REPRESENTING NATIONAL IDENTITY WITHIN URBAN LANDSCAPES: CHINESE SETTLER RULE, SHIFTING TAIWANESE IDENTITY, AND POST-SETTLER TAIPEI CITY

by

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ABSTRACT

Academic literature has examined how the transformation of a nation’s state power can give rise to shifts in national identity, and how such shifting identity can be represented in the form of the nation’s changing urban landscape. This thesis investigates that topic in the case of Taiwan, a de facto independent country with almost one hundred years’ experience of ‘colonial’ and then ‘settler’ rule.

Both colonial rule and settler rule constitute an outside regime. However, the settler rulers in Taiwan regarded the settled land as their homeland. To secure their supremacy, the settler rulers had to strongly control the political, cultural, and economic interests of the ‘native’ population.

Democratisation can be a key factor undermining settler rule. Such a political transition can enable the home population to reclaim state power, symbolising that the nation has entered the post-settler era.

This thesis explores how the transition from Japanese colonial rule to Chinese settler rule and then to democratisation gave rise to changes in Taiwanese national identity, and to its reflection in the urban landscape of the capital city, Taipei. The thesis reveals the irony of a transition in which the collapse of settler rule has been unable to drive significant further change in the city’s urban landscape. In other words, the urban landscape of post-settler Taipei City is ‘stuck in transition’. The condition reflects the ambivalence in Taiwanese national identity caused by the unforgettable, yet not really glorious memory of settler rule.
Dedicated to my parents

Their unconditional love makes me a better person 😊
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS

BOT.............................................. Build-Operate-Transfer
CIP............................................. Council of Indigenous Peoples
CKS.............................................. Chiang Kai-shek
CPC.............................................. Communist Party of China
DPP.............................................. Democratic Progressive Party
FWCC.......................................... Foreign Worker Culture Center
HOME.......................................... House of Migrants Empowerment
KMT.............................................. Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)
MAAG.......................................... US Military Assistance Advisory Group
MND.............................................. Ministry of National Defense
PFP.............................................. People First Party
PRC.............................................. People’s Republic of China
ROC.............................................. Republic of China (Taiwan)
TIWA........................................... Taiwan International Workers’ Association
TSU.............................................. Taiwan Solidarity Union
UN.............................................. United Nations
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Through a cross-disciplinary approach, one can understand how national identity can be represented within a nation’s urban landscape. There are numerous academic works examining the nature of national identity. Dominant theories are concerned with historical reviews and political power competitions (see Anderson, 1991; Held, 1992; Smith, 1991). Within the same themes, moreover, the existing literature has explored how government change, developing multiculturalism, and involvement into globalisation can give rise to shifts in national identity (see Brah, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Hall, 1992; Scholte, 1996; Stevenson, 1999). Meanwhile, many urban studies also have pointed out how government change, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation would affect a nation’s urban landscape. For instance, the new government would demolish the previous regime’s urban legacies (see Kolbe, 2007; Vale, 2006). Moreover, the increasing immigrants would eventually forge specific ethnic enclaves in the city (see Hayden, 1995; Yip, 2001). Furthermore, a nation’s involvement in global capitalism can make the city become packed with global retailers, international entertainment venues, skyscrapers, and other symbols related to global culture (see Harvey, 1993; Sklair, 2006). In other words, one can observe a nation’s changing built environment to picture its shifting collective identity, and vice versa.

While there are many nations being able to generate relevant stories regarding how shifting national identity can give rise to the nation’s urban
changes; Taiwan, the focal subject of the thesis, provides a rich context for this inter-disciplinary issue. According to Weitzer’s definition (1990), Taiwan was a ‘settler country’. The region was occupied by the Chinese settlers in 1945. As being the newly-arrived minority, the settler rulers had once dictatorially controlled Taiwan’s political, cultural, and economic affairs to secure their legitimacy. Simultaneously, the local population’s self-identification was suppressed. Nonetheless, since the late 1980s, the nation began to experience democratisation. The condition eventually undermined Chinese settler rule. Ultimately, the political party, composed of the natives as the majority, won the direct presidential election in 2000; symbolising the coming of the nation’s post-settler era.

This thesis investigates how government change, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation had implications for Taiwanese identity and its urban representations; in the context of settler rule’s establishment, transition, and transformation. More details of the research background are elaborated in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 then briefly explains how the analytic framework and research questions are developed; and how to carry out the empirical work. Section 1.4 states the main findings and key messages emerging from the thesis. Finally, Section 1.5 draws the entire thesis’s outline.

1.2 Research Background

From the thesis title *Representing National Identity within Urban Landscapes: Chinese Settler Rule, Shifting Taiwanese Identity, and Post-settler Taipei City*, one can realise that this study is set to examine how Taiwanese
identity is represented within Taipei City’s urban landscape. Nevertheless, one may be curious about the terms ‘Chinese settler rule’ and ‘post-settler’. Weitzer (ibid) suggests that like the colonial country, the ruling class in the settler country are formed by ‘people from outside’, rather than the natives. The difference between the colonial country and the settler country is that the colonisers usually regard the colony as a land where they can exploit its natural resources or take advantage of its strategic importance; while the settlers regard the settled land as ‘home’. In order to secure their superiority at the ‘new home’, the newly-arrived settler rulers need to have ultimate control of the natives’ political, cultural, and economic interests.

The establishment of Taiwan’s settler rule resulted from complicated international relationships. Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to the end of the Second World War. After the colonisers departed, the US Government allowed the Kuomintang (KMT/Chinese Nationalist Party) Government, which represented the state of the Republic of China (ROC), to be in charge of Taiwan’s post-war affairs. Thereafter, the KMT Government claimed that the region was ‘restored’ to be part of the ROC’s territory; implying that the home population was governed by a newly-arrived outside political entity. Although the local people had tried to fight against the corrupt KMT Government, they were ultimately suppressed by the armed forces. Meanwhile, the KMT Government used martial law alongside public education and language restrictions to control Taiwanese society as well as to manipulate the local population’s collective identity. In 1949, the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War to the Communist Party of China (CPC) on the Mainland China. Taiwan therefore became those Chinese
refugees’ settlement, implying that Chinese settler rule became further rooted in the region.

I was born in Taiwan in 1979. At the time, martial law still acted. I remember that when I was studying at the elementary school, the history and geography textbooks mainly featured Chinese history and geography, rather than those of Taiwan. In fact, some of my childhood friends’ schools were forcing students to speak Mandarin and banning other mother tongues. I also remember, in the school’s corridors, there were many flyers with the late President Chiang Kai-shek’s words or the anti-Communism slogans on them. They would be important references if one wanted to get a good result in essay or speech competitions.

Things began to change after martial law’s abolition in 1987. I recalled that instead of teaching, some of my school teachers spent much time criticising the Government’s policies. After finishing their comments, some teachers might add that they could have already been caught by secret agents if martial law still had acted. Moreover, there were increasing news reports about student, social, or political movements against the Government. I remember that a student movement was launched to appeal the Government to force the old National Assembly members to retire. My school teacher told the class that those old politicians were a privileged group. I did not exactly understand the teacher’s words at the time. Nonetheless, those old Assembly members retired ultimately.

In his study of the settler country’s transformation into the post-settler country, Weitzer (ibid) suggests that democratisation can be the key driving the natives to regain their political, cultural, and economic interests; and therefore
undermine settler rule. Moreover, such a democratisation process can constitute a political transition period that ultimately leads the nation to enter the post-settler era in which the natives formally seize state power. Given this perspective and my personal experience presented above, one can suggest that martial law’s abolition symbolised the beginning of Taiwan’s democratisation as well as political transition. In fact, this political transition has already led Taiwan to its post-settler era. In 2000, the KMT lost the presidential election to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main opposition party claiming that it represented ‘local power’. The result symbolised the formal beginning of Taiwan’s post-settler era.

Meanwhile, by consulting the relevant literature concerned with Taiwan’s urban history, one can realise the connections between Chinese settler rule’s transition and the nation’s changing urban landscape. For instance, due to the coming of the nation’s democratisation, the general public living in the city began to be able to appeal for the government institutions to improve the community’s civic facilities, such as public parks (Huang, 2005a). Moreover, after martial law was abolished, some monuments initially erected to pay tribute to the important KMT figures were removed from the city’s public spaces (Hou, 2000; Simon, 2003). In short, when Taiwan’s democratisation began to undermine settler rule, it also affected the urban elements and policies initially set up to serve the Chinese Settler State’s interests. Moreover, given that those relevant urban changes were related to the Taiwanese’s everyday living experiences and social practices, one can suggest that the changes also implied shifts in Taiwanese identity.

However, the existing literature only focuses on significant changes happening during the nation’s political transition period. Meanwhile, probably
because Taiwan just began to experience its post-settler era in 2000, there are not many academic studies exploring how post-settler Taiwan’s changing urban scene reflects further shifting Taiwanese identity. In view of that emerging issue, I started the research project. The next Section gives more details of how the entire study was carried out in an academic context.

1.3 Conceptual Approach, Research Questions, and Empirical Work

Clearly, the starting point of this study is to review the relevant literature to construct an analytical framework concerned with the connection between national identity and urban landscapes. In this Section, I just briefly summarise the critical viewpoints derived from the literature review process. I define that **national identity constitutes an imagined collective memory** [see Chapter 2]; and **urban landscapes constitute (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces** [see Chapter 3]. This is to say, the state intends to forge hegemonic identity concerned with the nation’s history and culture by practising specific social control, such as public education. Meanwhile, by creating the built environment where people gain their everyday living experiences, the state also can therefore create the nation’s collective memory. However, national identification is a process consistently affected by the nation’s government change, developing multiculturalism, and involvement in globalisation. It means that the state is unable to always maintain an unchanged collective memory among the nationals. In fact, the nationals not only keep ‘remembering’ new history and culture, but also keep ‘forgetting’ old ones. More importantly, things that are remembered today can be forgotten some
day and vice versa. Similarly, the urban elements that are demolished today can be rebuilt some day.

Given that the analytical framework enables one to identify specific urban elements and policies related to the nation’s shifting identity, it is applied to link the existing literature concerned with Taiwanese identity to those concerned with Taiwan’s urban history. Hence, a general storyline about how shifting Taiwanese identity was represented within the nation’s changing built environment can be produced [see Chapter 4].

However, the framework also enables one to point out several unexplored issues emerging from the existing studies. For instance, they do not investigate more potential urban elements that could serve the Chinese Settler State’s identification schemes. Moreover, they do not examine settler rule’s potential implications for the local minority’s living space in the city. In addition, they do not explore how the Settler State dealt with globalisation’s impacts on historic urban elements. Apart from these, as mentioned in the end of the previous Section, the most obvious gap among the existing studies is that only a few of them explore post-settler Taiwan. Given this condition, it is useful to look into other post-settler countries to search for the inspiration. In this study, South Africa is used to be the reference. It is because its settler rule transformation history is similar to that of Taiwan. Furthermore, it has already entered the post-settler era in 1994; and there have already been the relevant studies concerned with post-settler South Africa’s significant urban changes. By reviewing those studies, a proposition is developed to suggest that Chinese settler rule would make post-settler Taiwan’s urban landscape become ‘stuck in transition’. It means that
although some urban changes related to settler rule’s decline have taken place during the nation’s political transition era, the DPP Government/Post-settler State still is unable to eliminate the settler urban legacies already rooted in people’s everyday life [see Section 4.2].

These unexplored issues altogether generate the fundamental research question of the thesis: **How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces?** Moreover, in consideration of the subjects that each unexplored issue relates to, three sub-questions are generated to enable me to narrow down the research scope:

(1) **How did the Chinese Settler State use iconic sites, national-cultural sites, and other urban elements, to practise its national identification scheme in Taiwan, and what implications for those urban elements have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?** (This question implies examining physical urban elements that served the Settler State’s political and cultural legitimisation)

(2) **How did the Chinese Settler State affect Taiwan’s developing multicultural society and multicultural urban environments, and what implications for these environments have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?** (This question implies examining physical urban elements and urban policies concerning the ethnic minority groups’ interests)
(3) How did the Chinese Settler State deal with the impacts of economic/urban globalisation in shaping Taiwan’s urban landscape, and what implications related to this globalised urban scene have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era? (This question implies examining Taiwan’s urban regeneration and conservation)

It ought to be noted that although the questions seem to focus on urban policies and physical urban elements created by the KMT Government, they actually involve the investigation of the previous ruling political entities’ legacies. After all, Taiwanese identity and the nation’s built environments were not formed by the Chinese settler rulers only.

In order to find answers to the research question, the case study of Taipei City was carried out. Why Taipei City, Taiwan’s capital city, is the selected case is due to two reasons. Firstly, the theoretical framework suggests that the capital city usually acts as the nation’s political, cultural, and economic centre where one can encounter many national identity’s physical representations. Secondly, Taipei City is the predominant subject of the existing literature concerned with Taiwanese identity and its urban representations. Give these reasons, as an independent research student, Taipei City is a suitable spot for me to execute the fieldwork. Meanwhile, the case study findings also can solve the unexplored issues among the existing literature.

The Taipei City case study involves the multiuse of four research methods, namely, documentary research, archival research, direct observations, and interviewing. Meanwhile, the theoretical framework enables me to target specific
urban elements and policies that are relevant to this research project. Those focal subjects can be classified into six categories: (1) the physical urban elements initially built to legitimise state power and national culture; (2) the identity and urban policies benefiting or oppressing specific ethnic groups; (3) the places constituting the specific ethnic enclave; (4) the places whose formation is related to the nation’s economic globalisation; (5) the urban elements whose demolition is related to the nation’s economic globalisation; and (6) the policies related to urban regeneration and conservation.

1.4 Original Contributions

Generally, the novelty of this study lies in providing a different perspective on looking at the formation of Taiwanese identity. In other words, it creates the connection between Chinese settler rule, Taiwanese identity, and the nation’s urban landscape.

From the result of the empirical work [presented from Chapters 6 to 9], it is found that since the newly-arrived Chinese settler rulers initially regarded Taiwan as a temporary settlement, they just intended to quickly secure state power by practising several identification schemes, including manipulating Taipei City’s urban form; and therefore ignored comprehensive urban planning. Consequently, issues, such as the nationalist monument’s legitimacy, the marginalisation of the ethnic minority’s living territory in the city, and urban decline, were emerging. After the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, the general public and the private sector were able to make the Chinese Settler State deal with the issues and got certain achievements. One may think that after the Democratic Progressive Party,
claiming to represent local power, seized state power, symbolising the beginning of Taiwan’s post-settler era, the new government would be able to deal with the issues more efficiently. Nevertheless, the fact was that many of the issues still existed or have even become more complicated in the nation’s early post-settler era. In other words, post-settler Taipei City’s urban landscape was ‘stuck in transition’. This messiness of the urban form reflected the ambivalence of post-settler Taiwanese identity. That is to say, although settler rule was not a pleasant collective memory, post-settler Taiwan still was unable totally to get rid of it; given that settler rule has already put down roots in Taiwan and caused deep influences on the nation’s political, cultural, and economic conditions.

It ought to be noted that this study is initially set to produce a clear picture of how different political entities in Taiwan’s history gave rise to shifts in Taiwanese national identity alongside urban changes. Meanwhile, the study neither attempts to find a possible ‘result’ of the future urban image in post-settler Taiwan nor to produce a conclusion applicable to other settler countries. After all, Taiwan’s political landscape will continuously change and therefore affect national identity and its urban representations. Moreover, arguably, every settler country and its cities have different historical backgrounds. However, those uncertain factors inspire one to explore a broader range of research opportunities. More details are presented in Chapter 11.

1.5 Thesis Structure

After introducing the general idea and the setting of this study, this Section illustrates how the thesis is set to be presented. Following this Chapter, Chapter 2
conceptualises ‘national identity’ by examining the relevant theories concerned with the origins of national identity and with the factors that can affect national identification. It is presented as a selective discussion of shifting national identity that is important in relation to the development of Taiwanese national identity. Built upon the debates, Chapter 3 then employs the relevant academic studies to explain the relationship between shifting national identity and changing urban landscapes.

The literature-review process continues in the first half of Chapter 4 and begins to generate the connection between the thesis’s main subjects, namely, settler rule, Taiwan, and Taipei City. Apart from elaborating on the definition of the settler country, the first half of Chapter 4 also looks into the case of South Africa to draw the potential trend of how Chinese settler rule’s transition and transformation would have implications for Taiwan’s urban landscape. It then introduces the nation’s basic profile and examines the existing literature to find the relationship between Taiwan’s transforming state power, shifting national identity, and changing urban scene.

By considering the theoretical framework derived from those reviewed studies, the second half of Chapter 4 points out the issues among the existing literature concerned with Taiwan. A series of research questions are then developed and proposed. Chapter 5 outlines the methodology used to approach those questions. More specifically, it explains the reason for a case study approach; why Taipei City is the selected case; why certain research methods are employed; the entire data collection process; and the issues that I encountered in doing the fieldwork.
The thesis then moves on to the presentation and analysis of collected data. From Chapter 6 to 9, the empirical findings derived from the case study are presented. Although all of the four Chapters are set to demonstrate Chinese settler rule’s implications for Taiwanese identity and post-settler Taipei City, they respectively focus on four themes, namely changing state power, transforming national culture, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation’s impacts. Chapter 10 draws the findings together to provide an in-depth analysis directly reflecting the research questions.

Finally, as the concluding chapter, Chapter 11 reviews the entire research project and highlights why and how this thesis can have contribution to wider academic debates related to settler rule, national identity, and urban landscapes. By considering this study’s limits caused by specific factors, the Chapter ends by proposing future lines of research built upon those new insights developed in this thesis.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW (I):

CONCEPTUALISING NATIONAL IDENTITY

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter employs the relevant academic studies to examine the nature of national identity. Moreover, the Chapter essentially serves as a selective discussion of the issues that are important in relation to the development of national identity, especially in relation to Taiwan. From Sections 2.2 to 2.4, the focal subject is the connection between the nation, national identification, and the state. Section 2.5 reveals potential factors that are able to affect that connection. Section 2.6 briefly introduces how Taiwanese national identity was forged. A pertinent conclusion is given in Section 2.7.

2.2 The Origin of the Modern Nation

Anderson’s study—*Imagined Communities* (1991)—presents a historical approach to examining the origin of the modern nation. In that study, Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political [my italic] community” (p. 6) and writes that:

> It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion … In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined … [The nation] is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that
makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of
people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited
imaginations.

(Anderson, 1991: pp. 6-7)

Apart from giving this definition, Anderson traces the history of West Europe and
suggests that prior to the modern nation being conceptualised, there were two
powers that drove West Europeans in different regions to imagine that they
belonged to a community. First, it was the religious power that dominated
people’s thinking, behaviour, morals and values. The second power was the
ancient ‘political’ rulers, such as emperors and kings, who convinced the general
public that their power came from the grace of God.

Anderson suggests that these two powers, constituting ‘cultural roots’ of
ancient West Europeans, bound people together in an imagined cultural
community, despite the fact that they were living in a land where they neither
really knew each individual nor clearly indicated the land’s boundary. In this
community, people had the same religious disciplines that were recorded in
Latin—the sacred language at a time when the majority of society were illiterate.
Meanwhile, they were subject to a group of political/cultural elites who were able
to read Latin and represented God’s legacies in the earth.

Nevertheless, Anderson points out that the ancient religious power in West
Europe began to be challenged by the Religious Revolution taking place in the
sixteenth century. The coming of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment period, in
which people began embracing science and rationalism, also further undermined
the religious power. Meanwhile, the ancient West European political regime also
began to collapse in the late eighteenth century when political evolutions drove
people to perceive the power of political leaders should come from themselves, rather than God.

With the collapse of these two powers constituting cultural roots of the ancient imagined community, the concept of establishing the modern nation began to emerge. It means that different groups of West Europeans with respective shared culture, language, living territory, and collective historical memories attempted to use a new system to make their respective existence clearly recognisable. This attempt, known as nationalism, then caused conflict when it would affect different groups of people’s interests, such as the right of territory. Under these circumstances, the system of the modern nation began to develop. Different groups of West Europeans initiated their nation-building process including the nation’s domestic union, the establishment of diplomatic relations with other nations, or waging war on others. Clearly, this modern nation-building process involved deliberate and systematic political operations. It is one of reasons Anderson coins the term ‘imagined political community’ to refer to the modern nation. The other reason—how the state uses its political resources to create and maintain national identity—is explored in the next two Sections.

From the above discussion, one can point out that the concept of the modern nation stemming from West European countries. Meanwhile, in terms of other areas in the world, the emergence of the concept was due to various international encounters, such as wars and colonialism. That is to say, the oppressed people in these regions were inspired by their oppressors to build their nation to defend themselves as well as to maintain their own culture and language in the recognised territory. This nation-building trend in non-West European
regions became worldwide since the nineteenth century. Likewise, this trend involved deliberate political operations (Held, 1992; Kohn, 1975; Snyder, 1954).

2.3 The Origin of National Identification

The previous Section has revealed how and why ancient religious and political powers were undermined; and how the concept of the modern nation then emerged and became eventually worldwide due to deliberate political operations. Meanwhile, this Section explains how ‘national identity’ replaced ancient religious and political powers to make people imagine that they belong to a specific community, meaning the modern nation. In fact, it is also a story associated with the decline of ancient religious and political powers, and deliberate political operations. According to Anderson (1991), before the invention of print technology in the late fifteenth century, most people were illiterate. Nevertheless, the invention of print technology enabled words to be fixed on the printed page. The condition eventually gave rise to three associated implications:

(1) The Bible, which was originally written in Latin, could be translated into different languages. Meanwhile, in comparison to original versions that were presented in the form of priceless manuscripts, those translations could be mass produced and spread among people. As a result, the power of religious elites was undermined because the ‘knowledge’ stored in manuscript Latin Bible was no longer a secret held by them. This condition was also a crucial factor that gave rise to the Religious Reformation.
(2) Apart from religious elites, ancient political elites were the only social group that could read Latin at the time. Thus, they were willing to see the decline of the religious elites’ power. However, fixed language through printing also began to facilitate the development of public education. Eventually, increasingly literate and civilised people began to question the legitimacy of the ancient political elites. As a result, political evolutions alongside modern nation-building movements were launched to overthrow those ancient ruling classes.

(3) The third and most important impact was the emergence of ‘modern’ national identification.

This third impact of the invention of print technology needs to be elaborated further. It can be argued that ‘identity’ is formed through unconscious ‘learning’ over time, rather than through innate consciousness at birth. In this light, identification is actually the focal point when one attempts to examine the origin of specific identity (Hall, 1992; Preston, 1997; Scholte, 1996). Before the invention of the print technology, the main methods that drove identity of the imagined cultural community to be ‘passed down’ from generation to generation were oral teaching and everyday practices. Such an identification process could only be practised among a limited number of people in the group. However, after the invention of the print technology, this process was able to be executed at a much broader geographical scale through the spread of print matter whose contents could include the community’s common language, history, culture and
geographical features. Clearly, meanwhile, the process needed to be practised through deliberate political operation. Anderson (1991) and McLuhan (1964) argue that since books appeared in the late fifteenth century in Europe, the political elites had controlled the printers and booksellers and enabled the book market to be capitalised. Under these circumstances, the general public could only read books that had been ‘reviewed’ by the ruling class. Through the print matter’s unchanged contents, including ‘our’ language, ‘our’ history, ‘our’ culture, and geographical features of ‘our’ land, a collective imagination of the nation’s profile was forged among the general public. In other words, people began to have collective identity concerned with their nation. As time goes by, such collective identity seemed to have become innate for people of the nation. Billig gives an appropriate description of this national identification process by writing that:

National identity is not only something which is thought to be natural to possess, but also something natural to remember [my italic].

(Billig, 1995: p. 37)

Reference to Billig’s description of national identification, apart from the print matter, the phenomenon of ‘remembering your nation as well as who you are’ can be created by other types of the mass media in people’s everyday life. For instance, by reading the newspaper, one can perceive ‘his/her’ and ‘others’’ national affairs. Moreover, the weather reports on television usually show maps and it actually reminds one of ‘his/her’ as well as ‘others’’ national territories. Furthermore, by watching the film, one can perceive ‘his/her’ and ‘others’’ national cultures. In short, those representations of national identity within the
mass media consistently make people unconsciously remember their nation and who they are. It ought to be noted that like the ancient political elites eager to control the print matter, the modern political force running the nation—the state—also can use its political resources to control the information delivered by the mass media. For example, in a nation with a strong religious faith, the state can control the mass media to block information concerned with other religions (Hall, 1992). In other words, the state is able to intervene in the national identification process. The next Section explores more about what role the state plays in forging national identity.

### 2.4 The State and National Identification

Organisationally, or functionally, the ‘state’ can be defined as a set of government institutions that legitimises laws, orders, defences, and traditional values within a bounded territory; and therefore conveys its superior power over the inhabitants of the region (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). Although the modern state and the modern nation originally emerged at the same time, ‘state-making’ and ‘nation-building’ are two different subjects. The former refers to a political entity’s establishment and legitimisation within a nation’s territory. Meanwhile, the latter refers to a process of the nation’s determination to become recognisable. Nonetheless, given the fact that the state represents the nation to deal with domestic and international affairs, state-making and nation-building may be interconnected during the initial stage of a nation-building process (Held, 1992).

As a legitimised political entity of the nation, the state plays an important role in the national identification process. For instance, as already mentioned at
the end of the previous Section, the state can apply mass-media censorship to control national identification. Meanwhile, the state can also control the educational materials concerned with the nation’s history, culture, and geographical features (Guibernau, 1999; Hall, 1992). As a matter of fact, Billig (1995) indicates that the state can create various banal symbolic objects, activities, and events in people’s everyday life to forge national identity. For instance, the official coins and bank notes usually feature national emblems legitimised by the state. Furthermore, the state can designate national days for reminiscences of the nation’s memorable events. And people are usually expected to stand up and be serious when the national flag is raised or the national anthem is sung or broadcast. In short, those symbolic events, activities, images, and objects altogether constitute national-identity representations produced by the state. Under these circumstances, people’s everyday experience is actually a national-identification process where they unconsciously remember their nation and who they are.

2.5 Shifting National Identity

From the previous Section, it may appear that the state needs only to apply particular symbolic objects and activities to ‘remind’ people of their national identity, because it has already produced an ‘unchangeable’ collective identity. However, national identity can eventually shift due to certain interrelated factors. They can be categorised into three subjects presented in the following subsections:
(1) Government change

Arguably, the state’s intention to forge and maintain the nation’s collective identity can be interpreted as the means by which the state tries to create hegemonic identity serving its interests, meaning to maintain its political legitimacy (Billig, 1995; Guibernau, 1999; Hall, 1992; Smith, 1991). However, due to war, coups d’état, public elections, or many other reasons, the state’s administrative system can change with the coming of a new set of government institutions. The new government’s coming can imply the beginning of a new identity manipulation process affecting the ‘old’ identity. For example, after the end of colonial rule, the post-colonial state can enable the previously oppressed natives to begin to ‘reclaim’ their identity by compiling new history textbooks; creating the new national holiday; releasing the new bank notes (Hall, 1992; Papastergiadis, 1997). Incidentally, this example is associated with what is mentioned in the end of Section 2.2 [pp. 16-7] explaining how the concept of the modern nation became rooted in non-Western areas of the world. That is to say, through war or colonialism, modern Western states’ oppression eventually stirred up nationalism among the oppressed people who began to imitate their oppressors by forming their own state as well as their nation to efficiently fight back. After becoming independent, meanwhile, the newborn non-Western state also used similar methods, which had been used by its Western counterpart, to forge a new collective identity among the ‘new’ nation.
(2) Multiculturalism and cultural hybridisation

It can be acknowledged that ‘culture’ is one of the crucial factors shaping national identity. However, throughout human history, various factors, such as slave trading, wars, immigration, colonisation, and tourism, have made many nations consist of different ethnic groups. Although individuals with different ethnic backgrounds can be recognised by the state as citizens, each of them can still fiercely keep their cultural identity, including language, religion, and custom. In other words, a nation can constitute a multicultural society. What is more, in such a society, an individual can adopt other cultures and simultaneously ‘lose’ part of his/her original cultural practices. These circumstances eventually gave rise to cultural hybridisation among the nation. It implies that local cultures are changeable. More importantly, it also implies that the state is unable to maintain hegemonic collective identity in a nation with developing multiculturalism (Brah, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Hall, 1992; Scholte, 1996).

(3) Globalisation and cultural hybridisation

Arguably, in the age of ‘globalisation’, advanced technology makes people’s trans-national movement (e.g. immigration and tourism) become easy and frequent. The condition reinforces a nation’s developing multiculturalism; and, as mentioned in the previous subsection, cultural diversity and hybridity therefore emerge and affect national culture. Despite cultural diversification and hybridisation, however, this subsection focuses on how ‘global culture’, one of implications of globalisation, affects national identity. The formation of global culture is due to global capitalism and the advanced technology by which culture
is integrated into commodity production or information distributed worldwide. Under these circumstances, people in different nations can share similar everyday life experiences. Many nations’ adaptation to Hollywood films, international fashion clothing lines, and global fast food chains provide relevant examples (McGrew, 1992; Thompson, 1992). Meanwhile, as the state is keen to maintain hegemonic national identity, it may actually be unable to resist global culture’s formation and subsequent impacts on national culture. It is because capitalism and advanced technology, which give rise to global culture, can improve the nation’s economy alongside modernisation; the condition can simultaneously reinforce the state’s political legitimacy (Smith, 1991).

It is worth noting that Western countries are usually regarded as producers of global culture, due to their colonial, military, and commercial activities. In other words, Westernisation seems to be equated with not only modernisation, but also globalisation. However, instead of acting as the receivers of Western culture, the individual in the non-Western country also can be the distributor as well as the seeker of his/her own cultural features. For example, the diasporas in a given Western country can use different types of the mass media to voice or to access information concerned with their ‘motherland’. Meanwhile, in consideration of targeted consumers of a specific region, the culturally-sensitive Western capitalist may deliberately produce the products related to the locals’ demands. For example, the global fast food chains will have different recipes in different countries in order to cater for local customers. In short, people in different places of the world can live within the same framework of various accessible/adoptable cultural symbols paradoxically signifying ‘global’ or ‘local’. It implies global culture,
cultural diversification and cultural hybridisation can coexist in the nation experiencing globalisation. Meanwhile, it also implies the state is unable to maintain hegemonic national culture, let alone national identity (Hall, 1992; Scholte, 1996; Stevenson, 1999).

Although it cannot be denied that national identity remains vital in terms of issues of civil rights and immigrant mobility, it can be suggested that national identity has been consistently shifting due to the nation’s government change, developing multiculturalism, and involvement in globalisation.

2.6 Shifting Taiwanese National Identity

Building upon the previous selective dissection concerned with the nature of national identity and with factors being able to affect national identification, Section 2.6 briefly examines how Taiwanese national identity was formed by looking into the nation’s complicated historical background. This discussion is amplified in Chapter 4.

In the seventeenth century, European navigators began to pay attention on potential natural resources and the strategic importance of Taiwan Island, in which the Han People emigrating from the Mainland China and the Taiwanese Indigenous People coexisted without being ruled or governed by specific national political entities. In 1624, the Dutch Colonial Government became the first political entity of the region by establishing a colonial base in southwest Taiwan Island. In order to develop the colonial base’s agricultural industry, the Dutch colonisers encouraged the Han Chinese, who had sufficient agricultural skills, to
immigrate from Mainland China. Eventually, the Han People became the majority in Taiwan Island’s multicultural society. The significant impact of this condition on Taiwanese national identification was that Han Chinese culture became dominant when cultural hybridisation took place among different native groups. The condition was reinforced after 1662, when Chen Cheng-kung, a remaining officer of the Ming Empire, which was replaced by the Qing Empire on the Mainland China, drove off the Dutch colonisers. He made southwest Taiwan Island his base for restoring the Ming Dynasty, and therefore brought more Han immigrants. Meanwhile, other areas of Taiwan Island began to be explored due to its increasing population (Brown, 2004).

In 1683, the Qing Empire eliminated Cheng’s remaining power. The Qing Empire’s significant contribution to Taiwanese national identification was that Western cultures, in the form of consumer products, living style and philosophy, were swiftly imported into Taiwan Island after the mid 1800s, given that the Empire lost wars to Western countries and was forced to let Western businesspeople and missionaries to enter the region (Su, 2005).

In 1895, the Qing Empire lost the Sino-Japanese War to Japan and ceded Taiwan Island and other small neighbouring islands to the Japanese Empire. Naturally, when the Japanese Colonial Government governed the region, Japanese culture was hybridised with local culture. Meanwhile, it ought to be indicated that the Japanese colonisers also deliberately introduced aspects of Western culture to colonial Taiwan, given that the colonisers were keen to learn Westernisation at the time (Ibid). The circumstances made the natives’ collective identity more complicated.
In 1945, the Japanese Empire lost in the Second World War. The Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) Government represented the state of China at the time and therefore took over Taiwan. Although the newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders and the Taiwanese majority were both the Han People, different social-political experiences had made them become distinct groups. The new Government began to impose Chinese national identity on the local Taiwanese in a dictatorial manner. In 1949, the Kuomintang lost to the Communist Party of China in the war on the Mainland and was forced to retreat to Taiwan. The region eventually became the Chinese settlers’ ‘permanent’ settlement. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang Government’s national identification schemes were implemented more intensely (Manthorpe, 2005).

Apart from directly imposing Chinese national identity, the Kuomintang Government also intended to maintain its legitimacy by developing Taiwan’s economy. After a series of successful economic restructuring policies were implemented, Taiwan eventually played an important role in global economic interaction. Meanwhile, a Western style consumer society was formed in the 1970s (Chou, 2005). In other words, global culture and subsequent cultural hybridisation began to affect Taiwanese national identification.

In the late 1980s, the Kuomintang Government began to loosen its strong control over Taiwanese society. Hence, many social movements against the Government’s policies were able to take place. Meanwhile, given that the Kuomintang Government no longer intended to strongly impose Chinese national identity on the general population, the issue of what was Taiwanese national identity began to emerge. The Democratic Progressive Party, the main opposition
party composing of the locals as the majority, was officially recognised due to the nation’s democratisation (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003). In 2000, the Party won the Presidential Election. The new Government began to set up new education curriculums and use political discourses to emphasise Taiwanisation, although those actions were often criticised by the Kuomintang, which became the main opposition party after the 2000 Presidential Election. In other words, although the Kuomintang Government, initially founded by the Chinese settlers, lost state power, its remaining power still affected the formation of Taiwanese national identity (Manthorpe, 2005).

The above discussion generally shows how government change, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation affected the formation of Taiwanese national identity. A specific point relevant to this study and making Taiwanese national identity an interesting issue needs to be pointed out is that Taiwan was governed by the Chinese settler rulers after 1945. In other words, Taiwan was a settler country. In comparison to the colonisers who did not deliberately impose their own cultural roots on the natives, the Chinese settler rulers tried to impose Chinese national identity on the local Taiwanese. What is more, although settler rule was symbolically undermined when the party claiming to represent local power seized state power in 2000, it still had implications for Taiwanese national identification. A more detailed discussion concerned with settler rule is given in Chapter 4.
2.7 Conclusion: National Identity—Imagined Collective Memory

In consideration of the above debates, it is suggested that national identity constitutes an *imagined collective memory*. This term does not mean that every individual of a nation would have exactly the same ‘memory’. Instead, it is used to denote the nature of national identity. That is to say, in order to make a specific group of people keep ‘collectively imagining’ that they belong to the same nation, the state has applied an education system and various banal national-identity representations to make people unconsciously ‘remember’ the state-approved information relevant to the nation’s political, cultural, and economic features from the past to the present. However, government change, the formation of multicultural society, and globalisation can make people, in an everyday context, gain and lose factors associated with the nation’s profile created by the state. In other words, national identification is a continuing ‘memory’ reconstruction process in which people keep remembering or forgetting things related to the nation.

In terms of Taiwan, the focal point of this thesis, the nation’s imagined collective memory was also affected by government changes, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation. Specifically, the nation was once governed by the Chinese settler rulers who regarded Taiwan as their permanent homeland and therefore imposed Chinese national identity on the home population. In other words, the settler rulers intended to make the local Taiwanese collectively imagine/remember they were Chinese. The more detailed discussion concerned with settler rule’s implications for Taiwanese national identity is given in Chapter 4.
This Chapter has indicted how the state uses several banal objects (e.g. the national flag, coins and banknotes), and events (e.g. national holiday) as the physical representations of national identity to forge and maintain such an imagined collective memory. The next Chapter explores how built environments can also be the physical representations of the nation’s imagined collective memory.
3.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 has conceptualised national identity, an imagined collective memory forged by the state; yet continuously changing due to the nation’s government change, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation. Built upon the debates, this Chapter examines urban landscapes’ role as physical representations of national identity. More specifically, Section 3.2 firstly examines the relationship between the state, national identity, and the city. It then focuses on investigating when shifts in national identity occur due to the aforementioned three factors, how the nation’s urban changes would take place respectively. Following the discussion, Section 3.3 gives the relevant concluding remarks.

3.2 Representing National Identity within Urban Landscapes

Section 2.4 [p. 21] has applied several examples showing that national identity can be represented in the form of certain banal objects (e.g. the national flag and the national anthem). Meanwhile, a similar perspective given by Edensor (2002) is that national identity also can be represented through what he calls ‘iconic sites’. He elaborates on this viewpoint by citing that:
Typically these spatial symbols connote historical events, are either evidence of past cultures, providing evidence of a ‘glorious’ past of ‘golden age’ and antecedence (Stonehenge, the Great Pyramids, the Taj Mahal), or they are monuments erected—often within larger memoryscapes—to commemorate significant episodes in an often retrospectively reconstructed national history (Statue of Liberty, Arc de Triomphe, Nelson’s Column). They also frequently celebrate the modernity of the nation, are symbols of its progress (Empire State Building, Petronas Towers, Sydney Opera House). As such, the destruction of the ‘twin towers’ of the World Trade Centre proved to be a potent attack on the idea of ‘America’. In addition, there are a host of sites which symbolise official power: the royal palaces, halls of justice, military edifices, presidents’ house, parliamentary building, and so on, which provide the materialised spaces of national rule.

(Edensor, 2002: p. 45)

Moreover, Edensor argues that iconic sites can constitute popular tourist attractions. In addition, their images are frequently captured by the mass media. Furthermore, they are usually the venues to host state-organised activities such as celebrations of particular events or festivals that are associated with the state national identification scheme.

Apart from iconic sites, Edensor suggests that sites such as show grounds, religional institutions, and public entertainment venues also function as national identity’s physical representations due to their association with the nation’s cultural features (e.g. the national/state religion and the national sport). Although he does not coin a specific term to refer these sites, I intend to call them ‘national-cultural sites’. Meanwhile, Edensor also writes that:

[T]he style and materiality of suburban working-class housing, the design of parks, the prevalence of leisure facilities such as football and rugby pitches, pubs and the mundane codes reinforced by street names … This regular pattern of spatial distribution means that little jars us out of our accustomed habituation of such landscapes.

(Ibid: p. 51)
In other words, even a subtle urban element can constitute national-identity representations due to their consistent unchanged features and certain symbolic meanings that made people become familiar with as well as remember them.

Edensor’s insights inspire one to further consider how urban landscapes can be interpreted as physical representations of national identity, which the previous Chapter terms an ‘imagined collective memory’. Clearly, the discussion so far is unable to be associated with two subjects examined in the previous Chapter. The first subject is the state’s role in forging national identity. The second is shifts in national identity. In other words, it needs to create the connection between the state, shifting national identity, and urban landscapes. By consulting the relevant literature, the following four subsections explore that connection:

(1) The capital city

According to Hall (2006), some capital cities (e.g. London) combine all or most of the highest national-level functions related to politics, commerce, finance, media communication, education, etc. Furthermore, some capital cities (e.g. Washington) are designated as the political capital without significant economic functions. Moreover, some ex-capital cities (e.g. Berlin) constitute ancient historical and cultural references of the nation. In addition, some cities (e.g. New York) play a capital-city-like role, because they function as the nation’s window for international cultural and economic interactions. Given these examples, one can suggest that a nation’s capital city can be an appropriate spot for one to explore how national identity is represented within urban landscapes since
national identity is an imagined collective memory related to the nation’s political, cultural, and economic features.

According to the literature concerned with different capital cities’ establishment, it can be argued that iconic sites, such as government buildings, monuments, and landmarks, have been vital for a given capital city’s design and planning. For instance, in colonial New Delhi, the British Colonial Government erected magnificent official buildings to symbolise the British Empire’s superior power over the colony (King, 1976). Moreover, in Imperial Paris, Nazi Berlin (see Hall, 1998 and Tinniswood, 1998), Fascist Rome (see Tinniswood, 1998), and Soviet Moscow (see Hall, 2002; Tinniswood, 1998), the states constructed splendid statues and buildings in capital cities to symbolise the nations’ strength and simultaneously to legitimise state power. Furthermore, in the case of Washington DC, the city was packed with landmarks to narrate the US’s nation-building story (Hall, 2002; Tinniswood, 1998).

Apart from the iconic sites that may directly be associated with state power, national-cultural sites, such as national theatres, operas, museums, galleries, and libraries, are also significant features in a given capital city’s planning project since they symbolise the nation’s civilisation and cultural characteristics, notwithstanding that some of their functions is to store or exhibit the nation’s historic or cultural relics. According to Kolbe (2007), in many post-Communist Eastern European capital cities, the states dedicated themselves to national-cultural sites’ construction to create the image denoting the resurgence of the nations’ previously oppressed cultural development.
It is worth noting that a capital city’s central business districts, packed with global retailers, international entertainment venues, and skyscrapers, also can be physical representations of the nation’s economic achievement alongside modernisation. For instance, after George IV seized state power, in order to forge the image of Britain’s promising economy and simultaneously to demonstrate his capability to run the nation, he created Regent Street in London to host many financial institutions and luxury goods retailers (Hall, 1998; Olsen, 1986). A similar example is that many post-Communist states in Eastern Europe began to implement new business districts in the capital cities to create the nations’ new images as well as to boost the domestic economy (Kolbe, 2007).

From the above discussion, overall, one can realise the close connection between the state, the capital city, and national identity.

(2) Government change and the post-colonial city

Section 2.5 [p. 22] reveals that the transformation of the state’s administrative system can give rise to shifts in national identity alongside changes of national-identity representations. Likewise, the urban landscape can be changed due to the same condition. For instance, after the fall of the Soviet bloc, many communist monuments in Eastern European countries were demolished (Edensor, 2002). Moreover, the former government buildings representing communist state power nowadays have lost their original meanings and been transformed into tourist attractions (Kolbe, 2007).

By examining the urban history of former Western colonial cities in Asia or Africa, one can find more relevant links between government change, shifting
national identity, and changing urban landscapes because those cities have experienced three distinct periods, including pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras. Numerous literatures\(^1\) have suggested that prior to the Western colonisers’ arrival, religious buildings usually played the role as iconic sites as well as centres of the natives’ living territory. However, the newly-arrived colonisers would then introduce urban planning to build their ‘ideal’ colonial city whose building styles hybridised those of the West and the native. Those hybrid urban buildings symbolised the beginning of the colony’s new history. Meanwhile, the natives’ original built environments might be partially damaged even entirely demolished for the sake of colonial urban planning’s implementation.

It ought to be noted that the ‘new’ history that the Western colonisers intended to create for the colony was a history implying not only becoming modernised, but also legitimising the colonisers’ superiority. For instance, relevant ‘modern’ political, cultural, and economic institutions and public facilities (e.g. financial centres, museums, schools, churches, sports grounds, etc.) were erected within the colonial city. Moreover, streets and places were deliberately named after important colonisers. In some cases, racial segregation was implemented to force the natives to live in the backwater. Given these examples, one can suggest that the colonial city’s construction could change the natives’ living experiences alongside their imagined collective memory.

The coming of the post-colonial era in those Asian or African countries meant that the natives began to be able to reclaim their identity. Under this

\(^{1}\) e.g. British Colonial New Delhi, see Hall (2002), James (1997), Jyoti (1992); King (1976) and Metcalf (2005); British Colonial Kenya, see Mazrui (2001); British Colonial Singapore, see Yeoh (1996); French Colonial North African cities, see Hamadeh (1992); Lamparkos (1992) and Rabinow (1992); French Colonial Pondicherry, see Chopra (1992); Italian Colonial Libya, see Fuller (1992)
condition, the colonial urban legacies might be affected by the post-colonial state. For example, the street- and place-names might be replaced by those related to the natives’ heroic figures (Lewandowski, 1984). However, it does not mean that the post-colonial state would intend to reshape the city into what it looked like during the pre-colonial era. In fact, many colonial urban legacies, denoting the colonisers’ past control, can stand still in the post-colonial era since they constitute the city’s significant infrastructures or people’s regular visiting places (e.g. museums, banks, and playgrounds) (Alsayyad, 1992; McClintock, 1994; Vale, 1992). Apart from these physical constructions, moreover, the unbalanced urban development caused by the colonial city’s racial segregation may also remain. It means that the former backwater where the colonised lived would become the low-income social groups’ residencies after the coming of the post-colonial era (Hall, 2002). What is more, those Asian or African post-colonial states may even actively add Western architectural features to post-colonial urban landscapes. For example, the new official buildings, combining the Western and native architectural styles, could be erected to symbolise the nation’s independence as well as its capability to pursue modernisation without the former Western colonisers’ guidance (Vale, 2006). Overall, these examples show that colonial experiences have already become part of the nation’s imagined collective memory; and it is evidenced by colonial urban planning’s permanent implications for the post-colonial city.
Section 2.5 [p. 23] has indicated that the emergence of a multicultural society would give rise to shifts in national identity. In terms of this condition’s implications for the nation’s urban landscape, according to the relevant literature², it can be acknowledged that under the circumstances where international traders, economic immigrants, tourists, or even the military stationed overseas have been participating in the locals’ everyday life, these newcomers would introduce different cultures to the region. Meanwhile, the locals may also actively provide services (e.g. food and entertainment) that the newcomers are familiar with. As a result, not only through the physical urban elements’ architectural styles, the city can also demonstrate cultural diversity and hybridisation through food, music, religions, clothing, and entertainment.

It ought to be noted that the nation’s multiculturalism also can give rise to the formation of specific ‘diaspora space’ in the city. Clearly, individuals of different immigrant groups can demonstrate their respective cultural symbols or activities (e.g. speaking mother tongue or engaging in traditional entertainment) in the city’s general public places, such as parks or squares (Rishbeth, 2004; Sandercock, 1998). Nonetheless, the diaspora space is a symbolic territory where a group of specific immigrants and their following generations settle together. Notwithstanding, in this space, the ethnic group can freely sustain their cultural practice as well as identity. Meanwhile, the ‘others’ in the nation would also recognise this space’s symbolic meaning (Cohen, 1997).

