Post-War Social Recovery in Northern Uganda: Grassroots Perspectives and Non-Governmental Organisations

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Abstract

From mid-2006 to 2010 grassroots perspectives of Acholi people in Northern Uganda followed Non-Governmental Organisations’ roles in post-war social recovery. For over 20 years of war between the Lord’s Resistance Army and Uganda Government, displacement and home-returns, Acholi people relied on NGOs.

This study explores how far NGOs can transform and rebuild social authority structure and support social reconciliation in Acoliland. Using a qualitative methodology, Acholi returnees’ views were triangulated with those of NGOs, Government officials and relevant actors following grassroots perceptions on roles NGOs played.

From this study, NGOs play participatory political and social roles at grassroots level; fail to address the root causes of conflicts. The contentious NGO roles involve a separation of inflated expectations from what is achievable. Social realities of Acholi people are in theory and ideally over-ridden by practical NGOs’ levels, typologies, activities, budgets, policies and codes of conducts. NGOs played key roles in the interlocution and encouragement of a discourse for rebuilding Acholi lineage-based authority without middle-class elites that links grassroots population.

With NGOs’ withdrawal from post-war reconstruction, Acholi remained in a weak social authority and loose social bonding with lesser meaning and reality of social reconciliation. With raised disappointments on NGOs, Acholi people are stuck between a rock and hard place in respective villages.
Dedication

To the memory of my father: Livingstone Ali Angoma who did not live to witness this day of my academic success. It was a painful process to endure, but with your highly dignified intellectual, philosophical and administrative fatherly skills and guidance, God passed on your sources of inspirations and determinations to me. I am therefore obligated and responsible to the same God to use the generous talent and knowledge He gave me to benefit my people, country and all mankind.
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This thesis arise from the daunting process most postgraduate research students undergo, so, for any mistakes and errors, unaccepted views and the theory contained herein, wrong or right, I alone remain responsible.

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Source: http/mol.go.ug/content/images/Uganda
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1 INTRODUCTION

This study is about grassroots perspectives of Acoli [widely written as Acholi] people in Northern Uganda on roles of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The study is conducted in a post-war social recovery settings from mid 2006 to 2010. It lies within the context of the “return” of the formerly Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Northern Uganda caused by war between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony and Yoweri Museveni’s Government of Ugandan (GoU) Army, the National Resistance Army (NRA) now called Uganda People Defence Force (UPDF). The war started in August 1986 after Museveni took over power in February 1986 from the Northern domination of state-power and military since pre-independence of 1962.

This research explores the experiences and views of Acholi IDP-returnees whose grassroots perspectives were widely sought on the extent to which NGOs play a role to address the internal and external crises that resulted to total breakdown of Acholi social authority structure and relationships. After Acholi returnees gradually moved back to respective villages from IDPs-camps from mid 2006, peacebuilding initiatives continued to rely mainly on NGOs’ support sometimes seen more as added value to Ugandan Government’s initiatives and not reaching the population.

This chapter captures the researcher’s experience and positionality to the study (1.1), context of the research (1.2), study problem (1.3), research questions and objectives (1.4), overview of NGOs definition and categorisation (1.5), the study significance (1.6), limitations and delimitations (1.7), and the structure of the thesis (1.8) before conclusion (1.9).
1.1 RESEARCHER’S EXPERIENCE AND POSITIONALITY TO THE STUDY

This section discusses my experiences and the position this research has taken following firstly, my background as an Acholi who got caught up in the war. My experiences of the war started in February 1986 which later led me to leave my village Namokora and the country after losing my father, dear ones and a home. NRA were campaigning to collect guns from suspected ex-Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A), the housed Uganda’s national army. The defeated Acholi soldiers who were traumatised at their loss of power had to hand in their guns, surrender, join the NRA or be “crashed”. The external linkages Acholi enjoyed in the country was effectively ended. Internally, the Acholi crisis deepened at the time the external pressure from the NRA was intensifying.

Secondly, I got involved in peace-building activities for many years using the peace by peaceful means ideology inspired by Johan Galtung, John Paul Lederarch and the Responding to Conflict (RTC) training organisation based in Birmingham, United Kingdom. Seeing that little support from Non-State actors were targeting the local population, the particular question about how far NGOs can support Acholi people who were caught up between LRA and UPDF war bothered me. This questioned later drove me to train practitioners in conflict transformation and consequently study NGO roles in the post-war social recovery.

As an Acholi, my hope in Acholiland was taken over by the fear of the social contradiction (conflict context) grounded in the commonly held views in most parts of Uganda that the war in Acholiland is Acholi war, rather than Ugandans’ that has regional and global contexts and implications. The resultant impact based on the breakdown of lineage-based and social authority that once bounded Acholi people together relied mainly on NGO interventions. And yet, the views of Acholi people on how and why the broken-down lineage-based social authority can be rebuild has to consider support and mobilisation from NGOs. But, NGOs also work following their own principles and codes of conduct. It was becoming increasingly unclear to me why the representative roles of NGOs on Acholi problems to the international community very minimal.
Amidst the growing numbers of NGOs in Acholiland, the perceptions of Acholi people on NGOs were also changing as the war drew to a close towards July 2006. There was also varying perceptions of Acholi people on how far NGOs can support them, especially in respective villages of returns.

Thirdly, my experiences needed to be placed within an academic debate, how it both positively and negatively affected the study, and how I dealt with it. As an Acholi, I share much empirical reality Acholi people went through. However, the academic theoretical considerations both challenged and inspired me to conduct this research, especially while critically following on the importance of NGO roles in transforming conflict. Placing this study within the social constructivist views, war-affected realities of post-conflict recovery population, NGOs are considered never apolitical and yet are social actors. This view suggests that NGOs actually constitute to the formation of social reality of those war-affected population. NGOs engage in discussions about the meanings of activities, interactions, ideas, and perceptions in situations like that of Acholi IDP-returnees.

The challenges based on balancing my practical peacebuilding training background to that of theoretical perspectives of post-Marxist structuralists and non-violence pacifist movementists whose incorporated Realists’ perspectives continued to dominate academic debates. The traditional peace movement and pacifist discourses were being taken over by many newly established conflict resolution organisations such as International Alert (IA), Saferworld, and the International Crisis Group (ICG). I met some of these challenges by understanding the diversity and interface of peace practice in Northern Uganda and in finding relevant literature explanations.

Where NGOs got involved, the diversity and interface of peace practice is found to coexist with complementary and/or mutually compatible transformative and conditionality approaches. While the transformative approach is blamed not to safeguard the prime condition of good governance and pluralism, it does consider the most effective way of promoting human rights. This was
clearer in following NGO roles who engage with local actors in critical-constructive process of dialoguing and capacity building. On the other hand, the conditionality approach safeguards individual human rights and pluralism, a fundamental precondition for peace processes. All these conform to the position of this research that NGOs can create fertile ground for many developments in the governmental and nongovernmental actions (Dijik 2009) and (Carroll 1992). Therefore, my framework of analysis follows the scope of transformation along the various typologies of NGOs activities and their direct and indirect involvement in post-war recovery. Grassroots, intermediary and advocacy NGOs as well as INGOs are analysed. The next subsection (1.2) puts this research into context.

1.2 THE CONTEXT OF THIS RESEARCH

The specific context of this study investigates NGO involvement in rebuilding crises in Northern Uganda. A region destroyed by the more than twenty years of war, commonly defined by the GoU as thugs-like, baseless and backwardly. However, the changing contexts of the war to peace transformation later left Acholi IDP-retumeees to continue with or turn more to NGOs. This study context is about IDPs' return to respective villages from mid 2006 to 2010.

"Returnees" are understood in this study as those formerly internally displaced persons (IDPs) by war and have decided to go back to their villages of origin. There is no legal definition of internally displaced persons as there is for refugees. However, a United Nations report contained in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement uses the definition: "internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border" (Deng 1998: 16-19).
The return has global, national and local contextual explanations. The explanations lie in the typology of NGOs involved in post-war peacebuilding activities, kinds of actions they engage in and at different levels. Internal Displacement is a "global" crisis and has affected more than 20 million people in more than 55 countries (UN-OCHA 1999:1). An estimated 27.5 million people were internally displaced by conflict or violence worldwide (IDMC March 2011). While 2.9 million people were newly displaced in 20 countries in 2010, in over 40 countries, internal displacement has continued for years (IDMC March 2011). Amongst them is the war in Northern Uganda that recorded a number of factors in terms of devastation, internal displacement, abductions and killing, the geographic range of violence and the indirect and direct losses in both human and economic terms (Lancina 2006: 276-289). According to Oxfam (2007) in the last 20 years some 1.2 million people, representing more than 90 percent of the total population in the four districts of Amuru, Gulu, Pader and Kitgum were displaced in over 200 camps. UNDP (2007) rates the level of displacement in Northern Uganda as one of the highest in the world.

The return of IDPs to places of habitual residence – known in this thesis as “villages of origins or returns” (VoR) situates the Acholi people within the context of uncertain post-conflict transitional definitions (see detailed definition in sub-section 2.2). The conditions of return offered difficult analysis to gauge the “size” or “severity” of the the war (Lancina 2006: 276-289). Phealan (2005) argues that gauging the size and severity of war is the means-to-ends dichotomy of transforming war- to peace-system. Phealan (2005) adds that must address not only when, but how wars and their destructions are ended. Consequently, the return of IDPs to places of habitual residence came when LRA issued some form of political demands (Buhaug 2006: 691-708) at the Juba Peace Talks (JPTs) that resulted into the cessation of hostilities agreement, post-conflict recovery although it was clouded with uncertainties. Brown et al. (2008) and Phealan (2005) argue that within this uncertain post-conflict context, “cold” peace or normalcy needs to address the structural causes of the conflict.
Still within the global context, the policy contained in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN-GPID) issued in September 2004, sets out 30 principles based upon existing international humanitarian law and human rights instruments. “Displacement shall last no longer than required by the circumstances” (UN-GPID Principle 6.3 September 2004) and, “competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country” (UN-GPID Principle 28.1).

These principles were set to serve as policy standards to guide governments as well as international humanitarian and development agencies to provide durable solutions to IDPs. Uganda was one of the first countries to develop a formal policy on IDPs with its National IDP Policy which was enacted in August (NIDP-Policy 2004: VI). According to the report issued by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement in 2010, IDPs achieve a durable solution when they no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and they can enjoy their human rights without discrimination, returned to their place of origin, integration in areas of refuge (local integration) or settlement elsewhere in the country and must be voluntary and sustainable.

Further, it includes giving adequate information to the returning IDPs so as to make a free choice between return, local integration and settlement elsewhere in their country. Mere physical movement, such as return to one’s community of origin, moving to another part of the country or settling at one’s current residence does not amount to a durable solution. IDPs may continue to face displacement-related assistance and protection needs upon settlement in these areas. Until these needs are met, they have not achieved durable solutions (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, IASC FDSs for IDPs April 2010).
From the global to the local context, analysis can be made on exploring further on post-war social structures, the return of formerly displaced IDPs to respective villages and the social realities they face without relying on NGOs. This calls for Lederarch’s peacebuilding and Miall’s et al. (1999: 79) post-settlement peacebuilding framework with particular focus on the goal of relational transformation - reconciliation at the local level of returnees. These include rebuilding of lineage based social authority- meaning (social and economic well-being that focuses on the fundamental social and economic basic needs (relief aid); restoration of social services and addressing sustainable programmes (long term social and economic development)); the transformation of security sector - meaning both human and food security; and in the transformation of governance and participation - meaning leadership (rules and procedures of political decision-making, public service). Leadership includes the participation of an-all-inclusive voices of returnees through NGO representation, advocacy, policy orientation, the provision of relief and humanitarian aid and empowerment / transformation.

Miall’s et al. (1999: 79) post-settlement peacebuilding framework is used in this thesis to categorise NGOs levels of activities and involvement in post-war recovery. This fits into the three-tier levels of Lederach’s model of peace-building as is briefly shown in sub-section (1.5 and chapter two). The purpose of using the frameworks are that the “return” of Acholi-IDPs to VoRs draws a different attention to the forms of NGOs and activities involved in peacebuilding process. Miall’s framework and Lederach’s model of peacebuilding in social recovery relies heavily on the context of Acholi IDP “return” to VoR because local integration and protection which are aspects of durable solution policy were not of priority to returnees. Local integration and protection were under-valued for several reasons. One reason is that land is of paramount importance to the Acholi people and their ties to their ancestral clan land that they were forced to flee remain strong: the prospect of not returning to that land or not keeping some link to it is almost unthinkable. Another reason for return is that land is tied very closely to wealth, and therefore remains of critical importance for most of the population. Thirdly is the cultural and economic links to
ancestral lands, and most feel no tie or yearning to stay in the area of displacement, but to return to cultivate and build a hut on the land.

The Geneva based report of the internal displacement monitoring centre [IDMC] (2009) argues that the “return” defied the view that IDPs should have chosen to remain in IDP-Camps for economic reasons because it gave them a viable business or enterprise that was created during displacement at the site of displacement. The lack of options, in cases where the homeland is not known or accessible, or vulnerabilities such as no caregiver for an elderly person, or lack of proximate or adequate access to services in home areas such as schools or clinics, caused only a few people to stay in their communities of displacement (IDMC 2010).

Therefore, staying in the area of displacement in these three cases is neither a complete solution - as evidenced by maintaining strong ties to the area from which displacement occurred, nor often seen as a permanent one - as demonstrated by those who are there because of services, vulnerabilities, or the absence of a realistic option to return home. Certainly it is not a durable one as situations of IDPs and ability to remain in precarious conditions is at the mercy of landowners. The next sub-section addresses the research problem.

1.3 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Uganda’s political development of the “tribal” and “regional” identities is based on the predominantly historical ethnic political identities and crises created by the British colonial regime leading to “regional political identity” (Branch 2010: 26).

In February 1986, two major crises, the internal and external crises confronted Acholi people after Museveni’s takeover of government. Museveni’s take over, shifted the historically North-Nilotics domination to South-Western Bantu-domination of power which set forth the crises. Internally, the Acholi people were faced with how the defeated retreating soldiers would fit into civilian lives. This caused internal breakdown of lineage-based institutional authority. Externally, Acholi people were faced with how to regain the lost political and military control of the country’s crisis. Both crises
resulted into the destruction of Acholi lineage-based bondings and the political links and glory that
once tied the Acholi together in the local, district to the national state.

Attempts to “fix” these crises target rebuilding the destroyed social structure and strengthening the
lineage-based relationships. Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies against the UPDF – the
enemy, were/are led by the regrouped former Uganda Nationl Liberation Army (UNLA) who called
themselves the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) respectively. These military options, including the persistent
LRA who are currently not in Acholiland worsened the internal and external social bonding and
relational crises in Acholiland.

The worsening Acholi crises saw the emergence of the HSM, a spiritually led insurgency by Alice
Auma “Lakwena” who trumped the elder’s authority and their claim to represent the Acholi.
Lakwena offered a route to cleansing and forging social inclusion for those ex-UNLA who did not
want to submit to the elder’s authority (Allen 1991b: 378). The LRA operations escalated
the internal crises within Acholiland by representing the impure and the corrupt Acholi who are also
understood to be government colaborators against the younger abducted Acholi children. With the
unresolved crises, the reality or hyper reality of the cosmology of war in Acholiland, nationally and
internationally excluded Acholi people on the basis that they are the enemy of the state.

Consequently, the Acholi people are subjected to more serious conditions of internal
diaplacements and increased cleavages and crises. The internal and external Acholi crises are
replaced by donor-suported programmes, and NGO-oriented interactions emerged, but were
unrepresentative of the non-political Acholi “civil society” composed of the Diasporas and some
who called themselves middle class Acholi people.

Uganda’s political development and the related crises in Acholiland still haunt Acholi people.
Donor funded activities for Uganda’s national development excluded Acholi people although
GoU’s claims have been argued to be legitimately balancing democratic processes in the country.
But the direction undertaken by Uganda government’s pursuits of foreign aid has been in the name of ending the violent conflict in northern Uganda. Further international diplomatic outcry from northern Ugandan leaders and politicians and the steps taken by Ugandan government against the northern war and eventual return of Acholi-IDPs to villages of origins attracted many NGOs. The roles of NGOs in the support and mobilisation of Acholi people during and after dispacements has been to address internal and external crises of Acholi population.

The general problem faced in the post-war peacebuilding social recovery in Acholiland is how far NGOs can transform and rebuild the once destroyed social authority of civilian war-affected population. NGOs’ actions in post-war peacebuilding still lack clear model of analysis and intervention from the broader conflict transformational goals Llamazares (2005: 31). The unclear model of analysis leaves a gap for NGOs to apply in the local context like that of Acholi IDP-returnees in Northern Uganda. Within this study problem lie the different types of actors in which NGOs work with, considering NGOs assigned interests, values, principles, codes of conduct and modes of operations. The implication raises questions on how far NGOs play a role in the support and mobilisation of IDPs-returnees; the facilitative roles and their representation in the international, national and local levels for addressing the historically complicated crises in the local context.

The purpose of this study was to explore the roles of NGOs in rebuilding the broken linege-based social structure and relationships amongst the Acholi IDP-returnees in Northern Uganda. The study also sought to explore in-depth description of IDP-returnees’ perceptions on the need to address the crises, now that NGOs and other multiple actors remain the most promising hope. But NGOs were packing bags and consequently leaving.
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

The major research question aims to address:

1. How far do NGOs play a role in supporting and mobilising IDPs-returnees after experiencing crises in the breakdown of lineage-based social authority and destroyed relationships? And why do NGOs get involved?

To help answer the above major questions the study adopts sub-questions asking:

1.1 Can NGOs facilitate post-war peacebuilding social recovery using sets of principles and models in a way that takes into account the views on rebuilding social authority and relationships between Acholi IDP-returnees? Can understanding the root causes of the war help NGOs to facilitate to rebuild Acholi people’s destroyed social authority and restore the broken-down relationships?

1.2 How far are Acholi IDP-returnees involved in defining their models of post-war social recovery based on the many years of war to peace transformation experiences?

1.2.1 How representative have NGOs been in the international, government and local levels for returnees?

1.3 How did Acholi IDPs perceive the role NGOs play using the models and sets of practices they deploy to mobilise and support them in post-war social recovery?

There are three objectives that discuss several sub-issues:

(i) To investigate the actions NGOs undertake to rebuild the once broken-down Acholi lineage-based social authority and in strengthening such weak social institutions with the external actors, the GoU and international community. This objective is achieved by examining why NGOs get involved in an historically deeply rooted and complex causes, and how far they play their role in ways that supported Acholi IDP-returnees using local post-war peacebuilding tools. Within the changing context of the war to peace, the study follows the internal and external crises of Acholi
people, the transformational goals to identify IDPs needs, their relationships with various actors in their local environment and their social structural recovery settings.

(ii) To examine how far Acholi-IDPs-returnees are involved in defining what happens to them during the transformation from war to peace. This objective is achieved by first demonstrating how the multiple actors facilitated or not, the helplessly caught up Acholi people between the LRA and UPDF insurgency since NGOs became the only source of survival. This particular consideration follows from returnees’ experiences and views about support and mobilisation from NGOs and other relevant actors.

(iii) To explore the experiences and perceptions of Acholi IDP-returnees on NGOs and other actors’ actions. This is achieved by deploying an indepth methodological approach that explores into the post-war Acholi peoples’ realities.

1.5 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
This sub-section defines NGOs and clarifies their categories and typologies. It identifies the activities of NGOs within their operation levels based on Miall’s post-settlement and Lederach’s peacebuilding models. These arise from the literature review that formed the framework of analysis in chapter two (see section 2.4). Figures 2.6.2, 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 give detailed explanations about NGO categorisation, activities, and their involvement in transforming conflicts.

By any general definitions:

NGOs are legally constituted organisations created by private organisations or people with no participation or representation of any government; are totally or partially funded by governments; maintain their non-governmental status insofar as they excludes government representatives from membership in the organisation. NGOs are non-profit, voluntary citizen groups who are organised on a local, national or international level; NGOs address issues of justice and peace (Brown et al. 2008: 18).

Categorisations
Salamon (1987 and 1994) categorises NGOs by distinguishing between operational and non-operational modes and conducts. Operational organisations include member-serving organisations who provide services to members of the organisation and public benefit/social
service organisations. They also provide services to other beneficiaries who are not their members. The modes and conducts of these non-operational organisations are to engage in activities such as research, advocacy, lobbying and fund-raising. Salamon also includes a separate category for religious organisations whose modes and conducts are similar.

Building on NGO categorisations by Fowler and Bratton, Ian Gary breaks NGOs into four types (Gary 1996). The first type, community-based organisations (CBOs) are small, intimate and are run by the members and rely on locally generated resources. The second types are service or intermediary NGOs, which are organisations with paid staff that provide social services to some beneficiaries (these can be individuals or community-based organisations). The third types are intermediary NGOs that are involved in policy and advocacy. The fourth types of NGOs are those NGOs that are international relief and development organisations with large, professional staffs, huge budgets and offices in many countries (Nesbet 2003: 8-16).

According to Carroll (1992), intermediary NGOs are a special subset of the family of NGOs. He identifies two kinds of intermediary NGOs - Grassroots Support Organisations (GSOs) and Membership Support Organisations (MSOs). GSOs are organisations that provide services to grassroots organisations and individuals. These GSOs often serve as links, or intermediaries, between individuals and organisations at the grassroots level and higher-level government agencies or donors. An MSO is very similar to a GSO except its members are grassroots organisations and the MSO provides services directly to these organisations (Nesbet 2003: 8-16).

**NGOs Activities**

NGOs perform a variety of services and actions in all stages of conflict, and many NGOs perform several different functions. According to Brown et al. (2008) NGOs exercise task-oriented programmes with people-driven common interest to perform a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bring citizen’s concerns to governments, advocate and monitor policies and encourage political participation through provision of information.
Because of the varied nature of NGO activities, NGOs can be hard to classify and categorise by function. However, NGO activities can be grouped into several different categories. Four main kinds of NGO actions in conflict transformation can be identified as advocacy, policy work, the provision of relief and humanitarian aid and empowerment/transformation (Nesbet 2003), (see analytical framework in figures 2.6.1 and 2.6.2).

**Types of NGOs Involvement in Transforming Conflict**

The typology of NGO involvement in transforming conflict aligns the four activities with the levels in Lederach’s peacebuilding model. Miall’s framework shows which organisations are involved in which activities at the different activity levels within Leaderch’s model in post-war recovery. It must be realised that the same organisations involved in conflict transformation may be performing other activities related to development, providing social services, or other activities at any point before, during, and after the conflict (see figures 2.6.3 and 2.6.4). According to Annan (2004) NGOs promote and sustain one another, and, the question then is not when but how they work.

**1.6 STUDY SIGNIFICANCE**

The significance of this study realises on how far away returnees are removed from being self-reliant and how far apart the desired social equilibrium has been broadened as they remain so stuck in between rocks and hard surface. The perspectives indicate significant evidence of the impact of structural violence that decayed the social, economic, cultural and political structure of the Acholi people and the region as a whole. It looks not into changing the status quo of returnees, rather on the significant roles of NGOs in so far using models and sets of practices to mobilise and support the returnees.

Post-war peacebuilding, social recovery models or sets of practices NGOs use for IDPs-returnees have no one-size-fits-all. NGOs continue to test and improve on models so as to transfer “best-practice” to add value to government development plans. In all these, returnees tend to continue to depend on or think it is the role of NGOs and government to mobilise and support them. Their
social realities are created along experiential patterns in the social realities, which in the post-conflict stage now has left them with bigger/wider social burden, parasitism and frustration. NGO models and, sets of practices may not be applicable any longer.

Therefore, it is significant that this research assists in understanding the nature of transforming violent social conflict based on theoretical and contextual analysis of understanding social burden, frustration and parasitism derived from overly dependence on NGOs. Suggested areas of further research are significant to derive many questions about the impacts and effectiveness of NGO interventions to transform violent conflicts with the recovering post-war population locally.

1.7 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

**Scope:** The scope of the study was sub-Saharan African intra post-civil war social recovery involving the international/national non-governmental organisations, Ugandan government and its military, leaders in Uganda’s Gulu, Kitgum, Amuru and Pader districts. The focus was on NGOs’ roles in the mobilisation and support to Acholi IDP-returnees. The transformation of war to peace recorded changes in the dynamics and complexities of sustaining peace. The scope does include analyses of the root causes of the conflict with Acholi IDPs-returnees.

**Limitations:** Internal validity to this study may have been limited by several factors. Post-war returnees’ condition is followed based on the outcome of the war. The limitations may lie in the processes and social structural orientations NGOs undertake to support and mobilise Acholi returnees. One such several factors limit the internal validity of the study.

External factors limiting this study include limited access to the broader population of returnees in the selected conflict region. In addition, not all returnees and NGOs in the selected conflict region were willing to participate in an academic study. Not all NGOs and returnees with wide range of opinion in all conflict regions were accessible and not all identified respondents and communities as possible participants were willing to participate. The selection of participants considered the need to achieve reaching out to each of the four districts which has implications in terms of
geographical, ethnic, political, and demographic and perspective compositions. The budget for the current study restricted the maximum number of participants, thus the purposive sampling technique may have limited the potential range of opinions.

The varying experiences and different social conditions of Acholi IDP-returnees may limit the choice of respondents. James et al. (2005) argues that the top-level leaders limit the potential application to mid-level and lower-level leaders. Studying one particular conflict context raises questions about generalisability. The study is limited to the specific context of Acholi people, Acholiland in Northern Uganda. The range in opinions included validation of the desired diversity and representative nature of perspectives. These opinions do not assure generalisability of the findings. Northern Uganda alone may not be representative of all conflicts, past, present, or future to apply for other cases.

IDPs-returnees value continued relief distribution from NGOs. They hope that NGOs exit strategies will include them when the GoU takes over. Therefore, some respondents were reserved resulting sometimes to having divided views amongst the displaced population who prefer to stay in camps for continued handouts distribution to those in VoRs. Consolidating the perceptions and perceived consensus from such social recovery basing it on participants can limit study findings.

The theoretical discussion within a suitable methodology aimed at dealing with generalisation may limit the study. However, the methodological uniqueness centred on triangulating methods and data from interviews, observations, reports, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and my prior experiences.

Peacebuilding NGOs whose roots have international, national, district and local connections were chosen for this study. This may have limited the study as NGOs influx in the region resulted in sectoring NGOs to suit geographical, programmatic and project adjustments. The regulation of
NGOs after overwhelming the local population and the GoU imposed new social dynamics which caused concern for the coordination mechanisms of policies, programmes and projects. This limits the transfer of “best-practice” and “added-value to government development plans”. To these limitations, NGOs neutrality and legitimacy is further evaluated, guided and shaped by global agendas of multilateral and bilateral donor governments.

**Delimitations:** Several internal factors, delimiters, limited the current study. The current study focused on one conflict, one country, and one people group, the Acholi of Northern Uganda. The focus may limit the generalisability of the findings to other conflicts, other countries, and other people.

FGD participants and key government officials who were key informants were purposively sampled and not randomly choosen. The basis of the selection of the participants was knowledge of the conflict in Northern Uganda involving the LRA, the GoU, and the Acholi of Northern Uganda. The responses were not random and may not be representative of all people, NGOs, all Ugandans, all Northern Ugandans, or all Acholi people. The responses may have been representative of the collected perceptions of the participants alone. Selection of the participants may limit generalisability.

Internal factors limiting this study acknowledges differences to meet the “expectations” between the researcher and the sampled FGDs, participants and financial constraints to travel within the region. Returnees in all conflict regions, including Northern Uganda, have limited accessibility. The participants in the current study may not have been representative of any returnees outside the participant group. These uniquenesses pose implications to theory, policy and practice, methodology and suggests further areas for research (see chapter eight).
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This study seeks to explore the experiences and views of Acholi IDPs-returnees on the lack of clear model, or sets of practices that NGOs undertake to transform the delapidated social structure and relationships of Acholi people.

Chapter two is the contextualised theory and practical understanding of the descriptive and prescriptive conflict transformation goals. The actions of NGOs in mobilising and supporting IDPs-returnees are reviewed. But also follows on Lederach’s (1999) view that theories without practice are if not dead, at least lifeless and of little use.

The background chapter on Uganda provides the political development, crises and reconstruction in Northern Uganda. The crises to be rebuild includes, but are not limited to Acholi social structure and relations. The chapter sets the understanding to returnees moving back to their respective villages.

Chapter four discusses the research methodology. The detailed perspectives from IDPs, NGOs and local government representatives in the Acholi sub-region were considered. Their experiences, perceptions, systems for explaining collective meaning, emotions and the connection to any human behaviour which are significant factors in the generation, maintenance and the experience of the conflict and peace are captured. The particular methods for collecting and analysing data are presented in details in the study chapter. The study addresses its limitations while pointing to issues related to the data validity and reliability for the research.

Chapter five focuses on identifying the causes of the war so as to explore whether understanding the root causes of the war can help NGOs to facilitate the rebuilding of Acholi people’s destroyed social authority and in restoring the broken-down relationships. Fundamental needs of rebuilding relationship and the social authority in Acholiland after the crises are identified. This chapter provides an in-depth explanations on how far Acholi returnees were involved in defining what happened to them of which convergences and divergences in perspectives emerged.
Chapter six is about rebuilding Acholi lineage-based strong social authority in Acholiland. It locates social structures within which the Acholi social institutions was based in the past and are needed for future rebuilding. The broader views on NGOs actions are discussed.

Chapter seven discusses about societal relationship building, mainly social reconciliation. Internal relationships amongst Acholi people takes a traditional form of traditional restorative justice commonly known as *Mato Oput*. NGOs’ roles to play a representative role in the national and international level is discussed. External and internal relationship building are discussed in this chapter.

Chapter eight is the concluding chapter of the thesis. It revisits the research questions and study objectives to see if the findings are consistent with the evidences. The chapter ends with observations relating to the research implications, the thesis itself and suggestions to possible areas for further research.

1.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter is the background and the justification for the study. It set out the research questions, study purpose and objectives. The limitations of the study are highlighted. The next chapter forms the review of the existing literature on the subject. My framework of analysis arises from literatures to suit the methodological consistencies in the research questions and study objectives. The next chapter deals with the understanding of contextualised theoretical and practical concepts of conflict transformation discussed within the post-war peacebuilding social recovery terms.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW – CONTEXTUALISED IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews relevant theoretical concepts of conflict transformation drawing from the inter-disciplinary literatures on roles of NGOs in post-war peacebuilding social recovery. Section 2.2 reviews the literature development from the Realists’ views that incorporates Post-Marxist and Non-violence pacifism conceptions.

In subsection 2.3, conflict transformation and peacebuilding are understood in this thesis as are complementary concepts to another. Conflict has not to be confused with violence (2.3.1) and the destructive and constructive nature of conflict has to provide insights into the conceptualisation of positive and negative peace practices (sub-section 2.3.2). All these have implications of theory, policy and practices in both conceptual and analytical terms once reflected on NGOs’ involvement in post-war peacebuilding (2.3.3). In sub-section 2.4, the relevance of the review to NGOs actions can be understood from empirical studies. The theoretical discussions include practices of NGOs in the contextual and complementary role they play in facilitating post-war social recovery peacebuilding using sets of principles and modes. This is reviewed in consideration to the views of local context of post-war societies.

Sub-section 2.5 discusses NGO roles with particular focus on rebuilding a once broken-down social structure and restoring relationships among post-war social recovering population. The explanations revolves around how far local populations are involved in defining their own models of recovery based on their experiences. A framework of analysis in figure 2.6.1 combines Lederach’s peacbuilding and Miall’s post-settlement framework. I use these combined frameworks to analyse NGOs’ categorisation and typology (2.6.1) followed by sub-section 2.6.2 relating it to the respective activities, and the relevant analysis of returnees while in IDP-Camps, on return and those who already returned to respective villages.
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Conflict transformation is still a relatively new, poorly defined and growing concept. The evolution of contemporary literatures have gone through four major periods; The preliminary developments from 1914-1945 and until the end of The First World War (1914-1918) saw the growth of pacifist sentiments and organisations as is articulated in the Dada art movement and in political cynicism (Barcovitch Kremenyuk and Zartman 2009: 16-30). This period marks the incorporation of the realist approach to conflict transformation with Post-Marxist and Non-violence pacifists’ views from Galtung (1975: 9-13; 1998: 17-18, 66 and 1990). Conflict and violence were to be understood differently based on the differentiation between “positive peace – sustainable/durable peace” from “negative peace – cold/unsustainable peace”. The latter was defined as the absence of war which does not necessarily mean peace.

From 1946-1969, laying the ground for many developments in the governmental and nongovernmental actions to prevent future wars where transnational institutions and the fostering of reconciliation between enemies emerged; for example the United Nations (UN), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisations (UNESCO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), the International Peace Research Centre (IPRC) set up by Johan Galtung in Oslo in 1959 and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 1969 (ibid.). This period sets one goal of conflict transformation as of rebuilding broken relationships (Lederach 1999).

The third period (1970-1989) is the expansion and institutionalisation that had three distinctive international environments of early 1970s when Cold War became more managed through arms control agreements. There was disappointment on the achievement of conflict resolution (Boulding 1978; Harty and Modell 1991), the normalisation of relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States; and Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1989 end of Cold War in the Soviet Union (Ibid.). This period is vital in understanding NGOs since their appropriate actions at the different
levels of aggregation helps to understand how representative they can be in the various levels of institutions.

And the fourth, *diffusion and differentiation* (1990-2008) period marked profound UN engagement in conflict and adherence to human rights protection, increases in democratic countries, engagement of women in governance and decline in international wars (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Human Security Centre 2005; Marshall and Gurr 2005). The September 11, 2001 attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda against the US and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq marked a seemingly new beginning of a new world order (Barcovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman 2009: 28). On the other hand, more specialised research like the *John Hopkins Washington Interest in Negotiation Group* emerged, with growing literatures focusing on post-agreement problems and solutions relating to external intervention and institutional building (Paris 2004; Stedman et al. 2002). This period is fairly wide but provides policy discussions like that of the UN-Internally Displaced Persons (UN-IDPs) policy which is being used as guiding principles by governments and non-governmental organisations.

In all these developments, conflict transformation concepts have gone through a series of stages since the beginning of its regular usage (Miall 2003; Reimann 2003; Rupesinghe 1995; Lederach, 1999; Värynen 1991). NGO modes and practices of conflict transformation have been identified by Miall (2004) as a response to the changing nature of contemporary conflicts are in their incomplete stages of synthesis. Senghaas (2004) introduces the guiding notion of civilising conflict, a constructive pacifism for conflict transformation deriving a model of complex peace architecture of "civilisation hexagon" (Berghoff Handbook Dialogue Series [BHDS] 2007). Conflict transformation requirements rest with “healing” (Roswitha 2001), “reconciliation” (Negowetti 2003; Lederach 1999), “the discovery of peace” (Louise 1994), “constructive confrontation” (Burgess 1996), shifting “from violence to peace politics” (Francis 2000), and “justice with fair share, fair treatment and fair play” (Maiese 2003: 1-2).
The evolution of literatures contributed hugely to increases on NGO literatures by known scholars of conflict transformation such as Lederach (1993, 1995, 1999 and 2003) and Paffenholz (2006, 2003a, 2001a and 1998). These literatures have sometimes been expressed in the name of civil society. Roles and responsibilities of NGOs attracted considerable attention on humanitarian and development sectors (Anderson 1996 and 1999). Specific functions of NGOs are often overlooked (Aall 1996). More relevant literatures emerged from (Arthur 1999; Cooper and Berdal 1993; Crocker et al. 1999) adding onto NGOs to include Multi-Track Diplomacy roles (Diamond and McDonald 1996; McDonald 1991, 2003; Notter and McDonald 1996). Multi-track diplomacy originates from track-one diplomacy. Track-one diplomacy carries the common view that governmental activities concerned with building and maintaining orderly communications and relationships are carried out by professionals who are politically appointed by the state. They focus on negotiating peace, drafting peace treaties, and handling day-to-day implementation of protocols. According to Bolling (2010) these roles are not enough in reality and are limited in influence and forms.

Bolling (2010: 72) argues that the attitudes, knowledge, words, and deeds of ordinary citizens, as well as activities of private organisations and institutions in their interactions with other people at home and abroad, can have significant impact on international relations, fostering either friendly cooperation or suspicion, hostility, and conflict. It is in this view and with the growing influence from NGOs that Bolling (2010) suggests that track-two diplomacy has to deal with the realities of the growing involvement of private individuals and NGOs in activities related to conflict analysis, conflict management, and attempts at conflict resolution (conflict transformation). These initiatives from private sectors are now natural, welcomed manifestations of track-two diplomacy, or what is now often called Multi-track diplomacy (Bolling 2010: 73).

These initiatives require a transformative approach to focus on understanding/analysing the root causes of the war and in dealing with the aftermath of war realities on war-torn societies. Austin et al (2004: 446-465) define conflict transformation as actions and processes which seek to alter the
various characteristics and manifestation of conflict by addressing the root causes of a particular conflict over the long term. In regards to the transformative approach towards a post-war era, most wars fought in Africa in the post-cold war era seemingly dictates distinctive conditions on how post-conflict reconstruction concept can be adopted and implemented for durable peace. The altering characteristics of transforming violent conflict to peace in peace studies and research focuses on how negative peace are reduced and negative relations eliminated; and how positive peace are built to enforce harmonious relationships (see sub-section 2.3.2).

These views are explained within the objective that investigates actions NGOs undertake to rebuild the once broken-down Acholi lineage-based social authority and in strengthening such weakened social institutions. According to an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) report (2007), governments and donors are keen to see an early end to the relief phase of any emergency. There is often a political incentive as well as a humanitarian goal to save lives and get people home. Hanlon (2006) argues that these two interests can be uneasy bedfellows if the timetable driving return is quicker than is practically appropriate. The framework of analysis from when the war started can be quite mechanistic, over ambitious and inconsiderate because a whole range of conceptual terms such as triggers, proximate causes, root causes, permissive conditions, mobilising causes are misleading (Hanlon 2006).

An examination of what happens to the post-war population has to be based on post-war affected people’s perspectives amidst the multiple actors. Conceptually, the institutionalisation of the post-conflict appears to be a resounding success whenever impressive numbers of organisations contribute to the cause of ending and preventing deadly conflict and use triggers, proximate causes, root causes, permissive conditions, mobilising causes as post-war concepts to frame and organise post conflict activities (Krasner (2005: 153-163). Krasner (2005) adds that the holistic post-conflict concept should embrace political development, security, justice, community relationships, economic and social development; and community participation and consultation that should be a national and international agenda from peace negotiations to peace enforcement
According to Annan (1997c) peacebuilding has various concurrent and integrated actions that must be undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. Such views help to explain why conflict transformation goals use peacebuilding as a tool rather than contesting concepts (see sub-section 2.3). The transformation goals are then used to identify IDPs needs, their relationships with various actors in the local environment and in rebuilding the social structure.

2.3 CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING

This study regards peacebuilding and conflict transformation goals as complementary to one another, rather than stand-alone contesting concepts. The aim of conflict transformation is to transform negative destructive conflict into positive constructive conflict and deal with structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspects of conflict (Austin et al. 2004: 464-465). The goal suggests that NGO actions do not only have to focus on how-to-do-it but also what-to-do. This is also the overall aim of peacebuilding, to create sustainable peace, a peaceful future, conducting an overall needs assessment, developing a coherent peace plan, and designing an effective implementation plan (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 12). In the post-war stages, Annan (1997c) and Miall (2004: 188) view post-conflict peacebuilding as very distinctive of humanitarian and development peacebuilding activities to have specific aim of preventing a relapse to violence (see subsection 2.2).

The important point is that the negative tasks of preventing a relapse into covert violence and the positive tasks of aiding recovery and expediting eventual removal of the underlying root causes of internal war provide distinctive closer relationships between complementary sets of tasks (Miall et al. 2004: 185-215). Conducive conditions have to be created for reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery. These peacebuilding views complement the concept of conflict transformation which is a “process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very structure of constitution of society that supports the protraction of violent conflicts” (Miall 2003: 5).
The processes of conflict transformation utilises peacebuilding as a tool that must rely on and operate within a peacebuilding framework defined by sustainable transformation (Lederarch 1999). Wormgoor (2004: 39-40) acknowledges the importance and relevance of peacebuilding approaches, but also suggests countries choose conflict transformation as the main focus for a country as a whole. This is because “the very structure of groups and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflicts” (Miall 2003: 5). If successful, the process might result in benign spirals of relationships. If not, conflicts develop into vicious spirals. Conflict may broaden (suck in new issues), widen (suck in new actors) and intensify (suck in new victims) (Ibid).

Lederach (1999) believes that conflict transformation addresses structural issues and the development of a supportive infrastructure for peace (sub-section 2.4). Conflict transformation stresses on inclusions of more than a post accord reconstruction focusing on a dynamic social construct of interrelated interactions. Wallenstein (2006) concurs with Lederach (1999) that peacebuilding is a tool of conflict transformation, and it should be viewed as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships.

While they agree that the term involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow beyond formal peace accords, post-war peacebuilding does not bring out and embrace structures and systems, psychosocial concerns, policy as central focus rendering peace-building as a tool of conflict transformation, a concern for conflict transformation (Wallenstein 2006: 4; Lederach 1999; Galtung 1997). Schirch (2004) reinforces the divergent view that conflict transformation is one tool in a peace building toolbox. Her suggestion on conflict transformation depends on dialogue, mediation and negotiation to build relationships and address the root causes of conflict and that peace building includes a far wider variety of processes. The point of contention seems to situate itself in Schirch’s (2004) narrow vision of conflict transformation of restoring relationship (reconciliation), transforming structural and cultural violence. All these
should happen when conflict changes from war to its post-war stages and the contextual and dynamic challenges of the protraction of every conflict.

Frieters et al. (2008) argue in a joint Utstein Report that the cornerstone of future peacebuilding work is to address structural causes of conflict. Utstein report is contained in a German National Report to allow all peacebuilding praxis to include all activities to mainstream justice and cover the context of reconciliation and participation. This report makes complements to structural and psychosocial peacebuilding to include security, relief, good governance, democratisation and economic development. Lederach (1999) proposes the use of conflict transformation not to be reserved only for situations of direct violence but it can also be used to tackle structural and cultural violence. Fisher et al. (2000) places the view within a time frame that it needs the longest and most wide-ranging commitment centring on changing the relationships, behaviours, attitudes and structures from negative and destructive conflicts to positive peace.

Peacebuilding tools include negotiated agreements for ending civil strife, disarmament, repatriating refugees, advisory security reform, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Boutros-Ghali 1995). Lewer (1999: 12) and Llamazares (2005: 2-4) are concerned about the inclusion of so many activities, levels and actors under the umbrella term peacebuilding that has rendered its definition so broad that it is in danger of becoming meaningless. The concern here is not what post-war peacebuilding is, but what it can be, a complement to conflict transformation about how-to-do-it as well as what-needs-to-be done.

2.3.1 CONFLICT VERSUS VIOLENCE

According to Fisher (2000), the exploration of conflict transformation within a social context views conflict as a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have, or think they have incompatible goals. Violence is “the avoidable insults to basic human needs and more
generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible” (Galtung 1990: 291-305).

Galtung (1999) argues that “conflict cycle” is embedded in the attitude (minds and hearts of actors), behaviour and in the social contradictions, sometimes referred to as context - the ABC-triangle. According to Galtung (1999) “conflict the creator” can bring “dynamic change which keeps relationships and social structures honest, alive, and responsive to human needs, aspirations and growth” (Lederach 2003: 18) if handled well. If mishandled “conflict the destroyer” (Galtung 1999) can generate violence, thus violence, not conflict itself, is the antithesis to peace (Lederach 2003 and Gawerc 2006: 435-478). The views can direct NGO actions and modes of operation, because, according to Dugan (1996) and Lederach (1999) conflicts have nested multiple levels (1999). Both Mitchell (2002) and Boulding (1990) agree that multiple actors are accompanied by their attitudinal cognitive, affective, emotional aspect which are relevant for their behavioural dynamics.

2.3.2 FROM NEGATIVE PEACE (DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT) TO POSITIVE PEACE (CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT)

According to Galtung (1999) the overt destructive violent conflict behaviour leads to physical violence; the overt destructive violent conflict in attitude becomes cultural violence and the overt destructive violent conflict in social contradiction/context leads to structural or systemic violence. Negative peace is defined as the cessation of direct violence and positive peace is the removal of structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1990). Galtung (1998, 1996, 1990 and 1975) argues that averting structural violence requires addressing structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspect of conflict. The view suggests that where structural violence occurs, a wider social, economic and political source of conflict needs NGOs to transform both the negative energy of war into positive peace.

Simon (1995: 30) argues that it is not always easy to distinguish one type of violence from the other. Buckley-Zistel (2003) assumes violence and culture are disconnected and that violence can
not be a cultural expression. The answer lies in the levels of structural and cultural violence that serves as early warning indicators for direct violence, as well, too late warning of structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1990: 294 and 2002). Galtung (2002) answers that cultural violence legitimises direct and structural violence.

According to Francis (2006) and Lederach (1999) constructive conflict or positive peace as is opposed to negative peace is vital if it focuses on transforming the people, conflict parties, the affected society or region and outsiders with relevant human and material resources, as all having complementary roles to play in the long-term process. Lederach (1999) recommends a comprehensive and wide-ranging bottom-up approach that needs to emphasise on the support for grassroots within the society in conflict rather than for the mediation of top-down outsiders. By this explanation, the representative role of NGOs and views of the local people can be analysed.

Both Lederach (1999) Galtung (1996) agree that conditions where exploitation is to be minimised or eliminated and where there is neither the overt violence nor the subtler phenomenon of structural violence creates conducive social conditions for lasting peace.

2.3.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE

The gaps in theory, practice and policy are still wide. As mentioned above in sub-section 1.1, during the late 1990s and early 2000s the social reality reflects less in the strife for social change and justice, although many nonviolent conflict prevention and transformation development policy were being announced. Defining structural and systemic causes of conflicts drifts away from bridging the theoretical-gap discourses so as to understand the social reality creation of meanings and how peacebuilding policies and theories link with practices.

Vivienne and Körppen (2006) argue that a positivist view makes it unclear on how the individual and social are interwoven in the inherently socio-political struggle during conflict transformation. It causes gaps that arise from the consensus that both levels – the individual and the social – can and must be influenced since there is not yet very clear understanding on how the transfer from
one level to the other works, builds up and is sustained. The implication is not only in the levels, but also in the linkages of theories to practices involving policy implementations. Vivienne and Körppen are referring to Lederach’s peacebuilding model that has three levels (sub-section 2.6).

According to Galtung (2000) bringing both practitioners and policy makers closer for thorough and far-reaching strategy is preferable. Theory without practice in the context of peacebuilding is, if not dead, at least lifeless and of little use (Lederach 1999). Therefore, the descriptions and explanations of theory are accompanied by practical examples in order to make them more comprehensible and more based on real life experiences (Lunqvist 2009: 2).

Bloomfield and Schmelzle (2006: 6) argue that bridging the gap between theory and practice is a continuing challenge. They try to answer Vivienne and Körppen that a positivist and a constructivist approach, in particular, have come against each other, suggesting an underlying struggle of paradigms. The paradigms are distinct and have relevant advantages to the constructivist stance, since this is a case study. The case study approach to the practice of conflict transformation leaves a tangible imprint to the politics of conflict and peace and more have yet to emerge (Bloomfield and Schmelzle 2006: 6). A case study approach does not necessarily require a paradigmatic shift (Nueman 2003). Therefore, further development of theory needs to accommodate practice, not simply in providing empirical answers, but by integrating practitioners into the process of generating questions (Bloomfield and Schmelzle 2006: 6).

Berghof Handbook Dialogue (BHD) (2007) writers emphasise on the role of change agents, relative importance of third party interveners (outsiders versus insiders), and implicit over-reliance on external agents, no replacement for insiders and internal resources and asymmetry of power. There is need to re-examine and possibly re-align our categories of analysis and modes of engagement (Bloomfield and Schmelzle 2006: 6; Dudouet 2006). Shapiro (2006) says conflict interventions indeed start at diverse levels of analysis and assume different levels of influence. It
is in her contribution that the issue of what needs to change (first) becomes most tangible and reveal its potential counterproductive consequences.

Barash and Webel (2002: 7) argue that good citizen may participate in settings within which individuals may do enormous amounts of harm to other human beings without ever intending to do so, just performing their regular duties as a job defined in the structure. This ‘just following orders’ argument is to say everyone is restricted by frameworks in which they live and anyone existing within a conflict will do anything to survive. That is not to approve of their actions though, but also not to condemn it without understanding. Major argument in the literature reviews suggest that conflict transformation stresses on rebuilding social structural aspects of the war-affected population and their relationships. The role of NGOs are paramount to view conflict as different from violence, and the shift from negative peace to positive peace has implications on theoretical discussion, practitioners’ views and in the policies of NGOs’ principles and codes of conducts. The next section narrows the literature discussion down to roles of NGOs.

2.4 LITERATURE REVIEW – RELEVANCE FOR NGO ROLES IN TRANSFORMING CONFLICT

From the previous sub-section, the emphasis has been on rebuilding structural damages and broken down relationship war brings. This section explains how far NGOs can play their roles in rebuilding structural damages and broken-down relationship in the post-war stages of recovery. The section explains why NGOs have increasingly gotten involved in peacebuilding activites, and how representative they are in the international, national and local levels to support the local contexts. These explanations are done in consideration to actors’ interests, sets of principles and models of operations NGOs work along with.

My framework of analysis is thereafter arrived at to critically analyse NGOs’ actions in post-war social recovery. Most conceptual and analytical reflections on NGOs involvement in conflict transformation have occurred in the context of empirical studies and yet the roles of NGOs in post-
conflict studies have failed to address structural violence. The locals carry-on with social burden and loose coping mechanisms even when they return to villages of origins. MacFarlane (1998) argues that one dominant pattern in both academic and praxis-oriented contributions have been to contrast a description of the ideal role of an NGO with empirical reality. The empirical reality leaves locals with further social burden and imbalance. Opong (2009) admits that there are gaps in the limited literatures to contextualise NGOs, mostly INGOs who provide local services to the community and how this is often discordant with the worldview and socio-political values of the local people.

According to MacFarlane (1998: 245) the proliferation of NGOs is part and parcel of the pluralist conception of the rooting of democratic governance within a society; to the extent that citizens aggregate on the basis of common interests into effective organisations for the promotion of the latter, this limits the power and flexibility of government. NGOs can strengthen and develop civil society so as to effect democratic governance that may provide oversight over the state. MacFarlane (1998: 245) tends to concur with Lederach’s middle level leadership role of NGOs.

In a World Bank (2006b: 12) report, NGOs have many roles to play in peace processes, aside direct mediation such as bringing issues to the attention of the international public and getting them on to the political agendas; building local constituencies for peace by organising dialogues with civil society leaders and at the grassroots; and working with media and schools. “In addition to their direct effect on public policy, NGOs have an important indirect effect in increasing the awareness of the public at large because of the nature and significance of policy issues before government” (MacFarlane 1998: 245). NGOs can make a contribution in situations in which traditional diplomacy is unable to take an initiative or to proceed further (Simonse et al. 2010: 223).

NGOs do not carry the baggage of government status (MacFarlane 1998: 245). “Another potential strength of NGOs is that they have no formal connection to government, and, generally, an
aversion to military force. This frees them from direct political interest in the outcome of the conflict" (Natsios 2003: 343-344). They can establish contacts with the conflicting parties, initiate and facilitate peace talks, and help the parties to implement an agreement (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 223).

NGOs may have organisational interests in establishing their presence in regions of conflicts although various NGOs deal with various activities, but structurally embedded violence are left for the locals to take the burden. In as far as the content of peace process is concerned, NGOs tend to be “interested in particular outcome, […] because they believe in its inherent desirability” (Zartman and Touval 2007: 442). NGOs’ value orientation has particular outcome too, for example, effect peace agreement that is inclusive and that tackles the root causes of the conflict (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 224). Although various NGOs deal with various activities at different levels, they actually leave structurally embedded social issues to the post-war society.

Several authors cite the chaotic nature of contemporary conflict as a reason why NGOs should be directly involved in peacemaking (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 223). According to Galtung (1990) the chaotic nature of many NGOs is that they still perceive structural and cultural violence only as early warnings of direct violence, not as bad in and by themselves, therefore they rely so much on lessons-learnt from many years of experiences. According to Danielle (2007: 138), “there are potential risks in reclassifying acts of violence” and Vivienne (1996: 59) argues that “exploitation, injustice or inequalities as is believed by Clausewitzians require rational action so as to separate the individual from the community”. Within the two arguments, agreement lies in equating injustices with acts of violence to victims of justice and victims of violence. “Major structural changes will always be necessary conditions for any successful effort as relationships have to be replaced and rebuilt” (Mitchell 2002: 15). Systems that created violence and injustices according to Francis (2002) and Fisher et al. (2000) allows NGOs to support discriminated groups, communities and nations. Lederach (1999) argues that NGOs’ roles are to encourage attitudes of
openness, behaviour of restraint and creativity, most importantly, alter the contradictions/context that brought structural violence in post-conflict social recovery.

Familiar “NGOs with countryside good network of local contacts with the different factions can act as intermediary. They may be better able to get into contact with the different factions” (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 224). Galtung (1990) argues that actions of NGOs should transform hatred, provide social exclusion that activates deprivation of services. Galtung adds that NGOs’ actions should bring down polarisations, bridge the lack of trust, lack of co-operations. His argument bases on the view that people get stuck into their protective positions, social disintegration and social stagnation and may lack creativity and innovations, powerlessness and hopelessness. While the argument could be the basis for social disintegration and social stagnation, NGOs have left an imprint of social burden, parasitism and frustration in Acholiland. Compared to states, NGOs have informational power (being a communication link between parties) and expert power (based on the knowledge and experience) (Aall 2007: 481-6).

Bergman (2000) argues that many changes are in the levels of shifting conflict, reduction and/or increase in numbers of actors, issues getting sucked in and out as people start recovering from past atrocities. NGOs’ typologies has to be developed for the purpose of understanding the levels of actors (Knox and Quirk 2000; Lederach 1995, 1997 and 1999). “NGOs’ actions and activities should address a range of dimensions of micro- to macro-issues, local to global levels, grassroots to elite actors, short-term to long-term timescales” (Miall 2004: 17). According to Simonse, Verkoren and Gerd (2010: 224), since the elites that ruled conflict-ridden countries are often in exile, dead or traumatised, diplomats have lost their traditional counterparts. Peace processes necessarily reflect the confused reality of these conflicts. There has to be “a mixture of de-centralised, flexible adaptable, and multi-pronged efforts loosely orgainsed in the pursuit of common goals” (Simonse, Verkoren and Gerd 2010: 224).
Wong (2006) thinks liberal peace roles of NGOs have to adopt and identify conflict transformation process to diminish the means and motivations for conflict. According to Wong (2006) the goals of liberal peace are to develop and strengthen local institutions so that they can take the lead in their own governance, economic development and security. Local ownership is emphasised essential but, Wong’s liberal peace approach is more rooted on war on terror and re-building collapsed states like in Somalia.

Jeong (2000: 25) maintains that theoretical underpinnings of transforming conflict through enforcing democracy in the liberal sense does not explain how to deal with unacceptable social order, the changing human conditions, an important goal of positive peace. Jeong’s view relates to the argument that NGOs involved in conflict transformation requires to understand the root causes of direct violence and the ways of thinking and acting that perpetuate direct and structural violence (cultural violence) (Barash and Webel 2002:129). The central point here is that, “the philosophies of most NGOs emphasise that grassroots people know best, that solutions need a backing of local communities on the ground and indigenous culture and authority have to be respected” (Simonse, Verkoren and Gerd 2010: 224).

“Efforts of NGOs often help to strengthen the context” (Zartman and Touval 2007: 451) offering indirect and direct service provision. The direct service may include provision of contingency and incentives that include advocacy and fund-raising, and the direct short term responses, contingency and incentives include relief distribution, resettlement “demobilisation and reintegration” (Natsios 2003: 344). NGOs’ cooperations among different NGOs involved may also pose a serious weakness: NGOs proliferation and highly guarded authonomy often leads to competition and contradictory approaches (Ibid.: 342). NGOs may be the only one with operational capabilities in the area (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 225) offering both operational and non-operational functional modes (Salamon 1987 and 1994).
According to Simonse, Verkoren and Gerd (2010: 224) NGOs are needed to implement peace agreement, in which may not warrant an end to NGOs’ roles. NGOs’ roles in rebuilding the once broken down social structure and relationships poses huge challenges.

This section discusses NGOs involvement in and how far they play their roles in post-war peacebuilding at grassroots levels. Within the changing context of the war to peace, most conceptual and analytical studies on NGOs’ involvement have accrued in the context of empirical studies. Further contextualisation following the transformational goals of NGOs, mainly focusing on rebuilding relationships and the social structural dimensions of local service provision to the local population is relevant information to the wider socio-political world view. This is also the subject of the next sub-section 2.5.

2.5 NGO ROLES IN REBUILDING SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS
The extent to which NGOs get involved in rebuilding social structures and relationships was earlier discussed. The discussion locates structuralists’ views on how NGOs create social, political and economic space for recovery after war, and that, that usually happens over time. In the case of rebuilding relationships – meaning mainly reconciliation, NGOs’ ability to create social conditions and realities are paramount when their representative roles include local experiences (see research question 1.2 and 1.2.1). Rebuilding a once broken down social structure and relationships does not only lead to behavioural change but also requires changes in social structures and relationships (Azar and Burton 1986: 47). The perceptions of local population are therefore paramount.

The perceptions can only be completed if the modes and sets of principles NGOs work with include policy, practice and theory (sub-section 2.3.3). Mitchell (2004) believes that scholars and practitioners alike are faced with, not only when but also how to act to transform social structures and the once broken relationships. Literatures especially from Forrester (2003) warn that transforming a once broken-down social structures and rebuilding relationships require
discernment and wisdom. As was already mentioned before, Vayrynen (1991: 4-7) and Miall (2004: 9-10) emphasise that the conflict context, social structure, actor, conflict issue and personal/elite cannot be neglected.

Rebuilding the once destroyed social structures in a violent conflict in the short-term through to the long-term (Lederach 1999) has to realise that conflict does not disappear only because a peace agreement has been signed. Post accord reconstruction must consider human needs (Azar and Burton 1986: 47). Galtung’s (1997) concept recapitulating on structural violence and according to Azar and Burton (1986) must consider interests of politically established structures which enabled the full development of individuals and the groups’ belonging (Azar and Burton, 1986: 49). The Refugee Law Project ([RLP] 2004: 3) publications argue that it calls for provision of sufficient assurance of safety, security, law and order to allow people displaced by conflict to return to their homes and livelihoods. It also requires a holistic and multifaceted process (Lederach 1999) of conflict transformation to engage with actors.

Third-party peace practitioners should act as enabler or facilitator in building peace constituencies (Garcia 2006). NGOs and other agencies should be considering timely interventions, respect for cultural context, patience and persistence and a comprehensive understanding of the conflict (Vayrynen 1994). Azar and Burton (1986) argue that individuals could be socialised and coerced, that differentiates between needs and interests, that is between values that are not negotiable and interests that can be traded be clearly understood. It is impossible to socialise the individual over any length of time in its behaviours that runs counter to the pursuit of security, identity and other aspects of development (Azar and Burton 1986: 51).

Lerderach (2000), Galtung (1996), Azar and Burton (1986: 51) argue that post-war social recovery tend to stress more on rebuilding broken social structure and rebuilding relationships. Meeting basic human needs involving NGOs and agencies as enabler and facilitator in a multi-faceted
process has to avoid classical thinking that leads to some form of Utopianism (Azar and Burton 1986: 51). The next two sub-sections focus on rebuilding social structure and relationships.

### 2.5.1 REBUILDING BROKEN-DOWN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

How far NGOs are involved in post-war recovery relates to the need to rebuild a once broken-down social structure by war. According to Gawerc (2006), NGOs need to develop systems and structures that respond to the full range of psycho-political and socio-economic communal needs. This literature view bases on Galtung’s views contained in the ABC-Triangle and how they are inter-linked. Both Galtung (1996) and Lederach (1999: 74) agree that transforming structural dimensions of war must highlight the underlying causes of conflict, and the ways in which social structures, organisations, and institutions were built, sustained vulnerability and dependency. They both stress the importance of analysing the social conditions that caused conflict and the ways conflict transformation affected social structural changes in the existing social, political and economic institution.

According to Azar and Burton (1986) structures that are decentralised and rely on functional cooperation rather than elite power are the logical extension of the trends that are part of social evolution. The functional cooperation may focus on the cultural transformation of violent conflict to create reconciliation, systems and structures that needs to be developed. On reconciliation, Abu-Nimer (2006) suggests that reconciliation only succeed if it is not divorced from structural arrangements.

Rebuilding realtionships for reconciliation (subsection 2.5.2) without addressing physical reconstruction, infrastructural elements and other economic needs will be resented (Abu-Nimer, cited Gawerc 2006: 459). Mitchell (1981), Fisher and Ury (1992) argue that these linkages help transform oppressive relationships with the help of third party outsider intermediaries and insider involvement so as to confront and prevent violence to overcome exploitation, discrimination, exclusion and oppression. The view is widely supported by Curl (1996), Lederach (1999), Francis
(2002) and Galtung (1995). Their views are consistent with transforming a once broken down social structure.

