British Discourses on Europe: Self/Other and National Identities

Justin Gibbins

A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science and International Studies
School of Government and Society
University of Birmingham
July 2012
University of Birmingham Research Archive

e-theses repository

This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation.

Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.
Abstract

Britain’s stormy relationship with the European Union is a frequently cited illustration of a Eurosceptic state *par excellence*. Possessive of a strong national identity, a unique island status, a plethora of wartime experiences and a tenacious hold over its sovereignty, Britain has long been invested with an ‘awkward partner’ status. This dissertation seeks to unravel such presuppositions to answer the central research question: how has British national identity been forged and constructed by competing political elite visions of Europe?

I deploy a discourse analytic approach and the Self/Other nexus to examine elite configurations of Europe over three critical events in European integration history. The empirical findings suggest three things. Firstly, discursive constructions of Europe play a fundamental role in determining perceptions of national identity. Secondly, the emerging trend in poststructuralist discourse analysis that views the Other not as a single, radical, hostile adversary, but as a whole array of much subtler and less easily defined Others is pertinent to identity construction. Finally, although national identities are perceived as contingent on previous conceptualisations and shifts in identity are subsequently slow and incremental, the case of Britain actually reveals a range of discontinuities in its nationhood over the historical events.
Acknowledgements

I would like to take the opportunity to acknowledge the invaluable help of my supervisors. Dr. David Bailey, Professor Peter Preston and Professor Thomas Diez all provided me with prompt feedback, incisive suggestions and important advice which very much helped with the vision, production and completion of this project. It would be difficult to find three academics that could have provided any more momentum. I would also like to thank Dr. Hans Joachim Knopf who made extremely useful comments about an earlier draft.

To my wife, I thank her for her support and encouragement. Having been there since the inception of the doctoral process, she too has been part of this long, arduous and frequently uncertain journey.

Finally, I am indebted to my parents for their love, support and companionship. Thank you to both of you.
Chapter 1: Theoretical and Methodological Framework

1.1 The Problems of Defining National Identity

1.2 Working towards a Definition: Identity in International Relations

1.3 The First Layer: Discourse Analysis

1.4 The Second Layer: Self/Other Analysis

1.5 Methodology

1.6 Defining the Concept of National Identity

Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature on British National Identity

2.1 British National Identity

2.2 Constructivist Approaches

2.2.1 Introduction

2.2.2 Critical Approaches

2.2.3 Discursive Approaches

2.2.4 Gendered Approaches

2.3 War and Empire

2.3.1 Introduction

2.3.2 Why Discourse Analysis?

2.4 Geography and Landscape

2.4.1 Introduction

2.4.2 Friendly, Non-radical and Radical Others

2.5 Interpreting History

2.5.1 Introduction

2.5.2 Official Discourses and Textual Material

2.5.3 How to Look for Linking and Differentiation

Chapter 3: The European Communities Membership Referendum

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Historical Background

3.3 The Pro-Membership Debates

3.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Membership Debates

3.3.2 Presupposition within the Pro-Membership Debates

3.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Membership Debates

3.4 The Anti-Membership Debates

3.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Membership Debates

List of Figures, Tables and Appendices

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

Background

Britain, Europe and Identity

Thesis Aims

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Summary

Organisation

Conclusion

Methodological Steps

Articulation

Methodological Steps

Defining the Concept of National Identity

Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature on British National Identity

2.1 British National Identity

2.1.1 Introduction

2.1.2 Interpreting History

2.1.3 War and Empire

2.1.4 Geography and Landscape

2.1.5 The Break-up of Britain?

2.1.6 Conclusion

Chapter 3: The European Communities Membership Referendum

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Historical Background

3.3 The Pro-Membership Debates

3.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Membership Debates

3.3.2 Presupposition within the Pro-Membership Debates

3.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Membership Debates

3.4 The Anti-Membership Debates

3.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Membership Debates
3.4.2 Presupposition within the Anti-Membership Debates .................................................. 149
3.4.3 Subject Positioning within the Anti-Membership Debates ........................................ 151

3.5 Self/Other and National Identities .............................................................................. 153
3.5.1 National Identity and Friendly Othering ................................................................. 156
3.5.2 National Identity and Non-radical Othering ............................................................ 158
3.5.3 National Identity and Radical Othering ................................................................. 160

3.6 The Production of British National Identities ............................................................... 165

Chapter 4: The Maastricht Treaty ..................................................................................... 173
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 173
4.2 Historical Background .................................................................................................. 175
4.3 The Pro-Maastricht Debates ....................................................................................... 185
4.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Maastricht Debates ....................................................... 186
4.3.2 Presupposition within the Pro-Maastricht Debates ................................................ 196
4.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Maastricht Debates .......................................... 197
4.4 The Anti-Maastricht Debates ...................................................................................... 201
4.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Maastricht Debates ...................................................... 201
4.4.2 Presupposition within the Anti-Maastricht Debates .............................................. 211
4.4.3 Subject Positioning within the Anti-Maastricht Debates ........................................ 213
4.5 Self/Other and National Identities .............................................................................. 215
4.5.1 National Identity and Friendly Othering ................................................................. 219
4.5.2 National Identity and Non-radical Othering ........................................................... 221
4.5.3 National Identity and Radical Othering ................................................................. 223

4.6 The Production of British National Identities ............................................................... 226

Chapter 5: The Treaty of Lisbon ....................................................................................... 232
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 232
5.2 Historical Background .................................................................................................. 234
5.3 The Pro-Lisbon Debates ............................................................................................. 245
5.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Lisbon Debates ............................................................. 246
5.3.2 Presupposition within the Pro-Lisbon Debates ...................................................... 257
5.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Lisbon Debates .............................................. 258
5.4 The Anti-Lisbon Debates ............................................................................................ 261
5.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Lisbon Debates .......................................................... 262
5.4.2 Presupposition within the Anti-Lisbon Debates .................................................... 271
5.4.3 Subject Positioning within the Anti-Lisbon Debates ............................................ 272
5.5 Self/Other and National Identities .............................................................................. 273
5.5.1 National Identity and Friendly Othering ................................................................. 276
5.5.2 National Identity and Non-radical Othering ........................................................... 279
5.5.3 National Identity and Radical Othering ................................................................. 280

5.6 The Production of British National Identities ............................................................... 283

Chapter 6: Accounting for Change – The Evolution of National Identities ... 290
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 290
6.2 Identifying Images of Nationhood ............................................................................. 294
6.2.1 Continuity ................................................................................................................... 294

Globalism, Globalisation and Britain as a Global Actor ............................................... 294
A Britain of Values ............................................................................................................ 299
6.2.2 Discontinuity ............................................................................................................. 303
Temporal and Conceptual Othering .............................................................................. 303
The Changing Nature of Sovereignty and the Nation-State ........................................... 307
The Role and Status of Actors ......................................................................................... 310
List of Figures

Figure 1: Research Design ............................................................................................................ 16
Figure 2: Othering and the Self..................................................................................................... 62
Figure 3: Articulation of Representations ..................................................................................... 76
Figure 4: British National Identities in the Debates over Membership of the EEC .............. 167
Figure 5: British National Identities in the Debates over the Maastricht Treaty ................. 227
Figure 6: British National Identities in the Debates over the Lisbon Treaty ...................... 284
Figure 7: The Production of British National Identities: a Comparison ................................. 292

List of Tables

Table 1: Friendly, Non-radical and Radical Others ................................................................. 64
Table 2: Predication and Processes within the Pro-Membership Debates .............................. 134
Table 3: Predication and Processes within the Anti-Membership Debates ........................... 148
Table 4: Self and Other within the Pro and Anti-Membership Debates ............................... 155
Table 5: Predication and Processes within the Pro-Maastricht Debates ............................... 195
Table 6: Predication and Processes within the Anti-Maastricht Debates ............................. 210
Table 7: Self and Other within the Pro and Anti-Maastricht Debates .................................. 218
Table 8: Predication and Processes within the Pro-Lisbon Debates .................................... 256
Table 9: Predication and Processes within the Anti-Lisbon Debates ................................... 270
Table 10: Self and Other within the Pro and Anti-Lisbon Debates ..................................... 275
Table 11: Identifying Images of Nationhood ............................................................................. 293

List of Appendices

Appendix 1 .................................................................................................................................. 320
Appendix 2 .................................................................................................................................. 322
Appendix 3 .................................................................................................................................. 323
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>European Exchange Rate Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILP</td>
<td>Independent Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Background

We joined a living, growing body, capable of change, indeed, crying out for it. The half-hearted involvement of one of its most powerful members and the constant impression that we are only in it on the narrow accountancy basis of a grocer’s shop has cut off most attempts at change before they even started.¹

There are those who imagine that the EC is a sort of Western European fraternal gathering, but it is not like that. It is a number of nation states that argue together so that they can obtain the best possible advantage … The EEC is not a fraternal body of harmony and light in Western Europe.²

Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality.³

With the Labour Party I realised quickly that you couldn't simply do a spray job. If you repaint an old car, it's still going to be an old car. Instead you have to re-engineer the model, reconstruct it, rethink whether that model is what the public wants and whether they would feel comfortable driving it. In a sense, we've got to do the same for Europe.⁴

The European Union has become “an irreversible movement of history”⁵ and since its inception has created a virtually uninterrupted frenzy of political and public discussion regarding its causes, character and role. The case of Britain provides no exception to this as post-war British history offers a wide array of contested ideas about how the European project has been perceived. The above quotes can barely do justice to a topic that has been so

---

widely discussed since its inception. Roy Jenkins decries the stagnation of an institution whose British members obfuscate the real possibility of achieving change within the Union by allowing themselves to dither over an ‘in or out’ obsession. The emphasis on change echoes the idea that Europe must evolve on the basis of new challenges rather than stay fixed within the framework set by its original architects. Bob Cryer mocks the communal vision of the integration enterprise and constructs Britain’s relationship as that of a zero-sum game: territorial states jostling for a position of economic dominance whereby any power that goes to Brussels is a simultaneous loss to London. Margaret Thatcher, in her much talked about speech in Bruges, affirms that no such European identity exists because if it did, it would have to be imposed by a supranational behemoth. As for those with an idealistic image of Europe, “[u]topia never comes, because we know we should not like it if it did.” Peter Mandelson, much like Roy Jenkins, highlights the transitional and developmental nature of the EU by drawing attention to the need for reinvention; that the original purpose of the EU was to safeguard against war and to promote peace, and that its purpose must now be reformulated to achieve further substantive goals.

These multiple positions are just a small example of how British political elites have constructed Europe. Several have formulated the entity as a threat to British interests, as an attack on national sovereignty, and as an attempt to supplant Britishness with a continentally oriented, foreign-imposed identity. Such reluctance to embrace the European project, it has been argued, stems from a variety of attitudes including British exceptionalism – its specific and almost exclusive geographical position, language, history and national myths – as well as the fear of economic calamity were Britain to gain ever closer ties with mainland Europe. It has also been claimed that such a position originates from Britain being an initial outsider and

then trying to shape what it had previously spurned; influence occurring “from the sidelines rather than in ‘the heart of Europe’”. In contrast, alternative political elites have recognised the economic importance of the Union and have championed the institution for projecting a vision far beyond the narrow self-serving interests of nation-states. Europe has absorbed many different identities as states have attempted to shape it to reflect and embody their own concerns and images. It has functioned as a space where ideas are projected; where no single interpretation of what Europe is rules, but Britain, in order to have an influence on the direction Europe takes, must be part of that process. Hence, the aim of my thesis is to reveal how different perceptions of Europe are played out and the effect that this has had on British national identity.

*Britain, Europe and Identity*

It is a common argument that the nation-state is still the most germane form of collective identity despite its long-heralded demise. National identity – be it defined as a commonality of laws, national myths, culture, memories and/or psychological we-feeling – is what, in essence, holds a nation together. Identity is important because it is the ‘sense of self’ that enables a country to define its interests, and therefore its political outcomes, in a particular way. Who we are still largely defines and determines what we do. National identity, according to the constructivist position, is not exogenous to the political system but is constructed via processes of social interaction. As identity is constructed and reconstructed, it is important to highlight its ever-changing composition and nature rather than assume it to be fixed. This process of change and fluidity is revealed in my research by an analysis of the various perceptions British political elites have had of Europe. That is, the identities I am

---

seeking to uncover are British political spokespeople’s understandings of national identity. A focus on Britain is relevant because, as a major economic power within Europe, it has had considerable influence on the integration process and is frequently seen as being one of the primary shapers of Europe. A study of how British identity gets constructed vis-à-vis Europe is apt precisely because no governing consensus of what Europe is dominates. An analysis of political discourses can reveal how such positions are constructed and reconstructed, how some dominate, and how these perceptions have forged British identity.

However, is it right to talk about British identity, as if Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales do not have their own ideas of who they are? How can these regional discourses be reduced into a national amalgam? For the purpose of this study, a focus on identifying British discourses rather than regional ones is for two main reasons. Firstly, despite the Council of Europe charter in 1985 highlighting the necessity within a democracy for a level of local government and autonomy, and despite the creation of devolved institutions within which attitudes to Europe vary from region to region, my intention is to examine the overall debate. Welsh, Scottish and English discourses on Europe may contain overlapping similarities as well as marked differences but the focus on Britain aims not to ignore these disparities, but to provide a comprehensive picture of how national identity, rather than regional identity, becomes destabilised and reformulated. Secondly, although Celtic identities have had a feeling of duality, British as well as their own identity, the inherent complexity of what constitutes British identity makes any study that intends to disconnect these components increasingly complex. To highlight an English discourse, over a Welsh or Scottish one, is fraught with difficulty precisely because they are so embedded within one another.

---

Subsequently, this dissertation takes British identity, as reflected and produced by discourses on Britain, as the central focus.

**Thesis Aims**

The multitude of positions about what Europe is reveals that no single idea dominates. There is no Europe; there are instead many different perceptions of Europe, or many Europes, each being discursively constructed to try to achieve a position of dominance. These might include, for example, cultural, historical and/or economic readings of Europe as well as the political formulation of “EU-ropes” associated with the organisation, processes and institutions of integration. However, although much of the literature is keen to identify the effect Europe has had in defining a certain kind of Britain, the result has frequently been characterised by a rigid conformity. The traditional or much-lauded view of Britain’s approach to Europe has been one enshrined in phobia, scepticism and grudging partnership. Britain’s position has frequently been characterised by “missed opportunities”, an “awkward partner”, suffering from “semi-detachment” and “reluctance”. Although these manifestations must also be considered when providing a wide spectrum of British elite attitudes to Europe, this dissertation attempts to offer a deeper reading of how the debates over Europe are both more multitudinous than some of the literature suggests and are identity driven. That is, the debates are in fact struggles over British national identity. As such, a number of important questions frame this project. How have British political elites

---

constructed and reconstructed discourses over the events? Why have some discourses become more dominant? What images were utilised when producing these discourses and why were these images employed and not others? What other voices were formulated and why weren’t they heard? From here, the central question of this study is how has British national identity been forged and constructed by these divergent competing visions? This project reveals the many different constructions of Europe and shows that attitudes of the British political elite towards it are numerous, contested and in a state of flux. It illustrates that Europe is not Britain’s sole Other, but that the attitudes of elites have encapsulated many different Others. These Others reveal the many competing ideas about what Europe is and show that such perceptions are each being played out amongst many. This process of Othering elucidates how Europe – being filled with actors and subsequently identities – has shaped British national identity. My research maps out the struggle of what Britain and Europe mean to one another to show how certain meanings of Europe – be they sceptical, ambivalent or friendly – have become dominant. It is only by considering these Others; be they other states, Europe as a whole, or historical events or myths; and the political discourses that reflect them and are reflected in them, that we can hope to gain a greater and more comprehensive understanding of Britain’s approach to Europe and in turn highlight how national identity is not monolithic and static but multiple and in motion.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This dissertation examines three critical events in post-war British history: the 1975 referendum on continued membership of the Common Market, the 1993 ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the 2009 enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. The events are linked by both temporality and discourse and are ‘critical’ in the sense that they are characterised by an
intensity in political and media activity and have thus produced a wealth of documentation, discussion and commentary. Although the theoretical and methodological explanation of this study is developed in detail in Chapter One, there are a number of characteristics of both discourse analysis and Self/Other relations that I will briefly outline. I focus on what political elites – heads of state, civil servants and government spokespeople – write and say because it is they who interpret events on the basis of the particular visions or ideas they have. This dissertation predisposes a discursive approach as a methodological tool for analysing these diverse perceptions. Hence, I am interested in how political actors write about, talk about, and construct their ideas about Europe and how these ideas become reflected in national identities. Firstly, as a broad definition, discourse “looks at patterns of language across texts and considers the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used.” Consequently, what political actors say and write can be formulated into a structure, that we are able to understand the patterns in this structure, and that these patterns, in turn, further influence what can and cannot be said or written about. Secondly, discourse focuses on linguistic and non-linguistic communication and not on the individual actors’ hidden motivations or secret agendas. Thus, methodologically, the nebulous process of uncovering the reasons and motivations as to why a politician might say the thing that he or she does is avoided. In short, we stay firmly within the realm of language and derive meaning from language alone. Thirdly, a discursive approach perceives language as a social phenomenon and meanings are therefore contingent on social and cultural context. There is no universal standard by which actors constitute political phenomenon – be it citizenship, institutions, identities or policies – because each of these concepts is created within a particular social setting. Finally, language and power are mutually constitutive. The

---

dominance of one particular discourse necessitates the subjugation of another or others. As such, this thesis also examines not merely when but how this process happens.

The Self/Other nexus is a pertinent framework for looking at how ideas about Europe are constructed and how national identity is produced. The national identity of the in-group only contains meaning when contrasted with other national identities of the out-group(s). Hence, the existence of Others, be they frictional or fraternal, affect and shape the identity of the Self. The constant reconfiguring and redefining of who the Others are reveals how identity becomes destabilised and reformulated. However, although Othering presumes a level of difference and therefore confrontation, this study does not seek to identify solely ‘Radical Others’, a process of binarisation that pits, for example, educated against ignorant, modern against traditional and Western against Third World.\textsuperscript{15} This, I believe, mistakenly groups relations solely in terms of conflict. Othering reveals the friends as well as foes, the similarities and not just differences. Instead, my analysis identifies the ever-changing Others and explains how British identity has been constituted via the roles these Others have played. The interconnectedness of states, particularly in a ‘postmodern polity’ like the EU, requires an understanding of how they engage with one another, how they perceive one another and how this, in turn, affects their ideas of Europe. Self/Other analysis is the approach adopted to reveal how this interrelatedness operates and how it can help us gain “a better understanding of who ‘the actors’ are, how they were constituted, how they maintain themselves, and under which preconditions they may thrive.”\textsuperscript{16}

Summary

To summarise, this project examines how British political figures, over three critical events in European Union history, have constructed Europe. The patterns implicit in the language they have utilised are discursively structured and elites are key players in determining which of these discourses become dominant. These discourses reveal a process of linking and differentiation between not merely a single Other (the object) and the Self (the subject), but various Others implying different gradations of threat or accord. This array of Others – defined as friendly, non-radical and radical – construct and shape the Self’s national identity.

The following figure, employed from Hansen, represents the research design for my study:

**Figure 1: Research Design**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Selves</th>
<th>Intertextual Models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single: Britain</td>
<td>Model 1: Official discourses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Construction of British National Identities

- Historical development from 1970 to 2009
- 3 events: related by discourse and time

**Organisation**

The organisation of this thesis is as follows. *Chapter One* provides the theoretical and

---

methodological framework of this study. The chapter begins with an overview of the
difficulties in defining the core outcome of this dissertation, national identity. Following this
is a critical engagement of other theoretical approaches that factor identity as an explanation
for state behaviour. The rationale for this is firstly to provide an argument for the increasingly
important role identity plays within International Relations and secondly to reveal how the
approach to identity I adopt differs from others. Second, the essential assumptions of
discourse analysis utilised for the empirical sections are outlined. Third, an overview of the
Self/Other nexus, the manner in which it is defined and the reason for its application are all
described. Fourth, I present the methodology which explains the importance and relevance of
both the historical events and the textual materials chosen. After that, an explanation is
provided to elucidate the method of identifying linking and differentiation, key factors in
revealing the process of Othering. The final section summarises the chapter by revealing the
definition of identity applied throughout this study.

Chapter Two is a review of the literature on British national identity. Although this study
focuses on the construction of British national identities as seen by statespeople, it is
pertinent to examine the broader conceptualisations of national identities. This is because in
order for political figures to successfully articulate a particular identity, it must in part be
attached at a more national level and needs to have salience to the wider public. This chapter,
therefore, highlights the major themes, images and processes that get picked up and utilised
as well as reformulated in the empirical sections. This chapter concludes with references to
how such thematic representations are pertinent to this study.

The third, fourth and fifth chapters are the empirical content. Each chapter covers a different
historical event. The organisation of each chapter follows the same pattern. First of all, a
historical overview leading up to the event is given. Despite the fact that this study is predicated on the notion that Europe is inherently contestable, this section serves as both an aide-mémoire and as a means of contextualising the discourses. Its purpose, therefore, is not to present a thickly descriptive account but to provide an understanding of some of the dominant themes and discussions using Europe as a prism. Secondly, the various discourses are presented, systematised and then analysed using a discourse analytic method. This reveals the many differently contested meanings that Europe possesses within the debates. The grouped themes and readings of Europe and other actors are summarised in Tables 2 and 3, 5 and 6, and 8 and 9. From here, these findings are employed to expose the various processes of Othering. Again, these are diverse and, as such, are arranged in a systematic way and presented in Tables 5, 7 and 10. The final section of each empirical chapter argues how such practices have produced a range of Selves. These ‘images of nationhood’ are products of the various national identities attributed to Britain over the historical events. They are illustrated in Figures 4, 5 and 6 and followed by an explanation.

Chapter Six is the final empirical chapter and has two purposes. Firstly, it synthesises the results of the previous chapters by showing the chronological struggle over identity over the particular historical junctures. Secondly, by amalgamating the findings in the empirical chapters, it introduces a comparative element by examining the continuity and discontinuity over the discourses, identities and British Selves. This study concludes with a recapitulation of the findings as a summary of the whole project and presents possible applications and future areas of research.
Conclusion

To conclude, this dissertation seeks to make an original contribution to the field of International Relations in three ways. Firstly, it applies a novel discursive approach to map out a range of British national identities which use Europe as their focus. Starting with a simplified pro- versus anti-dichotomy, this is dissolved to produce a range of British Selves up to now frequently unexamined in the literature. Secondly, the Self/Other nexus is employed with an eye to extracting national identities. In contrast to much of the existing research, I introduce and highlight the neglected role of non-radical and friendly Othering. Consequently, the aim of this study is not merely to identify differences and the roles that they have had on shaping British national identity, but also to locate the different levels of difference hitherto ignored. Finally, the three events studied are linked temporally and discursively and subsequently allow a deeper reading of the evolution of British national identities. Hence, although a synchronic study in which phenomena are examined at a particular historical time, this dissertation entertains a comparative element that enables the identities to be analysed systematically over the episodes. The results impact considerably on contemporary attempts to cultivate a British national identity.
CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 The Problems of Defining National Identity

Even before any attempt to unravel how British national identity has been constructed, an early difficulty centres on labelling. A number of terms – such as nation, state, nation-state and nationalism – are important to differentiate in terms of the role they play in constituting national identity. Nationalism is important because it animates and brings nations into being. It is “an ideology that places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote its well-being.”¹⁸ Nation and state are important because they have been treated so synonymously as to produce the all-pervading label ‘nation-state’ to describe the territorial and sovereign units common to the international system. Consequently, the nation is significant both because of its ubiquity and because its characteristics embody an identity specific to it: an identity that is national in scope, rather than personal or private. However, despite the plethora of literature on the topic, the task of defining national identity is a bewildering task due to both confusing assumptions and unclear explanations. Such expressions, Connor argues, are “shrouded in ambiguity due to their imprecise, inconsistent, and often entirely erroneous usage.”¹⁹ He goes on to identify the many terms that reveal how an allegiance to the nation is regularly conflated with an allegiance to the state including ethnicity, primordialism, pluralism, tribalism, regionalism, communalism, parochialism, and subnationalism. This confusion has caused governments and scholars to misunderstand and underestimate the power of non-state loyalties and has subsequently limited any attempt to explain them. Hence, one can argue that the tendency to blindly equate the state with the

nation, instead of accepting that many states are comprised of more than one nation, is one of the first and most obvious errors when formulating ideas of allegiance to a bounded entity and therefore national identity.  

A second and related problem is definitional. What and when is a nation? With reference to just three exemplary scholars amongst many, the challenges of how to classify the nation can be underscored. Benedict Anderson famously configured the nation as imagined because the members will never know most other individuals. It is limited because the nation was produced from a time when the Enlightenment and Revolution were tearing down religious dynasties. It is also imagined as a community because it is conceived in terms of fellowship despite any inequalities that may exist. Whereas Anderson highlights the imagining of the nation as fuelled by “print-capitalism” which gave fixity to language and created a cultural awareness between speakers of the same language, Ernest Gellner posits both cultural and voluntaristic definitions that are merely provisional:

Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating. ... Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognise each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities.

Furthermore, pre-modern political units, being small, did not require shared linguistic and cultural communication as social roles were totalising but the eventual wearing away of these strict positions made a shared culture more important. Gellner’s approach to nationalism,

---

20 In fact, Connor posits that in a survey of the 132 entities considered as states in 1971, only 12 states (9.1%) can justly be described as nation-states. Ibid., p. 382.
22 Ibid., pp. 44-6.
like Anderson’s, is modernist. That is, “population explosion, rapid urbanisation, labour
migration, and also the economic and political penetration of previously more or less inward-
turned communities”\(^{25}\) all forged new cultural boundaries and, as a consequence, nations are
products of late eighteenth century industrialism. In contrast to this position is one that
highlights the importance of pre-existing traditions. Anthony Smith, in a celebrated debate
with Gellner, outlined that a commitment to modernism overlooks “the persistence of ethnic
ties and cultural elements in many parts of the world, and their continuing significance for
large numbers of people.”\(^{26}\) Termed ‘ethno-symbolism’, the nation is consequently “a named
population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public
culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members”.\(^{27}\) Pre-
modern epochs contain looser cultural units called *ethnies*, which are defined as “named units
of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared
culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among
their elites.”\(^ {28}\) As a result, Smith’s approach posits that nations, although modern, owe much
of their present structure to pre-existing ethnic bonds which stemmed from earlier *ethnies*.\(^ {29}\)
This cursory overview reveals how the debate over how to define the nation is governed by a
temporal binary: is the nation a modern, invented and essentially elite-authored construct or is
it primordial with ethnic, cultural and historical linkages to the pre-national cultural unit?

A third complication arises when viewing a nation’s identity through the lens of a composite
of nationally specific features. Language, territory, geography, history and culture, for
example, have all been frequently postulated components of national identity. To begin with,

\(^ {26}\) Smith, A. D. (1995) *The Warwick Debate*. Available at: [http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/gellner/](http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/gellner/).
\(^ {27}\) [Accessed 8 Feb. 2012].
\(^ {29}\) Ibid., p. 57.
a common language is no guarantee of unity. British people may speak English or Welsh, Canadians may talk in English or French, and Swiss might converse in German, French, Italian or Romansch.\footnote{Deutsch, K. W. (1966) Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 2nd edition, Cambridge (Mass.): M.I.T. Press, p. 18.} This point is echoed by Rustow\footnote{Rustow, D. A. (1967) A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp. 47-51.} who argues that the size of linguistic communities differs to such an extent that some groups are large enough to traverse several national boundaries. For example, the Hausas live in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Dahomey (Benin) and Togo. He goes on to provide several other reasons as to why language offers no persuasive benchmark for nationality. To begin with, language is not fixed but mediates between shaping politics and being shaped by politics. To say that language defines the political outcomes of a group readily ignores how outcomes are both reflected in and reflect language. In addition, the demise of empires and the subsequent emergence of nations have produced a change in thoughts towards diversity: “[w]here the older nation-states of Europe were to find in ethnic loyalty and linguistic unity their stablest foundation, dynastic and colonial empires sought their security in diversity and mixture.”\footnote{Ibid. p. 49.} The permeability of language and the way it traverses borders, undermining attempts to define a group linguistically, has also been addressed by Kedourie. Upon a Hungarian statesman enquiring about the number of Poles in the disputed district of Teschen over which both Czechoslovakia and Poland laid claim, a Czech politician remarked to him that “the figures change. The people of certain villages are changing their nationality every week, according to their economic interests and sometimes the economic interests of the mayor of the village.”\footnote{Kedourie, E. (1960) Nationalism, London: Hutchinson, p. 124.}

The issues of territory and geography pose another set of problems in identifying the nation. Territory, far from being historically immutable, has contained ever-shifting borders. The
transitory nature of divides has meant that “[r]egions easily fragment into localities, and localities may easily disintegrate into separate settlements.”34 Geographical features have also not exclusively helped define difference but have sometimes fostered sameness. For example, the French and Spanish are divided by the Pyrenees but the Alps helped formulate the Swiss into a nation and while geographical inaccessibility ensured Japanese distinctiveness, the same level of insularity did little to prevent the various invasions of Britain.35 Furthermore, Deutsch argues how feelings of nationality have often navigated across sovereign divides, in particular islands, which have bonded Crete to Greece, Sicily to Italy and Northern Ireland to Great Britain, despite their geographical separateness.36

Another much-cited characteristic of national identity is history – that a people’s shared experience provides the adhesive that bonds them together. Deutsch, however, argues that “[i]nstead of being automatically united by a shared history, men at least under some conditions cannot share the historical events through which they live, unless they are already in some sense united.”37 For something to be common presupposes a feeling of cohesiveness in knowing what can and cannot be shared. There is no guarantee in presuming that two people who share the same ravaging historical events might draw the same conclusions as to the events’ origins, causes or effects. The claim of objective history might, after all, be another’s ‘history’, replete with distortions or fabrications to justify ethnic, religious or national exceptionalism. Furthermore, the desire to identify with certain symbols and events has helped create a number of myths which defy historical refutation. Claims of a group asserting its ethnic homogeneity or its distinct ancestry may well provide a feeling of

37 Ibid.
distinctiveness but “what ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is.”

By incorporating history into identity we are not left with an objective attempt to understand which events have patterned and constituted a nation’s identity. Instead, we are faced with a nationalist tug-of-war – an arena dominated by jostling national interests – all parties trying to monopolise certain historical events and use them to embellish or individualise their own pasts.

The obscurity in defining national identity can be summed up by exposing the inadequacy of offering a composite or static approach. To believe that people belong to a “solid, unchanging, intrinsic collective unit” does not adequately explain “why the social actors involved act in a certain way and how such political and military conflicts could arise.”

Similarly, an understanding of national identity as inert does little to reveal the differences between an identification with the nation and an identification with other political or social units. Smith, for example, identifies the difference between ‘objective’ factors that define the nation, such as language, territory and customs, and ‘subjective’ factors, such as attitudes, perceptions and sentiments. However, he asserts that the objective factors exclude many accepted nations and the subjective factors include too wide a number of cases which makes it difficult to distinguish between nations and regions, tribes, city-states and empires. Any one of these components, if altered in anyway, might not automatically result in a change or a loss of identity. For example, “the Irish and the Scots could lose their language without losing their conviction of a separate national identity. Similarly, Jews can sever their affiliation with

---

38 Connor, W. (1978) ‘A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group ….’, p. 380.
40 Ibid.
Judaism, while remaining very consciously tied to the Jewish nation.”

Due to the inherently transitory and indefinable nature of such aspects as language, territory, geography, history, culture and emotions, we are left with the salutary warning that “[a]t best the idea of the nation has appeared sketchy and elusive, at worst absurd and contradictory.”

1.2 Working towards a Definition: Identity in International Relations

In order to illuminate how national identity has been formulated and reformulated due to various perceptions of Europe, it seems pertinent to provide an overview of the approaches that also factor identity. The wealth of literature on the topic supports the argument that what was once regarded as epiphenomenal is now a leading feature in many post-positivist and constructivist approaches. As the centre of gravity of this dissertation is rooted primarily in the field of International Relations, I focus specifically on this literature. The purpose of this section is two-fold. Firstly, a description of approaches that treat identity as endogenous helps situate this research within an academic context. That is, its location within international relations theory can perhaps best be argued via a broader examination of the various approaches with which it sympathises and from which it differs. Secondly, the theoretical foundations of this dissertation are based on particular assumptions that are influenced and shaped by a range of perspectives. Again, a critical engagement with some of these helps to clarify the theoretical assumptions of this dissertation and establishes in the conclusion to this chapter the definition of identity I employ. The following section examines constructivist, critical, discursive and gendered approaches. Each perspective is explored and each section concludes with an explanation of the relevance of these approaches for this research project.

42 Connor, W. (1978) ‘A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group ….’, p. 389.
Social constructivism, commonly labelled constructivism, takes its animus from dissatisfaction with existing neorealist and neoliberal thinking. Neorealism takes an ontological position of a unified state, neoclassical microeconomic theory that has been imported into its framework and rationalist postulations. The character of the state offers little explanation of behaviour, neorealists argue, because states are unitary actors. “[C]ulture and identity”, therefore, “are, at best, derivative of the distribution of capabilities that have no independent explanatory power.”

Liberal intergovernmentalism is the leading neoliberal theory of European integration. Its foremost scholar, Andrew Moravscik, argues that the European Community has developed through “a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains” between domestic interest groups and the relative power of these groups defines which outcomes are produced. Being a neoliberal theory, it has greater faith in institutions than its realist counterparts but still perceives states as being the main actors, that interest groups define their interests rationally, and that a positivist ontological position of self-interested actors attempting to realise their goals leads to interests being largely (although not exclusively) economic and material. Constructivism, in contrast, makes a number of alternative claims. Hopf identifies several of these. The first concerns the constitution of structure and agency. Hay defines this as “the relationship between the political actors we identify (having decided upon our specification of the sphere of the political) and the


environment in which they find themselves.” 48 Constructivism argues that structure and actor are mutually constituted. Although material constraints do exist, what is important from the constructivist perspective is “how an action does or does not reproduce both the actor and the structure.” 49 Secondly, anarchy operates as an imagined community. It is imagined because it is constituted via the communities own intersubjective understandings and practices and, as such, has multiple meanings. 50 Thirdly, identities are an inextricable feature of constructivism because they contribute to defining the interests of political actors. This occurs because of what constructivists call constitutive rules rather than regulative rules. These are rules that “define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organised social activity – that is to say, they specify what counts as that activity.” 51 Hence, social norms not only regulate actors’ conduct, but they also constitute the identity of the actors involved. 52 In addition, identities help define what actors’ interests are. For example, Checkel argues that social learning – argumentative persuasion which is a social act rather than manipulative persuasion which lacks any form of interaction – involves changing actors’ attitudes through argument and debate. 53 Identities, therefore, not only determine particular outcomes but are also susceptible to change through socialisation.

Hopf outlines the functions that identities perform in a society: “they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are.” 54 However, what is also important is how “the

50 Ibid., p. 174.
producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others.”\(^{55}\) The way state X acts towards state Y is formulated not merely through materialistic notions of the balance of power and the distribution of capabilities, but the perceptions X has of Y as formulated via long-running and complex social, cultural and historical processes. Constructivism, therefore, takes it that “[i]dentities are the basis of interests”,\(^ {56}\) and subsequently views the representations of identities as constructed, multiple and contextually contingent. This alternative is in stark contrast to the neorealist position that postulates that units possess only one meaningful identity, that of self-interested states.\(^ {57}\) The constructivist perspective helps reveal a whole gamut of attributes that can be imbued by one actor onto another:

> It might be endowed with leadership; it might be aggressive and hostile or peaceful and non-threatening; it might be potentially but not actually dangerous; it might be weak, strong or simply annoying.\(^ {58}\)

Perhaps an early source of confusion investigating a critical reading of literature that privileges identity, however, is the lack of consensus regarding how the various constructivisms can be grouped. For example, Adler mentions that constructivism occupies a middle ground between rationalists and interpretivists.\(^ {59}\) Hopf makes clear the distinction between various constructivisms and argues that “conventional constructivism, is a collection of principles distilled from critical social theory but without the latter’s more consistent theoretical or epistemological follow-through.”\(^ {60}\) Guzzini cautions that constructivism “does not succumb to the sirens of poststructuralism, which critics have turned into a radical idealist

\(^{55}\) Ibid.


position, increasingly emptied of any intelligible meaning.”61 Constructivist research has also
been placed along a rationalist/reflectivist axis with widely diverging results.62 However,
Risse helps clarify the confusion by identifying a number of misleading assumptions relating
to constructivism.63 Firstly, its claims are not exclusively wedded to a post-positivist
epistemology even though some radical positions do question an objective reality. Secondly,
as an approach influenced by more general theorising on international relations,
constructivism offers no substantive theory and subsequently its scholars may join a number
of different readings of European integration. The crucial point, as he goes on to mention, is
that constructivists believe that “[t]he social environment in which we find ourselves, defines
(‘constitutes’) who we are, our identities as social beings.”64 Subsequently, identity is viewed
as a social phenomenon, configured via culturally and historically specific social
environments. Therefore, what can be broadly agreed upon is the fact that the myriad of
approaches that fit under the umbrella term of social constructivism has sought to place issues
of identity at the core of an understanding of European politics. In relation to this study,
British elite perceptions of Self are very much constituted via what Wendt labels “signaling,
interpreting, and responding”.:65 As I take it that the formulation of the Self is grounded in
both antagonistic and non-antagonistic relationships, and are stable enough to be constituted
and analysed, the relationships between Self and Other are based on intersubjective
understandings. These are what Wendt calls “reciprocal typifications.”66 They come about via

---

Relations, vol. 6 (2), pp. 147-182 (at 148).
Public Policy, 6:4, pp. 528-544 (at 542-3).
Theory, p. 159-160.
64 Ibid., p. 161.
66 Ibid.
lengthy interaction that rewards and discourages actors holding certain ideas about each other.  

Where this study does differ, however, is in regard to its explanative focus on discourse. Despite all branches of constructivism acknowledging that identities in some way matter, the field of conventional constructivism has sought to avoid any liaison or linkage with its interpretivist counterparts. For example, Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein stress that “we part company with those scholars who have pointed the way to a more sociological approach, but who insist on the need for a special interpretive methodology”. Also, conventional constructivism, according to Hopf, entails treating identities as causes of behaviour and has little recourse to consider the role theorists have in participating and subsequently affecting the social world they seek to observe. As my approach seeks to examine identity formulation through a more critical rather than conventional constructivist approach, I deal with a critique of conventional accounts first.

An initial observation of the conventional constructivist position is that despite highlighting the significance of identity, there are few attempts to go beyond the rather cursory proclamation that it is a social act whose formulation occurs due to cognitive processes. Risse-Kappen notes research “has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside” and the same argument can be applied to the role of identities. Such a lacuna occurs because despite

---

67 Ibid.
accepting that states acquire identities via their interaction with other states, the branch of liberal constructivism has questioned whether identities need to come into being via difference. In short, identity is still given rather than born and this makes an investigation into why certain identities rise or fall difficult. Wendt, for example, argues that pre-social or corporate identities preclude the dichotomy between Self and Other because differentiation

… becomes trivial if it leads to a totalizing holism in which everything is internally related to everything else. If a constitutive process is self-organizing then there is no particular Other to which the Self is related. Having a body means you are different than someone else’s body, but that does not mean that his body constitutes yours in any interesting way.

Firstly, Rumelili argues that the perpetual drawing of boundaries – even if the Other is not complicit in this – negates the idea of a collective being self-organizing. Even though the Spanish existed independently of and had an identity autonomous of the Aztecs, Spain’s corporate identity became reconfigured upon first contact in order to construct the Aztecs as inferior and subsequently ripe for colonisation. Secondly, the process of ingroup identity construction, even if not formulated from the existence of an outside Other, can still be created via ingroup Othering. Certain characteristics or attributes can be revered, producing inequalities and patterns of dominance and subjugation, all under the pretext of preserving the survival of the ingroup. Consequently, attributes that do not comply are othered – treated as weaker, denigrated and/or marginalised. One such notable example of the universal ingroup Other, traversing all cultures and time, is ‘women’, whereby masculine dominant discourses have constructed women as voiceless, inferior and relegated to the private sphere. Thirdly, the somewhat formulaic image of a pre-social identity is that of the primitive jungle-dwelling

---

74 Ibid.
tribe, insulated from the outside by their remoteness and formidable habitat and untouched by foreign contact. However, the environment, weather conditions, natural dangers or even deities or certain animals might still be regarded as the Other. Language, clothes, the type of shelters built, hunter-gathering practices and protocols, and human relations within the group all reflect and create a specific identity to ensure survival in the surroundings in which the group finds itself, and this inherent desire to adapt and triumph over the hardships might be synonymous with the conquest of the Other. Finally, one might posit the existence of the ‘imagined Other’ and how identity might not need to be constructed via the demonisation of ‘real’ threats or groups: “[L]ong-standing historical notions of identity are not rendered irrelevant for all the arguments that they may be ‘mythical’ or ‘imagined’. Imagined essences of identity are potent social forces, and appeals to them have been very dangerous.”

Taylor goes on to mention how the ‘imagined Other’ threatens the unity and intransigence of the Self and can produce, in its most fervent incarnation, acts such as “ethnic cleansing”. From the perspective of my own study, therefore, identity does not merely come into being and cannot be configured independently of other identities – irrespective of whether they are personal, national or transnational identities. Consequently, I argue that the notion of identities existing as “constitutionally exogenous to Otherness” is flawed for three main reasons. Firstly, the concept seeks to define identity within the structure of the international system and consequently analyses identities only in so far as they relate to ‘state’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘anarchy’. This ignores the fundamental issue that the nature of the international system, though possibly constraining to actor behaviour, does not give a state a particular identity.

78 Ibid., p. 346.
cannot explain historical changes and therefore cannot elucidate why identities change.\textsuperscript{81}

Secondly and relatedly, a concentration on systemic theory offers little advice as to “how each state, nation or other ‘unit’ has to create its own terms or rationales, its identity and foreign policy”.\textsuperscript{82} Conventional constructivism, as already mentioned, cites identity as a fundamental cause of action yet even if one accepts a positivistic connection between cause and effect, one needs to know what an identity is before one can explicate what it can do. A case by case approach, rather than a broader set of generalisations about the international system, can help explain what an identity is. Finally, the existence of pre-social identities implies a level of stability that is less methodologically equipped with analysing change. Subsequently, the view of identity being reformulated via co-determinism between actors takes as its starting point a particular fixed concept of identity. Again, this fixity ignores the contestations and processes that cause one identity to become another.