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² e.g. the East African cities, see Gensheimer (2001); Mombasa, see Mazrui (2001)
The diaspora space’s formation in the city may involve immigrants with the same ethnic background attempt to live together. Such formation may result from the immigrants’ marginalisation by the predominant ethnic group or even by the native authorities. In this case, the diaspora space was usually formed in the suburbs with lower rent prices\(^3\).

Nevertheless, with the development of the nation’s multiculturalism, the oppression of the ethnic minority can be lifted. Meanwhile, the construction of the theme museum or restoration of the diaspora space can take place to symbolise that the identity of ethnic minority is acknowledged. The government institutions may actively get involved into these places’ constructions in order to demonstrate its determination to pursue ethnic harmony. For example, when the US and Japan confronted each other in the Second World War, the Japanese Americans’ living quarter, nicknamed Little Tokyo, in Los Angeles declined since the US Government forced many residents to move to specific camps to keep them under watch. After the end of the War, several non-governmental organisations began to dedicate themselves to Little Tokyo’s symbolic restoration by setting up the Japanese cultural centre and the theme museum in the area. Ultimately, the government institutions also began to participate in the relevant projects (Hayden, 1995). Overall, one can suggest that these ‘ethnic-cultural sites’ represent not only a specific ethnic group’s imagined collective memory of being part of a diaspora, but also part of the development of the nation’s multiculturalism.

\(^3\) e.g. non-slave African America in St Louis prior the 1861 American Civil War, see Mooney (2001); Mexican and Italian immigrants in Los Angeles, see Ghirado (2001); Chinese immigrants in California, see Yip (2001); Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles, see Hayden (1995)
Section 2.5 [pp. 23-5] suggests that in the era of globalisation, different cultures can be spread worldwide due to global capitalism and people’s trans-national movement. The condition can give rise to the formation of global culture, cultural diversification, and cultural hybridisation in a nation, implying changes of the nations’ imagined collective memory.

The previous subsection has mentioned how cultural diversification and hybridisation created from immigrant groups changed a nation’s urban scene. In the case of global culture, meanwhile, one can perceive it through a city’s commercial areas where global retail stores, fast food chains, and relevant entertainment venues are located. Such a scene symbolises not only the nation’s involvement in global capitalism, but also the locals’ adoption of global culture (Clark, 2003; Wong, 1997).

Clearly, the state can collaborate with the private sector to construct the city’s central business district where office buildings, financial service centres, theatres, hotels, department stores, and skyscrapers are erected to attract global entrepreneurs. Although this globally-standardised business district’s appearance and even function may not have many references (e.g. architectural styles and entertainment activities) related to the locals, it can improve the nation’s economy as well as image. Simultaneously, the state’s legitimacy can be reinforced (Hall, 2002; Kaika and Thielen, 2006). Incidentally, such ‘modern’, and local-culture free, central business districts were initially erected to regenerate declining cities in the US during the 1970s. With accelerated globalisation, eventually, this kind of commercial place without distinct local cultural references became the symbol
of modernisation and has been adopted by many countries around the world (Harvey, 1993).

However, the globally-standardised urban landscape’s creation may also affect urban elements representing the locals’ old collective memory. For example, although a new commercial district’s implementations may be able to boost the local economy or improve the area’s image, the residents may still disagree with the plan carried out by the government or the private sector to transform their familiar living environments into a globally-standardised commercial spot, while the urban conservationists would protest if the plan would affect historic buildings. Under these circumstances, conflict can surface between different interest groups, including the government institutions, architects, historians, real-estate entrepreneurs, planners, and local residents. In short, the nation’s globalising urban landscape can give rise to localism; meaning an emphasis on urban conservation, rather than on economic/urban globalisation (Boyer, 1996; Hannigan, 1998; Harvey, 1993; Sklair, 2006).

3.3 Conclusion: (Re-)remembered and (Re-)forgotten Spaces

From the above discussion, it can be summarised that the nation’s urban landscape constitutes a physical representation of national identity. After all, the city is a space where people’s everyday experiences and socio-cultural practices take place; the condition eventually generates people’s collective memory/identity. Meanwhile, the state plays an important role in setting this physical representation. For instance, the state can erect an iconic site (e.g. a monument or a government building) to denote a specific national event or the state’s superiority. Moreover,
the construction of a national-cultural site, associated with the nation’s cultural features such as religion, entertainment, and tradition, can also result from the state’s deliberate operation. Furthermore, the state can create commercial areas packed with global retailers and international entertainment venues to symbolise the nation’s economic success and modernisation. In fact, even subtle urban elements (e.g. street names and architectural styles), which may be less associated with the identity of the state, can be contributory factors in forging national identity since their permanence of these features make them familiar to people. The capital city is usually a distinct place for one to observe those physical representations, given that its history and functions have close connections to the nation’s political, cultural, and economic standings.

Meanwhile, changes in the nation’s urban landscape can imply shifts in national identity taking place due to the nation’s government change, developing multicultural society, and involvement in globalisation. For instance, an iconic site built by the former government may be demolished or functionally changed by the new government. Moreover, the development of the nation’s multiculturalism can result in the formation of the diaspora spaces where a specific ethnic group settle and strongly keep their cultural identity. In addition, the creation of globally-standardised central business districts in the city can symbolise not only the nation’s economic improvement, but also the dominance of global culture in the nation.

It ought to be noted that although shifts in national identity alongside urban changes may imply the emergence of new urban elements and the demolition of old ones, the latter still can be symbolically re-emerged someday.
For instance, the post-colonial state can erect new iconic sites representing native identity that was oppressed by the colonisers. Moreover, the construction of an ethnic-cultural site symbolises that the previously oppressed ethnic minority’s identity ultimately gained its recognition in the nation. In addition, urban conservation can become a significant issue when the existence of a local historic place is threatened by a globally-standardised business district project.

Reflecting the previous Chapter’s conclusion that national identity is an imagined collective memory and national identification is a recurring process involving remembering, forgetting and reconstructing, it is suggested that the nation’s changing urban landscape constitutes (re-)remembered and (re-)forgotten spaces. That is to say, the built environment consists of physical national-identity-representations that the state intends to make people remember. Nevertheless, due to the nation’s government change, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation, new urban elements representing new memories can appear. Meanwhile, although old urban elements representing old collective memories may be demolished, they can still be reconstructed some day; and even be replaced by the previously ‘new’ urban elements that had once replaced them. In short, the nation’s urban landscape is a battle ground where a continuous contest between remembering and forgetting the nation’s profile through those physical national-identity-representations is taking place.

Built upon the above arguments concerned with the connection between the state, national identity, and urban landscapes, the next Chapter employs the relevant literature to introduce the basic profile of Taiwan, the focal subject of the
thesis; and to examine how shifting Taiwanese identity has been represented with the nation’s (re-)remembered and (re-)forgotten spaces.
CHAPTER 4
LITERATURE REVIEW (III):
THE CHINESE SETTLER STATE AND TAIPEI CITY

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 has conceptualised national identity and briefly investigated how Taiwanese national identity was forged. Meanwhile, Chapter 3 examined how national identity can be represented within urban landscapes in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces. This Chapter employs the relevant academic studies to reveal how shifting Taiwanese identity was represented within the nation’s changing urban scene. More importantly, by reviewing these existing studies, the Chapter also develops and presents the research questions of the thesis.

It ought to be recalled that Chapter 3 suggests that a nation’s government change can give rise to shifts in national identity and the urban landscape’s respective changes. Meanwhile, many cases exemplifying this viewpoint are concerned with the nation in the context of a post-Communist or post-colonial state. However, in terms of Taiwan, the thesis’s focal subject, the nation’s historical background is complicated beyond post-Communist or post-colonial countries; given that it has experienced not only Japanese colonial rule, but also Chinese ‘settler rule’. Section 4.2 explains the definition of the settler country. Moreover, it applies the relevant literature to illustrate how settler rule’s transition and transformation can have potential implications for the nation’s built environments. Section 4.3 then applies the existing literature to examine the
implications of Chinese settler rule for Taiwanese identity and its urban representations. Section 4.4 presents conclusions from the existing literature and points out the issues that remain. Section 4.5 then develops the research questions of the thesis.

4.2 Transforming Settler Rule and Changing Urban Landscapes

In his study *Transforming Settler States*, Weitzer (1990) describes the settler country’s features:

Settler rule is one of form of political domination that is in decline around the world … They share in the general historical decline of colonialism, but settler states have shown more resilience because they represent permanent home to a dominant group that is prepared to resist metropolitan pressures for change and any hint of native resistance … Settler societies are founded by migrant groups who assume a superordinate position vis-à-vis native inhabitants and build self-sustaining states that are de jure or de facto independent from the mother country and organized around the settler’s political domination over the indigenous population … In some cases (Rhodesia, South Africa, Liberia), economic interests (exploitation of natives and prosperity of settlers) provide a key rationale for political domination; in others (Northern Ireland, Israel, Taiwan), economic considerations have been secondary to other imperatives: maintaining a specific religious or cultural order (Northern Ireland, Israel), a refuge or homeland (Taiwan, Israel). To constitute a settler state, the descendants of settlers must remain politically dominant over natives, who present at least a latent threat to the settlers’ supremacy … Settlers considered the territory their permanent home; this paramount interest shaped all social, economic, and political relations with the indigenous population. Compared to the minimalist coercive apparatus of the classic colonial state, a settler state is institutionally strong: the security core of the state has at its disposal substantial resources (finance, personnel, weaponry), and the exercise of repression is determined by settlers’ assessments of security, not metropolitan approval. Independent control over state coercion empowers settler regimes to resist domestic threats and foreign machinations; thus attempts to transform them have been more problematic than those to decolonize conventional colonies.

(Weitzer, 1990: pp. 25-6)
Arguably, from a broader view, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the US can also be regarded as settler countries; given that they were white settler colonies. Nevertheless, why Weitzer just cites those nations, including Rhodesia, South Africa, Liberia, Northern Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan, is because the focal point of his study is how the settler country can transform into the post-settler country and the implications of this process. Weitzer suggests that although each of these settler countries has its unique historical background, a common feature is that strong political control or even authoritarian governing is the general way applied by the settler rulers to secure their legitimacy and predominance. Under this condition, democratisation plays an important role in the settler country’s transformation since it can empower the natives to participate in political decision making, and; perhaps, to gain state power ultimately. In other words, the democratisation process constitutes a crucial political transition era that can transform the settler country into the post-settler country.

Although the focused nations in his study are Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe, Weitzer still briefly expresses his perspectives on other settler countries’ political contexts. In terms of Taiwan, the subject of this thesis, he writes that:

Few contemporary settler regimes have attempted to open the polity to the extent of threatening continued settler supremacy. Taiwan may prove to be a deviant case. Since 1987 the regime has lifted martial law (which had been in effect for thirty-nine years), tolerated the formation of opposition parties, eased press restrictions, and freed political prisoners. A native Taiwanese has become president (after the sudden death of Chiang Ching-kuo [(the settler ruler)]). Despite these significant reforms, repressive emergency laws remain in effect; [Chinese] mainland settlers (14 percent of the population) are vastly overrepresented in the three legislative bodies (more than 80 percent); and powerful military elites and ruling party stalwarts remain opposed to further democratization and
liberalization. According to one observer, the bottom line is that the ruling party (the Kuomintang) will not allow itself to be dislodged from power, and the softening of authoritarian rule should not be confused with genuine democratization. It remains to be seen if a reformist solution will indeed make Taiwan unique among settler states.

(Ibid, 1990; p. 34)

However, Weitzer’s perspective on Taiwan’s ‘contemporary’ condition was published in 1990. Since then, Taiwan’s democratisation eventually led the nation to the post-settler era in 2000, in which the Kuomintang (the Chinese settler rule) lost state power. The result confirms Weitzer’s view: democratisation is the key to the settler country’s transformation.

Meanwhile, Weitzer’s perspective on settler rule inspires one to consider how shifts in Taiwanese identity could occur through the nation’s settler-governing, political transition, and post-settler eras; and how such shifting identity could reflect on the nation’s urban changes. Prior to exploring this emerging issue, the urban history of South Africa provides an insight into Taiwanese cities’ potential changes. Why the case of South Africa is employed here is due to two reasons. Firstly, although two countries’ history timelines are not exactly the same, South Africa and Taiwan both were settler countries respectively governed by the White minority and the Chinese minority. Secondly, South Africa has experienced settler rule’s establishment, transition, and transformation. Therefore, there have been the relevant studies (Beall et al., 2002; Bollens, 1999; Saff, 1998) showing significant urban changes during the nation’s different political periods.

By reviewing those studies, it can be indicated that after the British established colonial rule in South Africa, unsurprisingly, colonial urban planning in major cities, such as Cape Town and Johannesburg, was designed to benefit the
White minority, while the Non-white majority were forced to live in squats in suburbs. The situation remained unchanged after the coming of the settler-governing era in which the colony formally became the Republic of South Africa in 1961. Nonetheless, since the late 1980s, settler rule began to be undermined by several democratisation movements. Under this condition, more and more Non-whites were able to rent properties in White residential districts. Such a change became more evident after the governing Nationalist Party formally gave up its authoritarian rule in 1990, symbolising the beginning of the nation’s political transition.

However, it ought to be noted that those positive changes only benefited the wealthy Non-white population. Many Non-whites were still living in squats. The situation remains unchanged after Nelson Mandela became the first Non-white South Africa President in 1994, symbolising the coming of the country’s post-settler era. That is to say, the new government has still been unable to regenerate those suburbs with their high concentration of low-income population and many social problems. Given this condition, it can be suggested that post-settler South Africa’s urban scene to a certain extent is ‘stuck in transition’.

From the above brief review of White settler rule’s implications for South African cities during the nation’s transition and post-settler eras, one can infer that a similar trend would happen in Taiwan. That is to say, although Chinese settler rule’s unequal urban policies were affected by the nation’s political transition; urban problems still were unable to be further resolved after Taiwan entered into the post-settler era. What is more, given that those South Africa urban studies are policy-oriented, one can further consider whether the relevant physical changes,
such as the specific urban elements’ construction or demolition, would happen due to settler rule’s transition and collapse in Taiwan. In addition, one can also consider how Chinese settler rule’s transition and transformation would affect the nation’s cultural and economic conditions; and how the circumstances would subsequently affect the nation’s urban landscape.

The next Section focuses on literature that illustrates the relationship between shifting national identity and urban landscapes in Taiwan. Those studies, however, are not just concerned with Taiwan’s settler-governing, transition, and post-settler eras. I, therefore, trace back to Taiwan’s pre-settler-governing era that involved the participation of several political entities. This historical approach generates a comprehensive view on how relevant urban elements has been (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten within Taiwan’s capital city.

4.3 Reviewing Literature of Taiwanese History and Taipei City

In this Section, I describe the stories of Taiwan’s shifting national identity alongside Taipei City’s changing urban landscape in chronological order. However, details of some specific historical events are cited in Appendices of this thesis:

The Dutch colonial era (1624-1662)

Taiwan, a geographic term referring to Taiwan Island and several small islands neighbouring it, lies between Asia’s eastern seaboard and the west Pacific, separated from the Mainland China by the Taiwan Strait [see Figure 4.1, p. 51]. In the late sixteenth century, the Portuguese navigators encountered the Island and
called it ‘Ilha Formosa’, meaning the beautiful island. Thereafter, Ilha Formosa’s natural resources began to attract European navigators’ attention. However, prior to the coming of the Dutch colonisers, the Island was still an open land where the Han People immigrating from the Mainland China and the Indigenous People lived without state control⁴ (Manthorpe, 2005).

In 1624, the Dutch colonisers established a colonial base in the southwest Taiwan Island, around present-day Tainan City. Thereafter, in order to develop the region’s agriculture, the Dutch Colonial Government deliberately encouraged the Han People, who had the basic knowledge of agriculture, to emigrate from China to Taiwan. Eventually, the Han People become the Island’s majority. Meanwhile, cultural hybridisation also emerged among the Han and Indigenous Peoples (Brown, 2004).

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⁴ See Appendix 1 for more details of Taiwan’s history prior to the Dutch colonial era.
During the mid-seventeenth century, the Ming Empire was replaced by the Qing Empire on the Mainland China. Cheng Cheng-kung, one of the Ming Dynasty’s remaining officials, led his troops to keep fighting with the Qing Empire. Ultimately, Cheng drove off the Dutch colonisers and made Taiwan Island his base for restoring the Ming Empire. Under such condition, the Han People who did not want to be ruled by the Qing Empire also emigrated to the Island\(^5\). Although Cheng still used the Dutch colonisers’ base in the southwest Taiwan Island as the administrative centre, the immigrants started to explore other parts of the Island. Therefore, cultural hybridisation among the Han and Indigenous Peoples was extended. Being the majority, the Han People were more predominant within this cultural-hybridisation process (Ibid).

In 1683, the Qing Empire terminated Cheng’s power in Taiwan Island. Thereafter, it just sent troops to exploit the Island’s natural resources, rather than developing the region. In fact, the Qing Empire even forced the Island’s Han population to ‘move back’ to the Mainland and prevented the Mainland’s Han People from moving to the Island. These policies implied that the Qing Empire initially treated Taiwan Island as a colony. However, since more and more foreign countries showed their interest in occupying the Island, the Qing Empire

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\(^5\) The Ming Empire was established by the Han People, the majority of the Chinese community in the world. Meanwhile, the Qing Empire was formed by the Chi People originally living around the northeast Mainland China. Because of it, some Han People did not want to be ruled by the Qing Empire and therefore emigrated to the Taiwan Island. Nonetheless, after establishing their imperial rule on the Mainland, the Chi People eventually adopted Han culture (Manthorpe, 2005).
eventually recognised Taiwan Island’s strategic importance, and thus made it an administrative province in 1887 (Manthorpe, 2005).

Prior to Taiwan Province’s creation, like Cheng Cheng-kung’s regime, the Qing Empire’s administrative centre was located at southwest Taiwan Island where the basic infrastructure were already founded by the Dutch colonisers. However, given the fact that foreign powers kept invading the Island’s northern areas, the new administrative centre was decided to be located at present-day Taipei Basin, where two small commercial towns, namely Mengja and Dadaocheng, were already formed⁶. In 1884, a stone-walled ‘city’—called Chengnei, meaning ‘inside the city’—was established as the future administrative centre [Figure 4.2] (Su, 2005).

Figure 4.2—The locations of Mengja, Dadaocheng, and Chengnei

The left picture shows the Japanese Colonial Government’s 1905 Taipei City urban planning. One can see a square formed by four bold lines representing the stone walls originally bounding Chengnei. The colonisers destroyed the walls and allowed their base to become four boulevards. Meanwhile, the right picture illustrates colonial Taipei City’s residency distribution. It can be seen that in addition to Chengnei, another two areas in the west and the north were intensely populated. They were Mengjia and Dadaocheng respectively, adjoining the Danshuei River passing west Taipei Basin.

⁶ See Appendix 2 for more details about the formation of Mengja and Dadaocheng.
Liu Ming-chuan was one of the few Qing officials who believed that Western countries’ industrial and technological modernisation experiences would benefit the Empire. However, his thinking was criticised by conservative senior officials. Thus, when he became the first Governor of Taiwan Province, Liu used stone-walled Taipei City as the laboratory for his modernisation schemes. For example, he set up the electric streetlight and the railway. But when the senior Qing officers on the Mainland were aware of Liu’s Westernisation projects, he was forced to leave his post in 1891 (Manthorpe, 2005).

It ought to be noted that although the Qing Empire claimed Taiwan Island to be its administrative province, it did not really control the whole Island because the Island’s east areas were dominated by the Indigenous population. In other words, the Qing Empire was ‘ruling’ the Island, rather than ‘governing’ the entire region (Ibid). The condition echoes Anderson’s (1991) arguments that the pre-modern state (kingdoms or empires) was not able to practise sovereignty within a clearly defined territorial boundary, let alone being able to forge a hegemonic imagined collective memory among the ‘nation’.

The capital Taipei’s construction process also shows the Qing Empire’s inability to govern Taiwan Province. According to Su (2005), although the City’s location was chosen by the administrative government, its construction depended on the local wealthy business and cultural elites. It is because these social elites’ coordination and financial contribution enabled them not only to possess properties or shop fronts in the stone-walled City, but also to become ‘quasi-officials’, levying taxes on the locals. This backdrop story implies that the Qing
Empire’s state power was not really executed in the capital Taipei from the very beginning, let alone the entire Taiwan Island.

**The Japanese colonial era (1895-1945)**

In 1895, due to the Qing Empire’s defeat in the First Sino-Japan War, Taiwan Island and its neighbouring small islands were ceded to Japan. The geographical term ‘Taiwan’ was therefore defined. More importantly, in contrast to the Dutch colonisers, Cheng Cheng-kung, and the Qing Empire, all of which ‘ruled’ only part of Taiwan, the Japanese Colonial Government was the first political entity ‘governing’ the entire Island (Brown, 2004; Manthorpe, 2005). It can be inferred that the Taiwanese imagined collective memory began to emerge at this time.

By learning Western technology and political system, Japan eventually became a powerful country in the Far East from the late 1860s. Hence, when the Japanese colonisers arrived at Taiwan, even Liu Ming-chuan’s ‘modern’ capital Taipei was regarded as a crude product, not to mention the rest of Taiwan. In fact, Su (2005) indicates that the Qing Empire did not have adequate knowledge of geographical survey and census, nor of urban planning. This implies that the Qing Empire was unable to comprehend and master the region. Meanwhile, it also reflects the previous subsection’s statement [p. 54] that the Qing Empire was not a modern state being able to execute state power in its territorial boundary.

After struggling with the hot weather, adverse living environments, and the natives’ rebellions, the Japanese Colonial Government decided to start from scratch. Through the use of a census and the survey of colonial Taiwan’s cultural,
natural, and geographical conditions, the colonisers began to efficiently control their first colony. It symbolises the first time in which state power was able to govern across entire Taiwan (Ibid).

Meanwhile, the state power’s direct intervention on urban development demonstrated the Japanese colonisers’ preference for Westernisation. For instance, Chengnei’s stone walls were demolished in order to create a wide field of vision. The urban elements, including the sewer system, public parks, statues, and monuments, that did not exist previously in Taiwan, were constructed in the City. Western entertainment places, such as cafés and theatres, appeared in the newly-built central business district. In addition, the government buildings and the museums symbolising state power as well as colonial identity were erected. It is worth noting that many new colonial buildings were constructed in hybrid styles with a mix of classic Western architectural features. The natives were also encouraged to build their dwellings featuring these mixed styles. Overall, these changes served the Colonial Government’s intention to make colonial Taipei City become ‘Oriental Paris’ (Ibid).

During the process of colonial Taipei City’s modernisation, the natives were affected by colonial urban planning. For instance, the colonisers needed to negotiate with the natives if a public construction project would affect their living quarters or religious centres, but in some cases, these old sites were demolished. Moreover, public facilities, such as parks and public transportation, were provided in areas dominated by the Japanese population (Ibid). In short, although the Japanese Colonial Government did not force the natives to live in slums, which would be against the name of ‘Oriental Paris’, the ‘difference’ between the
colonisers and the colonised was still observable through colonial Taipei City’s urban landscape.

The settler-governing era: prior to the political transition (1945-1987)

After the end of the Second World War in 1945, Japanese colonisers were forced to leave Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang (KMT), which represented the state of Republic of China (ROC) since 1912, took over the region and claimed it to be a province of the ROC territory. Although the local majority and the newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders were both Han People, different socio-political experiences made them become two distinct groups. In fact, the KMT Government claimed that the local people needed to be re-educated since they were brainwashed by Japanese colonisers. Consequently, Mandarin immediately became the locals’ ‘national’ language. Moreover, Chinese literatures, history, and geography also became the subjects of the state-edited textbooks (Manthorpe, 2005). These circumstances mean that the home population was unable to become self-governing despite the end of Japanese colonial era.

Despite its dedication to forging the new imagined collective memory of the national identity among the home population, the KMT Government was unable to deal with post-war Taiwan’s economic recession and conflicts between locals and KMT officials and soldiers. Ultimately, a severe clash between the local population and the settler rulers, called the ‘2-2-8 Incident’ in present-day Taiwan, broke out in the capital Taipei in 1947. The Incident subsequently caused

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7 See Appendix 3 for more details of Japan’s colonial urban planning.
8 ‘Kuomintang’, the Party’s official English name, is the Mandarin term for ‘Nationalist Party’. Incidentally, the Party’s whole name ought to be translated as ‘Chinese Nationalist Party’.
9 See Appendix 4 for more details of origins of the ROC and Taiwan’s controversial international status.
nationwide riots. After bloodily suppressed the rebellions, the KMT applied strict polices and secret agents to eliminate the local social elites who were supposed to have the potential to threaten its political legitimacy (Ibid).

In May 1949, since the KMT was struggling with the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the Chinese Civil War on the Mainland China, martial law alongside stronger linguist restrictions, education policies, and media censorship were implemented in Taiwan in order to reinforce not only the KMT Government’s legitimacy, but also anti-Communist ideology (Ibid).

In the late 1949, the KMT lost the War with the CPC and retreated to Taiwan. During this period, approximate 2,000,000 Mainlanders came to Taiwan. These newcomers accounted for 14 per cent of Taiwan’s population at that time. Approximate 600,000 of them were KMT soldiers and their dependents. Under these circumstances, Taiwan became the KMT’s base for re-conquering the ‘lost’ Mainland. However, the fact is that the KMT has never re-conquered the Mainland. Therefore, Taiwan ultimately became these newly-arrived Mainlanders’ ‘home’ (Ibid).

There have been some academic studies revealing how the KMT Government used the capital Taipei to serve its identification scheme. For instance, many new government institutions and landmarks were deliberately designed to represent imperial-palace architectural styles at Mainland China (Tay, 1995). Furthermore, new road and place names were adopted, which were associated with nationalistic slogans and terms, those names in the Mainland

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10 See Appendix 5 for more details of the 2-2-8 Incident.
11 See Appendix 4 for more details of the Chinese Civil War.
China, and KMT figures (Leitner and Kang, 1999). Moreover, statues of KMT figures became essential features in public parks and squares (Hou, 2000).

In addition to using physical urban elements, the KMT Government also attempted to legitimise its political control by strengthening Taiwan’s economy. With the support and advice of the USA, Taiwan’s economy was improved from the 1950s. In 1971, with the support from the USSR, the CPC’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) replaced the ROC in the United Nations (UN). Consequently, the ROC became a de facto independent country without any international community’s recognition. This diplomatic crisis reinforced the KMT’s determination to apply economic achievements to secure state power (Hsu, J. Y., 2005).

Such a series of economic developments as well as of power legitimacy schemes were also represented by Taiwan’s changing urban scene. For instance, in the 1950s, lands initially belonging to heavyweight landowners were redistributed towards sharecroppers. Thereafter, the KMT Government allowed those agricultural lands to be used for industry, to promote Taiwan’s light industries, such as shoe and cloth making. Under these circumstances, urbanisation was accelerated. Subsequently, rural-urban migration also emerged (Ibid).

Moreover, in the 1960s, in order to develop Taiwan’s export-oriented manufacturing industry, the KMT Government applied the new policies, such as tax cuts, to attract foreign investors. Taiwan’s cheap labour also helped the industry’s promotion. As a result, many factories and warehouses were erected in

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12 See Appendices 4 and 5 for more details of the relationship between the US and Taiwan.

13 See Appendix 6 for more details of Taiwan’s diplomatic crisis.
east Taipei City, which constituted the capital city’s suburbs with a lower population density (Chou, 2005).

Furthermore, in the 1970s, at the beginning of Taiwan’s diplomatic crisis, the KMT began to reinforce its political legitimacy by embarking on mega infrastructure constructions, such as the motorway, to stimulate economic developments throughout Taiwan. Ultimately, the service industry began to emerge, evidenced by the growing number of finance institutions, insurance companies, and real estate agents, and also by hotels and department stores erected in Taipei City during the mid-1970s (Ibid). These newly-built glass-concrete-steel skyscrapers in the capital city represented the nation’s flourishing economic development during that period (Tay, 1995).

Since the 1980s, cheap labour in China and other Southeast Asian countries became a threat to Taiwan’s export-oriented manufacturing industry. Given this new threat, the KMT Government began to develop high-tech industries, such as computer and micro chip manufacturing (Hsu, J. Y., 2005). Thus, several science and high-tech parks were built in the capital Taipei and its neighbouring cities (Chou, 2005). As a matter of fact, due to the growth of the middle classes resulting from economic development, Taiwan itself also faced labour shortages. Hence, the KMT Government began to allow foreign labour to participate in certain public construction projects and private caring services. This condition led to Taiwan’s multiculturalism. Incidentally, the other distinct group of new immigrants were immigrant spouses. Their participation in the Taiwanese society resulted from Taiwan’s increasing social polarisation that drove the low-income Taiwanese males to find civil partners in Southeast Asian countries.
through match-maker companies’ operation. In terms of Taipei City, the immigrant spouses were concentrated in the suburbs due to their partners’ socio-economic backgrounds (Tai, 2005).

From the above discussion, it seems that the KMT successfully developed Taiwan’s economy since the 1950s and thereby established the capital Taipei as a multicultural city. However, this economic restructuring as well as power legitimacy process also had other significant impacts. For instance, the complicated and fragmented land ownership, resulting from the 1950s’ land reform, eventually became an obstacle to urban renewal since the 1980s; because the government institutions have to negotiate with a large number of landowners who have different interests (Chou, 2005). Moreover, in order to strengthen human resources and economic development, the KMT Government dedicated itself to constructing schools and transportation infrastructure, but, the construction of civic facilities, such as parks and community centres, was ignored (Huang, 2005a). In addition, public housing schemes only favoured civil servants, educators, and military figures composed of the Chinese Mainlanders (Chen, 2005). In fact, prior to the beginning of democratisation, the general public and even the local authorities were unable to appeal to the high-level government institutions to deal with issues regarding their living environment (Huang, 2005a).

The settler-governing era: the political transitional period (1987-2000)

After the KMT leader and five-term ROC President Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, Taiwan’s political landscape began to change and gradually undermine Chinese settler rule. For instance, more and more locals, including those without
KMT membership, were able to be employed by higher government institutions. Moreover, President Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, was highly tolerant of ‘illegal’ social movements, including those against the KMT Government. Ultimately, the KMT Government formally abolished martial law in 1987; and thus accelerated the nation’s democratisation (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003). Recalling Weitzer’s viewpoint (1990) mentioned in the previous Section [p. 47], the abolition of martial law can be seen as the symbolic beginning of the political transition from settler-governed Taiwan.

After the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui became the first ‘native-born’ ROC President. Without the restrictions of martial law, Lee freed the mass media, improved the right of free speech, and allowed opposition parties to be established. Hence, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main opposition party composed of the local people as majority members, was officially recognised and began to grow. In addition, the issue of Taiwan’s future, whether to be united with China or to be independent, could be discussed publicly14 (Ibid).

Taiwan’s changing urban scenes also reflected the nation’s developing democratisation. For instance, statues of significant KMT figures were no longer vital elements in public spaces. Some of them were even removed (Hou, 2000; Simon, 2003). Furthermore, until 1993, the Mayor of Taipei was still appointed by the KMT Government, but in 1994, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian became the City’s

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14 See Appendix 7 for more details of Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui, and Taiwan’s independence dilemma.
first directly elected mayor. Under Chen’s governing, the ‘2-28 Memorial’\textsuperscript{15} was erected in Taipei Park in 1995. Meanwhile, the Park was renamed 2-28 Peace Park. As a result, on 28th February of every year, the site not only becomes the place for the Incident victims’ descendants to hold memorial services, but also the venue for different parties’ politicians to make speeches emphasising ethnic harmony (Simon, 2003).

In 1996, the DPP’s Taipei City Councillors proposed changing the name of Chiehshou Road, which lies in front of the Presidential Building, as they considered it to be the product of an authoritarian regime. In Mandarin, ‘chiehshou’ signifies ‘long live Chiang Kai-shek’, who led the KMT Government’s retreat to Taiwan where he seized state power until his death. Although this proposal triggered criticism from other Councillors representing KMT and other conservative parties\textsuperscript{16}, it was adopted. From approximately 7,000 suggestions forwarded by the City’s residents, the new name of the road was decided to be Ketagalan Boulevard. ‘Ketagalan’ was the name of a Taiwanese Indigenous tribe that had lived in the area surrounding the present-day Taipei Basin. The new name symbolised that Taiwan’s ‘local roots’ had begun to get attention (Leitner and Kang, 1999).

Apart from these obvious physical changes, democratisation also enabled the local authorities and the general public to appeal to high-level government institutions to improve their inadequate living conditions. In Taipei City, for example, many non-governmental organisations and community-based networks

\textsuperscript{15} The incident happened on 28th February 1947. In English, it should be called ‘2-28 Incident’. However, the Taiwanese call it ‘2-2-8 Incident’ in Mandarin. Meanwhile, this thesis adopts the official English names of the sites related to the Incident.

\textsuperscript{16} See Appendix 7 for more details for the formation of relevant conservative political parties in Taiwan.
were formed to carry out projects concerned with living environment improvement, such as constructing public parks or community centres. Incidentally, in most cases, these community-based networks were formed by middle- or upper-middle-class residents, because they had a basic understanding of how to access the relevant official institutions as well as how to deal with the bureaucracies. Although the condition implies the lower-class communities’ marginalisation, it cannot be denied that the capital Taipei’s living environment was improved in a great extent (Huang, 2005a).

Apart from allowing the general public to become involved in creating a better living environment, the KMT Government also loosened the restrictions on the private sector’s participation in urban development. Although this change inevitably caused the real estate market to be manipulated by large enterprises, many large-scale projects were able to be implemented effectively. In terms of Taipei City, this change gave rise to the construction of ‘Xinyi Planning District’; currently the most global-like central business district of Taiwan. The District’s origin can be traced back to the 1990s when the KMT Government, considering the significance of globalising economic interactions, attempted to make the capital Taipei become the ‘Asian Financial Center’, and therefore carried out the project of Xinyi Planning District. Owing to the private sector’s participation, the metro, large office buildings, grand hotels, luxurious residential complexes, and department stores were constructed in the District. Although the KMT’s ambition to make Taiwan Asia’s financial centre was not achieved, due to the nation’s de facto independent status and the Chinese Government’s obstruction, the District’s
accomplishment was successful in giving a global city image to the capital Taipei (Jou, 2005).

Incidentally, one can regard the Xinyi Planning District as an evidence of how Taiwan’s economic restructuring gave rise to the importation of global culture. Cultural diversification and hybridisation can be seen also in other Taiwanese everyday lives. For instance, although traditional markets were affected by the arrival of international supermarket chains from the 1960s, those old marketplaces remain important for urban planning as well as for the everyday life of Taiwanese people. The traditional market can sell foreign products, and the local entrepreneur can be a shareholder in the foreign supermarket chain. In other words, the Taiwanese’s daily consumption in urban spaces constitutes an experience of cultural diversity and hybridity (Wu, 2005).

The post-settler era (2000-)

In 1998, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian was defeated by the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou in Taipei Mayoral Election. In 2000, however, Chen represented the DPP to win the ROC Presidential Election by a margin of 39 percent of the votes over the other two candidates with a KMT background (Manthorpe, 2005). It can be suggested that the result marked the end of the Chinese-settler-governing era and the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era.

Although the DPP’s pro-independence stance raised concerns from both the CPC and the USA\textsuperscript{17}, the DPP did not officially raise the independence issue after it came to state power. Nevertheless, the DPP Government still emphasised

\textsuperscript{17}See Appendices 6 and 7 for more details of the relationship between the ROC, the CPC, and the USA.
Taiwan’s ‘local roots’ in subtle ways. For instance, DPP officials might deliberately use their mother tongue, rather than Mandarin, to speak in public. Moreover, a new language curriculum was introduced despite the criticism from the opposition parties, including the KMT and its allies (Ibid).

In 2004, despite Taiwan’s economic downturn and many DPP politicians’ involvement into corruption scandals, Chen Shui-bian won the Presidential Election by a margin of 0.2 percent of the votes. However, the KMT subsequently won the Legislation Yuan (National Assembly) Elections and became predominant in the Yuan. Under these circumstances, the party political competition between the DPP, the KMT, and their respective allies became even more intense18 (Ibid).

Taiwan’s complicated party political issue affected the nation’s urban development. For example, after the DPP came to state power in 2000, some significant projects, such as the metro linking the international airport and the capital Taipei, proposed by the KMT-led Taipei City Government, were rejected by the DPP-led Central Government. The DPP Government said that it was because the City Government’s projects would spend too much of public revenue, and thus affect other Taiwanese cities’ development. However, one may surmise that it was just because the City was administered by the KMT (Ching, 2005).

4.4 Conclusion and Issues Emerging from the Former Literature

From the above discussion, it can be seen that, just as Western colonisers created their ideal colonial cities [see Section 3.2, pp. 35-6], so, too, in Taiwan,

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18 See Appendix 7 for more details of Taiwan’s Presidential Elections.
Japanese colonisers dramatically changed the capital Taipei’s urban landscape. This new urban form not only represented colonial state power, but also symbolised the beginning of Taiwan’s new history. On the other hand, unlike those Western colonial cities where the natives were forced to live in slums, although the Japanese Colonial Government enabled Japanese residents to have easy access to public facilities, it did not really force the native Taiwanese to live in backwaters. It was because the Japanese colonisers attempted to create a flawless colonial city.

After the end of the Japanese colonial era, Taiwan was occupied by the KMT Government, claiming the region to be part of China’s territory. In other words, the end of Taiwan’s Japanese colonial era actually was the beginning of a period of settler government. The situation became clearer by 1949 when the KMT was forced by the CPC to settle in Taiwan, implying that the region became those newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders’ ‘home’. Reflecting Weitzer’s view (1990) on the settler state’s features, in order to secure its legitimacy, the KMT Government strongly controlled Taiwan’s political, cultural, and economic affairs. Such control directly affected the home population’s imagined collective memory and the built environment. In the capital Taipei, for example, many new urban elements, such as government buildings and statues, were built to denote the KMT Government’s superior power.

Taiwan’s democratisation, taking place in the late 1980s, began to undermine settler rule. This political transition ultimately enabled the DPP, with the local population as the majority, to win the 2000 presidential election. The result symbolised that the nation had entered into the post-settler era.
this transformation process reflects Weitzer’s argument about how the settler country’s political transition can give rise to the coming of the nation’s post-settler era.

Like cities in South Africa [see pp. 48-9], whose White settler rule, transition and transformation history is similar to that of Taiwan, Taipei City’s changing urban scene represented the impacts of political transition by Chinese settler rule. For example, the urban elements associated with the KMT Government’s early authoritarian rule were changed or even demolished.

However, a clear gap in the existing literature is that only a few writers have explored conditions in post-settler Taiwan. What is more, recalling the discussion in Chapter 3 concerned with national identity’s urban representations, it can be questioned whether there were other urban changes, such as specific ethnic enclaves’ construction, or historic sites’ restoration, that resulted from Chinese settler rule’s establishment, transition, and transformation. The next Section elaborates on this point and develops the research questions of the thesis.

4.5 Discussion Leading to Research Questions

By reviewing the relevant academic studies, Chapters 2 and 3 provide an analytical framework considering how a nation’s domestic- and international-political, cultural, and economic changes are able to affect national identification and simultaneously to change urban scenes. Moreover, Section 4.2 examines the settler country’s features. In addition, in view of the fact that its historical context is similar to that of Taiwan, the Section refers to literature concerned with South
Africa’s urban changes to show how the transition and collapse of settler rule would have potential implications for the nation’s urban landscape.

Built upon that theoretical framework, Section 4.3 reviewed the literature concerned with Taiwan’s political history and Taipei City’s urban changes, and showed how Chinese settler rule’s establishment, transition, and collapse affected Taiwanese identity, and how the circumstances were reflected from capital Taipei’s changing urban scene. As a nation having experienced colonial, post-colonial/settler-governing, and post-settler eras, the case of Taiwan also reinforces the previously developed theoretical framework. For instance, unlike many conventional Western colonial cities where buildings hybridised Western and native architectural styles, due to their enthusiasm for Westernisation, the Japanese colonisers erected many new buildings representing mixed classic Western architectural features. In addition, Chinese settler rule’s transition and transformation alongside shifts in Taiwanese identity provided a different picture of how a nation’s changing administrative system would affect its imagined collective memory. Furthermore, in comparison to those policy-oriented studies on how settler rule’s transition affected housing distribution in South African cities, Section 4.3 shows settler rule’s transition also could have physical impacts on the urban scene.

Taking the overall theoretical framework and Taiwan’s contemporary condition, one can point out several unexplored issues emerging from the literature review concerned with the shifting identity of Taiwan and its urban representations. They are expressed in following five subsections:
(1) Urban elements associated with the KMT Government’s identity policy

Literature shows how the KMT Government used iconic sites and banal urban elements (e.g. government buildings, memorials, street and place names, and statues) to legitimise its political control and to simultaneously impose the new imagined collective identity on the home population. However, in view of various examples in relation to national identity’s urban representations given in Chapter 3, it can be questioned whether there were other urban elements that also served the pre-transitional KMT Government’s identification schemes. For example, previous studies do not show whether the KMT Government had built relevant national-cultural sites (e.g. museums) to Mainland China’s culture.

(2) The KMT Government and Japanese colonial urban legacies

It has been suggested that a post-colonial government may either destroy or keep colonial urban legacies [see Section 3.2, pp. 36-7]. However, the literature reviewed in Section 4.3 does not clearly indicate how the KMT Government, constituting not only Taiwan’s settler state but also post-colonial state, dealt with the capital Taipei’s Japanese colonial legacies.

(3) Evolving multiculturalism

Contemporary Taiwan’s ethnic groups can generally be categorised as Chinese Mainlanders, local Han People, and Indigenous People. Globalisation has also brought immigrant spouses and workers and thus reinforced Taiwan’s multicultural society. In fact, several studies also indicate that Taiwan, due to its geographical location, has attracted international explorers, businesspeople,
colonisers, and strategists since the seventeenth century. However, in consideration of the theoretical framework suggesting how the nation’s multiculturalism can be reflected in its urban landscape [see Section 3.2, pp. 38-9]; it can be pointed that the existing literature does not clearly explore how Taiwan’s urban scene possibly represents its long-time evolving multiculturalism (e.g. the formation of specific diaspora spaces), nor how the KMT Government possibly affected the local population’s living space in the city.

(4) Effects of globalisation on urban landscapes

Previous studies have explored how the KMT Government promoted economic development to secure its political legitimacy and therefore gave rise to Taipei City’s ‘global city’ urban scene. The literature also indicates how this economic/urban globalisation process affected the citizens’ interests (e.g. the lack of parks and community centres). Nonetheless, in view of the fact that the city’s globalisation process is able to affect its historic urban elements [see Section 3.2, p. 41], it can be pointed out that the existing literature has not explored whether Taiwan’s economic/urban globalisation could cause the demolition of the urban elements representing the old imagined collective memory.

(5) Post-settler city? Recalling the case of post-settler South Africa

Recent studies have briefly mentioned how the party political disputes between the Post-settler State (the DPP Government) and the Chinese Settler State’s remaining power (the KMT and its allies) affected post-settler Taipei City’s urban development. Nevertheless, probably because Taiwan is a young
post-settler country born in 2000, there is not much in the literature about potential changes in post-settler Taiwan’s urban landscape.

Recalling the case of South Africa described in Section 4.2 [pp. 48-9], it was found that although some positive urban changes had taken place during the nation’s political transition era, the new post-settler government still had difficulties to deal with some urban problems originally caused by White settler rule. As a result, post-settler South Africa’s urban scene is ‘stuck in transition’ to a certain extent.

In the light of South Africa’s experience, it can be questioned whether Chinese settler rule would have similar implications for post-settler Taiwanese cities. In other words, would it be difficult for the DPP Government to deal with the relevant settler urban legacies, including not only biased urban policies, but also physical urban elements associated with the KMT Government’s identification scheme? More importantly, how would the condition of being ‘stuck in transition’ affect Taiwanese national identity?

In consideration of these unexplored issues directly connected to Taiwan’s political-historical context, the aim of this thesis is to use the constructed theoretical framework to explore relevant issues that have not been thoroughly dealt with in existing academic studies concerning Taiwan’s shifting national identity alongside its changing urban landscape. The fundamental research question is How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces?
By focusing on the unexplored issues highlighted in this Chapter, the fundamental research question can be seen to have three dimensions. Each of them takes the form of a distinct research question. They are briefly expressed below:

(1) **How did the Chinese Settler State use iconic sites, national-cultural sites, and other urban elements, to practise its national identification scheme in Taiwan, and what implications for those urban elements have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?** (Apart from exploring the relevant urban elements built by the KMT Government, this question is also concerned with how the KMT Government treated the Japanese urban legacies having national identification functions).

(2) **How did the Chinese Settler State affect Taiwan’s developing multicultural society and multicultural urban environments, and what implications for these environments have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?** (Exploring how the Chinese settlers, the suppressed local population, international traders and strategists, and global economic immigrants affected Taiwan’s urban scene in the nation’s different socio-political contexts).

(3) **How did the Chinese Settler State deal with the impacts of economic/urban globalisation in shaping Taiwan’s urban landscape, and what implications related to this globalised urban scene have emerged**
after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era? (Apart from exploring how Taiwan’s economic restructuring caused early-developed urban areas’ decline, this question focuses more on how the Taiwanese governments dealt with issues related to the conservation and restoration of historic urban elements).

4.6 Summary

Built upon the analytical framework with regard to the representation of shifting national identity within (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten urban landscapes, and the impacts of the transforming settler rule on South Africa cities, the first half of the Chapter reviewed the existing literature to examine connections between shifting Taiwanese identity and changing urban landscapes in the context of Chinese settler rule’s establishment, transition, and collapse. The literature review revealed that after occupying Taiwan in 1945, the Chinese Settler State began to manipulate the nation’s imagined collective memory to sustain the Settler State’s legitimacy. The condition simultaneously affected the capital Taipei where landmarks and street and place names were used to forge collective memory serving the Settler State’s interests. Nonetheless, the nation’s democratisation taking place in the late 1980s began to affect settler rule’s legitimacy. As a result, some of those urban elements related to the Chinese Settler State’s identity were changed or demolished during this political transition era.

The second half of the Chapter identifies several unexplored issues among previous studies concerned with shifting Taiwanese national identity and its urban representations. For instance, they do not consider the KMT Government’s role
not only as the settler state but also as the post-colonial state, and how the condition would affect Japanese colonial urban legacies in Taiwan. Furthermore, they do not consider the locals’ and international immigrants’ potential implications for the nation’s multicultural built environments. In addition, they do not consider how the settler government and the post-settler government would react to globalisation’s potential impacts on Taiwan’s historic urban elements that represent local identity.

More importantly, very few existing literature deals with Taiwan’s contemporary condition, even though the nation entered its post-settler era in 2000. Thus, existing literature has not addressed how Taiwan’s urban landscape can be said to represent post-settler Taiwanese identity.