Key authors like Specht (2008: 6), Francis (2002) and Miall (2002 and 2003) all agree that constructive changes are necessary in the conflict context to include the society in conflict, the wider international and regional level in the short, medium and long term. It is the long-term goal of transformation that is validating and builds on people and resources within the setting (Lederach 1995 and 1999). Fisher et al. (2000) include the wider social and political sources of conflict to be transformed into positive social and political changes.

Dijik (2009: 12) argues that conflict transformation is comprehensive enough to address the underlying structures of a conflict, relating policy and practice to the different peacebuilding approaches and what lessons that can be learnt from analysis. Adding policy discussion, Dijik (2009) concurs with Galtung (1999) on the positive peace view to bringing changes in the economic and institutional structures that generated conflict and institutional policy responses.

Most scholars and practitioners have come to agree that issues of identity, security, and recognition – meeting basic human needs are critical (Postel 2003). Postel (2003) adds that they are one of the important issues that must be dealt with if an intractable conflict is to be transformed. She argues that ignoring the underlying needs and just negotiating the interests may at times lead to a short-term settlement, but it rarely will lead to long-term resolution.

Max-Neef et al. (1991) developed a 36-cell matrix that projected onto the Human Needs and Human-Scale Development (HN&HSD) report (Manfred A. Max-Neef with Elizalde, Hopenhayn 1991). The “Human Scale Development” sees condition of being human to be very few, finite and are possible to classify. This is distinct from the conventional notion of economic “wants” that are infinite and insatiable (Max-Neef et al. 1986).

Fundamental needs are common and constant throughout cultures (Max-Neef et al. 1989: 7-80). Maslow’s self-actualization needs reflects on humankinds’ desire to use every gift and ability to
achieve all that they are capable of, imagining that this will bring happiness and fulfilment. However, Max-Neef’s summary in Appendix B-5.1 is important in that human needs are understood as a system, arguing that they are interrelated and interactive (Max-Neef et al. 1989: 7-80). In this system, there is no hierarchy of needs, apart from the basic need for subsistence or survival as postulated by Maslow; rather, simultaneity, complementarities and trade-offs are features of the process of needs satisfaction (Max-Neef et al. 1989: 7-80).

Burton (1997) raises concerns on the adversarial institutions of society leadership, legislatures, the work place, the legal system and the international relations system has to resolve basic human needs problems. In Burton’s (1997) view, strategic leaders from the government, civil service, military and faith groups, middle level leaders maybe from professions such as head teachers, NGOs and traditional societal structures (chiefs) and grassroots communities such as IDP camp leaders, village elders are mostly hierarchically located necessary leaders beyond any immediate conflict (Burton 1997).

Practitioners and partners or beneficiaries particularly NGOs’ aims and objectives and their respective fields of academic viewpoints have considered socio-economic resource categories of action, responsibility and commitment, and socio-cultural resources (Lederach 1999: 87-98). Similarly, skills, operating frameworks and training manuals (Fisher et al. 2000), strict codes of conducts (International Alert 1998) based on NGOs’ principles, the Uganda NGO-Policies (2008) and the different knowledge are requirements for the transformation of conflict.

The argument above tends to support the structuralists viewpoints who prescribe NGOs’ activities. Galtung (1999) argues that structure is a pattern of interaction whereby people are enacting roles without reflecting on what they do because “everybody does it” (in social space), and “we always did it that way” (over time).

NGOs’ responses and interventions to rebuild broken social structure amongst conflict-affected communities can be mainly viewed from their deliberate interventions. Some structuralist NGOs
whose responses to transforming conflicts provide insights into underlying causes and social conditions that create and foster violent expressions of conflict. Lederach (2003) adds that such NGOs openly promote non-violent mechanisms that reduce adversaries, minimise and ultimately eliminate violence, and foster structures that meet basic human needs (substantive justice) and maximise participation of people in decisions that affect them (procedural justice).

2.5.2 REBUILDING BROKEN-DOWN RELATIONSHIPS

The previous sub-section is directly linked to rebuilding a once-socially broken down relationship. The mechanisms for rebuilding social relations in post-war recovery focus primarily on reconciliation between antagonists (Lederach 1999: 23-35). Social relations between individuals, groups, NGOs and Governments are a part of relational goal of transforming impacts of conflict. Rebuilding a once-broken relation and that which looks at the ways in which peaceful means to a once structurally violent conflict was created requires that NGOs be institutionalised.

The particular focus of this research is on NGOs role who tend to create catalyst for reconciliation in post-war social recovery. The problems associated with some of these NGOs who sometimes regard themselves unconsciously as structuralist, assume that everyone believes in the same thing (human rights) and that this is unpolitical. This is a huge assumption and NGOs eventually become politicised.

Relationship building is the basis for both conflict and its long-term solution but, as well, requires mechanisms that engage the sides of conflict with each other as humans-in-relationships (Lederach 1999: 35). According to Lederarch (1999: 29) contemporary conflicts need to conceptualise reconciliation based on truth, mercy, peace and justice.

Truth is the longing for acknowledgement of wrong and validation of painful loss and experiences, but it is coupled with Mercy, which articulates the need for acceptance, letting go, and a new beginning. Justice represents the search for individual and group rights for social restructing,
and for restitution, but it is also linked with peace, which has to underscore the need for interdependence, well-being, and security (Lederach 1999: 29).

Lederach (1999) stresses on the patterns of how people perceive themselves, one another, and the conflict itself, and in their hopes for their future relationship: how close or distant, how interdependent, how reactive or proactive a role to play, what the other party want. For him, reconciliation involves the creation of “social space” (Galtung 1999), where both truth and forgiveness are validated and joined together, rather than being forced into an encounter in which one must win out over the other or envisioned as fragmented and separated parts.

Confirming the structuralist viewpoint, Lederach (1999) observes reconciliation as both a focus and a locus built of paradoxes and yet must be proactive in seeking to create an encounter where people can focus on their perceptions, feelings, and experiences with one another, with the goal of creating new perceptions and new shared experience.

The roles of NGOs and Governments are to facilitate relationship building with innovative ways so as to create “time and space”, within various levels of the affected population, to address, integrate, and embrace the painful past and the neccessay shared furture as a means of dealing with the present (Lederach 1999: 35). In this way, reconciliation is seen as a process of encounter and as a social space (Lederach 1999: 29) and (Galtung 1999).

On Justice, Buckley-Zistel (2003: 121) empahsises that if conflict is about tangible issues, it can be resolved through distribution that is more equal or sharing. However, this notion of justice does not take into account that conflicts are not only about issues, but also about relations between parties. Lederach (1999) refers to the general transformational goal on relational patterns of communication and interaction to look beyond the tension around visible issues based on the underlying changes produced by the conflict.

This section (2.5) discusses about rebuilding of social structure and relationships while placing human needs requirement in the centre. In particular, sub-section 2.4 teased out relevant
literatures about peacebuilding and conflict transformation to the specific roles of NGOs and human needs discussions. Rebuilding of relationships in sub-section 2.5.2 argues that reconciliation and its elements of truth, justice, mercy and peace are key mechanisms for NGOs roles to deploy.

The literature discussions is narrowed down to Lederach’s (1999) peacebuilding framework so as to critically follow the levels of actors and their intervention patterns and NGOs’ typologies (2.5.2). Together with Miall’s (1999: 203) post-settlement peacebuilding framework, NGOs’ categorisations and their typologies in the involvement to rebuild post-war recovering society provides a framework of analysis in this study. These are presented in the next section.

2.6 FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

My peacebuilding framework of analysis is arrived at from the literature discussions, and its relevance to NGOs’ roles in sub-sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. The different patterns of interventions actors undertake to build peace at various levels of post-war recovering populations is discussed. John Paul Lederach’s peacebuilding framework is deployed as one of the bases for analysing NGOs’ typologies with the purpose of understanding the levels of actors (Knox and Quirk 2000; Lederach 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001).

Lederach believes that there are three levels of actors in peace-building process, and each level of actors engage in different peace-building tasks. Figure 2.5.1 above presents Lederach’s peacebuilding model based on the three levels. It shows the top level leadership to include military, religious and political leaders who have high visibility. The mediating roles of NGOs can also be based on personality and on high level negotiators who arrange ceasefires. Top level leadership is important in getting the middle level leaders to reach agreement and also in building confidence that the conflict is over. The middle range level leadership includes ethnic and religious leaders, leaders of humanitarian NGOs, academics and intellectuals and other respected leaders. The middle range leaders provide problem-solving workshops, training in conflict resolution, peace
commission, and insider-partial teams. Finally, the bottom-grassroot level leadership is comprised of the grassroots leaders, such as local leaders, leaders of local indigenous NGOs, community developers and local health officials.

FIGURE 2.5.1: LEDERACH'S PEACE BUILDING MODEL

These leaders focus on local peace commissions, grassroots training, prejudice reduction and psycho-social work in post-war trauma. Those grassroots leaders at the bottom of the pyramid are many, while leaders higher up in the pyramid are fewer, despite the fact that their actions become
increasingly more visible. Top leaders can have direct links at the grassroots especially where opinion and religious leaders and elders are organised and stronger.

Revisiting sections 2.3 and 2.4, Lederach (1999) argues that the most effective peace-building is the kind that stresses reconciliation between parties in conflict and eventual transformation of their attitudes and institutions. He argues that true peacebuilding is the social, economic, sociopsychological, and spiritual changes in lives of the people involved. Lederach’s model is very helpful in distinguishing which activities need to take place at the different levels of action (see subsections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2).

However, Lederach does not thoroughly discuss particular types of organisations and leaders are better suited to activities within each of the levels. Another drawback with Lederach’s model is that it applies specifically to periods of intensive conflict and the post-conflict stages, but fails to discuss the prevention of conflict into a relapse into renewed war. Some of these criticisms come from positivists who tend to employ linear and monicausal approach to conflict interventions, and favour an approach which reflects that, every intervention becomes itself part of a conflict system that needs to be analysed and planned accordingly (Bloomfield and Schmelzle 2006: 6). In subsection 2.3.1 conflict and violence are delineated, but particular levels and forms of conflict and violence (Ross 1993: 35 and Vivienne 1996: 60-61) are not explained by Lederach especially at the outbreak of any particular incident of violence or where conflict needs to direct attention to forces which makes a society more or less prone than another.

Vivienne (1996) argues that these limitations lie within the structuralist approach to developing an understanding of violent conflict by not having provided an ontological conception of social structure and its relation to social action (Vivienne 1996). It fails to account for primacy of some interests over others and the process through which structurally defined interests develop. Social transformation underlies structural and context specific conflicts, coupled with many invisible actors, with little empirical research in the post-war social recovery. The problems are associated
with the links between and within the actors’ levels, the coordination and allocation of resource on “how-to-do-it”. This was discussed is based on the implication of policy to practice and theory in subsection 2.3.3.

To resolve these drawbacks, Miall’s post-settlement peacebuilding framework (2.4.2) considers Galtung’s (1958 and 1969) three approaches. First it works to reduce the manifested violent conflict through the intervention of military forces in an interpository role; secondly, peacemaking which is directed at reconciling political and strategic attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation at elite level; and thirdly, peacebuilding which addresses the practical implementation of peace through socio-economic reconstruction and development (Galtung 1975: 282-304) in (Miall et al., 1999: 187).

Miall’s (1999) framework also includes Lederach’s (1999) characterisation of peacebuilding model to address the underlying structural, relational and cultural roots of conflict (Ibid.). Miall (1999) argues that the cessation of “direct” violence – negative peace and the removal of “structural” and “cultural” violence developed by Galtung (1990) are important for the post-settlement peacebuilding framework.

Miall et al. (1999: 188) framework is made up of the “negative” task of preventing a relapse into overt violence and the “positive” tasks of aiding national recovery and expediting the eventual removal of the underlying causes of internal war. It addresses strategic form of post-settlement peacbuilding actions within the scope of short, medium and long term transformation (Miall et al. 1999: 203).

The framework presents a reconstruction of the scope of transformation along the military/security, political/constitutional, economic/social, psychosocial and internal methods of interventions. The interim/short and medium terms require responsive and contingency task to prevent a relapse into war. The long term structural and institutional transformation requires creating a self-sustaining peace (Miall et al. 1999: 201-203).
The military/security make-up considers the usual pattern of cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of rival regular and irregular forces, and the reconstruction of the remainder into a national army and civil police force (Miall et al. 1999: 202). The political/constitutional method prescribes power-sharing arrangements, free and fair national/local elections, liberal democracy and independent judiciary (Ibid.: 202).

The economic/social make-up underpin conditionalities that may be undertaken to minimise on cutbacks on peace process, humanitarian aid, the widened social, economic and structural inequalities that was created by war, strengthening peace-oriented policies and local empowerment for social justice by NGOs and having an integrated post-war social transformation (Ibid.: 202).

The psyco/social make-up underpins conditionalities of managing peace and justice. These include overcoming distrust, healing, dealing with negative peace (the absence of violence) via justice (truth, acknowledgement, reparation, rehabilitation, punishment and pardon) towards long-term reconciliation (positive peace) (Ibid.: 209).
The international dimension is directed towards the culturally sensitive support against peace interference or process that may be neglected, transference to local control, integration into cooperative and equitable regional and global structures, advocacy and transformation. Miall et al. (1999: 156-157) argues that it requires transformation regionally and/or internationally. Clearly, what happens in one country is to some extent dependent on what happens with the neighbours. Neighbouring countries may contribute to a civil war directly by supplying their own troops,
allowing bases for warring parties, expressing political support or indirectly by not being capable to control their own borders (Wallenstein 2006: 13).

Gawerc (2006: 435-478) argues that there is unfortunately no order of priority of activities. She adds that all must be done at once and at the same time, and the steps kept apace of each other as the process moves along, rather than a series of discrete steps taken one step at a time. Lederach and Maiese (2003) argue that Miall’s framework can be applicable by NGOs outlining several core practices that are useful in addressing social conflict from a transformational approach.

These includes developing a capacity to see presenting issues as a window; the capacity to recognise what sorts of processes and time frames may be needed to address the different kinds of change; the capacity to reframe conflict that enables NGOs to more clearly identify goals and seek innovative options for action; develop a capacity to make complexity a friend, not a foe; and, develop a capacity to hear and engage the voice of identity and relationship. Using Miall’s framework, the transformation scope and the methods that include a typology of NGOs’ actions and activities are shown in sub-section 1.6.

2.6.1 CATEGORISATION AND TYPOLOGY OF NGOS ACTIVITIES

NGOs categorisation mentioned in sub-section (1.6) can be narrowed down to their operational and non-operational modes (Salamon 1994). Needless to go through NGOs’ categories again, the typology of NGOs’ activities in figure 2.6.2 on page 46 suggests that NGOs perform a variety of services and actions in all stages of conflict. Many NGOs perform several different functions. Because of the varied nature of NGOs’ activities, NGOs can be hard to classify and categorise by function (Nesbet, 2003). However, NGOs’ activities can be grouped into several different categories. Figure 2.6.3 on page 50 presents a typology of NGOs’ activities with particular involvement of NGOs.
As seen in (Figure 2.6.1 on page 44) Miall’s framework makes distinctions in the transformation scope column showing the interim/short term and systemic long-term, and the method relating to indirect and direct service provision to IDPs-returnees. During the interim and short term transformation scope, NGOs engage in activities relating to direct/indirect service provision to IDPs-returnees. The short term/interim indirect responses, contingency and incentives include advocacy and fund-raising, and the direct short-term responses, contingency and incentives include relief distribution and camp demolition.

**FIGURE 2.6.2: TYPOLOGY OF NGO ACTIVITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scope of Transformation</th>
<th>Activities Relating to Indirect Service provision to IDPs: Advocacy, Policy and Fund-Raising</th>
<th>Activities Relating to Direct Service Provision to IDPs: Relief, Camp Demolition, Empowerment and Transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interim / Short to Medium Term - Responsive, Contingency and Incentives</td>
<td>ADVOCACY</td>
<td>RELIEF AID DISTRIBUTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic and Long-Term Structural and Institutional</td>
<td>POLICY and FUND-RAISING</td>
<td>EMPOWERMENT / TRANSFORMATION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

Based on the reviewed literature, humanitarian NGOs undertake peacebuilding activities based on the tradition of meeting basic human needs (saving lives through humanitarian relief and aid distribution). United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR 2004) points out that humanitarian NGOs act to secure social conditions aimed at maintaining life, livelihood and dignity, access to social services, security, and to ensure absence of discrimination and community level dispute. Buckley-Zistel (2008) confirms that key ideas and assumptions to transforming the deep-rooted conflict is to satisfy basic human needs.
Within the systemic and long term transformation scope, the activities relating to direct service provision to IDPs include structural and institutional transformation while, activities relating to indirect service provision to IDPs include empowerment that has a broader transformation goal. These two types of NGOs’ methods could easily be termed as operational and non-operational.

System’s thinkers like Dijik (2009: 13-14) argues that better policy and practice are required (subsection 2.3.3), but also found few evidence on how to coordinate policy instruments that sustain NGOs who transform violent conflicts even when a participatory context-based approach is taken. The systemic traditions have been arguing that each conflict is embedded in a wider system that contributes to invisible root causes, influences process and dynamics for how it plays out. For the functioning role of NGOs, a collection of policy deployment mechanism to mobilise post-war societies (Boekhlike 2009:15) has to bear similar characteristics especially in the influencing and governing of social process (Ringeling and Van Nispen 1998:14). The systemic traditions pose problem with NGOs’ practices that still need exchanges of knowledge, sharing of experience, time, support to staff and partner organisation and considerations to be “both an art and science” (South Research c.s. 2008: 29).

Literature confirms in figure (2.6.2) four main kinds of NGOs’ actions in transforming conflict. The first kind is advocacy. Under this type of action would be early warnings from NGOs when conflict is likely to erupt, pressuring the international community to become involved in conflicts, attracting media attention to expose violent conflicts, and encouraging warring parties to engage in peace talks (Nesbet 2003). According to Simon et al. (2000) advocacy works even in a post-war recovery since it [post-war] issues can also act as triggers to the relapse in fresher wars. This arguments is also linked to the cause of conflicts’ arguments in chapter five.

Paffenholz (2003a and 2009) argues that approaches that combine in-country peacebuilding with peacebuilding advocacy at the international level can be used to analyse the validity of conflict transformation. He argues that conflict transformation dimensions may exist within the shifting
focus from the international to local actors, attracting more scholars/practitioners and the international peacebuilding NGO communities, yet has not been subject to any fundamental critique for a while (Paffenholz 2009: 3). Paffenholz (2003a) concurs with Lederach (1997) that theory and practice within the regional and local context has to adopt a community-based bottom-up peacebuilding, but also with the focus on the inside-out mid-level approach focusing on grassroots perspectives.

The second kind of NGOs’ action is policy work which is linked to the previous discussion, but one that is more systemic and preventive in nature. This includes general lobbying for human rights or women’s and children’s rights. It also includes more lobbying of governments to change local institutions, to democratise and to give funding for NGO services. Under this rubric, NGOs can carry out research on the root causes of conflict and about how to re-order social institutions to mitigate and prevent conflict. The third kind of action is the provision of relief and humanitarian aid. The activities in this category include giving food and medical services to the affected populations and caring for displaced persons (Nesbet 2003).

The systemic action of NGOs in empowerment/transformation bases on providing services to help change the attitudes and institutions of people involved in conflict as a means of preventing further occurrences of conflict. Activities that would fall into this category are trauma counseling, spiritual healing, reforming local institutions to span groups in conflict, rebuilding the local economy, seeking justice and retribution, and building local capacities. NGOs working with the psychosocial views on civil wars still emphasise on the material conditions of social life that constrains the development of human potential and therefore causing conflict. The basis for this argument is that actors have attitudes in conflicts that are cognitive and emotional, behaviours that can generate violence and pacifisms (Galtung 1999).

NGOs are both social and political actors. Such linkages make NGO representative roles closer to the state, government, policies, public administration, civil-military relations, political parties,
political leaders than the the people in need. NGOs must also relate to leaders, political processes and state institutions (Fisher et al. 2000). Their social tendencies tend to focus on “the people” and to explore how conflict emerges from and contributes to the development, organisation and functioning of communities and the wider societies.

Attention can now turn to addressing which types of NGOs are performing these activities. Figure 2.6.3 focuses on the typology but with particular focus on four types of NGOs involvement.

**FIGURE 2.6.3: TYPOLOGY OF NGO ACTIVITIES – INVOLVEMENT OF NGOS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Activities Relating to Indirect Service provision to IDPs: Advocacy, Policy and Fund-Raising</th>
<th>Activities Relating to Direct Service Provision to IDPs: Relief, Camp Demolition, Empowerment and Transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Transformation</td>
<td><strong>ADVOCACY</strong></td>
<td><strong>RELIEF AID DISTRIBUTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interim / Short to Medium Term</strong></td>
<td>NGOs Involved:</td>
<td>NGOs Involved:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• INGOs</td>
<td>• INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Advocacy Intermediary NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Activity: Top, Middle &amp; Grassroots</td>
<td></td>
<td>Level of Activity: Grassroots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Systemic and Long-Term</strong></td>
<td><strong>POLICY and FUND-RAISING</strong></td>
<td><strong>EMPOWERMENT / TRANSFORMATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural and Institutional</strong></td>
<td>NGOs Involved:</td>
<td>NGOs Involved:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• INGOs</td>
<td>• INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Advocacy Intermediary NGOs</td>
<td>• Advocacy Intermediary NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Service Intermediary NGOs</td>
<td>• Grassroots NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Activity: Top, Middle &amp; Grassroots</td>
<td>Level of Activity: Grassroots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the above figure 2.6.3, INGOs tend to be involved in all types of activities. Intermediary NGOs are more likely to be involved in responsive, contingency and incentive related activities focusing on indirect service provision to IDPs, such as advocacy and policy work. Carroll (1992) adds that other two types of intermediary NGOs are Grassroots Support organisations (GSOs) and
Membership Support Organisations (MSOs). GSOs can provide services to grassroots organisations and individuals and serve as links, or intermediaries, between grassroots-level and high-level government agencies or donors. GSOs are similar to MSOs except their members are grassroots and provide services directly to the communities. Grassroots organisations are most likely to be involved in empowerment and transformation activities.

Generally, intermediary NGOs can be involved in responsive, contingency and incentive activities relating to indirect service provision to IDPs’ activities, but they also do empowerment work at the grassroots-level. With the background information about NGOs and the functions they perform, it is time to turn attention to the typology of NGOs’ involvement in conflict transformation.

### 2.6.2 TYPOLOGY OF NGOS ROLES IN PEACEBUILDING

The typology of NGOs’ involvement in peacebuilding builds on four important elements as was discussed above. Levels of NGOs’ activities in Lederach’s model are employed and Miall’s strategic framework completes the analytical framework. Drawing from NGO literatures, the types of NGOs involved and the activities they engage in to support post-war social recovery shows which organisations are involved in which activities at the different levels during recovery. Before discussing the typology, it is important to note that the organisations and activities are directly linked to the analysis.

The same organisations involved in conflict resolution may be performing other activities relating to development, providing social services, or other activities at any point before, during, and after the conflict. The typology is broken down by the make-up of activities relating to indirect and direct services provided to IDPs. In the boxes are the various activities taking place at that particular level of activity and make-up of activities during the transformation, along with the organisations performing those functions.
The typology of NGOs’ involvement according to (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994) follows patterns of interactions that can change with the understanding of their environment and the current rules-in-use. NGOs can influence the incentive structures surrounding disputes and conflict as well as how NGOs themselves are embedded in incentive structures that in turn affect their behaviors. We have seen that NGOs at different levels of activities they do, are better suited to altering given conflict incentive structures. Because NGOs are embedded in different environments and have different participants and resources, their involvement in conflict resolution should mirror those differences.

Although literatures have discussed the actors that need to be involved in post-war recovery and has given warnings about the involvement of external actors (such as NGOs), sometimes, there are no comprehensive delineation of which NGOs should be involved in different activities associated with conflict resolution (Nesbet 2003). The biggest issues about NGOs who intervene in peacebuilding centers on the large INGOs who could also be involved. INGOs are powerful and prolific actors in conflict resolution, although many of their actions have unintended consequences and can be a subject of controversy. The first issue is that of civil society. Many authors claim that building a strong grassroots civil society is vital for resolving conflict and reducing tensions in societies.

However, Stewart (2002a, 2002b and 2000) argues that the sheer presence of NGOs does not mean that civil society is growing or improved. According to Stewart (2002a, 2002b and 2000) many donors and organisations mistakenly feel that the best way to promote democratisation is through promoting civil society and that the confluence of NGOs is equivalent to strengthening civil society. He advocates about determining the specific factors that can contribute to local civil society followed by democratisation. This is closely linked with the middle range leadership role mentioned before.
Because the presence of NGOs do not indicate civil society, others advocate that outsider NGOs, such as INGOs need to focus more on capacity-building and strengthening local grassroots organisations (and NGOs) that are truly indicative of local civil society (Nesbet 2003). International NGOs should be more involved in supportive roles rather than direct provision of services, meaning that they should identify and strengthen local indigenous institutions and knowledge systems (Edward and Hulme 1996). Lewis (2006) argues that NGOs need to think more about good governance and the relationship between its agenda with donor control in Africa.

Another issue is that while INGOs do try to work through local organisations and NGOs, they often do so in the wrong ways. For instance, NGOs and donors can smother local grassroots organisations with too much money and attention and it is difficult for them to cope with the rapid growth and role expansion (Carlson, Jerker et al. 1990). Grassroots organisations that function well in their own limited sphere and purpose might not thrive with too many resources and projects to manage. Thoughtful development of INGO programs can lead to improved civil society, but care must be taken to distinguish between the proliferation of NGOs who talk about conflict resolution and the development of true civil society that aids in the conflict transformation process (Nesbet 2003).

Accroding to Marshall (2000) one thing that many authors agree on is that INGOs should foster more partnerships and collaboration among NGOs of all types. Marshall (2000) urges that NGOs build partnerships and collaborative networks, lobby for political involvement, and encourage more funding and support to help grassroots women’s organisations. INGOs are in a good position to sponsor collaborative networks, and these networks can be instrumental in conflict resolution. Referring back to Lederach’s peacebuilding model, the actions at each of the three levels of the pyramid are necessary for true peacebuilding. He believes that one of the major faults of current peacebuilding efforts is the lack of coordination of actions within and among the three levels—what he calls horizontal and vertical integration. Horizontal integration entails leaders within the
same level developing relationships with each other and coordinating their efforts. Vertical integration requires that leaders cultivate relationships with people at different levels. By fostering collaborations and partnerships, INGOs can aid horizontal integration. INGOs are also in a good position to create more vertical integration because of their activities and connections in each level of the pyramid (Ledearch 1999 and 2000).

Another issue surrounding INGOs’ involvement is the state and local government relations. According to Gary (1996) INGOs are susceptible to being manipulated by local governments or other major parties in conflict, and they can inadvertently (or purposefully) weaken local governing institutions. Gary (1996) argues that international donors are trying to undermine state governments in Africa from below by increasing NGOs’ funding and from above by a loss of legitimacy and sovereignty (through World Bank and IMF policies) (Gary 1996). As this African state is being weakened, Gary believes that it can sometimes co-opt and control these NGOs to its own purposes as a consequence of their battling together for the same resources. As a result, Gary (1996) believes that local African NGOs might not be as independent as claimed.

Concerning the role of NGOs and the state in agricultural development in Africa, Puplampu and Tettey (2000) raise similar concerns specifically about increasing globalisation forces that are conditioning the state and NGOs. The heightened competition between the state and NGOs for resources makes it so that INGOs are increasingly being substituted for good local policies (Puplampu and Tettey 2000). According to Terry (2002) another aspect of INGOs’ activities that can be manipulated is aid to IDPs and refugees. Terry (2002) discusses the paradoxes of the humanitarian refugee situations. The first paradox is that of protection - that refugee camps are often not fully de-militarised and thus become targets for violent action. Humanitarian aid can also be manipulated by factions to bestow legitimacy on their cause and to control the local population. Refugee camps can also involuntarily feed into the war economy by creating a space for other groups to make a profit off of the displaced persons or through providing services and resources.
to the groups providing aid. Terry (2002) argues that these groups have little incentive to see the conflict end because it will dry up their own sources of revenue.

Manipulation is a huge problem for several reasons. It can add to the incentives surrounding the conflict and inadvertently perpetuate the conflict, and it can also jeopardise the organisations’ central missions through a loss of neutrality. Rieff (2002) also points out the dangers of humanitarian aid and how numerous large, international aid agencies are succumbing to the dilemmas of aid and forsaking their neutrality and independence by lobbying governments and the UN to take action on human rights issues (Rieff 2002). This jeopardises these organisations’ free access to all victims because they are no longer seen as neutral participators, and it also opens them up to be manipulated by world leaders and governments to serve their own political purposes.

Even more alarming is when NGOs become more and more politicised. In Sudan, NGOs with clear political agendas have been proliferating and that can hinder conflict resolution and entangle the NGOs in the conflict (Riehl 2001). NGOs have strong incentives to get involved politically because the political situation affects their ability to make headway with conflict resolution. Although giving aid appears to be a benign and benevolent activity, aid can inadvertently perpetuate patterns of conflict. Anderson (1999) argues that international humanitarian aid can negatively affect conflict in two main ways - it can either feed into tensions between groups or it can weaken existing connections between the groups (Anderson 1999). An example of this would be targeting the aid to a particular group of people - ethnic, religious, or some other group. If this group receives aid and another group with whom they have tensions doesn’t receive aid, it can serve to reinforce those divisions. Anderson (1999) thinks humanitarian aid needs to be given in a thoughtful way, including an analysis of the causes of the conflict and how existing institutions and norms either feed into the conflict or serve to mitigate it. These organisations need to be careful
that any resulting aid will strengthen local capacities for peace and not serve to strengthen existing tensions and divisions.

According to Nesbet (2003) INGOs are the largest sources of controversy when it comes to NGOs’ involvement in conflict resolution. Referring back to Figure 2.6.2, the most dangerous thing for NGOs is when they try to engage in activities relating to both direct/indirect service provisions to IDPs. For instance, trying to combine relief and advocacy can lead to jeopardising the neutrality that is so vital in relief work. Even combining policy work and empowerment /transformation activities can be difficult because then NGOs might be looked on as taking sides as well. Referring to Figure 2.6.3, we see that INGOs are most likely to try to cross this divide - ergo the controversy surrounding INGO activities. Advocacy intermediary organisations might be crossing the divide as well, but the evidence isn’t nearly as strong.

The typology of NGOs’ involvement in post-war social recovery is summarised based on the periods of recovery; While IDPs were staying in camps (responsive on contingency), during the return of IDPs (responsive on incentives) and after their return (transformation of institutions and social authority). The level of NGOs’ activities as we have seen above vary. This is indicated in figure 2.6.4 below.
**FIGURE 2.6.4: TYPOLOGY OF NGO INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION: POST-WAR SOCIAL RECOVERY PERIODS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods of Recovery</th>
<th>Level of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>While in IDPs Camps</td>
<td>Top Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsive on Contingency</td>
<td>ADVOCACY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• INGOs</td>
<td>Middle Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During Return to Villages of Origins</td>
<td>ADVOCACY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsive on Incentives</td>
<td>• INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• INGOs</td>
<td>Grassroots Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• INGOs</td>
<td>RELIEF AID DISTRIBUTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advocacy Intermediary NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Villages of Origins</td>
<td>POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation / institutional and social authority</td>
<td>• INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• INGOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Advocacy Intermediary NGOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• INGOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grassroots Level</td>
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<td></td>
<td>RELIEF/ AID DISTRIBUTION</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• INGOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Grassroots Organisations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Advocacy Intermediary NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Service Intermediary NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author

**Period One: While Returnees are in IDPs Camps (Short term-Responsiveness on Contingency)**

During this stage, the primary work of NGOs is advocacy. Although many of these NGOs are providing services or performing other functions, these functions aren't usually directly connected to conflict resolution at this point. The main task at this point is that NGOs, especially the large INGOs, engage in advocacy through observing the local populace and the relations among various religious, ethnic, or political groups. Through this monitoring, NGOs are often aware of what is going on. It is posited that because NGOs work with local populations at the grassroots level, they are in a good position to warning national and international leaders before widespread
violent conflict breaks out (Miall 1999: 200). It often takes the larger INGOs with their resources and international legitimacy to serve as effective advocates to get the international community involved in the conflict before it becomes uncontrollable.

**Period Two: During Return of IDPs (Medium - Responsiveness on incentives)**

Before return of IDPs, NGOs begin to get involved in earnest. At the top leadership level, INGOs are still engaged in advocacy - with more favour and with more evidence to support their claims. At this point, the INGOs often begin more extensive use of the media to report on violence and human rights abuses being committed as a means of stirring the international community to action. More advocacy work also begins to take place on the middle level during this stage. This type of advocacy work is usually done by INGOs and advocacy intermediary NGOs who encourage leaders to engage in peace talks and to initiate ceasefires.

The biggest change during this period is that the conflict has usually reduced to the point that there are severe problems with the return of displaced persons, food shortages, extreme medical needs, and other major issues as part of peace dividends. The relief and humanitarian NGOs that get involved with providing food, medical services, and refugee camp services to those who are in need is reduced. The reduction hits the grassroots level most, since this is where these items were needed the most. Doctors Without Borders provide medical services in refugee camps like in Rwanda or Somalia (Terry, 2002) leaves the area first. In fact, the literature on INGOs is replete with examples of large, international organisations providing relief and humanitarian services to those involved in conflict.

**Period Three: After Return to Villages of Origins (Long Term - Rebuilding of Lineage-based social authority and in the relational and socio-economic well-being)**

In this stage, the conflict has died down, but tensions still remain within the society. It is this environment that NGOs can have a huge impact. Their most important actions take place at the grassroots level where they engage in empowering the people and helping them to transform their
attitudes and institutions in order to help reduce future tensions and prevent further violent conflict. INGOs, service intermediary organisations, and especially grassroots organisations are involved in empowerment and transformation activities.

In Somalia, women grassroots organisations have been instrumental in initiating interclan dialogue and getting clan leaders to engage in peace discussions (Marshall 2000). In Nigeria, USAID/OTI worked as a third-party intervener to encourage media campaigns to promote peaceful living as well as supporting workshops about peace and bringing people from different groups into discussions (Albert 2001). In Burundi, the International Committee of the Red Cross studied local traditions and folklore and met with local social and political leaders to develop extensive media campaigns promoting peace - especially through local playwrights and artists (Anderson 1999).

As has been pointed by Lederach above, relief and humanitarian work at the grassroots level also continues during the initial periods of this stage until the local agricultural and market infrastructures can be built back up. Relief is also transferred more and more to grassroots organisations in some areas (Marshall 2000). For instance, women’s organisations in Somalia have helped to ensure access to potable water, and have helped provide services to internally displaced persons (Ibid.). Gradually, relief activities shift to more empowerment and transformation activities as local people are engaged to rebuild their institutions and infrastructure.

Marshall (2000) notes that another major difference during this stage is that the advocacy work at the top and middle levels now shifts to a longer-term focus and takes on a policy bent. INGOs at the top level encourage national and international leaders to change their policies concerning conflict-prone areas and to be more systematic about their approaches to solving conflict. After the failure of the international community to intervene during the genocide in Rwanda, many INGOs feel that it is their mandate to make sure that this situation never happens again. Relating to Lederach’s model, the middle level NGOs can influence national and regional governments and politicians to adopt more favourable policies toward intervention in conflicts.
policy work at the mid-level, NGOs also help with training government leaders and holding workshops as they go through the peace-building process. In Rwanda after the genocide, NGOs were instrumental in helping to rebuild the court structure and assisting in the truth and reconciliation commissions (Marshall 2000 and Nesbet 2003).

2.7 CONCLUSION

The theoretical discussions in this chapter contextualises conflict transformation and peacebuilding with considerations to contributions from inter-disciplinary literatures.

In subsection 2.2, the theoretical development of conflict transformation saw the growth of pacifist sentiments and organisations that later incorporated the realist approaches with the Post-Marxist and Non-violence pacifists’ views. In sub-section 2.3, concepts and models relating to conflict transformation and peacebuilding are reviewed based on the many years of theoretical development. The processes of conflict transformation to utilise peacebuilding as a tool relies on and operates within a framework defined by sustainable transformation (Lederarch 1999). “The very structure of groups and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflicts” (Miall 2003: 5). Conflict transformation depends on peacebuilding tools of dialogue, mediation and negotiation to build relationships and address the root causes of conflict and that peace building includes a far wider variety of processes. The separation of conflict from violence in (sub-section 2.3.1) has played an important role in understanding the negative and positive peace arguments, initially defined peace as an absence of war.

The chapter argues in sub-section 2.3.3 that NGOs do provide policy adherence to increases in democratic processes and post-agreement problems and solutions relating to external intervention and institutional building. The implications of theoretical, policy and practical discussions, especially in understanding how far NGOs can play their roles in post-war peacebuilding social recovery, derive structural and societal relationship conceptual underpinnings. However, the
expansion and institutionalisation of NGOs and governmental actions over many years, suggests that NGOs have different levels of operations and activities. These have brought inconsistencies amongst writers although some generally agree that each conflict must be analysed uniquely especially, when viewed from within its context, social structural compositions, social relations and the entire dynamic complexities of human lives. This would also form the conceptual basis for explaining how far NGOs play a role in supporting and mobilising IDP-returnees after experiencing the breakdown of lineage-based social authority and relationships, and why? There is also the question about how NGOs’ representation of the local views and contexts to the international, national and local levels are.

Sub-section 2.5 adopts Lederach’s peace-building model, as very helpful in distinguishing which activities need to take place at the different levels of action. This is helpful to address the problems associated with rebuilding social institutions so as to understand the underlying structural and context specific conflicts, coupled with many invisible actors, with little empirical research in the post-war social recovery. This sub-section 2.5 also addresses particular structural issues and the development of a supportive infrastructure for peace that can support broken-down social structure and relationships. NGOs have to undertake their actions not only based on how-they-should-do-it but also what-they-should-do.

The problems was found to be in the links between and within the actors’ levels, the coordination and allocation of resource on “how-to-do-it”. Therefore, Maill’s post-war framework of analysis addresses strategic forms of post-settlement peacbuilding actions within the scope of short, medium and long term transformation (Miall et al. 1999: 203). Because of the various NGOs typologies and activities, NGOs can be hard to classify and categorise by function (Nesbet 2003), thus overshadowing their operational and non-operational roles. Therefore, various NGOs’ activities, the typology of NGOs who work with different models and sets of principles has to consider addressing structural causes of violence.
In conclusion this thesis has two major conceptual and analytical reflections on rebuilding of social structure and restoring broken relationships for reconciliation after the end of the war. Whenever NGOs get involved the contextual and practitioners' empirical studies indicate that transformation of institutional development requires the governing and participatory leadership that may include rules and procedures of political decision-making and public services. The suggestion arises from the discourses on structural violence that a wider social, economic and political source of conflict needs NGOs to transform both the negative energy of war into positive peace.

Rebuilding and supporting social institutions has to include the social and economic well-being to address fundamental basic needs (relief aid), restoration of social services, and addressing sustainable programmes (long term social and economic development). These include the transformation of security sector, the human and food security. The different patterns of interventions actors undertake to transform conflict at various levels of post-war recovering populations is therefore required.

Rebuilding relationships focuses on societal reconciliation that has elements of justice, truth, mercy and peace (Lederach, 1999). Likewise, NGOs need to address the root causes of the conflict and work with the local cultures. However, most NGOs still perceive structural and cultural violence only as early warnings of direct violence, not as bad in and by themselves. They [NGOs] rely so much on lessons-learnt from previous years of experiences. Much as peacebuilding actors, practitioners, policy makers and researchers are trying to understand the root causes of conflicts, there are still no one-size-fits-all, blue-print or best-fit model that exist to apply.
CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND OF UGANDA’S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the background of Uganda’s political development, crises and development in subsection 3.2. Uganda’s political background has the basis of “tribal” and “regional” identities and conflicts. These led to the internal and external crises of Acholi people’s lineage-based political authorities and relationships so much damaged from 1986 to date. In subsection 3.2.1, the background of Acholi people and the formation of lineage-based authority is discussed. The discussion also looks at the breakdown of lineage-based authority and social institutions in Acholiland. The conflict in Northern Uganda in sub-section 3.2.2 discusses on the insurgencies and counter insurgencies in Acholiland fought in attempts to resolve the crises.

Sub-section 3.3 discusses on the various forms of responses to resolve both crises following the internal disorder within the Acholi society, mainly using insurgent attacks on the external enemy – the National Rrsistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) government. The insurgent groups in Acholiland were the ex-UNLA reorganised troops under the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the persistent Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

In response to the insurgencies, the NRA/M government forced Acholi people to go to “protected villages” - the internal displacement camps/persons (IDPCs/Ps). Nearly two million people were kept in ID-Camps for two decades while other parts of Uganda were experiencing economic, social and political recovery. NGOs became the lifeline of the IDPs (sub-section 3.4 and 3.4.1).

Out of the many peace negotiation processes and the roles NGOs played outlined in sub-section 3.5, the JPTs brought relative peace, good enough for the return of IDPs to their respective villages of origins (sub-section 3.6).
3.2 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRISSES AND RECONSTRUCTION IN UGANDA

This section focuses on Uganda’s political development of the “tribal” and “regional” identities that has a basis for the predominantly historical ethnic political identities and crises. Basing mainly on Branch (2010), Northern Ugandan war often fails to account for the historical processes by which ethnic identities were constructed and politicised, instead neutralising them and not questioning how they came to be bases for communal political identification and action (Ibid.; p.26).

Branch argues that “tribal” ethnic identity arose out of “tribes” demarcated by the British during colonialism as the administrative indirect rule – the five “treaty kingdoms” of Southern Uganda and the “districts” of Northern Uganda (Ibid.; pp.26-31). The British colonialisation went through phases of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, was administered under the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC) until 1893 and later became an official British Protectorate in 1894 (Mamdani 1993: 6).

During these phases, Buckley-Zistel (2008) argues that the colonial rule changed the political landscape of Uganda dramatically, the repercussions of which are still prevalent today. The colonial rule introduced taxes, the growth of an ethnically heterogeneous and racially administered population, the creation of hierarchies of civil service chiefs as leaders, mission education as well as the growth of small middle sector education (Jorgensen 1981: 176). MacGregor (1967) argues that the British administrators were codifying and promulgating traditions they considered valuable, thereby transforming flexible customs into hard prescriptions (see Buckley-Zistel 2008: 61). It resulted to each “tribe” to change from a category of colonial administration to a category of political identity and action, each became to be an internal aspect of Uganda’s political identity (Branch 2010: 26).

Regionally, the British administrative impact in Uganda also left political tension between the Kingdom of Buganda and the colonial state of the Uganda Protectorate (Jorgensen 1981: 176). The distinctly British political demarcation of Northern Province - a “regional political identity”
was referred collectively to the Northern districts of Karamoja, Lango, Acholi, West Nile and its sub-district of Madi (see Map of Uganda pages ix and x). Finstombs (2003: 54), Atkinson (2000) and Allen (1984) both argue that the local Acholi people were encountered and further labelled after clans, such as Koch, Patiko or Payira. The native tribes were set against each other in a mindless, self-destructive struggle (Markakis 1987: 29).

The separation of a sense of belonging to the nation from “tribe” is lost (Finnstrom 2003), but consequently becomes a dominantly internal political order and the current Uganda’s North-South divide respectively. Although the coalition government between Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) political party leadership and Mutesa’s Kabaka Yeeka’s [Luganda word meaning, Only The Kings’ Party] was formed immediately after independence. The purpose was to win over the five parties who posed threats to assume future leadership of the country on independence day, 9th, October 1962 (Dicklitch 1998: 38). Mazrui (1967) refers to the coalition government as “politics of reconciliation” because the coalition government leaders were not strong enough to command own military support.

The Presidency of Milton Obote’s first period of power (referred to in Uganda as Obote I), and in the independent Uganda from 1963-1971 continued to operate along ethnic, linguistic and religious divisions that remained deeply rooted in colonial politics (Rugumamu and Gla 2003: 12). Branch (2010) argues that the Presidency of Obote I became a basis for collective political identification and action of regional divide between north and south alongside ethnic dimension in the putative distinction between the “Nilotic” groups living in the north of the Nile river and the “Bantu” groups living to the south (Branch 2010: 27).

According to Mudoola (2008, 1993) Obote’s seizure of power brought the Uganda Army on the stage of Uganda politics since the army was then used as an instrument of policy to resolve domestic struggle for power. Obote expanded the army in the 1960s, entrenched the Northern dominance of the armed forces; the army grew from 700 troops at independence to 9,000 at the
time of Idi Amin's inception coup in 1971 of which over one third were Acholi and Obote’s Langi tribemen (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 51, 81-5; Mudoola 1996: 97).

The consequence of Amin’s rule from 1971-1979 was a continued tribal political identity and ethnic tension in Ugandan politics (Mudoola 1996: 103; Mutibwa 1992: 71-2: Omara-Otunnu 1987: 87-91). From North-Western Uganda, West Nile, Amin was widely welcomed by Buganda. He returned the body of Baganda’s King - the Kabaka Edward Mutesa II, had died in exile in London. Amin released prisoners and was widely hailed as “a man of peace”, declared an end to ethnic favouritism but, took steps to eradicate the Langi and Acholi from their hold on state power (Branch 2010: 27). Amin suspended all democratic rights, gave the army - he mainly recruited from his own West Nile and Southern Sudanese tribes, to execute dictatorial powers of arrest and punishment, and set up a military tribunal to try political offenders, purged it on Langi and Acholi (Omara-Otunnu 1987:104; 133-6; Mamdani 1993; Sathamurthy 1986: 615). He used the military and other security forces to purge the national service of the Acholi and Langi political elite (Mutibwa 1992: 108; Sathamurthy 1986: 613, 664-5 nn. 22, 23). At the district level, the local government had become an extension of the security services, as military and police officials displaced political leadership and lineage-based authorities suffered significant losses as tens of thousands Acholi and Langi were killed (Kasozi 1994:121; Mutibwa 1992:88).

When the exiled Acholi and Langi including other exiled Ugandan tribes united under the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) later to be known as Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) with the Tanzanian Defence Force (TDF) to overthrow Amin in April 1979, the social order that had pertained in Acholiland was destabilised, and the link between the Acholi in the district and the national state was destroyed (Ibid.: p. 29). The formation of UNLF was marred with divisions in Tanzania before Idi Amin’s overthrow. Nonetheless, Obote returned to Uganda on May 27, 1979, but his return marked an ideologically divided nation (Bantu dominated Democratic Party (DP) and others, and Yoweri Museveni’s small groups who had formed the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) in Tanzania in 1972.
The two spheres of political animosity coupled with dislikes from other factions in exile against Obote’s leadership intensified, but the political bearings of the country later changed when Obote returned to power for the second time (referred to in Uganda as Obote II) from 1980-1985. Obote governed the country under the state terror, had no sharp line of military option rule from previous Obote I (Fabian 2000: 146). There was no wide-scale political rehabilitation of the Acholi middle class (Mutibwa, 1992: 153). Instead, Acholi people were brought into the state principally through the military, and the officer corps of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) again became heavily weighted towards the Acholi and Langi (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 149-51).

While Yoweri Museveni, the founder of FRONASA, then Minister of Defence in the UNLA officer corps was already fighting a bush war he initiated in 1981 against Obote II government, and on the account that the 1980 election that brought Obote II to power was rigged. Despite his loss in the election, his NRA/M based in Luwero District, one of Buganda’s districts, designated Northern ethnic enemy by appealing to tribal ethnic commonality of Bantu against Nilotics, and in part framing their revolution along regional terms – South against North (Branch 2010: 30).

When the Army commander David Oyite died in a helicopter crash, his replacement with another Lango, Opon Acak triggered division between Acholi and Langi. While the cleavages between the Acholi and Langi, a North-North officer corps of UNLA worsened and weakened the UNLA, the possibilities to resolve antagonisms within the military and political bloc failed. General Tito Okello, a King’s African Rifle (KAR) army veteran from the colonial period took over Obote’s II government from mid 1985 to February 1986. Tito Okello offered peace talks and positions in the government to Museveni. In his unpublished book, “Inside the Turmoil in Uganda” (1989) Okello’s extended invitation including to pro-Amin insurgents was a gesture of great symbolic importance meant to stop the political upheaval in Uganda. But the invitation of pro-Amin insurgents insulted many people and became a source of mutual mistrust in the post-Obote turmoil (Finntrom 2003: 101). Museveni ignored the agreement and fought on to take over power on 26 January 1986.
Finnstrom (2003: 101) notes that two governments led by Ugandans from the North (Obote is from Lango, and the late Okello was an Acholi) followed in the aftermath of Amin (of Kakwa origin, from West Nile region in North-Western Uganda). Northern domination of Uganda’s power house was effectively ended and power shifted to the Bantu-led southern people, a move welcomed by Buganda (Pirouet 1988). Branch (2010) concludes that, the development of Uganda’s national politics and its criseses and state’s lack of accountability to the Acholi have remained more or less constant, deriving lack of national elite, and the failure of the Acholi diaspora to engage meaningfully in Uganda’s politics.

3.2.1 STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES OF ACHOLI AUTHORITY SYSTEM

The Acholi are a part of Luo people, came to Northern Uganda from Bahr el Ghazal, Wau area in the contemporary South Sudan in the late fifteenth and sixteenth century. In the late seventeenth century, the physical environment (the 11,000 square miles – 28,400 square kilometres), social and economic systems developed among the Luo of Northern Uganda. During this time, the socio-political structures and organisation of Acholi had no strong formal political structures, but people lived in lineage-based, single-village political communities (Atkinson 2001: 66). The two major linguistic representation of the Central Sudanic (Moru, Madi, Lendu and others) and Eastern Nilotic ((Teso-Maasaian -Teso, Karimojong cluster) and Lutuko-Maasai and Bari) of which the Western Nilotic central Luo group of Alur, Acholi and Lango are a part of, all share the same environment, technology, staple food crops, means of production, kinship-based socio-political institutions and ideology.

Before the pre-colonial period, there were between 35 to 40 (Oruni, 1994: 17) sovereign territories and each territory was headed by the chief (Rwot). The current Acholi Traditional Institution kwon as Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) has now over 50 original traditional leaders. The KKA current structure was re-constituted in 2000 under article 246 of the Ugandan Constitution as a legal cultural institution. Since then, the anointed chief(s) (sg. Rwot and pl. Rwodi) with their elders, women and youth leaders have set up the Acholi Traditional Leaders Council.
The process and structure of being a chief is hereditary, with the eldest son being the next one in the line. Acholi authoritative system is based on arbitration by chiefs and elders who carry out wide consultations at grassroots level during the processes of conflict resolution. They form a web of special duties to their people. An Acholi chief is seen as a ruler to the socio-political institution, a factor that contributes to the distinctive commonality of Acholi social order, political culture and collective identity. The socio-political order that was established in the eighteenth century is characterised by large-scale socio-political structures that have superimposed chiefdom-lineages (kal). The instruments of sovereign domination like the royal drum (bul ker), royal spear (tong pa Rwot) and shield (kwot), and sovereign secrets (mung) authenticate the identity of his people, his sovereignty and determination to the recognition of the sovereign territory by another. The “Unity of spears” ribo tong is called for in times of emergency.

The authority of relationships is central to Rwot’s status and deeply rooted in Acholi tradition. The aspect of Acholi life, rights, obligations and privileges of the individual, social service administration, civics, politics, defence and security (bravery and conquest), gender and children are all ascribed in the authority of relationship. Within the web of relationship, lies the central aspect of “relation” derived from “relative” meaning wat. Nevertheless, Acholi single-village (gang) is characterised by exogamous, patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal lineage (kaka) composition. According to Atkinson (2010) a village can on average range from two hundred to not more than four hundred although some villages vary in numbers. A clan, which is a combination of a group of villages can have an average of a population of four hundred to a thousand people. Village-lineage system had recognised rights to agriculture, hunting land, usually organised in the day-to-day cooperative village-lineage labor (awak) in the farm, and (dwar) in the hunting land (Ibid.: 13).

Women leaders Lawii mon are also respected and their voices listened to. They, Rwodi Mon [women leaders] more formally, are those who are knowledgeable in all aspects of women’s affairs. They are also respected on clan affairs. They (usually one) can be traditionally anointed at the same time as the Rwo Moo.
The processes of leadership styles in times of conflict resolution are consensual with a common view based on free debates and arguments. 125 years ago, Samuel Baker is said to have initially thought that the Acholi lacked a leader because of their consensus approach.\(^1\) Every clan, parish or village may have an elder(s) whose determinants to wisdoms are mainly based on experience, respect and age. Other special attributes to be considered for investiture include maturity, sense of truth, honour, dignity, justice and social responsibility. Age without clear consent in opinion and open mindedness may not count. An elder who is highly respected can also have a very extended family with many children and whose homestead can resemble a chief’s. At a village level, elders can constitute a council of elders who can also include elderly woman/women. So the numbers of elders are not limited by any administrative means. An elder can be older than a Rwot Moo and therefore, there is always co-oporation and collective consultation between the elder and chief, especially during council meetings, ceremonies and rituals, rulings and functions. Elders’ role can extend but is not limited only to his area of domain. This means that an elder can preside over an opinion ruling in another’s clan or together if necessary. Traditionally the eldest woman in a clan should always give her blessing in accordance with such event.

With the arrival of British colony, Acholi people were classified based on the above mentioned membership identity, presumptively determined by their origin and background (Atkinson 2010: 14 and Barth 1969: 14). The classification; a tribe, changed British colonial policy in 1902 (Ibid.: 5) considering Uganda's political development of the “tribal” and “regional” identities to be predominantly based on historical ethnic political identities. This destroyed Rwot system, political and social structure followed by the subsequent political changes in Uganda, thus the outset to the crises under this study.

\(^1\) Albert Lloyd: “Uganda to Khartoum” London - refers to Mato Oput resolution approach in Acholi: 1906. Nowadays, because of this kind of approach to consensus leadership, it has led so many Ugandan tribes especially southerners to believe that “the Acholi leaders have failed them”.
The outset of crises were followed by two simultaneous dimensions that formed two intertwining types of ethnic political identity in Uganda and Acholiland respectively. The first, the *internal crisis* came about as a result of the missing local political elite, and threatened Acholi lineage-based and institutionalised authorities that have undergone change (Branch 2010: 43). The resultant impact from the breakdown of social authority in Acholiland was a reality after Museveni’s take over of power in February 1986. Attempts to recapture power through insurgencies and rebel groups to rebuild the internal crisis further destroyed the relationship Acholi held amongst themselves, with neighbours and in the country. The lineage-based political authorities of Acholi people were also being destroyed from within by the LRA war ideology.

The second, the *external*, has been as a result of the destruction of Acholi peoples’ political, economic and military links that had tied the Acholi people in the district to the national state. The external tribalistic demand by Acholi elites also left Acholi people vulnerable in the local, Uganda’s national politics and international diplomatic representation. The instrumental formation of an-overall ethnic belonging orchestrated institutionalised lineage-based political authorities – an aspect of external tribalistic demand by Acholi elites in the national politics. According to Branch (2010) many nationally and locally based Acholi elite, especially the middle class including the political elite, lacked an independent base from the state. The middle class were easily eliminated by Idi Amin and in Museveni’s regime respectively. Acholi people remained without the middle class elites and there is no independent economic foundation, and may yet to come by way of NGOs support by building a new mediating class between the peasantry and government (Branch 2010: 27).

### 3.2.2 CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA

This section focuses on the post February 1986 conflict in Northern Uganda. After NRA takeover of power in February 1986, Uganda’s new beginning marked the era of a liberated Uganda by Museveni to install a system-overhaul of the old guards and install a new beginning for a broad-based government. Jackson (2002) argues that with the final defeat of the UNLA in March 1986,
the Acholi were adrift from any power structure within Uganda and effectively under occupation. Anger, fear and rage increased amongst Acholi people as the cosmology of the war changed when NRA reached Gulu in March 1986 and Kitgum in April 1986 respectively. In the context of both destabilisation of the social order in Acholiland under Idi Amin or even during the 1950s when decentralised pre-colonial socio-political structure was challenged by British imposition of administrative chiefs, the Acholi crisis continued from 1986 (Branch 2010: 25).

The two major crises mentioned above; the internal, caused disruption, unmanageable by the weakened internal authority structure, and the national political crisis failed to link Acholi political middle class elites with the Acholi peseantry and the central state. Secondly, the arrival of NRA in Acholi had a fundamentally misinterpreted situation. NRA understood neither the political bankruptcy of the Acholi ex-UNLA nor the alienation of the returning soldiers from significant sections of the civilian Acholi society (Ibid.; p.33). While the NRA prepared a long battle with the Acholi - along ethnic lines as enemies, the Acholi were and probably still being perceived as the consummate Northern tribe. On the one hand, the Acholi troops, ex-UNLA presumed there would be an automatic, natural bond with the rural Acholi population.

This presumed identity gave rise to the spectra of substantial political-military force in Acholiland, so the NRA prepared for a long and difficult fight in Gulu and Kitgum (Amaza 1998: 62; Behrend 1998: 109; Pain 1997: 48). The NRA could not escape the ethnic terms in which it had framed its rebellion, and the North-South articulation that the NRA/M had given the question of national power determined its political military approach to the Acholi: it proceeded as if they were occupying enemy territory and tried to solve the “Northern Question” for good by destroying the putative ethnically based power of the ex-UNLA (Ginyera-Pinyecwa 1992 and 1989).

In June 1986, reports of looting and rape by NRA soldiers while on “their frequent operation for hidden guns”, despite civilian Acholi’s willingness to cooperate and assist, degenerated and
became frequent. NRA stepped up their use of force, robbery, rape, and killing of civilians on accusation that Acholi as a group refused to cooperate in collecting/returning guns.

Branch (2010) argues that “again, the NRA/M’s ethnic lens prevented it from distinguishing between Acholi civilians and the ex-UNLA” (Branch 2010: 34). By mid August 1986, the NRA began broad “security swoops” or “screens”, detaining hundreds of “lodgers” in Luzira and other major prisons, and carrying open massacres, like in the most infamous incident where over forty people including my father in Nam-okora were killed by NRA and FEDEMU (Amnesty International 1989, 1991; Gersony 1997: 21-3). According to Branch the paradoxical results would be that the NRA/M’s wrong-headed strategy, in particular its violence in Acholi civilians would give birth to the very rebellion the NRA/M had expected. It created the conditions for the temporary resolution of the internal crisis through a mutually convenient alliance between the ex-UNLA and Acholi elders oriented towards military struggle against the NRA (Branch 2010: 35).

3.3 REBUILDING ACHOLI SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS

In response to both crises (the Acholi-Acholi: internal, and Acholi–Bantu: external), the post-1986 rebel movements in AcholiLand saw the emergence of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attempts to impose internal order upon Acholi society by building constituency against the NRA/M based on a particular conception of Acholi political identity (Branch 2010: 35). Attempts to rebuild the social structure and relations were mainly military in nature through formations and transformation of above named rebel groups.

Branch argues that each rebel group endeavoured to resolve the internal crisis through the violent resolution of the national crisis, to create internal order through military struggle against a common enemy, all cast in ethnic terms (Branch 2010: 25). The ex-UNLA troops reorganised, got elder’s recognition and formed the Uganda People’s Democratic Army/Movement (UPDA/M) in South Sudan (Ruaudel and Timpson 2005).
3.3.1 UGANDA PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC ARMY/MOVEMENT

The defeated ex-UNLA soldiers, mainly the Acholi, sought bases in South Sudan, and linked up with one of Southern Sudan break away force from the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) (Allen 2005: 4). The unity force between UPDA and EDF led to the claim that Museveni sought agreement with the late SPLA leader John Garang to destroy and disarm the UPDA. Garang later died in a 30 July 2005 helicopter crash.

However, the unity force between UPDA (the defeated trained army) and EDF (the break away force from SPLA) would be dangerous for both Museveni and Garang. The UPDA crossed into Uganda from Southern Sudan and got support from Acholi people based on the need to restore the lineage-based institutional authority. The UPDA provided the only hope and still held legitimacy in Acholiland. One common external enemy, Museveni’s Bantu-led government under the NRA/M whose definiton of all Acholi are enemies, attracted Acholi elders to tenously come together and stabilise internal order around a discourse of Acholi identity (Branch 2010: 33). Disgruntled and disoriented youths, some had direct support of education and finances from the ex-UNLA were either coherced or recruited to give support to UPDA, since the traditional “Acholi authority” agreed to UPDA’s rebuilding of Acholi social structure and restoration of order.

UPDA tailored their need for popular support to regain national power by promising to retake Kampala, derived from the mindset of ex-UNLA. They promised to bring to an end to the NRA violence, capture NRA bases and restore democracy and political rights in Uganda. UPDA surrounded Gulu in early 1987 for two weeks within a radius of half kilometres from the town centre, but failed to take Gulu Barracks that was meant to be used as a military advancing base to Kampala. The UPDA were defeated. The NRA counter insurgency proved very brutal that the UPDA was unable to provide adequate protection to the population, and it appears that the elder’s authority was too attenuated (Branch 2010: 33). Subsequently sections of UPDA signed a peace accord with Museveni in Gulu in June 1988 (Lamwaka 2000 and 2002). In addition, in early May
1987 Obote’s currency, the most widely used medium of exchange was abolished and a new national currency was introduced.

