal time values implied by Prospero's changed aims, from revenge to brotherhood. Thus they are drawn into the earthly paradise so deftly suggested in the last act. This is still a precarious paradise, complete with tempter in the person of Antonio. From now on Prospero will act according to a Christian concept of eternity, his earthly task almost complete. As in the moral plays, the religious dimension changes the values from narrative 'short time' to those of eternity. As Spenser's Epithalamion verses serve 'for short time' and 'endless monument', so actions in time become eternally valuable when judged to be morally good. In contrast, in The Ruins of Time, contemplation of long time leads to despair. Prospero's mutability speech interrupting the betrothal masque shares exactly the tone of Spenser's lament and many another example of this topos:

Verlame I was; what bootes it that I was
Sith now I am but weedes and wastfull gras?...
Sith all that in this world of great or gaie,
Doth as a vapour vanish, and decaie...
O Rome thy ruine I lament and rue,
And in thy fall my fatall overthrowe,...
High towers, faire temples, goodly theaters,
Strong walls, rich porches, princelie pallaces...
All those (O pitie) now are turned to dust.
And overgrown with blacke oblivions rust.40

(my italics)

Shakespeare echoes Spenser's very words. As Spenser's envoy to the Countess of Pembroke at the end of the poem is finally by implication Christian, so Prospero moves from despair in the revels speech to faith in the epilogue. Prospero's thoughts of his grave are like
Spenser's admonition to 'loath this drosse of sinfull worlds desire'. In the *Epithalamion*, while the stars influence men's 'timely joyes', 'heavenly tabernacles' are finally hoped for. Spenser's time will pass, yet his poem will be read in later ages. The poem is also about virtue and must give him credit towards an eternal life. It also commemorates his future wife in the near-eternity of art.

Song made in lieu of many ornaments,
With which my love should duly have bene dect...
Be unto her a goodly ornament,
And for short time an endlesse moniment.\(^41\)

In the same way, a play is a gesture in the brief present, but exists in a script and has a continuance in time as often as it is re-enacted. In eternity, all the endeavours of men are perhaps a dream, as Prospero fears. Yet as virtuous praxis, art has an existence in a Christian heaven. Art is 'action' for its makers and has an effect in the 'real' world. Since *The Tempest* is 'virtue-causing delightfulness', and will, in a Christian value system, store up credit for its maker after death, Shakespeare and Spenser may have considered themselves nearer heaven because of their art. As Chaucer sees it, some books are to be retracted but not 'moralitiee, and devotion'.\(^42\) On many levels then, the movement of time in the play is towards morality and devotion, though not towards an instant paradise.

Prospero is fortunate in that, by providence, he is given the chance to 'redeem time', like Prince Hal in *Henry IV Part I*. In a commentary on that play, Jorgensen explores the then accepted sense of this phrase; it meant 'to rescue time', to take 'full advantage of the
time a man is given here on earth for salvation'. Ephesians 5:15-17 reads 'Take heed therefore that you walk circumspectly: not as unwise, but as wise/ Redeeming the time, because the days are evil./ Wherefore be ye not unwise, but understanding what the will of the Lorde is'. Prospero's secret studies cost him his kingdom but enabled him finally to read the opportune stars, bring the ship to his isle and make use of Ariel. His labours during the play span are to fulfil 'the will of the Lord' playing his part in providential history. His twelve 'lost' years taught him the wisdom to use his knowledge which he lacked earlier. So Prince Hal learns to know mankind through his profligate years in order to turn this knowledge to virtuous account. These 'plots' of destiny are inherent in the biblical world picture, as reflected by Milton's anxiety to present his 'true account', in patience to God's will.\textsuperscript{44}

Prospero's type of sloth can be defined very aptly in the warnings given by Lipsius and Bacon as to the dangers lying in wait for inordinate scholars. Lipsius's analysis of a ruler's tasks are severe. His strictures apply to Prospero, who pleases himself rather than his subjects:

A king is not chosen to the end he may pamper up himselfe in delicacie, but that by his means, they which have honoured him with that dignitie, may live happily...neither is the commonwealth thine but thou art the common-wealth's...a just good king laboureth, watcheth, and knoweth that the greatest empire is accompanied with greatest cares. His vigilancie preserveth his subjects when they are sleepe, his labour giveth them their ease, his industrie and travell, maintaineth their pleasures...wherefore he may sometimes pause and refresh himselfe, but never be dissolute and careless.\textsuperscript{45}

Learning, the glory of renaissance civilisation, is not an end in
itself. Bacon finds that: 'To spend too much time in studies is sloth...wise men use them [studies]: For they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them and above them, won by observation'. Wisdom and knowledge are by no means identical, and Lipsius, too, warns against this self-indulgence:

Prudence...[cannot] be attained unto in any large and full measure, except it jumpe with a minde, well disposed and trained up. Not withstanding I intend not hereby, that learning is able to give virtue unto us, but prepareth our mindes to embrace it...do not embrace learning...to cover thy unfruitful idlenesse with a glorious name, but to th'intent thou mayest be able to serve the common wealth thou livest in, being firmly armede against all accidents. Neverthelesse thou oughtest to use a discretion herin, for to desire to know more than reason requireth is a kind of intemperancie'.

This 'intemperancie to know more than reason requireth', laid Milan open to usurpation. On the island, Prospero's knowledge can now be employed wisely to redeem the time, twelve years later. First he must vanquish his sloth in rule, and having recognized his opportune stars, the play does indeed show him anxious to use every moment of the brief four hours that they favour him. His secret knowledge is stretched to the utmost in controlling people and events either by illusion, like Chaucer's magician, or by real interference with nature's course. But at the last, he required a wisdom 'without and above, won by observation'. This wisdom demanded that he, like the usurpers, give up the fruits of his sin, the knowledge he so treasured. His new wisdom as a ruler demanded, further, the Christian virtue of forgiveness for practical reasons. Mercy is the better politics, the play suggests, as well as merely just - Prospero himself had been treated mercifully by providence. In order to
achieve forgiveness Prospero had to vanquish even his righteous anger. Eleanor Prosser points out the uncertainty of editors as to the meanings of 'virtue' and 'rarer action' in the speech that reverses all Prospero's previous intentions of punishment.

Though with their high wrongs I am struck to th' quick, Yet with my nobler reason 'gainst my fury Do I take part; the rarer action is In virtue than in vengeance (V.1.25).

Whereas 'editors often feel it necessary to gloss rarer as "nobler" and virtue as "forgiveness" in fact Prospero is striving for the rarer action (choso tresbelle) in terms of Montaigne's discussion [in the essay Of Cruelty], which is about mastery over self. The point Montaigne makes is this:

He that through a naturall facilitie, and genuine mildnesse, should neglect or contemne injuries received, should no doubt performe a rare action, and worthy commendation: But he who being toucht and stung to the quicke, with any wrong or offence received, should arme himselfe with reason against this furiously-blind desire of revenge, and in the end after a great conflict, yeeld himselfe master over-it, should doubtlesse doe much more. The first should doe well, the other vertuously: the one action might be termed goodnesse, the other vertue. For, It seemeth, that the verie name of vertue presupposeth difficultie, and inferreth resistance, and cannot well exercise it selfe without an enemie. 

(Italics in the text)

Thus Prospero's Faustian hubris is converted to humility, brotherhood and compassion as the true basis of human combination: 'Shall not myself/ One of their kind, that relish all as sharply/ Passion as they, be kindlier moved than thou art?' (V.1.22). The play maintains that virtue is the true magic. Henceforth Prospero will engage in the spiritual labour of prayer 'which pierces so that it assaults Mercy itself' (V.1.335). The word 'assault' still denotes a battle
against evil, this time a spiritual one which Prospero must fight as
ruler and man. Is prayer sufficient as political action? As a wise
ruler should he really have cast away his weapons? Miranda, at
least, enjoins 'wrangling' upon Ferdinand.

iv. SACRED EMPIRE AND THE 'SCORE OF KINGDOMS'

The need for political action is raised twice. Prospero
tells Antonio and Sebastian:

But you, my brace of Lords, were I so minded,
I here could pluck his highness' frown upon you,
And justify you traitors. At this time
I will tell no tales (V.1.126).

A more active political struggle is suggested by Miranda:

Mir: Sweet lord, you play me false.
Ferd: No, my dearest love, I would not for the world.
Mir: Yes, for a score of kingdoms you should wrangle,
And I would call it fair play (V.1.172).

This, I suggest, is associated in a particular sense with the idea of
'sacred empire' attached to the children of James I. This passage
introduces a more active theme of bringing about an ideal Britain, a
return to Eden through a 'mending of the jars of religion'. Several
writers describe the Tudor myth of British royal line descended from
the Trojans. The significance and symbolism of this history myth
were reawakened to connect James and his family with it in the early years of the century. There was always doubt among scholars about the legend of Brut as Trojan offspring of Aeneas come to found a British nation, but Holinshed in 1577 wrote 'wee shall not doubte of Brutes hyther comming'. Spenser's historical allegory is founded on it, as Patrides points out, with London as a capital to rival both Priam's Troy and Aeneas's Rome: 'It Troynouant is hight, that with the waues/ Of wealthy Thamis washed is along.' William Camden sat on the fence, and Drayton makes much of it in Polyolbion in 1612. An accession panegyric 'A gratulatorie Poem by Michaell Drayton', (1603), sums up the elements that would support the idealization of James. His empire includes all parts of Britain and Fame has waited for him to add as much of the world as possible:

The North-west passage that thou mightst decover  
Unto the Indies, where that treasure lies  
Whose plenty might ten other worlds suffice...  
That whilst thy true descent I doe rehearse.

He is shown to be the man divinely appointed to the hereditary right deriving both from Arthur and from Brut, combining the Roman and the Trojan greatness. We come to

Seventh Henry, that of royall blood  
By his deere mother is the red rose bud,  
As theyr great Merlin Propheci'd before  
Should the old Brittons regalty restore.

Brut is mentioned, said to be descended from the Trojans:

Since Brute first raign'd, (if men of Brute alow)  
Neuer before united untill now,  
O now revive that noble Britaines name,  
From which at first our ancient honors came.
As Roy Strong points out, the Hapsburg, Valois and Stuart houses 'all three claimed direct descent from the ancient imperial stock of Troy'. By this mythology they were 'all promoting remarkably parallel visions of autocratic rule in their festivals'; their most favoured theme was empire. Serious hopes were placed by many on Prince Henry. Frances Yates quotes Donne's Elegy upon the Untimely Death of the Incomparable Prince Henry which describes for the prince a rather active mission for internal peace. The Prince

Was his great father's greatest instrument
And activest spirit, to convey and tie
This soul of peace through Christianity.
Was it not well believed that he would make
This general peace th' eternal overtake,
And that his times might have stretched out so far
As to touch those of which they emblems are?

The same ambience relates to Princess Elizabeth about to marry the Elector Palatinate. Frances Yates connects the following from Jonson's Prince Henry's Barriers with this warlike theme:

...that most princely maid, whose form might call
The world to war, and make it hazard all
His valour for her beauty: she shall be
Mother of nations, and her princes see
Rivals almost of these.

The 'war' in this speech parallels Miranda's 'wrangles' in The Tempest:

Yes, for a score of kingdoms you should wrangle,
And I would call it fair play (V.1.74).

That 'score of kingdoms' is of the same order as 'mother of nations' - its reference may be either to a sacred empire of the known Christian
world, or to new colonies to be won. There could well be a parallel, then, of Jonson's tribute to the princess in the way Shakespeare conceives of Miranda's future. Orgel notes that 'the stake in the larger context of [Miranda's and Ferdinand's] 'wrangling' at chess' is, of course, Milan, the realm he has played for and won'. I would extend this to allow a further reading touched on by Loughrey and Taylor: the dialogue accompanying the chess game 'incorporates notions of imperialism and reconciliation'. In my reading, as in Orgel's, Miranda's 'you play me false' refers to the 'wrangle' between Ferdinand and Miranda as play adversaries, but Miranda goes on to answer Ferdinand's denial by shifting to a new meaning of 'wrangle', such as both of them, as joint rulers, must engage in: the 'wrangle' or 'war' for a 'score of kingdoms', that would gather a virtuous empire under their joint rule. They now have common interests, having been the means of reconciling Milan and Naples. 'Score' is not just a rhetorical emphasis like 'a thousand thousand', but it is literally (if approximately) meant, like Drayton's 'ten other worlds'. It recalls Emilia's pun in Othello; Ferdinand's meaning in 'not for the world' is idiomatic - 'not for anything' - Miranda picks it up in a literal sense and says that for possession of the whole world, or at least a lot of it, like twenty kingdoms, it would be worth compromising with virtue. So Emilia thinks it would be worth making her husband a cuckold if it would make him a monarch (Othello). In the sentence, 'wrangle' is parallel to and nearly synonymous with 'play false'. But false would become 'fair' - meaning 'just', if some fighting would give such desirable results, as giving empire to a virtuous nation. Since Miranda is virtuous by nature and nurture,
their rule would strive precisely towards a sacred empire, a new Eden. Ferdinand ought to fight for that, the stress is on 'should'. To extrapolate from Milan to England is unavoidable. A British audience that has identified with Milan in a tale will surely identify Milan with Britain. 'The score of kingdoms' could not fail to be understood or, for that matter, fail to please. How proudly Spenser dedicated The Faerie Queene to 'the most high mightie and magnificent empress...Elizabeth by the Grace of God Queene of England, Fraunce and Ireland and of Virginia, defendour of the faith', not as an empty formula but, as Padelford says, 'back of the unified search for England's antiquities, back of the interest in the Arthurian legend, is the motive of England's building for British empire'.

Empire building was commonly defended on Christian grounds:

Thus (Christian Reader) thou maist perceive, that the worlde, of late yeares, hath beene discovered by sundrie regions of this our Europe [apportioned according to climatic habits, like to like]... Consider also, that Christians have discovered these countries and people, which so long have lyen unknowne, and they not us: which plainly may argue, that it is Gods good will and pleasure, that they should be instructed in his divine service and religion, whiche from the beginning have beene nouzeled and nourished in Atheisme, grosse ignorance, and barbarous behaviour. Wherefore, this is my judgement, (in conclusion) that who so ever can winne them from their infidelitie to the perfect knowledge of his divine institutions and service, hee or they are worthy to receive the greatest rewarde at Gods hands, and the greater benefites from those countries, which he hath discovered.

Montaigne saw through disingenuous colonizers, and if Shakespeare read Montaigne's essay Of the Cannibals to the end, he must have read that, though the natives ate flesh,

there was never any opinion found so unnaturall and immodest, that would excuse treason, treacherie, disloyaltie, tyrannie, crueltie and such like, which are our ordinarie faults. We
may then well call them barbarous, in regard to reason's rules, but not in respect of us that exceed them in all kinde of barbarisme...their waures are noble and generous...and they contend not for the gaining of new lands.62

Prospero's scepticism is marked: the new people in the brave new world are only the old people.

Mir: How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world That has such people in't!

Pro: 'Tis new to thee (V.1.182).

But Miranda, in her game of chess, suggests an active gathering of empire, in fact a holy war, to please the audience and perhaps encourage James. If the audience at the betrothal performance for Princess Elizabeth made any identification between Ferdinand and Miranda and their own royal couple, they were to see them embroiled in it very soon.

v. IMAGES OF SACRED JOY

Frances Yates sees the idea of sacred empire running through all the last plays:

The theophanies in Henry VIII reveal mystical experience in which the religious discords of the past are reconciled. The vision in Cymbeline, and its interpretation by the soothsayer, express a mystical view of expanded religious imperial destiny. The return to mythical Romano-British imperialism matches the return to Tudor Protestant imperialism in Henry VIII...it is this double historical line of ancient purity of
the British chivalric tradition, combined with the theological purity of Royal and Tudor reformation, which informs this poetic view of history. The Tempest phoenix is just such an image of mystical rule, quite specifically flattering James I:

Now I will believe
That there are unicorns; that in Arabia
There is one tree, the phoenix' throne, one phoenix
At this hour reigning there (III.3.21).

'Throne' and 'reigning' sufficiently indicate that this is an image of rule. This is not just an unbelievable bird from travellers' tales, but symbolic of James's succession to Elizabeth's reign of peace and plenty, an image of the body politic at one with the ruler - Prospero's aim and James's claim. The Phoenix was Elizabeth's image and is applied unmistakably to James in Shakespeare's Henry VIII as Marie Axton points out.

As when
The bird of wonder dies, the maiden phoenix,
Her ashes new create another heir...
   Peace, plenty, love, truth, terror,
That were the servants to this chosen infant,
Shall then be his...
His honour and the greatness of his name
Shall be, and make new nations (Henry VIII, V.5.39).

The image is also associated with Shakespeare's The Phoenix and the Turtle, printed in Love's Martyr in 1601. There the home of the phoenix is called both Arabia and Brytania. The political allegory of the book whose theme is the succession while it was yet undecided and worrying in 1601, was evident in 1611 when it was republished under the title 'Annuals of Great Britaine'. Axton's network of
reference to the royal mythology includes the double body of the king, which is the heart of the phoenix image; perpetuity in a mutable world; Utopian abodes for the phoenix; the king-sustaining vows of troth and allegiance; empire and new Troy; the instructive power of poetry. All of these are relevant both to Prospero and to James. 67

The Banquet dream of Katherine in Henry VIII is a dream of holy rule. In the context of the last plays it recalls in reverse the banquet that is snatched away in The Tempest where the happiness, like that of Katherine's dream, is dashed. A false eucharist is a serious perversion and the Tempest group of usurpers are deep in sin. Instead of spiritual happiness they receive spiritual suffering, as Ariel snatches the food away and forces them to recognize their crimes. Shakespeare uses the banquet setting to show that the magical food of regeneration is as yet undeserved. There are other banquets in Shakespeare's plays, showing a positive and negative allegory of feasts. The banquets of Timon are telescoped in The Tempest. Agostino Lombardo compares Timon and The Tempest.

A veritable hymn to friendship is indeed one of the culminating moments of the first part of Timon...in a banquet scene which...seems concretely to represent the realization of Timon's utopia.... In the new world, as Gonzalo shall discover in The Tempest, utopias disintegrate and collapse, and after the banquet Athens shows its true face...[Timon] finds the real, the historical world, not Arcady or the Garden - the only gesture he can make is that grotesque one...the hot water filling the plates of a non-existent banquet. 68

Spiritual insight of heavenly joy, or deathly sorrow such as Timon's despair, is the allegorical meaning of the banquets. The Eucharistic controversies were the ones which were the most irreconcilable aspect
of the split in religion. A banquet denoting the eucharistic renewal applies to nations as well as individuals. It is a natural image to use to denote the restoration of a single church which was desired by both sides. Ironically, this desire so soon after led to the Thirty Years War.

Shakespeare writes the moment of insight into all the last plays, as indescribable and solemn joy, but the ultimate breakthrough remains a dream. Partial experiences, not yet wholly heavenly, prefigure the ultimate joy. In *The Winter's Tale* the 'resurrection' of Hermione and the reunion of the family is perhaps symbolic of ultimate Christian hopes of the resurrection of the body. In *The Tempest*, the reunions of the last act, in a mood of solemn simplicity, achieve a similar stage event for the audience. The mystery and solemnity of it finds fitting language in Gonzalo's 'O rejoice/ Beyond a common joy, and set it down/ With gold on lasting pillars!' (V.1.206). The pillars ensure a record of this miracle of providence for the Dukedom of Milan. Ben Jonson's poem explicating the four engraved pillars on the title page engraving of Raleigh's *History of the World* sums up the reasons for writing history. History is

Times witnesse, Herald of Antiquitie,
The light of Truth, and Life of Memorie.

Finally in *The Tempest* the evil and the stupid are alive and well though some improvement is hoped for on both counts - at least Caliban says 'and I'll be wise hereafter/ And seek for grace'. The Eucharistic banquet is not yet due. At least the harrowing of hell is suggested in a comic version:
Boatswain We were...all clapped under hatches, 
Where but even now, with strange and several noises
Of roaring, shrieking, howling, jingling chains,
And more diversity of sounds, all horrible,
We were awaked, straightway at liberty,
Where we, in all our trim, freshly beheld
Our royal, good, and gallant ship (V.1.231).

There are visions of a golden age in many modes. We may add
to Gonzalo's projection of a perfect society Caliban's vision of
heaven, and Juno's blessing in the 'most majestic vision' of the
masque, promising a golden age: 'Spring come to you at the farthest,/
In the very end of harvest!' (IV.1.114). These are discussed
elsewhere in this thesis.

vi. JONSON'S MASQUE AND 'THE TEMPEST': SOME COMMON GROUND

Kermode and Frances Yates link The Tempest to the Jonson
Masques and the court of James I, particularly to the betrothal of
Princess Elizabeth to the Elector Palatine in 1612. The Masques
and the last plays belong to the politico-religious complex topical at
this date. The theme of the Masques is par excellence that of the
Golden Age restored through virtue. Orgel stresses Jonson's moral
intentions in the Masques.

For the Jacobean poet, the idealization of the virtue embodied
in the king and aristocracy was in the highest sense a moral
act. The Jonsonian Masque must...instruct through praise. Every Masque concluded by merging spectator with masquer, in
effect transforming the courtly audience into the idealized world of the poet's vision. The Masque...is always about the resolution of discord...the form was not, for Jonson, ultimately spectacular, but didactic and moral. 73

Jonson says as much himself:

It was my first and special regard to see that the nobility of the invention should be answerable to the dignity of their persons. For which reason I chose the argument to be a celebration of honourable and true fame bred out of virtue, observing the rule of the best artist, to suffer no object of delight to pass without his mixture of profit and example. 74

Certainly the characterization, when not representing classical figures, is usually based on moral abstractions. For instance the hags in the Masque of Queens are commented on as follows in Jonson's notes about the witches:

To have made themselves their own decipherers and each one to have told upon their entrance what they were and whether they would, had been most piteous hearing, and utterly unworthy any quality of a poem, wherein a writer should always trust somewhat to the capacity of the spectator, especially at these spectacles, where men, besides inquiring eyes, are understood to bring quick ears. 75

All the same, the hags declare themselves pretty plainly:

Dame: First then advance
My drowsy servant, stupid Ignorance,
Known by thy scaly vesture, and bring on
Thy fearful sister, wild Suspicion,
Whose eyes do never sleep; let her knit hands
With quick Credulity that next her stands. 76

The old Moral plays and the Masques join hands in the mode of their abstract moral characterization, and undoubtedly The Tempest shares this with both of them. Shakespeare trusts 'somewhat to the capacity of the spectator'. A moral definition of persons is crucial to my
reading of the characters in *The Tempest*, and I find it corroborative that moral abstraction is the fashion in some drama types at both ends of Shakespeare's writing life. Jonson in *The Masque of Queens* attributes moral significance to musical sounds:

> the part of the scene which first presented itself was an ugly hell, which flaming beneath, smoked unto the top of the roof. And in respect all evils are, morally, said to come from hell, as also from that observation of Torrentius upon Horace his Candida *ex Orci faucibus profecta videri possit*, these witches, with a kind of hollow infernal music, came forth from thence.77

Is this 'the strange hollow and confused noyse' upon which the reapers suddenly vanish, as Prospero suddenly remembers Caliban?

**Pro:** I had forgot that foul conspiracy
Of the beast Caliban and his confederates
Against my life (IV.1.139).

The return of Prospero's memory interrupts the idealising masque with an unharmonious sound - strange, hollow, confused - the blast of evil from hell. Another sound in *The Masque of Queens* may also have been significantly remembered in *The Tempest*:

> In the heat of their dance on a sudden was heard a sound of loud music, as if many instruments had made one blast; with which not only the hags themselves but the hell into which they ran quite vanished and the whole face of the scene altered, scarce suffering the memory of such a thing. But in the place of it appeared a glorious and magnificent building figuring the House of Fame.78

Heroic Virtue then speaks. In *The Tempest* the dancers and visions of delight 'heavily vanish'. The effective sudden transformation at a musical blast denotes the reverse here from the transformation in *The Masque of Queens*. The Masques blandly assert, like Gonzalo, that
Paradise will come at a wish. *The Tempest* asserts the contrary. Evil exists and the masque is only a 'present fancy', a vision of a very distant paradise, like Gonzalo's commonwealth. But 'there is much business yet pertaining'. The play is about labour, the labour all must engage in this side of paradise. Not only Prospero but all the characters engage in labour. At every level hard work and not idleness is the necessity of fallen man. Prospero has no intention of relinquishing his unhappy slave who fetches fire and water and washes the dishes. Ferdinand's physical labours are taken by him to be work for slaves of the type of Donne's 'harvest ants'. Miranda's willingness to take it on herself is the clearest sign of the selfless humility of love. The labours of love and of 'the very virtue of compassion' — which Miranda shows in her offer to carry the logs — are the real key to a new Eden.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


4. According to Frances Yates, Hobbes writes against the authority of the Pope; this, according to her analysis of Henry VIII and King John, would tally with Shakespeare's views: 'Shakespeare's view of English history is from the start rooted in Foxe'. In Henry VIII 'Wolsey represents "Popery" as understood by the Reformers'. Frances A. Yates, Shakespeare's Last Plays: A New Approach (London, 1975), pp. 70-72.