These issues provide the basis for the thesis and its research questions. In short, I intend to apply the theoretical framework to examine how Taiwanese identity has been affected by the nation’s government change, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation, and how such shifting identity was represented within the nation’s changing urban landscape until the early beginning of the nation’s post-setter era.

How the entire research is designed, how certain ideas derived from the theoretical framework, guide me to find answers to the questions, and how the empirical work is executed are elaborated in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 has stated that my research purpose is to apply the theoretical framework to investigate the unexplored issues emerging from the existing literature concerned with shifting Taiwanese identity and its urban representations. It also outlined the thesis’s main research question, generated from those unexplored issues, is **How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces?** Three sub-questions are derived from this fundamental question.

This Chapter explains how these research questions are approached. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss the research strategy. Section 5.4 explains how the theoretical framework is applied to develop the basic approaches to each research question. Section 5.5 then presents the research methods and sources of evidence to be employed in this study. The overall research process is explained in Section 5.6. Finally, Section 5.7 discusses the issues emerging from the entire research design and process.

5.2 Case Study as the Research Strategy

There are different research strategies (e.g. survey, historical study, and experiment) that can be used by researchers in their pursuit of answers to their research questions (Yin, 2003). Given that this study involves investigations of
certain urban elements that have been demolished, one may suggest that historical study is a research strategy that can be applied to carry out the research project. However, this study is also concerned with Taiwan’s contemporary conditions. Hence, it needs a more comprehensive strategy.

Case study, according to Yin (ibid), is a form of research strategy in which the researcher investigates the cases relevant to his/her research interests derived from existing academic works, analyse them so as to confirm, challenge, or extend the previously constructed theoretical framework. Specifically, case study can be applied to deal with the research project involving any of following three conditions. Firstly, unlike doing experiments in the laboratory, the researcher cannot really control the investigated subject. Secondly, the subject being focused on is a ‘contemporary’ phenomenon. Thirdly, the case is ‘unique’.

Recalling the research purpose and questions stated in Section 4.5, one can recognise four characters of my study echoing Yin’s conditions on using case study as the research strategy:

(1) The theoretical framework is used to examine how Taiwanese identity is represented within the nation’s built environments. Thus, the outcome of the study can confirm or even extend the original analytical framework.

(2) Government change, multi-ethnic society, and the nation’s involvement in globalisation are the objective facts triggering shifts in national identity. Clearly, these factors cannot be manipulated by the researcher.
(3) Although this thesis looks for ‘forgotten’ urban elements in the past, it also intends to investigate currently existing urban elements in Taiwan.

(4) As a nation having experienced colonial, post-colonial/settler-governing, settler-transitional, and post-settler eras, arguably Taiwan itself is a unique case.

In this light, case study is a suitable research strategy for this research project.

5.3 Taipei City as the Case Study

After deciding on case study to be the research strategy, the next question is how to select the appropriate case/city for study? In this research project, Taipei City, Taiwan’s capital city, was chosen. The reason is explained below.

The theoretical framework has suggested that the capital city’s urban scene, in general, represents the nation’s political, cultural, and economic character in view of its unique role as the nation’s political, cultural, and economic centre [see Section 3.2, pp. 33-5]. That is why, in Section 4.3, the capital Taipei was used to demonstrate how settler rule’s transition affected Taiwan’s urban scene. Meanwhile, the existing literature showed that the City has been closely connected with the state through Taiwan’s Qing-ruling, Japanese colonial, settler-governing, and post-settler eras, and therefore became the place where physical representations related to the nation’s changing political, cultural, and economic experiences were constructed, demolished, or re-constructed. From the literature
review, it was clear that Taipei City is predominant in existing literature concerned with Taiwan’s urban change.

In the light of this, there were two other advantages in choosing Taipei City as the selected case. Firstly, as an independent researcher with limited time and financial support, I could easily find all relevant urban elements in one city that represented shifting Taiwanese national identity. Secondly, it will be argued that the findings from the case study of Taipei City are able to address the research questions arising from the reviewed literature.

Overall, the above discussion explains briefly why Taipei City was a suitable case for the empirical work. The City’s basic profile (e.g. areas and populations) is given in Appendix 8.

5.4 Approaches to Each Research Question

As a comprehensive research strategy, case study enables the investigator to apply different research methods to triangulate various types of data sources that are ultimately converged to explain a specific phenomenon. Meanwhile, the validity of the study is also improved owing to such a multi-source approach. However, not until the investigator decides how he/she is going to approach research questions, can the relevant research methods to be applied to the project be identified (Yin, 2003). Section 4.5 has stated that the fundamental research question of the thesis is ‘How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces?’. The questions arising from this are approached as follows:
(1) Question 1

How did the Chinese Settler State use iconic sites, national-cultural sites, and other urban elements, to practise its national identification scheme in Taiwan, and what implications for those urban elements have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?

To answer Question 1, firstly I have to explore how different national governments in Taiwanese history practised specific identification schemes (e.g. legitimising state power or creating national culture) when they were/are in power. From this, I can then begin to explore which spatial features in Taipei City are related to these identity policies. Referring to the theoretical framework, these spatial features are classified into three categories below:

(i) Iconic sites

These sites are buildings, landmarks, or places associated with state power, particularly with historical meanings, and/or the nation’s economic achievements. They are usually important government institutions or tourist venues. In addition, their images are frequently exploited by the mass media, such as news reports and tourist guides.
(ii) National-cultural sites

These sites can take the form of state-legitimised museums representing ‘national’ culture and history. They can also be religious buildings or public leisure centres reflecting Taiwanese folk life or public culture. However, even folk life or public culture may still be the product of the state’s identification scheme. Like the iconic sites mentioned in the previous category, these national-cultural sites can frequently be shown by the mass media.

(iii) Other subtle banal urban elements

In the research-design process, it is difficult to precisely identify this category of urban elements, since each country has its own subtle banal urban elements perceived as physical representations of national identity. For example, previous studies demonstrate that street and place names in many countries are used by the states as a tool of national-identification. On the other hand, although Edensor (2002) indicates that London’s public phone booths can be regarded as a banal urban element representing British identity owing to their long-time unchanged appearance, this by no means suggests that other countries’ phone booths in their capitals convey the same meaning. Given this fact, I can only identify urban elements included in this category in the data collection process. Nonetheless, public facilities or general housing constructions bearing a specific pattern or design are a clue to my exploration.
(2) **Question 2**

**How did the Chinese Settler State affect Taiwan’s developing multicultural society and multicultural urban environments, and what implications for these environments have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?**

To answer this question, I have first to identify Taiwan’s ethnic composition. According to previous studies, the ‘local population’ include the Han and the Indigenous Peoples. Chinese Mainlanders became part of Taiwanese society from 1945. Apart from these three groups constituting ROC nationals, earlier studies also revealed or implied that there have been many new immigrants (e.g. international capitalists and immigrant workers) settling in Taiwan for different reasons. Prior to exploring how such a multi-ethnic society gave rise to cultural diversity and hybridity alongside a multicultural living environment, I have to first identify these ethnic groups’ origins. What is more, I have to investigate how the state, in Taiwan’s different political periods, promoted or suppressed a specific ethnic group’s self-identification, and how such promotion and/or suppression were reflected in Taipei City’s urban landscape. Referring to the theoretical framework, three factors are significant in this context:

(i) Biased urban policies

Since the Chinese Mainlanders were the politically dominant group, I have to explore the extent to which urban policies benefiting the newly-arrived
Mainlanders. I also have to investigate the policies’ concurrent impacts (e.g. racial segregation, building restrictions, or unequal urban development plans) on the home population. Finally, I need to examine the implications of the policies for the capital Taipei in Taiwan’s political transition and transformation eras.

(ii) Ethnic enclaves/Diaspora spaces

Apart from identifying those relevant places in Taipei City, I also have to trace their origins. Some of the ethnic enclaves and diaspora spaces were formed ‘organically’ (e.g. the minority were marginalised in society and therefore collectively settled in a specific area of the city). On the other hand, the formation of some areas might result from the state’s policy serving the interests of a specific ethnic group.

(iii) Ethnic-cultural sites

Like investigating ethnic enclaves and diaspora spaces, the purpose of examining ethnic-cultural sites in Taipei City is to explore their origins. Clearly, an ethnic-cultural site’s formation symbolises the state’s recognition of a specific ethnic group, usually the minority. However, it still needs to be considered in what context the state began recognising the minority (e.g. the ethnic minority might launch grassroots social movements to claim their right to be recognised).
(3) Question 3

How did the Chinese Settler State deal with the impacts of economic/urban globalisation in shaping Taiwan’s urban landscape, and what implications related to this globalised urban scene have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?

To answer Question 3, firstly I need to investigate global capitalism’s implications for Taipei City’s urban landscape. The existing literature shows that the formation of the City’s several important business districts were resulted from global capitalism. Moreover, the literature also indicates how the KMT Government embraced global capitalism, thereby tolerating unbalanced urban development alongside old communities’ decline. Nonetheless, apart from further exploring these business districts and urban-development issues, my approach to Question 3 is how this economic/urban globalisation process impacted on Taipei City’s historic urban elements and how the state and other relevant interest groups reacted to this.

All these preoccupations imply that I have to examine Taipei City’s urban regeneration history. Meanwhile, I also need to investigate laws, achievements, and main issues regarding Taiwan’s urban conservation.
5.5 Research Methods and Sources of Evidence

After considering the basic approaches to each research question, I decided to apply four research methods, namely, documentary research, archival research, direct observations, and interviewing, in my fieldwork. Why and how I employ each method alongside sources of evidence is explained in the following four subsections:

(1) Documentary research

Documentary sources are essential in case study research because the investigator would apply various documents to facilitate the basic understanding of investigated subjects, and therefore execute empirical works (Yin, 2003). In terms of this study, prior to the fieldwork, documentary sources provide me with a basic understanding of shifting Taiwanese identity and Taipei City’s urban history. Meanwhile, they also enable me to recognise potential urban features that need to be examined.

The contents of various types of documentary sources are not restricted to text as they can include images. Specifically, visual materials are vital to this thesis since they can help readers gain a clearer understanding of the written descriptions of investigated urban elements.

Furthermore, documents can take both physical and electronic form. In fact, during the data collection process, I realised that electronic documents were significant sources for the following two reasons. Firstly, I only had limited time to conduct the fieldwork in Taipei City [explained in the next Section]; therefore, in the UK, electronic documents, such as online news reports, were useful for me.
to gain updated information on Taiwan’s concurrent events that were relevant to my study. Secondly, it was inevitable that most documents were written in Traditional Chinese (Taiwan’s written language), particular efforts were made to find English-written documents in order to facilitate comprehension and source-tracking for non-Mandarin readers. Hence, Taiwan’s government websites and online news agencies became useful since they were often able to provide English-version contents. Clearly, these electronic documents are drawn from credible websites maintained by the government institutions or news agencies.

The obvious disadvantage of using documentary sources is that the researcher needs to recognise that they may have bias. For instance, government publications and news reports may be manipulated to support the state’s policies (Yin, 2003). Even visual images do not always provide objective information, given that some photographers’ goal is to provoke specific emotional reactions (Cronin, 1998). Thus, apart from my objective interpretation of documents, other research methods, explained below, are simultaneously employed as a means of checking whether different types of sources corroborate and are compatible with one another.

Generally, different types of documentary sources used in this study can be put in four categories below:

(i) Government-authorised documents

These documents include progress reports, internal records, news letters, urban policies (laws), and general tourist guides. All of them are released by government institutions. These documentary sources provide insight not only on
the basic profiles of Taiwan and Taipei City, but also on the urban elements that are being explored.

(ii) Academic literature

Documents in this category include academic studies relating to this research. They provide additional details with regard to Taiwan’s political history, Taipei City’s urban history, and information on the urban elements that are being examined.

(iii) Non-academic literatures

Such documents include publications that use Taipei City as their topic of discussion (e.g. novels or graphic books). From these documents, a folk-based perspective on Taipei City is drawn. Meanwhile, they also enable me to understand the City’s basic profile and to identify urban factors relevant to my research interests.

(iv) Mass-media reports

Documents included in this category consist of news clippings and articles publicised via the mass media (i.e. newspapers, magazines, television, and online news agencies). Their function is similar to that of non-academic literature since they offer an independent perspective on the subjects under investigation. Also, they are likely to provide relatively ‘newer’ information in comparison with other types of documents.
(2) Archival research

In terms of how to search for relevant documentary sources (excluding those I came across before and during the formal data collection procedure), the bulk of them were found within government institutions (e.g. National Central Library, the Council for Cultural Affairs, the Taipei City Government, and the Taipei City Archive) that stored documents relevant to Taiwan’s changing political, cultural, and economic conditions, and to Taipei City’s urban history. In other words, the knowledge of certain documents’ existence is derived from archival research. In fact, the difference between documentary and archival sources can be rather vague. For instance, an archive, such as a museum, can store manuscripts, print matter, and illustrations that can all be regarded as documentary sources (Iredale, 1973). Furthermore, government websites and online news agencies may serve as online archives providing electronic documents.

Why I intentionally distinguish between documentary and archival research is because some items stored or exhibited in an archive (e.g. a museum) may lack references, such as author names, titles, and publishers, which are usually found in conventional documentary sources. In these cases, I can only indicate that the source comes from the specific archive and the date I visited it.

Like documentary sources, bias also can exist in archival sources. Hence, impartial interpretations of the sources and other research methods’ applications are vital (Yin, 2003).
(3) Direct observations

This research method is able to provide additional information or new primary sources relevant to the researcher’s understanding of the investigated subject. Meanwhile, it also enables the researcher actively to test the validity of other types of sources (May, 2001; Yin, 2003). In this way, direct observations become a crucial method for my fieldwork. That is to say, after identifying the potential targets—the urban elements in Taipei City—and by consulting other types of sources (e.g. documents, archives, and interviews), subsequent observation (e.g. investigating a specific urban element’s contemporary condition or recording people’s behaviour in a particular place) enables me to confirm whether different types of sources can corroborate each other, or to find new information they do not include.

It ought to be noted that observations can also be made unintentionally during the researcher’s data collection activities within an everyday setting (Gillham, 2000a; Silverman, 2001; Yin, 2003). Incidentally, apart from textual records, I also present some observed sources in the form of photographic materials in this thesis.

(4) Interviewing

In contrast to the application of a structured questionnaire, the use of interviews is regarded as a qualitative research method based on guided conversations which can provide a case study investigator with significant primary information (Yin, 2003). Thus, it can be argued that interviewing provides me with supplementary information that documentary, archival and
observational sources lack or do not elaborate on. For instance, if at any point confused by documentary and archival sources’ descriptions, I can interview the key people to obtain a more clear-cut picture, if they are still alive and willing to participate. Moreover, interviewees may raise issues that I did not take into account previously during my observational data-recording process. In other words, the information from a variety of sources (documents, archives, observations, interviews) all contributes to building up a picture of the subject of the research.

Clearly, oral data also can be obtained informally. For example, through listening to and/or engaging with other people’s conversations which respondents may give out information that is relevant to the research interests (Gillham, 2000a). Besides these conventional ways of conversation, I used semi-structured interview by setting, in advance, a general structure involving the theme to be covered and the main questions are to be asked. Initially, the interviewee can answer at some length in his/her own words. Subsequently, the interviewer will prompt the interviewee with follow-up questions to get him/her to clarify, or expand, on the answers previously given (Gillham, 2000b).

The obvious distinction between an unstructured (natural) conversation and a semi-structured interview is that the latter targets specific respondents. The targeted interviewees in this study are categorised into two groups below. Additional information on each respondent (e.g. current positions and interview dates) is presented in Appendix 11.
(i) Local authorities (community representatives)

Potential interviewees from this category are elected political representatives of Taipei City’s wards (as known as ‘li’ in Mandarin), the primary-level unit in Taiwan’s local self-government system. In other words, these interviewees are community representatives. Since they tend to be residents who have lived in their areas for long periods of time, they are expected to have sufficient knowledge on local affairs, such as local histories or specific policies’ implications for communities. Arguably, they may also have a political standpoint to defend and may not be ‘objective’. Thus, other research methods’ applications are important.

(ii) Staff of the public sector or the private sector

Interviewees in this category include staff (preferably, from the urban planning and cultural affairs departments) of the Central or Taipei City Governments. Others are members of non-governmental organisations (e.g. human rights organisations) or private construction corporations. And some are staff working for a particular sites’ management (e.g. the ethnic-cultural site). Their job-related experience and knowledge is relevant to an understanding of issues around ethnicity, economic development, and Taipei City’s changing urban landscapes.

The application of each of the research methods in approaching the research questions is presented in Table 5.1 [see p. 92], while Table 5.2 [see p. 92]
categorises the contribution of each method as ‘secondary sources’ and ‘primary sources’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method Question</th>
<th>Documentary research / Archival research</th>
<th>Direct observations</th>
<th>Interviewing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Question</td>
<td>Knowing Taiwan’s and Taipei City’s profiles / Identifying each national government’s identity policies / Identifying and investigating targeted urban elements and policies</td>
<td>Investigating targeted urban elements’ contemporary condition (if they currently exist) / Investigating people’s behaviour in particular sites</td>
<td>Investigating targeted urban elements and policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 1</td>
<td>Knowing Taipei City’s profiles / Identifying and investigating targeted urban elements and Policies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Question 2</td>
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<td>Question 3</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origins Types</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
<td>Documentary and archival research</td>
<td>Academic studies relating to Taipei City / Non-academic literature (e.g. news coverage) relating to Taipei City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary sources</td>
<td>Documentary and archival research</td>
<td>Policy documents and official reports from the Central or City Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Textual and visual fieldwork records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviewing</td>
<td>With relevant actors in public and private sectors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.6 Data Collection and Analysis

The research process, including data collection and analysis, started from December 2006 and ended in February 2008. The data collection combined both desk-based research and field research. Apart from the collection of data from online sources (from government and private news agency websites) that could be done at any time, there were two stages of fieldwork conducted within Taipei City. In the first stage (from 15/12/2006 to 08/02/2007), I used all four research...
methods to collect as much data as I could in a limited time span. More specifically, via the documentary and archival sources, I identified potential urban elements and places that I needed to investigate. Thereafter, direct observations were carried out. After analysing the information from these sources, I identified the information they did not provide and set out to interview key people in order to obtain necessary data.

Through analysis of data from the first stage of fieldwork, I identified gaps on which to focus in the second stage (from 12/10/2007 to 6/12/2007). The entire data collection process was finished in January 2008. However, several official statistics (e.g. population figures) used in this study were not released until February 2008.

5.7 Issues and Limitations

The previous Sections have explained how I planned and accomplished the empirical work. Three issues arise from the research design and the fieldwork. They are elaborated as follows:

(1) The issue of the single-case-study approach

The capital Taipei is the only case/Taiwanese city being studied in this research. Some have argued the problems of generalisation from a single-case–study approach, when generalisation is often a goal in traditional social-scientific research (Donmoyer, 2000; Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Schofield, 2000). Nevertheless, as a researcher who is engaging in the project independently and is affected by limited time and financial support, a single case study can be a
practical decision. A broadening of case studies to include other cities is a potential line of further research which is beyond this thesis. This possibility is discussed further in Chapter 11.

(2) The sensitivity of Taiwanese identity

This issue emerged in my first interview. The interviewee was a senior volunteer working in a museum exhibiting items relating to the 2-2-8 Incident, a severe conflict between the local people and the KMT Government [see Appendix 5]. After telling me about the museum’s origin, the interviewee asked my ethnic background. After knowing that I was local Han Taiwanese, the same as her, she began to tell me more about how the former Taipei Mayor, a second-generation Chinese Mainlander, seemed to try to affect the museum’s management [see Appendix 9, p. 333].

This experience reminded me that some of themes of this thesis, such as ‘national identity’ and ‘ethnicity’, might cause the interviewees to worry and make them reluctant to answer my questions. Bearing this in mind in my other interviews, although I just needed to ask the respondents questions about their life experiences or professional knowledge, such as changes in the community’s physical environment or the origin of a specific urban policy, I actually avoided mentioning the topic of my thesis whenever I could. Instead, I told them that I was a UK-based research student currently investigating Taipei City’s urban history.

Although such a strategy does involve research ethics (de Laine, 2000; Homan, 1991), it enabled me to avoid the interviewees’ potential
misinterpretation of my motivation. In fact, I did not encounter again the experience that I had in the first interview.

(3) The unexpected events

The final issue arising from the fieldwork was that I had to deal with concurrently-happening events relating to my research interests. The whole data collection process was initially planned to end in May of 2008 since it would be the end of the DPP’s second term of being the governing party, a point symbolising the end of a specific time period in Taiwan’s political history. However, considering that this would delay the completion of the thesis, the data collection process was rescheduled to end in September 2007.

During the data collection period, an event that happened in Taiwan actually related to my research [the story of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, see Section 6.5, pp. 124-31]. In consideration of the event’s significance, I decided to keep watching its development. As a result, the entire research process was extended until January 2008. This timescale change reflects the nature of case study research mentioned in Section 5.2—the researcher is investigating a situation that is uncontrollable and contemporary. Meanwhile, it also implies that as a young post-settler country, Taiwan’s national identity and its urban representations have been changing swiftly. This condition inspires one to consider several future research subjects. More details are discussed in Chapter 11.
5.8 Summary

In summary, I used case study as the approach to addressing the research questions and achieving the overall goal of this thesis. Considering the questions arising from the literature review, the limitation of time and financial support, and the nature of the capital city, Taipei City was chosen to be the case for study. Moreover, I applied the theoretical framework in identifying specific policies and urban elements that are relevant to this study. Four research methods—documentary research, archival research, direct observations, and interviewing—are employed in the empirical work.
CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS (I):
TRANSFORMING ICONIC SITES IN TAIPEI CITY

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 6 examines several iconic sites in Taipei City. Why those sites are chosen is because they are associated with state power’s representation and legitimisation. More importantly, their stories behind them reflect different political entities’ establishment and collapse in Taiwan. Section 6.2 examines the building of the nation’s Presidential Office, which has represented state power since it was built in the Japanese colonial era. Section 6.3 then investigates the Ketagalan Boulevard. It is in front of the Presidential Office and is the stage where important national events take place. Section 6.4 focuses on exploring how the Zhongshan North Road was transformed from a linear iconic site into an ordinary traffic route due to Japanese colonial rule’s collapse and Chinese settler rule’s transition. Finally, Section 6.5 looks into how the legitimacy of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, which was built in 1980 to pay tribute to the late settler state leader, caused conflict between the DPP-led Central Government and the KMT-led City Government in 2007.

6.2 The Office of the President

The theoretical framework indicated that a given nation’s central government building usually is the iconic site that represents both national identity and state power [pp. 31-2]. In the case of Taiwan, that site is the Office of
the President [Figure 6.1]. This Section reveals the relevant stories behind the building:

*The Japanese colonisers’ goal of Westernisation*

After the Qing Empire’s ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895, the Qing Empire’s highest administrative institution in the capital Taipei—the Office of Logistics and Defence Bureau [see Figure 6.2, p. 99]—became the temporary office of the colonial Governor-General. It was not until the Colonial Government had entirely controlled Taiwan that the project of erecting the Office of the Taiwan Governor-General was proposed in 1906 (*Office of the President*, 2005a). The land for the Office originally belonged to two wealthy Taiwanese clans, which had already built ancestral temples at the site. By 1907, after compensating the clans for their loss of the land, the Colonial Government built a sports club on it (Kao, 2004). Nevertheless, in view of its location’s proximity to the centre of colonial Taipei City, the land subsequently became designated to host the Office. The construction work then started in 1912 (*Office of the President*, 2005a).

![Figure 6.1 — The Office of the President](image)
The Office was completed in 1919. The architectural styles reflected the Japanese Empire’s admiration for Westernisation via the application of elements such as British-style brick construction, colonnades, gables, vaulted windows, Roman columns, and composite columns. Moreover, the deliberately imposing 60-meter tower became the colonial capital’s highest landmark at that time (Office of the President, 2006a; Yang, 2001). The Office’s image also subsequently appeared in postcards, postmarks, posters, and paintings (Office of the President, 2005b).

From the above discussion, it can be argued that the Office of the Taiwan Governor-General’s origin and construction reflect some common features of colonial urban planning. For instance, although ancestral temples are supposedly
an important symbol for the native Taiwanese, the Japanese colonisers still obtained the land, on which two native clans’ ancestral temples were located, to erect the Office. Although the documentary sources report that the Colonial Government had compensated the clans, one can assume that it might also be difficult for the clans to reject the Government’s acquisition. In addition, the Office’s geographical location (the centre of the capital city) and physical features (the highest building) were also conveying symbolic meaning related to the colonisers’ predominance and superiority.

It is worth noting after the Office’s completion, the printed media played a role in enabling the Office’s image as well as its symbolic meaning to be diffused across colonial Taiwan. One can argue that the circumstances reinforced the natives’ collective imagination of being collectively governed by the Japanese Colonial Government.

*The Chinese Settler State leader’s birthday gift*

Prior to the end of the Second World War, the Office of the Taiwan Governor-General was damaged by US air bombardments. However, after the KMT took charge of Taiwan’s post-war affairs, the building was immediately reconstructed to be the 60th birthday gift presented to Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT leader as well as the ROC President, born in 1887. Meanwhile, the restored Office was renamed ‘Chiehshou Hall’. In Mandarin, ‘Chiehshou’ implies ‘long live Chiang Kai-shek’ (Ko and Chuang, 26/03/2006).

Despite the severe economic downturn during the early post-war period, the local people were forced to contribute financially towards the costly
reconstruction project (Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum, visited on 19/12/2006). It can be suggested that the KMT’s dedication to the Office’s restoration and their simultaneous ignorance of local people’s hardship signified the beginning of the settler state’s strong control over the local population.

The Chiehshou Hall was fully restored by 1948. It initially served as the Office of the Taiwan Provincial Governor. Nevertheless, after the KMT lost the war with the CPC on the Mainland China and was forced to retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the building also became Chiang Kai-shek’s Office of the President (Office of the President, 2006a). Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek literally began to work in the building he had been given as a birthday present.

**Liberalisation of the Office of the President**

It ought to be noted that the Office was not guarded as heavily as might have been expected during the Japanese colonial era. In fact, the general public were able to have access to the building to handle their affairs (Office of the President, 2005c). This condition somewhat reflects colonial Taipei’s urban planning that represented the colonisers’ superiority (e.g. public facilities were concentrated in areas where the colonisers’ were in the majority) yet without severely marginalising the native.

The public accessibility to the Office continued during Taiwan’s early post-war period. However, after the KMT formally retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it became a forbidden building for the general public. Meanwhile, its surrounding area was under strict supervision (Ibid). This change subsequently influenced capital Taipei’s urban planning. In 1963, the Urban Planning Commission of the
Taipei City Government changed the designation of the land around the Office from commercial to administrative use (*Office of the President*, 2005a). One can suggest these changes implied the creation of settler rule’s superiority and legitimacy.

Nonetheless, with the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, the site began being ‘liberalised’. For instance, in 1995, President Lee Teng-hui allowed the building to be opened to the general public on certain holidays. In 2000, Taiwan formally entered the post-settler era; President Chen Shui-bian even allowed the public to book in advance its visits to certain areas of the building on weekdays (*Office of the President*, 2006b; Yang, 2001). Overall, the Office of the President has become more people-friendly due to its increasing accessibility.

On 25th March 2006, the DPP Government announced that the name of the building ‘Chiehshou Hall’ was officially changed to ‘Presidential Building’. Although the opposition politicians criticised this change as a boring and pointless political gesture (Ko and Chuang, 26/03/2006), the Office’s Department of Public Affairs asserted that:

[The change] attests to the fact that Taiwan has successfully transformed from an authoritarian to a democratic country, and has embodied Taiwan’s democracy and its people’s popular sovereignty … [the old name] is a product of a special time in Taiwan’s history … the “Presidential Building” perfectly complies with the function of the building and bears constitutional significance.  
(*Office of the President*, 2006c: lines 6-16)

It is worth noting that prior to the DPP Government’s announcement, the Taiwanese media and general public were already used to calling the building ‘Presidential Building’, rather than ‘Chiehshou Hall’. Thus, the opposition parties’
claim that the change was pointless may be justified to a certain point. The fact that ‘Chiehshou Hall’ was not frequently used by the Taiwanese highlights the change’s symbolic meaning.

6.3 The Ketagalan Boulevard

The existing literature revealed how, during Taiwan’s transition era, the DPP-led Taipei City Government took the opportunity to rename the road in front of the Presidential Building from ‘Chiehshou Road’ to ‘Ketagalan Boulevard’ in order to pay tribute to the Taiwanese Indigenous People, rather than honoured Chiang Kai-shek, the late Settler State leader [see Section 4.3, p. 63]. In fact, the road has played a role as the nation’s iconic site since the Japanese colonial era. This Section explores the relevant stories:

*The stage of the national identification performance*

When Taiwan was under the Qing Empire’s rule, the Road’s name was ‘Tungmen Street’, meaning ‘East Gate Street’ since it stretched from the East Gate of the stone-walled Taipei City [see Figure 6.3, p. 104] (Leitner and Knag, 1999). After the establishment of the Office of the Taiwan Governor-General, the Road was frequently used to hold fairs and exhibitions to demonstrate the Colonial Government’s technical or economic achievements (*Office of the President*, 2005c). Moreover, it was the venue for the Colonial Government to hold military parades in specific ceremonies (*Discovery Center of Taipei*, visited on 07/02/2007). In short, the site was used by the Colonial Government to hold different national identification activities.
Figure 6.3—The location of the Ketagalan Boulevard
In 1946, following the KMT’s occupation of Taiwan, the Road was officially renamed ‘Chiehshou Road’ to imply ‘long live Chiang Kai-shek’ (Leitner and Knag, 1999). It remained a public space accommodating state-run fairs. Nonetheless, following the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the Road became strictly overseen since the KMT Government kept the general public away from the Office of the President. Under these circumstances, the rare chance for the public to approach the Road and the Office was on New Year’s Day or the ROC National Day (10th October) since the KMT Government would organise relevant national activities there (Office of the President, 2005c). An article released by the Office of the President (when the DPP was the governing party) gives an illustration of how the KMT Government had dedicated itself to the National Day ceremony:

The preparations begin long before October 10, as participating organizations and groups begin to organize and practice for the National Day activities weeks in advance. At the end of September, troops that will march in front of the reviewing stands gather in Taipei … In addition to supporting every celebration, the students of different schools have had many complicated rehearsals to perfect their performance. School honor guards have practiced extensively, and civilian groups invited to participate in the programs have also made their preparations early … [T]he front of the Presidential Building is decorated with colourful billboards and red ceremonial arches are erected on Chiehshou Road … In the past, slogans were very political, such as: “All success in the anti-communist campaign and the establishment of the nation.” … [or] “Unifying China under freedom and democracy.” … On National Day, the flag-rising ceremony kicks off a series of activities and is followed by a highlight—the National Day message delivered by the President. During those distressful years of “not yet recovering the lost territory [(the Mainland China)],” the President’s address has never been a joyful one; instead, it has always shrouded by a solemn, tragic and painstaking atmosphere. During the 1960s and 1970s, as full diplomatic relations with foreign countries declined, few high-ranking foreign guests attended the occasion. In response, National Day messages would often begin with such words as: “The international community allowed the adverse current to run unabated…” and ended with encouraging words such as “…behaving solemnly and righteously in strengthening
the nation, and remaining calm in adversity” … A military review follows the presidential message … In the past, when hostilities with Beijing were intense, the troop review served as a demonstration of military strength and a symbol for developing national power. (Office of the President, 2005d: lines 5-32)

From the above description, it can be seen that the ROC National Day was a significant occasion for the KMT Government to forge the imaged collective memory and simultaneously to legitimise state power. Meanwhile, the Chiehshou Road played a key role in enabling the relevant messages to be diffused because of the national identification activities held on it [Figure 6.4]. Many Taiwanese were able to collectively experience such a national identification performance via the mass media.

Figure 6.4—The 1987 National Day ceremony
People marched into the nationalist slogans and the national flag on the Chiehshou Road
Liberalisation of the Ketagalan Boulevard

With the coming of Taiwan’s political transition and transformation, the Road no longer played the aforementioned role as the stage of radical national identification performances. For instance, after martial law was lifted, the National Day ceremony began to include folk performances of different Taiwanese ethnic groups, symbolising that the state put emphasis on Taiwan itself (Discovery Center of Taipei, visited on 07/02/2007). Furthermore, after the DPP became the governing party in 2000, slogans related to Chinese nationalist discourses were no longer heard or seen on the road during the occasion. In addition, there are no scenes where the masses chant slogans to show their loyalty to the national leader (Office of the President, 2005d).

Apart from being disconnected from the state’s extreme national identification scheme, there were other changes happening to the site since Taiwan’s democratisation. Being the road in front of the building representing state power, Chiehshou Road could serve as the site where people could hold demonstrations against the state. With the coming of democratisation, marches against the KMT Government’s dictatorial rule were indeed held on the Road (Office of the President, 2005c). Moreover, in 1995, the DPP Mayor Chen Shui-bian launched an unprecedented outdoor dance party on the Road (Discovery Center of Taipei, visited on 07/02/2006; Lee, 2001a; Office of the President, 2006d). In addition, after changing the name of the site from Chiehshou Road to Ketagalan Boulevard in 1996, Mayor Chen lifted the ban on bicycle and motorcycle traffic on it (Yang, 2001). The memory of the site’s once stern character began to fade.
6.4 The Zhongshan North Road

For the contemporary Taiwanese populace, the Zhongshan North Road in Taipei City may be a landscape beautified by trees neatly planed along it, rather than an iconic site with significant meanings created by the state. Nevertheless, during Taiwan’s colonial and early settler-governing eras, the Road was a linear iconic site linking several other iconic sites related to state power’s representation [Figure 6.5]. This Section unfolds the stories of the Road’s forgotten iconic status:
The forgotten road leading to the residence of the gods

‗Shinto‘ originally was a Japanese folk religion. After having restored the Imperial Family‘s power in the late nineteenth century, the Japanese Meiji Emperor applied Shinto to deify himself and therefore reinforced the Imperial Family‘s legitimacy. Meanwhile, Shinto also became Japan‘s state religion (in present-day Japan, however, Shinto is more like a custom than a religion). Under these circumstances, after Taiwan became a Japanese colony, several ‘jinja’, the Japanese term of Shinto shrine, were constructed in the region. In 1900, the Colonial Government launched a project to build the Taiwan Jinja in the capital Taipei. Being an Imperial-sponsored jinja, its rank would exceed those sponsored by individuals, the local authorities, or the central government (Wang, 2005).

Traditionally, the jinja needs to be based on and surrounded by the natural environment. Hence, the Taiwan Jinja was arranged to be located on the Jiantan Mountain. This arrangement was due to not only the Mountain‘s fine natural scene, but also to the consideration that it was able to symbolise how the gods, living in the Jinja, would view the colonial capital from their high position. Although the land there belonged to the French Embassy, a wealthy Taiwanese businessman, and a local temple, the Colonial Government still seized it (Ibid), thus implying the Government‘s ultimate superiority.

Following the Taiwan Jinja‘s completion in 1901, the Japanese colonisers began to visit it to worship gods during the New Year or festival periods. Some native Taiwanese were also influenced by the colonisers to follow the same religious ritual. With the stabilisation of Japan‘s colonial control, the Jinja

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19 In addition to the information extracted from documentary sources, meanings of ‘Shinto’, ‘jinja’, and ‘jingū’ mentioned in this subsection are contributed by my Japanese colleague, Kazuko Kakegawa.
eventually became a tourist spot for people in Taiwan. In 1926, the Colonial Government decided to ‘upgrade’ the Taiwan Jinja to the ‘Taiwan Jingū’ (jingū is the highest-ranking Shinto shrine) [Figure 6.6]. This decision meant that the original area covered by the Jinja needed to be expanded. Consequently, the local temple that had given away part of its land for the sake of the Taiwan Jinja’s construction was relocated (Ibid). In other words, colonial urban planning’s forcefulness once again made the native spirits give way to the gods from Japan.

The Taiwan Jinja’s establishment also influenced the capital Taipei’s holistic urban planning. With the erection of the Jinja, a road (combining present-day Zhongshan South Road and part of Zhongshan North Road, see Figure 6.5, p. 108) was constructed to allow worshippers to access the Jinja. The road then came to be known as the ‘Imperial Messenger Road’ because, after the establishment of the Jinja, a Shinto ritual contingent, serving the Japanese Emperor only, came to

Figure 6.6—The Taiwan Jingū, the 1930s
colonial Taiwan and marched on the Road to the Jinja to practise its first rite (Wang, 2005; Wang, 2005a). Furthermore, as ‘the road to the gods’ residence’, the Road was designed to be colonial Taiwan’s most modern boulevard—fifteen meters in width, paved by macadam slabs and planted with trees (Wang, 2005). In addition, it was deliberately designed to connect the Jinja and the Office of the Taiwan Governor-General to symbolise Shinto’s significance to the Japanese Empire (Hsu, 2001a; Kang, 2002; Lin, 2005a).

Apart from these symbolic functions, the Road was designed to lead tap-water channels from the waterworks, located at the north Taipei Basin, to the urban area (Shen, 2005). Moreover, it also played an important role as a travel medium for people to visit not only the Jinja, but also the north Taipei Basin where the zoo, playing fields, hot springs, golf clubs, and several leisure centres were located. Under these circumstances, the Road eventually was packed with vehicles and people not only on traditional festivals, but also during weekends (Wang, 2005; Wang, 2005a).

In consideration of its excessive use, the Road’s condition was improved from 1936 to 1940. For instance, apart from planting more trees and flowers along it, the Road became asphalt-paved and forty-meters wide. Street lights were installed and electric cables were put underground. New pavements along the Road were paved by concrete bricks and planted with trees [see Figure 6.7, p. 112]. Furthermore, high-quality residential quarters were set up along it. In view of these adjustments, it was not long before fine shops and restaurants appeared on the Road. The condition ultimately made the Imperial Messenger Road the pride of the Colonial Government as well as of the Japanese Empire (Wang, 2005).
That is to say, the Road was a physical symbol of the Japanese colonisers’ political, cultural, and economic achievements in Taiwan.

The forgotten road for welcoming foreign guests

After the KMT took over Taiwan at the end of the Second World War, the Imperial Messenger Road was renamed Zhongshan Road in honour of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the ROC and the KMT, who is also known as ‘Sun Zhong-shan’ amongst Taiwanese. The Road was also divided into Zhongshan North Road and Zhongshan South Road by the Zhongxiao East Road [see Figure 6.5, p.

\[20\] Many Chinese historical figures had several first names by which people could refer to them in their lifetime. For instance, they could originally have a name ‘registered’ within their clans’ ancestries. After having begun to receive education, however, their mentors would give them another name. In addition, they could still give themselves other names to imply their higher educational status. The legacy of this culture may confuse the researcher when he/she deals with sources presented in different languages. For example, although English academic studies usually use ‘Sun Yat-sen’ and ‘Chiang Kai-shek’ to refer to the two KMT leaders, the Taiwanese usually call the former ‘Sun Zhong-shan’ and the later ‘Chiang Zhong-zheng’.
Subsequently, several adjustments were made to the Road and its surroundings. The first one was at the damaged Taiwan Jingū.

In 1944, the Taiwan Jingū was damaged by US air-strikes as well as a Japanese passenger aeroplane crash. At the time, Japan was still struggling in the end of the Second World War and was therefore unable to pay attention to the Jingū’s restoration (Wang, 2005). After the KMT came to Taiwan, it used the Jingū’s remains to build a guest house to serve foreign officials. Ultimately, the Grand Hotel was built in 1952 at the same location in order to make Taiwan have an internationally recognised top class hotel (The Grand Hotel, 2002). Clearly, the Hotel’s main purpose was to accommodate the ROC’s important foreign persons. Moreover, this arrangement enabled the foreign officials to witness the beautiful urban scenery of the Zhongshan North Road when coming into and out of the Hotel. Eventually, many foreign embassies were built along the Road (Kang, 2002).

In 1973, the expanded Grand Hotel, a fourteen-storey traditional Chinese palace building [see Figure 6.8, p. 114], held its opening ceremony on the ROC National Day (The Grand Hotel, 2002). Tay (1995) suggests that it was a distinct landmark with the state-imposed representation of Chinese antiquarianism. Nevertheless, after Taiwan’s UN seat was replaced by that of the People’s Republic of China in 1971 and lost international recognition, many embassies were closed and the number of important foreign visitors also decreased. Eventually, the Zhongshang North Road lost its function of serving foreign guests (Hsu, 2001a). Meanwhile, the Grand Hotel’s significance was also diminished. Its extravagant Chinese palace styles and former political functions even became
topics for satire in present-day Taiwan (Lei, 2001). Overall, although it still constitutes a landmark in the capital Taipei due to its architectural features, the Grand Hotel also awkwardly represents Chinese settler rule’s one-time superiority and Taiwan’s marginalisation within the international community.

The forgotten road serving the Settler State leader

Although the Zhongshan North Road stopped serving important foreign guests after Taiwan’s 1970s diplomatic crisis, it still had to serve Chiang Kai-shek, the ROC as well as the KMT leader whose official residence was located along it. When the KMT was struggling in the Chinese Civil War in the late 1940s, Taiwan Provincial Governor Chen Cheng was already looking for a suitable place to be Chiang’s official residence. The location was finally decided to be at present-day Section Five of the Zhongshan North Road [see Figure 6.5, p. 108]. The location had previously been used by the Japanese Colonial Government for the
development of gardening and agricultural cultivation techniques. Hence, it constituted an exquisite natural environment. Since the area was called ‘Shilin’ by the locals, the residence was named the Shilin Residence. After its completion in 1950, the Residence became Chiang Kai-shek’s life-time residence in Taiwan (Department of Transportation, updated 08/06/2006; Parks and Street Lights Office, updated 02/06/2006; Wang, 2005).

With Chiang’s move into the Shilin Residence, the area simultaneously became a strategic point of armed forces (Parks and Street Lights Office, updated 02/06/2006; Wang, 2005). Meanwhile, both the Zhongshan North Road and Zhongshan South Road would form Chiang Kai-shek’s official route from the Residence to the Office of the President [see Figure 6.5, p. 108]. Therefore, the Roads also became a strategic point. As a result, thirty minutes before Chiang’s departure, the military police, civil police, and plainclothes agents would collectively collaborate on the Roads’ traffic control. Moreover, as a precautionary measure against air-attacks, buildings along the Roads were required to consist of more than four storeys in order to facilitate the use of ground-to-air weapons in an emergency (Wang, 2005).

Despite such intense security operation, however, the railway line along the Zhongxiao East Road, crossing the Zhongshan North Road and Zhongshan South Road, occasionally hindered Chiang’s fleet [see Figure 6.5, p. 108]. Fearing that this condition might ‘harm national security’, Taiwan’s first flyover—the Fuhsing Bridge—was constructed in 1954 to connect the Zhongshan North Road and Zhongshan South Road over the railway line. Thus, Chiang’s fleet was able to travel between the Residence and the Office without the risk of being stopped.
Incidentally, in Mandarin, ‘fuhsing’ means ‘restoration’ implying Chiang’s ambition to restore the Mainland China.

After Chiang Kai-shek’s death, the Zhongshan North Road no longer needed to serve such an extremely cautious national leader. Moreover, with the tube lines’ construction, the railway line that had once obstructed Chiang’s way was demolished. Hence, the Fuhsing Bridge also lost its function and was demolished in 1996 (Ibid). Apart from those up-to-four-storey buildings along it, nowadays, one can no longer perceive how Chinese settler rule’s superiority had dramatically affected the Zhongshan North Road.

In terms of the Shilin Residence, although its landownership belonged to the Taipei City Government, it became a forbidden site following Chiang Kai-shek’s death and Madame Chiang’s emigration to the US. Not until the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian became the mayor and negotiated with Madame Chiang, did a large part of the Residence, functioning as a public park, began to open to the general public since 1996. Nonetheless, Chiang Kai-shek’s and Madame Chiang’s house [see Figure 6.9, p. 117] is still a forbidden area in the Residence (Shilin Residence, visited on 13/10/2007). Arguably, this arrangement shows respect for the late national leader. Nonetheless, it may also imply that the late Settler State leader’s unshakable power has not been entirely weeded out.
6.5 The Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) Memorial Hall

One can acknowledge that the iconic sites examined in the previous three Sections are more or less related to the late Chinese Settler State leader—Chiang Kai-shek. As a matter of fact, Chiang still influenced capital Taipei’s urban landscape after his death. This Section reveals his spatial legacies in the City:

Chiang’s death and the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall

Having been a state leader with virtually unshakable power, Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975 unsurprisingly resulted in the construction of an iconic site—
the CKS Memorial Hall [Figure 6.10]. But, before examining the CKS Memorial Hall’s establishment and implications, I want to briefly introduce the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, erected to pay tribute to Sun Yat-sen, the KMT and ROC founder. In fact, the first person proposing its construction was Chiang Kai-shek himself in 1964. The main structure was completed in 1972. However, following extensive discussions between Chiang and the designers, the Hall was made to bear more Chinese architectural features (National Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, visited on 21/12/2006). A slight irony was that after Chiang died on 5th April 1975, only three years after the completion of Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, the building became his body’s temporary resting place [see Figure 6.11, p. 119] (Nan, 2001). One can suggest that it was another national-identification activity that made Chiang’s death become the nation’s imagined collective sorrowful memory, thereby reinforcing settler rule’s legitimacy.
The origin of the CKS Memorial Hall

According to the claim made by Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Office,

As an expression of their high esteem for the late President and as a way of eternally cherishing his memory, Chinese communities at home and abroad all generously donated funds to the government to build the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall. In June the same year the Executive Yuan (Prime Minister’s Office) accepted recommendations from the public and resolution of the official Funeral Committee to build the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall [and it was accomplished and opened to the public in 1980].

(National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Management Office, visited on 19/12/2006)

Clearly, it is difficult to investigate all the details within the above claim (e.g. whether ‘Chinese communities at home and abroad’ indeed donated funds to the Hall’s construction). Nonetheless, one may not be surprised that the KMT immediately dedicated itself to the project after Chiang Kai-shek’s death. In fact, in comparison to the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall that took nine years to be accomplished, the more spectacular CKS Memorial Hall’s construction took only five years.
The Hall with its adjacent Square and Memorial Park [Figure 6.12] occupies an area of 250,000 square meters, and consists of many traditional Chinese architectural features. In view of its magnificent scale and architectural aesthetic value, the Hall has become one of Taiwan’s famous tourist spots (Kang, 2002; Lee, 2001a).