The internal social crisis of the Acholi worsened, the unclean young men, the ex-UNLA and the UPDA once more challenged the elder’s fragile authority. UPDA failed to score military victory over the NRA/M to ensure Acholi political crises was ended. The politically inexperienced and experimenting armed group took stage, internal crises erupted the more, and a new rebel group, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) emerged to assert legitimate moral and political authority over the population (Branch 2010: 36).

3.3.2 HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT

The emergence of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by the Priestess Alice Auma ‘Lakwena’ - meaning messenger, staged a new conventional warfare through the creation of a supernatural Acholi force (Jackson 2003).

Although it was initially Lakwena’s father, Severino Lukoya, who formed an insignificant movement called Lord’s Army based on creating a supernatural authority in Acholiland, was mainly to fill in the gaps of an incompleteness of peace by UPDA/M (Dolan 2005: 34) and to give way to Lakwena’s HSM. According to Branch (2010) Lakwena’s HSM attempted to mediate the crises – Acholi internal and external crises and to complete the UPDA failed attempts to assert authoritative Acholi social structure against the common external enemy. Lakwena managed to establish the HSM in Acholiland by April 1987, tried to co-opt remnants of the UPDA, but the leadership of the UPDA refused, and subsequently turned on the HSM (Behrend 1999a: 372-3). Lakwena’s forces counterattacked and she overran a number of UPDA brigades, notably in Korna Kilaka, collecting guns and absorbing troops (Allen 1991b: 272-3).

The discourse behind Lakwena’s HSM is of spiritual cleansing within Acholiland, drawing upon the long-standing alternative tradition of Acholi spirituality that contested the claims to authority made by male Acholi elders and “chiefs” and which allowed her to assert authority over the UPDA, the
ex-UNLA and Acholi civilians generally (Branch 2010: 36). According to Allen (1991b), Lakwena’s spiritual cleansing claim presented a challenge to the elder’s claim to exclusively possess the power to cleanse; thus, through appealing to aspects of Christian imagery that were outside the authority of the elders; Lakwena trumped the elder’s authority and their claim to represent the Acholi, while offering a route to cleansing and social inclusion for those ex-UNLA and ex-UPDA who did not want to submit to elder’s authority (Allen 1991b: 378).

Finnstrom (2003) argues that the gathered support and remnants of the UPDA was based on the accumulated fears of Acholi people aimed at preventing the disappearance of the Acholi people. Doom and Vlassenroot (1999) describe HSM as a millennial assault on reality. Jackson (2003:8) goes further to state that HSM captured the unique cosmology of conducting war. Lakwena’s claim to restore social order in the internal authority of Acholi, proving that Acholi “traditions” or “customs” which is typified by the custodian male elders’ and traditional chiefs’ has been a contested terrain of inter-generational, inter-gender and intra-Acholi struggle (Branch 2010: 37).

Lakwena’s other claim to spiritual authority took on a national and universal aspect, going beyond the concern of Acholi identity, something the UPDA failed to deliver. Through a discourse of cleansing, Lakwena focused on purging not just Acholiland but Uganda, the corruption and violence of NRA/M, …next target after Kampala would be South Africa (Branch 2010: 37). Within this universal claim, Lakwena gained support, and in July 1987, she began moving east- and southwards through Lango and Teso, recruited heavily in Teso and confirmed the testament to the appeal her movement had through the North and East of Uganda (Behrend 1999a: 67-8). The HSM found regional, not only tribal, appeal and was able to temporarily unite non-Bantu groups – Acholi, Langi, Teso and Jo-Padhola (Branch 2010: 37; Omara-Otunnu 1995: 443-63). Lakwena developed “War Mobilisation Committees” (WMCs) since, she saw NRA/M’s system of local governance, the Resistance Councils (RCs) a challenge in the new areas of advancement. She organised WMC at sub-county and village levels to help supply, information and recruitment functions (Behrend 1999a: 70).
Lakwena eventually assembled an army of 7,000-10,000 troops (Behrend 1999a: 76-71). The HSM troops advanced crossing into the Bantu area, Magamaga in Busoga near Jinja town, a few miles away from the capital city Kampala. In the area, the HSM was not only looked at as a liberator but rather was an invading Northern army (Branch 2010: 38). The peasants cooperated with the NRCs and Local Defence Units (LDUs) and within weeks, the HSM degenerated in the face of the combined NRA-LDU-Civilian defence (Behrend 1999a: 50-2).

Aspects of Lakwena’s secular strategies - creating the WMCs, were ultimately subjugated to her spiritual project, whose military defeat wiped out any institutional developments the movement might have catalysed. Acholiland was left even more devoid of leadership, responsible organisations and basic security (Branch 2010: 39).

3.3.3 LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

After the defeat of the HSM in 1987 the full emergence of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from 1987 onwards (Behrend 2000) was a replica of HSM’s non-conventional warfare. Kony was one of the UPDA junior officer operating side by side, sometimes against the fragmented UPDA/M. The break-away rebel groups, the HSM and the fragmented UPDA terrorised each other’s civilian supporters. Lakwena had exhausted the supply of volunteers and those factions had to step up forced recruitment (Branch 2010: 38). Kony emerged victorious and began to take a centre position on the institutional establishment of lineage-based authority, but without volunteers.

While the Acholi pursued non-conventional methods (Jackson 2003: 12) since the conventional warfare totally failed, Museveni’s war of containment, probably working on the fear for the Acholi people who are a consummate tribe and a “never-give up people”, pressured Kony. Finnstrom (2003: 144) and Gersorny (1997: 59) note that, “[o]f the Acholi people in Gulu and Kitgum [and Pader], more than 90% do not respect, welcome, encourage, support or voluntarily assist the LRA. Weeks (2002: 11) argues that he “could find no one in Acholi who would admit to having any sympathy for the LRA”. The Refugee Law Project (RLP) (2004: 21) argues that the LRA
occasionally carried out large-scale attacks to underline the inability of the government to protect the populace.

The destruction of the once large herds of Acholi cattle has been blamed on the NRA by Acholi people. Weeks (2002: 4) originally puts the figure of rustled cattle to 123,375, then later estimated that in 1983, the number dropped to 3,000 in 2001. Gersony (1997: 27) claims a drop from 1985 to 285,000 and to 5,000 in 1997.

The reality or hyper reality of the cosmology of war in Acholiland was nationally and internationally duped on Acholi. Kony’s reality was not gaining significant progress against the NRA. There was lesser support by Acholi civilians. While NGOs were taking different approaches to safe lives of IDPs, the Government was doing nothing to support Acholi civilians. Acholi civilians were left without clear leadership or agents of political change: none of the rebel factions had achieved dominance, and the government had only displayed its incapacity and unwillingness to provide protection (Branch 2010: 38).

Towards late 1987 to early 1988, the UPDA had phased out and those who had not joined Lakwena accepted government’s offer of Amnesty and concluded a Peace Peace Agreement with the NRM in June 1988, or joined Kony. Kony’s force was strengthened, and the rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army became commonly known. According to Lamwaka (2002: 31) the government entered into a peace negotiation with Kony in 1988, but Kony was very suspicious on both the government and the Acholi who crossed over – the betrayers.

The government stepped up its violence against civilians, launching a wave of forced displacement in October 1988 (Lamwaka 2002: 32-3). At this stage, Odoi-Tanga (2009) argues that the causes and consequences of armed conflict in Northern Uganda, particularly in Acholiland; the reasons for it and the “facts” about it all differ, depending on who is telling the story or writing about. The principal asset base of the Acholi people were stripped away, and LRA’s political ideology to install a government led by the Holy Spirit, using the ten commandments of
God was unable to provide a comprehensive appreciation of the causes of political conflicts in Northern Uganda. According to Titeca, “An emphasis on these characteristics, fundamentally unfamiliar practices to Western observers, has often been used in portraying the LRA’s actions as primitive and irrational madness, a similar action portrayed by the Revolution United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone or the LURD in Liberia” (Titeca 2010: 59).

With the rejection of a foreign force in Acholiland, the NRA/M began to disappear although hatred remained as the government RC system was being consolidated, and became stronger. The roles of RCs in Acholiland were being viewed as an organ of the NRM’s state agents of surveillance and control on the local. On that basis Kony gained support based on the context that the previous rebel groups had failed, and he proposed a violent and new resolution to the twofold political crises. Nationally, it was debatable whether RC functions were to serve the state, the NRM or the people (Ddungu 1994: 367-9; Mamdani 1995b; Oloka-Onyango 2000). Eventually, the LDUs and RCs effectively localised the state down to the villages, although its administration continued to create undemocratic local representations in Acholiland.

Kony existed and dominated because of the previous failure to assert legitimacy by previous rebel groups; the overwhelming UPDA alliance with Acholi elders, and the redemptive reduction of violence through cleansing, and to lead that new purified community against the external enemy, the NRA. On the one hand, Lakwena claimed to resolve key internal cleavage – between UPDA/ex-UNLA and the Acholi community against the external enemy, the NRA. She had failed.

Additionally, the insurgency intensified due to Sudanese support to the LRA from 1994 to 2002. Sudan and Uganda were both providing weapons and shelter to each other’s insurgencies. Violence was renewed beginning with the offensive by the UPDF in 2002. LRA fighters crossed in and out of the Northern border to establish bases in South Sudan with the approval of the Khartoum government and crossed back for attacks on civilians inside Northern Uganda.
Kony maintained a more fundamental and stringent internal cleavage, one between the genuine Acholi whom he would lead against the NRA/M, and on the corrupt, false Acholi who had crossed over to the NRA/M. Kony proposed the cleansing of an internal enemy (Allen 1991b: 378), just like Lakwena, but with particular focus to fighting political corruption of the administrative and security apparatus of the NRA/M, embodied in its Acholi agents (Branch 2010: 40).

Kony’s discourse was limited to Acholi, as UPDA’s was. The internal crises merged with the national crisis. NRA/M was an external enemy that transposed to the inside of Acholi society in the form of NRA collaborators, the new internal enemy (Branch 2010: 40). Kony defined the Acholi as false – collaborators of NRA/M and the genuine Acholi, while dismissing the powers of elders or any other Acholi leadership to determine the bounds of Acholi identity. The LRA alone would decide who would be relegated to the category of the impure, corrupt Acholi, needing to be cleansed from Acholi society (Branch 2010: 41). Attempts by two elders, Okot Ogony of Cwero, eastern Gulu, Chairman of the Peace Commission of the Council of Acholi Chiefs, and Olanya Lagony, a respected elder from Koc-Goma, south-western Gulu resulted in them being killed on 8 June 1996 (Finnstrom 2005: 95-93 and Okello Angoma 2005).

Mutilations had started in 1994 that also saw the first mass forced abduction of children and young people. Jackson (2002: 43) terms LRA’s philosophical approach of mutilations and forced child-recruitment as similar to that taken by the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, referring to it as auto-genocide. LRA’s attacks on civilians had at least three strategic objectives. Firstly was to deny the government information about its movements by forcing the rural population to flee; secondly to gather resources from the looted villages (RLP February 2004:19) and thirdly and most bizarrely, to show the populace that the government is unable or unwilling to provide protection, and thus encourage people to support to the LRA (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999: 30). The Acholi people found more support coming in from NGOs.
While Kony turned his aggressions on both NGOs and Acholi, the North-South divide was of equal pressing importance, the spiritual discourse of cleansing became one of violently expurgating the internal enemy from Acholi society (Ibid.: 42). The LRA framed its goals exclusively in a secular political language (Finnstrom 2008b), conducted information campaigns in the villages, and issued political statements and manifestos, set up a series of rules with violent sanctions, example, no riding bicycles, all meant to prevent reporting LRA positions, operations and movements to the NRA/M. Like Lakwena’s WMCs strategy to subjugate her powers in Acholiland, Titeca argues that the “strategic functions of the spiritual order in the LRA had internal strategic functions – ensuring internal cohesion, through motivating, legitimising and intimidating the individual fighter centred towards the spiritually posed leader, Joseph Kony” (Titeca 2010: 62-73).

According to Branch (2010) LRA perspectives presented itself with problems in the internal crises within Acholiland. First, the LRA’s ideas of about who represented the impure, corrupt Acholi were constantly in flux and had little to do with who the civilians understood to be government collaborators. For example, LRA incorporated RC/LC system into their pro-government versus anti-government decampaign and therefore, targeting RCs/LCs. Secondly, the LRA often blamed Acholi civilians for going along with policies that those civilians felt the government had forced upon them; for example, when Acholi were forcibly displaced into camps, the LRA stepped up their violence against displaced people, accusing them of being government supporters, burning camps down, and calling on people to go back to their villages (Branch 2010: 40-3). “LRA is firmly embedded in the local belief systems” (Titeca 2010: 38), a means or “strategic imperative” (Vinci 2005: 362).

Kony followed the footsteps of UPDA and the HSM to assert what he saw as legitimate authority over the Acholi, and thus resolve the internal political crisis against NRA/M. Branch argues that the Manichean political framework within which the LRA was operating, however, and according to which it sought to establish its legitimacy, led its use of violence to be subject to imperatives alien to the population’s own interests or needs. The result has been a regime of violence that might
make sense from the LRA’s perspective but has failed to resonate with the Acholi population, serving only to further entrench the political crisis (Branch 2010: 42-3).

In the nearly two decades of war, the national political crisis and the state’s lack of accountability to the Acholi have remained more or less constant, deriving from the lack of a national political elite, the exclusion of legitimate Acholi representatives from the government, the expression of Acholi opposition leadership, and the failure of the Acholi Diaspora to engage meaningfully in Ugandan politics (Branch 2010: 43). The replacement of the ex-UNLA by regrouped UPDA followed by the HSM and LRA, the missing local political elite, and the threatened Acholi lineage-based authorities changed the social reality in Acholiland. With the missing Acholi political middle class to serve as links between the rural population and the national government of NRA/M – the enemy deepened the crises in Acholiland.

Instead, the crises in Acholiland has been replaced by donor-suported, NGO-oriented, and the unrepresentative non-political Acholi “civil society” composed of the Diasporas and younger middle class Acholi people. The status of Acholi lineage-based social authority is still controversially weighted against relying on a donor funded form of traditional justice support and the traditional authority having waned not only as a result of continued war and displacement, but also as a result of new upsurge of authority amongst women and youths. The women and youths have profited from foreign-sponsored humanitarian and peacebuilding initiatives in the camps, while older men have not comparatively (Branch 2010: 44).

With the unresolved crises through military modes of operation – the UPDF, HSM and LRA, nor institutionalised political modes of operation, the Resistance Council / Local Council (RC/LC) system and multiparty elections, nor non-institutionalised political modes of organisation – “traditional” authority, a new political middle class or the emerging youths – managed to establish legitimate local political authority or leadership among Acholi (Branch 2010: 44). The political development and the related crises in Uganda, the Acholiland in particular, leaves Acholi people
with an incapacitated participatory roles and continued elusive legitimacy in Uganda’s national politics. The roles of NGOs in the support and mobilisation of Acholi people, especially during and after displacements substituted not only the internal and external crises in Acholiland, but also been the direction undertaken by Uganda’s political pursuits of foreign aid in the name of ending the violent conflict in Northern Ugandan and other rebellions.

3.4 PROTECTING ACHOLI AND RECONSTRUCTING UGANDA

One of Uganda government’s strategies for dealing with LRA insurgency was to remove the people from rural areas where they might assist the rebels, either out of choice or owing to fear of what would happen to them if they did not (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 14). Clearly, the internal and external crises in Acholiland discussed above was taken advantage of and/or manupilated by the NRA/M, mainly by using Acholi individuals who crossed over to the NRA/M – “the collaborators”, the weakened and unsuccessful Acholi rebel groups, and by the confidence the Western governments had extended to support Museveni’s government. The government policy of creating “protected villages” was not entirely to deny LRA safety nets and protect Acholi civilians but also “has been an intergral part of Uganda’s foreign-aid-driven reconstruction process” (Mwenda 2010: 45).

For over two decades of war and displacements (1986 to mid-2006), “Almost two million people have been living in internal displacement (ID-camps), many of them in conditions of extreme deprivation” (Ibid.: 45). Dolan (2002) argues that “a strategy of resettlement, or “villagisation” is a common anti-insurgent technique used extensively for example by the United States throughout the Indian Wars to isolate Native Americans in reservations. The camps are also crowded, unsanitary, and miserable places to live” (Dolan 2002: 19).
Besides “failures” to defeat the LRA, several authors have given many accounts as to why the war in Acholiland was taking so long to end despite the rag-tag nature of LRA. NRA/M conducted several failed military operations despite the highly trained and sophisticated NRA personnel and logistics. Mwenda argues that “Uganda’s politics of foreign aid and violent conflict using LRA rebelions [and others in parts of the country – author’s addition] was to a large extent charity from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has substituted the state” (Mwenda 2010: 45).

Immediately after the 1986 Museveni announcement at the takeover of power in Uganda, the economic reform and political consolidation presented challenges to the NRM in providing basic security and offer of economic dividends to NRM “supporters”, mainly Bantu people. NRM needed foreign exchange to import industrial parts to run the broken down industries and provide basic social services. Between January 1986 to May 1987, Uganda tried to pursue a development strategy involving barter trade, but the NRA/M that adhered to its left-wing organisation ideology felt into the trap of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and appealed for foreign financial support from Western powers. Between 1987 and 1990, the government received an average US$650 million per annum as foreign aid and economic growth average 7 per cent (Mwenda 2010: 47). In all these, the entire Northern Uganda was considered an enemy population and therefore generated resistance – both violence and pacific (Ibid.: 47). The exclusion of the North from the national reconstruction process became an added factor to the internal and external crises in Acholiland.

The need to transform the NRA as a national army came at the time the Northern Ugandan war was raging - the need to rebuild the broken down social structure and relationships compounded to the dynamics of the internal and external crises in Acholiland. Mwenda argues that “the NRA were built around personalised and informal structures and at the same time most of the officers were dying of HIV/AIDS. High ranking officers enriched themselves with war front logistical supplies and businesses” (Ibid.: 49). HIV/AIDS infected soldiers were sent to war fronts in the North.
During this period in 1989, General Omar el Bashir took over power in Khartoum, Sudan and established the National Islamic Front (NIF), which alerted the US interest. Uganda became US’s conduit while assisting the SPLA and in retaliation, Sudan began to support the LRA, transformed them. These eventually altered the US alliance with Ugandan Government (Mwenda 2010: 49). For over a decade the international dimension of the war continued to take another direction when the U.S. pressure on Sudan intensified following the 1998 bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by al-Qaeda operatives with links to Sudan. Over the next few years, Khartoum is believed to have substantially curtailed aid to the LRA (Weeks 2002:16). When there was an al-Qaeda attack in 2001 upon the World Trade Centre and The Pentagon in the U.S, the relationship between Sudan and Uganda changed abruptly. Following the LRA’s designation as a terrorist organisation by the U.S. State Department on 5 December 2001, Sudan agreed to stop supplying aid to the LRA (see US Terrorist Act, Terrorist List 6th December 2001; Afarko 2003:6). Weeks (2002: 16) argues that cross-border tensions were dialled down as support to proxy forces fell. The LRA itself appeared settled into their Sudanese base camps and only periodically crossed the border (RLP 2004: 30), but the Acholi people were in IDPs.

Mwenda (2010) argues that the rebellion and the politics of economic reform favoured Museveni with a free hand to pursue his preferred political and military objectives. He was politically able to consolidate a one party system when donors, during the on-set of the Cold War democratic reforms, were forcing multiparty politics down the throat of other governments. Militarily, the donors allowed Museveni to pursue his preferred security agendas in the North, creating IDPs and regionally invading Rwanda, Sudan and later DRC (Mwenda 2010: 49). In Mwenda’s view, Museveni always won over donors, thus the more donors gained control of the policy and budget process, the more Museveni called for increased defence spending. From 1992 onwards, defence spending had been US$42 milion, in 1996, it had increased to US$88 million, in 2001 it reached US$110 million, and today, it is at US$260 million (Ibid.: 51). Donors focus on inputs, not outputs, they were unable to link increasing defence spending to increased efficiency or effectiveness of
the military in countering insurgence (Ibid.: 51). The discourse of protecting civilians were contained in the “protected villages” philosophy of the Western donors, than the reality on the ground.

The dynamics of the rebellion of the LRA brutalities in the North against civilian population allowed Museveni to portray himself as a victim rather than a perpetrator of the war in Northern Uganda and the regions. The international community favoured Museveni with increased diplomatic concerns, foreign assistances and humanitarian help. Dolan argues that UNICEF gave a taste of interventions in June 1998 that called for LRA abductors to be tried at the International Criminal Court (Dolan 2005: 40). Allen and Vlassenroot (2010: 51) argue that at the end of 2003, Museveni was persuaded to refer the situation in the North of his country to the new International Criminal Court (ICC). Mwenda adds that “The real victims were the Acholi people in IDPs, were caught up between fire and the frying pan. A camp of 15,000 thousand people would be defended by about 14 soldiers” (Ibid.: 53).

The government preferences to combine mixed military operations with amnesty and peace talks portrayed Museveni as a promising leader in forging peace in the North, thus in the country. Museveni sidelined, although listened to the Acholi civil society groupings’ request for a negotiated peace solution. The Acholi Diaspora group named Kacoke Madit (KM) – meaning the big gathering in Acholi, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI), and the revived Acholi Traditional Leaders, Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) (Dolan 2005: 40) were of secondary importance to military options. Allen and Vlassenroot (2010: 10) argue that from the time of the peace agreement with the UPDA in 1988, President Museveni in particular, has persistently tried to downplay what has been happening. The Government wanted to broadcast its new status as an engaging member of the international community (Mwenda 2010: 45-58). Confident that the war in Northern Uganda was basically solved, Museveni appointed Betty Bigombe in 1988 as Minister of State for Pacification of Northern Uganda, resident in Gulu.
However, in 1991 LRA’s continued insurgency led Museveni to conduct a four months military offensive, the “Operation North” to antagonise and alienate non-combatants. Bigombe took a middle-ground approach to counter the insurgency by arming community defence groups, the local defense units (LDUs) called “Arrow Groups”. Nyeko and Lucima (2002) argue that the creation of the “Arrow Groups” angered LRA leader, Joseph Kony, who began to feel that he no longer had the support of the population. The violent reaction of the LRA included the amputation of limbs and cutting lips, noses and ears. Nyeko and Lucima (2002) argues that “Kony used his rhetoric to explain the reasons for these actions as, “If you pick up an arrow against us and we ended up cutting off the hand you used, which is to blame? You report us with your mouth, and we cut off your lips? Who is to blame? It is you! The Bible says that if your hand, eye or mouth is at fault, it should be cut off”” (Nyeko and Lucima 2002: 25). Allen and Vlassenroot (2010: 11) argue that the NRA seemed reluctant to provide protection, and Bigombe’s lightly armed “arrow brigade” were especially vulnerable.

Maintaining the middle ground approach, Bigombe was willing to talk to LRA, Khartoum government, any relevant leaders, and GoU officials. In 1994, she engaged the LRA in discussions about peace, went into the bush and had four meetings with Kony to ease tensions that seemed a real prospect of a peace agreement (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 11). In February 1994, Museveni’s attitude to the talks was not enthusiastic, when he [Museveni] announced a seven days ultimatum dateline for LRA to disarm and turn themselves over to government forces (Ibid.: 11). LRA resumed killings and abductions three days after the ultimatum. Bigombe maintained contacts with the LRA, but in 1996 she was replaced by a Minister Owiny Dolo after she lost the elective seat in Gulu minicipality to Norbert Mao. Acholi Parliamentary Groups (APG) lobbied the parliament to allow for formal investigation of atrocities in the north. The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI) also pushed for a blanket Amnesty that would cover all Ugandan rebel groups, including the LRA. An Amnesty Act was enacted in January 2000. The
discussions to carry out investigations in the Northern atrocities was overturned and military operations was supported.

The anti-terrorism act of 2002 also played a big role. The NRA who at this time changed their name to Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) launched assault on LRA strongholds in South Sudan such as the “Operation Iron Fist” in 2002. LRA forces began crossing back into Uganda and carried attacks on a large scale and of a brutality not seen since 1995 to 1996.

3.4.1 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION INTERVENTIONS

Following the establishment of IDP-Camps by the turn of 1990s, cultivation and movement was impossible outside the camps for Acholi people. Food and other commodities were provided by aid agencies, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 14-15). WFP was providing relief distribution to over 1.5 million internally displaced people in early 2004, a figure which reflects 80–90% displacement of Acholi population in the sub-region, and the addition of hundreds of thousands in Teso and Lango sub-regions (Dolan 2005: 48). An idea of how dreadful these camps could be gleaned from the shocking crude mortality rates (CMRs) was recorded by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) (Ibid.: 15). In the extreme situations in 2005, MSF report and Jan Egland’s visit to Northern Uganda in 2003 (see below) listed the conflict in northern Uganda as one of the “Top-Ten” most underreported humanitarian stories of 2004 (MSF 2005).

Against this background, the anticipation of extreme emergency was affecting on how to deal with Acholi “internal” crisis, as well as the “external”. The bigger question remains how representative NGOs have been in the international, government and local levels to mobilise and support the Acholi people? Consistently, the description of northern Ugandan war in the international media was known along Uganda’s discourses as: LRA is a shadowy organisation, Kony is a “madman” and “evil witchdoctor”, “LRA is just a couple of kids and a few fanatics”, and “they ought to be extracted pretty easily” (Jackson 2007: 5). The emphasis on LRA’s characteristics as religious
lunatics, sinister former priest, a bizarre ritualists and ruling Uganda using the ten commandments gave an ethnocentric descriptions of religion and spirituality discourse can act as a medium through which other grievances can be framed (Titeca 2010: 59).

Jackson (2007) analyses the conflict in Uganda and came to the conclusion that it is less written about in academic texts than Sierra Leone and Liberia, which have received excellent coverage, partly because Ugandan war is less easy to categorise into current literature on the logic of African violence. Jackson argues that the Ugandan context of framing LRA sees evil as the principle of irreconcilability, i.e. the energy of the rejected channelled into undermining the prevailing consensus within society (Jackson 2007: 5).

The description of Northern Ugandan war blurred the international awareness from transforming conflict to peace. Carter Centre hosted a further implementation of the UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Nairobi in June 2001. OCHA then reported on the improved security and access in Northern Uganda to encourage relief agencies to establish semi-permanent offices in Acholiland (Dolan 2005: 46). In July 2000 the European Union (EU) drew up a resolution calling “on individual EU Member States to ban LRA operations and travelling of LRA representatives within the EU and between EU Member States and Non-EU Nations” (2002: L12). US Department of State (USDoS) was following the LRA. Later, the USDoS added LRA on US ‘B-List’ of ‘other terrorist organisations’, and there were talks of using the Terrorism Act of January 2002 against LRA members in the UK. Similarly, UK froze bank accounts of known LRA and Western Ugandan based rebel group, Allied Democratic Force (ADF) collaborators as part of the crack down on terrorism (OCHA 28 February 2002: 31-32). From 2001 onwards was an era that marks Global War on Terrorism (GWT) generated by the US and its allies. The post 11 September 2001 al-Qaeda attack in the US translated into very concrete anti-LRA actions on the ground. There was no direct international intervention in the LRA case, rather, Presidents Basir of Sudan and Museveni together with the then UK Secretary of State for Development, Clare Short, held bilateral talks while attending an Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit in
Khartoum. The agreement from the meeting allowed Uganda to cross into Sudan to “rescue children” and deal with LRA once and for all. 6,000 troops were sponsored for “routine training” by US.

During a November 2003 field visit to Uganda the United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland stated, "I cannot find any other part of the world that is having an emergency on the scale of Uganda that is getting such little international attention” (BBC News 2003). This was followed by the UN Security Council condemnation of the atrocities committed by the LRA and expressions of concern about the plights of the displaced children. Perrot (2010) argues that Jan Egeland’s visit to IDP camps in Northern Uganda marked a turning point that raised international awareness and prompted the intervention of hundreds of state and non-state external actors. Egeland’s ensuing floodlighting of the Ugandan humanitarian crisis hastened an unprecedented, uncoordinated and fragmented rush of hundreds of UN agencies, local and international NGOs, journalists, consultants and researchers (Perrot 2010: 187). Perrot records from the interviews conducted in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader NGO Forums’ representatives in October 2005 more than 216 NGOs were registered in Gulu NGO Forum’s list, 50 in Pader and more than 100 in Kitgum” (Perrot 2010: 305).

Perrot (2010: 188) continues that for local actors and peace activists, the internationalisation of the conflict was expected to raise international awareness of a humanitarian and security situation. There was hope that donors and multilateral institutions, intervention would soften the government policy on the Northern Ugandan conflict and bring alternative solutions to the unlevel dialogue between the military option prioritised by the government since 1986 and the negotiated solution put forward by Northern NGOs and civil society organisations (Perrot 2010: 189).

Mwenda (2010) argues that from 2004 onwards, the Northern conflict became a magnet for international attention and funding. Total humanitarian assistance increased from US$19.5 million in 2000 to US$56 million in 2002 and US$119.5 million in 2007 (UNOCHA 2000, 2002, 2007). At the same time the total official development assistance and official aid increased from US$817
million in 2000 to US$1.2 billion in 2005 (World Bank, 2007). Perrot (2010) argues that “Ten years before, Comboni Fathers and a few NGO representatives were the only “white people” locally termed in Swahili word as Bazungus, in major towns in Acholi districts. Today, bars and chic hotels are mushrooming in Gulu, four-by-fours ride up and down its main streets, NGOS’ signs thrive on every corner. Gulu has become NGOs city! One day NGOs will displace us from Gulu to get more space for their offices and compounds” (Perrot 2010: 189).

Another important dimension of the international intervention was the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In December 2003, President Museveni referred the LRA to the ICC to determine if the LRA is guilty of international war crimes. ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo formally opened an investigation in January 2004. Some local Ugandan groups have criticised this move as an ICC conviction of Joseph Kony and his senior lieutenants is seen to make a negotiated end to the conflict nearly impossible. 12 arrest warrants were to be issued for LRA war crimes suspects, the first such warrants since the ICC was established in July 2002. The ICC chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, said the court intends to start its first war crimes trial in Uganda by July 2005 (Palme 2005). Palme (2005) the ICC spokesperson said, during the coming year, there will be warrants. The prosecutor was looking at a very small group of LRA top leaders. Palme (2005) did not rule out possible prosecution of members of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in relation to their conflicts with the LRA, but stated that LRA crimes are far more serious than the crimes of UPDF. Following a visit to meet local leaders in Northern Uganda by Ocampo in 2005, the possibility to be able to delay issuing warrants in deference to any peace negotiations was slim. Bigombe (2005) urged that she would abandon mediation of the peace process if the ICC prosecution continued, something she did. Alen and Vlassenroot (2010) argue that “President Museveni was using the court to deflect attention away from the illegal activities of the Ugandan army in DRC. There had been many allegations of serious crimes carried out by Ugandan government forces in Northern Uganda: what was ICC going to do about those?” (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 16).
According to Allen and Vlassenroot (2010: 16) “Aid agencies expressed concerns that the LRA would be unwilling to release abducted people because they might be used as witnesses. On the other end, the ICC referral would affect the Amnesty processes, implying the blanket amnesty could no longer be viable”. Allen and Vlassenroot (2010) argue that the best way was to combine amnesty and traditional reconciliation – *Mato Oput*. In November 2004 President Museveni was exploring ways to withdraw the referral made to the ICC, which was seen as a complication to what appeared to be a significant movement towards a negotiated peace. The human rights group Amnesty International (16 November 2004) vigourously protested Museveni’s move.

Nonetheless, the ICC issued arrest warrants of senior LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony in September 2005. Green (2008:11) argues that Kony himself faced thirty-three counts. This is believed to have angered Kony. Green (2008) adds that rumours had it that the rebels had circulated hand written note in Gulu in which they threatened to kill any foreigners they found. A British man who had gone to help rafters in trouble on the Murchison Falls National Park a couple of months before, and two de-miners had been shot dead in an ambush across the border in Southern Sudan. Natsios (2003: 343-344) argues that “another potential strength of NGOs is that they have no formal connection to government, and, generally, an aversion to military force. This frees them from direct political interest in the outcome of the conflict”. This may diverge from the case of Northern Uganda. Ugandan government have strong and formal connections to NGOs. The proliferations of NGOs in Northern Uganda according to Zartman and Touval (2007) may have an organisational interest in establishing a presence in a region. As far as the content of peace process is concerned, NGOs tend to be “interested in particular outcome, […] because they believe in its inherent desirability” (Zartman and Touval 2007: 442). Outside interventions were being either initiated, steered or frustrated by the Ugandan government.

“Rushing into the humanitarian breach opened by Egland, an impressive increase in more or less good-quality international informing, sensitising, lobbying and fundraising initiatives have flourished on the Web” (Perrot 2010: 189). A noticeable long list can be found to include the
Uganda Conflict Action Network-Uganda-CAN, the joint International Crisis-Group-Center for American Progress’s ENOUGH project “to establish genocide and mass atrocities”, the Gulu Walk initiated by two Canadians, or the International Rescue Committee’s Campaign: “Stop the violence in Uganda!”. College students, Hollywood actors and peace activists produced documentaries on the Northern Ugandan “plight”, such as Canadian seven-award-winner Uganda Rising, Daniel Simpson and Matthew Green’s Rebels without a Cause of Journey into Sunset, produced a report by the former special adviser to the president at the International Crisis Group (ICG) John Pendergast (Ibid.: 189). Perrot (2010: 189-90) argues that the controversial 2004 documentary film Invisible Children (Rough Cut), dedicated to night commuters, has been shown on almost every campus in California from suburban living rooms to Capitol Hill, with coverage on Oprah, CNN, and the National Geographic Channel.

According to Perrot (2010) these marginal and limited emergency aid from non-state actors in the public awareness and international mobilisation converged only at the top levels with growing political support from highest international forums, UN members and diplomatic circles for a quick resolution of the conflict (UN Security Council 2006). These effected a quick diplomatic strategy towards Museveni’s government, reflecting the arrival and growing influence of new actors in the diplomatic landscape in Uganda and in the UN institutions (Perrot 2010: 191). Harsher diplomacy of public awareness and international mobilisation partly broke the status quo policy towards responsibility in the conflict that had been implemented by traditional donors. Museveni’s success stories of the 1990s and its military interventions including in the DRC, corruption scandals involving Ugandan officials, and the slow democratic process mobilised growing criticism of the regime’s humanitarian laissez-faire and obstinacy in pursuing military option which, until then, had brought only modest results (Perrot 2010: 191-2). Perrot (2010) argues that the relatively “naïve” donors became realists that suggested the peaceful path to conflict resolution in Northern Uganda. Museveni tactically launched the Peace and Recovery Development Project (PRDP) in October 2008, as a three-year Shs1.1 trillion ($606.5 million) programme to provide 30 per cent of
the funding, the rest being financed by donors (Perrot 2010: 199-200). This was to ensure that vital foreign aid was not cut off and encouraged UN agencies and NGOs to address the problems (Chabal 2005; Dolan and Howel 2006).

In conclusion, the humanitarian and regional bias used by external actors to analyse the conflict adds to the depoliticising of conflict and its resolution. The crises in Acholi, the internal and external were overwhelmed and got more complicated by NGOs interventions (humanitarianism), regional Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) reached between SPLA and Kharthoum government, the confrontational policies towards political oppositions, the North-South divides, the fueling tensions on Acholi people, and the fact that the army remains the chief actor in the North will have to be addressed. However, the reality of a negotiated peace process, the Juba peace talks emerged and NGOs involvement in forging peaceful dialogue between the GoU and LRA became real.

3.5 PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND NGOS INVOLVEMENT

Section 3.3 discusses on the failed attempts to resolve and rebuild the Acholi internal and external crises through insurgencies. The government policy to protect the Acholi population moved them into IDP camps. Donor-funded reconstruction programme did not include the North that was at war. NGOs assistances remained the lifeline, mainly in terms of humanitarian help. Several attempts to have a negotiated peace agreement failed, but hope came to the effective reality of engaging GoU and LRA in the Juba Peace Talks (JPT) in South Sudan in July 14, 2006. Aspects of regional changes brought about by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in South Sudan contributed to the Juba Peace talks. Also, in the previous section was discussed the diplomatic pressures that eventually led GoU to subscribe to the participation in the JPT. This thesis is directed towards the role of NGOs in Northern Uganda peace process and eventual return of IDPs to respective villages of origins (sub-section 3.6).
According to Simonse et al. (2010), initially, low-profile civil society initiative evolved into a hugely publicised negotiation process chaired and overseen by six African and three Western governments as well as by representatives of the United Nations and the European Union. Simonse et al. (2010) argues that NGOs that brought parties to the northern Ugandan conflict to the table in Juba is Pax Christi Netherlands, starting from the process initiated in 1997 (Simonse et al. 2010: 225). Contacts made with the Uganda Catholic Episcopal Conference, Pax Christi commissioned Dr Simon Simonse as an independent consultant to carry out a study (Pax Christi Netherlands 1998).

An initiative by the British Comic Relief mediation process was being undertaken by Dr Onek Leorenzio, a South Sudanese Acholi based in Nairobi, Kenya. Preliminary talks between Dr Obita, the external representative of LRA and the Uganda Minister of the North took place in Lancaster with Professor Aseeefa as a mediator. Aseeefa was working closely with Dr.Obita. British Comic Releif ran out of funding, but Dutch Interchurch Aid made arrangements for a second secret round of talks in the Netherlands in March 1988 (Simonse et al. 2010: 225). The Dutch government arranged for travel document for the rebels, including Joseph Kony, but another parallel process was being facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome through an intra-LRA group (Simonse et al. 2010: 225). Betty Bigombe’s peace attempts came when Pax Christi Netherlands had tried many initiatives. Pax Christi came in after getting to know that the LRA rebels viewed Bigombe as too close to the government. The other issue was the ICC interventions in 2005 (Simonse 2010).

Other initiatives came as a result of the signing of the CPA between Sudanese government and the SPLA on the 9 January 2005. CPA made important provision for South Sudan to have a semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS). Atkinson (2010: 208) argues that the provision included amongst other conditions in the CPA to deal with LRA and the presence of the UPDF in South Sudan. The GoSS took LRA issue seriously and SPLA leader John Garang pledged, he would not allow the LRA to operate in the south once he gained formal control of the region.
(Atkinson, 2010: 208). Months later, Garang died on 30 July 2005 in a helicopter crash but his death did not appear to shake the close cooperation between SPLA and Uganda.

Salvar Kiir Mayardit replaced Garang and Dr Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon became Kiir’s Vice-President. Paulino Matiep Nhial became Kiir’s deputy commander and effective head of the SPLA. The new GoSS leadership considered ending the LRA factor important, but none had stronger links to Museveni as Garang. However, both Matiep and Riek had substantial dealings with the LRA (Atkinson, 2010: 209). Atkinson (2010: 208) argues that GoSS leadership reasoned that talks with LRA offered chance, and GoSS would serve as mediators in peace negotiations between LRA and GoU; the LRA would cease initiating hostile activities inside Southern Sudan; and if LRA could not accept these two provisions, then GoSS would force them to leave.

On July 14, 2006 JPT began between delegations from the LRA and GoU with the Vice-president of Southern Sudan Riek Machar as the chief mediator. JPT had five agenda items: cessation of hostility (CoH) – signed on 26 August 2006; comprehensive solution to address the root causes of the conflict; reconciliation and accountability - signed on 19 February 2008; permanent ceasefire; and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - signed on 29 February 2008. The leader of the Ugandan delegation, Internal Affairs Minister Ruhakana Rugunda stated in (The Monitor Newspaper 2006) that his priority was to obtain a quick ceasefire. The LRA delegation led by Martin Ojul said in a Sunday Vision, 15 July 2006 that LRA's acceptance of the peace talks should not be interpreted that LRA can no longer fight, but stressed that a negotiated settlement is the best way to end the conflict. Kony requested meetings with local religious and political leaders from Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan.

While the broader context of the talks remained confused and highly watched by both LRA and GoU, GoSS viewed the talks as a means of ridding itself of a foreign army that is complicating their delicate relationship with Khartoum government. The more general peacebuilding dilemma of whether to prioritise justice (trying war criminals) or peace (ending the violence) was, and still is,
the most hotly debated issue (Simonse et al. 2010: 236). The GoU’s interest had changed against the ICC to suspend the war crimes indictment against leaders of the LRA. The GoU’s request was largely supported by Acholi leaders and civilians within Northern Uganda. The move was condemned by international human rights groups and some political analysts saw GoU’s request as a ploy to gain local support.

The process of JPT was very slow and cumbersome and as an advisory member to the Acholi CSOs I found both delegations very large, a big mediation and there were many others present. The Acholi civil society groups were added onto these cumbersome process fairly late. The number of diverging processes to the talks also increased as agenda items were being far removed from addressing the internal and external Acholi crisis into details. Simonse et. al. (2010: 236) argue that trust-building versus legitimising criminals needed to address the root causes of the conflict. Maintaining confidentiality and transparency was difficult for Pax Cristi as the negotiation dragged, attracted media attention and the visibility of the talks could not be hidden.

The war in Northern Uganda became a way of life, so was the protracted Juba peace negotiation meeting became a place for making money, striking deals and making friends. The venues, Juba Raha and later Home and Away in Juba, South Sudan have since regained their names and businesses based on the JPTs. According to Simonse et al. (2010), not only were the individual parties involved in the JPT wanted to protect their reputations, but also the NGOs, UN agencies and governments. The negotiation was based on values and the basis of power struggle, later obstructed the NGOs, UN agencies and other local initiatives from the CSOs in Uganda and South Sudan respectively. However, LRA was not any longer operating in Acholiland. The concerns of the majority Acholi people, mainly those who were caught up in the IDP-Camps were that Kony should not be taken to The Hague. That Kony should come back and live with the community because this is how Acholi social reconciliation process works.
Generally, the emergence of peace in Northern Uganda was based on the success of the talks, but the potential that the talks would fail like before was apparent. The signing of the first agenda item on CoH between the GoU and LRA allowed for the LRA forces to leave Uganda and gather in two assembly areas. Ugandan government promised they would not attack LRA and the GoSS guaranteed the LRA safety. This was positively embraced by the IDPs as they began to move towards their respective villages of origins.

Although Kony failed to show up for the final signing of the peace deal after many postponements and delays starting from 26 March 2008; followed on 28 March 2008 to 3 April 2008 and again to 5 April 2008, and another postponement to 10 April 2008, Kony was finally reported suffering from diarrhoea. In an interview with the retired Bishop Ochola (2009) who reflected that the word “Lord” in the LRA did not only attribute to the failure of the signage of JPTs, but also that Kony needs to confirm with that Lord, an unseen dimension in the spirited religion that the JPTs did not consider.

The GoSS announced on June 8th, 2008 that they would no longer mediate arguing that there were multiple reasons for the decision, including the LRA resumed recent attack, and the apparent lack of interest in the peace process on the part of the Ugandan government. The GoU had another plans after the talks ended. An “Operation Lightning Thunder” was instead launched on LRA base in Garamba on 14 December 2008 marking to an effect end of the JPTs and pushing LRA further inside DRC and to Central African Republic, places where LRA continue to operate in.

3.6 RETURN TO VILLAGES OF ORIGINS

In a situation once termed “social torture” by Dolan (2005 and 2009) began to change after the September 2006 siging of the CoH agreement between LRA and GoU in a JPTs in South Sudan. The GoU began a process of creating “satellite camps” to decongest major IDP camps, like Pabo, the third biggest in East Africa. In Pader district, 28 satellite sites were occupied out of 48
identified IDP camps while the numbers in Kitgum district were 21 of 36 (OCHA 2006). IDPs further South in Teso and Lango were being encouraged to return home directly.

The process of return was challenged first by questioning if Acholi sub-region is in a post-war stage, adding onto the difficult demise of defining post-war concept. In practical and policy terms, Allen et al. (2010: 279) argues that large numbers of IDPs left the camps and the process accelerated since the government announced the IDP-policy of “voluntary” return and a camp phase-out operation in 2007. Allen (2010) points out that the Office of Prime Minister (OPM) issued a statement like “the right to freedom of movement must be respected”, and that the “voluntary character of return in safety and dignity must be ensured”. Nothing about the past horors of IDP was acknowledged (Allen et. al 2010: 282; UNP for IDPs 2004: vi). Lederach (1999: 33) argues that the ending of violent conflicts are nothing more than opening a door into a whole labyrinth of rooms that invite us to continue in the process of redefining our relationships.

Since 1995, many returnees realised the war spoilt everything (Allen et al. 2010: 281). The culture changed, the social structure and many deaths had been recorded. The displacement, age, livelihoods, social services, shelter/land, psychosocial, HIV/AIDS have posed problems for the returnees and NGOs (IASC 2007). Structural violence occurred in a much wider social, economic and political scale and the source of conflict became difficult to trace. Rebuilding the social structure and relationships between returnees by NGOs’ needs to transform both the negative energy of war into positive peace. There is hope and expectations that sustained peace (positive peace) will coincide with rapidly improving livelihoods, but experiences among the masses of forcibly displaced have been very mixed (Allen et. al. 2010: 283).

Access to land following displacement is linked to the longer period of displacement, the difficult and intractable land tenure and ownership and laws (Uganda Land Act 2007). Rapid population increases while in IDPs was registered as returnees began to go back villages of origin. Return exerted pressure on land both for ownership and use. On return, only few families were given
seeds and tools and some basic food to enable them to plant and grow sufficient food (Oxfam 2007). The absence of shelter made returnees face enormous daunting prospects of starting everything from scratch, like, roads, water sources as well as overgrown fields (IASC 2007). In a IASC (2007) report, establishing ownership of disputed land is stretching Uganda’s traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Disputes can be taken to the formal official judicial system, but there is also lack of documentation to prove land ownership, for example.

This is because, both local population and the GoU relied heavily on NGOs supportive roles to promote the search for durable solutions for returnees. However, the causes of displacement; facilitating safe and voluntary return, resettlement, integration and re-integration of the IDPs; ensuring that every person internally displaced or otherwise receives information relating to the policy and citizens would be protected from arbitrary displacement was missed out during return. The activities of the national and international humanitarian and development agencies have been mainly effective at the district and local (community) levels through the promotion of public awareness of the problems of the IDPs, and through support aimed at developing self-help and self-reliance (UN-Policy for IDPs 2004).

Government assistance relied on the implementation of the Peace, Reconstruction and Development Plan (PRDP). Allen et al. (2010) argue that there was predictability that the PRDP and the manner of its implementation may not regain peace, recovery and development following its relatively small budget of US$609 million. 70 per cent of PRDP is to be donor funded and 30 per cent to be provided by the GoU. PRDP faced several problems of lack of ownership of projects, concerns that funds have been abused by politicians and basic lack of consensus about its management, PRDP’s geographic scope, which comprised of eighty districts. The affected Northern Ugandan districts are made of only twelve districts, which raises the question of why and how twenty-six districts have come to be subsumed under Northern Ugandan reconstruction (Allen et. al. 2010: 284).
Allen et al. (2010: 284) puts the PRDP in Georgia’s and Palestinian’s context that: after the seven days of conflict with Russia in August 2008 over Georgia’s separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has been pledged $4 billion in aid and Palestinian Authority has been pledged $5 billion in aid, after the three-week Israeli offensive in Gaza during 2008 (Allen et al. 2010: 284). The PRDP has not been different from these cases and in deed until the end of writing this thesis.

3.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter can safely conclude that Acholi social structural authority and relationship were grounded in the past ethnically grounded culture and local structures during the political development of Uganda. Following the formation such social reality patterns, the consequent possible social developments were destroyed by the colonial legacy during Uganda’s political development. This is because Uganda’s political development of the “tribal” and “regional” identities was strongly grounded based on the predominantly historical ethnic political identities and crises on not only Northern Uganda, but also other parts of the country.

While the political development predates back to colonial times, ideological formations coupled with geopolitical, real politicking of the contemporary North-South conflict clearly annotated the geopolitics of Uganda as Bantu-South and Nilotic-North. The instrumental formation of an-overall ethnic belonging orchestrated institutionalised lineage-based political authorities – an aspect of external tribalistic demand by elites in the national politics.

Historically, bullets rather than ballots have dominated Uganda’s politics in which two governments were removed by military coups (i.e. Obote I in 1971 and Obote II in 1985), one by foreign incursion [i.e. the 1979 Tanzania – Uganda National Liberation Front invasion] and another by armed rebellion - the NRA and Museveni rebellion of 1981 – 1985 that culminated in the overthrow of Tito Okello (Brett 1995: 129-152 and Odoi-Tanga 2009). Again, the military domination of Northern people in the army found it hard to shift the political end game through military domination.
The two major crises that would, first be the basis for the breakdown of social authority in Acholiland emerged as a result of the return of the defeated ex-UNLA soldiers to fit into civilian lives in Acholiland. And, secondly the lost of political control that would lead them back to resolve the national crisis since the destruction of political links that tied the Acholi in the district to the national state is lost (see Branch 2010: 25). Attempts to resolve the crises through insurgencies and counter-insurgency attacks against the enemy, the NRA/M government establishment did not succeed. Rebel movements in Acholiland comprising of the defeated and regrouped ex-UNLA soldiers UPDA, HSM and LRA rebel groups escalated the crises. Both groups tried to impose internal order upon Acholi society by building constituency against the NRA/M based on a particular conception of Acholi political identity (Branch 2010: 35). These means that military attempts to rebuild the social structure and relations were not of any value.

With the NRA/M government policy to protect the Acholi civilian the creation of “protected villages”, not entirely to deny the only rebel fighting group, the LRA safety nets and protect Acholi civilians was an intergral part of Uganda’s foreign-aid-driven reconstruction process (Mwenda 2010). The focus was aid more than protection of lives. These also saw the massive influx of NGOs in Northern Uganda.

While conditions of living in IDP camps worsened beyond extreme human living conditions, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) listed the conflict in northern Uganda as one of the “Top-Ten” most underreported humanitarian stories of 2004 (MSF 2005). Another report by the United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland in November 2003 rated northern Ugandan situation as is getting very little international attention.

Following Jan Egeland’s visit to Northern Uganda and other NGO reports, northern conflict became a magnet for international attention and funding with huge numbers of NGOs proliferations into the region from 2004 onwards. NGOs became more involved in peacebuilding
process and in July 14, 2006 the Juba Peace Peace Talks (JPT) in South Sudan started between the LRA and GoU. The International Criminal Court (ICC) had also intervened in the peace with justice process of warranting arrests for LRA commanders.

NGOs played a big role in peacebuilding, including some other initiatives like the signing of the CPA between the SPLA and Khartoum administration for the talks to continue. These led to the IDPs return to villages of origins. The process of return was announced by the government that IDPs must have voluntary return in safety and dignity be ensured, the right to freedom of movement must be respected and a camp phase-out operation was launched in 2007. Majority Acholi have returned home, but nothing about the past horrors of IDP was acknowledged (Allen et al. 2010: 282; UNP-IDPs 2004: vi).
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION
This methodology chapter addresses the research design in sub-section 4.2 leading to explaining why a qualitative research approach was preferred in sub-section 4.2.1. In sub-section 4.3 the case of Northern Uganda discusses on the sample design and the criteria used to select the different respondents/groups. Sub-section 4.4 addresses the data collection techniques used. Sub-section 4.5 is the analysis followed by the verification, validation and ethical issues in sub-section 4.4.1 before the conclusion. The methodology adopts a context specific, qualitative study of the views of relevant respondents involvement in the Acholi IDPs’ crises and returnees to respective VoRs. The next sub-section 4.2 is the research approach.

4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
This section explains the design for this research and why other research designs were not chosen. This research is grounded within the interpretists research philosophy. The aim is to explore the subjectively constructed and interpreted social worldviews of war affected Acholi population. In designing this study, a decision to discard alternative designs, first, those with leanings towards the positivists strand had to be made. Meaning, laboratory experiment could not be applicable given the emphasis that it places on manipulating the independent variable so as to ascertain on the dependent variable (Bryman 2001: 33). It was not, for example, possible to manipulate how material and organisational determinants of social actors like the Government and NGOs are assertive of internal and external Acholi crises, displacement and return to VoRs that might have led to the production of current crisis in social interactions and breakdown of lineage-based social authority within Acholi population. Survey research (cross-sectional and longitudinal) and statistical designs were deemed inappropriate for this thesis.
Ethnography, grounded theory approach and phenomenological research designs are deemed inappropriate for this study, despite their leaning towards a qualitative methodology (Creswell 2003; Robson 2002). Ethnography studies are pre-occupied with describing and interpreting socio-cultural features of a research population, over a longer period. It [ethnography] is not the focus of this thesis. Grounded theory approach aims to generate theory from data, which again is not the case with this thesis. It is cumbersome as it involves numerous visits to the field and it starts from a fallacy of zero pre-assumptions and theoretical ideas about the subject (Robson 2002). While a phenomenological research has the advantage of focusing on people’s subjective explanations and interpretations of the social world view, it demands, as Robson (2002: 196) argues, a highly specialised vocabulary and solid grounding in some challenging philosophy which the researcher has no background of.

4.2.1 RESEARCH APPROACH

The approach to this research is to serve the purpose of exploring and describing post-war affected Acholi people’s understanding and interpretations of their social realities in respective villages in as far as roles of “outsiders” are concerned. The research approach bases on the logical generation and justification of the explanation leading to the accumulation of views of Acholi people, NGO workers and government officials.

As said before, this thesis is influenced by the researcher’s underlying assumptions of epistemology, ontological stands, human nature and methodology. The distinguishing role of the researcher or the relationship of the researcher to that being researched was important. Schramm (1971) argues that a research strategy aims to explain “why […]decisions] were taken, how they were implemented, and with what results in order to achieve the objectives of a research” (Yin 2003:12).

The basic original knowledge of Acholi people was thwarted by war that resulted into both internal and external crises, internal displacement, followed by returns to respective VoRs. Importantly, is
the epistemological issue that makes the appropriate knowledge about Acholi population and their social world or without natural science model of the research process becomes relevant and suitable for this study. The ontological issues view the social world of returnees as something external to returnees or as something that they are in the process of fashioning. Asserting the importance of following the rebuilding/transforming of the internal and external crises, social conditions of displacements and eventual returns to VoRs, and what it means to the returnees was based on accomplishment made through the support of many social actors. These social conditions have invariably produced new social conditions with interdeterminate knowledge that still haunt returnees. Creswell (1994) argues that the nature of reality, axiological issues, the role of values in the research and the rhetoric of the study or language of the research need a good choice of strategy. The choice of methodology (strategy or plan of action that links methods to outcomes) governs the choice and use of methods, the techniques and procedures used.

According to Azar and Burton (1986: 49) formally controlled experiment and in empirically based theorising deductive approach that relied upon falsification was impractical, as such testing was usually not possible in open systems. Northern Uganda is a case in point where there was an absence of political legitimisation dominated by the lack of internal and external social authority, displacements and eventual return to VoRs. The attempt to impose structures that denied people their identity and their development in all aspects, and the attempt to impose the norms of the powerful, were dysfunctional and a source of conflict (Azar and Burton 1986: 50).

Ritchie and Lewis (2006) argue that any research purpose can be accomplished using a variety of methods, it is therefore important to identify the kinds of circumstances with which this might be so (Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Marshall and Rossman 1999; Patton 2002 and Walker 1985). Creswell (2003: 4-5 and 1994) points to the interrelated levels of what epistemology informs the research, that is to say, lies behind the methodology in question. The justification of choosing the qualitative method is discussed below.
4.2.2 JUSTIFICATION OF CHOOSING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

The choice of methodology in social science research according to (Sarantakos 1993 and Bryman 1988) has exaggerated the differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies as tools for data collection and analysis. The approach serves the functions of this research, is contextual and theoretically based on “thick” description (Geetz 1975; Mason 2002 and Gibbs 2010).

Initially, the research preferred to adapt mixed methods (Creswell 2003). However, qualitative data analysis of words and images varied from statistical figures and numbers. Qualitative methods make no attempt to measure, count or classify, but rather try to capture the full complexity of social phenomena through descriptive analysis that focuses on views and perceptions. Interviews are unstructured and not structured as is rightly put by Pope and Mays (1995a and 1995b) that qualitative research allows people to contribute and share their views and feelings in a conversational format, without the constraints of a structured questionnaire. Marshall and Rossman (1999) and Robson (2002) argue that the functions of qualitative research have been called descriptive or exploratory by other authors and indeed both are key features of contextual research. The essential purpose is to explore and describe participants’ understanding and interpretations of social phenomena in a way that captures their inherent nature (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 28).

This qualitative research method requires examining and determining IDPs-returnees’ social conditions based on the emerging patterns that explains perceptions within the context they find themselves in at the moment. Marks (2000) argues that they are a useful way of finding out about people, what they think, feel, hope, believe and understand. According to her, qualitative research enables researchers to discover the range, motivations and needs behind people’s attitudes and behaviour, rather than measuring their incidence or rationalised opinion. The role of qualitative methods in providing the kinds of information and understanding needed in social research has to consider some of the broader functions of social investigation (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 26).
undertaking of the research study therefore, requires great consideration as to the appropriateness and validity of any chosen method since they both influence the research outcomes (Denscombe 2003; and Kirk and Miller 1986). Ritchie and Lewis (2006) argue that there is a general agreement that the factors that determine whether qualitative methods should be the principle or sole method used is centrally related to the objectives of the research. “The nature of the information or evidence required of the purpose is concerned with understanding the context or process” (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 32).

Acholi IDP-returnees were newly developing unique social phenomena, such as, according to Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 32) the need for successful resettlement or refugees in disadvantaged urban areas, where previous knowledge or understanding has not fully explained occurrences or circumstances that are known to be widespread. They argue that the open and generative nature of qualitative methods evidence alone may be needed (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 32) as the measurement is problematic. Pope and Mays (1995a, 1995b) emphasise that qualitative research is reaching the parts other methods cannot reach. The qualitative context and process needed a carefully framed and responsive questioning to help the participants uncover and relay the delicacy of their perceptions and responses. Most notable sensitive issues were mainly cautioned on vulnerability based on, for example, previous physical or sexual abuse and bereavement amongst mainly returnees. Amongst the NGOs and Government officials, sensitivities arose based on the type of information delivered to the research team. These were overcome by prior arrangement to send questions and use of probing techniques and interactive exchanges of views during the interviews and FGDs.

Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that the conventional format of qualitative research methods puts the researcher directly in touch with participants and provides a means of getting “beneath the surface” of attitudes and behaviours and depth of understanding of issues within the studied areas. Qualitative research allows the researcher to obtain a more realistic feel of the world that cannot be experienced in the numerical data and statistical analysis used in quantitative research.
(Matveev 2002) and to interact with the research subjects in their own language and on their own terms (Kirk & Miller 1996). According to Miles and Huberman (1994:1);

Good Qualitative data are more likely to lead to serendipitous findings and to new integrations; they help researchers get beyond initial conceptions and to generate or revise conceptual frameworks….the findings from qualitative studies have a quality of undeniability. Words, especially organised into incidents or stories, have a concrete vivid, meaningful flavour that often proves far more convincing to a reader – another researcher, a policy maker, a practitioner – than pages of summarised numbers…

Silverman (2000) notes on the other hand that, despite the growing enthusiasm for qualitative analysis, there have been criticisms relating to its validity and reliability. According to Mays and Pope (1995b: 109):

The most commonly heard criticisms are, firstly, that qualitative research is merely an assembly of anecdote and personal impressions, strongly subject to researcher’s bias; secondly, it is argued that qualitative research lacks reproducibility – the research is so personal to the researcher that there is no guarantee that a different researcher would not come to radically different conclusions; and finally, qualitative researcher is criticised for lacking generalisability since it tends to focus on a small sample size.

According to Kirk and Miller (1986) qualitative research is subjective and associated with unsystematic selection of information from a massive amount of data, in ways that are irreducible or even incommunicable. They argue that qualitative findings should be questioned since no one can see how the researcher reduced thousands of hours of field notes into the conclusions. Perhaps research methods themselves are not good or bad. In other words, no single research method is intrinsically better than any other method, although particular purposes may be better served by particular method.

Qualitative method is appropriate when the study involves the exploration of a topic or issue in depth, with emphasis on seeking information from the people who are experiencing or involved in the issue (May 1997 and 2002). The selection of the appropriate methods in a given study depends, among other things, on the research problem or research questions (Creswell 1994).
Qualitative research can illuminate why it is happening (Creswell 1994). Moreover, as Devine (1995) argues, they are most appropriate (i) when the researcher wants to explore people’s subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences, (ii) in the study of process, for example, the question of what is going on or why it is changing, and (iii) when the issue needs to be studied in a specific context or social setting. These are addressed in the next sub-section for the case of Northern Uganda amongst the returning Acholi people from ID-Camps.

4.3 CASE STUDY - NORTHERN UGANDA

The case of Northern Uganda is chosen in association with this qualitative research to provide an empirical inquiry that investigates the contemporary real life context of Acholi IDP-returnees. It finds cases rich in information from the “multiple sources of evidence for use” as are justified by Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 51); Yin (1994: 91–94 and 2003: 13-14); Sarantakos (1994: 259) and Patton (1987: 19). A case study is “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (population)” (Gerring 2007: 20). These definitions set hallmark to the explorations on the “rooted specific context” (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 76) of the roles of NGOs so much explained within the northern Ugandan context.