8. Trousdale, p. 29.


11. e.g. Jonathan Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature: Jonson, Shakespeare, Donne and their Contemporaries (Baltimore, Maryland, 1983). It is the theme of the book: 'Political realities and literary representations...are not kept separate here' p. xii; Gary Schmidgall, Shakespeare and the Courtly Aesthetic (Berkeley, California, 1981). Schmidgall examines The Tempest 'with respect to the most complex and learned "capacity" for which it was intended' (p. xxii). See also Roy Strong, Art and Power: Renaissance Festivals 1450-1650 (Woodbridge, 1984).

12. Sir Walter Ralegh, The History of the World (1614), edited and selected by C. A. Patrides (London, 1971), p. 11, n. 4.: 'The king himself was so far from pleased with The History of the World that he suppressed
it for divers exceptions, but specially for being too sawcie in
censuring princes' (John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carlton, 5 January
1615).


14. Marie Axton, The Queen's Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan

15. James I, 'A Speech to Parliament, 22 March 1603/4', Journals of the
House of Commons, 1, 143, cited from Alan G.R. Smith, p. 394, n. 2.


17. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval
Political Theology (Princeton, New Jersey, 1957), p. 496.

18. James I, 'A Speech to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at
White-Hall on Wednesday the xxi. of March anno 1609', in The Political


20. Goldberg, p. 117.


23. Paul Christianson, Reformers and Babylon: English Apocalyptic
Visions from the Reformation to the Eve of the Civil War (Toronto,

24. Christianson, p. 94.

25. Cited by Christianson, pp. 95n and 96, from King James I, A
fruitful meditation in Works (1616).


27. Frances A. Yates, Shakespeare's Last Plays: A New Approach

28. 'Of the Cannibales', in Montaigne, Essays, translated by John
Florio, Everyman's Library, 3 vols (London, 1910, last reprinted 1980),
I, pp. 216, 220.

29. See for example many passages in The Jamestown Voyages under the
First Charter 1606-1609, edited by Philip L. Barbour, The Hakluyt
Society, 2 vols, second series (Cambridge 1969). e.g. 'By then the
councell had fully plotted to depose Wingeld, the then
President...Thus they had forsaken his Maiesties government sett down in
the instruccions, and made it a triumvirat...' (I, 218); or 'Master Smyth in the Tyme of our hungar had spred a Rumor in the colony that I did feast myself and my servauntes out of the comon stoare...' (II, 230).


47. Lipsius, p. 15.


49. 'Of Crueltie' in Montaigne, Essays, II, p. 108.

50. Yates p. 26; Strong, p. 65; Graham Parry, The Golden Age restor'd; the Culture of the Stuart Court, 1603-42 (Manchester, 1981), p. 64.


55. Roy Strong, p. 65.

56. Quoted by Yates, Shakespeare's Last Plays, p. 81.


64. In a more general context, the phoenix was commonly an allegorical image of renewal. Some saw the phoenix like Ralph Carr (1600), in a cyclic view of history: 'I am of opinion often a Platonist, assigning all mortall affaires necessarilie a periode in theyr perfection, to which haung attayned, they fall into a retrograde of declining...nor there long continuing, againe and againe reuie and arise from fourth the ashes like the Arabian Phoenix': Ralph Carr, *The Mahumetane or Turkish Historie* (1600), cited by C.A.Patrides, p. 107. But, as Patrides points out, though the phoenix was a symbol of the 'meaningless cycles of flux and reflux in the Graeco-Roman attitude towards history (outside the Judeo-Christian tradition) 'Christianity - with characteristic genius! - soon absorbed that symbol as well, and applied it to the resurrection' (p.12 n.41).


67. Marie Axton, p. 130.


73. Orgel's *Jonson*, pp. 2-3.

74. Orgel's *Jonson*, p. 122.

75. Orgel's *Jonson*, p. 125.

76. Orgel's *Jonson*, p. 126.

77. Orgel's *Jonson*, p. 123.

The modern theatregoer might simply ascribe to Shakespeare's Englishness the constant documentation of the weather to mark the progress of time in *The Tempest*. It is of course apt that the opening storm is resolved by 'calm seas' and 'auspicious gales' (V.1.315) at the happy end; he may even remember a parallel when Aeneas leaves Sicily at the end of Book 5 of the *Aeneid*, and Neptune promises fair weather to get them to Italy: 'ferunt sua flamina classem', 'And swift in seas they swim, the windes themselves their navy sends'.

Equally, Shakespeare's economy may be admired in that 'yon same black cloud...[that] looks like a foul bombard that would shed its liquor' (II.2.21) neatly serves a triple purpose, as reminder of the weather, as representing Trinculo's drinking interests, and as a pretext for the farcical intertwining of Caliban and Trinculo. Shakespeare and his audience, however, shared concepts of nature vastly more purposeful than such casual patterns as these. The island, minutely mapped in Shakespeare's text, surrounded by the 'Mediterranean float' (I.2.234), has an existence in less material dimensions as well which are more subtly present in the text. According to the biblical world picture, the island and everything in it and surrounding it in time, space and eternity would provide a realistic inventory of creation, and demonstrate the action of Providence. All of nature is proof of God to man. Nature also acts
upon man as God's instrument, and human beings can 'read' the messages of Providence, that is to say, natural events may be unexplained, but providential interpretations are sought. In the imagery of Pentecost, Donne says that God speaks to each man in his own language through his works:

He may heare God in...The seasons of the yeare, in the vicissitudes and revolutions of Church, and State, in the voice of Thunder, and lightnings, and other declarations of his power. This is God's English to thee, and his French, and his Latine, and Greek, and Hebrew to others.  

In short, nature 'tells' man about God, and informs him, too, about his own position in God's plans. The believed facts of natural philosophy were based on the element structure, that governs matter and all that belongs to the world of change, as Aristotle holds, himself partly deriving the concept of the four elements, air, earth, fire, water, from Empedocles. In the Renaissance a mediaeval impetus from Arab sources vitalized both the practical and mystical aspects of element theory, which was active from the twelfth to the end of the seventeenth centuries and beyond. Men who wanted what, in modern terms, is called technology, tried to crack nature's divinely constructed codes of matter through books of occult knowledge. 'Open sesame' effects through words and signs engaging with the sacred patterns of natural law were expected, and many kinds of adepts and natural philosophers tried to produce them, and they were, indeed, believed to occur. In The Tempest nature will be seen to be meaningful and communicative in many ways.

The subject of nature in this section is treated as four interlocking aspects of the communication between man and nature, as
follows: God is the basis of all concepts of nature in this period. The play is shown to engage fully with concepts stated by Hooker and Calvin, who are cited to show mainstream beliefs as to the manner in which creation demonstrates God's existence to man; nature is the instrument of Providence and is maintained in being by it. Secondly the play projects the system of the four elements in the structure and significance of its natural world, equally understood by its audience as a commonplace pattern of facts relating to the spiritual and material unity of the world. Ariel and Caliban are each integrated into the play's concepts of nature, together projecting aspects of the elemental world. Caliban's language has often been debated by critics and is here closely examined in its relations both to the natural world and to his community. Thirdly, man's ability to recover the secrets of nature lost at the Fall is mirrored in Prospero's learning, and knowledge accumulated in books is evaluated. According to Hooker, man's reason is angelic:

In the matter of knowledge, there is between the angels of God and the children of men this difference: angels already have full and complete knowledge in the highest degree that can be imparted unto them; men, if we view them in their spring, are at first without understanding or knowledge at all. Nevertheless from this utter vacuity they grow by degrees, till they come at length to be even as the angels themselves are...we are to search by what steps and degrees [the soul] riseth unto perfection of knowledge.

In The Tempest such cataclysmic power in human hands (almost by definition irresponsible since the Fall) is questioned. Since language was regarded as 'real' (thing-related) by many, and co-active with things, linguistic means were, in effect, the means of gaining
control of nature. In this section Prospero's use of books is compared to the methods and aims of empirical science; the latter gradually sidelined these linguistic methods as the seventeenth century advanced, but they did not always abandon the aims or even beliefs of the occultists. The fourth section considers a different register of language invoked by Prospero when he relinquishes his art. This is the language of prayer, equally if not more powerful for the fulfilment of man's aims than the arts he practised. We may describe Prospero's abandonment of his magic and the final prayer of the epilogue as linked actions. Now bypassing his previous challenges to God - constituted by his decipherment of creation, a hubristic enterprise - Prospero turns to a more direct appeal, straight to the top as it were. This language of prayer is advocated by Hooker as the proper technique for the ordering of commonwealths. Prayer is at once the weapon and the partial attainment of the desired harmonious community (which Prospero had previously intended to bring about by force) both in the enacted fiction, and in the theatre where, through shared belief, the spectators participate in the prayer on their own account.

i. NATURE AND PROVIDENCE

Nature is defined by Hooker as the instrument of God under the name of Providence:
Those things which nature is said to do, are by divine art performed, using nature as an instrument...the disposition whereof in the purity of God's own knowledge and will is rightly termed by the name of Providence...That law [of nature] the performance whereof we behold in things natural, is as it were an authentical or original draught written in the bosom of God himself; whose Spirit being to execute the same useth every particular nature, every mere natural agent, only as an instrument created at the beginning, and ever since the beginning used, to work his own will and pleasure withal. Nature therefore is nothing else but God's instrument.8

This view of nature is identified and powerfully documented in The Tempest. Matched up against all the parallel concepts of fate and destiny scattered through the play, particularly in the opening scene, Prospero confidently asserts he was brought ashore by 'providence divine' (1.2.159), clearly indicating that Gonzalo was also an instrument of God, 'out of his charity' (1.2.162) and 'of his gentleness' (1.2.165) giving necessaries and books. Shakespeare bears out in the play what Hooker has to say relating the Christian view to the pagan:

Providence...was wont by the ancient to be called natural Destiny.... This workman, whose servitor nature is, being in truth but only one, the heathens imagining to be moe, gave him in the sky the name of Jupiter, in the air the name of Juno, in the water the name of Neptune, in the earth the name of Vesta and sometimes of Ceres...but unto us there is one only Guide of all agents natural, and he both the Creator and the Worker of all in all, alone to be blessed.9

This was so well understood by the Latin-trained Elizabethans that Christian and Classical identities presented no sense of opposition but rather a clear comprehension of the common subject matter contained in different cultural codes. The Christian, however, in Prospero's mention of 'providence', nevertheless stresses a personal God by a subtle personification, as vivid as the typical classical
personifications of nature; thus the pity and love of the winds must be taken literally:

There they hoist us
To cry to th' sea that roared to us, to sigh
To th' winds, whose pity, sighing back again,
Did us but loving wrong (I.2.148).

Prospero recognises an active God-related nature - the words 'pity' and 'loving' are not just a pretty touch of pathetic fallacy.

In fact Ariel's harpy speech makes the instrumental character of nature crystal clear, stressing the inseparable participation of nature in the life of man (nature being co-created with man but not fallen, and of the same substance as man). This passage, an adaptation from Virgil's Aeneid, takes account both of Virgil's 'pater' and the harpies as instruments of justice: 'quae Phoebio pater omnipotens, mihi Phoebus Apollo/ praedixit, vobis Furiarum ego maxima pando.'

You fools! I and my fellows
Are ministers of Fate...remember -
For that's my business to you - that you three
From Milan did supplant good Prospero,
Exposed unto the sea, which hath requit it,
Him and his innocent child; for which foul deed,
The powers delaying, not forgetting, have
Incensed the seas and shores, yea all the creatures
Against your peace. Thee of thy son, Alonso,
They have bereft; and do pronounce by me
Ling'ring perdition (III.3.60,68).

Except in identifying Ariel as a harpy, Shakespeare does not give nature classical names here, reserving this mode for the masque (see below). He paraphrases Virgil's 'pater omnipotens' and 'Phoebus' together as 'powers'. Phaer straightforwardly has 'God': 'That God
him selfe to Phoebus said, and I by Phoebus finde/ That am the chiefe of furies all, and thus to you I tell,\textsuperscript{11}. For 'furies' Shakespeare has 'ministers of Fate'. It is the sea that has 'requited' the crime against Prospero in response to the 'powers'; nature is not neutral but imbued with law, which Hooker lists as his chapter headings, for example:

II. Of that Law which God from before the beginning hath set for himself to do all things by.
III. The Law which natural agents observe...
IV. The Law which angels of God observe.
V. The Law whereby Man is in his actions directed to the imitation of God...
VIII. Of the natural finding out of Laws by the light of Reason...\textsuperscript{12}

Alonso, in a 'strange stare' hears Ariel's voice as words coming directly from the elemental forces, a speaking landscape: the billows 'spoke', the winds 'sang', the thunder 'pronounced' his guilt, and his recognition of his guilt simultaneously puts him in touch again with God's natural messengers:

\begin{quote}
Methought the billows spoke and told me of it,
The winds did sing it to me; and the thunder,
That deep and dreadful organ-pipe, pronounced
The name of Prosper: it did bass my trespass.
Therefore my son i' th' ooze is bedded (III.3.96).
\end{quote}

Behind this lurks the tradition that before the Fall everything in nature could literally speak, or alternatively, that man could understand nature's language. For example a tale from Shakespeare's Jest Books treats this as common knowledge: 'In the old world when all thyng could speke, the iiiii elementys mette to geder for many thynges whych they had to do'\textsuperscript{13}. Alonso recognizes the truth of
Ariel's words as to the instrumental force of nature - the drowning of his son strikes him as apt punishment, to mirror, in the destruction of his own dynasty, the destruction of Prospero's. We are reminded of the words of Shakespeare's Henry IV who suspects that Hal's wild rejection of his princely duties justly punishes his usurpation by nullifying it:

I know not whether God will have it so...
But thou dost in thy passages of life
Make me believe that thou art only marked
For the hot vengeance and the rod of heaven
To punish my mistreadings (III.2.4).

Alonso's despair is suicidal, and the audience recognizes the curse of Cain, whom earth rejects in just such 'ling'ring perdition'. In the Bishop's Bible the fourth chapter in the Book of Moses (Genesis) is headed 'Cain is cursed and despaireth':

Moses 4:11-14, And now art thou cursed from the earth, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brothers blood from thy hand.
12. If thou til the ground, it shall not yeld unto thee her strength. A fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the earth.
13. And Cain said unto the Lord, My iniquity is more then that it may be forgiven.

Unless repentance follows, therefore, alienation from the fellowship of nature ensues, for an evil must be extruded. This moral participation of nature stresses the immanence of a moral God in nature. So Wordsworth experiences alienation from nature on moral grounds when he is out at night in a stolen boat enjoying himself and nature seems suddenly to accuse him:
A huge peak, black and huge,
As if with voluntary power instinct,
Upreared its head.

Alienation through guilt is well known to modern psychologists; it is, after all, an atavistic experience of guilt, as in the Oedipus myth where guilt brings disease upon the city, which must expel him. Men's crimes pollute a nature which is believed divine, and when thrown into disorder it takes a just revenge. Hooker has a vision of ruined nature, should disorder interrupt God's maintenance of it, though he does not say that human beings could be the cause of this failure of providence:

now if nature should intermit her course...if the moon should wander from her beaten way, the times and seasons of the year blend themselves by disordered and confused mixture, the winds breathe out their last gasp, the clouds yield no rain, the earth be defeated of heavenly influence...what would become of man himself?

That nature itself might end is a fear, but Hooker adds that God would not let this happen. Yet man and nature affect each other, as when the murder of Duncan in Macbeth causes unnatural phenomena, to show that the death of the rightful king affects the interlinked system of natural and human and divine correspondences. Ariel, who works with and through nature's processes, suffers from their perversion, as he did from Sycorax's 'earthy and abhorred commands,/ Refusing her grand hests' (I.2.273). Ariel belongs to the order of nature, and the fact that he can tolerate his tasks as Prospero's agent shows Prospero's magic in a good light, although he clearly does not wish to be harnessed to human concerns at all since he asks for liberty.

As well, Ariel is a secret agent of providence in his appeal
to Prospero's compassion for the penitents. Among the agents of providence in the play, Gonzalo is nevertheless grouped with the penitents, for though he is a man of virtue he is implicated in Alonso's crimes. By his very virtue of loyalty to his master he is also tainted. Thus he, too, is 'brimful of sorrow and dismay' and Prospero praises him as 'a loyal sir/to him thou follow'st' (V.1.69). Antigonus in a similar situation reaps his severe but lawful punishment and dies, an innocent victim like Mamilius, for whom the tyrannical Leontes's conversion is too late. 'The particular drift of every act proceeding externally from God we are not able to discern...[but] there is a law imposed upon it', says Hooker. Gonzalo reiterates his recognition of the active planning of providence. He is sure the gods 'have chalked forth the way', even if the audience knows Prospero has done some of the chalking, hand in glove with and aided by providence. In ever widening circles the play extends its providential faith to the audience. If 'the play's the thing' to 'catch the conscience', then it can win faith too. In The Tempest, then, man and nature communicate intimately in a moral universe believed to be minutely maintained by God, here exemplified in the words of Calvin's catechism:

"We ought to understand, that as the worlde was made of him in the beginning, even so nowe he doth conserve the same and upholdeth the state of thinges, so that heaven and earth, with the reste of the creatures, coulde not contynue in their estate if his power did not preserve them...it is he that sendeth raine and drought, haile, tempestes, and fayre wether...to be shorte, he hath all thynges at commaundement, to do hym service at his owne good pleasure."
An early piece in English that teaches science is from the early English metrical lives of saints and dates from the reign of Edward I, according to the editor 'curious as being the first piece found in the English language'; here is a verse from it:

Of this four elementz ech quik thing i-maked is,
Of urthe, of water, and of eyr, and of fur, i-wis.
Man has of urthe al his bodi, av water he haveth wete,
Of eyr he haveth wind, of fur he haveth hete'.

The passage proceeds to identify all the lore of the imbalance of elements and the disarray of the temperaments that follows, explaining also other scientific beliefs, such as the nature of man's three souls. A late mention of the theory from the first Encyclopaedia Britannica (1768-1771) has not yet jettisoned the 'elements' in its entry on chemistry: 'We are always stopped by substances in which we can produce no change, and which are incapable of being resolved into others...Of this kind the principals are earth, water, air, and fire' (II, p. 66). The four elements as denoting the order of nature are named and detailed throughout The Tempest. Unquestionably element theory is accepted as fact by all and sundry throughout the period as the comprehensive, divinely ordered system governing matter. The law of nature and the elements are coupled by Hooker, writing of that natural law that holds man and nature in an orderly interdependent network:
Wherefore to come to the law of nature...natural agents keep the law of their kind unwittingly, as the heavens and elements of the world, which can do no otherwise than they do...this has in it more than men have as yet attained to know or perhaps ever shall attain.  

Hooker thinks of the elements as one of the two components of the universe, the other being the heavens.

Ariel's functions are conceived throughout in elemental terms and he is able to function in any medium - air, earth, fire, water, in their various manifestations. We hear of the elements by name in Ariel's own account of his work:

All hail, great master, grave sir, hail! I come To answer thy best pleasure, be't to fly, To swim, to dive into the fire, to ride On the curled clouds. (I.2.189)

He describes himself as a fire spirit on the ship, where he 'flamed amazement'. In scolding his supposed unwillingness, Prospero again adds details listing the elements:

[Thou] think'st it much to tread the ooze Of the salt deep, To run upon the sharp wind of the north, To do me business in the veins o' th' earth When it is baked with frost. (I.2.252)

Ariel's harpy speech combines reference to spirits in their relation to matter, that is, the elements, as well as the relation of elements to each other:

You fools! I and my fellows Are ministers of fate - the elements Of whom your swords are tempered may as well Wound the loud winds, or with be mocked-at stabs Kill the still-closing waters, as diminish One dowl that's in my plume. My fellow ministers Are like invulnerable. If you could hurt,
Your swords are now too massy for your strengths,
And will not be uplifted (III.3.60).

What Ariel implies here is that the law of God's order is all one. The law of fate, which may be said to belong to time, is allied to the law of matter which governs the elements, and the two work together to fulfil the workings of providence. They are completely untouchable by man. But Ariel is only acting the part of the harpy, the minister of fate in the Aeneid. All the same, as a spirit, he is immaterial, or at least can transmute into different elements. The speech paraphrases Virgil's harpy scene (here in a modern literal translation):

Then I bid my comrades seize arms and declare war on the fell race...my comrades charge, and essay a strange combat, to despoil with the sword those filthy birds of ocean. Yet they feel no blows on their feathers, nor wounds on their backs ['sed neque vim plumis ullam nec vulnera tergo/ accipiunt'].

Phaer has:

And on the filthy birdes they beat, that wild sea rocks do breede,
But fethers none do from them fall, nor wound for stroke doth bleede,
Nor force of weapons hurt them can, their backes and wings no spearr/can perce.

Virgil's reason why the weapons cannot harm the harpies is probably interpreted by the Renaissance as being transposable to their own Christian system without ado, since Virgil is in any case taken to be a voice prophetic of Christianity. Classical terminology is regularly appropriated to explain the Christian world, representing the wisdom of the elders, rather than the foolishness of the outdated. If it seemed not to tally, it was easy to explain it allegorically. Ariel might be
judged wholly immaterial if he is considered to be an angel, good or bad, perhaps one of the *dii inferi* cited by Dr Johnson from Hooker as being fallen angels dispersing themselves into the elements:

some in air, some on the earth, some in the water, some among the minerals, dens and caves that are under the earth... and these wicked spirits the heathen honoured instead of gods.\(^{22}\)

We need not follow Hooker and interpret Shakespeare's Ariel as a fallen angel, but he could equally have been judged to be one by contemporaries of Shakespeare. The writer of the actors' list at the end of the First Folio *Tempest* did not make a point of this, however, with 'Ariell, an ayrie spirit' accompanied by 'Juno, Iris, Ceres, Nymphes [and] Reapers' also defined as spirits.

Whether Ariel is spirit or angel (the latter in the light of his angelic message of compassion to Prospero in Act V), or fallen angel, Hooker asserts that angels are wholly immaterial:

Touching angels, which are spirits immaterial and intellectual...God, which moveth mere natural agents as an efficient only, does otherwise move intellectual creatures, for beholding the face of God...they all adore him.\(^{26}\)

But even if he has physical as well as intellectual being, Ariel can take any shape: 'Go make *thyself* like a nymph o' th' sea.../Go, take this shape' (I.2.301). He ends up tiny or wholly immaterial, flying on the bat's back or curling up in a cowslip's bell. He is frequently invisible, and needs no time for his transport. In the backward and abyss of Ariel's genesis, even before Puck, he is perhaps one of the musicians that Glendower provides:
And those musicians that shall play to you
Hang in the air a thousand leagues from hence
And straight they shall be here. (III.1.225)

On the stage Ariel's music is the sign that his power is in action and it accompanies each of his supernatural effects. The last time it is required it is 'a solemn air, and the best comforter/ To an unsettled fancy' (V.1.58) which Prospero called 'heavenly' (V.1.52). It would be foolish to categorise him further according to presumed theory as to whether he is a demon, an angel, or some other kind of spirit; but he is at one with the elements and these are harmonious and orderly and fulfil God's law. The exception to this belief may be St. Paul. In the play the elements are seen as harmonious, but The Oxford Classical Dictionary interprets St. Paul as castigating belief in the elements (Galatians 4:9). It is Shakespeare who adds the idea of elemental harmony to Virgil's idea of the invulnerability of the birds. His anthropomorphic images of wounding 'the loud winds' or killing 'the still-closing waters' with 'bemocked-at stabs', whereby the earthy metal swords cannot affect the sister elements is quite literal, and part of the belief.