Figure 6.12—Plan of CKS Memorial Park
It is worth noting that although Sun Yat-sen was the founder of the ROC and the KMT, through documentation investigated in this study, the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall seems less ‘iconic’ than the CKS Memorial Hall in the Taiwanese’ eyes, meaning that the latter is a more important landmark in Taiwan. Apart from the fact that the CKS Memorial Hall’s grander appearance and scale made it frequently come under the media spotlight, one explanation can be that in comparison to Sun, Chiang’s image of ‘great national leader’ had been created through the large-scale propaganda prior to Taiwan’s democratisation. For example, by consulting several archival sources (Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum, visited on 19/12/2006) of the martial law period, the Taiwanese media and public education textbooks had portrayed Chiang as ‘the saviour of the human beings’, ‘the great man of the world’, ‘the lighthouse of liberation’, and ‘the Great Wall of the nation’.

As a large-scale project, the CKS Memorial Hall’s construction directly affected Taipei City’s urban planning. The land occupied by the Hall was a military base during the Japanese colonial era. Although the land remained in military use in the early settler-governing era, it was intended ultimately to be used for commercial purposes in order to accelerate the capital’s economic development. However, Chiang’s death immediately changed that plan (Lee, 2002a). As a result, several new business districts, which are examined in Chapter 9, were subsequently established in east Taipei City (the CKS Memorial Hall was located in the Zhongzheng Administrative District in west Taipei City; see the relative position on Figure A.1, p. 331) (Kang, 2002). One can suggest that this change and its implications demonstrates how Chiang Kai-shek’s superior
leadership, despite his death, still had impacts on the capital Taipei’s built environments.

*The demotion of CKS Memorial Hall*

The CKS Memorial Hall stored the collections and information in relation to Chiang Kai-shek. Meanwhile, the CKS Memorial Park served as an open recreational space for the general public. In particular, the CKS Square was frequently used by governmental and private institutions as a fair or exhibition venue. However, the KMT Government might not have expected that the Square would one day serve as the centre-stage for social movements against itself.

Following the abolition of martial law in 1987, several large social movements were launched by the opposition party and the general public. One of the movements was organised to force the old National Assembly members to resign. The ROC National Assembly had been formed on the Mainland China in 1947. Since Assembly members were intended to represent different regions of the Mainland, they became irreplaceable after the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Under these circumstances, if a member died, a Mainlander originally from the same region would be appointed to fill the vacancy. However, if no suitable person could be found, a new member would be selected from Chinese-Mainlander communities in non-Communist countries (Roy, 2003).

Although the newly-established DPP subsequently enabled several local politicians to become Assembly members representing Taiwan’s regions, the Assembly was still dominated by elderly Mainlanders. For example, in 1988, a ninety-three-year-old Mainlander was elected as the session chairman. More
importantly, since one of the National Assembly’s functions was to elect the ROC President and to revise the ROC Constitution, the elderly Mainland members’ predominance would make the KMT always have the privilege of being the party in power (Ibid).

In order to show their disapproval of such a political monopoly system, thousands of students occupied the CKS Square in March 1990 for several days to appeal to the KMT Government to urge these old Assembly members resign. As a result, in 1991, President Lee Teng-hui asked the long-term Assembly members to resign and launched the elections to select new members from Taiwanese constituencies only (Ibid).

After the 1990 student movement, the CKS Square became a regular venue for anti-KMT social demonstrations to be held. In addition, the CKS Memorial Hall was then nicknamed as the ‘CKS Temple’ to satirise the KMT’s deification of Chiang Kai-shek (Lee, 2001a).

The CKS Memorial Hall’s iconic status has been continuously challenged with the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era. Taipei City’s Sungshan Airport had been the location of the official welcoming ceremony for foreign leaders. In 1995, in consideration of the fact that the Airport was far from the Presidential Building where the ROC President would meet foreign leaders, the CKS Square began to host such ceremonies. However, in April 2006, the DPP Government announced that future ceremonies would be held on the Ketagalan Boulevard. Although the DPP Government emphasised that the change would enable foreign leaders to avoid extra traffic between the CKS Square and the Presidential Building, the opposition politicians claimed that the DPP intended to distance the ROC
Government from anything related to Chiang Kai-shek (Ko, 06/04/2006). Recalling the fact that, on 25th March of the same year, the building name of the Office of the President was just changed from ‘Chiehshou Hall’ to ‘Presidential Building’ [see Section 6.2, pp. 102-3], it may be understandable why the opposition politicians made such a claim.

*From the CKS Memorial Hall to the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall*

Prior to exploring why the CKS Memorial Hall became the National Taiwan Democracy Hall, the DPP’s strong attention to the 2-2-8 Incident needs to be recalled, since it was the trigger for the Hall’s functional change. The literature review [see Section 4.3, pp. 57-8; Appendix 5] mentioned that, on 28th February 1947, a conflict between the local people and the KMT Government broke out in Taipei City. Thereafter, a series of riots occurred throughout Taiwan. After violent suppression of the riots, the KMT began to use harsh methods, such as secret police, to control the public. Meanwhile, the Incident became a taboo subject until the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation. Finally, in 1995, the DPP’s Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian enabled the 2-28 Memorial to be erected at Taipei Park, which was also renamed 2-28 Peace Park, to symbolise ethnic harmony [see Figure 6.13, p. 125]. He also constructed the Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum [see Figure 6.14, p. 125], originally a Japanese legacy located next to the Park, which was opened in 1997 (*Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum*, visited on 19/12/2006).
Figure 6.13—The 2-28 Memorial in the 2-28 Peace Park

Figure 6.14—The Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum
See more details of the Museum in Appendix 9
The DPP’s strong connection with the 2-2-8 Incident was continuously shown after it took state power. For instance, in 1998, President Lee Teng-hui, also the KMT’s chairman at the time, already apologised for the massacre caused by the KMT military, and simultaneously designated 28th February as the ‘Peace Memorial Day’ and a national holiday (Ibid). On 27th February 2006, the DPP Government even announced that national flags in government institutions and schools across Taiwan should be flown half-mast on the Day in order to mourn the victims. Such a policy was criticised by the opposition politicians claiming that the DPP was trying to attack the KMT and its allies by highlighting the KMT military’s misbehaviour (Chuang, 28/02/2006; Chuang, 01/03/2006). Despite this criticism, on 28th February 2007, the 60th anniversary of the Incident, the DPP Government announced the construction of the National 228 Memorial Museum [Figure 6.15] in the capital Taipei (Hirsch, 28/02/2007). In addition, for the first time, new history textbooks including the illustration of the 2-2-8 Incident would be released in the same year (Gluck, 27/02/2007).

Figure 6.15—The National 228 Memorial Museum stamp
See more details about National 228 Memorial Museum and the stamp in Appendix 10
Among those ‘2-2-8 Incident compensation measures’ made by the DPP Government, the one that directly impacted on the CKS Memorial Hall was triggered by a report released by the 228 Incident Memorial Foundation in 2006. The report was endorsed by the Central Government in 1992. It concluded that Chiang Kai-shek bore the greatest responsibility for the Incident since he ordered the troops sent from the Mainland China to Taiwan to brutally suppress the riots. On 26th February 2007, the DPP Government announced that the report was regarded as an ‘official’ document (Chuang, 27/02/2007; Gluck, 27/02/2007). Thereafter, in his opening speech at the conference commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Incident, President Chen Shui-bian reemphasised the report’s conclusion and vowed to tackle the legacy of authoritarian rule by renaming the CKS Memorial Hall (Ko and Shih, 27/02/2007). It is worth noting that, in early February, a similar proposal had been made by the DPP politicians (Wang, 08/02/2007). Nonetheless, the name-change policy announced by President Chen was legitimised by the ‘new official report’ of the 2-2-8 Incident.

Subsequently, on 2nd March 2007, the Cabinet announced that the CKS Memorial Hall would be renamed as ‘National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall’. It would be used to display information regarding the Taiwan’s history of democratisation. The Square and Park around the Hall would be renamed too. Moreover, the white-washed walls surrounding the Hall’s territory would be demolished (Mo and Wang, 04/03/2007; Wang, 05/03/2007).

The Cabinet’s plan immediately caused criticism from the opposition parties (Mo, 04/03/2007; Mo and Wang, 04/03/2007). On 4th March 2007, the KMT’s Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin announced that due to its historical and
architectural features, the Hall was designated as a potential historic site under official review. According to the Cultural Property Preservation Law, examined further in Chapter 9, the Hall would therefore remain untouched during the review process, which could last from six months to one year. Predictably, Mayor Hau’s strike-back strategy immediately caused disapproval from the DPP and its allies (Mo and Chuang, 07/03/2007; Wang, 05/03/2007).

Despite the continuous disputes within politicians and the general public with different political stand points (see Chuang, 10/05/2007; Ko, 18/05/2007; Loa, 19/05/2007; Shih and Wang, 21/05/2007), on 19th May 2007, with protestors and supporters both gathered at the scene, the DPP Government invited the 2-2-8 Incident victims’ families to join the name-change ceremony held in the ‘new’ National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall. In order to avoid any physical damage on the Hall already designated by the City Government as the potential historic site under official review, several new name signs were erected surrounding the site (Loa and Wang, 20/05/2007). Moreover, giant banners were hung to cover the old-name plate of the main hall.

The dispute regarding the Hall’s future continued after the name-change ceremony (see Ko, 29/05/2007; Loa, 16/07/2007; Mo, 26/05/2007). On 6th November 2007, the Council for Cultural Affairs approved the City Government’s proposal for designating the Hall and its surrounding park as an historic site at the municipal level. Based on this decision made at the central government level, the City Government and the KMT assumed that the Hall would remain untouched (Hsu, 07/11/2007).
Nonetheless, the DPP Government said that although it would not affect the Hall’s important physical structure due to the Council for Cultural Affairs’ decision, the name-change would be continued to be put in practice. On 23rd November 2007, the relevant proposal made by the DPP Government was also approved by the Council for Cultural Affairs. Based on the proposal, the four Chinese characters ‘Da Zhong Zhi Zheng’ (meaning ‘Great Centrality and Perfect Uprightness’; ‘Zhong Zheng’ implying Chiang Kai-shek’s other name Chiang Zhing-zheng) would be changed to another four Chinese characters meaning ‘Liberty Square’. Moreover, the name tablet inscribed ‘Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall’ above the main hall’s entry would be changed to the one inscribed ‘Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall’. Unsurprisingly, the KMT-led City Government was unable to accept these changes. Moreover, it emphasised that the Central Government needed to obtain its permission to make the changes since the City was the government institution that was in charge of the Hall’s historic heritage interests (Loa and Mo, 23/11/2007; Mo, 08/11/2007).

However, the DPP Government just ignored the City Government’s concerns and the City Government appealed to the Taipei High Administrative Court to overturn the Central Government’s decision. On 30th November, although the Court indicated that the City Government had the right to prevent the site from being physically damaged, it rejected the request to stop the Central Government’s future actions (Chang and Hsu, 01/12/2007).

As a result, despite strong criticism made by the City Government and opposition politicians, the preparation of the re-construction work began on 5th December 2007. However, the work was unable to start since the site was packed
with protestors and supporters having different opinions about the change. Ultimately, with the assistances from the National Police Agency and the City Police Department, the work was able to take place on 7th December [Figure 6.16]. The inscription on the arch was changed on the 8th and the new name tablet was hung on 9th December (Hsu, 08/12/2007; Wang and Lao, 06/12/2007).

After changing these signs, the DPP Government began to change the main hall’s interior. On 1st January 2008, the main hall was reopened to the public. Although the giant Chiang Kai-shek statue was not removed, its surrounding was decorated with kites representing a ‘democratic wind’. Moreover, the names of all the recorded Incident victims were posted on the inside wall (Ko, 02/01/2008). Meanwhile, the dispute between the Central and City Governments
was continuing. The City Government has been suing the Ministry of Education, which was in charge of the re-designing the main hall, for changing the municipal historic site’s physical elements without its permission (Hsu, 09/12/2007; Hsu and Wang, 11/12/2007).

From the above story of the CKS Memorial’s change to the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall, it can be seen that conflict between the DPP-led Central Government and the KMT-led Taipei City Government constitutes not only a party political competition, but also an identity contest. On the one hand, by using the 2-2-8 Incident as the justification, the DPP claimed that the Hall was a legacy of authoritarian rule and changing it would symbolise the accomplishment of transitional justice. On the other, the KMT claimed that the DPP just intended to apply the change to tarnish the KMT’s image.

Clearly, both sides’ claims can be taken into account and I do not attempt to make any comment about them. However, one concern is that if the CKS Memorial Hall’s change did symbolise the practice of transitional justice, why did it not occur in Taiwan’s political transition era? Such ‘unaccomplished’ transitional justice can imply that, despite its symbolic collapse, Chinese settler rule still has a strong influence on Taiwanese identity and its urban representations. In fact, although the DPP Government eventually changed the CKS Memorial Hall’s name and function, the metro-station and bus-stop names of the site remain ‘CKS Memorial Hall’, due to the insistence of the KMT-led Taipei City Government.
6.6 Conclusion

This Chapter has examined how the changes of several iconic sites were associated with state power’s transformation in Taiwan. From these stories, it can be concluded that the Japanese Colonial Government applied state power to efficiently build several iconic sites in the capital Taipei. Apart from representing colonial rule’s superiority, it ought to be noted that these sites also had practical functions corresponding to the colonial capital’s urban planning (e.g. the Imperial Messenger Road functioned not only as a state-religion symbol, but also as an important traffic route linking the city centre and the recreation spots in north Taipei City).

In terms of the newly-arrived KMT Government, although it built its own iconic sites to represent/legitimise political control and Mainland China’s culture, the new government also kept using some of these Japanese colonial iconic sites to practise similar national identification schemes (e.g. as in the Japanese era, the Chiehshou Road was still the site hosting national events organised by the state). However, a distinct difference between these two political entities’ uses of the sites was that during the early years of the KMT Government’s authoritarian rule, some iconic sites were almost inaccessible to the general public. One can suggest that this difference implied settler rule’s further superiority. Not until the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation did the transitional KMT’s begin to abandon these identification schemes, and the relevant sites simultaneously became increasingly accessible.

The reason why the KMT Government kept using these Japanese legacies, rather than deliberately destroying them, can be that when the KMT took over
Taiwan in 1945, it was still struggling in the Chinese Civil War with the CPC on the Mainland China. That is to say, although it was able to manipulate the home population’s collective identity through education, media propaganda, and martial law, the preoccupation of the Civil War left KMT unable to pay any attention on these Japanese legacies’ legitimacy. Hence, many noticeable physical representations of colonial memories still remain in the capital Taipei. In fact, one can even suggest that these Japanese legacies played an important role in making the KMT settle quickly in Taiwan. It not only meant that these Japanese legacies were able to accommodate the KMT while struggling in the war on the Mainland China. It also meant that these sites’ symbolic functions were used by the KMT to swiftly legitimise state power.

In contrast to the KMT Government, in Taipei City, the DPP Government did not really built new iconic sites representing state power. Nonetheless, since Taiwan’s political transition era, the DPP, the opposition party at the time, has applied its political resources to enable several sites, representing sorrowful memories caused by the KMT Government’s early dictatorial rule, to be constructed in the capital Taipei (e.g. the 2-28 Memorial was erected to commemorate the victims of the 2-2-8 Incident). Moreover, it also introduced several name- or functional-change policies to divest the iconic sites from serving the KMT’s interests (e.g. the Chiehshou Road was renamed Ketagalan Boulevard to pay tribute the Taiwanese Indigenous People, rather than the late Settler State leader).

In the light of this, it is unsurprising that the DPP, after it came to state power in 2000, would try to use the similar methods to affect the settler-rule
iconic sites in the capital Taipei (e.g. trying to transform the CKS Memorial Hall into the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall). However, since the opposition parties, consisting of the KMT and its allies, were controlling the City’s administration at the time, the plans of the DPP-led Central Government were hindered by the KMT-led City Government. This implies that settler rule, despite the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era, still has implications for the nation’s imagined collective memory and its urban representations.
CHAPTER 7

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS (II):
NATIONAL CULTURE, FAMILIARITY, AND TAIPEI CITY

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 introduces several national-cultural sites and subtle urban elements in Taipei City. Although they seem to be ordinary public places, their existence is originally associated with the state’s deliberate arrangement to forge, maintain, and reinforce the nation’s imagined collective memory concerned with national history, national culture, and the sense of ‘home’. Specifically, Section 7.2 examines how different political entities in Taiwanese history used the museums to legitimise state power and ‘national’ history and culture. Moreover, Section 7.3 explores how sports and the relevant playgrounds also served the state’s interests in forging the nation’s collective identity. Finally, Section 7.4 investigates other specific urban features that are also related to the state’s identification schemes.

7.2 Museums and National Identification

The theoretical framework [p. 34] has suggested that a museum can constitute a national-cultural site since it can be used by the state to store and display collections relevant to ‘national’ history or culture. This Section explores several museums that were state-legitimised as national-cultural sites in Taipei City:
The museum as the Japanese colonial legacy

The National Taiwan Museum is a Japanese legacy. Like many Western colonisers inclined to demonstrate their superior power by erecting museums where the colony could be symbolically displayed within a limited space, the Japanese colonisers also had the same inclination. In 1915, Taiwan’s first museum, the Taiwan Governor-General Museum, was built in the colonial capital Taipei. Like many other colonial landmarks (e.g. the Office of the Taiwan Governor-General, see Section 6.2, pp. 98-9), the Museum’s appearance combined various Western architectural features implying the Japanese colonisers’ partiality to Westernisation [Figure 7.1] (Bee, 2005).

The original purpose of the Museum was to display the information concerned with Taiwan’s earth science, anthropology, zoology, and botany for both academic and industrial uses. However, it ultimately came to serve as the Kodama/Goto Memorial Hall in order to dedicate to colonial Taiwan’s fourth
colonial Governor-General and third Chief Civil Administrator, who had successfully modernised the colony from 1898 to 1906. It is worth noting that the Museum’s location was originally occupied by the Matzu Temple constructed in the Qing-ruling era. Although ‘Matzu’ is a significant religious spirit for the locals, it was unable to prevent the Temple from being demolished for the sake of the Museum’s construction (Ibid).

During the Second World War, the Museum was used to store and display the war spoils to justify the Japanese Empire’s role in the War. The similar tactic of such spatial propaganda was applied by the KMT Government. For example, the Museum was used to display materials related to the KMT’s battles with the Qing Empire, Japan, or the CPC. The situation continued until the 1980s where Taiwan’s democracy began to emerge (Bee, 2005). In short, although its original function was not to legitimise specific national history or culture, the Museum, as a public space, eventually served the state’s identification schemes. Nowadays, the Museum only serves academic interests.

Incidentally, after the KMT took over Taiwan, the Museum was renamed several times due to changes in the nation’s domestic administrative system. Ultimately, in 1999, the name National Taiwan Museum was confirmed and is now the name by which the museum is known (National Taiwan Museum, visited on 09/01/2007).

*Remembering Chinese roots*

In view of the KMT’s progressive defeat in the war with the CPC on the Mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek allowed many significant Chinese cultural
assets to be transported to Taiwan since 1948. In 1956, some of the cultural relics were displayed in the Artifact’s Museum in the capital Taipei. It was the first museum ever built by the KMT Government in Taiwan. After visiting the Museum on the ROC National Day in 1957, Chiang Kai-shek ordered it to be renamed ‘National Museum of History’ (*National Museum of History*, visited on 10/01/2007). One can suggest that this arrangement was intended to legitimise Taiwan’s connection with Mainland China’s history and culture. Incidentally, the Museum’s appearance represented the traditional Chinese imperial-palace architectural style [Figure 7.2].

Nonetheless, the National Museum of History only displayed a small part of the valuable Chinese cultural items originally moved from the Mainland. The rest were not displayed publicly until the opening of the National Palace Museum in the capital Taipei in 1965. Ironically, the ‘original’ National Palace Museum
was on the Mainland China. The story dates back to 1925, when the KMT allowed the Qing Empire’s Forbidden City—the Emperor’s home in Beijing—to become the ‘Palace Museum’. The cultural assets transported by the KMT to Taiwan were collections from that Qing-Imperial legacy (Caltonhill and Asmus, 2006; National Palace Museum, visited on 15/01/2007).

The National Palace Museum represents the typical Chinese imperial-palace architectural styles [Figure 7.3]. In view of its abundant collections, the Museum is one of Taiwan’s famous tourist spots. It can be suggested that the circumstances of its creation further reinforced Taiwan’s connection with Chinese history and culture.

In March 2007, when the National Palace Museum’s Organic Status was being reviewed, the DPP Government proposed that the Museum should accommodate international cultural and historic relics rather than only those concerned with ‘Chinese’. However, the proposal was blocked by the opposition parties claiming that the DPP was practising de-Sinicisation (Shih, 22/03/2007).
Remembering Taiwanese roots

One may assert that, in terms of the three museums described in the previous two subsections that the one most closely linked to ‘Taiwan’ actually is the Japanese colonial legacy, the National Taiwan Museum. After all, the Museum’s existence was originally attributed to the colonisers’ attempt to display colonial Taiwan within a limited space. Nonetheless, by visiting the present-day National Taiwan Museum, one can realise that it only displays items concerned with Taiwan’s anthropology and natural science, rather than those associated with Taiwan’s history and culture. Overall, it seems that the National Museum of History and the National Palace Museum still play the role of displaying items that are representing Taiwan’s ‘national’ history and culture.

Nonetheless, by consulting the documentary sources, it is found that Taiwan’s political transition has intended to plan a national-cultural site concerned with the region itself. The story dates back to 1992. After visiting the Provincial Taiwan Museum (the present-day National Taiwan Museum), President Lee Teng-hui proposed a project to construct the ‘Provincial History Museum’ that was meant to store and display historic and cultural relics related to Taiwan. After the streamlining of the Taiwan Provincial Government [see Appendix 7, pp. 326-7], the planned museum was directly administered by the Central Government and was renamed as ‘National Museum of Taiwan History’ in 1999. Incidentally, the planned Museum is located in Tainan City in south Taiwan, rather than the capital Taipei. This arrangement was due to the fact that it was Taiwan’s earliest developed area. In other words, the location symbolises the
origin of Taiwanese history (National Museum of Taiwan History Planning Bureau, 2003).

The Museum’s construction began in 2003 and was planned to be accomplished in 2008. An article titled ‘History of the Land and the People” published in a DPP Government-published booklet introducing the planned Museum said that:

History is an endless flow linking the past, the present and the future. It cannot be expounded upon in a uniform way, but it is open to public debate. History still awaits constant exploration and interpretation … The history we speak of is the history of this land known as Taiwan and its people. Viewing this land “Taiwan” as the stage and the early settlers and recent immigrants that are “Taiwan’s people” as the lead actors, we construct Taiwan’s history as the evolution of interaction between multiple ethnic groups and the natural environment over a great period of time.

(National Museum of Taiwan History Planning Bureau, 2003, pp. 6-7)

From the above article, it may be suggested that the DPP Government, claiming that it represented ‘local’ power, regarded the planned Museum as a significant symbol highlighting Taiwan’s history and culture, rather than those of the Mainland China.

7.3 Stadiums and National Identification

The theoretical framework [p. 32] has suggested that a specific sporting activity can constitute a nation’s cultural feature, and it can be represented by a given city’s sporting facilities. This Section unveils how national sports were associated with the state’s identification schemes in Taiwan, and how they reflected certain sites’ construction and demolition in Taipei City.
The state and the sport

The Japanese learned baseball from the US educators teaching in Japan. In 1898, the sport was introduced by the Japanese colonisers to Taiwan. However, the natives initially regarded baseball as ‘the colonisers’ game’. The condition had not changed until the 1920s where the Colonial Government intended to secure ethnic harmony by beginning to allow the natives to participate in the colony’s political decision making [see Appendix 3]. At that point, the Government also assumed that ‘team’ sports could provide a means of cooperation between the colonisers and the colonised, and therefore made physical education a compulsory course within colonial Taiwan’s educational system. Unsurprisingly, baseball was included in the course. Eventually, the sport became the natives’ main leisure activity (Chen, 1999; Lin, 2002; Slack et al., 2002).

In comparison to baseball, basketball was not popular in colonial Taiwan. However, it had already become popular on the Mainland China after the US military officials introduced it to their KMT counterparts. After the KMT took over Taiwan in 1945, similar to the Japanese colonisers intending to use baseball to unify the colonisers and the colonised, the KMT Government began to apply basketball to forge a new identity among the local Taiwanese population. For instance, the well-trained basketball teams were formed by military and police units in order to enable the locals be identified with them. Moreover, many tournaments were held to celebrate Taiwan’s ‘restoration’ (the end of Japanese colonial rule), Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday, and the KMT’s claimed achievements. The situation continued until the 1960s, when the relationship between the KMT and the CPC began to become less intense (Shu, 2005).
In terms of the baseball’s development in early settler-governing era, although the KMT was practising de-Japanisation at the time, it did not regard baseball as an inappropriate colonial legacy. Thus, the local people were able to play baseball continuously. However, although the KMT Government did not ban baseball, it did not promote the sport in comparison to its dedication to promoting basketball (Chen, 1999; Slack et al., 2002).

In 1968, a significant event ultimately changed the KMT Government’s stance on baseball: a Taiwanese elementary school baseball team defeated the visiting Japanese counterpart in a friendly game in Taipei City. Since the mass media were serving the KMT’s interests at that time, the news reports distorted the game by reporting that the local team had defeated the Japanese national elementary schools ‘champion’. Meanwhile, the general public were happy with this ‘news’ implying a victory over the former colonisers. Under these circumstances, the KMT Government not only realised the Taiwanese youth baseball players’ talent, but also the extent to which baseball could be used for propaganda alongside national identification. Thereafter, the Government began to send youth baseball teams to participate in international games, in which they won the titles frequently. When Taiwan was forced to leave the UN and experiencing a series of diplomatic blows in the 1970s [see Appendix 6, p. 323], these sports victories were used as state propaganda to reassure the public. Eventually, baseball’s as Taiwan’s national sport was confirmed (Chen, 1999; Lin, 2002; Slack et al., 2000).

Clearly, the national basketball teams’ victories were also able to reassure the public when Taiwan encountered the diplomatic crisis in the 1970s (Hsu,
2001b). Nonetheless, after the PRC replaced the ROC’s role as ‘China’ in the UN in 1971, many international organisations began to marginalise Taiwan. Consequently, the International Basketball Federation cancelled ROC’s membership for ten years from 1975. During this period, the only ‘international’ games that the ROC Basketball Team could participate in were the invitation tournaments held by the KMT Government in Taiwan (Shu, 2005). In this light, it may be suggested that in comparison to basketball, Taiwanese baseball gained even more reputation at the ‘restricted’ international level.

The basketball stadium and national identification

When basketball was the favourite game, the KMT constructed several basketball courts in the capital Taipei during the early post-Second-World-War period. One of the most famous indoor basketball stadiums was the Three Armed Stadium, administered by the ROC’s Ministry of National Defense in 1951. It is worth noting that the Stadium also functioned as a theatre/gallery hosting significant artistic events. However, like the basketball game, the artistic events also served the KMT’s identification scheme. For example, an ordinary art events’ title had to include nationalist or anti-Communist slogans (Shu, 2005).

Despite its association with the state’s identification scheme, the Three Armed Stadium was once an important public entertainment venue for the citizens in the capital Taipei. However, it was demolished in 1960 and the location became the present-day Jieshou Park [see Figure 6.3, p. 104] (Kao, 2004; Shu, 2005). Despite the demolition of such an important site being able to connect basketball, art, and national identification, the KMT Government had another plan.
After the ROC gained the right to host the Second Asian Championships Basketball Tournament, the KMT Government persuaded a wealthy overseas Chinese entrepreneur, who had already invested in Taiwan’s hotel industry, to contribute to the construction of a large-scale basketball stadium in Taipei City. Therefore, the Chunghua (literally meaning ‘Chinese’) Stadium [Figure 7.4] was erected in 1960, and used to host the Championships in 1963. When the ROC became marginalised within the world of international basketball [see the previous subsection, pp. 143-4], the Stadium became the most important site where the KMT Government could host its international tournaments (Hsu, 2001b; Lee, 2002a; Shu, 2005).

Like the Three Armed Stadium, the multi-use Chunghua Stadium became an important public entertainment venue in the capital. However, it was destroyed by fire in 1988. The impact was that the KMT Government had no other appropriate stadiums to host major basketball events. Hence, many state-organised tournaments, constituting the only channel for Taiwanese basketball to have contact with foreign teams, were temporarily suspended. Meanwhile, although Taiwan’s basketball standard had always been competitive in comparison to other Asian countries, it began lagging behind its Asian

Figure 7.4—The Chunghua Stadium
counterparts following the Stadium fire (Hsu, 2001b; Shu, 2005). In other words, the site’s abrupt collapse coincidentally reflected Taiwanese basketball’s decay. One can suggest that the situation reinforced baseball’s role as the nation’s national sport.

Incidentally, although the Taipei City Government made plans to build a new stadium on the ground where the burned Chunghua Stadium had stood, due to the incessant disputes between the land-owners and investors, the location had remained undeveloped within one of the City’s important commercial districts (Hsu, 2001b; Lee, 2002a; Shu, 2005). By the time of my fieldwork, nonetheless, in 2006, however, the location was in use for the new metro’s construction.

*The baseball stadium and national identification*

In view of the fact that baseball is Taiwan’s national sport, it is unsurprising that one can encounter baseball parks within many Taiwanese cities. It ought to be noted that, according to the information provided by the Chinese Professional Baseball League (Taiwan’s only professional baseball league), several present-day baseball stadiums in Taiwan are Japanese legacies (*Chinese Professional Baseball League*, 2007a-d). After all, the sport itself was introduced by the Japanese colonisers. However, in contrast to the aforementioned basketball stadiums that were deliberately built by the KMT Government, the construction of the Taipei City Baseball Stadium, which was once Taiwan’s most famous baseball field, came about by chance.

The basic construction of the Taipei City Baseball Stadium was accomplished in 1959. At the beginning, it was used as a multi-use sports field
Figure 7.5—The Taipei City Baseball Stadium
The beginning of Taiwan’s professionalized/commercialised baseball in 1990 reinforced the Taipei City Baseball Stadium’s role as the capital’s important entertainment venue. It was also used to host various other outdoor events. However, due to overuse, the Stadium was ultimately closed after hosting its final professional baseball game on 26th January 2000 (Lee, 2002a).

In contrast to the burned Chunghua Stadium’s impact on Taiwanese basketball [see the previous subsection, pp. 145-6], the Taipei City Baseball Stadium’s demolition did not result in Taiwanese baseball’s decay. As a matter of fact, in view of its other available baseball parks with decent facilities, Taiwan subsequently hosted the 34th Baseball World Cup in 2001 and won the bronze medal. The title ‘Asia number one’ (Cuba won the gold and the US won the silver) once again cheered the Taiwanese (Lin, 2003). In other words, although the site representing good memories has gone, baseball’s role as Taiwan’s national sport remains unshakable.

Incidentally, in 2005, the Taipei Arena [see Figure 7.6, p. 149] was erected at the original location where the Taipei City Baseball Stadium had stood. It was a BOT project\textsuperscript{21}. Like the Taipei City Baseball Stadium, this new multi-use domed-shaped stadium became a significant recreational site in the capital since it has hosted various sports and artistic activities (Lee, 2002a; \textit{Taipei Arena, Eastern Dome Management Co. Ltd.}, visited on 12/01/2007). However, the significant

\textsuperscript{21} BOT (build-operate-transfer) is a project whereby the government allows specific public works to be constructed by the private sector that will be authorised to operate the site and obtain the profit in a limited contractual period. After the end of the period, the government takes over the site.
difference is that the Taipei Arena is unable to function as an indoor baseball stadium.

7.4 Subtle Urban Elements and National Identification

Section 4.3 [see pp. 58-9] mentioned that after the KMT Government took over Taiwan, new street and place names and statues were appearing to create a new national identity. This Section reveals more subtle urban elements in Taipei City that were linked to the state’s identification schemes.

Forgotten daily nationalistic propaganda

The KMT Government’s nationalistic propaganda had once formed part of everyday life until the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation. For instance, state-released lottery tickets were literally named ‘patriotic lottery ticket’ and imprinted with figures of important official buildings and traditional Chinese allegories. Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek’s portraits as well as various anti-Communist and nationalistic slogans were frequently seen on postage stamps (Hsu, 2001c-d).
Likewise, these portraits of important KMT figures and anti-Communist and nationalistic slogans had dominated the capital Taipei’s urban scene during Taiwan’s martial-law period. They were painted on walls of schools and governmental institutions, posted on public transport billboards, or hung on bridges or facades of historic buildings [Figure 7.7] (Hsu, 2001e; Lee, 2001b; Nan, 2001).

Another relevant, yet odder, example is Taipei City’s pavements. The ROC national flag [see Figure 7.8, p. 151] depicts the slogan that the most Taiwanese may be familiar with—‘Blue Sky, White Sun, Red-covered Ground’. The official statement below explains the meaning of the flag:

The 12 points of white in the emblem represent the 12 two-hour periods of the day, symbolizing unceasing progress. At one level, the three colors of blue, white, and crimson stand for the Three Principles of the people, nationalism, democracy, and social well-being [(proposed by Sun Yat-sen, the ROC founder)]. At another level, the colors embody qualities that evoke other concepts enumerated in the Three Principles … a government that is of the people … a government that is by the people … a government that is for the people.

(The Government Information Office, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2005: p. 3)
In 1968, at the time the Taipei Mayor was still appointed by the KMT-led Central Government, the City Government decided to use red bricks to pave the City’s pavements. As a result, the capital’s urban scene would symbolise the ‘Blue Sky, White Sun, Red-covered Ground’. Incidentally, the bricks’ pattern was deliberately designed to denote ancient Chinese coins implying good luck [Figure 7.9] (Lee, 2001c).

Although the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian, the first direct elected Taipei Mayor, changed several subtle urban elements (e.g. street names and status) associated with the KMT Government’s Chinese identification scheme, it seems that he did not notice that these pavements also collectively constituted a settler-state legacy.
with the identification function. The person who later initiated the relevant changes was the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou, who defeated Chen in the 1998 mayoral election. Mayor Ma consulted with the basic-level local authorities and thereafter decided to allow local communities to choose their own patterns and colours for pavements in their living areas. Meanwhile, the City Government also allowed the private sector to adopt some pedestrian areas and decide their appearance (Ibid). The reason why the KMT Mayor did not intend to preserve these old pavements could be that after thirty years, and with their worn-out appearances, these pavements’ original meaning may have already been forgotten. In addition, as mentioned in Section 4.3 [pp. 63-4], Taiwan’s democratisation had already led the general public to become involved in the creation of their built environments; it was therefore unnecessary to cause potential conflict with the empowered citizens.

Architectural styles and national identification

Prior to exploring how the KMT Government applied urban elements’ architectural design to practise its identification scheme, a brief examination is needed of the Western-style Japanese housing legacies. One can still encounter these physical representations of the Taiwanese’s imagined collective colonial memory in present-day Taiwanese cities.

Section 4.3 [see p. 56] mentioned that the Japanese Colonial Government built Western-style official buildings, parks, statues, and monuments in colonial Taipei City in order to create a Western-city image. Meanwhile, Lu (2005) indicates that the Colonial Government also encouraged the natives to build Western-style houses. Nonetheless, the Colonial Government did not force the
natives to follow the official guidelines when re-building their dwellings. Hence, although there were many Western-style official buildings and public places in the City, the natives still lived in traditional Chinese-style houses.

In 1911, a typhoon caused severe damage to colonial Taipei City. Many traditional Chinese-style dwellings of the natives were therefore seriously damaged. The Colonial Government then took this ‘opportunity’ to propose new guidelines for the natives to build new Western-style houses (Ibid). Meanwhile, the location of the present-day Hengyang Road, where many Japanese companies were located, became the starting point for the Colonial Government to experiment with the new guidelines. The project was generally completed in 1914 and the area subsequently became one of the capital Taipei’s most successful commercial spots [see Figure 7.10, p. 154] (Hsu, L. C., 2005; Lee, 2002a). Thereafter, many native businesspeople also began to renovate their shop fronts with Western architectural features in order to attract customers. Some natives even asked the public sector to help them build Western-style living quarters (Lu, 2005). From this, it can be suggested that the Colonial Government successfully made the natives accept the new living environments. In other words, the natives were embracing the new sense of ‘home’ as well as the new identity.

It is worth noting that, according to the documentary sources (e.g. Kang, 2002; Lee, 2005), although the Japanese Colonial Government encouraged the natives to build and live in Western-style houses, most houses in the colonisers’ residential areas were traditional Japanese one-storey houses. The contradiction implies that the colonisers still tried to keep themselves ‘different’ from the colonised and therefore highlighted their superiority. One can still encounter these
old one-storey Japanese houses in present-day Taipei City. Reasons behind their existence to date are discussed in the next Chapter.

Figure 7.10—Changes of Hengyang Road

The upper picture was taken in the late 1880s when the Qing Empire still occupied Taiwan. One can see shabby houses along the Road. The middle one, taken in the 1930s, shows the outcome of the Japanese Colonial Government’s new housing guidelines. The final picture shows present-day Hengyang Road. One can still encounter several Western-style colonial housing legacies (e.g. the building on left side of the picture)
Following the KMT’s occupation of Taiwan, according to the sources that I have investigated, it seems that the Settler State did not establish specific regulations requiring the general public to build Chinese-style houses. Nonetheless, the KMT Government still had Chinese architectural elements added to Taipei City’s built environment. The Grand Hotel and the CKS Memorial Hall examined in Chapter 6 [see pp. 114 and 118] are the main examples. Furthermore, pavilions in parks, phone booths, and many of the capital’s public buildings, such as Taipei Station [Figure 7.11], the National Theater, and the National Concert Hall [see Figure 7.12, p. 156], have Chinese architectural features. Although the nation’s architectural features have become more diverse and hybridised with the coming of democratisation (Lee, 2005), these Chinese-style urban elements still remain familiar to the Taiwanese. After all, they have long been part of people’s everyday life.

Figure 7.11—Taipei Station
7.5 Conclusion

Recalling the literature reviewed in Section 4.3 and considering the case study findings revealed in this Chapter, it can be seen that the Japanese colonisers introduced various previously unknown urban elements, including parks, statues, the museum, baseball grounds, and Western-style housing, to the capital Taipei. By having access to these new urban elements (e.g. visiting the park or the museum, playing in the baseball field, settling in the Western-style dwelling), the natives’ everyday socio-cultural experiences were therefore changed unconsciously, implying shifts in the nation’s collective memory. These subtle urban elements’ permanent influence on Taiwanese identity is evidenced by the fact that some of them still exist in present-day Taipei City.

Meanwhile, the KMT Government, like the Japanese colonisers, also applied similar urban elements (e.g. statues, museums, sports, etc.) to practise
their own national identification schemes. Hence, the home population’s socio-cultural experiences were affected once again. In comparison to the Japanese colonisers, however, the Chinese settler rulers were more active and ‘creative’ in producing the identification messages via different mediums (e.g. sports events, artistic events, posters, pavements, architectural styles, etc.). In fact, one can suggest that the entire Taipei City’s public spaces and facilities collectively constituted a national-identification machine serving the Chinese Settler State’s interests.

The coming of Taiwan’s democratisation resulted in a disregard for or even physical demolition of certain urban elements that were associated with the KMT’s identity manipulation. Moreover, new urban elements, such as the planned museum related to local culture or the buildings featuring mixed architectural styles, have been appearing.

Nevertheless, some subtle settler-state legacies have become widely and deeply rooted within the Taiwanese everyday living environments (e.g. street- and place-names, the National Museum of History, the National Palace Museum, the National Theater, etc.). Even though Taiwan has entered the post-settler era, the DPP Government can only try to ‘change’ some aspects of the past (e.g. the National Palace Museum’s function), rather than eliminating them entirely. In other words, the existence of these subtle urban elements in post-settler Taipei City proves the Chinese Settler State’s deep implications for the nation’s imagined collective memory.
CHAPTER 8
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS (III):
ETHNICITY AND TAIPEI CITY’S URBAN LANDSCAPE

8.1 Introduction

From the previous literature concerned with Taiwan’s history, it can be seen that the region had become a multi-ethnic land by the seventeenth century, given the Han Peoples’ emigration from the Mainland China and their coexistence with the Taiwanese Indigenous People. Moreover, the coming of Japanese colonisers, Chinese settlers, international capitalists, and economic immigrants also means new ethnic groups’ participation in Taiwanese society as part of a process of cultural diversification and hybridisation [see Section 4.3; Appendices 1 and 2).

Clearly, many simple examples can be used to show how developing multiculturalism can be observed in Taiwan’s urban life. For instance, the café was introduced by the Japanese colonisers keen to pursue Westernisation (Shen, 2005). Moreover, some snacks and dishes that can be seen in the local market constitute Chinese-settler legacies (Chen, 2001a; Yeh, 2005). This Chapter therefore aims to examine how different political entities in Taiwanese history gave rise to certain spatial outcomes concerned with particular ethnic groups’ interests. Specifically, Sections 8.2 and 8.3 focus on the once politically predominant Chinese settlers’ impacts on Taipei City. Meanwhile, Sections 8.4 and 8.5 respectively investigate how the Hakka and the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples, both Taiwan’s ethnic minority groups, reclaimed their once suppressed
cultural identities, and how the circumstances reflected the capital Taipei’s urban changes. Finally, Section 8.6 explores why and how the foreign capitalists, strategists, and economic immigrants contributed to the formation of Taipei City’s multicultural urban scene.

8.2 The Chinese Settlers’ Spatial Implications (I)

Sections 4.3 [pp. 56-7] and 7.4 [pp. 153-4] indicated that although the Japanese Colonial Government did not make the Taiwanese natives live in the backwater, the underlying ‘difference’ between the colonisers and the colonised could still be perceived from colonial Taipei’s urban scene. For instance, public parks and transportation were concentrated in the area dominated by the colonisers. Moreover, although the Colonial Government encouraged the natives to build Western-style houses, the colonial officers still lived in traditional Japanese houses. Such arrangements implied the ultimate difference between the colonisers and the colonised, and simultaneously emphasised the colonisers’ superiority. In fact, according to Chao (2005), during the Japanese colonial era, even churches could be built for the colonisers’ use only. Very few native businesspeople could have opportunities to enter the colonisers’ places.

This Section explores how the Chinese Settler State applied Japanese urban legacies and several new tactics to mark the ultimate difference between the settlers and the locals living in the capital Taipei, and what implications emerged during Taiwan’s political transition and post-settler eras.
Section 7.4 [pp. 153-4] briefly mentioned that one can still encounter one-storey traditional Japanese houses, built during Taiwan’s Japanese colonial era, in present-day Taipei City. Why they remain despite the coloniser’s departure is because they have been used to accommodate the Chinese Mainlanders immigrating to Taiwan in the late 1940s. After the KMT occupied Taiwan, it also took over all state-owned properties and businesses. Hence, these former Japanese officials’ living quarters, built in the traditional one-storey Japanese housing style, became the KMT Government’s properties. According to documentary sources (Liu, 2005; Lee, 2002a) and the information given by a member of the City Government’s Department of Cultural Affairs (personal interview, 23/01/2007), apart from accommodating the newly-arrived KMT officials, some of these Japanese houses were also designated to accommodate Mainland Chinese social elites, including high-ranking military men and senior educators.

It is worth noting that one can easily encounter these Japanese housing legacies in the present-day Daan Administrative District of capital Taipei, since the colonisers erected most of their official-use living quarters in this area [see Figure 8.1, p. 161] (Lee, 2002a).

The old Japanese houses in Taipei City are not the only colonial legacy applied by the KMT Government to benefit the newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders. For instance, the Ji Nan Presbyterian Church [see Figure 8.2, p. 162] originally served the Japanese colonisers and the wealthy natives only. In the early post-colonial era, it became the Church for the Mainland Chinese social elite. Although the locals eventually were able to have access to the Church, its Sunday
Mass is still attended by two groups of people, the Mandarin speakers (Chinese Mainlanders and their following generations) and the Minnan speakers (the ‘local’ Taiwanese) (Chao, 2005).

Similarly, the Nanmem Market [see Figure 8.3, p. 163], colonial Taipei City’s most modern and famous indoor market constructed in 1910, was occupied by the Mainland Chinese retailers after the colonisers’ departure (Kang, 2002; Lee, 2001d). Although retailers in the present-day Market include locals, it still functions as the capital’s most famous collection-and-distribution centre of traditional Chinese food.
Figure 8.2—The contested Ji Nan Presbyterian Church

The believers are divided into the Mainlanders and the ‘locals’. Each group belongs to a specific Presbyterian society. Moreover, each society’s name plaque is hung on each site of the Church’s front door (see the upper picture). In addition, each society erected a notice of its religious service time beside the Church (see the lower picture).
Apart from taking advantage of these aforementioned Japanese urban legacies, the settler rulers also created the new urban elements in the capital Taipei to serve the newly-arrived Mainlanders’ interests. For instance, since the 1950s, many bus-ticket kiosks began to be erected on Taipei City’s pavements [see Figure 8.4, p. 164]. They were originally built by the City Government to provide employment for retired KMT soldiers. By the late 1960s, when the private
sector began to enter the market, these kiosks were monopolised by Mainlanders. But, since the beginning of the capital’s pavement-reconstruction project in 2001, these ticket kiosks have been removed (Lee, 2001e).

According to the relevant sources (Discovery Center of Taipei, visited on 07/02/2007; Hsu, 2001f; Hsu, 2005a; Lee, 2001f), another example is the Zhonghua Market. In the Japanese colonial era, there was a railway line running along the present-day Zhonghua Road. After the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan, some KMT soldiers began to illegally construct houses along the railway line and to sell goods and foods. Eventually, this linear illegal settlement became one of the capital’s famous commercial spots due to its cheaper products and services. Despite the negative impact of these illegal shabby houses on the image of capital Taipei, the City Government took no actions against them. One can suggest that it is because, at the time, the KMT Government still believed it would one day re-
conquer the Mainland China and therefore regarded such an inappropriate urban scene as a ‘temporary’ problem.

Interestingly enough, the City Government ultimately ‘legalised’ houses along the railway line by constructing eight three-storey indoor markets at the location. The project was started in 1960 and accomplished in 1962. The markets were collectively named the Zhonghua (meaning ‘Chinese’) Market [Figure 8.5]. Although the Market was not entirely monopolised by the Mainlanders, its various traditional Chinese food and military equipment stalls still implied its origin. Incidentally, as Taiwan’s first big collective market, the Zhonghua Market enabled its surrounding areas to develop rapidly.
However, with increasing modern department stores opening in the capital Taipei, the Zhonghua Market eventually became outmoded. In 1992, the City Government demolished the railway line running along the Zhonghua Road to implement the mass transit underground project. The Market was also demolished for good.

Similar to the case of the Zhonghua Market is the story of Parks No. 14 and 15. In 1932, the Japanese Colonial Government proposed to construct sixteen parks linked by five boulevards in colonial Taipei City in order to present a modern/Western urban image. However, due to the Second Sino-Japan War alongside the Second World War, the Colonial Government was unable to accomplish the project. But, after the colonial era, Taipei City’s main park construction projects have still followed the Japanese Colonial Government’s initial plan (Wang, 2005b).