According to Ritchie and Lewis (2006) “Contextual research is concerned with identifying what exists in the social world and the way it manifests itself. A major feature of qualitative methods is their facility to describe and display phenomena as experienced by the study population, in fine-tuned detail and in the study participants’ own terms. They add that it offers the opportunity to “unpack” issues, to see what they are about or what lies inside, and to explore how they are understood by those connected with them” (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 27).

“Secondary analysis of available literature, interviews with respondents and analysis of information has to generate data that allows participants to describe their personal or organisational contexts in which the research issue is located and how they relate to it” (Ibid.: 56). As stated above, the most basic consideration in deciding qualitative method is appropriate for the data that exist (Ibid.: 56). This will best illuminate the research topic and on practical
considerations (Marshall and Rossman 1999; Mason 2002; Patton 2002). Also, the researchers
own epistemological and ontological position is relevant (Mason 2002).

The study explores the grassroots case but also shows how representative such a case has been
to the national and international levels. Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 54) argue that such a study
would be used for example in exploring changing societal influences on attitudes, the role of
qualitative research, with a case study design would be to identify new factors or experiences, to
explore how they have arisen and to explain their consequences. (Rodall 2002) argues that the
selection of a combination of respondents, as some researchers perceive it can have certain
limitations.

Others argue that the results of single case under investigation cannot be representative and
cannot be generalised. Stake (2000a and b; Gomm et. al. 2000: 7-8; Schofield 2000; Lincoln and
Guba 2000: 27-30) argue that even though case studies may not provide a sound basis for
(scientific) generalisation of the conventional type, they do have general relevance. Stake (2000a)
for example, argues that if research is to be of value to people, it has to be designed in a manner
that will provide learnings about the world, firsthand. The weakness of a case study according to
Yin (2003: 10-11) is ‘lack of rigor’ due to researcher’s bias and use of unsystematic procedures,
and little bias for scientific generalisation. Yin (2003: 10-11) adds that a case study can “take too
long and result in massive, unreadable document.”

However, if a case study is properly designed and implemented, case studies facilitate
“naturalistic generalisation” in the sense that they provide “vicarious experience” in the form of full
and thorough knowledge of the particular case (Stake 2000a: 19-24; Gomm, Hammersley and
Gomm 2000: 7-8). A case study approach further ‘assist in refocusing the direction of future
investigations in the [same] area’ (Burns 2000: 461).
4.3.1 SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

This study deploys a purposive sampling technique as it did not aim to sample the research participants at random nor by convenience. In qualitative research, purposive sampling considerations often apply to the sampling of the cases in which the research will be conducted and then to people within those cases (Bryan 2008: 414). Peacebuilding framework of analysis in subsection 2.6 plays a strategic role following the categorisation and typology of top leadership, mid-range and local levels of actors based and the roles and activities they play. The purposive sampling goal is therefore to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed (Ibid.: 415). The research questions on how far the Acholi IDP-returnees are involved in defining and describing their experiences; How representative have NGOs been in the international, government and local levels for returnees; and, how did Acholi IDPs perceive the role NGOs play using the models and sets of practices NGOs deploy to mobilise and support them in post-war social recovery were relevant.

The purpose of using the purposive sampling is to ensure that there is a good deal of variety in the resulting sample, so that sample members differ from each other in terms of key characteristics (Bryan 2008: 415). Heterogeneity of the sampled population varied so as to enable the research to describe and analyse the internal and external crises in Acholiland, trends, occurrences, experiences and perceptions not only of conflicting actors, but also of civil society groups, Acholi IDP-returnees [elders, youth, women employed/unemployed etc], (I)NGOs, CBOs, local and national politicians and government officials. The purposive sampling technique aims to provide in-depth description of the groups named above, their perceptions on the need to address the internal and external crises coupled with prolonged internal displacements, since NGOs and other multiple actors remain the most promising hope. Because the population is heterogenous, the sampling provides a detailed investigation of NGOs who undertake actions of rebuilding the once broken down lineage-based social authority and how they seek to strengthen the weakened social authority that once guided the society.
The intention and goal of this study is to capture the reality from the inside through interaction and with interpretive explanations, a notion that lies within the position taken in this research. Therefore, this sampling technique does not represent availability of samples by chance - convenience sampling, but has clear stated goal and intention named above. NGO officials and areas of their operations in the Acholi-IDP returnees’ villages of returns, elders, religious leaders and traditional leaders, etc are all selected in sub-section 4.3.2 below, because of their relevance leading to the understanding of the internal and external crises Acholi people went through, the IDP-camp life and the reality of eventual returns to respective villages, and how far NGOs can support them in the transformation and rebuilding of the once destroyed social structure.

Since the sampling technique was not following any preferred convenience sampling approach, snowball sampling approach was preferred. Bryan (2008: 184) argues that with snowball sampling, the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with them. My initial work in Northern Uganda, participation in the LRA and GoU JPTs and coming from Acholiland gave me a wide range of opprotunities to establish contacts with government authorities, regional leaders, diaspora, national key figures, Acholi traditional leaders who in turn directed me to Acholi elders of particular knowledge, retired civil servants from Acholiland, NGOs officials, local and national politicians, religious, IDPs-camps and other opinion leaders. With a good knowledge of the geography of key specific areas of returns across Acholiland, I was able to specify suitable interviewees, respondents and informants for FGDs and interviews.

Again, within these groups, random sampling with accessible sampling frame for the population from which the sample is to be taken was difficult to create. Creating such a sample frame would be inaccurate straight away, because Acholi IDPs were a shifting population, NGOs were being moved from one sector and activities to humanitarianism and recovery sectors. Some IDPs were still living between IDP-camps and villages of returns (Satelite camps), although many camps were being closed.
The problems faced with the purposive sampling, snowballing approach is that it became very unlikely that the sample was adequately representative of the population covered. Within the population, there were also very many categories with diverse characteristics and circumstances that could have fitted the sample group, for example people who never were displaced from their original villages. These categories was decided not convenient. Within this technique, snowballing approach reduced the problematic of external validity and the ability to generalise in this qualitative study. Tellis (1997) argues that what is important is to clearly set the parameters of the study, methodology and its goals. Once this is achieved with rigor, the validity of the study is beyond doubt. Tillis (1997) adds that the weakness of data collection techniques can be allayed through methodological triangulation. That way, optimising the principle of validity and reliability through data and methodological triangulation is helpful. The purposive sampling technique with a snowballing approach guided the selection of the locations of the study areas in sub-section 4.3.2. A detailed description of how many categories were sampled and the numbers included in each categories, and the location of the research is discussed below.

4.3.2 SELECTION CRITERIA - STUDY LOCATIONS
This sub-section justifies the selection criteria of the area where the study was carried out. The problems and limitations of a case study in sub-section 4.6 according to Yin (2003) is common to other research designs and strategies. The study locations were visited from April 2009 to May 2009 in four Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Amuru. The study locations were chosen based on a number of strategic reasons, namely, the areas are known to the researcher; background of the locations, duration and size of return/returnees of particular communities, NGOs typologies and sector activities in the government allocated areas of NGOs' operations in Acholiland, motivation of returnees (mostly referred to as a “push and pull policy”) to encourage returns, and that of the general government IDP and camp phase-out policies. Some communities did not get support from NGOs and were not selected although their insights could have been informative to the research (see next sub-section below). The locations included:
**Gulu District:** Gulu town is the regional headquarter of Northern Uganda where government offices and Minister of Northern Uganda Reconstruction and other government recovery programme officials are based. In Omoro county, one of Gulu district’s counties, Opit trading centre was chosen. Another chosen county in Gulu district is Achwa, Paicho area. Paicho also had a huge number of IDPs that converged from parts of Odek, and others from north-eastern parts of Gulu district including Awach area. NGOs that was allocated for IDP-return in Gulu is an Italian NGO, the Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI) whose linkages range from international, national, district to local levels. County and parish AVSI offices are located at both Opit, Lalogi, Acet, Paicho and Awach.

Opit presents one of the biggest IDP camps in Gulu, 40 kilometers east of Gulu. From Opit to Tee-Ilwa, 12 kilometers on the road to Palenga before joining the Gulu to Kampala highway, a community of returnees was located. Tee-Ilwa community are at the border of Lango and Gulu, have lived together even before the war and the Lango-Acholi have unique relation. Tee-Ilwa community once formed the bigger IDP community in Opit. Another location while in Opit is Lalogi (12 kilometres from Opit) following to Acet (10 kilometres from Lalogi). The Opit-Lalogi-Acet lies east of Opit on the road leading to Joseph Kony’s birthplace, Odek.

A second county in Gulu district is Acwha county, Paicho area. Paicho lies about 25 kilometers north-east of Gulu town along the Gulu to Kitgum highway. While in Paicho IDP-camp that was located at the trading centre, mixed (male and female) youths of primary school going age were met at Paicho Primary School compound. Women groups were met at Anyomo-Twon, 4 kilometers south of Paicho trading centre, and men’s group were met at Tee-Olam village 3 kilometers north of Paicho trading centre towards Awach. Bungatira, the family place where Alice Auma “Lakwena” once lived is only 5 kilometers north of Gulu town. Of the 9 sites visited, 4 locations provided strategic reasons named above for carrying out FGDs, while others offered interviews and key informant opportunities both from NGOs and community members.
**Amuru District:** Amuru is one of the newly created and grafted district from Gulu by the Ugandan Parliament in 2006. It lies about 60 kilometers west of Gulu district bordering the Nile river in the east. Most of the administrative activities were still being carried out from Gulu town as the new district headquarter do not have facilities. Pabo trading centre was chosen as it represents the biggest IDP camp in Uganda and third biggest in East Africa. Pabo shares borders with Gulu district, located about 43 kilometers along the South Sudan-Gulu highway towards Nimule, South Sudan.

19 kilometers along the Gulu to Nimule highway, lies Awee trading centre, a western junction from the highway leading to Amuru’s proposed town area. While in Amuru town centre, 22 kilometers south lies Alero trading centre. From Amuru town centre, about 25 kilometers eastwards lies Guru-Guru area. Majority of IDPs either moved to Pabo or Alero. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), a Norwegian NGOs was allocated to work in Amuru district. Of the 3 sites visited, Amuru town centre provided strategic reason named above and also based on the period of returns, population of identified returnees, NGOs interactions/presence with them and the post-war social challenges like land issues. This site allowed the researcher to conduct FGDs and while in Pabo and Alero, interviews and key informant opportunities both from NGOs and community members were also carried out.

**Kitgum District:** Kitgum district lies north of Gulu bordering South Sudan. The areas that were visited in Kitgum town lies from Kitgum to Omiya-Anyima (50 kilometers from Kitgum town), Omiya-Anyima to Namokora (15 kilometers) lies along the Kitgum to Kidepo highway. Namokora is the home and birthplace of the former President, General Tito Okello who was overthrown by Museveni in 1986. It is the researcher’s home area too. North of Namokora along the Kitgum to Kidepo road at a junction (Kalabong) leads eastwards to Orom trading centre (17 kilometers), and along Namokora northwards through Kalabong is Akilok (25 kilometers), the home of some of the prominent former ex-UNLA officers who formed the UPDA. Akilok has close proximity to the South Sudan border, while Orom shares the eastern borders with Karamoja.
Another important area that was visited by the researcher is Padibe 25 kilometers north of Kitgum. Padibe experienced serious cases of killings, mass murders and abductions during the war. Huge IDP camp was located at the heart of the trading centre. West of Padibe and east of Namokora lies Mucwini (about 25 kilometers) is the home of the murdered Bishop Janani Lowum allegedly by Idi Amin in 1976. Mucwini experienced serious atrocities at the hands of LRA, where more than 50 people were killed at Yapa village, east of the trading centre. The International Rescue Committee (IRC), an American NGO was located to work in Kitgum district, especially on the return operation programme.

**Pader District:** Pader is one of the district that was created out of Kitgum at the same time when Amuru was also being created. Pader locations were assessed from two major locations. From Namokora to Omiya-Pachwa (38 kilometers) continuing towards Kalongo (20 kilometers from Omiya-Pachwa) both of which lie in Pader District, and from Kitgum town southwards to Dure and Acholibur (20 kilometers) along the main highway towards Gulu or Lira. In Pader, the prominent NGOs include GOAL and the Catholic Charitable Organisations Associations (CARITAS) a German NGO with its headquarter based in Essen. GOAL is an international humanitarian agency founded in Dublin in 1977 by former sports journalist and Chief Executive, John O’Shea. GOAL was also moving towards post war recovery in Pader. Uganda forms one of the thirteen countries where they operate.

From the twenty areas that were sampled and visited in Acholiland, thirteen communities were purposely sampled for this research covering the major areas of Acholiland. The potential NGOs whose international profiles during the more than two decades of war were targeted since they also have long history (fifteen years or more) of involvement in the area were purposely sampled. Other sampled sites included the Gulu Support the Children Organisation (GUSCO), Amnesty Commission and Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI). GUSCO is an indigenous NGO working to promote the well-being of war affected children in Northern Uganda through provision of Psycho-Social Support, Capacity building of communities, education, advocacy and
peace building. Composed of six different religious sects/denominations (Anglican, Catholic, Muslim, Orthodox, Pentecostal, and Seventh Day Adventist) ARLPI is an interfaith peace building and conflict transformation organisation formed in 1997 as a proactive response to the conflict in Northern Uganda. The figure below shows the map of the areas the study was carried out from April 2009 to end of May 2010.
4.4 DATA COLLECTION

The purpose is to provide an indepth description of the sampled respondents’ experiences, perceptions on the address to the internal and external crises in Acholiland whose background of prolonged internal displacements and eventual return to respective villages remained in the hands of NGOs. Thick (in-depth) data is needed on NGOs’ roles in rebuilding the once broken down
Acholi lineage-based social authority and how such weak social authority that guided the Acholi people is strengthened, now that IDPs have returned to their respective villages.

This study deploys both secondary and primary methods of data collection. Primary data came from interviews, FGDs and researcher’s records. Secondary data came from NGOs’ and government reports and other official government policy documents, international reports, published and unpublished journals, reference books, Internet and online services, newspapers that provided useful and well-researched information concerning the area of study.

The overwhelming qualitative data collected needed, according to Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 52-53) mapping a full range and diversity of case types and incorporating all key players in each may result in very large overall samples. Case study analysis can be very complex, with comparisons made between different actors within a single case, between cases, and between groups of participants across cases (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006: 52-53). There were fluctuations within the sectored activities allocated to NGOs by the government to mobilise and support IDPs Acholi-returnees. This proved advantageous for data collection. While NGOs were being sectored and moved around the districts, the staffs met had knowledge of situations of previous districts. This proved helpful in Pader and Amuru whose district affiliations were still very close to their former districts they broke away from.

Personal experiences: As was mentioned in subsection 1.1, my prior experience, local language and the previous trips to Northern Uganda on pilot studies carried out were very useful in collecting data within one month. For example in identifying fundamental needs, understanding the context or expressions and making follow-up questions, history of the conflict and quick identification of gaps between what IDP-returnees in villages stated earlier on and their actual behaviour they exhibited in their villages after return.

Primary Data collection used choice modelling technique and ranking of options especially during FGDs so as to identify key needs that seemed to provide a long list of needs. It was necessary to
allow the IDPs express themselves freely as they clearly identified fundamental peace dividends, causes of the conflict and their perceptions on roles NGOs play.

4.4.1 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

A total of 9 FGDs were conducted in four districts of Amuru, Gulu (before a new district, Nwoya was created from Gulu district at the end of 2010), Pader and Kitgum (before creating a new district Lamwo from Kitgum district at the end of 2010). Each group compromised of well selected sample between 10-15 people. The districts registered different periods of return and sectoring allocation of different NGOs.

“The researcher has been interested in who says what [can be opinion leader] dominating the discussion … how they say it [practical word that they employ]” (Bryman 2004: 349). Crucial, has been the size of the groups, the level of moderator involvement, selecting participants and asking questions, which if was not well planned could have posed problems. Three FGDs, one in Opit at Tee-Ilwa village in Gulu District, one in Namokora/Omiya-Anyima in Kitgum district were mixed FGDs and, in Padibe with the elders. In Amuru town centre, a group of AVSI volunteers were met during their volunteer training sessions to discuss as a group on the issues the research raised. An unplanned, but strategic FGDs with government officials who were mixed with NGOs workers was held in Gulu town at Acholi Inn during the Gulu University conference that discussed on the post-war reconstruction after Juba peace talks.

According to Krueger and Casey (2000: 5) a focus group study is a carefully planned series of discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening environment. Three FGDs in Paicho were sampled and chosen based on the request from Anyomo-Twon women, Paicho Primary School mixed youths and from Tee-Olam men’s groups. The three discussions were done concurrently with the help of research assistances. These separate invitations was based on request from the groups that the earlier researchers failed to present the particular views of returnees (interviewee, LC-one Chairman Paicho 2009).
The FGDs method made the discussions relaxed to the participants who shared their ideas and perceptions freely. All the nine FGDs promoted self-disclosure among participants that enabled the participants to discuss sensitive issues. According to Krueger and Casey (2000) a group’s participants generally number from 5 to 10, but the size can range from as few as 4 to as many as 12. The FG members comprised of homogenous participants who have had similar experiences. The nature of the study determined the type of heterogeneity; for example in the study, the group comprised of village officials, elders, women, school going youths, NGOs workers and local government officials.

A discussion guide and the position, interest and need (PIN) tool was used during the half day planned FGDs to guide the discussions (appendix B:5-2). A number of themes based on issues that were not fully explored in the interviews were captured. During the administration, respondents were sampled to form FGDs on the basis of their age, gender, location (village) willingness to participants and knowledge of NGOs interventions in mobilising them. Suitable venues within each village were identified for the FGDs. The age of the participants ranged from fifteen to over seventy.

On choice modelling (CM) technique, two Nobel Peace Prize winners in 2000 in Economic Sciences, James J. Heckman and Daniel L. McFadden define CM technique as attempts to model the decision process of an individual or segment in a particular context (James J. Heckman and Daniel L. McFadden 2000). CM was used to trade-off unwanted alternatives to identify and rank key needs. The techniques followed the IDPs' decision who returned voluntarily to villages of origins, at least was being supported by the IDP-policy. The alternatives were designed in such a way that FGDs explored how far they were involved in defining what happens to them as they try to handle internal and external crises of the war. The alternatives were ordered based on identified themes to identify causes of the conflict (appendix B:4-2). The identified alternatives formed the component attributes that sometimes proved convergent and/or divergent amongst Acholi IDPs-returnees, NGOs and GoU-officials across Acholiland. The lists of identified
preferences from IDPs were described as attributes or characteristics attached to case nodes. There was need to describe the case nodes and attributes in terms of age, sex, education, income and interest and from that the CM used the ranked/ratings for possible analysis to help avoid protests votes.

The contingency ranking allowed for the respondents to rank their options of peace dividends as were identified from the FGDs and interviews in terms of individual desirability. Respondents were then asked to score the alternative scenarios on the scale provided and comparisons with the alternatives were made using pair-wise ranking methods. Some of the peace dividends that were identified were discovered embedded, mainly in the areas of socio-economic dividends, the need to implement policy driven government programs and projects focusing on social services and institutions like schools, health centres and roads. Again, the interviews noted on the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents like age, sex, interests, income and education included health statuses and in some cases, the EVIs/PSNs.

Where the variations were inappropriate, the repeats with all other variations were again checked. These then provided identifiable interpretations and possible applicable results. These results formed vital reflection on the knowledge about how meaningful NGOs and GoU responses to transform conflict to peace, the patterns of which generated statuses of social realities within the society and the new social order and authority within the IDP-returnees. It also provided vital clues about how far the IDPs were involved in the mobilisation until return to VoR. Divergences and/or convergences in perspectives were checked if those vital clues complied with the extent to which IDPs in Acholiland were supported and mobilised after the war, and more so, against/for the study objectives. Lastly, a practically straightforward and attractive ways of administering the data was identified. Not all the issues that needed to be addressed in detail could be discussed in FGDs. Some research questions required interviews from a sample of key government, NGOs and Camp leaders.
ILLUSRATION 4.4.1: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION – ACHOLI INN, GULU

(Source: Author’s version based on FGDs from NGOs, Government officials in Gulu, Acholi Inn from 24th-04-2009).
4.4.2 INTERVIEWS

A total of 55 interviews were conducted comprising of structured or standardised, unstructured and semi-structured or guided interviews (May 1997; Denscombe 2003). Denscombe (2003: 167) distinguishes structured from semi-structured and unstructured interviews based on the degree of control exercised by the researcher over the nature of the responses and the length of the answers allowed by the respondent.

Of the 55 interviews, 33 in-depth interviews obtained the full and unbiased account of the participant’s perspectives on the research topic. The researcher used every means at his disposal to aid this (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 159). Qualitative interviews provide an undiluted focus on respondents and an opportunity for detailed investigation of people’s personal perspectives, for in-depth understanding of the personal context within which the research phenomena are located and for very detailed subject coverage. Because of the depth of focus and the opportunity they offer for clarification and detailed understanding, qualitative research traditions are particularly well suited for this study (Ritchie 2003: 36 – 37).

Respondents who took part in the in-depth interviews included IDP-returnees, camp leaders, NGOs and government officials, religious leaders, CBOs, camps officials, business community, politicians and some military officers. The person-to-person and telephone interviews, written responses and electronic mails assisted in gathering data from respondents. Their views were particularly helpful in answering the research questions (appendix A-5).

In-depth interviews with the government officials and NGOs-policy officers were mainly to draw comparisons with what they hear from others (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 36). According to Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 37) in-depth interview can also be useful when the subject matter is complex or unfamiliar to participants and there is benefit in interactive or joint reflection. In-depth interviewing gave the respondents the opportunity to reassess the information they had initially supplied, and to come up with a more reliable construct through probing. According to Devine (1995),
Sarantakos (1994) and Rodall (2002) probing demands the researcher to request for more elaborate answers in order to clarify, correct verify and amplify, as the case may be from previous information the interviewee might have had. In order to ensure quality control over data collection (Lavrakas 1998: 429), the conversation was limited to soliciting the data that adds value to the research. This was limited to the complexity and length of the interviewing process, as it did not encourage probing into some of the critical and vital issues that lied outside the research objectives.

Nine unstructured interviews helped in complementing the semi-structured and structured interviews during the data collection. The purpose was to collect data based on arrangements and not to be considered as main source of information. Bryman (2004: 320) notes that the researcher uses at most an aide memoire as a brief set of prompts to him or her to deal with a range of topics. A set of questions and/or specific topics that needed to be covered [see appendix A: interview guide] was prepared and key informants whose role and access to vital sources of information was adequate. These included district officials and NGOs-workers. Unstructured interviews according to (May 1997) is usually used as informal conversation between the researcher and interviewees about the topic. The researcher’s role generated and developed questions according to what the participants said. As an Acholi, good interpersonal skills kept the interviews flowing on the one hand, while on the other hand, the focus on the topics was being maintained.

Semi-structured interviews are somewhere between structured and unstructured interviews in format. Out of the fifteen, they were not “standardised as in structured interviews and interviewee “talked freely without any preset questions”, as in structured ones. Unlike structured interviews semi-structured interviews did not follow a rigid form. Rather, the interviewer prepares an interview guide that includes a list of questions or issues that are to be explored (Oka and Shaw 2000; Denscombe 2003).
The method including semi-structured interviews is without a doubt, the most utilised data collection method in qualitative research studies (Oka and Shaw, 2000). (Oka and Shaw 2000; Denscombe 2003) argue that the researcher prepares in advance interviews and allows the researcher to generate her/his own questions to develop interesting areas of inquiry during the interview (Flick 1998) and thereby keeping the interview flow more focused on the topic.

Based on the advantages each interview type offered the case study, the researcher was aware of the risk involved that may lead the study to go beyond the focus. Also, in order to cover all issues under investigation, the researcher used the time at disposal to reach out as much as possible. However, semi-structured interviews have more flexibility but still have the advantages of the structural approach. **Telephone Interviews:** Telephone conversation was used to speed up data collection, arranging meetings at sampled sites and in programming facilitation from NGOs and respondents.

### 4.4.3 KEY INFORMANTS

Although key informants have been mainly useful in ethnographic studies (Bryan 2008: 151), this study purposively sampled 24 key informants based on the predictive validity in the long list of community needs, NGOs’ varying background and information in the region about the internal and external crises in Acholiland. Predictive validity refers to the issue of whether an indicator (or sets of indicators) that is devised to gauge a concept really measures that concept (Bryan 2008: 151-155). The purposively sampled key informants used pre-designed interview guide that contained summarised thematic areas of the research (see appendix A-4). They were selected on the basis of their profession, positions, experiences and age. Some of the key informants are known to me, and whose insights were very informative to the research.
4.4.4 DATA RECORDING

Data was collected from the wide range of respondents including IDPs Acholi-returnees in respective VoRs during the FGDs and interviews. From the FGDs, flip charts were used to identify IDPs’ preferences and peace dividends based on their knowledge of the causes of conflict during the ranking of options. Follow-up studies were recorded from the telephone arrangements with respondents and key informants in the districts, returnees, NGOs-officials, Community Based Organisation officials, Camp Leaders, Political leaders, traditional leaders and religious leaders.

Data recording according to Denzin and Lincoln (2000) have their pros and cons in that, it is important to consider the place where interviews take place, the interview topics, (e.g. people may object to tape recording, if the data is of a sensitive nature), the available resources (i.e. tapes, records and so on), the skills of the researcher, and even more important the willingness of interviewees. Data was recorded to influence the process of data analysis and interpretation that would follow. The researcher took records from both FGDs, interviews and audiotape (those that were accepted to be audiotaped). Saunders et al. (1997) point out some disadvantages of tape-recording, including (i) the possibility of adversarial relations between the researcher and the participants since it may cause discomfort for interviewees and they may be reluctant to talk when they know what they say is being recorded, (ii) there may be a technical problem during the interview, (iii) disruption to conversation when changing tapes, and (iv) the time consumed to transcribe the tapes. Person-to-person interviews were tape-recorded (with the permission of the respondents) including the summarised notes the researcher was taking during the interview.

4.4.5 DATA ADMINISTRATION

Telephone interviews became expensive and time consuming in remote places surrounding Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Amuru locations although the consent of respondents were mostly sought by using phone calls through the Residence District Commissioners’ (RDC) offices. The consent of any research process has to go through this presidential appointed officer in the districts, including all NGOs’ offices. Potential respondents to be interviewed in remote places were arranged
through respective NGOs officials in their sector locations. Telephone conversations helped to arrange meetings with respondents for FGDs or personal interviews. The impact of this process was also reflected in NGOs documents that were used to crosscheck information. Electronic mails were effective but only applicable to people with access to home/office internet connections. Further, most agency staffs became unwilling to answer probing questions and that which required much thought. Pilot interviews and FGDs helped to break the barriers and helped to polish thoughts while refining questions.

4.5 DATA ANALYSIS

From the case study design and the data collection methods used in this study, a broad spectrum of raw data was analysed. The aim of the analysis is to consider both the process and content so as to give higher construct validity (Larbi 1998: 136), “considering the detailed description of the setting or individuals, followed by analysis of the data for themes or issues” (Stake 1995) in Acholiland.

This study regards data analysis as a process by which reflection upon the data collected relating to research questions analyse raw data. Raw data was located in a particular context of Acholi IDP-returnees in order to further understanding (Blaikie 2003). The huge data were recorded and transcribed in words and texts, interview notes, fieldwork notes and documents were obtained on request from the NGOs and DDMC, NGOs and GoU-reports. Major phases of qualitative data analysis involved data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawings and verifications. According to Miles and Hubberman (1994) data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcriptions. This is an initial process by which material was selected and condensed on the basis of a conceptual framework.

The study went further to display data, a step beyond data reduction to provide an organised, compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing. Data was later transcribed
using segmentation and a code and retrieve method. This was first done manually by tagging and labelling the data based on the relationship and social structural codes, the setting and context codes (Creswell 2003: 193). The manual coding displayed data in the textual chunks that were sorted according to categories and themes (see, Rosman and Rallis 1998: 17). The categories and themes were later collated in relation to research question. During the coding process, data were broken down into component parts with given names. The coding frame contained lists of codes in relation to analysis of data based on interviews. This was used to delineate the categories used in connection with each questions (open and closed). The manual coding in the analysis of contents provided statements of instructions that outlined all the possible categories for each dimension that was being coded. The categorised data helped to interpret the data so as to generate meaning and reach conclusions in more specific terms in consonance with the research questions. The interpretation of the information identified the patterns, discovered trends and explanations for refining, confirming, determining and evaluating the validity, validation to the research questions, purpose and objectives.

These steps has been essential to label categories in the actual language of the participants, a step Creswell (2003: 193) calls an in vivo term. Since the qualitative data that was manually being analysed became so huge, using NVIVO saved money and time (see, Blaikie 2003). The logged in accounts was part of the interpretive process. The combination of manual coding, analysis with NVIVO made it easier for the researcher to identify, focus on and select potential interpretation of data.

The use of NVIVO has been helpful since coding is not an analysis in itself, but only a means to making the analysis of data simple and the representation of the decisive link between the original raw data and the theoretical concepts easier. Coding is only the starting point of analysis as it (a) notices relevant phenomena, (b) collects examples of those phenomena, and (c) analyses those phenomena with the view to establishing commonalities, differences, patterns and structures (Seidel and Kelle 1995). Once the data is categorised into simpler analysable units, it can be
expanded and to reconceptualise some of the original theoretical prepositions (Strauss 1987: 55 - 58; Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 28).

Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 56) argue that “the analysis of the first stage fieldwork needs to be organised in a way which will make it possible to integrate later stages of data, to make comparisons and identify changes. This means that there is a highly dense and probably cumbersome data set to manage and interpret. The process is aided if the same analysis method and thematic framework are used (with new themes added as appropriate), and if new and old data are displayed side by side” (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 56).

The interpretations or meanings from displayed data used triangulation techniques. Both data source and methodological triangulation techniques were deployed to cross-check findings. The use of two or more data collection techniques used by the researcher (see, Neuman (1994:141) examined same variable and the evidences that were gathered (investigator triangulation) were used to build up coherent justification for themes (Creswell 2003:196). The researcher’s investigator form of triangulation was used to check the integrity of, and/or extend, inferences drawn from the data. The use of such investigator triangulation therefore aimed to validate the reliability of the study’s analytical generalisations. It was also used to check consistencies of ‘findings generated by different data-collection methods used and/or of diverse “data sources within the same method” (Burns 2000: 419). In other words, a means the researcher used triangulation to investigate the convergence of both data and conclusions derived from them.

There were wide variations based on the triangulated perspectives of IDP from the NGOs’ and GoU’s. The manual coding used a retrieving method and aided by NVIVO. The major part of the design was to make sure it reflects onto the “real life of the IDPs returnees” since their experiences remained central.

In summary, data analysis and interpretation followed the steps of organising and preparing data for analysis; reading through the data to obtain a general sense of the information; manual coding
process; generation of a description of themes; used the description and themes to convey
representation of respondents information in a table; and the interpretation based on the meaning
of the data - some lessons were learnt.

4.5.1 DATA VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF FINDINGS

Reliability and Validity: Reliability in this thesis means dependability or consistency of the data
and its analysis (Neuman 2003: 178). Some authors are also concerned about replicability of
research findings and whether or not they would be repeated if another study, using the same or
similar methods, were undertaken (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 270). The constructivists position
taken in this thesis argues that there is no single reality to be captured in the first place so
replicability is an artificial goal to pursue (Hughes, et al. (1997) and; Marshall and Rossman
(1999). Replicability in qualitative research is naïve given the likely complexity of the phenomena
being studied and the inevitable impact of context (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Holstein et al. (1997)
argue that those who believe that qualitative research is dynamic and can only be conducted
effectively in a responsive manner argue that studies can never be, nor should be, repeated.
Probably, concerns about reliability in qualitative research be avoided, instead, writers discuss
similar issues using terms and concepts that are felt to have greater resonance with the goals and
values of qualitative research (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 270).

Other authors view reliability and replication to have direct relevance to qualitative research
replication is “a somewhat unrealistic demand” but argues that this is a consequence of practical
problems associated with qualitative research than “insuperable philosophical problems
concerned with conceptions and measurements of “reality”” (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 271). Seale
(1999: 158) argues that showing the audience of the research studies as much as is possible of
the procedures can lead to a particular set of conclusions.
Data gathering methods used and subsequent analysis in this thesis was guided by (a) the use of multiple choice of evidence (b) the creation of a case study data base – assembly by evidence and (c) the maintenance of a chain of evidence, i.e. linkages between questions asked, data collected and the conclusions drawn (Yin 1994). Yin (1994) argues that these principles help to solve issues of reliability and validity, and improve the quality of case studies when applied.

This study required a clear understanding of what features of qualitative data were expected to be consistent, dependable or replicable, from within the original data, would recur outside of the study population (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 270). It was essential to understand the emerging perspectives about the roles NGOs played and how they [NGOs] represented grassroots perspectives’ on the crises that was haunting them.

**Validity:** the validity, “correctness” or “precision” of this research findings and data was concerned with “investigating the claim” (Arksey and Knight 1999) and the extent to which other contexts or settings are generated, refined and tested (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Effectiveness in verifying the accuracy or truth in social enquiry, even if there is a truth there to be confirmed may still cast doubts in other researcher’s minds. The subsidiary research questions strengthened by the research methods helped the analysis and interpretation (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 275).

The triangulation of sources compared data from different qualitative methods (interviews, FGDs, documented accounts) provided validation of findings for this study. Patton (2002: 556) states that it is in the data analysis that the strategy of triangulation really pays off, not only in providing diverse ways of looking at the same phenomenon but in adding to credibility by strengthening confidence in whatever conclusions are drawn. The researcher embarked on involving the research participants who were interviewed to check if the meanings or interpretation assigned are confirmed. Different documents from different sources may contain similar information; therefore triangulation helped in providing a means to crosschecking accuracy.
By looking at the data from different theoretical perspectives, the description and explanation analysis needed to provide a clear account of the logical and conceptual links made in the interpretation, and of the evidence on which they are based. Other authors have widely discussed about validation of the inference once a finding appears open to generalisation, then checks against other evidence and corroboration from other sources are highly desirable (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 278-279). This particular concern is mainly centred toward how to address generalisation in qualitative research. Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that the central condition for inferential generalisation is similarity between the “sending” and “receiving” contexts. This study provided in-depth (thick) description of the research context; of the views, processes, experiences, IDPs’ needs and the nature of transforming conflict; and how they appear or have experienced different contexts even within the very minute sample.

**Confidentiality:** Neuman (2003: 127) argues that confidentiality means that information may have names attached to it, but the researcher holds it in confidence or keeps it secret from public. The information about respondents were not released in a way that permits linking specific individuals to responses and is publicly presented only in an aggregate form. According to Berg (2001) deception occurs when participants’ understanding of a purpose for analysis is different from the researcher has in mind. It was very important that who decided to co-operate in the research should not suffer any ill effects for it. The best guarantee of participants’ protection was made sure that nothing in the study was traced to specific individuals or groups. The researcher conveyed in writing the purpose of the study to the government officials at the national (see appendices of ethical considerations on pages 328 and 329) and districts levels, NGOs-offices and individuals, interviewees to solicit permissions and participants’ consent to participate, the procedures of data gathering and the voluntary nature of research participation.

Confidentiality has been a major issue for security reasons in Northern Uganda where majority of the population did not trust each other therefore care was taken to uphold this confidentiality not to associate statements and quotations with specific names. Confidentiality may protect participants
from physical harm (Neuman 2003: 127). He adds that participants’ information must be treated as private property. If it is private property, a person’s right to keep, sell, or give away becomes clear (Neuman, 2003: 127). This study intends not to falsify, suppress or invent evidence. Neuman (2003) argues that these fraudulent practices are not acceptable in professional research communities, as they constitute scientific misconduct.

4.6 PROBLEMS, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL ISSUES

The problems associated with this research study posed constraints in dealing with problems of reliability (Sarantakos 1994). These were caused by extreme subjectivity, problems of objectivity and detachment, risk of collecting "dirty" data, i.e. meaningless and useless information, time management, problems of ethics (entering the personal sphere of the subjects), and problems of representativeness and generalisability. A number of these limitations were considered in the interpretation of the results when generalising the results. The results considered the scope of this study is sub-Saharan African intra post-civil war in which social recovery was studied following the dynamic variations of the war to peace period. The study placed the scope of the roles of international/National Non-governmental organisations, Uganda government and its military, and leaders in Northern Uganda into the wider context in which Northern Ugandan war was fought. It has been difficult to determine when post-war commenced so that the need for peace dividends amongst the wider Acholi population could be supported. This required reworking the boundaries to the research problems.

Conducting an interview or rather research in an immediate post-conflict situation like Northern Uganda was a daunting undertaking. Dates and time of each interview were difficult to determine as getting the interviews were disrupted by many factors. There were periods the security fears posed fragility of gathering information in Northern Uganda, especially where the Juba peace talks were failing. Suspicions on who is who has been of concerns to many Acholi people, especially on the diaspora of which I was classified. These affected the research purpose from time to time.
whether it should centre on power politics or concentrate on IDPs-perceptions, which brought so many attributes and categories in the study.

The difficulties in distinguishing the effects of embedded attributes under the growing different categories and new emerging alternatives were commonplace events. During the data collection, it was obvious that in the analysis period, the “code and retrieve approach” would be faced with problems of grouping and comparing chunks of data outside the context in which they occurred. Coffey and Atkinson (1996) provides explanations on this issue.

In order to avoid these constraints, the researcher employed two research assistants, one female (25 years) and one male (26 years). The research assistances are all University under graduates who speak local Acholi language. They have been working on collecting data from the communities for a long time. They helped break up and reconstitute data for further analytical understanding. Anselm (1987: 55) assures on this technique that coding fractures the data, freeing the researcher from description and forcing interpretation to higher levels of abstraction. Some embedded categories of data were easily identified as either coming more from the youths and women than from male adults. They helped in the choice modelling ranking process during FGDs.

Northern Uganda where this research was conducted is the researchers’ home place. Renewing contacts and placing the researchers’ hat on was one key task to face before deepening into the filed work. Time was spent on reviewing documents from Gulu University, government reports and Northern Uganda development initiatives, ARLPI, NGOs and District councillors’ offices. This accorded the researcher with deeper insights into the issues under research, the process and routine. The topic guide in appendix A helped to constantly check how best the research question, objectives and arguments shaped and fitted into this study.

**Ethical and moral dilemmas** are an unavoidable consequence, and may be an occupational hazard De-Laine (2000) as the subject continues to pose “moral panic” (Van de Hoonaad, 2009).
It was therefore imperative that ethical transgression be observed. Ethical stances like universalism (never to break ethical percepts), principled relativism (deception to be considered on a case-by-case basis), observed pervasive nature of ethical transgression, the deontological (certain good and bad things do not happen to respondents) and consequential ethics (the consequences for guidance of whether the acts of right or wrong) were considered.

The ethical relationship between the researcher and the population was established prior to, and throughout the research (Renzetti and Lee 1993). Written consent was obtained from the President’s Office, the Uganda National Council for Technology (UNCST), RDC whose phone calls to the relevant LCs in the respective areas opened the ways and facilitated all local level (agreement before conducting the research). Developing and maintaining a field relationship minimised a number of barriers to remove the hidden, the deviant or the tabooed. This allowed for personal information to be fairly and lawfully processed, for limited purpose adequately and relevant for this study.

Planned visits to study locations, explaining reasons for the visits, introduction of the research team and aims and permission to record and revisit ideas became easier. See appendices A-1, A-4, ethical considerations one and two respectively. Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 63) argue that it makes studies accessible to the groups involved, requires consideration of appropriate language to use in approaching them. The considerations made sure that information was not exposed to outsiders and unnecessarily too long. The focus were on top-level opinion leaders, religious leaders although some mid-level or lower-level leaders were also representative of the perspectives from grassroots society. The information was not transferred to other countries without protection. The validation of the perceptions of the participants therefore occurred through comparison with the perceptions of the other participants. Nothing obviously suggested a lack of expertise of the participants with respect to the subject of the study. However, these limitations did not detract hugely from the study significance. The researcher employed different strategies to gain access to and establish a field relation with these participants. For sustained relationships
and intensive interactions, some researchers have had to go through formal recruitment procedures to enter the “back region” of the population they wanted to study (De-Laine 2000: 71). Even where entrance is gained, it is not unusual for some participants to treat the researcher with scepticism, fearing that cooperation may bring in its wake untoward repercussions (Renzetti and Lee 1993: 101).

The manner and way a researcher gains access and manages to sustain that access without losing the confidence of participants therefore shaped and determined the research process and outcome. As said, access to conducting comprehensive research required permission from the Office of President, (OP) based in Kampala. According to Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 63) an approach letter such as “please let us know if there is anything we can do to make it easier for you to take part in the study, was useful starting points, which allowed the potential participants to raise issues such as timing; location; practical needs such as childcare and travel; the appropriate language for interview; or communication or cognitive difficulties”.

The lessons learnt from previous pilot studies and visits to Northern Uganda was that the approach to fieldwork for this study entered into negotiations with the ‘gatekeepers’, namely, those that have the power/authority to withhold access to information relevant for the study Bailey (1996: 11); Punch (1986: 35–36); Creswell (2003: 184-129); De-Laine (2000); and Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 62-63). Negotiations with gatekeepers and subsequently with participants preferably centred on the participation in research, the purpose of the research, the procedures of the research, the risks (if any) and benefits of the research, the voluntary nature of participation, the right to withdraw from the research at any time, assured confidentiality and the consent for the research to proceed as designed.

Creswell (2003) argues that, in research work, researchers need to anticipate the ethical issues that arise during their studies. He mentions that ethical issues arise in the literature about code of professional conduct for researchers and that researchers should be mindful of it in their research
plans. In research work, Creswell (2003) points out that the researcher has to avoid a research problem that will disempower the study participants. Generally, permission for the use of the tape recorder was sought and what the data would be used for was explained. The disadvantage faced in recording by hand has been that segment of the interviews were easily missed while trying to capture points in the filed notebook, thereby, losing valid point in the process. The advantage though was that the researcher was able to capture the most relevant points. The advantage of tape recording was that, all the information needed was already on the tapes, ready for transcription.

Problems of access to information were key challenges in the areas of the researcher’s topic. Government officials, some local and senior politicians who are representing majority opposition groups against the government held back information especially wherever the ethical implications would seem to disadvantage them. However, the researcher’s knowledge of the people and influence was useful. Northern Uganda has mobile communications and concentrating on the research process drew attentions away. Respondents were asked to switch off their phones before the actual interview session’s started. From previous trips to Northern Uganda, the researcher noted that some respondents had tendencies of straying away from the topic of discussion. The researcher therefore managed the discussion tactfully without offending the interest and sensibilities of the respondent. Choice modelling and ranking options were very energising exercise during the discussions.

In order to avoid time wasting during coding and data processing, the huge volumes of collected data were marked with dates, names of respondents and places indicating the necessary and available information on them. The researcher has been aware from previous study trips about the massive volume of information that had a daunting work of going through them one by one and the time it consumed. There was huge economic implication as well; it became very costly to spend days after days in the research areas. The researcher was attacked by Malaria and decision was made at some point to stop in which case, some vital information were left out.
This chapter addressed the methodological perspective of the study to gather a “thick” description of views from the perceptions of IDPs-returnees on roles NGOs and GoU-officials play. The interpretists research philosophy was adopted. The justification suggests the service it offers to the purpose of exploring and describing participants’ understanding and interpretations of social phenomena in a way that captures their inherent nature (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 28).

Case study design was preferred because of its association with qualitative research (Yin 1994: 91–94) has an empirical inquiry that investigated a contemporary real life context so as to find cases rich in information (Patton 1987: 19). A purposive sample of cases/participants was done in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research (Bryan 2008: 415). A good deal of variety in the resulting sample gave the sample members differing key characteristics – heterogenous in the four districts of Acholiland. The composition of involving key participants, how it varied between different cases or sites (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 52) played a big role in this study.

Data was collected from both secondary and primary sources. Data arising from interviews, FGDs, key informants were collected. Documents, videos, reports and more were reviewed. Raw data was transcribed using segmentation and coding techniques through manual tagging and labelling the data. The relevance based on the framework of analysis, the research questions, study aim and objectives to help condense the data into analysable units by creating categories with and from the data. The data was thereafter fed into the computer-assisted software, NVIVO for final analysis. Data verification and validity helped the triangulation process from the categorised data sources that were created. Data source, investigator, methodological triangulation techniques were deployed. This chapter discussed on the problems met during the research process. The next chapter discusses about the evidences found from determining IDPs’ perceptions on their needs about roles NGOs and GoU-officials.
CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS: REBUILDING SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents findings in response to exploring on how far NGOs play their roles in support and mobilisation of Acholi IDPs-returnees who were faced with the realities of rebuilding the broken-down lineage-based social authority, and the destroyed relationships. It is prudent to ask why NGOs get involved in the above respect. This chapter emphasises on the ontological considerations of the many years of IDP-returnees’ perceptions emanating from the local context (sub-section 1.2) of the war and return to respective villages.

In sub-section 5.2, the causes of Northern Ugandan conflict were identified based on the framework of analysis, a basis for understanding how and why NGOs intervene in situations like that of Acholi people. Before intervention, NGOs require an understanding of the causes of conflicts. NGOs are social actors and their social interactions with Acholi people posed critical question on how far NGOs can facilitate post-war peacebuilding social recovery using sets of principles and models. In sub-section 5.3, the fundamental needs of returnees are identified with particular address to the crises (the internal Acholi-Acholi and external Acholi–Bantu or with other neighbouring tribes), rebuilding social authority structure and relationships. The triangulated views was based on the method of investigation, sources of data and the theoretical perspectives -framework of analysis. The evidences suggest that there is a rich and indepth description and significant information about returnees’ new formation of social lives.

Meeting unending needs of returnees in sub-section 5.4, found divergences and/or convergences of IDP returnees’ exist compared to NGOs’ and GoU officials’. The need to address Acholi lineage-based social authority was identified as very key in this research and the subsequent need to strengthen it (sub-section 5.6). Rebuilding relationships (reconciliation) in sub-section 5.7 was another need in key themes for social recovery in Acholiland. Linkages in these needs are
made in sub-section 5.8 to explore NGOs’ empirical stances with secondary data. Valuable knowledge on how far NGOs can play their roles and that the supporting roles of NGOs can help IDP-returnees ease confrontations with the harse reality of rebuilding social authoritative structure and relationships are discussed.

5.2 CAUSES OF WAR IN ACHOLILAND

The causes of war in Acholiland reaped various explanations depending on who you talk to. Following the unique and complex nature of the war, the political development of Uganda (chapter three), the internal and external crises, internal displacements and realities of return in respective villages of former IDPs, the causes of war in Northern Uganda has not been presented clearly. Finnstrom (2003), Jackson (2003), Branch (2005) and Dolan (2005) attempt to discuss on the root causes of the conflict in Northern Uganda from anthropological, socio-political and historical standpoints. Dolan (2005) cites the causes of war to the predation of Arab ivory and slave traders in the nineteenth century (Dolan 2005). Azar (1986: 36) argues that it is never easy to know when war truly begins. Some base it on deaths per year to reach a certain level or by articulating it on when the first short was fired.

Of the 17 major armed conflicts analysed in 2009 in 16 locations around the world, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) identifies the case of Northern Ugandan conflict as was inactive or not defined as ‘major’ until 2008 (Brzoska [SIPRI Yearbook] 2007 and Schnabel [SIPRI Yearbook] 2008). Other problems are according to Galtung (1996) based on the lack of “diagnose” and proper understanding of early conditions of structural violence that were created and eventually lead to physical violence (Dolan 2005). Defining root causes of conflict based on statistical data that was not known to the outside world, and on the one hand listening to the returnees who were subjected to violence that later defined their accumulated experiences, still pose challenges to NGOs’ work.
For over three years till 2009, I have been using a conflict-tree analysis-tool to probe deeper into these various perspectives about the causes of war in Northern Uganda so as to recommend entry points for interventions by Non-State actors. Top ex-LRA commanders, CBOs and NGOs officials, IDPs and camp officials, academics, diaspora community, LRA peace talk delegation’s position papers, religious leaders and traditional leaders were followed on the conflict-tree-analysis tool to identify the root causes of Northern Ugandan war.

Firstly, I followed the basic literature prerequisite that any intervention in any conflicts by outsiders/insiders require a detailed understanding (analysis) of the root causes of such conflict. Roles of NGOs whose action target the transformation of negative peace to positive peace (subsection 2.3.3) followed this prerequisite. It also followed NGOs’ methods of intervention (see framework of analysis) in Northern Uganda, which adapted NGOs’ operational and non-operational modes of conduct and principles. These modes did not exclude classifying NGOs as are political actors who played social roles while interacting, thus creating social realities in Acholiland.

The second prerequisite is to follow the ontological base [social crises] of former IDPs by identifying the returnees’ social problems and the particular social realities based on the root causes of the Northern war. Addressing social realities required exploration in bringing out empirical data on how far NGOs identified and fulfilled basic needs of war-affected population in Acholiland. This was done in relation to investigating what Acholi-returnees experienced in attempts to rebuild the destroyed lineage-based social authority and in how to restore relatationships.

Thirdly, there was need to understand the objective source of the renewed conflict in Northern Uganda (chapter three) of which the root causes were not only being understood as proximate causes and/or symptomatic in nature, but mainly centred on “needs” (Featherstone 2000: 2) and, see summary in appendix B:5.1 and appendix B:5.2. The changes in perspectives about what
returnees really want did not bring out the root causes of the war clearly. Rather, the Acholi people's social world and realities were viewed by most NGOs as are very complex and dynamic along the realist line of argument. In real terms there was no concern from NGOs and GoU to go deeper in finding out the true root causes of the conflict were. This realists’ view of NGOs and GoU are grounded in the argument that the denial of basic needs cause conflict (Crocker 2003 and Curl 1994). From the findings, the realist argument have been viewed by NGOs as a paradigm, or a cluster of assumptions [theoretical building] for practical implementation, thus forming roles of NGOs for intervention. The problematic is found to lie in the paradigmatic views of the world of returnees who opposed the practices of NGOs especially, in failing to fully support the rebuilding of lineage-based social authority in Acholiland. In that respect, the key needs of returnees in VoRs were found to be very complex and was not necessarily linked to some identified causes of war below.

Chapter three notes that the war between the GoU and the LRA was unique and complex, denoted with exacerbated internal and external crises, internal displacements and the realities of return in respective villages of former IDPs. Many returnees identified Joseph Kony's war as one cause of the war, a war of its own nature that has never been experienced in Uganda and Acholiland. However, Kony denies being the cause of war in Acholiland. He confirms in his recorded audio tape aired out on Mega FM, a local radio station in Gulu in April 2007 that LRA war is a succession from the previously failed wars. That he did not start the war but continued from where other insurgencies had failed. Kony expressed disappointment with the former UPDA officers and blamed Acholi elders who he claims, blessed his LRA take over from UPDA and at the same time were the very same elders and chiefs who forsook him. Kony tries in his realist approach to link LRA interest to Acholi needs in the name of taking over the government from Museveni. But, Kony’s mixing of his needs to overthrow the government using the ten biblical doctrine and his interests to save Acholi, poses ideological constraints, at least from amongst the realists NGOs who do not subscribe to this claim. Jackson (2007: 5) argues that the demonisation
of LRA leadership has prevented meaningful analysis in the Western media about the root causes of the conflict and the reason why the war has become so brutal and taken so long. In an interview with the former Chairperson of ARLPI, Bishop Ochola (2009) argues that probably the word “Lord” contained in the [L]RA and “Holy” in [H]SM are the problems. This confusion moved Acholi-returnees’ needs to a position (during war times) of developing interest (while in IDP camps) to have tremendous coping mechanism. Appendix B-5:2I summarises on the position, interest and needs (PIN) of returnees.

Nobody is responsible for causes of war in Acholi sub-region but many have different interests. While Kony’s message seems to be facilitating his movement’s interest to fulfil the needs of Acholi people, it disrupts exploration to designing action based on identified causes of conflicts. Interviewees from NRC, CARITAS and AVSI NGO-field workers and the government district officials (2007-2009) reject Kony’s movement’s interest to fulfil the needs of Acholi as a basis for supporting Acholi people, thus facilitating Kony’s agendas. On the one hand, the government’s approach to solving the crises in Acholiland is found to illustrate the subjective nature of the perceptions and definition of Acholi social crises based on NGOs and expert views, not referring it to causes of the war itself. The government denied many reports on Acholi crises exist, thus no or less actions taken. On the other hand, the GoU’s argument is that Kony places himself in the position of mobilising Acholi people only within the transformative scope of waging his war, a perception that was heavily based on judgements about values within which Kony tends to define Acholi social problems and social realities.

Acholi people find themselves caught up in the middle. Instead, they turned more to NGOs for interim and short term responsive, contingency and complementary support. NGOs supported

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2 Bishop Ochola repeated his statement he gave in Stockholm on 27th September 2003 while meeting with members of Acholi Society in Scandinavia and the church congregation. Ochola was emphasising on the nonviolent approaches to fight a bad system and how to address issues relating to rebuilding a strong lineage-based Acholi identity and as a people to accept one another [strengthening of Acholi-Acholi Relationships] and to stand against humiliation and encampment which is tantamount to death [return to villages of origins]. Ochola was accompanied by Aruu MP, Hon Otto Odonga.
Acholi people more but with the government (see sub-section 2.6.1) full involvement, and in Fisher’s and Keashley’s (1996: 256-261; 1993 and 1991) views, this is the objective-subjective view that mixes interest-based challenges of the war with the changing context of the war. The causes of war has been muddled up with the current social crises in Acholi and government policy. The latter being understood in various dimensions, now that the 25 years' war ended.

Interviewees from NGO-field workers and government officials confirm that major underlying causes of the war have been based on the accumulated historical facts, rather than particular recent needs or interest of LRA leaderships or to those of returnees. However, majority of Acholi people agree that NGOs failed to support Acholi people based on the improper analysis of the causes of war in Acholiland. In an interviewee with Gulu NGOs-Forum (2009), LRA rebellion and others are not the causes of war in Acholiland. NGO-forum project manager (2009) adds that attention was mainly focused on suppressing the North militarily, thus allowing the conflict continuum to be mirrored on the LRA as an Acholi war. But in the actual sense, both LRA and UPDF operations were acting in concert with one another. This latter view supports the problematic of realism mentioned above.

However, UNHCR (2009) puts it into context that the causes of northern Uganda war were a combination of historical reasons based on national political propaganda of “Acholinisation of the war”. The north-south dividing factor, lack of government political will and the protraction of the war itself provided enough evidence about the Acholinisation of the war. Appendix B:4.2 summarises the above points.

Other schools of thoughts from NGOs and Government officials argue that major causes of the conflict lie in the self-generated failure of Acholi people to resolve and strengthen their internally weakened lineage-based social authority and in the broken-down relationships with other parts of Uganda. This view was rejected by many including the diaspora community who, for example, view Museveni’s action and LRA modalities of building a new Acholi lineage-based social authority
as are congruent in fighting Acholi people. On the other hand, NGOs support to sector activities for rebuilding structural damages caused by the conflict did not come as a result of proper analysis to the structural causes of the war. That explains why NGOs continued support addressed only the symptoms/effects of the war, like confidence-building, reinforcing dialogue structures amongst IDP-returnees and neighbours, promoting income generating activities (IGAs), provision of social services and supporting Extremely Vulnerable Individuals/Perssons and Persons with Special Needs (EVIs/PSNs).

NGOs’ advocacy roles in rebuilding the broken-down relationships was identified to be based on the selective promotion of nonviolent judicial mechanisms, rather than on identified causes of the war so as to increase the transformation of alternative structures. According to most NGOs workers who were interviewed, the advocacy roles of NGOs has been to counter both LRA and UPDF denial that the war destroyed Acholi social structures and relationships. The consequence of which usually makes NGOs’ work based on principles and codes of conduct very difficult. Rather, views of NGOs workers about the causes of the war have bases on the documented reports and books, similar to those of Government officials’. This context reflects more to four major causes of the war discussed below and summarised in appendix B-5.2. These triangulated variations from other Acholi people lie in the NGOs’ and government officials’ policy guidelines, reports and from previous lessons-learnt. NGOs’ roles were more reactive (short term and interim) than proactive (long term).

In Kitgum, a local NGO Director (interviewee, LNGO 2009) stated that the relationship between Acholi IDPs with the Government and LRA widely strayed because they both could have contributed to the root causes of this war. Nonetheless, NGOs became stronger and closer to the local population, see framework of analysis in sub-section 2.6. Sections of Northern Ugandan population have previously argued that UPDA, the defeated and regrouped ex-UNLA soldiers brought war home in Acholiland, because they behaved badly during their service in the army.
When UPDA pioneered better resistance to Museveni’s rule in Acholiland in mid to late 1980s, this view was changing, in that, UPDA was justifying her insurgent action to correct their past mistakes and protect Acholi people. In a Kacoke Madit [Grand Meeting in Acholi Inaguage] peace conference held in Nairobi 2000, two elderly (male and female) argued that UPDA had good cause to fight NRA not entirely to defend their bad acts in previous government, but defend Acholi people. These elders actually endorsed the establishment of UPDA and supported them with food and information.

In an interview with an ex-soldier (2009) who served in the UNLA and later joined UPDA, HSM, LRA and signed up for amnesty, asserts that UNLA broke because of the death of former Army Commander in the Obote II government. Oyite Ojok died in the mysterious helicopter crash (chapter three). To him, Oyite’s death escalated every cause of war in Northern Uganda. Oyite Ojok is a Langi by tribe and it is believed that his replacement sparked division between the Acholi and Langi top army officers on who should succeed Oyite Ojok. This view on the cause of war in Northern Uganda is localised to mostly former army officers and not civilian population in Acholiland. Another interviewee, an ex-soldier (2009) says that the need to defend Acholi people through UPDA insurgency was to stop Museveni and defend Acholi people.

The older King's African Riffle (KAR) veterans were weaken and Museveni took advantage of the internally divided and weak army. He [Museveni] took advantage of Acholi internal weaknesses to broaden his internal and external political domination and military support from within other tribes and from outside. Museveni blamed the UNLA top commanders for failing to understand and utilise the contemporary politics of Uganda apace modernity and globilisation. Museveni used the divide and rule, south and north over the years from independence in 1962 and left Northerners to “rot” (interviewee, Gulu University Director 2008).

In an interview with human right workers and amnesty commission respondents (2007, 2008 and 2009), Acholi was left to rot and that backfired on the government. As a state Uganda, failed to
observe principles of protections of its citizens and democratic human rights. This was named as one major cause of the escalated conflict in Acholiland. This justice-based perspectives were strengthened by all the eight FGDs carried out in (2009) to have formed a general consensus that Acholi people were collectively being punished along ethnic and identity lines. This view is strongly expressed, that the cause of the war in Uganda as a whole is ethnic based and are interlinked within the preplaned structural violence (historical context), overworked mindset and dishearting programming against Northerners (attitude of north-south divide) and the actual killings, rape (behaviours) of Northerners, (see Galtung’s ABC-Triangle). The Acholi IDPs confirm this view, but non-conforms with the perspectives and opinion of NGOs field workers and Government Officials.

As mentioned already, the identified causes of the war mixed up what would be termed as symptoms/effects of the previous and existing wars with core problem. NGOs have been addressing primarily symptoms/effects (visible violence) rather than addressing the structural causes of war (invisible violence) and the overall culture of violence. The effects also included major failures to realise the structural causes propelled forward by government policies. For example, the policy of “protected villages” for example exacerbated and prolonged the war. The failure of the international communities to speak out and ban civilian internal confinements, declare Northern Uganda a disaster area, failure to recognise the too over-burdened bureaucratic and consent based political authority in Acholiland, all aggravated the conflict. The perceptions of Acholi IDP-returnees suggest that the causes of war lies in the intended and pre-planned systemic/structural actions on them. Within the IDPs, these varying opinions about the causes of the conflict followed along sex, age, experiences, profession and level of education.

Youths in their twenties and below were followed and they mostly referenced to proximate causes of the war and effects/symptoms, just like the NGOs and to some extent government officials. This can explain why NGOs and youths have been consistently convergent on the future development of social recovery in Acholiland. However, IDP-returnees’ fundamental needs remain contextual in both
structural and systemic nature. The fulfilment of needs and interest has created severe attitudinal and behavioural dependency on NGOs. Jackson (2003) argues that the economic causes of war based on greed and grievances that has been so much akin to most Sub-Saharan African civil conflict is not anymore applicable in the Northern Ugandan case.

It was not clearly stated by a youth camp leader in Pabo, Amuru (2009) who was barely 10 years before the war started, that the context to the conflict and its causes and breakdown of lineage-based social authority in Acholiland was IDPs life-style. In his view, it started from February 1986 when the societal devolution to find ways of adjusting to civilian lives in Acholiland was unimaginable. Acholi needed quick readjustment through local leadership, and those who could locally organise civil population. However, there were no such leadership to give sense of directions. Therefore aggressions, assumptions of leaders[hip] roles, resistance to such drastic changes and confusion took over. The camp leader was mainly attributing to the lack of local leadership structure and non existances of the middle to top leaderships in Acholi as one historical cause of the war in Acholiland.