One element cannot attack another, or mingle with it, because the elements keep their appointed place in an orderly system. All the same, Aristotle mentions this as somewhat problematic and raises the question of contiguity. Hooker, an Aristotelian according to Bayne, suggests mutual benignity in the relationships of natural substances - the elements are invulnerable to harm from each other, on the grounds of the benign, God-relatedness of nature. Aristotle's physics gives good grounds for Hooker's reading of mutual benignity into nature's
substances, though Aristotle thinks the point of contiguity is problematic:

In the succession of elementary bodies the neighbours with which each is in unforced contact are kindred to it...at the margins where the different [but kindred] elements are in contact, they act and react upon each other. It is equally natural for the elements severally to rest in the places that belong to them, for the relation of each element, in its own portion of the whole place-universal, to its neighbours is that of a separated part of a single element to the whole of that element.23

Just as Hooker sees angels as altruistic because there is 'a law which bindeth them...all to prefer the good of the whole before whatsoever their own particular', so elements, too, sometimes go against their usual course for the good of the whole:

as we plainly see they do when things natural in that regard forget their ordinary natural wont; that which is heavy mounting sometimes upwards of its own accord, and forsaking the centre of the earth which to itself is most natural, even as if it did hear itself commanded to let go the good it privately wishes and to relieve the present distress of nature in common.24

So perhaps in Ariel's harpy speech quoted above, earth is asserting herself to protect her fellow elements in making herself so heavy that the swords which are part of the element of earth cannot be lifted, nor can air and water suffer attack from earth if the intent is evil. Aspects of this idea in other Shakespeare plays are juxtaposed by Baldwin. He explains Shakespeare's use of the idea of semina rerum in Ovid's opening lines of the Metamorphoses in his 'nature's germens' and 'seeds of time'. These occur in several passages that envisage primaeval chaos and a contrasting order which is hand-in-glove with love (King Lear, III.2.6-9; Macbeth, IV.1.58-61, I.3.58-59; Winter's Tale,
These as yet ungrown germens and seeds of time are equivalent to the elements in chaos 'before Love produced order, as in Hesiod-Plato-Ovid', says Baldwin. This is echoed in Othello's 'and when I love thee not/ Chaos is come again' (III.3.93). Divine goodness, then, pertains to the order of matter.

Peyré gives a richly documented account of the elemental significances of the masque which is very convincing. Here at last is a meaningful integration of the Ceres, Juno and Iris figures into many aspects of the play as a whole, particularly into the elemental concept of nature under discussion here, and a coherent structure in the relationship of the goddesses to each other also emerges. Peyré establishes that the three are element figures, that elemental attributes relate to the many images of fecundity and sterility of the scene, with temperateness the ideal between hot and cold, wet and dry - an imagery which meshes with contrasts of civility and wildness which also occur in the rest of the play. Ceres, among all her other attributes, is equated with earth. This is why her landscape includes not only the fertile harvest images but also 'thy sea-marge sterile and rocky-hard' (IV.1.69). Peyré traces this identification in the many contemporary commentaries of the natura deorum type on the meaning of
ancient mythology, typically Abraham Fraunce, in his lively 'Ivychurch' pastoral: 'Ceres herselfe noteth the earth'. In the text itself Iris identifies Juno as 'queen of the sky', representing air, and she calls herself 'watery arch'. Iris, as rainbow, unites earth and sky more essentially than by reason of the visible arc stretching between them; through her parents Thaumas and Electra she is the grand-daughter of the sun and the sea, that is, fire and water - Thaumas was the son of Pontus the sea, and Electra was daughter of 'heaven, or the sonne' as Fraunce explains. Peyré sums up: 'A travers Cérès, Iris, Junon, le masque présente une double image d'union cosmique de la terre et de l'air par l'intervention du soleil et de l'eau, et tout en célébrant l'union de Miranda et de Ferdinand annonce le retour de l'harmonie dans l'univers'. Iris as rainbow, of course, represents traditional biblical reconciliation. 'No more storms', Ceres seems to say in the lines 'Spring come to you at the farthest/ In the very end of harvest' (IV.1.114), since, as Peyré points out, winter is typically the season of storms. He recalls that Virgil's De Partibus Anni oppose à la saison de Cérès celle des tempêtes:

Flaua Ceres aestatis habet sua tempore regna...
Imperium saeuis hyberno tempore ventis.

The benign weather, then, recalls not only another fictional golden age to match Gonzalo's dream, but the storm that is gone. The elements are at peace again and in their proper places after the opening storm.

A closer look at Miranda's description of the latter shows it to be clearly described in terms of warring elements:
The sky, it seems, would pour down stinking pitch,
But that the sea, mounting to th' welkin's cheek,
Dashes the fire out (1.2.3).

Elsewhere in the play, Prospero himself refers to his storm-making in elemental terms,

I have bedimmed
The noontide sun, called forth the mutinous winds,
And 'twixt the green sea and the azure vault
Set roaring war. (V.1.41)

Miranda's words, above, personifying 'welkin' through the word 'cheek', suggest violent emotion and hate between air, fire and water: fire descends, water rises, contrary to their natures, invading the air between them. Fire, which is light and said to rise and always seek the upper levels of the spaces apportioned to the lower world, is, instead, pouring downwards in the form of black clouds flashing with lightning - the 'stinking' and liquid pitch seems to be actually burning like 'the mines of sulphur' in Othello, which would indeed stink. The danger of this causes the sea to go against its naturally heavy nature, and rise, in order to douse the fire, thus saving the world from the disordered behaviour of elements that should stay in their places. All this is commonplace knowledge as summarized in Rastell's Interlude of the Four Elements:

The ayre whiche is hote and moyst also,
And the fyre whiche is ever hote and dry,
About the yerth and water joyntly they go
And compassa them everywhere orbycularly,
As the whyte about the yolke of an egg doth lye.
But the ayre in the lower parte moste remaynyth;
The fyre naturally to the hyer tendyth...

The fyre and the ayre of their naturys be lyght,
Therefore they move by naturall provydence.
The water, bycause it is ponderous in weyght,
Movyth not naturally but by vyolence
Of the sterris and planetys, by whose influence
The see is compellyd to ebbe and flowe dayly,
And freshe waters to sprynge contynually.

And though that the water be grose and hevy
Yet nothynge so grose as the yerth iwys,
Therefore by hete it is vaporyd up lyghtly
And in the ayre makyth cloudys and mystys,
But as sone as ever that it grosely is
Gederyd togyder, it descendyth agayne
And causyth upon the yerth hayle, snow and rayne. 32

I have found few commentators who recognize the 'elemental conflict' in
the storm; Furness notes one, however. 33

Venus, goddess of wanton love and destroyer of the rites of
marriage, is introduced as a threat. She encouraged Pluto to steal
Ceres's daughter Proserpina, whose marriage, according to Boccaccio, was
sterile because of Pluto's heat and the ensuing dryness. 34 'Selon
certains mythographes, la stérilité qui représente le rapt de Proserpine
est due à de trop fortes chaleurs, et à la sécheresse qu'elles
provoquent.' 35 Ferdinand is threatened with barrenness by Prospero if
he 'breaks Miranda's 'virgin knot before/ All sanctimonious ceremonies'
(IV.1.14), and later Prospero repeats the warning, 'the strongest oaths
are straw/ To th' fire i' th' blood', to which Ferdinand answers, 'the
white cold virgin snow upon my heart/Abates the ardour of my liver'
(IV.1.52,55), thus opposing the 'hot' and 'cold' in his own body. The
'tempering' of these elemental qualities is an aspect of virtue and
determines human order and disorder as well, and it even applies to the
'temperate' nymphs dancing with the 'sun-burnt sickle-men of August
weary' (IV.1.134). 'L'équilibre des humeurs et la modération des
passions semblent être prones tout au long du spectacle...toujours suppose
une union temperée du chaud et du frais, qualité que Adrien a reconnue à
Adrian says that the island 'must needs be of subtle, tender, and delicate temperance', because the air is sweet, the grass lush and green and 'here is everything advantageous to life' (II.1.50). 'Come, temperate nymphs,' Iris says, 'and help to celebrate/ A contract of true love' (IV.1.133). The element structure, then, which applies to all aspects of the play in so far as it refers to an accepted system of knowledge, is also a moral structure: 'dans l'allégorie naturelle se lit en filigrane l'allégorie morale'.

iii. CALIBAN'S LANGUAGE

The harmony of temperateness which applies both to nature and civilization is counterpointed by Caliban, who is contemptuously called 'thou earth' by Prospero. Unlike the benign Ceres, he represents the element in its negative aspect: 'and though that the water be grosse and hevy/ Yet nothynge so grosse as the yerth iyys,' which in itself is no more than to say that he is not, like Cleopatra, 'fire and air' as she aspires to leave the body behind and gives her 'other elements...to baser life' (V.2.280). Caliban is rebellious, frustrated and destructive - as Dryden says, by heredity: 'the poet has most
judiciously furnished him with a person, a language, and a character, which will suit him, both by Fathers and Mothers side...his language is as hobgoblin as his person: in all things he is distinguish'd from other mortals'. Dr Johnson comments on Warburton's note quoting Lord Falkland, Lord C. J. Vaughan and Mr Seldon concurring that Shakespear had not only found out a new character in his Caliban, but had also devised and adapted 'a new manner of language' for that character. What they meant by it without doubt, was, that Shakespear gave his language a certain grotesque air of the Savage and Antique, which it certainly has. But Dr Bentley took this 'of a new language', literally...[in a comparison with Milton] 'Satan had not the privilege as Caliban in Shakespear to use new phrase and diction unknown to all other' and again - 'to practise distances is still a Caliban stile'.

Dr Johnson took this to mean that Shakespeare had departed from linguistic norms, which he rightly denied:

These critics certainly mistook brutality of sentiment for uncouthness of words...his Diction is indeed somewhat clouded by the Gloominess of his Temper and the Malignity of his Purposes; but let any other being entertain the same Thoughts and he will find them easily issue in the same Expressions.

Though Dr Johnson is right that this language is not grammatically or lexically un-normative, yet I wish to enlarge on Dryden's and similar perceptions. Dr Johnson misses the clue in his phrase, 'let any other being entertain the same thoughts', for Shakespeare aims to create a being whose thoughts are uniquely his own, not comparable with 'any other being'. I find Shakespeare experimenting with semantics rather than with idiom, grammar or even nonsense of the type spoken by poor Tom in King Lear, or, for instance, Ignorance in the moral interlude of The Four Elements where the author has a comparable problem of finding a speech style expressive of the character type.
Yngnoraunce:
A hundred wynter the water was depe,
I cannot tell you how brode,
He toke a gosse nek in his hande
And over the water he went.

He start up to a thystell top
And cut him downe a holyn clobe,
He stroke the wren betwene the hornys
That fyre sprange out of the pyggys tayle.

and so on for six verses in all.

Caliban's ignorance is an irreparable moral ignorance combined with other aspects of ignorance related to his circumstances: both are reflected in his speech. His language has three features, discussed below, which together give impressions of an unusual consciousness to the listener. Of these the first two are certainly stylistic, observing a decorum for the character which very likely Shakespeare did indeed mean to project as 'savage', 'antique', 'gloomy', 'malign'. This style is marked by a vocabulary of nouns and adjectives relating largely to the natural world; a further aspect of it can be characterised as a style of 'naming'; and the third justifies Dryden's intuition - the audience is non-plussed by certain things Caliban says. If the listener were to define his reaction, it would be that Caliban uses certain words without understanding their usual context or import for the audience. Thus not all the words he has learnt are validated, for validation comes from shared human insights or shared cultural connotations; these are the pre-requisite for language to 'mean'. Shakespeare's perceptions about the relation of language to mind can be formulated in terms of the language philosophy of Saussure, Firth and other more modern writers as indicated below.
In accordance with contemporary belief in the three souls, the vegetative, the animal and the rational (the latter being 'intelligent' in a wide sense, not only ratiocinative), Shakespeare shapes language for Caliban on sense perceptions and memory, but little on the intellectual plane, as expressed in the interlude of The Four Elements:

Wherefore thou man—now I speke to the—
Remembre that thou art compound and create
Of these elementis, as other creaturis be,
Yet they have not all lyke noble estate,
For plantis and herbys growe and be insensate,
Brute bestis have memory and their wyttes fyve,
But thou hast all those and soul intellectyve.  

Hooker says of animals compared to men:

Beasts are in sensible capacity as ripe even as men themselves, perhaps more ripe...[and] may in actions of sense and fancy go beyond them...the soul of man has...a further ability whereof in them there is no show at all...of reaching higher than unto sensible things...education and instruction are the means...to make our natural faculty of reason better...man in perfection of nature being made in the likeness of his maker.

Caliban, unique, is not an animal, yet below the bottom line of humanity, a sample of human degeneration, or simply an aberration, which Hooker allows of. As well as the inspired gusto of the invention, Shakespeare has invented him on a principle, as a contrastive definiens of 'man', like him in everything but one defining factor, which will emerge later in this chapter. Between animals and angels, there is a scale for human beings too. A contrastive comparison with Francis the drawer is useful here, for the language of each is a studied and deliberate indication of personalities that are ranked in the human scale. Caliban will be shown to fit in below the bottom line on moral
grounds. Just above it perhaps is the delightful but unmettlesome Francis in Henry IV Part I whose humanity is not in doubt but who also falls (almost) below par judged on factors which reveal themselves in his language: 'That ever this fellow should have fewer words than a parrot, and yet the son of a woman' (Henry IV, II.4.95). Prince Hal, it will be remembered, was sounding out 'the very base-string of humility', in his exploration of 'all humours' since 'goodman Adam', which turned out to be a linguistic investigation of the drawers. Francis has no language but clichés ('O Lord', 'I'll be sworn', 'I could find in my heart') and 'the parcel of a reckoning'. His language has shrunk to the world of the tavern, (II.4. 95-99) yet he is eager and good-willed. Yet more might be expected of a creature of reason, next to the angels, is the implication. Shakespeare makes varieties of language style mirror varieties of mind by creating idiolects. It was generally believed that in every way man may be declining more and more since the Fall. Ben Jonson considers the question of degeneration in Timber:

I cannot think nature is so spent and decayed that she can bring forth nothing worth her former years. She is always the same, like herself; and when she collects her strength, is abler still. Men are decayed, and studies: she is not.  

If the tavern is the world that has limited Francis's language, the sense and experience world of Caliban is wholly of the island, with as much or more memory of Sycorax as Miranda has of court ladies. His world is richer than that of Francis, however, and it is reflected in his language somewhat by the same stylistic technique as Othello's is: the wealth of things and places of the latter's speech regularly show him emotionally anchored in the concretes of war and
travel. We can easily believe in a literalness which leaves him out of his depth in the machinating world of Venetian bed-hopping that Iago projects. Caliban is not out of his depth among the things and creatures of the island but in certain other dimensions. One might say that his language learning — a language of naming — has put him in cognitive possession not only of his own 'purposes' but also of the island (besides this he claims it, like colonizers, because he was there first 'by Sycorax my mother'). His curses, his appetites, and his fears all refer to the places of the island, to the animals, and to the sensation of touch and movement which compose his existence. His curses show him engaged in biological warfare, in possession of no mean arsenal of foetid diseases and sinister poisons: 'What ho, slave! Caliban!/ Thou earth, thou, speak! (I.2.113). Earth does speak, ill-willed, dispensing curses connected with disease such as a 'wicked dew' that will 'blister you all over' gathered from 'unwholesome fen', (line 321); 'the red plague' (1.363); the feather of a raven, toads, beetles, bats, (1.340), his mother's familiars — 'all the charms of Sycorax' remembered from his childhood; and finally 'all the infections that the sun sucks up/ From bogs, fens, flats on Prosper fall, and make him/ By inchmeal a disease!' (II.1.1). Thorndike describes a book by Fernel, De abditis rerum causis (1548) reprinted throughout the sixteenth century and beyond, and well known, which asserts 'that the cause of pest is occult, and that there is something occult in all epidemics'. Besides these poisons of nature, the inventory of earth begun by Ceres is completed by Caliban by a list of creatures — a close-up focus, as it were, of the earth's surface. This list has much to do with goodies to eat, while another group among the innumerable creatures
that are mentioned in connection with him or by him are a cause of fear. Prospero threatens him with 'stripes' by using the island world against him, and since Prospero is more powerful than Caliban's 'dam's god Setebos', Caliban cannot resist him, even though he remembers these powerful plague curses, which incidentally Thorndike relates to witches. Prospero can set upon him torments which he describes as painful in various ways, but which Caliban identifies in detail: urchins, bees, hedgehogs, will o' the wisps, apes, and adders. Prospero is regularly abusive to him and their dialogue is reminiscent of the 'language of beasts' between Timon and Apemantus. Indeed Prospero does not speak to him as a human being but as 'filth'. De Grazia finds great similarities between Sycorax and Prospero: 'Not only are their histories similar and their powers interchangeable, but both sorceress and magician are driven by the same passion - anger.' The kind of food which Caliban enjoys he freely offers to Stephano and Trinculo (not forgetting the former friendly efforts of the younger Caliban to show Prospero good drinking water). These foods, as Peyré points out, are the kind of wild food which are offensive to the civilized palate of Ferdinand, who is threatened with 'fresh-brook mussels, withered roots and husks/Wherein the acorn cradled', and Ferdinand determines to 'resist such entertainment' (I.2.464). Peyré suggests that his wild foods also prove his rejection of 'le foyer, double image de la civilisation et de la famille'. Caliban means to show Stephano and Trinculo every inch of the island in return for their divine drink, and to fish for them as he does for Prospero; scamels, crabs, pig-nuts, jay's eggs and little monkeys (marmosets) are all on the menu - they have to be gathered, caught, climbed for or scraped up. Thus Caliban
experiences something of Wordsworth's active boyhood years and 'their glad animal movements' although he is fully a man (aged 24 years). He thus gives an impression of immaturity, or, like Miranda, simply a lack of sophistication. Thus, except for his dream of heaven, his world is composed of food finding and identifying what is to be feared; these are, indeed, the prime concern of human beings in the wild. He hates the slave labour which the civilised demand from him. Tasks mentioned in the play include bringing in wood and water for cooking and heating, fishing, scraping 'trencher' and washing dishes, and tidying up the cell, pretty much the usual household round, elsewhere reserved for 'greasy Joan that keels the pot'. His entire life is laid out before us in these terms, a life of the senses, a life of things, a life of naming with nouns.

Caliban's memory is the seat of his language learning. Naming is typical of the learning that children do; it is also the language of creation in the Book of Genesis, of the Book of Job, and of several of the Psalms. Caliban specifically connects his language learning with the naming of creation, recalling the process by a Bible quotation: 'wouldst teach me how/ To name the bigger light and how the less' (1.2.335). In the Book of Moses (Genesis), 1:16, these words are 'And God made two great lights: a great light to rule the day, and a lesse light to rule the night, and he made starres also'. The frontispiece illustration to the Bishop's Bible of 1588 typically illustrates the Garden of Eden as teeming with every living creature (including a grasshopper the size of the hedgehog in the picture). 'Listing creation' in picture and word is the natural corollary of a belief in a perfect, unchanging creation that is complete. It is the
language of praise recording man's simple joy and awe at being, in the midst of his natural inheritance. The concept of achieved creation is alien to the modern mind brought up on evolutionary assumptions; it accounts for the endless listing and classifying process undertaken no less by the empiricists than previous writers. Linnaeus is in the same camp and is typical of the empirical classifiers, who had not abandoned their literal belief in the Bible; it is entirely logical that his patron, Celsius, should be a Professor of theology. Darwin's brief in his voyage on The Beagle had similar aims. Fitzroy (the Captain) had a special object in view, a religious object. 'The voyage, he believed, would provide a grand opportunity to substantiate the Bible, especially the book of Genesis. As a naturalist, Darwin might easily find many evidences of the Flood and the first appearance of all created things upon the earth. He could perform a valuable service by interpreting his scientific discoveries in the light of the Bible. Darwin, the young clergyman-to-be, was very ready to agree.  

Hooker points out that nature is wholly purposeful: 'only thus much is discerned, that the natural generation and process of all things receiveth order of proceeding from the settled stability of divine understanding'. Shakespeare uses Caliban's naming along with other ploys to create the island as a paradigm of the natural world and a potential earthly paradise. With a light touch Shakespeare calls up the population of the animals Adam might have named, thus incidentally pointing a parallel between God's verbal fiat and the playwright's. The mere 'bow-wow' and 'cock a diddle dow' of Ariel's song calls up dogs and strutting chanticleer; if there is 'horse-piss' (IV.1.199) in the 'filthy-mantled' pool there must be horses, and the awakening lords are as ready as the
audience to imagine 'a hollow burst of bellowing/ Like bulls or rather lions...sure, it was the roar/ Of a whole herd of lions' (II.1.309,313).

Caliban orders his idea of creation in his own way. Shakespeare gives him the adjective/noun-pair diction that pins down the 'typical', which he frequently reserves for descriptive narratio: he characterizes the marmoset as 'nimble', the filberts as 'clustering', the mole as 'blind'. Naming, and thus defining, the creatures and sensations in his own sphere of existence includes such fine differentiation as 'noises', 'sounds', and 'sweet airs', and puts him in possession of his sensory world - naming is knowing and knowing is owning: 'human knowledge and human power meet in one', says Bacon, though by knowledge he means something almost contrary to mere names. By naming, Caliban has pierced the miasma which, Saussure says, is the human condition. 'Without language, thought is a vague uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct without language'. Now Caliban can make his purposes and his world known to Stephano and Trinculo for instance.

His purposes, however, show deficient human understanding; they are to rape Miranda and kill Prospero. Shakespeare shows that knowing words does not ensure knowing meaning in all contexts. Only the natural world in the wild is Caliban's context, and Shakespeare proceeds to alert the audience to the gap in Caliban's mind between certain of his words and their normal connotation. 'Some of you there present are worse than devils', Prospero says, and their evil is that of the corrupted will (Antonio). Caliban's evil is distinguished from theirs as an incapacity of the 'soul intellectyve' which includes innate moral knowledge. On several occasions Shakespeare creates a discrepancy for
the audience which they must perceive for themselves, just as it is up to them to notice Iago's lying, which is not pointed out as it occurs.

The first of these shows Caliban to have no conception of Prospero:

Remember
First to possess his books; for without them
He's but a sot, as I am, nor hath not
One spirit to command - they all do hate him
As rootedly as I. (III.2.89)

To begin with, there is little evidence that the spirits hate him more than their desire for freedom might indicate; secondly, a bookless Prospero is by no means definable as a sot. Caliban's concept of books is of something mechanical, a recipe book for magic, as though books constituted the only difference between Prospero and him. Caliban is for ever unaware of Prospero's stature as a man, ruler, and sage. Books, which Prospero prized above his dukedom and which 'o'er-排除 all popular rate' (I.2.92) are prized by Prospero not for recipes alone but because they are the garnered harvest of human knowledge which will lead human beings back to their lost knowledge of God-in-nature. For the audience Caliban's speech rebounds as a judgement upon Caliban's shallowness. If alert, the audience disagrees with his estimate of Prospero because the play has convinced us of Prospero's essential nobleness in spite of some ambiguous signals. There is also a second dimension of irony to this speech which makes itself felt at the end: this insight is that we are as far from understanding God as Caliban is from understanding Prospero. A further irony leads back to the realisation that, nevertheless, Prospero is only narrowly saved from being a moral sot by Ariel's intervention. The remark 'he's but a sot as I am' reverberates as a long-term question that relates to every
apparent judgement established between audience and play, for Prospero says no less in 'we are such stuff as dreams are made on' (IV.1.156) and in the epilogue, 'my ending is despair,/Unless I be relieved by prayer' (V.1.333). The triad 'book'- 'Prospero' (man)- 'sot' has one meaning for Caliban and another for the audience. Saussure's term 'value' clarifies the discrepancy here. A concept is not a fixed entity, different people use the same word, but with different 'value':

Modern French mouton can have the same signification as English sheep but not the same value,... Speaking of a piece of meat ready to be served at table English uses mutton not sheep. The difference in value between sheep and mouton is due to the fact that sheep has beside it a second term while the French word does not. If words stood for pre-existing concepts, they would all have exact equivalents in meaning from one language to the next.

'Saussure thus articulates the liberating principle that the meaning of a word is not its referent, but, anticipating Wittgenstein, its use in the language.' Caliban only partially understands the 'value' of the words 'book' or 'Prospero'. Thus Shakespeare exploits a realization which language philosophers did not articulate sharply until the twentieth century, that 'meaning in language is a complex of contextual relations'.

These contexts are partly missing for Caliban because of his island isolation and partly on account of a deficiency at once intellectual and moral. The former, inexperience of the group that has evolved the language, causes Caliban's second gap between word and concept, and gives him pause over the word 'nonpareil':

And that most deeply to consider is
The beauty of his daughter. He himself
Calls her a nonpareil. I never saw a woman
But only Sycorax, my dam, and she;
But she as far surpasseth Sycorax
As great'st does least. (III.2.96)

Caliban works for comprehension here which his lack of experience precludes. Shakespeare makes this the companion passage to Miranda's 'I do not know/ One of my sex, no woman's face remember,/ Save from my glass, mine own' (III.1.48) and draws the listener's attention to Caliban's conceptual deficit here. The word 'nonpareil' is there, but he cannot claim its meaning, through ignorance of women, just as Miranda shows her ignorance of men. Experience of a shared world is clearly a requisite for language meaning. Caliban does well here, working on the grammar of comparatives to arrive at the grammar of what he does understand, the comparison of two. His contrasting superlatives express his perception well and reinforce the audience's sense of his isolation. All the same, Caliban's firm acknowledgement of Sycorax is touching, deeply related to him both for good and ill. Shakespeare leaves alternate discourses open - Sycorax with her baby, her envy, her devil mate and her good deed awaits a twentieth century storyteller. Unlike Caliban, Stephano and Trinculo are street-wise and that is how they know the world. They know all too many women with whom they would compare Miranda, and their colloquial 'is it so brave a lass?' shows they would class her with their 'Moll, Meg, and Marian, and Margery', which leaves them as uncomprehending of Miranda as Caliban.