Parks No. 14 and 15 were two parks the colonisers did not finish. After the KMT took over Taiwan, some Chinese soldiers began to build illegal houses on the land. Eventually, the capital’s largest illegal residency was formed [see Figure 8.6, p. 167] (Hu, 2002; The Department of Cultural Affairs, Taipei City, 2005). Again, it can be suggested that this resulted from the KMT Government’s belief in re-conquering the Mainland and therefore its neglect of the capital Taipei’s comprehensive urban development.
Impacts of the settlers’ spatial privilege

From the previous subsection, one can suggest that after the KMT occupied Taiwan, its urban polices were established to benefit the newly-arrived Mainland Chinese social elites. Meanwhile, its neglect of the illegal built houses’ impacts on Taipei City was benefiting the newly-arrived KMT soldiers.

The circumstances ultimately caused significant consequences. For instance, the KMT Government initially regarded the old Japanese houses as the settler elites’ ‘temporary’ residencies in Taiwan. However, since it never restored the ‘lost’ Mainland China, these temporary residencies have become ‘permanently’ occupied by the first-generation Mainland Chinese residents and their offspring. With the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, although such unequal housing distribution has caused public outrage, both the transitional KMT Government and the DPP Government have had no appropriate measures to deal with this awkward situation. After all, as indicated by the community
representative (personal interview, 13/01/2007) living in the area consisting of many old Japanese houses accommodating the first-generation Mainlanders, it might be seen as cruel to force these old Mainlanders to move out.

According to a member of City Government’s Department of Cultural Affairs (personal interview, 23/01/2007), many of these old Japanese houses have become officially recognised historic buildings. The ideal situation is that after the residents move out or pass away, the houses will formally be revitalised for public use. However, if a resident passes away and his/her offspring still live in the house, no relevant laws are able to force them to leave. Meanwhile, the member also reveals that being able to live in the Japanese urban legacy does not always constitute an advantage to these old Mainlanders. Since many of these Japanese legacies have been designated by the City Government as historic buildings, based on the Cultural Property Preservation Law, which is examined further in Chapter 9, if the resident decides to renovate the house, he/she will have to provide the City Government with feasible construction plans and then wait for its permission. It can result in a long time waiting due to bureaucracy. Of course, the resident can move out to avoid such inconvenience. However, according to the aforementioned community representative (personal interview, ibid), not all of these old-time Mainland Chinese elites are able to afford the purchase or renting of private residencies in present-day Taipei City. Hence, some of them can only be ‘stuck’ in these old houses.

In comparison to the Chinese social elites occupying old Japanese houses, the KMT soldiers’ illegally built dwellings directly caused impacts on Taipei City’s urban planning. The previous subsection [see p. 166] already revealed that
the location of unfinished Parks No. 14 and 15 was the City’s largest illegal residential area formed by newly-arrived KMT soldiers under the KMT Government’s neglect. It is worth noting that after the KMT came to Taiwan, building restrictions were practised in the capital Taipei until 1974 (Chiao, 2002). However, by 1963 it was estimated that there were approximately 52,000 illegal houses, including those settled on the land of Parks No 14 and 15, in Taipei City resulting from the late 1940s’ great Chinese immigration trend. During the 1960s and the 1970s, although the City Government demolished some illegally built houses and simultaneously provided the residents with public housing constituting altogether 10,000 households, illegal residencies still occupied many suburbs or lands originally designated for public park use (Huang, 2005b).

Ultimately, the relevant demolition projects aiming to tackle these illegal dwellings were successfully introduced in the 1990s. Nonetheless, since there were a large number of residents, the illegal houses on the land of Parks No. 14 and 15 remained untouched (Ibid). In March 1997, finally, the DPP Mayor Chen Shui-bian made the controversial decision to demolish the illegal residencies occupying the land. Approximately 3,000 households, including 976 low-income families, were therefore forced to move (Chen, 2001b; Hu, 2002; The Department of Cultural Affairs, Taipei City, 2005).

Parks No. 14 and 15 were eventually restored [see Figure 8.7, p. 170]. However, if the KMT Government had appropriately arranged for these newly-arrived Chinese soldiers to settle in Taiwan, it is unlikely to have so many illegally built residences with their unpleasant impacts on the capital Taipei.
8.3 The Chinese Settlers’ Spatial Implications (II)

In addition to the ordinary Mainlanders, from the above Section, one can see that the Mainland Chinese social elites (e.g. the intellectuals and the KMT officials) and the KMT soldiers were two distinct groups of the Chinese Mainlanders strongly affecting post-colonial Taipei City’s urban scene. Given that the Chinese social elites could settle in old Japanese houses, and the KMT soldiers had to build their own settlements, it seems that the Chinese social elites enjoyed more privileges than the KMT soldiers.

Nonetheless, the KMT Government had been supporting the KMT soldiers and dependents to form specific living quarters across Taiwanese cities. These quarters are known as ‘chuan tsun’ in Mandarin, literally meaning the ‘family-dependent village’. The villages’ formation dates back to 1949 when the KMT had just retreated from China to Taiwan. At the time, a greater wave of Chinese soldiers lived with their families in schools, temples, abandoned Japanese houses,
or self-built illegal houses. Eventually, various military-dependent villages were formed. In 1950, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) began to supervise these villages. Simultaneously, the term ‘chuan tsun’ began to appear in official documentaries (Kuo, 2005). In this light, one can suggest that these originally illegal built military-dependent living quarters ultimately became the officially recognised Mainland Chinese diaspora spaces.

Usually, soldiers of the same service and arms would settle in the same village. Accordingly, the name of each village denoted its residents’ type of military service, its geographical location, its non-governmental institutional sponsor, the troop’s original base on the Mainland, a specific individual, or, inevitably, a nationalist slogan (Ibid).

Some military-dependent villages, like a military base, had restrictions on public access. However, some villages did not have such restrictions, and therefore benefited surrounding areas’ development. For instance, some present-day schools and hospitals were originally built for the use of soldiers and their dependents only. Also, the increasing number of residents might stimulate the growth of local transport networks and commercial activities. Incidentally, some villages even became officially recognised wards included in the city’s administrative system (Ibid).

Nevertheless, not all illegally built residences could become dependent villages recognised by the MND. Parks No. 14 and 15 mentioned in previous subsections [see p. 166] is a relevant example. Moreover, although the KMT Government did not ban the KMT soldiers from illegally building their living quarters, it did not support them either (Huang, 2005b; Kang, 2002). Therefore, in
contrast to the dependent quarters based within old Japanese residencies that offered better living conditions, most self-built military-dependent villages were run-down. For instance, the residents had to use public toilets; the building materials were often inferior; and the lanes separating individual houses were very narrow. In addition, the houses might be extended to accommodate more family members, thereby exacerbating the poor conditions. Even high-ranking military figures might live in these shabby settlements (Kuo, 2005). As before, it can be suggested this was because the KMT Government, with the hope that it would re-conquer the Mainland China ultimately, regarded these military-dependent villages as the soldiers’ temporary settlements, and therefore ignored their living conditions.

Not until 1957, the KMT Government began to improve the military-dependent villages’ conditions by soliciting contributions from or directly taxing the private sector. This gave the MND sufficient financial support to search for private construction companies to build new villages on land that was MND-owned, or bought or rented from the general public (Ibid).

Nevertheless, although the soldiers’ living conditions began to improve, many of these originally illegally built villages still affected Taiwan’s urban development. As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s, the KMT Government launched several public housing projects to permanently settle the veterans of some villages, which would then be demolished (Lee, 2002a). Meanwhile, the MND itself also tried to solve the relevant problem. According to the MND staff (personal interview, 08/01/2007) in charge of the management of military-dependent village,
a plan that was proposed and commenced from 1980 onwards was based on the following three tactics:

(1) The MND would subsidise the residents’ renovation of their dwellings;

(2) The MND would build new residences and would subsidise the soldiers to purchase them;

(3) The MND would provide the Central or local governments with land to construct public housing. The households would be allocated to the institutions participating in the public housing project. Meanwhile, the MND would subsidise the veterans’ purchase of their housing.

It ought to be noted that although the above measures appeared to be successful in terms of improving the image of the old villages and of catering for Taiwan’s urban development, they still had unexpected consequences. For instance, despite the MND’s subsidy, some soldiers were still unable to afford the new residencies. Hence, some new public housing units ended up vacant. In addition, in comparison to the military-dependent villages, public housing offered a ‘multi-ethnic’ living environment. Therefore, the old Mainlanders might be unable to adapt themselves to a new environment (Kuo, 2005).

What is more, the crucial issue, according to the MND staff (personal interview, ibid), was that the above three tactics were not legislated by the Central Government, and the MND was therefore unable to execute them efficiently. The
‘Enforcement Rules of the Act for Rebuilding Old Quarters for Military Dependents’ were not formally introduced until 1996. Apart from giving the MND more financial support, the new Act allows the land where the bigger dependent villages stand to be used as the site where the new flat complexes will be erected. The new construction can house people both from the original bigger village and from other surrounding smaller villages. Meanwhile, the land of the smaller villages can be sold and the proceeds used to build more apartment complexes. Of course, prior to the implementations of the construction project, the MND and the residents can negotiate the subsidy.

According to the MND’s online archive (National Defense Laws and Regulations Archive, updated 21/06/2007), there was an Article 6 in the original Act stating that if the resident passed away, his/her partner or offspring were able to inherit his/her unit. However, the Article was deleted on 16th September 1998. One can suggest that the Article’s deletion implied that the transitional KMT Government began to regard military-dependent villages as unique spatial products that needed to be carefully considered, rather than allowing them to organically develop and be continuously occupied by those Mainland Chinese diasporas without the state’s interference. After all, if the new flat complex still had been officially allocated to those veterans’ partners or successor generations, this controversy could have kept emerging among the general public.

Although the new Act aims to enable the MND to efficiently eliminate old military-dependent villages, several issues remain. For example, some residents are still unable to afford the new housing; the once close relationships formed in older neighbourhoods might disappear when residents are rehoused in separate
apartment dwellings; and many old veterans might be reluctant to spend time and
energy moving to new places (Kuo, 2005). After all, given that they have lost
their original homes on the Mainland China, these Chinese settlers may not want
to lose their sense of home again.

The above discussion shows that Taiwan’s public housing projects were
originally introduced to accommodate the residents whose dependent villages
were affecting urban planning. An interesting implication is that, in Taiwan, the
terms ‘military-dependent village (chuan tsun)’ and ‘public housing’ became
characteristically overlapped. Nonetheless, as the MND staff (personal interview,
ibid) suggests, with not only the departure of the soldiers and their families but
also the participation of new residents, these ‘dependent villages/public housing’
will become ‘real’ public housing in the future.

By visiting some of these ‘dependent villages/public housing’ in present-
day Taipei City, one can still find clues indicating the sites’ origins. The
surrounding areas of Taipei City’s Qingnia Park can serve as an example. One can
see many dependent villages/public housing located there, standing since 1975
when the City Government authorised their construction [see Figure 8.8, p. 176]
(Lee, 2002a). During a visit, I discovered that although it was an ordinary day,
ROC national flags were still hung out of some buildings. Furthermore, several
restaurants declared their cooking of Chinese dishes originating from specific
places on the Mainland China. Moreover, I found some old people sitting in the
community centres to socialise with each other. Given their accents, they could be
KMT veterans. Incidentally, the interiors of some of these community centres
Two public housing quarters near Qingnia Park

The upper picture shows the Guoxing (nation-rise) Community; whereas the lower picture shows the Zili (self-strength) Community. They were originally built to solve the impacts on urban planning caused by the demolition of illegally built military-dependent villages located in the area.

were decorated with the ROC national flags, national symbols, and nationalist slogans.
Although the legislation of the ‘Enforcement Rules of the Act for Rebuilding Old Quarters for Military Dependents’ accelerated the demolition of military-dependent villages across Taiwanese cities, the condition ultimately generated outcries amongst some scholars and politicians who believed that such unique urban products ought to be preserved. Eventually, many cities began to hold theme fairs and festivals to highlight the history of their military-dependent villages. Some cities even planned to transform the old villages into thematic museums (Kuo, 2005). Taipei City was the city with the most dependent villages. However, it was also the first city where the policies regarding the demolition and reconstruction of the old villages took place. Hence, as the MND staff (personal interview, ibid) indicates, in present-day Taipei City, there are now no real old military-dependent villages consisting of shabby houses and narrow alleys.

Nonetheless, an old village in Taipei City, namely Si-Si Nan Cun (literally meaning ‘Forty Four South Village’), has been revitalised as a public space to represent the classic image of the military-dependent village. According to the relevant sources (Lee, 2002a; Xinyi Public Assembly Hall, visited on 16/01/2007), the site was a military storage room during the Japanese Colonial era. After the KMT took over Taiwan, by 1948, the storage room became the base of the KMT Government’s 44th Arsenal. Subsequently, the Arsenal’s soldiers and their dependents formed the Si-Si Nan Cun beside the base. Even after the Arsenal was removed in 1978, these retired veterans and their families still lived in the Si-Si Nan Cun.

In 1980, the MND proposed to demolish Si-Si Nan Cun and settle the residents in new public housing. Si-Si Nan Cun was located in Xinyi Planning
District [Figure 8.9], one of the capital Taipei’s important business districts, which will be explored further in Chapter 9. Given this fact, the MND’s proposal was justifiable.

In 1988, the residents agreed to MND’s subsidies for moving to the new public housing that would be ready by 1999. However, concerns over the demolition of their initial homeland in Taiwan did not take long to surface. With the time of their relocation approaching, petitions from the residents were presented to both the Central and City Governments in the late 1990s.

Ultimately, the Si-Si Nan Cun’s classic image of the old military-dependent village, in comparison to its 247 counterparts within the capital Taipei, led to the City Government’s decision to preserve it. After the residents moved out in 1999, the relevant land-use policies and restoration plans began to be
implemented. In 2003, the completed project made the revitalised Si-Si Nan Cun become not only the model representation of the classic military-dependent village, but also provided the Xinyi Public Assembly Hall [Figure 8.10]. The surrounding area, including old bomb shelters, has been designed as a public park. As a result, the capital Taipei is able to retain the physical evidence representing the post-war Mainland Chinese immigrants’ participation in Taiwanese society.

8.4 The Hakka’s Ethnic Sites

Section 4.3 [p. 51] mentioned that Han People constitute Taiwan’s ethnic majority, and they can be further divided into three subgroups: the Chinese Mainlander (coming to Taiwan in the late 1940s), the Hokkien (Hoklo), and the Hakka. Given the Mainlanders’ political privilege and the Hokkien’s predominant population, the Hakka constitutes Taiwan’s ethnic minority. This Section
investigates how the Hakka overcame their marginalisation within Taiwanese society, and how this change was reflected in Taipei City’s changing urban landscape.

*The invisible Hakka*

The Hakka and the Hokkien have been part of the Han population emigrating from the Mainland China to Taiwan since the seventeenth century (Council for Cultural Affairs Executive Yuan, 2001). Despite their different cultural backgrounds and languages, in the early years of exploring ancient Taiwan, these two ethnic groups had co-operated to fight with the Taiwanese Indigenous People when competing for natural resources or territories. However, with the population’s increase, conflict between these two groups also emerged. As a result, the more predominant Hokkiens forced some Hakkas to move to other unexplored areas (Hsu et al., 2002). In the case of ancient Taipei Basin, after being defeated by the Hokkiens, some Hakkas moved to the areas surrounding present-day Taoyuan, Xinzhu, and Miaoli. Nowadays, these three cities are still perceived as areas of Hakka concentration in north Taiwan (Tai and Wen, 1998).

The Japanese Colonial Government was the first political entity to conduct a comprehensive census in Taiwan. In its census records, the Colonial Government clearly distinguished the Hokkien from the Hakka. However, after the KMT took control of Taiwan, in its first census conducted in 1956, the KMT Government divided the Han population into two categories based on ‘place-of-origin’. According to that system, the Hokkien populace was registered as coming from Fujian Province on the Mainland China, and the Hakkas were registered as
coming from the Guangdong Province. This arrangement was based on the idea that each Province had its own ethnic group as the relative majority (Ibid). Clearly, the local Han’s ancestors did not just come from two Chinese Provinces alone. One can suggest that the system constituted an identity policy enabling the KMT Government to legitimise the connection between the Taiwanese Han population and that on the Mainland China.

In 1992, the transitional KMT Government formally cancelled the ‘place-of-origin’ section in the citizens’ residence registration records. However, due to that early inaccurate survey method, Taiwan’s Hakka population could only be an estimate based on early Japanese accounts and KMT Government archives (Hsu et al., 2002; Tai and Wen, 1998). In 2004, a more accurate survey was conducted by the DPP Government’s Council for Hakka Affairs (2004). This 2004 survey estimated that the number of Hakka population in Taiwan was approximately 3,048,000, or 13.5 per cent of the region’s entire population. Moreover, the survey also reported that the Hakka community accounted for 11.7 per cent of the capital Taipei’s population. The approximate number was 307,70022.

Reclaiming Hakka identity

As already mentioned above, in the early Han emigration era, many Hakkas were forced to live in Taiwan’s unexplored areas. When most explored areas began to experience urbanisation, many Hakka communities were therefore still engaged in the agricultural sector. In the 1950s, the KMT began to change its focus from developing the agriculture sector to light industry in order to boost

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22 In that 2004 survey, several criteria were set up to identify the Hakkas. They included ‘self-identifying’, ‘language’, ‘ancestor’, etc. In this thesis, I use the criterion of self-identifying.
Taiwan’s economy. Under these circumstances, many Hakkas began to move into urban areas to seek job opportunities. Subsequently, many urban-based Hakka societies began to appear since the 1960s (Hsu et al., 2002).

During the martial law period, these Hakka societies only functioned as platforms for the Hakkas living in the close urban areas to connect and socialise. However, with the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, these grassroots organisations became significant actors enabling the Taiwanese Hakka to reclaim their suppressed identity (Hsu et al., 2002; Hsiao and Huang, 2001). For instance, the Righteous People Ceremony, a significant Hakka religious festival only held in the cities where the Hakka population was in the majority, was held for the first time in the capital Taipei on 19th August 1988, due to the coordination of several Taipei-based Hakka societies (Hsu et al., 2002; Tai and Wen, 1998). Since then, the Ceremony has been held in Taipei City every year. In 2000, the City Government replaced those grassroots Hakka societies’ role as the main actor to organise the event (Hakka Culture Center, visited on 21/01/2007).

More importantly, on 28th December 1988, in Taipei City, the first Hakka social movement, namely ‘Reclaiming Our Mother Tongue Movement’, was held in order to appeal to the KMT Government to promote Hakka culture and language, which were strongly suppressed in the martial law era (Hsu et al., 2002). The Movement made the DPP become more active to improve the Taiwanese Hakka’s cultural rights (Tai and Wen, 1998). Subsequently, the KMT lost several regional elections due to the Hakka communities’ votes for the DPP (Hsiao and Huang, 2001). This result made the KMT Government acknowledge the Taiwanese Hakka’s political influence. Therefore, along with several grassroots
Hakka social movements taking place in Taipei City, the KMT Government began to make new policies serving the Taiwanese Hakkas’ interests. For instance, in November 1989, at which time the mass media had not been totally freed, the television stations began to broadcast thirty-minute Hakka-speaking programmes (Tai and Wen, 1998). Moreover, in 1997, many public transportation services were required to use the Hakka language when they broadcast information to passengers (Hsu et al., 2002).

In short, due to the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation and the grassroots Hakka nationalists’ efforts, the Taiwanese Hakka began to use the capital Taipei as the stage to demonstrate their capability to influence political decision making, and therefore began the process of reclaiming their self-identification.

*Remembering the Hakka in Taipei City*

After elaborating on how Taiwan’s changing political landscape enabled the Taiwanese Hakka to reclaim their identity, one may question how Taiwan’s urban landscape could reflect this change.

In the case of the capital Taipei, by tracing back to ancient Taipei Basin’s exploration history, it can be pointed out that the temples were the centres of the Han People’s enclaves when they began to explore the region. In this light, one can associate relevant temples in Taipei City with the presence of the ancient Hakkas (Tai and Wen, 1998).

Moreover, according to the Colonial and KMT Governments’ records and several contemporary small-scale surveys, since the Japanese colonial era, the majority of the capital Taipei’s Hakka population has been concentrated around
present-day Zhongzheng District, with the Daan and Songshan Districts being the second and the third Hakka populace concentrations respectively [see the relative positions on Figure A.1, p. 331]. More specifically, they are situated on Nanchang Road, Tongan Street, Wolong Street, Tonghua Street, and Shipai Road. The story behind the formation of these Hakka enclaves began with the Japanese colonisers’ departure from Taiwan. Some of the colonisers’ abandoned houses in these areas were eventually occupied by the local Hakka communities. From the 1950s onwards, in order to live with neighbours bearing the same ethnic roots, many Hakkas from other Taiwanese regions also chose these spots as their first settlements in Taipei City (*Hakka Culture Center*, visited on 21/01/2007).

Although I did not have many chances to hear the residents speaking the Hakka language when I visited these Hakka enclaves, I did encounter temples and restaurants related to Hakka culture. Moreover, I found that the areas were packed with furniture shops, shoemaking stores, and traditional Chinese pharmacies. These industries are believed to have been set up by the first-generation Hakkas settling in the capital Taipei (Tai and Wen, 1998).

It seems that if one lacks basic knowledge on the Hakka’s religions and the migration history in Taipei City, it can be difficult to notice these Hakka enclaves since one of the Hakka’s most distinct characteristics—Hakka language—cannot be ‘seen’. Nonetheless, there are three venues in Taipei City, namely, the Hakka Culture Hall, the Hakka Art and Culture Center, and the Taipei Northern Hakka Culture Hall, where one is able to see the Hakkas freely demonstrate their cultural roots.
The Hakka citizens’ interests have been incorporated within the City Government’s policy-making since the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian acted upon this initiative in the 1994 Taipei mayoral election (Hsu et al., 2002; Tai and Wen, 1998). However, like the stories concerned with how the Hakkas were able to reclaim identity, the formation of these three Hakka-cultural sites was also due to the efforts of the grassroots Hakka figures. According to the staff of the City Government’s Hakka Affairs Commission (personal interview, 24/01/2007), the projects of the Hakka Culture Hall [Figure 8.11] and the Hakka Art and Culture Center [see Figure 8.12, p. 186] were initially proposed by grassroots Hakka organisations. Although the City Government has subsidised the sites’

Figure 8.11—The Taipei Hakka Culture Hall
The Hall’s appearance deliberately combines the architectural factors, such as bricks and rough stones, of traditional Hakka dwellings
construction since 1998, it was not until 1999 that the City Government formally established a specialist team under the Department of Civil Affairs to promote these two sites by organising several cultural events. In 2001, the project of Taipei Northern Hakka Culture Hall was also implemented. In the following year, the City Government formally set up the Hakka Affairs Commission to take over these three sites’ management. Incidentally, all of the sites are built on land formerly occupied by government buildings or offices.

When I visited these Hakka-cultural sites, I encountered many collections related to Hakka culture. Moreover, I discovered that the sites would regularly
host events, such as Hakka music concerts, language tutorials, and traditional operas. More specifically, inside the sites, I heard people speaking the Hakka language; in contrast to my experience when visiting the places supposed to constitute the capital Taipei’s Hakka enclaves. It can be suggested that due to the grassroots Hakka nationalists’ efforts, the capital Taipei can own these three Hakka-cultural sites that represent not only the Hakka’s recognition within Taiwanese society, but also an improved tolerance of different cultures and ethnic groups in Taiwan.

8.5 The Taiwanese Indigenous People’s Ethnic Sites

The Hokkien, the Hakka, and the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples collectively constitute the ‘home population’ having been governed by two ‘outside’ regimes, including the Japanese Colonial Government and the KMT Government. But it can be argued that the Taiwanese Indigenous People represent the ‘real natives’, given that their ancestors were already living in Taiwan prior to the Hokkien’s and Hakka’s arrival in the seventeenth century. In present-day Taiwan, there are thirteen official recognised Taiwanese Indigenous tribes (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2007a). Moreover, due to their distinct living environments, the Taiwanese Indigenous People can generally be divided into two categories, namely, the ‘Plains Tribes’ and the ‘High Mountains Tribes’. At the end of 2007, a government survey reported that there were 484,174 Indigenous population in Taiwan (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 28/01/008), occupying approximately 2 per cent of the region’s total population. This Section aims to
examine how these real natives could contribute to the formation of capital
Taipei’s multicultural urban scene.

*The suppressed Taiwanese Indigenous People*

Despite being the ‘real natives’, the Indigenous People’s imagined
collective memories were consistently affected by different political entities
featured in Taiwan’s history. For instance, the Dutch colonisers had introduced
Western religion to the Taiwanese Indigenous People. Afterwards, when Cheng
Cheng-kung and the Qing Empire were ruling Taiwan, the Indigenous Peoples
witnessed mass waves of Han immigrants and therefore adopted a new culture.
Moreover, the Japanese Colonial Government had tried to culturally assimilate the
Indigenous population in order to exploit the natural resources within tribal
territories; the relevant story is revealed later. The KMT’s Chinese identification
schemes strongly suppressed Indigenous identity (e.g. the Indigenous People were
forced to have Chinese names). The Plains Tribes were affected more than the
High Mountains Tribes since the former’s living areas were more accessible
(Hsieh, 1987). In January 2007, the Sakizaya was just officially recognised as the
thirteenth Indigenous tribe (*BBC NEWS*, 17/01/2007). This suggests that there
may be more Indigenous tribes ‘hiding’ within Taiwan, since their self-identity
has been suppressed over the years.

Shifts in the Taiwanese Indigenous People’s collective identity and the
changes of their living environments are interrelated. Given that many useful
natural resources were located in the Indigenous People’s living territories, the
Japanese Colonial Government had been planning to control the Indigenous
population, especially the High Mountains Tribes. At first, the colonisers tried to understand the Indigenous’ cultures and languages. Eventually, the colonisers were able to socialise with the tribes and therefore were able to have access to tribal lands to gain the relevant information, for example, on the presence and extent of natural resources. Subsequently, colonial regulations were introduced declaring that the lands were state-owned. The circumstances generated great dissatisfaction amongst the Indigenous People who regarded the lands as their livelihood. Ultimately, in 1902, a severe battle between the colonisers and the Indigenous People broke out. After oppressing the rebellion, the Colonial Government began to use armed force to threaten the Indigenous People. With its efficient control, since 1915, the Government began to train and force the Indigenous People to help it exploit natural resources. Such a tactic led to another serious riot in 1930. Finally, the Colonial Government decided to use compulsory education to change the Indigenous People’s customs; and therefore made them obey the colonisers (Fujii, 2001). One can argue that this last measure, constituting a cultural assimilation policy, was able to fundamentally affect Indigenous identity.

After the end of the Second World War, the newly-arrived KMT Government’s relevant land policies once again caused an identity conflict for the Indigenous People. Although the colonisers distinguished Indigenous tribes’ territories from those of the Hokkien and the Hakka, the KMT Government did not recognise individual tribes within administrative districts where the authorities were usually Han Peoples. Consequently, tribe leaders lost their power.
Meanwhile, the younger Indigenous generations also lost their sense of tribal territory (Ibid).

Moreover, by consulting the Japanese colonisers’ natural resources survey record, the KMT Government claimed that certain Indigenous’ territories were state-owned and called them ‘preserved lands’ (Hsieh, 1987). In other words, like the colonisers, the newly-arrived settler rulers also intended to take advantage of these lands’ economic value. According to Fujii (2001), in 1951, when the KMT Government began to promote Taiwan’s agriculture sector, many preserved lands were transformed into agricultural land. In the mid-1950s, the KMT Government thought that Indigenous culture could be a tourist attraction; and therefore transformed many preserved lands into private ownership in its attempts to develop Taiwan’s tourist industry. These land use changes were intended to promote the nation’s economy. However, without appropriate support measures, many Indigenous landowners sold these transformed lands to the Han entrepreneurs. As a result, once again, many Indigenous People lost their sense of tribal territory and identity.

*Moving from tribes to cities*

In the late 1950s, when the KMT Government began to promote light industry, Taiwan’s agricultural sector started to decline. Under this condition, increasingly more Indigenous People moved to Taiwan’s urban areas in pursuit of job opportunities since their mountainous homelands were eventually sold to the Han entrepreneurs. However, due to their distinct cultures and languages different from those of the Han majority, most of Indigenous People could only engage in
unskilled or physical work, and settled in suburbs (Ibid). What is more, the mass media and state-edited textbooks even portrayed them as the ethnic group with limited or no education and economic means. The circumstances not only affected the Indigenous People’s chances of finding jobs but also their self-esteem (Hsieh, 1987). Overall, it can be suggested that in comparison to the nation’s other ethnic groups, the Taiwanese Indigenous People’s self-identity was strongly suppressed; and their living territories within urban areas were relatively further marginalised.

Resurgent Indigenous’ identity

With the Indigenous People living increasingly in urban areas, came opportunities for consolidation amongst these long-time suppressed ethnic minorities. For instance, several Indigenous societies founded by students or cultural and religious elites began to appear in the capital Taipei from the early 1980s. Moreover, prior to the DPP’s formal establishment, many Indigenous nationalists had got involved in the anti-KMT social movements organised by people who later became DPP figures in order to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with their communities’ marginalisation (Ibid).

With the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, the Indigenous People strove more actively. For instance, two ‘Giving My Lands Back Movements’ were held in 1987 and 1988 in Taipei City. As a result, although some ‘preserved lands’ were still controlled by the Han businesspeople, the KMT Government stopped proclaiming that the lands were state-owned (Fujii, 2001). Moreover, in 1991, the term ‘Mountain Compatriots’, referring to the Taiwanese Indigenous People, first appeared in the ROC Constitution. However, such term caused
dissatisfaction amongst the Indigenous Peoples. With the relevant social movements and changes taking place, ultimately, in 1997, the new term ‘Indigenous Peoples’ was adopted by the Constitution to emphasise that the Indigenous were composed of many tribes that collectively constituted an distinct ethnic group within Taiwanese society (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2007b).

Overall, one can indicate that the Indigenous communities further realised their marginalisation within Taiwanese society through interactions with other ethnic groups in the context of urban life. Democratisation then provided them with opportunities to use the capital Taipei as the stage to widely demonstrate their resentment, and eventually to reclaim their dignity. This process, to a certain point, echoes how the Taiwanese Hakkaas reclaimed their cultural rights as well as self-identification mentioned in the previous Section [see pp. 181-3].

Apart from these grassroots social movements, the Indigenous politicians also directly influenced the transitional KMT Government’s decision-making. For example, the Council of Aboriginal Affairs was established under the Executive Yuan in 1996 (Fujii, 2001). After several changes of the Central Government’s administrative system, the organisation was renamed as the Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP) in 2002 (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2007c).

The DPP Government also made several policies serving the Indigenous People’s interests. For instance, in 2005, the Government declared the 1st August to be the ‘Indigenous Peoples Day’ given that the term ‘Indigenous Peoples’ was initially adopted by the Constitution on that day of 1997 (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2007b). Furthermore, in the same year, the curriculum materials covering different Indigenous tribes’ languages were published by the Ministry of
Education and the CIP (Mo, 16/01/2005). In addition, the Indigenous Television Network began to operate in 2005 (Gluck, 01/07/2005).

Interestingly enough, one year before the KMT Government announced the setting up of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs, Taipei City Government had already been requested by both governmental and non-governmental Indigenous figures to establish the Indigenous Peoples Commission. In 1996, the Commission became Taiwan’s first government institution serving the Indigenous People’s interests (Indigenous Peoples Commission, Taipei City Government, 2004), although it could only take care of the capital Taipei’s Indigenous citizens. The Commission has made policies concerned with vocational advice, education subsidy, and cultural preservation. By the end of 2007, there were 12,544 Indigenous People living in Taipei City (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 28/01/2008), less than 0.5 per cent of the capital’s whole population.

It seems likely that the City Government established the Indigenous Peoples Commission ahead of the Central Government because the capital Taipei had become the stage for the Indigenous nationalists to reclaim their interests since the late 1980s. This made the politicians aware of the Indigenous citizens’ political influence. Actually, as the first Mayor openly supporting the Hakka citizens’ interests [see the previous Section, p. 185], the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian was also the Mayor who allowed the Indigenous Peoples Commission to be established. One may question whether Mayor Chen’s motivation was for getting votes from the Hakka and Indigenous citizens, but whatever the reason, his policies have benefited these two minority groups living in the capital Taipei.
Remembering the Indigenous People in Taipei City and emerging issues

At a spatial level, the Indigenous Peoples Commission also contributed to the construction of several Indigenous-cultural sites in the capital Taipei. For instance, the Aborigine Culture Theme Park was built in 2000 [Figure 8.13]. It was deliberately constructed next to the National Palace Museum [see Section 7.2, pp. 138-9]. Given that the Museum is famous for its Chinese cultural relics, this arrangement symbolises the significance of Indigenous culture to Taiwan. Incidentally, the Park’s design caused several disputes between non-Indigenous designers, Indigenous artists, and government institutions. These took time to resolve and reconstruction continued until 2002 (Indigenous Peoples Commission, Taipei City Government, 2006).

Another Indigenous-cultural site is the Ketagalan Culture Center [see Figure 8.14, p. 195] built in 2002. The Center is located in Beitou Administrative District [see Figure A.1, p. 331], where an Indigenous tribe—Ketagalan—had lived in ancient Taipei Basin (Ketagalan Culture Center of the Indigenous
Peoples Commission, Taipei City Government, 2008a-b). The Center functions as a museum featuring the Taiwanese Indigenous People's culture and arts. It is also used for Indigenous education and training. The Shop inside the Center is the one of four Indigenous Shops set up by the Commission since 2001 to promote Indigenous culture and help the Indigenous citizens earn more income (Alin, 2007).

As noted previously, with Taiwan’s economic development, many Indigenous People began to move to urban areas to seek for job opportunities, usually accompanied by their families. Waves of urban immigration occurred in the 1950s and 1970s (Liao and Li, 2000). Given that most of these new urban residents could only engage in low-paid labour work at the time, many Indigenous communities were formed in the suburbs in the late 1970s (Liao and Li, 2000;
Yen and Yang, 2000). In the case of Taipei City, present-day Neihu and Nankang Administrative Districts [see Figure A.1, p. 331] are areas where the capital’s Indigenous population is concentrated since they were the capital Taipei’s suburbs (Yen and Yang, 2000; Fu, 2001).

Some of this suburban Indigenous housing was built illegally and therefore affected urban planning (Yen and Yang, 2000). It also gave rise to the capital Taipei’s first Indigenous-People public housing project [Figure 8.15]. According to a senior staff member of the City Government’s Indigenous Peoples Commission (personal interview, 20/11/2007a), the story dates back to the early
1990s. At the time, an Indigenous dwelling, including approximate twenty households, was illegally built in the Neihu Administrative District. The residents called the site ‘Happy Village’. The Village’s inadequate living condition was revealed by the mass media. In response to the public opinion, the City Government designated the Building C of the nearby Donghu Public Housing as a rental house serving not only the Villagers but also other Indigenous citizens. Thereafter, neighbouring Building E was also designated to serve the same purpose.

These two Indigenous People housing blocks, accommodating 74 households, are managed by the City Government’s Indigenous People Commission. They are also used to hold events organised by the Commission and the Indigenous citizens. The two blocks are called ‘Upper Tribe’ and ‘Lower Tribe’ respectively and have elected tribe chiefs. Currently, the female Indigenous citizens with specific conditions (e.g. the domestic violence victim) have priority to rent these units. Low-income Indigenous citizens also can make application. Incidentally, in 2001, the capital Taipei became the pilot city where 10-per-cent of some public housing will be rented to the low-income Indigenous citizens only.

However, the other Indigenous Peoples Commission staff member (personal interview, 20/11/2007b) reveals that the Commission has encountered some residents being unable to pay rent. In view of this problem, the Commission may need to give the residents guidance in financial management or even force them to move out. Meanwhile, a real task for the Commission in managing the houses is that some tenants may be unable to get used to urban life. According to the Commission staff (personal interview, ibid) and the community representative
(personal interview, 22/11/2007) of the area where the Donghu Public Housing is located, there are sometimes instances of anti-social behaviour and tension between Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents, resulting in complaints to the Commission. As a result, the Commission has responded by trying to work with the tenants to improve living conditions in the area.

8.6 The Spatial Implications of the ‘New Immigrants’

The previous three Sections examine the urban policies and sites associated with Taiwan’s three ethnic minorities, including the (politically predominant) Chinese Mainlanders, the Hakka, and the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples. However, there are still other ‘new immigrants’ who have shaped the capital Taipei’s multicultural urban scene and simultaneously contributed to the formation of part of Taiwanese identity concerned with the nation’s developing multiculturalism. The Section reveals those stories.

Western influential power and its spatial implications

Due to its defeat with Western countries’ coalition in the war, the Qing Empire was forced to open several harbours to the Western countries in the 1860s. Hence, increasing Western businesspeople were able to come to west Taipei City where the locals already formed commercial spots around the ports. Against this background, Dadaocheng began to develop [see Appendix 2].

In view of Dadaocheng’s development, in 1885, Governor Liu Ming-chun designated the region as the capital Taipei’s central business district. Meanwhile, the area of the present-day Gueide Street, located next to the Dadaocheng Wharf,
was designated as the foreign nationals’ residential quarter. Therefore, several local entrepreneurs helped their foreign business partners build churches and Western-style houses along the Street (Chih, 2003). Nowadays, one can still see some of these Western-style buildings on Gueide Street [Figure 8.16].

According to the sources investigated in this study, it seems that the Westernised Japanese colonisers did not set up specific areas in the capital Taipei to accommodate foreign nationals. On the other hand, the KMT Government built several sites to serve this purpose, though for US soldiers, rather than foreign businesspeople. One of the sites was located at present-day Tienmou in the Shilin Administrative District [see Figure A.1, p. 331]. It is worth noting that ‘Tienmou’ is not an officially recognised region but a name used by the locals to refer the area including the present-day Sixth and Seventh Sections of the Zhongshan North Road, and Tienmou West and East Roads. The origin of the name is from
the construction of a Japanese Shinto shrine named Tienmou Jinja in the area in 1933; and the locals therefore began to use ‘Tienmou’ as a geographical indicator (Lee, 2002b). In other words, the name is a Japanese colonial legacy.

The story of the site’s formation dates back to 1951. At the time, in view of the rapid spread of Communist power over the Mainland China and North Korea, the US sent its Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Taiwan, the region bearing great strategic value in the west Pacific [see Figure 4.1, p. 51]. In consideration of the CPC’s threat, clearly, the KMT Government accepted the MAAG’s coming. In order to accommodate these US military figures and their families, the KMT Government built a living quarter in Tienmou. The area constituted one of the capital’s suburbs at the time. However, the area began to develop and many shops, pubs, and restaurants were opened to sell Western products or food that these newcomers were familiar with. Although the MAAG departed in 1978 due to the termination of ROC-US diplomatic relations [see Appendix 6], Tienmou’s infrastructures and atmosphere still attract many foreign countries’ representatives and the ROC’s foreign nationals to settle there. The American School and the Japanese School are also located in the area. With its high-income residents, Tienmou has become an up-market cosmopolitan place in the capital Taipei [see Figure 8.17, p. 201] (Ibid).

Another place in Taipei City associated with the US military’s urban legacy is the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road. The lands around the Fourth Section of the Road, in which the present-day Taipei Fine Arts Museum and the Taipei Artistic Park stand, were the MAAG’s command base [near the present-day Grand Hotel, see the relative location on Figure 6.5, p. 108]. Hence,
Foreign schools, luxury residential complexes, international bank branches, pubs and fine shopping malls are the US military’s and foreign residents’ collective legacies in Tienmou. Several Western entertainment venues and US military living quarters were erected at the Third Section of the Road. Meanwhile, the locals also started to provide these newcomers with relevant commercial services. For example, foreign book-stores, cafés, restaurants, music shops, markets, and pubs were opened along the Road. These services not only catered for the MAAG personnel stationed in Taiwan, but also for US soldiers who participated in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, who used Taiwan as their holiday base (Cheng, 2005; Hsu, 2005b; Hu, 2002).
After the MAAG’s departure, the lands of its command base were taken over by the ROC’s MND and were finally used for the establishment of the aforementioned Museum and Park (Hu, 2002). Meanwhile, according to the former community representative living in the area (personal interview, 19/01/2007), the pubs’ business declined dramatically due to the US soldiers’ departure. Therefore, most of the tenants moved to the low-rent houses on the Third Section’s lanes. Eventually, a special night life spot was formed [Figure 8.18]. Nowadays, these US legacies’ main customers are the locals, rather than foreign nationals.
Remembering the immigrant spouses

In today’s society, issues of identity and ethnicity are a serious matter that cannot be denied or deliberately overlooked. My colleagues and I, in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the governing party, will lead the way in addressing such issues … It was several hundred years ago that the generations before us traversed the “Black-water Channel” (Taiwan Strait) or crossed the great ocean to find a safe haven in Taiwan. No matter what year they arrived, regardless of their ancestral origins and their mother tongues, even in spite of their different hopes and dreams, all are our forefathers; all have settled down here and together faced a common destiny. Whether indigenous peoples or new settlers, expatriates living abroad, foreign spouses or immigrant workers who labor under Taiwan’s blazing sun—all have made a unique contribution to this land and each has become an indispensable member of our “New Taiwan” family.

(Office of the President, 2005e: lines 173-81)

The above quotation is part of President Chen Shui-bian’s speech in his Inauguration Ceremony as the 11th-term ROC President. Despite the specific political discourse that one may interpret from the speech, it is clearly that in illustrating Taiwan’s multi-ethnic society, Chen mentioned two specific groups—the ‘foreign spouses’ and ‘immigrant workers’.

At the end of 2007, there were 372,741 immigrant spouses in Taiwan [see Table 8.1, p. 204] (National Immigration Agency, updated 31/01/2008). Meanwhile, there were 357,937 immigrant workers from Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Mongolia engaged in various industries in Taiwan; 37,211 of them located in Taipei City (Council of Labor Affairs, updated 12/2007). It is worth noting that these two groups’ combined number (730,678) is greater than that of the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples (484,174).
In terms of the immigrant spouses, Tai’s study (2005) indicates that Taiwan’s economic development caused social polarisation, and some low-income male Taiwanese therefore began to find their partners via the private matchmaker company’s arrangements. Most of these immigrant spouses are coming from China or Southeast Asian countries where the gross domestic income is less than that of Taiwan. Due to their husbands’ social-economic backgrounds, it is usual to find these new immigrants in suburbs.

However, given my personal experience, the circumstances are more complicated than suggestion by Tai. In January 2007, I met two Chinese females by chance in a hospital located in Taipei County. At the time, they were the personal nurses of my sister’s father-in-law. They told me that via a specific private organisation’s arrangement, they came to Taiwan by using marriage as an excuse whereas their true purpose was to work there.

Clearly, various stories behind the increasing number of immigrant spouses are not the focal point of this study. What ought to be highlighted is that

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<th>Korea</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Hong Kong and Macau</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: National Immigration Agency (updated on 31/01/2008)
their number has already become a significant element in Taiwan’s population. In 2003, the DPP Government set up several policies concerned with the immigrant spouses’ interests. For example, the local governments have to organise relevant activities, such as language classes, to help these new citizens fit in new environments (National Immigration Agency, updated 05/2007). In 2005, the Taipei City Government erected the Taipei City New Immigrants’ Hall [Figure 8.19] to host these activities (Taipei City New Immigrants’ Hall, 2005).

According to the Hall’s staff (personal interview, 24/10/2007), the building was formerly the City Government’s publication office. The official statement said that the term ‘New Immigrants’ is used for the purpose of political correctness, given that ‘foreign spouses’ may imply discrimination (La, 2005). Some might argue that this special ethnic site within the capital Taipei symbolises the immigrant spouses’ important role in Taiwan’s developing multicultural society.
Remembering the immigrant workers

In terms of the immigrant workers, Section 4.3 [p. 60] already mentioned that since the late 1980s, the KMT Government began to allow immigrant workers to come to Taiwan. In 1992, in consideration of the nation’s acute labour shortage, the relevant laws were amended to allow more industries, including public construction and nursing, to employ immigrant workers (*Government Information Office*, 2006).

In comparison to the immigrant spouses, the immigrant workers have more obvious effects on Taiwan’s urban landscape. The Third Section of the Zhongshan North Road in the capital Taipei serves as the example. As mentioned in the previous subsection [pp. 200-2], the area’s ‘pub lanes’ also the US military’s spatial legacies. However, regardless of these pubs located in the lanes behind the Road, by visiting the area, one can describe it as Taiwan’s Little Philippines. For example, some shops and restaurants use both English and the Filipino language on their signs and sell Filipino products.

Nonetheless, it may be difficult for one to encounter Filipinos in the area from Monday to Saturday, since they only appear on Sunday mornings. On that day, restaurants will play Filipino pop music. Moreover, the local hawkers will come to settle on the pavements and use English, Filipino, or pure body language to sell cheap accessories, clothes, or toys. Furthermore, in several overseas post offices in the area, one can see many Filipinos sending the items they just bought to their hometown. In addition, there is a bank (which also opens on Sunday) where the staff can use English and Filipino to serve these foreign customers [see Figure 8.20, p. 207].
Figure 8.20—Sunday morning on the Third Section of Zhongshan N. Road
On Sunday morning, the Filipino immigrant workers and the local hawkers make their appearance on the Third Section of Zhongshan N. Road

According to members of the Taiwan International Workers’ Association (TIWA) (personal interview, 25/01/2007), the reason behind the former US military enclave’s transformation into the Little Philippines is due to St. Christopher’s Church [see Figure 8.21, p. 208], a Catholic church originally erected at the area to serve the MAAG personnel. In view of the increasing number of Filipino workers settling in Taipei City, in 1996, an international religious group, accustomed to helping immigrant workers in different countries, sent a Filipino priest to St. Christopher’s Church. Eventually, the Church became the spot where the Filipino workers can not only attend mass, but also socialise with each other on Sundays. It ought to be noted that most immigrant workers in Taiwan only have a break on Sunday.
Meanwhile, according to a former community representative (personal interview, 19/01/2007) of the area, many shops along the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road were initially set up to sell antiques or fine wooden furniture to the target consumers—the US soldiers. As expected, the MAAG’s departure deeply impacted their business. Nonetheless, the presence of the Filipino workers then reversed the condition. The local retailers rapidly changed their products to serve these new potential customers. Eventually, the Little Philippines was formed. Incidentally, the area even attracts Filipino workers working in neighbouring cities.

With the increasing number of immigrant workers, the Church staff realised that the workers have been encountering various problems, such as being
exploited by the employers. Hence, in 1997, the Church required help from a Catholic-based organisation, originally located in Taoyuan County and having experiences in dealing with the relevant issues. Since the newly-arrived volunteers served not just immigrant workers from the Philippines, workers of other nationalities also began to visit the Church on Sundays. Unsurprisingly, the local retailers also began to provide these new potential consumers with food and products that they are familiar with. A similar situation also happened around some Taiwanese cities’ rail stations and churches (TIWA members, personal interview, ibid).