By way of addressing some of these issues, other scholars within the conventional constructivist vein have focused on nation-state identities in particular situations. Katzenstein, for example, introduces a number of essays that seek to redress the shortcomings of a systemic approach.\textsuperscript{83} Robert Herman argues that Soviet reform occurred not via the realist prism of material capabilities but through the efforts of a liberal specialist group that helped replace Marxist-Leninist ideology with a pro-Western vision.\textsuperscript{84} Thomas Berger reveals the reformulation of German and Japanese identities in the wake of the Second World War and argues how the subordinate military roles these countries have had in the post-war era are


attributed to the construction of ‘trading state’ identities in opposition to their previously militaristic ones. Risse-Kappen analyses the evolution of NATO through the Suez and Cuban missile crises and explains that the persistence of NATO has occurred via its transnational linkages of domestic polities to the foreign policies of states. Two issues can be pointed out about the articles in this volume. Firstly, several of the essays seek to establish identity as a causal factor and this can only be achieved if things are held constant: A causes B, B causes C, and so on. Similarly, in relation to Berger’s essay, Hopf points out that “[s]uch a claim requires the presumed nonexistence of relevant unobservables, as well as the assumption that the practices, institutions, norms, and power relations that underlay the presumption of those identities are somehow fixed or constant.” Secondly, Wæver claims that states with very similar cultural and historical backgrounds might maintain very different foreign policies. Once again, what conventional approaches lack is an investigation into the processes that have enabled identities to come into being. This requires a consideration of the alternative constructions of identity that founded and a more ‘critical’ approach to constructivism would seek to answer this fundamental question.

To summarise, one might conclude this overview of constructivism by recapitulating its relevance for this study. Three points can be considered. Firstly, British political elite readings of Europe are, in effect, struggles over identity. Identities are the basis of interests rather than the more rationalist assumption that treats self-interest as an unquestionable pre-given. Again, much constructivist literature on Europe supports the argument that integration

---

is not solely an exercise in the pursuit of economic and material interests. For example, an emphasis on economic influences can be questioned by looking at the German and French examples. French politicians, to assuage the power of Germany, should actually prefer a federalist version of the EU while Germany, in an attempt to extricate itself from the constrictive effects of integration, should pursue a ‘Europe of nation states’. Secondly, Risse et al., in their study of British, French and German policies and attitudes towards the Euro, contend that actors’ perceptions of interests are “deeply controlled by their visions of European political order.” Thirdly, within the British debates, incidents such as Margaret Thatcher’s support for a single market but hostility towards greater integration stem not merely from the desire to realise economic benefits but from “economic ideas which provide the framework in which economic interests are constructed.” The arguments against greater integration have included discourses based on economic self-interest, but they in turn have been produced from conceptual ideas about how countries have been constructed vis-à-vis Europe. Viewing economic interests in isolation is dangerous because “economies are always embedded in societies (thus they are not asocial technical machineries amenable to naturalistic analysis), and national economies have extensive linkages to trans-national global networks.” Thus, rather than perceiving the EU as a process ruled solely by economic forces, this dissertation argues that nation-state identities have been instrumental in determining how economic ideas are formulated and which economic ideas become prevalent.

92 Ibid., p. 147.
Additionally, I take it that Self and Other come into being via both difference and similarity. That is, pre-social identities do not exist as the Self only possesses identity in relation to the intersubjective understandings it formulates of Others. Again, for the purposes of how this position moulds this dissertation, the Self is taken to be British political elite interpretations of the events. The Others are a number of state-dominated actors that appear within the debates, such as France, Germany, the USA, etc., as well as other entities which include the EU, the Commonwealth and Central and Eastern Europe. I take it that British political elite perceptions of these actors reveal a range of British national identities.

Finally, this thesis, rather than causal in its explanations, takes a descriptive line in keeping with much constructivist research. By way of example, in relation to the smaller Nordic EU states, Hansen mentions that the constructivist approach the authors utilise confirms “that we ask and answer different types of question.”\textsuperscript{95} The Nordic study, instead of an attempt to explain the causes of integration as determined by the larger states of Britain, France and Germany, tries to identify “the most basic ‘codes’ which structure the way in which constructions of ‘Europe’ can be argued politically in a given country.”\textsuperscript{96} Again, I take it that these codes are symbolic of attempts by British political elites to impose a certain reading of Europe and it is these efforts this dissertation seeks to uncover.

\subsection*{1.2.2 Critical Approaches}

Critical perspectives, although once again suffering from little consensus on their categorisation, are arguably unified by their attempt to “seek to escape the intellectual

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p. 9.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
straitjacket of traditional political science by questioning assumptions about political systems and institutions, economistic rationalities and methodologies”.

I focus on the literature relating to critical theory because of its contributions in trying to produce a post nation-state configuration and an identity that is not founded upon traditional notions of territory. Subsequently, although it focuses more on the processes of “argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion … with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned consensus”, identity is an important part of the emancipatory attempt to transcend the restrictive notion of the Westphalian state and instead offer multi-perspectivity – that another Europe is possible.

Other such schools loosely labelled under the emblem ‘critical’ may also include Marxist and Gramscian perspectives. However, as I am confining the argument to a consideration of perspectives that factor identity in the functioning and formulation of the EU – rather than examining the EU from the position of class relations – I will focus first on the critical perspective of the Habermasian mould and then second in the deconstructive sense.

Jürgen Habermas has, for the past fifty years, been one of the staunchest advocates for a universalist and non-exclusionary antidote to nationalism. Although he has consistently argued that nation-state solidarity must be “widened to embrace all citizens of the Union”, he has also highlighted that this process is not inevitable and must occur by means of a learning process “stimulated via the development of tools for social integration – the clear

and obvious one being social policy.\textsuperscript{102} Hence, he makes three claims: first, the nation-state is not destined to be ever-lasting because it is a product of modern history; second, the forces of globalisation reveal that the modern state is susceptible to powers over which it has no control; and third, a new ‘cosmopolitan consciousness’ is the only alternative to the vagaries of modern society.\textsuperscript{103} One can argue that the burgeoning of NGOs within Europe\textsuperscript{104} supports the argument that the EU has greater sensitivity towards inclusivity and diversity and is heading towards a post-Westphalian conceptualisation of sovereignty in the Habermasian sense. However, a number of issues can be raised about this quest for a post-national polity. Firstly, Murphy asks the obvious but noteworthy question: “how realistic is it to talk about a future solidarity that is at present non-existent?”\textsuperscript{105} He cites how forms of solidarity are deeply embedded at national levels and national myths have no such European equivalent. In reaction to the demonstrations in Europe against the war in Iraq in 2003, Habermas and Derrida cited the protests as “a sign of the birth of a European public sphere.”\textsuperscript{106} Others argue that such a proclamation might be premature. In a review of Old Europe, New Europe and Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After Iraq, a collection of essays calling for Europe to act as a counterweight to American hegemony, Lloyd comments on the simplistic binarisation between a pro-European identity being envisaged solely through anti-Americanism, the equally naive assumption that the only two choices for Europe are to unite or perish and the observation that national identities should somehow be treated as

\textsuperscript{104} See, for example, the Commission discussion paper presented by President Prodi and Vice-President Kinnock titled ‘The Commission and Non-Governmental Organisations: Building a Stronger Partnership’ (18 Jan 2000). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/ngo/docs/communication_en.pdf. [Accessed 20 April 2009].
“illusionary”. Lloyd concludes: “[u]s Europeans cannot exploit a caricature of the new world to solve the problems of the old: for America is not responsible for the real issues which face us. The fault, that we are underlings, lies not with the US, but with ourselves.”

Subsequently, while not denying the role of compromise and consensus within the EU and its institutions that try to reconcile the divergent and competing viewpoints of the myriad of political actors, I argue that such positions have been formulated by the particular views these actors have of other actors. It is quite correct to assume that states bring their own particular visions to the debating table and attempt to promulgate their ideas and shape the various institutions according to these ideas. However, it is of greater salience to understand not merely how these contestations are played out in an attempt to achieve harmonisation or compromise, but how these visions have come about due to the perceptions the actors have of Others. Therefore, I argue that the communicative approach neglects to consider how the process of argumentation is actually a forum for contested identities to be played out, all having been constructed via their perceived relationship to one another.

Deconstructivism, by contrast, posits a range of alternative interrogative techniques for revealing or deconstructing the implicit binary oppositions that permeate the political landscape. Hay notes that Western/modern thought is structured and dependent on a never-ending series of stratified dualisms which repress and marginalise others. Deconstructivist approaches deal with a wide range of phenomena. First, Derrida’s analysis of Europe, for example, reveals a journey towards the Other and a subsequent “redefinition of European

---

108 Ibid.
identity that includes respect for both universal values and difference”. Hence, European identity needs to be configured within an acceptance and respect for differentiation and guard against “closing itself off in its own identity and advancing itself in an exemplary way towards what it is not.” Likewise, other scholars have added a much-needed empirical dimension and have attempted to investigate and pinpoint who these European Others are. Illustrations include the former Soviet Union, Islam and the USA. Many attempts to capture and expose the Other has a tendency to reify the process and reduce what I argue is a subtler configuration of identity contestations into an oversimplified dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Second, Wæver argues that this deconstructive approach also deals with configuring identity not merely as an object, but how the media and technologies shape it as a practice. For example, Delanty explores four dimensions of community – the political, the cultural, the social and the transnational – and argues that attempts to create a European demos and ethnos have monumentally failed. He concludes that as cognitive processes enable us to experience social reality more and more – what he calls ‘knowledge society’ – then “if Europe cannot be (a) ‘real’ community perhaps it can become a ‘virtual’ one.” In addition, Burgess argues that the history of Europe is synonymous with the crisis of cultural identity, and that the attempt to create an identity requires fixity that negates the prospects of diversity;
hence the necessity but impossibility of constructing a European culture.\(^{118}\) He also highlights the role of the media and technology in creating this paradox as modern technologies add to the alienation of consumers whilst simultaneously uniting them via the power of tools of communication.\(^{119}\) A final aspect of the deconstructive approach seeks to investigate the linkages between identity and legitimacy. Howe optimistically argues that a European identity need not be lodged within an ethnic or cultural homogeneity and that “the idea of a shared destiny to catalyse the development of the American and Canadian nations”\(^{120}\) can be utilised as a framework for constructing such a community. Laffan, on the other hand, discusses how problems of identity – evident in immigration, the revival of nationalist populist parties and the fragmentation of Communist bloc – have caused the EU to act as a “catalyzing agency for inculcating certain political norms and rights within the EU and enticing non-EU states towards similar values as the price for entering the club.”\(^{121}\) Also, Hansen and Williams discuss the role myths play in determining legitimacy and raise the important issue of how competing myths create “socially operative practices.”\(^{122}\) They claim that taking myths seriously involves examining social and political structures more directly and conclude that the ill-fated 1980s attempt to formulate a cultural identity has given way to the Maastricht Treaty’s introduction of European citizenship as well as the Amsterdam Treaty’s endeavour to given the EU a ‘human face’.

From this brief overview of critical approaches, two points can be highlighted that contribute to the manner in which identity is configured in this study. Firstly, despite the fact that some


\(^{119}\) Ibid., p. 34.


practitioners of critical theory highlight the birth of a European identity, I would argue that national identities still continue to be omnipresent and are formulated only in relation to other such identities. That is, even though this study denies the impact of an all-encompassing European identity, critical theory nonetheless emphasises the process of Othering in defining how Europe constitutes itself via patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and calls attention to the role of ‘imagined Europe’ in helping understand arguments for and against integration. Shared histories and languages, cultural linkages, the pull of modernity, and national and transnational myths have all been important stabilisers of British national identity. Secondly, some critical theorists have prioritised the role of communication in the attempt to formulate a post-national political sphere. Although communication is important for the transmission of ideas about what identities are, this dissertation utilises patterns of language, or discourses, in its attempt to define identities. That is, the process of argumentation is not merely about the attempt to impose a particular vision but also about recognising that these visions are constrained by the prevailing discursive field. This delimits what can and cannot be said and, in turn, enables a discursive reading of identity to take place. In short, the approach I adopt attempts to explore the background conditions and discursive structures that also enable change to occur.

1.2.3 Discursive Approaches

Discursive approaches also consider how nation-state identities affect the process of European integration. One approach towards analysing European governance from this perspective has sought to explain foreign policy via the concepts of state, nation and Europe. This structural approach, stemming from what has been called the Copenhagen School,

examines the issue of change within a three-tier formation: first, the basic concept of state-nation; second, the relational position of state and nation vis-à-vis Europe; and third, the concrete policies pursued by actors.\textsuperscript{124} State, nation and Europe are used because they are “we-concepts, identities we hold simultaneously and which therefore have to be articulated with each other.”\textsuperscript{125} Despite presenting a possible process of how nation-state identities shape Europe, one can argue that such an approach suffers from a number of drawbacks. Firstly, the presumption is that European discourses are dominated by certain concepts at the expense of others. Similar such studies have exercised this framework to include other discourses such as security and the nature of international relations.\textsuperscript{126} Another obvious lacuna, however, is that of economistic discourses which crop up particularly frequently within debates affecting the national economies of European countries, such as the adoption of the Euro. Technological, religious and militaristic structures might also be included as we-concepts. However, not only does a structural approach neglect the inclusion of important discourses, but one can argue that there is no consensus of opinion about what state, nation and Europe might mean. The concept of the EU, for example, is constructed differently according to context\textsuperscript{127} while the concept of state is perceived very differently in Denmark (broadly interventionist) and Britain (non-interventionist) and may include concepts that are non-state or nation related.\textsuperscript{128} Secondly, a structural approach tends to view language as “too static, stable, and coherent”\textsuperscript{129} whereas a more poststructuralist analysis would highlight “the inherent tensions within any move towards coherence and thus their ironies and strange effects.”\textsuperscript{130} A structural approach argues that change is difficult precisely because it views language as stable and static rather

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
than contested and fluid. Hence, the concepts of state and nation remain comparatively constant due to their higher “degree of sedimentation”. \(^{131}\) Subsequently, this approach is less sympathetic at analysing the manner in which discursive hegemony can become contested, destabilised and ultimately replaced, perhaps a core focus of investigation for much poststructuralist discourse analysis.

By way of contrast, a governance approach accounts for change via linking polity-ideas to meta-narratives which capture ‘deeper’ concepts such as politics, progress and economy. \(^{132}\) This approach makes use of the notion of discursive nodal points whereby a number of discourses become tied together allowing meaning to become stabilised. \(^{133}\) Diez goes on to give the example of European governance functioning as a Free Trade Area whereby its specific rules “determine the overall argumentative structure of articulations of European governance within the discourse and prescribe the kind of relations that can reasonably be drawn between various metanarratives.” \(^{134}\) By emphasising the disputed nature of Europe, this approach is particularly adept at identifying misleading characterisations about various nation-state identities. One of these has been the oversimplified dichotomy of pro- versus anti-European – perhaps most commonly exemplified in the British debate – as well as traditionalist views that British identity stems exclusively from the Empire or its island status. \(^{135}\) Similarly, the governance approach has opened the political landscape to encompass non-state centrism, unlike the comparatively rigid structurationism implicit within the Copenhagen School’s notions of nation and state. However, a number of shortcomings can be

---


134 Ibid.

identified. Firstly, it “downplays the inter-connectedness of different discourses that are
mutually defined in relation to each other, e.g. British Conservatives are very likely to
develop their position in relation to Labour and this is usually more important to them than
family connections to other Conservative parties.”\(^\text{136}\) Hence, a governance approach tends to
attach less importance to national contexts and instead overplays transnational linkages
between groups. Secondly, a focus on polity ideas and ideal-type models, defined as
“normative orders in which specific constructions of the legitimacy of a political system are
(re) produced through the ascription of purpose and meaning”\(^\text{137}\) suffers from the accusation
of being un-discursive. In short, “[i]t goes against the basic idea of discourse analysis where
no categories are universally valid … it is surprising to see ideal types derived from general
overarching considerations and then used as boxes into which discourses fit.”\(^\text{138}\) Finally, the
mapping of central ideal types “does not tell us why certain ‘Europes’ were put forward in a
particular national context, how easily they might be changed, and what structures within a
domestic discursive field govern those processes.”\(^\text{139}\)

The literature on discursive approaches impacts on this dissertation in several ways. To begin
with, although agreeing that state, nation and obviously Europe are important we-concepts,
identity is formulated through the ever-changing conceptualisations of other state and non-
state actors. A particularly transparent example from the British debates concerns the altering
perceptions of France. Ludlow, for example, recounts how Britain’s eighteenth-century elite
equated Europe, and particularly France, as civilised and modern. The weakening of this
attitude was prompted by a literary and artistic trend that became critical of all things

Order’, p. 413.
Challenge of the Nordic States, p. 6.
‘foreign’, the political reformism that brought to light ‘Saxon freedoms’ being subjugated by
the ‘Norman yoke’ and the French Revolution characterised less by its progressivism and
more by its brutality. Such images, far from being curios of a forgotten past, continue to
play out in the present. Hence, notions of state, nation and Europe are reflective of national
identities but these identities are configured via the perceptions elites have of other actors. In
addition and in contrast to some of the literature mentioned, this study does employ a
simplified pro/anti dichotomy. It is important to clarify the reasoning behind this. Firstly, the
debates clearly point towards this demarcation. British political elite perceptions initially take
the form of being supportive of or resistant to the initial continued membership of the EEC
and of the treaties examined. As a consequence, the pro/anti delineation is both a useful
starting point from which to methodologically begin inquiry as well as a naturalised
preliminary position articulated by political figures. Secondly, as has been mentioned, an
anti-position is not synonymous with a broader scepticism, fear or dislike of anything
Europe-related. As I take it that language is “the means through which social meaning is
communicated”, we stay firmly within the realm of text to extrapolate identity from that
which political figures have said or written. As an illustration, from the Maastricht debates,
one famed political figure stated the following:

I bitterly resent the title “Euro-sceptic”. Am I an “Anglo-sceptic” because I
did not like the Thatcher government? I oppose the Maastricht treaty as a
European because it takes from every country in Europe the rights that are
being taken away from us.

Consequently, no singular meaning of Eurosceptic, phobic, sclerotic or pro-European, pro-
EU and so on, dominates. As such, although the debates are initially cast in pro/anti
straightforward terms – either for or against continued membership or whatever treaty is

---

being discussed – this study then groups the underlying meanings of Others to reveal how the Self is constructed. Finally, from an initial pro/anti position, the range of British Selves produced reveals a number of patterns or dominant strands of identity that are examined in the final empirical chapter. Again, as an example, one such thread that pervades all three debates is sovereignty. Hedetoft points out that “sovereignty is the central building block in the wall of national identity”\(^{143}\) and an initial pro-/anti-dichotomy reveals how sovereignty is not merely configured differently within each debate but also shows how the concept evolves over the arguments.

**1.2.4 Gendered Approaches**

Gendered approaches also take stock with the view that identities are irreversibly soldered to the notion of the sovereign state. Within the framework of championing such non-state identities, gender “articulates an aspect of political subjectivity which is potentially transnational by virtue of including all women from all countries and cultures.”\(^{144}\) Hansen goes on to reveal that despite the fact that EU and European Court of Justice rulings have sought to pressure member states into passing ‘women’s rights’ legislation, this has been achieved without re-examining the inherent gender bias that exists within the neoliberal and masculine organisation of the EU. Women’s lack of support for the EC is bound up with its patriarchal and elitist structure, and this “sceptical dichotomy”\(^{145}\) alludes to the existence of inclusion and exclusion, rather than communitarianism and solidarity.

---


\(^{145}\) Ibid., p. 141.
The wealth of other studies in this area provides ample testimony to the gendered nature of the EU and its institutions. Firstly, several studies have sought to counter the illusion that the EU is an unconditional ‘progressive polity’, distributing gains for all irrespective of age, race or gender. Bretherton,\textsuperscript{146} for example, has sought to identify how a supposed commitment to gender mainstreaming – “the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making”\textsuperscript{147} – reveals a considerable gap between the rhetoric and the reality. She also argues that such opposition to gender mainstreaming occurs due to discriminatory practices in training and recruitment, the lack of gender impartiality in the labour market as well as social conservatism and matriarchy promoted via institutions such as the Catholic Church and entrenched notions of male dominance. Similarly, Mazey, Shaw, Elman and Bell\textsuperscript{148} present arguments to suggest that although gender perspectives have perforated into “world trade and globalisation, EU enlargement, fisheries, and asylum and refugee policy”,\textsuperscript{149} ‘gender blind’ areas are still prevalent including “the internal market, competition policy, trade, energy and transport”.\textsuperscript{150}

Such absences occur due to a lack of political commitment, under-funded lobbying groups (such as the European Women’s Lobby) that might press for greater inclusion for women, under-representation within certain events (such as the Convention of the Future of the Union) and the difficulty in determining what counts as ‘evidence’ when arguing that Europe is progressing to end sex discrimination. Despite that such studies accord with a general agreement on EU legislation that is becoming more inclusive and respectful towards the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
previously ignored area of gender, it has been argued by Claudia Roth, President of the Green Group of the European Parliament, that “[e]qual rights and equal opportunities are reduced to the workplace and that is not enough. The question of the role of women in society remains unresolved.”

Subsequently, gender approaches to the EU, notwithstanding their panoply of diversity, are unified by their struggle to highlight not merely the under-represented role of women within legislation and institutions, but also to underscore the many entrenched attitudes that act as an obstacle to the de-masculinisation of the polity. In short, “[f]eminist scholarship has gone beyond an emphasis on rights and policies, towards the gendered nature of the polity itself.” Indeed, due to the commitment to revealing the inside/outside, inclusive/exclusive nature of the EU, a gender approach frequently sits well with similar such attempts to emphasise the Self/Other nexus as a means of making the Community a more inclusive and communitarian entity. Likewise, feminist approaches highlight a neglected perspective on the world and help to propel previously ignored voices and viewpoints into the forefront of political debate and decision-making. Weber, for example, cites Peterson’s view of gender “not as something that can be placed but instead as something that helps us to place things – events, people, ideas – that we encounter in our everyday world.”

To summarise, although the unit of analysis – gender – is not the focal point of this dissertation, gendered approaches to Europe nonetheless impact in two important ways. Firstly, a consideration of gender helps challenge the notion of the inviolability of the

sovereign state. Although what British political elites say and write are taken as the sources
of identity construction, political figures have consistently articulated broader and non-state
centric appeals to national identity. Indeed, the national dimension of identity contains the
articulation of a societal and civic sense of attachment that frequently positions the
government as its effective protector or guardian. Secondly, gendered approaches sit well
with the attempt by political elites to influence the pattern of European integration.
Frequently within the British debates, what is being argued is a vision *in spe*. By way of
example, the ILP politician Robert Edwards, stated during the 1969 Annual Labour Party
Conference that there lies the occasion to build “a new civilisation, giving our young people a
majestic aim – a united Europe and eventually a socialist Europe.”\(^\text{154}\) As such, the British
debates do not merely focus on what Europe is but what it might become. Not merely does
this concur with a fundamental constructivist premise that our identity – who we are –
determines, shapes and influences the world within which we function, but that it also opens
up other vistas, such as gender, for change and reconfiguration.

1.3 The First Layer: Discourse Analysis

1.3.1 The Assumptions of Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis may be defined as an “approach to the analysis of language that looks at
patterns of language across texts as well as the social and cultural contexts in which the texts
occur.”\(^\text{155}\) Subsequently, it is firmly lodged within a view of our world as socially
constructed. Discourse analysis, therefore, seeks to argue that an external reality cannot be

British Debate over Europe’, p. 18.

held as authoritative and universal but is instead a series of representations. External reality is not independent of our perceptions of it and our social world only becomes accessible to us via the manner in which we organise it and place it into categories. An investigation into these categories can help reveal which representations are utilised within the attempt to impose a reality and why such representations were more successful than others.

The labelling of these subject and object categories has been abundant over the ages with such examples including “God, Reason, Humanity, Nature, and the Iron Laws of Capitalism”. These categorisations enable our understanding of our ‘reality’ which is contingent on social, cultural and historical contexts. Although we may not dispute the existence of a natural phenomenon, our understanding of it is contingent on our social practices that attribute meaning to that which occurs:

An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of the discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence.

The essence of discourse theory is rooted in the study of both spoken and written language because the language we employ when describing our ‘reality’ gives it meaning. However, how can language reveal discourses that are structurally fixed enough to enable them to be studied whilst assuming language is inherently volatile? This peculiarity can be explained in two ways. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe adopt the concept of nodal points which are “privileged

---

signifiers or reference points ... in a discourse that bind together a particular system of
meaning or ‘chain of signification’.”\textsuperscript{159} Hence, the act of articulation contains the
construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning\textsuperscript{160} allowing for a structural reading
of language. Secondly, one can adopt a differential rather than a referential approach to
language. A referential understanding, according to Wæver, is “where words and concepts
are names used in order to make reference to objects out there in reality.”\textsuperscript{161} A referential
approach, therefore, “will not have much to work with than the degrees of deviation from the
ideal of language as a transparent medium”,\textsuperscript{162} resulting in a bias towards psychological
accounts rooted in “‘perceptions’ or ‘belief systems’ or ‘images’”.\textsuperscript{163} On the other hand, a
differential understanding incorporates a more systemic approach because “meaning is
located in the differences among concepts – we know how to use the term horse by the
distinctions differentiating it from other animals, from other means of transportation as well
as through other sets of distinctions.”\textsuperscript{164} Hence, by rooting language in a system of linking
and differentiation, and even though ‘suture’ or discursive closure can never be fully realised,
“[t]his does not mean that elements of stability may not be identified.”\textsuperscript{165} In short, the
volatility of language does not preclude a study of it.

Milliken highlights “three analytically distinguishable bundles of claims”\textsuperscript{166} which highlight
the theoretical commitments of discourse scholarship and its research programme. The first

A. J. and Stavrakakis, Y. (eds.) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemony and Social Change,
\textsuperscript{161} Wæver, O. (2002) ‘Identities, Community and Foreign Policy’ in Hansen, L. and Wæver, O. (eds.) European Integration
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 29.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{166} Milliken, J. (1998) ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods’, pp. 228-
230.
claim is that discourses function as systems of signification within which meaning occurs via the relationships between objects placed within the sign system. One might add that meaning, in this deconstructionist approach, “is always an unfinished business because these signs constantly alter their relationship to other signs as they travel from context to context.” The second is by defining who the actors are and the knowledgeable practices by these actors towards the acted upon, discourses identify how some actors and actions are engaged while others are excluded and silenced. As such, discourses produce and reproduce a certain reality that becomes commonsense. The final assertion is that discourse offers how meaning can become dominant, hegemonic and fixed while also examining whether stabilisation can be challenged due to the “overflowing and incomplete nature of discourses that opens up the space for change, discontinuity, and variation.” Again, the highlighting of both change and continuity emphasises the inherently unstable nature of discourse. Hence, meaning resides in linguistic signs, the manipulation of these signs determines who speaks and about what, and dominant meanings, therefore, can be fostered or maintained. These key points reveal the inherently contestable and conflictual nature of discourse and how language and power are mutually constitutive. Although listed as separate claims for the purpose of clarity, I utilise all three for the following reasons. Firstly, I am interested in showing how dominant discourses of Others affect national identity as well as how these discourses become dominant. Secondly, as “systems of signification never fully close up and fall into place – they always retain paradoxes, open ends, and impossibilities”, a study of identity formation can investigate how these signs link with one another to produce a constellational web of

---


meaning. Thirdly, the interlinking between subjects and objects can be revealed empirically via the conceptual tools of predication, presupposition and subject positioning. Although expanded on later, these three methods for analysis provide the particular features and attributes of subjects that are referred to, the background that is taken to be true and the manner in which the subjects and objects are linked and related. It is via these three processes that the practice of linking and differentiation, and subsequently the three claims made by Milliken previously cited, can be established.

1.3.2 Why Discourse Analysis?

As already mentioned, discourse analysis functions as an empirical tool for scrutinising what is said, written or communicated, and no less importantly, what may not be said, written or communicated. Often, however, discourse scholars have been condemned as belonging to a “deviant community”, while discourse theory has been condemned as “dangerous science, seductive but ‘prolix and self-indulgent’”. Despite frequently made complaints about its untestability, several notable studies have revealed how discourse analysis can be framed empirically. Although not meeting criteria demanded by positivist expectations of scientific rigour (and neither does discourse analysis attempt to) and despite not asserting that the only thing in the world is discourse, a discursive approach offers a limiting and delimiting tool for examining how we assemble, perceive and subsequently act within our social world.

---

A discursive approach, because it posits that language is inherently unstable, offers an insight into how norms, values and identities are subject to change. Poststructuralist discourse theory states “that there is no pre-given, self-determining essence that is capable of determining and ultimately fixing all other identities within a stable and totalizing structure.”¹⁷⁵ Rationalist methodologies, on the other hand, have frequently argued that norms, values and identities are fixed and given, and interests, therefore, need not be bogged down by their consideration. Discursive and constructivist approaches, however, have been at pains to deny the exogeneity of these phenomena which, in turn, allows for a study of the catalysts which construct and reconstruct them. As this study focuses on the inherent flexibility and multidimensionality of identity, a constructivist/discursive approach is employed over a more methodologically narrowing rationalist one.

Furthermore, as “discourses reproduce the everyday assumptions of society”,¹⁷⁶ a discursive position illuminates power structures that are implicit in the social and political world. Indeed, instead of power being perceived as the possession of material resources or capacity, it “is conceived in terms of the political acts of inclusion and exclusion that shape social meanings and identities and condition the construction of social antagonisms and political frontiers.”¹⁷⁷ Instead of taking interests as realised through power as given, the approach I adopt contends that interests are actually constructed and illuminated through patterns of language, or discourses. Power structures, be they evident or hidden, permeate the political arena and set certain privileged agendas because “[l]anguage and discourse are dominated by the powerful in society who can impose meanings and explanations of social reality which

protects their interest and undermine the rest of society.” Hence, a discursive approach helps expose and critique that which is often accepted as commonsense or somehow ‘natural’ to the political and social world.

Finally, by revealing how identity is constructed and reconstructed, a discursive approach can reveal not only the monolithic formulation of a single identity, but also the conflictual nature of competing identities as revealed in discourses. As Diez notes, by viewing a particular topic of study, for example Europe, as a “discursive battlefield”, the political territory reveals discursive linkages which help define what can and cannot be discussed. Rather than a focus on explanation, this approach contributes to a much deeper ‘critical understanding’ of which policies become implemented and which are rejected.

1.4 The Second Layer: Self/Other Analysis

1.4.1 Introduction and Assumptions

As already mentioned, identities can only exist in relation to those that it is not. The claim that I am a European, for example, only makes sense if we are able to understand the wide array of non-European identities, be they Asian, African, Latin American, and so on. The Other does not merely nominally influence the Self for the Self’s identity to be configured, but the Self’s identity, shaped by several factors of socialisation, is “always constituted in

---

178 Ibid.
181 Ibid., p. 30.
relation to difference because a thing can only be known in relation to what it is not”.

Political identities, consequently, do not appear to exist without the difference between the Self and Other. Whilst accepting these assumptions, I would also add another important dimension to the concept of the Self being configured solely through difference. I would like to argue that there are different levels of difference which can function as a shaper of the Self’s identity and that “meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness as well as through a differentiation to another series of juxtaposed signs.”

There are a number of reasons for arguing that meaning can be articulated through different gradations of difference. To begin with, the formation of what can be called the radical Other might have the effect of inextricably forging two near-Selves together in the pursuit of a common agenda against it. Two examples can be provided to support this point. Firstly, Banerjee highlights Jawaharlal Nehru’s invocation of the Self-Self opposition within colonial India to counter the common Other: “[i]t is all the more astonishing and astounding … that such things [violence], which made the common foe of all the communities – British Imperialism – laugh in unholy glee, should have at all happened.”

In order to quell the violence occurring between Hindus and Muslims, Nehru sought to “discipline elements of the group self through the specter of the other.” Hence, what are perceived as deep-running historical, cultural and religious differences become moderated and a common identity is constructed to deal with the universal threat. The second example concerns the security practices of the Cold War.

---

threat of the USSR – the radical Other – encouraged a level of cooperation amongst European states that might not have happened had the threat not existed. As such, an all-encompassing European identity “was a Cold War construct shaped and defined by the global confrontation of capitalism and communism.”\textsuperscript{188} A further argument for advancing how Othering encapsulates different levels of difference is that less powerful countries, by lacking the means or resources, might identify themselves with more powerful ones in the hope of realising their interests. In this case of bandwagoning, the promotion and protection of the Self is orchestrated by a linking to a more powerful near-Self or non-Self as a way of trying to ensure the Self’s survival. The persistence of the ‘special relationship’ might echo this point. Finally, by embodying the notion of different levels of difference, empirical analysis becomes much broader by not merely concluding “that all foreign and security policies therefore have to be built on a conquest of the Other.”\textsuperscript{189} Hence, the processes of both equivalence and difference might be revealed in the concept of ‘democracy’, for example, as a privileged identity that creates a set of relations with other states on the basis of their ‘democratic potential’ and also situates this identity within a structure of spatial and temporal difference because not all states can be regarded as adequately democratic.\textsuperscript{190}

Apart from drawing attention to different levels of difference, which I believe to be an important but neglected aspect of identity construction, I would argue that Self/Other analysis has three other important characteristics. First of all, the Self/Other nexus involves a dualistic character. It is both inward-looking because it defines a measure of commonality within the group and also outward-looking because it identifies those who must be distinguished from

\textsuperscript{190} Hansen, L. (2006) Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, p. 25.
the ingroup. Hence, “[i]t involves both self-awareness of the group and awareness of others from which the nation seeks to differentiate itself.”\textsuperscript{191} Furthermore, Self and Other do not merely come into being but are formulated due to the perceptions actors have of them. Consequently, they are defined via a process of socialisation – the practice of knowing – and “the activity of knowing is a formulation of the world.”\textsuperscript{192} Lastly, the relationship between Self and Other is not a permanent configuration but is liable to change. “[T]here is no such thing as a permanent or privileged self”\textsuperscript{193} because the interconnectivity of actors is orchestrated through a multitude of Others and is therefore not reducible to a perennial Other. This implies the existence of what Diez argues as “different kinds of difference: more or less exclusive, antagonistic and violent ones.”\textsuperscript{194} As identity is multilayered and constructed from a variety of sources, I categorise Others into three distinguishable groups, each demarcated by its threat value. An explanation of them follows.

\textit{1.4.2 Friendly, Non-radical and Radical Others}

While not ignoring the impact of the radical Other, and clearly accepting that its existence implies “that some forms of othering are more problematic than others”,\textsuperscript{195} I believe that the interrelatedness of actors in the political arena is as governed by non-radical actors as by radical ones. The process of clear and lucid differentiation and subsequent hostility implicit in defining the radical Other does not reveal a comprehensive picture of how actors perceive and define one another because “it definitely does not follow from a poststructuralist starting

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
point that antagonisms should be the main source of meaning.” Wæver goes on to mention that unadulterated difference is less information rich than more nuanced structures of differentiation as the Self is influenced and constructed via its relationships with friends and relatives, and not just foes. The Other should not be perceived as a pantomime villain and may well exhibit characteristics that although foreign are not necessarily repugnant:

(The public enemy) … does not have to be morally evil, he does not have to be aesthetically ugly, he does not have to appear as an economic competitor, and it can … even be advantageous to have business dealings with him. He is nevertheless the Other.

Part of the dominance of the perception of the radical Other stems, in part, from the security practices of the Cold War. Hansen argues that the simplistic notion of the overtly threatening Other has been coloured by these practices during the post-World War Two period and that its confrontational legacy still continues to infuse the perceptions we have. Similarly, judgements that hinge on singularities – the West versus the East, for example – tend to deny the multiplicity of national and regional positions that might not be so easily reducible to the officially accepted position. Although, for example, such constructions as the negative invocations of the ‘Turk’ have had (and continue to have) resonance within Europe, not all states have constructed the threat in the same way or at the same level of danger. This is not to deny that identities cannot collectively embody a diverse transnational group or that a Self cannot be embodied in a larger configuration or entity, such as Europe for example, only that caution must be displayed in presuming Self/Other necessitates an overriding black/white distinction. In short, Self/Other is more of a multifaceted spectrum than the process of radical

---

197 Ibid.
Othering presupposes. The following figure diagrammatically represents this constellational process of Othering along with the processes of linking and differentiation:

**Figure 2: Othering and the Self**

![Diagram of Othering and the Self]

Table 1 outlines characteristics and examples of friendly, non-radical and radical Others. Four examples, along with references, are provided for each category. As is evident, Others can be internal (residing within the boundaries of the entity regarded as the Self) or external to this entity. Others may also be real or imagined/symbolic. They might also be regarded as radical within one era, non-radical or friendly in another, or even unnoticed or non-existent at a different stage. Such a situation is context-, issue-, time- and event-dependent and is an endemic feature of the ever-evolving nature of identity construction. Subsequently, due to the fact that identities are fluid, the configuration of Others is captured at a particular point in time. Although a common configuration is to construct the Other as a singular entity, this does not exclusively need to be the case as the development of national identity hinges on a continuous reconstruction and search for Others from which to formulate the Self.  

201 For example, Campbell, D. (1992) *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,*
since my focus is to reveal how national identity is represented by the process of Othering, the examples I provide are states, transnational entities, and ethnic and political groups. Needless to say, this in no way implies that Others must be formulated in this way:

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Campbell posits that American identity has been so linked to the articulation of dangers that it has produced a welter of Others that have shaped an expansionist US foreign policy. He includes such examples as the war on illegal drugs, Vietnam, Japan and Iraq amongst others.
### Table 1: Friendly, Non-radical and Radical Others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Friendly</strong></td>
<td>Process of strong linking: clear association with the Self; references of cultural and historical similarity, solidarity and partnership; frequent existence of a common Other that binds friendly Other to Self</td>
<td>• Britain</td>
<td>• The United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Finland</td>
<td>• The European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Jordan</td>
<td>• Arab Motherland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Poland</td>
<td>• Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-radical</strong></td>
<td>Process of mild differentiation: non-threatening altercasting (persuading a group to accept a role that makes them behave according to how the persuader wants); ‘bridge-building’; cooperation whilst retaining independence</td>
<td>• The United States</td>
<td>• Former Soviet Union (during Gorbachev’s policy of ‘New Thinking’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Denmark</td>
<td>• The European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Australia</td>
<td>• Pacific Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• South Korea</td>
<td>• Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radical</strong></td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: clear binarisation and dichotomisation revealing nexus of superiority/inferiority, rational/irrational, good/evil, civilised/uncivilised</td>
<td>• The West</td>
<td>• The Balkans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Spanish</td>
<td>• Native Indians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Europeans</td>
<td>• Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Russian Nationalists</td>
<td>• Russian Westernizers and Jews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


64
1.5 Methodology

1.5.1 Historical Events

As already mentioned, the historical events focused on are the 1975 referendum on continued membership of the Common Market, the 1993 ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the 2009 enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. There are three main reasons as to why they have been chosen. Firstly, they can be classed as ‘critical junctures’. Critical junctures have been defined as “perceived crisis situations occurring from policy failures, but also triggered by external effects.” They are important because established arrangements of identity become destabilised and reconfigured. The events can be classed as crises because they all caused British political elites to define and redefine themselves in terms of what meaning Europe had for them. In this sense, the 1975 referendum remains the only UK-wide vote on European membership to date. Unlike general elections in which issues over Europe can be ignored or downplayed, the appeal to the electorate catapulted Europe into the public sphere and effectively became an early harbinger of ideas over what Europe actually meant. The Maastricht Treaty functions as an acute exercise in how divisions over Europe are so fundamental to the nature of British politics that they can rupture political parties and even have the potential to topple governments. Furthermore, by leading to the implementation of the single currency, the Treaty highlights the ever-changing values and objectives of Europe and also acts as a high point in the battle over national sovereignty. The Lisbon Treaty can perhaps be regarded as one of the most important recent episodes to galvanise British opinion on the nature of Europe. It again helped trigger a flurry of familiar themes and also

contributed to the argument that Britain’s relationship with Europe continues to remain at the forefront of British political debate. In short, the conflict over European integration has been labelled as “one of the dominant and most divisive issues of modern British politics” and the three events I examine are acute illustrations of this.

A second reason why I focus on these episodes is that quite simply one cannot construct identity from non-events. As already outlined, the process of Othering, whilst not exclusively glued to the restrictive and gloomy presumption of conflictual relations as evident in the construction of the radical Other, nonetheless presupposes a process of linking and differentiation that is perhaps more reified when emergencies occur. The three events conjured up a host of Others because they caused British leaders to examine Europe and the course of integration in a way they might not have done had the events not occurred. Lesser or non-events do not create the same sense of political frenzy and commentary and do not reveal how discursive constructions of identity become challenged, destabilised and/or predominant. Finally, the events are grouped according to temporality and discourse. That is, they are organised within a time frame which renders comparative analysis possible. It is opportune to choose events that are not so disparate because, for example, “[c]omparing national discourses on Europe in 1850 and 2005 might provide an interesting snapshot, but it would leave the question of how discourses develop between 1850 and 2005 unanswered.”

This study is not only a reading of history that discloses how identity was constructed in the past, but also how certain linkages have been utilised to forge identities that still resonate today and may provide some indications as to how they might be reformulated in the future.

1.5.2 Official Discourses and Textual Material

Utilised from Hansen\textsuperscript{217}, the analytical focus, objects and goals of analysis can be explained as follows. The official discourse focuses on heads of states, governments and senior civil servants. The objects of analysis centre on supportive and critical texts including debates, political speeches, memoirs and diaries. The goals of analysis are to examine the processes of how dominant discourses become dominant, the stabilisation and hegemony of the official discourses, as well as the response of official discourses to critical discourses. Although this focus has been incorporated by Hansen to show the impact on policy, official discourses are pertinent to the formulation of identity because those closest to the instruments of policy, i.e. party elites, “have always been major vehicles for the transmission of ideas”.\textsuperscript{218} In turn, they are constrained by the existing structure whereby the formulated ideas must contain certain resonance towards the electorate. Hence, official discourses reveal a process of identity reinvention. As this analysis seeks to reveal the hegemonic discursive structures about Europe, the actors most associated with the creation of these discourses are political elites. The term ‘political elites’, however, is not unproblematic. Giddens, amongst others, has argued how terms which include “‘ruling class’, ‘political class’, ‘elite’, ‘power elite’, and ‘leadership group’ vie with each other for supremacy in the literature.”\textsuperscript{219} However, the three events analysed in this study position Europe as an object of policy. As a consequence, I have taken political elites to include party political actors who were in some way connected to shaping policy and opinion on Europe.