The third gap is in his proposed murder of Prospero:

Why, as I told thee, 'tis a custom with him
I' th' afternoon to sleep. There thou may'st brain him,
Having first seized his books; or with a log
Batter his skull, or paunch him with a stake,
Or cut his weasand withthyknife (III.2.85).
This gap is apparently an irredeemable one. Caliban speculates about the killing as a technical problem. Shakespeare eliminates both pleasure and pain—Caliban is emotionally untouched by words which make the audience shudder. Caliban is a psychopath who can kill and rape because his self-identification with other human beings is maimed to the extent that he can feel pain and 'stripes' himself but not recognize himself in others. In Antonio conscience has 'been candied o'er' and the effect is the same, but the moral judgement against the latter is more severe, though both are equally dangerous to their society. Caliban's vision of killing Prospero does not match ours, which is loaded with horror as we visualize battering a skull or cutting a throat. Thus for lack of these three aspects of reason, which in modern terms we might name intellect, experience and empathy, Caliban fails to share the contexts which his words hold for others, both within the play and for the audience. Francis, perhaps, lacks intellect (or, like Gray's mute, inglorious Milton, education), while Miranda lacks experience. Caliban lacks the one essential that defines the human norm: empathy, 'the very virtue', is the pre-requisite for human kindness in the primary meaning of that word, and the basis for the brotherhood of man. As such, empathy is necessary for human communication, and language itself should reinforce this brotherhood. It is Caliban's innate moral deficiency which marks him off from the deprived Francis. Prospero's words, 'a feeling/Of their afflictions' (v.1.21) at the play's climax reiterates the 'very virtue of compassion' which opens the theme with Miranda's words at the beginning of the play. Neither Ariel nor Caliban can fully experience the capacity for compassionate feeling. Ariel tells us so: '[my feelings] would become
were I human'—while Caliban's language has forced us to deduce a lack of feeling from it. These demarcation lines, which place Ariel and Caliban above and below the human respectively, recall Aristotle:

The disposition opposed to Bestiality [or 'Brutality'—translator's note] will clearly be some quality more than human; for there is no such thing as Virtue in the case of a god, any more than there is Vice or Virtue in the case of a beast: divine goodness is something more exalted than Virtue, and bestial badness is different in kind from Vice. And inasmuch as it is rare for a man to be divine...so a bestial character is rare among human beings; it is found most frequently among barbarians.

In The Tempest Shakespeare has pin-pointed evil more exactly than in any other play, that is to say analytically (for the audience's experience of evil is clearly more direct in many others of his plays since in The Tempest the evil-doers are forestalled, or their evil is retrospectively treated). Hankins summarizes Aristotle's reasoning on this subject and finds that Shakespeare probably knew Aristotle's treatment of this question. He outlines some of the complex associations and sources that possibly bring together for Shakespeare Aristotle's bestial man from Nicomachean Ethics with popular writers both classical and contemporary on cannibals and primitive societies. According to Aristotle 'there are three evil states of the human mind, incontinence, malice, and bestiality. The incontinent man's evil appetites overcome his will to do good'—I suggest we might accord that state to Stephano and Trinculo, ready to murder for power, gain and lust; 'the malicious man's will is itself perverted to evil purposes though his reason perceives the difference between right and wrong'—this, I suggest, applies to Antonio; 'the bestial man has no sense of
right and wrong, and therefore sees no difference between good and evil. His state is less guilty but more hopeless than those of incontinence and malice, since he cannot be improved. While men can degenerate into bestiality through continued wrong-doing...a natural state of bestiality is relatively rare in the human race'. Aristotle gives examples of cannibalism as bestiality, which associates Caliban with the bestiality through his name as well. Hakluyt and Stow are among many who refer to cannibals in contemporary literature, including comment on their bestiality and sometimes unintelligibility of their language. Modern psychology would blame Caliban's insentience on his childhood sufferings, though some still say that psychopaths are born that way. Aristotle even touches on this question too, in order to mark off the bestial type from the physically or mentally sick, but judges diminished responsibility for both. One cannot accuse them of vice, or unrestraint, yet they are deplorable:

Other unnatural propensities are due to disease...insanity... acquired by habit, for instance plucking out the hair, biting the nails, eating cinders and also sexual perversion. These practices result in some cases from natural disposition, and in others from habit, as with those who have been abused from childhood...now these various morbid dispositions in themselves do not fall within the limits of vice, nor yet does bestiality.

Hankins suggests that 'in these parallels we can find a clue to the philosophic explanation of Caliban', compounded of the wild, the natural, and the bestial as defined by Aristotle. Twice Prospero suggests that no reform is possible for Caliban: 'A devil, a born devil, on whose nature/Nurture will never stick' (IV.1.188) and 'Abhorred slave,/ Which any print of goodness wilt not take,/ Being
capable of all ill' (I.2.251). Can the born devil seek for grace? Can Caliban's imagination grow to perceive 'the other' if his will reaches out to it, as it briefly does at the end. Shakespeare leaves this question open.

iv. PROSPERO'S BOOKS

If nature speaks to man of God, and acts as instrument to Providence, Prospero can speak to nature in return, and act upon it, through language. Books are made much of in the play. Milan was 'for the liberal arts/ Without a parallel' (I.2.74), and they were also for Prospero 'all my study'. There are thus two different kinds of studies Prospero engages in, the seven traditional subjects of the liberal arts, the trivium and quadrivium, which consisted of the three language branches, grammar, rhetoric and logic, and the four mathematical ones, arithmetic, music, astronomy, geometry. The others are secret ones, the occult studies by which Prospero was 'transported/ and rapt in secret studies' (I.2.76). Through esoteric words, symbols or signs in his books he becomes adept, and can command Ariel, a demonic or angelic nature spirit. Examples documented by Gustav Davidson include efficacious signs, symbols and words, such as the angdic script, the seals of the seven angels, the names of God, and the Solomonic rites of the magic circle. Entries on the name Ariel (with sources) list the
name as that of an angel, demon, sprite, angel of winds, and more. At this period this secret knowledge of nature is likely to be sacred knowledge. Nature can be acted on by language because nature was made by God through the Word, and the right words and signs should indeed reveal these amazing forces to the transported Prospero and empower him within them. The talmudic exegetical system was thought to provide such a key and to determine hidden meaning behind every word of the Bible, which, together with a doctrine of literal inspiration for the Bible, 'was amplified into an occult theory of creation in which the (Hebrew) letters play an active part: "In thirty-two mysterious paths of wisdom did the Lord write...he created his universe by the three forms of expression, Numbers, Letters and Words"'.

The various divine names are not arbitrary combinations of sounds; they conceal a mystery of miraculous power in their letters. So, too, do the names of the angels. By uniting these names and combining their letters in various ways, men may achieve the power to influence the course of nature. Knowledge of the proper techniques of interpretation is the key to release a secret meaning from a literal surface.

But nature's inner workings being invoked, they may also be violently perverted from good aims or against nature's affinities as Sycorax did, arrogating to herself the moon's powers (V.1.270). We do not know how to judge Prospero's experiments by which he 'bedimmed the noontide sun' and opened graves, resurrecting the dead (V.1.40-50). An alchemical reference in the play is discussed in Chapter 1.

In contrast, the new empiricism, and the principles which crystallized in the Royal Society a mere fifty years later, purports to make a clean break with books in order to take a fresh look at the operation of things. Thomas Sprat, in his rebuttal of the French
Historiographer Royal's misapprehensions about the Royal Society in 1664 (M. Sorbière) says particularly that the Royal Society have 'most industriously avoided...a reliance upon Books, for their intelligence of Nature'. The books they were rejecting contained the ancient Aristotelian world picture which Prospero's liberal arts relate to, and that Bacon inveighed against:

There is no soundness in our notions whether logical or physical. Substance, Quality, Action...Element, Matter, Form...all are fantastical and ill defined...[the only right way is to] derive axioms from the senses and particulars...it is idle to expect any great advancement in science from the superinducing and engrafting new things upon old...the honour of the ancient authors remains untouched; since the comparison I challenge is not of wits or faculties, but of ways and methods.

These, however, were what was being taught at the universities, though Mordechai Feingold softens the reputation Oxford and Cambridge had for the 'Aristotelian rigidity' which modern critics have accused them of. He shows that there was plenty of interest in the occult, which is not easy to detach from the new science either. The university attitude to the occult resembled that of the state:

Private study was tolerated as long as it did not involve any unlawful casting of nativities of monarchs or debasing of coins or...scandalous accusations of cheating or witchcraft...the only explicit distinction between the lawful and the unlawful being made by Sir Henry Savile when he founded his professorship of Astronomy at Oxford in 1619, which forbade judicial astrology (the casting of personal horoscopes).

In the early days of the Royal Society it is hard to distinguish between the occult and the empirical groups. Vickers puts the case for 'attitude to language' as a major dividing factor:
In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a spectrum of beliefs and attitudes can be distinguished, a continuum from, say, absolutely magical to absolutely mechanistic poles, along which thinkers place themselves at various points depending on their attitudes to certain key topics. One of these...is the relationship between language and reality. In the scientific tradition, I hold, a clear distinction is made between words and things and between literal and metaphorical language. The occult tradition does not recognize that distinction. Words are treated as if they were equivalent to things and can be substituted for them. 

On the face of it this difference would divide magicians, like Prospero with 'magic garment' (I.2.24), books and staff, from the new scientists, for Prospero's books themselves are finally treated like dangerous objects, as though they would spring up armed men. They carried a physical danger it would seem, from the necessity of having them sunk 'deeper than did plummet ever sound' (V.1.56), like radioactive material in our time. Vickers points out, too, that secrecy is a marked feature of occultism as opposed to the determination of empiricists to communicate their results internationally, e.g. 'Dee...deliberately cultivated obscurity, a long-standing feature of the occult which also serves to distinguish it from the non-occult sciences'. Yet Westfall makes the case for Newton's secrecy about his alchemical studies because of the disrepute which alchemy fell into, which would have harmed his credibility. Thorndike shows the difficulty in separating the various types of investigation into nature in this transitional time:

Natural Magic is the working of marvelous effects, which may seem preternatural, by a knowledge of occult forces in nature without resort to supernatural assistance. It was therefore regarded, unless employed for evil purposes, as permissible, whereas diabolical magic, worked by demon aid, was illicit. Natural magic was also distinguished from natural science, as being more mysterious and less explicable in universal, regular and mathematical terms. Indeed, since demons were often thought to work their magic simply by superior insight into the secrets of nature based on long experience, the
connection between natural and diabolical magic was somewhat closer than that between natural magic and classified and generally accepted natural science. 

Within these broad divisions, cabbalism, neo-Platonism, alchemy and Paracelsianism might all be part of Prospero's art. Thorndike's account of Bruno may have some particular relevance, in that Bruno considers a world soul in everything, so the least thing in the world may work the greatest operations. So Prospero makes a point of his 'meanker ministers' and describes the elves and demi-puppets as 'weak masters':

Ye elves of hills, brooks, standing lakes and groves,  
And ye that on the sands with printless foot  
Do chase the ebbing Neptune, and do fly him  
When he comes back; you demi-puppets that  
By moonshine do the green sour ringlets make...  
   by whose aid -  
Weak masters th'ough you be - I have bedimmed  
The noontide sun (V.1.33).

In fact Thorndike shows that even the most sceptical scientists late into the seventeenth century held beliefs we would call occult. The interest, with only fifty-odd years between The Tempest and the foundation of the Royal Society, lies in the overlap. To regard words as efficacious upon matter, as predicated in the occult philosophies, instead of envisaging chemical and mechanical action upon matter (until Newton also establishes forces) is not, in the play, a very serious difference between magic and science. To some extent the complex knowledge of the modern scientist puts the public as surely into a position of awe and reliance on his mysteries as the magician of old. In terms of aims, for example, Prospero and the new scientists of the later seventeenth century are alike, for both desired control and power
through knowledge, and in the play Prospero achieves this control. As
will be stressed later in this discussion, knowledge was not everywhere
considered a duty, though Hooker asserts the God-like reason of man.
Knowledge was as often considered hubristic, forbidden and sinful. The
statement Prospero makes through the rejection of his books is a
rejection of knowledge and its moral abuse, not a rejection of magic as
opposed to a less occult system of controlling nature. In passing it
may be noted that the empiricists believed in spirits and angels, that
they believed as easily as the magicians that the desired knowledge
might be available in a hand's turn, and that nature was created by God
complete and knowable. Thus Wilkins, expounding physical and code
systems for telegraphy (as it were) in The Secret and Swift Messenger is
not ironic when he refers to angels as a fact and therefore perhaps
employable as messengers. He might indeed be describing the hard-
working Ariel:

Amongst all created substances, there are not any of so swift
a motion as angels or spirits. Because there is not either
within their natures, any such indisposition and reluctancy,
or without them in the medium, any such impediment as may in
the least manner retard their courses...if we could but send
one of them upon any errand, there would be no quicker way
than this for the dispatch of business at all distances.
That they have been often thus employed, is affirmed by divers
relations...but this way there is little hopes to advantage
our enquiry because it is not so easy to employ a good angel,
or safe dealing with a bad one.\

It may seem to us fictional that Prospero achieves his aims through his
magic, but the audience could accept this as reasonable when even Sprat
has little understanding of the as yet unfounded sciences of physics and
chemistry, and can say with an uncomprehending optimism, 'We may well
guess, that the absolute perfection of the True Philosophy, is not now
far off'. In the minds of the audience, Prospero's astrology - 'by my prescience/ I find my zenith doth depend upon/ A most auspicious star' (1.2.180) - is to some extent licensed by James I in 1603 through the Stationers' Company: 'All conjurers and framers of almanacs and prophecies exceeding the limits of allowable astrology shall be punished severely in their persons', so there must have been an allowable sector and known danger limit. Valentine Weigelius (1649) introduces astrology as 'Philosophy itself'. It is 'the whole light of Nature,...which is twofold...external in the macrocosm and internal in the microcosm. Or, Astrology is the very knowledge of good and evil' (if theology is properly integrated into it). All the same Prospero's astrology was probably illegal, for his is horary astrology and that relating to elections and inceptions, which fall under judicial not natural astrology: 'horary endeavoured to answer questions (usually practical, often urgent)...at the moment when the question was asked;...elections (etc) concerned the beginning of an enterprise'. This is what Prospero explains:

By my prescience
I find my zenith does depend upon
A most auspicious star, whose influence
If now I court not, but omit, my fortunes
Will ever after droop (1.2.180).

Predictive Astrology extends to the fate of nations, as it does in The Tempest where Prospero's fate is the dukedom's fate. Sprat too has a sense of divinely ordained national political destiny. As Milan was 'without a parallel' for learning, so Sprat wants England to lead the world. Sprat finds his countrymen ideal in their temperateness and therefore destined for the breakthrough:
If there can be a true character given of the Universal Temper of any Nation under heaven: then certainly this must be ascribed to our countrymen...that they have the middle qualities, between the reserved southern, and the rough, unhewn Northern people...so that even the position of our climate, the air, the influence of the heavens, the composition of the english blood...seem to join with the labours of the royal Society, to render our country, a land of Experimental Knowledge.

The editors suggest that this 'almost mystical sense of a national unity of spirit was one of the most influential ideas of the seventeenth century'.

v. PRAYER 'PIERCES' AND 'ASSAULTS'

The tradition which associates an ideal nation with philosophical knowledge of nature in this period is perhaps found more in literature than in life. Brooks-Davies traces literary mercurian and hermetic rulers from Spenser to Pope, and identifies the concept as an aspect of absolute monarchy, where the magician king can regain a golden age with his power of bringing heavenly influence to bear on sparring factions. He suggests that some real monarchs took the idea seriously, referring to Rudolf II, Maximilian, and the Danish Frederick III. In The Tempest, however, this divine basis of absolutism is rejected in favour of a common weal converted from within, not from above. Prospero, the best of rulers, the play suggests, was near to failure twice over - there can be no such trustworthy absolute rulers,
The whole structure of the play shows Prospero as a 'god of power' (1.2.10) who moves from knowledge to wisdom. Eugene Rice, in his chapter 'The Transformation of Wisdom from Knowledge to Virtue', shows the typical Renaissance process of the secularization of wisdom from a contemplative to an active virtue. Charron's De la Sagesse is a summary of this final position. 'His wisdom is a precise and particular prudence, a moral virtue, and a code of action'. It completes the transformation of wisdom 'from a virtue of the intellect to a perfection of the will'. Such wisdom instantly denies divine status to any man, and it will enjoin upon a ruler a non-machiavellian set of principles. Such wisdom would abjure expediency but in The Tempest Prospero's virtue turns out to be expedient as well.

Wisdom will tell a ruler when to temper justice with mercy. Mercy is a gift of grace, suggested to Prospero through Ariel's angel intervention. This cuts the gordian knot of Prospero's incompatible mixture of justice and revenge, and puts an end to the festering crime which first resulted from Prospero's unwise neglect of his Kingdom. Mercy, as a word and as a concept, is held up to scrutiny through the play. From the start Miranda counsels mercy:

Had I been any god of power, I would
Have sunk the sea within the earth or ere
It should the good ship so have swallowed, and
The fraughting souls within her (I.2.10).

Next, when Prospero's project gathers to a head, the negative semantics of the word 'mercy' in the idiom 'at my mercy' go unquestioned by the audience:
Ariel: Hark, they roar.
Prospero: Let them be hunted soundly. At this hour
Lies at my mercy all mine enemies (IV.1.262).

After Prospero's flash of compassion in Act V, however, he pursues his erstwhile enemies 'not a frown further' (V.1.30). Ferdinand, who not only survives, but finds his wife, father, peace, and a dynastic future, discerns a merciful providence at work in the shipwreck and its outcome. 'Though the seas threaten, they are merciful./ I have cursed them without cause' (V.1.178). Ironically, however, it was Prospero who threatened and was merciful, arrogating to himself the work of providence. The quality of his mercy is 'unstrained' when he espouses forgiveness, for instantly he wholeheartedly follows through the logic of his reversal, destroying the magic which is his powerbase. It is 'rough' because it brings apparent but not reliable peace, which must be based on the changed will of the erstwhile usurpers. His magical knowledge has served him brilliantly, but cannot become a principle of action. What then is the principle of action? This must be knowledge tempered with wisdom, and wisdom says that only providence is far-sighted enough, and that a ruler must pray to find out God's will. Hooker says

The same piety, which maketh them that are in authority desirous to please and resemble God by justice, inflameth every way men of action with zeal to do good unto all. For that, they know, is most noble and divine...For if religion did possess sincerely and sufficiently the hearts of all men, there would need no other restraint from evil.

The principle is for 'all well-ordered commonweals to love [religion] as their chiefest stay'. From Erasmus we learn the composition of such prayer, defending a modicum of knowledge:
Knowledge puts the intellect in touch with salutary ideas. Neither, therefore, should be unsupported by the other...Faith and hope make it possible for one to pray fervently.\textsuperscript{82}

In the epilogue Prospero appeals to God in the language of attack:

\begin{quote}
And my ending is despair  
Unless I be relieved by prayer,  
Which pierces so that it assaults  
Mercy itself, and frees all faults' (V.1.332), my underlining.
\end{quote}

The word 'mercy' had two poles of meaning, and so, now, does the language of attack and war. 'Piercing assaults' were imaged in the play emblazonedly, through the drawing of swords by all the lords, including Ferdinand, at every threat. They are foiled each time, their swords extended, as in Dürer's image of the iron age. The sword is the response of the courtier in the iron age of the Italian city wars of the play, but in the golden age that is imagined for the island, the sword is put by. The nerves in Ferdinand's arms 'are in their infancy again / And have no vigour in them' (I.2.486) when he attempts to resist being bound. The lords stab at the harpy and are scorned: 'You fools! I and my fellows/ Are ministers of Fate' (III.3.60). The world order of the golden age is to be consonant with God's laws. Sebastian and Antonio are arrested on the point of killing Alonso and Gonzalo, whom Ariel rouses:

\begin{quote}
Alonso: Why, how now, ho! Awake? Why are you drawn?...  
Gonzalo: As mine eyes opened  
\hspace{1cm} I saw their weapons drawn...  
\hspace{1cm} Let's draw our weapons. (II.1.306,317,320).
\end{quote}
The world of matter, which provides iron for swords in the earthy part, is also the world of Prospero's elemental magic, however refined. To 'pierce' and 'assault' the ears of God is a paradoxical enterprise of the spirit, bringing about a better victory through words than through swords. The nature of this language of prayer is described by Erasmus in the *Enchiridion militis Christiani*: 'not the outcry of the mouth but the burning desire of the spirit gets, like a very penetrating voice, a hearing from God'. The very title of the book demonstrates the aggressive terminology of pacifism. For that is what it is in the words of Fox, following St. Paul's:

> And our weapons are spiritual not carnal, yet mighty through God, to the pulling down of the strong holds of Satan, our shield is our faith...our sword is the word of God and our Baptism is that of the Spirit.

This is identical with the imagery of Loyola transferring his chivalric code along with his conversion, as he calls up his army of the counter-Reformation, the soldiers of Christ. This militant language of the church brilliantly converts a passive and erstwhile effeminate message of turning the other cheek into a battle worthy of heroes fighting against the hordes of the seven sins, within and without, from the time of the *Psychomachia* to that of *Pilgrim's Progress*. It appeals to man's natural aggressions and nullifies them (or else turns them masochistically inwards if despair ensues). This language energizes, constructing an ideology which projects the moral life as active. Occasionally physical warfare is inflamed by such language, as it was in the Crusades and the Civil War. Here precisely, is where *The Tempest* is astute. Such fundamentalist conviction of righteousness linked to
power is what Prospero rejects. The health of Shakespeare's plotting lies in a real humility. Prospero acknowledges man's ignorance and folly vis-a-vis God. This is shown both in the word 'despair' in the epilogue, and in an image in the revels speech, where man is a dream and nothing is known at all. Thus humility is incumbent on all.

Prospero's struggle is with anger: 'Never till this day/ Saw I him touched with anger so distempered' (IV.1.144) says Miranda. Prospero's own battle with his sin of anger is closely parallel to that described by Erasmus. Erasmus draws a Caliban image to embody the vice:

To succumb to temper is not even the part of a man, but of mere beasts - and wild ones to boot...go to a mirror. When your reddened eyes glare like that, when your cheeks turn white, your lips writhe...who would look upon you as a man?...What devilish madness is it that in order to pay back someone else's wrongdoing, you yourself become more wicked than he.... For what will be the result of these reciprocal injuries if everyone hastens to retaliate in kind for his own grievance...by mildness and forbearance even the man who did the wrong is not infrequently cured, and, doing an about face, changes from foe to very staunch friend.

Fox states the rationale of Prospero's conquest over his anger and his Christian reversal:

For the man of God must be patient, with spiritual weapons, not with carnal by force and compulsion, but with love, and this is the way to overcome. And this is the cause of so much strife, debate and revenge, men cannot forgive so they stand bound in their sins.

Thus faith is self-fulfilling, creating a spiritual kingdom by the power of will and spiritual desire. One further aspect of the play's structure is lit up by Hooker's account of prayer as two-way communication, doctrine brought down from God, and prayer rising upward
from man. Like one of Hooker's angels, Ariel, in the guise of the harpy, pronounced the gospel doctrine of repentance, and Prospero resolves the tragic world with 'the holy desires' of his prayer. In the end these are the two simple Christian premises of the play. Hooker joyfully describes this communication between God and man:

> Between the throne of God in heaven and his Church upon earth here militant if it be so that angels have their continual intercourse,...his heavenly inspirations and our holy desires are as so many angels of intercourse and commerce between God and us. 87

This chapter began with the language that providence speaks through nature, to assure man of the heavenly guidance of the world. The choruses to providence at the end of each act in Pastor Fido make a connection between the two plays as examples of Christian pastoral tragicomedy. In the Compendium of Tragicomic Poetry Guarini describes the essentials of his new genre as belonging to a Christian society:

> What need have we today to purge terror and pity with tragic sights, since we have the precepts of our most holy religion, which teaches us with the words of the gospel? Hence these horrible and savage spectacles are superfluous, nor does it seem to me that today we should introduce a tragic action for any other reason than to get delight from it. 88

This extends to the form of drama the logic of its content. Both plot and form together turn the potentially tragic world of The Tempest into a 'delight' for the audience. But only if the Edenic visions of the play were to come true would purgation no longer be needed.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR


2. Theobald's note in Johnson's edition of The Tempest cites other examples of using the word 'bumbard' in a drinking context: 'by these several Passages 'tis plain the Word meant a large Vessel for holding Drink, as well as the piece of Ordnance so called'. Quoted from 'Notes', The Plays of William Shakespeare, edited by Samuel Johnson, 8 vols (London, 1765), I, 43.