Apart from helping immigrant workers avoid employers’ exploitation, the major task of these volunteers was to build bridges between the workers and the local communities since the latter frequently claimed that the former caused mess and noise. For example, the volunteers have organised cultural festivals as a means of enabling the locals to understand the new immigrants’ cultures (Ibid).

On gaining more experience in dealing with immigrant worker issues, the volunteers decided to set up a specific organisation in Taipei City to help immigrant workers across Taiwan since many relevant central government institutions were located in the City. As a result, the TIWA was established in 1999. Meanwhile, in view of the area’s cosmopolitan urban scene, the TIWA’s headquarters were located at the Third Section of the Zhongshang North Road (Ibid).

Concurrently, some volunteers were employed by the Taipei City Government’s Foreign Workers Counseling Center, also founded in 1999. Hence, the TIWA was able to gain the City Government’s financial support. The most
important achievement of this public-private link was the establishment of the House of Migrants Empowerment (HOME) in 2002 [Figure 8.22]. It was an ordinary rented building located amidst the lanes of the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road. It provided the immigrant workers with a private place where they could have a break and socialise (Ibid).

Although the idea of the HOME was proposed by the TIWA, the whole project was supervised and sponsored by City Government. In other words, the Government trusted the TIWA to manage the site. Later on, the staff with TIWA backgrounds left the Foreign Workers Counseling Center due to changes of the institution’s personnel. Since the new officials thought that the HOME only opening on Sundays was a waste, financial support towards the HOME was eventually withdrawn and the HOME was closed in 2004 (Ibid).

Although the officials believed that the closure of HOME would release funds to be spent on other pro-immigrant-worker activities, they did not consider that the immigrant workers’ attention might be focused more on having a private place to rest on Sundays, rather than joining government-organised activities that would consume their spare time (Ibid).
In fact, after the closure of the HOME, in the same year the Foreign Workers Counseling Center used a one-floor office, with cheaper rent, to set up the Foreign Worker Culture Center (FWCC) which was supposed to function in the same way as HOME (Ibid). However, the FWCC located inside a traditional market in Dadaocheng [Figure 8.23]. In this area, the immigrant workers are unable to find the religious or commercial services they can relate to. Furthermore, the location is not as good as the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road where bus and metro stations are nearby.

More importantly, according to the TIWA members (personal interview, ibid), in comparison to HOME where different ‘nationality zones’ were arranged for the immigrant workers to have a rest or socialise, the one-floor FWCC does not have such large space, while TIWA’s new office is also limited in space. This had made it less attractive for immigrant workers of different nationalities to visit
the FWCC or the TIWA. As a result, although the Filipinos are still the majority visiting the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road, immigrant workers from other countries began to gather at other places on Sundays. For example, the Indonesians usually meet at the Taipei Rail Station. The dispersal of immigrant workers’ social and other activities made it difficult for the TIWA and the City Government to have access to them as a group. In addition, in the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road, according to a former community representative (personal interview, 19/01/2007), some local people originally against the HOME’s existence in the area now also realised that it provided a good focal point for immigrant people. Through the interviews, it was found that both TIWA and the local communities have suggested the City Government should re-establish the HOME as well as designate the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road as the immigrant workers’ ‘holiday’ base. However, the proposals have not met the City Government’s approval yet.

The above information suggests that grassroots organisations (St. Christopher’s Church and the TIWA) and the local businesspeople were the main reason for the popularity of the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road and the subsequently built HOME become a meeting space and a sign of the immigrant workers’ contribution to Taiwan’s developing multiculturalism in a global context. Ironically, the government institutions’ later intervention eventually broke the balance within this space and caused unexpected, implications.
8.7 Conclusion

From the evidence presented above, it can be concluded that different ethnic groups (including the Hokkien, the Hakka, and the Indigenous Peoples) in Taiwan had been forming their territories without much interference from the state until the coming of the Japanese colonisers. The Colonial Government not only distinguished the living territories of the colonisers and the colonised in the urban areas, but also forcefully took the tribal territories in remote areas into state ownership in order to exploit the natural resources within them.

The KMT Government took advantage of these Japanese urban legacies and land policies. For instance, in the capital Taipei, the settler social elites were assigned to live in former Japanese colonial officers’ residencies. Moreover, some tribal territories were still claimed to be state-owned lands. In other words, these Japanese colonial legacies enabled the Chinese Settler State to keep its superiority and the settlers’ privileges.

What is more, since the KMT Government initially regarded Taiwan as a temporary settlement in its preparation for re-conquering the Mainland China, it did not prevent the newly-arrived settlers (most of them were KMT soldiers) from randomly erecting dwellings in urban areas. These illegally built houses eventually affected Taiwan’s urban planning and development.

With the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, the issues caused by these housing settlements and land use policies began to be discussed openly. Both the transition KMT Government and the DPP Government have tried to deal with the issues. However, they have encountered difficulties since every change could
affect different interest groups, such as residents, developers, and urban conservationists.

Like the Chinese Mainlanders, the Taiwanese Hakka and Indigenous Peoples are both minority groups in terms of their relatively small population in Taiwan. However, unlike the Mainlanders who were backed by the Chinese Settler State, the Hakkas and Indigenous Peoples formed small ethnic enclaves in the capital Taipei by themselves. In fact, their cultural identities were strongly suppressed by the KMT Government’s policy, which aimed to forge hegemonic Chinese identity. The Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples were portrayed as a group with lower socio-economic status. Hence, they usually lived in poor quality suburban areas.

Ultimately, the nation’s democratisation enabled these two groups to organise a series of grassroots social movements in the capital Taipei to promote their self-identification. The movements eventually made the transitional KMT Government to begin to support the Taiwanese Hakka and Indigenous People’s self-identification alongside social welfare (e.g. setting up Hakka language television programmes; stopping claiming that tribal lands were state-owned). Meanwhile, the movements also enabled several ethnic-cultural sites to be constructed in Taipei City to promote Hakka and Indigenous cultural development. It is suggested that the sites’ establishment symbolises the recognition within Taiwanese society of these two former suppressed ethnic groups.

Apart from the local Taiwanese and the 1940s Chinese immigrants, Taiwan’s natural resources, geographical features, and economic development have been attracting international traders, strategists, and economic migrants to
come to the region and simultaneously reinforce its multicultural living environment. For instance, after it lost the war with Western countries, the Qing Empire was forced to open Taiwanese ports to Western traders. As a result, many international traders began to settle in west Taipei City where two ports were located. Meanwhile, churches and Western-style buildings were built in the area.

Moreover, due to the region’s strategic importance, the KMT Government allowed the US military to station in Taiwan. The US military living quarters and their surrounding areas quickly became a confluence of Western cultural flows. Despite the US military’s departure due to the ending of diplomatic relations between the ROC and the US, these US military’s spatial legacies (e.g. foreign schools and entertainment venues) still remain in present-day Taipei City.

In addition, the KMT Government’s dedication to Taiwan’s economic development, as a way to secure its political legitimacy, eventually caused social polarisation and labour shortage, and led to immigrant spouses’ and workers’ participation in Taiwanese society. Several ethnic-cultural sites or diaspora spaces related to these new immigrants have appeared in Taipei City. Some of these developments were the result of the general public and grassroots organisations dedicating themselves to helping the new immigrants.

From the stories revealed in this Chapter, it can be seen that, under different political entities’ control, different ethnic groups in Taiwan were being privileged or suppressed. Clearly, the impact of those who were privileged could have spatial implications for Taipei City, although not all implications and legacies were approved (e.g. the illegally-built dwellings erected by the Chinese settlers). Meanwhile, owing to Taiwan’s democratisation, those who had been
suppressed were able to break through and change the situation. Their ultimate success is evidenced by the new urban elements and policies implemented in Taipei City to serve their interests. In other words, they have become symbolically remembered in the form of the capital Taipei’s urban landscape. These trends also show the development of Taiwan’s multiculturalism, which has become a part of the nation’s changing imagined collective memory.
CHAPTER 9

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS (IV):

TAIPEI CITY’S GLOBALISATION AND LOCALISM

9.1 Introduction

Chapter 9 aims to examine the connection between Taiwan’s economic globalisation and Taipei City’s urban changes. More specifically, it investigates the state’s role in trying to achieve a balance between urban globalisation and urban conservation. The former implies the formation of a new identity within the nation and the latter means maintaining the original imagined collective memory.

Section 4.3 [pp. 53, 56, 60, 64-5] briefly mentioned how several business districts were formed in the capital Taipei due to the deliberate operations of different political entities. Based on second-hand materials and the additional documentary sources found in the fieldwork, Section 9.2 uses a historical approach to reveal how the formation of these districts reflects the process whereby Taiwan was getting involved in globalisation. Section 9.3 then exemplifies how Taipei City’s globalisation caused issues related to urban decline and urban conservation. From Sections 9.4 to 9.6, several cases are introduced to show how the state, during the nation’s different political periods, dealt with these issues, and what implications have emerged.

9.2 Taipei City on the Way to Globalisation

Section 2.5 [pp. 23-4] indicated that the nation’s involvement in globalisation resulted from the state’s intention to boost economy by attracting
international capitalists’ investment. Meanwhile, Section 3.2 [pp. 40-1] revealed how such an economic globalisation process can give rise to urban changes. For instance, the city’s central business district, packed with global retailers, international entertainment venues, and skyscrapers, is physical evidence of globalisation’s implications for not only the nation’s economic activities but also cultural diversification and hybridisation. What is more, in a globalising city, the appearance of these new urban elements can cause the old urban elements’ demolition. The circumstances imply a contest between the new imagined collective memory and the old one.

Built upon the viewpoint derived from the theoretical framework, this Section investigates how Taipei City’s globalisation enabled specific ‘new’ urban elements to appear in it. Chou (2005) argues that due to the operation of different political entities, Taipei City has several central business districts reflecting the history of Taiwan’s economic globalisation. Figure 9.1 [see p. 219] shows the locations of the sites mentioned in this Section.

**Dadaocheng**

Section 8.6 [pp. 198-9] and Appendix 2 have mentioned that due to its defeat in the war with the Western coalition, the Qing Empire began to open its ports to foreign businesspeople since the 1860s. These international traders then began to settle in Dadaocheng, a port area located at west Taipei City. Dadaocheng therefore developed rapidly. Meanwhile, many Western-style buildings were erected in the area.
Dadaocheng’s initial development was due to British camphor trader John Dodd. After visiting Taipei and encountering the region’s tea tree farms in 1865, far-sighted Dodd decided to invest in Taiwan’s tea farming. He worked with local entrepreneurs to introduce new seeds and to train local farmers. Following Dodd’s success, many foreign and local businesspeople began to invest in the same industry. Eventually, ‘Formosa tea’ became Taiwan’s significant export (Tseng, 2005a). Overall, one can suggest that Dadaocheng’s development and Westernisation implied Taiwan’s first-time deep involvement in global economic movements.
During the Japanese colonial era, Taiwan’s tea export business was affected by the emergence of Indian tea and the Second World War (Ibid). Meanwhile, fabric, traditional Chinese medicine, and groceries gradually replaced Formosa Tea as Taiwan’s main export products [Figure 9.2] (Lee, 2002a).

From the above information, it can be argued that Dadaocheng’s development was initially contributed by the Western and local entrepreneurs, rather than the Qing Empire. In fact, one can assume that if the Qing Empire had not lost the war against the Western coalition, it would have kept foreign businesspeople from entering its territory, and Dadaocheng therefore would not have experienced the early consequences of economic globalisation.

Figure 9.2—Dadaocheng Wharf, 1908
Dadaocheng was still an important business district in the early Japanese colonial era, evidenced by its busy wharf.
Ximending

‘Ximending’ (meaning ‘west gate town’ and pronounced as ‘sai-mon-cho’ in Japanese\textsuperscript{23}), built by the Japanese Colonial Government, constitutes the first state-planned central business district in Taiwan. The project of Ximending was carried out in 1914 in order to form a commercial district next to colonial Taipei City’s railway station (Chou, 2005).

Before the project was formally proposed, the Japanese Colonial Government had been implementing some infrastructures in the region. For example, Taiwan’s first government-built public market, with mixed Western architectural features, was erected in 1908 (Tseng, 2005b); the relevant story is presented in Section 9.4. Incidentally, the area originally was a cemetery outside the west gate of stone-walled Taipei City. That is the reason why it was named ‘west gate town’. In 1922, with the project’s accomplishment, the name was formally legitimised by the Colonial Government (Lee, 2002a).

Ximending’s construction is part of the Japanese Colonial Government’s aim of building a Westernised/modern colonial capital. In other words, it was built to be a ‘modern’ central business district. Apart from the aforementioned public market [see Figure 9.3, p. 222], for example, theatres, ballrooms, cafés, and department stores were also introduced to the district. In fact, even in the post-colonial era, Ximending remained the capital Taipei’s most famous business district (Ibid). It shows that Ximending’s ‘modernity’ was also recognised by the KMT Government.

\textsuperscript{23} The knowledge of Ximending’s meaning and pronunciation in Japanese is contributed by my Japanese colleague Kazuko Kakegawa.
In the early 1960s, the Zhonghua Market [see Section 8.2, pp. 164-5] was established next to Ximending. These two sites collectively then became capital Taipei’s most popular commercial as well as entertainment spot [Figure 9.4] (Lee, 2002a).
East District and high-tech parks

Section 4.3 [pp. 59-61] indicated that the KMT dedicated itself to Taiwan’s economic development to reinforce its political legitimacy. The KMT Government’s economic development strategies alongside its achievements can be described in the form of a brief timeline. In the 1950s, the Government implemented a series of land reforms to develop the agricultural sector. In the 1960s, light industries alongside the export-oriented industries became the focal points. In the 1970s, in view of a series of diplomatic blows, the KMT Government set out to develop Taiwan’s economy by promoting heavy industries. In the 1980s, recognising that cheaper costs of labour and materials in China and many Southeast Asian countries began to threaten Taiwan’s export-oriented industries, the KMT Government successfully set up the high-tech industries, including computer chip production and software development, to make the nation become competitive in the global economic system.

Such an economic restructuring process simultaneously affected the capital Taipei’s urban landscape. Chou (2005) indicates that in the 1960s, the City’s ‘East District’ (a non-official term roughly referring to a region located across present-day Zhongzheng, Zhongshan, Daan and Songshan Administrative Districts) began to develop, since many export-based manufacturing headquarters and factories were located in the area.

After the ROC was replaced by the PRC in the UN in 1971, the KMT became more eager to secure its legitimacy by strengthening Taiwan’s economy. As a result, service industries began developing. Reflecting this change, financial services, insurance, and real estate firms, hotels, and department stores began to
appear in the East District (Ibid). Nowadays, the East District still constitutes an important modern business district in the capital Taipei [Figure 9.5].

Since the early 1980s, the KMT Government began to promote high-tech industries. The Neihu Science Park and Nankang Software Industrial Park were therefore built in Taipei City during the late 1990s. What is more, the project of Beitou Knowledge Park has also been carried out in order to promote bio-industry (Ibid). The expectation was that these modern-looking high-tech industrial parks [see Figure 9.6, p. 225] would stimulate their surrounding areas’ development.

**Xinyi Planning District**

From the previous subsection, one may suggest that the East District’s formation to a certain extent was owing to the private sector’s participation, rather than the KMT Government’s comprehensive urban planning and design. In fact, Chou (2005) also suggests that the East District’s efficient development was
owing to the grid street pattern designed by the Japanese Colonial Government. Based on the colonisers’ design, main roads and nodes in the region became appropriate locations for shops and office buildings to be erected. Meanwhile, lanes behind these roads and nodes formed residential areas accommodating urban residents as well as small businesses. The overall combination served both investors’ and consumers’ interests.

Nonetheless, Xinyi Planning District’s construction derives from the KMT Government’s urban planning. In his study of the Xinyi Planning District’s formation, Jou (2005) argues that the District is regarded by the general public and international tourists as the capital Taipei’s most significant and international-oriented area since it consists of business headquarters, first-class hotels, shopping malls, entertainment avenues, and luxurious residential complexes. Reflecting the theoretical framework of this thesis [see pp. 40-1], one can suggest that the Xinyi Planning District constitutes a global-standardised business district.

The story of the District’s establishment dates back to 1975. At the time, the area was occupied by the 44th Arsenal [see Section 8.2, p. 177]. In order to deal with the capital Taipei’s over-population, President Chiang Kai-shek ordered
the removal of the Arsenal. The City Government was then responsible for building residential complexes in the area. However, the project was reviewed several times. Ultimately, in 1980, the City Government announced the project of the Xinyi Planning District, which aimed to make the area become the capital Taipei’s administrative, cultural, and economic centre, rather than just a residential district. Based on the new proposal, the planned new City Hall would be located in the District. Moreover, the Dr Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall [see Section 6.5, pp. 117-9], already standing within the boundary and functioning as a place of exhibition and performance, would play the role of representing the District’s cultural function. Finally, a commercial district would be created. It ought to be noted that although the City Government was putting forward the District’s future image, the entire project was also supervised and modified by the Central Government (Ibid).

However, the newly-built Xinyi Planning District’s economic activities developed slowly because with Taiwan’s democratisation, the private sector was allowed subsequently to participate in the project’s implementation, and the District’s land prices were therefore manipulated by the real estate investors. Until the early 1990s, only a few commercial department stores and luxury apartments were erected in the District (Ibid).

In 1991, in consideration of frequent global economic interactions, the KMT Government intended to make Taiwan the ‘Asia Pacific Operation Center’ playing the role of Asia Pacific region’s economic as well as financial headquarters. In view of this ambition, it was necessary to build an international financial, business, and entertainment centre in the capital Taipei. It was felt that
the Xinyi Planning District was an appropriate base for such a scheme to be put into practice (Ibid).

However, the scheme was not carried out until Chen Shui-bian became Taipei Mayor in 1994. Chen coordinated with the Central Government to release more city-owned lands to the private sector and therefore accelerated the area’s development. Meanwhile, the City Government deliberately organised many large-scale outdoor activities in the District to make it become a well known public place. In addition, in order to create a ‘modern’ urban image, the City Government set up specific building-coverage- and floor-area-ratio regulations to increase the District’s building height and pedestrian areas. These policies were all applied to make the District become what Mayor Chen coined the ‘Manhattan of Taipei’. Ultimately, through coordination between the Central and City Governments and the private sector, the Xinyi Planning District began to develop rapidly in the late 1990s (Ibid).

As the ‘Asia Pacific Operation Center’, it was considered necessary to have a distinct landmark in the District. Taipei Financial Center, nicknamed Taipei 101 due to its 101 storeys, was therefore constructed [see Figure 9.7, p. 228]. The skyscraper was the first BOT (build-operate-transfer) project ever carried out in Taipei City24 (Ibid). As the tallest office building (508 meters) in the world at the time, it can be argued that the Taipei 101 constitutes Taiwan’s iconic site. Incidentally, although it seems to look like just a typical glass-steel office building, as the ‘Asia Pacific Operation Center’, the building contains many

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24 Meaning that the government allowed the project to be executed by the private sector, which was authorised also to operate the site and obtain the profit in a limited contractual period. After the end of the period, the government takes over the site [like the Taipei Arena, see Section 7.3, pp. 148-9]
Figure 9.7—Taipei 101 stands high above the Xinyi Planning District.

oriental symbols. For instance, the structure of the building itself represents bamboo poles, while symbols of ‘copper coins’, ‘propitious clouds’, and ‘dragon heads’ are integrated into the detail of the building’s design. All these features symbolise good fortune and luck (Taipei 101, visited on 18/12/2006).

When the Taipei 101 project was started in 1997, Chen Shui-bian was Taipei Mayor. When the basic construction was accomplished in 2003, Chen had become the ROC President. In his attendance at the ceremony of the basic
construction’s accomplishment, unsurprisingly perhaps, President Chen made the skyscraper a nationalist symbol by indicating that:

[The Taipei 101] is a monument to the nation’s can-do spirit amid an economic slowdown, a SARS epidemic and persistent friction with China … This building will lead Taiwan to the top of the world, giving Taiwan the drive to fulfil its dreams.

(Bloomberg, 02/07/2003: lines 2-8)

Meanwhile, Jou (2005) indicates that although Ma Ying-jeou, becoming Mayor of Taipei in 1998, had paid more attention to restoring and promoting the City’s historic places, the image of Taipei 101 as well as the Xinyi Planning District had already become the main features of the capital Taipei’s city promotion.

9.3 Forgetfulness in Globalising Taipei City

Section 4.3 [p. 65] indicated that despite Taiwan’s involvement in globalisation, some traditional commercial activities alongside old places remain significant for the locals (e.g. the traditional markets). Night markets, initially formed by hawkers gathering in front of temples in the past (Kang, 2002), have been the locals’ important commercial and entertainment venues. Meanwhile, for foreign travellers, night markets also constitute a distinct tourist attraction. Nowadays, many local governments in different cities have commodified their night markets as ‘tourist night markets’ [see Figure 9.8, p. 230] (Chung, 2005a; Lin, 2005b; Su, 2002).

However, not all old memories can remain in globalising Taipei City. For instance, during the late Qing-ruling era, Dadaocheng’s harbour was filled with
silt. Meanwhile, the new harbour and the railway gradually became important means of goods transportation and overtime, Dadaocheng lost its function. Although the City Government has designated Dadaocheng Wharf as a tourist spot, the site’s historic past has gone [see Figure 9.9, p. 231] (Yu, 2005a; Lee, 2002a).

Moreover, Chou (2005) has indicated that when the East District became a new-born central business district in the 1960s, its western counterparts, Dadaocheng and Ximending, began to decline. Although increasing land prices, traffic jams, and pollution were slowing the East District’s development during the late 1980s, the relevant infrastructure construction projects (e.g. the metro) were subsequently introduced to solve the problems. By contrast, it is difficult to renew west Taipei City due to the area’s complicated and fragmented property ownership resulting from the 1950s’ land reform. That is to say, the land reform
allowed more people to own their lands, and therefore improved the nation’s agriculture sector and light industries. However, when the government attempted to regenerate the area, it had to negotiate with many landowners with different interests.

In fact, land ownership still constitutes an issue affecting contemporary west Taipei City’s urban regeneration (Lee, 2005a). Ironically, in order to regenerate the area, the underground railway and the metro projects introduced in the 1980s caused Zhonghua Market’s demolition [see Section 8.2, pp. 165-6] and traffic problems around Ximending, thereby affecting the area’s commercial activities (Kang, 2002; Tseng, 2005c; Yu, 2005b). On the other hand, since the population density in east Taipei City was lower compared to that in the early-developed west area, the public sector was able to implement policies for east
Taipei City’s development without much worry of affecting the residents’ interests. Hence, the East District was able to develop swiftly (Huang, 2005).

The old places’ decline and the new places’ emergence in globalising Taipei City also implied shifts in people’s sense of their capital city. Prior to the late 1980s, Taipei City’s distinct landmarks were the Grand Hotel [see Section 6.4, p. 114] and the CKS Memorial Hall [see Section 6.5, p. 118]. However, the new skyscrapers in East District gradually became new landmarks (Huang, 2005b). For example, in 1994, the Japanese department-store chain, Shin Kong Mitsukoshi, erected a 51-storey skyscraper next to new Taipei Station. As the capital’s tallest building at the time, Shin Kong Mitsukoshi Taipei Station Store became the City’s new landmark as well as an important meeting place [Figure 9.10] (Lee, 2002a).

Figure 9.10—Shin Kong Mitsukoshi Taipei Station Store
It is worth noting that some ‘ordinary’ places in Taipei City functioning as the general public’s daily assembly places were also affected by the nation’s rapid economic growth. For example, with their increasing incomes, many Taiwanese began to buy motorcycles. Wider roads therefore became necessary public constructions (Lei, 2001). Yet more road widening was needed as Taiwan’s flourishing stock market made people increasingly able to purchase cars during the late 1980s (Hsu, 2001g). As a result, many old narrow lanes and streets, where neighbours socialised and children played games [Figure 9.11] were demolished (Huang, 2005b; Lee, 2001g).

9.4 Localism and Discontent (I)

From the previous Section, it can be suggested that Taiwan’s economic/urban globalisation has had two interrelated impacts on Taipei City.
Firstly, in view of the development of east Taipei City, the City’s early-developed west area eventually declined. Secondly, since many new places with assembly and entertainment functions were built, the old places with similar functions were neglected or even demolished. Overall, these impacts imply a process in which the urban elements representing local roots are gradually forgotten. Nonetheless, Sections 9.4 and 9.5 reveal how certain old places were re-remembered within Taipei City.

In 1977, Taipei City Government set up the Urban Regeneration Section in order to achieve the comprehensive development of the entire City. However, the process did not function well, given that the City Government still focused on east Taipei City’s development (Lee, 2005b). From the early 1990s, the local authorities of west Taipei City began to demand that the City Government should regenerate their living environment, too. In the late 1990s, the City Government began to improve Ximending’s infrastructure, for example, by creating pedestrian areas. As a result, Ximending became popular with and a major consumption node for young people (Chou, 2005).

Regenerated Ximending can attract the younger generation because there are many retailers selling cheaper fashion products or providing cheaper entertainment. Meanwhile, since it was a popular entertainment venue in the post-war period, regenerated Ximending also re-attracts the older generation due to these traditional tailor shops, barber’s, and old cafés still standing in the area [see Figure 9.12, p. 235] (Chung, 2005b; Lee, 2002a). In other words, the site’s physical improvement not only creates its new image, but also partially restores its past glory.
When I visited present-day Ximending during the fieldwork, I found that the younger generation might call the region ‘Ximen’ instead of ‘Ximending’. In fact, according to names appearing on various public guideposts, ‘Ximen’ (west gate) is the official name of the site, referring to the area where stone-walled Taipei City’s west gate was located. Why many Taiwanese call the area Ximending is because Japanese characters ‘west-gate-town’ looks similar to Chinese characters ‘xi-men-ding’. In other words, the name ‘Ximending’ is a Japanese legacy. Meanwhile, the present-day younger generation seem to have adapted to the region’s official name ‘Ximen’, rather than ‘Ximending’.
Apart from Ximending’s regeneration, the City Government also began to regenerate early-developed west Taipei City by building parks, widening roads, paving sidewalks, renovating traditional markets, and restoring historic buildings (Lee, 2005b). Despite the improvement of these civic infrastructures, however, most local residents are still living in old dwellings. It is because, under contemporary regulations concerned with floor-area and building-coverage ratios, the new built house tends to be smaller than the existing one, and the locals are therefore not willing to build new houses. As a result, the City Government is planning to change the relevant regulations (Tseng, 2005b).

It ought to be noted that in addition to the improvement of west Taipei City’s infrastructures, the City Government’s eventual goal is to use the area’s cultural assets, such as historic buildings and traditional-goods retailing, to attract consumers and therefore boost the entire area’s economic activities (Chen, 2002). However, the locals may not approve of such a strategy. The story of ‘Red Playhouse’ illustrates why.

The original Red House was Taiwan’s first government-built public market erected by the Japanese colonisers in 1908 [see Section 9.2, pp. 221-2]. Due to its distinct red-brick architectural features, the locals called it ‘Red Building’ (Tseng, 2005b).

After keeping its operation for many years, the market ultimately closed in 1991. In 1997, the City Government designated the building as a historic site. In 1998, since it also functioned as a theatre during the Japanese colonial era, the City Government attempted to make the building a theatre providing local artists with chances of performance. However, this idea was criticised by some of the
local communities which claimed that since the building was located next to regenerated Ximending constituting the younger generation’s assembly place, such a plan would be unable to attract this group of consumers (Ibid). In other words, in the local communities’ view, neither historic importance nor cultural functions can cater for their economic interests.

Despite this criticism, in 2002, the City Government began to trust the Paper Windmill Cultural and Educational Foundation to manage the building. Meanwhile, The Red Building was named ‘Red Playhouse’ and started to function as a theatre [Figure 9.13] (Lee, 2002a). By visiting the site, to some extent, I could understand the locals’ concern about the Red Building’s new identity. It is because in comparison to neighbouring Ximending, the Playhouse was not able to act as an entertainment venue that could generate lively commercial activities.

The case of Red Playhouse demonstrates how the City Government and the locals can have disagreements about public-owned historic sites’ potential. In
fact, disagreement can also occur over private-owned historic site. A relevant example is Dadaocheng’s Dihua Street. The houses along the Street are classic Western-style facades built in the Qing-ruling era [Figure 9.14]. In 1977, the City Government attempted to widen the Street for the sake of urban development. Such an intention caused the locals’ and scholars’ disapproval. Ultimately, through a series of debates, the Dihua Street and its old buildings were designated as an historic site in 1988 (Hsu, 2005c; Huang, 2005b). Given that the area was packed with retailers selling traditional medicine and dry food that the locals used to purchase before the coming of Chinese New Year, since 1996, the City Government has designated the Street as the ‘Spring Festival Shopping Street’ during that specific time period every year (Lee, 2002a). However, if not visiting the site during that period, one may find that the Dihua Street’s commercial activities are not very lively.

Figure 9.14—Historic buildings along Dihua Street
Clearly, the cases of the Red Playhouse and the Dihua Street may not be comparable to each other. In the case of the Red Playhouse, the local communities ignored the site’s historic meaning, whereas in Dihua Street, the local communities embraced the site’s historic significance. Nonetheless, both cases show how Taipei City’s economic/urban globalisation eventually gave rise to the issue of urban conservation; and how the issue would involve different interest groups’ debates. Based on a chronological approach, Sections 9.5 and 9.6 further examine different political entities’ policies on the conservation of those physical representations of Taiwan’s old collective memory.

9.5 Localism and Discontent (II)

In practice, the Japanese Colonial Government was the first political entity to introduce regulations for the conservation of Taiwan’s historic urban elements. For instance, in 1896 when it was still using armed forces to suppress the natives’ resistance, the Colonial Government ordered the troops not to damage temples or Qing Empire’s official buildings. Furthermore, in 1922, the Colonial Government passed the relevant laws to conserve the colony’s historic and cultural assets (Lu, 2005). In fact, from the stories of colonial Taipei City’s formation revealed in previous Chapters, it can be acknowledged that prior to the laws’ establishment, although the Colonial Government demolished some native religious institutions and Qing Empire’s legacies for the sake of urban planning (e.g. the Matzu Temple was demolished due to the construction of the Taiwan Governor-General Museum, see Section 7.2, pp. 136-7), it also conserved some of them (e.g. the Qing
The KMT Government, when it was on the Mainland China, established laws regarding the conservation of historic heritage as early as 1920. However, since the KMT was struggling with warlords and the CPC at the time, the laws did not really function (Tu, 2007).

After its retreat to Taiwan, the KMT Government initially did not pay attention on the conservation of Taiwan’s historic and cultural assets. In 1981, however, the Government formally established the Council for Cultural Affairs. The Cultural Property Preservation Law was then legislated in the next year (Ibid). The reason why the relevant institution and laws did not exist in Taiwan prior to 1982 can be that during the early settler-governing era, the KMT Government was keen to re-conquer the Mainland China, and to secure its political legitimacy by rapidly forging state-imposed identity and accelerating economic development, thereby neglecting the conservation of historic and cultural relics. Eventually, since the dream of re-conquering the Mainland faded away and the nation’s economy developed stably, the Government, by the late 1970s, finally could begin to pay attention to the nation’s cultural development. As a result, the Council was established and the Law implemented in the early 1980s.

However, perhaps due to the KMT Government’s lack of experiences in dealing with historic urban elements, the 1982 Cultural Property Preservation Law did not function efficiently in reality. For instance, although the Law indicated that the construction work had to be stopped when historic heritage was found at a site, it did not lay down how to deal with the situation further. Moreover, it only
indicated that when the public construction project was planned, the authorities had to investigate the site in advance to confirm that there were no historic heritages. However, it did not mention whether the private sector also had to take such procedures (Ibid).

It is worth noting that Taiwan’s real estate model and its impacts also exposed the 1982 Law’s inadequacy. That is to say, although new buildings have constantly been erected, how to improve old buildings to modern standards or purposes was ignored in Taiwan. In the light of this, it is unsurprising that a public-owned historic site might be neglected and eventually ruined, affecting the city’s image or even causing a public safety problem. Meanwhile, a private-owned historic site might be demolished without warning (Tsai, 2004). To some extent, one can suggest that such an urban development pattern also resulted from the KMT Government’s initial attempts to re-conquer the Mainland China and its simultaneous neglect of Taiwan’s comprehensive urban development. Taipei City’s lack of housing construction control in the 1950s, mentioned in Section 8.2 [pp. 164-9], is a relevant example.

What stimulated the 1982 Law’s amendment was an event that happened in the summer of 1997. At the time, a group of artists were searching for an exhibition space in Taipei City. Finally, they came across the Taipei Winery, a Japanese colonial legacy that had been unused since 1987. Since the Winery was located in the area called ‘Huashan’ by the locals, the artists named the site ‘Huashan Arts District’ and began to use it for artistic purposes. However, when a play was performed in the Winery, police officers charged the director with illegally occupying public-owned property. The news aroused public opinion
about not only the lack of performing spaces for Taiwanese artists, but also the governmental institutions’ neglect of public-owned old places (Ibid). Under these circumstances, the Council for Cultural Affairs came to be in charge of the issue. The Council took the site from the Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Commission (now Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Corporation) and trusted the private artists and cultural associations to manage it [Figure 9.15] (Council of Cultural Affairs, 2005).
The story of the Huashan Arts District made some political decision makers realise the potential of public-owned historic sites. In the past, ‘conservation’ in Taiwan referred to ‘rescuing the site that would be damaged’ or ‘preventing the site from being accessed in order to protect it from potential damage’. However, in 1998, the amended Cultural Property Preservation Law indicated that historic sites need to be restored and reused, rather than being passively conserved. Moreover, in 2000, the Council for Cultural Affairs, under the newly-established DPP Government, announced that the reuse of neglected public-owned historic sites was one of its significant policies (Tsai, 2004). Thereafter, many local governments began to dedicate themselves to the neglected old places’ revitalisation (Fu, 2001a). In the case of Taipei City, according to the member of the City Government’s Department of Cultural Affairs (personal interview, 23/01/2007), apart from the aforementioned Red Playhouse and Haushan Arts District, several public-owned Qing or Japanese legacies have already become museums, galleries, or theatres. Many of them are operated by the non-profit organisations trusted by the City Government. Most historic buildings in Taipei City are those colonial civil servants’ traditional Japanese houses. Apart from the Japanese housing legacies, Fu (2001b) indicates that due to the nation’s industrial restructuring history [see Section 4.3, pp. 59-60]; many neglected public-owned factories and storehouses also constitute historic sites.

Clearly, the neglected public-owned historic sites’ reuse can involve the participation of many interest groups, including government institutions, interior designers, scholars, and local communities, thereby giving rise to disagreement. One of key issues, like the story of Red Playhouse mentioned in the previous
Section [pp. 236-7], is that the local community may claim that the government institutions just intend to make the site become a cultural venue, instead of a commercial spot. In some cases, furthermore, the local community may want the site to become an ordinary public space, such as a park, rather than a cultural venue that they cannot frequently use (Fu, 2001b; Tsai, 2004).

Overall, from the above discussion concerned with how the Taiwanese Government began to approach the issue of neglected public-owned historic places, it can be seen that it is difficult for the Government to find the balance between economic development, practical functions, and local identity, especially in a context where the nation has been experiencing economic/urban globalisation.

9.6 Localism and Discontent (III)

As shown in the previous Section, the 1998 Cultural Property Preservation Law seemed to be able to revitalise Taiwan’s public-owned historic sites and therefore make them become re-remembered within people’s everyday living experience, despite conflict over the sites’ new functions. However, in 2002, in order to increase the revenue of the national treasury, the National Property Bureau announced that it would take over neglected public-owned buildings in Taipei and Kaohsiung Cities, the only two Taiwanese cities partially administrated and financed by the Central Government, if their owners could not propose appropriate plans to reuse the sites. To avoid the new policy before it was introduced, many government institutions in these two Cities immediately destroyed some neglected public-owned buildings, including many Japanese housing legacies, in order to retain ownership of the land. This shows that conflict
over the conservation and reuse of historic places can occur between government institutions at different levels, rather than just between the public sector and the general public (Tsai, 2004).

In 2005, the Cultural Property Preservation Law was amended to define different types of cultural asset as well as to indicate different government organisations’ responsibility over the issue (Tu, 2007). The 2005 Law clearly regulates how government organisations at different levels must deal with the recognition, conservation, and revitalisation of different public-owned historic urban elements.

In the case of the conservation and revitalisation of private-owned historic sites, according to the 2005 Law, non-governmental organisations or the property owner need to ask the local government to investigate the site to judge whether it has historic and cultural importance. The local government then has to employ experts to investigate the site. Thereafter, public meetings need to be held to allow the property owner, government institutions, scholars, and other interest groups to discuss the site’s future.

Assuming that the owner is willing to allow his/her property to be designated as a historic site, the 2005 Law states that the owner then has responsibility for the site’s conservation. Meanwhile, the local government has to compensate for the owner’s ‘losses’. For instance, if the owner attempts to erect a new building on the land, the new building’s bulk ratio can avoid the contemporary regulation and be increased by that of the historic building [see Figure 9.16, p. 246]. Furthermore, the owner can have a cut in taxes relative to
land, house, and inheritance, thus making the site have commercial and tourist functions.

If a private-owned historic site needs to be restored, the 2005 Law stipulates that the owner can acquire support from the local government. The local government then needs to make a contract with the private sector through public bidding for the site’s restoration. Nonetheless, according to an architect (personal interview, 11/12/2007) who has participated in several historic building restoration projects in Taipei City, the result of restoration can be unsatisfactory due to the limited funds the local government can provide to contractors. It means that despite more financial cost, if the property owner arranged the site’s
restoration by himself/herself, the result could be better than relying on the local government’s ‘support’. What is more, the property owner can also avoid time-consuming to deal with bureaucracy.

Nonetheless, ‘assuming that the owner agrees to allow his/her property to become the historic site’ is just an ideal situation. That is to say, from the very beginning, the Cultural Property Preservation Law has not clearly indicated how to deal with the situation where the owner refuses the government’s attempt to designate his/her property as the historic site. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the process of recognising a private-owned historic site can cause disputes between different interest groups. For example, if the owner dislikes the strict regulations regarding the historic site’s future conservation, he/she may demolish it prior to the government’s formal affirmation of its historic importance. These kinds of cases have occurred many times in Taipei City (Hsu, 2005c; Huang, 2005b; Lee, 2001g). In other cases, the owner can take administrative proceedings against the government’s decision in order to maintain his/her property’s status quo (A member of City Government’s Department of Cultural Affairs, personal interview, 23/01/2007).

A current case demonstrating the difficulty of conserving and restoring private-owned historic sites is a Presbyterian church located in Dadaocheng. The church was built during the Qing-ruling era. In 2002, the City Government attempted to designate the church as a historic site. However, the church staff disagreed with the proposal and subsequently destroyed the building’s façade to ‘devalue’ its historic value. In order to prevent the church staff from further damaging the building, the City Government immediately affirmed that the
partially demolished church was a tentative historic site. Thereafter, the church staff took administrative proceedings against the City Government’s action. In 2004, the Taipei High Administrative Court pronounced that the City Government’s decision was invalid because it did not hold any public conference to legitimise the church’s tentative historic site status (Ibid).

Despite the Court’s judgement, the City Government continued to negotiate with the church staff. Ultimately, both sides agreed to allow the church to become a historic site. The conditions were that a new building integrating the restored façade would be constructed [Figure 9.17]. Meanwhile, the church staff had to employ the architect by themselves to plan the whole design and construction projects, following the Cultural Property Preservation Law’s relevant regulations. In addition, in order to ‘compensate for the property owners’ loss’,

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**Figure 9.17—Dadaocheng Presbyterian Church**

*Above: During the Japanese colonial era; Lower: After demolition of the façade; Right: The future image*
the church staff were able to sell the surplus building bulk ratio (e.g. based on the official regulation, the height of the new building can reach eight floors. However, the owner decided to construct a six-storey building. Under these circumstances, the owner can sell the two-storey building bulk ratio of the site to a buyer. In the future, that buyer can apply this surplus ratio to increase the height of his/her building). It ought to be noted that such conditions have become a general measure applied by different local governments to encourage private-owned historic sites’ restoration in contemporary Taiwan (The architect participating in the church’s restoration, personal interview, 11/12/2007).

However, the next stage revealed more of the difficulties involved in the conservation and restoration of historic sites in contemporary Taiwan. At the beginning, the church staff were unable to find architectural design companies that wanted to do the work. It was because the companies realised that the project would involve the government bureaucracy that would delay the working process. In fact, since 2002, the company that took over the project found that it had to spend much time dealing with bureaucracy. Ultimately, all the interest groups, including the City Government, scholars hired by the City Government, the designers, and the church staff, reached a conclusion on the projects; and construction work started in 2007 (Ibid).

The future of many other Japanese urban legacies in Taipei City also shows the difficulties of conserving and restoring historic sites when they are privately owned. Many one-time Japanese sites in Taipei City are owned by ‘former’ state-run companies (e.g. a bank) and institutions (e.g. a university). With the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, these public institutions gradually
became privatised or autonomous. Gradually, these Japanese legacies became private-owned, and this made it difficult for contemporary government institutions to confirm their historic significance. Incidents similar to that of the Dadaocheng church have occurred, meaning that owners have partially damaged or even demolished the historic sites (The member of City Government’s Department of Cultural Affairs, personal interview, 23/01/2007). Also, the local governments may not have enough resources to support a ‘new’ private sector owner to conserve the sites. Therefore, sometimes the local government only selects the sites in better condition to be conserved and restored (The architect participating in several restoration projects in Taipei City, personal interview, 11/12/2007).

These examples show how commercial pressure caused by Taiwan’s economic/urban globalisation made the state take urban conservation more necessary. However, democratisation has weakened the state’s influence on the creation of built environments, and empowered the general public, the private sector, and sometimes even the public sector to pursue interests that can be detrimental to historic urban elements.

9.7 Conclusion

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that since the 1860s, Western capitalists began to bring commodified Western cultures to Qing-ruling Taiwan. During the Japanese colonial era, the colonisers, favouring Westernisation, reinforced that condition further. After the Japanese colonial era, in order to secure its political legitimacy, the KMT Government also welcomed international capitalists to explore the nation’s market and therefore made Taiwan
become involved in globalisation. The capital Taipei’s changing urban landscape, especially its several business districts, represents a process in which cultural diversification and hybridisation emerged due to the nation’s globalising economic activities. For instance, during the Qing-ruling era, many Western-style buildings were erected in Dadaocheng where international traders’ living quarters were located. Moreover, the Japanese Colonial Government constructed Ximending that hosted many Western-style entertainment venues. In addition, international retailers and skyscrapers appeared in east Taipei City due to the KMT Government’s economic restructuring plan.

However, with its devotion to economic development alongside modern urban image making, the KMT Government neglected the capital Taipei’s comprehensive urban development. Hence, as the new business districts were developed, the old business districts and their surroundings began to decline. Not until Taiwan’s democratisation, were the newly-empowered local communities and authorities able to influence political decisions and therefore bring about the improvement of these old places.

The other outcome of the KMT Government’s economic-development-oriented policy making resulted from their lack of interest in urban conservation, so that public-owned historic sites were neglected, and private-owned ones demolished. Although Taiwan’s stable economic development ultimately made the KMT Government start to pay attention to this issue from the early 1980s, it was just the beginning of an experimental process in which inexperienced government institutions kept amending the relevant laws to approach the issue. Meanwhile, democratisation empowered the private sector, citizens, and even the
public sector to control their properties, including those potential historic sites, thereby causing more difficulties for the relevant government institutions to achieve urban conservation when the property owners perceive their interests (in most cases, economic interests) will be affected.

Overall, as the globalising urban scene alongside the modern urban life has become part of the nation’s imagined collective memory, the KMT Government to a certain extent also lost its power to strongly control what can be remembered or forgotten within the capital Taipei. Consequently, the urban elements, which constitute historic and cultural relics as well as physical representations of the nation’s old imagined collective memory, can be easily demolished. The situation today remains the same as in Taiwan’s post-settler era, meaning that the DPP Government has encountered similar problems when dealing with urban conservation. This settler-rule legacy implies not only a setback in Taiwan’s urban conservation, but also an identity contest between the new and the old.
CHAPTER 10

REFLECTIONS ON RESEARCH QUESTIONS

10.1 Introduction

The previous four Chapters have revealed abundant information from the fieldwork. This Chapter examines how the information relates to the research questions. As explained in Section 4.5, the core research question is: How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces? This core question gives rise to three further questions, each of which is discussed, in turn, in Sections 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4. The aim is to make connections between the case study findings and the reviewed literature, and to use the theoretical framework to examine issues that have not been explored in existing academic work concerned with Taiwan’s shifting national identity alongside its changing urban landscape. Based on discussions of these three Sections, Section 10.5 returns to the core question and further highlights connections between the case study findings and the theoretical framework.

10.2 Question 1

How did the Chinese Settler State use iconic sites, national-cultural sites, and other urban elements, to practise its national identification scheme in Taiwan, and what implications for
these urban elements have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?

The Chinese Settler State/Post-colonial State

In order to answer Question 1, I started my empirical work by looking back to Taipei City’s Japanese colonial era. It is because the KMT represented not only the settler state but also the post-colonial state to Taiwan. The previous studies concerned with Taipei City’s urban history do not clearly indicate how the KMT Government dealt with these Japanese colonial urban legacies that were supposed to be against its Chinese identification schemes.

The relevant studies investigating post-colonial cities (e.g. Alsayyad, 1992; McClintock, 1994; Vale, 1992) have suggested that the post-colonial government cannot entirely eliminate colonial memories emanating from the post-colonial city due to the fact that the city was fundamentally created by the colonisers. Likewise, the case study shows that the KMT Government encountered the same issue. That is to say, the early 20th century Taipei City was constructed to represent the image of ‘Oriental Paris’ corresponding to the Japanese Empire’s aim of pursuing Westernisation. Meanwhile, when the KMT first occupied Taiwan in 1945, it was also struggling with the CPC in the Chinese Civil War on the Mainland China and therefore unable to pay attention on eliminating Japanese colonial urban legacies. In fact, one can suggest that these well-built colonial official buildings, public facilities, and infrastructures enabled the KMT to settle in Taiwan immediately. As a result, the Japanese colonial memory can still be remembered within the capital Taipei under Chinese settler rule.
The KMT Government even applied some colonial urban legacies’ identification functions to swiftly legitimise state power. For instance, the main government building remained the place where the extravagant military parade took place. Furthermore, the museum was used to exhibit items related to the KMT’s claimed achievement. In addition, the baseball stadium was used to forge nationalism derived from the nation’s sporting victory. With the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, these identification implements were eventually abandoned.