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., p 64.
\textsuperscript{218} Marcussen, M., et. al. (1999) ‘Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities’, p. 615.
In terms of how spokespeople have argued, I have focused on parliamentary debates, political speeches, memoirs and diaries as the objects of my analysis because they broaden the discursive field of study. Official discourses can arguably suffer from a ‘scripted’ feeling, that politicians are liable to trot out well-rehearsed party mantra, whereas impromptu challenges and questions in debates force elites to ‘think on their feet’ and allow for a more extemporaneous and therefore genuine invocation of their positions. Similarly, whilst memoirs raise the question of legacy-hunting, they provide a background and insight that rarely gets investigated within a focus on solely official documentation and commentary and they also offer an attempt to “clear the past for the future”. Although Gamble stresses how memoirs need to be utilised with other texts to safeguard against unreliability, he mentions that they provide “insights into how agents imagine their role and interpret events.” That is, bearing in mind the social constructivist position I take views language as a social practice, memoirs do not reveal identity itself but do reveal elite perceptions of identity. It is from the interpretations of events that particular notions of identity are being realised and promulgated. Memoirs are also juxtaposed with parliamentary debates and speeches. This enables empirically richer findings as well as a greater degree of consistency. As has already been mentioned, the ideas political elites have must in some capacity be ‘sold’ to the electorate. Parliamentary debates and speeches, particularly in terms of their dissemination by the media, function as apt vehicles. The criteria for the texts used are that they offer clear articulations, are widely read and attended to, and are all from a formal and recognised authority. In addition, despite the fact that poststructuralist discourse analysis gives

---

221 Ibid., p. 61.
“priority to the study of primary texts”, 224 I have included secondary texts which provide historical background and analysis to the events in question, and help ‘set the scene’ for the official debates, commentary and statements.

A final consideration concerning the texts is the manner in which they are organised. The pro- and anti-divide is initially invoked for several reasons. Firstly, the literature points quite clearly to this demarcation. The evidence suggests that agnosticism or indifference to European integration was not paramount and that the EEC, EC and EU in their various guises and stages have been fundamental to the way Britain is seen. However, a particularly important caveat is required. Utilising a pro- or anti-EU categorisation has the danger of equating it with a range of other positions precisely because what is meant is dangerously clouded. An anti-position, for instance, might mean anti-Euro, anti-Commission, anti-Franco/German, anti-deepening or even anti an idea. Consequently, it is quite logical and indeed common within the debates to witness an anti-Europe position when Europe is meant as the structure, organisations and/or role of the Community, whilst being pro-Europe in its historical and cultural sense. 225 To avoid this obfuscation, the various viewpoints are categorised as pro/anti-membership, pro/anti-Maastricht Treaty and pro/anti-Lisbon Treaty. In this sense, the wider implications of what is meant are explored but from an initial understanding of the author’s position over the treaty or membership being debated. Secondly, the pro/anti dichotomy is an ideal type. An ideal type can be defined as “like a utopia ... formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discreet, more or less present and occasionally absent

224 Ibid., p. 82.
concrete individual phenomena”. Accordingly, ideal-type configurations enable the systematic organisation of evidence to allow examination. Finally, although the pro- and anti-positions are convenient starting points to scrutinise the debates over Europe, they are simplifications. As such, and as a means of extracting the identity issues contained within the texts, the pro/anti divide is dissolved to produce a more nuanced, less rigid formulation of how identity becomes configured.

The organisation of the textual materials is as follows. Firstly, pro- and anti- are employed to reveal the implicit meanings of Europe as well as other objects featured within the Europe debates. Secondly, those textual meanings are categorised according to their status as Others. From this, the various characteristics are presented with an aim to revealing the identities that have been formulated. To reiterate, the pro/anti divide becomes fused at this stage because certain identities are cross-cutting. That is, Europe is taken to be a contestable entity that broaches many divides, including political parties, genders and age groups, and as a consequence of this, individual identities may appear in both pro- or anti-positions in the same way. Finally, these identities are systematised to produce a range of British Selves. These are the products of the identities constructed and, as such, are taken to be British political elite perceptions of Britain or, in other words, images of nationhood.

---

1.5.3 How to Look for Linking and Differentiation

Articulation

In order to identify the processes of linking and differentiation, and to reveal the different gradations of difference which constitute friendly, non-radical and radical Others, I intend to utilise the process of articulation. Hall, whilst acknowledging the potential misunderstandings of the definition of articulation he applies, narrates its double meaning:

…‘articulate’ means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate. It carries out that sense of language-ing, of expressing, etc. But we also speak of an ‘articulated’ lorry (truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but not necessarily, be connected to one another. The two parts are connected to each other, but through a specific linkage, that can be broken.227

Subsequently, articulation possesses two distinct dimensions. Firstly, it refers to the manner in which meaning can become temporarily fixed through the connection of signifying components.228 For example, Weldes, in her study of how US security was constructed in light of the Cuban Missile Crisis, gives the example of how “references to Castro and his revolutionary associates were persistently articulated to the adjective ‘bearded’” thus implying that ‘bearded’ indicated Castro was “irresponsible, uncivilized, and a danger to the United States.”229 Secondly, it reveals how meanings are connected to various institutions and social relations.230 For instance, chains of connotation in early neoliberal discourses on Thatcherism might include the linking of “‘unemployment’ to ‘welfare state’ to ‘big

230 Ibid.
government’ and in turn to ‘deregulation’ and privatization’ in order to make markets ‘free’ and ‘flexible’”.

The process of articulation is revealed through the concepts of what Doty calls predication, presupposition and subject positioning to show how subjects and objects can be organised into a “grid of intelligibility.” Such notions are interconnected although I will briefly explain them individually for the purposes of clarification and convenience. Firstly, predication views discourse as a system of signification which, via linkages and processes of differentiation and equivalence, suggests an analytical study of language practices “in order to draw out a more general structure of relational distinctions and hierarchies that order persons’ knowledge about the things defined by the discourse.” Milliken and Sylvan, in their study of US foreign bombing strategy in Indochina, offer an adroit application of how predicate analysis presents a more critical interpretation of foreign policy via gendered distinctions between North and South Vietnam. The gendered nexus pits North Vietnam as the masculine entity – with “hard” targets, “tough” opponents, and a “harsh” landscape; whilst South Vietnam is constructed as feminine – “soft” targets and “squabbling” allies. Predicate analysis “focuses on the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns.” It looks at how the object (the Other) is linguistically constructed and imbued with “particular features and capabilities” by the subject (the Self).

235 Ibid.
237 Ibid.

72
Secondly, Doty argues that presuppositions are made to formulate background knowledge. Hence, “[w]hen one uses language, one is implying something about the existence of subjects, objects, and their relation to one another.” The process of presupposition, therefore, takes something for granted or ‘sets-the-scene’ to allow a particular reality to be true. It is also an important textual mechanism for examining what elements of an entity, in this case Europe, are established before the debates take place. For example, Biebuyck argues:

[t]o say we are ‘disappointed’ or ‘surprised’ in Europe due to recent political events prompts an even more fundamental question: what naturalized assumptions, about Europe and its form of politics, made disappointment and surprise normal responses?

Presupposition helps uncover these assumptions and therefore asks similarly searching questions about how Britain, Europe and other subjects and objects are formulated.

Finally, subject positioning refers to the fact that subjects and objects are always produced in respect of other subjects and objects. Predicates and presuppositions, subsequently, can be positioned to reveal relationships such as “opposition, identity, similarity, and complementarity.” Extreme forms of binarisation permeate negative meaning into constructing the Other and thus define the Self as superior. One such example is that of the European perception of the Balkans which acted as a prelude to Western involvement in the Bosnian War of 1991 to 1999. Hansen argues that the Balkans were perceived as barbarian, violent, irrational and underdeveloped, thus constructing Europe as its antithesis: civilised, controlled, rational and developed. As already mentioned, discursive practices need not be

---

238 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
exclusively wedded to the construction of binary opposites but might also include processes of linking and similarity.

For the purposes of this study, articulation is thus important methodologically for two main reasons. Firstly, articulation – via the textual mechanisms of presupposition, predication and subject-positioning – not merely indicates the perceptions the Self has of an Other, but helps construct a diversity of Others. The interwoven and multiple natures of the various linkages reveal different nuances of difference, rather than a single, monolithic disparity. A discourse, therefore, should not be read as if it functions as a solitary, self-enclosed harbinger of meaning, but as a constellational set of linkages containing relations and hierarchies to other components. Subsequently, the perceptions British decision-makers have contain presuppositions that construct Europe as a series of particular ‘truths’ and various qualities are inscribed into other entities that reveal either linking or differentiation. Secondly, political identities are revealed by these “struggles over meaning”, which take the form of articulations. The multitude of linkages and differentiations implicit within the employment of articulation exposes a range of identities as “[i]t is not the individual elements of a discourse that have political or ideological connotations, it is the ways those elements are organised together in a new discursive formation.”

Methodological Steps

Neumann, in his study of Russia, utilises Todorov to ask three questions of each text: What is the framework of knowledge within which the European Other is seen? What moral

---

judgement is made of the Other? What relationship is proposed between Russia and the European Other?\textsuperscript{246} Within a European context, Wæver asks the following questions: What are the powerful categories on which each argument rests? How are they related? Are some concepts tied together as necessarily companions (e.g. “us”, Europe, Germans, civilization)?\textsuperscript{247} The passages are also read with a focus on “[h]ow the texts argue, not what they say.”\textsuperscript{248} Firstly, I ask several similar questions of each text in order to extrapolate meaning and assemble the predicates, presuppositions and subject positioning. The predicates are highlighted first as they show how meaning is produced via the production of certain qualities. Presuppositions are then enumerated as they provide the background knowledge in which the processes of articulation operate. Lastly, subject positioning exposes the relational position between the various subjects and objects. Hence, the concepts of presupposition and predication construct various subjects and objects whilst the relationships between them can be taken as subject positioning.\textsuperscript{249} Figure 3 shows the methodological steps taken:

\begin{itemize}
\item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
1.6 Defining the Concept of National Identity

To conclude, I would like to offer the definition of national identity employed in this study. This is perhaps essential by way of bringing together the different strands and approaches already discussed as well as highlighting the framework within which this dissertation operates. Firstly, I would posit that the nation, and subsequently its identity, is a constructed entity. Benedict Anderson defines the nation as an “imagined political community … (it) … is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of
their communion”.250 The imagined character of a nation reveals that it is an ideal-type notion: an impression that means different things to different people and is therefore liable to change depending on the focal point of the observer. The way in which a nation was imagined several generations ago might not have the same resonance to the way it is constituted today. Many European countries, for example, had their monarchies firmly embedded in their sense of ‘we’s’. Nowadays, it can be purported, monarchies might not be considered as strong a factor in determining national identities. Conceptualising identity, therefore, as an all-encompassing, rigidly defined monolith, suffers from an inability to account for change. Subsequently, I argue that “national identity has always been a constructed identity and … we need to move beyond a simple evocation of historical identity to acknowledge the constancy of active formation and reformation.”251 In addition, what is referred to as national identity is actually an attempt to impose a particular perception of what the speaker, or in this study political elites, wishes others to have. Identity, therefore, is not an independent, exceptional and ever-static configuration, but a spectrum that is continuously being challenged and reformulated on the basis of the ways other identities get perceived and therefore instilled with meaning.

Secondly, in keeping with the belief that there is no overriding nationalism, that “nationalism is a protean phenomenon, capable of taking on a multiplicity of forms depending on the – historical, social and political – context over which it reigns”,252 I would assert that identities are relational and multilayered. Identities can be nested, cross-cutting and/or separate253 and

“actors normally have multiple social identities that vary in salience.” Consequently, to talk of a country possessing a national identity, one can argue, is a misnomer because whichever definition we use or variable we seek to privilege – be it common or collectively held cultural images, historical narratives, language, and so on – is susceptible to change over time precisely because identity has an intrinsic capacity for reformulation. As such, what makes an identity national is the manner in which individuals or groups make use of national discourses. The preponderance of national discourses, as opposed to other identity discourses, occurs because of its constant articulation in day-to-day practices as a “mode of cognitive access to the world … (and) … a mode of agency”. The manifold nature of identity ensures that allegiances are not fixed and stable but traverse areas according to issue. As Wendt mentions, “I may identify with the United States on military defence but with the planet on the environment. In any given situation, however, it is the nature of identification that determines how the boundaries of the self are drawn.”

Thirdly, I would argue that the nation is always constituted in relation to an Other. Identity, therefore, comes into being via its juxtaposition with other identities. The significance of these other identities determines, in part, the composition of the Self. Thus, via the notion of identity I utilise, one can circumvent the focus on hazy concepts that supposedly embody national identity by embarking on a journey – what Neumann calls a “tour d’horizon” – when talking about a collective European identity. A reading of these Others – instead of the

---

255 Ibid., p. 230.
257 Ibid., p. 386.
fixity of an analysis of the Self – and the level of threats formulated from how these Others are perceived, can help reveal how the Self is constituted.
CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON BRITISH NATIONAL
IDENTITY

2.1 British National Identity

2.1.1 Introduction

This chapter functions as a survey of the existing debates. It is organised thematically in order to shed light on the roots of many of the configurations articulated by British political elites. Although not exhaustive, I have focused on those discourses that contain elements picked up in the empirical sections of this dissertation. More specifically, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, it provides an introduction to many of the recurring themes which appear within the discourses on Europe. However, it critically engages with such concepts to argue that although such identities have been historically dominant, they have frequently moulded into other configurations. That is, historical discourses on Britain and Europe are relevant but must be read contextually as a means of comprehending how resonant they might be for the historical events analysed. Secondly, it attempts to show from where political elites get their ideas and how they argue. Therefore, it supports the idea that spokespeople have to articulate arguments which have a meaning with the wider public and bolsters one of the central notions of this dissertation: that elite configurations matter in the construction of national identities. As such, arguments are not extemporaneous but instead draw on deeply embedded historical readings and beliefs. Each theme is introduced with relevant literature and I conclude with what relevancy such readings of identity have for this project. This literature review, therefore, is an examination of how identity has been configured so far.
2.1.2 Interpreting History

The invocation of historical myths and exclusivity of nationally specific events are abundant in the various attempts political spokespeople have used to fashion a British national identity. The role that history plays in shaping identity, however, cannot be extricated from the disagreements over what constitutes British history in the first place. Pertinent to this study is the fact that although common or frequently occurring historical events are called upon, they are read in a multitude of ways. Subsequently, while historical images are consistently utilised to inject national characteristics, “the problem is not history as such, but rather the truncated and selective view of it that is often purveyed and believed.”^259 For that reason, it is important to iterate that history is not a value-free objective process but “[a]ll of us, living in our own time, tend to see the past on our own terms.”^260

In approaching British history, an early difficulty is to identify how Britain is categorised. As Nairn points out, the myriad of different terms are all equally unsatisfactory:

[W]e live in a State with a variety of titles having different functions and nuances – the U.K. (or ‘Yookay’, as Raymond Williams relabelled it), Great Britain (imperial robes), Britain (boring lounge-suit), England (poetic but troublesome), the British Isles (too geographical), ‘This Country’ (all-purpose within the Family), or ‘This Small Country of Ours’ (defensive-Shakespearean).^261

Such confusion, however, reveals that the various classifications are invoked to serve a particular political purpose. Identities, therefore, possess multiple meanings. Neither is such a cluster of labels merely a contemporary problem as the various monikers for Britain had been noted by George Orwell over seventy years earlier:

It is quite true that the so-called races of Britain feel themselves to be very different from one another ... You can see the hesitation we feel on this point by the fact that we call our islands by no less than six different names, England, Britain, Great Britain, the British Isles, the United Kingdom and, in very exalted moments, Albion.\textsuperscript{262}

Whether such disparities are recognised has the effect of producing two quite divergent histories and correspondingly different identities. The first seeks to produce a more homogenous and unified narrative by arguing that Britain is synonymous with its most economically and culturally dominant component, England. In this history, Wales, Scotland and Ireland are peripheral figures in the shaping of British history. The second rejects this Anglocentric approach and attempts to argue that a real history must take note of Britain’s polyethnic and multiple natures. I deal with both of these approaches in turn.

The first approach takes its strength from the Whig interpretation of history which informs the debates over Europe even today. Whig history has a number of important characteristics. Lord Macauley, writing in the nineteenth century, opens his five-volume \textit{History of England} heralding how the settlement of England was defended against enemies, how liberty and freedom ushered in a period of unrivalled prosperity, how bondage was shaken off to be replaced by Empire and how huge merchanty spawned a maritime power unsurpassed in history.\textsuperscript{263} Whig history also includes

the tendency in many historians to write on the side of Protestants and Whigs, to praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present.\textsuperscript{264}

Closely wrapped up with the belief in the inexorable path to progress is the celebration of a number of important historical milestones. These are significant as they are all part of the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\end{thebibliography}
teleological view that events have culminated in perhaps the high point of the Whig interpretation: the inviolability of the Constitution. Victories such as the Magna Carta in shaking off the ‘Norman yoke’, the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 in heralding a new political liberty, and the sanctity of a non-interventionist state in direct opposition to continental systems, are all watersheds within this interpretation. In short, Whiggishness is a hagiographic portrayal of progress coupled with a celebration of English superiority. The success of this approach is synonymous with Britain as a world power. Fuelled by industrial development and the expansion of Empire, this interpretation sat comfortably with Britain as pioneer: “where Britain led, the rest of the west soon followed, and the Third World might confidently be expected to advance in the same direction”. Unsurprisingly, Britain’s declining world role augmented an assault on the Whig interpretation. However, it would be wrong to presuppose that past glories are not still invoked by political elites with the direct intention of bolstering the politics of the present. One notable example, by the then Prime Minister John Major, was during the election campaign for the European Parliament in 1994:

This British nation has a monarchy founded by the kings of Wessex over eleven hundred years ago, a Parliament and universities formed over seven hundred years ago, language with its roots in the mists of time, and the richest vocabulary in the world.

In contrast, the ‘four nations’ approach has sought to question the simplicity of this interpretation. A number of scholars have contributed to producing a more pluralistic history. Norman Davies revises the conventional notion of Britain being governed by an immutable and eternally characterised England to instead “pay due respect to all the nations and cultures

---

in the history of the Isles.”\textsuperscript{270} With the highlighting of a more disparate Britain comes a plethora of examples which chip away at the received wisdom. These include shedding light on the prehistory of Celtic Britain, as against the more standard starting point of Roman Britain; the well-worn tale of the Norman invasion of England actually being a Viking invasion,\textsuperscript{271} and the Reformation, commonly perceived as extricating England from Catholic vassalage, actually having the effect of destroying England’s European elements.\textsuperscript{272} In a similar vein, Hugh Kearney offers a view in which British history is a complex of interacting cultures with England being part of a “multi-national conglomerate.”\textsuperscript{273} His research looks at the many cultural fault lines that peppered the Isles. Examples include a sixteenth century Scotland with a Gaelic-speaking west having closer links to Ulster and loyalties going to local chiefs, as against the English-speaking Lowlands where feudal loyalty was determined by religious persuasion and a Puritan insistence on Bible-reading eventually improving literacy.\textsuperscript{274} In the same way, Raphael Samuel argues how the borders of Anglo-Saxon England were entirely permeable, with Scotland appearing to be politically united but pitted with a menagerie of Irish, Picts, Angles, Saxons and Britons.\textsuperscript{275} He concludes that Scotland “seems to have been inhabited by virtually everybody except the Scots.”\textsuperscript{276} Similar fractiousness occurred in Wales whereby two cultures became sub-divided by religion and class\textsuperscript{277} and the symbol of territorial divide, Offa’s Dyke, actually functioning as a crossing point which suggests a symbiotic relationship between English and Welsh lords.

Although not an advocate of ‘four nations’ history, Linda Colley, rather than emphasising the

\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., p. 236.
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., p. 338.
\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., p. 175.
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid.
\end{small}
disaggregate nature of Britain, has stressed how Britishness was forged in the wider context of contact with the external Other: “Britishness was superimposed over an array of internal differences in response to contact with the Other, and above all in response to conflict with the Other.”

The Other being Catholic France. Subsequently, instead of viewing history as the internal machinations of four separate but interrelated entities, Colley broadens the picture to include overseas as a major constituent in the making of Britain. Hence, she argues, that Britain was forged ‘top-down’ by the twin complements of Protestantism and Empire as a way of dealing with the Catholic threat. This subsequently positions Ireland as a peripheral actor, as Colley not uncontroversially admits: “the Welsh, the Scottish, and the English saw (and often still see) the Irish as alien in a way that they did not regard each other as alien.”

These two conflicting approaches to British history can be summarised in a much-cited commentary which first initiated the debate. In 1975, J. G. A. Pocock called for an intercultural approach which sought to present British history not as separate histories of its constituent parts, but as a number of “phases in which it can be seen as the interrelations of a number of advanced and sophisticated provinces.” This contextual approach, as already noted, emphasises the interrelatedness of the entities of England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland and attempts to untether British history from a hegemonic English standpoint. As for the dominance of England: “[t]he fact of a hegemony does not alter the fact of a plurality, any more than the history of a frontier amounts to denial that there is a history beyond the advancing frontier.”

In short, British history, in order not to fall into the trap of offering an over-arching, simplistic narrative, must make room for a profusion of non-English voices. By

---

281 Ibid., pp. 605-6.
contrast, A. J. P. Taylor’s rebuff to Pocock paraded the English versus British history not as an exercise in the politics of language, but “a fuss over names, not over things”. He went on to state that the so-called common cultural experience between the various nations of Britain “is not true. The culture is and always has been exclusively English, with some contributions from the outposts that are on a very small scale.

To reiterate, the study of British history has been frequently characterised by the conflation of England as Britain. This elision is most evident in the Whig interpretation of history, an approach dominant in the nineteenth century, which sought to highlight an inexorable progress towards enlightenment. In contrast, a vigorous backlash, sometimes labelled ‘four nations history’, has attempted to position England as one of several provinces that helped shape British history. Emphasis is placed on the non-homogenous nature of the four nations and the interrelatedness between them.

2.1.3 War and Empire

British national identity has been manifestly affected by the contact Britain has had overseas. Other countries have acted as mediums which have instilled both Britain and other states with certain characteristics, attitudes and behaviour. Seeley, in his celebrated and influential *Expansion of England*, mentions that “the history of England is not in England but in America and Asia.” Consequently, Empire enabled the British to take both themselves and their culture overseas, which although producing very different societies, were arguably

---

283 Ibid.
British in the first instance.\textsuperscript{285} Despite Seeley’s notable claim that “[w]e seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind”,\textsuperscript{286} the growth of trade could not be disentangled from the growth of sea power. Mahen’s \textit{The Influence of Sea Power upon History}, which held an enormous amount of sway on naval strategy, particularly in the US, begins with reference to “that English nation which more than any other has owed its greatness to the sea.”\textsuperscript{287} However, rivalry and Empire certainly predate the late nineteenth century world of Seeley and Mahen, and it is worth examining the influences behind the origins of Empire and the consequent effect such perceptions have on this study.

Armitage identifies a number of potential roots.\textsuperscript{288} One traces the British Empire back to the reign of Elizabeth I in which Empire became defined as Protestant, Anglo-British, benign and extra-European, and is characterised by the maritime feats of English sailors. A second points to Empire having its roots in the sixteenth century when ‘internal colonialism’ was replaced by external ‘imperialism’ and the previously disparate nature of local power characteristic of Norman Britain would give way to racial, political and cultural dominance starting with the civilising missions in Ireland during the same period. At this time, Armitage notes, Empire was no longer benign and no longer exotic as it sought to amalgamate the disparate centres of power closer to home. Another derivation of Empire starts from the twelfth century and is characterised by “its supremacist racism, its crusading national identity and its ideology of conquest”.\textsuperscript{289} What is clear is that the very nature of Empire brought England and Britain into contact and conflict with a range of other states and ethnicities. What is also clear is that differing accounts of the origins of Empire still reveal a number of characteristics of present-

\textsuperscript{286} Seeley, J. R. (1883) \textit{The Expansion of England}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., p. 6.
day national identity. As Armitage goes on to note, the British Empire, in contrast to present
empires such as the Spanish Monarchy as well as past empires, was primarily Protestant,
commercial, maritime and free.\textsuperscript{290}

Perhaps the most obvious example of the articulation of such characteristics is embodied
within Britain’s turbulent and much-historicised wars with France. Several examples can be
provided to support the view that France has functioned as a key influence on British identity.
Smith argues how “France assumed a leading role within a European Catholic Christendom,
providing the model of a Christian European aristocratic civilization.”\textsuperscript{291} By contrast,
“[w]hen England was detached from Rome, it also separated as both state and nation from the
Catholic realm.”\textsuperscript{292} Hence, despite the predominance of the Europe-as-Christendom narrative
and not forgetting the weakening of its spiritual roots,\textsuperscript{293} “Britons enlisted Protestantism
chiefly as a way of strengthening its simple antithesis in which ‘Protestant Britain’
confronted ‘Catholic France’.”\textsuperscript{294} As already mentioned, this point is echoed by Colley.
Britain, she mentions “was an invention forged above all by war. ... Britons ... defined
themselves as Protestants struggling for survival against the world’s foremost Catholic
power. They defined themselves against the French as they imagined them to be,
superstitious, militarist, decadent and unfree.”\textsuperscript{295}

Even the Battle of Culloden in 1746, with the Jacobite cause extinguished, did little to
assuage a more general anti-Catholic sentiment. This emotion was entrenched in a more

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., p. 448.
Integration’, p. 436.
249-276 (at 261).
perennial historical narrative in which “[a] powerful and persistently threatening France became the haunting embodiment of that Catholic Other which Britons had been taught to fear since the Reformation in the sixteenth century.” After the Napoleonic Wars, the threat of the Catholic peril, it has been argued, shifted from France to Ireland. McLeod states that Ireland in the nineteenth century was both feared and despised: feared because of the threat of armed revolution and the possibility that Ireland might function as a stepping-stone for foreign invaders; despised because its poverty was symbolic of drunkenness and fecklessness. This negative imaging was further bolstered by Irish immigration to England, particularly during and after the Great Famine in the late 1840s, as well as the proliferation of Irish nationalism characterised as Fenianism. A further shift in view occurred during the middle of the nineteenth century in which the image of the drink-sodden but largely inoffensive Irish peasant became replaced by an apelike belligerent intent on stone-throwing, violence and anarchy. Such characterisations also appeared within publications such as Punch. As Haydon points out, “[i]f, in the nineteenth century, protestant Englishmen saw Irish catholics as ‘the other’, whose many failings negatively defined and extolled the former’s values, continental papists were ‘the other’ for protestant Britons in the preceding century.” He goes on to highlight two broad depictions of Catholic elites. Firstly, they bolstered despotism and tyranny. Spanish dignitaries were portrayed as “cruel and proud” and French noblemen as “foppish and debauched”. Secondly, Catholicism was constructed as a
perversity of the gospels with cohorts of monks, nuns and clergy promulgating false doctrine and surrounded by grotesque wealth in contrast to the poor and servile peasantry. A pamphlet issued by the Association for the Preservation against Republicans and Levellers focused on French atrocities in Alexandria, Jaffa and Europe and stressed that “the same soldiers, the very same rapacious and sanguinary host” were poised to invade Britain “like gaunt and hungry wolves”. An address to the people of England, but not Britain, from an American newspaper, The Balance, and Columbian Repository, conjured up similar images of French terror. On the French invasions of Germany in 1796 and 1798, they spread themselves over it like beasts of prey, devouring and destroying every thing before them ... In many places they stripped the clothes from the backs of people, set their liquor flowing in the cellar, burnt their provisions to ashes ... Towards women of all ages and all conditions, they were guilty of brutality never before heard of ... but the lower orders of the people, the artisans and the labourers, were the objects of their direst malignity; against them was directed the sharpest bayonets.

In short, such negative imaging – from elites, the press and the people – helped to infuse a fundamental difference between Britain and the Continent. This relationship can be aptly summed up by Kumar:

Protestant nations were free, independent, tolerant and prosperous, friendly to and thriving on commerce and constitutional liberties. Catholic nations were sunk in despotism, dogma and poverty, the prey of power-hungry monarchs and superstitious priests.

Throughout the twentieth century, the negative representations of France lingered. War time images of a supine France collapsing so quickly to German aggression not only “strengthened established national stereotypes of continental corruption and English exceptionalism”, but

\[\text{\footnotesize 302 Ibid., pp. 34-5.}\]
have also been fiercely intransigent because they are deeply embedded in a web of self-belief and national myths. During the post-war period, Smith argues how France’s harmonisation of relations with Germany from after the Second World War devalued its former relationship with Britain and how Franco-British relations still continue to be a formative influence on British Eurosceptic attitudes today.\textsuperscript{307} The French vetoes of the British applications for entry into the Common Market, first in 1963 and again in 1967, perhaps also serve as conceptual reference points Eurosceptics use to propagate their views. Finally, Margaret Thatcher’s brusque comments in an interview with \textit{Le Monde} in 1989 underscore entrenched notions of a British aptitude for rules of fair play and respect for rights and ethics, freedoms that have not been crudely imported from the Continent but have been gradual and home-grown: “[h]uman rights did not begin with the French Revolution ... (We English) had 1688, our quiet revolution, where Parliament exerted its will over the King ... it was not the sort of Revolution that France's was.”\textsuperscript{308} Lady Thatcher went on to present President Mitterrand with a first edition copy of Dickens’ \textit{A Tale of Two Cities}, “which also made somewhat more elegantly the same point as my interview.”\textsuperscript{309}

France, however, has not been the only nation to serve as a foil for defining Britishness. Greene notes how the Elizabethan-era surge in mercantilism and exploration enabled England to be defined as both the bulwark against papal belligerence and the harbinger of commercial benefits and freedoms.\textsuperscript{310} England could then be defined as a great trading nation in contrast to “Spanish tyranny, Spanish cruelty, and Spanish ambition.”\textsuperscript{311} By the end of the nineteenth

\textsuperscript{309} Ibid.
century, challenges from the USA, Russia, Germany and Japan would relegate Protestantism as a defining characteristic of British national identity. Instead, Judd has argued that by this time, the Empire served as a fig leaf to cloak Britain’s declining world power status.  

312 So successful was the masquerade that it caused an Italian and German scramble for colonies. One Hanoverian officer complained that the British “plume themselves not only upon them being free themselves, but being the Assertors and Bulwarks of Liberty all over Europe,” while “they vilify most of the Nations of the Continent ... for being Slaves, as they call us.”  

313 As perceptions of Empire altered, so did the effect on national identity. While the Empire was once lodged within a celebratory triptych of Protestantism, economic prosperity and the extension of natural born freedoms to the Dominions and much of the ‘uncivilised’ world, this view began to be questioned. For example, Thompson argues how the Boer War effectively stifled any new attempts at conquest as the British army found itself cowed by a small community of Dutch farmers.  

314 This, he continues, caused the Dominions to be seen in more federal and cooperative terms as a way of ensuring continued competition with the likes of Germany and the USA. This sense of community between Britain and its Dominions was articulated by the Navy League, a non-party pressure group designed to promote the importance of maritime supremacy, through references to family metaphors, such as ‘sister nations’, ‘daughter dominions’, and ‘parent’ and ‘mother country’.  

315 The role of the US in fashioning British identity is also particularly notable, especially as the relationship includes not merely the mutual rivalry so associated with the Continent, but also

---

315 Ibid., p. 175.
sentiments of commonality and kinship as perhaps embodied in the well-worn motif of the ‘special relationship’. The links between Britain and her distant colonies could only be maintained by a sense of cohesion; that as Britain was the home of freedom in Europe, so too was the British Empire in America.\(^{316}\) These freedoms were to eventually give way to the perception of Empire as a conduit of power and domination over the settlers. As Benjamin Franklin observed, settlers were not “fellow subjects, but subjects of subjects”.\(^{317}\) Subsequently, the origins of the ensuing revolution were to be found in Britain, not America, as the growing economic and strategic importance of the colonies created the fear that greater autonomy might lead to their loss.\(^{318}\) The injurious legislation enacted upon the colonies was a simultaneous attempt to deny the colonists the traditional rights of all Britons.\(^{319}\) Hence, although the American Revolution may have had its foundations in unfair taxes, the upheaval was symptomatic of a much broader clamour for democracy.

Colley has observed how the loss of the American colonies instigated “a rise in enthusiasm for parliamentary reform, for imperial reform, for religious liberalisation, for the reforms of gaols and lunatic asylums: for virtually any change, in fact, that might prevent a similar national humiliation in the future.”\(^{320}\) The issue of humiliation, and the broader turbulent nature of Britain’s relationship with America, reveals several shifting configurations of British national identity. Firstly, many of the perceptions of the relationship are lodged within a begrudging nexus of superiority and inferiority. As Hitchens mentions:

> Post-imperial Britain, during the arduous and sometimes embarrassing process of becoming post-imperial, leaned very decidedly towards the


\(^{319}\) Ibid., p. 100.

United States. Not without rancour, it appointed the United States as its successor. Not without quibbling and reservation, the United States took up the succession.\footnote{Hitchens, C. (1990) Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies, London: Vintage, p. 24.} He goes on to reveal how the remnants of Empire were reformulated by ruling elites to reinvigorate the idea that Britain still had a role to play in a world no longer shaped by it. Hence, the ‘special relationship’ might “somehow allow the English ghost to pass into a new and vigorous body.”\footnote{Ibid.} Secondly, Britain has been viewed as a ‘transatlantic bridge’ and capable of mediating between Europe and America.\footnote{See, for example, Hebel, K. (2007) ‘A “Bridge” Between the “Two Wests”? The British Identity Dilemma in a Post-Atlanticist Age’, paper for presentation at SGIR 2007.} This pits British identity as lodged within a solidaristic and sympathetic sense of affinity based on common and shared values and interests. Finally, and stemming from the experience of the Second World War, both Britain and America are perceived as stalwarts against totalitarianism and embodiments of freedom. Much of this is configured against the Continent with particular emphasis on the idea of Germany as naturally authoritarian and France predisposed towards corruption and cowardice.\footnote{Wallace, W. (1991) ‘Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom’, p. 72.}

Apart from the Empire fashioning British identity via conflict, Britain’s overseas conquests have had several other ramifications. Firstly, Judd has remarked how via the increase in prosperity, employment opportunities and mass emigration, the Empire functioned as a stabilising factor in post-revolutionary Britain and instilled a sense of national confidence.\footnote{Judd, D. (1999) ‘Britain: Land Beyond Hope and Glory?’, p. 20.} Secondly, the legacy of the Empire also helped construct an identity different to that in the Continent by which the significance of Europe could be denied.\footnote{Ibid.} McCrone has pointed out how the British state was primarily geared towards the management of its overseas
possessions thus producing the ‘nightwatchman state’, overwhelmingly concerned with matters of defence. They are not citizens of a state ... [t]hey are subjects of a monarch, enjoying ‘liberties’ which their ancestors won from previous monarchs.” Wellings mentions that as industrialisation increased, an alliance of common interests formed between the aristocracy and bourgeoisie which centred on the state and was fuelled by the defence of Empire. However, as the state had existed prior to the process of rapid industrialisation, it was never obliged to force itself upon civil society to cultivate this economic expansion. This helped produce a state identity that was less interwoven into civil society. Thirdly, Empire has been seen as a means of denying closer links to Europe and again highlighting a sense of British separateness from the Continent. For example, Bell has provided an account of the attitudes towards the Continent of three notable and highly influential English historians: George Trevelyan, Herbert Fisher and Arthur Bryant. Although all three historians focused on England rather than Britain, Bell isolates four main themes in their histories: the character of England was separate from the Continent; English institutions and society were superior; England found her true self when she crossed the oceans to plant colonies; and when England involved herself within European affairs, it was traditionally to save the Continent from tyranny. Bell goes on to cite how influential these historians’ attitudes, particularly favoured among Prime Ministers, and concludes that in the early post-Second World War period, “these ideas were still firmly established in the minds of educated Englishmen as they considered the case of European integration, and in

330 Ibid.
332 Ibid., p. 18.
most cases rejected it." Finally, it has been argued that the notion of Empire made society more integrated. As Morgan has noted, the growth of railways and communications, national banking systems and mass newspaper press were all made easier by the vision of Empire which fostered an image of unity. Consequently, the Empire popularised a view that all participants of the ‘four nations’ could contribute and benefit from being part of British expansionism, and the inhabitants of ‘the Celtic fringe’ would all play their part in the founding, running and defending overseas territories. Hence, national identity was notable for an allegiance to the Crown, rather than any ethno-cultural sameness. This has the effect of understanding Empire as a way of revealing dual identities, whereby citizens could be Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish and English at home but British abroad.

To summarise, both war and Empire have had tangible effects on British national identity. Historical rivalries have pitted the Continent, most notably France, Germany and Spain, in opposition to Britain. In order to embolden the notion of a unified and superior Britain, the characteristics of Britishness were embodied in the virtues of an expanding Empire, which transmitted the inalienable right of freedom as well as prosperity abroad. In order to guarantee this wealth, the state was geared towards the defence of Empire and subsequently took a less active role within civil society. Such affluence is located in stark contrast to foreign poverty and degradation. Further characterisations of the Continent positioned it as tyrannical, superstitious and corrupt as against a Britain defined as independent, rational and principled. However, as the Empire bolstered the national image at home, its decline resulted in Britain having to create an identity of dependence on its natural successor, America.

333 Ibid., p. 19.
2.1.4 Geography and Landscape

For millennia, geography has had an explicit effect on the political world. Livingstone highlights how geography has had an intimate involvement with exploration and been an instrument of imperialism, has been exploited in an attempt to point to a divine creator, has vitalised the human experience by extricating humankind from nature’s grip and has also functioned as a bridge between nature and humanity. Moreover, places are important for identities and particularly for national identities because nations straddle both the social and the spatial: the people as part of a community and the place as a homeland. Two predominant geographical themes are implicit within the attempt by British political elites to depict a British national identity over the Europe debates. The first is the invocation of the island story and the second is the role of landscape, and in particular, the rural countryside.

To begin with, the evocation of the ‘Britain as island’ narrative has emboldened the image of Britain as a unique and geographically separate nation. Although linked to the Whig interpretation of history which stresses British exceptionalism, the island story far predates industrial Britain. The Roman historian Tacitus, for example, drew up an early geographical and ethnographic study of the British Isles:

[N]owhere has the sea a wider dominion, that it has many currents running in every direction, that it does not merely flow and ebb within the limits of the shore, but penetrates and winds far inland, and finds a home among hills and mountains as though in its own domain.

Tacitus’ text arguably foreshadows the role geography plays in forging a distinct identity. The insularity of ancient Britain and its people is accentuated by its geographical remoteness.

This must become reformulated as a precursor to conquest. Subsequently, the ocean, which once functioned as a barrier now becomes a medium by which the Romans can seize Britain.\textsuperscript{339} The sea is multipurpose: “[i]t limits size, marks boundaries, and insulates against continental contaminants.”\textsuperscript{340} The insularity, therefore, harbours the poetic notion of the garden kingdom, untrammelled by foreign influence. A number of scholars, however, have shed light on the romanticised vision of the island story. Davies firstly highlights the tendency within some scholarship to be fixated with the one island allure.\textsuperscript{341} Examples include Roy Strong’s opening claim that “Britain is an island and that fact is more important than any other in understanding its history”,\textsuperscript{342} and A. L. Rowse’s imperial pronouncement that “[t]he story of Britain is that of the island which has influenced the outside world more than any other island in history.”\textsuperscript{343} The second point Davies addresses is the ever common elision between England and Britain. He expresses scepticism of the claims in \textit{The Oxford History of Britain} that Venetian ambassadors in the fifteenth century might have been “convinced of the special quality of British society”\textsuperscript{344} when the British state was yet to be formed and late-medieval emissaries would likely have visited only England. Similar such problems with the island story have been elucidated by Crick who highlights the mythdom of uninterrupted peace and tranquillity by citing the Scottish occupation of Newcastle in 1640 and Dutch invasion in 1688 as examples.\textsuperscript{345}

Although the notion of landscape has most commonly been used to construct a particular English identity, it is pertinent to British national identity in three ways. Firstly, a dualism

exists which has its roots in the discourses of Whiggishness and Empire. That is, the smallness of England helped cultivate the pride of an overseas British Empire and that both Englishness and Britishness, therefore, are fused. In terms of historical symbolism, these two facets have been most commonly illustrated by the countrified John Bull and the ruler-of-the-waves Britannia. Secondly, images of a rural England have been influenced by factors outside of the geography of the South. Thirdly, the attempt to provide a unifying idea of ruralism was an attempt to downplay the fractiousness and rivalries between different intranational communities, many of which were scattered all over Britain.

Ruralism is perhaps most readily identified with wholesomeness and civility. As illustrated by Howkins:

Purity, decency, goodness, honesty, even “reality” itself are closely identified with the rural south ... It is an organic society, a “real” one, as opposed to the unnatural or “unreal” society of the town.

These dominant representations are seen as embodying Britain as a whole. Howkins, for example, further argues that at the turn of the twentieth century, rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, along with racial tensions, had created a ‘Back to the Earth’ policy in which the solution to urban crises could only be found in the countryside. Political elites had abandoned a sense of national allegiance as the “rapacity of international capital had martyred three generations on the wheels of industry”, whereas the country and its people

---

350 Ibid., pp. 62-88.
351 Ibid., p. 70.
“were seen as the essence of England, uncontaminated by racial degeneration and the false values of cosmopolitan urban life.”\textsuperscript{352} The recourse to rural imagery was a way of traversing the class divide and ensuring continuity against the decimation of the First World War. As Howkins adds, “there simply had to be a world outside Flanders, and this world equally could not be that of ‘dark satanic mills,’ even if that did better represent the reality of home.”\textsuperscript{353} Consequently, pastoral imagery was an important counterweight to the grim realism of war.