4. 'The school to which Empedocles and Anaxagoras belong, start from the first with both unity and multiplicity: for they assume an undistinguished confusum from which the constituents of things are sifted out. (Anaxagoras) assumes an unlimited number of distinguishable substances...whereas Empedocles has only his four so-called elements' (I. iv, p. 41). 'The hypothesis of an intermediate substance seems best, for fire, earth, air and water, are themselves implicated with contrasted properties; so that there is reason in distinguishing the universal material element from all of them' (I. vi, p. 63). Aristotle, Physics, translated by Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford, The Loeb Classical Library, revised edition, 2 vols (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), I, 41, 63.

5. Wayne Shumaker, The Occult Sciences in the Renaissance: A Study in Intellectual Patterns (Berkeley, California, 1972), pp. 161, 169. 'The "elements" of the alchemists were the Aristotelian fire, air, water and earth. The substances thought necessary to produce gold or the philosophers' elixir were at first mercury and sulphur and (sometimes)...salt' (p. 161). In the West, the alchemical renaissance began with the translation of Arabic texts, the first of these translations dating from 1144, and the tradition flourished for five centuries or more (p. 169).

6. God is 'the supreme cause of all things; and every effect doth after a sort contain, at leastwise resemble, the cause from which it proceedeth.' Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Books 1 to 4, edited by Ronald Bayne, Everyman's Library, (London, 1907, reprinted 1925), 1. V. 2, p.165.


8. Hooker, Book 1. III. 4, pp. 159-60.


13. A Hundred Mery Talys, edited by Carew Hazlitt, in *Shakespeare's Jest-Books: Reprints of the Early and Very Rare Jest-Books Supposed to have been Used by Shakespeare* (London, 1864), xvii, p. 36.


25. T. W. Baldwin, 'Nature's Moulds', *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 3 (July, 1952), 237-42 (p. 239 n. 4-8; p. 241). Batman upon Bartholome 'who stood ready to tell Shakespeare and his contemporaries "also ye fiends as Austen saith, by sharpsesse of witte know vertues semiall of things, that we know not. The which seedes they sowe by convenable and temperate commixtions of Elements, and so they bring forth things of diverse kinde. For what that kinde may do by it selfe in due time, the same the diuell may do sodeinly by swift hasting of the worke of kinde". The church thus sees interference with the elements as demonic and evil, and St. Augustine may be Hooker's (and therefore Dr. Johnson's) source for sharing this view, as cited above.


30. Peyré, p. 54.

31. Peyré, p. 61 and p. 70, n. 57.


33. Furness records Staunton's note: 'It may well be questioned whether "cheek", in this place, is not a misprint. A more appropriate and expressive word than heat of Collier's MS, one, too, sanctioned in some measure by its occurrence in Ariel's description of the same elemental conflict, is probably crack or cracks: "the fire, and cracks of sulphurous roaring, the most mighty Neptune seem to besiege," etc. In Miranda's picture of the tempest, the sea is seen to storm and overwhelm the tremendous artillery of heaven; in that of Ariel, the sky's ordinance, the "fire and cracks," assault the "mighty Neptune"'. Furness adds, 'Very far from being one of Staunton's happiest emendations'. William Shakespeare, The Tempest, edited by H. H. Furness, New Variorum Edition (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1892), p. 23.

34. Peyré, p. 56, and p. 68, n. 30.

35. Peyré, p. 57.

36. Peyré, p. 57.

37. Peyré, p. 57.

38. Rastell, line 267.


41. Rastell, p. 67, line 1400.

42. Rastell, p. 36, line 204.

43. Hooker, pp. 166-69, Book 1, VI. 2-5; VII. 2.

44. 'But howsoever these swervings are now and then incident into the course of nature, nevertheless...those things which nature worketh are wrought either always or for the most part, after one and the same manner.' (1. III. 3).


50. Hooker, Book 1, III. 4, pp. 159-60.


68. Richard S. Westfall, 'Newton and Alchemy', in Mentalities, pp. 315-36. Westfall shows that Newton had to protect himself from charges of occultism in using such words as 'attraction' and 'repulsion': 'these Principles I consider, not as occult Qualities, supposed to result from the specifick Forms of Things, but as general Laws of Nature, by which the Things themselves are formed', pp. 234-25, 334, n. 52.


It is storied...that whilst they have resided in remote countries, they have known the death of their friends, even in the very hour of their departure; either by bleeding, or by dreams, or some such way of intimation. Which, though it be commonly attributed to the operation of sympathy, yet it is more probably to be ascribed unto the spirit or genius.

72. See Owen Hannaway, The Chemists and the Word: The Didactic Origins of Chemistry (Baltimore, Maryland, 1975), p. 153, who compares Oswald Croll as representative and spokesman for the enthusiastic alchemical ideology of the Paracelsians with Libavius, who got indirectly as far as inventing chemistry as a discipline through writing teaching manuals; 'if there is one tangible form of chemistry at this time it is the didactic form'.


76. Curry, p. 8.

77. Sprat, p. 114.

78. Sprat, p. xix.


i. CALIBAN AS MONSTER

An exact understanding of the configuration of Caliban's mind is important because he is the constant term in the play's scheme of comparisons. Other minds and actions are measured morally against Caliban. Briefly summarized, we are to compare him with Prospero as potential ruler, claiming to own the island; with Ferdinand in his attitude to labour, and in the definitions which emerge from the comparison of slavery and freedom; with Miranda in everything—in their isolated nurture on the island, in language, and in the social and moral distance between these two children of magicians and their mates, one a 'piece of virtue' (I.2.56) and one 'got by the devil himself' (I.2.319). With Antonio he is to be compared as tempter to murder. The pastoral debate takes a curious form in the contrast between Caliban's sovereign identification with his own natural world, and his inexperience in Stephano's and Trinculo's merry, teeming, streetwise world. The earth/air contrast between Ariel and Caliban clearly embodies allegorical aspects of the elements, and yet they both defy allegorization. Does Shakespeare guide us in an understanding of Caliban's mind that could apply in all these contexts? Caliban is described as 'a saluage and deformed slaue' in the Folio 'Names of the Actors' and this may not be Shakespeare's description. The naming of Caliban within the play is 'slave',
'monster' and 'devil' and 'fish'. In Act 1 Prospero introduces him as 'Caliban, my slave' and addresses him each time he speaks to him as 'thou poisonous slave, thou most lying slave' and Miranda as 'abhorred slave'. He is addressed or referred to as 'monster' thirty-eight times by Stephano and Trinculo. It is hard to know 'where to have him': Stephano finds that 'this is a devil, and no monster' (II.2.93), Trinculo decides 'this is no fish, but an islander' (II.2.34). The adjectives judge him to be 'delicate', 'shallow', 'very weak', 'poor credulous', 'perfidious and drunken', 'scurvy', 'abominable', 'ridiculous', 'howling', 'brave', 'ignorant' through the eyes of Stephano and Trinculo. He is described as a somewhat puzzling fish nine times though once he is wholeheartedly identified - 'one of them/Is a plain fish' (V.1.266). In Act 4 Prospero adds a reiteration to Miranda's 'Abhorred slave/Which any print of goodness wilt not take' (I.2.350) with the conclusion 'a devil, a born devil, on whose nature/ Nurture can never stick' (IV.1.188). Some of the contemporary concepts of 'monster' as defined in the OED read as follows: 'something extraordinary or unnatural', 'an animal or plant deviating in one or more of its parts from the normal type'; 'an animal afflicted with a congenital malformation', 'an imaginary animal part animal, part human', 'a person of inhuman or horrible cruelty'. The actor David Suchet, playing the part of Caliban in the Royal Shakespeare Company season of 1978-79, rejected these definitions. He found after careful consideration of the text that Caliban was fully a man and not in any way a deformed creature or part animal, but that the Europeans would consider his appearance strange because his features would not be European, and the travellers would in any case
be expecting monsters in keeping with travellers' expectations, such as the Shapes called to mind. He also felt the Romany word 'cauliban' for 'black' gave licence for a black-skinned Caliban in the colonization contexts of the play. 'This thing of darkness' (V.1.275) 'is punning on behaviour and on physical appearance' he suggests. He played Caliban as a 'basic man, a man without learning, without fine intelligence but capable of an enormous amount of uninhibited love and brutal savagery'. He writes of the attempted rape, 'Isn't survival of the species a basic instinct? Surely it is Prospero with his sophistication who translates Caliban's attempts as pure lust'. This view reverses the nuance of 'unnatural' in the word 'monster' to the very opposite, and calls it approvingly 'natural', but this evaluation is anachronistic: good breeding, learning and civilizing influences are expressly valued in the play and the period, and necessary for the improvement of fallen degenerate man. It is post-Darwinian and 'evolutionary' to approve of lustful acts on the grounds of 'natural' drives. A deliberately modern reading of the play is of course legitimate but it shows at the same time how alien and almost contrary the biblical and moral world picture is to our age.

However, Shakespeare himself throws light on Caliban's mind and language. The concept of 'monster' is worked out in several previous plays and exists full-blown in both comic and tragic contexts. We may look, therefore, at Shakespeare's own frequent complexes of meaning connected with monster images. Stephano's and Trinculo's repetition of 'monster' with all the derogatory or pathetic adjectives domesticate and reduce this potentially frightening creature, whose
peculiarity is further debased as a potential show object at fairs; Suchet is right that he is 'placed' in the play as a legitimate and not too frightening creature of the unknown world where even mythical creatures such as unicorns and phoenixes perhaps really exist. The ideas of 'language' and 'fishiness' are never far from Shakespeare's use of the word 'monster' in other plays. These monsters are consistent, and possibly denote popular concepts corresponding to the audience's perception of the word. The origin of Caliban seems to lie in a comic context; the mind of a monster in Troilus and Cressida is defined as a human mind that has become unnatural or deformed by a vice. The word is typically associated with self-love, inability to think and speak, a reversed understanding of the rest of the world, and fishiness because fish are proverbially dumb:

Ther: A wonder!
Achil: What?
Ther: Ajax goes up and down the field asking for himself.
Achil: How so?
Ther: He must fight singly tomorrow with Hector, and is so prophetically proud of an heroic cudgelling that he raves in saying nothing.
Achil: How can that be?
Ther: Why 'a stalks up and down like a peacock - a stride and a stand; ruminates like an hostess that hath no arithmetic but her brain to set down her reckoning, bites his lip with a politic regard, as who should say 'there were wit in this head an 'twould out'; and so there is; but it lies as coldly in him as fire in a flint, which will not show without knocking...He knows not me. I said 'good morrow, Ajax'; and he replies 'Thanks, Agamemnon'. What think you of this man that takes me for the general? He's grown a very land fish, languageless, a monster. (Troilus and Cressida, III.3.242)

In the demonstration that follows, Thersites acts the part of Ajax and answers 'hum! ha! hum! ha!' to everything. Thersites is asked to take a letter to him and answers: 'Let me bear another to
his horse, for that's the more capable creature'. The 'wonder' of
the opening is connected with the monster, the landfish, an unnatural
creature, one who is a man, yet worse than a natural animal. Pride
is the flaw that has dehumanized his reason by contaminating his
vision of the world with self. Once reason has left him language is
'at random from the truth, vainly expressed' (Sonnet 147). Ajax is
inarticulate and deranged with pride and 'raves in saying nothing'.
Self-contemplation is a madness which makes reason, and therefore
language, disintegrate - Ajax 'ruminates' helplessly. Ajax's pride
makes him too superior to communicate with others: Thersites
continues 'he professes not answering. Speaking is for beggars'
(IV.3.265). It is clear that this scene is intended as a set piece,
since Achilles is so obviously made to feed Thersites the lines.
Shakespeare skimps nothing in order to give full comic scope to this
vice made palpable. Ajax's incomprehension in confusing Thersites
with Agamemnon - the worst with the best - is also present in Caliban,
who calls Prospero 'a sot, as I am' and accepts a poor drunkard as a
god. Contemplation of self is shown as the reverse of human
communication. This defines the communal aspect of man as the
essential hallmark of the human, and the converse as monstrous. Thus
reason, and with it language, the vector of communication, have a
moral orientation, toward the brotherhood of man. The fact that
pride is the vice which destroys Ajax's communicative powers is
commonplace, and in itself, identifies the Ajax passage with the kind
of linguistic breakdown that occurred at Babel as a moral one - the
audience would make the link between pride and loss of language that
is made in the Bible passage itself:
Genesis 11:6-7,
6. And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language: and this they begin to do, neither is there any let to them from all those things which they have imagined to doe.
7. Come on, let us goe downs and there confounde their language, that everyone perceive not his neighbour's speach.

A happy precursor of the landfish, a mixture as to the element it belongs to, is possibly Mistress Quickly as otter. Her malapropisms and her spunky spitfire spirit are the essence of her idiolect, but she is no moral monster, for she has a heart of gold. Still, the idea of her muddled speech has had some connection in Shakespeare's mind with an amphibious creature, one both at home on land and water, a version of 'landfish' as a 'mixed' creature, and thus a monster in one of its definitions. She is rather like Francis the drawer, not exactly 'noble in reason', but good in heart. Her simplicity leaves her open to the really sophisticated corrupters of language. Falstaff's doubleness of meaning leaves her helpless, but we may note that the simple Corin beat Touchstone at this game in As You Like It. Simplicity in itself is not necessarily a failure of truth. It is to Nell's credit that she cannot see the scurrilous double meaning in the verb 'to have':

Quick: I am no thing to thank God on...thou art a knave to call me so...
Fal: Thou art a beast to say otherwise.
Quick: Say, what beast, thou knave, thou?
Prince: An otter, Sir John! Why an otter?
Fal: Why? She's neither fish nor flesh: a man knows not where to have her.
Quick: Thou art an unjust man in saying so: thou or any man knows where to have me, thou knave, thou! (HenryIV, Part 1, III.3.121).
Monsters, as physical aberrations of men, have much in common with beasts: 'a horned man's a monster and a beast' (Othello, IV.1.62). Both lack reason but this is natural in an animal, deformed in a human being. All Shakespeare's uses of the word monster show that this reason they lack is a moral rather than a ratiocinative faculty: 'O monster ignorance, how deformed dost thou look...only sensible in the duller parts' (Love's Labour's Lost, IV.2.24), or 'dull, unfeeling barren ignorance' (Richard II, I.3.168). 'Your ignorance which finds not till it feels' (Coriolanus, 3.3.129) recalls Prospero's remark to Caliban 'whom stripes may move, not kindness' (I.2.345). Vices are automatically deformations as in 'but alack, the monster envy' (Pericles, IV. Gower, 12) and 'monstrous lust' (Pericles, V.3.87).

The real force of the concept that monsters co-exist invisibly with man, as dark brother, is felt in tragic contexts. Nature produces both: 'nature hath meal and bran, contempt and grace' (Cymbeline, IV.2.27); monsters are distinguished from men by the experience of the person meeting them, not outward appearance — significantly the train of thought immediately leads Shakespeare to sea monsters:

'These are kind creatures. Gods, what lies I have heard!
Our courtiers say all's savage but at court:
Experience O! thou disprov'est report.
The imperious seas breed monsters, for the dish
Poor tributary rivers as sweet fish' (Cymbeline, IV.2.33).

When human beings behave like either beasts or devils they are monsters, like the daughters of Lear: 'Tigers, not daughters, what have you performed?...most barbarous, most degenerate' (IV.2.43) where
'degenerate' points to the loss of humanity, instantly visualized in terms of sea monsters:

If that the heavens do not their visible spirits
Send quickly down to tame these vile offences,
It will come... Humanity must perforce prey on itself,
Like monsters of the deep (King Lear, IV.2.46).

Particularly in the non-Christian settings men become monsters, all human bonds dissolve, man and society revert to ancient chaos and men are lost to salvation and nature. So Timon despairs of man and envisages nature as common mother to men and monsters but rather monsters:

Common mother, thou,
Whose womb unmeasurable and infinite breast
Teems and feeds all; whose self-same mettle,
Whereof thy proud child, arrogant man, is puff'd,
Engenders...all th' abhorred births below crisp heaven...
Ensear thy fertile and conceptious womb,
Let it no more bring out ingratitude man!
Go great with tigers, dragons, wolves and bears;
Teem with new monsters whom thy upward face
Hath to the marbled mansion all above
Never presented (Timon, IV.3.178)

Apemantus concludes his debate with Timon as a beast among beasts for 'Athens is become a forest of beasts'. The cursing between Apemantus and Timon is a monstrous deformed speech, yet in this language of despair there is still pain, and relationship of a kind in their joint depravity; Timon has not yet fallen silent in his final rejection of man. Timon rejects language with his last breath. Language has become a farce - there are no bonds but cruel laughter and curses:

Apem.: A plague on thee! thou art too bad to curse...
There is no leprosy but what thou speak'st.
Timon: I'll beat thee - but I should infect my hands.
Apem.: I would my tongue could rot them off! (Timon, IV.3.357)
Together in all these passages the degeneration of man is associated with language as diseased. Curses are infections, like the diseases Caliban curses Prospero with. Gold has 'the gift of tongues', not to save but to corrupt men with. The disappearance of man from the earth envisaged here, replaced by beasts and monsters, is not far from the image of the island peopled by Calibans. They would be the only future inhabitants of the island (as a microcosm of the world), had Caliban succeeded in raping Miranda, a monstrous population. Such concatenations of meanings as are associated here in the words 'slave', 'beasts', and anti-social language are the combined features of Caliban's monstrosity. Caliban is not enslaved to gold but to his passion of anger and his inheritance of malice, and therefore he is also enslaved by physical means lest he harm the society of 'good natures' he lives among. But physical enslavement cannot harm Ferdinand, who recognizes freedom as a quality of soul. In Timon, the corruption of man and of language are so linked that communication is no longer worth while. 'Lips, let sour words go by and language end:/ What is amiss, plague and infection mend!' (Timon, V.1.218). It is language, too, that preserves time for human beings, for time has no importance for beasts. Thus Timon wants to cancel existence by expunging his name from time's records: 'Here lies a wretched corse, of wretched soul bereft;/ Seek not my name' (Timon, V.1.70). From this we gather that language uniquely keeps step with reason,
mirrors depravity, and ends when social bonds end. The essence of mankind is social, and ideal language is, ideally, charitable. In the Christian tragedies too, language ends with all those who, like Timon, reject human fellowship, and, in Christian terms 'remorse'. The implication of Iago's 'I never will speak word' (V.2.307) and of Antonio's silence is that language ends when human bonds break. All such are monsters not men, like those that indifferent nature has bred in the sea. Yet the smelly man monster is not so different from his companion under the gaberdine: Shakespeare deliberately does not define the 'puppyheaded monster', 'cat', 'legged like a man, and his fins like arms', for Caliban's place is in comedy and the whiff of the sea monster is that of a 'not-of-the-newest poor-John' (II.2.26). The moral deficiency in Caliban's language is discussed in Chapter 4. Caliban can be used as a measure, as Ariel can, providing between them upper and lower limits for what defines the human. These limits are not simple limits of 'better' and 'worse', however, for Ariel has deficiencies of passion compared with the human norm, and Caliban has a bond with nature that the other human beings lack. Nevertheless, similarities between Antonio and Caliban, and Stephano, Trinculo and Caliban, will be a measure of their degeneration in some things; or comparison with Caliban will clarify the good in contrasting figures like Miranda and Ferdinand.

ii. CALIBAN AND STAGE APES

It is worth noting that Caliban shares some of the traditional
characteristics of the stage ape. Apes, baboons, and 'monkeys were popular on the refined stage at about this time, and though Caliban is not by any means a simian, yet stage apes occur in moral, comic and Virginian contexts. They were of interest in precisely the way Caliban is, as being only a little different from humans. They are also associated with mummmings and allegorical dumbshows of wild men and their 'dumb discourse'. Caliban is not an ape, baboon or monkey. He himself differentiates himself; apes for him are part of the dangerous animal population of the isle enjoined to torment him: 'For every trifle are they set upon me, / Sometime like apes, that mow and chatter at me,/ And after bite me' (II.2.9); he calls Trinculo a 'jesting monkey', and warns Stephano and Trinculo that if Prospero wakes they will all be 'turned to barnacles, or to apes/ With foreheads villainous low' (IV.1.249). This is a traditional transformation, quoted by Anat Feinberg as occurring in Massinger's The Bondman, and also as a belief in 'Judaism, Christianity and Islam' that sinful men and heretics are transformed into monkeys. Caliban as monster shares many loci and qualities attributed to simians in popular lore, or associated with simians on the stage, as may be seen from Anat Feinberg's account of the ape in tradition and in theatrical contexts of the period. Like Caliban the stage ape 'served...because of his likeness to man, to set up a distorted image of man, and was cast in the role of parodist satirizing human nature and activity'. Feinberg cites several stage apes almost contemporaneous with The Tempest that appeared at Whitehall at the wedding celebrations of Princess Elizabeth and the Elector Palatine. She points out that 'the vogue of the ape in drama belongs primarily to the masque with
its exclusive audience'. One such baboon appeared in the second anti-masque in Beaumont's *The Masque of the Inner Temple and Gray's Inn*, where he was one of thirteen country characters including a He Baboon and a She Baboon. 'It pleased His Majesty to call for it again but...one of the Statues by that time was undressed'. Waith remarks that Shakespeare borrowed the idea in the Morris dance in *The Two Noble Kinsmen*. The 'Baboon with long tail and eke long tool' (III.5.130) is pointed out by the schoolmaster. At the same wedding celebrations there were baboons dancing in the anti-masque of Chapman's *Memorable Masque of the Middle Temple and Lincoln's Inn* in a masque which contained 'a troop of noblest Virginians [who] attended hither the God of Riches'. Feinberg finds that 'traces in late Renaissance drama of the mediaeval image of the ape as *Figura diaboli* - the ape-headed devil so common in medieval art - are very few and far between but do exist. Caliban, although no ape, reminds us of this more mediaeval aspect of the tradition, in an allegorical sense:

As in *Timon* 'the strain of man's bred out/ Into baboon and monkey' (I.1.252). Lust and loss of reason are typical attributes; so Townshend describes the function of the anti-masque in *Tempe Restored* (1631): 'the beasts...represent unto us that Sensuall desire makes men loose their Virtue and Valour, turning Parasites and slaves to their Bruitish affections'. Simians were thought of as excessively sexual, together with goats, as in Othello's 'goats and monkeys!' In
this Caliban is true to type. All that is done to apes because of their lust is done to Caliban. Apes are fettered 'prisoners of their sensual desires' just as Caliban is 'deservedly confined into this rock' (I.2.360). As in Massinger's The Bondman 'libidinous beasts are made to feel the stroke of their masters' whip and are put in fetters, since wild beasts should be tamed by policy'. So Caliban is constantly punished, 'whom stripes may move, not kindness' (I.2.345). Further motifs listed by Feinberg are 'the motive of the slave as the untamed animal in a comedy which examines critically the roles of master and slave'. The presentation of the ape in the company of inferior humans occurs in William Davenant's Britannia Triumphans, where apes are placed in company with social outcasts. Stephano and Trinculo, drunken, quarrelsome and greedy, qualify as 'inferior' characters; while in Tempe Restored there is an echo of associations of simians with 'the poor silly naked Indians just one degree (if they be so much) removed from a monkey'. Flattery and servility are also frequently associated with the ape, and perhaps mirrored in Caliban's flattery of Stephano: 'How does thy honour? Let me lick thy shoe. I'll not serve him, he is not valiant' (III.2.22).
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5A


5. Feinberg, p. 2.


11. Feinberg, p. 3.

12. Feinberg, p. 3-5.

13. Quoted by Feinberg, p. 3.

14. Feinberg, p. 3.

15. Quoted by Feinberg, p. 4.

16. Quoted by Feinberg, p. 4.

17. Feinberg, p. 5.

18. Feinberg, p. 5 and p. 11, n. 55.
In this chapter, Miranda's language of tears, as also the poetics of tears of the play as a whole, are under discussion. There are many direct references to persons of the play weeping, many of them foregrounded or dwelt upon. Besides this, there are references to grief and pain, 'heart's sorrow' (III.3.81) and 'sea-sorrow' (I.2.170), and many words that speak directly and simply to the emotions. There is acute suffering, such as Prospero's groans at sea, and Ariel's groans 'as fast as mill-wheels strike' (I.2.281), paroxysms of grief such as the repentant men experience, 'brimful of sorrow and dismay' (V.1.14), Ferdinand's 'weeping again the king [his] father's wreck' (I.2.391) and Alonso's hopelessness. All these create an elegiac tone and pierce to the imagination - that is the identification - of the audience. This is indeed the intention of this language, reinforced by particular kinds of acting. Within this framework Miranda is the most frequent weeper - there is hardly a scene of hers where she does not burst into tears (indicated by her own words, or by other speakers), yet the cause is not necessarily a sad one. She, and Gonzalo, Prospero, Ferdinand, and the repentant lords, are moved to tears for many clearly differentiated reasons.
i. CONTRASTIVE MORAL LANGUAGE: CURSES AND TEARS

It has been shown (for instance in Chapters 1A, 4, and 5A) that Caliban's monstrous lack of human empathy, and the profound lack of socialization which results from it, appears in his speech. This is contrasted with Miranda's expression in language of the opposing virtue of compassion, and all that belongs to it. Her tears are an aspect of her language. Tears when shed for others vividly demonstrate and invite empathy, sometimes to the point of causing tears in others, as when Prospero weeps 'fellowly drops' (V.1.63). Being an involuntary body language, tears usually show sincere feeling, whatever their cause. They are recognized as a powerful communicative force by rhetoricians (see below). As part of an orator's equipment of skills they were considered actable by a good orator or actor yet genuine, in the manner of the actor in Hamlet who wept real tears for Hecuba. Thus, both for Caliban and Miranda, the language that immediately and distinctively characterizes them is a spontaneous expression of their natures. At the same time, Caliban's cursing and mischief are antisocial, Miranda's tears and empathy highly social. Virtue and vice are not, finally, seen as a private state of mind in the individual, but as a function of social harmony and the common good. Language is both 'the interpreter of our souls', as Montaigne says, and the chief system of social intercourse. In the passage below, Montaigne expresses the central Renaissance belief in community. The social dimension is the field of virtue, and the dimension in which the individual is judged and has his being:

Our intelligence being onely conducted by the way of the Word; Who so falsifieth the same, betraiyeth publik society. It is the onely instrument, by means whereof our wils and thoughts
are communicated; it is the interpretour of our'soules; if that faile us we hold ourselves no more, we enter-know one another no longer.