Acholi Elders Forum member from Kitgum North (70 years) mentioned in a FGD that the causes of the war were tramped up by the accumulated fears Acholi people harboured starting from Amin’s persecution in the 1970s. And, eminently, Museveni was repeating the history of persecution of Acholi. He adds, “...we perceived the Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) would not be different from Idi Amin’s in the 1970s” (interviewee, an Elder in Kitgum 2009). According to this elder in Kitgum (2009), Museveni’s regime is still being perceived as having a clear set agenda to clear Acholi people off Uganda’s map. Acholi sons who served as soldiers of the UNLA lost power, ran towards Southern part of Sudan, unemployed and could not live civilian lives. Their fears soon became greater than the locals’, but the fears were quickly shared all over the region. The cause of the war was common knowledge, war propaganda and historical facts were all there to confirm these fears. NRA began to exhibit aggression on Acholi civilian when
they started tying people “kandoya” and “brief-case”. (North Kitgum Elder Forum member 2009), a very severe form of punishment. This elder was suggesting that the cause of war was actually based on the fear and NRA propaganda of war that tramped up rumours in soldiers that Acholi people are warlike and never give up easily, thus needs to be crashed. NRA became more brutal and were acting like an invading army in the name of liberation advocating for the country’s ten point program that would effect Uganda’s system overhaul.

Most Acholi elders and traditional chiefs who were interviewed argue that the complex nature and continuums of conflict to peace patterns and its historical impact on Acholi people was due to bad leadership. Leadership issue stands out as one major gap based on the failure to trace the causes of war in Uganda. To them, what is being seen in Northern Uganda has been as a result of ignored roles of elders and the lack of respect that could have strengthened the lineage-based social authority in Acholiland, which used to bind Acholi people together. These patterns did not help mobilise the supporting linkages between the resolution of internal and external crises. Army officers who claimed the military ranks assumed leadership statuses as was sometimes opposed to the middle class peasantry who worked to gain their statuses in the society.

Chapter four discusses that it was mostly the elderly and the educated Acholi people who believe that the colonially designed economic imbalance that was part of divide-and-rule policy is one major cause of conflict in Northern Uganda, was being deployed by the Museveni regime. An IDP women camp leader (72) years old argues that the majority of Acholi people lacked strong and organised leadership structure to mobilise people as there is no lineage-based functional authority to centrally bind them. Her view seems to oppose the colonialist’s past policy. Her view tallys well with all the nine FGDs members who agree that Acholi leadership structure has since been weak. FGDs argue that military ranks and positions formed the pioneering roles and models in the

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3 Kandoya is a method of torture where hands were tied on victim’s back hard enough to expose the chess to block breathing. Death and paralysis occurs as time went on. Brief-case is when the two hands and legs would be tied together and the victim would be hang dangling like a brief-case.
society. There has not been any strengthened mix of leadership from middle-class and veteran soldiers to promote and support the *Rwot-Kweri* (Hoe Chief), elders and chiefs in Acholiland. Paicho men’s FGDs (2009) add that the criteria for choosing *Hoe Chiefs* were earned based on knowledge, experience and age, not army ranks. But NGOs have filled in the current missing gaps by forming Camp Leadership social structure. The introduced government policy on urbanisation of IDP-Camps and the militarisation of agricultural reform, introduced by Museveni’s brother, Salim Saleh in his Security and Production Plan (SSP) 2003, is rejected by returnees. NGOs did not work with that. Rather, better option for addressing the leadership, economic and security deficit in Acholi which is perceived by many academics as a source of conflict and poverty in Acholiland are left between government governance system, traditional leaders and a vacuum NGOs created.

Gulu University Director (2009) predates his diagnosed poor leadership structure of contemporary Acholi to the traces of the historical myth of Acholi in today’s Uganda as the first cause of the break-down in lineage-based social authority of elders and would-be leaders. The mythical history is based on the story of the ancestral father, Olum whose two sons, Labongo and Gipiir had bitter separation at Pubungu, currently known as Pakwach in West Nile. The historical context narrates that the separation led to opposite migration from Pakwach. The separation also lead to the formation of eastern Luo, the Acholi people from Labongo and Gipiir form the western Luo. The Gulu University Director claims that the bitterness continues to haunt Acholi people from garnering better sense of unity and forging attitudes to respect their leaders.

The Director also believes that the apparent divergences in views lack knowledge about the contextual socio-economic, cultural and direct forms of violence, that was structured in the political and socio-economic systems in Uganda over time. Most Acholi people are not well aware of the deep-seated structural causes of the war and how to unpack the structurally designed consequences following from the past. These have played major structured and systemic roles
that NGOs, and the younger generations may not be bothered about. NGOs and youths understand very well the current economic imbalances the war brought in Acholiland, but not as an historically compounded and generated past.

In a rare occasion, the LRA delegation in the JPTs claimed some of the deep-seated root causes of the war in Uganda as lack of power sharing, unfair representations in national political positions, destructions and looting of properties from Acholiland. Returnees and civilian Acholi people argue that the LRA delegation who were mostly from the diasporas did not reflect local contexts and grassroots perspective. The LRA position paper on root causes of the conflict gave different views. It was definitely opposed to the GoU’s peace talk delegations. Both parties failed to pursue on how to address the root causes of the conflicts. They also failed to explain the extent to which CSOs would play a part in transforming the war towards peace under the JPTs protocols.

The Gulu Human Rights Focus Director (2008) thought it was all about power sharing between top LRA and the GoU officials, which could not be overlooked to include parties’ common interests. In his view, the Director (2008) says it was not unusual for the emotionally charged and seemingly violent parties to hotly pursue peace talks, and yet their rigid positions and interests were concealed in their (Kony’s and Museveni’s) individualistic and/or socially binding claims to own fundamental needs - power. Darweish (2010) and Francis (2002) maintain that once the cause of war is based on the imbalance in power and it came through negotiated agreements, a relapse into fresher wars are possible. The failure to address power-sharing deal seen as a root cause of the war left doubts and mistrust not only amongst the LRA negotiators but also amongst returnees.

The Acholi CSOs identified the causes of the war for official representation at the JPTs but both CSOs, traditional leaders and NGOs were only allowed to observe. Grouped under the Ker Kwaro Acholi Paramount Chief, Rwot Acana, CSOs and LNOs compiled root causes of conflict
contained in appendix B-4.2. The causes have been similar to (Galtung 1995) ideas and the historical facts in Uganda.

The divergences in perspectives about the root causes of the conflict in Northern Uganda made it difficult to exactly secure a further apportioning of JPTs agenda, questioning on responsibility, accountability and reconciliation for post-war recovery. The perspectives would have explained how the war started and the destruction it brought, how it ended and how a new beginning can be supported by NGOs. IDP-returnees could not define the causes of war and to express what happened to them properly. These were similar kinds of patterns and responses NGOs and the government officials expressed about returnees. This could be because, many returnees saw themselves as victims, while others as perpetuators or both, the resulting force of which made many to shy away from talking details. In an interview with the project manager of GOAL (2009) in Kalongo argues that NGOs did not give enough pressure and progressive plans to the government because they did not know the true causes of the conflict to address. He adds that had NGOs gotten the clear background to the causes of conflicts, they would have been able to give pressure to the government. The war would have ended a long time.

The above reflection suggests that the causes of conflict had some ontological patterns that impacted on human lives, juxtaposed with the confusion between locating the positions, interests and needs of the multiple actors in the war in Acholiland. There was a general consensus amongst middle class and highly educated Acholi people that the root causes of the conflict has links to the historical facts based on the British, colonial policy of divide-and-rule. That, the divide-and-rule policy unbalanced occupations and professions in the country. The struggle to gain power and its shift that generated fear of reprisals was another that is annotated by ethnic fault lines and hatred. The latter is believed by middle class Acholi to have systematically developed while the former were radical measures the British used to mobilise the contemporary Uganda.
Again, most middle class population agree that NGOs’ roles centred on responses and actions without involving Acholi people to address the root causes to the war.

These common views can be concluded that in a nested paradigm structure like the lineage-based social system of Acholi people, there is need to address not only the root causes of conflicts, but also actors, relational and structural dimensions. There is also the contextual causes of Northern Ugandan conflict, uniqueness of the human dimensions of understanding relationships and the social structures involved. Most NGOs have moved towards reconstruction by identifying the many post-war social recovery gaps. Identification of root causes do not only form the perspectives of the shifting NGOs’ activities from relief to reconstruction but also the roles they play to mobilise and support the returnees. The GoUs’ and NGOs’ views concur on issues of policy implementations. The local government leadership structure needed NGOs to continue with relief aid distribution and provide assistance, especially to EVIs/PSNs. These perspectives showed reflections about the wider problem of deep-seated causes of persistent violent conflicts that inclines towards the perpetrator–victim dycotomy, as well as to the victim-perpetuator co-existence that generally lacked attention.

Generally, this sub-section can be summarised to have found four major causes of the war (see details in appendix B-4.20). The first is about the unbalanced distribution of occupations and professions by the colonial leaders. The core problems has been lack of a united spirit of nationalism, division between the militarily that was dominated by the north against the economically better southern Bantu ethnic groups. Linked to that is the second consistent issues of ethnicity and identity, some of which are aggravating while others are triggering factors. Diversity was not used as a positive force to unite Ugandans, rather formed the core problem to effect collective punishment arguments, bureaucratic and consent-based political repressions on the subsequent serving regimes. The subsequent regimes usually fail to protect the civilian
population on the loosing sides. The effect of this has been identified as constituting to the creation of internal crisis like internal displacements and refugees.

Thirdly, the socio-political causes of war in Uganda reveals many aggravating and triggering root causes too. Desparities in the socio-political cases of war aggravated the poor public sector management, corruption, marginalisation, and obsessions to manipulate power through nepotisms as are centrally steered. Those in government have power and vested interest in keeping it going because they benefit personally through corruption (interviewee, NGO official in Gulu 2009). The result has been widespread oppressions and promotion of self-enrichment and countrywide poverty.

Lastly, the socio-economic exclusions has had at its core policies of social sanctions that excluded northerners from the mainstream economic growth. The effects have also formed the major context to the lack of social services, weak and corrupt judicial systems, and poor infrastructural, political and decayed moral standard. Dolan (2005) summarises these as social torture. The next sub-section 5.3 narrows down to identifying Acholi IDPs-returnees’ needs in VoRs. This follows on the changing IDP-returnees’ social realities [ontological basis], the patterns of NGO support provided and the representative roles of NGOs and government officials in Acholiland.

5.3 MEETING UNENDING NEEDS OF RETURNEES

Fundamentally, the needs to socially rebuild Acholiland, and the priorities on what roles NGOs play considerably varied from contingency support, advocacy to institutional transformation and development roles. Appendix B-5.2 summarises IDP-returnees’ positions, interests and needs. The variations depended on how NGOs have been working with both GoU and UN policies to allocate specific roles and activities to different NGOs. In an interview with Akwinya (2009) both the GoU and NGOs say many things but they do not deliver. Tee-Ilwa FGDs (2009) confirm that NGOs have indeed tried to do their best, but government initiatives failed to deliver, especially the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) who are very corrupt.
Responses arising from IDP-returnees about any reduced dependency on NGOs gave mixed perspectives, depending on whether GoU officials made the promises or NGOs. Some IDPs were positive about cattle restocking schemes and provision of seeds and farm implements as best way of meeting fundamental needs of returnees in VoRs. At the grassroots level, the failure to provide for example, clean drinking water in VoRs were seen as one big failure of NGO activities' implementation. Concerns from IDP-returnees agree that NGOs duplicate activities, which were sometimes not easily accepted by the representatives of other NGOs, but were blamed on the changing government policies.

My framework of analysis suggests that this kind of duplication is more prevalent within INGOs who fail to integrate horizontal and vertical activities with grassroots and middle range leaders. The middle-range leaders known mostly as middle-class elites whose background were grounded on the linkages from grassroots farmers, teachers, religious leaders to the district and national levels are very weak or missing. These have made the various and unending list of needs of returnees fundamentally changing in demands and difficult to streamline. This view was explained in subsection 2.5 in which Max-Neefs and Maslow's hierarchy of needs diverge. Max-Neef et al (1991) treat needs in their 36-cell matrix as satisfiers (see appendix B-5.1). The prioritisation follows from analysing NGOs’ activities and roles that found returnees’ needs have always remained basic - a “must have”.

Returnees’ needs diverged from those of NGOs’ and government officials’ especially, on how far safety, sense of belonging, esteem to prosper and self-actualisation are reached. Max-Neef (1991) includes subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure, creation, identity and freedom. The perceptions of Acholi IDPs-returnees also include existential categories of being, having own space (an Rwot ki oda) meaning in Acholi, “I am a chief in my own home” (see Appendix B-5.1). The perspectives of returnees are heavily reinforced by Max-Neef’s view of identifying needs. It provides logical and analytical considerations in understanding roles NGOs played in mobilising and supporting them.
The typology of NGOs provided in chapter two suggest that empowerment and transformation scope of NGO roles include, but are not limited to developing local institutions. However, there are simultaneity, complementarities and trade-offs in NGOs’ roles-sets as can be distinguished from returnees’ perceptions, especially in the process of needs satisfaction. This is because NGOs continued to support and mobilise the IDPs into the post-conflict recovery phase in an ad-hoc relief/aid supporting manner, providing hands-on direct services (see sub-section 2.6). Major activities that remain to be addressed include support in fulfilling physiological and biological needs that was created in the over 25 years of war. In an interview with NRC workers (2009), IDPs have become passive and redundant. IDPs believe that it is the role of NRC to support locally-based social services like building schools, health centres, huts and road constructions. Such NGOs have done less in areas of advocacy and policy changes aimed at improving the lives of returnees.

5.3.1 SUPPORTING LOCALLY BASED SOCIAL SERVICES

One NGO roles identified by the framework of analysis is the provision of both direct and indirect services to support locally-based social services. Grassroots perspectives diverged widely from those of NGOs’ and government officials’. Based on the framework, locally-based social services may form part of what can be fundamentally systematised human needs, which in NGOs’ and government officials’ views are mostly driven by NGOs’ budgets and GoU’s policy. The IDP-returnees, some NGO-field workers and most government officials did not clearly express the extent to which policy-driven activities were impacting on rebuilding, say locally-based social authority and reconciliation.

NGOs’ involvement to strengthen and rebuild Acholi people’s social services fall within the empowerment and transformative bottom right quadrant of NGOs’ typology and activities in figure 2.6.2 which requires policy orientation and funding. It is mentioned in the framework of analysis that the services require long term strategy from NGOs. Rebuilding social infrastructures and supporting government related social institutions like schools, health centres, road rehabilitation,
livelihood support, micro-finance and IGAs have become primarily roles of NGOs. However, returnees still need continued relief aid distribution for at least two or more years. An interviewee, Opobo (2009) argues on the “no reason to go home” when at 70 years of age he bears no attachment to. Other elders rebuke Opobo’s attitude on the loss of coping mechanisms, excessive drinking habit and in the loss of family members many bear experience to.

According to a female interviewee, Lakot (2009) who is 70 years old, locally-based social services never were made available by the GoU, but some NGOs have tried a lot. In VoRs, there are no schools, no health centres and no water points compared to while it was in IDP-camps. Food ratios, start up packages to facilitate returns were not provided, because return still remains voluntary and must be done in safety and by informed consent of individual returnee. Lakot’s comment refers to the failure on the part of implementing the push and pull government policy by NGOs, a section of analysis which deals with systemic and long-term policy and fund-raising methods of indirect service provision. An interview with Too-rac (2009) who runs a local NGO which is contracted to build schools, estates and latrines in villages and parishes shares Lakot’s perceptions. The views suggest that LNGOs are always caught up in competition with highly funded NGOs. LNGOs lack strong lobbying power and the withdrawal of INGOs leaves behind dependency syndrome, redundant social realities as opposed to hardwork which is now evident in Acholiland. Too-rac argues that Acholi people do not have work spirit and hygienic feeling to dig own latrines in VoRs because NGOs have taken over simple but voluntary community spirits and responsibility.

Literatures especially from Atkin (2007) argue that NGO workers fill every available hotel room, which are so sought after. NGOs occupy ground floors while the first floor is still being constructed. NGO employees drive in “four by four vehicles”, young white volunteers walk and
cycle through the town as casually as if they were going to college at home.4 Staffs from NGO Forum in Gulu (2009) consider the fluctuating record of an estimated 500 NGOs5 in Gulu town alone towards the end of 2007 as having redrawn their strategies to suit post-war social conditions. NGOs have become sub-contractors of government and INGO projects and are grassroots agents of social and financial power, driving lifeline for the communities, businesses, architectural designs, education career to suit labour markets after graduation” (interviewee, Kitara 2009). “NGOs are our main customers and they pay us in US dollars. They are depriving local efforts to rebuild social structures in villages, rather, younger people are moving to cities” (interviewee, an Estate Broker only named as Estate 2008 and 2009). “NGOs erect very poor schools and health centres and are sometimes semi-finished” (interviewee, Otim-Ogal 2009). For example, in Lakwana, Save the Children simply painted one unfinished school that was being built by AVSI. The school was built to demonstrate government push-policy (interviewees, Adong and Ocen 2009). The government is unseen in villages, but the pace of moving away from relief to reconstruction is faster than mass education (interviewees, Ocen and Adong 2009).

LRA returnees have been treated carefully at the GUSCO centre. In the interviews conducted with Anywar (2009) and Atkinson (2009) the actions necessary to support ex-LRA soldiers and abducted returnees still treat most ex-LRA returnees as EVIs/PSNs. The fundamental needs of ex-LRA in respective villages especially in the areas of physiological and biological needs are unattended to. The activities of GUSCO in this area has stopped during the camp phase out (interviewee, GUSCO 2009).

Education amongst youths, retired teachers, councillors and NGO workers were distinctively cited to support curriculm based civic education, vocational training and mainstream education, that is

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4 This view is consistent with (Hilary Atkins from SOS-Kinderdorf International, 16-04-07). This idea alludes to Toorach who runs his LNGO from Ayul in Kitgum District but has his offices in Pader, Gulu and Amuru.

5 This figure was reported on the AllAfrican.com and NGO Forum in Gulu, but the actual figures keep fluctuating depending on the government regulation of NGOs policy and partly, the redrawing of NGO strategies to suit the post-war conditions.
to say, formal and informal education. However, IDP-returnees are failing to balance most immediate needs with the long-term educational investment needs (interviewee, Adong 2009). NGOs can not bridge the gaps through capacity building training alone as we tend to close down many activities (interviewee, Kilama 2009). In rebuilding a future Acholi social structure, almost all interviewees believe that education is the key. Interviews with many youths agree that many youths missed out their quality education and lack substantial knowledge to analyse and reflect on the changes from war to peace, which greatly hinders their successes (interviewee, Latigo 2009).

Youths prefer formal education in schools to get better paid up jobs, preferably with NGOs. Youths who dropped out of schools prefer IGAs with the capital boost to be coming from agricultural production and NGOs, not from the government who fail on their [government] promise.

Youths’ FGDs in Paicho (2009) note that the reason for remaining in the camp before return and/or passing through transit camps, and eventually join parents and relatives in VoRs is because, there are no social services like schools and health centers. Everything is starting from scratch. Scholastic materials and teachers are not there. Teachers still cycle from Gulu town to over 20 miles away, and sometimes they never turn up for work. An informant, NGO-field worker who lived through the more than two decades of war says that returnees need reconstruction and development and minimised support and mobilisation to address physiological and biological needs like before. His view is that capacity building and education so received can bridge the gap of knowledge. But his view is disapproved by the fact that NGOs do not put effort in post-war reconstruction and development, meaning, NGOs mostly offer intermediary services at the post-war social recovery period. For example, NRC employed about 600 trained volunteers at the peak of the insurgency downsized her staffs to about 150 workers by the end of 2009. Hundreds of educated youths are jobless as INGOs pull out or scale down their activities in the north (interviewee, Ogwok 2009).

As a result, there is alarming increase in the number of unemployed, and educated youths are causing social problems, because of lack of planning to absorb jobless young graduates. An
interview with AVSI employee, Adong (2009) notes that IDPs are in constant need, because they see NGOs as the only lifeline in providing humanitarian relief. Therefore, social recovery becomes slow because changes in perceptions amongst returnees especially young graduates is to pursue education with the intention of getting job with NGOs. Almost every graduate want to work with NGOs in Acholi. This dependency syndrome on NGOs is cancerous against boosting up coping mechanisms, self motivation and creativity. Anywar (2009) raises issues regarding “coping mechanism”, highly articulated by Atkinson (2010) that the Acholi IDPs-returnees used to learn how to survive as a community, but it is unclear now that return process and camp-phase-out has posed many challenges to individual survival.

5.3.2 CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS

Of all the FGDs the researcher conducted, the need to build the capacity of IDPs-returnees has been suggested to embrace the wider community sensitisation. Capacity building training has most of the time been attributed to the context of fundamental need for both formal and informal education. This is to mainstream and reinforce both formal and informal curriculum in education sector. Informal education in the form of community sensitisation has to prioritise strengthening agricultural sector and IGAs leading to self-employment. NGOs are closing shops but returnees cannot compete for white-collar jobs. “As farmers, we need to diversify our agricultural mechanisms, skills in storing and preserving food, what is consumable and what is for sale and marketing” (interviewee, Otim 2009).

Informal education that targets major areas of agriculture can be included amongst NGO exit strategies (interviewee, IRC and UNHCR officials 2009). But there is lack of resources and ill preparedness on the part of the GoU to own return programs and projects. In an interview with AVSI project coordinator (2009), AVSI’s capacity building programmes are to design exit strategies to allow the government to begin setting up local council leadership elections in villages. But the government claims incapacitation based on lack of finances and qualified personnel (interviewee, Adong 2009).
Capacity building programmes are also hindered by the lack of qualified trainers, teachers, scholastic materials, medicines and unqualified doctors. Exorbitant money has to be paid to access these services (interviewee, Olango 2009). Returnees agree that capacity building training offered many new ideas, especially on how to generate income, something many learnt while in camps. As was mentioned above, capacity building needs is closely linked to education needs. Likewise, perceptions about capacity building varied considerably. In an interview with Olaa (2009) there are lots of weaknesses from conflict transforming actors if one looks at the quality, structure of training, familiarities and impacts of the series of seminars, workshops, sensitisation programmes, human rights meetings, DDMC reports, policy reviews and distribution of Per Diem at the end of the day” (Olaa 2009). An AVSI employee (2009) says that a lot of money is spent on administration compared to what should be delivered to IDPs. The quality of trainings are sometimes very poor. Most IDPs are illiterate, so trainings must be tailored according to their levels of understanding.

Despite the lack of in-depth capacity building, the experience and know-how of NGOs are being used in Acholiland, but, this study finds that, that can only be used to fulfil the short- and to the mid-term needs. The framework of analysis argues that the presence of a strong foreign NGOs, namely most INGOs, may complicate the role of the government, instead of adding value to national development, as well as creating a new form of social reality in Acholiland.

5.3.3 NEED FOR INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES

Although there are ambivalent attitudes adopted towards NGOs, attempts to rebuild Acholi social structure through income generating activities (IGAs) micro-finance schemes have given much more desired relationships with NGOs like AVSI and IA. IGA scheme is a new and eye-catching social phenomenon that has attracted mostly women and youths. NGOs are supporting IGAs as a means of achieving sustainable durable solution.
In a joint NGOs’ report, IGA has clearly reaped results in the neighbouring districts of Lango, Teso and West Nile where return took place earlier. The report cites the successful micro-finance and IGA schemes that became one important means of raising living conditions and mobilising actors to rebuild social structures. IGA pursu was directly linked to socio-economic developmental activities and are mainly connected to sales of agricultural products, bee keeping, pottery and charcoal burning. The GoU provides very little support in these sectors compared to NGOs’.

IGAs are now being seen as one of the most sustainable activities amongst returnees to support agricultural production in a commercialised mode and scale. An interviewed AVSI NGO-field worker (2009) in Paicho says that returnees want to be independent economically. However, since return, the level of household income declined so low that most families can not afford two meals a day. Returnees are exploiting the natural environment and agricultural production to boost income. In Amuru district, discussants from the NRC-field workers (2009) agree that household economy must be boosted so that the community are able to support their children up to University level of education.

Returnees need road access to market their agricultural products, health centres and water points. While IDP-returnees’ requests are directed towards NGOs rather than to the GoU. In turn, NGOs direct similar views and gaps they identify and gather from IDPs to the GoU. This vicious cycle of referencing sectored NGOs activities has left returnees doubtful about how far NGOs are able to support and represent their views locally, nationally and internationally.

Further, there are divergences that are primarily based on peasantry occupation using self-employment (farming) to generate agricultural activities for income, accessing roads, maintaining human and food security, supporting education and payment of school fees and making

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6 The displacement in Lango and Teso started much later than in Acoli, and the war ended quicker so many people could still identify themselves very strongly with the return programmes, unlike in Acoli sub-region which has been there for nearly 23 years.
medicines available in health centres and clinics. The international community supports the views that the GoU must take full control of returnees’ needs.

Convergences of opinions, especially amongst Acholi IDP-returnees, NGOs and government officials are that the EVIs/PSNs need more support because they cannot cope with the new changes in VoRs. EVIs/PSNs are identified as old male and female of over 60 years of age, but have no other younger family members to build huts, cook or take care of them. This convergence of views is also backed up by the International Alert (IA) (September 2008) views of “Investing in Peace” with the central hypothesis that peacebuilding in Northern Uganda require positive approaches to socio-economic recovery that are both strategic and cognisant of political realities. IA’s emphasis is to use political economy and conflict-sensitive lens to understand broad trends and challenges, and in identifying positive and negative examples of sectored and inter-sectored planning.

The role of NGOs is seen by many as are adding value to social development. But interviews with Paicho, AVSI NGO-field workers, Local Council Chairman-I (LC-I) (2009), CARITAS in Kalongo, Menya (2009) and the NRC-field worker in Gulu (2009) both argue that added-value should increase productive livelihood activities like food security, commercial farming, and cost sharing programmes. NGOs should also add-value by supporting confidence-building, reinforcing dialogue between LRA, Acholi and GoU. In an interview with Rwot Acana (2009), NGOs need to get IDP-returnees out from continued relief assistances, “bad culture” of aid dependency, drunkenness and prostitution to normality. As long as security (human and food) is restored, IGAs can boost socio-economic social recovery although land ownership have become a major source of disputes.

In all their roles, NGOs remain to be considered to be much more effective employers compared to state institutions. NGO funding sources and their engagement with the grassroots population went beyond government’s writ. It is possible that such situations may increase the risk of anti-government actions.
5.3.4 RESTORING SECURITY

The major role of NGOs identified in restoring security has been to reduce vulnerability, avoid and/or escape the insecurity of human, food and property inequalities. Returnees' shared views on security reform, a form of combating vulnerability, is about the core function of the state to stop LRA abductions and protect them. Some of these views confirm the Weberian standpoint that a state like Uganda can actually monopolise the use of force in the name of pursuing LRA. The mistrust Acholi people have on the army and police are prevalent. Previously, local militias performed the role of local defence (LDUs), but are now being trained to perform the roles of community police, commonly referred to as Special Police Constables (SPCs). The programme is being supported by World Vision.

While food and human security has been defined outside state protection, the fear of insecurity was expressed, reduced from the regional LRA return to Northern Uganda to focusing mainly on food and human security. This heaped more responsibilities on NGOs and the government to provide seeds and agricultural implements. GoU-Officials and NGO workers expressed considerable knowledge on security policy implications citing mainly national, food and human security in that order. This structuralist or holist approach NGOs and GoU undertook regarded new emerging social structures introduced by NGOs and GoU have powers that actually created social realities and social structures that we now see in villages of origins. According to Wednt (2008) social structures are irreducible to individuals and societies have social realities based on those individuals who are members of the society.

The Acholi-IDP-returnees prioritised food, human and national security. Fragmented security services in Acholiland such as Karimojong cattle raids and rag-tag highway robbers like, Boo-Kec ["vegetable is bitter" – prefer meat by stealing goats, cows and chicken] still pose threat although the national coherence to stop LRA is sustained. During the war and towards the JPTs, the perceived social reality was that, civil society groups be involved in institutionalising the tradition of sustained peace. The role of NGOs in Northern Uganda would identify social services and social
institutional transformation to assist in the process of survival, and security so as to overcome structural violence non-violently (Galtung 1996: 103-113). NGOs, CSOs and other actors opted for peace by peaceful means, addressed structural ties of oppressions that the LRA and UPDF inflicted. NGOs worked on empowerment programmes like boosting income generating activities, support to PSNs/EVIs, provision of medicines and more, for most Acholi IDPs who were in camps.

Before and immediately after JPTs in July 2006, the emphasis to improve security situation seems to tally well with the 2007 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (OECD-DAC). OECD-DAC suggests that the security sector reform framework requires a coordinated approach on police and military reform in an immediate and medium term support to returnees. However, this did not work in reality in VoRs. During return, evidences showed that, the transformation of security sectors focused on supporting and mobilising former Local Defence Forces/Units (LDF/U) re-trained and turned the forces into SPCs.

In an interview with Gulu elders (2009) the systems of social representations and material gains, language disclosures emphasised the missing political links between security strategy, public finances and civilian oversight of the local police to prevent LRA fresh attacks, represent and protect civilians. While NGOs trained their own personnel in removing Un-exploded Ordinances (UXO) like land mines that caused fear on return, the World Vision supported and mobilised IDPs to build social security structures manned by SPCs in VoRs. Interviewee, Aboda (2009) argues that the security is now dependent on SPCs because they are the local sons. Majority of the SPCs were former LDF/U or former LRA ex-combatants who have returned home, and some were newly recruited.

“Robbery and stealing is still rampant in villages” (interviewee, Oketayot 2009). The nature of conflict transformation in Uganda in chapter three argues that reintegration of former LRA and other belligerent groups did not take a formal Disarmament Demobilization Rehabilitation and
Reintegration (DDRR), rather fighters were integrated into the NRA before demobilisation and reintegration program in 1992 when the Uganda Veterans Assistance Program was launched (Colleta, Kostner and Wiederhofer 1996). Acholi Inn FGDs (2009) agree that most IDPs feel the government security is invisible in villages. Both human security (protection) and food security (livelihood) still refer personal security as processes which are mainly embedded in the structures of the new institutional transformation of government security structures in VoRs. Basic security, in terms of protection from roaming bandits is a new concern in the countryside. The transformed police are few.

Unlike in South Africa where the wage bill was expanded for security services as a transitional measure (South Africa Ministry of Defence 1996; Williams 2002; Batchelor and Dunne 1998), NGOs dealt more with food security leaving the GoU to cater for national and regional security. Literatures point out that formal DDR is not a guarantee as former ex-combatants may re-merge as hired killers. The trusts to guarantee legitimacy to serve the function of effective return amongst IDPs lacked professional handling, especially where psychosocial institutional reconstruction are most neded. Returnees have little social security especially when confronted with trauma, memories and alledged spirits and ghosts of those who were brutally killed. Indirectly, some NGOs provided professional measures (material support through chiefs) to deal with the evidence of collecting and burying human bones found lying in abandoned homes and water wells.

Security reforms in urban areas, like in Gulu police station is not different. It has more than 70 percent of prisoners who are juveniles. Most of them were former LRA ex-combatants who were once housed at Gulu Support the Children Organisation (GUSCO) psychosocial reception centre. In an interview with the police superintendent in Gulu (2009) there are no supporting community care for these children. Criminality remains a problem in the aftermath of the war (interviewee, Oryang 2009). Within return, returnees enjoyed mutual advantage and peaceful cooperation with NGOs rather than mutual hostility and destruction (Haralambos, et al. 2000: 1036) as opposed to GoU and LRA. NGOs’ provision of food security and human security placed NGOs to directly
support only a targeted people, the EVIs/PSNs. Allocation of funds and its criteria was later perceived by most IDPs as discriminating. Calling returnees “able or disable” IDPs create social sanctions, only in the strictest term to qualify others NGO support. Elders who should be classified ad EVIs/PSNs in Amuru town centre (2009) and Padibe in Kitgum – now Lamwo districts (2009) suggest that security should focus on the regional and national rather than localised groups.

Perspectives emanating from NGO-field workers, IDPs and government officials confirm that reforming security structures to community policing (SPC) did not combat robbery from Boo-Kec, criminality and Karimojong raids. NGOs and the state are actors who facilitate social reconstruction and such social structures and institutions are specifically leaving returnees as very “light” things, thus compromising the ideas that conflict transformation goals are holistic. This traditional view that the state is “givens” of world politics unfairly represents classes, agencies, gender and ethnicities, for example, in Kalongo, SPCs cannot withstand the aggressive Karimojong cattle rustlers from the neighbouring Karamoja. Pader and eastern part of Kitgum districts are most affected.

The rationalist on the one end relate preferences for food security to continue relief aid supplies from World Food Program (WFP) to remedy gaps in returnees’ mobilisation and sustainability. An interview with AVSI field-worker in Opit (2009) security situation in villages is now assured and access to the wider environment can be exploited, the level of income has also increased.

In Northern Uganda, policewomen were not mentioned by GoU officials as partners of SPCs but are represented in the national police force. In Namibia, Women and Child Protection Unit were created within the national police to address local and domestic and gender based violence (OECD 2007b). Similarly, in Liberia, the UN Mission (UNIMIL) all-female Formed Police Unit was a joint initiative to prevent crime and conduct night patrols with police amongst the locals (OECD 2007b). Like in Sierra Leone, the female victims were reluctant to come out in Northern Uganda, but, with the UN mission in Sirrea Leonean, helped create a Family Support Unit within the police
department that included women police (OECD 2007b). The Uganda police in Northern Uganda have both military and police backgrounds arising from the trained militias.

5.4 THE NEED TO REBUILD ACHOLI LINEAGE-BASED SOCIAL AUTHORITY

One major theme of rebuilding a post-war population after war, articulated in the Korten’s second generation of NGOs, is to create a community with greater harmony, tolerance, liberalism, even consensus between conflicting parties, and have a tautological peacebuilding institution. Rwot Lugai argues that Acholi institutional and systemic social transformation has not been fully implemented by NGOs (interviewee, Rwot Lugai 2009). In a much subjective interests, the dynamic Acholi lineage-based social authority has been severely destroyed by the war and NGOs could not rationalise state-oriented policy with the grassroots demands.

Within the framework of analysis, it can be confirmed that the Acholi people agree to their lineage-based social authority in VoRs as very weak or does not exist. And that NGOs’ hands-on and systemic scope of operation actually provided incentives, but also paved very little diplomatic interventions to end the war. During the war, followed by internal displacements, authoritative social structure of the Acholi people and, especially elders authority were severely challenged and lost. NGOs’ support and mobilisation to rebuild a strong Acholi social authority is inadequate or missing (interviewee, Okwera 2009). NGOs and government officials believe that Acholi lineage-based social authority will never be the same again although the ancestral land seems to be the drawing factor for returnees. The views are qualified by identifying an accompaniment through provision of quality education and capacity building of traditional leaderships. NGOs are also expected to play a role in facilitating traditional social reconciliation, sustainable development, providing space for job opportunities, access to land in both practical and policy ways, clearance of land mines, IGAs, micro-finance (soft loans) and sustainable solutions.

IDP-returnees really want peace and permanent returns in respective villages, traditional reconciliation, human and food security, roads to provide access to markets, agricultural tools and
seeds, IGAs, empowerment (soft loans and tax free years). These were repeated across Acholiland and the analytical framework suggests that the transformation of social structure and the development of Acholi people has to be boosted by the support of NGOs for long term recovery. Instead, key needs have always maintained on security, food, clean drinking water, schools, shelter and health care, land use and ownership and survival. These “must have” made NGOs to focus mainly on mitigating escalatory dynamics of returns on an ad-hoc basis and not long-term strategies that are embedded in the norms and values of Acholi people. This is not enough representation of Acholi views, now that they have returned home.

Acholi people and most NGOs agree that the GoU has been only interested in establishing national authority and control in the region, consolidation of national wealth by implementing (enforcement) development policies under the PRDP (2007-2010). This view has been established partly because the implementation of IDP- and NGO-policies that aimed at reducing poverty and promoting economic investment began to center mostly on land ownership and land-use. It was also being done through routing and permanenting the local council governance systems in Acholi so as to woe Acholi people into the national political system. All these have been possible because NGOs are packing their bags and partly the government cannot be overseen. This has down played participatory politics of NGOs in which political regulation of conflicts, accountability and corruption, media role, political cynicisms by government officials, values and ideals, security, and external support vanished.

Over the years, the GoU really wants to maintain political, military and economic power, control and authority over Northern Uganda. The government needs popular national support in the north, good international image, and have been using free universal primary and secondary education as political points gained. However, health centres, roads, leadership at the local council one (LC1) and (LC2) are still weak and are not aimed at supporting and strengthening Acholi lineage-based

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7 Detailed information are contained in the bottom left hand square in appendix B-5.2 and the diagram showing summary and linkages in perspectives.
social authority. The advocacy and policy orientation role of NGOs fails to support the local context in Acholiand. Rather, GoU land ownership and land use policy is still being seen as best opportunity for international, national and [local] investment. A representative of the elder’s forum in Amuru (2009) argued in the interview that the GoU desperately wants to increase its control, consolidate power and recognition and assume legitimate government authority in northern Uganda.

Most Acholi returnees who were met by the researcher, especially in all FGDs agree that most advocacy roles of NGOs are for soliciting funds. That, NGOs have been working to protect their good national and international working image, so is the government. In a FGDs in Tee-Ilwa (2009) self-sustaining projects and promotion of self-reliant community, working on identified gaps (EVIs/PSNs), monitoring and protecting returnees, camp demolitions and provision of sustainable livelihood to returnees are secondary work of intermediary NGOs. In Namokora (2009) FGDs, NGOs are understood to strive towards maintaining their neutrality in the name of nonviolent actors but tend to protect their mandate, codes of conducts, identity and legitimacy more than putting IDP needs afore. NGOs are only interested in extending their funding proposal in the name of maintaining their development plans and controls and not strengthening lineage-based authority of Acholi people (interviewee, elder in Alero 2009).

Although returnees’ views diverge from NGOs’ and that of government officials’, both agree that rebuilding a strong lineage-based social authority is key for returnees. However, this can only be done in the context of strengthening the social structure in VoRs.

5.4.1 STRENGTHENING ACHOLI SOCIAL STRUCTURE

NGOs can provide integrated services, create systems and scales social operations once the principle of effective delivery and sustainable development seek on locally appropriate and

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8 Detailed information are contained in the bottom right hand square in appendix B-5.2 and the diagram showing summary and linkages in perspectives.
grounded structures. However, NGO officials agree that the strength of Acholi is only dependent on owning and using land. Strengthening traditional leadership, social services, capacity building, education and boosting IGAs are huge challenges of social integration. The integrative role of NGOs, according to my framework of analysis is one way of rebuilding the lineage-based social authority. The Acholi people call it roco tee kwaro pa Acholi meaning, "re-juvinating/regenerating lineage-based traditional authority of Acholi". The destruction of Acholi social structure following the internal and external crises (discussed in chapter three) challenged the extent to which NGOs may be able to provide integrative roles.

The internal Acholi political order that was built since 1950s was significantly held by Acholi middle-class elites. Elites formed highly organised and linked authority from the decentralised pre-colonial socio-political structure to the grassroots. The linkages stabilised Achoil people from top, middle to grassroots level of leadership. Tandon (1996) argues in sub-section 2.6.2 that INGOs should be more involved in supportive roles rather than direct provision of services by identifying to strengthen local indigenous institutions and knowledge systems.

In the post-conflict peacebuilding stages of Acholi IDP-returns, the socio-political order had already been replaced not only by the colonial administrative chiefs and not only by anointed chiefs, but also with camp life. In an interview with Lawoko (2009) who was one of the pioneers of political establishment in Acholi in 1950s, return to villages of origin is a moral obligation that has to be justified by Acholi dignity and culture. These, according to Lawoko has been so much destroyed by camp life even when NGOs tried to give some relief/aid. Rebuilding societal structure has to start with the restoration of Acholi values, identity, dignity, reaping and feeding from the ancestral Acholiland. All these must draw emotional attachments from elders, traditional leaders, women and through to the youths (interviewee, Lawoko 2009). This is reflected based on the poor state of camp living experiences.
Lawoko’s view above links directly to the petty bourgeoisie group of Acholi people who lacked large landholding class and significantly depended on private sector state employment and resources for its position. These groups are better placed to understanding NGO roles and can fund-raise and work with policy much better than the grassroots Acholi returnees. However, both groups resent the discretionary powers of the British-appointed chiefs, and sought out economic and political concessions from the colonial government, got recruited in the army and occupied the middle-class Acholi elites. This position has changed during the Museveni regime and especially amongst returnees who have come back home. Not many feel the same way Lawoko assumes, going back to the old ways would put chiefs in charge, rather, younger generations are not willing to be controlled by the chiefs and traditional values in the countryside as they prefer to live urban lifestyle (interviewee, Atimo-ango 2009).

In an interview with Otim-Okello (2009) the introduction of district councils, formation of political alliance between the lineage-based authorities and the emergence of petty bourgeoisie Acholi people were co-opted into institutionalised politics. Otim-Okello believes that attempts to regenerate the Acholi societal structural arrangement after 25 years of war did encourage gradual return to respective homestead that must also consider land ownership and land use. He does not link any NGO supporting roles to this view. This could be possible because there seem to be emerging a new form of Acholi social realities brought about by NGOs world views. For example, IGAs promotion amongst Acholi returnees is new – entrepreneurship. Nonetheless, Acholi values and identity are vividly seen in their traditional hut building, family responsibilities and set-up, marriages, funerals and support system to families to meet own basic needs. However, some of these social attributes are being suppressed by the GoU’s politically structured national politics which seems to catalyse on returnees’ progress.

Interviews conducted with most Acholi local politicians, the Acholi petty bourgeoisie who became the key link between Acholi peasantry and national government needed to effect local structures at local levels, but this is missing. Young Acholi politicians have tried to effect new political order
within Acholiland and link the rural Acholi by bringing Northern Uganda into Museveni’s national movement politics (interviewee, Otim-Ogal 2009). Accepting this new political order is seen either as opportunisms, temporal, or there are no other options left but to work with the devil or cessate for that matter. Post-war socio-economic foundations in Acholiland is incongruent with Uganda’s new political order of Museveni’s regime.

One Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG) member (2009) said in an interview that the claims to bring Acholi identity and the assertion of Acholi unity by the petty bourgeoisie in national politics, made ethnicity in Uganda a viable discourse in which Acholi lineage-based authority is at least being recognised. The APG and some followers of Museveni’s political party represent Acholi middle-class. Elected positions in parliaments, appointed positions in government civil service and officer positions in the military and the rural Acholi structure is not very helpful in strengthening an internal social order and structure in Acholi. IDP-returnees have turned to asking for more support from NGOs even after return, continued food distribution, few household utensils and agricultural tools and seeds (interviewee, Ateeri 2009).

On the policy role of NGOs, grassroots perspectives from all the nine FGDs suggested some variations in the government push and pull policy that should have assisted in the social structural transformation. NGOs are phasing-out IDP-camps at the same time pushing returnees to VoRs saying, services will follow them in respective villages. But NGOs only want to maintain their good image and boost their budget because there are no structures to pull youths back home (interviewee, Otim-Okello, 2009). IDP-returnees agree that the implementation of government’s push-and-pull policy gave false promises and does not take into consideration how reshaping of the destroyed social setting of the Acholi people can be done. But it also strengthened the need to voluntarily return home since the government had played very little roles.

This study finds that NGO officials find Acholi social structure was already severely destroyed and lost between participatory politics of NGOs, setting up socio-economic foundations and cultural
and individual assumptions. But, cultural assumptions on return to respective villages gave not much priorities for rebuilding. NGOs turned to work more and better with organised groups (participatory politics) rather than support structural rebuilding of localised authorities. Again, the linkages between the petty bourgeoisie who are Acholi peasants, the emerging middle class and the non-existing local structures in VoRs remained a missing link. The traditional leadership structure was expected to continue after NGOs departures from Acholiland.

5.4.2 STRENGTHENING TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP

As mentioned above, the typology of NGOs’ involvement in the systemic and long term goals tend to focus on the structural and institutional scope of social transformation. In my framework of analysis, activities of NGOs that relate to indirect services to returnees mainly suggest policy and fund-raising roles, while direct services with returnees at the grassroots level are mainly empowerment and transformational. In an interview with one of the NRC-field worker (2009), argues that Acholi elders gave up leadership too early. This, to him cannot be blamed on NGOs. He believes that Rwodi-Kweri, meaning hoe chiefs in Acholi language, are younger than expected and they cannot perform complicated issues like settling land wrangles that is primarily their role and not NGOs. Rwodi Kweri have intermediary leadership roles in rebuilding social structure, but they also require contingency and incentives to empower them. This could be the supportive roles of NGOs to undertake but is not practical. From 2002, I tried to follow up this unclear argument with traditional chiefs who maintain that youths are becoming more ambitious in pursuing paid-up leadership careers. My interest has been to see if the influence was coming from NGOs, GoUs or there is a new form of social transformation in the leadership structure in Acholiland.

My findings is that, while annointed traditional chiefs must come through the hier of the father by the first son in the lineage, Rwot-Kweri position in Acholi that used to be a voluntary, skills-set and requires age-old experiences was being lost. Most elders have died and the powers of annointed chiefs is above hoe chiefs’. However, younger generations and a big section of Acholi people do not respect regulatory customary roles of both annointed and hoe chiefs. NGOs policy officials
believe that this is partly because of the camp leadership structure that came into existence during displacement, was immediately institutionalised, have salaried positions and are endorsed for easy administration by the government and NGOs’ operations. The new leadership structure was merged with the government’s local governance system, remained functional until when camp-phase-out started in July 2007. Youths have seen career development in elective and paid up camp leadership positions and in the local government (LC) leadership structure than in the voluntary hoe chiefs roles.

Identifying future and prominent Acholi traditional leaders amidst NGOs and the Local Council (LC) government leadership system is hard. Camp leaders believe that they can perform both LCs and Rwodi-Kweri roles, for example the chiefs and hoe-chiefs have played a role in cleansing evil spirits and formalising decent burials of those whose remains have been discovered in VoRs. Some traditional chiefs still belief that Kony’s spirits exists, probably are more powerful, but both cannot be one of both combining roles. Government policies and Uganda’s constitution (2009) suggest that there are huge distinctions between the Local Council (LC) government and the local Rwot-Kweri traditional structures. Advocay and service intermediary NGOs lack funding, thus affecting a wide variation on roles NGOs play to mobilise and support returnees.

These findings suggest that there are major faults in the current peacebuilding efforts that lie within the lack of coordination of actions [NGO operations] in the three levels of Lederach’s framework. This is because there are lack of horizontal and vertical integration of NGO actions, especially where leaders within the same level develop relationships with each other and coordinate efforts. Traditional leaders are failing to cultivate relationships with the returnees and yet most INGOs tend to partner and aid horizontal intergration. These gaps are filled in by either traditional leaders turning into seeking indirect services through advocacy and fundraising from NGOs and the goverment or through NGOs capacity building trainings which are not enough and well thought of through for the future.
Traditional local and camp leadership structures will never be the same again although some still see direct services of NGOs of distributing relief aid eminent, but in actual sense will provide only interim and short term responsive contingency and incentives. Currently, rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority cannot be left to the decision-making body of the traditional authorities alone as they are very weak. They cannot mobilise resources and their leadership statuses and skills are from time to time questioned by NGOs, Acholi people, GoU officials and sometimes chiefs themselves.

Paicho FGDs (2009) notes that Acholi traditional leaders have no assistances to offer to IDP-returnees in respective villages, be it humanitarian assistances, land disputes or reconstruction of huts and water points, except preside over family and other traditionally minor issues. They are the custodians of cultural and social mobilisation, but they depend heavily on NGOs and government wages. Confirming the analysis above, FGDs (2009) in Paicho reflects that chiefs lobby NGOs for financial assistance on behalf of their subordinates, but many have never seen such help coming.

An elder informant who was picked from FGDs (2009) said that subordinates share the same trauma with chiefs. Chiefs have become NGOs’ and GoU’s subordinates, so they cannot see us as their subordinates in the same way anymore. Chiefs are also exposed and vulnerable to insults from their locals. They cannot teach new ideas, and many argue that chiefs sit in capacity building trainings together and yet the trainers are even sometimes younger Acholi graduate who are working with NGOs.

An interview with one elder, Lawoko (2009) denies that some chiefs are simply inexperienced, cheap and young. His argument is that elders have been adamant even when they were in IDP-camps. NGO workers assume that everyone needs to be taught Acholi values because they need to be prepared for return. Like many elders, Lawoko was unhappy about some NGO roles who first came to ask him about Acholi values and at the same time invited him to come for a seminar.
that trains Acholi values, the very same idea he mentored to NGOs. Generally, future traditional leadership in Acholi will continue to rely on both outside support (NGOs) and the government governance system. The demand to keep the chiefs will permanent chiefs’ roles as arbiters of traditional justice at the local level.

5.5 LET US RECONCILE OR BE RECONCILED
The supporting roles of NGOs to rebuild relationships internally (Acholi versus Acholi), Acholi and the nationals and other districts is one major challenges of NGOs (interviewee, Rwot Olango 2009). Externally (Acholi versus others), Acholi people want to be part of the growing community in Uganda and globally, although some sections of Acholi believe that Northern Uganda will remain impoverished as long as Museveni (Bantu-led government) is in power (interviewee, Omona 2009). Both request have asked for NGO roles to advocate, represent their views and resource directly to the Northern development.

One striking finding is that, although positive and negative peace (see subsection 2.3.2) discussions in literatures support relationship building, people working within the government and younger respondents talk more of investments, developments and IGAs (see subsection 5.3.4 above) than reconciliation. The traditional leaders, elders, older generation and women present fundamental needs for social reconciliation. Societal reconciliation is a thing of the past that can be dealt with later (FGD, Omiya-Anyima 2009). However, both traditional and religious leaders disagree with the above argument saying that reconciliation cannot be postponed and therefore traditional reconciliation mechanisms must project viable means for stabilising and harmonising peaceful coexistence within returnees. This view also aims at strengthening the weakened lineage-based social authority Acholi once enjoyed. The religious leaders stressed that authoritative social structure must encourage peaceful-coexistence, hope and common good practice as a means of reconciling Acholi people with herself and her neighbours.
Returnees argued during the interviews that traditional leaders have taken the lead to ask NGOs to support them so as to conduct decent burials for their dead ones. In this way, the process of reconciliation can begin anytime. In an interview with Labeja (2009), exposing social realities of returnees, like for example, in the many discoveries of the remains of dead people in water wells, bushes and abandoned huts are being made and are scary. In an interviewee with Okumu (2008) Acholi politicians have been calling for a national reconciliation, human rights address and social justice. In his view, local social reconciliation can best be handled by traditional leaders. It is only in the outcome of JPTs that a middle ground hybrid justice mechanism came to be. This later reflection contradicts the conventional ways of analysing conflict in literatures, partly because JPTs never sealed a comprehensive peace agreement. Partly it never came into force and lacks knowledge and resource balances.

Reconciliation with the LRA rebel leader, Joseph Kony who is still at large and is wanted by the ICC is hard earned. Evidence shows that national reconciliation is downplayed and most perspectives reflect on destructive conflict, the negative peace discourse cited in the literatures. On the one end, traditional reconciliation that has been taking place during the war is primarily amongst ex-LRA and the communities. The two processes question on the lack of balancing power asymmetries from the national to local levels, as well as between LRA and GoU to that of ICC. This was previously raised in Darweish’s (2010) and Diana’s (2002) arguments on empowerment need in post-war social recovery especially whenever such an outcome to peace was negotiated.

The distinction is important for any reconciliation so that mobilisation roles of NGOs represent and analyse activities from the local context of returnees. Earlier interview with Bishop Ochola (2003) emphasises on the focus to change the bad systems and structures that enforces and maintains the conflict over a period of time. The elderly and middle aged men and women in Acholi have kept positive peace view very consistent irrespective of NGOs’ assistances. Mego Lakor (2009) relates her views of traditional reconciliation with the reflection closer to understanding the root
causes of the conflict in Acholi before NGOs came to Acholiland in this war. For her, reconciliation is a deferred concept based on its own timing. She says in an interview that many questions need to be answered. The people to answer them are still either in powerful positions in the current government and/or are running loose in the bush. She adds that the current peace is only fulfilling the local fundamental needs and immediate priorities, but has not found a place in the national (GoU) and international (ICC) long-term priorities.

Achieving peace and reconciliation is a journey with a purpose in most people’s minds but was not clearly reflected as priorities in Maslow’s lower level needs. Attempts by NGOs to mobilise the people resonates well with the address to meeting fundamental human needs, which offers short-term outcomes along the journey, but diverge at the national and international level. In an interview with Rwot Acana (2009) the need to support and mobilise IDPs were suppressed by various social problems during the war and IDP-camp living condition. People are finding their ways to knowing themselves, one another and committing to their new environments. It is a process full of emotional affection, which needs time and in the spaces they now inhabit.

In appendix B-5.1, Max-Neef introduces a matrix of fundamental human needs centring onto making tighter interactions within the IDP-returnees in VoR. It goes beyond Maslow’s heirarchical human needs discussed in subsection 2.5.1. There is also the question about identity within the dimensions of reconciliations explained above. In the same interview, Acana (2009) adds that Acholi people are identifying themselves with their new habitat, adjusting to freedom and not encampment, socialising and understanding their needs in a more systematic way. NGOs have probably created such conditions which later on will consolidate their representative roles.

Perspectives of returnees on NGOs transpired from the FGDs in Tee-Ilwa that there were indeed unnecessarily too many NGOs in their area. One of my informants, Emmanuela (2009) blames it on the government NGO-Policy (2003) for previously sectoring activities that left some NGO experts to work in the local settings as if they left their hearts in their regional and national/international offices. Reconciliation lies with the community and the work of the
Government and NGOs is to facilitate, in part, through financial process ([interviewee], Ochola 2009).

The new generations in Acholiland believe that the local government system, the camp leadership structures supported by NGOs provide better co-existence and tighter relationship. It is in this relationship where they tend to define reconciliation, *Bedo Maber* meaning living in harmony with one another. In Pabo, NRC became “dual-citizens” with their assimilated experts working with the IDPs in villages. This view is unclear as the younger group of IDP-returnees in Pabo (2009) confuse Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) as their government National Resistance Council (NRC). Closing and phasing-out IDP-camps clearly shows that NGOs are packing their bags and doing very little. An elder in Paicho notes that there are so many NGOs coming to consult on health issues, schools, boreholes and water wells, promoting micro-finance schemes, training to build the capacity and many more but not on reconciliation. Some divergences on how reconciliation is understood leaves it as an open textured concept. This distinction offers this study with additional knowledge in analysing degrees/types of reconciliation within peaceful environment as co-existence. These degrees tend to take surface reconciliation of non-lethal co-existance, shallow reconciliation of parallel lives and deep reconciliation of the community. This is discussed in details in chapter seven.

### 5.5.1 ACHOLI HOMESTEAD AND ANCESTRAL LAND

Most NGOs confirm peace has returned, a post-conflict era in Acholiland that allowed Acholi people to go back to their respective homesteads and ancestral land, *[Dwogo cen i wii Obur]* meaning “returning back to old homesteads”. This was seen as one factor that would let returnees reconcile or even be reconciled over past issues. Ancestral land is more than anything in Acholiland. Many IDPs were denied access to their ancestral land and were exploited by camp land owners. Return to homesteads and ancestral land after more than two decades of living in IDP-Camps was therefore highly desired. Return to a once abandoned homesteads was part of mental start to rebuilding the once broken-down relationships and lineage-based social authority.
The GoU and some NGOs view support only the short term support after return to respective villages (see figure 2.6.3). NGOs focused on identification of PSNs/EVIs for hut construction and minimal support to meet basic physiological needs. The transformation and institutional development of social authority in the top to middle level activities of NGOs remained mainly in the policy orientations (figure 2.6.3). The IDP policy guidelines failed to balance the short-term goals with long-term goals insofar as grassroots needs were concerned. Both direct and indirect service intermediaries like the churches carried out widespread advocacy roles but not contributed fully to the rebuilding of a strong Acholi lineage based social authority and relationships. The churches and traditional institutions are creating more awareness in the spiritual balance of needs and traditional reconciliation than NGOs.

5.6 LINKAGES IN PERSPECTIVES

Socio-economic foundations of social recovery, participatory politics, cultural and individual changes and general political environment in post-war reconstruction can be seen in the diagram 5.4.1 below. The diagram shows linkages between perspectives on NGOs’ actions to the left, the GoU and NGOs’ actions in the middle and GoU actions on the right. NGOs’ actions on the right have mainly shown empirical impacts on returnees. But NGOs’ closer links with the government in the middle are strengthened by policies and frameworks. Because GoU actions on the left have been mixed with military operation, amnesty, peace talks and corruption, the transformation of the war to peace have mainly focused on removing physical violence.

Literature review states that the removal of physical violence promotes negative peace because systemic and structural violence will have remained within the existing unchanged systems and structures of the government in control. These are indicated by dotted arrows on the left hand side of the diagram. Returnees are located in the middle of the diagram, directly linked as victims and EVIs/PSNs. Because the needs of returnees are many and have shifted hugely from a hierarchical to systematised and fundamental structure, the GoU tries to clientalise them in a form of
neopatrimonial political movement under Museveni’s personalised leadership. Meaning Acholi people are slowly moving towards an inchoate political environment in Uganda.

In a nutshell, the diagram suggests that NGOs’ actions in peacebuilding in Acholiland tend to broaden and hinder the transformation process of rebuilding the internal and external crises in Acholiland. These includes policies, inconsistent theories and practices of the Government and NGOs.
NGO actions in peacebuilding tend to broaden and hinder the transformation process of internal and external crises in AcholiLand. These include policies, theory and practices as are becoming inconsistent. Needs have shifted hugely and have not simply been hierarchical but systematised and fundamental.

(Source: Author’s version from data collected and analysed from field studies carried out in Northern Uganda: December 2007)
5.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has identified perspectives of respondents about the causes of the conflict arguing that the objective source of conflict lies heavily in the ontological base in denial of basic human needs -procedural and substantive (Fisher 2000). Convergences on perspectives emerged between NGOs and some GoU officials, but diverged from the Acholi IDPs-returnees’ The divergences from returnees bases mainly on knowledge and age. As shown in appendix B-5.2, four major causes of the war was identified. The Acholi IDPs-returnees’ views matched with Maslow’s physiological and biological needs priorities and also in the pragmatic problems of realism to determine between interest-based and needs-based solutions. The actions of NGOs pose contingency and complementary objective to subjectively mix roles of middle level and top-level government priorities. It found that policy-driven needs are embedded in the roles NGOs play and that it cannot be avoided, but such may not be so clear to Acholi IDP-returnees.

This chapter raises many issues relating to how far NGOs can mobilise and support Acholi IDPs-returnees. Adding onto the complex nature of conflict to peace transformation patterns, the returnees’ needs overwhelmed the support needed to especially rebuild the once destroyed lineage-based authority and social structural breakdown of relationships. There are fractured concepts about reconciliation especially when issues of victims and EVIs/PSNs arise. The need for continued relief assistance converge amongst IDP-returnees. Because the root causes of the conflict offer divergent views, most IDPs can not go beyond identifying why NGOs and GoU officials are not addressing Acholi crises, especially in rebuilding the destroyed lineage-based social authority and supporting local reconciliation.

NGOs did not give enough pressure on war protagonists and were not representative enough of Acholi crises. Evidences show that these issues were deeply rooted and embedded in the existing and past structures and systems that deepened political antagonism against Acholi people – the “Acholinisation of the war”.

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While the debates on interest-based and needs-based overshadow NGOs’ contingency and complementary roles, many promises, push and pull policy campaigns to convince IDPs to return, and other unfulfilled policy-driven activities have not supported Acholi people in rebuilding the social authority and reconciliation. Consistencies remain with the ever growing numbers of NGOs who have stayed in the region for nearly two decades now. It has caused imbalance because they rely so much on NGOs.

The glimmer of hope remains mainly in the land that most IDPs have to return to utilise. Any attempt to exploit the returnees on issues of land in the name of IGAs and investment can causes volatile potentialities for new conflict, because the transformation in relationships and adaptation to new social structures are still weak. The nature of how far war can be transformed to peace after such a long time still carry impacts of structural and cultural violence in this negative peace times.

NGO-officials do not know when NGOs will leave the region. NGOs’ exit strategies are not feasible for government to adopt as both government and IDPs have traditionally become dependent on NGOs. Instead, NGOs are shifting their strategies from relief aid to reconstruction that may take as double the years the war took. Doubts and mistrust about NGOs’ engagements with the IDP-returnees raised ethical issues and lack of moral obligation to fully support and mobilise IDP-returnees.

The sizes of NGOs’ responses to both visible and invisible impacts of the war are mirrored on the capacities NGOs have in the region. Agricultural tools and implements, seeds, IGAs and micro finance, measurable capacity building trainings, schools and water wells, health centres and roads are underdeveloped or does not exist. These services (direct/indirect) are slow to play a role in strengthening social authority and interactions of Acholi people. NGOs have the legitimacy and mandate to go at the pace they find fit for their agendas/budgets. It spans beyond accountability, neutrality and responsibilities, suggesting that the need to focus on supporting returnees is slow or
ca be neglected. Determining the extent to which NGOs will continue to mobilise and support returnees is premature. This seems to be far from being real, as an interviewee, Anywar (2009) says, restoring a strong lineage-based social authority and reconciling Acholi with itself which is so much at imbalance. Interestingly, most Acholi people have exhibited amazing coping mechanisms in terms of adhering to culture and tradition, pride and social contract amongst themselves.