This homogeneity and continuity has also been exemplified by Readman who illustrates how a particular inward-looking and localised feeling of Englishness was prevalent in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{354} By using centenary celebrations, primarily the 1901 thousandth anniversary of the death of King Alfred, as well as references to the proliferation of antiquarian literature, travelogues and preservationist movements, he shows that although such appeals to history may have been elite inspired, they firstly had too much popular appeal to be merely elite representations, and secondly, the manifestations of Englishness were locally grounded and not born out of external conflict related to Empire or Protestantism. Hence, “pageants evoked the spirit of a pastoral and contented ‘Merrie England’ ... largely due to the emphasis many placed on the Elizabethan past.”\textsuperscript{355}

Similar such pleas to idyllicism occurred during the Second World War. Lunn highlights how images of Britain in newsreels were sometimes industrial, but, in order to imbue patriotism, gave way to a more mystical vision which also had the purpose of countering ‘abroad’ and the other more social realist ‘Britains’ which existed.\textsuperscript{356} The Blitz is another war time image

\textsuperscript{352} Ibid., p. 69.
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., p. 81.
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., p. 186.
constructed as congruous and has been investigated by Calder.\textsuperscript{357} The hegemonised narrative paints a picture of gritty Cockney resilience and national unity against the German air raids. As written in \textit{The Economist} at the time, “[t]hese sufferings have been borne with courage and cheerfulness. It is common form in all such disasters to say that the morale of the people is excellent. In London this week the hackneyed phrase has had a real meaning.”\textsuperscript{358} Calder, however, reveals a quite different picture with spates of muggings and rapes occurring under the protection of black-outs and dirty over-crammed air raid shelters providing a breeding ground for racial and sexual harassment. Entrenched class divisions continued to permeate society and negate the idea of national unity while “Jews were blamed for monopolising the shelters, women for the shortage of cigarettes, American soldiers for seducing English girls.”\textsuperscript{359} Similarly, Rose shows how the wartime attempts to foster the image of Britain as a paternalistic and benign colonial nation fighting a ‘People’s War’ against Nazism was undermined by the ‘colour bars’ and racial discrimination against the very people needed to win a global conflict.\textsuperscript{360} The all-in-it-together narrative is further questioned by how close Britain had actually been to social disintegration. Such was the desperation, Clement Attlee said “[i]f only the Germans had had the sense not to bomb west of London Bridge, there might have been a revolution in this country.”\textsuperscript{361} Due to, rather than in spite of such uncomfortable realities, images of rural England continued to flourish.

A final point relates to how the rural setting is synonymous with particular outdoor pursuits which have also been articulated to reveal national characteristics. The proliferation of horse-
breeding, grouse-shooting and salmon-fishing, as Kumar notes, emphasises a shift from the
town to the country and is related to the integration of the British nobility that practised these
pursuits in all corners of the kingdom.\textsuperscript{362} Similarly, by the 1840s and 1850s, landed gentry no
longer had the monopoly over field sports as \textit{nouveaux riches} began to partake more and
more in the pursuits of the so-called country gentleman.\textsuperscript{363} One such recreation, full of
national meaning and elite-monopolised, is fox-hunting. It has an effect on the Britain-as-
rural identity and the broader issue of national identity in several ways. Firstly, before the
Hunting Act of 2004, a number of parliamentary debates revealed, once again, how such a
topic functions as a vehicle for thrashing out contested notions of identity. One Member of
Parliament linked a respectful visit to commemorate the war dead at the Cenotaph in London
to the threat against liberty of a fox-hunting ban:

\begin{quote}
Although I do not expect Labour Members to understand the concept, it
must be true that all those people who gave their lives would wonder today
whether the pursuit of liberty and their final sacrifice for the defence of
freedom against tyranny was worth dying for.\textsuperscript{364}
\end{quote}

The ban being a threat to liberty was also taken up by several newspapers and magazines.
Wallwork and Dixon cite several in their study on how the various debates over the ban
produced rhetorical constructions of particular places and identities.\textsuperscript{365} The \textit{March Magazine}
included the following:

\begin{quote}
Millions of countrymen died in two World Wars. They were fighting for
freedom. The threat to the countryside and the country way of life is a
dictatorship, precisely what our gallant soldiers, sailors and airmen fought
and died to prevent\textsuperscript{366}
\end{quote}

So, although an elite-dominated pursuit, the right to hunt foxes is articulated as a more

\textsuperscript{366} \textit{March Magazine} (1998). Cited in ibid., p. 27.
general exercise of personal freedom and a ban is perceived as an assault on the freedoms of all. The notion of liberty is seen as a fundamental, inalienable British right. Secondly, a leader in the *Daily Telegraph* points out how hunting “provides a model of the organisation of country life, totally unsubsidised” and that this tradition “must now be abolished because of the urban, anti-Christian ideology”. In this sense, hunting is symbolic of an organic and voluntary mechanism for managing the countryside and is at risk from the interfering ambitions of urban dwellers. A tension exists between town and country and yet “‘country’, in the sense of nation, is closely bound up with ‘country’ in the sense of green fields.”

Finally, country life is seen as an integral part of national identity and country pursuits embody this sentiment. Rural sport provides a link to this identity which is threatened. That is, “[h]unting with dogs remains one of the few ways in which people who live in towns can participate actively in real rural life” and “[m]ost British people, wherever they live, have a strong sense that the countryside is part of their identity.”

In summary, an examination of some of the literature on geography and landscape reveals two dominant themes that have been consistently articulated: the island story and the image of rural England. Both, one might add, heavily appeal to emotional imagery and mythdom. As such, myths are needed as a means of constructing national identity because they “consume the least amount of resources in an attempt to rally a people around a common cause.” The articulation of the island story has a major effect. By highlighting the singularity of Britain, and downplaying the peripheral groups or fragmented nature, it

---

368 Ibid.
positions Britain as unified, isolated and unique. Common references also position this distinctiveness against the backdrop of a disparate and patchy Continent. The image of rural England has a three-fold effect. Firstly, it preaches a sense of idyllicism against the milieu of war and social upheaval. Hence, the pastoral image is utilised in an attempt to repulse economic decline and urban squalor. Secondly, the representation functions as a way of unifying the disparate elements within British society, particularly class and ethnic differences as well as antagonisms between town and country. Again, in the advent of war, such images had a unifying effect which cut across social differences. Thus, as Lunn mentions of Hobsbawm, the image of rural England is an ‘invented tradition’ which attempts to make sense of the present by invoking a sanitised version of the past. Thirdly, this image is wrapped up within a discourse of power; that this image is not necessarily home grown or locally cultivated, but imposed as a way of dealing with the social problems of war and urbanisation. For example, John Major’s attempt to define Britain as an unerring and continuous entity invoked images of “the country of long shadows on cricket grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pools fillers.” This endeavour to highlight an undying image resonating across the whole nation merely exposes a cloying nostalgia for a Britain many people might not recognise or want to eulogise: masculinised, middle class and rustic.

2.1.5 The Break-up of Britain?

One of the most recent elite-driven attempts to fashion a British national identity has been the pursuit of a unifying sense of Britishness. This attempt occurred due to widespread agreement

---

over what can be called the crisis of Britishness, evident within a number of apocalyptically titled books on the subject. The death throes of the British state are seemingly in motion and it is not unreasonable to assume that Britain, at least in its current format, shall not survive. Such a position is largely connected to the issue of devolution with the establishment of the National Welsh Assembly and the reestablishment of the Scottish Parliament under the Blair government. The crisis also has other purported causes including the 2005 London bombings, the stalled Northern Ireland Peace Process and the after-effects of the Iraq War. The potential break-up of Britain, it can be argued, has even broader antecedents whereby previously unifying factors, such as Protestantism, the Second World War and Empire mentioned in the preceding sections, are fading in the national consciousness to such a degree that they have little to offer a modern-day formulation of British national identity. As such, the literature points to a clear demarcation between Britain as a modern construction and Britain as possessing an ever-lasting essence. This final section examines these arguments.

A recently published special issue in *The Political Quarterly* addresses the consequences and meaning of Gordon Brown’s well-publicised attempt to launch the Britishness project aimed at a declaration of British values. In an address to the Fabian Society in 2006, Brown argued that while America has its Independence Day and France its Bastille Day, Britain too needed a day of patriotic pride and national celebration. Such feelings, Brown argued, have been hijacked by the far-right when in actual fact they encompass the ideas of “liberty, fairness and

---


Hassan outlines the evolution of Brown’s thinking culminating in his conversion to (re-) discovering Britishness. He is highly critical of the unoriginal and contradictory nature of these stages of transformation: in the 1970s, ‘red Brown’ posturing as a radical but following conventional Labour thinking; in the 1980s, ‘supply side Socialism’ in which ‘efficiency and fairness’ are paraded but no critique of the casino capitalism of the City attempted; and the 1990s, whereby commitments to child and pensioner poverty ignored any reference to the responsibilities of the super-rich. Thus, the search for Britishness was born out of “a realisation that his economy and social justice messages were neither distinctive nor that appealing.” But what was the purpose of the mission to locate Britishness? Hassan argues it was three-fold: to try and synthesise the Labour story in a post-Thatcherite world, to support devolution whilst sustaining the unity of the state and to surpass geographically determined political allegiances via homogenisation. Brown’s omissions, however, are the crux of the problem and function as a distinct reminder of the difficulties in articulating an overarching national sentiment. Two major oversights are noteworthy. Firstly, Brown’s Britain is one where “Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are nations and England is a collection of regions.” Critical events in English history including the Magna Carta, the Peasants’ Revolt and the English Civil War are appropriated as part of Britain’s tale. Hence, the age-old conflation of using Britain for England undergoes a reversal: English history becomes British as a means of concocting a feigned narrative of national unity. Secondly, Brown’s Britishness is insular and ignores Britain’s relationship with the Commonwealth,
Europe and America.\textsuperscript{383} His attempt to glean the essence of Britishness by looking inward rather than outward overlooks the many foreign influences that domestic identities are subjected to.

Colley argues that the weakening of the roles of Protestantism and Christianity, the marginalised role of the Royal Family, the lack of a clearly defined foreign enemy or Other (for example, the shadowy and non-consensual War on Terror) and the level of interrelatedness which ensures that decisions in Washington have far greater impact on the UK than could have been imagined prior to the Second World War\textsuperscript{384} are all suggestive of a shift in the meaning of Britishness. She stresses the importance of the establishment of a written constitution which might serve as “valuable cement”\textsuperscript{385} and the fact that its absence has been responsible for the somewhat muddy concept of British citizenship. This current notion is firmly attached to both Empire and monarchy in that subjecthood can no longer be characterised by either and a more robust language of citizenship is required. A further restriction on articulating a more inclusive and wide-reaching sense of Britishness concerns the electoral system. Instead of rewarding parties whose support is geographically centralised, proportional representation would erode the close connection political parties have to certain regions and this would enable a party to more justifiably claim to represent all of the UK.\textsuperscript{386} In short, political willpower is the necessary precondition for instigating widespread reform. This would have the effect of nurturing and producing a sense of Britishness that might have greater resonance for many more citizens than a geographically concentrated few.

\textsuperscript{383} Ibid., p. 95.
\textsuperscript{385} Ibid., p. 27.
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid.
Parekh argues that British self-definition is a political project that although elite driven must
grow out of public debate and not merely be proscribed or enforced by statespeople.\textsuperscript{387} He
asserts that the Thatcherite approach to Britishness relied too heavily on notions of Empire,
religion, England and the Atlantic relationship; and the Blairite vision could not reconcile the
contradictions of affirming the importance of social responsibility with rampant
individualism nor with the significance of continental and trans-Atlantic ties particularly after
the Iraq War had estranged many European allies.\textsuperscript{388} The polyethnic and cultural dimensions
ensure that Britain exists on two levels: one consisting of four nations which have their own
rituals, myths, customs, etc., and the other residing within a common British identity based
on an all-encompassing civic and public culture characterised by certain institutions, values
and practices.\textsuperscript{389} Although welcoming the debate, Crick regards the politicians’ desire to
pinpoint the constituent elements of Britishness as both senseless as Britishness means
different things to different people and unnecessary because Britishness is not the glue that
holds the country together. On Gordon Brown’s 2007 speech to the TUC, in which The
Guardian recorded 34 uses of the expression Britishness, Crick mentions that “Gordon
Brown really does seem to believe that the unity of the United Kingdom is in danger if there
is not a strong and common sense of Britishness.”\textsuperscript{390} In contrast to the pursuit of the chimera
of Britishness which, according to Kellner, possesses a formidable range of meanings,\textsuperscript{391}
Crick argues that what we might need is simply “good government and social justice.”\textsuperscript{392}

\textsuperscript{388} Ibid., pp. 35-6.
\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., p. 36.
\textsuperscript{390} Crick, B. (2007) ‘Do We Really Need Britannia?’, The Political Quarterly, 78, pp. 149-158 (at 152).
\textsuperscript{391} Although Kellner focuses on a YouGov survey for the Daily Telegraph which asked the general public rather than
politicians on what Britishness meant to them and although the author admits the responses can be grouped according to
geography/tradition and values, the list of meanings Britishness has is still staggering. Examples include Britain’s defiance
against Germany in 1940, the achievements of British scientists and engineers, British justice, democracy, a strong economy,
the Royal Navy, stoicism, the BBC, the weather, driving on the left, the motorway network, beer, as well as many others.
Two papers on devolution also appear in this publication. Firstly, Jeffrey argues that although the British public may agree on Brown’s set of values – including freedom and liberty, a sense of duty and fair play, openness and tolerance – “those values may simply express a broader set of commonalities shared across western democracies”\(^{393}\) and the fact that such values might be held by all of the constituent components of the UK is not sufficient enough to believe continued devolution and the possible independence of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland may not occur. The relationship between England and its counterparts is not multilateral and redolent of unity but is bilateral and fragmentary in that administrative agreements between England and Scotland, for example, do not necessitate identical arrangements with Wales or Northern Ireland.\(^ {394}\) The British government inherited a number of pre-devolution practices including adhocery and lack of transparency among others which illustrates that Brown’s attempt to fuse the disparate units of the UK presupposes a commonality that doesn’t exist. Secondly, Aughey posits that the constitution of the UK has historically comprised of three key factors: contingency, the cultural and national make up and the geographical scope of the state; complementarity, in which diverse and distinct practices and institutions added to the collective whole and thus enabled a national identity to survive; and solidarity, a sense of being a part of a nation and bound to other nations.\(^ {395}\) With the weakening of contingency and the complementarity of national differences flourishing due to solidarity being reflected in the component entities of the UK, devolution became the wager to try and stymie the unpalatable reality of disintegration.\(^ {396}\) Aughey goes on to argue that Brown’s attempt to impede disintegration of the union is tantamount to a personal

\(^ {394}\) Ibid., p. 113-4.
\(^ {396}\) Ibid.
crusade and yet the dissolution of the UK can best be contested “by working according to principles already imitated in the traditions of British political life.”

A scholar who does subscribe to the narrative of disintegration is Tom Nairn. Nairn’s seminal work on nationalism plots the evolution of the British state and predicts its demise. Nairn argues how external imperial successes masked the hierarchical nature of the English state and that the revolutionising ethos prevalent in France could be safely abjured by the improvement in material conditions. Nairn further argues that political elites claim to instigate democratising changes but are in reality intent on preserving the status quo. This stability could only be preserved via recourse to myths. Having no myth pool with which to draw on, examples being the lack of English national dress and the ambiguity of English folklore, the twin concepts of popularism and romanticism were galvanised to inject an English nationalism. Nairn argues that the break-up is inevitable as the uneven development of capitalism creates fissures between the have and have-nots, or the core and periphery, and multi-statism is therefore destined to collapse. Devolution is thus merely an attempt to slow down the constitutional break-up of Britain and to make the transition more gradual. On the inevitability of dissolution, Hobsbawm raises the issue that neo-nationalism, at its heart, might not ultimately demand separation, that political independence is one of several possible outcomes, and that economically and historically, regional interests have tended to be best realised via their integration into larger units. In addition, as iterated by Wright and Gamble, devolving power, as in Spain, has not led to disintegration and a refusal to devolve

397 Ibid., p. 144.
can lead to disintegration in the same way that devolution can be integrating. In short, has the ultimate integration project, the European Union, really eroded the nation-state system?

2.1.6 Conclusion

The various themes elucidated in this chapter reveal a number of aspects that are pertinent to this study. In relation to England, Preston argues that “there have been several ‘Englands’ and several ‘Britains’ and these variously remembered historical episodes present us with a stock of resources – images of England and images of Britain – with which we can make preliminary sense of our present situation.” A cursory overview of these various Englands reveals several characterisations including “liberal, commercial and energetic; rural, pacific and enduring … radical and forward looking … (and) multi-cultural”. Firstly, I would similarly argue that it is only via an understanding of Britain as heterogeneous that identity formation can occur. As Pocock iterates:

“British history” thus denotes the historiography of no single nation but of a problematic and uncompleted experiment in the creation and interaction of several nations ... But “British history” does not stop there; it extends into oceanic, American and global dimensions.

Subsequently, approaches which seeks to concentrate on the internal – by positing a set of perennial traits or characteristics – “take for granted the very thing that needs investigation: the wider world”. Cohen posits that identity has been formulated along the interactions of six frontiers: the United States, Europe, the former white Dominions, the rest of the

---

402 Ibid., p. 6.

Secondly, I take it that identity is always a plural contestation and, in the words of Davies, “[e]veryone feels a sense of belonging to a complex network of communities; and there is no necessary tension or conflict between them.”\footnote{Davies, N. (1999) *The Isles: A History*, p. 874.} What I argue, however, is that the attempts to render identity single are the critical historical events I examine in this study. Hence, I examine the attempt to formulate a British identity as the British identity. Again, these attempts are very much intertwined with the themes outlined in this literature review. This also goes to support the idea that political elites do not articulate their arguments from scratch, but make references to already deeply entrenched and historically rich imagery, myths, prejudices and stories.

Thirdly, war and empire, Protestantism and liberty, geography and landscape, and viewing the nation as unified or heterogeneous are all vehicles employed by political elites to try and define a British national identity. They function as dominant representations or ‘signs’ which have become partially stabilised and hegemonic. This is not to say that they function as the only categories within which identity discourse operates but that they are important as they are commonly articulated. Despite also being hegemonic, they are prone to destabilisation and replacement by other signs as I take it that identity is in a constant state of flux. Similarly, these mediums do not carry equal levels of potency. Indeed, as has already been mentioned, although historically significant in aiding the inviolability of British national sovereignty and
freedom versus tyranny in the eighteenth century, Protestantism waned significantly as a means of constituting national identity in the twentieth century. Similarly, whether, for example, ‘the island story’ is invented or perennial is not a fundamental dilemma for this study. The focus is on the manner in which this narrative is discursively constructed, rather than the veracity of the claims made about it.

Fourthly, the attempt to pinpoint and celebrate the shadowy concept of Britishness and the notion of the potential break-up of Britain are fundamentally important. To begin with, the contested nature of Britishness supports the position that identities serve a political purpose. That is, Britishness is a reflection of certain interests and the attempt to formulate an elite-inspired Britishness quickly degenerated into a jostling of different stances each purporting to lay claim to the real Britain. This realisation is important for this study as I seek to extricate the various attempts to forge several national identities. The break-up of Britain is similarly important as this project occurs against the backdrop of a radically changing nation. Despite being a historical analysis, the articulation of the potential disintegration of Britain is evident of a deep national crisis. This has the effect of catapulting identity into the forefront of political debate and forces elites to try and answer the quasi-metaphysical question of who we are and the rather more foreboding one of what we are going to become.

Finally, as Europe and, more broadly, the Continent have been regarded as key harbingers of meaning for British national identity, this study aims to use this as its focal point in constructing a range of British national identities. Subsequently, I argue that “[a]ny realistic view of Britain will have to see it within the perspective of Europe and the whole Atlantic
world”.

Other key identifiers such as the Commonwealth, the USA, the USSR and Russia are utilised. Consequently, I take it that identity is constructed, relational and always constituted against other identities, be they oppositional or non-oppositional. Viewing British identity as multiple and constructed offers a counter to unchallenged preconceived ideas about what Britain is and isn’t, and also configures an identity within a constellation of other identities which are subject to pressure, influence and modification.

---

CHAPTER THREE: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MEMBERSHIP

REFERENDUM

3.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to examine the discourses surrounding the 1975 referendum and the subsequent processes of Othering and the constructions of British national identity. The primary sources used in revealing the rival discourses and subsequent national identities are listed in Appendix 1. The descriptive explanations as well as Tables 2 and 3 have numbers next to each quotation which relate to the source in the appendix. The appendices have all been arranged alphabetically and the numbers in the tables are sequential. Single quotation marks within the tables appear in the original. The quotes, therefore, may not have been necessarily stated by the author of the source but by an individual or group cited within the text. The sources can be categorised broadly into four groups. Firstly, I utilise the general election manifestoes of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties in the February and October 1974 general elections. As they were widely distributed and read, they function as key documents in the attempt to convey particular ideas of Europe to the general public. The second group of documents takes the form of memoirs and biographies from leading Euro-exponents and antagonists within the debate. These key political figures featured highly within the echelons of government and are important as they helped create and propagate particular perceptions of Europe. Thirdly, I employ several other texts containing primary source statements, declarations and press releases from a range of various political figures.

409 Suffice to say, an assortment of different expressions in the debates include the European Economic Community, the Community, the Common Market, the European Community, the European Communities, the European Union and, of course, Europe. Indeed, George (An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, p. 2) cites this array of different uses as an indication of ‘awkwardness’. However, for this dissertation, I use EEC, EC, Community and Common Market up to and including the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Thereafter, I use the Community, the European Union, and its abbreviation unless writers or spokespeople are being quoted.
and groups. These documents also include the official referendum leaflets distributed by the Post Office in the last ten days of May, which were designed to argue the cases for and against continued membership. Finally, I examine the parliamentary debate that took place between 7 and 9 April 1975, which concluded with a ‘Yes’ majority on continued membership. This “great Commons debate” featured protagonists from across the political spectrum and functions as a crucial source in how political elites envisioned the Community just before the historic referendum.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. The opening provides the historical background leading up to the referendum. This orientation section, however, is not designed to offer an alternative viewpoint to the commonly received understanding of events. Instead, its function is as an aide-mémoire to highlight the actors and political environment within which the discourses are produced. It is also not designed to examine all major domestic and international issues that affected the governments of the day. It is to observe recent British political history through the lens of Europe. The second section provides an account of the various nouns, verbs, adjectives and descriptive meanings revealed by an analysis of the sources and presents the various predicates and processes. The predicates are the meanings that are attached to the subjects. Depending on the particular verbs, adjectives and adverbs used, the subjects and objects are described in a particular way and subsequently infused with meaning. The debates are separated into two positions: arguments for and against continued membership of the EEC. As iterated in the Theory and Methodology chapter, pro- and anti-positions are not synonymous with a broader feeling of anti-Europeanism. In addition, and although admitting that pro and anti were not the only arguments articulated, these two

---

antagonisms function as ideal types which enable the diversity of opinions to be organised into a systematic structure. The empirical evidence also suggests that agnostic positions, although previously existent, played little role in how Europe was formulated during the debates. In short, membership of the EEC mattered. Next, I examine the presuppositions. This background knowledge enables a particular reality to be formulated as the truth. After that, the manner in which these meanings are organised, the subject positioning, is discussed with a view to analysing oppositional and non-oppositional relationships between the central concepts and to disclose the relationships between them. The subject positioning, as a consequence, reveals several discourses that have been formulated according to the perceptions British political elites have had on Europe and other actors. This then reveals the process of Othering with the range of friendly, non-friendly and radical configurations implicit in the discourses which are presented in Table 4. After a discussion of what British national identities are evident within this process of Othering, the final section synthesises the pro-/anti-dichotomy, the discourses and the identities to show how such formulations have produced a number of British Selves. These are the images of nationhood that are products of the national identities attributed to Britain by the perceptions British political elites have had. These finding are produced in Figure 4 and are followed by an explanation. For clarification, the discourses and identities are italicised and the range of British Selves is highlighted in bold.

3.2 Historical Background

On 5 June 1975, of the twenty-five million British people who voted on whether to continue membership of the EEC, seventeen million voted ‘Yes’. As Britain’s only national referendum on membership to date, the event functions as a constitutional peculiarity not
Secondly, a vote by the British people would sink the Labour opponents of the EEC, who were dominant and powerful within the Party but weak on a national level.

Britain’s early leading role in the formulation and ratification of European treaties has been well documented. The Dunkirk Treaty on 4 March 1947 between Britain and France and the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948 between Britain, France and the Benelux countries both attest to the argument that Britain wished to play a leading role in the building of the new Europe. However, the leap from union to unity faced British recalcitrance.\footnote{Croft, S. (1988) ‘British Policy Towards Western Europe, 1947-9: The Best of Possible Worlds?’, \textit{International Affairs}, vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 617-629 (at 617).} Winston Churchill perhaps best characterises this stance of obdurate defiance. Hugo Young, whilst acknowledging Churchill’s role as the Father of Europe, argues that he “was also the father of misunderstandings about Britain’s part in Europe.”\footnote{Young, H. (1998) \textit{This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair}, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 6.} A year after the Second World War, Churchill’s speech to the Academic Youth in Zurich, illustrated the need to build a United States of Europe with France and Germany taking the lead together but with “Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia” acting as the “friends and sponsors of the new Europe”.\footnote{Churchill, W. (1946) ‘Speech in Zurich’, 19 Sept. Cited in Harryvan, A. G. and Harst, J. (eds. and trans.) (1997) \textit{Documents on European Union}, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 38-41.} This highlighting of the distinction between Britain and Europe was confirmed in Churchill’s celebrated ‘three circles’ doctrine\footnote{‘Conservative Mass Meeting: A Speech at Llandudno, 9 October 1948.’ Cited in Churchill, W. (1950) \textit{Europe Unite: Speeches 1947 & 1948}, London: Cassell, pp. 416-418.}, presented originally in 1948, and which provided an important conceptual blueprint for future British foreign policy.\footnote{Larsen, H. (1997) \textit{Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe}, p. 52.} The first and most important of the ‘three circles’ was the British Commonwealth and Empire. Second was the English speaking world with Canada, other British Dominions and the USA. Finally, there was United Europe. The concept of the ‘three circles’ was pivotal because, as Churchill elaborated, Britain was the only country to be part...
of all three entities and hence the only country with the opportunity of joining them together. What was also pertinent was the lack of parity between the concepts with United Europe being mentioned in more detached and less affectionate terms than the other two.\textsuperscript{423}

From then on, until the late 1950s, diffidence became the locus of the relations between Britain and Europe. The 1950 Schuman Plan, the chief aim of which was to place German and French coal and steel production under a common High Authority, was reported on by a committee of officials appointed by Clement Attlee:

It is not merely pooling of resources, but also, in the first place, the conception of fusion or surrender of sovereignty in a European system which the French are asking us to accept in principle.\textsuperscript{424}

The Messina Conference of 1955 – a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Coal and Steel Community in order to appoint the new High Authority – was attended by a British representative, Russell Bretherton of the Board of Trade, who later withdrew from the discussions in Brussels in November the same year.\textsuperscript{425} However, the 1956 Suez Crisis – the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Colonel Nasser of Egypt and the subsequent intervention by the British and French – perhaps revealed that the Atlantic Alliance might not be everlasting.\textsuperscript{426} Similarly, the nature of the Commonwealth was changing as “Canada and Australia emerged as Powers in their own right … India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaysia all became independent, to be followed by the many African territories.”\textsuperscript{427} In opposition to the obvious progress ‘the Six’\textsuperscript{428} were making, the Cabinet, after drawing up various

\textsuperscript{423} Ibid., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{428} The name given to what became the original entrants of the EEC: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg.
strategies, proposed an industrial free trade area which excluded agriculture and allowed individual member states to determine their own tariffs against non-members. The European response was unenthusiastic and integration pressed on regardless. In short, the ‘three circles’ concept was under threat: the first two circles seemed to be vanishing whilst the third was crystallising without Britain having a role.

The first application, by Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government in July 1961, was arguably an attempt to redress the realities of Britain’s fading role. Membership would have satisfied several interests including salvaging the Anglo-American relationship whilst avoiding British seclusion from a French-led community. The French President, Charles de Gaulle, gave a statement on 14 January 1963, which effectively vetoed British entry. Macmillan, in his diaries, lamented how “French duplicity has defeated us all.”

Several reasons can be given for the anticipated veto. A common argument centres on the ‘politics of grandeur’ which demonstrated “a will to restore, preserve, (and) promote an abstraction, France”. Subsequently, the veto occurred due to the threat Britain posed to the natural unity of the nascent organisation, de Gaulle’s distaste for the United States and dislike of the UK (the Trojan horse assertion), and the belief that so long as the Community remained small, the French President would be more able to dominate it and secure his particular vision of France. An alternative hypothesis argues that the veto occurred because de Gaulle was principally motivated by commercial concerns, in particular those of agriculture. As a country

\[\text{and the Netherlands.}\]


that imported its food from outside of the EEC, Britain would inevitably block legislation that pushed for preferential trading agreements between the European nations.\textsuperscript{435} Consequently, Britain was excluded from the Community as the Common Agricultural Policy and, in particular, the stabilisation of prices, was of paramount importance to French foreign policy and only seconded by the civil war in Algeria.\textsuperscript{436} The second application in May 1967 was then made by the Labour government of Harold Wilson. The attempt to cultivate the ‘friendly Five’, it has been argued,\textsuperscript{437} ensured interaction with France was kept to a minimum. This had the effect of further souring relations with Britain’s greatest obstacle to entry. Coupled with the French desire to have a Europe free from Atlantic authority and steered by France,\textsuperscript{438} as well as a major currency crisis that eventually led to the devaluation of sterling,\textsuperscript{439} the General issued a ‘velvet veto’ later that month, followed by a more categorical renouncement in November. In the sixteenth Press Conference delivered by de Gaulle on the issue of British entry, he stated that “[i]n order that the British Isles can really make fast to the Continent, there is still a very fast and deep mutation to be affected”.\textsuperscript{440}

The British government must have felt that the much-needed mutation occurred with the resignation of de Gaulle on 28 April 1969, after losing a referendum on regional and Senate reform.\textsuperscript{441} The subsequent President, Georges Pompidou, was significantly less obtrusive. At the same time, a new and unexpected win by the Conservative government in the general

\textsuperscript{436} Ibid., p. 18.
election on 19 June 1970 brought considerable progress on the issue of Europe. Edward Heath became noted for “a lifetime of undeviating effort”\textsuperscript{442} towards British entry, and unlike the majority of his predecessors, “Europe was his great theme”.\textsuperscript{443} The Heath-Pompidou summit held in Paris on 20-21 May 1971, made considerable headway on the issue of British entry. Eventually, after a year and a half of further diplomatic effort, Britain, along with Denmark and Ireland, signed the Brussels Treaty of Accession on 22 January 1972, thus leading to their formal entry on 1 January the following year. The Labour Party in opposition had rejected a referendum on joining but had instead emphasised the need to renegotiate the terms of entry in late 1971 and early 1972.\textsuperscript{444} These circumstances had come about as the actual conditions of entry emerged as being less than beneficial to British interests. Issues included an excessive British contribution to the Community’s Budget, an agricultural policy that inflated food prices, barriers against well-established trading partners and the risk of jeopardising the future welfare of other regions, namely Wales and Scotland.\textsuperscript{445} The degree of opposition led to the cabinet decision on 21 January 1975 that the terms of remaining within the Community would be put to the country in a referendum and the cabinet members were given the opportunity to campaign either way.\textsuperscript{446}

This ‘agreement to differ’ reveals one more point worth noting about the political environment. Europe did not function within a traditional ideological divide which neatly pitted Labour against Conservative. Frequently, the arguments drawn upon cut across the political spectrum and created notable alliances. By way of example, the prominent Labour member and staunch opponent of the EEC, Michael Foot, appeared on a radio discussion

\textsuperscript{443} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{445} Ibid., pp. 13-17.
programme with the Conservative politician Enoch Powell on 11 June 1973, and stated, “I don’t mind having allies in defending the House of Commons, particularly when there are so many deserters.” In the same broadcast, Powell opined on the election of a Labour administration that would withdraw Britain from the Common Market: “I would say: ‘[w]ell, so be it. But at least we have retained the power to decide under what general principles this nation is to be governed.’” As such, the debates on the referendum did not merely embody entrenched and long-held opinions, but actually revealed constantly shifting positions, some by individual members and others by the party as a whole.

It has been suggested that material factors also dominated the early debates over membership of the Common Market. A common argument, for example, suggests that from 1962 to 1975, Britain’s applications were not about cultural or emotional links to Europe; “concrete benefits were weighed up against concrete losses”; the argument “was technical in nature and had little to do with Britons’ sense of themselves” and, apart from a few Euro-friendly voices, there was little appeal to “Euro-mythology”. Reports taken less than a month before the referendum support the argument that British citizens were mostly concerned about prices and the cost of living (58%), food prices more specifically (37%), unemployment (15%), with sovereignty and independence having marginal importance (9%). In the wake of the economic position of Britain in the early to mid-seventies, with over 20% inflation, the spectre of the 1973 oil-price hike and the effects of the three-day working week on output and

448 Ibid.
the miners’ strikes, it is not surprising that ‘bread-and-butter’ issues prevailed. However, in keeping with the essentially contested nature of discourse, evidence suggests that identity played a key role within the debates. Young narrates, for example, that when Edward Heath was accused of disguising the political ramifications of continued membership, culminating in the threat of monetary union, he produced references to former statements which highlighted the consistency of his belief in the Community as a political construct.\textsuperscript{453} A similar such position has been echoed by Roy Jenkins who claimed that “throughout the campaign the issue that really seized people’s attention was the political issue of Britain’s orientation in the world.”\textsuperscript{454} Analogous examples can be applied to the anti-membership camp with prices and unemployment being the focus of figures like Douglas Jay and Barbara Castle and national independence and sovereignty being the concerns of Enoch Powell and Michael Foot.\textsuperscript{455} Subsequently, the various positions on EEC membership reveal the struggle over conceptualising Europe as primarily an economic union or a political community. Suffice to say, the following analysis does not postulate that economic factors were not paramount in the debates, only that the examination of identity-related conceptualisations of Others opens up a previously neglected vista of identity politics exerting a significant influence on how Europe was and is formulated. National identity was very much part of the debates on Europe and that despite the public preoccupation with how continued membership would affect them monetarily, this did not stop political elites from arguing that the EEC had a variety of different meanings and connotations.

\textsuperscript{453} Young, H. (1998) This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, pp. 294-5.
3.3 The Pro-Membership Debates

In this section, I analyse the predicates and processes relating to the pro-membership positions as represented in Table 4. These are the descriptive characteristics extrapolated from the documents listed in Appendix 1. Next, I explain how these descriptive characteristics make sense given specific background knowledge. After this account of the process of presupposition, I present how these practices produce subject positions which place the particular subjects in relationship with one another. The documents, page numbers and columns taken from the appendix are given in square brackets in the following explanatory section and Table 4. However, in keeping with the discursive approach I adopt, I have not explicitly listed the names of all individuals cited. Although it can be argued that the role and reputation of political spokespeople also contributes to their ability to disseminate ideas, I am predominantly concerned with how elites have argued about Europe, rather on who has said what.

3.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Membership Debates

To begin with, Britain is constructed as a particular type of subject. Firstly, it is positioned as playing an essential rather than peripheral role in Europe. A considerable degree of agency is imported into Britain to reveal ‘a great nation’ [11], always having ‘played a major role in the world’ [21-col.1033] and which can continue to ‘be a force’ [20-col.907]. Secondly, the evocation of historical events places the notion of decline as central to the way in which Britain engages with Europe. A tension exists between the idea that membership provides a substitute for ‘having lost an Empire’ [20-col.907] whilst remaining outside of the Community would conjure up ‘a sort of Churchillian myth that we were the greatest and most
important country in the world’ [7-p.347]. On the one hand, Britain is seen as fulfilling a historical role of natural leader of Europe. One such example by the Britain in Europe pressure group asks ‘are we going to stay on the centre of the stage where we belong, or are we going to shuffle off into the dusty wings of history?’ [19]. On the other hand, Britain is also seen as a fading power whose voice, in order to be heard, must be linked within a European framework of fellow nations in order to, according to the Conservative Party manifesto, ‘reverse our political and economic decline’ [4]. A third configuration demonstrates how continued entry is the best way of realising British interests. The policy of a ‘siege economy’ [19] is demonised as isolationist and nationalist, and as indicative of an ‘insular mentality’ [11-p.539]. Anti-marketeers are perceived as ‘Little Englanders’ [9-p.412] who hark back to past glories. British interests are positioned as wholly contingent on the interdependence between other European nations and Britain must therefore rely on ‘friends and allies’ [1] and ‘partnership with our democratic neighbours’ [3]. To summarise, though Britain is conceived as a leading international actor, continued EEC membership is construed as being reflective of a sense of crisis: is continued membership the means to exercise Britain’s global and historically entrenched impact or is it more of an attempt to address Britain’s declining power?

Three dominant themes construct Europe: as a means of securing peace, as inevitable and as a way of bolstering national sovereignty. Firstly, the debates make references to the European legacy of bloodshed and configure membership as the only means to safeguard Europe from a resurgence of its bloody past. The Community represents a ‘struggle for freedom’ [11-p.210], ‘one world at peace’ [11-p.381], ‘it removed fears of a continuation of the three wars between France and Germany’ [13h-p.180] and created an international structure ‘free from tyranny and bloodshed’ [16-p.295]. This security discourse, therefore, focuses on the role unification
plays not in weakening Germany, but in insuring its inclusion into a peaceable Europe. Edward Heath, for example, stated that Europe is fundamentally a political union as its original purpose was to ‘absorb the new Germany into the structure of the European family’ [11-p.545]. Subsequently, Europe has the power to foster harmony between previously antagonistic members. A sanguinary Europe-as-violent past is invoked to highlight a Europe-as-peaceful present.

Secondly, Britain is irretrievably linked to Europe. The process of integration, therefore, is viewed as inexorable. As early as 1971, in a decisive vote that saw 69 Labour MPs vote with the Conservative government over entry to the Common Market, the Labour member Roy Hattersley saw entry ‘as not only essential but inevitable’ [15-p.140]. Similarly, Lord Denning likened the Treaty of Rome to ‘an incoming tide’ [16-p.250] and consequently ‘cannot be held back’ [16-p.250]. Entry is seen as an ‘irrevocable decision’ [7-p.348] and the Community ‘will not go away if we say ‘No’’ [17]. Any sense of voluntary disassociation is unworkable and, as a consequence, Britain ‘has to adapt’ [1] to reconcile and harmonise its position within the inescapability of union. Coupled to this theme is a particular concentration on the consequences of withdrawal from the Community. The unprecedented nature of the referendum and the lack of understanding of what life would be like outside of the Community enabled advocates of continued membership to paint a particularly bleak picture of an isolated Britain. Consequently, withdrawal would be ‘a disaster’ [1], ‘Britain’s future would be dismal’ [11-p.363] and ‘we should be alone in a harsh, cold world, with none of our friends offering to revive old partnerships’ [19]. Thus, the metaphor James Callaghan used to describe the referendum as “a rubber life-raft into which the whole party may one day have to
climb may be equally applicable to describing the nascent membership of the Community. This aspect, therefore, helped create a belief that Britain will have more influence as a member of this group, that the Community is a useful port in an economic storm, and it would be better, particularly in such stormy times, not to rock the boat by leaving the Community shortly after joining it.

Thirdly, a particularly dominant motif within the pro-membership debates is arguably the particular perceptions of sovereignty and democracy. A fluid reading of sovereignty produces two subdivisions: sovereignty as a pooled concept and sovereignty as a means of promoting prosperity. The first positions sovereignty as something that cannot be ‘hoarded, sterile and barren’ [15-pp.146/7] but can instead be malleable and apportioned. The debates vacillate between recognising that British sovereignty can actually be boosted by union whilst also accepting that interdependence, even outside of the structure of EEC membership, has adulterated the idea of national integrity. The former rests with the notion that as sovereignty is a shared concept, Britain can effectively influence Europe via its own particular vision thus bolstering its own national sovereignty. The second – sovereignty as a means of advancing prosperity – focuses on the fact that since ‘no country in the modern world enjoys absolute sovereignty’ [10-p.211], it is sheer idealism to view Britain as a self-contained, self-governed entity. The commitment to Europe negates a ‘billiard-ball’ formulisation of sovereignty but opens up how it can instead be a way of enhancing British power via the creation of linkages to other European states.

Of the other countries referred to, I have limited the investigation to those specifically related to Britain’s membership. The Atlantic and Commonwealth are important as they reveal the

fissure between Britain and Europe.\textsuperscript{458} Both the Atlantic and the Soviet Union are significant because of the issues surrounding security during the Cold War. The more conciliatory and friendlier role towards Europe as a whole mirrors a similar such attitude of association with other states. A struggle however exists within this position. The consolidation of friendships in the Far East, China and America jars with the idea that Europe has come to dominate British political thinking. Callaghan, for example, highlighted the desire to ‘cultivate the rest of the world once more’ [8-p.296]. Former Communist countries also, it is argued, look to Europe as a way of distancing themselves from their authoritarian pasts. Europe is also perceived as a blueprint for peace in conflict-ridden corners of the world. Heath, with reference to Africa, drew attention to ‘how much there is to be gained by working for closer unity’ [11-p.217]. By enhancing prosperity and soldering peace – what are perceived as key European values - the Community not merely benefits European citizens but also provides a framework for propagating those values and conditions beyond. The position of the Commonwealth vacillates between recognising Britain’s obligations towards it, whilst simultaneously accepting the realities of its diminished role in shaping Britain. This reveals the changing role of the Commonwealth. It is constructed as yesterday’s alliance, in contrast to Britain’s nascent membership of the EEC. Despite, therefore, the fact that ‘close relations’ [1] with the Commonwealth were assured, it nonetheless had become evident that it was now ‘fissiparous’ [11-p.361] and ‘largely self-governing’ [20-col.833]. It is the Commonwealth’s ability to align itself with Britain’s new partners that determines whether or not the diminished role it possesses can be reinvigorated.