Montaigne's word 'falsify' implies more than the neutral modern definition of the words 'truth' and 'falsehood'. The modern sense of 'true' - correspondence of words to a pre-existent fact or concept - is not in the first place evaluative, but 'truth in language' as Montaigne implies it has a moral value. It corresponds rather to the Shakespearean sense of 'honest', meaning 'good', as in Audrey's use of the word in her questions about poetry: 'Is it honest in deed and word? Is it a true thing?' (As You Like It, III.2.14). Since language, either as words or signs, is the communicative bond among human beings, so virtue and vice manifest themselves in language and create or destroy relationships. Virtue and vice appertain to the same social dimension as does language. In The Tempest tears are a powerful indicator of virtue. Before 'tears' can be placed in the acknowledged rhetorical contexts of the time, something more must be said as to Shakespeare's contrastive intentions for the language of Caliban and Miranda.

Caliban's language 'falsifies', and precludes 'inter-knowing'. Often, it is the corruptions of mankind that he is drawn to in his social intercourse. Thus when he meets the morally lax Stephano-Trinculo pair, he is receptive to their brand of destructiveness through drink, as they are to his incitement to murder and power-seeking. Each adds to his own vices through the 'falsifying' of language. For example, drunkenness (that destroys reason) is lauded, the killing of Prospero is unquestioned and unopposed, Caliban's
politic flattery of Stephano sows discord between friends. In Miranda we find a language contrastive to Caliban's, and a model for what constitutes virtuous language. Hers is a language of one "so perfect and so peerless...created/Of every creature's best" (III.1.47) as Ferdinand says - the best that nature and nurture together can produce. In a compressed literary form the phrase summarizes the Elizabethan idealization of women within the platonizing Petrarchan sonnet conventions. Further aspects of her language are discussed later in Chapter 5, in relation to the lovers' explorations of truth in language, particularly in the context of love. Caliban, on the contrary, is a being whose language and actions together define him as someone "which good natures/Could not abide to be with" (I.2.359). He is therefore inferior on a scale of valuation both social and moral since it is 'the good' who cannot live with him. An idea of ranking human beings in this way occurs in Macbeth:

1st Murderer: We are men, my liege.
Macbeth: Ay, in the catalogue ye go for men;
As hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs,
Shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves, are clept
All by the name of dogs. The valued file
Distinguishes...whereby he does receive
Particular addition, from the bill
That writes them all alike (III.1.90,98).

Macbeth suggests that the murderers' ranking will improve if they have the mettle to do the murder. This passage, as it happens, demonstrates how falsification of language results from moral corruption. Macbeth, having lost his conscience, has lost right reason, and he calls the worst best. Murder is described as a worthy act of courage, in the same way that Lady Macbeth had defined Duncan's
murder as manly. In The Tempest the idea of social/moral ranking is applied to Miranda, too, so carefully defined as 'best' by education and birth at the beginning of the play, as well as in Ferdinand's Petrarchan compliment.

The difference between Miranda and Caliban - which frustrated Prospero's attempt to make Caliban a part of the family - lies in his 'vile race' (1.2.357). Shakespeare takes pains to tell us that Miranda and Caliban are potentially equal in life experience, each with only vague memories of an unshared past. In the plan of the play, the island among all its other functions also serves as a controlled environment in an experimental scheme. Two human beings are brought up together in isolation from unshared influences. What was the factor that vitiated Caliban's chances of integration into his little group? This society, small as it was, carried, through Prospero's experience of civilization, all that was needful to a human life worthy of the name, as a creature of reason created by God. In reviewing the disparity in the natures of Caliban and Miranda in this controlled environment, Shakespeare creates a language intended to isolate and define for the audience the factor that determines the essentially human. He points to this factor as demonstratively in Miranda's speech, as he does in explicating Caliban's abuse of speech. For this reason, for instance, he particularly stresses Caliban's disruptive cursing, while for Miranda attention is drawn early on to her tears. These strategies reveal the essential ingredient to be a moral factor. Tears are typical for Miranda, and Prospero specifically links them to virtue:
Wipe thou thine eyes; have comfort.
The direful spectacle of the wreck, which touched
The very virtue of compassion in thee
I have...safely ordered (1.2.25).

Compassion comprises the power to feel, and thereby to feel for others as for oneself. This makes mankind 'kindly' and 'kin' to each other, it is the virtue that more than any other promotes and expresses Montaigne's 'enter-knowing'. In Christian thinking compassion is altruistic, and is equally named 'pity', 'caritas', and 'charity'. Aristotle gives it a somewhat different colouring, at least in a contemporary Renaissance reading of him:

Of pitty, or Compassion
Pitty is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of hurt, or troubles to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinketh may happen to himselfe or his.
And because it appertaines to Pitty to thinke that he, or his may fall into the misery he pitties in others, it followes that they be most compassionate Who have passed through Misery.3

Aristotle's more self-preserving logic as to the kind of self-identification necessary to feel pity no doubt has the same end result as the Christian logic of charity as simple altruism. In the Christian Renaissance the essential human ingredient is felt to be caritas, compassion, which cements human society, whereas Caliban alienates himself from human society in word and deed. His rejection of the other human beings at the start of the play echoes the example of Timon, who exchanges curses with Apemantus (IV.3.355) as Prospero exchanges aggressive language with Caliban. Disruptive speech creates a society of beasts, not men (IV.3.345); in The Tempest Prospero's speech of the last act, showing forgiveness and humility, is in marked contrast to the opening scene, showing a man easily
angered. Flavius's tears (IV.3.482) convince Timon that there might still be altruism in the world. These contrasts of cursing and tears in Timon perhaps foreshadow the contrastive representation of language in The Tempest. In the latter, language becomes thematic throughout the play, itself the sign and tool of man's humanity to man.

ii. THE POETICS OF TEARS

In so far as rhetoric is a psycholinguistic system, descriptive as well as prescriptive, tears are classed by rhetoricians among the inartificial proofs that orators may use to persuade judges and courts. Shakespeare refers to this in Titus Andronicus, where Titus pleads for pity from the stony-hearted tribunes:

And let me say that never wept before
My tears are now prevailing orators (Titus Andronicus, III.1.25).

The Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique neatly summarizes Aristotle's essentials as regards 'proofs':

Rhetorique is that Faculty, by which wee understand what will serve our turne, concerning any subject, to winne beliefe in the hearer. Of those things that beget beleefe; some require not the helpe of Art; as Witnesses, Evidences, and the like, which wee invent not but make use of; and some require Art, and are invented by us. The beleefe, that procedes from our invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker; partly from the passions of the hearer: but especially from the proofes of what we alledge.
Quintilian considers the 'artificial' element in 'inartificial' proofs, and writes at length on the orchestration of appeals that will cause tears in the judge, but they should 'always be brief' and abandoned 'when that emotion is at its height' lest the hearer grows weary of his tears. He sees 'moving' as paramount, whereas Aristotle prefers logical proof.

The peroration is the most important part of forensic pleading, and in the main consists of appeals to the emotions... Few indeed are those orators who can sweep the judge with them, lead him to adopt that attitude of mind which they desire, and compel him to weep with them or share their anger...and yet it is the emotional power that dominates the court... Proofs, it is true, may induce the judges to regard our case as superior but the appeal to the emotions will do more, for it will make them wish our case to be better...the judge when overcome by his emotions abandons all attempt to enquire into the truth of the argument [which may leave something to be desired] and is swept along by the tide of passion... When tears, which are the aim of most perorations, well forth from his eyes, is he not giving his verdict for all to see?

Since 'fire alone can kindle, and moisture alone can wet', as Quintilian says, the orator who wants to move another must first feel those emotions himself. How is this possible for an orator, asks Quintilian. 'When we desire to awaken pity, we must actually believe that the ills of which we complain have befallen our own selves...we must identify ourselves'. Quintilian gives away his trade secrets as to how this can be induced in oneself as pleader or actor: 'I have often seen actors, both in tragedy and comedy, leave the theatre still drowned in tears after concluding the performance of some moving role'. Quintilian also makes the point that the speaker's ethos is a chief factor in persuasion. The middle style of oratory is the most suitable because ethos speaks for itself:

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The ethos which I have in my mind...is commended to our approval by goodness...the chief merit in its expression lies in making it seem that all that we say derives directly from the facts and persons concerned and in the revelation of the character of the orator in such a way that all may recognize it...Consequently the oratory employed in such cases should be calm and mild with no trace of pride, elevation or sublimity, all of which would be out of place...therefore the intermediate style (between the Attic and Asian) is most suitable.¹⁰

In contrast, Titus's style in the speech referred to above is indubitably 'Asian', that is, in the grand style of oratory.¹¹ His eyes are capacious 'urns', his hyperbolic promise of eternal weeping into the ground, in order to persuade earth to intervene and exchange his tears for his sons' innocent blood, has no effect. In The Tempest, a 'middle style', in keeping with the tragicomic tone, pervades the play, and the play may itself be said to have a middle ethos. A poetic of tears threads through the play, fulfilling, in muted and credible ways, different aspects of the persuasive function by means of tears.

In The Tempest the exposition of past events is in the narrative, instead of the dramatic, mode. Nevertheless through this emotive poetry of tears the narrative has some of the emotional force of an enacted scene. Like the poet in Sonnet 30 Miranda weeps at 'grievances foregone', and Prospero from 'woe to woe tell[es] o'er/ The sad account of fore-bemoaned moan'. As she weeps for the past the audience, too, responds to their traumatic exodus:

One midnight
Fated to th' purpose did Antonio open
The gates of Milan, and i' th' dead of darkness
The ministers for th' purpose hurried thence
Me and thy crying self (I.2.128).
The image of the child crying reaches to the deep and automatic instincts of pity for the young which are recognized in Macbeth:

And pity, like a naked new-born babe,
Striding the blast, or heaven's cherubin hors'd
Upon the sightless couriers of the air,
Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye,
That tears shall drown the wind (Macbeth, I.7.21).

This image links pity both to storms and to the Cherubin, as The Tempest does ('O, a cherubin/ thou wast that did preserve me', I.2.152). Pity, in the Macbeth passage, is aided by spirits 'of the air' such as Ariel, perhaps, who also furthers the work of compassion.

The compressed associations of the idea of pity in the Macbeth image are expanded over the whole play in The Tempest. Miranda’s tears, now, allow her and the audience to encounter the Pathos of the recounted scene:

Alack, for pity!
I not rememb'ring how I cried out then
Will cry it o'er again - it is a hint
That wrings mine eyes to't (I.2.134).

Miranda’s tears and sympathies invite the audience to participate in the past, not only to hear about it, a necessary technique if Shakespeare is to make the narration experiential as well as expository. Miranda cannot remember this traumatic occasion but for Prospero it is a re-living. Prospero remembers their 'sea-sorrow' in a vocabulary of sounds, sighs, cries, groans, roars, and tears:

There they hoist us
To cry to th' sea that roared to us, to sigh
To th' winds, whose pity, sighing back again,
Did us but loving wrong...
Thou didst smile...

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When I have decked the sea with drops full salt, Under my burden groaned (1.2.148).

These images of stress are worded in an onomatopoeic set of sounds and rhythms. They denote gusts of air, whether wind or sighs, long drawn out in the diphthongs of 'cry' and 'sigh', and the long vowel of 'sea'; while 'roar', 'groan', and 'wrong' interject phonetically long 'open' vowels mimicking louder calls of sea and humans intermingled. There is a limited range of vowels and aspirated consonants, frequently long and short 'i' and 'ai' diphthongs, and 't' and 's', at regular intervals; a briefly repeated rhythm, quickly reversed, moans like a gusty wind. Quintilian recognizes the emotional effects of the arrangement of speech sounds and rhythms:

Since rhetorical ornament, like clearness, may reside either in individual words or groups of words, we must consider the requirements of both cases...as several words may often have the same meaning (they are called synonyms), some will be more distinguished, sublime, brilliant, attractive or euphonious than others. For as those syllables are the most pleasing to the ear which are composed of the more euphonious letters, thus words composed of such syllables will sound better than others, and the more vowel sounds they contain the more attractive they will be to hear. The same principle governs the linking of word with word; some arrangements will sound better than others. But words require to be used in different ways. For example, horrible things are best described by words that are actually harsh to the ear.12

Prospero and Miranda survived. The scene is not tragic, interwoven as it is with 'heavenly' vocabulary: 'loving', 'cherubin', 'fortitude', 'heaven' and 'smiles' contrasts with their sea-sorrow.

Prospero: O, a cherubin
Thou wast that did preserve me. Thou didst smile,
Infused with a fortitude from heaven,
When I have decked the sea with drops full salt,
Under my burden groaned, which raised in me
An undergoing stomach to bear up
Against what should ensue (1.2.152).

This passage is typical of the restrained poetry of this play of relatively few similes or adjectives; it is a poetry of phonetic subtlety and thematic vocabulary, often in strongly contrasting pairs. An effect of catharsis for Prospero and Miranda is achieved in the manner of the sonnet cited above and shared by the audience - the work of memory adds a defining and commemorative value to past tragic events. Words reviving emotion in a less cataclysmic context can allay past horror. This grief is lived here at one remove, then, as the special emotion of the tragi-comic mode in this play: '0 my heart bleeds/ To think o' th' teen' I have turned you to' (1.2.63). The narratio of the scene is a parallel to the enacted expulsion and supposed death of Hermione and her baby daughter in the first half of The Winter's Tale, each play aiming to produce tragic effects in a tragicomedy. The Winter's Tale takes a different route to tragicomedy, divided in the middle as it is by time and by style into a tragic and a comic half. The subdued but experienced approach to retrospective grief through narrative becomes the preferred method of The Tempest. Indeed, the very reversal of the play, assuring Prospero's compassion for his enemies, follows upon Ariel's mere narration of Gonzalo's tears.

Quintilian links the whole complex of character ethos and speech with emotion in the hearer, and considers the use to be made of the unique power of tears, that cause 'fellowly drops' and thereby instant concurrence. In a play, this affects the characters in relation to each other, and in the relation of play to audience.
This same complex of the affective force of tears is important in *The Tempest*. Tears are a stated part of Miranda's speech to denote her character ethos. Ariel for his part applies persuasion through making his hearers visualize the words spoken and the tears thus described - the ocular proof of emotion - in his description of the weeping Gonzalo. His hearers are both Prospero and the audience. Word painting is allied with the *ut pictura poesis* theory of the arts and their relation to the emotions and to the moral world. (See below). Prospero responds in a chain reaction of pity and forgiveness, equivalent to Quintilian's judge. This in turn draws tears and identification from the audience who 'believe' in the play and convert gnosis to praxis. As the century progresses the 'rhetoric of tears' takes on ever more elaboration in the form of the set piece, such as Crashaw's *Saint Mary Magdalene*, or The *Weeper* and Marvell's *Eyes and Tears*. Almost contemporary with *The Tempest* is Monteverdi's *L'Orfeo*, which rises to the challenge of persuading the auditors that the laments of Orfeo would indeed persuade Pluto himself to break the eternal law, moved by music and tears.

Proserpina: Signor, quell'infelice...
ch'udito hai tu pur dianzi
cosi soavevmente lamentarsi,
ossa ha tanta pietà dentro al mio core...

Plutone: Benchè severo et immutabil fato
contrasti, amata sposa, i tuoi desiri,
pur nulla omai si nieghi
a tal belta congiunta a tanti prieghi.
La sua cara Euridice
contral'ordin fatale Orfeo ritrovi.

The use of tears in *The Tempest* may itself owe something to Italian influence. Denis Arnold on Monteverdi's madrigals writes of the
mannerism in Italy at the time: 'it is typical that exaggerated emotionalism was encouraged [in the Gonzaga household at Mantua]. Their poets matched this atmosphere in many ways...[in] the erotic poems of Guarini or his Il Pastor Fido, with its constantly weeping shepherds and shepherdesses'.

Miranda's tears of compassion for the shipwrecked are for unknown sufferers: 'I have suffered/ with all that I saw suffer: a brave vessel...O, the cry did knock/ Against my very heart' (I.2.5). Prospero comforts her in words which define her responsiveness: 'Tell your piteous heart/There's no harm done'...wipe thou thine eyes; have comfort...The direful spectacle of the wreck, which touched/The very virtue of compassion in thee' (I.2.14,25). Her 'piteous heart', shown in her tears, is to be the expression of her ethos. Ferdinand says 'My sweet mistress/ Weeps when she sees me work' (III.1.11), while compassion also makes her anthropomorphize the very wood that Ferdinand gathers. She tells Ferdinand that the logs, which will no doubt splutter and squeak in the heat, will weep for his labour when they are burnt. This kind of pastoral pathetic fallacy, debased subsequently through conventionalization, must be taken as serious in this play. In A Midsummer Night's Dream and The Tempest nature is so actively bound up with man, and is so much in the service of man, that it would be anachronistic to suggest that this passage is merely one of rhetorical exquisiteness. Unlike a possible modern anthropomorphic interpretation that compassion should be directed rather at the wood for having to be burnt, we may suppose that this passage has a literal intention. Just as nature becomes disordered when Macbeth kills Duncan, so the rightful prince's labour as a slave is against
order, which upsets the other orders of nature. Belief in the hierarchy of nature's orders as well as in the sympathy between them connects the animal, vegetable and mineral 'kingdoms' with the kingdom of man. In the scheme of elemental sympathy and hierarchy as described in Chapter 4, the wood feels pity for the princely hands that gathered it. Some of Miranda's tears are part of her character as, simply, a person of feeling. She cries tears of mixed emotion compounded of happiness and unworthiness, as she tells Ferdinand:

Ferd: Beyond all limit of what else i' th' world [I]  
Do love, prize, honour you.
Mir: I am a fool  
To weep at what I am glad of...
Ferd: Wherefore weep you?  
Mir: At mine unworthiness, that dare not offer  
What I desire to give (III.1.73).

As well, perhaps, there are reasons stated by Montaigne which Shakespeare may have remembered. Montaigne's essay is on the subject of 'how we weep and laugh at one selfe-same thing'. Montaigne refers to the mixed emotions of young women leaving their parents to join their spouse, which somewhat resembles Miranda's situation.

We see, not only children, who simply and naturally follow nature, often to weep and laugh at one selfe-same thing...what gentle flame soever doth warme the heart of young virgins, yet are they hardly drawn to leave and forgoe their mothers, to betake them to their husbands.17

Since tears are spontaneous, the body's involuntary and visible responses are the most credible proof of true feeling, body language per se. It is, for example, the only 'proof' Timon will acknowledge:

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Timon: What! Dost thou weep? Come nearer. Then I love thee,
Because thou art a woman and disclaim'st
Flinty mankind; whose eyes do never give,
But thorough lust and laughter. Pity's sleeping
Strange times, that weep with laughing not with weeping!

Flavius: I beg of you to know me good my lord,
To accept my grief...

Timon: Had I a Steward
So true, so just, and now so comfortable?
It almost turns my dangerous nature mild.
Let me behold thy face. Surely, this man
Was born of woman.
Forgive my general and exceptless rashness,
You perpetual sober gods! I do proclaim
One honest man, mistake me not, but one (Timon, IV.3.489).

Weeping denotes the one proof of humanity here, in contrast to 'flinty mankind' whose laughter to the point of tears is a grotesque contrast pointing to the degeneration of the crucial human bonds, so that Athens is turned into 'a forest of beasts'. Tender emotion, caring, is seen by Timon as a female quality in contrast to the hard hearts of men. Such quick tears as Miranda is moved to, throughout the play, might seem only suited to the characterization of women to some members of an Elizabethan audience. There are traditions of stoicism, or concepts of male dignity, as in the libretto to Monteverdi's L'Orfeo: 'Ma lunge, ah, lunge sia da questo petto/pietà, di mio valor non degno effetto' ('But far, ah far from my breast/ be pity, which is beneath my dignity').18 Hardness and dignity are related. Miranda's ethos is not only demonstrated as being virtuous in her frequent and varied show of tears, but also female. 'To weep' is phrased as 'to woman it' in All's Well that Ends Well: 'I have felt so many quirks of joy and grief/ That the first face of neither at the start/ Can woman me unto't' (All's Well that Ends Well, III.2.47). However, the more humane of the males
weep too, Prospero for compassion and fellowship, Ferdinand for his father, Gonzalo for grief and for joy. Even the hardened villains, spoken of as a group, are described by Ariel as 'brimful of sorrow and dismay'. The audience, we must suppose, understood and responded to tears as a sign of human fellowship for men and women alike.

iii. UT PICTURA POESIS

Gonzalo's tears pouring down like winter rain are tears of compassion for his fellows and tears of repentance:

The King,
His brother, and yours, abide all three distracted,
And the remainder mourning over them,
Brimful of sorrow and dismay; but chiefly
Him that you termed, sir, the good old Lord Gonzalo,
His tears run down his beard like winter's drops
From eaves of reeds. Your charm so strongly works 'em
That if you now beheld them, your affections
Would become tender (V.1.11).

The ut pictura poesis theory can pinpoint some of the implications of this speech. It is a theory of moving the feelings through visual effects. In the summary of this theory which follows, I refer to the analysis made by Renssellaer Lee as to the theoretical relation between poetry and painting at the time. Renaissance theory, interpreting Aristotle, Cicero and Horace, holds that poetry and painting have a like function and method of relating to the public. Poetry and painting resemble each other in that both have the task of
making a vivid pictorial representation, whether in words or in paint. Both are arts of imitation, and they should be 'representative', typical, avoiding the 'accidental'. This point has already had some discussion in this thesis, in relation to Sidney's similar statement about the painters who set before you 'that which is fittest for the eye to see' instead of 'the meaner sort of painters who counterfeit only such faces as are set before them'. Here Renaissance idealization in the arts derives about equally from Aristotle and from the need to prove that art has moral worth. Aristotle's theory in the Poetics that generally applicable fiction is more imitative of life than particular incidents, was easily conflated with rhetorical concepts of decorum. The theory of decorum 'fills many a dreary page of sixteenth and seventeenth century criticism' and is itself a theory of the suitable and the typical in style and characterization. According to Lee it stems from Aristotle, Demetrius, and Horace among others via the Italian Renaissance theorists. The vogue for Theophrastan characters adds yet another strand related to these precepts of stylization. Further sources of character description besides the mid-sixteenth century translation of Theophrastus were the model Latin rhetoricians, who frequently invoked the drama as guide for their own eloquent effects in the law courts. Quintilian and the Rhetorica ad Herennium, for example, delight in copiously describing set characters with vividly dramatized characteristics. 'Invention' (as one of the five necessary components in the production of discourse, of which some were also applied to painting) under these circumstances is a case of refreshing and renewing traditional themes and types. The avowed purpose, as
always, is to teach and delight.