The purpose of this study was to explore the roles of NGOs in rebuilding the broken down lineage-based social structure and relationships amongst the Acholi IDP-returnees in Northern Uganda. The study also seeks to explore on the in-depth description of IDP-returnees’ perceptions on their need to address the crises, now that NGOs and other multiple actors remain the most promising hope. The chapter discusses about the extent to which perspectives of IDPs on the roles government officials and NGOs play a role in rebuilding the broken down lineage-based social structure and relationships amongst the Achol IDP-returnees in Northern Uganda.

Chapter six focuses on rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority, an expansion of the identified returnees’ needs in this chapter. Chapter seven expands on rebuilding societal relationship mainly reconciliation that forges an understanding to resolve external crises in Acholiland.
CHAPTER SIX: REBUILDING ACHOLI LINEAGE-BASED SOCIAL AUTHORITY

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses issues relating to rebuilding Acholi-lineage based social authority which was discussed in the earlier chapter, requires support and mobilisation from within, NGOs and where possible, from the GoU. Following from sub-section 5.3.1, Acholi people need to strengthen their social authoritative order and local institutions by themselves addressed (sub-section 6.2). While NGOs have had the legitimacy to work following approval from the government administrative systems and policies, returnees have weak coping mechanism. NGOs have to provide support for security, justice and socio-economic support to first improve the conditions of Acholi IDPs-returnees.

According to Lederarch (1999) one goal of conflict transformation is to strengthen social institutions through the international, national, regional NGOs who can also play the representative role of grassroots perspectives. However, NGOs representation of Acholi crises to the national and internal domain failed to critically analyse structural and social conditions of Acholi people. The social realities of war to peace and NGOs’ interventions in Acholiland has affected new changes in the current Acholi social order and structures in VoR. This is also the objective views shared mostly amongst returnees.

To a greater extent, NGO undertakings miss out on the rebuilding of Acholi lineage-based social institutions, a process by which local peacebuilding is supported. It also misses out on how substantive justice and maximal participation (procedural justice) is met. Section 6.2 is about rebuilding Acholi social authority that has particular attention to restoring security, understanding the gap created in the middle-class and elite group, traditional leadership and restorative form of justice of Acholi people. These social authority are the cornerstones of Acholi social authoritative institution.
Sub-section 6.3 is about socio-economic regeneration which plays a big role in the current social regeneration in Acholiland. Employment, education and health care support is viewed as are coming from land use through agriculture, but are also to generate income. This is a form of new social realities which is regenerating and shifting Acholi people towards “modernity” or “stagnation”.

6.2 REBUILDING ACHOLI SOCIAL AUTHORITY

Before analysing the roles of NGOs in rebuilding Acholi social authority, it is important to note that the interpretation of Uganda’s war in the north is directly linked with the political crises and ethnic politics in Acholiland (chapter three). With the view that Uganda is an actor with such a pluralist’s state-as-structure and an institutional-legal-order organisation. The crises in Acholi was also a political advantage to the GoU. Besides, most NGOs whose structuralists’ roles of rebuilding a strong social authority, and are social and political actors, failed to consider the interpretation of peace and return of Acholi people. The failure lies in understanding how social transformation of Acholi people had been structured in the historically accumulated violence.

The failures did not consider internal crises of Acholi as had its roots in the destruction of the dominant internal social-political order, an order that had been anchored, on the one hand, by male Acholi elders and lineage-based authorities and, on the other, by an Acholi political middle class, both of which justified their authority through a discourse of Acholi ethnicity (Branch 2010:26). While the various reasons given by who you talk to about the root causes of the war, a combination of Idi Amin’s destabilisation of Acholi middle class, and national political propaganda of “Acholinisation of the war” during Museveni’s regime, links between Acholi peasantry and the central state are separated.

It is important to analyse the methods and scope of NGOs involvement to transform the Acholi social structure from the short-term to medium-term goals of advocacy and relief distribution. The analysis regard levels of many NGOs’ typologies and activities in the conflict transformation mode
to mainly serve the middle to grassroots communities. In the systemic and long-term structural and institutional transformation of Acholi social structure, policy and fundraising, empowerment and transformation have mainly remained at the middle to top levels of NGOs and government activities. There are also intermediary NGOs who are subsets of NGOs. The intermediary NGOs did not exist in Acholliland as such but the responsive, contingency and incentive activities of indirect services to support structural and institutional transformation were done either by NGOs camp leaders or the government.

Also, the transformation of Acholi social institutions require restoration of human and food security and rebuilding traditional justice system. As said, Acholi social structures operate within the national social and political institutions with considerate reliance on NGOs roles. Therefore both the state (social norms and behaviours and ability of leaders to change sectarian political differences through NGOs to create greater national and political cohesion) and non-state institutions (to advocate for improved rule of law, inclusivity for local returnees) are important without necessarily copying “legitimate” Western institutions.

Literatures argue that conflict is a normal part of social and political interaction. It is, however, a failures of development when institutional and structural causes of conflict takes violent forms (Kaldor et al. 2006: 1). According to Tocci (2008) Western institutions like the WB and IMF tend to focus too much on the forms of transformation rather than its functions in the contemporary social conditions of post-war Sub-Saharan African societies. NGO roles are to serve the functions rather than the forms of social transformational realities and not those interested parties who may become “conflict dictators”, dictating a settlement in their own interest (Galtung 1996). IDPs-returnees’ socio-structural conditions were understood to have been shaped by government internal protection policy and the LRA brutal abductions of own people. LRA carried much more interest-based forms of social transformation.
Dolan (2004) bases his argument on the policy that was used to prevent the population from seeing reality, prevent Acholi people from mobilising themselves after defeat in 1986, continuously fragment them and make them become vulnerable and beggars. Government encampment policy was mainly used to prevent consciousness-formation by subjecting slow but sure “social torture” (Dolan 2004). It is argued in this thesis that social realities of war to peace systems were created from the daily meanings of IDPs and social constructions that bears social and political realities. Therefore, the security, justice and socio-economic disparities in Acholiland require institutional social authority transformation in Acholiland.

In an interview with one of the Chief Administrative Officer ([CAO] 2009) rebuilding and transforming Acholi social institutional and authority has its own scope. The scope has widened to include Acholi middle class, traditional leaders whose traditional justice authority are still relevant and the supporting socio-economic base that linked the peasants to districts and national representations. Representations of the local context is hard to strike for and a best-fit approach even for NGOs is missing (interviewee, CAO 2009).

### 6.2.1 Acholi Political Middle Class and Elites

Each elements of the internal crisis in 1986 – the returning UNLA soldiers, the missing local political elites, and threatened Acholi lineage-based autroities – has undergone change (Branch 2010: 43). The Acholi political middle class is missing. In an interview with Okeny Tiberio (2009), initially, Acholi middle class elites served as a linking group of rural population with the national government.

In his view, the gap has been replaced by the donor-supported, NGO-oriented, unrepresentative, non-political Acholi civil society. Almost all NGO interviewees agree that NGOs have tried to bridge this gap. Although the status of Acholi-lineage based authority is still a matter of controversy under the leadership of traditional chiefs, grassroots views are that the authority is
incapable. As said, foreign donors’ support within the “traditional justice” agenda is rendering the traditional leaders lose status in filling the gap between Acholi middle class and elites.

While women and youths have profited from foreign-sponsored humanitarian and peace-building initiatives in the camps, the older men have seen their role of providing for their families, stripped off. Foreign relief agencies has taken over the particular function of providing food and other essential material for all. However, women and youths have not come that far enough to play key roles in bridging the Acholi middle class elite with the local, northern region and nationally. At the time of completing this research, the Acholi political middle class elite remained divided in their roles between the diasporas and the local non-political NGO-based civil society. Sometimes driven by ideologoical indifference, but also ethnic politics. The traditional institution is also relying on NGOs and tend to act with NGO-based attitude of playing a non-political but social authority of Acholi people.

**6.2.3 ACHOLI TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP LINEAGE-BASED AUTHORITY**

While the interlocking nexus, security transformation and realities of returnees leave them stuck between a rock and hard place, NGOs are seen as complicit bystanders. While there is lack of proper traditional institution and mechanisms of justice and reconciliation, traditional leaders are caught between fulfilling the moral obligation of the Acholi, but without support. The internal and external crises in Acholi have contributed immensely to the knowledge distortion about traditional institution especially, amongst younger individuals and in the society at large. The Acholi cultural norms are widely formed by cultural and historical realities, some based on past wars and atrocities inflicted on the society during Idi Amin (Chapter 3).

Returnees believe that corruption within the Government officials dealing with the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) project, PRDP and NAADS hinder the implementation of government plans in VoRs. Peace dividends that allows for the revival of Acholi culture, relationships, social contracts, roles and responsibilities within the social processes is different
from socio-economic, and political changes. In an interview with one cultural leader, Oryang (2009), NGOs’ attempts to reverse the social and historical roots of suffering is not a guarantee that the reality of returnees can be fixed by any forthcoming traditional lineage-based social authority. Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority is taking a natural order just like the promotion of building IDP-camps to become peri-urban townships would have (interviewee, Oryang 2009). Acholi traditional leaders are the custodians of the traditional institution. In an interview with Rwot Lugai (2007) chiefs need resources to handle social problems in VoRs rather than build townships which are positive percept in the long run. According to Lugai, war-affected children will never recover especially, for those whose psychosocial habits have been permanently damaged. These, according to Lugai are unavoidable social baggage (problems) (interviewee, Lugai 2007 and Acana 2009).

Few NGO officials agree that Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA), an Acholi traditional institution can change repressive, retaliatory and resistant nature of perpetration once supported. Such support failed to address the contextual and experiential change processes with KKA traditional institutions during and after war. On the other end, Women FGDs in Paicho (2009) argue that the repression, retaliation and resistance against social issues, traditional rules, social structures by traditional institutions, cannot be transformed by traditional mechanism. This view was proved against reviewing on how KKA addresses Gender Based Violence (GBV) (see diagram 6.2.1).

In a JPTs resumption conference in 2008, highly educated Acholi women, mostly living in cities concurred with Paicho women FGDs. Many women are divided over this, with some saying that, for example, elopting a girl is part of Acholi culture that sometimes tolerates the use of reasonable force to seduce a girl to a boy’s bedroom. This argument has been countered against the mode of LRA abduction and the formal eloption process. The Diaspora women delegatation to the JPTs resumption conference argued that LRA abduction and formal eloption is not the same and Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority has to take leadership in explaining the differences.
NGOs’ workshops to sensitize women misses factual elements of reality to influence classifications of weak Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority. Instead women returnees seek jobs in restaurants, hotels. Most of them have histories of sexual abuse, rape and are victims of social stigmatizations and exclusion. Instead of turning to Acholi traditional lineage-based social authoritative guidances many returnees train on household economics, bakery and hygiene. Most NGOs seem to be appreciating these initiatives. NGOs seem to produce new forms of traditional ideology to fit into Acholi people’s contemporary social realities. NGOs provide initial support to women who may not be able to receive support under traditional structures, especially, legal services.

With many years of my interactions with Acholi traditional chiefs, have always said, traditional mechanisms address GBV but under different values and principles, posing the ontological notions on what is “real” and “unreal” about traditional transformation or there needs to be more social interventions to support Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority. Taking the example of addressing GBV are included in it victim-perpetrator and perpetrator-victim dilemmas in villages of returns. There is a collective view amongst returnees that NGOs’ support to Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority may intentionality neglect GBV debate in a more conventional manner.

The failure of the traditional institution to address community violence couldn’t be attributed to blaming the institution because the aftermath of the war in Acholi is huge. Sometimes the police and court magistrates equally fail to address, say GBV committed by UPDF, some LRA and other cases (interviewee, Ochora 2006). Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority is weak so is access to all forms of justices. The weak Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority has been subjected to particular circumstances of historical testable conjecture of Acholi people’s real world. The internal crisis was taken advantage of by Uganda’s political inculcating and re-enforced opinion about LRA tactics to constitute ineluctable environment. A claim used to justify the views that Acholi institutions are irreducibly self-referential to their standard arrogance and warlike
people. Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority has been believed by many to have ineluctable claim to justify it as truth. However, the actualisation of government promise of popular participation embodied in the RC/LC system is countering the legitimacy of Acholi traditional social authority as the government advance many new internal political social authority using local democratisation plan through RC/LC. While the government recognises the Acholi traditional social authority, the government’s democratic political configurations tend to incapacitate local initiatives, meant to raise national political anticipation and representations of the government.

6.2.4 ACHOLI TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY

Acholi traditional justice authority stands amongst the highest practices anywhere in the world (Allen 2010: 246). This restorative justice practice is based on traditional social reconciliation called Mato-Oput (drinking a bitter root from a common gourd). Mato-Oput requires acknowledgement of responsibility by the offender, repentence and then payment of compensation. The process involves a number of rituals, aims at a-not-again change of offender’s attitude, cooling the situation (stopping revenge), healing the land and restoring relationship (Allen 2010: 46).

Reviving Acholi traditional authority face challenges from acquiring finances both for running the process as well as in how compensation should be handled. According to Pain (1997), international NGOs should be asked to liaise with peace and reconciliation infrastructure as part of their legitimate brief in addition to their aid and development functions. International donors should be approached as a matter of urgency to support the traditional authorities in establishing the reconciliation procedures to be used in resolving the conflict (Ibid.: 110-15).

There is a consensus amongst opinion leaders, chiefs and elders that reflects on the attitudes of the Acholi people to revive Acholi traditional authority. Unlike GoU’s combined military operations, coercion, amnesty, peace envoys and peace talks, false promises and to a greater extent corrupt military officials who gain from war, reviving the traditional chieftaincy system, namely KKA was
blamed on few individuals who have vested interests (Bradbury 1999: 17-20). Many agree that while the government approach tends to promote negative peace, KKA system may be used to sustain the bad government systems and structures left behind by war. It was hoped that NGOs would play a bigger role.

In diagram 5.4.1, for example, compensation is negotiated to target the physically deformed; land is seen as capital asset for large scale investment while returnees see that as an asset. Returnees perceive the support of NGOs will support them with IGAs, cultural attachments, local and national markets with improved road access and education. The transformation of a workable justice system is negotiated with the traditional leadership and legislated by the GoU for NGOs to implement. Attempts by ARLPI to provide mobile courts, train paralegals and lobby for free legal services were backstopped by lawyers, that it cannot act as a supplement to formal justice in the complex issue of Northern Uganda. The problematic lies in the categorisation of mechanisms of transitional justice as “formal” or “informal” to be a convenient tool (Quinn 2006). Yet this distinction between “formal” and “informal” is problematic for a number of reasons. It is often the case that customary mechanisms are recognised and adopted by the state apparatus, thereby becoming “formalised” (Quinn 2006).

In an interview with Oulanya (2008) the challenge of justice reform was how to bridge the traditional – Mato-Oput with the formal criminal system at an early stage of peace talks and ceasefire agreement. While the traditional system seemed more accepted by Acholi people, the combination of local institutions and state mechanism needs a middle ground Uganda Special Court Division (USCD). Although returnees heard about the USCD that amalgamates traditional justice with government criminal and to some extent ICC’s, has not been transformed to embrace a national reconciliation or truth commissions. Apologists of the ICC system prefer the provision of accessible, accountable and affordable security and justice that protects people’s rights and property, keeps families safe and resolves disputes and punishes perpetuators.
Such amalgamations have worked in Mali where land disputes were recorded in judgements at local prefecture. Civil war in Guatamala recorded massive abuses, Palestinian refugee camps and Lebanon recorded rapes during the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres (Bastick, Grim, and Kunz 2007), but informal women court have been successful. Although the GoU officials turned around against ICC, a form of transformation in the justice system, many Acholi people believe that the ICC is a UPDF-Museveni apologist. The ICC has been seeking its “justice” with the support of the hoard of profiteering NGOs, against the critical voices of the local people who are demanding that all parties to the conflict be investigated and those found guilty – be they on the LRA or UPDF, be prosecuted (Blackstar News Paper 2010). But the ICC sticks to its guns that only the LRA and Kony committed crimes in Northern Uganda.

This discussion is dealt with in detail in the next chapter. The diverging and converging perspectives failed to identify the necessary distinctions between traditional mechanisms and the criminal justice. The transformation of Acholi justice system has not gone further than attempting to decode ICC protocols. The process of recognising and reforming the capacity of traditional leaders in Mato-Oput requires gradual orientation towards mercy, peace and reconciliation for national norms, which is missing (interviewee, Bishop Ochola 2009). Within Acholi people, there is heritage in \textit{Mato Oput}, but many NGOs do not bother (interviewee, IRC field worker 2009).

In an interview with Acholi Paramount Chief Acana (2010) the traditional mechanism that handles the highly contentious issue regarding GBV exist within the cultural institution of Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) (see diagram 6.2.4 below). His view is that KKA needs resources to add value to the existing chieftainship in order to strike the balance in relational transformation. Within the wider forum in Uganda and literatures, justice is concerned with ensuring equitable access to state resources, not NGOs. Corruption has taken passive bribery even from within NGOs as financial control as procurement continues to delude anti-corruption strategy. Acana adds that, instead a lot of violence is usually blamed on culture, of which KKA tends to disassociate itself from such cowardice men’s bad attitudes towards women.
Diagram 6.4.1 above summarises the cultural principles that provides an overview of how cultural process is integrated to deal with GBV, for example, rape. GBV is addressed as community special needs through experience sharing or reparation, restitution and compensation or both. Both processes aim at restoring dignity and providing privacy and security to the victim. Cultural leaders and elders investigate the different cultural institutional approaches and how best cultural principles are implemented to incorporate existing systems (Dijik 2009:13-14). Clear monitoring mechanisms, which takes into account experiences and perspectives of elders emphasise on the need to structurally transform, protect and restore the once eroded “good” culture of Acholi people.

Following from Acana’s perspectives, literatures discuss on cultural transformation that reflects on the identity of Acholi people so much destroyed, lost and changed in IDP-Camps. The Acholi traditional elders’ views cover a broad array of rebuilding Acholi social authority including individuals (victims and perpetuators) who should bridge the generation gap and strengthen the traditional leadership institutions. The figure fails to provide transparent information that can be used to integrate early stages of reviving traditional justice system within government legal
systems. Since the GoU and NGOs started giving support in the name of compensations to victims, mostly identified as PSNs/EVs, most Acholi say they are as well victims, a view so hard to disregard (see diagram 5.4.1). There is also a consensus that Acholi people are not involved in defining what happens to them because of the fear of accountability. The figure below suggests three ways to address accountability.

**DIAGRAM 6.4.2: SHOWING TRADITIONALLY-BASED STRUCTURE TO ADDRESS ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION**

(A: INNOVATIVE ALT. [JUSTICE MECHANISMS])

*Source: Author’s version based on Juba Peace Conference held in Gulu and position papers of peace talks delegates (December 2007).*

At the innovative stage of alternative justice mechanism (A), the traditional justice denoted by black pointed arrow follows to (B) suggesting truth telling (C) as a mechanism for rebuilding relationships (D) through restitution and reparation, which is believed, addresses community social peace and security (E), resolves the problems of impunity but brings lasting peace and reconciliation in Northern Uganda. For the alternative addressed by the formal and civil justice mechanism (ICC and criminal justice) innovated at (A) is denoted by broken pointed arrows to rebuild relationship through punishment (c) that can address impunity directly (d) or by restitution and reparation through courts to bring community social peace and security (e), thus, addresses impunity and brings everlasting peace. The double pointed red arrows are new forms of harmonised traditional justice and Uganda criminal court, Uganda Special Division Court. The
later has never been tried. In the next section the perspectives of returnees on NGO actions for structural transformation heavily focused on transforming the socio-economic sectors.

6.3 REBUILDING SOCIO-ECONOMIC SUPPORTING MECHANISM

An aspect of overcoming distortions dubbed as “economy of war” is to re-establish a stable macro-economic framework, reconstruct productive infrastructure, reactivate agro-based production, increase the demand and supply to local markets, strengthen food security, promote structural reforms in the social and socio-economic transformation after the end of the war. Socio-economic transformation in most post-conflict countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is also tightened to policy frameworks for transitional donor funding from post-conflict to sustainable development. Olu et al. (2009) argue that economic and social policy-making in SSA countries is expected to be distinct from that usually undertaken in non-conflict countries, thus signalling the need for each country, given its circumstances, to articulate policy benchmarks that may, or may not, overlap with those proposed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donors. Th framework of analysis suggests that long-term structural and institutional policy and fund-raising services of NGOs includes all levels of top, middle and grassroots population. Direct and indirect services of empowering and transforming the grassroots could offer the best option to support returnees. This view is also re-enforced by Schermerhorn (1961: 12) who argues that socio-economic development is an empowerment tool that should be done in conformity with intended policies. One identified cause of the war in Northern Uganda is rooted in the socio-economic imbalance the colonialist imposed as a policy to divide-and-rule Uganda (see chapter three). The core problems resulted in social sanctions and harse structural adjustment policies, the intended social exclusions of Northern Uganda, lack of opportunities, physical infrastructure and institutional transformation (see appendix B-4.2, diagrams 5.4.1, 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). Uganda’s economic and political reform caught responses from international donors that opened cash taps since May 1987. In these reforms, the entire population in the north has been looked at as enemies of the state.
On return to villages of origins, rebuilding socio-economic activities identified IGAs, access to markets, land use, cultural attachments to peasantry occupation. These were identified in the context of addressing the effects/symptoms of the war. Moral and economic development in Acholiland does not address corruption/lack of judicial system, poor education, and diversion of developmental projects. However, the GoU is focusing on how to control the population by advocating on political awareness to educate Acholi people through structured systems of GoU party politics. On that basis, government officials argue that the roles of NGOs are to add value to government initiatives and empower returnees.

NGOs carry out needs assessments, but fail to feedback. In an interview with the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) (2009) the relationship between returnees and NGOs are modally characterised by asymmetrical predominance coupled with negative sanctions meant to dominate the lifestyle of returnees. The GoU employed mechanisms for financing post-conflict recovery aimed at poverty reduction strategies during post-conflict recovery and using distinctive features of post-conflict recovery strategies. Such top-down approach have always remained the major concerns for community-driven track one actors as is discussed in chapter two, subsection 2.6.

Like many SSA civil wars and internal violence, bilateral donor agencies, intergovernmental organisations, and NGOs have been playing an increasingly critical role in rehabilitation efforts once an acute conflict is over. In Northern Uganda, it has become clear that the traditional aid focused on developing economic sectors, but has not been sufficient, mainly because the political and social institutions of war-torn societies has to be reconstructed. NGO assessment looks at returnees’ levels of income starting from tracking disposable income through sales of agricultural products (interview with AVSI policy officer, 2009). Studies from former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola indicate that rebuilding socio-economic supporting mechanism needs to address the bad culture and the gap of independence that is found in the society. In a FGDs with elders in Padibe (2009) rebuilding socio-economic lineage-based Acholi authority is not about money, but culture, informal Acholi education (Wang-Kongo, meaning “by the fire teaching”), respect, morals,
and more. Most NGOs have not reached such service oriented roles of supporting Acholi people, evident by the view that capacity building, changing attitudes and allowing NGOs to support social authority and capabilities are limited or missing. 90 per cent of 30 males over 60 years and 20 females from 46 years old and above who were interviewed emphasised on the options to have continued relief assistances from World Food Programme (WFP). This view diverged from the youths’ and middle aged women who prefer to begin working on their farms and eating fresh foods. The EVIs/PSNs, whose security and survival were jeopardised within the community, including single mothers and widows between 20-35 years of age, and orphans are considered PSNs/EVIs. The need for self-reliance diverged widely, mainly on security and institutional transformation.

The convergence was that NGOs have own agendas and were making profits, colluding in project allocation with government officials during the mobilisation process. Changes in attitudes and in behaviours are pointing more towards agriculture and land utilisation to lift IGAs as additional support within returnees. IGAs comes mainly from the sales of agricultural produce. Few students and businesswomen/men are engaged in charcoal burning, carpentry and pottery (interviewee NRC field officer 2009). In Acholiland, agriculture provides the main job opportunities from land cultivation, but a good percentage of people are illiterate. Due to lack of education qualifications and requirements, returnees cannot compete for white-collar jobs, like in the NGOs sectors (interviewee, AVSI field officer 2009). Sales from farm products (cash crops) is the only traditional support for financing educational and scholastic needs. There are no mechanised farming and hybrid seeds since NGOs view land use and land ownership as part of socio-economic development in Uganda at large. But NGOs’ involvement as suggested in figure 2.6.2 in the framework of analysis shows that levels of NGO engagement can spark conflict between NGOs and grassroots population because of the contention about land in Acholiand. Such basis would not help both parties [NGOs and grassroots population] to work towards rebuilding and strengthening Acholi social authority in VoRs.
Informant, Omona (2007) says that rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority that aims at socio-economic issues amongst returnees has become a reciprocating demand and a trade off with political affiliations as long as livelihood is still a crisis and kept constant. INGOs cooperate with governments and to some extent serve as contractors. This may allow the local population to perceive NGOs to be having better logistic capabilities to implement projects at the local level, but the transfer of projects to the local population may fail. In Bosnia and Herzegovnia, Angola, East Timor, Ahiti, Salvador and many countries, the dynamic partnership of NGOs with the governments were questioned. In his address at Post-JPTs conference in Gulu in December 2008, President Museveni urged Acholi to give their lands for investment or remain unemployed as they already lagged behind in national economic growth compared to other parts of Uganda.\(^9\)

In that meeting, opinion leaders asked President Museveni to demonstrate his words by establishing social contract with Acholi people, to build at least one new government run food processing industries that can be remembered in the name of NRM government. Else, renovate cooperative societies which were destroyed during the war, rehabilitate and build roads and bridges, supply power in rural areas, provide clean drinking water to the people, build hospitals and health centres. Sending investors like Madhvani to occupy 40,000 hectres of Acholi virgin land for sugar plantation is unwelcoming even when Acholi people may be asking for development.

Broader socio-economic transformation support reflects more on the prominence of new cultures, which many youth tends to follow. With considerable level of illiteracy and ignorance, many young people want to catch up with international standards, like watching western movies, viewing direct football games from satellite TVs, striving towards owning at least a motor-bike rather than a bicycle, and ownn smart mobile phones. Even when countries like Afghanistan fear NGOs could weaken its fragile position and help opposition, NGOs have contributed hugely in Northern

\(^9\)President Museveni was officiating in a Post-Juba peace conference held in Gulu. The conference was organised by the northern Uganda traditional chiefs in December 2008. Museveni emphasised that there is always only one post for white collar jobs: President post is only for one person, Ministerial post needs one person, etc.
Uganda through its mobilisation of the population. Local artists sing songs to get the attention funding (money) as well as target international and government supports.

In an interview with Rwot Acana (2009) NGOs encourage group mobilisation so that they can be given soft micro-loans to start up retail businesses. Some groups have used the traditional methods of “sharing labour” – awak that the Acholi had before and still practice. Most chiefs and elders view awak as one viable means of mobilising people to engage in farming, although not necessarily rebuilding a strong Acholi social authority. Rwot Otinga-Yai (2008) explains awak that during the process of organising awak, shared responsibilities are exercised, human rights issues are addressed so that work-rotas are fair to all members, and women, youth and men all work together under various roles.

6.3.1 SUPPORTING EMPLOYMENT SECTORS AND EDUCATION

In an interview with Ongwec (2009) NGOs work best with organised social groups through well written projects, while government design programmes do not. For example, the government programme of livestock restocking run under Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme Initiatives (NURPI) scheme left some people still waiting for cows and goats, now for over fifteen years. People have lost hope and patience and that has undermined the local initiatives of “sharing labour” (awak), which used to unite people along various social lineages and family authoritative settings.

In support of employment and education, initiatives like awak cannot be enough. Service intermediary NGOs and INGOs like World Vision, Oxfam etc have been very influential in these areas. To that effect, schools have gone ahead to establish structures including parents, teachers, pupils (students) under the “Parents and Teachers Association” (PTA), LNOGs like Acholi Education Initiatives (AEI). However, achieving the level of rebuilding these sectors have government goals which are tied to political democratisation plan. This makes it difficult for NGOs to build schools and provide scholastic materials. The advancement of the actors’ own interests,
with whose violent coercion was the means of achieving those ends, is assured part of government hegemony. “In most, if not all Acholi households, education is seen as an investment, just like the currently most preferred IGAs, and the success in education is a culture measured against how far a child went to school” (Interviewee, Lawoko 2009) (see the left hand wing of diagram 5.4.1).

These ideas seem to fit in with what Collier considers why economic policies may need to be distinctive if a country like Uganda where most parts were peaceful but Northern Uganda is in post-conflict can recover. Collier (2009) argues that, appropriate responses are job creation for young men, and deep cuts in military spending. In his view, political opportunities are likely to be distinctive because reform may be easier than at other times. Economic opportunities are unlikely to be distinctive because conflict distorts the structure of the economy. Standard approaches to economic development are therefore often inapplicable, yet the capacity of government to devise tailored solutions is very limited (Collier 2009).

The district officials have diverging views stating that job opportunities are reaped from education, even if Universal Primary Education (UPE) is producing low-quality graduates due to problems of overcrowded classrooms and inadequate scholastic materials (interviewee, Makmot 2010). Amongst this group, no mention was clearly made about the need to boost the IGAs that returnees desperately preferred, a view NGOs have been supporting through awak and micro-finance groups. Rather, the central Government officials are positive about UPE achievement that it made massive increase in enrolment. Government officials are not seeing investing in education through land use (IGA through agriculture) in VoR as a means to create jobs in the long run. Rather, IGAs are seen as a bonus per se. In an interview with Akaka (2009), a retired primary school teacher, UPE is good on paper, but cannot fully support returnees in practice, may be World Vision and War Child INGOs. Many children do not benefit from it in terms of quality. There is automatic promotion for children and by the age of 13 they should all have finished primary education, but parents end up paying additionally exhorbitant fees anyway.
Generally, economic support through quality education investment was preferred by many, but mostly related to earnings contributed to from agricultural production and small scale IGAs. In an interview with Ochen (2009) NGOs should mobilise and support IDPs with commercialised farming to sustain IGAs since it is now the most wanted household economy. It should be boosted so that people are able to sponsor their children to school and up to university level. With the return of regional security, economic reconstruction needs NGOs and government support. Rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority and the creation of Acholi elites and middle class has to fester its root from the rural community, district to national representation. Kumar (1996) argues that the subsequent challenges faced, achievements gained, and hurdles to be overcomed to achieve a lasting peace in deeply divided societies must focus on how the needs, demands and pressures faced by those recuperating from civil wars centre on fundamental issues that in turn determine if the peace achieved would be a temporary or lasting one. This subsequent challenge is on land use and land ownership (next sub-section).

Evidence amongst Acholi people show that many respondents failed to underpin the need to transform the political and social institutions after the GoU and LRA war ended. It is equally difficult for NGOs to support the population since the system is structured, legitimated and sometimes negotiated with hegemonic powers to handle Acholi people as clients of government’s political community. Social reconstruction aimed at socio-economic transformation and equitable distribution of wealth played a big role in the history of Uganda’s national politics and power struggle. Acholi missed their chances and needed to go through this time of suffering. That is why Acholi woke up and started developing Gulu even during the war. Nobody would imagine Gulu town was besieged by war for over two and half decades (interviewee, Obuku in Alero -Amuru District 2009). It was not because of NGOs, but the Acholi people did it.

It is interesting to note that yearning for peace and security through innovative socio-economic transformation came at the price of human suffering from this war and its displacements. Probably it answers the pronounced sharp differences in needs for food security and human security from
returnees, NGOs and government officials. Investing in cash crops now depends on availability of security, rain, soil and market prices but people lost the consistencies in growing cash crops. Besides the confinement in camps, the current mobilisation and operations and agendas of NGOs in the region, showed that it was increasingly becoming irrelevant to rely entirely on cash crops (interviewee, Obuku 2009).

6.3.2 LAND IS LIFE

Most NGOs have distanced themselves from the “land-is-life” advocacy campaign, because of the contentions and potential land issues in Acholiland. This has made huge divergences in perspectives on the dychotomies surrounding land use and land ownership. In an interview with Odur (2009) the government is using NGOs to convince returnees to give land to investors. Land ownership and use has a very strong attachment to Acholi people. It is the only resource they have left and can hold onto.

Baranyi and Weitzner (2008) argue that land is life. It is a “surface” that people live on, an economic asset, a point of access for other resources like minerals, territory for states and peoples, and a central element informing certain communities’ identities and spiritual worldviews” (Baranyi et al. 2008). Acholi people define land as a “property for the dead and unborn”. This means that the living are custodians of the property whose rights are shared by clan or family members. This definition of Acholiland targets primarily customary land tenure system. Returnees encountered various land tenure problems in VoRs, mainly the customary regulation of ownership and access that challenged the traditional definition of land and roles of NGOs. The Uganda land policy has transformed from individual interests to government interests especially on the Acholi customary authorities’ intentions on land tenure, land use and land administration in Northern Uganda.

Most NGOs workers agree that major changes in the legal and institutional framework governing land tenure are state-led, market-oriented or hybrid models of land reforms. It is affecting land use
and ownership in VoRs. According to an interviewee Lorna (2009) land conflicts or disputes have become inherent to relations within and between families and neighbours. In Amuru, there are increasing concerns about the escalation of land related conflicts, leading to open conflicts and violence. Initially, the internal Acholi crisis did not include land disputes, at least, not its current magnitude, until after acquiring camp life and return to villages respectively (interview with Director of Kitgum LNGO, 2009). Younger generations who became adults and parents while in IDP-Camps increased, some died leaving spouses with children, but on return they cannot go to claim ownership of land in VoRs. In a FGD in Omiya-Anyima (2009) the view holds that both NGOs and the government missed the opportunity to prevent land dispute, which was the best option before return to respective villages. The FGDs agree that the transformation of land for use and ownership needed to forecast in defusing violence or preventing conflict by implementing government reforms that could also address the underlying causes of conflicts. The involved stakeholders has to involve elders who knew bounderies and relationships amongst the community. NGOs did not anticipate the magnitude of land grabbing and disputes, since they [NGOs] are bookish whenever it comes to pointing out the root causes of the conflict in Northern Uganda (Interview with IRC Policy officer 2009). Many people have preferred IGAs from NGOs to support themselves, preferably in towns which is a different case in VoRs.

In an interview with Ochora (2009) the consolidation of human and food security that puts in place sustainable peace, allowing people to go back home from camps and resume normal life in the whole region was government priority, not land. Ochora adds that after such normalcy, investment from land use in order to create jobs would then follow. While interviewing the former top LRA commander, Banya (2009) who is engaged in extensive farming, the only way to sustain families, create employment and bring people together is land use. Government Army commanders, traditional chiefs, businessmen/women and others have embarked on acquiring huge land coverage for extensive farming, mainly in the name of reaping huge investments from agricultural products. Some of them are being accused for land-grabbing.
In an interview with one veteran Acholi politician (2007 and 2009) many people look for work in farms not for money, but salt, soap and other basic essentials items. They also primarily socialise in the most cultural ways and tell/counsel each other through stories. Communal-work is not for earning income but a socialising therapy. In a report by Nalugo in the Monitor Newspaper (2010) the Uganda’s Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Kadaga asked the government in a review of the 10 years of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 that was organised by Care International in Kampala, that the resettlement process in Northern Uganda need to invest more in post-war healing programme. Kadaga was meaning the victims who go through a number of challenges, which the government must address for example how many of the victims are accessing medical services. An NGO worker with International Alert, Acellam (2009) says that post-war reconstruction programmes has disjointed responses at all levels of support and mobilisation.

Recalling Lederach’s track II middle leadership level and linking it with grassroots level and track I top-level actors, Wallenstein concurs with Lederach on issues of coordination of actions as part of post-war social development. As said in sub-section 6.3, the broader socio-economic policy incentives and linkages of actors has to link from top to bottom and vice versa. An interviewee, Arweny (2009) in Omiya-Pacwa suggests that it is the responsibilities of the government to resource and empower returnees, but NGOs are the most seen. In an interview with Owak (2009) the would-be government resources under PRDP-2007-2010 to support returnees pass through many hands with policies that put burdens on decisions and in the end never reach the local communities. Returnees cannot demand from the Government nor from NGOs, meaning only trusted members of the government – The Movement Political Party can receive support. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) (2008) questions in their final appraisal report of PRDP (2007-2010) whether PRDP is actually a policy framework, plan of action or simply a guiding document. The doubts questions the impact of PRDP and its coordination framework to support returnees.
“Land is life” in sub-section 6.3.2 is one fundamental needs of all Acholi grassroots realities, but the reality is that Acholi population depended on NGOs for too long and too much expectations from the government is not fulfilling. Younger generations, Acholi middle class and would-be investors lack knowledge and national market-base that can be competitive in the country. This evidence is not only confirming the difficulties the would-be Acholi middle class elites may rise up through farming as it was in the late 1950s and 1960s. The root causes and the proximate causes or symptoms/effects of the war in appendix B-4.2, may not serve as a benchmark for rebuilding middle class.

Many returnees see the rebuilding of socio-economic authority lies in land use, but primarily with the support from NGOs since the day-to-day fundamental needs – livelihood, survival and security are hardly met. Huge and complex socio-economic issues focusing on “unemployment, expanding IGAs to increase disposable income (probably to reach a mechanised level of investment), increased standard of living, managing food and agricultural prices, reduction in bad culture of drunkenness and raping young girls are social issues NGOs can not transform (interviewee, CAO 2009).

6.3.3 SUPPORTING HEALTH SECTORS

According to Mwenda (2010) the outbreak of HIV/AIDS pandemic disease scaled the devastation of the spread by 40 per cent amongst the NRA killing the best top officers, when they assumed power in February 1986. Coupled with the insurgency in the north before NRA established formal structures in the army, the prosecution of the war in Northern Uganda took precedence over institutionalisation (Mwenda 2010:47). The spread of HIV/AIDS is mostly narrated back to this time of NRA arrival in Acholiland. By the turn of camp life, many people were already infected by HIV/AIDS, Ebola and other unusual outbreak of pandemic diseases.

The iconic identification of NRA as are complicit in spreading the silent killing weapons [sexually related diseases] in Acholiland is widely talked about. These also included rape of men infront of
their families during the war (interviewee, Pabo camp leader 2009). Carrying out sensitisation programmes on rape and HIV/AIDS education is very hard in villages compared to when returnees were in camps. In an interview with Oringa (2009) stigmatisation is a silent killer in VoRs because rape victims do not want to disclose their odeadls. HIV positive patients must walk the distance to obtain ARV medications, thus exposing their concealed identity as carriers of HIV/AIDS. Despite these challenges, NGOs have advocated to the community and government to make sure ARV are given to the affected population.

According to one patient, Mary (not real name) (2009) the movement of HIV positive victims to bigger cities and or towns is one of the ways of avoiding stigmatisation or getting access to ARV without being identified. This rural to urban migration is an ongoing exercise. Currently, there is a new internal crisis amongst Acholi people, how to deal with the pandemic diseases like HIV/AIDS. It has no borders, does not discriminate age or sex and wears people slowly (interview with Kitgum District Health Officer, 2009). Cultural norms, for example, wife inheritance that used to form part of lineage-based bonding and share of compounded family responsibility is dying out because of HIV/AIDS spread. This is affecting not only the socio-economic relations but also the basis for revisiting on how to rebuild lineage-based social authority as it might have been once enjoyed.

6.4 CONCLUSION
The perspectives in this chapter are about rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority and the need to rebuild sets of social institutions that can be supported by NGOs’ peacebuilding actions locally. The internal and external crises in Acholi needs to address the missing political middle class and elites gap, restoration of both human and food security, traditional leadership and traditional justice. Other sectors include socio-economic support mainly in the areas of employment, education, land ownership and use and health which is widely perceived as intended killing weaponry of the government. In all these institutional transformation process, NGOs are
relied upon to facilitate and moderate with flexible government reform agendas, so that Northern Uganda reaches a maintained social cohesion at national level.

This chapter concludes that social conditions that gave rise to conflict effect changes in the returnees’ social structures and patterns in VoRs. The roles of NGOs and government officials provided considerations to the underlying causes and social conditions that created and fostered violent conflict. NGOs promote nonviolent mechanisms that can reduce adversariness and ultimately eliminate violence (substantive justice discussed in chapter 5). NGOs can foster structures that met basic needs and maximise participation of returnees (procedural justice in chapter, 5 and 7).

Some NGOs like IA, Safer World have taken the realists’ epistemological position to acknowledge the realities of Acholi people by asserting that returnees’ social world should be concerned with the identification of structures that generate such world. Timeliness has also become essential for bridging the gap between Acholi lineage-based social institutions and authority. These arguments form the basis for government of Uganda’s approval of NGOs’ roles to establish special police posts that would later lead to the maintainance of security (human and property and not food security). There has not been any DDRR that would be applicable to Northern Ugandan war that can be viewed may create a new form of social institutions in Acholiland. Rather, the particular needs for human and food security, social services like health, schools, roads and water points, agricultural production mainly farm implements and seeds, socio-economic needs focus on IGA and leadership are the needed basis for strengthening Acholi social authority.

It became so clear from this chapter that approaches to social development has domains in participatory politics and policy of NGOs, which can be affected by government interference. Lederarch’s three-tier-levels of actors’ analysis of returnees’ social structure and socio-economic transformation suggest that a tighter social policy and participatory politics can distinguish the potentials of NGOs facilitation from nonfacilitative roles. Also, it may distinguish the realities of
local social institutions that are the beneficiaries. For example, the social reintegration within family re-unification, LRA returnees and neighbours shows that institutional and systems-integrations are inter-linked. The appeal is to protect the good culture against the bad cultures witnessed in camps, and to bridge the gap of generational independence on NGOs.

Another example can be seen from the distinction between the traditional and criminal court system and adapting the limited role of the middle ground hybrid Uganda Crime Court on returnees’ social realities. The transformation of courts and the need for village policing structures is confusing the implementation of justice mechanisms, the traditional and/or the criminal. As a result, the Acholi people are failing to make amends to procedural justice, that is to say, maximising political and social participation in decision-making that affect them along side substantive justice, and fostering structures that meet their human needs. Although the youths tend to have acquired “business-as-usual attitude” form of identity after the end of the war, the return to VoRs still poses new challenges on the culture of “how-things-used-to-be” for the elders and chiefs. None of these have been the view of NGOs and the Government officials. The common benchmark for both NGOs, returnees, and government officials are the constant demands for a better life, more IGAs, good quality education that is affordable and health care. Unfortunately, all these have to depend on land ownership and land use for agricultural production [giving pressure to social adjustment]. However, the hegemonic politics where probably neither NGOs’ participatory politics nor socio-economic foundations needed to rebuild a strong Acholi lineage-based social authority may resolve land is life paradox.

The transformation of leadership in VoRs is not in conformity with IDP-Camp leadership structure and the Local Government system of leadership (LCs), in that the reality of traditional Rwot-Kweri – hoe chief attaches itself with the new meanings of wage payments. FGDs in Opit, Paicho, and Omiya-Anyima agree that Rwot-Kweri leadership structure is linked to the socio-economic and structural transformation of collective and shared labour, called Awak. Again, the needed leadership styles that can sustain the level of social services and social institutions in villages of
returns based on the facilitative/non-facilitative roles of NGOs. This leads to the next chapter on relational transformation.

Generally, new sets of institutions which support peacebuilding are either understood structured and systematised under government regulations or defined by returnees in terms of support, development are expected to be coming from NGOs. The question remains, what is it that can be necessary for peacebuilding by NGOs? It emerged that rebuilding of Acholi lineage-based social authority leans towards the government and NGOs responsibility, but rebuilding the social structure is at its worst and/or non-existance. From compensation of victims, rehabilitation of schools and roads, health centres, national reconciliation and setting up truth commissions, political awareness, national and local security, the government tows the hegemonic versus clientalisation politics, suggesting negative peace promotion. Much as parts of Acholi people want rule by the people - democracy, rule by the elite - oligarchy exist from within the fractured population, making government’s rule by one person –authocracy posing unequitable goals of social recovery in Acholiland.

This is opposed to the findings that NGOs’ actions whose empirical impact of war to peace transformation suggests positive peace although the anger on them suggests they continue to be complicit bystanders in the recovery process. There is also a whole range of sequencing and prioritising of institutional transformations which NGOs can expand on from current state’s capacity for Northern Uganda. The role NGOs play is confirmed best a mixture of state and nonstate bottom-up and top-down inside-out conflated approach to support returnees for long-term institutional transformation. These ranged from camp-phase-out with minimised relief distribution to internal support from policies and systems that allows actions for community-driven interventions.
CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOVERING OF SOCIAL RELATIONS - RECONCILIATION

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter follows on from the thematic findings about the need for Acholi people to recover the functioning social relationships amongst themselves, the neighbours, and how the national and global relations can be facilitated from external support. Within own society, relationships amongst Acholi people has been mainly understood in terms of traditional social reconciliation with preference to peace first and justice later. The purpose of this chapter is to explore returnees' perspectives on the representative roles of NGOs and government officials on the preferred changing social relationships of Acholi people in respective VoRs. Social reconciliation is part of the re-enforcing element of the long history of Acholi lineage-based social authority and relations (chapter six).

In sub-section 7.2, internal relationships amongst Acholi people requires social reconciliation and peace that can also be understood externally. Acholi social reconciliation has been sometimes understood to contradict with the notion of justice. Returnees understand the “means to end” processes of Mato-Oput traditional social reconciliation as a “never again” outcome in a more restorative justice framework, than retributive.

Sub-section 7.3 discusses about external relations that NGOs play, mainly to advocate and facilitate relationships building. However, NGOs have own principles and strategies in mobilising returnees. NGOs have had tighter relationships with IDPs in camps whilst delivering what the government could not, or added value where necessary. This has created a gap for the government to practice a political system in which power is dispersed, of which sharing of the national growths is assumed to unify politics.
Sub-section 7.4 discusses on the perceptions of returnees on GoUs’ roles. It discusses the external and internal relationships of Acholi people. The next section begins with returnees’ perspectives on own internal relationships.

7.2 INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONGST ACHOLI PEOPLE
Extending social bridges and bondings in Acholiland, northern region and the country as a whole is not only about promoting participatory politics with non-state actors, but also about establishing social reconciliation. Social relations’ recovery amongst Acholi people is identified to be of context specific to grassroots traditional resolution. Pain (1997) argues that Acholi traditional resolution of conflict and violence stands among the highest practices anywhere in the world.

In my findings, what varies are the perspectives from NGOs, GoU officials and returnees about how NGOs do play a role in forging internal social recovery relations amongst Acholi returnees in VoRs. NGOs formed reciprocal perceptions against other competing NGOs and the GoU through their advocacy roles. For example, in Afghanistan, the U.S. and Western European countries, the United States Council for World Federation or Committee for a Free Afghanistan got directly involved in the politicisation of NGOs thus eroding the neutrality of NGOs. The loss of neutrality within the country and at the grassroots level led to the Museveni government to have formed a polyarchy way of deploying popular democracy by portraying the government image as the lead authority to protect Acholiland.

In chapter five, most Acholi people worry that LRA returnees are abducted children, victims turned perpetrators against own communities or close relatives, requiring a wider social transformation. By focusing only on individual and/or personal social transformation and viewing formerly abducted LRA returnees as are collectively guilty, or Acholi population for that matter, may misrepresent the true nature and scope of social reconciliation in Acholiland. It may also fail to fully understand the processes by which substantive and procedural justice can be reached. The state claims and strategies have evaded the essential and pragmatic questions the Acholi people
are raising about their abducted children. State claims and hopes of returnees have to be separated from necessity which NGOs are able to provide. All these may represent the likelihood of social reconciliation, but not actual.

Initially, the perspectives of returnees on the root causes of the war in Acholiland in sub-section 5.2 suggest that returnees’ bonding process within families were not supportive of NGO attempts to restore social authoritative structure. It has affected ways by which any strong authoritative lineage-based social structure of Acholi people are to be rebuilt after returning “home”. Many still continue to ask why the war took so long, the war that prevented them from making attachment to the ancestral homestead. Parts of some of the answers are provided on the likelihood that felt needs of returnees are associated with both met and unmet needs so much necessary to be facilitated by NGOs and the GoU. Instead this has broadened and delayed the goal of rebuilding social reconciliation. The other debate is that traditional justice are only a part of a long-standing local contest about who should interpret the Acholi spiritual world and traditional customs of social life (Allen 2010:254). For example, the relevance of amnesty, international criminal court (ICC) or any hybrid court of Uganda only occurred in each situation in which they have been introduced. However, returnees believe that traditional justice, after achieving peace, has to stress on righting wrongs and amending broken relationships by way of Mato Oput.

Where, external societal rebuilding and bonding of Acholi people with other districts and regions, mainly west Nile and Lango are concerned, social polarisation from the past has to be addressed. Internally, formal DDRR programme did not take place in the entire Northern Uganda leaving societal reconciliation to have been by-passed. Apart from the high ranking officers of the LRA who enjoyed amnesty from the GoU, many Ex-LRA returnees who were abducted children are housed in reception centres like GUSCO (Gulu), KICWA (Kitgum) and Rakile (Lira) and are later handed over to the parents (if the parents can be found), to relatives or are sometimes recycled back into the UPDF.
Social reconciliation of [Mato-Oput for Acholi; Kayo Cuk for Lango, Ailus for Teso and Tulu Koki of Madi] tend to prefer peace before justice and not vice versa. In the eastern sub-region of Teso, Buckley-Zistel (2008) finds that the relationship between various parties has not been transformed and peace remains shallow. What seems uniting in both Teso, Acholi, Lango and West Nile cases is that majority of the population prioritise peace before justice.

7.2.1 TRADITIONAL SOCIAL RECONCILIATION – MATO OPUT

Mato Oput reconciliation isn’t necessarily a replacement of any justice, rather is rated as a form of traditional restorative justice of Acholi people, now widely preferred in Northern Uganda. Mato-Oput creates social cohesion and tends to invest in developing social human capital that may not necessarily rely on the context of relief and emergency aid NGOs used to provide. The process of Mato-Oput searches for restorative justice by understanding crime that compares and contrasts the “legal” or criminal justice to that of restorative justice, brings the two approaches to different views regarding key questions. Acholi restorative justice asks key questions of who has been hurt. What are their needs and whose obligations are these? It assumes “peaceful coexistence” which if it takes long time may fail to achieve its authenticity. Mato-Oput falls within the arguments pertaining to the “no-post-conflict rehabilitation model” that can be universally applied.

Generally, Schreiter (1992) argues that reconciliation is not “managed process”. People cannot be merely exhorted or manipulated into a truly heart-felt reconciliation. It most often has to be initiated from the side of the victim, since the perpetrators are always unable to forgive themselves or even to recognise honestly, the enormity of what they have done; “it comes upon us like a healing,” for “reconciliation is something that comes upon the victim, something that the victim discovers, rather than a well-managed therapy or process. It is more of a spirituality than a strategy” (Schreiter 1992).

Criminal justice views crime as a violation of the law of the state and that violation creates guilt to the state and individual. The victims are considered the state as well as the individual, therefore,
justice requires the state to determine blame (guilt) and impose pain (punishment) and the central focus is on offenders getting what they deserve. The key questions of criminal justice are what laws have been broken? Who did it? And what do they deserve?

Broadly speaking, the Acholi traditional system of reconciliation looks at elements of harms and related needs of victims first, but also of the community’s and the offender’s, the community’s obligations that have resulted from and given rise to this harm. Stakeholders in the offense and those who have legitimate interest in its resolution, usually the victims, offenders, and community members are engaged. The system requires to address victim’s harms and needs, hold offenders accountable to put right those harms, and involve victims, offenders, and communities in the process. It puts the offender under intense psychological obligation and moral fit. Participation and public consultation vary from both justice procedures.

In all the nine FGDs I carried out during my data collection, peace was chosen over justice. The first step towards social reconciliation is to initiate the Mato Oput ritual process. Convictions in any criminal trials are not of a universally recognised approach to justice with the Acholi people who tend to prefer social reconciliation than retribution. Amnesty and truth-telling seem to be much more acceptable particularly if those who have suffered can receive some form of compensation (Allen 2010: 244). Despite community’s pursuit for peace first, returnees agree that most NGOs and the Government are continuing to strive towards post-conflict recovery programme (interviewee, Chief Administrative Officer 2009). This question was posed when NGOs were facing pressing social issues of camp-phase-out and the emergence to enter into social reconciliation process. Social reconciliation would also require compensation of “victims” which must come from donor funding. This is believed will support the process of Mato Oput through anointed chiefs Rwodi Moo.

In an interview with a senior staff of the International Alert (IA) (2009), the impact of war that took so long and overshadowed developments in Acholiland needs to invest on and consolidate the
positive peace. In an interview with the retired Anglican Bishop Ochola and who was also the Chariman of Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI) (2009) argues that Acholi people hanged on only hope. Hope in his view connected Acholi people to peace and justice and that hope brought Acholi people together (Interviewee, Bishop Ochola 2009). Ochola believes that rebuilding relationships requires continued attitude of sharing the past pain, sorrows, stories (bad and good), dreams and hope. He says, “I find that majority of younger and educated Acholi people talk about Mato Oput as if it is unique” (Ochola 2009).

In Mozambique, Honwana (1997) shares the view that after a long period of social and material destructions in rural communities as a consequence of regional destabilisation and civil war, the communities were faced with both its material rehabilitation and social reconstruction challenges. The Mozambiquean strategy for post-war healing and social reconstruction involves the role of traditional leaders and families in healing the social wounds within which the context applies. The traditional institutions in Mozambique were able to bring back social balance, harmony, co-existence and social stability.

In Northern Uganda, the possibilities also lies in the philosophy that underlines the practices of these institutions and funding to partly strengthen the traditional institution and facilitate compensation. It was not clearly stated if the cosmological model of healing social wounds to regulate social life, particularly in rural communities after return can be facilitated by funding alone. In the past, compensation for a conviction based on killing using Mato Oput ritual process would involve giving away a girl to the family of the bereaved, both to bind the families together, and so that a child could be born to the bereaved lineage to replace the one that had died (Allen 2010: 245). In Desmond Tutu’s (2002) Ubuntu philosophy, both the Mozambiquean and Acholi tend to see the world as fundamentally resting on the two-folded foundation of unity and diversity and as a goal to strive for harmony between the two. Returnees prefer NGOs facilitatation to the restoration of hope in people and begin to invest in the very people who can magnify own peace, just like Tutu’s philosophy and that of the Mozambiquean’s cosmology. Currently, the bigger Acholi
population prefer traditional methods of reconciliation of Mato Oput that focuses on outcome with compensation to victims, but not payment of a girl to the bereaved family. The effort made in 1996 by the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD) to facilitate the reinstitution of anointed traditional chiefs have not met to strive for harmony within all Acholi people. Bradbury (1999) also made a comparative fact finding study to the ACORD research that concluded that; traditional structures were weak and fragmented; many “elders” were themselves not sure how to carry out traditional rituals; there were widespread disagreement about who were the real traditional leaders; and that few people considered the traditional structures a key priority (Dolan 2000a; Acord 2000).

Generally, the foundation of any unity and diversity to rebuild and represent Acholi traditional social authority and relationships to the outside world has become more complex, probably more political and economical in nature. Already in the 1990s, Bradbury (1999: 17-20) argues that there were tensions between elders over the possible financial benefits from the government who had shown interest in restituting KKA. There were concerns that the external support for traditional chiefs from the government was just another way of trying to bring the region under closer government control without contributing to improve education and economic development. Some of these gaps were expected to be bridged by Kacoke Madit (KM) “Big Meeting”. However, KM advocacy-oriented organised style failed to provide direct services to the local context. KM mandated itself to strengthen Acholi unity and Acholi cultural heritage (Allen 2010: 245). But, KM could not match the growing field of traditional peace movements and pacifist discourses, Pax Kristi’s realists role in organising JPTs, and the evolving civilisation of the war. KM vanished although its presence only lies with individual convictions amongst very few Acholi people.

In an interview with a member of the Kitgum Women Peace Group (KWPG) (2009) who chose peace first with the reflecting perspectives to exercise harmony and coexistence as a part of Mato Oput process, to them, realism meant tangible IGAs. Taking actions for household’s and communities’ well-being, unity (to work together as a group – for example, Awak), respect (to
recognise one another’s’ pain and share stories – social healing) and security, reflects concerns of food and human security as are necessary in the social reconciliation processes.

For support, many women I talked to argue that healing process needs economic support from NGOs, not GoU who tend to frustrate Acholi peoples’ collective attempts to recover. Acholi region is already far below economic national growths rate. These women believe that economic relations can strengthen internal and external relationships. Internally, majority of Acholi women especially, express in their songs of peace, war and funerals, dance and drama about peace. They welcome any societal support leading to healing process. Songs are sung in times of hardship, war and protection, happiness, marriages, health, well being, good harvest and reconciliation. The significance of songs, dance and drama and symbols in Acholi offers a powerful reflection in putting memories to words. Sometimes songs are quickly and spontaneously composed for any occasion. For more than fifteen years outside my home, I went to spend Christmas and visit my village and relatives in Namokor, in December 2006. My communities quickly composed songs and danced to rekindle my relationship with them. Such songs would also provide space for grieving the past and orienting towards the future.

Amongst the younger Acholi generation, music industry flourished, for example, a song was composed to express, “it is unbearable to live in camps” (*Bedo i “kem” lare kuu*) was a song that was composed to express social sufferings and grievances about live in internal displacement (protected villages). The song was sold and played widely to west Nile and Lango and other districts. The word (*kem*) comes from the english word “camp”, did not exist in Acholi vocabulary (see sub-section 3.4). These songs became questionable whether forgiveness portrayed by the younger generations in their songs clearly means peace, truth, mercy and justice or transcendence or the youths did not want to associate with the past. It seems that a new generator for strengthening traditional social reconciliation, and/or a replacement of the new emerging traditional system is not the question either, although Acholi songs have dominated local, national and regional relations.
However, there is no evidence of any new emerging, or re-emerging traditional system of Acholi justice (Allen 2010: 249). In an interview with one Gulu Women camp leader (72 years) in 2009, accepting ex-LRA returnees must involve a number of rituals which are not new emerging traditional system. Songs only redeem, comfort, prepares for forgiveness and narrates about past pain and so on. Rituals include “chasing away evil spirits” (ryemo cen). In order to “forgive” and have compassion, rituals like (ryemo cen), stepping on the eggs (nyono tong-gweno), washing away the tears (lwoko pig wang), cleansing the spirit/ghost (mayo tipu), cleansing for an abominable act (tumu kir), chasing spirits from a wide area (ryemo gemo), cleansing someone who has been killed in war (kwero merok), chasing a “roaming” spirit (ryemo jok or jwee) and payment for compensation (culu kwor) are all contained in Acholi ritual performances. The process of “cooling” the situation, Kwayo Piny meaning “pacification”, traditionally involves everyone to first sit down and then a “lamb is sacrificed” Tumo Romo, whose blood was considered to “calm down the land”. This is mainly to stop the cycle of violence (culu kwor) from happening once there has been a homicide.

Although “forgiveness” has been termed (timo kica) which has sometimes been used to describe amnesty and social reconciliation, the proliferation of recognised rituals, however, does not resolve the basic difficulty of turning selected practices into something new (Allen 2010: 252). Returnees maintain their central argument that truth-telling and acknowledgement of guilt from both the Government and LRA may not justify forgotten justice (amnesia). For returnees, clarity, acknowledgement and truth-telling from the GoU and LRA arises from the breaches of security guarantees of the past, and in the fear that the unsealed JPTs’ comprehensive peace agreement may once again result in LRA repraisal attacks in Northern Uganda.

Acholi attitudes, perceptions and trust may have had a wider socio-political and socio-economic implications on social reconciliation and peace. The impacts suggest that some broader peace (peace-writ-large) needs to be translated into actions at the socio-political and socio-economic levels of the returnees before justice takes its course. Such demand depends on the supportive
roles of NGOs and the GoU willingness to give meanings to the realities of returnees who feel they are caught up in the (peace-writ small) processes. NGO activities that needs to engage returnees’ strategic political leaders bases on (Lederarch’s) three levels, where peace-writ-large. It can be effective if it relies on acknowledgment, hope, mercy and forgiveness amidst all performances of rituals named above. In that, Acholi values and emotive reflections on traditional mechanisms of social reconciliations and forgiveness becomes central.

In an interview with Rwot Lugai (2009) forgiveness cannot be demanded, but once it is allowed to germinate at the epicentre of peace, it will not be denied. Peace and reconciliation will be drawn much closer to societal co-existence and harmony, support and compassion than any single focus on compensation of victims. In the interview, Rwot Lugai George William (2009) argues that the war in Northern Uganda left victims who cannot and will not, even with the help of NGOs, compensate or be compensated amidst the mass violence. The question is who can be forgiven and who can forgive.

The government officials on the other hand are to be tasked with identifying LRA victims and start the process of compensation. In such government’s attempt, over 4,000 LRA victims with physical disabilities, of which 2,846 have some form of LRA mutilations were identified. Many Acholi believe that this is more of a political tool than an agenda that can address the deeper and real compensation process. Returnees argue that the principles of truth-telling, confession, mediation and reparation resulting into reconciliation and restoration of relationships is being by-passed.