In contrast, Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union reveals quite different predicates and

is formulated as a subject quite distinct from the other states and organisations mentioned. Two aspects of this relationship are worth noting. One is the belief that the Soviet Union was not against Britain’s continued membership as this situation could function as a buttress against German economic power. The second, however, is firmly lodged within a balance of power perception that dominated Cold War thinking and places the referendum within an international setting blighted by fears of the East. The EEC is perceived as a security barrier against potential Soviet invasion. Of the texts, a dominant stance argues that the Common Market, although maybe not initially popular, was preferable to the prospect of a socialist Britain.459 Thus,

[459] The real reason which could not be told publicly for our entry to the common market was because our intelligence service had learnt the Soviet Union had plans to invade Western Europe and these would be carried out once trade unions in Western Europe led by a Communist Fifth Column had fomented widespread strikes to prevent the invasion being resisted.460

Subsequently, part of the success of this discourse lies in its ability to argue that not only was the Common Market an essential barrier to Soviet domination, but that EEC detractors, by “being labelled as Communists and ‘fellow-travellers’”, 461 were actively sowing the seeds for a Britain to become ‘part of the Soviet bloc’ [19]. The threat was not peripheral but ontological: the very existence of Britain was in jeopardy.

Of the final non-European state examined in the texts, the role of the USA indicates a schizophrenic position. The Atlantic Alliance is heralded as important but the relationship should include ‘a Europe of which we are a part’ [19]. The Superpowers are perceived as possessing such power that ‘the voice of Europe was in danger of being lost in world affairs’

Subsequently, a united Europe is constructed as a means of competing against an American-Soviet dominated environment. Furthermore, it is suggested that Britain’s relationship with America actually obstructs better relations with Europe. As Young argues, “[i]n contrast to all other post-war British prime ministers, Heath’s Europeanism led him to distance himself from the US. He even wished to avoid any use of the term ‘special relationship’.” The bond between Britain and America, therefore, is characterised as ‘an allegiance foreign to Europe’ [16-p.222].

To summarise the predicates and processes in Table 2, a tension exists which firstly views Britain as a fading power which needs membership to abate its decline. Secondly, Britain is conversely seen as a dominant player by which it can shape and develop the Community. The EEC is constructed as a force for good in which issues of peace and security are paramount. Europe is viewed as an instrument for guaranteeing peace and prosperity and many references to the bloodshed of the Second World War make membership vital. The Community is also seen as an inevitable entity in which Britain is no longer able to ignore or sideline whilst withdrawal is a potential disaster leading to weakness and isolationism. Complete sovereignty is regarded as illusionary. Interdependence as characterised by EEC patterns of trade and cohesion has penetrated nationalistic and outdated views of sovereignty. Of the other countries mentioned, the Commonwealth is looked upon as part of yesterday’s heritage, with states which are no longer dependent on Britain and look more towards a united Europe as a trading partner of which Britain is a part. The Soviet Union is classed as expansionist and threatening which highlights the importance of continued membership as part of an anti-Soviet bloc. In short, it functions as the antithesis to how Europe is perceived.

---

Finally, the Community is seen as a welcome bulwark to American dominance and Superpowerdom.
Has always played a major role in the Sad impotence of this country Having lost an empire and… the imperial Are we going to stay on We are better able to advance and protect If we turn our backs on Europe who is Narrow-minded nationalism of many so-called ‘internationalists’ [3] A better life in these islands depend(s) on partnership with our democratic neighbours [3] Gives us the opportunity to reverse our political and economic decline [4] If we did not go in, we would go back to a sort of Churchillian myth that we were the greatest and most important country in the world [7-p.347] Anti-marketeers were ‘Little Englanders’ [p.91] Insular mentality [11-p.339] A great nation like Britain – a nation that…twice this century… fought in Europe and in the process bled itself white in the cause of liberty and democracy for the peoples of the world [11-p.547] Frightened of the UK being left isolated, outside the Magic market circle [13-p.192] If we turn our backs on Europe who is there to turn to? [14-p.91] We are better able to advance and protect our national interests [17] Some want an isolationist Britain with a ‘sick economy’ [19] Are we going to stay on the centre of the stage where we belong, or are we going to shuffle off into the dusty wings of history? [19] Having lost an empire and… the imperial power it once had, can be a force [20-col.907] Sad impotence of this country [20-col.922] Has always played a major role in the world [21-col.1033] Peace and Security: Need for a Europe that is united [1] Partnership instead of rivalry [1] Instrument for improving the life of the people [1] Make a similar war impossible in future [4] Only through unity could the Western European nations recover control over their destiny [4] Liberal, outward looking federation of free people with sovereignty [6] Larger groups of nations acting together in the common interest leads to greater unity and this adds to our strength in the struggle for freedom [11-p.210] We were creating one world at peace [11-p.381] Free and democratic, prosperous and peace-loving, unselfish in recognising and accepting its responsibilities to those less fortunate than its own people [11-p.382] It was founded for a political purpose…. to absorb the new Germany into the structure of the European family [11-p.545] (Peace) has been secured by the conscious and concerted effort of nations to work together [11-p.546] It removed fears of a continuation of the three wars between France and Germany [13b-p.180] Memories of the Second World War provide an attraction for an organisation which brings countries together [13i-p.187] 40 million people died in two world wars … Vote Yes to keep the peace [14-p.90] For your children’s future vote yes [14-p.90] Free from tyranny and bloodshed, living in peace and prosperity [16-p.295] To bring together the peoples of Europe … To help the poorer regions of Europe and the rest of the world. To help maintain peace and freedom [17] Force for stability in world relations [20-col.876] United Socialist Europe [20-col.908] Centre of stability, activity and prosperity [22-col.1279] If we are to avoid a future holocaust… (our) interests require a compromise with the nations of Europe [22-col.1325] Inevitability: It (entry) was an irrevocable decision [7-p.348] Membership…(is) not only essential but inevitable [15-p.140] Like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back [16-p.250] The Common Market will not go away if we say ‘No’ [17] Sovereignty and Democracy: Sovereignty was destroyed anyway by interdependence [7-p.343] No country in the modern world enjoys absolute sovereignty [10-p.211] We could influence the development of our continent and so increase the effective sovereignty of Britain [11-p.548] What is proposed is a sharing and an enlargement of individual national sovereignties [15-p.137] Sovereignty is not something to be hoarded, sterile and barren… Nor is sovereignty something which has to be kept in the crypt… Sovereignty is for this House to use in the way it thinks best [15-p.146-7] Sovereignty isn’t something you put down in the cellar in your gold reserve, and go down with a candle once a week to see if it still there [16-p.246] Membership … imposes both rights and duties, but has not deprived us of our national identity [17] What real sovereignty is left in a world that can destroy itself overnight by nuclear holocaust? [21-col.1083] Withdrawal: A disaster for which future generations would never forgive us [1] Would give us less power and influence in the world not more [4] Would confront us with the choice of almost total dependence on others or retreat into weak isolation [4] Sierra eclipse [8-p.326] Britain’s future would be dismal without Europe [11-p.363] This is no time for Britain to be considering leaving a Christmas club, let alone the Common Market [16-p.289] We would just be outsiders looking in [17] Outside we are on our own [17] This tarring apart would be a major upheaval [19] Would leave us weak and unregarded, both economically and politically [19] We should be alone in a harsh, cold world, with none of our friends offering to revive old partnerships [19] Grim and barren alternative [21-col.1040] Cold and hostile world [21-col.1066] Commonwealth: Maintain close relations with our fellow-members [1] Wants us to stay in [7-p.345] [17] [19] Was fissiparous [11-p.361] Some want us to fall back on the Commonwealth – but the Commonwealth itself doesn’t want that [19] Largely self-governing [20-col.833] Have become independent [21-col.1027] Total fantasy to believe… we can summon up the lost legions of the Commonwealth [21-col.1066] The Soviet Union: Progress… in re-establishing a proper relationship [1] Note with concern the continuing expansion of all branches of the Soviet armed forces [1] Not an attempt to change each other’s systems because we had to learn from each other [7-p.149] Secretly they might like us in, to control the Germans [7-p.345] Some want a Communist Britain – part of the Soviet bloc [19] The USA: Reaffirm our full support for the Atlantic Alliance [1] The strength of the Superpowers was so much greater than other individual nations that the voice of Europe was in danger of being lost in world affairs [8-p.305] Britain need not fear that she would be cold-shouldered [8-p.320] Instead of being little more than the subject matter of American-Soviet relations, we must aim to become an equal determinant in our own future [8-p.330] Resentment of America dominating our continent [13g-p.171] An allegiance foreign to Europe [16-p.222] Even Super Powers… do not have complete freedom of action [17] They want a close Atlantic relationship… with a Europe of which we are part [19] Some want us even closer to the United States than to Europe – but America itself doesn’t want that [19] Strong currents of neo-isolationism in the United States [21-col.1067] Interdependent relationship with the United States rather than a one-sided relationship [21-col.1089] Major supporters of a strong and united Europe [21-col.1093] Other: Consolidated friendships in the Far East, China, the Indian Sub-Continent, Africa and the American Continent [1] The time has come to cultivate the rest of the world once more [8-p.296] African countries will appreciate how much there is to be gained by working for closer unity themselves [11-p.217]
A number of presuppositions help construct a world within which the predicates have meaning and are therefore recognised as fact. Several of them are subtle in their configuration and contain elements of similarity and kinship. Others are clearly formulated along a nexus of binary oppositions. To begin with, although Britain is referenced as a ‘country’ [7-p.347] [20-col.922] and ‘these islands’ [3], it is identified foremost as a nation [2] [5] [11.p.547]. This has a dual effect. Firstly, it creates a perception of unity by positioning Britain as a single homogenous entity. The articulations of ‘we’ and ‘us’ [1] [2] [4] [7-p.347] [14-p.91] [17] [19] denote the nation and contribute to forging a sense of togetherness. Secondly, it takes for granted that nations are the principal political actors within Europe and beyond. Categorising Britain as one of many nations helps to construct the presupposition that European integration has been fuelled by the need to reconcile previously warring interests between different peoples and that interrelatedness and interdependence now govern the political world. In short, membership of Europe is the conceptual and practical means of anchoring one nation to others. This point is very much related to the manner in which sovereignty is predicated. Real sovereignty is configured as an illusion imagined by isolationists. Sovereignty is instead a malleable entity that is utilised by political actors to realise national interests. That is, British sovereignty is actually empowered by being within the Community because attachment to ‘Europe as a power-bloc’ enables Britain to function as a more instrumental power.

A principal oppositional formation pits the notion of the ‘Little Englander’ [9-p.412], steeped in the mythology of isolationism, against a far more internationalist and less exclusionary understanding of Europe. Individuals who muse over the golden age of self-containment are
condemned for their ‘insular mentality’ [11-p.539] and inability to accept that the Community is an entity that cannot be avoided and is the best chance to preserve peace and prosperity. EEC detractors are constructed as lodged within a static worldview against a Community that continues to develop and evolve. Thus, this outward-looking/inward-looking nexus constructs non-membership in absolutist terms: that independence from the Common Market is a call for economic and political seclusion.

A further opposition situates the EEC as a harbinger of stability as against the instability emanating from other nations, Britain’s economic and domestic woes and Europe’s bloody past. This stable/unstable opposition draws on historical images to construct a modern, peaceful Europe in contrast to a predatory Soviet Union, a United States that sits outside of the regionalism important to Europeans and a fading Commonwealth. The ‘three circles’ doctrine, therefore, is reformulated to position a united Europe, not the English speaking world, as the means of ensuring stability. The historical references are read in an important number of ways. First of all, the Second World War features heavily within both debates. Such imaging is especially trenchant given the fact that many of the spokespeople would have had personal experience of either the Second World War or at least of the immediate aftermath of a postwar Britain. Within the pro-debates, the Second World War is highlighted as a product of unfettered nationalism which can only be checked from reoccurring via a compromise with other states. Secondly, the references highlight the need to anchor Germany firmly to the European fold. The EEC is configured not merely as an economic stabiliser that increases prosperity due to the free flow of commerce, but also as a political project designed to create peace between France and Germany. Thus, rather than iterating the need for Britain to be at the heart of Europe, both France and Germany are reified as exemplifying the core of
Europe and Britain is conceived of as ensuring this relationship remains strong. As William Whitelaw, the then Conservative Shadow Deputy Leader remarked:

Two world wars in one generation had their origins in the long-standing antagonism between France and Germany. Today these two countries work together as partners. By working with them we in Britain can do much to cement this new relationship. Reflecting on the sadness of personal loss and the horrors of those wars, I certainly would hate to throw away that opportunity, and so, I suspect, would many of our fellow citizens.  

Finally, the war time references are formulated as the end of an old era of nationalism and rivalry and the start or continuation of a new one of conciliation, cooperation and economic prosperity. The stable/unstable nexus is reliant on the sustenance of peace via the propagation of wealth. A stable Europe generates wealth which in turn contributes to further stability.

A concluding opposition is formulated along the nexus of globalist/nationalist. The EEC is positioned more broadly as a global entity whilst its detractors are located as provincial and narrow in outlook. The issue of sovereignty is also deeply lodged within the struggle between global and purely national interests. The need for pooling, in order to safeguard the common interests of all members, is positioned against the hoarding of sovereignty which again is indicative of self-containment and insularity. Thus, Europe functions as a global community within which Britain is both a constituent, dominant and historically embedded member.

### 3.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Membership Debates

Both the predicates and the presuppositions establish subject positions which reveal how the subjects and objects are related to one another. As already mentioned, both Britain and Europe are perceived as embodying a significant degree of instrumentality and influence.

---

That is to say that interdependence is inherent as they are both constructed as powerful actors and both possess regional and international influence. However, to recapitulate, Britain is positioned with Europe in three important ways which all contribute to the image of inseparability. Firstly, Britain is in decline. The sense of desperation of the period has been aptly highlighted by Vernon Bogdanor, a participant in the Witness Seminar held in on the 20th anniversary of the referendum:

I think someone said that one cannot exaggerate the state of fear which existed in Britain in the mid-1970s. In 1974 the abyss seemed to be opening up. What had seemed to be a civilised society seemed to many to be under threat ... It is difficult to imagine now, but people felt that the ground was shifting under them.\textsuperscript{464}

Secondly and conversely, Britain is a global power. Isolationism is perceived both as anathema to Britain’s natural historical role and as a threat to the ability to project power not merely from Europe but on a worldwide level. Thirdly, Britain is irretrievably linked to Europe. However, the linkage is not merely defined by geographical proximity but is invoked by reference to the commonality of values and interests. A coupling of the EEC as ‘new’ and Europe as ‘old’ enables integration to be constructed as a dynamic and fresh alliance whilst simultaneously invoking historical and deep-seated kinship. Such positioning also helps to demonise what is perceived as the perils of returning to a non-participatory detachment. This is indicative of what is seen as a thirst for past imperial glories and an unwelcome return to the stultifying myth of Empire.

Europe as an object is constructed to produce four distinct discourses. The first can be defined as \textit{Europe as a security bloc}. Several dimensions within it are apparent. It is both economic and political: economic in that it is trade focused and political in that it demands an international structure to enforce agreement and unification. Furthermore, it is dualistically a

militarised coalition driven by Cold War threats which lie outside its borders whilst simultaneously functioning as a demilitarising union designed to stabilise member states and prevent conflict between them. The second formulation can be defined as *Europe as its historical antithesis*. This is a temporal construct. That is, European history is read as bloody and destructive and a violent European past is invoked to instil fears not about what Europe is but what it once was and may become again. The third classification of Europe is *Europe as established*. The EEC is treated as a given entity, possessive of power and influence and, most importantly, as indelible and irreversible. The final categorisation is *Europe as a network of sovereignties*. This definition requires some clarification. Although sovereignty is articulated within the debates in a national context; i.e. that British sovereignty possesses a level of predominance, the belief that Britain was becoming an increasingly weak international actor helps reinforce the notion of a network in two ways. Firstly, EEC membership is seen as a way of strengthening Britain’s depleted sense of Self by which it might regain its former sense of stateliness. Second, a malleable understanding of sovereignty helps explain that a loss of sovereignty in one area might bolster other deeply held identities in another. Membership is seen as augmenting free trade, enhancing prosperity and ensuring stability which are also many-cited factors of British identity articulated within the debates. In addition, the articulation of ‘free’ [6] [11-p.382] [16-p.295] [17], ‘democratic’ [3] [11-p.382] [11-p.547] and ‘prosperous’ [11-p.382] [16-p.295] [22-col.1279] helps to bind Britain to a Europe of shared values. As a consequence, Britain, along with other member states, is part of a common network which is prepared to pool its sovereignty to produce a Europe which reflects both its interests and its identity. Britain plays a leading role in ensuring the free, democratic and prosperous nature of the Community whilst enlargement ensures the dissemination of those values to other states. That is, Europe, by embodying certain
advantageous qualities, rights and prospects helps ensure the democratisation of those values and therefore functions as a model for non-Europe.

Other actors are located in a hierarchical structure that formulates them with varying degrees of significance. By far the least essential is the Commonwealth. It is positioned as important but reminiscent of a dwindling alliance. The Commonwealth is secondary and the cultural and historical linkages to Britain are only recognised in so far as Britain retains its position in a wider European community. It is also suggested that trade patterns between Britain and the Commonwealth have changed and, although regrettable, is lodged within what is seen as an inevitable shift. This discourse can be labelled as the Commonwealth as past. It also contains a duality: that past patterns of dependence possess importance because they are historically embedded but that an alignment, if it is to continue or be reinvigorated, must fit into the realism of newer, fresher and more vibrant relationships.

The Soviet Union is labelled as expansionist and fundamentally different. Although a ‘proper relationship’ [1] is mentioned as being possible, the interdependence is imposed. The Otherness of the USSR is embedded in the Soviet aspirations to threaten mainland Europe and eventually impose Communist principles. Thus, the dominant view pertains to a Soviet Union as not Europe discourse that further buttresses the goal of European membership and fortifies the discourse of Europe functioning as a security coalition. This threat is ontological.

The USA is positioned somewhat differently. First, it is used as an example to argue that even great powers do not have complete independence, thus rendering the loss of Britain’s sovereignty as more acceptable. Subsequently, the positioning of the USA as simultaneously possessing Superpower status and considerable restraints supports the idea that greater
interdependence is not merely contingent on the say-so of individual nations but is locked in to a historically determined path of mutualism. Second, the USA is constructed as in mild opposition to European regionalism that must in some way be united to influence world affairs. Therefore, a sense of competitiveness is compounded to reveal an America that should be challenged rather than blindly followed. The final references reveal a much broader sphere of influence both for Europe and Britain. Friendships reaching as distant as the Far East, China and the Indian Sub-Continent help to position Europe once more in a global context. Rather than an inward-looking entity, the combined strength of European states enables a greater influence outside of Europe. That influence is also not constructed as a threat but as a means to forge greater linkages worldwide.

As a consequence of other non-European states, I would argue that two further discourses on Europe spring from these readings. The first is *Europe as a transnational cooperative*. The Commonwealth, as has been mentioned, is defined as a particular object lodged within an increasingly distant history. The ability for the Commonwealth to repossess any importance is very much attached to its configuration to the new Europe. That is, Europe is not exclusionist in its operations but stretches out to forge new collaborative projects. Similarly, the USA and the USSR are both part of the scope of Europe’s transnationalism and are included as important actors with which Europe can influence and be influenced by. Secondly, and again in relation to the USA and the USSR, a *Europe as superpower* discourse is evident in the way Europe is configured as a dominant and rival entity. Such dominance is orchestrated as both a challenge to bipolarity and as a means to further enfranchise European states by providing Europe as the tool within which they can exercise governance beyond the grip of America or the Soviet Union.
3.4 The Anti-Membership Debates

In this section, I analyse the predicates involving the anti-membership positions as represented in Table 3. As with the previous section, the predicates and processes are presented and then the background knowledge, or presuppositions, discussed. Subsequent to this, the relationship between the various subjects and objects, the subject positioning, is examined with an eye to revealing the range of discourses implicit within the debates.

3.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Membership Debates

As with the pro-membership debates, a key theme centres on the notion of decline. Within the previous debates, decline is the mechanism that anchors Britain to Europe and effectively speeds up the need for further integration. Within the anti-debates, however, decline is articulated quite differently. Firstly, membership is seen as indicative of this degeneracy; that the need for union demonstrates that Britain is effectively helpless. Instead, as uttered by Peter Shore, the Labour Secretary of State for Trade, Britain must be burdened with ‘terms and conditions, penalties and limitations’ [16-p.292] as though defeated in war. Implicit in this discourse are a number of references to Britain’s greatness, perhaps most famously characterised many years earlier by then Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell, warning how the Common Market would lead to “the end of a thousand years of history”\(^\text{465}\). Secondly, it is argued that membership actually exacerbates decline by effectively ending any sense of British exceptionalism and uniqueness. Membership requires the country to become ‘absorbed’ [20-col.903] thus rendering pro-marketeers as ‘defeatists’ [18] in accepting the

shackling of Britain to the Community. A further aspect of decline focuses on the emotive language employed to describe this process of assimilation. References to ‘dismemberment’ [7-p.343], ‘decapitate’ [7-p.153], ‘guillotine’ [7-p.153], ‘strangled’ [7-p.48] and ‘destruction’ [13-p.193] position the Community as a body intent on the dissolution of Britain. The ‘long and famous story of the British nation and people has ended’ [16-p.292] reveals Britain as effectively under siege from an existential threat. A final observation focuses on how deeply decline is ensconced within an Empire-driven identity. In the House of Commons debate on 9 April 1975, Enoch Powell argued how many EEC supporters view the EEC

... as a surrogate for Empire. It supplies the same sensation as is believed to have been enjoyed in the past, of belonging to a great and powerful show. ... We shall participate in that not as a nation but as members of something different; for the nation, our independence, our “we-hood”, must be traded in as the price of gaining membership of that new power structure.  

That is, pro-membership is attached to a desire for national greatness and a global projection and influence reminiscent of the British Empire. However, the EEC is a new power structure that does not accommodate nation-statism and, by way of its composition, actually demands the opposite: that individual members must forfeit national power and sovereignty. Thus, the misguided need to belong to a greater entity, far from bolstering nationhood, actually strips it.

This is closely related to what is arguably the dominant theme within the anti-debates: that the EEC is a threat to British independence and national and parliamentary sovereignty. Several layers are related to this position. Firstly, an elision of two different concepts occurs within this discourse. Wallace makes the distinction between national autonomy, defined as “the ability of a nation to attain its objectives through unilateral action”, and national sovereignty, which is “the ability of a nation to act on its own rather than under the

Thus, within the debates, no distinction is made between autonomy, which is constrained, and sovereignty, which is preserved. The conflation of these concepts, therefore, positions sovereignty in zero-sum terms with ‘shifts (of) power from the elected to the unelected’ [13g-p.175], ‘transfer of power to the centre’ [13i-p.187], ‘greater centralization of power to Brussels’ [13j-p.192] and ‘too much power had drained away to Europe’ [7-p.135]. A second observation focuses on the lack of democracy within the European structure. The democratic deficit is not seen as a by-product or peripheral element of supranationality but is its locus. The EEC is ‘a carefully constructed mechanism for eliminating all democratic influences’ [13g-p.173], a ‘threat to democracy’ [13g-p.170] and a means to removing ‘the power of governments to discourage revolution or riot’ [13g-p.173]. ‘Betraying’ [7-p.343], ‘conniving’ [7-p.343] and ‘deception’ [13j-p.193] are all implicit in this reading which emphasises that the real nature of the Community has been hidden and promoted surreptitiously. Consequently, continued British membership leads to a political infringement on sovereign issues which are being masked behind a carefully constructed façade of economic arguments. A final aspect of the sovereignty is how the EEC is rife with bureaucracy and corruption. Bureaucrats are likened to belonging to an omnipotent cabal or inner circle, producing a continuous ‘flood of regulations and directives’ [13f-p.168], making decisions that are ‘ridiculous or foolish’ [13i-p.185] and being involved in ‘corruption and waste’ [13i-p.185]. Indeed, ‘unelected Commissioners’ [18] are even blamed for circumventing the law to such a degree that ‘if it were a private company, (they) would be languishing in jail’ [13h-p.177]. The EEC buildings, apparatuses and processes are demonised by reference to their size. Tony Benn, the then Secretary State for Industry, described the whole mechanism as ‘so big and bureaucratic’ [7-p.144] and the ‘huge Commission building in Brussels, in the shape of a cross’ feeling ‘absolutely un-British’ [7-

468 Ibid.
A related reading positions the EEC as a ‘rich man’s club’. Two aspects are implicit in this construction. Firstly, by being ‘welcomed by the multinationals’ [13g-p.172] and ‘dedicated to a capitalist or market economy theology’ [7-p.346], the EEC is seen as a big business blueprint designed to satisfy corporate interests and further domination. Therefore, and although falling outside of the articulations by political elites, many trade unions “concluded that the EU was an undemocratic, bureaucratic extension of the interests of big business, designed to benefit multinational capital at the expense of citizens and workers”.

Secondly, this representation reveals how the EEC functions as the main barrier to building both a socialist Britain and a socialist Europe. This position is obviously heavily indebted to Labour party ethos and, in particular, a focus on trade unionism. However, and although one cannot glean what kind of socialist Britain is being threatened, interests and identity are very much lodged within an anti-corporate, pro-worker configuration. That is, this account contributes to viewing ‘the Community machine’ [22-col.1289] as an elite-driven, corrupt and anti-democratic venture that couples the sinister interests of its political architects to those of big business.

Of the other countries referred to, France, perhaps most obviously, is predicated as a foe. A number of formulations construct it as ‘nationalistic’ [8-p.306] and ‘no friend’ [7-p.348] of...
Britain’s. Further references examine the attempt to make French the official language of EEC business which is seen as eroding the English language and even putting the literary greatness of ‘Chaucer, Shakespeare and Milton’ [16-p.273] under threat. Hence, France is perceived as a strong actor, jostling for hegemony, intent on destroying the cultural heritage of Britain. Similarly to the pro-membership debates, the references to the Commonwealth demonstrate a conflict between Britain’s obligation to the historical alliance and recognition of its fading importance. The Commonwealth had been relegated to the role of ‘diminished concern’ [8-p.296] and the prevalence of positions towards Common Market membership, although antagonistic, nonetheless reveals the cardinal role that Europe increasingly took. The Soviet Union is mentioned as possessing the desire to drive out Britain from the Community in accordance with Europe functioning as a bulwark against the Soviet model. An obsession with membership of the Community is also blamed for weakening Britain’s relations with the USA. The USA is actually read in two ways. Firstly, it is a security coalition in which an unreliable Europe is scant replacement. Secondly, the relationship is historically and culturally embedded within the practices and policies of both states. This linkage is cultivated with reference to Cold War terms which again help diminish the importance of the EEC. Of the other references, abroad is described as ‘bloody’ [8-p.302] while the Continent is constructed as possessing an autocratic and politically unstable history of which Britain sits apart: they ‘have been ruled by dictators, or defeated or occupied’ [18] and ‘are more used to abandoning their political institutions than we are’ [18]. Britain is located, therefore, as possessing a superior political structure that should be protected against the import of mainland European political instability and strife.

To summarise the predicates in Table 3, Britain is seen as resolutely free and independent in contrast to the undemocratic, bureaucratic, threateningly large, corrupt and authoritarian
nature of the Community. The EEC is a direct threat to the British parliament and much focus is given to the waste, dishonesty and lack of transparency of unelected European officials. Aiding Community bureaucrats is the motive of big business. Hence, elite interests are fused into a mutual relationship of combined political and corporate power. France is consistently singled out as overbearing and imperial. The Commonwealth is conveyed as an important relationship at risk from greater links to Europe. The USSR is intent on weakening the unity of the union as the EEC is perceived as a rival power structure. The USA is characterised as a part of a trusted alliance at risk from moves to deepen EEC membership. Finally, the Continent is viewed as a homogenous cluster characterised by virtually uninterrupted despotism or occupation.
Table 3: Predication and Processes within the Anti-Membership Debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>European Economic Community</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>British Democracy:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bureaucracy and Corruption:</strong></td>
<td>France:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community’s institutions can be improved…to reinforce democratic control [1]</td>
<td>Absurd the way the bureaucracy was growing there. Nobody believed in it – they just took their hat along because they felt they had to join in [7-p.142]</td>
<td>‘France is no friend’ [7-p.348]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power has gone to Brussels, to the TUC and the CBI, and we are just a rubber stamp [7-p.16]</td>
<td>I can think of no body of men outside the Kremlin who have so much power without a shred of accountability for what they do [7-p.343]</td>
<td>France, one of the oldest and most nationalistic of countries [8-p.306]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is completely undermined [7-p. 128]</td>
<td>If it were a private company, the Commissioners would be languishing in jail [13b-p.177]</td>
<td>France’s approach to the EEC would mean ‘a complete rupture of our identity’ [16-p.273]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too much power had drained away to Europe [7-p.135]</td>
<td>Decisions made by Europe are just ridiculous or foolish [13i-p.185]</td>
<td>‘The language of Chaucer, Shakespeare and Milton…was threatened by the French demand for linguistic hegemony in the EEC; ‘Non, merci beaucoup’ [16-p.273]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The myth of Empire had been replaced by the myth of Europe [7-p.143]</td>
<td>Corruption and waste [13i-p.185]</td>
<td><strong>Commonwealth:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Commission will decapitate or apply the guillotine to British Democracy [7-p.157]</td>
<td>Undermining the powers of industry and commerce [13i-p.188]</td>
<td>Concentration on negotiations…had given the impression of a diminished concern for the Commonwealth [8-p.296]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The huge Commission building in Brussels, in the shape of a cross, is absolutely un-British. I felt as if I was going as a slave to Rome [7-p.180]</td>
<td>Gross deception [13-p.193]</td>
<td>We shall cease…to be a member of the Commonwealth [18]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A long retreat from parliamentary democracy…is being forced upon us [7-p.292]</td>
<td>So big and bureaucratic [7-p.144]</td>
<td><strong>The Soviet Union and the USA:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Community will destroy the whole basis on which the labour movement was founded, and its commitment to democratic change [7-p.343]</td>
<td>Unelected Commissioners in Brussels [18]</td>
<td>The Soviet aim was to dislodge us from the Common Market [7-p.155]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of the EEC will fatally dilute some of the main motive power of British social democracy and give a great fillip to consensus politics [9-p.605]</td>
<td>Macroe-planning organisation [20-col.915]</td>
<td>Deep and lasting commitment to Europe had weakened our relations with the United States [8-p.295]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To encroach still further into the law-making authority of the member states [13f-p.168]</td>
<td>The Community machine [22-col.1289]</td>
<td>We were about to exchange our old friends in the Commonwealth and the United States for ‘an aroma of continental clausiphobia’ [16-p.273]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to democracy [13g-p.170]</td>
<td><strong>Capitalist Club:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Other:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A carefully constructed mechanism for eliminating all democratic influences [13g-p.173]</td>
<td>Dedicated to a capitalist or market economy theology [7-p.346]</td>
<td>For him (Douglas Jay) abroad is ‘bloody’ [8-p.302]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removes the power of governments to discourage revolution or riot [13g-p.173]</td>
<td>Rich men’s club [13g-p.170]</td>
<td>In recent times, they (Continental countries) have been ruled by dictators, or defeated or occupied. They are more used to abandoning their political institutions than we are [18]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will stimulate nationalism…may break up amidst hostility between nations [13g-p.174]</td>
<td>EEC was set up to rebuild Europe on safe capitalist lines [13g-p.171]</td>
<td>They (certain European countries) do not have the long-term commitment to democratic control [20-col.903]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shifts power from the elected to the unelected [13g-p.175]</td>
<td>Was welcomed by the multinationalis…as a way of overcoming the policies of national governments to which they objected [13g-p.172]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermines democratically accountable authority [13g-p.177]</td>
<td>Commission is little more than a regional agent of globalisation, enforcing the dictates of the bankers [13g-p.175]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The myth of ‘inviolability’ [13g-p.179]</td>
<td>Club of relatively privileged nations which want to maintain their positions [20-col.918]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of power to the centre [13i-p.187]</td>
<td>The largest capitalist organisation in the world today [20-col.939]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The destruction of self-government [13j-p.193]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian system of legislation, taxation and government…sapping away the sovereignty…(and) democratic control [15-p.144]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That choice is nothing less than whether we shall remain a nation at all [15-p.146]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To merge Britain with France, Germany, Italy and other countries into a single nation [18]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An authoritarian system of legislation, taxation and government…sapping away not just the sovereignty of this country as an independent self-governing nation but the democratic control of our people over the laws and powers of government [20-col.860]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The nation, our independence, our ‘we-hood’ must be traded in [22-col.1301]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

148
Several presuppositions are evident that provide background knowledge of what is presumed to exist. The predicates are primarily configured along a series of hierarchical differences and oppositions. From the perspective of Britain, the EEC is configured as a particular kind of threat which can be enumerated along four principal oppositions. Firstly, and very similarly to the pro-marketeer debates, Britain is exemplified as a nation. Again, the invocation of this produces a sense of unity and places Britain as a parliamentary-bound political unit, which protects the nation, rather than as being defined by the mechanism of state. In contrast, the EEC is very much governed by executive interests. Consequently, what can be called a parliamentary-oriented/executive-oriented nexus is revealed as a principal opposition. The workings, functions and primary interest of the EEC are governed by an array of groups whose interests operate in antagonism to the general populace. These groups include businessmen, bureaucrats, capitalists, commissioners, bankers and privileged nations. As the European project has been designed by and for self-serving elites, the EEC is beyond reform precisely because it functions against the common interest.

Secondly and relatedly, the predicates operate within a reified democratic/undemocratic opposition. European institutions are branded as authoritarian in contrast to the autonomy that is constructed as firmly rooted within British parliament. Thus, parliamentary sovereignty is presumed to be inviolable and this legislative autonomy is attached to and emblematic of a broader national democracy. For example, in an open letter to his constituents, Tony Benn wrote:

"Britain’s continuing membership of the Community would mean the end of Britain as a completely self-governing nation and the end of our..."
democratically elected Parliament as the supreme law-making body in the
United Kingdom.⁴⁷¹

Thus, Britain is constructed as a state that exemplifies the notion of autonomy and self-rule
whilst the EEC is perceived as its antithesis.

A third presupposition positions membership as a sign of economic and political failure. The
EEC is orchestrated as a mechanism to convene those powers which cannot sufficiently
exercise their authority on an international scale. Subsequently, a great power/minor power
nexus is presupposed to exist within which membership is a test of an individual state’s
status. Again, invocations of ‘weak’ [16-p.292], ‘powerless’ [16-p.292] and ‘defeatist’ [18]
are all symptomatic of a craven need to anchor Britain to the security blanket of Europe. In
short, this presupposition effectively demonstrates that those who support integration are
positioning Britain as a peripheral actor whilst resistance to integration is emblematic of a
British national identity that perpetuates an imperial narrative: that Britain possesses a wider,
global and more powerful actor status than other European states.

The final and related opposition is formulated along a local-national/supranational
opposition. That is, non-participation in the EEC would bring about two things. Firstly, the
local and regional are very much implanted within the notion of independence. The sheer
scale of the institutions of European governance, along with the assumptions of bureaucracy,
 Ministers, waste and corruption, helps articulate a threat against more localised, national interests.
Secondly, the focus on state identity as functioning at the national level contributes to once

⁴⁷¹ TNA (The National Archives), PRO PREM (Records of the Prime Minister’s Office) 16/558, Benn to the Constituents of
Britain’s Terms of Entry into the European Community, 1974-1975’, Contemporary British History, 24: 4, pp. 471-91 (at
481).
again positioning Britain as operating beyond the restrictiveness of Europe. That is, membership is stultifying as it limits British involvement with non-European trading partners.

3.4.3 Subject Positioning within the Anti-Membership Debates

The predication and presupposition produce a number of subject positions. Similarly to the previous debates, a considerable level of instrumentality is afforded to principle subjects. However, Britain is positioned in two additionally important ways. Firstly, as a great power, it possesses a level of agency beyond those of its counterparts. Subsequently, EEC-membership is an attempt to deaden Britain’s global actor status. This threat is exacerbated by the fact that Britain, by being a more predominant agent, has more to lose than others. By way of example, and not denying the diminishing role the Commonwealth had, a pamphlet written in 1971 by a New Zealand campaign against EEC membership contained the following doom-laden message:

Together we stand at the crossroads of history. THE SECOND BATTLE OF BRITAIN is imminent. In the mystical sense, am I to be the stranger from New Zealand standing on a broken arch of London Bridge to gaze upon the ruins of St Paul’s? 472

Accordingly, Britain is positioned in relationship to other European states as multi-tentacled and dominant: that its influence goes far beyond the confines of geographical Europe and the EEC, therefore, is a mechanism to restrict British influence and trading traditions.

Secondly, Britain is positioned as sovereign. The issue of sovereignty is made more potent by its attachment to a long narrative of domestic and international struggles within which this value has prevailed. Sovereignty is very much exemplified within the functioning of

parliament and is therefore defined institutionally rather than popularly. Ron Leighton, a Labour politician, sums up how preciously sovereignty needed to be safeguarded:

Our present liberties and freedoms in Britain were fought for and achieved by our forefathers in a long struggle included such milestones as Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Chartist movement, the various reform bills, women’s suffrage, and so on. Our present MPs have inherited these rights and liberties, and now they are custodians responsible for handing them on to future generations. They certainly have no mandate to surrender or abandon our right to self-government and self-determination to the apparatus in Brussels and would never be forgiven for doing so.473

Europe is read in two important ways. Firstly, there is Europe as a federal state. This discourse is heavily punctuated with the transfer of power becoming increasingly and irreversibly centralised. It is also coupled to Empire building, as opposed to more regional and localised structures of governance. The EEC, therefore, is positioned as behemothic, elite-drive, corrupt and deceptive. The second reading posits Europe as a syndicate. In this sense, a capitalist versus worker nexus is utilised to reveal that the EEC is constructed as a means to facilitate globalisation with the intent on safeguarding corporate power structures. It is governed by a corporate ethos which propagates expansion for reasons of profit. As early as 1963, Tony Benn wrote that “the Treaty of Rome entrenches laissez-faire as its philosophy and chooses bureaucracy as its administrative method.”474

Within the references to other actors, the first is the USA as a security alliance. In as much as Europe is vilified for its increasingly more assertive role, Britain very much identifies not with any attempt to forge new security alliances out of Europe but to stick with older, more-established ones. The second positions America as a historical and cultural linkage. As such, the alliance is very much embedded in the psyche of British political elites in that Atlanticism

is the means by which Britain’s past survives into the present. It is seen as a way for Britain to relive and act out past influence.

The Continent as a whole is demonised by referring to the ‘bloody’ mainland as against a peaceful Britain. Its history is conceived as being a long series of uninterrupted wars and conflicts. The EEC, the Continent and Europe are all used synonymously. This locates a much broader threat and seeks to homogenise quite separate entities into a whole. Attempts to reinvigorate British historical and cultural linkages as a way of countering EEC encroachment help formulate a USA that should not be snubbed. The Commonwealth is also positioned as an alliance wholly contingent on the national independence of Britain and, as such, cannot retain a relationship of importance so as long as Britain becomes submerged into Europe. Consequently, both pro- and anti-positions share the Commonwealth as past discourse.

3.5 Self, Other and National Identities

The array of Self/Other configurations are summarised in Table 4. Each Self and Other configuration, its particular characteristics and the sources from Appendix 1 have been listed. Within the pro-membership debates, the EEC is constructed as friendly, with shared values and history, and the prospects of withdrawal risk creating a situation of international anarchy and a return to the nationalist wars of the twentieth century. The Commonwealth is classified as a non-radical Other. It retains ‘close relations’ [1] with the Self but is indicative of a fading affinity. Despite the importance of the Atlantic Alliance, Britain is firmly pitted as existing within a regional context. It is also evident that this does not necessarily conflict with US interests but instead enables the USA to engage more fitfully with a united Europe. The USA,
therefore, can be viewed as a non-radical Other. Britain’s past is constituted as a radical Other. The past is perceived not merely historically, relating to previous European wars, but also to past attitudes that are configured as decadent and antiquated. The Soviet Union and Communism as a whole are also posited as a radical Other. The Soviet Union is hostile and the need for continued British membership of the EEC is a barrier to its expansionism.

In contrast, the anti-membership debates configure the USA as a friendly Other, playing a fundamental role in ensuring the defence of the new Europe and demonstrates the importance of retaining this association. The Commonwealth is positioned as an ‘old friend’ [16-p.273] but the relationship also reveals the preponderance of the nascent Community in relegating the Commonwealth to secondary role. The Commonwealth is constructed as an alliance lodged within a historically contingent setting. The EEC is positioned as a radical Other. Through a clear process of binarisation, the Self is pitted as democratic, free and victimised as against an undemocratic, meddling and malevolent Other. Such negative characterisations are also extended to the Continent which is also perceived as a radical configuration steeped in a history of bloody campaigns and authoritarian control of which France is notable as its chief belligerent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Debate</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Categorisation</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Pro-Membership Debates</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The EEC</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Process of strong linking: clear association between Self and Other; malleable notion of Other formulates it in a flexible and non-threatening way; fear of withdrawal; persistent references to peace, prosperity and common interests and values</td>
<td>1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13h &amp; i, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The Commonwealth</td>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td>Process of mild differentiation: close relations but liable to fracture, does not want Self to isolate itself, recognition of shifting importance of the EEC</td>
<td>1, 7, 11, 17, 19, 20, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The USA</td>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td>Process of mild differentiation: clear importance of Atlanticism but with a focus on regionalism, desire to create European unity in order to compete at an international level, recognition that a united Europe does not necessarily conflict with the US</td>
<td>1, 8, 13g, 16, 17, 19, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain’s present</td>
<td>Britain’s past</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: internationalism vs. isolationism, interdependence vs. ‘little Englandism’, partnership vs. rivalry</td>
<td>3, 7, 9, 11, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The Soviet Union / Communism</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: free Britain vs. Communist Britain, peaceful vs. aggressive, democratic system vs. nondemocratic system</td>
<td>1, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Anti-Membership Debates</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The USA</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Process of strong linking: defined as an ‘old friend’, essential to maintain alliance for defence</td>
<td>7, 8, 13g, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The Commonwealth</td>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td>Process of mild differentiation: defined as an ‘old friend’, positive commitment and obligation to the Other but recognition of declining role, Other is constructed as part of historical alliance that has become interrupted and ruptured</td>
<td>8, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The EEC</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: democratic vs. undemocratic, greatness vs. decline, free nation vs. encroaching community, elected national politicians vs. unelected bureaucrats, local and national vs. large and supranational, victim vs. Perpetrator</td>
<td>1, 7, 13a, f, g, h, i &amp; j, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The Continent</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: peaceful vs. bloody, stable vs. unstable, ruled by parliament vs. ruled by dictators, victor vs. defeated or occupied</td>
<td>8, 18, 20, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: international values vs. nationalist values/conciliatory vs. hegemonic</td>
<td>7, 8, 9, 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Due to the discursive contestations, and the range of Others produced, a number of conflicting national identities are generated. The positioning of a number of threats and alliances, as indicated by the formulation of Others, has repercussions for elite interpretations of Britain’s sense of Self. I argue that the various processes of Othering – friendly, non-radical and radical – reveal the following attempts to impose a number of national identities.