Creating new identity

Although the KMT chose not to destroy the relevant Japanese colonial urban legacies in the capital Taipei, previous academic studies (e.g. Hou, 2000; Leitner and Kang, 1999; Tay, 1995) showed that the KMT Government created new iconic sites, street and place names, and statues to legitimise its political control as well as to forge a new identity among the local population. Meanwhile, the case study findings also show that the KMT built the relevant national-cultural sites in Taipei City to serve the same purpose. For instance, the museums were erected to legitimise Chinese culture and history as ‘national’ culture and history. Moreover, the basketball stadiums were erected to host ‘domestic’ matches of ‘China’.

In comparison to the existing literature concerned with post-colonial cities in Asia and Africa (e.g. Vale, 2006) suggesting that the new government may build new landmarks hybridising Western and native architectural features to symbolise the nation’s independence and capability to pursue modernisation
without the former colonisers’ ‘help’, the case study shows that the KMT Government made these self-built new urban elements simply represent Chinese-palace styles without hybridising other architectural references. One can suggest it is because the KMT Government did not have strong connections with Japanese colonial Taiwan. Instead, it was a newly-arrived political entity claiming that Taiwan should have been part of China’s territory. Thus, those new iconic sites, national-cultural sites, and relevant public facilities were built purely to legitimise Taiwan’s ‘Chinese roots’, and were not necessary to denote the end of Japanese colonial rule. Apart from directly conveying images related to ‘being Chinese’, the KMT Government legitimised its political control by setting up many subtle urban elements, such as banners, fliers, and slogans, displaying in the Taiwanese’s everyday built environments.

For the local Taiwanese, however, these new urban elements created by the KMT, to a certain extent, might symbolise the beginning of a new colonial history. With the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, the symbolic meanings and functions of these urban elements began to be questioned publicly. As a result, some of them were physically demolished or functionally changed. Nonetheless, others are still intact in post-settler Taipei City. It is not just because there will be a lot of work to make the changes happen (e.g. renaming all of those streets and places) or that the changes will be costly (e.g. removing a giant monument). It is also because the opposition parties (the KMT and its allies controlling not only Taipei City’s administration, but also the National Assembly’s operation) can obstruct the DPP Government’s plans aiming to affect these settler-state legacies.
From the case study findings [see Chapters 6 and 7] and relevant information from the existing literature, Table 10.1 [see pp. 258-60] summarises the information presented in this Section. The Table shows how the KMT Government used the Japanese colonial legacies, especially those iconic sites, to practise its identification scheme. Moreover, the Table also lists the iconic sites, national-cultural sites, and those urban elements created by the KMT Government to legitimise its power as well as to create collective memory among the Taiwanese. Furthermore, it shows how these urban elements’ identification functions faded away during Taiwan’s political transition period, and how that transition also enabled the DPP, which administered Taipei City at the time, to represent the nation’s sorrowful memory—the 2-2-8 Incident—in the form of the memorial and the museum. It can be seen also that when the DPP was in government and tried to further affect some settler-state legacies’ symbolic meanings, its actions were criticised or even stopped by the KMT and its allies.
### Table 10.1—Functions of iconic sites, national-cultural sites and urban elements in Taipei City in the main governing eras of Taiwan 1683-2000+  
(Data compiling: Sung-ta Liu)

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<td>Temporary use / Historic site</td>
<td>Ordinary government building / Historic site</td>
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<td>Representing state power / Hosting official foreign guests / Function lost since 1970s (due to Taiwan’s diplomatic crisis)</td>
<td>The original symbolic function and meaning became forgotten</td>
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<td>Representing state power</td>
<td>Representing state power / Hosting official foreign guests / Function lost since 1970s (due to Taiwan’s diplomatic crisis)</td>
<td>The original symbolic function and meaning became forgotten</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Hotel</td>
<td>Legitimising state power and Chinese culture / Hosting official foreign guests / Function lost since 1970s (due to Taiwan’s diplomatic crisis)</td>
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<td>The original symbolic function and meaning are being satirised</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shilin Residence (Chiang’ Kai-shek’s official residence)</td>
<td>Representing state power / Function lost after Chiang Kai-shek’s death</td>
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<td>Partially open to the general public in the mid-1990s</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CKS Memorial / National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall</td>
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<td>(1683-1895)</td>
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<td>(1895-1945)</td>
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<td>2-28 Memorial</td>
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<td>Post-settler era (2000-)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The original symbolic function became forgotten</td>
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<td>National Palace Museum</td>
<td>Ordinary public place</td>
<td>Function change (multiculturalism) blocked by opposition parties</td>
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<td>Project launch / Promoting Taiwanese history and culture</td>
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<td>Under construction</td>
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<td>Basketball stadium</td>
<td>Forging national identity and nationalism</td>
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<td>Function slightly changed (de-nationalistic)</td>
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<td>Baseball stadium</td>
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<td>Statues / Place and street names</td>
<td>Legitimising state power</td>
<td>Demolition or becoming part of people’s banal living environments</td>
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<td>Forging national identity</td>
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<td>Demolition</td>
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<td>Mixed-Western styles / Representing state power</td>
<td>Chinese imperial-palace styles / Legitimising state power and Chinese culture</td>
<td>Chinese imperial-palace style became unnecessary / Diversity and hybridity</td>
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10.3 Question 2

How did the Chinese Settler State affect Taiwan’s developing multicultural society as well as multicultural urban environments, and what implications for these environments have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?

Reluctant Chinese diasporas

Question 2 is set to explore the development of Taipei City’s multiculturalism throughout Taiwan’s different political contexts. From the fieldwork, five groups are identified. They are: (1) Chinese Mainlanders coming to Taiwan in the late 1940s; (2) the Hakka; (3) the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples; (4) the US military people stationing in Taiwan from the early 1950s to the late 1970s; and (5) the new global immigrants including immigrant spouses and workers.

For the Mainlanders coming to Taiwan at the end of the 1940s due to the Civil War on the Mainland China, it can be assumed that some of them might initially believe that Taiwan was just a temporary settlement. However, since the KMT never re-conquered the ‘lost’ Mainland, all of these new immigrants ultimately became a reluctant diaspora. Meanwhile, some of them formed their diaspora spaces in Taipei City.

In contrast to the literature (e.g. Gensheimer, 2001; Mazrui, 2001) suggesting that diaspora spaces tend to form in the suburbs due to the diasporas’ marginalisation from the locals, the formation of these Chinese diaspora spaces in
the capital Taipei present a different story since the Chinese Mainlanders were the ‘politically-predominant minority’ and able to have privileges concerned with their settlements in Taiwanese cities. The relevant academic studies (e.g. Chen, 2005) have indicated that the KMT Government’s housing policies, to a large extent, only benefited civil servants, educators, and military figures, in which Chinese Mainlanders were the majority. However, the studies do not clearly explore this condition’s origins and implications. In the case of Mainlanders who were officials or educators, the case study findings indicate that the newly-arrived KMT Government arranged for them to settle in the former Japanese colonisers’ living quarters. Unsurprisingly, in comparison to the local peoples’ residential areas, people living in these quarters would have easy access to public facilities with better conditions. This condition can be related to discussion in Section 10.2 [p. 254] indicating that the ‘ready-made’ colonial urban legacies enabled the newly-arrived KMT Government to settle in Taiwan quickly. Meanwhile, it also somewhat reflects Hall’s viewpoint (2002) that unbalanced spatial distributions originally stemming from colonial urban planning can still exist in the post-colonial city.

Since ‘restoring the Mainland’ has become just a slogan, these ‘temporary’ living quarters ultimately became the ‘homes’ of these first-generation Chinese settlers and their offspring. As a result, these places can be regarded as the Chinese diaspora spaces to a certain extent, although they were originally built by the Japanese colonisers. By interviewing the key authorities, it was found that although such unequal arrangements have been discussed publicly with the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, both the transitional KMT Government and
the succeeding DPP Government have been unable to provide appropriate solutions to deal with this awkward situation. After all, it can cause controversy if the government force these old Mainlanders to move out.

Apart from civil servants and educators, the majority among the Chinese Mainlanders immigrating to Taiwan during the late 1940s were KMT soldiers and their dependents. By consulting the official documents, interviewing the authorities, and visiting the relevant places, it was found that since the KMT Government initially regarded Taiwan as a temporary settlement, it did not prevent these soldiers from illegally constructing their dwellings in Taiwanese cities. In Taipei City, the City Government even built the public market or stalls to accommodate these newcomers’ illegal settlements.

It cannot be denied that some of these illegally built Chinese diaspora spaces strengthened economic activities or improved the infrastructure of the surrounding areas. Some of them even became officially-recognised ‘military-dependent villages’. However, their existence implied the KMT Government’s ignorance of Taiwanese cities’ comprehensive planning during the early 1950s. Furthermore, many of these roughly built villages’ living conditions were inadequate, as was their appearance. These factors eventually affected Taiwan’s urban development in the long run. Therefore, both the KMT and the DPP Governments have made relevant laws to deal with the issues. In fact, Taiwan’s contemporary public housing scheme was originally launched to resettle these veterans living in military-dependent villages.

A slightly surprising finding, which somewhat reflects Hayden’s study (1995) investigating how diasporas can become symbolically recognised in their
settled land, is that although these military-dependent villages can be regarded as the physical evidence of the KMT Government’s unequal urban policies and as an obstacle to Taiwan’s urban development, their historic meaning eventually attracted the attention of some conservationists and government institutions. In the case of Taipei City, its role as the nation’s capital makes it the first Taiwanese city experiencing many experimental military-dependent-village-demolition projects. Nevertheless, owing to the efforts of some politicians, scholars, and former residents, the last old military-dependent quarter in the capital Taipei was restored and functioned as a theme museum as well as a public hall.

From the above discussion, it can be suggested that despite the residents being either Chinese social elites or KMT military figures, the reason why these Chinese diaspora spaces have caused many controversies and problems is due to the KMT’s early political priority for re-conquering the Mainland China. The priority made the KMT Government once regard Taiwan as a temporary settlement and thus it did not formulate comprehensive plans to accommodate these newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders, who ultimately became the reluctant diasporas. Consequently, thorny issues have occurred and still exist in Taiwan’s political transition and post-settler eras.

The locals’ rights of self-identification

Apart from the Chinese Mainlanders, the case study also explores how the local minority groups had spatial implications for Taipei City. The local Taiwanese can be classified into two groups, namely the Han People and the Taiwanese Indigenous People. The Han People are composed of two subgroups,
namely the Hokkien (Hoklo) and the Hakka. Like the Taiwanese Indigenous People, the Hakka is the minority because of their smaller population. According to the relevant government publications, the Japanese Colonial Government clearly respected Taiwanese ethnic groups by studying and recording their customs, demographics, and living territories, etc. Nevertheless, for the succeeding KMT Government, the local Taiwanese were identified as Chinese. The condition immediately affected the Hakka’s and the Taiwanese Indigenous People’s self-identification. For instance, the language restriction forced the Hakkas to become ‘invisible’ in Taiwanese society since they could not speak their mother tongue on most public occasions. Meanwhile, the Indigenous People were forced to learn Chinese culture.

With Taiwan’s economic development alongside accelerating urbanisation, increasing numbers of Hakka and Indigenous Peoples began to settle in Taiwanese cities to search for job opportunities. In Taipei City, several Hakka and Indigenous enclaves were therefore formed. Meanwhile, many societies were established by these minority residents. With the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, these grassroots organisations began to play an important role in making the transitional KMT Government eliminate those irrational identity policies. Consequently, as seen in Hayden’s study (1995) which investigated how a given city can represent maturing multiculturalism, several museums, community centres, monuments, and public housing were erected in the capital Taipei in tribute to, or for the benefit of the Taiwanese Hakka and Indigenous People.
The US urban legacies

Previous literature (e.g. Brown, 2004; Su, 2005) has suggested that due to its multicultural environments, Taiwan’s cultural diversification and hybridisation have already been organically generated from interactions between the Indigenous People and the Han People prior to any political entity’s occupation of the region. Apart from that ‘organic’ cultural diversification and hybridisation, the literature also indicated that the state’s policies were able to initiate the integration of Western culture with Taiwanese culture. For instance, the Qing Empire was defeated by the Western countries’ coalition, and was thereby forced to allow Western traders and missionaries to enter Taiwan. Moreover, the Japanese Colonial Government regarded Westernisation as modernisation. All these factors influenced the flow of Western culture to Taiwan alongside subsequent cultural diversification and hybridisation.

Similarly, the case study findings reveal how the state’s policies enabled the US troops to bring Western culture to Taiwan. After the KMT retreated to Taiwan, the party was worrying about the threat from the CPC. Meanwhile, the US was worrying about the extension of Communist power in East Asia. Under these circumstances, the KMT Government allowed the US Government to station troops in Taiwan. Thereafter, similar to other cases (e.g. Gensheimer, 2001; Mazrui, 2001) concerned with relationships between non-Western locals and Western strategists, the Taiwanese locals began to provide the American newcomers with services such as food and entertainment that they could relate to. The newly built shops, restaurants, and entertainment places collectively implied emerging cultural diversification and hybridisation.
In Taipei City, although the US troops departed after the US Government cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, one can still encounter their urban legacies in the areas where they were located. For instance, a nightlife spot was formed at the Third Section of the Zhongshan North Road owing to those pubs originally opened to serve the US troops. Moreover, the area around the Seventh Section of the Zhongshan North Road became a high-quality cosmopolitan place where one can easily encounter foreign nationals, international schools, pubs, cafés, and exotic restaurants.

The new global immigrants

In the age of globalisation, people can easily travel around the world for tourism, business, study, marriage, or work opportunities. The condition accelerates and reinforces the formation of a multicultural society (McGrew, 1992; Thompson, 1992). In Taiwan, Tai’s study (2005) has shown that the region’s two distinct global immigrant groups are immigrant spouses and immigrant workers. The participation of both groups in Taiwanese society is due to Taiwan’s economic restructuring. More particularly, in order to secure its political legitimacy, the KMT Government dedicated itself to Taiwan’s economic development. Capitalism eventually gave rise to an increasing middle class alongside social polarisation. Under this condition, the low-income Taiwanese males began to try to find their partners in Southeast Asian countries through match-maker companies. Meanwhile, the labour shortage began to emerge, as increasingly highly-educated generations tended to engage in white-collar jobs, and eventually drove the KMT Government to allow immigrant workers, the
majority from Southeast Asian countries, to participate in the nation’s relevant industries.

Although not all of these two groups of new immigrants are permanently living in Taiwan, the case study findings show that they had permanent implications for the capital Taipei’s urban scene. For instance, a community centre was erected in Taipei City to host relevant courses and events to help immigrant spouses adapt to their new environment. Since the immigrant workers only settle in Taiwan for a certain period depending on their contracts, they have not so far formed specific residential areas in Taiwanese cities. Nonetheless, the local religious institutions, businesspeople, and grassroots human-rights organisations began to provide immigrant workers with relevant services and gave rise to the organic formation of Taipei City’s Little Philippines, an assembly place for the Filipino immigrant workers on every Sunday, the only day off they have in a week. It can be suggested that these places symbolise the evolution of Taiwan’s multiculturalism.

The findings of the case study [see Chapter 8] and literature review related to Question 2 are summarised in Tables 10.2 [see p. 270] and 10.3 [see p. 271]. Table 10.2 demonstrates how different groups’ self-identification and living territories were affected under different political periods. From the Table, it can be seen that the Hakka’s and the Indigenous People’s identity suppression and reclamation corresponded to their marginalisation and eventual inclusion in the capital Taipei. Table 10.3 shows how original ‘outside’ cultures have been integrated into Taiwanese culture and are reflected in Taipei City’s changing
urban landscape. In short, from these two Tables, one can see that some groups were been privileged and some were being disadvantaged, even suppressed in different periods of Taiwanese history. The nation’s democratisation made the state begin to revise certain groups’ privileges. More importantly, these suppressed groups were able to strive to be treated equally. Those new urban elements and policies serving their interests represent not only the former suppressed groups’ achievements, but also Taiwan’s developing multiculturalism:
Table 10.2— Implications of identity and urban policies for different groups in Taipei City in the main governing eras of Taiwan 1624-2000+ (Data compiling: Sung-ta Liu)

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<tr>
<td>Mainlander social elites</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mainlander soldiers</td>
<td>Chinese diaspora space</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hakka</td>
<td>Identity conflict</td>
<td>Slightly affected by the State’s policies</td>
<td>Cultural/Language suppression</td>
<td>Social movements/ Identity reclaimed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Spatial implications</td>
<td>Forming ethnic enclaves organically (temples as community centres) / Competing with other ethnic groups</td>
<td>Experiencing modern urban planning</td>
<td>Living spaces being marginalised</td>
<td>Benefited by the State’s policies (community centres and museums)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hokkien (Hoklo)</td>
<td>Identity conflict</td>
<td>Slightly affected by the State’s policies</td>
<td>Cultural/Language suppression</td>
<td></td>
<td>Identity reclaimed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spatial implication</td>
<td>Forming ethnic enclaves organically (temples as community centres) / Competing with other ethnic groups</td>
<td>Experiencing modern urban planning</td>
<td>As being the ethnic majority, there are no urban policies specifically set up to serve the group’s interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indigenous People</td>
<td>Identity conflict</td>
<td>Religion assimilation</td>
<td>Cultural assimilation</td>
<td>Social movements/ Identity reclaimed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spatial implication</td>
<td>Forming ethnic enclaves organically / Competing with other ethnic groups (threatened by increasing Han People)</td>
<td>Living territories in mountain areas became state-owned</td>
<td>Tribal lands reclaimed / Benefited by the State’s policies (community centres, museums, memorial places, and public housing) / Issue of “being unable to fit in the urban lifestyle” emerged</td>
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Table 10.3 — New immigrants’ implications for the urban landscape of Taipei City in the main governing eras of Taiwan 1683-2000+
(Data compiling: Sung-ta Liu)

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<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forming ethnic enclaves</td>
<td>Introducing Western cultures</td>
<td>Living quarters designated by</td>
<td>Spatial legacies adopted</td>
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<td>capitalists</td>
<td></td>
<td>with local entrepreneurs’</td>
<td>alongside entertainment venues</td>
<td>the State (prior to the late 1970s) /</td>
<td>the locals (e.g. the</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>help</td>
<td>(e.g. café, theatres, cinemas,</td>
<td>The locals provided commercial</td>
<td>nightlife venue, Western</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US soldiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>department stores, exotic</td>
<td>services that the group could</td>
<td>style housing, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>restaurants, etc.)</td>
<td>relate to, thereby Westernising</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>immigrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the urban scene</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>spouses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
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<td>workers</td>
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Note: The locals provided religious and commercial services that the group could relate to, thereby forming specific assembly places / Community centre construction with the grassroots organisation’s help / Cultural clash with the locals.
10.4 Question 3

How did the Chinese Settler State deal with the impacts of economic/urban globalisation in shaping Taiwan’s urban landscape, and what implications related to this globalised urban scene have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era?

Globalisation

To answer Question 3, we need to know how global culture was formed in Taiwan. Previous studies (e.g. Hall, 1992; Scholte, 1996; Stevenson, 1999) have suggested that global culture’s formation, to a large extent, resulted from the spread of Western culture, driven by global capitalism. Based on this viewpoint, I traced back to the early 1860s when the Qing Empire was defeated by the Western coalition, and was therefore forced to open Taiwan’s ports to Western capitalists. It was the first time Taiwan became involved in world trade due to the state’s policy. The documentary sources show that these newly-arrived Western entrepreneurs cooperated with local businesspeople to enable a port area, namely Dadaocheng, to become the capital Taipei’s central business district. Many Western-style buildings were erected in Dadaocheng and some still remain in the area.

Technically, it can be argued that Westernised Dadaocheng was a spatial product contributed by both foreign and local capitalists, rather than the Qing Empire. However, unlike the Qing Empire, the successive Japanese Colonial
Government actively constructed a central business district, namely Ximending, in the capital Taipei. Ximending consisted of mixed Western-style buildings reflecting the Japanese colonisers’ aim of pursuing Westernisation. Meanwhile, various Western entertainment venues, such as cinemas and cafés, were also located in the district.

Clearly, although Dadaocheng, formed in the late 1860s, and Ximending, completed in the early 1920s, are physical representations of how Taiwan began to get involved in global capitalism, neither of them is able to match the contemporary globally-standardised urban scene that has been described (e.g. Clark, 2003; Wong, 1997) as a place, usually the city’s central business district, packed with skyscrapers and global-brand retailers, representing a ‘sameness’ derived from global culture. Such a globally-standardised central business district did not emerge in the capital Taipei until the KMT’s coming. Other writers (e.g. Chou, 2005; Hsu, 2005; Jou, 2005) have emphasised that ‘economic development’ was one of the instruments used by the KMT Government to legitimise/secure state power. This eventually enabled global capitalism to take root in Taiwan. As a result, several globally-standardised commercial districts were formed in Taipei City. For example, the East District began to develop in the 1960s since many export-oriented manufacturing factories were located at the area. In the 1970s, owing to the nation’s developing service sector, many financial institutions, department stores, official buildings and luxury hotels were erected in the East District. The subsequent process of democratisation enabled the private sector to create many consumption spaces. For example, before the early 1990s, the Xinyi Planning District developed slowly due to its high land prices
manipulated by the private sector. Later, through coordination with the Central and City Governments, substantial investment by the private sector then accelerated the Xinyi District’s development from the mid-1990s.

*From globalisation to localisation*

The formation of globally-standardised central business districts in Taipei City was driven by the KMT Government’s desire for economic achievement as well as power legitimacy. However, as Huang (2005a) has shown, the construction of civic facilities related to people’s welfare, such as community centres and parks, was ignored for many years by the KMT Government. Meanwhile, the general public were not successful in their appeals to higher government institutions to improve their living environments. Eventually, with the coming of democratisation, the transitional KMT Government began to allow the general public to participate in policy-making concerned with urban planning and therefore improved their living conditions.

Nonetheless, some thorny issues caused by the lengthy economic/urban globalisation process still cannot be easily solved. For instance, Chou (2005) has shown that, to develop the nation’s light industry, the KMT Government converted much agricultural land for industrial use in the 1950s. Although such a forceful land policy indeed enabled Taiwan’s light industry to develop rapidly. The complicated ownership due to land reform further hindered west Taipei City’s urban regeneration launched in the 1980s, since the City Government had to negotiate with a large number of landowners. The case study findings show that the consequences are still affecting contemporary west Taipei City.
What is more, in consideration of the literature (e.g. Harvey, 1993; Sklair, 2006) examining urban issues caused by globalisation, the case study investigates whether Taipei City’s globalisation has resulted in the demolition of historic urban elements representing the old collective memory. The findings show that, as the first Taiwanese city to experience urban globalisation, the capital Taipei is also the one frequently suffering from losing historic urban elements. And since modern Taipei City was founded by the Japanese colonisers, most of the demolished historic buildings were housing legacies from the Japanese era.

It has been suggested that the reason behind the demolition of these old urban elements was that when the KMT Government retreated from the Chinese Mainland to Taiwan in 1949, it regarded Taiwan as merely a temporary settlement, thereby not paying attention to urban conservation. Yet even the Japanese Colonial Government had made regulations to conserve urban legacies from the Qing Empire.

In terms of when the KMT Government began to deal with the issue, it might be assumed that Taiwan’s democratisation would be the point at which non-governmental organisations, academics, and the general public would begin to appeal to the authorities to conserve historic assets. However, the documentary sources show that these views had already emerged in the late 1970s, and that, in the early 1980s, the KMT Government established laws to protect historic sites. The reason why the issue began to attract the public sector’s and the general public’s attention earlier than the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation can be that the nation’s economic development became stable and successful in the late 1970s,
and this enabled the authorities and the general public to begin to consider Taiwan’s cultural development.

Due to the lack of experience, the KMT Government’s urban conservation policies had several shortcomings. For example, the early policies focused on ‘conservation’ by keeping historic sites inaccessible, without considering their potential for revitalisation. The policies even did not clearly indicate the responsibility of government institutions at different levels when dealing with urban conservation affairs. Meanwhile, echoing the literature (e.g. Boyer, 1996, Hannigan, 1998; Harvey, 1993; Sklair, 2006) investigating how different interest groups, including government institutions, real estate agents, developers, and property owners, can have conflict over the balance between urban development and urban conservation in different nations, the case study findings show a similar situation in Taiwan.

The irony is that the situation seems to become more complicated with the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation. Many financial, business and educational institutions initially controlled by the state became privatised or autonomous after the abolition of martial law. Often, they occupied government properties that the KMT Government took over from the Japanese Colonial Government, and some own historic Japanese housing legacies. As a result, in addition to resistance from the private sector and ordinary citizens owning historic buildings, the government institutions also have to restrain privatised former public sector organisations from demolishing historic sites for the sake of their own commercial and other interests. Even local governments, which also became more independent due to democratisation, in some cases demolished their historic properties to prevent the
central government from taking them over. Given this experience, the relevant laws have continuously been revised and strengthened throughout Taiwan’s transitional and post-settler eras.

Drawing on the information from the case study findings [see Chapter 9] and previous academic literature, Tables 10.4 [see p. 279] and 10.5 [see p. 280] summarise the answer to Question 3. Table 10.4, inspired by Chou’s study (2005), indicates the formation of different central business districts in the capital Taipei in the context of Taiwan’s experience of economic/urban globalisation. Table 10.5 shows how this economic/urban globalisation process impacted on the residents’ living environments in the capital Taipei and on Taiwan’s urban regeneration and conservation policies, and how the Taiwanese government, in different political periods, dealt with the impacts. The key point is that since it initially regarded Taiwan as a temporary settlement, the KMT Government had ignored the issue of comprehensive urban development, both in Taipei City and in other Taiwanese cities. Consequently, although several important business districts were formed in Taipei City by the Chinese Settler State to represent the nation’s economic achievements and simultaneously to secure its legitimacy, the City was still short of civic facilities, and some historic sites were damaged or even demolished. The nation’s stable economic development and following democratisation eventually made the KMT Government begin to pay attention to the issues. However, democratisation also empowered the public sector, the private sector and the general public to manage their own properties and change/demolish some historic urban elements, without the state’s strong control. Hence, how to conserve those
physical representations of the nation’s old imagined collective memory, in a
globalising built environment where new memories are being consistently forged,
is still a crucial issue in post-settler Taiwan.
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<td></td>
<td>Declining</td>
<td>Slightly restored by improving public facilities and marketing in the late 1990s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dadaocheng</td>
<td></td>
<td>Formed in the late 1860s owing to Western capitalists’ participation / Declining due to the loss of harbour function since the late 1890s</td>
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<td>Declining</td>
<td>Regeneration by improving public facilities and marketing in the early 1990s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ximending</td>
<td></td>
<td>Built by the State to cater for its idea of Westernisation</td>
<td>Slightly declining due to the East District’s emergence</td>
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<td>East District</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Formed organically in the 1960s owing to Taiwan’s economic restructuring and the private sector’s participation</td>
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<td>Science/High-tech parks</td>
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<td>Built in the 1990s due to the State’s economic restructuring policies / Improving surroundings’ development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xinyi Planning District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Formed in the early 1990s due to the State’s economic restructuring policies / Developing in the late 1990s owing to the private sector’s participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td>Land reform policy made many agricultural land become industrial / Land ownership became complicated and fragmented</td>
<td>Complicated land ownership has impeded urban regeneration (e.g. the case of early developed east Taipei City)</td>
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<td>Civil facilities’ construction</td>
<td>Founding basic infrastructures (e.g. public parks, traffic systems, and water systems), which were concentrated in areas where the colonisers were the majority</td>
<td>State budget was arranged to dedicate to improving national defence and economy, rather than civil facilities</td>
<td>Citizens/Communities are able to appeal for the authorities to improve their living environments (e.g. parks and community centres were built owing to the communities’ efforts)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Old places’ conservation and reuse</td>
<td>Law establishment / Sometimes demolishing historic sites for the sake of colonial urban planning</td>
<td>Initial neglect due to the State’s focus on re-conquering the Mainland China / Attention began in the late 1970s owing to stable economic development / (inadequate) Law establishment</td>
<td>Paying attention on public-owned historic sites conservation / Relevant laws were unable to efficiently deal with property owners (empowered the private sector, general public, and autonomous government institutions) / Laws amendment</td>
<td>Paying attention on both public-and private-owned historic sites conservation and reuse / Relevant laws were unable to efficiently deal with property owners / Laws amendment</td>
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10.5 Conclusion

After explaining the connections between the existing literature, case study findings, and each of the sub-research questions, this concluding Section gives a stronger summary of how the research as a whole relates to theoretical framework of the study. This is followed by an explanation of the outcome of the study in relation to the core research question:

How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces?

From the theoretical framework to the case study

The case study is concerned mainly with three topics derived from the theoretical framework. The first topic, set out in Chapter 2, is about the nature of national identity, based on viewpoints of Anderson (1991) and other commentators (e.g. Cohen, 1997; Billig, 1995; Hall, 1999; Scholte, 1996; Smith, 1991; Thompson, 1992), the term an ‘imagined collective memory’ is used to represent the effects of the nation’s changing political, cultural, and economic conditions.

The second topic, set out in Chapter 3, is concerned with how shifting national identity is represented within urban landscapes. By examining the work of Edensor (2002) and others (e.g. Cohen, 1997; Hall, 2000; Hall, 2002; Harvey, 1993; Hayden, 1995), I suggest that the nation’s changing urban landscape constitutes what I term ‘(re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces’ where new and
old imagined collective memories consistently compete for representation due to national government changes, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation.

The final topic, set out in Chapter 4, is concerned with Weitzer’s study (1990) of settler countries. He suggests that the settler state may use authoritarian ways to maintain its political control in the settled land. However, democratisation can enable the suppressed home population to begin to participate in political decision-making. This political transition can eventually make the nation evolve into a post-settler country, meaning that the home population formally gains (or regains) state power. Such a viewpoint inspires one to consider how national identity and its urban representations can be affected in the context of the settler country’s transition and transformation.

The existing academic works (e.g. Chen, 2005; Chou, 2005; Hsu, 2005; Huang, 2005a; Jou, 2005; Leitner and Kang, 1999; Simon, 2003; Su, 2005; Tai, 2005; Tay, 1995) investigating the KMT Government’s implications for Taipei City’s urban landscapes have reflected these three topics to a certain extent. That is to say, the KMT Government/Chinese Settler State used language restrictions, control of educational materials, mass-media censorship and economic achievements to create the imagined collective memory of ‘being Chinese’ and simultaneously to legitimise its political control in Taiwan. The built environment of the capital city, Taipei, was also used to a certain extent by the KMT to express the sense of ‘being a Chinese city’. For example, Chinese imperial-palace style public buildings were erected by the KMT Government. But with the beginning of Taiwan’s democratisation in the late 1980s, many of the Settler State’s explicit identification schemes have been abandoned. Meanwhile, Taipei City’s urban
changes also reflected the nation’s political transition. For example, some urban elements associated with the KMT Government’s early authoritarian rule were demolished.

Taiwan entered the post-settler era with the DPP Government coming to power in 2000, yet urban changes in post-settler Taipei City have received relatively little attention in the academic literature. But from studies concerned with urban post-settler South Africa (Beall et al., 2002; Bollens, 1999; Saff, 1998), it can be asked whether post-settler Taipei City would be ‘stuck in transition’ due to the Chinese Settler State’s profound influence? Moreover, in consideration of the theoretical framework of this study, one can also indicate unexplored issues concerned with Taipei City’s various characters, including its roles as post-colonial city, multicultural city, and globalising city in Taiwan’s changing socio-political contexts. Hence, I set out to investigate these issues to generate a comprehensive perspective on what has been (re-)remembered and (re-)forgotten in contemporary Taipei City, in relation to shifting Taiwanese identity. The following subsection presents the conclusion to the entire study as well as the answer to the main research question of the thesis.

(Re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten Taipei City

Through a historical approach, one can argue that, in comparison to the Dutch colonisers, Cheng’s regime, and the Qing Empire ‘ruling’ part of Taiwan, the Japanese Colonial Government was the first political entity that began to ‘govern’ the entire region. Therefore, in consideration of Anderson’s perspective (1991) on the formation of a nation/an imagined political community, the
beginning of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan means the beginning of the formation of the Taiwanese’s imagined collective memory. Meanwhile, by examining the existing literature (e.g. Su, 2005) concerned with colonial Taipei City’s urban planning; and simultaneously reflecting the theoretical framework in which several commentators (e.g. Edensor, 2002; Vale, 2006) have exemplified how the state can enable imposed national identity to be represented within urban landscapes, one can suggest that the imagined collective memory of the Taiwanese began to be systematically represented within the capital Taipei’s urban landscape due to the Japanese colonisers’ comprehensive urban planning. However, according to the case study findings, the Colonial Government did not set out to eliminate the urban legacies of previous rulers, due to its concern for their historic and cultural value. Therefore, the Taiwanese’s imagined collective memory can be traced further backwards in time through the existence of these old urban elements.

After the KMT Government/Chinese Settler State occupied Taiwan in 1945, the new Government’s political priorities were to legitimise its power and to benefit Chinese Mainlanders. The KMT’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949 implied Chinese settler rule’s further rooting in Taiwan. Meanwhile, ‘re-conquering the Mainland China’ became the main policy of the KMT Government. Under these circumstances, the KMT Government dictatorially controlled Taiwan’s political, cultural, and economic affairs. Both the literature (e.g. Manthorpe, 2005) and the case study findings indicate how the KMT Government used different media, such as the press, language control, and official publications, in an everyday context to forge hegemonic national identity serving its political priorities. These
identification schemes echo the academic studies (e.g. Billig, 1995; Hall, 1992) exploring how the state can affect national identification.

Although the goal of re-conquering the Mainland eventually was abandoned, the original principles of the KMT’s policy to secure its legitimacy and maintain the Chinese settlers’ interests continuously dominated Taiwan’s political landscape, evidenced by physical representations and biased urban policies implemented within the capital Taipei’s urban landscape. Several academic works (e.g. Chou, 2005; Huang, 2005a; Tai, 2005; Tay, 1995) have described these phenomena. Through the present case study of Taipei City, new information has been explored to create a clearer picture showing how the City’s changing images represented the implications of settler rule for Taiwan’s political, cultural, and economic experiences: the factors that shape Taiwanese identity. Since the KMT was struggling in the war with the CPC on the Mainland when it was initially occupying Taiwan, it did not destroy Japanese colonial urban legacies, and used them to enable the KMT Government to swiftly settle in Taiwan. The colonial memory therefore is still embedded in the post-colonial capital Taipei.

Under KMT Government rule, although Taipei City’s urban landscape seemed to show the spirit of modernity, the spatial products generated from the Government’s one-dimensional political doctrine ultimately caused issues including extreme nationalistic propaganda, unequal urban development, and the local minority’s marginalisation. Not until the early stages of Taiwan’s democratisation in the late 1980s, did the general public begin to be able to affect political decision making. From the literature and other data from the Taipei City
case study, it can be seen that, during the political transition period, some urban representations, used by KMT Government to make the home population ‘remember’ were physically demolished or functionally changed. Moreover, some collective memories that the KMT had, deliberately or not, made the home population ‘forget’ were being represented in the form of newly constructed urban elements (e.g. the 2-28 Memorial to the conflict between the locals and the newly-arrived KMT Government). Some of these changes were owing to the DPP, the main opposition party, winning the City’s first ever mayoral election. Incidentally, in comparison to studies (e.g. Beall et al., 2002) demonstrating how South Africa’s political transition affected previously biased urban policies, the case of Taipei City shows the potential of transitional settler rule to give rise to the city’s physical changes.

After democratisation developed in Taiwan, the KMT’s single-party control was challenged by grassroots social movements and opposition parties. Ultimately, the KMT lost the presidential election to the DPP in 2000, which marks the beginning of the nation’s post-settler era. This historical milestone supports Weitzer’s study (1990) of the transformation from a settler to a post-settler country, meaning that democratisation can undermine the settler state’s superiority, and this political transition can ultimately enable the home population to gain state power.

Following its election, the DPP Government predictably launched several identity policies, such as adding new education materials, to promote Taiwan’s local roots. Some of the policies involved the capital Taipei’s urban change (e.g. physically demolishing or functionally changing the KMT Government’s urban
legacies; and preventing the minority from being marginalised in the city; and protecting the historic urban elements). Although it seemed to be easy for the transitional KMT Government/Chinese Settler State to change the urban scene for the sake of sustainable urban development and the nation’s re-identification, the case study findings show that it has been difficult for the successor DPP Government/Post-settler State to deal similarly with settler-state urban legacies and their implications. I suggest that such a contradiction results from four interrelated factors:

(1) Although the DPP symbolically ended Chinese settler rule by defeating the KMT in the 2000 presidential election, the new Government thereafter faced issues of economic downturn and political corruption. In these circumstances, despite the DPP’s claim that it represented ‘local’ power, the KMT and its allies began to take control at central or local governmental levels by winning the relevant elections. For instance, the KMT and its allies became the majority in the national assembly. It also won two consecutive Taipei mayoral elections in 2002 and 2006; and therefore has continuously administered the City Government. Hence, the KMT and its allies could influence or even block DPP Government policies that would affect settler-state legacies.

(2) Many KMT policies were controversial (e.g. identity manipulation; turning a blind eye to illegally built houses), but the nation’s successful economic development and rapid democratisation can be attributed to the continuity stemming from the KMT Government’s single-party governing. It is
impossible to deny the Chinese settler rule’s political, cultural and economic contribution to contemporary Taiwan. This is seen in the fact that settler-state urban legacies are prevalent within the everyday living environment of Taiwan; and it is therefore impossible to eliminate them totally, let alone ‘forget’ them. In fact, some of them have even become regarded as unique spatial products with cultural and historic importance.

(3) In securing its political legitimacy by boosting economic development, the KMT Government enabled Taiwan to become involved rapidly in globalisation. However, since the KMT initially regarded Taiwan as a temporary settlement, it did not set up relevant urban policies concerned with the comprehensive development of Taiwanese cities, nor policies concerned with urban conservation. Consequently, urban regeneration and conservation became complicated problems, capable of causing conflict between the state, the public sector, the private sector, and the general public.

(4) With the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation, state power became less dominant. This enabled different actors, including the general public, the private sector, and even the public sector (e.g. local governments, banks, schools), to affect the urban landscape’s creation against the state’s plans. Specifically, for the transitional KMT Government, these ‘plans’ were more concerned with urban regeneration and urban conservation. For the DPP Government, meanwhile, the ‘plans’ also included the intention to remove or change settler-state urban legacies. The more liberal climate meant, however,
that, unlike the dictatorial KMT Government, the post-martial-law governments have been unable to create or maintain a hegemonic imagined collective memory among people in Taiwan through shaping the nation’s urban landscape.

From these four factors explaining why the DPP Government has been unable to modify the Chinese Settler State’s urban legacies, I argue that although there have been some ‘good signs’ related to changes in the capital Taipei (e.g. removing symbols of authority; former suppressed ethnic groups being no longer marginalised in central urban areas; trying to make the balance between development and conservation), the City’s urban landscape, consisting of these (re-)remembered and (re-)forgotten urban elements representing shifting Taiwanese identity, was still ‘stuck in transition’ during Taiwan’s early post-settler era (from May 2000, when the DPP began to represent the state of Taiwan, to January 2008, when the fieldwork for this study ended), in which the governing party, the opposition parties, the public sector, the private sector, and the general public all had the capability to affect physical representations of Taiwanese identity. This ambivalence suggests that, for the contemporary Taiwanese, Chinese settler rule is a part of imagined collective memory that is, as yet, unforgettable, even to those who may wish to forget it.
11.1 Introduction

Chapter 10 has concluded the case study findings in detailed ways. However, Chapter 11 provides further concluding comments on the thesis that set it in the context of the wider academic discourse. These comments are divided into four subjects presented in following four Sections respectively. Section 11.2 reviews the entire research project by taking account of the various changes and outcomes concerned with Taiwan’s political changes at government level, shifting national identity, and changing urban landscape so as to develop wider academic debates. Built upon the review, Section 11.3 outlines the thesis’s academic contribution. Section 11.4 considers the limitations of this study. Finally, Section 11.5 discusses how these contributions and limitations can drive this study to be taken forward in further work.

11.2 Reviews of the Entire Study

The driving motivation of this thesis is to improve our understanding of shifting Taiwanese national identity and its representations in the form of the nation’s changing urban landscapes. The main research question ‘How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces?’ leads to three specific sub-questions that emerge from a multi-disciplinary analytical framework explaining how a nation’s government
change, developing multiculturalism, and involvement in globalisation can give rise to shifts in national identity and changes of its urban representations.

By reviewing the entire research, three associated aspects of Taiwan’s change are revealed. They are respectively discussed in the following three subsections:

(1) Political changes at government level

In 1624, the Dutch established the colonial base in southwest Taiwan Island. In 1662, Cheng Cheng-kung drove off the Dutch colonisers and turned the colonial base into his settlement in preparation for restoring the Ming Dynasty terminated by the Qing Empire on Mainland China. In 1683, The Qing Empire eliminated Cheng’s remaining power on Taiwan Island. In comparison to the Dutch Colonial Government and Cheng’s regime only focusing on controlling southwest Taiwan Island, the Qing Empire extended state power to the Island’s north area. However, state power in east Taiwan Island was still absent, given that the Qing Empire did not want to face resistance from the area’s Indigenous tribes. It means that those first three political entities in Taiwan’s political history only ‘ruled’ different the regions. In other words, at the time, Taiwan was a pre-modern nation where state power did not really extend throughout.

The significant change happened after the coming of the Japanese colonisers. By learning scientific technology and the concept of the modern state and colonialism from the Western modern nations, the Japanese Colonial Government dedicated itself to investigating Taiwan’s ethnic, cultural, and geographical characteristics and therefore controlled the entire Taiwan completely.
In other words, the Japanese Colonial Government made Taiwan became a modern nation that was ‘governed’ by the modern state being able to systemically set up laws, orders, and even values throughout the entire country.

In 1945, the KMT Government replaced the Japanese Colonial Government. As a newly-arrived political entity whose interests were sometimes in conflict with those of the local population, the KMT Government used public education, the mass media, and military and police forces to strongly control Taiwanese society as well as to secure its power. These circumstances were reinforced after 1949 when the KMT lost the war to the CPC on the Mainland China and Taiwan eventually became these Mainland refugees’ permanent settlement. In other words, Chinese settler rule became deeply rooted in Taiwan and affected the local population’s political, cultural, and even economic interests.

From the 1980s, the KMT began to abandon the radical measures used to control the Taiwanese society. This change implied the beginning of a political transition period in which settler rule was eventually undermined by the nation’s democratisation. Ultimately, the DPP, claiming to represent local power, defeated the KMT in the Presidential Election in 2000. However, although the DPP’s victory symbolised the coming of the nation’s post-settler era, the KMT and its allies subsequently played the role as the powerful opposition party coalition seriously affecting the DPP Government’s political decision making. Meanwhile, due to democratisation taking place from the late 1980s, the general public have also become able to influence the Taiwanese Government through voting or organising social movements. In other words, in early years of post-settler Taiwan,
the state’s power was limited due to intense party political competition and the empowered general public.

(2) The key features of changing Taiwanese national identity

The Dutch Colonial Government, Cheng Cheng-kung’s regime, and the Qing Empire were three political entities once ruling part of Taiwan. Although their state power was unable to be practised over the whole region, they had similar impacts on Taiwanese national identification. That is to say, when they ruled Taiwan, the Han People emigrating from the Mainland China eventually became the majority in the region. Han Chinese culture therefore became dominant when cultural hybridisation took place among different ethnic groups. In addition, apart from the Dutch colonisers introducing Western culture to Taiwan and therefore giving rise to cultural hybridisation, the Qing Empire also swiftly imported Western culture into Taiwan. This was because the Qing Empire lost wars to Western countries and was forced to allow Western businesspeople and missionaries to enter the region.

As the first political entity governing the entire Taiwanese territory, the Japanese Colonial Government applied public education to forge colonial identity among the native Taiwanese. The educated natives thereafter became useful human resources for the colonisers to exploit colonial Taiwan’s natural resources. However, the educated Taiwanese eventually began to question and even challenge Japanese colonial rule. In other words, the collective identity of ‘being Taiwanese’ among the natives began to form. Incidentally, during the Japanese colonial era, aspects of Western culture were continuously introduced to Taiwan,
given that the Japanese colonisers were keen to adopt Westernised practices at the time.

After the KMT Government took over Taiwan, the Chinese settler rulers strongly imposed Chinese national identity on the local population by using public education and the mass media. However, since the 1980s, the KMT Government began to loosen its control over the Taiwanese society. Hence, the issue in relation to Taiwanese national identity began to emerge. Meanwhile, the minority became able to reclaim their cultural identities once suppressed by the KMT Government’s policies. As a result, the nation’s multiculturalism was able to develop. To improve Taiwan’s economy to secure its legitimacy, the KMT Government became involved in global economic interactions. As a result, Western cultural products were imported to Taiwan and gave rise to cultural hybridisation. Meanwhile, the nation’s rapid economic development caused polarisation and labour shortage. Hence, the number of immigrant spouses and immigrant workers rapidly increased. The condition reinforced the development of Taiwan’s multicultural society and cultural hybridity.

Taiwan’s political transition ultimately made the DPP win the Presidential Election in 2000. The new Government began to promote Taiwan’s local roots by introducing new public education materials and political discourse. However, such an intention and relevant actions were criticised by the KMT and its allies claiming that the DPP Government was populist. These party political debates over the nation’s collective identity implied the ambivalence of post-settler Taiwanese national identity.
(3) The significant impacts of changing Taiwanese government and national identity on the capital Taipei’s urban landscape

Like Cheng Cheng-kung, the Qing Empire set up its administrative centre in southwest Taiwan Island where the Dutch had built the colonial base and basic infrastructures. Given that foreign countries kept invading north Taiwan Island, thereafter, the Qing Empire finally established Taipei City to be the administrative capital. However, the Japanese Colonial Government was the first to apply modern urban planning knowledge to develop Taipei City. After all, the Qing Empire was even unable to accurately measure the area of the City.

The Japanese colonisers built their own living quarters packed with traditional Japanese-style houses. Moreover, the public facilities, such as public traffic services, were concentrated in the areas where the colonisers were the majority. The arrangements indicated the difference between the colonisers and the native Taiwanese. However, the colonisers did not really ignore the natives’ living conditions in the capital Taipei. It was because the colonial rulers intended to make Taipei City into an ‘Oriental Paris’, representing their eagerness to pursue Westernisation. Under these circumstances, meanwhile, many mixed Western-style buildings and public spaces were built in colonial Taipei City. Although colonial urban planning significantly changed Taipei City’s urban form, the Japanese colonisers did not destroy all of the Qing Empire’s urban legacies. In fact, the colonisers even conserved some of those legacies in consideration of their historic and cultural values.