The diagram 7.2 below demonstrates how Acholi traditional approach and structure is used, for example, on issues relating to how the social authoritative structure of Acholi people address victims, leading to social reconciliation. Based on the governments identifications, it is simply too hard to define, identify and classify victims if, say, one takes into consideration the major

10 Joint declaration on agenda item 3 of the Juba Peace Talks (accountability and reconciliation) by cultural leaders and religious leaders, women and youth from Madi, Teso, Lango and Acholi sub-region held at St Augustine Hall-Lira, on 11th August 2007, presented by Rwot Acana II.
causes of victims while relying on the three types of violence: physically deformed, cultural classifications especially, those classified under the psycho-social trauma and marginalisation, and thirdly those who are structurally denied the supporting livelihood to promote human potentials and development, and access to services and equal opportunities.

7.2 Diagram Showing Traditional Approach and Social Authority Structure used to Address Issues of Victims

Source: Author’s version from Post-Juba Conference, Adel, Gulu, 17th–20th December 2007

A criticism against figure 7.2 lies in addressing issues of fairness (justices) and in having equality in the society. The basis for the arguments against such criticism by most elders give are that the lack of respect and humility (woro ki mwolo) cannot be bought by money in the society or achieved prematurely where social justice (procedural and substantial justices) were denied for a long time. Centrally, the traditional methods/strategies has to identify, classify individuals, groups
or particular community to first understand the acknowledgement and secondly follow truth-telling process. This may result into compensation, thus, social reconciliation.

Truth-telling through indepth narrative, forensic, social and individual truths can sometimes lead to reconciliation (interviewee, Elders’ FGDs 2009). However, some NGOs do not approve of the above process, especially those subscribing to feminist contemporary burden-sharing responsibilities and accountability. Their argument is that women bear the biggest burden based on the structural and cultural violence they went through. These types of violence are invisible. This view is clearly stated in Galtung’s literatures.

In representing the Acholi views in the diagram above, it seems there is need for a consistent balance in the reflection on where support, compassion and where acknowledgement and truth-telling requires any NGOs action-oriented elements to promote mercy. Mercy may promote mutal actions of the past, current and future targets of co-operation, support and compassion of the Acholi social traditional relationships and responsibilities. Social responsibilities in this case plays a shaping role of social reconciliation process in Acholiland, something NGOs could pick up. According to an IRC protection manager in Kitgum (2009) it is difficult for NGOs to address issues of fairness, since lack of respect and humility (wor ki mwalo) is far from being understood in the society. Returnees need external relationships and exposure so as to compare lessons from other regions, and these can be done partly with the help of NGOs.

7.3 **ACHOLI EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS - NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

This section focuses on the perceptions of Acholi people on NGOs contributions in ending the war and in mobilising returnees from IDPs to respective villages, mainly in external representations. Key players in post-conflict reconciliation processes are often governments or non-governmental organisations (Buckley-Zistel 2008: 140). The international dimension can be directed towards the transference of peace to local control, integration into cooperative and equitable regional and
global structures, advocacy and transformation (see post-war peacebuilding framework in figure 2.5.2).

The views of NGOs and government officials, religious leaders, local organisations and the international communities are explored. They (NGOs) are social (focus on people) and political (work with state, policies, public administration, etc) actors. The intermediary services of INGOs did not include formal DDRR programme in Acholiland. Instead, issues of compensation of victims’, accountability, responsibility and unification in national politics attracted more views from NGOs workers and those of GoU’s. By way of connecting Acholi people to the external world, social reconciliation was conveyed in different forms and functions. Most GoU officials believe that social incoherence can have different perceptions that requires the government to strategise on using polyarchy. Polyarchy is a political system in which power is dispersed, of which sharing of the national growth would unify politics and ethnics division.

The war in Northern Uganda had a late internationalisation (interviewees, Okumu and Achan 2009). The extra-moral violence used by the LRA (forced child conscription, exactions on civilians, maiming …), the absence of a clearly articulated political agenda, its constant reference to supernatural forces, the ten biblical commandements which are hermetrical to Western rationality of warfare – had partly obscured the complexity of the political and social processes the LRA has developed (Perrot 2010: 188). Western ways of addressing traditional reconciliation has been formed to establish confidence and trust-building amidst the huge humanitarian assistance that overshadowed what form of social recovery would emerge. The aim has been to address social indifferences and antagonisms in Acholiland. NGOs are working to forge harmony and co-existence in the name of peace (interviewee, Bishop Onono 2009).

In an interview conducted with the AVSI field officer in Paicho (2009), the relationships NGOs have with ex-IDPs (returnees) has been very close and tight, but some have failed to play a representative role of supporting Acholi social bondage. The failure to represent Acholi people
aris from the associated problems NGOs have especially those who regard themselves unconsciously as structuralist. They [NGOs] make for example assumptions that human rights are uniform and are non-political, but they actually become politicised over time.

Literature has been clear that social relations between individuals, groups, NGOs and government are a part of relational transformation. In an interviewee with Ocen (2009), whose work with NRC has followed Acholi returnees for many years, NGOs workers including (Bazungus – Swahili word meaning whites) have been freely working in returnees' villages and some of them have adapted native culture. “Some NGOs workers seem to have left every bit of their hearts in Western countries, mainly those working as international experts, and are coming from regional and national coordinating offices” (interviewee, GOAL project manager 2009). Few in the FGDs reflected upon NGO workers who acted like “dual citizens” (see appendix B-7.3). Dual citizen NGOs have become locally institutionalised forging what Lederach calls mechanism to engage with each other as humans-in-relations (Lederach 1999: 29).

In policy terms, the government began to regulate all LNOGs to be legitimately registered following the NGO national policy (NGO-National Policy June 2008). Regional NGO (RNGOs), National NGOs (NNGOs) and some INGOs maintained their legitimacy and continued to work with INGOs and the communities. For local actors and peace activists, the internationalisation of the conflict was expected to raise international awareness. But, the humanitarian and security situation heretofore were barely reported in the brief articles in the regional section of the national newspapers (Perrot 2010: 188-189). The external representation of northern connections by NGOs to the international communities was missing or being blocked by the government. In what could have been the international basis to conceptualise reconciliation based on truth, mercy and justice, negative peace was pursued in the confines of time, political space NGOs have with the government and people and financial provision that was made available to completed date-line projects.
In financial terms, the total humanitarian assistance that increased from US$19.5 million in 2000 to US$56 million in 2002 and US$119.5 million in 2007 ([United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] OCHA 2000, 2002, 2007) raised so much hope of financial continuity in the post-war period. According to Rwot Acana [interviewee] (2009) reconciliation is a process-oriented exercise that is to be achieved at the end, when peace, security, truth etc are established. The process requires financial assistance. In an interview with Acana (2009) the preferable process of reconciliation Mato Oput can take months if not years, unlike retribution where outcomes are achieved immediately with the purpose of punishing the wrongdoers. Any supporting NGOs can walk Acholi through – meaning empowerment, especially when the offender comes out and tells the truth about his/her action, the process cannot be denied.

Still on financial contribution to societal reconciliation, in a FGDs (2009) development assistance and official aid increase from US$17 million in 2000 to US$1.2 billion in 2005 (World Bank 2007) stops with the national NGOs and government officials, district political leaders and some government appointed individuals. A very low relations with the population registers whenever such a big financial contribution is earmarked but no representations are established with the local people - beneficiaries. District and national government officials collude with NGOs to solicit funds and steal because these officials are committed to own careers to remain in the good books of the government and/or parent NGOs. For example, the government’s National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAAD) officials were cited as the most corrupt government body acting locally (FGDs 2009).

Although the national and international media coverage brought the squalid conditions of IDPs’ living conditions to the fore front, corruption became a way of life that nobody speaks about. After Egeland’s humanitarian crisis alert in Northern Uganda, the international information, sensitisation, lobbying and fund-raising initiatives flourished. Like in figure 2.6.2 the types of NGOs ranged from the Uganda Conflict Action Network-Uganda-CAN, the joint international Crisis-Group-Centre for American Progress’s ENOUGH project, Gulu Walk was initiated by two Canadians, Invisible
Children targeted teenagers, International Rescue Committee’s campaign, Oprah Winfred coverage, CNN, the National Geographic Channel and many free-agents.

However, in an interview with a member of Gulu Teacher’s Association (GTA) (2009) Gulu town did not only become the northern hub for NGO free-agents, but also corruption corridors. When the emergence of public awareness and international civil mobilisation started making headlines in public medias, the top levels political support from international forums, UN members and diplomatic circles started growing for a quick resolution (Security Council 2006). New actors in the diplomatic landscape in Uganda and in the UN alerted many Government and NGOs sectors. But Uganda’s political ascension promoted many individual-merits-based support to be recognised by Kampala regime. This has also grown wider to the UN, IMF and WB levels who did not consider how their relations with the government has had an impact on the grassroot population.

There are also NGOs and individuals who worked with the ICC, behaved as if they left their hearts in the court chambers in The Hague or were individual-merit-based people seeking national/local popularity. They have no sensitivities about what impacts it has on IDPs. This view is widely shared across Acholiland. The traditional court mechanisms are down played without considering the importance it has on traditionally transforming relationships. In an interview with Mego Lakor (2009) who questioned if “the person named ICC” has a mother and ever gave birth to a child, called peace.

Individuals whose behaviours suggest profiteering from the war and/or spoilers of peace tend to create NGOs that are termed Brief-Case NGOs and/or USB-Memory Stick NGOs. Such individuals fail to play any facilitative roles of linking returnees to the international community. Government initiatives like the National Agricultural Advisory development (NAAD) did not directly work to finance reconciliation amongst returnees. But her support for agriculture seemed to have re-enforced the socio-cultural interactions amongst Acholi people. NAAD has produced many plateau-career free agents, most of who write fantastic project proposals and resorted to lobbying
INGOs mainly to seek domestic and international political and financial backing. These plateau-agents move freely in VoRs to engage in “stateside” operations hoping that there are INGO-global stints, which will change financial packages in their favours (Poverty Reduction and Developement Programm [PRDP] 2009).

Together with INGOs, local and international plateau-career free agents frequently change jobs from one NGOs to another. Some resort to running their own NGOs, besides working with the INGOs. Some work with NNGO, INGOs for bigger paying positions while acting nationally from Kampala to local Gulu, Kitgum, Pader or Amuru locations. This particular group also tend to think globally as well as are acting locally. Returnees believe that rebuilding any external relationships while relying on free agents in the name of social reconciliation sometimes prioritise support for general peace dividends. More than 90 per cent of Acholi youths prefer to study hard and work for NGOs along this argument.

Free-agents are distinct from plateau-career agents and others who have adapted themselves to the native roles. For example, the Quaker Peace Witness (QPW), Conciliation Resources (CR) are few track one actors whose link with track three returnees expose themselves (QPW) and (CR) as are expert groups working on the ground to demonstrate their native actions. They identify programmes and support related projects at track-three mainly driven by non-political traditional and religious leaders. These NGOs tend to externally link Acholi people based on the importance of their local resources, practices and attitudes with local Acholi people.

While native-like NGOs tend to despatch closer psychological share in their medium of identity, returnees are left to assign values to keep it to commit by. Usually, the parent NGOs, say from United Kingdom, USA, Canada, etc coordinate through country directors in Kampala or Gulu. But it is unclear how far such NGOs with native nature can commit, relate and act consistently at the local level. These NGOs are very few. They depart so quickly than expected after coming so close to the people after raising too much hope. Some of whom might have become too local and
stayed to assume CBOs statuses. Probably this confirms the view that, “acting locally and thinking globally” suits actions of NGOs that have adapted a local culture and context of returnees.

In sub-section 2.6.2, the typology of NGOs’ involvements follow patterns of interactions that can change with the understanding of their environment and the current rules-in-use (Ostrom, Garden and Walker 1994). While some NGOs have tried to inject incentives into altering the social structures, the implementing policies dictates on attitudes of some of the national/local government officials who do not want to take responsibilities on settling returnees (interviewee, IRC 2009). Such policies have resulted into unintended consequences, especially where short-term to long-term relationships has to shape NGOs exit strategy. In our interview with the IRC field coordinator (2009) NGOs may take longer to withdraw entirely from Acholi sub-region.

The complex nature of rebuilding societal relations was perceived to include changes in the cultural and social structure of Acholi people rather than relying on the past. The goal to reconcile Acholi people or support national reconciliation is downplayed and denounced by the GoU. This is because most INGOs acted naïvely without ethical and Pearsonian conception of international relations although Nordic country representatives had been among the most vocal in denouncing Museveni’s military policy in Northern Uganda (Perrot 2010: 192). According to an interviewee, Lawoko (2009), such naïve versus realists conception affected the way NGOs relayed information to the outside world. He argues that some NGOs sometimes consulted with elders to ask for Acholi traditional training scheme. Suprisingly, the very same elders are called for the training scheme as participants.

The perspectives and reflections of most religious INGOs like AVSI, World Vision and CARITAS converged with those of IDPs and ARLPI who have their hearts in truly investing in peace and hope (interviewee, Director of LNGO 2009). These INGOs tend to thread ties and commitment well with both their parent organisations and the returnees. This reflection qualify “dual-citizen NGOs” whose ties with the Acholi people focused on relational process rather than short term
“nice-to-see-you” and a “see-you-again” outcomes. They dual-citizens NGOs] had long-term
tighter communications and relationships with the IDPs. They are highly reflected upon by Acholi
people as having had a much desirably continued support to mobilise and work with the
population. These INGOs act contrary to Terry’s (2002) argument that paradoxical protection by
humanitarian NGOs in refugee camps have little incentives to see the conflict end because it will
dry up their own source of revenues (see page 76).

Acholi external relations with NGOs goes back to the JPTs as was outlined in chapter three. However, the post-Juba conference held in Gulu (May 2009) points out that justice has become a
contentious issue. Returnees continue to be confused whether Uganda which does not have a
war-crime court, but basing on war-crime division and Mato Oput are enough. In an interview with
Ochora (2009) over 23,000 men and women have been rescued from LRA and Uganda war-crime
division can actually try those who have cases to answer. NGOs’ options to invest in hope-raising,
support psychosocial issues, act on the practice of mercy and forgiveness were not freely
dispensed without revisiting their budget. Ochora argues in our interview that government Poverty
Reduction and Development Plan aims to target Acholi returnees and over 1,500 victims are
identified in Gulu alone and education takes district priority.

A donor conference was being talked about a lot as one of the supportive and facilitating role
INGOs can directly undertake, at least Acholi people will be known externally. An official of the
UNHCR (2009) argues in our interview that donor conference are pledges and not tangible. Donor
pledges are sceptical and yet unsuccessful reintegration and resettlement of formerly abducted
LRA returnees, the civilian returnees facing the realities of unexploded ordinance (UXO) are
paramount. Even when illegal guns are being collected nearing between 35,000–40,000
(interviewee, Ochora 2009), donor conference is similar to NGOs quarterly or yearly budgets. In
July 2005 Ministry of Health report on mortality rates in the IDP camps, known as the “WHO Report” (Ugandan Ministry of Health 2005), and the Human Rights Watch report on the UPDF
exactions on civilians (Human Rights Watch 2005b) were issued. With some rival emotional
declarations concerning the Uganda plight, ambassadors and foreign representatives called for action to put an end to the conflict (Perrot 2010: 192). An AVSI informant (2007) argues that lives of some returnees do not wait to balance financial budget books as NGOs usually do or wait for pledges. Direct relations with external world have not been so frequent, but relied mostly on media reports, books, few field visits by researchers. Acholi people were confined in their remote and trapped social realities and Acholi start-up-packages to rekindle kinships amongst themselves, lagged behind the modern process of any contemporary social transformation.

Empirical evidence from NGO-field workers who work closely with track-three actors are not consistent with the grassroots’ perspectives, especially following on the nature and impact of NGOs workshops, capacity building and conferences. Their arguments are that empowering Acholi IDP-returnees that aim at supporting or even generating local struggles for social justice in respective VoRs are missing out the wider socio-structural changes. It is not proven that NGOs’ support to rebuild lineage-based social authority, strengthening political middle class and elites, and relying on traditional leadership lineage-based authority would consolidate socio-economic foundation of Acholi structure. Miall (2002) summarises that, conflict transformation emphasises on support needed for groups within the society in conflict rather than for the mediation of outsiders. It also recognises that conflicts are transformed gradually, through a series of smaller or larger changes as well as specific steps by means of which a variety of actors may play important roles, in this case, inter-connectivity and relationship building.

It was apparent that NGOs’ relationships with returnees carry a lot of manipulation of incentives to harmonise returnees’ realities to NGOs’ central missions in the fear of losing out their neutrality and independence to lobby governments and the UN to take actions (Reif 2002). The proliferation of individual initiatives led to cross-cutting and duplicative programmes. Given the high level of competition among donors, (international) NGOs and agencies seek to develop niches, sometimes creating programmes where they are not necessarily needed (Ginifer 2006). This is
not what may be required in VoRs, and NGOs support to rebuild societal relations may have come to the end of the road.

7.4 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS OF ACHOLI PEOPLE

The external and internal crises of Acholi people have not been mediated well by NGOs as seen above and in chapter three. Blind-eye diplomacy that blurred the naïve donors versus the realists did not improve external and internal relationships of Acholi people. A member of Acholi Parliamentary Group (2008 and 2009) argues in our interview that from the start of JPTs and return of IDPs to VoRs in Acholiland, donors, international NGOs and UN agencies disagreed on the political position to adopt on central issues left unexplored from JPTs.

Between traditional diplomacy and the tougher policy of new external actors: some prominent UN Security Council Permanent Five (P5) members as well as some ambassadors, were irritated by the aggressive and jostling post-Westphalian style of non-members (Perrot 2010: 197). The UN P5 member states include: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Within external actors, internal jealously has kept leadership for peace initiatives and the small emerging international actors mixed up with generous naïve donors who have good humanitarian intentions (Ibid.: 197). Reconciling Acholi people has not been an issue of these externally jealous actors. GoU played well and maintains good relationships with donor countries. Donors’ twofold diplomatic strategy has been relying on support for and in collaboration with the government on the one hand and constructive pressure on the other.

In an interview with key government National Resistance Movement (NRM) politicians the support for Acholi internal to external bond must follow international legal lines too. The Uganda War Crimes Court (Jurist Legal News & Research 2008) support this argument even when the court has failed to familiarise its practical implementations. Not many people I spoke to know well about the Uganda special division court. UN and donors understand too well about their confrontation policy they have had. UK’s humanitarian diplomat John Holmes was being succeeded by
Canadian, Allan Rock, who gave a clear indication of shifting back to a realist approach. From mid 1990s the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI), traditional leaders and most Acholi people would have preferred similar approach. ARPLI travelled widely around the world to explain the impact of not only the war, but also the traditional customs that unite Acholi. While the ICC stood its ground by insisting that the LRA leaders must be arrested and indicted in mid early 2000, the GoU took a side-step to prioritise a combination of traditional and retributive forms of justices. It is a new re-negotiating position of justice backed by Ugandan Judiciary Court system and Acholi traditional reconciliation mechanism.

Besides, the Government policies of ending the war, national and regional reconciliation remains on paper. It has rendered reconciliation a fractured-concept. Uganda walked on a tightrope, oscillating between authoritarianism and democracy, restricting political liberties but enhancing freedom of speech, and using a very sophisticated grammar of half-restraint violence. National reconciliation initiatives to serve the wider national truth commissions, and local societal levels through Mato Oput were insulted and neglected by government officials. There has been fear in the government that any call for national reconciliation would require truth commissions that will also implicate key government officials. National reconciliation became a collective agenda for political discourse. Any social change agenda for national and local context, external and internal linkages to Acholi social authority have been kept away. Regionally, the enforcement of the South Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to create a separate country seem to impress political willingness to strengthen regional, external to internal Acholi relations.

As seen before, any viable justice system without traditional system to address the massive internal broken-down relationships, externally driven justice may further fracture internal relations. Neighbouring districts would also find solace in the traditional system, but if the GoU is at its hub. Buckley-Zistel (2008: 140) clarifies that since the strategy of the government is mainly to create a unified nation … unification policies [rather than national reconciliation – my addition], top-down efforts are hard to influence relationships of turning war-torn society into one collective identity.
Buckley-Zistel (2008: 141) assures that this creates national identity that is, citizenship that can be a vehicle for overcoming cleavages that have led to violent conflict in the past. Such top-down influences have failed to establish any viable national truth commissions, now in its seventh attempts (chapter three).

Buckley-Zistel’s point is that any proven unified reality of national to local influence of national identity only works when there are good leadership structure. In an interviewe with Otim Galdino (2009), without giving opportunities to local relationship to strengthen and rebuild their poor leadership structure in VoR, low levels of actions from the traditional and local population cannot create a unification of purpose that can address the external cause of the social crises. The need to bridge the existing generational gaps, integrate LRA-returnees into the communities and some top-LRA commanders is a challenge to social cohesion, realities and resources. Some of these commanders went back to their farms or assumed adult education, but not young ones. Although the government officials say that ex-LRA combatants have had nowhere to return to after leaving GUSCO and that decision to re-join government army was voluntary and of informed choices, there remained a wide gap in the nature of rebuilding societal relations from within Acholi IDPs-returnees. Ex-LRA returnees are trained and taken back to CAR to fight their remaining abducted brothers who are still with the LRA. This worsens the Acholi external relations with own Acholi. Acholi elders believe that the root causes of the war, the fear of exterminating Acholi people and the lack of government political will is using Acholi people again as shields and spears in battle fields, just like it was when they were in “protected villages – IDPs” (interviewee, Akera [80 years old] 2006). These views were explained within the context of the historical, structural and cultural violence that caused the internal and external crises in Acholiland.

The unclear labelling of the conflict as local, without classifying it as a national and regional crisis understaved the formulation and implementation of a clear policy by external actors towards Northern Uganda. In figure 2.6.3 periods of recovery in which the transformation of Acholi institution and social authority focuses on implementation policies for returnees. But such policies
remained at the top and middle levels only. Humanitarian bias used by external actor to analyse the conflict could not avoid the depoliticising of the conflict and its resolution. These participatory politics used by NGOs favoured humanitarian bias during crises management in Northern Uganda but failed returnees in respective VoRs.

7.5 ACHOLI RELATIONSHIPS EXTERNALLY – NGOS’ REPRESENTATIVE ROLES

Northern Ugandan insurgency extended into regional dynamics especially with South Sudan and DRC. Ugandan government continued to distract international attention by advancing internal military and political developments politics. It also prevented donors from intervening directly in the Ugandan political sphere, especially in the northern situation. When the northern situation was referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in late 2003, the LRA had been fighting the government for over fifteen years. ICC went ahead to issue arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and four of his top commanders in 2005. The role of ICC in Uganda was attacked as an effort to impose a partial and compromised “Western” form of justice, one which sets aside or ignores local mechanisms for conflict resolution and social reconciliation. The Acholi relationships became the more diluted case, making traditional reconciliation and justice being conceptually misunderstood. The contention is widened by the ICC pursuit of criminal justice.

Generally, government officials who first supported referring the Northern Ugandan conflict to the ICC in pursuit of justice against LRA leaders turned against the referral. Many Acholi returnees think such a turn around by the government is a manipulation of justice, acting sometimes as free agents and certifiers to the international agenda and at the same time trying to improve on her relationships with donors. At the start of ICC investigation in Northern Uganda, UPDF had renewed its “Iron Fist” military offensive, crossing the so-called Red line for the first time (Brubacher 2010: 270). This evidence has shown that there has not been any uniformity when actions were required after reflections on what justice should be followed in the case of Northern Uganda.
After realising that the “drinking of a bitter root – Mato Oput” does not support convictions in criminal trials, ICC which was already termed a “briefcase of the white man” saw their officials sneaking in and out of Acholiland to talk to selected people (interviewee, Opoka 2009). Local ICC offices in Gulu and Kampala emerged (interviewee, Rwot Lugai 2009). For ICC to make justice a component of peace in Northern Uganda is difficult although some experiences of previous international criminal courts demonstrates that the pursuit of justice is linked to efforts arising from other actors in any context, including peace processes (Horowitz 1985; Mark 1995; Sisk 1996; Lake and Rothchild 1996; William and Scarf 2002). Probably this argument lies in the lack of trust Acholi people have in the government, thus denying elements of trust, so much needed in any reconciliation process. According to Lederarch (1999) elements of trust is attributed to acknowledgement of guilt and respect. Trust on the government is measured based on her pursuit of criminal justice of ICC, Amnesty Act, to what Acholi people and what many LRA have preferred to respond to. The Amnesty Act pardoned 12,645 LRA-returnees and the overall total of 23,526 (appendix C-3) including other former rebel groups. However, there has been assumptions on the functionality of Amnesty from the Uganda Amnesty Commissions (UAC). UAC called on the government for fresher amendment to cater for the presence of the ICC. Government judges argue that the old law which did not provide for the trial of people who committed atrocities against nationals be enacted because wrongdoers could use the old law to escape trial (New Vision 2010). Based on my informant (2009) Amnesty Act that brought out many ex-LRA combatants was high-jacked by the ICC and some Acholi lawyers supported the government. External relationships of Acholi people in the international community are sometimes mixed with principles and standards for accountability. The GoU holds some Acholi people accountable, as was previously mentioned. Oosterveld (2008) argues that issues of principles and standards for accountability mechanism classified community level issues, under general Acholi and clan based reconciliation are not taken into account in the ICC pre-trial chamber.
These minimise trust building amongst IDP-returnees that can become more fragile. For example, accepting and responding to amnesty has been hard, expressed in the local language as *ada lit* – the truth is painful. Top LRA leadership still reject amnesty and Kony maintains that LRA soldiers are his recruits not abductees. Kony’s statement increased fears that the government Amnesty Act was a tool to lure LRA and kill or imprison them once they take up the offer. To that effect, traditional chiefs started a radio programme called *dwog-paco* meaning “come back home”. Those who responded were a mixture of the highly traumatised children and few commanders (interviewee, Lugai 2008). Amnesty Act made an impact to work jointly with the traditional institutions (interviewee, Otinga 2009). Although Amnesty Act and ICC have not made headways but traditional reconciliation remains acceptable mechanism to address truth-telling at the grassroots level (interviewee, Kitgum Teachers’ Association 2009).

Other than political rhetoric of the government, ICC’s approach and traditional mechanisms have greatly hindered the wider conflict transformation goal. With the government, reconciliation remains an abstract rhetoric that continues to occupy verbal political space and not attracting actions. The national reconciliation aid foundation (NAREAF) delivered their concept paper in 2001 outlining specific areas of NGOs, UN Agencies, and ICRC inadequacy to implement Amnesty laws.\(^\text{11}\) However, the interests and needs of returnees was not shared by UN agencies, HRW, ICC and GoU (Interviewee, Adong 2009). Any external relationships with the international community has to go through the GoU. Consequently, Acholi people have long known that the Government has been lying to them about ending the war and may not provide peace dividends and future developments (interviewee, Okello 2009).

In a Museveni’s address in Gulu on the 12-20\(^\text{th}\) December 2007 peace conference, the president wants to expose Acholi people to extensive farming and lift them to become middle class citizens.

\(^\text{11}\) When I met with the executive director of NAREAF, Mr Olowo-Sirrah Joseph in 2007, his organisation based in Kampala, Box 27356 suggested implementation issues by NGOs on issues of national reconciliation. It has not been heard off by the time I finalised this thesis.
However, his view about forgiving Kony was mixed. “I am surprised Acholi people are begging Kony for forgiveness when Kony should be begging Acholi people for forgiveness and reconcile with them. Kony is the one who wronged you and recently killed Otii. Kony has no right to kill anybody. Why did he kill Otii who was pro-peace? This showed that Kony is not for peace” (Musevein’s address in Gulu 2007). Museveni’s perceptions on peace separated forgiveness, truth and justice to the distinctively varying perception from that of Acholi people, religious leaders and peace facilitating NGOs. The President’s converging views to the ICC’s and HRW doctrine to prevent impunity and protect human rights minimises Acholi people’s views on forgiveness seen as a process of relinquishing one’s feelings and resentment and thoughts of vengeance and the process of fostering compassion, generosity and even love towards those who have afflicted pain.

In other words Museveni wants Kony tried in a criminal court of justice in Uganda.

Leaderach (1999) argues that forgiveness can be unilateral, that is to say, proceed from the levels of cognitive, emotional and spiritual, and of course, without forgetting what injustices have done, meaning the evils perpetrated by human agents needs to be confronted. Apology, repentance or acknowledgement of the past, willingness to suffer, unilateral and bilateral expressions of gesture, legal compensation, justice and restoration, making the past wrongs right and interpersonal versus executions of remorse are forms of forgiveness (Wrange 2009). Arendt says that forgiveness is a means to which repetitive cycle of violence ties new generations to sin of the past.

Literatures remind us that reconciliation, forgiveness and mercy is definitely an issue of post-war societal relationships. Much as these elements exhibit social responsibility that must be shared, the external relations of Acholi people cannot precondition any future need for national reconciliation as the northern war was understood to have been theirs. In an interview with (Auma 2009), the love of sharing, comes with giving. She argues that the LRA are abducted children and how can they be rejected since they share in us our humanity? Auma’s view is supported by the argument that Acholi society is now composed of perpetrators and victims in every households, individuals, clans and people. Throwing away one section of those perpetuators would also mean
throwing away own which we will result in people taking on one another as enemies. Auma argues that there is a degree of tolerance and measure for forgiveness that are required during the process of rebuilding the society (interviewee, Auma 2009). The younger generation only support and practice traditional mechanism of reconciliation in the context of maintaining the culture. The reality is that the war in Acholiland brought new identities and preferences for other traditional methods, probably a mixture of criminal and restorative justice system.

While the traditional institutional mechanisms emphasise on consensus and confidence building, truth and acknowledgment, compensation and restoration of relationships are according to Acana (2009) lies in establishing “truth and clarification commission”. Acana’s (2009) view looks more into annexing regional reconciliation with the neighbouring South Sudan. Acholi reconciliation entails, honest acknowledgement of harm, sincere regrets and remorse from perpetuator, readiness to apologise to victims and victims to readily accept so as to set the process of letting anger and bitterness subside, addressing other grievances caused for accurate compensation and eventual mutual enriching relationships. As said already, Acholi traditional justice system is primarily about trust, voluntary process, compensation and restoration, a combination of rituals, sometimes leaving justice as un-attended to social phenomena. The desire for the expected process of reconciliation that sinks deep into as many areas as possible where there has been social break-down is a misnormer. The destruction of traditional institutions and rewinding the search for universal truth isn’t basic to the achievement of reconciliation in Achol after so much suffering. However, seeking the truth has made it possible for neighbouring non-Acholis to express the need for regional reconciliation.

7.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter is about rebuilding societal relationships of returnees in Acholiland. The relationships between Acholi IDPs-returnees and NGOs, CBOs and the government suggest that most village volunteers were formerly running their CBOs, who could forge better relationship with the people.
Their prescriptions is also hoped to link post-conflict Acholi people’s realities in rebuilding the Acholi homestage and Acholi-Acholi reconciliation for a wider national social inclusion in Uganda.

Internal relationship amongst Acholi is context specific traditional societal reconciliation – Mato Oput. It is a ritual that does not necessarily play a replacement role of justice, rather a form of restorative justice. The roles NGOs and Government play in the local context of returnees confirms that people are the key, since people formulate and implement strategies, build socially organised structures, people invent and utilise technology. While the psychological obligation and moral fit remains with the offender, victims and the community are part of the moral fitness. It is not an issue of most NGOs.

But, the concept of reconciliation remains open-textured although returnees, NGOs and GoU officials reference reconciliation to restoration of broken relationships. Reconciliation is a journey with a purpose, but justice seems to be misunderstood in Acholiland. The returnees are stuck in the middle between NGOs, the government and LRA. The tension between intentional intervention by NGOs to IDP-returnees are minimised by government officials and international community mainly ICC. Explicit relational fears about LRA re-emergence washed away hopes and goals of the returnees in terms of affectivity and interdependence in VoR. This view represents reconciliation as one dimension of peacebuilding that promotes co-existence between LRA and Acholi people, but initiatives differed in terms of means to achieve it within the units of analysis.

Two levels of analysis to restore broken relationships discussed the nature of relationship with both the GoU and LRA. The first asked for specific and multifaceted roles of NGOs to represent Acholi views in the national and international fora – reconciliation to pain of the past. The other level is the nature of the process (preparing for future co-existence) that includes individuals and the collective ways of dealing with trauma and pain.

Earlier, Buckley-Zistel (2008: 21, 140) suggests that conflict transformation seeks to encourage wider social change amongst antagonistic parties to the conflict. But key players in post-conflict
reconciliation processes are often governments and non-governmental organisations. The government and NGOs understand reconciliation as a thing of the past, exercised in the post-conflict peaceful environment where the seeds of co-existence create calm, truth, peace, mercy, justice and transparency if they exist in the protagonists’ wish. The diverging perspectives from government officials show the consistently rhetorically preferred top-down unification policies of constitutional rights than ethnically sectored reconciliation. Government officials’ understanding of reconciliation is shallow and runs parallel to Acholi-returnees needs, hinders the wider goals of rebuilding broken relationships. Returnees perceive this not as representative of their views although their priorities were on peace first over justice.

The need for reconciliation was shared by many, but would only relay common knowledge. Returnees felt that there were no realistic sensitivities to their need to promote co-existence. This contradicts Desmond Tutu’s vision of Ubuntu where returnees widely believe that “you are one of those reconciliation people”. Like in Northern Ireland, Acholi people are ready for peace, but reconciliation takes two, which is hard to establish in a victim-perpetrator and perpetrator-victim environment. There seem to be more emphasis on forgiveness which can be unilateral to UPDF and LRA. IDPs express reconciliation to be coming in instalments, a process-oriented to seed social reality that must be allowed to germinate amongst returnees. The seemingly frustrating IDP-returnees’ views is that actors like the European communities and World Bank come too close for comfort with the implementing NGOs working locally, likewise, NGOs have come too close for comfort with the governments, leaving grassroots population stuck in the middle. In the case where the government seem detached from returnees, the space offered for social change is suppressed once NGOs try to bridge the gap of independence with returnees. For NGOs, reconciliation becomes a thing of the past with new gaps and challenges yet to be identified. With mixed roles from NGOs sometimes acting as free-agents, those that adapted native mode of operations, the hearts-left-home and dual-citizen experts, the Acholi-returnees remain with reconciliation as their social responsibility. This is clearly seen where individuals and LRA
returnees have to face a sense of collective social responsibility, which primarily does not exist when it comes to compensations. NGO workers and government officials tend to balance societal relationship building with their budgets and merited achievements. Interviews with NGO workers and FGDs (2009) term some NGO workers as self-seekers who individually seek merits or wage earnings. That, NGOs tend to service only livelihood irrespective of entering into a new phase of post-war recovery.

In an interview with a UPDF army official (2009) government officials are keen to let go the LRA returnees but quite a number of ex-LRA are co-opted into army professions. The experiences of the past, present and future is recycling Acholi people into the army to fight LRA in the bush. Many Acholi elders argue that such acts exploit justice at the expense of peace, but the community is locked in the middle. Since the government sees reconciliation as a need to the unification of democratic process in the country, the facilitative roles of NGOs tend to hinder the wider section of rebuilding societal relations. The middle hybrid transitional justice (War-Crime Division) cannot serve the local context since trials and tribunals leads to self-victimisation and resentment within the returnees. If peace is a precondition anchored on justice, substantive cases that reflect on lessons-learnt should now provide a fairly smoother social contract (HRW May 2009).

This chapter adds vital knowledge about the distinguishing types and degrees of reconciliation within the desired peaceful environment of co-existence. Three types and degrees of relational transformation leading to reconciliation emerged to first take a surface reconciliation of non-lethal co-existence between Acholi people and LRA returnees. Secondly, there is a shallow reconciliation of parallel lives with of grassroots population with the GoU and ICC. The third degree is the deeper reconciliation of the community, which seem to be missing. With the different degrees of reconciliation at play, Acholi people remain stuck between a rock and hard place in VoRs with very lose lineage-based and lesser authoritative social structure.
CHAPTER EIGHT: IN CONCLUSION

8.1 INTRODUCTION

My research is about the roles NGOs play in post-war social recovery following grassroots perspectives in a post-war social setting after over twenty years of war in Acholiland, Northern Uganda. The findings are discussed in light of the objectives set to answer the research questions using the analytical framework (sub-section 2.6) to underpin grassroots perspectives of Acholi people discussed in (sub-section 8.2). Grassroots perspectives focuses on how far and why NGOs’ roles may/can facilitate mobilisation and/or support in rebuilding the once broken-down lineage-based social authority and relationships in Acholiland. The overall framework is discussed in sub-section 8.2.

While there are abundant literatures on NGOs with their evolution from CSOs (sub-section 2.2), there are on the other hand, meagre literatures on NGO interactions with traditional authority in war affected societies in Sub-Saharan Africa and how these literatures evolved over time and why. This study highlights critical post-war social recovery issues of rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social reconciliation and social authoritative institutions, and suggests that there are still significant shortcomings to overcome (sub-section 8.1.1). At the same time, the comparative nature of the research, the limits in breadth and global trends limited the scope of the research conclusions. The limitations in such a complex subject area, particularly in the methodology (sub-section 8.3.2) is discussed. However, findings from my research in Acholiland offer interesting areas for further investigation and draw conclusions from the nature of the research process itself.

8.1.1 METHODS, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The roles of NGOs in post-conflict recovery can be contentious and involve a separation of inflated expectations from what is achievable. The social realities of Acholi returnees show this clearly in that the theoretical and idealistic approaches are frequently over-ridden by practical concerns such as funding limitations. This has limited the roles, expectations and image of NGOs
as deliverables are reduced. Insights on this came from multiple respondents operating in a context where NGOs are the main source of survival for former IDP-returnees in Acholiland. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation involves individuals, returnees, organisations, respective governments and international actors playing a role of producing a complex web of activities with multiple aims and objectives. At the same time, there is no post-conflict reconstruction model that is universally valid, because it is contextual and difficult with NGOs and many actors who would be producing differences in the pressures and mixtures of activities.

The complexity of peace building as is rooted in its own history, culture and the particularities of the war makes NGO roles difficult to carry out. In this study, Northern Uganda is held to highlight inconsistencies and contradictions in the literature (sub-section 2.3) and its relevance to the roles of NGOs and CSOs (sub-section 2.5). The analytical framework (2.6) concentrates on the empirical reality of returnees and the clash of ideals with the roles of NGOs which seem to overlook many of complexities and paradoxes to the modalities of non-state interventions.

8.2 THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

The core contribution to knowledge arising from this study is the evidence found in the grounded reality of Acholi returnees and how this relates to the approaches and ideology of NGOs. There are two major cross-cutting issues: Firstly, the rebuilding of Acholi lineage-based social authority (chapter six); and, secondly, the relationships surrounding social reconciliation (chapter seven). The analysis that has been applied throughout in this study follows on post-structuralism’s conception, basing the idea on the ‘transformation approach’. This contribution incorporates the wider socio-political sources of conflict (sub-section 5.2), with the modalities of how NGOs can transform negative energy of war for long-term positive socio-political changes (Fisher et. al 2000). My peacebuilding framework in sub-section 2.6 is deployed to firstly analyse NGOs’ typologies with the purpose of understanding the levels of actors (Knox and Quirk 2000, Lederach 1993, 1995, 1997 and 2001) and NGOs’ activities. The framework is deployed to find out how far
NGOs played a role in supporting and mobilising IDP-returnees after Acholiland experienced crises in the breakdown of lineage-based social authority and in the relationships during the war. It is used to analyse how far Acholi IDP-returnees were involved in defining their models of post-war social recovery and how they related to particular types of NGOs. The distinguishing activities of NGOs tend to vary not only in the levels but also in the social, economic, socio-psychological and spiritual changes and activities they apply and consequently in the way that impacts on the lives of returnees. This role created more gaps between some Acholi elites and grassroots population. The variation is widened by the respective NGOs’ codes of conducts, lessons learnt, the size of their funding and adaptability to grassroots environment (sub-section 3.4.1).

My framework of analysis moves on from Lederach’s general peacebuilding framework in that the Lederach framework lacks no order of priorities for NGOs to undertake. In addition, there are also problems associated with NGOs coordination and allocation of resources on practicalities of engagement and actions needed in post-conflict environments as well as unclear and contradictory international approaches to co-ordination and engagement. A mismatch is found to exist between the high visibility granted to NGOs by high level officials and the amount of practical knowledge generated by NGOs on the ground about the conflict itself and the issues of peacebuilding. In particular, the publicly stated aims of many NGOs to address the root causes of the war in Northern Uganda were not matched by their actions or activities on the ground.

The enhanced Lederach framework is designed to build on the arguments raised in sub-section 5.2 where the GoU’s problem-solving approach in Acholiland is found to have illustrated the subjective nature of perceptions and definition of Acholi crises, sometimes based on NGOs expert analysis as well as Southern Ugandan prejudices. The findings suggest that there are those NGOs who have acted as dual-citizens (counter productive to the rebuilding of Acholi lineage-based social authority) and those who maintain a level of preconceived ideas about the war and about the nature of rebuilding Acholi society (not very supportive of grassroots needs). In addition, the nature of LRA modalities, realities and hyper-realities shaped perceptions of the Acholi in
general and led to value-based judgement on future solutions for Acholi people after the war. In this context, NGOs may not be entirely able to facilitate post-war peace building and social recovery (research question 1.1) and similarly implement the representative nature of NGOs’ roles (research question 1.2.1).

8.2.1. **STRENGTHENING THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS**

The strongest support to the framework of analysis came from empirical data, analyses and improvement to the combined framework on findings in chapters five, six and seven. While Lederach’s peacebuilding framework is considered comprehensive, other complementary contributions from Miall’s post-settlement framework were adapted to suit the objectives of this study.

Two specific areas of findings have strengthened and contributed to the improvement of the combined framework. The first being on the insufficient attention of NGOs’ roles in rebuilding social structures (lineage-based authority) and in using traditional mechanisms that might provide legitimacy amongst the Acholi. The improved framework allows discussion of particular types of NGOs which are better suited to activities within different levels of interventions that may include traditional as well as more technical modes of operation. Levels of NGOs activities, the typology of NGOs involved and the activities they engaged in to support post-war social recovering Acholi population has clearly shown that direct and indirect services can be matched with NGOs’ typologies for various activities at the different levels during recovery. This can enable NGOs within this framework to follow NGOs’ actions before, during and after return to VoRs.

It does concur with Lederach’s model in that, such a study would not pre-empt the prevention to a relapse into another war, thus breaking social relationships and destruction of social structures. This criticism comes mainly from positivists that claim that every intervention becomes itself part of a conflict system that needs to be analysed and planned accordingly and separately (Bloomfield and Schmelzle 2006: 6). The framework also attempts to improve on ways of understanding
particular levels and forms of conflict and the differences from structured violence (Ross 1993: 35 and Vivienne 1996: 60-61). Lederach did not explain this, especially at the outbreak of any particular incident of violence or where conflict needs to direct attention to forces which makes returnees more or less prone to conflict than another. It can be concluded that although various typologies of NGOs deal with various activities, they actually leave structurally embedded social issues of post-war social burden, raising more disappointment on NGOs (see sub-section 8.3 below). The overall view remains that social transformation underlies structural and context specific conflicts, coupled with many invisible actors. This study projects the empirical realities of returnees in the post-war social recovery as are opposed to the ideal roles of NGOs that fails to address structural causes of conflicts. At the same time, the study finds that the process of post-conflict integration and peacebuilding is far more complex and political than that recognised within the technical models usually applied by international NGOs, and also more expensive than many of their budgets.

The second is on rebuilding relationships and the representative roles of NGOs that assisted in the support of humanitarian crises and the subsequent methods of survival and hope for peace. Miall’s framework can be applied by NGOs outlining several core practices that are useful in addressing social conflict from a transformational approach. This study finds useful ways of developing a capacity to see presenting issues as a window; the capacity to recognise what sorts of processes and time frames that may be needed to address the different kinds of change. The framework developed in this study can be used to enable NGOs to more clearly identify goals and seek innovative options for action. NGOs and grassroot communities can develop a capacity to make complexity of war-related social issues more user friendly for both returnees and Governments. This was shown in chapter seven that developing a capacity to hear and engage the voice of identity and relationship can serve as a nexus between internal and external need for rebuilding relationships in Acholiland.
Rebuilding social structures (lineage-based authority) requires a lot of campaigning, lobbying and representing the local context to the national and international forum, so as to stop the violence. The role of NGOs in advocating and campaigning against GoU’s military intervention has been one of interlocution and of encouraging a discourse between different elements with interests in the conflict but at different times they have been less than direct in dealing with the core problems.

In Northern Uganda, the methodological make-up of NGOs’ actions did not play much advocacy/campaigning role in denouncing military intervention in view of local support during military operational options. At such times, the scope of transformation by NGOs in the interim and medium-term was limited to responsive and contingency roles (figure 2.5.2), advocacy and relief aid distribution (figure 2.6.1). The GoU controlled the situation although some local initiatives like ARLPI and APG advocated that Northern Uganda be declared a disaster region. In this sense, the international NGOs were followers rather than leaders of the discourse.

While the political, social, economic and international responses continued to attract NGOs regionally and internationally, the wide range of state and non-state actors participating in peacebuilding in the region meant that much had to be assimilated and led to the discouragement of many local initiatives. This was destructive to rebuilding of local social structures and local relationships with neighbouring districts and regions. For example, the intervention of the ICC, the Uganda’s hybrid justice mechanisms and the grassroots preference for traditional system of restorative justice of Mato Oput were a national and internal mismatch to the overall needs of justice amongst returnees. The JPTs succeeded in negotiating passages of LRA out of Northern Uganda and many LRA-returnees went directly to either traditional chiefs, GUSCO, families, NGOs or joined the UPDF rather than participating in a more regular DDR programme that could be managed. However, during the later periods of JPTs, NGOs provided economic support to the peace process.
The eventual reconstruction that did take place in fragile states after the war, actually provided an outcome that offered implicit psychosocial support to the Acholi people. The local coping mechanisms that allowed them to return to their respective villages relied on the expectation that NGOs’ support would continue, the GoU will stop the LRA from returning to Northern Uganda and justice (ICC) will halt it persuit of LRA leaders in the name of peace. However, the role of NGOs in supporting local integration of grassroots returnees (vertical and horizontal) into cooperative and equitable regional and global structures - as recommended by Lederach - was missing. This was mainly because there was little or sometimes no horizontal links between NGOs’ actors or links with the grassroots population.

Appendix B-7.2 summarises the level of intervention (analysis and action) based on the dimension (personal, relational - reconciling or to be reconciled (sub-section 5.5.4 and chapter 7), structured lineage-based social authority (5.5.2 and chapter 6) and in the cultural norms (fighting against bad culture derived from IDP-Camps). The added value of this study is that the scope of transformation addressed both horizontal and vertical dimensions in addressing the systemic and structural institutional building of Acholi lineage-based authority and social relations that NGOs might deploy in future. This was done by analysing grassroots perspectives on NGO roles, particularly in relating to indirect service provision. Both dimensions are actually mono-casual and linear in practice. Again, the direct service provision by NGOs – in terms of empowerment to the grassroots level - took workshops, seminars, and meetings formats and methods to design grassroots actions to meet grassroots needs. In reality, however, the structural transformations were mainly offered by the local government levels and many actual grassroots perspectives were ignored on provision of schools ( teachers), health centres (with medicine and staff) (see figure 2.6.2).

The role of NGOs in peace-making which should have been directed towards reconciling political and strategic attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation at elite and local level took varied perspectives (chapter seven). Again the horizontal and vertical integration of
international action with internal relationships amongst Acholi people (sub-section 7.2) missed out the context specific traditional practices of Acholi people since the middle class seemed to be missing or are just resurfacing. Without the help of NGOs, the middle class Acholi elites some of who are parliamentarians advocated for national truth commission. In this situation, the grassroots perspectives on the role of NGOs stagnated since people concentrated to meeting basic physiological needs (Maslow’s view) which reduced the emphasis on social reconciliation needs. Instead, many Acholi people are beginning to form social realities of individualism rather than universal (community) social linkages. This implies that the process of transformation can be viewed as a complex matrix similar to MaxNeef’s system and structures of satisfiers. For example, security needs, using land for investment have made more subjective impacts on returnees than waiting for resettlement packages (food, shelter and blankets) from NGOs, or to wait for the GoU to allow return to respective villages.

Where the need for traditional social reconciliation Mato Oput arose, four major elements (mercy, truth, peace and justice) actually confirmed Lederach’s design that exercising mercy, returnees were living with hope and support from NGOs. Trust building was expressed as an important element between the locals and returnees and that would be cemented if there was any functional government truth commission. Acknowledgement of guilt from former LRA returnees and commanders was widely practiced but at the same time not much of that came from UPDF, and yet both UPDF and LRA are viewed as perpetrators. This dynamic has allowed Mato-Oput reconciliation processes to rebuild relations and has changed local ways of understanding peace as a priority before justice. The dynamics also defined and understood peace as “co-existence”, living in “harmony” with other family members, mainly done along village- clan- or chieftainship-lineages (jami pa kaka) meaning clan issues. These findings increased understanding of social reconciliation and allowed recognition by grassroots population based on reconciliation.

The first approach was expressed as a means of dealing with the pain of the past and, the second was to prepare for the future co-existence with/between victims/ perpetuators. In both cases,
NGOs’ roles have not gone deep enough to provide practical co-existence to returnees, an element defined locally from achieved peace as a form of reconciliation process. NGOs therefore remain on the outside of these processes. In addition, the GoU excluded itself from both forms of social reconciliations (based on the past) and (looking into the future). Therefore, social reconciliation remained the community’s responsibilities along with the accompanying social burden. The burden continues to destroy the strong memory and coping mechanisms of the interpersonal forgiveness that had strong links to amend relationships in the past, and is now being interpreted based on NGOs’ world views within the historical memory reconstruction of the Acholi people. The concealed feelings of hatred and desire for future revenge may not be entirely overcome, leaving residual issues such as a desire for revenge, alienation and resentment. However, NGOs did facilitate the process of peaceful coexistence that resulted in surface-level social reconciliation that reduces non-lethal actions but is really a partial form of co-existence. Some of this style of social reconciliation is happening between some LRA-returnees, IDP-returnees, neighbouring districts and the GoU. However, this is likely to remain at the surface level since the deeper forms of reconciliation associated with truth commissions are unlikely to be developed.

Social justice was another important element of social reconciliation. Galtung (1990: 293) views social justice to be in the structural/systematic violence that was intended/unintended to harm, irreversible beyond the visible or invisible and are customised. Within Acholi context, justice was vividly explained as restorative, not retributive. The difference was also found in the process-orientation of restorative justice as having elements of community moral continuity starting with peace then justice (Lee 1996: 78). From social reconciliation to rebuilding of lineage-based social authority, this study concludes that the act of violence in Acholiland left returnees stuck between peace and co-existence, peace and justice and restorative and criminal justice respectively. Social reconciliation is faced with the hard choice to distinguish victims of justice from victims of violence.
The ARLPI have been encouraging traditional reconciliation of the Acholi which is part of social interactive process to adopt an informal structure of social reconciliation. What is lacking are NGOs’ incentives to motivate both vertical and horizontal social integration that has made Acholi-returnees stagnant, lack creativity and innovations, feeling of powerlessness and hopelessness. ARLPI expresses the need to include daily church prayers for peace in an informal structure of social reconciliation, in conformity to the fear in God, and live in hope. Lederach, himself a Mennonite from the group of spiritual community, stress the need for spiritual elements and practices when he developed his peace building framework amongst divided societies in the mid-1980s. What is unique in ARLPI recommendations is that in the history of early missionary arrival in Uganda, churches never accepted the mixtures of church prayers and traditional practices. Neither the ICC nor Human Rights Watch groups have accepted traditional mechanisms, and would only do so if certain conditions were met. The paradoxical remix of LRA’s Christian and Islamic doctrine with the ideological and actions are unique, confusing and do not comform to NGOs’ levels of activity interventions.

The contributions most spiritual discussions bring in this study are that the changing social and cultural NGOs’ orientations to support returnees can actually yield positive peace once followed and funded by providing a source or form of spiritual healing that may enhance peace and social transformation. This is particularly powerful because of the LRA motivation to fight a spiritual war with the aim of changing the social and cultural structures of Acholi society. The LRA model was rejected and since the GoU’s political will has been low, NGOs were most hoped for. However, the post-war social study reveals that NGOs did not clearly meet the goals of rebuilding social authoritative structure. The ICC in fact stands in the way to make practical implementation of the symbolic day to day social reconciliation Acholi people use (see below sub-section).

No viable truth commission (TC) designed to bridge the gap between peace and justice was ever successfully implemented in the entire history of Uganda (Quinn 2007). The practical realities of truth commissions that are perceived by returnees, politicians, government and international
actors only rest with Acholi opposition politicians. TC proposals are either contradicted or neglected at the national level. The core reasons for this are the view that TCs in Northern Uganda are ‘unbecoming’ but also that a TC represents a risk to the GoU and to some specific officials as well as the LRA. Within this scenario, NGOs have largely remained out of the debate, concentrating on the more tactical issues and their usual operations and business-as-usual, outwardly espousing impartiality and neutral roles, whilst the government asserts their political authority.

It was clear from the analysis that NGOs do not assess and/or disclose their own risks adequately before pursuing work in the public sphere. If they do, they tend to adjust the risks amongst the organisational members (experts) so as to make the public have the impression that they are doing something worthwhile. Such low risk assessment and apathy creation frees public authorities of their responsibilities which can only be discovered after NGOs have left. In Northern Uganda, too many NGOs, some without experience, were operating government recommended programmes partly because of funding but also partly because of government backing. Within Lederach’s and Miall’s combined framework, NGOs working in that manner cared more about governmental policies and international donor programmes than grassroots. Barakat and Chard (2002: 817-835) argue that NGOs and INGOs offer politically global rhetoric that masks the contradictory aims pursued in the field. In Northern Uganda, this study finds that NGOs assumed tasks to provide direct and indirect services that seemed to give the government more attention than the grassroots population, thus mirroring this view.

There were consistent perspectives from returnees about NGOs practical implementation of building peace through socio-economic reconstruction and development. This was held by most returnees who were being critical to the lack of support for long-lasting development to maintain the current peace through IGAs. However, the systemic actions of NGOs that was required to empower/transform, build the capacity of returnees for better services, change the attitudes and improve on social institutions targeted only those EVIs/PSNs (identifying gaps after return). The
target was underestimating that the entire Acholi population are EVIs/PSNs. NGOs working on psychosocial issues of war, like GUSCO, over-emphasised on material conditions of addressing the social life of LRA returnees that further constrained the psychosocial development of returnees’ full potentials. For example, GUSCO would take between two to three weeks to re-orient LRA-returnees before relocating them to respective relatives. Basically, NGOs working in this area showed traversing roles from advocacy, relief distribution, policy and fund raising, but only to a lesser extent try to empower and transform the lives of LRA-returnees (figure 2.6.2).

Post-war social recovery has hugely attracted government manipulations based on incentives arising from NGOs which in turn jeopardised their [NGO] missions and neutrality. For example, working with victims, free access to higher offices and seeking funds from donors opened up many NGOs for manipulation. It was apparent in this study that the GoU took advantage of such NGO actions, especially where relief/advocacy was combined with empowerment/transformation in the post-war stages. The PRDP was a government initiative but a “suitcase without portfolio”. The government proclaimed that PRDP money was being used to drill bore holes in Pabo, for example, when it was actually the NRC doing it. This controversy implies that Lederach’s peace building framework should look at particular periods of recovery and at the deployment of inappropriate responses, since the local context relayed a different story to the theory. Miall’s idea that, say, in the period of IDP stay in IDP-camps, short-term responsive contingency was appropriate, while during returns, medium-term responses and incentives actually works well. But where agriculture decides the long term future of returnees, NGOs’ support was still needed because of the costs and risks of starting an agricultural enterprise. However, NGOs left the long-term rebuilding of lineage-based social authority and relational and socio-economic well-being of returnees either to the returnees themselves or to the GoU and therefore performed a partial rebuilding rather than a comprehensive transformation. There was no order of priority in the activities as returnees continued to view themselves as victims and as qualified EVIs/PSNs.
8.3 ROLES OF NGOS – THE GOOD AND THE BAD

The war in Northern Uganda did not follow fragile states argument where post-war reconstruction resources would require external financial assistance, like in Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia and many more. In most African intrastate conflicts, Northern Ugandan war was generated by systemic and structured impediments, of which impacts to the local population simultaneously experienced elusive peace amidst eventual recovery (Laurie 2000:212). Financial assistances from the international community came both from NGOs and international communities, the need Acholi returnees required to rebuild their social structure and social reconciliation. However, the case of Northern Uganda, amongst others, attracts warnings from post-structuralisms on NGOs that NGOs’ code of conduct manual like that of IA, Fisher’s, LPI’s, Anderson’s Do-No-Harm and others in sub-section 2.4, not to rely too much on outsiders. Despite these, Uganda’s militarised politics, post-war social recovery policy, poverty reduction, human capital and attempts to work on hopelessness and accumulated fears of rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority has not given NGOs success story from returnees. NGOs still do badly even when they continue to add value to the national development process and/or work closely with grassroots.

In Northern Uganda, a number of scaling issues like, the simplistic criminalising of LRA by the GoU and the branding of the LRA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation diffused the realist discussions which changed the attitude of donors. This made it difficult to follow on roles NGOs played in representing Acholi crises to the international, regional and/or national levels. NGOs mobilised huge financial support in the rush to compete and establish themselves in Northern Uganda. NGOs are not democratic institutions and they work from the basis of fulfilling funders’ requirements and gaining access to resources. This made NGOs relied heavily on objective, bureaucratic and often centrally produced criteria, rather than on sustained contact between skilled and experienced staff and local partners in Acholiland. NGOs focused heavily on budgets and funding which normally leads to short-termism that made them become too rigid on post-war recovery, too little or sometimes, paradoxically, too much and too fast withdrawal. Too many
competitions have led NGOs in Acholiland to adapt a “hoop-jumping” activity mode of operation leading to Government’s introduction of strict policies and regulations on NGOs like in Burundi, Rwanda, East Timor, and Afghanistan.

NGOs’ lack of justice-based approaches to bringing social order using a legislated act in parliament than traditional approaches, for example in resolving land disputes left most returnees without hope. Now, there are massive land disputes. Traditional leaders need funding to support in the rebuilding of social authority, but, what is untold is that NGOs are also weak in negotiations with the international funders, unlike governments or other international bodies. Many projects were closed down half way through the proposed project period and failed to support rebuilding social structure and reconciliation. Because it is not part of NGOs mandate, the implication of the justice-based support to develop the human capital by providing new skills to VoRs was neglected in post-war social recovery. Instead, the role of NGOs in capacity building has been widely applauded, a positive contribution to empowering returnees to rebuild social relationships and understand social structure of Acholiland. NGOs’ interventions brought changes in behaviours, identity, levels of income (IGAs), job opportunities, alcohol consumption and self-reflecting cognitive ability to cope with change.

Conflicting roles between NGOs and the GoU, especially, where sectored projects and collaboration is expected generated structural problems in that, the widespread corruption exist between NGOs and GoU officials. NGOs and the GoU did not consider the wider need of rebuilding the internal and external crises in Acholiland. This research finds that where NGOs’ sector programmes and government initiatives are to be implemented, the various NGOs’ codes of conducts, policies and principles keep local projects unfulfilled, uncompleted or relocated somewhere else (see subsection 8.3). This explains why many returnees view NGOs as have been complacent with GoU who did not represent enough of their problems to the international communities. It also explains why NGOs’ identities were difficult to differentiate, just like in Afghanistan where NGOs, UN agencies and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) workers
were referred to as “muzzesi” [organisations]. The perception of Afghani people based on the fact that muzzesi are promoters of Western (or American) values and principles, while other Afghani people would consider it as democratisation, liberalisation and emancipation. Consequently, this similar perspective has also lead Acholi people to conclude that both the GoU and NGOs share the same bed, leaving them with even a more difficult social burden and dependency. The culture of dependency is also viewed as a form of neo-colonialism by middle class elites and politicians.

The overall scope of NGOs’ roles could be seen as destructive to the rebuilding of Acholi lineage-based social authority, identity and to the preservation of traditional Acholi values because of NGOs’ budgetary constrains in post-war reconstruction. Other reason is based on the objective selectivity of NGOs’ projects who focus on short-term humanitarian relief aid which fails to address returnees’ long term assessments and priorities of post-war social recovery. For example, hut construction for EVIs/PSNs is short-term, while traditional chiefs’ needs to strengthen Acholi social authority, which is long-term, turned against chiefs that they [chiefs] are the conduits of government mouthpiece and whose financial dispossession are taken advantage of by the state.

To that effect, Acholi traditional authority body (KKA) is believed to be behaving as an NGO. This posed hugely implicated on GoU’s and NGOs’ policies and practices, because what NGOs ought to do (the required actions) in post-war peacebuilding is believed to be consensual on the linkages between policy and practice (Barakat and Chard 2002: 817-835, and Llamazares 2005: 28) and with the grassroots population.