3.5.1 National Identity and Friendly Othering

The EEC in the pro-debates is predictably positioned as a friendly Other. A number of important linkages help attain this relationship. Firstly, the EEC is constructed as the means to harbour and project British interests and identity. This is achieved via the articulation of the fear of isolation. Withdrawal is perceived as an existential threat and the cementing of links to Europe is the process necessary to sustain individual national identities. To combat the frequently cited concern over the loss of sovereignty, it is wedded to the notion of pooling. Sovereignty is a pooled construct akin to a continental approach which views it as “being multi-layered, local, regional, national and European”. By pitching Europe as a fundamentally evolutionary project, it is argued that identities themselves are not intrinsically inert and can shape and mould to their new surroundings. Identity, therefore, is essentially malleable and its potency rests on a need to accept change and to recant what are seen as primitive and outmoded readings of sovereignty that configure it as sacrosanct and timeless. Secondly, the references to the EEC as a galvaniser for peace and prosperity make much use of the existence of shared and common values. British

---

national identity is positioned within a European framework and subsequently no longer embodies exceptionalism but universalism. That is, not only is Britain part of a European legacy but it is also a key contributor and promulgator of the common values that help define what Europe is. Finally, much use of the economic and political malaise that would befall Britain if it chose to stay outside of the Community reveals an identity no longer lodged within a discourse perpetuated by empire. Forster notes how “[i]n the Conservative party, many MPs based their anti-Europeanism on a strong emotional commitment to the Empire/Commonwealth”\textsuperscript{476} and, as would be expected, pro-marketeers similarly articulated a position that sought to extricate Britain’s present and future from the shackles of its imperial past. The ability to distance Britain from its expansionary, colonial history positions national identity in new and vibrant terms and helps to formulate it in partnership with rather than in rivalry with other such national identities.

The configuration of the USA as a friendly Other in the pro-membership debates is bound up with two distinct readings of the relationship. The first is cultural in that both countries have being forged culturally and historically and this homogenising legacy continues to live on. Roger Scruton captures this sentiment:

\begin{quote}
The British Empire lives on in America, just as the Roman Empire lived on in Byzantium, although in a form more vital, more industrious and more generous than its ancient archetype.\textsuperscript{477}
\end{quote}

In short, cultural ties and values not merely reveal an affinity, but the embodiment of what was once celebratory about Britain continues to operate in America. To prop up this link, key historical events are illustrative of the proximity in values of the two countries. For example,


Wallace mentions how the legacy of the Second World War helped to fortify the image of a fundamentally British national character. One might add how this national character was bolstered by the image of an occupied mainland Europe as against both free and resilient Britain and America. America became positioned as a fundamental lifeline for free states hostile to the intimidation of Communism and fascism and this also positions British identity as freedom-loving and liberal. The second is material. The predominance of the ‘special relationship’ is inextricably linked to a static reading of security. Subsequently, an evolving, growing Europe is not constructed as an entity that can in any way rival the dominance of America’s Superpower status. In short, the relationship is a pre-given and little trust is placed in the ability of the EEC to cultivate a sense of security that could ever compete with the Atlantic Alliance.

3.5.2 National Identity and Non-Radical Othering

The Commonwealth is positioned as a non-radical Other in both the pro- and anti-membership debates. Firstly, the natural role of British leadership had been supplanted by a dual recognition of the importance of fomenting closer ties to Europe and the understanding that the nature of the Commonwealth had radically altered. The Commonwealth states had become largely independent and, as referenced in the pro-membership debates, any attempt to ‘summon up the lost legions of the Commonwealth’ [21-col.1066] was pure fantasy. Subsequently, the fading role of the Commonwealth is synonymous with the fading role Britain possessed in attempting to shore up an alliance that no longer had its previous resonance. This positions a British sense of Self which understood that the resurgence of economic and political links to non-European

nations could not compete against the thrust of the new Europe which was being made. Despite this shifting locus towards the European venture, the Commonwealth, however, is not constructed as an entity that should be ignored or sidelined. References are made to how Commonwealth interests do not sit in opposition with a pro-European Britain which enables identity to be less nationally defined, but more transnational and cross-cutting. The Commonwealth is also partially constructed as a remnant of colonial days in which a more pro-European stance might position Britain in less imperial terms and more as part of an anti-Empire, voluntaristic association.

In the pro-debates, the USA functions as a non-radical Other. The much-lauded ‘special relationship’ is dramatically reconfigured to reveal the emergence of a quite different association. Hitherto, the Anglo-American rapport was essential for British identity in a number of ways:

> It fitted British pre-dispositions perfectly. It was image building; it flattered popular feeling and imagery about Britain’s world role; it was a direct continuation of Britain’s wartime experience, so deeply engraved in the national psyche; it gave substance and sense to Britain’s mission to serve world security.\(^479\)

By the 1970s, however, the ‘special relationship’ had become coined as the ‘natural relationship’ by Edward Heath\(^480\) and despite clear associations with the USA, a number of identity-based changes started to occur. Firstly, the focus towards regionalism helped foster the idea that the EEC, irrespective of any suspicion towards it, could no longer be sidelined. In the 1960s, “[w]e took it for granted that Britain was a world power, entitled to a seat at the top tables. Europe was


not then a top table". By the 1970s, “the basic doctrines of English pan-Anglo-Saxonism (as) the unquestioning identification of British and American leadership” had been corroded by the realisation that Britain could not continue to ignore the integration of Europe. Secondly, there is perhaps the early understanding that European and American values and interests were essentially no longer the same and that Britain fundamentally had to choose between the two. This perhaps reveals an early process of the Europeanisation of Britain whereby Atlantic ties had to be softened in order to be part of the European family. The gradual shift away from the USA being positioned as Britain’s most important ally is reflected in the dwindling identification with American values. This slow process reveals a national identity that is sticky but not immutable and a future that is firmly planted within a European rather than Atlantic sphere. As a consequence, the USA as a non-radical Other retains a level of importance but is adulterated by Britain’s growing sense of purpose to attach itself to the core of the new European sphere.

3.5.3 National Identity and Radical Othering

The practice of radical Othering reveals how past invocations of history, Communism, the EEC and the Continent are all positioned as a series of threats and these reveal certain kinds of national identities. Firstly, although both sceptics and enthusiasts evoke past memories when making their cases, “they do not talk about the same past.” The radical Othering of a history replete with past glories helps recognise the importance of how historical legacies are tightly

---

constraining, whilst simultaneously identifying how these myths can be debunked. This temporal Othering, therefore, is somewhat related to a more general European Other that, since World War Two, has constructed a European identity in opposition to its past. Subsequently, within the pro-EEC debates, and perhaps unconventionally, I also argue that Britain’s past, particularly viewed at a time by political elites who had had experience of this violent history, is a radical Other. Additionally, the preoccupation with weakness, and the fear of withdrawal, helps reveal a national identity which operates in contrast to the previously dominant configuration of Britain as being fundamentally detached from the rest of Europe. The detachment rests on a “myth created by the Victorians as an explanation for the historical inevitability of the British empire.” The references to decline seek to question this inevitability and the romanticised view of a go-it-alone, imperial Britain and subsequently positions British national identity as internationalist rather than isolationist. As “the United Kingdom was obliged to seek admission to a Europe it could no longer control or avoid”, this indelible linkage to the Continent seeks to reposition a British national identity that is no longer constitutive of the British empire and no longer in opposition to Europe. As a consequence, Britain’s past, cloaked in imperial dominance and idealised isolationism, is very much pitched as a radical Other.

The second process of radical Othering within the pro-membership debates elides Communism and Socialism as similar threats and constructs Britain as under siege from all variants of what is seen as left-wing authoritarianism. As was articulated by one Conservative politician during the House of Commons debates:

The Left calls the Community a capitalist club. I do not know what the opposite to capitalism is – presumably it is Socialism, with a large capital S – the sort of Socialism which is so closely allied to Communism that in my view it is difficult to differentiate between the two.488

This fear is very much lodged within a Cold War West versus East binarisation. In 1951, a Foreign Office memorandum argued how integration had been innervated by the Soviet threat and the sheer size of the Soviet bloc drew attention to the weak and fragmentary nature of Western Europe.489 The security risks continued to permeate the period during and after the referendum leading to the conclusion that “anti-Communism had provided British Conservatism’s main external enemy in the post-war era.”490 The security dimension has a number of repercussions for identity. To begin with, the East as threat helps to instil the idea that national sovereignty is an integral part of British identity and can only be realised within a setting of closer union to other European nations. Sovereignty is positioned as indivisible and unitary and its preservation is seen as integral to the continuation of a democratic tradition. Next, the manner in which this sovereignty is not at risk from dilution with other European states situates Britain as firmly wedded to the Continent. Subsequently, the process of the radical Othering of the Soviet Union helps construct a Britain that has a leading role to play in the containment of the Other. Finally, the process of binarisation pits an aggressive East against a Britain as victim to this aggression. Again, the previously dominant position of Britain as possessing a sense of Self based on imperial conquest is repudiated to reveal a much more peaceful and conciliatory nation.

The third radical Other, taken from the anti-membership debates, locates Britain in conflict with the EEC. However, although unsurprising, a number of important formulations help consolidate this stance. Historical ruptures, such as the Second World War, are displayed as events which threatened but did not alter the essentially enduring and teleological nature of sovereignty. The articulation of sovereignty is embedded within a tightly drawn historical framework which seeks to construct the present as a direct continuation of the past. Identity is therefore constructed as singular and static. The importance of orderliness, and lack of critical junctures, is core to British identity. Political change, therefore, occurs in slow, incremental ways and this projects a national identity that is measured and controlled, rather than rebellious and anarchistic. British identity is rooted in individualism and independence. Britain is “a self-contained and detached entity with its centre of gravity located within itself” and must therefore be resistant to the monumental changes that membership would foist upon it. British identity is steadfastly linked to the perception of the homogeneity of the nation-state, “parliamentary sovereignty remains the only fully legitimate source of sovereignty” and identity is resistant to change as it is “historically firmly embedded.” Due to this, national identity has two dominant motifs when positioning the EEC as radical Other. Firstly, it seeks to elide sovereignty with identity; that is, the loss of sovereignty is also a loss of identity. Secondly, British identity is mired in historical myths that construct the rest of Europe as corrupt and despotic as against the idealism of the ‘free-born Englishman’.

A final process of radical Othering also stems from the anti-EEC debates and seeks to configure the Continent, and in particular France, in direct opposition. One can argue that “[t]he existence of France as an object of discourse underlying the British, or more precisely English, sense of national identity has a very long history.” The antagonistic positioning of France is firmly positioned within an elite reading of history that seeks to draw clear links between past and present. To begin with, and perhaps most obviously, the numerous wars between the two states have solidified the idea that Britain has at several times been at risk of conquest and this enables mainland Europe to be positioned as a threat. The invocation of past conflicts, therefore, culminating in the “self-protection against the pretensions of pope and emperor”, position Europe as an encroaching entity, with France at its helm, and with the Continental European states categorised into the “victors and vanquished.” However, the adversarial positioning of the Continent is linked not merely to historical spats, but also to fundamental legal and constitutional differences. The identities of

[t]he continental states were also quite similar to one another, both because they had sprung from the Napoleonic wars and subsequent historical events and because they had a common social basis in peasant agriculture. ... The federal idea therefore came naturally to them and did not damage their national identity.

Wallace argues how the controversies in the 1970s were “argued in terms of superiority of common law to Roman law, the greater underlying strength of the British democratic tradition, and the statist and corporatist assumptions which underlay continental government and

---

administration.” Subsequently, France is seen as heavily influencing the European project in order to supplant and dominate Britain. Due to Britain being “tightly constrained by its historical legacy”, two key elements of British national identity can be pinpointed within the anti-membership debates about the Continent. The first is that Britain possesses a deep feeling of insecurity in its relations with its neighbours. The second is that Britain positions itself as superior in its practice of democracy, governance and values.

3.6 The Production of British National Identities

Figure 4 summarises and unifies the findings within the debates. The reason for presenting this is threefold. Firstly, it synthesises the empirical data in this chapter. Secondly, it provides a summary as a means of comparing how which identities in all three empirical chapters have been stabilised and which are specific to the historical event. In short, it provides the framework for an understanding of change and stasis within the identity formations. This comparative element will be examined in detail, however, in Chapter Six. Thirdly, it enables a deeper understanding of the factors that help stabilise and produce the identities. Although the debates have been divided into pro- and anti-positions, these in turn produce multiple readings of Europe, as well as other states and international organisations, which impact on the production of British national identities. That is, the discourses produced contain characteristics that have been articulated in both pro- and anti-positions. Consequently, although the pro/anti dichotomy has been included as a means

of understanding which identities have been produced from which position, it can be said that the demarcation has been diluted.

The figure is organised as follows. The processes of Othering and the various pro/anti divisions are displayed. Then, the discourses taken from the subject positioning are shown. These, in turn, produce a range of identities extrapolated from both the discourses and from the characteristics in Table 4. Finally, from these attributes, I argue that six British Selves can be posited. In the same way as Othering produces a range of Others – not a single, definable entity – so too does it produce a number of Selves. Although these final configurations are state-centric, they can be regarded as images of nationhood formulated due to the various identities attributed to them.
Figure 4: British National Identities in the Debates over Membership of the EEC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Othering</th>
<th>Pro/Anti</th>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>British National Identities</th>
<th>Britain’s Selves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>Europe as a Security Bloc</td>
<td>Multiple European</td>
<td>European Nation-State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe as Established</td>
<td>Pragmatic Fading Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe as a Network of Sovereignties</td>
<td>In crisis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>USA as a Security Alliance</td>
<td>Militarily influential</td>
<td>Transatlantic, Securitised Nation-State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USA as a Cultural &amp; Historical Linkage</td>
<td>Regionalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>Europe as a Transnational Cooperative</td>
<td>Militarily influential</td>
<td>Transnational European Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe as a Superpower</td>
<td>Regionalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commonwealth as Past</td>
<td>Trade-driven</td>
<td>Transnational Nation-State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Commonwealth as Past</td>
<td>Global Internationalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>Europe as a Superpower</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>Cooperative European Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe as its Historical Antithesis</td>
<td>Free / Peaceful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR as not Europe</td>
<td>Liberating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Europe as a Federal State</td>
<td>Non-isolationist</td>
<td>Sovereign Parliamentary Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe as a Syndicate</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LOCAL / Organic Unitary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the basis of the findings in this chapter, six British Selves are formulated. These are the formulations extracted from the processes of predication, presupposition and subject positioning within the body of this chapter. The first can be categorised as **Britain as a European nation-state**. Three discourses forge this categorisation: *Europe as a security bloc, as established* and *as a network of sovereignties*. The security dimension lodges Britain within a European framework that functions as an essential defence against the ‘East as threat’. As an established and rooted construct, Europe is taken as pre-given. Its existence is indisputable as is the dominant agency afforded it. Consequently, Britain identifies with this inevitability and is firmly attached to what is seen as the increasingly central role that the EEC has. *As a network of sovereignties*, European membership weds individual nation-states together in a system of interdependencies. Complete sovereignty is regarded as chimerical. The interests and identities of states are neither diluted nor threatened because the Community provides the means to ensure they are exercised and protected. A number of British national identities are produced from these discourses. For the purposes of explanation, they can be grouped in two ways. Firstly, identity is *multiple, European* and *pragmatic*. Multiplicity reveals a non-exclusionist view of British identity that includes an overlapping spectrum of different allegiances. The most dominant is Europe that is fashioned out of a realistic, matter-of-fact necessity. The attachment to Europe, however, does not preclude other alliances. This is because of the cross-cutting nature of identity and also the fact that political authority very much continues to be lodged within the sphere of the nation-state. Secondly, identity is *in crisis, militarised, defensive* and demonstrative of a *fading power* status. The reification of Europe as a major identity for Britain is made sense of within a security structure that has two elements. The first is that Europe functions as a means to protect its members from outside threats. ‘Cold-War Europe’ is the dominant configuration that gives
Britain meaning. The second is that Britain, with its declining dominance, is forced to anchor itself to the Community as a means of bolstering its national authority abroad.

The second British Self is as a transatlantic, securitised nation-state. Two discourses construct this reading. The first is the USA as a security alliance. As with the previous discourse, identities are framed by defensive measures although as an alliance, the security relationship is more mutually determined. The second discourse constructs the USA as a cultural and historical linkage. The USA is imbued with a sense of fraternity and commonality. These two discourses produce several British national identities that can be grouped into two clusters. One focuses on Britain as militarily influential, regionalist and defensive. Apart from the dominance of the already mentioned security dimension, identity is lodged within a regionalist perception that pinpoints the USA as a conduit for Britain and helps forge two more identities: Britain as culturalised and historicised. That is, identity is not governed by geographical proximity but by regional association defined via history and culture. As a consequence, Britain is configured as possessing a transatlantic identity which functions in opposition to a historically and culturally distant Europe.

The third British Self can be identified as a transnational European power. Three discourses produce this understanding: Europe as a transnational cooperative, Europe as a superpower and the Commonwealth as past. Firstly, Britain possesses a level of transnationalism that exercises an influence on Europe and as well as beyond. This influence is governed principally by trade links which help formulate Europe as a cooperative: a union of like-minded unitary members whereby interdependency dominates due to the common goal of prosperity via commerce. The second
discourse is generated by the non-radical Othering of the USA in which Europe can function as a both a complement and a competitor to the Atlantic Alliance. That is, Britain’s voice can best be exercised via being a solid member of a united Europe that has become an actor with significant status, capable of dealing with the many security responsibilities hitherto exercised by America. Conversely, Europe functions as a global force in which American unilateralism can also be checked. Thirdly, a waning relationship with the Commonwealth nonetheless provides the argument than Britain retains a sense of transnationalism denied other states. It possesses a level of exceptionalism that positions it as unique in its sense of global reach, not in terms of hard power but via historical connections. As a consequence, several British national identities are produced. First of all, Britain is *interdependent, dominant and trade-driven*. That is, Britain and Europe shape one another in terms of mutual reinforcement and lodges the common pursuit of prosperity and stability to the proliferation of free and unrestricted trade. Wary of the perils of isolationism, Europe is read as an international power that animates the status of individual states and imbues them with a level of instrumentality. This process enables member states to gain from membership but it places a small number of states, including Britain, as part of core Europe. In this sense, Britain is also invested with a sense of dominance in being a primary shaper of Europe. Secondly, Britain is *global and internationalist*. Although already mentioned, the albeit fading links to the Commonwealth are exercised to highlight a global British identity that still retains trade and historical links to non-European states and echoes the fact that although such affinities are largely redundant, Britain still possesses a distinctive capacity to forge international friendships denied to Continental Europe.

This configuration is reproduced in the fourth British Self which can be classified as a
transnational nation-state. Only the Commonwealth as past perpetuates this reading of Britain. As already mentioned, this weakening alliance nonetheless produces global and internationalist British identities because again Britain has the sole ability to transcend what is seen as the confining and restrictive obsession with the Community to develop, retain and salvage trade and cultural networks abroad. However, this configuration differs in one manner. Britain’s Self is lodged in the notion that political power resides within self-governing nation-states.

A cooperative European power is the subsequent British Self. This is produced by three discourses: Europe as a superpower, Europe as its historical antithesis and the USSR as not Europe. Again, Europe as a superpower locates Britain as a contributing force to Europe’s dominant actor status. Furthermore, Europe is read as an entity functioning in opposition to its past. This temporal configuration is tightly wedded to a particular reading of British identity. That is, Britain’s past is also part of Europe’s in which a rivalrous and destructive history is invoked to highlight the new Europe as embodied in the Community: an association characterised by trade, common interests and mutual cooperation. The final influence on identity is the USSR as not Europe. The Soviet Union is not part of a European consensus in which trade and conciliation flourish and it is positioned as expansionist and wedded to the dissemination of Communism. That is not to say that the Soviet Union is beyond reform. However, within this configuration, Britain is part of a broader European Self. Europe defines itself geographically, politically and economically from states that lie beyond its boundaries. It is geographically determined, politically democratic and economically free trade driven. The USSR, by contrast, is a closed system, promulgating and exporting centralising policies and functioning as a military threat. As a consequence of these discourses, Britain is dominant, free, peaceful, liberating, non-
isolationist and democratic. These identities are very much value-laden and operate according to European values based on the ability of its citizens to exercise freedoms. As a cooperative state, Britain sees itself as against isolationist barriers and instead positions itself as a conduit for promulgation of inter-European trade and contact. Furthermore, it is a liberating unit as it functions as a principal actor in battling protectionism, a source of isolationism and conflict, and instead has effectively forged a cooperative reading of Europe.

The final British Self can be categorised as a sovereign parliamentary body. Two negative readings of Europe formulate this. The first is Europe as a federal state. The EEC is regarded as part of a long process to consolidate power into a number of states and non-state actors. France is very much utilised within this construction and Europe is effectively a tool for French aggrandisement. Additionally, the Community is notable for its encroaching power and influence that threatens the authority of nation-states. These points are iterated via the articulation of federalism: that the goal of further integration is to consolidate power via stripping individual states of their sovereignty. In addition, Europe as a syndicate highlights that a surreptitious and conspiratorial relationship exists between big business and the Community. That is, corporatism is the ethos that drives the EEC while unelected bureaucrats carry unfettered capitalism intent on disregarding the broader values and identities of the populace. From this reading, a number of identity characteristics position Britain as local, organic, unitary, democratic, liberated, socialist and welfare-oriented. The singularised nature of Britain unifies its disparate elements by projecting the notion that the Community functions as a threat to all regions and elements of Britain. Parliament is envisaged as the vanguard of these localised identities. Finally, the socialist and democratic nature of Britain functions in opposition to a corporatist Community.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE MAASTRICHT TREATY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to examine the discourses surrounding the 1993 ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, formally called the Treaty on European Union or TEU. The primary sources utilised to construct the discourses and consequent national identities are listed in Appendix 2. An explanatory description along with Tables 5 and 6 reveal what has been said and written by political elites, are grouped thematically and are followed by numbers which indicate the source in the appendix. As with the previous empirical chapter, the numbers next to each quotation relate to the various sources in the appendix. Again, single quotation marks within the tables appear in the original. The sources can be categorised as follows. Firstly, I employ the general election manifestoes of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties in the 1992 general election. As they are an attempt to express elite perceptions on Europe to the wider public, they are of empirical importance in the context of this research. Secondly, I utilise memoirs and biographies from dominant political figures and spokespeople. Again, these individuals were central actors within the event and their accounts are significant as they propagated certain arguments, images and perceptions of Europe. Thirdly, I make use of other texts containing primary source statements and viewpoints. Finally, I examine the third parliamentary reading of the Maastricht Treaty which took place on 20 May 1993. This debate is important in two main ways. To start with, it culminated in the highest number of Tory rebels – 46 – who voted against the government. Thus, the level of dissention and contestability within the debate serves as an important conduit for revealing the many conflicting elite-driven meanings of Europe. Furthermore, the debate took place after the Maastricht Bill had been
completed. This had taken 210 hours and undergone 600 amendments. That is, this debate is effectively a summary of many of the common arguments and positions that had been articulated over the previous year.

The structure closely follows that of the previous empirical chapter. The opening section provides the historical background leading up to the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht. Again, this rehearsal of the mainstream position seeks to establish the principal actors, events and environment and is not an attempt to advance a challenge to the received history. This part is a means of bringing to light the contexts within which the discourses operate. Again, I restrict this historical overview to presenting events and positions that concentrate on Europe. The next section is an analysis of the various discourses revealed by an examination of the sources listed in Appendix 2. The predicates are presented and grouped and the debates are separated into those for and against the treaty. Again, it is worth reaffirming that an anti-treaty position is not identical with a broader hostility to all that might be considered European and, conversely, a proposition might be weakly held. As iterated in the introduction to the previous empirical chapter, these positions are ideal types and allow the range of different positions to be organised systematically and then examined. Subsequent to this, I present the background knowledge, or presuppositions, that take certain truths to be valid. I then show how these meanings are organised into subject positions which show the relationships between the various subjects. After that, the process of Othering is examined with the array of friendly, non-friendly and radical configurations presented. The next section examines how British national identities are constructed according to the conceptualisations of these Others and this process is presented in Table 7. The final section integrates the empirical data of the chapter to present the array of
British Selves, or images of nationhood, along with the national identities that have produced them. This is summarised in Figure 5 and is followed by an explanation. Again, for straightforwardness, British Selves are highlighted in bold while the discourses and identities are italicised.

### 4.2 Historical Background

It is important to highlight the fact that the vote for Britain to continue membership of the European Community, although much flaunted as a radical and unprecedented act, was more about the politics of fear that blighted a 1970s recession-hit Britain, rather than an intrinsic desire for political change. Despite being an unprecedented national ballot, it was an unenthusiastic decision to vote for the status quo and not for far-reaching new initiatives.504 “Support for membership was wide but it did not run deep”,505 and very soon the attitudes of British political elites reverted very quickly to a ‘business as usual’ attitude in which national interests always trounced any sense of Community spirit.

With Harold Wilson’s surprise resignation on 16 March 1976, James Callaghan, the then Foreign Secretary, was elected leader of the Labour Party. Although responsible for the renegotiations, he had been critical of the Heath government because the commitment to Europe had weakened what he regarded as the important bond with America.506 Several European projects certainly did seem to grind to a halt during the late seventies, many of which were obstructed by the Labour

---

505 Ibid.
government. In January 1975, the British government hastily cancelled a Channel Tunnel project after the French had already started construction.\textsuperscript{507} Similar disagreements occurred over emissions, fishing quotas and agricultural price reviews, several of these disputes occurring in 1977 when Britain held the presidency of the EC which is usually regarded as a position to provide Community animus and drive.\textsuperscript{508} Perhaps one of the most important areas of Community business was that of the EMS, the European Monetary System. Although Britain had joined, the Labour Party lacked enthusiasm for a monetary union that first required states to link their currencies to one another. In 1978, the British Ambassador to Paris lamented that

\begin{quote}
[our leading European partners were fed up with us – with our reluctant Europeanness; and they were determined to go ahead in creating a new monetary system for the Community. We would not be able to divide or break them even if should we wish to do so.\textsuperscript{509}
\end{quote}

Perhaps the final disagreement to round off what had become a turbulent decade was the BBQ, the British Budgetary Question, branded the Bloody British Question by the individual responsible for its resolution, the then President of the European Commission Roy Jenkins.\textsuperscript{510} The need to resolve this crisis stemmed from Britain importing far more products from outside the Community than the other eight members and therefore paying more in import levies and customs duties.\textsuperscript{511} By having only a small level of agriculture, which placed little financial strain on the Community, Britain found itself as one of the poorest members of the EEC whilst being the next biggest budgetary contributor after the richest country Germany.\textsuperscript{512} Eventually, the dispute was resolved somewhat acrimoniously by the Thatcher government in 1984, but the

\textsuperscript{507} May, A. (1999) \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945}, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{508} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{511} Ibid., p. 492.
\textsuperscript{512} Ibid.
excessive burdens of membership helped purvey an image of the Community as iniquitous with Britain contributing greatly but getting little in return.


European issues, however, would not be the focal point of the first two Thatcher governments as the Falklands Conflict, the US bombing of Libya, industrial strikes and the implementation of austere economic measures to combat double-digit inflation all took precedence during the early
and mid-eighties. However, the low-key and essentially pragmatic approach to Europe would eventually give way to a series of well-documented and tumultuous disagreements. These occurred against the backdrop of what could be argued as the two central issues relating to Europe during the Thatcher governments: the Single European Act and entry to the Exchange Rate Mechanism. In the build up to such high points, Britain’s relationship with its European partners would be defined by conflict. The budgetary question led to a number of lengthy and onerous negotiations and Thatcher’s abrasive style has been consistently cited as a source of added tension:

After giving a shrill exposition of the British case – ‘I am not asking for anyone else’s money, I just want my money back’ – at the first afternoon of the session, she again harangued her colleagues for almost the whole of a working dinner which took some four hours. Schmidt feigned sleep, Giscard just sat back contentedly watching her weaken her own position, and the others became increasingly unconvinced of the validity of the British case.\textsuperscript{516}

Gilmour goes on to argue how a battle against Britain’s European partners was the perfect complement to the monetarist crusade at home and “a running row with our European partners was the next best thing to a war; it would divert public attention from the disasters at home.”\textsuperscript{517}

In 1985, Jacques Delors, of the French Socialist Party, became President of the European Commission and signalled his desire to inject momentum into the integration project by his support of the single market. The Single European Act, ratified the following year, involved a number of important directives. These included establishing an internal market by 1992, the harmonisation and improvement of health and safety, the support of social cohesion by reducing


\textsuperscript{517} Ibid.
disparities between regions and the extension of Qualified Majority Voting.\(^{518}\) Thatcher always insisted that she had been duped and maintained that “[t]he Single European Act, contrary to my intentions at the time, had provided new scope for the European Commission and the European Court to press forward in the direction of centralization.”\(^{519}\) Thus, she spelt out an alternative which included the need to accommodate the new countries of Eastern Europe, the acknowledgment of the global economic changes in finance and business which relegated the importance of the EC and the need to resist a centralising “hierarchical bureaucracy”\(^{520}\) which was utterly inadequate for an ever-growing Europe that needed the market as a model.

In contrast, Delors was a staunch federalist. He had been labelled as “socialist, dirigiste and centralist”\(^{521}\) by a close Thatcher aid. In a speech to the European Parliament, Delors pressed ahead with the starting notion of “an embryo European government” within six years and the prediction that national assemblies would “wake up in horror, scandalized by their loss of powers.”\(^{522}\) He also gave a speech to Thatcher’s chief antagonist, the TUC, highlighting the social dimension to Europe. Thatcher’s rebuff, her infamous Bruges speech, underscored some spectacular differences. Firstly, she positioned Europe and its identity in much broader terms than Delors or any of her European counterparts, and made reference to the people East of the Iron Curtain who also “once enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity”.\(^{523}\)

Firmly contingent on this widening and inclusive interpretation of Europe was the USA, which


\(^{520}\) Ibid., p. 489.


as “the valiant defender of freedom”, had a significant securitising role in harbouring the newly founded liberties and independence of the Eastern European nations. Secondly, whilst recognising the need for cooperation, she revelled in the diversity of Europe and that far from becoming a homogenous entity, Europe was and should continue to be a cluster of “independent sovereign states”. In recognising this, she assigned a special role to the issues of sovereignty and identity and celebrated Europe as a family of nations, “understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour.” Finally, and perhaps most importantly, she poured scorn on the bureaucracy and centralism of Brussels and asserted that “[w]e have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.” These differences in vision not only revealed the divisions over how Britain and the Continent saw Europe, but also ignited internal rows within the Conservative government. In the aftermath of the Bruges speech, Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, symbolised the alarm felt in Europhile circles and berated how “the speech veered between caricature and misunderstanding.”

Meanwhile, Delors pushed on with his designs, perhaps bolstered by the fact that Thatcher increasingly stood alone. The Delors Committee completed a study of Economic and Monetary Union in June 1989 and stressed two fundamental aspects of monetary union: free capital movements and irreversibly fixed exchange rates. Upon its publication, Thatcher noted that in

---

524 Ibid.
525 Ibid.
526 Ibid.
527 Ibid.
contrast to previous discussions of a ‘three-stage’ system in which a signatory could refuse to advance to the later stages, it now insisted that by embarking on the first stage, full economic and monetary union was irrevocable.\textsuperscript{530} She doggedly resisted the call by both her Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, and her Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, to sign up for the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Lawson was eventually to resign on 31 October 1989. In July 1990, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Nicholas Ridley, was forced to resign after describing monetary union as “a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe” and also castigating the French for “acting like poodles to the Germans”.\textsuperscript{531} Although hastily identified as a privately held opinion and not a reflection of government policy, the attitude of one of Thatcher’s closest allies underscored the idea that “Ridley had spoken aloud the Prime Minister’s private thoughts.”\textsuperscript{532} Meanwhile, after Howe’s ignominious demotion to the perfunctory role of Leader of the House of Commons, and with Thatcher’s increasingly strident Europhobia, he resigned in November 1990. The disunity eventually led to the Prime Minister’s downfall. The Europhile Michael Heseltine had resigned in 1986 over the Westland Affair when he had supported the merger of the sole British helicopter manufacturer with European partners as against the Prime Minister’s preference for an American merger. His leadership challenge enabled him to win enough votes in the first ballot to force her withdrawal.\textsuperscript{533} Her removal, however, did not impede her decision to put her influence behind John Major, a candidate less seduced by the European faith.\textsuperscript{534}

\textsuperscript{530}Thatcher, M. (1993) \textit{The Downing Street Years}, p. 708.
The Maastricht Treaty set up the phases necessary for the introduction of the Euro and also created the pillar structure of the European Community (encompassing citizenship, policies and monetary union), the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Justice and Home Affairs. Although Economic and Monetary Union did not follow irrevocably from entry to the Exchange Rate Mechanism, it was generally believed that ERM would provide the ‘glide path’ to EMU.535 After Thatcher’s unambiguous and confrontational approach to Europe, and possibly because of it, Major adopted a more compliant and consensual role. Overtures were made to Chancellor Kohl as a way of assuaging both leaked reports of a seminar which contained more than disparaging remarks about the German national character and for Thatcher’s attempt to aggravate German reunification.536 This was echoed in March 1991 in Bonn when Major stated “I want us to be where we belong. At the very heart of Europe.”537 Two conferences in December 1991 produced British support for a more intergovernmental ‘pillar’ structure rather than a federal system yet the Maastricht Treaty also set out for the first time the objective of EMU, including the timetable and means to achieve an eventual single currency.538

Despite the two opt-outs from monetary union and the Social Charter, Major’s difficulties over Europe were to snowball. Whilst having ‘federal’ dropped from the treaty but by keeping the original phrase ‘ever closer union’ from the original Treaty of Rome, Major accepted federalist elements such as subsidiarity.539 Meanwhile, a surprising win in the general election on 9 April

538 Ibid., p. 279.

Such a paltry majority would have severe implications for the level of influence a small band of what became known as Euro-rebels would have. As enumerated by a leading rebel:

> With a majority of 100 a rebellion would have been futile. But with twenty, a group of determined backbenchers can change government policies. The Government can no longer allow itself the luxury of doing just as it likes.\footnote{Gorman, T. (1993) \textit{The Bastards: Dirty Tricks and the Challenge to Europe}, London and Basingstoke: Pan Books, pp. 36-7.}

The newly elected leader of the Labour Party, John Smith, also featured prominently in the Maastricht debates. The opt-out from the Social Chapter, he argued, with “low wages, inadequate skills and persistent under-investment” functioned as “the real drag anchors on Britain’s economic performance”\footnote{Smith, J. (1993) HC Deb., 22 July, vol. 229, col. 538. Cited in Brivati, B. (ed.) (2000) \textit{Guiding Light: the Collected Speeches of John Smith}, London: Politico’s Publishing Ltd., p. 234.} However, the most important tensions and splits over Europe and specifically Maastricht occurred firmly within the Conservative camp. The fratricidal potential the issue had was ostensibly limited to the ruling party at the time.

The anti-Maastricht standpoint was bolstered by two dramatic events. The first was the Danish ‘No’ vote in a nationwide referendum on the Maastricht Treaty which occurred on 2 June 1992. Such a decision provided much animus for the British Eurosceptics as it showed quite clearly they were not the only ‘awkward partner’ in Europe. The second event was Britain’s spectacular and humiliating crashing out of the ERM on 16 September the same year, commonly referred to as Black Wednesday. A number of causes cite rampant speculation, the excessively high level at which Britain had entered, high German interest rates and a declining dollar.\footnote{May, A. (1999) \textit{Britain and Europe since 1945}, p. 82.} However, it had been the Conservative government which had put Britain in the ERM and while both the
Bundesbank and the German government might have provided useful scapegoats, the only noticeable effect such finger-pointing had was a souring of Anglo-German relations.\(^{544}\)

The Maastricht Treaty, during its lengthy and tortuous process of ratification, produced a defeat over the Social Chapter by eight votes which has been called “the most serious parliamentary defeat suffered by the Conservative government in the twentieth century.”\(^{545}\) A small group of rebels were to defy the party whip against phenomenal pressure and thus severely dent the modern Conservative Party image of “a united and loyal organisation whose defence of the British state and of British interests abroad is not destabilised by intra-party fractures.”\(^{546}\) The defeat over the Social Chapter caused a confidence vote Major narrowly won in July 1993 and the bill was eventually ratified. However, the passage of the bill was not due to the government’s ability in putting down the rebellion, but because of the support from the opposition parties.\(^{547}\) Apart from the slim Conservative majority, which enabled such a small band of rebels to destabilize the government, Major’s less bellicose and more conciliatory style of party management also provided a breeding ground for revolt: “[w]hereas, under her, dissidence over Europe produced six sackings or resignations from the Cabinet, under Major the dissidents, in every case except one, remained inside, free to argue and corrode, challenge and dissent, from within the portals of power.”\(^{548}\) It has been argued that “Maastricht may have been the catalyst

which mobilized latent anti-Europeanism in the party and effectively made cynicism over Europe not merely acceptable but the norm within the Conservative party.

In conclusion, Maastricht is a particularly potent event for extracting identity-related arguments over Europe. Firstly, it can be argued, perhaps more so than with the 1975 Referendum on membership, that political and economic considerations had become fused. Economic and Monetary Union could not be extricated from the subsequent threat to sovereignty and independence. In addition, the dominant monetarist ethos of the Conservative Party also had political consequences. That is, issues of sovereignty were also wrapped up with positions over free trade, protectionism, economic liberalism and exactly how ‘social’ Europe ought to be. Secondly, unlike the referendum, Maastricht was an international treaty. The narrow support for the treaty in France and the initial rejection in the Danish Referendum contributed its gravity in Britain. Finally, the Eurosceptic wing, by voting against the government, was able to produce a vote of confidence. Maastricht had challenged the very leadership of the party and had produced such a fever pitch of contention that it attacked, according to one rebel, “the very soul of Conservatism.”

4.3 The Pro-Maastricht Debates

In this section, I start by analysing the predicates relating to the pro-Maastricht positions as represented in Table 5. As in the previous chapter, the documents, page numbers and columns

are given in square brackets. The predicates are the various verbs, adverbs and adjectives that give the subjects meaning. These are the characteristics contained within the documents listed in Appendix 2. Then I present the background knowledge, the presuppositions, which enable a certain reality or world view to function. Subsequent to this, the relationships between the various subjects and objects are discussed.

4.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Maastricht Debates

Three findings formulate a particular kind of British subject. Firstly, as expected, Britain possesses the ability to shape and influence Europe. ‘We play a central role in world affairs’ [1], ‘positive part to play’ [9-p.181] and ‘has led the world’ [1] highlight an indelible and far-reaching level of British influence. More specifically, various predicates emphasise the nature of the British imprint on Europe. The Conservative Party Manifesto for the 1992 general election, for example, highlighted ‘a great trading nation’ [1] which promotes ‘an outward looking Community based on free enterprise’ [1]. Influence, therefore, is predicated on the ability to forge open markets. Secondly, the realisation that Britain had been a member of the EC for nearly twenty years by the time of the Maastricht Treaty creates a form of trickle-down effect whereby the Community has been determined “in our own image”.551 Britain is ‘at the heart of Europe’ [1], capable of ‘(promoting) our vision’ [1] and ‘are grown-ups in the Community’ [8-p.460]. However, by predicking how the EC is influenced by the particular principles and practices of its member states, it is configured as an ever-changing entity. As a consequence,

European integration is formulated according to the respective make up of its constituent members. This formulation makes the ‘widening of the Community a priority’ [2]. That is, a dominant British vision seeks to extend and envelop a consensual European network based on market liberalisation in contrast to any attempts to deepen and further bureaucratise Europe. A final element concerns Britain’s role within Europe as inescapable. John Major, by way of example, argued that membership is ‘a fixed point in the future’ [15-p.417] whilst sceptics are indulging in a ‘phantom grandeur’ [12-p.376], harking back to an independence that no longer exists. An unworkable and idealistic demand for independence must be replaced by a pragmatic interdependence otherwise Britain, according to the then Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Howe, risks ‘being once again shut out’ [6-p.186].