The mixture of vivid detail and stylization can be seen in Shakespeare's poetic diction in many set pieces which correspond well to the theory of word painting, such as the death of Ophelia, or Jaques meditating. Such passages are often stylistically or contextually foregrounded. They serve both as narration and scene, a calm or significant moment pinned down for various dramatic purposes. Such a speech could economize on acted scenes or staging time, and create mood pauses, contemplation, or further the audience's understanding of plot. While there is some progression of time possible in the verbal telling, this is not possible for the painter in perspective. He must choose his moment most tellingly, as the Player in Hamlet recognizes:

For, lo! his sword,
Which was declining on the milky head
Of reverend Priam, seemed i' th' air to stick.
So, as a painted tyrant, Pyrrhus stood
And, like a neutral to his will and matter,
Did nothing (Hamlet, II.2.470).

Lee reproduces many painted versions of one scene, showing the popularity of certain set pieces, such as the moment of transformation to a hart of Actaeon, for example, or, from Tasso, Aminta's discovery of Rinaldo. Lee's illustrations are all in perspective. The non-perspective illustrations in Harington's Orlando Furioso are able even to retain the time progression that a poetic word painting can have, rather in the manner of modern cartoons with frames. These illustrations show a narrative organization of the picture space. The artist places various episodes in different sections of the framed
area so that the eye reads the story spatially as it were, roving not over distance in a given perspective scene but over several staged scenes simultaneously. Characters are labelled with their names. These truly narrative pictures illustrate even better the similarity of poetry and painting which is predicated in the theory of ut pictura poesis. 21

While the painter strove to dramatize his picture, the poet strove to impress the visual force and immediacy of painting. Shakespeare's "painted" scenes often have formal linguistic aspects one could call 'poetic diction', but in no negative sense. Poetic diction is intended as a beauty and is not per se a lapse in poetic power or sensibility. In accord with Renaissance principles of rhetorical style, Shakespeare's diction cannot be judged either by the approving concepts of poetic diction of the 18th century nor by negative Wordsworthian formulations. Sherbo cites Groom on the Tempest masque: 'Nowhere else in Shakespeare...is the style so entirely built up on epithets: turfy mountains, spongy April, pole-clipt vineyard, short-grass'd green, windring brooks, and the like - scarcely a significant noun in the first forty lines of the Masque but it has its rare, if not always felicitious epithet'. 22 But Shakespeare regularly places one apt adjective with its noun in the 'painted' speeches. We may note characterizing vocabulary in just this way in any number of instances where Shakespeare consciously chooses a pictura style. An almost random example describes Jaques's deer, where

the big round tears
cours'd one another down his innocent nose
in piteous chase; and thus the hairy fool,

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Much marked of the melancholy Jaques,
Stood on th' extremest verge of the swift brook,
Augmenting it with tears (As You Like It, II.1.38).

In a later passage in this play 'indented glides' and 'dry antiquity'
are typical of the degree of compression loading such pairs, creating
at once visual and emblematic quality that commands attention and
promises significance:

Under an oak, whose boughs were moss'd with age,
And high top bald with dry antiquity,
A wretched ragged man, o'ergrown with hair,
Lay sleeping on his back. About his neck
A green and gilded snake had wreath'd itself,
Who with her head nimble in threats approach'd
The opening of his mouth; but suddenly,
Seeing Orlando, it unlink'd itself,
And with indented glides did slip away
Into a bush (As You Like It, IV.3.103).

Some elements in later criticism defined as 'poetic diction' may be
noted in this example; these include English words in their concrete
Latin meaning, and the pairing of a concrete and abstract word.
Shakespeare regularly creates small vignettes in which one apt
adjective with its noun, and/or vivid verbs epitomize the typical.
The choice of what is typical is a sensitive matter in a given
context. We must attribute the 'rooky wood' and the thickening light
to this principle, in the beautiful 'light thickens, and the crow/
Makes wing to th' rooky wood;/ Good things of day begin to droop and
drowse' (Macbeth, III.3.50). It is not only a wood and not only dusk
which are to be epitomized, but a conjunction of the two is invented
by the poet because together they provide the emotional threats and
ambiguities which the vignette means to arouse in the listener. The
effect is to guide emotion like that of the incidental music of modern
All aspects of style work together. In a similar style a contrasting example occurs in *Hamlet*, this time releasing audience emotions from tension at the end of a ghost-ridden night: 'But look, the morn, in russet mantle clad,/ Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill' (*Hamlet*, I.2.166). Typical of poetic diction, too, is the Virgilian personification of nature, in the latter example. The important principle, which Lee would class under 'expression' in the *ut pictura poesis* theory, aims at identification. The artist succeeds because he identifies with what he is 'painting' verbally or visually, and the viewer/listener identifies with what he is looking at/reading/hearing. Lee quotes Lomazzo: 'Lomazzo, commenting on Horace's *si vis me flere*, observes that a painting in which the movement of the figure is rendered in life-like fashion (*con moti al naturale ritratti*) will cause the observer

To smile with him who smiles, think with him who thinks...marvel with him who marvels, desire a beautiful young woman for his wife if he beholds a fair female nude in a picture...desire to eat with him who eats precious and delicate foods, fall asleep with him who sweetly sleeps."23

In Ariel's passage about Gonzalo, 'His tears runs down his beard like winter's drops/ From eaves of reeds' (V.1.16). A single simile and a phonetic scheme account for remarkable effects, climaxing an abstract vocabulary of grief - 'distracted', 'mourning', 'sorrow and dismay'. 'Brimful' leads on to Gonzalo's overflowing eyes, one of many evocations of unmitigated sorrow with eyes 'never since at ebb' (I.2.436). The aim is to arouse emotion through image and style. The phonetic and rhythmic effects, and desolate imagery, make Prospero feel as well as know what is being said. Ariel can know by seeing,
and he feels as much as he is able. The image is of relentless winter rain and relentless grief at once. The two lines that carry the image are strongly marked with assonance in the long 'ee' sounds, 'tears', 'beard', 'eaves'. This thin wailing sound reinforces the disconsolate image. Images of weather and the elements run through the play in which nature and man are almost interchangeable; thus 'the billows spoke...the winds did sing' (III.3.96) to Alonso; thus 'those are pearls that were his eyes' (I.2.399); so too grey beard and grey thatch interchangeably weather the wintry time of grief.

'Those Words are most gratefull to the Eare,' says The Briefe of Rhetorique, 'that make a man seeme to see before his eies the thing signified'. Aristotle, and all the rhetoricians concur with him, finds metaphor of sovereign persuasive power in this respect (with which 'similitude' is equated): 'For in a Metaphor alone there is Perspicuity, Novity and Sweetnesse...The things that make a speech gracefull, are these; Antitheta, Metaphors and Animation...That which a Metaphor does, a Similitude does the same; but with lesse grace, because with more prolixity;' when brief, however, 'tis poetical'. Amplification, too, is an important aspect of persuasion in rhetoric, and the rhetoricians make much of detailed description, as here from the Rhetorica ad Herennium:

It is Ocular Demonstration when an event is so described in words that the business seems to be enacted and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes.

Then follows the description of the murderer (also in Cicero and Quintilian) 'In a sweat, with eyes blazing, hair bristling, toga awry...'
Through this kind of narrative Ocular Demonstration is very useful in amplifying a matter and basing on it an appeal to pity, for it sets forth the whole incident and virtually brings it before our eyes.28

This principle of visualization is taken over as a major concern in the amplifications taught by Erasmus as copia in his school books as an aid to stimulate imagination. Ariel's words that follow the image of tears as rain assume identification in the listener:

Ariel: If you now beheld them, your affections Would become tender.
Prospero: Dost thou think so, spirit?
Ariel: Mine would sir, were I human (V.1.18).

These words demarcate that quality of feeling which is not only human but uniquely human. As Caliban uses words but does not know their import, so Ariel has 'a touch, a feeling' of what 'affliction' is. He can see it when tears show it, but he cannot know it. Ariel, like Caliban then, does not quite understand human language, but by 'amplifying' what he sees he can make Prospero imagine their feelings. Gratitude for the human power of emotion clearly affects Prospero as it does the audience even though this power is also an affliction:

Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling Of their afflictions, and shall not myself, One of their kind, that relish all as sharply Passion as they, be kindlier moved than thou art? (V.1.21)

Again through assonance, in the dominant sh/ch sounds in a vocabulary denoting extreme feeling, 'passion', 'affliction', 'touch', 'relish', 'sharp', Shakespeare creates a poetry which moves the listener. Indubitably the rhetoricians are right to stress the power to move through words as the aim of all their teaching. It is because words

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have a direct link to feeling, phonetically, rhythmically and by association, that language holds its central place in human society; body language is perceived even more directly by the emotions. Tears are catching and Prospero weeps when he meets the weeping Gonzalo:

Holy Gonzalo, honourable man,
Mine eyes, ev'n sociable to the show of thine,
Fall fellowly drops (V.1.63).

When Prospero calls his tears 'fellowly drops' on greeting Gonzalo, he perhaps remembers Montaigne's comment in _Of Cruelty:_

But to returne to my former discourse, I have a verie feeling and tender compassion of other mens afflictions, and should more easily weep for companie sake, if possible for any occasion whatsoever, I could shed teares. There is nothing sooner moveth teares in me, than to see others weep, not onely fainedly, but howsoever, whether truly or forcedly.

The aim is above all to involve the audience. As for the emotion which these tears of repentance denote, Donne expresses the measure of the depth and seriousness intended, considering that all three penitents were suicidal with guilt and despair. This response, the sermon suggests, is common and must reverberate with the audience's own experience.

If we come to open our lips in true confession of our wretched condition...if we come to that _inebriatio lacrymis_, if we overflow and make ourselves drunke with tears, in a true sense, and sorrow for those sins...

Donne in his sermons aimed to move. The preacher and the moral playwright aim at the same result. In the passage below Donne takes it as a commonplace that tears 'affect'. Each tear, says Donne, does its work towards disposing God to pity.
Drown that world of sin...spare thy world noe more than God spared his, who drowned it with the floud, drowne thine too with repentant teares...but when that work is religiously done, miserere animae tuae...drowne it not more...God sees every teare, our first teare, and is affected with that.31

The paradox in *The Tempest* is that Prospero relinquishes vengeance for mercy as God would, meeting mankind's true 'heart-sorrow' (III.3.81). Prospero has played God throughout his action, begun with the storm. The reason he gives for his reversal is his human identity. Paradoxically, in the epilogue the same human response is demanded of God that he has shown (V.1.333). That is to say that the old law, invoked for instance, in L'Orfeo by Pluto and Charon, is forever negotiable by repentance and pity since the Christian reversal. Thus in the Renaissance humanization of God in which *The Tempest* shares, emotion is paramount, and pity leads to mercy.

Donne equates the poet with the preacher as teaching moral knowledge through the emotions:

All ways of teaching are rule and example...example makes it easy...like something which we knew before...Poet and Preacher, proceed in these ways in both, Rule and Example, the body and soule of Instruction.32

The special value of drama, as it is of preaching, is to use eloquence, then, as it should be used, to move the soul, since the soul tends to virtue. We may apply Donne's praise of eloquence to Shakespeare himself and *The Tempest*, approving passion and expressiveness as that which turns words into works:

His minister shall become *tuba*, a trumpet to awaken with terror. But then he shall become *carmen musicum*, a musical and harmonious charmer, to settle and compose the soul

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again...he shall not present the messages of God rudely, barbarously, extemporally, but with such meditation and preparation as apertains to so great an imployment...he shall be musicum carmen, music, harmony in re and in modo, in matter and manner: And he shall have a pleasant voice, that is...with a spiritual delight...when the person acts that which the song says, when the words become works...the auditory...shall confess that [the preacher's] labours work upon them, move them, affect them and that a cold manner of preaching agrees not with the dignity of God's service.33

The expressiveness of the play does not lie in an amplified rhetorical manner, so typical of the Renaissance, not excluding some of Shakespeare's plays. The art of saying the same things many times stretches from Lyly to Milton, whose prose is stacked with paraphrases mounting to their climax. Shakespeare's rhetoric in most of his other plays is essentially true to the theories which gave rise to the copious style, notably in the many paraphrases which build up the longer speeches in most of his plays. The descriptive type of passage discussed above, the 'ocular demonstration', is another aspect of this tradition. In The Tempest there is little rhetorical repetition, however. The poetry of the play lies rather in subtle phonetic and rhythmic effects, and thematic vocabulary clusters, as, for instance, in Prospero's revels speech. Philip Brockbank has written on the poetic effects of this play. He relates the wording of Strachey and Jourdain, and the 'secret dialogue' with Florio's Montaigne, to the wording of the play; above all, 'it was the sea, as the Elizabethan imagination dwelt upon it, that supplied the language of moral discovery'.34 The place of rhetorical amplification is taken by the concretized materials of the play, for the island characters and setting of the play are themselves its larger metaphors. The sea, the tears of memory and repentance, the strange
consciousness of Caliban, Ariel's music and the play's intimations of mortality are themselves part of the poetics of the play. Together, they create a charged yet aestheticized appeal to the emotions.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5B

1. Many occasions of woe accompanied by tears are mentioned, but
tears are by no means only expressive of sorrow. Some clear-cut
references to tears are as follows: I.2.25, 132, 134, 150, 391;
II.1.125; III.1.12, 19, 74, 76; V.1.16, 200. Of these, six are
associated with Miranda, two with Prospero, three with Ferdinand and
three with Gonzalo, and Caliban cries with longing (III.2.140).

2. Montaigne, 'Of giving the Lie', in Essays, translated by John
Florio (1603), Everyman's Library, 3 vols (London, 1910, reprinted

3. A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique: Containing in substance all
that Aristotle has written in his Three Booke of that subject...by T.
H. (London, 1637?), II.10, p. 93.

4. A Briefe, I.2, pp. 4-5.

5. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria, translated by H. E. Butler,
The Loeb Classical Library, 4 vols (London, 1932, last reprinted
1960), II, vi.1, p. 401.


13. Metaphysical Lyrics and Poems of the Seventeenth Century: Donne
to Butler, edited by Herbert J. C. Grierson (Oxford, 1921, reprinted
1947), p. 130.

14. The Poems of Andrew Marvell, edited by Hugh Macdonald (London,

15. Claudio Monteverdi, L'Orfeo: Favola in Musica (Venice, 1609),
words by Alessandro Striggio, printed in Illustrierte Textbeilage:

The translation in the libretto reads:

Pr. My lord, this unhappy one...
whom thou hast just now heard
lamenting so sweetly
has awakened so much pity within my heart...

Plu. Although stern and immutable fate
opposes thy wishes, beloved wife,
nothing indeed shall now refuse
such beauty combined with such entreaties.
His beloved Eurydice
Orpheus shall find again, contrary to the decrees of fate.


17. Montaigne, I. p. 83.


31. The Sermons of John Donne, IX, p. 274.


The issue of truth in language is raised in relation to Ferdinand's and Miranda's expression and acceptance of love. Their wooing and betrothal represents difficulties overcome in their communication and identification of love. Ferdinand's previous experience of the 'harmonious tongues' of women and the 'bondage' of love provides a subtext of conventionalized unhappy love, to be contrasted with a wholly fresh experience detached from convention - a pastoral experience as opposed to the courtly. At the same time, for Ferdinand, the language of love is placed in the context of his log-bearing. Once again a contrast with Caliban is implied since both Caliban and Ferdinand are captives sentenced to hard labour. It is the attitudes shown in their words that will mark the difference between them, since their circumstances are similar. By their words Ferdinand and Miranda transform the log-bearing from slavery to service, from bondage to freedom. The action is the same, the connotation reversed.

Ferdinand: There be some sports are painful, and their labour Delight in them sets off: some kinds of baseness Are nobly undergoen; and most poor matters Point to rich ends. This my mean task Would be as heavy to me, as odious, but The mistress which I serve quickens what's dead, And makes my labours pleasures (III.1.1).
Ferdinand's words show him noble. The example of his fortitude is derived from Aristotle's definitions of courage. In Chapter 1 this passage is discussed in the context of the cardinal virtues. Here the context is the transformation of the physical to the metaphysical plane. In Aristotle the transformation is effected by the love of victory in sport, for Ferdinand by love of Miranda. Miranda had already described Ferdinand as courageous (I.2.469). Now Ferdinand's speech argues out exactly the paradoxes on courage which Aristotle pinpoints.

Men are sometimes called courageous for enduring pain. Hence courage itself is attended by pain...Not but what it would appear that the end corresponding to the virtue of Courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the attendant circumstances.

Aristotle illustrates this by the example of athletic contests. To boxers, for example, the 'wreath and the honours of victory' are pleasant, but the blows and labour of training are painful. The virtue of courage, Aristotle concludes, is not essentially pleasant 'save in so far as it attains its end'. As victory compensates for the pain of boxing, so Miranda is the prize for log-bearing. Her pity for him and her wish to share in his burden further re-contextualize 'this wooden slavery' (III.1.62) as love's service. The log-bearing thus receives a reverse definition, where labours are pleasures. The dissolving of physical constraints is typical of the metaphysical poets. The mundane world becomes insignificant in the overriding meaningfulness of love or other spiritual solace. Hamlet could call himself 'king of infinite space' though 'bounded in a nutshell' (Hamlet, II.2.252), and 'stone walls do not a prison make' for Lovelace. But Ferdinand goes further and calls his labours pleasures. The transformation from slavery to
freedom could be classed as 'an illocutionary act' in speech act theory. Ferdinand's speech is an action, which transforms pain. Ferdinand's re-naming of log-bearing as freedom could be classed as a 'performative' utterance, 'which does not so much state as do', thus winning a moral victory over humiliation. An analogy from modern semiotic theory can be interestingly brought to bear on this process of transformation. Halliday describes an 'imaginative function' in language learning. Gradually a small child's early 'phylogenic' use of language is integrated into the linguistic and social common ground of the family and society. We may apply this by observing similar processes of meaning adjustments in the growth of love, if we consider that love is itself a 'philogenic imaginative function' which becomes socially meaningful when it is shaped by response from another. Log-bearing, experienced as a chore - and, under duress, as slavery - becomes the nexus for a new joint imaginative function for these two lovers. The log-bearing is undertaken by each as a gift of love (Miranda lifts logs too), one might say, instead of jewels and tokens. The acceptance of their 'fancy' by society as a whole finally integrates their private ideational world into the larger social world. The Renaissance connotation of 'fantasy' is remarkably like this pre-social 'imaginative function'. Here Prospero, and society's rites of betrothal and marriage, represent the final sanction which gives full meaning to their love. This is contrasted with Caliban's inability to transform his tasks. He fails to conceptualize his physical experience into contexts where it might have a more positive meaning. He could, for instance, envisage himself as part of a group; then he would share benefits as well as labour.
As will be seen in what follows, Ferdinand's and Miranda's exchanges explore what language can show or do to promote harmony meaning and truth between 'the best' among human beings. Ferdinand specifically made Miranda's equal: 'My language! heavens!/ I am th best of them that speak this speech,/ Were I but where 'tis spoken (I.2.31). The problems of language that come under scrutiny are problems of knowing, particularly knowing truth as regards love. These problems are all to do with the nature of experience, which either 'fills' words and makes them meaningful to speaker and listener, or else leaves them hollow, mere verbiage. Ferdinand invokes past experience as a basis of understanding: mistaken responses and untrustworthy love are recalled by Ferdinand as a means for comparing his present recognition of total meaning in which his 'soul speaks' (III.1.63). Proof of truth, however, is hard to supply through language—vows and oaths, whether of fidelity or chastity, are 'straw to th' fire in th blood' (IV.1.52), and can be 'hollow'. Belief in the listener must suffice instead of knowledge, but proof can sometimes be found in deed or events. Both Ferdinand and Miranda consciously labour to find styles of language that will convince, and transmit their experience. Their joint will creates a climate of mutual and self-discovery through speech which is a form of belief. The matrix of their interchanges is well expressed by Deetz:

As Husserl made clear, subjectivity is intersubjectivity...the interest here in interpersonal interaction is with the development and unfolding of meaning which is not yet available to either interactant...the nature of dialogue is to open the which is out of reach and beyond comprehension.
For this interaction they share the highly idiosyncratic common cultural and linguistic literary code of the court. Sinfield outlines the concurrent conventions of Ovidian lust, romantic devotion, and Protestant marriage, and analyzes the inability of most Renaissance writers to reconcile them. In a highly concentrated account of his court experience, Ferdinand summarizes many of these conventions:

Full many a lady
I have eyed with best regard, and many a time
Th' harmony of their tongues hath into bondage
Brought my too diligent ear (III.1.39).

The romantic conventions are composed of many literary streams. Several generations of Petrarchan imitators spread through Europe the paradoxes of unsatisfied love, the religious language of faith, service and even martyrdom, and the Platonic image of ideal beauty or virtue worthy of such devotion. These attitudes figure in sonnets, madrigals, lute songs and musical entertainments throughout the Renaissance period. This conflates with the unhappy shepherds of the pastoral, and the ideas of melancholy as a sickness of unbalanced humours and madness. On the female side Dido is a model for distraught love, and there was a brief vogue for Complaint poems representing women in the 1590s according to Hallett Smith, of which A Lover's Complaint is one. The romantic stance is ambiguous as to whether sexual consummation is desirable or possible, since marriage is not usually at issue and unchastity defiles the lady, whether a 'cruel she' or a modest maiden. In the case of Ferdinand, the number of women is heavily stressed: 'full many a lady', 'many a time', 'for several virtues...several women' (III.1.39-43). This is Ovidian. The 'too diligent ear' (III.1.42), however, implies - 325 -
guilt of some kind, with possibly an injunction to seek marriage instead of flirtations. In Protestant marriage sexuality was at last given a status which was neither lust nor frustration from the man's point of view, and equality between the sexes was intended. In fact Sinfield points out that freedom of choice of a partner for the woman was cancelled by the father's rights over her. To this might be added the inequality in experience: chastity for the woman, but experience for the man, a marked feature of Shakespeare's text here. The court ladies that Ferdinand found wanting are of a lesser calibre not only because they did not wholly please Ferdinand, but because the 'harmony of their tongues' implies insincere intentions through, possibly, the love rhetoric of courtly badinage. At any rate there were many of them, so Ferdinand's sincerity must also be questioned, since it seems he could not resist flirtation. There are anomalies here, not further pursued by Shakespeare. Ferdinand seems to be the almost passive recipient of advances, yet it is he who appears to be leafing through a vast supply of ladies all rejected as flawed.

The codes and vocabulary of these three conventions as outlined by Sinfield interweave the understanding of both Ferdinand and Miranda. The latter 'sighs' for love and has to struggle with 'coyness' (III.1.81). Ferdinand's reference to Miranda as 'every creature's best' is a shorthand evocation of Petrarchan Platonism. His whole manner of wooing is that of the idealizing and humbly serving lover, yet Prospero gives two admonishments, suggesting a level of petting on the stage that could infringe the required premarital chastity (IV.1.14, 53). Perforce Miranda must be content with the first suitable man she ever meets considering there are no others. 'Poor worm, thou art
infected' (III.1.31) Prospero says, in the idiom of the sick passion of unbalanced humours. Shakespeare allows Miranda to show some independence in the game of chess, with the suggestion that the wifely obedience which Sinfield sees as yet another bar to equality in Protestant marriage will not be too servile; this, however, could be a concession to her royal position.

ii. THE ELOQUENCE OF BEAUTY

Initially Ferdinand and Miranda are each struck by the other's physical beauty, which by itself is enough to engender love - beauty is eloquent; 'Beauty itself doth of itself persuade/ The eyes of men without an orator' (The Rape of Lucrece, line 29). The same speech metaphor occurs in A Lover's Complaint: '0, then, advance of yours that phraseless hand/ Whose white weighs down the airy scale of praise' (line 225). But beauty, Miranda suggests, is a sign of inner worth. Each, merely seeing the other, expresses a conviction that the other is divine not mortal in beauty:

Miranda: What is't? A spirit?...
    It carries a brave form. But 'tis a spirit.
Prospero: No wench...This gallant which thou seest
    Was in the wreck, and but he's something stained
    With grief - that's beauty's canker - thou mightst call him
    A goodly person...
Miranda: I might call him
    A thing divine, for nothing natural
    I ever saw so noble (I.2.410).
Ferdinand responds: 'Most sure the goddess/ On whom these airs attend' (I.2.422). Love at first sight goes hand in hand with the convention of beauty as the cause of love. Prospero says to Ariel, 'at the first sight/ They have changed eyes' (I.2.442). Miranda confirms it: 'This/ Is the third man that e'er I saw; the first/ That e'er I sighed for' (I.2.445). Ferdinand proposes marriage immediately: 'O, if a virgin/ And your affection not gone forth, I'll make you/ The Queen of Naples (I.2.448). Miranda rejects Prospero's trumped-up accusations of Ferdinand as impossible in one so beautiful:

There's nothing ill can dwell in such a temple.
If the ill spirit have so fair a house,
Good things will strive to dwell with't. (I.2.458)

This common belief is natural where beauty is equated with universal harmony. Harmony has holy associations. Thomas Wright makes this association on beauty as the cause of love:

The further I passed the more objects alluring to love I discovered: for beauty of bodies, the glory of nature, the glimps of the soul, a beam of thy brightness, I see, so inticed men's senses, inveigled their judgments, led captive their affections, & so ravish'd their minds that such hearts were more present in thoughts and desires with such bodies where they liked and loved, than with that body wherein they sojourned and lived...And what was this beauty which so fed their appetites? it could not be certainly any other thing then the apt proportion & just correspondence of the parts and colours of visible bodies, which first delighted the eye, & then contented the mind, not unlike the harmony of proportionable voices and instruments, which feed the ear...This harmony of mortal bodies (O my God, the beauty of beauty) hath disconsorted, & consequently deformed many an immortal soul.'