This study confirms that policies of post-war society tend to change more frequent and faster than its day to day practice, especially where NGOs become the middle man between governments and local contexts. NGOs are rebuked by local population for extreme incomes, high standard of living conditions and formation of elitism in a post-war recovering society. The good part of NGOs’ roles are that, the nature of what NGOs’ have done in Acholiland tried to depend on local circumstances, similar to the case of Moldova where for example, acute shortages of clean water minimised the tradition of dependency by people asking for help to develop their skills instead
[building local capacity]. NGOs were also able to pass on information and skills to encourage a more active citizenship role in Moldova, Sierra Leone and Liberia, to mention but a few. It is clear in Northern Uganda that NGOs generally moved further away from voluntarism to professionalism (subsection 2.2). Their [NGOs] management codes of conducts have become more rational and often more controlled from the centre and nationally. In Acholiland, the policies of NGOs’ project-based management lacked proper design of exit strategies because such exit strategies did not anymore follow track two and three policy orientation that most funders and donors need. This left Acholi returnees stuck between expectation for continued relief aid and what would come from NGOs for long term post-war social reconstruction support.

Positively, NGOs are actually continuing to develop their capacities to act as counter weights to donor pressures and at the same time engaging with policy debates. Few NGOs are able to work with such policies of donor agencies, international departments and countries to generate support needed in the innate characteristics of returnees, like the EVIs/PSNs, elderly, widows and orphans, younger generation who only knew camp lives. Much as the policy of voluntariness to return to villages of origin (IDP-Policy 2006) took the major part in the lives of returnees, the return environment called for exploring the wider embedded socio-economic advancements and socio-political freedom (chapter seven).

NGOs’ actions are still globally “branded” with the emphasis placed on humanitarian actions, not development, because aid architectures are changing with new options, treats and new opportunities. Acholi grassroots perspectives remained hopeful that NGOs will support them in rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social structure. Within the typology framework discussed earlier on, NGOs were subcontracted to work not for profit, leaving most Acholi civil society outside the confines of branding global aid a form on neo-colonialism. By making future choices globally, country-wise, sector-wise, locally, NGOs lose genuine struggle on how-to-do-it in supporting or franchising on the value of independence with governments rather than IDPs. In a case like Northern Uganda, NGOs’ complacency and complementarity roles were not decided from the
local context alone, but global and state laden with value-added government intricacies. Locally, NGOs operated in Acholiland up to a very high track one level and vice versa. The impacts are seen at the local level of family demography, education policy for returnees in Acholiland, which is characterised by the culture of migrating further to better schools in Kampala and not in Northern Ugandan villages. This is common amongst secondary and advanced level students who go to schools with the hope of working with NGOs. The Government’s policy of free Universal Primary Education and Universal Secondary Education (UPE/USE) education is inconsistent to practice. This is because, firstly the quality of free education is appalling and secondly, the policy of pushing or pulling returnees to VoRs has never made social realities of returnees any better rather than increased social burden and imbalanced the normalcy after return.

In general, Acholi-returnees perceive NGOs to be working towards fulfilling specific missions, improved organisational culture and outsourced support, making them [NGOs] dominate local and national peacebuilding constituencies. Any new NGO strategy of communication with the government and grassroots population can act as guidelines and/or code of conduct that can serve as a basis for a normative framework for NGO activities and their employees. This helps NGOs who are poor in giving feedback to conduct needs and impact assessments on how to forge relationship building and rebuild lineage-based social authority. Voluntary returns in Acholiland was partly hindered by the lack of these NGO-policy guidelines, especially for the case of those who moved through “satellite” camps with the hope that the guiding principles will provide support to them.

However, this study finds that NGOs’ roles were mainly played from the centre (inside-out impartiality) that facilitated rebuilding social structures, minimal social reconciliation and socio-economic developments. This dominated and overwhelmed the grassroots at the initial stages and on the other hand underserved post-war social recovery initiatives. The dichotomy of preaching good practices while communicating implicit and ubiquitous messages under various projects is generally slow thinking for practitioners and has been actually easy politics for local population. In
Northern Uganda, conflict transformation NGOs who are mostly working with nonviolent participatory processes, not with enforcement, lack ability to use force, but was able to provide checks and balances needed to build peace (create space for social reconciliation), the basis for a normative framework.

The good and bad roles of NGOs can also be viewed from politics of promises. The politics of promises are participatory and has been commonplace from NGOs and GoU to returnees even if the means were known to be limited. More excuses and making new promises always kept Acholi people up to believe that such promises will fulfil the need to rebuild lineage-based social authority and social reconciliation. Knowledge in the form of experiential learning theory from practitioners did not equip community-based peacebuilders with “Reflective Peacebuilding” so highly recommended by Lederach and his colleagues. This is a view that would pair up Acholi grassroots reflection as a learning community with NGOs’ monitoring and evaluation framework. On the other hand, Acholi people is still a learning community and this research can inform NGOs’ behaviours, programming and provide practical and theoretical attitudinal change towards sustainability amongst target groups.

8.4 CONCLUDING CONTRIBUTION

The outcome of this thesis sought to synthesise roles of NGOs and perspectives of grassroots population by applying to it conflict transformation and peacebuilding principles that guided the research process. Prominently, interventions of NGOs are more effective if it is placed in a general framework of sustainable peacebuilding like that of Lederach and Miall, but basing it on capacities and priorities as long as it allows for the affected people by war to be attended to in a neutral and impartial manner. These may not warrant supporting social coping mechanism to adjust to new environment in villages of returns, but NGOs and actors involved in projects and programme identification are more focused to the review of national context and international initiatives. The “paradox of NGO plurality”, that is, the exceeding high number of actors,
performing the same or similar activities in parallel and without coordination can work with my framework of analysis, although the quicker distribution of aid through NGOs may limit application and coordination at grassroots levels.

This study contributes to the debate that NGOs should locate and explain thematic sectors they work on and the activities they pursue to the local context before intervention and involving public authorities and other social sectors. The basis is that the transformation of war to peace is now a highly politicised exercise at all levels of society. Such basis would need to understand the structural causes of the conflict before any intervention. This can be clearly seen when preliminary and rigorous studies like this is conducted in the post-war social recovery following carefully at the social realities of people who are subjected to prolonged war and internal displacement like the Acholi. An interactive State-NGOs-Acholi interconnected process of societal relationship building is emerging with various claims. The political relations among Acholi returnees, regional interests and NGOs vary when compared with the Governments. The variations also depend on resource scarcity where NGOs have to add value to Government initiatives.

There is also social incoherence within the Acholi social authoritative structure, overdeveloped parts of central and western Uganda, lack of legitimacy accorded to traditional systems/leaders and the weak and reduced state cohesive power that eradicated the middle class political elites in Acholi. These have led to reciprocal perceptions of returnees on the part of NGOs as have exhibited essentialist roles but have failed to consider their pragmatic work, instead NGOs have mostly been reciprocated with the local context under government policy guidance. It is at this stage that the GoU builds on regularised political strategies that are not able to decongest social burden and imbalance and dependency.

The extent to which NGOs play their role have structured and systemic conditions linked to an interactive state which is always bigger and stronger, and probably more preferred to local claims.
The internal crises Acholi people went through and the claim that NGOs create social conditions that can rebuild the society still pose questions about rebuilding the internal breakdown of lineage-based institutional authority. The Government claim which is mainly a realist claim (highly politicised war by the government) contends with the naïve tendencies of NGOs practices, principles and policies. Here again, Acholi people are left in a difficult place. The government pursued military and displacement tactics, but also took advantage of the major historical events (chapter four) to enforce peaceful coexistence through Northern Ugandan reconstruction plans. This is also an opportunity for the government to show that national political correctness is viable to all citizens, a possibility which strengthens political position of the government in the country.

A wider scope for further critical research can still be directed at analysing roles NGOs play in transforming civil conflict in an inherently local social context using more theories of change. Analysis of NGOs’ roles in supporting post-war recovering population from different countries may focus on the objective observation of external reality that tends to locate both violent and non-violent actors within the study of their behaviours and a question can be asked, why? Since there are practically difficult measurable concepts, new research areas should focus on particular characteristics of returnees within the broader social group of IDPs, or on units that can be apparently measured in the study countries, households and/or individuals. Such further research should be critical of the “means to ends” dichotomies of war and its stages of change and transformative politics that can be structured by personalised state to local environments.

This study already outlines that NGOs-state relations are more clearly defined and undeniable in most SSA countries. Going by the strict legal framework of “legitimacy” may limit NGOs roles for local benefits and the case of Acholi demonstrates that an objective value-free analysis is both impossible and undesirable. INGOs will continue to bring their foreign funds from outside the country and at the same time be part of the social and political internal games in countries of interventions. For Acholi lineage-based bonding and the political links to be rebuilt, a new start
from the very basic local level need to understand how hyper-reality avoids dependency and improves coping mechanism so as to set provisions for social construction and give meanings to war-ravaged population. Whatever the case, peacebuilding work is easy to criticise since effective peacebuilding requires change. Change is in itself hard even if the people concerned really want change, worst off if they do not want it, and their work is impossible if there is a lack of political will from the respective government. Every process will seem like ‘peacebusiness’ and not peacebuilding, something that deserves more attention in terms of both theoretical contributions and their practical implications.


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- www.bbc.co.uk - British Broadcasting Cooperation
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- www.oecd.org - Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
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- www.refugeelawproject.org - Refugee Law Project
- www.reuters.com - News Organisation
- www.sipri.org - Stockholm International Research Institute
- www.spereproject.org - The Sphere Project (Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response)
- www.un.org - The United Nations
- www.unddr.org - United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre
- www.undg.org - United Nation Development Group
- www.undp.org - United Nations Development Programme
- www.unicef.org - United Nations Children Fund
- www.usip.org - United States Institutes of Peace
- www.who.org - World Health Organisation
- www.worldbank.org - The World Bank
- www.womenwagingpeace.org - The Institutes for Inclusive Security
- www.worldvision.org.uk - World Vision UK (NGO)
# APPENDIX

## APPENDIX A: TOPIC GUIDE

### APPENDIX A-1: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION: LOCATIONS, COMPOSITIONS AND DATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NR</th>
<th>Name of Location</th>
<th>Categories and numbers of members of FGDs</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Acholi Inn – Gulu Town Conference organised by Gulu University Conference on Post-Juba, Post-war in Acholiland</td>
<td>Mixed Conference Groups (Government officials, religious leaders, civil servants, NGOs, traditional leaders, Elders, NGO-Forums and CBO heads. 14 Members of FGDs assisted by 2 informants and 1 research assistant</td>
<td>24th April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Amuru Town Council With focus on Guru-guru Village</td>
<td>Village Mobilisers and some AVSI Volunteers (Mixed ages, sex and occupation) 12 Members of FGDs, 2 Informants, 2 research assistants and the researcher</td>
<td>26th April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Paicho Sub-County Anyomo-Twon Ward Village</td>
<td>Women Group (Mixed ages) 14 members of FGD, 4 informants from group and 1 female research assistant</td>
<td>30th April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Paicho Sub-County Tee-Olam Village</td>
<td>Men’s Group (Mixed ages) 14 members of FGD, 4 informants from group and 1 male research assistant</td>
<td>30th April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Paicho Sub-County Paicho Primary School</td>
<td>Youth Group (from 15 – 17) years of age 9 members of FGD.</td>
<td>30th April 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 6  | Lakwana Sub-County Parak Parish Tee-Ilwa Village                                  | 18 Members of FGDs and 5 informants from the village, 2 research assistances and the researcher  
   Note: Out of 798 +1 new born baby on the day (789) in the village, 132 people turned up. 2 hours of unstructured interview and observations took time to select prominent members for FGDs and informants | 01st May 2009   |
| 7  | Elders Forum – North Kitugm- Padibe                                               | 7 Members and 1 became the key informant                                                                  | 07th May 2009   |
| 8  | Omiya-Anyima Sub-county Panyum Parish                                             | 10 Members of FGDs, 2 informants and the researcher                                                       | 09th May 2009   |
| 9  | Namokora Sub-county Namokora Trading Centre                                       | 14 Members of FGDs, 2 informants and the researcher                                                       | 10th May 2009   |
APPENDIX A-2: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS TOPIC GUIDE

Pre-arrangements: Involved clearances from Presidents Office, the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) in Kampala (SS-2208) on permission and approval to conduct research in northern Uganda. This was followed by clearance by the District Residence Officers (RDC) on notification to the intentions and submission of applications to UNCST. Clearance from Local Concilors in the locations followed.

With the purposively sampled Acholi communities, there was clarity on not to raise too high hopes that seemed like; the researchers were coming to give support and/or standing as a voice for the IDP-returnees. The researchers followed the process using official procedures of gaining access from the local government village councillor. The names, locations, time, date and telephone numbers were given to the researchers by the authorities.

Planned Visits to Locations: Had to fit the criteria for choosing the returned populations, duration after return, closeness to any support and mobilisation from government and NGOs or never.

Explaining Reasons for the Visit: The explanations were first discussed amongst the research team, later were communicated to the sampled groups.

Introduction of the Research Team and aims: Good for confidence building, openness, profiling details and eliminating possible threats or any other related fear.

Permission to record and revisit ideas: Permissions were asked to record discussions in the groups.

Activities Carried Out During the FGD

1. Brainstorming exercise was used to tease out emerging themes from FGDs for classification in major categories.

Theme1: Identification of major crises and the root-causes of the war in northern Uganda.

Theme2: Identification of IDP needs and preferred preferences.

Theme3: Rebuilding of relationships – reconciliation issues.

Theme4: Identifying the bases for rebuilding lineage-based social authority body in Acholiland using indicators like: tradition, income, job, education, marital status and age.

The extent to which actors were involved in transforming war to peace in northern Uganda posed the following questions

1. Knowledge about the causes of the war? Why the war took so long to end?

2. Where support and mobilisation assistance has to come from and/or came from? Who can address/addressed the crises?
3. On return, how long time did it take to finally resettle permanently?

4. Identifying peace dividends and prioritising them.

5. Why more continued return and resettlement packages after return?

6. Was that help from NGOs or from somewhere else?

7. How to deal with threats and forced return?

8. Immediate challenges faced on return? And other related social issues after return?

9. How these social issues are dealt with without support from government and NGOs?

   1. Identification of needs whether the returnees are able to rebuild a strong authoritative
      social structure in the immediate and later return to VoRs.

   2. In own views, how much do returnees feel involved in the entire process?

   3. In own views, how representative has NGOs been to you locally, in the district, nationally and internally.

2. From every FGDs, key informants were selected to fill in their choices and rank options. Where the larger numbers turned up for FGDs, rule one applied and later FGDs out of the bigger population were separated to discuss, chose and rank options. Key informants who were identified from NGO workers and government officials also used this technique.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Interview <em>In-depth</em></td>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI): An Italian NGOs</td>
<td>IDP Protection Department Officer</td>
<td>12th May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Interview <em>In-depth</em></td>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI): An Italian NGOs</td>
<td>Opit Monitoring Resident Field Officer- Base1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Interview <em>In-depth</em></td>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI): An Italian NGOs</td>
<td>Opit Project Field Worker- Base2</td>
<td>27th April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Interview <em>In-depth</em></td>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI): An Italian NGOs</td>
<td>Lalogi Project Field Worker- Base1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Interview <em>In-depth</em></td>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI): An Italian NGOs</td>
<td>Lalogi Project Field Workers- Base2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Interview <em>In-depth</em></td>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI): An Italian NGOs</td>
<td>Acet Project Field Worker - Base1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Interview <em>Unstructured</em></td>
<td>Local Government Official - Local Council One Chairman</td>
<td>Community Mobiliser Opit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Interview <em>In-depth</em></td>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI): An Italian NGOs</td>
<td>Field Worker Paicho Base1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Interview <em>In-depth</em></td>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI): An Italian NGOs</td>
<td>Field Worker Paicho Base2</td>
<td>28th April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Interview <em>Unstructured</em></td>
<td>Local Government Official - Local Council Two Chairman</td>
<td>Paicho Community Mobiliser</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Interview <em>Telephone &amp; Semi-Structured</em></td>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI): An Italian NGOs</td>
<td>AVSI Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>09th June 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Interview <em>In-depth</em></td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation Forum member 12 (NGO-F12)</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>04th May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation Forum member</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>04th May</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX A-3: MATRIX TABLE OF ROLES AND ORGANISATIONS OF INTERVIEWEES ON DATES AND METHODS**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-depth</th>
<th>13 (NGO-F13)</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>Gulu University The Department of Peace and Strategic Studies (DGU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>Local Government (IDP Camp Leadership Structure) (PCL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Interview Telephone</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Interview Semi-Structured</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee (IRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee (IRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>NGO: GOAL Pader Kalongo (NGO-GOAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>NGO: GOAL Pader Kalongo (NGO-GOAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Interview (semi-Structured)</td>
<td>United High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) UNHCR-GPW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Interview (semi-structured)</td>
<td>Kitgum Local NGO (LNGO-43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Interview In-depth</td>
<td>District Service Commission (CAO-DSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Interview Type</td>
<td>Summary of Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Local Government (Semi-Structured Camp Leadership (Gulu-WCL))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>(semi-</td>
<td>Local Government Camp Leadership (Amuru-WCL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>structured)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>(semi-</td>
<td>Local Government Camp Leadership in Pabo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>structured)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Gulu Teacher's Association (GTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Gulu Teacher’s Association (GTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Kitgum Teacher’s Association (KTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Kitgum Teacher’s Association (KTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Amuru Teacher’s Association (ATA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Amuru Teacher’s Association (ATA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Pader Teacher’s Association (PTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>(semi-</td>
<td>Kitgum Elder Forum Leader (Male-Elder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>structured)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>(Semi-</td>
<td>Kitgum Elder Leader (Female-Elder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structured)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Acholi Elder’s Forum (Gulu-West) (AEF-GW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Acholi Elder’s Forum (Kitgum-North) (AEF-KN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>In-depth</td>
<td>Acholi Elder’s Forum (Gulu-East) (AEF-GE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Interview Type</td>
<td>Name of Interviewee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Interview in-depth</td>
<td>Acholi Elder’s Forum (Kitgum East) (AEF-KE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Interview Unstructured</td>
<td>Kitgum District Health Officer (KDHO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Interview in-depth</td>
<td>Kitgum Local Government Council (KLC3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Interview All forms</td>
<td>Acholi Traditional Institution Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA-Kitgum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Interview All forms</td>
<td>Acholi Traditional Institution Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA-Gulu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Interview Semi-Structured</td>
<td>Acholi Traditional Institution Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA-WL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Interview Unstructured</td>
<td>Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Interview Unstructured</td>
<td>Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Interview Unstructured</td>
<td>Human Rights Focus (HRF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Interview Semi-Structured</td>
<td>Ex-UNLA, joined UPDA, HSM, LRA and retired after taking Amnesty from Uganda Amnesty Commission (UAC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX A-4: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS

Pre-arrangements for all interviews involved showing clearances from Presidents Office, the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) in Kampala (SS-2208) on permission and approval to conduct research in northern Uganda. This was followed by clearance by the District Residence Officers (RDC) on notification to the intentions and submission of applications to UNCST. Clearance from Local Conclors in the locations and individuals followed. The researcher followed the process using official procedures of gaining access from the local government village councillor. The names, locations, time, date and telephone numbers were given to the researchers by the authorities.

Planned Visits to Locations: Had to fit the criteria for purposively samling respondents whose knowledge about the returned populations, duration after return, closeness to any support and mobilisation from government and NGOs or never was clear. Explaining reasons for the visit were first discussed amongst the research team, later were communicated to the respondent. Introduction of the researcher and aims was aimed to build confidence, openness, profiling details and eliminating possible threats or any other related fear.

Rebuilding after displacement to return
Exploring the possible IDP needs for social changes based on their perceptions and conditions of war to peace transformations (displacements and return).

1. Understanding the major crises in Acholiland and the root-causes of the war in Acholiland
2. Perceptions of IDP-returnees from camps through to Villages of Returns
3. Exploring conditions of returnees and wider social condition of the returnees in respective villages.

Causes of the conflict and displacement in northern Uganda
Explain in your opinion the major crises and the causes of the conflict in northern Uganda.

Explain the changes in social authoritative structures since the war displaced you in camps.

The Return Process
Explain your experiences of return from Internal Displacement Camp to your villages? (IDP-policy says: IDPs return is voluntary, own informed choice, in safety and dignity).

Do you think the social conditions were conducive enough to feel safe and dignified to return to the villages?

Based on your experience, do you think there will be re-displacement after your return to the village? Have you seen anything like that happening?

What is your view about the levels of your security and safety now that you have come back home?
Have you experienced any incidences where anybody in your villages suffered attacks, harassments, intimidation, persecution or any other form of punitive action upon return to the villages?

Social Services, livelihood and Income Generating Activities
What are your experiences about availability and access to basic social services and institutions, food security, livelihoods and income in your village?

Continued Support and Mobilisation
What economic support were/are continually provided for return and after when you came back to the villages?

How about after return?

How long do you think you need continued support and mobilisation?
Yrs.................... Months.......................... Weeks..................... Days....................
Where would that support be coming from?
Regulated support and mobilisation [The focus is on facilitation / Non-facilitation]
Were there any forms of regulations for return to your village?

How about after return?

Regulated by:
NGO (explain) ..........................................................

GoU roles (explain)

In information for Mobilisation and support: Experience on Government roles
Do you think there was enough information from GoU that supported your decision to return to your village?

How about after return? ..........................................................

Information for Mobilisation and support: Experience on NGO roles
Do you think there was enough information from NGOs that supported your decision to return to your village?

How about after return? ..........................................................
Mobilisation and Support for Transforming Social Relations amongst yourselves
Explain your social relations with each other that supported you to mobilise for change?

Before Return (while in camps)

During Return to Villages of Origin

After Return to Villages of Origin

Mobilisation and Support for Transforming Social Relations from NGOs and the Government
Explain your experience on social relations with the Government in supporting and mobilising you?

Before Return (while in camps)

During
Return

After Return

Explain your experience on social relations with the NGOs in supporting and mobilising you?

Before Return (while in camps)

During
Return

After Return
Appendix A-5: Topic Guide For In-Depth Interviews
The following generic questions were asked for in-depth interviews. Key informants assisted with collection of data from IDP-returnees on the post-war social recovery in Northern Uganda - Acholiland.

Questions to Non-Governmental Organisation Workers
The Major Question Sought: How far can Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play a role in the support and mobilisation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)-returnees?

- How long have you been working with this NGO in northern Uganda?
- What is the background of your NGO involvement in post-war social recovery for community return and resettlement in Acholiland (Gulu, Kitgum, Amuru and Pader)?
- Can you tell me what your organisation think are the root causes of this conflict?
- What are you doing to address them as you mobilise and support the IDPs?

NGO-Regulations to Support and Mobilise IDPs: (Facilitative and Non-facilitative Support and Mobisation by NGOs)

- Did you regulate your facilitation work with IDPs?
- What specific ones?
- Does it vary from programmes to programmes and/or community to community? Why?
- Are there some post-war social activities your NGO could have done, but are left out? Which ones are those? Why?
- How local can your NGO facilitate mobilisation and support?
- When will you stop facilitating IDPs return and resettlement, or generally on this conflict?

On the Return Process of IDPs: How far were Acholi IDP-returnees involved in defining what happens to them? And; how did Acholi IDPs perceive the different patterns of interventions and responses that helped them?

- Can you tell me how you involve IDPs-returnees in the process of return to their respective villages?
- How many days [long] does it take to resettle a family from IDP to the desired location in the village?
- What is involved during the processes? What are their perceptions?
- Are there other INGOs that you know are doing similar programmes with same community you are involved with? (Follow-up: How do you deal with duplication of activities?)
- What (in) direct impact did your NGO have on return and resettlement of IDPs?
- What kind of social changes have you recorded so far from the resettled returnees?
- What are you doing for those who decided to stay put (Stayees) in IDP-camps?
• How has these affected your capacity to work?
• Do you have any estimate to resettle a family from IDP to the village of settlements?
• How about in maintaining a resettled family, per day/week?
• Do you think the returnees are now stable enough to balance their own lives since return?

**NGO Relations with Returnees and Stayees [Can returnees define their needs [sustainable livelihood] by themselves?]**

• Do you have any social relations with IDP returnees who are now in their villages of origin?
• How about with those who are still in IDP-Camps?
• Explain the frequencies of your relations with returnees/stayees?
• How would you describe your relationship with other agencies?
• Are returnees still heavily dependent on your organisation?
• When do you think you will stop continuing to support mobilising the returnees?
• Has it ever occurred to you that the returnees refused your assistances? Reasons? Who? How many? Male of female? Age group?

**In-depth Interview with District Chief Administrative Officers (CAO), NGO-Forum, Local Government District Councillors Planning and Implementation Committees**

**The Major Question Sought: How far can Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play a role in the support and mobilisation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)-returnees?**

• Tell me about your background involvement in the conflict in northern Uganda, and now IDP return and resettlement to villages of origins?
• In your capacity, how long have you been working on the return and resettlement of returnees?
• Can you tell me what you think are the root causes of this conflict?
• What are you doing to address them as you mobilise and support the IDPs?

**Regulations to Support and Mobilise IDPs (Facilitative and Non-facilitative Support and Mobisation by NGOs)**

• Did you regulate your work with IDPs? How about NGOs?
• What specific post-war social recovery programmes have you chosen to do with the community?
• Does it vary from programmes to programmes and/or community to community? Why?
• Are there some post-war social activities you could have done, but are left out? Which ones are those? Why?
• How local do you work?
When will you stop working on IDPs return and resettlement, or generally on this conflict?

On the Return Process of IDPs: How far were Acholi IDP-returnees involved in defining what happens to them? And; how did Acholi IDPs perceive the different patterns of interventions and responses that helped them?

- Can you tell me how you resettle IDPs, the process from IDP-Camps to Villages of return?
- How many days does it take to resettle a family from IDP to the desired location in the village?
- What is involved during the processes?
- Are there other supports that you know, offer similar programmes with same community you are involved with? (Follow-up: How do you deal with duplication of activities?)
- What (in) direct impact did you have on return and resettlement of IDPs?
- What kind of social changes have you recorded so far from the resettled returnees?
- What are you doing for those who decided to stay put (Stayees) in IDP-camps?
- How has these affected your capacity to work?
- Do you have any estimate to resettle a family from IDP to the village of settlements?
- How about in maintaining a resettled family, per day/week?
- Do you think the returnees are now stable enough to balance their own lives since return?

Relations with Returnees and Stayees [Can returnees define their needs [sustainable livelihood] by themselves?]

- Do you have any social relations with IDP returnees who are now in their villages of origin?
- How about with those who are still in IDP-Camps?
- Explain the frequencies of your relations with returnees/stayees?
- How would you describe your relationship with other agencies in the district?
- Are returnees still heavily dependent on your organisation? Who else are dependent?
- When do you think you will stop continuing support and mobilisation to the returnees?
- Has it ever occurred to you that the returnees refused your assistances? Reasons? Who? How many? Male of female? Age group?

Selected Returnees to Villages of Origin from Internally Displaced People's Camps (IDPCs) – Family Heads

The Major Question Sought: How far can Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play a role in the support and mobilisation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)-returnees?
• What is the background of your family before the war started?

• Can you tell me what you think are the root causes of this conflict?

• Did you get support when you wanted to return and resettle? Who supported you?

• As a family, how long have you been assisted during the return and resettlement back to your village?

• Why could you not choose your own return and resettlement plans?

  o Addressing facilitative and non-facilitative Support and Mobisation by NGOs, GoU etc.

• Are there other social conditions apart from security issues that affected your family resettlement and return?

• What are those specific issues of central impact on your family after return and resettlement?

• What specific return and resettlement social recovery programmes helped you most?

• Are there left out programmes that could have helped even more? Which are those?

• Did you have set datelines for return and resettlement programmes for you and your family?

• How many days did it take you to return and resettle as a complete family from IDP to your village of origin?

• What processes were involved in doing that?

• Are/were there other international organisations that your family are/were getting similar assistances from?

• What would you say about the impacts of NGO work who assisted your family?

  o Would you say you do not need them anymore?

• Tell me more about the NGOs that used to assist you, did they choose to leave helping you or you did?

  o What reasons did they give?

• What social changes do you think you have seen so far from the time you returned to the village?

• Has these increased or decreased the family capacity to work on their own or still dependent on NGOs/Government?

• What are your experiences about NGOs support and mobilisation for your family?

  o Addressing: How far were Acholi IDP-returnees involved in defining what happens to them? And; how did Acholi IDPs perceive the different patterns of interventions and responses that helped them?

• What relationship do you have with the NGO/government?
• How do you maintain the relationship with the NGO who assisted you with the return?
• What relationship do you have with other NGOs here?
• How involved are you personally in maintaining the relationships between the NGO, and your family?
• How do you maintain the relationship between the local officials and NGOs?
• Is your family still heavily dependent on NGO resettlement and return packages?
  o Is this a similar case for all families in this village/community?
• How long do you think your family will continue depending on NGOs assistances?
• How many villages have the same NGOs resettled under the home return policy in this community?
• Do you have some people who have refused the home return assistances, but have returned to their villages? Who are they?
• What reasons do they give for not taking NGO assistances?
• Are those who returned through NGO assistances mostly male, female, youth or old ones?
• How about for those who refused to return, are they male, female, youth or old ones?
  o What reasons do they give you?
APPENDIX A-6: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM KEY INFORMANTS: NGOS, TRADITIONAL LEADERS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, CAMP LEADERS AND OTHER OPINION LEADERS IN THE DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Type of Social Recovery Operations</th>
<th>Type of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulu</td>
<td></td>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. RVO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. SSIDPCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amuru</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>3. SIDPCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occuption</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>4. DNM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitgum</td>
<td>Revisit Required for Corrections</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>Revisit and Corrections Done</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Revisit and Corrections Done
Signature…………………………………..…Date…………………………….………

First, Can you tell me whether you are now in a post-war social recovery?

Yes: Proceed to section 2, ‘Basic Data on Settled Communities’.
No: Proceed to the next question

Do you experience any post-war social recovery related activities now?

Yes: Proceed to section 2, ‘Basic Data on Settled Communities’.
No: Proceed to the next question

Thank you for your cooperation. We will now go into some details!

Please State

Settlement Area (Village)……………………………………………………………………

Area (Sub-Location)………………………………………………………………………………

Town/District/City……………………………………………………………………………………

Interviewer’s Name……………………………………………………………………………………

Interview Completed Yes / No

Refusal Yes / No

Date of 1st call ………… Date of 2nd recall ………… Date of 3rd recall………………

Information checked: Signature…………………………………..…Date…………………………

Basic Data on Settled Communities

First, I would like to ask levels of returnees’ income, how long time it took to resettle in the villages, the age group of people who returned, village location, major activities of jobs creation, particular kinds and amount of assistances offered, if there are any cooperation/partnership within communities, with others various NGOs, institutions and community leaders. I will also ask you about your maintained relationships amongst yourselves, with the NGOs, Local council leaders,
government officials, other neighbouring communities and for how long. Lastly I will ask you how much it cost you to resettle at the initial stages to date. Can you tell me about these? (Col/1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Provision of data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Details of Resettlement Village Locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Time Taken to Resettle Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Amount of Assistances Offered for resettling a family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Cost of Resettling a Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Age composition of Returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Jobs Opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Income Level (Income Generating Activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Maintained Partnership (MP) with other agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Time taken to Maintain Relationships (TTMR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr 1</th>
<th>Details of Resettlement of Village Locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col:1</td>
<td>Is this the final location of the settlement village after leaving the IDPCs? [Yes/No]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If Yes Go to Col.2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr 2</th>
<th>Time Taken to Resettle Communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col:2</td>
<td>How long time did it finally take to resettle in the village after return from IDPCs?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr 3</th>
<th>Explaining and identifying Assistances Offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col:3-1</td>
<td>Explain the type of assistance offered for return if any?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:3-2</td>
<td>How much in monetary value?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:3-3</td>
<td>Explain the type of assistance offered after return if any?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:3-4</td>
<td>How much in monetary value?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr 4</th>
<th>Cost of Resettling a Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col:4</td>
<td>Explain how much in total is offered to sustain the family for a month?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:4-1</td>
<td>Is the assistance coming mainly from NGOs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:4-2</td>
<td>Is this preferably enough?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:4-3</td>
<td>What would be the preferable amount that can sustain fully?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:4-4</td>
<td>How long would the preferred amount in col4.3 last?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:4-5</td>
<td>Do you think there is adequate progress that can provide sustainable solutions after return and settlement?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To a greater extent Some extent Fairly well Not at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr 5</th>
<th>Age Composition of Returnees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col:5</td>
<td>State what age group have easily preferred to settle in villages of origin?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:5-1</td>
<td>Indicate M ( ) for Male numbers or F ( ) for Female, or Both ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr 6</th>
<th>Jobs Opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col:6</td>
<td>What job opportunities are mostly preferred for engaging in forging sustainable return solution?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:6-1</td>
<td>What other jobs are you engaged in?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:6-2</td>
<td>How much on a Monthly Salary Weekly Wage Cash at hand Battered Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:6-3</td>
<td>What job offer would be most preferable? Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:6-4</td>
<td>What job offer would be least preferable? Why?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr 7</th>
<th>Income Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col:7</td>
<td>Indicate if you think the level of income <strong>increased or decreased</strong> since return into the villages of origins?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tick:</strong> Increased (+) / Decreased (-)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By how much in (UgShs)?</td>
<td>From (+) / To (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:7-1</td>
<td>What level of income would you prefer to have can be acceptable for a balanced livelihood level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Between UgShs:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:7-2</td>
<td>Would you prefer to have additional income for support? If yes state from where, what specific income and by how much.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From: How much: Type of Income Support:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:7-3</td>
<td>How long do you expect this to last?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To ever / One more year / Six Months / One Month / Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:7-4</td>
<td>To what extent would you rate the level of dependencies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To a greater extent / Some extent / Fairly Well / Not all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On NGOs / On GoU / Else / On NGOs / On GoU / Else / On NGOs / On GoU / Else</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nr 8** Maintained Partnership (MP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col:8</th>
<th>Did you have any ongoing and maintained partnerships after return to village of origin? (Tick) if: Yes / No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If Yes: With (Tick)</td>
<td>NGOs / Government / Chiefs / ARLPI / Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If NO: With (Tick)</td>
<td>NGOs / Government / Chiefs / ARLPI / Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Col:8-1** Is the partnership based on arrangement which are:

- Temporary
- Permanent
- Locally (Specific)
- Universally (widespread)
- Assured
- Randomly organised
- Long-Term
- Short-term

**Col:8-2** What impact has the partnership arrangement had?

**Col:8-3** Was it intended to be so or unintended?

- To a greater extent
- Some extent
- Fairly Well
- Not at all

**Col:8-4** Do you think this is positively or negatively preferable options for a balance social change?

**Nr 9** Maintained Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col:9</th>
<th>How is your relationship with other agencies that are also doing social recovery and return?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent / Good / Fair / Poor / Not at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col:9-1</th>
<th>How is the relationship based on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent / Good / Fair / Poor / Not at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col:9-1</th>
<th>How is your relationship with returnees who have returned and resettled back to villages of origin?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent / Good / Fair / Poor / Not at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col:9-1</th>
<th>How is the relationship based on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent / Good / Fair / Poor / Not at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How is your relationship with traditional leaders?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Col:9-2</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the relationship based on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-3</td>
<td>How is your relationship with religious leaders?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the relationship based on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-4</td>
<td>How did/do you maintain your relationship with the NGOs that assisted or continues to assist in the return and resettlement?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Face to Face Visits</td>
<td>Organised Workshops</td>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>Phones</td>
<td>Word of Mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-5</td>
<td>Do/did you maintain your relationship with other communities who are resettled by other NGOs through …?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Face to Face Visits</td>
<td>Organised Workshops</td>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>Phones</td>
<td>Word of Mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-6</td>
<td>How do/did you maintain your relationship with the traditional leaders?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Face to Face Visits</td>
<td>Organised Workshops</td>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>Phones</td>
<td>Word of Mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-7</td>
<td>How do/did you maintain your relationship with the religious leaders?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Face to Face Visits</td>
<td>Organised Workshops</td>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>Phones</td>
<td>Word of Mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-8</td>
<td>How do/did you maintain your relationship with the district council officials?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Face to Face Visits</td>
<td>Organised Workshops</td>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>Phones</td>
<td>Word of Mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-9</td>
<td>For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with your own settled communities?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We live with them</td>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>Twice a Month</td>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-10</td>
<td>For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with the traditional leaders?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We live with them</td>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>Twice a Month</td>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-11</td>
<td>For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with the religious leaders?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We live with them</td>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>Twice a Month</td>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-12</td>
<td>For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with the district council leaders?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We live with them</td>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>Twice a Month</td>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col:9-13</td>
<td>For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with other NGOs/agencies?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We live with them</td>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>Twice a Month</td>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Additional data from NGO-field workers (Questions asked as if NGO-FW is a respondent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Current NGO</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Communities</td>
<td>Duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Support and Mobilisation Role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Which type of communities below has the most to the least preference needs for assistance? Please rank, 1 for most needs, 2, 3, 4 (to the least) etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Details of Returnees to Villages of Origin (RVOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Satellite IDPCs – (SatIDPCs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Displaced and Staying Put in IDPCs – (DSPIDPCs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Never were displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Were you employed with other NGO(s) before?  
If YES:  
1. Name of former NGO(s)  
   Position held  
   Duties  
2. Name of former NGO(s)  
   Position held  
   Duties  

If answered NO were you  
Office Based, full-time employed  
Office Based, part-time employed  
Office Based contract employed  
Field-based, full-time employed  
Field-based, part-time employed  
Field-based contract employed  
Self-Employed  
Consultancy  
Other  

If answered YES were you  
Office Based, full-time employed  
Office Based, part-time employed  
Office Based contract employed  
Field-based, full-time employed  
Field-based, part-time employed  
Field-based contract employed  
Self-Employed  
Consultancy  
Other  

State what language you use in your CURRENT community work?  
Is Lwo your mother language?  
If NO, how do/did you communicate with the local community?  
Translated from to Lwo  

What number of returnees/stayees/satellites do/did you mainly work with?  
(Probe: Did/do you approach them, allocated to you by your NGO, authorities or chose them?)  
Individuals (<50)  
Village (< 50 people)  
Parish (50 – 200 people)  
Sub-county (200 – 500)  
County (500 – 5000)  
District (5,000 > )  

Do/did you convey information and help based on NGO designs/plans or government's?  
Based on ONLY our NGO plans, mandates and regulations  
Based on ONLY local government plans, mandates and regulations  
Based on ONLY community recommendations/plans  
Both  
Other  

Do/did you know how many returnees have been resettled since the return started?  
Do/did you know how many stayees - the Stay Put in IDPCs – (SPIDPCs) who still need support?  
What reasons do they give for continued assistances from you or other NGOs?  
Tick what sex and age categories are those returnees who continue to need assistance?  
Male between (25–30) : (31-45) : (46-60) : Over 60  
Female between (20-25) : (26-30) : (31-45) : (46-60) : Over 60  
Male youth (under 13) : (13-18) : (19-24)  
Female Youth (under 13) : (13-15) : (16-19)  
Disabled
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What particular work of social recovery process do you do based on the recommended plans with the community you have chosen that you work with?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are your main responsibilities with them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tick one or more options below, what kind of relationship you would prefer to have with them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Temporal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often do you visit them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We live with the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When was the last time you visited them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since the last visit, have you seen any changes in their social statuses?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain the progress/decline in the level of income you have witnessed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain what prospects of jobs opportunities they have?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the level of educational standard within the returnees/stayees and satellites compared to when they were in IDPCs become well or worst?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the level of income increases/decreased compared to when they were in IDPCs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you prefer they should be supported and mobilised?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain what these mean to you in terms of support and mobilisation impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has such support and mobilisation had any direct impacts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has such support and mobilisation had any indirect impacts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has such support and mobilisation had any short term preferences?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has such support and mobilisation had any long term preferences?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong>: Explain what you prefer should be done to allow the community you are working with realise the need to be sustained in the need for radical social change they are exposed to now.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX - ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ONE: SAMPLE INTRODUCTION LETTER FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

13th April 2009

To Whom It May Concern

I am writing to introduce Mr Sunday Angoma OKELLO, who is studying for a doctoral degree in Public Policy at the Department of International Development Department, University of Birmingham, UK.

Mr Okello is writing a doctoral thesis on: “Non Governmental Organisation Involvement in Mobilising Post-War Communities in Northern Uganda”. This is a very interesting and important area of research, which has huge implications for making the NGOs, CBOs, Governments, International Agencies and the affected communities in civil conflicts address social and policy issues.

To enable him undertake this study, Mr Okello requires access to the communities and other relevant public, private organisations / institutions and officials in Uganda. The Department and the University of Birmingham would like to ask for your cooperation and support during Mr Okello’s field research in Uganda, Northern Uganda in Acholiland. I should be very grateful if you could facilitate his work and help him in any way possible.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Paul B. Jackson
Research Supervisor
Director/Head of School

Dr Heather Marquette
Co-Supervisor

12 The original letter used during the field work had the official logo of the University of Birmingham and had been signed by both Professor (then Dr) Paul Jackson and Dr Heather Marquette.
APPENDIX - ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS TWO: SAMPLE INTRODUCTION
NOTIFICATION OF UNCST APPROVAL LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
UGANDA NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (UNCST)
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

Notification of UNCST approval

By e-mail from Leah [l.nawegulo@uncst.go.ug]
Sent: 23 April 2009 19:57
To: sao697@bham.ac.uk
Cc: leahtabo@yahoo.com

Dear Mr. Okello,

NGO involvement in mobilising post-war recovering communities in N. Uganda, SS 2208

This is to notify you that on 22nd April 2009, Uganda National Council for Science and Technology reviewed and approved your research project. The RS 6 forms have been forwarded to the Research Secretariat Office of the President for clearance to the study districts.

Once we obtain feedback from Office of the President, We shall notify you. You will also be required to pay the research fees before clearance letters can be issued to you. Details regarding research fee will be sent to you once clearance has been obtained from Office of the President.

Yours sincerely,

Leah Nawegulo
Head, Research Safety & Ethics Unit
for: Executive Secretary
Uganda National Council for Science and Technology

13 This notification letter was e-mailed to me and signed by the Head of Research & Ethics Unit, Lea Nawegulo after having processed it from the President’s Office, Research Secretariat, Kampala, Uganda. Data collection was permitted on the phone to begin prior to this e-mail notification, on condition that the Residence District Commissioner was informed on the planned fieldwork.
## APPENDIX B: TABLES
### APPENDIX B-4.2: ROOT-CAUSES, CORE PROBLEMS AND EFFECTS OF WAR IN NORTHERN UGANDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROOT CAUSES</th>
<th>CORE PROBLEM</th>
<th>EFFECTS/SYMPTOMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Unbalanced Occupation and Professions from colonial rule</td>
<td>National division of occupation between the North (Military) and South (Economic)</td>
<td>Domination of security/military professions by northerners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of a united spirit of nationalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ethnicity and Identity</td>
<td>Internal and external crises caused by loss of power (caused by 2.1)</td>
<td>Killing of civilian population by bith UPDF and LRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective punishment by NRA/UPDF</td>
<td>The Internally Displaced Camps, Exiles and refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Aggravating and Triggering Root Causes</td>
<td>Establishments of internal territorial confinements, bureaucratic and consent-based political authority in the traditional sense of eliminating Acholi people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The failure of Uganda as a state in observing principles of protections of its citizen and democratic human rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Socio-Political</td>
<td>Failure of regimes to address tribalism, obsession to power nepotism, corruption, poor public sector.</td>
<td>Ineffective government officials, oppression, and opportunism for self-enrichments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Socio-Economic Exclusion</td>
<td>Policies of Social Sanctions and intended social exclusion of Northern Uganda from National mainstream activities</td>
<td>Corrupt judicial system, poor health conditions, poor policing, and poor education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Opportunities, Widespread Economic Injustices;</td>
<td>Diversion of the developmental projects in physical infrastructures like road constructions, water, and power construction to other parts of Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Lack of structural adjustment policies;</td>
<td>Limited operations of political, moral and economic levels of recognisable progress and development of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Lack of Physical infrastructure and Institutional.</td>
<td>Lack of trust, opportunistic behaviours within the government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: (November 2009) - This tabulated version of the Juba Peace Talks Position Papers presented to Chief Mediator, Riek Machar from (August 2006-2009)) was also identified by key informants and respondents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1986</td>
<td>NRA topples Okello government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1986</td>
<td>Fighting in the North between NRA and fleeing UNLA troops; Gulu and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kitgum declared war zones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August, 1986</td>
<td>Former soldiers of the UNLA attacks Bibia in Gulu and 30 are killed by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the NRA. First UPDA incursions from Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alice Auma, a little known medium in Kitgum, claims the spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lakwena ordered her to stop healing and raise HSMF to wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>war against evil in Acholi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1986</td>
<td>HSMF attack Gulu and are defeated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1986</td>
<td>Alice takes over 150 troops from UPDA and successfully attacks NRA at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corner Kilak (Kitgum).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1986</td>
<td>Attack against NRA in Pajule, then Lira, Soroti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1987</td>
<td>Kony joins UPDA as “spiritual Mobiliser” in Major Benjamin Apia’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>black battalion. Kony and his followers seize UPDA division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>commanded by Okello Okeno; more UPDA soldiers later join Kony from 80th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1987</td>
<td>First protected camps for civilians created in Gulu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1987</td>
<td>Government declares amnesty for rebels willing to surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1987</td>
<td>“Operation Coy” to flush out UPDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1987</td>
<td>HSMF defeated near Jinja. Alice arrested in Kenya for illegal entry on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1988</td>
<td>Alice’s father (Severino Lukoya) attempts to continue HSMF in Kitgum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kony attacks 115th Brigade of UPDA and integrates it into his force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd March 1988</td>
<td>Agree to ceasefire and sign formal peace agreement with NRA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lukoya joins Kony, as well as Lukonyomoi of United Uganda Godly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement (UUGM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1988</td>
<td>Peace talks with NRA led by Salim Saleh in Gulu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall commander of UPDA, Odong Latek, joins Kony with 39 soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Museveni extends amnesty to all armed groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1988</td>
<td>Peace Treaty between UPDA and NRA. Over 2000 UPDA join NRA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1989</td>
<td>Museveni declares three-month moratorium on military operations near Gulu; after failure, NRA intensifies assaults and moves people back into camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>Launches a major four-month “Operation North” led by Minister of State for Defence; David Tineyefunza to end insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1991</td>
<td>Major revenge killings and atrocities against citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1994</td>
<td>Peace talks started, led by Betty Bigombe; talks break down after President issues ultimatum for conclusion in seven days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Sudanese support for Kony; mass abductions of children start.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1996</td>
<td>LRA offensive in Gulu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1996 to</td>
<td>Kony spreads the message that if Paul Semwogerere of DP becomes president, he will lay down arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary elections; Museveni wins but receives little support in Acholi areas. Acholi living in the Diaspora convene “Kacoke Madit”, a series of London meetings to seek a solution for the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January – December 1997</td>
<td>Kony starts a series of heavy attacks on Kitgum population; into 1999; many atrocities by LRA against Acholi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1998 to</td>
<td>The Acholi Religious Leader’s Peace Initiative presents a memorandum for peace to Museveni and hold Bedo-Piny, a three-day consultative meeting to focus on ending the war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1998</td>
<td>Amnesty Act is published in Uganda Government Gazette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>Signing of Nairobi Peace Agreement between Uganda and Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Local Peace Talks in Gulu under auspices of District Reconciliation and Peace Team (which ends in failure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>Army launches “Operation Iron Fist” against LRA in Sudanese territory after agreement with Khartoum; this shatters a two-year period of relative quite. LRA scatters in small groups from Sudan and crosses back to northern Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Unilateral ceasefire by LRA produces limited government ceasefire; nomination of presidential peace team and unsuccessful attempts to start negotiations; large-scale violations of ceasefire; expansion of conflict to Teso and West Nile. LRA moves to Soroti, Katakwi and Lira. The Arrow Group and Amuka Group formed in Teso and Lango to fight LRA. Top LRA Commanders Charles Tabuley, Tolbert Nyeko and Ceasar Acellam killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td>Museveneii asks International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate LRA abuses. ICC prosecutor appears willing to explore this. Frontier Guards formed in Kitgum to fight LRA. UPDF offensive against LRA continues. Sudanese ambassador to Uganda, Sirajal-Din Hamid, says Khartoum prepared to help investigate Kony and have him arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Juba Peace Talks Starts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Consultations on Agenda Item No. 3 / Skirmishes between UPDF and ADF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td>The Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army, signed annexure to Agenda Item No. 3 on Accountability and Reconciliation, originally signed on 27 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2008</td>
<td>A Declaration of the Stakeholders Conference on the Juba Peace Process is issued. Joachim Chissano, UN special envoy to the Juba peace talks convenes meeting in Kampala to restart stalled juba peace talks. Joseph Kony again fails to sign final peace agreement;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008</td>
<td>Ugandan, DR Congo and South Sudan forces launch a joint offensive on LRA bases in Garamba in DRC. Government and ADF rebels agree to hold peace talks in early 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>LRA leaders ask for a ceasefire amidst attacks of the joint forces of Uganda, DRC and South Sudan. LRA continues rampage on citizens of the DRC leaving hundreds dead. Reports of the firing of Matsanga, the LRA spokesperson causes chaos within the peace team. Odhiambo, LRA second in command, is wounded during attacks in Garamba hideout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2009</td>
<td>Reports that Odhiambo will surrender through facilitation by IOM do not come to fruition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>Thomas Kwoyelo, LRA fourth in command, is captured and returned to Uganda aboard a UPDF plane. Catherine Ajok, the last abductees from St. Mary's College Aboke is rescued and reunited with her family at State House in Nakasero, Kampala. UPDF starts pulling out of Congo bringing an end to Operation Lightning Thunder. LRA leader Joseph Kony and a few fighters are still at large with reports that they are heading to the Central African Republic. The DRC government takes over the hunt for the LRA in Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>Ugandan soldiers clash with LRA. Concerns abound about LRA receiving fresh supplies. The Government of Uganda investigates Belgium citizens suspected of delivering the supplies to LRA in northeastern DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>Calls for a fresh military offensive against the LRA from select human rights groups and a bill on Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 presented to the US Congress. LRA continues attacks in Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>LRA reprisal attacks continue in the Democratic Republic of Congo causing thousands to flee their homes. Two LRA commanders, George Labongo and Ocan Bunia reported killed. LRA launch attacks on a southern Sudanese army post near the DRC border killing 14 SPLA soldiers and 4 civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>LRA continue committing atrocities in north east Democratic republic of Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2009</td>
<td>LRA carry out attacks in the western Equatorial Region creating a mass displacement of people in southern Sudan with the border of the DRC and Central African Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>Sudanese Bishop asks for international help in dealing with the LRA who continue to wage terror in Sudan, DRC and CAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>47 LRA rebels surrender in Yei in central equatorial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Sudan and Uganda in a border conflict dispute over a stretch of land in Moyo district. A meeting held in Moyo is unsuccessful as tempers flare. LRA continues attacks in DRC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Being (qualities)</th>
<th>Having (things)</th>
<th>Doing (actions)</th>
<th>Interacting (settings)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>physical and mental health</td>
<td>food, shelter, work</td>
<td>feed, clothe, rest, work</td>
<td>living environment, social setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>care, adaptability, autonomy</td>
<td>social security, health systems, work</td>
<td>co-operate, plan, take care of, help</td>
<td>social environment, dwelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affection</td>
<td>Respect, sense of humour, generosity, sensuality</td>
<td>friendships, family, relationships with nature</td>
<td>share, take care of, make love, express emotions</td>
<td>privacy, intimate spaces of togetherness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>critical capacity, curiosity, intuition</td>
<td>Literature, teachers, policies, educational</td>
<td>analyse, study, meditate, investigate,</td>
<td>schools, families, universities, communities,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>receptiveness, dedication, sense of humour</td>
<td>responsibilities, duties, work, rights</td>
<td>Cooperate, dissent, express opinions</td>
<td>associations, parties, churches, neighbourhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leisure</td>
<td>imagination, tranquillity, spontaneity</td>
<td>games, parties, peace of mind</td>
<td>day-dream, remember, relax, have fun</td>
<td>landscapes, intimate spaces, places to be alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creation</td>
<td>imagination, boldness, inventiveness, curiosity</td>
<td>abilities, skills, work, techniques</td>
<td>invent, build, design, work, compose, interpret</td>
<td>Spaces for expression, workshops, audiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity</td>
<td>sense of belonging, self-esteem, consistency</td>
<td>Language, religions, work, customs, values, norms</td>
<td>get to know oneself, grow, commit oneself</td>
<td>Places one belongs to, everyday settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom</td>
<td>autonomy, passion, self-esteem, open-mindedness</td>
<td>Equal rights</td>
<td>dissent, choose, run risks, develop awareness</td>
<td>Anywhere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author's version (2009), based on modernised version of Max-Neef's (1991) *Human scale development: conception, application and further reflections*. New York: Apex. Chpt.2. "Development and Human Needs".
**APPENDIX B-5.2: SUMMARY OF IDENTIFIED PREFERENCES BASED ON POSITION, INTERESTS AND NEEDS OF IDPS, NGOS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Perspectives from IDP-Returnees</th>
<th>Perspectives from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)</th>
<th>Perspectives from Government (Local and Central)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>Peace, Human and Food security, Roads, Markets, Agricultural tools and Seeds, Income Generating Activities (IGAs), Empowerment, Land Ownership</td>
<td>Funds, Good image, self-sustaining projects &amp; community, Working on identified Gaps (EVIs), monitoring and protection, Camps demolitions, sustainable livelihood,</td>
<td>Power, popular Support, Good Image, Education, Leadership (LC1, LC2 etc), Land-use for investment,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What they really want</td>
<td>Food, Clean Water, Schools, Shelter &amp; Health Care, Land ownership</td>
<td>Identity, Legitimacy, Return &amp; Resettlement of all IDPs, Extended Funds, Power and Control, Development</td>
<td>Power, Recognition, Legitimacy, Land, Control, ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must have</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s version based summarised perspectives from IDP returnees, NGO workers and Government officials showed similarities and convergence of shared interests, but were not commonly bringing out convergences, else major divergences in the perspectives on roles NGO play in supporting and mobilising returnees in villages of origins, (2009).
## APPENDIX B-7.1: ROLES IN THE SUPPORT AND MOBILISATION ON RETURN TO VILLAGES OF ORIGINS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roles of Government</th>
<th>Roles of NGOs</th>
<th>Roles of Local Leaders</th>
<th>Stake holders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Centres</td>
<td>Training for Health Promotion</td>
<td>Work hand in hand with the central, government, district officials and NGOs to solve local problems</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Construction (Poor Roads)</td>
<td>Transport Improved Network Systems (access)</td>
<td>Work hand in hand with the central, government, district officials and NGOs to solve local problems</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Services</td>
<td>Bore holes, water wells</td>
<td>Encouraged manual labour (Aleya)</td>
<td>Local Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools for better Education</td>
<td>Scholastic Materials Inadequate teachers</td>
<td>Charcoal burning</td>
<td>Elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Food Security (hunger) provide relief aid (SPRING)</td>
<td>Farming (agriculture)</td>
<td>Former LRA Commanders (LRA abductees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>Training on Land Mines (UXO) Soap Blankets</td>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Sheets only to selected few</td>
<td></td>
<td>Encouraged manual labour (Aleya)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Farming tools, Seedlings, Hoes Restocking</td>
<td></td>
<td>Youths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAADS dominated government projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solve national problems like Land Dispute during return, e.g. border dispute between Acholi and Lango</td>
<td>Work hand in hand with the government to solve local problems</td>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate on behalf of the community</td>
<td>Help where Government has failed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Author’s version based on FGD from among others, Youths in Paicho (1st May 2009).)

(Source: Author’s version based on FGD from among others Tee-Ilwa, Parak Parish, Omoro County (1st May 2009).)
# APPENDIX B-7.2: SHOWING DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT AND TWO LEVELS OF INTERVENTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Intervention</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Personal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Feelings, Emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceptions, Fears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td><em>Therapy Psycho-social accompaniment…</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Advocacy Sensitisation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>To resume relations</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Words **not** in italics indicate interventions that was executed by NGOs

Words **in italics** indicate conflict transformation actions was executed by other actors

(Source: Author’s version adapted for this study from [www.beyondintractibility.org](http://www.beyondintractibility.org) accessed on 10th July 2009)
### APPENDIX B-7.3: SHOWING PATTERNS OF NGO RELATIONS IN NORTHERN UGANDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO relations in northern Uganda with IDPs, GoU and other NGOs</th>
<th>NGO relations to Parent Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Employees of these NGOs see themselves as free agents acting as hired-gun free agents and/or plateau-career free agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Employees working with NGOs here have tended to adapted native environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s (2009) version adapted from Black J. Stewart; Gregesen Hal B.; Mendenhall Mark E.; and Stroh (1999) *Globalizing People through International Assignments;* Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, USA for analysing NGO relations with IDPs, District and Government Officials and other NGOs in northern Uganda from (1986-2010).
### APPENDIX C: ILLUSTRATIONS

#### APPENDIX C-1: ILLUSTRATED LIST OF MEMBER ORGANISATIONS OF GULU NGO FORUM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Nr</th>
<th>Organisation Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Acholi Muslim Community Response on AIDS.</td>
<td>Gulu District NGO Forum is an umbrella organisation representing the interest of Civil Society Organisations operating in Gulu District.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Awich Youth Group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Bungatira Poverty Alleviation Integrated Project.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Charity Foundation for the Disabled Children Northern Region. NGO</td>
<td>It is member to apex organisations including National NGO Forum, DENIVA and CSOPNU. It works in partnership with the LIU Institute for the study of global issues and Kabarole Research Centre (KRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Community Welfare Initiatives. NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Dyere Tek (PLWA) Group. CBO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Gulu Lancashire Local Agenda 21 Link Association. NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Gulu Development Agency. NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Gulu Government &amp; NGO Drivers Association. CBO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gulu Youth for Action.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Gulu Women Empowerment Network. NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Gwokke the Trust. NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Koch Development Association. NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Laroo Child and Family Programme.(Laroo CCF) –NGO Local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Lwo Development Incorporated. (LDI) - NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Organisation of Old Age Association.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>PAAL Community Based Organisation. NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Patriot Development Services (PDS). NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Redeemed Bible Way Church. -NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Rural Community Development Association.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>UOSPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Uganda Red Cross Society. (URCS) - NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Waloko-kwo Support Organisation. -NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Watemu Lapianat Agro-forestry Association (WLAA). NGO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Youth Rehabilitation Project. NGO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Nwoya Rural Community Development Project. NGO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>KochGoma Bee Keeping Association. NGO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Uganda National Non-Governmental Organisation. NGO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Punena Child &amp; Family Programme. (Punena CCF) – NGO Local</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Africa Development Network.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Gulu Youth Development Association (GYDA)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Gulu Youth Florist Association. CBO</td>
<td>CBO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Gulu Youth Development Project.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Gulu District NGO Forum (GDNF). NGO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Charity for Peace Foundation.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Foundation for Cultural &amp; Sport Development.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>GUKIPA Hope Ministries.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Acholi Women Fish Mongers.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Gulu Community Social Support &amp; Counselling Organisation.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Rural Focus Uganda.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>National Association of Women Organisation in Uganda.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Heifer International. – NGO International</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Xx</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Can Deg Cabe Association (CBO).</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Alliance for African Assistance. NGO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Ang Ecapa Rwot Women’s Organisation. CBO</td>
<td>CBO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Human Life &amp; Community Organisation. CBO</td>
<td>CBO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF).– NGO International</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Gulu Organisation for Children in Distress. NGO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Concerned Parents Association. (CPA). – NGO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C-2: ARMED REBEL GROUPS AGAINST UGANDAN GOVERNMENT UNTIL FEBRUARY 2006

Action Restore Peace (ARP), **Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)**, Apac Rebellion (AR), **Citizen Army for Multiparty Politics (CAMP)**, Force Obote Back (FOBA), **Former Uganda National Army FUNA**, Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), the **Lord’s Army (LA)**, Lord’s Resistance Army LRA), National Federal Army (NFA), **National Union for the Liberation of Uganda (NULA)**, Ninth October Movement (NOM), **People’s Redemption Army (PRA)**, Uganda Christian Democratic Army (UCDA), **Uganda Federal Democratic Front (UFDF)**, Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), **Ugandan National Democratic Army (UNDA)**, Uganda National Federal Army (UNFA), **Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF)**, Ugandan National Rescue Fronts I and II (UNRF I and II), **Ugandan People’s Army (UPA)**, Ugandan People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), **Uganda Salvation Army (USA)** and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF).

### APPENDIX C-3: ILLUSTRATED LIST OF REBELS WHO GOT AMNESTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Rebel Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action Restore Peace</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>UFDF</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>Uganda Freedom Front</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Dictatorship Forces</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Uganda Freedom Movement</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Army for Multi-Party Politics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Uganda National Freedom Movement</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOBA/NOM</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>Uganda National Independence Liberation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOBA/UPA</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Uganda National Rescue Front II</td>
<td>3,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Army</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy Spirit Movement</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Uganda Salvation Army</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
<td>12,645</td>
<td>Uganda Democratic Alliance/ Front</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NALU</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>UNDA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>UNLA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Freedom Army</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNLF</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>UPDA</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Redemption Army</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>West Nile Bank Front</td>
<td>4,316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 23,526

*Source: New Vision - Government News Paper: Thursday, 1st October, 2009; By Madinah Tebajukira*