As an object, Europe is broadly configured in five important ways. These include Europe as a means of ensuring peace and security; the threat of isolation; a fluid and divisible reading of sovereignty; the manner in which the nation-state can coexist within the Community and the way in which the Community can encourage monetarist ideas of minimal government intervention, free trade and openness to markets. The first concerns issues of security which makes reference to the EC founding security dimension in which ‘lasting peace’ [5-p.79] and ‘protection against a perceived threat’ [4-p.173] can only be realised within the Community. Both strength and prosperity are also perceived as stemming from integration. The references to Europe’s founders again position Europe as a defence community firmly lodged within a Cold War scenario in which threats are ostensibly military and cannot be adequately countered by unilateral policies of individual states.
Developing from this theme is the second reading which centres on a fear of ‘missing the boat’ and of seclusion. ‘Dangers arise’ [4-p.156] when countries are excluded. Continued membership is perceived in rational, self-interested terms in which Britain should not ‘opt out emotionally from the club’ [7-p.640]. Similarly, the ‘late starts and squandered opportunities’ [6-p.186] and the prospect of a ‘lag’ [9-p.203] culminating in Britain losing out again pitches past prevarications as both a hindrance to Community progress and a failure for Britain. The Community is regarded as a ‘tide’ [5-p.15] in which British influence, if it is to possess any impact, must occur. As a consequence, this EC-as-inevitable object constructs a Community dominated by the need to be a part of the decision-making. The then Labour leader, in berating the Prime Minister over the opt-out of the Social Chapter, argued that

> after all, it requires quite an acute form of delusion to claim a triumph of negotiating skill in getting one’s country isolated and excluded from a decision-making process of great importance to the Community and, inevitably, of importance to this country.\(^{552}\)

The issue of sovereignty is once again a dominant motif within the debates over Europe and it is formulated in two main ways. To begin with, sovereignty is regarded as divisible. ‘Outdated notions of sovereignty’ [3] are rejected and pure independence and national integrity are viewed as anachronistic and outmoded. It is only the possibility of pooling which can break the cycle of ‘dominance and subjugation, of power and conflict’ [7-p.631]. Hence, an uncompromising and undiluted sovereignty is seen as a cause of war and dispute. In addition, sovereignty is seen as transferable. The transfer of power, however, is worth noting in that it does not become lodged in an EC-centric orbit. Nigel Lawson, in highlighting his vision of Europe, symbolised a transfer of power ‘not to Brussels, but to the people’ [11-p.899]. Sovereignty, therefore, is ‘exploitable in

the interests of a nation’ [7-p.631] and consequently empowers a nation’s citizens. It is configured as both fluid and definable according to the particular interests it might serve. Both of these attitudes are attempts to convey sovereignty as a practical rather than a theoretical concept.\footnote{Robertson, G. (1990) ‘Britain in the new Europe’, International Affairs, 66, 4, pp. 697-702 (at 699).}

The next configuration within these debates constructs Europe as a community of nation-states. Several themes hold together this object. Firstly, in keeping with structuring the European Community as an intergovernmental rather than a supranational entity, federalism is rejected in favour of cooperation. Power, therefore, ‘is exercised at the lowest level’ [3] and ‘lies as close to the citizen as possible’ [3]. With reference to the pillar system eventually adopted, the Community is ‘as a temple, not as a tree’ [8-p.460]. Subsequently, power is configured as diffused and entrenched within the individual member states rather than within any European institutions. Secondly and relatedly, the dominant interplay that exists within Europe is still lodged within a nation-state system. That is, ‘the nation states would remain the essential sources of authority’ [8-p.461] and, as such, ‘a Europe of nation states, rather than a single Federal superstate’ [11-p.892] predominates. The Community operates due to the voluntary practices of members and is therefore characterised as ‘a Community of free, independent members’ [12-p.376] and not as ‘an empire’ [4-p.198]. Finally, the Community is the means to achieve the correct balance between the ‘retention of nation states’ [11-p.1031] and ‘the closest possible co-operation’ [11-p.1031]. The EU, therefore, can ‘cement the peoples of Europe together’ [4-p.3] and adulterate the nationalistic drum-beating of ‘saloon-bar xenophobia’ [11-p.900].
A final observation on how Europe is invested with meaning relates to both the roles monetarism and the free-market have within Europe. Europe is visualised as a ‘deregulated, free-market’ [11-p.899] within which Britain will continue to contribute ‘economically conservative’ [7-p.691] policies which ‘emphasize sound finance and market liberalization’ [7-p.691]. Europe, therefore, must be non-protectionist and free trade driven whereby governments play a limited role. Similarly, entry to the ERM is seen as ‘a firm commitment to share in the management of a wider system’, a system that is not to be dominated by

… an over-regulated, bureaucratic, protectionist Europe, where standards are enforced by new directives and new regulations from Brussels, where outsiders are excluded, and where competition is seen as a threat, rather than a challenge to greater efficiency; a Europe in which ‘regulate and protect’ might be the motto.354

Of the other states revealed, the former Soviet Union is constructed in three major ways. Firstly, its military might is referred to but the unified image of the Soviet Union as a common antagonist has been reformulated, according to the former Conservative minister Leon Brittan, as a ‘far less conspicuous enemy’ [4-p.2]. As a consequence, ‘a poor, disintegrating Russia is a far greater threat’ [4-p.137]. The mutual suspicion of the Cold War in which the enemy is clearly defined is replaced by a more shadowy, less easily defined danger. This has the effect of producing ‘a less polarized, more unstable world’ [4-p.2]. Subsequently, the need for unanimity from Europe is configured as necessary in dealing with this peril. Secondly, although a potentially reformist new Russia makes possible a less bellicose relationship and one more in accordance with Western Europe norms, the reforms are seen as difficult to implement because of a lack of ‘historic memory’ [4-p.213] in realising the shift to a democracy. Consequently, remnants of the old Soviet Union still remain, are resistant to change and bear no historical

counterpoint for democratisation to easily occur. Finally, and despite the threat from a fragmented Russia, ‘suspicions and rivalries’ [9-p.179] can be assuaged ‘by negotiation, by verification, by cooperation’ [9-p.203]. This seeks to position the former Soviet Union as capable of reform and places a fundamental level of responsibility on the West to try and engage the nascent Russia in a ‘new security community’ [9-p.203]. Hence, two distinct Russias, one old and one new, are formulated as objects.

Central and Eastern Europe are categorised somewhat differently. Firstly, whilst the former Soviet Union suffers from a lack of past application of democracy, Central and Eastern Europe are instead ‘members of the same family’ [4-p.195] as Western Europe. EC membership, therefore, would not mean ‘casting off the moorings of history’ [4-p.198]. Instead, the ‘new liberty’ [9-p.180] is flourishing and greater democracy and reform can occur by providing ‘generous economic assistance’ [3] to those members that embrace both democracy and the free market. Membership of the Community, and of Europe therefore, is very much ensconced within the willingness of the emerging states to embrace what are regarded as democratic Western credentials.

The political reunification of Germany encapsulates the way in which the pooling of sovereignty, mentioned previously, can be used to encourage stability. Hence, Germany is configured dualistically as remaining ‘firmly anchored in Europe’ [7-p.638] by ‘sovereignty-sharing’ [7-p.638] whilst still possessing the superior economic strength to enable it to succeed and flourish as a strong member. Whatever power Germany has is tempered by its membership of the Community. Subsequently, Germany – particularly with reference to reunification – is
constructed as more powerful than other member states whilst simultaneously recognising the limiting effect that membership will have on its influence. ‘A strong Germany aroused too much fear’ [11-p.901] for it to be able to ‘exercise … power and influence beyond its borders’ [11-p.901]. The major changes occurring in Germany, although bringing ‘their own problems and dangers’ [9-p.203], can only be surmounted by wedding such a core state to the European nucleus.

Of the remanding configurations, ‘threats’ [1] are identified as coming from outside Europe. Despite the dwindling of the Cold War, and its dominant paradigm, Europe is still blighted by dangers which bolster the importance of unification. The Franco-German axis is portrayed as a ‘charmed circle’ [12-p.268] in which Britain must learn to deal with a club whose rules had already been set before it joined and whose ‘natural rhythms’ [12-p.268] have to be understood in order to operate within. The relationship with the United States is shaped with reference to the military flashpoints that were occurring during the Maastricht debates. The Gulf War had initiated a military response and the collapse of the Soviet Union had provided both the fear of instability and the hope of independence for many of the Central and Eastern European states. The breakup of Yugoslavia had created an inter-ethnic war in which the EC had been incapable of unified action in dealing with hostilities and a refugee crisis occurring on Europe’s very doorstep.\textsuperscript{555} The rumbustious relationship Britain had had with Europe, and the desire for some semblance of unanimity amongst EC nations, produces one prediction that “America will see Europe through the prism of Germany”\textsuperscript{556} Subsequently, America’s commitment to Europe seems contingent on the US understanding that ‘Europe does not take US support for granted’

and that conflicts like the Balkans, posited as Europe’s war, is dealt with by a united Europe, rather than a muddle of squabbling so-called allies. Finally, the Commonwealth is predicated as a ‘unique inter-racial and inter-hemispheric organisation’ [2] which has a robust role to play in ‘fighting racism, hunger and human rights violations’ [2]. Despite this, the Commonwealth relationship is not positioned as one in which trade or any common venture necessarily flourishes. The Commonwealth no longer plays a dominant role in the perceptions British political elites have over Europe and it is not regarded as a viable substitute for further European integration. In short, “we are still, by our fingernails, at the heart of the Commonwealth.”

To summarise the predicates and processes in Table 5, Britain is positioned as both a key player and shaper of the EC project. The process of Europeanisation constructs a Britain in which membership of the Community is inescapable and that Britain’s relationship must be one of harmony. Reference is made to previous disagreements with the purpose of projecting an image of Britain’s relationship with Europe as friendly and embracing. Five themes are evident within the way Europe is constructed: as a means of attaining peace and security, as a way of ensuring national interests can be channelled and realised, as a non-threat to sovereignty, as a community of nation-states and as an organ for disseminating a deregulatory market-driven ethos. The breakup of the former Soviet Union is viewed dualistically: the old regime is the Other that remains outside whilst the new Russia, imbued with a feeling of rebirth, has the potential to Europeanise. Central and Eastern Europe are categorised as emancipated and democratic and particular importance is placed upon including such states within the European sphere. Germany

is seen as an example of how shared sovereignty can ensure a level of containment: that is, a Germany firmly located within the EC is the greatest protection against it being dominant. Both the USA and the Commonwealth have a more peripheral role. American interests can be realised via a united rather than fractious Europe and the Commonwealth is representative of past complicities which have been relegated by Britain’s commitment to Europe.
### Table 5: Predication and Processes within the Pro-Maastricht Debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>European Community</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We play a central part in world affairs [1]</td>
<td>Is at the heart of Europe...is a great trading nation [1]</td>
<td>Yugoslavia show(s) what can happen when Communism collapses in disorder [1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has led the world in helping the reforms in the former Soviet Union...and in building up relations with the republics of the new Commonwealth of Independent States [1]</td>
<td>I want Britain to mould that change [1]</td>
<td>Promote democracy and reform in Eastern and Central Europe by coordinating generous economic assistance to countries introducing democracy, guaranteeing human rights and re-forming their economies [3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will be a leader in the New Europe [2]</td>
<td>Can only be secure, successful and environmentally safe if we play our full part in building a more united and democratic Europe [3]</td>
<td>Are not just friendly, impoverished neighbours, to be palmed off with aid, trade and patronage. They are quite simply members of the same family [4-5,195]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make the widening of the Community a priority [2]</td>
<td>Risks minimising our influence and maximising our...is at the heart of Europe...we are no longer a world power...they practise a sort of...we are...not entirely to our taste [12-5,265]</td>
<td>It is odd that they should be considered part of the same European history but should not share a common future [4-5,195]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can only be secure, successful and environmentally safe if we play our full part in building a more united and democratic Europe [3]</td>
<td>Only...be our rallying cry of phantom grandeur, a clanking of unusable suits of armour' [12]</td>
<td>Membership would hardly mean casting off the moorings of history [4-5,198]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We play a central part in world affairs [1]</td>
<td>We would have plunged it (the Maastricht Bill) and ourselves into a period of bad diplomacy and subjugation, of power and conflict [7-5,181]</td>
<td>Europe...in...countries like Poland and Hungary is surrounded by poverty and under-development...it will be fragile [9-5,180]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We would have plunged it (the Maastricht Bill) and ourselves into a period of bad-tempered confusion [7-5,476]</td>
<td>‘I want to be alone’. That is the constant theme. It is not splendid isolation or cunning or sagacity or diplomatic skill [9-5,181]</td>
<td>Poland and Hungary and independent. Czechoslovakia is a free country...Romania has freedom, but it seems it has yet to achieve the same confident liberty of Czechoslovakia [9-5,202-3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘I want to be alone’. That is the constant theme. It is not splendid isolation or cunning or sagacity or diplomatic skill [9-5,181]</td>
<td>If we lag, we lose, yet again [9-5,203]</td>
<td>Germany: Sovereignty-sharing in the EC was the way to ensure that a united Germany remains firmly anchored in Europe [7-5,638]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If we lag, we lose, yet again [9-5,203]</td>
<td>‘The important thing is to strike the right balance between closer co-operation and a proper respect for national institutions and traditions’ [15-5,424]</td>
<td>The political and intellectual leadership of Europe which France regarded as her birthright was threatened by...Germany [11-5,p,901]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is not frogmarching its members into a...tide that will flow ever more strongly [5-5,15]</td>
<td>We need to build a more decentralised and diverse Community, outward-looking and free-trading [16-5,384]</td>
<td>A strong Germany aroused too much fear for it to be able to exercise the political power and influence beyond its borders [11-5,p,901]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is not frogmarching its members into a...tide that will flow ever more strongly [5-5,15]</td>
<td>We have a three-speed Europe [16-5,426]</td>
<td>Commonwealth: This unique inter-racial and inter-hemispheric organisation can play a central role in fighting racism, hunger and human rights violations [2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The need for the closest possible co-operation and the retention of nation states [11-5,1031]</td>
<td>‘A Europe of nation-states’: A citizens’ Europe in which power lies as close to the citizen as possible [3]</td>
<td>Other: Increasingly threats come from outside Europe [1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘A Europe of nation-states’: A citizens’ Europe in which power lies as close to the citizen as possible [3]</td>
<td>A federal community, where power is exercised at the lowest level [3]</td>
<td>The United States will feel more inclined to maintain its commitment to Europe if it knows Europe does not take US support for granted [4-5,178]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A federal community, where power is exercised at the lowest level [3]</td>
<td>To cement the peoples of Europe together [4-5,3]</td>
<td>The charmed circle...It had its own natural rhythms [12-5,268]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Peace and Security:**
We have kept the peace by staying strong [1] Europeans have repeatedly been...ready...to trade national sovereignty in order to secure the best protection against a perceived threat [4-5,173] The EU is not frogmarching its members into a...tide of history [4-5,175] Risks minimising our influence and maximising our...is at the heart of Europe...we are no longer a world power...they practise a sort of...we are...not entirely to our taste [12-5,265] Is at the heart of Europe...we are no longer a world power...they practise a sort of...we are...not entirely to our taste [12-5,265] Is at the heart of Europe...we are no longer a world power...they practise a sort of...we are...not entirely to our taste [12-5,265]

**Isolation and Inevitability:**
Introversion would be no better for Europe’s economy [4-5,136] Dangers arise...when...countries exclude others [4-5,156] (The Euro sceptics are)...defeatists...running against the tide, a tide that will flow ever more strongly [5-5,15] We have paid heavily in the past for late starts and squandered opportunities [5-5,186] The trend towards European collective action was many-fronted and inexorable [7-5,608] We should not...’opt out emotionally from the club’ [7-5,640] We would have plunged it (the Maastricht Bill) and ourselves into a period of bad-tempered confusion [7-5,476] ‘I want to be alone’. That is the constant theme. It is not splendid isolation or cunning or sagacity or diplomatic skill [9-5,181] If we lag, we lose, yet again [9-5,203] Sovereignty:
The rejection of outdated notions of national sovereignty [3] The coming together of sovereignty excluded...the tragic and traditional philosophy of dominance and subjugation, of power and conflict [7-5,631] Should be seen as divisible – and exploitable in the interests of a nation [7-5,631] Is not like virginity...now you have it, now you don’t [7-5,631] Transferring sovereignty not to Brussels but to the people [11-5,899] Sovereignty:
The rejection of outdated notions of national sovereignty [3] The coming together of sovereignty excluded...the tragic and traditional philosophy of dominance and subjugation, of power and conflict [7-5,631] Should be seen as divisible – and exploitable in the interests of a nation [7-5,631] Is not like virginity...now you have it, now you don’t [7-5,631] Transferring sovereignty not to Brussels but to the people [11-5,899]

**Monetarism:**
Price stability remained our central objective...(ERM entry was) a firm commitment to share in the management of a wider system [7-5,639] Our politics were destined to be economically conservative with continuing emphasis on sound finance and market liberalization [7-5,691] The vision of a deregulated, free-market, open Europe [11-5,899] Peace and Security:
We have kept the peace by staying strong [1] Europeans have repeatedly been...ready...to trade national sovereignty in order to secure the best protection against a perceived threat [4-5,173] The EU is not frogmarching its members into a...tide of history [4-5,175] Risks minimising our influence and maximising our...is at the heart of Europe...we are no longer a world power...they practise a sort of...we are...not entirely to our taste [12-5,265] Is at the heart of Europe...we are no longer a world power...they practise a sort of...we are...not entirely to our taste [12-5,265] Is at the heart of Europe...we are no longer a world power...they practise a sort of...we are...not entirely to our taste [12-5,265]

---

*Source:* The person listed as [1] is the author of the first entry in the list. The numbers in brackets correspond to the page numbers where the text is found in the original document. The entries are organized by topic, with each section starting with a bolded title. The text continues with a detailed analysis of each topic, incorporating quotes and references to the original source.
4.3.2 Presupposition within the Pro-Maastricht Debates

The above representations make sense when certain background knowledge is taken for granted. According to the texts, several oppositional relationships constitute the ‘deep structure’ of the discourses. First of all, Britain is presumed to possess a leadership role. Not merely is this configuration based on the promulgation of a liberal and liberalising market ethos, but it is also positioned militarily with particular reference to Central and Eastern Europe. The leader/follower nexus positions Britain as dominant within Europe and possessive of a moral obligation to intervene and defend states beyond.

A further and related presupposition focuses on how the political world is very much carved up into stable/unstable zones. Not merely Britain but the Community is regarded as a stabilising and unifying force. This has three important aspects to it. Firstly, it encourages the process of integration widening because the EC possesses a planetary pull for fractious and newly independent states to seek membership. Secondly, the Community is a stabiliser as it engenders a commonality of values. In short, Europe speaks ‘the language of the market’ [4-p.199]. Thirdly, outside threats ensure the necessity of a unified Europe. The breakup of the USSR and the reunification of Germany produced a degree of uncertainty and that is played out as the articulation of threats.

Another opposition can be characterised by rationalism/emotionalism. The interrelations between states are regarded as a pragmatic necessity. Indeed, the whole of European history ‘is a patchwork of shifting, opportunistic alliances’ [4-p.173]. Subsequently, the cant of idealism is replaced by a rational realism that Europe, as a political and economic entity, must be engaged with. Such a realisation is also governed by the fact that the nation-state
system is not threatened by a stronger and more integrated Europe. Thus, John Major, at a party conference, attempting to calm Conservative fears, stated

    For many of you, the heart pulls in on direction and the head in another. … Emotion must not govern policy. At the heart of our policy lies one objective and one only – a cold, clear-eyed calculation of the British national interest …

A final presupposition draws on a reform/inertia nexus. The integration project is positioned as an evolving entity in which the Common Market, previously preoccupied with the promotion of freedom of trade and the bolstering of peace and security, has gradually developed into a more deep-seated political project. Inherent within this is the voluntarism implicit within the decision-making so that nation-states still dictate the course of action of the Community. Similarly, the perpetual pace of reform and change in the present is contrasted with the static idealism inherent in the past. As such, the reform/inertia binary formulates the Treaty of Maastricht as the latest process in the modernisation of Europe.

### 4.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Maastricht Debates

The various predicates can be positioned in a number of important ways. Firstly, and similar to the pro-EEC debates surrounding the 1975 Referendum, Britain is configured as a key player in complementing and providing animus for the EC. Secondly, a process of familiarisation of Britain’s historical attachment to Europe is articulated to create the notion of membership as a permanent and inescapable feature of British political life. That is, once again, Britain’s past is referred to as excessively preoccupied with conflict and disagreement and this is contrasted to Britain’s new and present position as a state in harmony with the Community. Thirdly, the widening nature of the Community provides a deep contrast to the

---

idea that countries can continue to ignore the project and merely go it alone. This also suggests that the Community is an evolving set of institutional practices in which new relationships are continuously being forged. The EC is therefore developing in two ways: expanding to include previously non-European nations and deepening to afford key players a more dominant and participatory role.

The EC is positioned via five key themes. Firstly, peace and security are linked to economic strength and prosperity. These are positioned in opposition to economic weakness and scarcity. Secondly, the fear of isolation is articulated by reference to historical late starts and dithering. Hence, the European project is constructed as a teleological certainty in which the power and importance of nation-states can only be exercised by active participation. Thirdly, sovereignty is viewed as a malleable concept in which both its divisibility and transferability is lodged in opposition to past configurations of inseparability and rigidity. Fourthly, the EC is a community of nation-states in which authority is transmitted from the individual members to the EC institutions and not from the EC to its members. That is, Europe is constructed as a deliberate, anti-Empire project whereby the voluntarism of members occurs without recourse to an overarching authority. Finally, Europe is seen as a mechanism to enhance free marketism. This image sets Europe within a wider free trade system in which protectionism is associated with insularity and trade wars.

These different readings of Europe enable it to be discursively constructed to produce three discourses. The first is *Europe as a security alliance*. Threats are articulated militarily. In addition, the tying in of increasing prosperity to the continuance of peace fosters the concept of the Union as a mechanism for soldering states together. This web of interdependence diminishes the potential for conflict. Secondly, *Europe as an intergovernmental community*
of nation-states emphasises that the influence of the EC is governed by the actions of states. National governments are the centres of power and subsequently determine the level and speed of integration. The final construction is *Europe as an international free trade area*. The onus here is on the proliferation of trade via both the limited interventionism of states and European institutions. In addition, such a configuration might be labelled as an international area in that it is not restricted to European states alone. It seeks to expand what it sees as the logic of market deregulation to external zones as well.

Of the other nations and regions mentioned, the former Soviet Union is positioned dualistically. The end of the Cold War has produced a new Russia which retains elements of the old USSR. The new Russia is capable of reform and part of a potential security community. The old USSR is resistant to change and undemocratic. This sense of uncertainty somewhat depends on which forces; the democratising, liberalising new or the entrenched and dictatorial old; prevail. This difficulty, and Western reactions to it, is summed up by the former Conservative member, Leon Brittan:

> Economic policies are more important to international relationships today than ever before. The removal of the Soviet Threat is a clear illustration of this: since the collapse of the Soviet Union, its erstwhile enemies have hurried to help Russia and its former satellites build their markets, stabilise their economies and sell their products abroad.\(^{559}\)

Such tumultuous changes locate the new Russia within a web of instability which contrasts sharply with stable Europe. However, it also places European and Western responsibility as paramount: that Russia can only make the transition to a non-threatening state via open markets, free trade and the embracing of globalisation. As a consequence, the former USSR is structured by two competing discourses. One can be characterised as the *former Soviet*

---

Union as not Europe. This discourse relies heavily on the Soviet Union as a historically repressive, undemocratic regime and seeks to position this threat in contrast to the liberating and self-governing member states of Europe. The other discourse takes stock of the shifting nature of the East and the manner in which the burgeoning new Russia can shake off its authoritarian moorings to become European. This can be labelled as Russia as reformist.

The discourse on Germany welcomes the democratising changes occurring due to the reunification but positions Germany as a potential threat; firstly, because the changes have ushered in a period of instability and secondly, because Germany possesses a formidable level of economic might. Subsequently, it is seen as imperative to tie Germany to the European superstructure to ensure this threat is assuaged and also to avoid destabilising all of Europe by displacing Germany. As a consequence, Germany can be quantified as an unstable but core European nation-state in that although reunification has injected uncertainty, it remains the nucleus of Europe. The USA is seen as wanting to cooperate with a unified Europe to ensure it is not merely taken for granted. This positions the relationship between the USA and Europe as harmonious but also blighted by American frustration over squabbling and infighting between European nations as well as an overdependency on the US. Finally, the Commonwealth, typified as unique, is configured by its ability to foster and safeguard human rights. However, the broader importance of trade, prosperity and security – factors iterated within Community membership – are not referred to. Hence, the Commonwealth is not positioned as a principal actor.

The states of Central and Eastern Europe are configured slightly differently. That is, whilst the new Russia has yet to emerge from its past, Central and Eastern Europe have gained independence. This Central and Eastern Europe as enfranchised discourse helps solidify
Europe as a securitised and free trade community. It also weds the newly independent states to a vision of Europe symbolised in the commonality of values and economic systems.

As a consequence of these interactions, two more configurations of Europe can be identified. First of all, the impact and influence of the ever-widening Europe constructs it as an *enlarging superpower*. Not merely is it instrumental but it is also a non-static entity which exercises a level of influence for potential new candidates. Its pull, therefore, contributes to its enlargement and its subsequent expansion as a power structure. Secondly, *Europe as a stabilising network* configures Europe as a means of tying previously fractious states to a stable core. Russia, Germany and Central and Eastern Europe all possess destabilising characteristics and the EC is regarded as the mechanism to taper any destructive potential such states may have.

**4.4 The Anti-Maastricht Debates**

In this section, I analyse the anti-EC positions. As with the previous section, the predicates are summarised and presented in *Table 6* and then the presuppositions are discussed. Afterward, both the practices and processes of predication and presupposition are utilised to reveal the subject positioning which identifies how the various subjects and objects are positioned within the debates.

**4.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Maastricht Debates**

As a subject, Britain is constituted via several important themes. A first viewpoint identifies a
‘Britain first, Britain second and Britain third’ [5-p.100] overriding purpose. Britain is imbued with a ‘sovereignty’ [5-p.190], ‘… Parliament … traditions … liberties’ [5-.38] which are regarded as ‘distinctly alien’ [11-p.1032] on the Continent. Nigel Lawson, the former Chancellor, identified that the parliamentary system in Britain is fundamentally different to those on the Continent and that ‘Britain is unused to coalition governments’ [11-p.1032]. Similarly, in addressing the rising fear of federalism, particularly after he had received much criticism over his ‘Britain at the heart of Europe’ address, John Major clarified that he had adamantly not endorsed Britain ‘slavishly following on at the behest of whatever fashionable European majority of that day should happen to be’ [15-p.425]. Subsequently, Britain is not merely seen as different but superior. Secondly, once again, the apparatus and organisations of the EC are seen as encroaching and demanding. ‘To come under control of Brussels’ [12-p.273] and to agree to a ‘federal destiny’ [12-p.273] jar with the openly defiant image of a ‘Britain united and independent’ [5-p.36]. Finally, the realities of a ‘post-Maastricht world’ [8-p.472] are invoked in order to discredit the ‘supranational rhetoric’ [8-p.472] so repeated by ‘nostalgic outsiders’ [8-p.472]. In short, Europe has moved on from the Monnet doctrine of transferring power to supranational institutions, and instead highlights the next stage in the evolution of the Community in which cooperation does not threaten national diversity and progress need in no way be wedded to institution building.

The anti-Maastricht position constructs Europe as a threat to monetary independence, in which the national currency is directly linked to national independence; popular sovereignty, in which the machinations of the EC threaten the nation as a whole; parliamentary sovereignty, in which the instruments of governance are at risk; and democracy, in which the EC possesses a centralising and authoritarian agenda. By identifying the EC within a broad spectrum of threats, it takes on the form of a particular type of object. To begin with, as a
major part of the Maastricht Treaty concerned the eventual implementation of a single currency, monetary independence is cast as an important symbol of national self-determination. Britain’s ‘unfettered decision’ [1] to join or not, the ‘imposition’ [15-p.424] of a ‘rigid grid’ [6-p.183] and a ‘centralised bank trying to rig exchange rates’ [6-p.112] all construct the single currency as an intrusion and a direct assault on Britain’s autonomy and democracy. The ability for a country to possess its own currency, therefore, is symbolic of a broader ability to retain its autonomy. In addition, the retention of the national currency embodies ‘the greatest expression’ [7-p.644] and the ‘very heart’ [11-p.892] of sovereignty. Subsequently, a very clear reference to British national identity constructs Sterling as a symbol of that identity and as an indication of an entrenched uniqueness.

Again, the popular sovereignty representation helps to position the threat from Europe in similarly extensive terms. In this sense, it expands the defence of parliamentary sovereignty into a more general defence of the nation. The EC is at risk of ‘treading unwittingly on cherished national tradition’ [4-p.8], is ‘gnawing at the core of … identity’ [4-p.15] and is ‘a battle for national integrity … in the same light as the Second World War’ [5-p.114]. Some also argue how the increasing centralisation of the Community is similarly anathema for home-grown identities. By way of example, Margaret Thatcher expressed the following:

[N]ot just in Britain but increasingly in other European countries, the popular mood was moving away from remote bureaucracies and towards recovering historically rooted local and national identities.\(^{560}\)

Subsequently, this position is populist in tone and views the EC as needing to serve the interests of ‘citizens and communities’ [3] and not ‘businessmen and bureaucrats’ [3]. ‘Historical differences’ [4-p.193] rather than the ‘grey, rootless Euro-personality’ [4-p.15] are not to be ignored or whitewashed. Secondly, the EC is constructed as interfering and

expansionist in its powers and aspirations. There is ‘excessive interventionism’ [4-p.10] in which the Commission is ‘inserting itself into the nooks and crannies of everyday life’ [8-p.459]. This interference erodes ‘the freedoms of ordinary men and women’ [12-p.361]. Again, this populist message warns that British citizens are most at risk from the encroachment of the EC. This intrusion is evident within the references to how the EC no longer influences solely economic areas and its mandate for a ‘massive official expansion … into non-economic areas’ [14-p.124] refers to an almost rapacious desire for incursion into everyday life. Finally, both the EC and the Maastricht Treaty are demonised as ‘alien’ [5-p.1], ‘a dinosaur’ [5-p.49], ‘wedded to the past’ [5-p.49] and ‘new-fangled’ [5-p.155]. Such references situate further integration as aberrant and an entity which jars with existing national and embedded institutions and processes.

Coupled with the focus on popular sovereignty, the threat to parliamentary sovereignty is also articulated. In fact, the sovereignty of parliament can be regarded as inseparable from the sovereignty of the people. The Commission is singled out as wanting ‘to increase its powers’ [6-p.184] despite being ‘a non-elected body’ [6-p.184], possessing ‘pretentious, interfering ways’ [8-p.476] and ‘overreaching itself with excessive interference and regulations’ [8-p.459]. Europe as a whole is ‘over-regulated, bureaucratic’ [11-p.899] and ‘protectionist’ [11-p.899] while Maastricht ‘will hand over more power to unelected bureaucrats’ [12-p.361]. In addition, ‘the Treaty on European Union is involved with almost every policy with which a national government could concern itself’ [14-p.121] whilst it also indulges in the exercise of policies such as harmonisation which are derided as ‘bureaucratic and absurd’ [11-p.894]. In short, national decision-making is being stripped by a level of

interference which firstly ought to be the duty of national governments, and secondly, entails much legislation that is unnecessary. Political authority must be incontrovertibly invested in national governments since ‘sovereignty cannot be carved up’ [14-p.106/7]. In addition, in an article published in *The Economist*, John Major wrote that ‘it is for the nations to build Europe, not for Europe to supersede nations’ [15-p.448]. Again, this highlights that the Community is a construct of its architects and members and it should not possess a level of power independently of that realisation.

The final reading of the EC concerns its paucity for democratic values. Although obviously linked to the concepts of sovereignty, this argument focuses on how the expansion of legislative powers is synonymous with a diminution of democracy. There are three facets to this reading. Firstly, Maastricht is condemned as ‘essentially socialist in nature’ [5-p.48/9], driven by ‘a narrow political caucus’ [5-p.161] or ‘exclusive élite’ [5-p.161]. The socialist make-up of the treaty, and with direct reference to the Social Chapter, is intent on ‘subsidizing industry and subsidizing regions’ [11-p.911] which ‘destroys their will to compete and their ability to compete’ [11-p.911]. By specifying both the socialist and bureaucratic composition of the Community, and particularly against the background of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the more general repudiation of Communism, the Community is viewed in harsh opposition to the prevailing monetarist ethos. Secondly, the ‘idealist rhetoric’ [15-p.308] is in danger of subverting the complexities of nation-building; that is, ‘you do not make a nation simply be decreeing it to be one’ [11-p.1030]. This pits the concept of the development of the nation-state as a slow, organic and incremental process that cannot merely be officiously imposed at a higher level, particularly by what are described as the ‘bumbling incompetents in Brussels’ [5-p.111]. Finally, the ‘cunningly devious plot’ [5-p.182] of Maastricht implies that in order to ratify the treaty, the truth of its
story had to be furtively cultivated precisely because it seeks to strip Britain of its democratic powers. Likewise, the desire by the Commission to ‘extinguish democracy’ [7-p.644] and the affirmation that ‘we have surrendered enough’ [7-p.644] is a call to stop this invasive process.

Of the other countries mentioned, the policies of the Soviet Union and of Communism as a whole are classified as ‘disasters’ [8-p.427] [11-p.1033]. The West is to be approached ‘for a new friendship based on trust’ [8-p.427] which signifies a shift in policy that jars with the mutual hostility built up over the Cold War. The new Russia, therefore, is contrasted with a past in which the ‘fear of the Soviet military threat’ [14-p.126] is invoked to argue why US administrators worked ‘for the political unification of Europe’ [14-p.126]. However, this prospect remains distant and the former Soviet Union is still placed within a reading that views it as unstable and belligerent.

Germany is endowed with several negative characteristics which can be grouped in a number of ways. The primary trait is one of dominance: that economic and monetary union is merely a facility to enhance German power. Both the single currency and the central bank are seen as prerequisites essential to ‘exercise control over the Community’ [5-p.179] and Germany, particularly after reunification, ‘would be tempted to assert once again ... dominance over others’ [8-p.420]. Europe is viewed less as a community and more as a theatre for dominant interests to dictate its nature and direction, and Germany, as the strongest European nation, is very much constructed within an authoritarian guise. Secondly, Germany is viewed as both unreliable and volatile. It had ‘ mishandled’ [11-p.1024] reunification, been reluctant to abide by its obligations and had ‘veered unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt’ [15-p.358]. The Deutschmark is regarded as a ‘straightjacket’ [5-p.100] which once again
threatens monetary sovereignty. Finally, historical references construct a modern Germany deeply attached to its Second World War past. Reference is made to the Reichsbank, the predecessor to the Bundesbank, furnishing the ‘sinews of war’ [5-p.150] whilst it would be ‘at least another forty years before the British could trust the Germans again’ [15-p.359]. The dizzying array of pejoratives to describe the German national character include ‘angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality ... capacity for excess, to overdo things, to kick over the traces ... to over-estimate their own strengths and weaknesses’ [15-p.360]. Identifying the German national character was the position most commonly associated with the Prime Minister during German reunification, Margaret Thatcher. Although she had left office in November 1990, before the Maastricht Treaty, her opinions on what she regarded as the ‘German problem’ are worth citing:

I do not believe in collective guilt: it is individuals who are morally accountable for their actions. But I do believe in national character, which is moulded by a range of complex factors: the fact that national caricatures are often absurd and inaccurate does not detract from that.  

Somewhat similarly, two aspects run through the depiction of France within the anti-Maastricht debates. French motivations for their role within the EC are depicted as self-serving and the EC apparatus, by making use of the language of integration, is being exploited surreptitiously for French national interests. The French ‘were adept at clothing their aims’ [8-p.458] and were ‘sticklers for their special interest groups’ [5-p.43]. In addition, a familiar reference to the Second World War offers a mocking scenario which asks ‘how would we have fared in the last war if France or Belgium had been in charge of Europe’s survival?’ [5-p.111] France as a whole, therefore, is classified as supine and untrustworthy.

---

The Continent is positioned as suffering from a level of instability which is characterised with a ‘weakness in democratic institutions’ [14-p.118] and a ‘restless urge for constitutional change’ [11-p.1032]. It does not possess the democratic foundations that Britain does and has little problem in allowing its affairs to be ruled by Brussels. Therefore, the ‘present moves towards a federal state of Europe’ [14-p.118] poses no threat to other European nations. In addition, this discourse is typified by a distrust of outsiders and synonymises EC power with handing the ‘Government to a bunch of foreigners’ [5-p.113].

Finally, a much broader reference which goes beyond the boundaries of Europe locates Britain’s ‘wealth and prosperity’ [5-p.190] being historically built up by ‘free trade with the whole world’ [5-p190]. Hence, the narrow focus and near obsession with Europe stands out against a much more all-encompassing desire to include non-European nations. ‘They are our natural customers and speak our business language’ [5-p.190]. This instils the idea that Britain’s relations with non-European partners are historically more innate.

To summarise the predicates in Table 6, British sovereignty is fused in triplicate; that is, it is embedded within monetary independence, popular sovereignty and parliamentary/constitutional autonomy. Hence, sovereignty is broadened to include any and all British political and non-political processes, institutions and traditions. Added to this is a subdiscourse which constructs European practices as meddlesome, corrupt and devious. The post-Maastricht realist world dominated by nation-states is contrasted with the idealistic rhetoric of Europe. The vision of Britain is lodged within a free-market dominated, non-protectionist and non-interventionist political ethos as against a Europe defined by the socialist practices of encroaching government intervention, the subsidising of industry and the gradual extinguishing of democracy. The policies of the Soviet Union are perceived as
disastrous and yet the turbulent changes are a sign that the new Russia might distance itself from its past. Germany is constructed as aggressive, unstable and unwilling to relinquish its historical legacy. German national consciousness is perceived as exploiting European mechanisms, particularly EMU, to try and increase German power. As such, Germany is still volatile and prone to unpredictable shifts. Both France and the Continent as a whole are denigrated. France is perceived as weak yet conniving and the Continent is capricious and lacking in democratic institutions.
The British, who have grown up with
For us, the nation state is here to stay
Our preoccupation with Europe is a
To help ensure that poorer countries
Resist pressure to extend Community
Britain slavishly following on at
destiny
Brussels; or to agree to a ‘federal’
distinctly alien
belonged to nostalgic outsiders
begins at home'
Politics, like charity,
should happen to be'
the behest of whatever fashionable
governments
Supranational rhetoric now
world. Supranational rhetoric now
that feeling is perhaps stronger here than anywhere else in Europe'
Britain first, Britain second and
Britain third. Politics, like charity,
Finally, the single currency
Britain
The tale of Maastricht is simple but it has been transformed
The Commission was overreaching itself with excessive interference and regulations
Their fear of the super-state and their resentment of the
Commission
Typically bureaucratic and absurd method known as
harmonization
An over-regulated, bureaucratic, protectionist Europe
Maastricht will hand over more power to unelected bureaucrats
Sovereignty cannot be carved up...
The Treaty on European Union is involved with almost every policy with which a national government could concern itself
It is for the nations to build Europe, not for Europe to supersede nations
They have...become the managers of Europe

Table 6: Predication and Processes within the Anti-Maastricht Debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>European Community</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monetary Independence:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will take our own unfettered decision on whether to join [1]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping our currency free from interference from a centralised bank trying to rig exchange rates [5-p.112]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘If we lose control over our currency the House will lose the rock on which our democracy was founded’ [5-p.150]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A ‘rigid grid’ would deprive the Government of all freedom of manoeuvre [6-p.183]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Totally and utterly wrong’ to agree to ‘abolish the pound sterling, the greatest expression of sovereignty’ [7-p.644]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rigid, grand blueprint [10-p.113]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A national currency lies at the very heart of national sovereignty [11-p.892]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A single European currency...offends against the democratic canon by entrusting monetary policy to an independent central bank [11-p.1020]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As far as monetary union was concerned, ‘we cannot accept its imposition’ [15-p.424]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘I hope my fellow heads of government will resist the temptation to recite the mantra of full economic and monetary union...If they do recite it, it will have all the quaintness of a rain dance and about the same potency’ [15-p.448]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Sovereignty:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is still too much an organisation for businessmen and bureaucrats instead of citizens and communities [3]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treading unwarrantingly on cherished national tradition [4-p.8]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive interventionism and inadequate explanation [4-p.10]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationhood is being sucked away and replaced by a grey, rootless Euro-personality [4-p.15]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is gnawing at the core of their identity [4-p.15]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roller-coasting people’s identity into oblivion [4-p.15]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical differences are deeper than some Euro-enthusiasts would have had us believe [4-p.193]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An alien type of government [5-p.1]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A dinosaur of a treaty, wedded to the past [5-p.49]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A battle for national integrity...in the same light as the Second World War [5-p.114]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No government has the right to transfer its power without first consulting the people [5-p.124]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The new-fangled European faith [5-p.155]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Inserting itself into the nooks and crannies of everyday life’ [8-p.459]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erode the freedoms of ordinary men and women [12-p.361]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If ratified, it would signal a massive official expansion of Community competence into non-economic areas [14-p.124]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Sovereignty:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gives far too much weight to the Council of Ministers at the expense of the European Parliament [3]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, the Commission wants to increase its powers. Yes, it is a non-elected body [6-p.184]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Commission was overreaching itself with excessive interference and regulations [8-p.459]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their fear of the super-state and their resentment of the pretentious, interfering ways of the European Commission [8-p.476]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(On the Social Chapter): obnoxious legislation [8-p.476]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typically bureaucratic and absurd method known as ‘harmonization’ [11-p.894]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An over-regulated, bureaucratic, protectionist Europe [11-p.899]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maastricht will hand over more power to unelected bureaucrats [12-p.361]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty cannot be carved up...The process of accountability is becoming murky [14-p.106-7]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Treaty on European Union is involved with almost every policy with which a national government could concern itself [14-p.121]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘It is for the nations to build Europe, not for Europe to supersede nations’ [15-p.448]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They have...become the managers of Europe [16-col.419]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Sovereignty:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racked by self-doubt and unsure about its future [4-p.1]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maastricht...is essentially socialist in nature [5-p.48-9]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumbling incompetents in Brussels [5-p.111]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The construction of European union has been the handiwork of a narrow political caucus...exclusive elite [5-p.161]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The tale of Maistoarch is simple but it has been transformed into a cunningly devious plot [5-p.182]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Commission was ‘striving to extinguish democracy’... ‘we have surrendered enough’ [7-p.644]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Subsidizing industry and subsidizing regions destroys their will to compete and their ability to compete’ [11-p.911]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You do not make a nation simply by decreeing it to be one [11-p.1050]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The idealistic rhetoric with which “Europe” was already being dressed in some quarters’ [15-p.308]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Former Soviet Union and the United States:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet foreign policy was a disaster...the West (is to be) approached for a new friendship based on trust [8-p.427]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The disasters of Communism [11-p.1033]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It was fear of the Soviet military threat which led many US administrations to work for the political unification of Europe [14-p.126]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The Deutschmark straitjacket’ [5-p.100]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The Reichsbank, the predecessor to the Bundesbank, became Hitler’s creature and provided him with the sinews of war’ [5-p.150]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unless there is to be a single currency and a central bank, the Germans won’t be able to exercise control over the Community’ [5-p.179]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The more Europe was federated, the more Germany would be dominant [7-p.638]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification would unbalance Germany [8-p.420]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would be tempted to assert once again...dominance over others [8-p.420]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could only be restrained by Britain and France acting together [8-p.422]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany was determined to have the euro for political reasons [10-p.120]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishandled the economic consequences of unification [11-p.1024]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bundesbank; which was guilty not only of irresponsible talk but of damaging reluctance to fulfil its intervention obligations [11-p.1024]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Has veered unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt’ [15-p.358]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be ‘at least another forty years before the British could trust the Germans again’ [15-p.359]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality...capacity for excess, to overdo things, to kick over the traces...to over-estimate their own strengths and weaknesses’ [15-p.360]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The way in which the Germans currently used their elbows and threw their weight about...suggested that a lot had still not changed’ [15-p.361]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sticklers for their special interest groups [5-p.43]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would we have fared in the last war if France or Belgium had been in charge of Europe’s survival? [5-p.111]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were adept at clothing their aims in the familiar phrases of European integration [8-p.458]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Continent:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘I didn’t come to this place to hand over the Government to a bunch of foreigners’ [5-p.113]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The restless urge for constitutional change that characterizes our continental partners is unsettling [11-p.1032]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The weakness in the democratic institutions explains why some of the Member States show no great concern about the threat to democracy posed by the present moves towards a federal state of Europe [14-p.118]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘(Our) wealth and prosperity has been built up on free trade with the whole world...They are our natural customers and speak our business language’ [5-p.190]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.2 Presupposition within the Anti-Maastricht Debates

A number of presuppositions provide background knowledge and subsequently create a reality within which the subjects and objects possess meaning. Again, some of these distillations are configured as binary oppositions whilst others are subtler in their meaning. First of all, the debates are located within a very rigid formulation of the nation-state system. That is, power is presupposed to exist solely within this entity and any attempt to challenge this accepted reality is fraught with danger. It is the supranationalism of the Community project that is a direct threat to the national identities of member states because it seeks to unglue the very fabric that holds the nation-state system together and also seeks to ignore the deeply rooted historical and cultural mores that have produced the identities in the first place.