'Disconsortment' is a danger, then, but

beauty is the rinde of bounty, & those creatures are more beautiful which are more bountiful: for bounty and goodness

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resemble the sun, beauty the beams...[But] beauty they make an instrument of vice, which by right reason should be an ornament of virtue..."11

In this context the body as a temple for the soul is a commonplace image, originally from St Paul: 1 Corinthians 6.19. 'What? Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own?' There are twenty-four references to this image in the Index to the Sermons of John Donne.12

iii. 'HEAR MY SOUL SPEAK'

In his wooing speech Ferdinand cites previous experience of the language of love, recalling the rhetoric of persuasion which won him, but which led to 'bondage' as opposed to the 'equal bonds' of love. By this means he now has the insight to judge comparatively between partial and complete love. The speech which declares this is an effusion of discovery, almost an aria we might call it. It makes clear the contrast between the full soul and the imperfect satisfaction he calls 'bondage'.

Ferdinand: Admir'd Miranda,
Indeed the top of admiration, worth
What's dearest in the world! Full many a lady
I have eyed with best regard, and many a time
Th' harmony of their tongues hath into bondage
Brought my too diligent ear. For several virtues
Have I liked several women, never any
With so full soul but some defect in her
Did quarrel with the noblest grace she owed,
And put it to the foil. But you, 0 you,
So perfect and so peerless, are created
Of every creature's best (III.1.37).

'Bondage' bespeaks the whole conventionalized gamut of the paradoxically desired humiliations, either Petrarchan or sexual, as in the Dark Lady sonnets where the abject lover speaks:

But my five wits nor my five senses can
Dissuade one foolish heart from serving thee,
Who leaves unsay'd the likeness of a man,
Thy proud heart's slave and vassal wretch to be (Sonnet 141).

In order to interpret these 'harmonious tongues' which imply deception, I draw on A Lover's Complaint, whose theme is that the tongues of fiends and of angels cannot be distinguished — the poem itself is a rhetorical tour de force which moves, engages, and lulls the judgement. This consideration of the relation between rhetoric and truth is taken up again in Love's Labours Lost. In A Lover's Complaint the false young man who wooed the betrayed maiden was indistinguishable in every respect from a true lover. His persuasion was irresistible to all, the maiden says, but at first she held out. Finally his beauty and eloquence — both of language and in the physical signs of sincerity and the content of his speeches — all bespoke uniquely intended and chaste love for the maiden.

So on the tip of his subduing tongue
All kinds of arguments and question deep,
All replication prompt, and reason strong,
For his advantage still did wake and sleep.
To make the weeper laugh, the laugher weep,
He had the dialect and different skill,
Catching all passions in his craft of will (line 120).
His body language seems to prove sincerity:

Of burning blushes or of weeping water,
Or swooning paleness (line 304).

The maiden considers whether her inexperience caused her to mistake him, but decides not, and the poem ends without solution:

Thus merely with the garment of a Grace
The naked and concealed fiend he cover'd,
That th' unexperient gave the tempter place,
Which, like a cherubim, above them hovered.
Who, young and simple, would not be so lover'd?
Ay me! I fell; and yet do question make
What I should do again for such a sake.

O! that infected moisture of his eye,
O! that false fire which in his cheek so glowed,
O! that forc'd thunder from his heart did fly,
O! all that borrowed motion seeming owed,
Would yet again betray the fore-betray'd,
And new pervert a reconciled maid! (line 316).

Thus faith in another's words of love is by definition an act of will; belief is given to that which cannot be proved. The sonnets to the Dark Lady are concerned with this problem: is it wilful or reasonable to believe protestations of true love? If deceived, the lover is enslaved to a self-destructive passion. Margreta de Grazia shows that the sonnets intend to describe a deeply sinful passion, a triumph of will over reason. In The Tempest model of faulty communication, the deceptive eloquence of the 'senders' is irresistible, as in A Lover's Complaint:

There my white stole of chastity I daff'd,
Shook off my sober guards and civil fears;
Appear to him as he to me appears,
All melting (line 297).
Miranda is drawn as a contrast to the court ladies. In her modesty she doubts her worthiness to be loved, and deliberately abjures 'a harmonious tongue'. To prove her truth of love with less not more eloquence, she consciously considers her methods of expression:

Ferdinand: Wherefore weep you?
Miranda: At mine unworthiness, that dare not offer
What I desire to give, and much less take
What I shall die to want. But this is trifling,
And all the more it seeks to hide itself,
The bigger bulk it shows. Hence, bashful cunning,
And prompt me, plain and holy innocence!
I am your wife if you will marry me;
If not, I'll die your maid. To be your fellow
You may deny me, but I'll be your servant
Whether you will or no (III.1.76).

This speech works from obscurity of expression to clarity, after she rates herself - 'hence, bashful cunning' - for the state of mind which results in this indirectness. She realizes that her real shyness looks like the insincere pretence at an attractive shyness and innocence attributed to court ladies, a reminder of the sonnet's representation of the 'suppression of simple truth':

When my love swears that she is made of truth
I do believe her though I know she lies,
That she might untutor'd youth,
Unlearned in the world's false subtleties (Sonnet 138).

Here the untruth was not believed, and Miranda realizes that her indirect wording does not conceal her true meaning. Her modesty forbids her to name a sexual relation, which is spoken of as 'what' - 'what I desire to give' and 'what I shall die to want'. This is indeed beating about the bush, 'trifling', and does indeed arise from bashfulness. The 'what' becomes the 'it': the more her sexual desire
'seeks to hide itself, The bigger bulk it shows' (an oddly 'male image in the mouth of Miranda). Miranda solves her linguistic problem of naming sex by opposing the words 'wife' and 'maid', thus giving the meaning of 'wife' a sexual weighting. The 'plain and holy innocence' which is to be preferred to coyness is a highly compressed statement about language. Behind it lies the whole issue of the virtue of plain speech, particularly for women, but also as an aspect of Protestant values on language. Miranda asks innocence to find words for her since innocence has nothing to hide and is holy (by definition). The word 'plain' is coupled with 'holy'. Innocence will speak plainly in two senses: openly and also simply. Miranda refers to her unsuccessful verbal elaboration and changes course stylistically. After her appeal to innocence, her language becomes direct both syntactically and in content. In its directness, her language must be thought forward for women, by all conventional standards of the time, though a different standard applied to princesses. The present tense 'I am your wife...' is forceful to the point of oddness, and her determination 'whether you will or no' would be brusque if it were not the message Ferdinand desires. To summarize, truth is in itself holy, and the real truth does not need complicated words. Brathwaite (1631) associates virtue with decency, and decency with restrained speech. The gentlewoman is temperate in her discourse, discreet in her answers, complement she affects not, as the world takes it. The word in his own native and unborrowed signification is good; but to be restrained to an enforced formality, shee cannot relish it...she cannot indure this latter introduced kind of complement, which consists of Cringes, Congies or supple salutes.14

As for lovers

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she knowes how to fancie; and in her shee retai-nes what shee fancies most, a chast soule...shee was never yet acquainted with a passionate ah me.15

Silence was frequently enjoined upon women. Nevertheless, gentlewomen received an education, Rheta Warnicke points out.16 This education could include the arts of speech:

a woman is a mouing Rhetoricke...more shall we see fall into sinne by Speech than Silence: Yea, whosoever intendeth himselfe to speake much, seldom observes the course of doing what is just.'17

Brathwait's is the conventional view, and his conclusion is relevant to Miranda's 'plain':

If you affect Rhetoricke, let it be with that familiarity expressed, as your plainnesse may witnesse for you, that you doe not affect it. This will make your speech seem gracious to the hearer, conferre a native modesty on the Speaker, and free you of all prejudicate censure.18

For Ferdinand, experience, then, is the knowledge which fills words with truth. Now he finds perfection in Miranda and understands the word 'love' so that he can say 'Hear my soul speak' (III.1.63). However, in Act I, on first meeting, the speed of his instant wooing seems suspiciously unreflective: 'O, if a virgin,/ And your affection not gone forth, I'll make you/ The Queen of Naples (I.2.448). Prospero rightly instigates the testing process by which love's inwardness can grow: 'This swift business/ I must uneasy make, lest too light winning/ Make the prize light' (I.2.451). In 'hear my soul speak' Ferdinand touches upon the ideal nature of Adam's language in Eden where essence and word are synonymous. Subsequently the masque playfully leads Ferdinand and Miranda into Paradise through its imagery of fecundity and no winter, as in the golden age:

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Barns and garners never empty...
Spring come to you at the farthest
In the very end of harvest! (IV.1.110).

To this Ferdinand replies: 'Let me live here ever./ So rare a wondered
father and a wife/ Makes this place paradise' (IV.1.131). The context
is light and fictional and is soon after reaffirmed as illusion in
Prospero's revels speech, though he must indeed take issue with evil in
the shape of the beast Caliban, thus pursuing the paradise metaphor.

The filling of language with experience is at the heart of all
debates about truth in language. Petrarch states the problem in terms
of understanding the word 'death': the context is that of an attack on
scholastic dialectic where 'although a host of little pinpricks play
upon the surface of your mind, nothing yet has penetrated the center'.

The long exposition of death and dying (in the Secretum) graphically
depicts

the powerful physical and emotional effects the witnessing of a
horrible deathbed scene can produce. 'Then, and only then,
can a man understand the truth of the standard definition of
man as a rational and mortal animal bandied about in the
schools. This then is what I meant by sinking down deeply
into the soul - not while perchance by force of habit you name
"death" or reiterate "nothing more certain than death." and
other sayings, for these fly right by and do not sink in'.

Trinkaus summarises Petrarch: 'Dialectical philosophy fails Petrarch
because it is an inadequate road to truth...based on too shallow a
conception of human nature. Poetry and rhetoric are better instruments
for acquiring the deep knowledge of the truth that reaches and moves the
will. Only this and not mere verbalizing is sufficient'. Thus we
may say Ferdinand played with the dialectic of love at court but did not
reach the deep knowledge of the truth. Trinkaus cites Valla and Gioviano Pontino on the same epistemological problem:

Valla: The true or the truth is a quality present in the sense of the mind and in speech...truth is knowledge of a disputed subject, and falsity is lack of knowledge concerning the same...we may say truth is both the knowledge of the mind concerning some matter and the signification of a speech derived from the knowledge of the mind (pp. 212-13).

Trinkaus explains Valla's conclusions: there may be falsehood out of ignorance or malice. He argues that the transcendentals of ancient philosophy - the good, the true, and the one - are qualities derived from human linguistic usage and not metaphysical entities. 'Valla closely links the question of truth and falsehood with that of virtue and vice':

To know, or be wise, or understand, is nothing except to believe and feel about things just as they are constituted...and this is called truth (p. 216).

On the other hand, lying takes such forms as ostentatio, simulatio and dissimulatio. Pontino, as quoted by Trinkaus, adds to those by stressing the social necessity of truth:

through truthfulness human conciliation is established and faith flourishes in the city, and a kind of bonding of all our actions and affairs takes place as well as the observance of all our promises and statements (p.218).

The discussions of truth in the hands of these three, Petrarch, Valla and Pontino, says Trinkaus, 'is highly original in a nexus of God, man, nature, history and society... These broader, more experiential and anthropological modes of conceptualization can...be understood as a consequence of Renaissance humanist study of ancient ethics and
rhetoric. This is a real contribution made by rhetorical humanism in the history of western thought.\textsuperscript{23}

iv. PASTORAL CONTRASTS: COURT GALLANT AND NATURE'S CHILD

Ferdinand's growth of experience follows that of Donne's lover in \textit{The Good Morrow}. We are not told whether Ferdinand had sexual relations with his court ladies, but before true love enjoins marriage, Donne's lover of many ladies says with bravado: 'If ever any beauty I did see, / Which I desir'd, and got, 'twas but a dream of thee'.\textsuperscript{24} There is some such bravado in Ferdinand's 'full many' ladies. Both Donne and Milton express the knowledge of true love as waking from a dream into reality. Ferdinand parallels Donne's 'And now goodmorrow to our waking Souls' (line 78), and Milton's \textit{Comus}, influenced as it partly is by \textit{The Tempest}:

\begin{verbatim}
I have often heard
My mother Circe with the Sirens three...
Who as they sung would take the prison'd soul,
And lap it in Elysium...
Yet they in pleasing slumber lull'd the sense
And in sweet madness rob'd it of it self,
But such a sacred, and home-felt delight,
Such sober certainty of waking bliss
I never heard till now (line 252).\textsuperscript{25}
\end{verbatim}
Here we have the 'prison'd soul' who recognizes a new sober certainty. So Ferdinand is the court gallant of experience who wakes into full knowledge of a different order. In *The Tempest* this is expressed as a sensation of freedom. Ferdinand, as a speaker whose words are now filled with knowledge, describes the past to show that his present speech has a firm basis in experience. Miranda is cast here as the receiving ear, and her comprehension is equal to his meaning. Miranda 'redescribes' Ferdinand's images as love:

Ferdinand: The very instant that I saw you did
My heart fly to your service, there resides
To make me slave to it, and for your sake
Am I this patient log-man.

Miranda: Do you love me? (III.1.64)

Redescription is evaluated by Donaldson:

Meaning and belief play interlocking and complementary roles in the interpretation of speech...we interpret a bit of linguistic behaviour when we say what a speaker's words mean on an occasion of use. The task may be seen as one of redescription...what do we need to know if we are to be in a position to redescribe speech in this way, that is, to interpret the utterances of a speaker...it is an aspect of the speaker's competence at understanding what is said.  

Miranda understands that the idiosyncratic court parlance of 'service', 'slave', 'your patient log-man' means love. The 'competence' named by Donaldson is linguistically the familiarity with the courtly idiom of love. Experientially it is taken literally, for as Donne says, the desire of love is to make the other happy and love is service: 'All discourses, all that is spoken to or from the soul, is all full of chast love, and of the love of chastity....Love is nothing but a desire, that they whom we love should be happy.'
trying to carry the logs, which will be easy for her 'for my good will is toward it', and she swears 'to be your fellow/ You may deny me, but I'll be your servant,/ Whether you will or no' (III.1.84). Ferdinand declares himself 'thus humble ever' and accepts the position of husband 'with a heart as willing/As bondage e'er of freedom' (III.1.88). Each sends the same message to the other. Ferdinand's and Miranda's wooing scene follows directly upon Caliban's drunken 'Ban, Ban, Caliban/ Has a new master - get a new man!/ Freedom, high-day! High-day, freedom!' (II.2.179). The juxtaposition is grotesquely apt.

In metaphysical terms, freedom is a state of mind. Caliban, however, grown incapable of free service after his first youthful 'love' for Prospero and Miranda when he trustingly showed them his beloved isle, deteriorates: 'his mind cankers' (IV.1.192). Since he could not learn to control his lust for Miranda he lost the freedom of his island. The freedom he relishes would be that of the savage who survives alone on nature's terms. In relation to other human beings his holiday from labour is short-lived. He instantly enslaves himself to a new passion, this time that of drink. He can only ensure his supply by becoming enslaved to Stephano, who controls the butt of wine. Passion, then, is the slave's master, while to submit to the control of reason might have preserved his brief freedom. Ferdinand's statement of control is thus a necessary completion to the play's enquiry into the nature of freedom:

Ferd: As I hope
For quiet days, fair issue, and long life,
With such love as 'tis now, the murkiesst den,
The most opportune place, the strong'st suggestion
Our worser genius can, shall never melt
Mine honour into lust...
I warrant you, sir,
The white cold virgin snow upon my heart
Abates the ardour of my liver (IV.1.24, 55).
Truth as plain speech is associated with a nature/court context, as in the Duke's speech in *As You Like It*:

Duke: Here feel we but... the icy fang
And churlish chiding of the winter's wind,
Which when it bites and blows upon my body,
Even till I shrink with cold, I smile and say
'This is no flattery; these are counsellors
That feelingly persuade me what I am'.
And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones and good in everything (*As You Like It*, II.1.5).

Here there are two different subjects under discussion. In the first, the Duke clarifies 'true' and 'false': the direct fact of experience (the cold) is truth, though an unpleasant one. At court, unpleasant truth or unfriendly action is hidden behind sweet but untrue words (flattery). We may apply this to *The Tempest*. The untruth of the court is a commonplace which lies behind the 'harmonious tongues' of Ferdinand's ladies. Away from 'public haunt', Miranda offers the intrinsic value of her person, 'her modesty', as the 'jewel in her dower'. Through this image she is seen to offer a self, instead of wealth in the court's materialistic evaluation of marriage which must be an aspect of 'painted pomp'. Here, as in the Duke's speech, essential 'being' is a 'true thing', and jewelled dowries irrelevant. The other aspect of the Duke's speech concerns the loss of what is good at court, all to do with the communicative value of language. Away from public haunt the social community is lacking, denoted by conversation, books - no doubt virtuous literature and the Bible - and preaching. These indeed are pleasures, and aids to salvation. But here Shakespeare refers to nature as God's book, where men may 'read' God in his works.
and find pleasure and help in them as compensation for lack of human fellowship, most forcefully seen in terms of language. Wordsworth pursues this subject literally, and the boy of The Prelude is morally instructed by nature. So is Wordsworth's Lucy, about whom Nature says:

And vital feelings of delight
Shall rear her form to stately height,
Her virgin bosom swell;
Such thoughts to Lucy I will give
While she and I together live
Here in this happy dell.  

Other aspects of Lucy besides her virginity also apply: to Ferdinand, Miranda is, like Lucy, both 'a star' and 'a violet by a mossy stone', wild, modest and hidden. In her isolation, she is also 'fair, as a star when only one is shining in the sky'. But the audience knows the difference - that she has had a better court education than other princesses even. This nullifies the potentially Wordsworthian message for the audience (not for Ferdinand), that nature alone makes real nobility - Shakespeare's best shepherdesses are disguised princesses. Shakespeare's pastoralism is seen as highly ambivalent compared with Wordsworth's poetic exploration of a pre-sexual Eve in her innocence.

The pastoral court/nature identities of Ferdinand and Miranda are elaborately intertwined, since both have courtly and rural aspects. Nature presides over the simple and instant conviction of their love while they are both living under nature's hard but true laws, away from court flatteries, yet Prospero presides there, and while both are literally 'rusticated', both are court-born and trained. Ferdinand identifies himself as a prince though he is, according to the facts, a prisoner on a desert island labouring as a log-man. Miranda movingly
identifies herself as 'nature's child'. Through slow monosyllables, her brief, simple sentences grope for a frame of reference.

Miranda: I do not know
One of my sex, no woman's face remember
Save from my glass, my own; nor have I seen
More that I may call men than you, good friend,
And my dear father. How features are abroad
I am skillless of; but by my modesty,
The jewel in my dower, I would not wish
Any companion in the world but you;
Nor can imagination form a shape
Besides yourself to like of. But I prattle
Something too wildly, and my father's precepts
I therein do forget (III.1.48).

The structure of each sentence is negative - Miranda does not belong to the world. The sparsity of her experience leaves her mind limpidly displayed to the listener. The force of the word 'shape' with which she makes Ferdinand a thing, a strange object seen for the first time, describes a strong physical impact, like seeing the sea for the first time. Here again the truth is embodied. Imagination cannot invent Ferdinands beyond Ferdinand. He is unique to her as she to him. In her next speech Miranda, believing Ferdinand's eloquent vows - 'I/
Beyond all limit of what else i'th' world,/ Do love, prize, honour you' (III.1.71) - proposes marriage as the corollary of her belief in Ferdinand's words. We are to see the best both of courtly and pastoral virtues in them both. Ferdinand's speech of praise is as courtly in its rhetorical flourishes and worldliness as Miranda's language is groping.

Admired Miranda,
Indeed the top of admiration, worth
What's dearest to the world! Full many a lady
I have eyed with best regard...never any

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With so full soul but some defect in her
pid quarrel with the noblest grace she owed,
And put it to the foil. But you, 0 you,
So perfect and so peerless, are created
Of every creature's best (III.1.37).

We have the phonetic play of **chiasmus** in 'Admired Miranda', which, as an exclamation, gives rhetorical notice of a deliberate sense of occasion. 'Exclamation', says Fraunce, 'is an excellent instrument to stir up diverse affections, sometimes wonder and imagination', while Hoskins says 'Exclamation is not lawful but in extremity of emotion'. Mounting to a climax 'but you, 0 you,/ So perfect and so peerless', the alliteration and superlatives satisfy the expectation built up by **comparatio** structures. The final climax, in the conventional Platonism of court literature, summarizes 'the blazoning pens' in Cassio's speech in which Desdemona excels: 'A maid/ That paragons description and wild fame;/ One that excels the quirks of blazoning pens,/ And in th' essential vesture of creation/ Does tire the ingen* (Othello, II.1.61).

An echo of this occurs in The Tempest where Prospero says Miranda 'will outstrip all praise' (IV.1.10), suggesting this will be her due on arrival at court by sea, like Desdemona arriving in Cyprus. Miranda is incomparable by all courtly standards; Ferdinand is incomparable because for Miranda he is the first man, Adam himself so to speak.

Miranda's 'holy' raises a contrasting rhetorical issue: humble language for sublime truth was the style specially advocated for Christian literature. The tradition of Christian Protestant poetics is summed up in Herbert's *Jordan*, as quoted by Barbara Kiefer Lewalski in her discussion of Protestant aesthetics based on biblical poetics, of which the 'heartfelt and uncontrived [plain] utterance of the Psalms' was one strand.
Must all be vail'd, while he that reades, divines,
Catching the sense at two removes?...

Shepherds are honest people; let them sing:
Riddle who list, for me, and pull for Prime:
I envie no man's nightingale or spring;
Nor let them punish me with losse of rime,
Who plainly say 'My God, My King.'

Lewalski suggests that 'the energy and power we respond to' in much of
the poetry of the period has its basis in 'the resources of biblical
genre, language, and symbolism, the analysis of spiritual states, and
the tensions over the relations of art and truth which were brought into
new prominence by the Reformation'. Auerbach points out the origin
of this essentially Christian stylistic mode in the high and the low
styles, the sermo gravis or sublimis and the sermo remissus or humilis,
'which [in antiquity] had to be kept strictly separated...in the world
of Christianity...the two are merged'. Baxter relates the style of
the sermo humilis to Shakespeare and particularly to his experiments
with it in Richard II. 'The lowly style of scripture encompasses the
sublime' and it was a style available in England, as he shows. Shakespeare needed a style both touching and tough for Miranda in
contrast to the golden-tongued court ladies. Since shepherds are such
a central element of Bible imagery, the pastoral modes naturally
intertwine with it. Miranda's isolated country state, and the idea of
sacred truth in love, are combined by Shakespeare in a deeply imagined
language of her 'spiritual state', combining directness and wonder.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5C


9. Sinfield, p. 70.


Rheta Warnicke points out that 'Tudor society as a whole encouraged its gentlewomen to become well-educated (against a backdrop of stark illiteracy for most of their female contemporaries)'. Of the four generations she examines, the last, the Jacobean one, 'was responsible for most creativity among learned women, such as the foundation of Latin schools for girls, original works in Latin, and prose and plays in English'. However, it was generally assumed that 'women needed firm male governance'.

17. Brathwait, p. 90.


20. Trinkaus, p. 212.


23. Trinkaus, p. 220.


32. Lewalski, p. 5.

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