After the Japanese colonisers departed from Taiwan, these colonial urban legacies made the newly-arrived KMT Government quickly settle down in Taiwan.
It was important for the KMT, given that it was struggling in the Chinese Civil War with the CPC on the Mainland China. Some of the colonial urban legacies that constituted public properties were even used to accommodate the newly-arrived Chinese social elites and KMT soldiers.

After the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War and retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the capital Taipei’s subsequent urban changes reflected the KMT Government’s intention to secure settler rule and the settlers’ interests. For instance, monuments symbolising state power were erected. New public housing schemes were implemented to accommodate the KMT soldiers and their dependents. Furthermore, new business districts were formed to boost the economy as well as to legitimise the state’s achievement. In addition, US troops were allowed to be stationed in the City because of the CPC’s military threat. The surrounding areas of these US military bases were therefore subject to Western influences.

Nonetheless, the KMT still regarded Taiwan as a temporary settlement for its preparation for re-conquering the Mainland China and ignored Taipei City’s comprehensive urban planning. Consequently, the increasing population caused a sharp increase in illegal-built dwellings. There was also a lack of public facilities, such as parks and community centres. The minority groups were marginalised within the urban space. The old communities were declining.

After Taiwan’s political transition took place in the late 1980s, the KMT Government began to remedy those consequences of its early dictatorial rule alongside ignorance of comprehensive urban planning. Meanwhile, new issues began to emerge. For instance, the government institutions acted slowly to accommodate rapidly increasing migrant workers. Furthermore, it was difficult to
implement urban regeneration and conservation, given that the relevant law was insufficient in the context where the nation’s economic/urban globalisation has made the general public and even the public sector concerned more about the properties’ economic values, rather than about the image and historic meanings of the capital Taipei.

After the DPP seized state power, it continuously dealt with those urban issues that the KMT Government had been unable to resolve. Specifically, because of the DPP’s insufficient performance of being the governing party, the KMT and its allies eventually controlled the national assembly by winning the relevant election. Under these circumstances, when the DPP Government proposed to affect certain settler urban legacies, such as the monuments and museums essentially built to legitimise settler state power and Chinese national identity, the opposition parties were able to block the proposals.

The various changes and outcomes concerned with Taiwan’s transforming state power, shifting national identity, and changing urban landscape shown in the above three subsections collectively converge to the ultimate conclusion of findings of the thesis: post-settler Taipei City, in which more stories concerned with (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces were expected to emerge, was ‘stuck in transition’. The condition reflects the deep impacts on Taiwanese identity caused by Chinese settler rule. Meanwhile, the discussion in these three subsections reflects on several crucial points given in the original theoretical framework, several divergences of the findings from the literature review can also be indicated. The relevant comments are formed in five points given below:
(1) Weitzer’s study (1990) concerned with settler rule’s transformation does not suggest how settler rule can have implications for the nation’s collective identity. From this thesis, it can be suggested that like post-colonial identity (Hall, 1992; Papastergiadis, 1997), post-settler Taiwanese national identity was ambivalent. In the post-colonial countries, however, colonial rule has collapsed and is unable to affect the country’s imagined collective memory at government level. The reason why colonial rule still has implications for post-colonial identity is due to its cultural and even urban legacies. Meanwhile, the thesis shows that Chinese settler rule only ‘symbolically’ collapsed and its remaining power was still influential in directly affecting Taiwan’s political landscape as well as Taiwanese national identification during the nation’s early post-settler era.

(2) The story of why the native Taiwanese became able to show their resistance to Japanese colonial rule reflects on how nationalism stemmed from non-Western countries, meaning that the native population eventually ‘learnt’ the concept of the modern nation from their suppressors, such as colonisers or invaders, and thereafter took the relevant action to reclaim their land (Held, 1992; Kohn, 1975; Snyder, 1954). The Taiwanese’s nationalist movements did persuade the Japanese Colonial Government begin to empower the natives in the 1920s. However, why the Taiwanese were still unable to become self-governed was because with the breakout of the Second World War, the Japanese Colonial Government began to use strong cultural-assimilation policies to control the Taiwanese. After the colonisers departed from Taiwan
in 1945, the local population immediately faced the dominance of newly-arrived settler rule using more radical methods to affect their political, cultural, and economic interests.

(3) In his study, published in 1990, Weitzer indicated that it would be interesting to observe transforming settler rule in Taiwan, given that the nation began to experience democratisation. After ten years, the DPP defeated the KMT in the Presidential Election and symbolically ended Chinese settler rule. This result supports Weitzer’s viewpoint suggesting that democratisation may play an important role in undermining settler rule; it could even make the nation transform into a post-settler country.

(4) Although Weitzer’s study only focuses on the settler country’s changes at the government level, his idea is applied in this thesis to consider how settler rule’s transformation in Taiwan could have implications for the nation’s urban planning. Before the fieldwork was implemented, the literature (Beall et al., 2002; Bollens, 1999; Saff, 1998) concerned with post-settler South Africa’s urban changes inspired me to consider whether Taipei City’s urban landscape would be ‘stuck in transition’ in Taiwan’s early post-settler era. The findings of the thesis support this initial assumption. Meanwhile, in comparison to those policy-oriented urban South Africa studies, this thesis shows that the DPP/Post-settler Government was unable to affect physically certain settler urban legacies, such as monuments and public places, initially built to legitimise settler rule and Chinese national identity. In other words, the thesis...
demonstrates the idea of ‘stuck in transition’ can be applied to illustrate the condition of a post-settler country’s physical urban elements.

(5) In terms of Taiwan’s urban changes and issues related to the nation’s developing multiculturalism and involvement in globalisation, such as the unexpected formation of global immigrants’ diaspora spaces and the ignorance of urban conservation in rapidly globalising Taipei City, the relevant stories echo the existing literature examining similar issues in different cities of different countries (Boyer, 1996; Gensheimer, 2001; Hannigan, 1998; Harvey, 1993; Hayden, 1995; Mazrui, 2001; Sklair, 2006). Nevertheless, how Taiwan’s government changes, from its Japanese colonial era to the post-settler era, affected the nation’s urban form differs from the existing literature. Unlike many studies indicating how Western colonisers used colonial planning to marginalise the natives in Asia and Africa (Fuller, 1992; Hall, 2000; Mazrui, 2001), the Japanese colonisers to a certain extent still paid much attention to the native Taiwanese’s living conditions in colonial Taipei City, given that the colonisers intended to build a spectacular built environment being able to represent the Japanese Empire’s state power in its first colony. More importantly, only a few of the existing papers investigate post-settler Taipei City’s conditions. Meanwhile, the thesis shows that although the KMT Government started to deal with urban issues caused by its early dictatorial rule as well as ignorance of comprehensive urban development, the issues remained in Taiwan’s post-settler era. In fact, those issues became more complicated and difficult for the DPP Government to deal
with, since the opposition parties and the general public were able to affect the government’s decision making related to their interests, which could be a specific urban element’s economic value, particular function, or even symbolic meaning.

Taking account the discussion given above, the entire research project is able to give rise to wider academic debates about the relationship between settler rule, national identity, and urban landscapes. They are discussed in following two subsections:

(1) Comparing settler rule with conventional colonial rule

In colonial cities in Asia and Africa, Western coloniisers usually erected new buildings combining Western and native architectural styles. These hybrid architectural features not only symbolised the beginning of a new history in the colony, but also implied the superiority of the colonisers’ culture. After all, the colonisers regarded the colony as a land with exploitable resources, rather than as a part of their motherland.

Like colonial rule, settler rule constitutes an ‘outside’ regime. However, the Chinese settlers initially regarded Taiwan as part of China’s territory, rather than just a colony with exploitable resources. Under this condition, although the Chinese settlers also created ‘new’ history in Taiwan, that new history was regarded as part of the Chinese history. In other words, the KMT Government imposed the imagined collective memory of ‘Taiwan is part of China’ alongside ‘being born to be Chinese’ on the local Taiwanese. Meanwhile, Taipei City’s
urban landscape also reflected this condition. For example, although the unequal housing distribution still implied the newly-arrived Chinese settlers’ political dominance, the KMT Government constructed many new public sites and subtle urban elements simply featuring Chinese-architectural styles, rather than specific hybrid styles.

Overall, the Chinese settler rulers’ and the Western colonisers’ different approaches to shape built environments serving their identification schemes lead to different attitudes towards the lands they respectively governed. Moreover, these different approaches to creating the urban form also serve as an explanation for why Chinese settle rule has such deep impacts on Taiwanese identity. That is to say, given that the conventional colonial city implicitly represented the difference between Western colonisers’ cultural roots and those of the colonised, the natives were still able to identify their identity. On the other hand, through these urban elements built by the Chinese Settler State, what the local Taiwanese were able to ‘remember’ was their close ties to China, rather than to the land where they were really born.

(2) The post-settler rule

In this study, I suggest that with the abolition of martial law in 1987, democratisation was accelerated and settler-governed Taiwan entered the political transitional era. Moreover, I indicate that after the DPP ended the KMT’s governing in 2000, the nation was entering the post-settler era. One may think that such a political history timeline seems too functional. For instance, it can be argued that Taiwan’s democratisation began to develop after the death of Chiang
Kai-shek, who established settler rule, in 1975. It implies that significant shifts in Taiwanese identity had already taken place prior to 1987. Furthermore, after the DPP gained state power, the KMT and its allies have still been influential in shaping Taiwan’s political landscape. It means that the DPP’s victory in the 2000 presidential election did not bring about a clean break in settler rule.

From this study, it can be seen that the relevant urban changes and policies (e.g. the removal of nationalist landmarks; the construction of the sites paying tribute to minority ethnic groups; and the participation of the local community and the private sector in urban development projects) were not implemented until after the ending of martial law in 1987. It was because the end of martial law enabled the general public and the DPP, the main opposition party, to begin actively to affect the state’s political decision making.

It can also be seen from this study that the DPP has been politically against the KMT. Nonetheless, after it became the governing party, the DPP was unable to use its political resources to successfully change settler-state urban legacies, for example, the urban elements associated with dictatorial rule still stand. Fragmented land ownership has become an obstacle to urban regeneration, and thus, government institutions have problems with implementing urban conservation. This was because, in a democratic society, everyone, including the KMT, the main opposition party now, and its allies and supporters, has been able to give voice to or even affect the state’s policies.

Thus, although it might be argued that my arrangement of Taiwan’s symbolic political history timeline seems to too be functional, it is a reminder of how democratisation can play a key role in undermining settler rule, how such a
political transition can affect national identity and its urban representations, how this transition can ultimately transform the nation into a post-settler state, and how settler rule can still be influential despite its electoral defeat. What is more, this timeline shows that when Taiwan’s political transition was creating ambivalence about the nation’s collective memory and the capital Taipei’s urban scene, it was also beginning to show the outline of post-settler Taiwanese identity and post-settler Taipei City. After all, the prefix ‘post-’ implies that settler rule’s influence still exists in the nation’s post-settler era.

In short, instead of just describing the colonisers’ and the settlers’ different attitudes towards the land they governed, the study has used ‘shifting Taiwanese identity’ and ‘Taipei City’s changing urban landscape’ as the themes to enable an understanding of the difference between colonial rule and settler rule. Meanwhile, within these themes, the study also highlights why settler rule has had significant impacts on the political, cultural, and economic experiences of the local population.

11.3 Contributions of the Thesis

Section 11.2 reviews the entire research project and highlights how the thesis reflects the robustness of the original theoretical framework, and how the findings can provide the inspiration for rethinking the existing literature. Building upon that discussion, it can be stated that the significant contributions of the thesis are:
(1) Producing a more comprehensive theoretical framework on the relationships between shifting national identity and changing urban landscapes

The theoretical framework derived from Chapters 2 and 3 is an analytical framework enabling one to consider how changing national government, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation can affect national identity and its urban representations. It was a combination of this theoretical framework, Weitzer’s study of settler countries (Ibid) and the policy-oriented studies about post-settler South Africa’s urban changes [see Section 4.2] that inspired me to carry out the Taipei City case study to examine how the transition and collapse of Chinese settler rule affected Taiwan’s imagined collective memory and (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces.

Clearly, Weitzer’s definition of the settler country is debatable. The only two cases, namely South African cities and Taipei City, cannot necessarily be the basis for a generalisable conclusion applicable to every settler country. However, the approach adopted in this thesis can be said to justify the theoretical framework built on an existing literature that is not much concerned with the nation in the context of a settler state, nor with the nation in the context of a post-settler state.

(2) Recording contemporary post-settler Taipei City’s changing urban landscape

The Taipei City case study in this thesis is a contemporary record of how the DPP Government/Post-settler State dealt with the settler-state urban legacies from 2000 to early 2008. This is a new piece of work and the thesis therefore provides a starting point for future research on post-settler Taiwan’s shifting
national identity alongside its changing urban scene. This is further discussed in Section 11.5.

In summary, the reason why this thesis makes an academic contribution is that it establishes links between three subjects, namely Chinese settler rule, shifting Taiwanese national identity, and Taipei City’s changing urban landscape. In doing this, the study provides a broader theoretical framework that can be applied in examining the urban representations of national identity in a post-settler country. Moreover, the case study findings not only fill a gap in the literature about the relationship between shifting Taiwanese identity and the capital Taipei’s urban changes, but also provide contemporary data for potential future research.

11.4 Limitations and Inspirations

Although the thesis has the potential to inspire future research, it also has three main limitations. They would therefore need to be taken into account in planning future research.

(1) Seeking for the stories behind party political competition

According to the case study findings, the DPP Government tried to physically or functionally change some settler-state urban legacies for different reasons. For instance, the DPP Government changed the location for welcoming important foreign guests to the front of the Presidential Building, rather than at the CKS Memorial Hall’s front square, and claimed that the new arrangement would enable guests to save the additional time of travelling from the Hall to the
Building to meet the President. Moreover, the CKS Memorial Hall was transformed into the Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall in order to mark the DPP Government’s dedication to transitional justice practice.

Meanwhile, the KMT and their allies accused the DPP of using these changes as an ethnic card as well as an election issue. In some other cases, the opposition parties even prevented the DPP Government from altering settler-state urban legacies. For example, when the DPP Government proposed to make the National Palace Museum exhibit more international cultural relics, rather than only those related to Chinese history and culture, the opposition parties, with their combined majority in the National Assembly, argued that the proposal implied the DPP’s intention to practise de-Sinicisation, and therefore rejected it.

Although viewpoint and claims of the KMT and their allies are worth thinking about, it is difficult in this study to interview the DPP’s central decision makers, such as people in the policy think tank, to explore the background to these issues. In fact, it can be questioned whether these key actors could provide ‘real’ answers. I tried to identify the specific times at which the DPP proposed to affect the settler-state urban legacies. Although not all of the proposals were made near election time, it remains difficult to judge which side (if any) was telling the true story.

A future study would need to consider how to carry out a deeper investigation of Taiwan’s party political debate on Taiwanese identity and its urban representations.
(2) Extending the data collection period

As mentioned in Section 5.7 [p. 95], the data collection process was initially planned to be finished in the end of May 2008 to coincide with the end of the DPP’s second governing term as well as the end of a symbolic period in Taiwan’s political history. But due to lack of time and financial support, the data collection process ended in January 2008.

Given this limited timescale, one can argue that if there were relevant events happening between January and May 2008 that the thesis could not include. In fact, the limited time span also meant I was unable to review some government archival sources since the application process would take too long.

These limitations show how an independent researcher, with limited resources, may encounter unexpected difficulties when investigating a contemporary phenomenon within a limited time period. They suggest also that the Taipei City Case study could have been enriched further by extending the data collection period.

(3) Considering a multiple-case-study approach

The theoretical framework [pp. 33-5] has indicated that the capital city is usually the nation’s political, cultural, and economic centre with many urban elements constituting physical representations of the nation’s identity. When I reviewed the literature on Taiwanese national identity and its urban representations, I also found that much of it focused on the capital Taipei. These considerations and the limited time and financial support available influenced my choice of Taipei City as the case study city.
Although the choice of Taipei City as the case study was successful in providing answers to the research questions, it might have been beneficial also to investigate other Taiwanese cities. Finally, although the subject of the thesis is Taiwan, the entire study may inspire one to look into other settler countries or post-settler countries, and to make a comparison between these countries.

**11.5 Directions for Future Research**

Given the contributions made by and the limitations of the thesis, the research could be extended in future by widening the range of enquiry and deepening the investigation of issues raised by the case study findings and analysis. For instance, a study over a longer period of time might show how Taiwan’s party political debate or the further development of a multicultural society can give rise to more urban changes. Furthermore, a multiple-case study could be designed to examine the implications of Chinese settler rule for urban landscapes in other Taiwanese cities. An international study of Taiwan and other settler or post-settler countries could also be undertaken.

It is worth noting that after the end of the fieldwork in January 2008, on 22nd March of the same year, the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou, a second-generation Mainlander, won the ROC Presidential Election by defeating the DPP’s Frank Hsieh. In view of the fact that the DPP Government, which claimed to represent ‘local power’, was criticised for the nation’s economic downturn and many political scandals, it may be suggested that the KMT’s victory (gaining 58 per cent of votes) implies that ‘origin’ is not an important factor that may influence the course of an election. In fact, before the 2008 Presidential Election, the KMT
and their allies had already achieved a majority in the National Assembly by winning the relevant election. Changes such as these may suggest that Taiwan’s democracy is evolving into a more mature system.

Meanwhile, an emerging question is how the ‘new’ KMT Government will affect the nation’s imagined collective memory and the relevant (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces. That is to say, will Taiwan continue to be ‘stuck in transition’, meaning that the ambivalence about Taiwanese national identity and its urban representation will remain or even become more complex? Or will the ‘transformed’ KMT Government/Chinese Settler State be able to forge a more cohesive national identity, and thus reduce that ambivalence? As a young post-settler country with a changing political landscape, Taiwan is full of potential to continue providing interesting stories of representing national identity within urban landscapes.
APPENDIX 1:

TAIWAN BEING AN OPEN LAND

In the mid-sixteenth century, the Ming Empire, which was ruling the Mainland China, sent troops to explore Taiwan Island. The troops returned to the Mainland and reported that the Island’s natural environment was uncultivated. Therefore, the Ming Empire, the political entity closest to the Island, regarded Taiwan Island as an insignificant land. Under these circumstances, different ethnic groups in the Island were living in the absence of state control. Meanwhile, the region became an important resting and trading spot for traders and pirates voyaging around the west Pacific (Manthorpe, 2005).
APPENDIX 2:
ANCIENT TAIPEI’S DEVELOPMENT

In 1644, the Dutch colonisers began to permit Han Peoples to explore the Taipei Basin. Gradually, most of Indigenous tribal lands in the Basin became occupied by the Han. After Cheng Cheng-kung drove off the Dutch colonisers in 1662, a new Han immigrant wave from the Mainland China came to Taiwan Island. However, the Han population in the Taipei Basin did not grow significantly. In fact, ancient Taipei’s development was limited due to the fact that Cheng focused on exploring the southwest of Taiwan Island (Su, 2005).

Not until the Qing Empire took over Taiwan Island in 1683, did the Taipei Basin begin to develop due to an another greater wave of Han immigrants from the Mainland China. In the mid-eighteenth century, with its natural harbour upon present-day Danshuei River; the area called Mengjia (around present-day Wanhua Administrative District; see Figure A.1, p. 331) became the business centre as well as a densely populated area in ancient Taipei. Although the predominant population in Mengjia was the Han Peoples, violent conflicts occurred between different Han subgroups and clans. Hence, after 1853, a segment of the populace moved north to Dadaocheng (around present-day Datong Administrative District; see Figure A.1, p. 331), the other area accommodating a natural harbour upon Danshuei River (Ibid).

After losing the war to the West countries’ coalition in the mid 1800s, the Qing Empire was forced to open its harbours to Western businesspeople. Therefore, increasing number of international traders began to visit Taiwan Island
via Mengjia’s and Dadaocheng’s ports from the early 1860s. At the beginning, those newly-arrived foreign entrepreneurs attempted to cooperate with local businesspeople in Mengjia, the Taipei Basin’s most significant business district. However, they eventually found that it was difficult to establish business relations with the locals who had a strong aversion to them. In these circumstances, they could only settle in Dadaocheng to found their international trade business. As a result, Dadoacheng began to develop and eventually surpassed Mengjia (Ibid).
APPENDIX 3:  

SHIFTING JAPANESE COLONIAL IDENTITY

In consideration that using the armed forces to control colonial Taiwan would not be a permanent solution, especially when the Japanese Empire intended to exploit the colony’s human and natural resources, the Colonial Government decided to begin to ‘civilise’ the natives. Since 1904, therefore, public education was executed to teach the natives to be efficient farmers or semi-skilled labourers. Unsurprisingly, they were also taught to obey the colonisers (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003; Su, 2005).

However, public education eventually affected colonial rule, because it broke the natives’ clan tradition that had bound specific families or villages together. That is to say, due to public education, the native youth of different clans had to leave their spheres to interact with other native youth with different social backgrounds. Under these conditions, the imagined collective memory of ‘being the suppressed Taiwanese’ began to emerge among the young generation. Ultimately, several anti-colonial social movements were launched by the educated natives in the 1920s (Su, 2005).

After negotiating with the natives, the Colonial Government modified some policies initially against the natives’ interests. For instance, the natives began to have the right to vote in basic-level elections. Moreover, a quota of positions in low-level government institutions was given to enable the natives to participate in political decision making. In addition, the low-income natives began
to be able to receive higher education through passing public examinations (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003; Su, 2005).

According to the independence history of many one-time colonies, it seemed that since the Japanese Colonial Government began to loosen its political oppression, the Taiwanese would one day be able to reclaim their sovereignty. However, such a generalisable process was ultimately disrupted by Japan’s ambition to control the entire East Asia. Given that ambition, Japan planned to attack China in 1937. Since the Han Peoples were both the majority in China and colonial Taiwan, the Colonial Government worried that the Taiwanese Han People would be upset by the 1937 attack. As a result, Japanisation was practised in colonial Taiwan from the middle 1930s. The natives were encouraged to use Japanese names, speak Japanese, wear Japanese clothes, and adopt Japanese religion. Thereafter, the natives even joined the Japan military in the Second World War. Under these circumstances, it was unsurprising that the natives were unable to organise independence movements (Ibid).
APPENDIX 4:

THE ORIGIN OF THE CHINESE SETTLER RULERS

In 1911, the Qing Empire was overthrown by the revolutionary troops headed by Sun Yat-sen, a doctor by profession as well as a Chinese nationalist himself. The Republic of China (ROC) was established to represent ‘China’ in 1912. Meanwhile, Sun, inspired by the Western party-political system, founded the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang/KMT) that was intended to govern the state of China (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003).

Due to his desire for democracy, Sun welcomed the establishment of other political parties. Hence, the Communist Party of China (CPC) was established with the USSR’s support. It ought to be noted that although the KMT was meant to act as the ‘state’ of modern China, it lacked total control of the Mainland in view of its continuous conflict with warlords following the ROC’s establishment. Moreover, after Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925, his deputy Chiang Kai-shek regarded the growing CPC as a threat to his power and began to eliminate it. Eventually, the KMT and the CPC became arch rivals, which triggered the Chinese Civil War which began in 1927 and continued until 1949 (Ibid).

The KMT and the CPC cooperated to fight against Japan when it aimed to extend its power in East Asia and attacked northeast China in 1937. Nevertheless, in view of the modern Japanese troops’ steady territorial gains, the KMT ultimately lost the capital Nanjing and retreated to the west Mainland. Simultaneously, the KMT-CPC coalition also broke up. Under these circumstances, the KMT had to face threats from both the CPC and Japan (Ibid).
In 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, whereupon the US declared war on Japan. The Asia Pacific region became one of the main war zones in the Second World War. Chiang Kai-shek took this opportunity to ‘formally’ declare war on Japan, because he predicated that the US would subsequently aid the KMT in fighting against Japan and it would relieve the KMT to fight against the CPC and Japan at the same time. Eventually, Chiang’s strategy was rewarded. Meanwhile, the ROC became one of the Allies led by the UK, the US, and the USSR in the War (Ibid).

The battles between the KMT and the CPC continued after the end of the Second World War. Driven by his efforts and backed by the USSR, the CPC leader Mao Zedong enabled Communist power to rapidly extend across north China. Meanwhile, the KMT had become a corrupt political organisation since the 1930s. Hence, as the CPC progressively gained the masses’ trust, the KMT kept losing its power on the Mainland. However, in order to prevent Communist’s influence from spreading throughout East Asia, the US continuously aided the KMT to battle with the CPC (Ibid).

Meanwhile, post-war Taiwan’s international status became a debatable issue. The story dates back to 1943, in which three main powers of the Allies—the UK, the US, and the ROC—met in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss post-war affairs. The conclusion of the discussion was summed up in the so-called Cairo Declaration, issued as a press release. According to the Declaration, Taiwan ‘shall’ be restored to the ROC following the War’s termination. It ought to be noted that although the Cairo Declaration mentioned post-war Taiwan’s possible future, it was neither a
treaty nor a composition of binding documents. In reality, Taiwan was still included in the Pacific War Zone under the US’s charge at the time (Ibid).

After the end of the War, the US allowed the ROC to take charge of Taiwan since it had to cope with more complicated post-war tasks with Japan. Interestingly, after the Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender on 15th August, 1945, no significant changes happened in Taiwan until two months later. On 15th October, KMT troops were airlifted by the US from the Mainland to Taiwan to preside over post-war affairs. On 25th October, General Chen Yi—the Governor of Taiwan appointed by Chiang Kai-shek—arrived in Taipei City to receive the Japanese surrender. On that day, Chen announced Taiwan’s restoration under the sovereign administration of the ROC (Ibid).

The Allies objected to Chen’s action since relevant treaties concerned with Taiwan’s status were neither negotiated nor signed by the Allies and the defeated Japan. Although he was made aware of this, Chiang Kai-shek ignored the Allies’ dissatisfaction. In fact, the Allies did not strongly ask the ROC to re-declare Taiwan’s status since the majority of them were preoccupied with their own post-war affairs. Meanwhile, the only allied country that was truly committed to the ROC and Taiwan was the US, which was supporting the KMT in its conflict with the CPC and considering the region’s strategic importance. Given that the Chinese Civil War was still intense, the US decided to focus more on the risks posed by the CPC’s growing power than on Taiwan’s international status (Ibid).

In 1947, Chen Yi’s government and the local Taiwanese population engaged in a severe conflict, which resulted in the bloody 2-2-8 Incident [see Appendix 5]. In the light of the KMT’s behaviour in Taiwan and its continuous
loss of ground to the CPC on the Mainland, the US National Security Council released a draft report in January 1949 indicting that the US would resolve Taiwan’s status by granting it independence. Nevertheless, the formal proposal, launched in the autumn of the same year, was abandoned since the KMT was finally forced to retreat to Taiwan in October. Thinking the CPC was likely to take over Taiwan sooner or later, on 5th January 1950, the US announced that it would stop its aid to the KMT (Manthorpe, 2005).

In fact, Chiang Kai-shek had already charted his future whilst his territory on the Mainland was gradually occupied by the CPC. For instance, in October 1948, he ordered that war-supply exportation from Taiwan was stopped in preparation for a ‘possible’ retreat. Moreover, higher class Mainlanders and significant Chinese cultural assets were transported to Taiwan during the late 1940s. After Chiang’s formal retreat to Taiwan in 1949, Taipei City was declared the ‘Temporary Capital’ on 10th December. Meanwhile, the CPC formally established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the Mainland (Ibid).

In June 1950, North Korea attacked the South Korea and triggered the Korean War. Fearful of Communist control reaching the entire Western Pacific region, the US decided to re-establish relations with the KMT by signing the Mutual Defence Treaty. After all, the KMT Government’s sole territory—Taiwan—lies in one of the region’s strategic positions. Meanwhile, this re-established US-ROC relations and to a great extent relieved Chiang Kai-shek of his intense worry over the CPC matter (Ibid).
APPENDIX 5:

THE 2-2-8 INCIDENT

After the KMT occupied Taiwan in 1945, conflict between the local population and newly-arrived Chinese officials and soldiers frequently occurred due to the collapse of the domestic economy and social order. Ultimately, an accident on 27th February 1947 triggered widespread riots the next day. On 27th, a local widow selling cigarettes on Taipei City’s streets was accosted by six Monopoly Bureau agents accusing her of selling smuggled cigarettes. When they tried to take her in for further questioning, the resisting widow was hit on the head by an agent’s pistol butt. The crowd, on hearing the widow’s cries for help, quickly surrounded the agents. Consequently, one of the agents fired his pistol in an attempt to escape from the crowd and caused one man’s death (Kerr, 1965; Manthorpe, 2005; Simon, 2003).

On the morning of 28th February, several thousand people marched to the Monopoly Bureau with a petition demanding an official response to what had happened the day before. This resulted in the Bureau being damaged and the officials being hit or even killed. Thereafter, the locals surrounded the Monopoly Commission. After discovering that the building was locked and guarded, they turned to Chen Yi’s Governor’s Office (it was the Municipal Hall in the Japanese colonial era, and it is now Taiwan’s Executive Yuan). They arrived around noon and some people were killed by soldiers with a machine gun. The news spread rapidly. Consequently, by the late afternoon, several riots targeting KMT officials erupted in Taipei City. Meanwhile, stores were closed, and workers and students
went on strike. Conflict between ordinary Mainlanders and local people also broke out (Ibid).

On that afternoon, a group of young local people occupied the Taiwan Broadcasting Station next to Taipei Park and radio-broadcasted the events across the whole Taiwanese territory. As a result, numerous riots occurred in the entire Taiwan. On 1st March, Governor Chen Yi met with a group of local civic leaders to discuss how to solve the problem. The next day, Chen announced via a radio broadcast that a compensation claim for the widow would be processed. Moreover, he called on the formation of a Settlement Committee which was composed of the local civic leaders in order to reduce the tension between the KMT and the local population. Thereafter, conflicts between the KMT officials and the local population continued, the Committee ordered militias to protect ordinary Mainlanders (Ibid).

On 7th March, the Committee presented Governor Chen with a list of demands, including the end of the military rule, the formal recognition of Taiwan as an autonomous Chinese province; and the democratisation of the region’s political and economic affairs. Chen rejected all proposals and forced the Committee members to moderate them. In fact, Chen had already sent a message to the Mainland China on 2nd March to request military aid from Chiang Kai-shek. On 8th March, 10,000 troops arrived at Keelung port in north Taiwan whilst another 3,000 touched down at Kaohsiung port in the south. Consequently, indiscriminate violent suppression was put into effect. By 13th March, the whole Taiwan was subjected to the KMT troops’ control (Ibid).
Afterwards, the troops began to hunt down locals who could potentially influence public opinions. Apart from several Settlement Committee members, many scholars, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and journalists were caught or even killed. It is generally suggested that such tactics continued until 16th May 1947. There was no accurate number as to how many people were killed during that period. The estimates ranged between 10,000 and 20,000. The end of the bloodshed did not stop the KMT Government further enhancing the combined power of the military, police, and secret agents to secure its legitimacy. Even ordinary Mainlanders could be threatened. Meanwhile, the 2-2-8 Incident became a taboo subject among Taiwanese society until the coming of Taiwan’s democratisation (Ibid).
APPENDIX 6:

Since the KMT Government’s retreat to Taiwan and the PRC’s taking full power on the Mainland in 1949, the dilemma of ‘which people and places belonged to which state’, in conjunction with the issue of ‘two Chinas’, not only exacerbated the rift between the KMT and the CPC, but also perplexed other countries.

The ROC was a founding member of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. However, in 1971, with the support of the USSR, the PRC gained admission to the UN General Assembly. This forced the ROC to relinquish China’s seat in the UN Security Council and to leave the UN. In the aftermath, a number of countries cut official relations with the ROC in order to establish ties with the PRC. On 1st January, 1979, the US also established diplomatic relations with the PRC, causing more countries to do the same. Against this background, Taiwan became a land identified with the ROC but recognised neither by the UN nor the majority of the international community (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003).

It ought to be noted that after the US terminated the Mutual Defence Treaty [see Appendix 4, p. 319] with the ROC in 1979 due to the end of both sides’ diplomatic relations, the US Government then introduced the ‘Taiwan Relations Act’ on April 10th of the same year. According to the Act, the US would continue to sell weapons to Taiwan in order to stabilise the ‘cross-strait relations’ (a commonly used phrase within academic literatures and the mass media reports with reference to the complicated relations between China and
Taiwan, which are separated by the Taiwan Strait). Arguably, the US used the Act as a means of maintaining its influence in the Asia Pacific region. Meanwhile, the US presumed that an ambivalent yet steady political balance could actually be forged and maintained; since both the KMT Government and the CPC Government continuously claimed to be ‘real China’. Nonetheless, the US failed to foresee that Taiwan’s democratisation emerging in the 1980s would undermine the KMT’s single-party political monopoly and eventually raise the issue of Taiwan’s independence. The condition subsequently affected the cross-strait relations (Manthorpe, 2005).
APPENDIX 7:

TAIWAN’S DEMOCRATISATION AND POLITICAL CHAOS

After Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975 during his fifth term as ROC President, Vice President Yen Chia-kan succeeded as President. Nonetheless, Chiang’s ‘imperial’ regime was destined to remain. In 1978, the National Assembly, formed by the Mainlanders, elected Chiang Kai-shek’s son—Chiang Ching-kuo—as the new President. However, Chiang Ching-kuo was different from his dictatorial father. Apart from frequently socialising with the general public, Chiang Ching-kuo believed that the KMT had to be identified as the ‘people’s party’, rather than the ‘Mainlanders’ monopoly’; and thus began to appoint the local Taiwanese, regardless of whether they were KMT members, to important government posts. In addition, he considerably tolerated the anti-KMT movements and the illegal formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. More importantly, martial law was lifted on 7th July 1987, whereupon Taiwan’s democratisation began to be accelerated (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003).

Following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, only six months after he abolished the martial law, Vice President Lee Teng-hui, a local Taiwanese born in the Japanese colonial era, assumed Chiang’s positions as the ROC President and the KMT Chairman. Lee continuously promoted democratisation, including freeing the mass media and recognising ideologically disparate political parties. Nevertheless, the crucial difference between Chiang’s and Lee’s democratisation movements lay in Lee’s assertive emphasis on the notion of ‘Taiwanisation’. For example, he introduced concepts such as ‘New Taiwanese’, ‘the ROC is Taiwan’,
‘Taiwan is already sovereign’, ‘the cross-strait relation is a special state-to-state relation’; and ‘Taiwan Nationalist Party’ (whereas the KMT stands for ‘Chinese’ Nationalist Party in Mandarin). He even openly called the KMT ‘a regime from outside’ during his presidency (Manthorpe, 2005).

Apart from fostering such a political discourse that stirred up the CPC and the US, President Lee deliberately pursued strategies that highlighted the ‘difference’ between China and Taiwan. For instance, although martial law had been lifted in 1987, the ‘Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion’ remained intact since its release in 1948. The Provisions directly superseded the Constitution and therefore gave Chiang Kai-shek virtually unshakable power during that ‘period of national mobilisation for the suppression of the Communist rebellion’. However, Lee ended the Provisions in 1991. The change symbolised not only a further step towards democracy, but also the KMT’s recognition that the PRC, governed by the CPC, was a ‘legal’ political entity. Moreover, policies regarding the Taiwanese visit to Mainland China, for tourism, academic research or business, were loosened. Furthermore, in 1992, the PRC’s athletes, artists, and scientists began to be able to come to Taiwan for special events. Meanwhile, the PRC’s national anthem and flag were able to be sung and hung during these special occasions (e.g. sports events). In 1998, the Taiwan Provincial Government alongside other associated official institutions at the ‘provincial level’, whose existence implied that Mainland China belonged to the ROC, were functionally eliminated due to their ‘administrative inefficiency’. On the one hand, it may be suggested that Lee used this change to undermine the political influence of James
Soong, a Mainland-born politician as well as the last Taiwan Governor who was gaining a lot of public support at the time. On the other, one may view this change as symbolising that Taiwan was an independent political entity distinct from the Mainland China (Ibid).

Since the early 1990s, some KMT politicians began to oppose Lee’s Taiwanisation policies and ultimately left the KMT to establish other small political parties (Leitner and Kang, 1999). Despite this, Lee enabled Taiwan’s first direct Presidential Election to take place in 1996. Prior to the election, the CPC Government launched a military exercise implying that Taiwan was the potential target. The CPC’s purpose could be interpreted as warning the Taiwanese not to vote for Lee, given his Taiwanese nationalist attitude having become clear in the early 1990s. However, Lee won the Election by 54 percent of the vote against three other candidates; one of them represented the DPP, the other two were former KMT politicians against Lee’s policies. A possible explanation for the CPC’s failure to deter voters from electing Lee was that its military threats actually evoked Taiwanese nationalism and thus drove the masses to vote for Lee. A fact that might support this explanation was that the DPP, the small pro-independence party at the time, actually gained the second highest vote (21 percent) (Manthorpe, 2005).

Prior to the second ROC Presidential Election in 2000, since Lee Teng-hui no longer represented the KMT and the governing party’s corruption was being revealed through the liberated mass media, the DPP became the CPC’s main preoccupation. Hence, the CPC Government launched the campaign via the mass media with the intention of warning the Taiwanese not to vote for the DPP
candidates. Nonetheless, the result of the Election disappointed the CPC once again. Former Taipei City Mayor Chen Shui-bian of the DPP defeated both the former Taiwan Governor James Soong (the former KMT politician who had run as an independent without political party support) and the Vice President Lien Chan of the KMT by 39 percent of the vote. In fact, the KMT received the fewest votes. Since then, the CPC Government has continued to use provocative rhetoric to warn the Taiwanese that if the DPP Government plans to announce Taiwan to be independent, it will launch a military attack (Ibid).

After his unsuccessful independent bid for the Presidency in 2000, James Soong and his supporters established the People First Party (PFP). Meanwhile, President Chen Shui-bian’s restrained pro-independence position disappointed his peers. As a result, in 2001, due to the former President Lee Teng-hui’s coordination, a new pro-independence political party—the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)—was founded. During the third ROC Presidential Election of 2004, the KMT Chairman Lien Chan and the PFP Chairman Soong, who were rivals in the 2000 Election, decided to form a political coalition to compete with Chen Shui-bian who intended to represent the DPP for re-election. Meanwhile, in their attempt to uphold ‘local power’, the TSU sided with Chen. Such alliances led the Taiwanese media to label the KMT, PFT, and other conservative parties and supporters, the ‘pan-blue’ force; and the DPP, TSU, and other relevant organisations and adherents, the ‘pan-green’ force. The names stemmed from the base colours of the party symbols belonging to each coalition’s majority; the KMT’s being blue and the DPP’s being green (Ibid).
Prior to the commencement of the third ROC Presidential Election in 2004, the CPC launched military exercises again. One may suggest that this time, as in 2000, the CPC attempted to discourage the Taiwanese from voting for Chen Shui-bian. Nonetheless, despite the CPC’s action, the economic depression, and negativity surrounding both domestic and international political affairs during his term in office, Chen defeated the pan-blue alliance (Ibid).

It is worth noting that the result of the 2004 Election was far from the long-time stereotypical claiming that the Mainlanders preferred the pan-blue politicians and the non-Mainlanders were inclined towards the pan-green politicians. Chen Shui-bian won by only 0.2 percent of the vote (29,518 votes), whilst the Mainlanders represented only about 14 percent of the Taiwan population. In addition, both sides’ supporters, which included politicians as well as the general public, were multi-ethnic. Meanwhile, it would be far too dogmatic to suggest that the result of the Election implied that the Taiwanese can be classified into two groups—pro-unification and pro-independence. However, these stereotypical perspectives continue to haunt Taiwan’s political landscape and the language of the mass media.
APPENDIX 8:

TAIPEI CITY’S BASIC PROFILE

Taipei City is located in north Taiwan. It had not really begun to develop until the growing number of Han People immigrating to the region during the Qing-ruling period. In addition, the Japanese Colonial Government upgraded it to a ‘modern’ capital city.

During the Japanese colonial era, the City’s boundary only covered present-day Taipei City’s southwest areas. After the KMT Government came to Taiwan, large number of newly-arrived Mainlanders caused the overpopulation of capital city. Thus, several areas outside the City, including present-day Neihu, Nangang Shilin, and Beitou, were officially included in the City’s administrative boundary. After the reorganisation of its administrative boundary in 1990, the City nowadays consists of twelve administrative Districts, covering a total area of 272 square kilometres (Taipei City Government, updated 22/02/2008) [see Figure A.1, p. 331]. At the end of 2007, the City’s population was 2,629,262 (Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, updated 22/02/2008), approximately 11 per cent of Taiwan’s population (22,958,360) (Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, updated 23/02/2008).
Figure A.1—Contemporary Taipei City and its Administrative Districts
APPENDIX 9:

THE ORIGIN OF THE TAIPEI 2-28 MEMORIAL MUSEUM

The building of the 2-28 Memorial Museum was originated by the Japanese Colonial Government’s Taipei Broadcasting Bureau. It was built beside the Taipei Park (the present-day 2-28 Peace Park) in 1930. During the colonial period, it was operated by the Information Office under the Governor-General’s Propaganda Bureau of Taiwan. After the KMT took over Taiwan in 1945, it was renamed as the Taiwan Broadcasting Station. Nevertheless, its function remained as the nation-wide broadcasting of state-produced news. After the KMT Government came to Taiwan in 1949, the Station became the Broadcasting Corporation of China, a state-owned company at the time. Finally, in 1972, the Corporation moved out and the site became the City Government’s Parks and Street Lights Office (Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum, visited on 19/12/2006).

On 28th February 1947, several young local people occupied the Taiwan Broadcasting Station to broadcast the news of conflict between the KMT Government and the locals in Taipei City, thereby causing the nation-wide riots [see Appendix 5, p. 321]. In view of its significant role in the 2-2-8 Incident, the DPP-led Taipei City Government in 1996 made a plan to convert the building to the Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum. It opened on 28th February 1997 (Ibid). When I visited the Museum, I discovered that, apart from displaying information relevant to the Incident, the exhibition implicitly disclosed the KMT Government’s authoritarian behaviour (e.g. deifying Chiang Kai-shek and restricting freedom of speech) during the martial-law era. Incidentally, as I
strolled within the Museum, I heard a visitor say to her companion “it was all the DPP’s idea”. Such a claim may be understandable, since the Museum’s establishment was due to DPP Mayor Chen Shui-bian.

However, in his 1998 re-election campaign, Chen was defeated by the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou. In his study of the 2-2-8 Incident, Simon (2003) consults documentary sources and suggests that after Ma became the Mayor, most of the Museum’s staff, who happened to be local Taiwanese, were replaced by Mainlanders. Bearing this in mind, I interviewed a senior volunteer working at the Museum (personal interview, 19/12/2006) to confirm Simon’s information. She told me that as a volunteer, she only knew that a few high-ranking staff were replaced when the new Mayor was elected and she was unable to say whether all of them were Mainlanders. Nevertheless, she revealed that, like many museums in Taipei City, the Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum has been managed by the non-profit organisation receiving funds from the City Government. Strangely enough, the Museum became the only one to be directly managed by Ma’s City Government in 2003. Afterwards, the City Government began to plan changes to the Museum’s displays that dealt with the KMT’s dictatorial rule. However, such an attempt was dismissed under pressure from the Commission of Incident victims’ families.

Although the volunteer’s interview cannot confirm Simon’s report, one still can assume that, no matter for what reasons, the KMT-led City Government has attempted to affect the Museum’s operation as well as its original purpose. In other words, the Museum can be the battle ground of an identity contest.
APPENDIX 10:

THE ORIGIN OF

THE NATIONAL 228 MEMORIAL MUSEUM

The building of the National 228 Memorial Museum is a Japanese colonial legacy, featuring mixed Western architectural styles [see Figure 6.15, p. 126]. It was built in 1930 to serve as the Taiwan Education Association Hall. After the KMT took over Taiwan, the building was briefly used as the meeting hall of the Provincial Assembly Council and the Taiwan Provincial Government. In 1958, it became the US Embassy’s Department of Information. In 1977, it was the US’s American Cultural Center. In 2002, however, the Center was moved. Since the building had already been designated by the City Government as a historic heritage in 1993, it was able to remain without being demolished. In 2006, ultimately, the Executive Yuan confirmed that the site would be revitalised as the National 228 Memorial Museum formally opened in 2009 (Hirsch, 28/02/2007; Taiwan Post Co., updated 11/01/2008; 228 Incident Memorial Foundation, updated 09/03/2007).

On 28th February 2007, the same day of the announcement of the National 228 Memorial Museum project, the Taiwan Post released a stamp featuring the future image of the Museum [see Figure 6.15, p. 126]. Specifically, it was the first stamp with the word ‘Taiwan’, rather than ‘Republic of China’, on it. It was because prior to the stamp’s release, the DPP Government had announced that it would change several state-owned companies’ official names related to ‘Chinese’. For instance, ‘Chinese Petroleum Corp’ became ‘CPC Corp, Taiwan’, and ‘China
Shipbuilding Corp’ became ‘CSBS Corp, Taiwan’. Meanwhile, Chunghwa (meaning Chinese) Post Co. became Taiwan Post Co. Unsurprisingly, such a name-change policy immediately caused the opposition politicians’ disapproval (Shan et al., 10/02/2007; Shan, 01/03/2007; Taiwan Post Co., updated 11/01/2008; Wang et al., 10/02/2007). Regardless of whether the DPP Government’s actions were justifiable, one can suggest that the 60th anniversary of the 2-2-8 Incident was a proper occasion for the DPP to introduce these bold re-identification schemes, including changing the CKS Memorial Hall’s name and function [see Section 6.5, pp. 127-31].
APPENDIX 11:
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interviewees’ Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19/12/2006</td>
<td>Senior voluntary worker of the Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/01/2007</td>
<td>Staff of the ROC Ministry of National Defense being in charge of military dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>quarter affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/01/2007</td>
<td>Representative of the Jinan Ward, where an old Japanese residence originally belonging to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Forestry Section of the Office of the Governor-General is located</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/01/2007</td>
<td>Former Representative of the Qingguang Ward, located on the Third Section of the Zhongshan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Road. Mr Cheng has lived in the region for about 30 years and has been the elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward Representative from 2003 to 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/01/2007</td>
<td>Staff of the Second Division of the Department of Cultural Affairs, Taipei City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/01/2007</td>
<td>Staff of the Taipei Hakka Affairs Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/01/2007</td>
<td>Senior staff of the Taiwan International Workers’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/10/2007</td>
<td>Senior staff of the Taipei City New Immigrants’ Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/11/2007a</td>
<td>Senior staff of Indigenous Peoples Commission of Taipei City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/11/2007b</td>
<td>Staff of Indigenous Peoples Commission of Taipei City Government being in charge of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donghu Indigenous Public Houses affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/11/2007</td>
<td>Representative of the Kangning Ward, where Donghu Indigenous Public Housing are located.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mrs Liu has lived in the region for about 20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/2007</td>
<td>The designer of King Shih Architects, having engaged in several historic building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>restoration projects in Taipei City</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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