As an example, Nigel Lawson wrote in his memoirs:

> You do not make a nation simply by decreeing it to be one. In general, the experience of multinational, multilingual federations is not a happy one. Whether the problems are faced in a civilized way, as in Canada, or a barbarous way, as in Yugoslavia, they are best avoided altogether. If a strong sense of national identity is denied the recognition of self-government, the ugliest manifestations of nationalism are likely to come to the fore ...\(^{563}\)

A further presupposition focuses on the nature of the EC. It is first and foremost powered by the Commission at the expense of both national governments and the only democratic entity referred to within the Community: the European Parliament. As has been referred to, the Commission is constructed as a particular kind of object: over-regulatory, bureaucratic, protectionist, interfering and expansionist. However, what holds these characteristics together is an embedded identification with Socialism. It is perceived first and foremost as a socialist construct within which an authoritarian ethos is being played out. Somewhat interestingly, the

dominance of centre-right European parties on the Continent during the early 1990s did little to weaken the ‘EC-as-socialist’ discourse. This presupposition invokes a Cold War narrative whilst simultaneously utilising the recent upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, Socialism is positioned dualistically: as a dominating and restrictive creed in the past, it has fractured to produce an equally dangerous and fissiparous ideology in the present.

A principal binary presupposition configures identity within a *home-grown/alien* nexus. As Forster points out, the Europhile perceptions of the EC shifted from being alien and remote to being intrusive and encroaching on every aspect of daily life.\(^{564}\) Subsequently, where previously the threat seemed distant, now the interventionism enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, particularly in shadowy expressions like subsidiarity and federalism, helps create a danger to what are seen as localised, organic traditions and practices. Indeed, such an effect is perceived as a greater threat for Britain because the sense of tradition, history and liberties are, it is viewed, more deeply felt.

A second process of binarisation presents the idea that the political dimensions of the EC effectively ignore the populace. That is, there exists a *populist/elite* opposition whereby the debate plays out as a battle for national identity within which national governments are sided with their peoples against a Commission motivated by a non-civic, hierarchical and ambitious set of interests. Both Germany and France are part of this hierarchy in that the EC is being propelled for and by their motives. Hence, to cite a common phrase, a European Germany, mired to the Continent as a way of ensuring peace and stability in Europe, has morphed into a German Europe, in which Germany, shorn of its national guilt, can now behave more

---

aggressively. Indeed, although falling outside of political elite commentaries, Tony Judt neatly captures this position:

German politicians from Adenauer to Helmut Kohl have made a point of playing down German strength, deferring to French political initiatives and emphasizing their own wish for nothing more than a stable Germany in a prosperous Europe; they have thus fallen victim to their own rhetoric, bequeathing to post-1989 Europe a muscle-bound state with no sense of national purpose.565

Subsequently, Europe is the vehicle for engendering German dominance, and events in European history, from reconciliation with France up to the single currency, are merely tools for this ambition.

4.4.3 Subject Positioning within the Anti-Maastricht Debates

The subjects and objects as revealed via the processes of predication and presupposition are positioned in several ways. Firstly, in terms of Britain, its domestic institutions and traditions are regarded as cherished and organic against imported and false European practices. As has been mentioned, Maastricht is regarded as ‘a dinosaur of a treaty’ [5-p.49] which is ‘alien’ [5-p.1], ‘wedded to the past’ [5-p.49] and ‘new-fangled’ [5-p.155]. That is, a nexus of superiority versus inferiority, traditional versus modern and independent versus federal permeates this position. Secondly, supranationalism is configured as defunct and redolent of past ambitions to forge European unity. Britain is part of the newly reinvigorated, post-Maastricht world of nation-statism while its continental partners are stuck in the nostalgia of an obsolete ethos. Thirdly, the importance of sovereignty is configured along three main areas: monetary, popular and parliamentary. National sovereignty is heavily imbued with the determination to retain a national currency. This retention is seen as a democratic right. It is

also seen as an important mechanism to enable monetary policy to be flexible and controllable and this is contrasted with what is seen the severe rigidity of being part of a European-wide monetary system. The issue of popular sovereignty positions elite configurations of Europe as a threat in a much broader sphere. That is, further EC encroachment threatens not merely the ability of political elites to govern independently, but also constructs the EC as interfering in all aspects of political and civil society. Parliamentary sovereignty, once again, is seen as under threat from the superseding ambitions of the Community. To summarise the articulation of sovereignty, the oppositional relationships which dominate this concept include nation-state versus superstate, lack of regulation versus overregulation, and a bottom-up configuration of power in which the citizens influence the political process versus a top-down structure in which the Community dictates rulings to the member states. This reveals a lone-British resistance to institution building, looks upon any European development as only occurring under the mandates of national governments and fuses constitutional sovereignty with popular sovereignty. Finally, two other formations of binarisation can be highlighted. One emphasises the socialist nature of Europe. This positions Britain as a vanguard of the free-market and freedoms inherent within a monetarist philosophy. Europe, by contrast, via subsidising industry and business encourages sloth, inefficiency and corruption. The second reveals the Maastricht Treaty, in keeping with the other machinations and agreements in Europe, as a plot propagated by the shallow idealism of a small, unaccountable European elite.

As a result of these readings, Europe is constructed using three similar but distinguishable discourses. The first is *Europe as a Franco-German hegemony*. Several linkages stabilise this discourse and position Germany in four distinguishable ways. Firstly, it is seen as a dominant threat in which reunification will play an important role in enhancing its ambitions. Secondly,
it is seen as an avid supporter of EMU which it uses as a mechanism to consolidate power. Thirdly, it is unreliable and volatile in contrast to what is perceived as the stable political nature and history of Britain. Finally, it continues to hold fast to some elements of historical baggage in which British Second World War memories and myths are firmly projected. France, as has been mentioned, is part of this duopolistic alliance and is classified as self-serving and surreptitious in its aims. The next discourse is *Europe as a federal superstate*. The references to encroaching bureaucracy, centralisation and an executive led power structure formulate this discourse. In addition, *Europe as a socialist assembly* engenders the elite-driven nature of the Community whilst also referring to its undemocratic and authoritarian tendencies. It is insular in nature and governed by a protectionist, state-centred rather than market-driven ethos. Finally, one other actor is formulated. The *former Soviet Union as an unstable power* makes a minor qualifying distinction between the former and the current state. The cleaving of the USSR has produced an entity which retains too much of the old, militaristic and disastrous political ideology that so blighted its past. As a consequence, it is positioned manifestly as a threat due to three principal components: its repressive political ideology, its militarised nature and its volatility.

### 4.5 Self, Other and National Identities

The array of Self/Other configurations are summarised in *Table 7*. The table is organised into the various debates; the Self and Other formations; the categorisations of friendly, non-radical and radical Others; the particular characteristics of the relationships between the Self and Other and the sources taken from *Appendix 2*. Firstly, the EC is unsurprisingly friendly in that it has secured accord, affluence and freedoms. It is also the framework within which economic policies reflect monetarist ideas and processes of deregulation and market
liberalisation. Britain is also part of a broader European Self which includes the burgeoning newly democratic Central and Eastern states. As a consequence, they are also categorised as friendly. They are firmly meshed within a European framework that categorises them as part of the democratic history of Europe characterised by liberalisation. The new Russia, on the other hand, is categorised as a non-radical Other in that it contains the potential to be cooperative and negotiable whilst also reflecting the fact that hostilities have historically been mutually embedded. Germany is also configured as a non-radical Other in that the reunification brings new fears as well as new hopes. Regarding the fact that the process of Othering need not only include states or visible groups, but can also refer to concepts or periods of time, I would argue that the fear of exclusion is configured as a radical Other. That is, the concept of isolation is configured as an ontological threat. The former Soviet Union is also perceived as a radical Other in that it is both inherently militaristic and lacking in a historical commitment to democracy to render it part of a broader Europe.

The anti-Maastricht debates configure the EC as a radical Other. Through an obvious practice of binarisation, the Self is constructed as accountable, citizen-driven, deregulated and rational as against a bureaucratic, elite-inspired, over-regulated and idealistic Other. The former Soviet Union is also regarded as a radical Other in that its policies have been ruinous and that European unity became galvanised as a means of combating a common enemy. Germany is similarly classified as a radical Other in that it is over-assertive, bullying and intent on exploiting the dominance of its currency to dictate the EC. Finally, France and the Continent are radical Others in that the Self retains institutions and traditions which are historically more strongly committed to democracy and political stability. The anti-debates are interesting in that they are all formulated according to radical Otherisation. This suggests two things. Firstly, that the enmity towards the EC is embedded in a broader constellation of
‘Europeanness’ that includes key figures, such as Germany and France, as well as the Continent as a whole. Effectively, the EC is synonymous with Europe. Secondly, that despite an anti-Maastricht viewpoint reveals a position frequently associated with pro-Atlanticism, the US, surprisingly, does not feature dominantly within the debates.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Debate</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Categorisation</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Pro-Maastricht Debates</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The EC</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Process of strong linking: has safeguarded peace and prosperity via unity and ceding of national sovereignty; collective action and interdependence is inevitable and inexorable; the Community is voluntary, built from the bottom upwards and is a citizens’ Europe; is a non-federal Community of free members; monetary stability is part of a wider system characterised by sound finance, deregulation, openness and market liberalisation</td>
<td>1, 3, 5, 7, 11, 12, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Process of strong linking: members of the same European family, Western responsibility to promote democracy and reform, should be treated as part of the same European history and future, have embraced the free market, characterised as experiencing liberty, freedom and independence</td>
<td>3, 4, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The new Russia</td>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td>Process of mild differentiation: notion of enemy has changed from a common enemy to a less conspicuous one; difficulty of diluting suspicions and rivalries between West and East; potential for negotiation, verification and cooperation; capable of reform</td>
<td>1, 4, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td>Process of mild differentiation: important for Europe for a united Germany to be anchored, reunification is regarded as both marvellous as well as heralding in new problems and dangers, France has a natural birthright to lead Europe and this is threatened by Germany, a strong Germany creates a fear which simultaneously confines its power</td>
<td>7, 9, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain as part of the mainland / Continent</td>
<td>Britain as detached from the mainland / Continent</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: at the heart of Europe vs. on the periphery, outward-looking vs. inward-looking, widening vs. narrowing, functioning as an active member vs. being left behind, maximising Britain’s influence vs. minimising Britain’s influence, strength vs. weakness, the realities of being a participant vs. the cult of isolation</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>The former Soviet Union</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: militaristic vs. peaceful, disintegrating vs. united, no historical memory of democracy vs. deep-seated record of democracy</td>
<td>1, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Anti-Maastricht Debates</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The EC</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: integrity vs. disunity; nation-state vs. federal state; post-Maastricht vs. supranational; voluntary and elected vs. imposed and unelected; citizens and communities vs. businessmen and bureaucrats; non-regulated vs. over-regulated; free trade vs. protectionism; confident vs. self-doubt; competitive vs. subsidised; rational vs. idealistic</td>
<td>3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>The former Soviet Union</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: success vs. disaster; European unity forged by Soviet military threat</td>
<td>8, 11, 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The array of Others is produced due to the discursive contestations implicit within the various attempts to impose a particular national identity. I argue that these conflicting notions of identity can be revealed via the following enumeration of friendly, non-radical and radical Othering.

### 4.5.1 National Identity and Friendly Othering

Two instances of friendly Othering occur within the pro-EC debates. The first process of strong linking positions the EC as a friendly Other. However, it can be argued that British national identity is not merely a reflection of certain characteristics – deregulation, openness and market liberalisation – implicit within the EC, but it is also reflective of how these identifiers have affected Europe. Similarly, unity in Europe is regarded as having secured peace and prosperity, and a British identity firmly lodged within a free trade augmentation is deemed as contributing to the stabilisation and affluence of Europe. The European project is also empowered by the notion of voluntarism. It is governed by the voluntary decision of states to enter into agreement and is therefore is not construed as a top-down imposition of authoritarianism. It is an amalgam of free members, built bottom up and reflects the interests...
of all the citizens of Europe. This also places a civic dimension to national identity and regards the building of Europe as a freely chosen, anti-Empire project. In short, British identity is linked to a conceptual Other that lies outside and, as a result, perpetuates the need for closer integration and stability. The concept of Europe is stabilised via the invocation of shared histories, cultures, interests, political systems and patterns of trade.

The second process of friendly Othering is that of Central and Eastern Europe. Britain is once again linked to a larger European Self and the newly emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe are part of the European family. The new liberties being experienced are conducted via an economic model that embraces the free market and repudiates those states’ socialist legacies. Authoritarianism has been replaced with democracy, free enterprise and independence. Britain is seen as part of this democratising process and shares responsibility in nurturing the fledgling nations of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the role of Central and Eastern Europe, and Britain’s reaction to the tumultuous changes affected them, runs deeper. There are two significant aspects to this. Firstly, by repudiating its socialist mindset, the new states are being rewarded. Central and Eastern Europe are positioned as ‘not Russia’ and are subsequently embraced. Secondly, the reaction of Britain and other Western European states is, in part, governed by the fear of the Balkanisation of Europe. With reference to the breakup of Yugoslavia,

[w]hat has been happening there is symbolic both of the perils that lurk throughout eastern Europe and of the challenge they present for western Europe. The EC bears no responsibility for the onset of the catastrophe unfolding on Europe’s rim. But because the Community appears so powerful, it is expected to find an answer to that crisis on its periphery.\(^{566}\)

Although not all Central and Eastern European states are mentioned as obtaining the same level of reform, Britain is pitched as a firm protagonist that can contribute greatly to this

---

process of development. This structures Britain as possessing substantial influence and also responsibility for providing a model for the new states. All European nations share the same past and are part of the building blocks of the next stage in the enlargement and development of Europe.

4.5.2 National Identity and Non-Radical Othering

Two examples of non-radical Othering also have repercussions for the manner in which British national identity becomes formulated. Both are from the pro-Maastricht debates. The first is that of the new Russia. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union produces a fissure in which both old elements remain and new elements are ushered in. The process of mild differentiation still constructs the new Russia as a potential threat but labels it as less potent. Consequently, danger persists yet the unifying nature of the common enemy has been reformulated. A further reference points to the intractability of East and West histories in which rivalry and animosity became so entrenched. Thus, this mutual suspicion may continue although the potential for negotiation and cooperation exists. In terms of British national identity, this has two elements. Firstly, as Britain is already seen as a leader within Europe, the crisis within the new Russia helps add animus to Britain’s role. That is, any source of collaboration with Russia must include and be spearheaded by Britain. This places both leadership and authority as important aspects of British national identity. Secondly, the articulation of the threat factor creates a stable British identity. The changes sweeping through the former USSR are in stark contrast to the entrenched political solidity associated with Britain.

The second non-radical Other is Germany. In this instance, Britain is part of the European
Self. This occurs due to the idea that Germany, as a newly reunified state, needs to be anchored steadfastly to Europe; first, as a means of cushioning the upheaval caused by reunification and second, as a way of checking rising German power. Subsequently, the reunification is labelled as spectacular but suggestive of future dangers. Again, these consequences have the following two implications for British national identity. Firstly, it is noteworthy that although reunification creates a level of uncertainty, particularly for its immediate neighbours, it is not a shift that could be detected by any noticeable changes in German policy. Thus,

German reunification 1989-90 aggravated existing feelings in France and Britain and what was already felt to be a novel German assertiveness over political union. It was true that for several years after 1989, the German government cautiously avoided any formal claims to a new status based on increased population and geographical extent.\(^{567}\)

Subsequently, German support for the single currency and for political union is symbolic of a continued commitment to integration and an indicator of Germany’s Europeanised identity.\(^{568}\)

Secondly, Germany is not perceived as equally threatening to Europe in quite the same way. German power threatens what is called the French birthright as political and intellectual leader of Europe. At first glance, this may seem to challenge the notion of a stable uniform Europe as a friendly Other. However, what it does is reify Europe as a stabilising structure by championing the new Germany, shorn of its politically repressive and geographically divided East, as European. It also locates Germany, with Britain and France, as part of a triptych of core states within Europe.


4.5.3 National Identity and Radical Othering

The first process of radical Othering views exclusion from the mainland Continent as an existential threat. Not merely is the EC viewed as an association of similar ideas and values, but national existence cannot occur outside of the structure of inclusion within Europe. The exclusionist danger configures a British identity in two main ways. Firstly, British identity is seen as part of a broader European identity. The values which Britain embodies are European in heritage and outlook. They contribute to the pool of European characteristics which include the exercise of freedoms and liberties. Secondly and relatedly, British national identity is internationalist. This is positioned in opposition to what can be called the cult of isolation in which British exceptionalism may have been a characteristic feature of Britain’s historic relations with the Continent, but now must make way for an identity which is more embracing, less antagonistic and firmly wedded to its partners in and beyond Europe. This identity is reflective of a process of Europeanisation in that Community membership has bolstered a sense of influence and belonging. Identity becomes articulated within a less inward-looking and more wide-ranging framework of cooperation and collaboration with other European states. Thus, this radical Otherisation is interesting in two ways. Firstly, it is not formulated against a physical Other that remains outside. It is constructed according to an idea, a temporal perception of self-exclusion that is associated with the weakening of national identity. Secondly, it others an imagined political community of what British national identity might become without an attachment to Europe: xenophobic, small-minded and nationalistic.

A second practice of radical Othering focuses on the former Soviet Union. The disintegration has led to a clear fissure between old and new Russia and British national identity is firmly positioned against this hostile configuration. Unlike the other discourses, British national
identity is constructed as a part of the unified Self of Europe, peaceful but active, with a deeply embedded tradition of democracy. Despite the fact that this position occurs against the breakdown of the Soviet state, enough remnants of the older militaristic system remain to act as a threat. Hence, this realisation formulates a British national identity which is guarded, integrated and law-abiding as against a fissiparous and potentially malevolent Other.

In the anti-Maastricht debates, the EC is also configured via a process of strong differentiation. These formulations manifest several aspects of British national identity. To begin with, Britain is positioned as a nation united against the fractious nature of the EC. As such, European nations are seen as possessing less democratically rooted institutions, practices and histories. These debates, therefore, produce democracy as a central tenet of British national identity. Next, national identity is formatted around the notion of the nation-state. Supranational ambitions are regarded as unrealistic. European accord is achievable via an intergovernmental rather than institution-building approach. This places British identity within a post-Maastricht mould in which decisions must firmly remain in the hands of sovereign governments rather than European institutions. Third, British identity is locally communalistic. The rights of citizens and communities are prioritised over the agendas of businessmen and bureaucrats. The British nation is a national and local entity in which a number of communities sit within the broader nation. Thus, it is also civic and home-grown as well as heavily imbued with the exercise of economic freedoms. Limited regulation, free trade and competition are part of the economic make-up of Britain as against an over-regulated, protectionist and subsidised Europe. This lack of state interference creates an identity in which individualism, free choice and personal enterprise reign. Finally, British national identity is characterised by rationalism and practicality. This is lodged against the abstract and idealistic attempt to build Europe from the top down.
The anti-Maastricht debates also construct the former Soviet Union as a radical Other and also position Europe as the Self. However, unlike the pro-EC configuration of the Soviet radical Other, Britain is part of the European Self not through the sharing of common values, but through the need to unify militarily against the USSR. Hence, this is articulated through the Cold War paradigm in which European unity was forged out of the need to resist the Soviet threat. This resistance, therefore, is part of what constitutes British identity.

Germany is also defined through a process of strong differentiation. Three major elements help construct a British national identity. Firstly, the retention of the national currency is regarded as an expression of national sovereignty. Fiscal and monetary independence are therefore representative of a broader sense of national determination. In this sense, a configuration of national identity is its resistance to Continental financial constraints or any uniform attempt to impose a single currency. Secondly, as Germany is constituted as dominant, aggressive and unpredictable, Britain is conversely constructed as the antithesis: non-threatening and established. A final configuration seeks to tie Germany to its military past. That is, the activities of financial institutions, such as the Bundesbank, are reflective of a national character which seeks to control Europe. Modern day Germany is linked to its past by what is seen as an overbearing and bullying national character. Germany’s past is positioned as a present threat and is represented by German assertiveness in Europe while Britain functions as a barrier to this increasing transfer of power.

The final process of radical Othering also occurs within the anti-EC debates. Both France and the Continent as a whole are configured in several ways. Firstly, Britain possesses a far greater sense of tradition and liberty, and its identity, therefore, is more reverential towards tradition and constitutional integrity. Secondly, British identity is very much linked to the
notion of ‘fair play’ and France, by contrast, is covert in its motives. France is adept at projecting a pro-European and fraternal image of itself when conducting Community business and yet is motivated by self-serving motives. This last identity formation constructs a Britain which is more open and honest in its relations and intentions. Hence, the label ‘Euroscepticism’ is not merely an aversion to EC institutions but is governed by a much deeper suspicion of Europeanism.

4.6 The Production of British National Identities

*Figure 5* summarises the findings within this chapter to argue that a range of particular national identities and Selves can be attributed. As before, the figure is organised into the processes of Othering, with pro- and anti-positions and the subsequent discourses which stem from this dichotomy. As before, these readings of Europe are multiple in nature and subsequently produce a range of identities some of which may occur in either debate. Consequently, certain identities are not necessarily pro or anti-treaty specific. Utilising these features, I unify the findings to assert that four unified British Selves have been produced. These Selves, or images of nationhood, are representations of how political elites view Britain and are formulated according to the identities attributed to them.
Figure 5: British National Identities in the Debates over the Maastricht Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Othering</th>
<th>Pro/Anti</th>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>British National Identities</th>
<th>Britain’s Selves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td><em>Europe as a Security Alliance</em></td>
<td><em>Peaceful / Prosperous</em></td>
<td>Liberalising European Nation-State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*Europe as a Community of Intergovernmental Nation-States</td>
<td><em>European</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Europe as an International FTA</em></td>
<td><em>Deregulated</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Securitised</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Anti-protectionist</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Monetarist</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Economically liberal</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td><em>Central and Eastern Europe as Enfranchised</em></td>
<td><em>Leader</em></td>
<td>Reformist Role Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Russia as Reformist</em></td>
<td><em>Peace-maker</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Germany as Core but Unstable</em></td>
<td><em>United</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Reform-driving</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td><em>Europe as an Enlarging Superpower</em></td>
<td><em>Stable</em></td>
<td>Global European Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Europe as a Stabilising Network</em></td>
<td><em>Influential worldwide</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Former Soviet Union as not Europe</em></td>
<td><em>Authoritative</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Securitised</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Model</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Politically, popularly &amp; economically sovereign</em></td>
<td>Sovereign Civic Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Europe as a Franco-German Hegemony</em></td>
<td><em>Citizen-driven</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Europe as a Federal Superstate</em></td>
<td><em>Populist</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Europe as a Socialist Assembly</em></td>
<td><em>Integrated</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Unified</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Former Soviet Union as an Unstable Power</em></td>
<td><em>Self-governing</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Essentialist</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the basis of an analysis of the debates in this chapter, four British national identities are produced. The first can be formulated as **Britain as a liberalising European nation-state**. Several discourses instil meaning into this conception: *Europe as a security alliance, as a community of intergovernmental nation-states* and *as an international free trade area*. Here we see the reformulation of the *Europe as a security bloc* discourse from the debates over the 1975 Referendum. However, in contrast, the advent of an alliance rather than a security bloc is instructive of a number of modifications. Firstly, the tumultuous changes stemming from the breakup of the former Soviet Union effectively forced a reconstitution of the threat value attributed to the USSR. As we have seen from the previous chapter, the Cold War was perceived in concrete form: that the USSR was intent on imposing Communist principles on Western Europe, that Britain’s attachment to the USA functioned as the best means to deal with this peril, that a unified Europe was essential and that Britain was concerned about both domestic and international issues stemming from its fading power status. By the time of the Maastricht Treaty, the threat from the East had splintered into an unstable formation and an opportunity had been created to hook the newly formulated states to a peaceable Europe. Secondly, a bolstered Europe had, by this time, seen German unification along with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. As such, and although a security reading of Europe and Britain existed, it had transfigured more into an alliance of nation-states rather than a homogenous bloc. Another discourse that shifted was *Europe as a network of sovereignties* in the 1975 debates becoming transformed into *Europe as a community of intergovernmental nation-states*. The driving ethos exemplified in this alteration concerns the monetarist and liberalising ideology that permeated much of the debates at this time. Intergovernmentalism became the key to reforming Europe by ensuring European decisions would still be made by individual nation-states and that supranationalistic institution building should be vehemently resisted as it destabilised market driven mechanisms. Linked to this is
the third discourse which formulates *Europe as an international free trade area*. As a vehicle for encouraging commerce, Europe allows national authorities and identities to remain unfettered. That is, there is seemingly no contradiction between upholding the sanctity of the nation-state whilst simultaneously forging new markets and patterns of trade. As a consequence of these three discourses, British identities can be grouped as follows. Firstly, Britain is *peaceful, prosperous, European* and *securitised*. Secondly, it is *deregulated, anti-protectionist, monetarist* and *economically liberal*.

The second Self is **Britain as a reformist role model**. This configuration is similar to the previous debates yet is moulded by different discourses. *Central and Eastern Europe are enfranchised*. That is, free from the stranglehold of Soviet domination, the newly autonomous states are part of an interlocking core and periphery. Britain and other established members are part of a core invested with responsibility, purpose and leadership. The fledgling independents are the periphery that can be stabilised, democratised and integrated. This produces a Britain possessive of several identities. It is a *leader*, a *peace-maker*, *united* and *reform-driving*. However, two further discourses consolidate these identities. The second is *Russia as reformist*. Again, a fissure exists within which elements of the former USSR are prevalent and yet regeneration, democratic change and Westernisation are also championed as potential elements of the new Russia. Thirdly, *Germany is a core but unstable state*. Again, the element of unpredictability after Germany’s reunification invests Britain with a reform-driving identity.

The third constructed Self is **Britain as a global European authority**. Again, several discourses formulate this reading: *Europe as an enlarging superpower, Europe as a stabilising network and the former Soviet Union as not Europe*. As a superpower, Europe is
particularly emboldened in two principal ways. Firstly, as the Maastricht Treaty paved the way for the adoption of the Euro, a common currency is formulated as a further example of how the EC was gradually evolving into a more powerful political unit. Secondly, the dissolution of the Soviet Empire had effectively paved the way for European expansion as it produced a number of independent states that could help project the new Europe. Similarly, Europe is unified via highlighting how elements of the old Soviet order remain. All of this has the effect of producing a more prominent Britain with identities which include stable, influential worldwide, authoritative and securitised and model. In addition to this is the manner in which Europe functions as a chief stabiliser. Again, the turbulent changes in Central and Eastern Europe produce a resolute core of European states that attracts those new states recently shorn of their Communist pasts. Of importance is the manner in which such a British Self can be contrasted to the previous chapter. In 1975, Britain functioned as a cooperative European power which took much of its animus by utilising the dominant role the EEC had in empowering Britain. By 1993, the fading power status and sense of national prevarication had gone to reveal a more global actor whose nation-state status was helping to forge a more progressive Europe. Hence, a shift from reluctant ‘piggybacking’ – staying in the EEC through well-entrenched fears and lack of alternatives – had shifted to one of confident authoritativeness.

The last reading is Britain as a sovereign civic body. This is instilled with meaning by the following discourses: Europe as a Franco-German hegemony, as a federal superstate, as a socialist assembly and the former Soviet Union as an unstable power. Thus, the Maastricht debates produced a more solid resistance to the EC by equating federalism within a Franco-German doctrine that effectively charged both states with the ambition to dominate the Continent. Coupled to this is the political and economic ethos attributed to the Community.
That is, due to its protectionist, statist and centralising tendencies, Europe functions as a socialist assembly. This has the effect of reifying the sanctity of sovereignty. In the 1975 debates that were against EEC membership, sovereignty was configured as a responsibility of British parliamentarians that European institutions sought to strip away. In the anti-Maastricht treaty debates, sovereignty had spread to include all facets of British life. As such, a major national identity is that Britain is *politically, popularly and economically sovereign*. As such, Britain is constructed as a civic body whereby a previously localised identity has moulded into a more pervasive national entity. Other identities echo both the local and national, as against the supranational. Britain is *citizen-driven, populist, integrated, unified and self-governing*. A final identity labels Britain as *essentialist*. It possesses a fundamental ‘essence’ that makes its independence born, not made, and subsequently unique.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE TREATY OF LISBON

5.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to examine the discourses surrounding the 2008 ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the consequent processes of Othering and the construction of British national identities. As in the previous chapters, the primary sources utilised in constructing the various discourses and the subsequent contending identities are listed in Appendix 3. As shown in the descriptive account as well as Tables 8 and 9, the numbers next to each quotation represent the source in the appendix. As also in the previous chapters, quotations marks have either been given in the original source or are quotes of quotations. Unlike the previous empirical chapters, memoirs and biographies have not been used. This is because the event is too contemporary to have been included in many political biographies. The sources that have been utilised, however, can be categorised as follows. Firstly, as before, I make use of the general election manifestoes of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties in the May 2005 general elections. Despite being published three years before the Lisbon Treaty, the manifestoes highlight the political elite attitudes towards Europe and are subsequently important as a vehicle within which identity issues are thrashed out. In addition, I have also included the manifesto of the United Kingdom Independence Party as this party was particularly vocal in the run up to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and had won 12 MEPs in the 2004 European Elections. Secondly, I utilise newspaper articles within which political figures have commented on the nature and implications of the treaty. In order to delineate which articles to employ, I draw on the search engine www.journalisted.com and search category ‘Lisbon Treaty’. The time frame for the articles published ranges from December 2007 to November 2009. This covers both the ratification
and the parliamentary debates and is therefore obviously the period of time in which political spokespeople most habitually expressed their opinions on the treaty. In order for this chapter to elucidate and cover these many different viewpoints, the articles have been taken from a wide range of newspapers including *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Independent*, *The Guardian*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Express*, *The Spectator*, *The Times* and *The Daily Mirror*. Although the Eurosceptic and, one might argue, Europhobic nature of the British press has been well-documented,\(^569\) the written media functions as a particularly potent source within which political discourses are produced. Only articles by prominent political spokespeople have been included. That includes former and current Prime Ministers, Home Secretaries, Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Europe, as well as non-cabinet Members of Parliament and Shadow Ministers. Articles have also been included by reporters and journalists but, as a means of ensuring authenticity in the discourses, only direct quotes from political representatives have been recorded from these articles. Thirdly, I include two important debates on the Lisbon Treaty in the House of Commons. The second and third readings of the European Union Amendment Bill, conducted on 21 January and 11 March 2008, contain lengthy arguments over the nature of Europe and are information-rich. The length of the debates also ensures a broad cross section of contributors from across the political divides.

The organisation closely follows those of the previous empirical chapters. The opening section provides the historical background leading up to the treaty. This orientation section, as in the preceding empirical chapters, is not designed to offer an alternative viewpoint to the commonly received history but instead functions as an *aide-mémoire* to highlight the context

within which the discourses function. The next section provides an analysis of the debates organised into pro- and anti-Lisbon Treaty ideal types. Each debate outlines the predicates and practices: the meanings which are attached to the various subjects. Again, the subjects are described in a particular way via specific verbs, adjectives and adverbs, and this descriptive process instils the subjects with meaning. Next, the presuppositions are analysed with a view to understanding which particular truths are taken as given. The subsequent stage examines how these processes are organised into subject positioning. These are investigated in order to show the oppositional and non-oppositional relationships between the subjects and objects, and to expose what relationships exist between them. These findings within the debates are revealed in Tables 8 and 9. The process of Othering, with friendly, non-friendly and radical configurations, is then presented in Table 10 and described. The concluding section examines how British national identities are constructed according to these processes and these findings are shown in Figure 6. As with the previous chapters, this figure reveals the assortment of British Selves or images of nationhood that have been produced from the national identities. Again, these Selves are highlighted in bold, and the discourses and identities from which they have been produced are italicised.

5.2 Historical Background

The immediate post-Maastricht period did little to allay the divisiveness over the issue of Europe. From in-party squabbling, the disagreements obviously impacted on European policy and demonstrated how the Conservative government’s approach to Europe clashed violently with those of its European counterparts. In keeping with the support for widening over deepening, Major’s government fully endorsed the admission of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU. The importance of widening was reflected in a speech Major gave at Ellesmere
Port in 1994 calling for a “multi-track, multi-speed, multi-layered” Europe. Such a flexible approach was not held by the German government which instead favoured a ‘two-tier Europe’ whereby a ‘hard-core’ of states – Germany, France and the Benelux countries – could actively pursue EMU to the exclusion on Britain. By 1996, Britain’s resistance prompted the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, to remark that Britain, “as the ‘slowest ship in the convoy’, would not be permitted to hold the others back.” However, perhaps the most publicised and acerbic display of antagonism between Britain and Europe was the 1996 beef crisis whereby the EU banned British beef exports due to the perceived link between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in animals and Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD) in humans. The illness was referred to more commonly as Mad Cow Disease. Certain Conservative members, perhaps enthused by the opportunity the crisis gave them to heap opprobrium on Europe, interpreted the ban quite differently. Michael Forsyth, the Scottish Secretary, stated “[w]hat we are witnessing is the cynical elimination of a formidable competitor from the markets of Europe”. Additionally, John Major argued that apart from European leaders succumbing to a media-driven frenzy, “action against only British beef carried the message that other beef – their beef – was safe.” After the continuation of the ban, several options were considered and the British government plumbed for a policy of non-cooperation. This strategy was announced to the House of Commons on 21 May 1996 and the Prime Minister made a clear declaration of its reason: “I say this with great reluctance, but the European Union operates through good will. If we do not benefit from

good will from partners, clearly we cannot reciprocate.” Blocking up to seventy measures, however, at least from the perspective of France and Germany, was merely a crude attempt at blackmail and it further contributed to the argument that Britain was an unsteady, unreliable and out-of-sorts partner. The beef crisis had two fundamental implications. The first was that the ban on exporting British beef was construed as indicative of an EU which far from being a union governed by the pursuit of common interests was actually self-interested states safeguarding their purely national interests. The event provided a great deal of animus for the anti-EU factions within the Conservative Party and signalled, once again, that Europe was a potentially divisive force. Secondly, notwithstanding the severe economic effects on Britain’s domestic farmers, identity factors also played an important role. John Major, for example, to a Spanish audience, called beef “part of the psyche of our nation”. In short, the beef crisis played out as a war and was seized upon by political actors to instil various meanings. The dominant perspective within the British government viewed the beef ban as a blatant attempt to solidify Franco-German power at the expense of Britain. The prevailing European perspective viewed British obstreperousness as the latest event in a long line of disjunctures that started with Maastricht and threatened the momentum of the Union.

In the meantime, the domestic political environment was similarly restive and continued to be blighted by intra-party splits. Major had to recover from a leadership challenge by the John Redwood, former Secretary of State for Wales, which Major won by only three votes above the minimum he had set himself. Also, despite earlier setbacks in the birth of the Euro, with the original launch year of 1997 being postponed by two years, the single currency was

---

now becoming a distinct reality which rendered the ‘wait and see’ policy as more problematic. In addition, Major’s distinctive non-combative style, perhaps cultivated as a reaction to his predecessor as well as influenced by the minority government he headed, only provided a breeding ground for dissent and the ever-great fear of rebellion was never really quashed. Subsequently, by the time of the 1997 general election, the Conservative Party was riddled with disagreements over Europe, and in particular, the single currency. By contrast, Labour was buoyed by an increasingly confident approach which promised a clear cut referendum on the adoption of the Euro and which operated in stark contrast to the muddy signals coming from the ailing Major government. Tony Blair, who had taken over from John Smith after his death in 1994, was more at ease with the European social model being courted by the Commission, and, in particular, the Social Chapter, and he was certainly aware of how the issue of Europe could be so fratricidal to a political party. The Liberal Democrats, in their general election manifesto, unambiguously embraced participation in the single currency but still lodged the decision within the democratic framework of a national referendum. Other political groups had catapulted onto the scene willing to demand that which the Conservative Party was unable to offer. The Referendum Party, headed by the businessman Sir James Goldsmith, offered just that. The party campaigned on its single issue, a national referendum on Europe, and the shrewdly worded question on which the party would campaign was unambiguous: “Do you want the UK to be part of a Federal Europe? Or do you want the UK to return to an association of sovereign nations that are part of a common trading market?”

The UK Independence Party, formed three years earlier by the academic Alan Sked, was even more strident in its position calling for complete withdraw from the Community.

The general election on 1 May 1997 resulted in a Labour landslide. For the new government, it was not at all hard to score high and easily on the issue of Europe. However, not merely was the new government more European by default, but it was led by a man whose Foreign Secretary described as “arguably the most pro-European Prime Minister in modern times, certainly since Edward Heath.” Hence, the signs early on at least pointed towards the courting of a more cordial rapport with other European states. Blair, in a speech given upon receiving the Charlemagne Prize in the German city of Aachen in 1999, stated that he had a “bold aim … That over the next few years Britain resolves once and for all its ambivalence towards Europe. I want to end the uncertainty, the lack of confidence, the Europhobia.”

Labour’s early tenure coincided with the Amsterdam Summit Meeting which resulted in the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, designed to update the Maastricht Treaty, inject greater democracy into the institutions of the EU and also prepare for enlargement. The ratification of the Treaty, however, only instigated minor progress. Qualified Majority Voting was extended into some areas including employment, the environment, health and transport; the opt-out from the Social Chapter was scrapped; and a ‘flexibility’ clause was introduced to allow those countries that wished to progress further down the path of integration to do so. In keeping with the Conservative position, border controls were vigorously defended as being the domain of national governments.

However, what could be agreed upon should not overshadow the very issue that had become dominant and indicative of the ever-evolving and, to some, ever-encroaching Union: the

single currency. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, although not objecting to adopting the Euro in principle, laid out five economic tests. Particularly after the manifesto pledge of a nationwide referendum, Brown’s strategy was met with a level of suspicion. Shirley Williams remarked that “[p]erhaps Whitehall keeps tests and conditions on its mantelpiece, as cooks keep jelly moulds, there to be used for any purpose.”

No doubt, and particularly in relation to the first wave of countries adopting the Euro in January 1999, the tests were sufficiently malleable to position Euro-entry as a foreseeable option for Britain whilst simultaneously relegating it as a peripheral issue for the time being. In short, it can be argued that the tests bought the government valuable time to ‘sell’ the idea of the single currency to the British people.

In any event, two important aspects of the Blairite approach to Europe characterised the early 2000s. The first was an attempt to position Britain as a natural leader of Europe. In a speech delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Blair claimed that “[t]he fact is that Europe is today the only route through which Britain can exercise power and influence. If it is to maintain its historic role as a global player, Britain has to be a central part of the politics of Europe.” Thus, a proactive British European policy was indicative of a fatalistic dominance it was destined to possess. Britain was, one could argue, merely playing out its identity. Secondly and relatedly, the attempt to play a more assertive role helps explain what Julie Smith has labelled “promiscuous bilateralism” whereby the Labour government dispensed with forging relationships with ideologically similar counterparts and instead

---


attracted strong working relationships with centre-right figures including Spain’s José-Maria Aznar and Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi. In contrast, by proselytising the new economic model based on deregulation, called ‘the third way’, Blair’s strategy brought him into conflict with centre-left political figures like Lionel Jospin of France, who was decidedly more interventionist, and Gerhard Schröder of Germany, who although warm to the idea early on, had to distance himself from such policies due to pressure from his Social Democratic Party. Furthermore, Labour’s non-participation in the European currency cast a shadow on whether the UK government could reasonably position itself as a leader in Europe.

What happened to be the greatest threat to Blair’s attempt to lead Europe actually occurred during his second tenure: the invasion of Iraq. The Labour government, and Blair in particular, had not been reticent about military intervention prior to 2003. His adamant support for military involvement in Kosovo in 1999 had highlighted the inadequacy within Europe of a military response to crises and the ever-important role Britain believed it had in acting out its global and Atlanticist role. Even before this test of international alliance, in a speech delivered on 10 November 1997, Blair argued that “[w]e are the bridge between the US and Europe.” However, Blair’s close relationship with President Clinton and particularly with his successor, George W. Bush, in light of the latter’s unilateralist pursuits which included the non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the lack of support for the International Criminal Court, certainly created unease with several European leaders most notably Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder. Even though Europe had stood

overwhelming firm with the USA after the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, and that a broad alliance had supported the start of the War in Afghanistan in the same year, British support for the invasion of Iraq showed that the much lauded bridge metaphor no longer existed. Bulmer cites two immediate repercussions of what he calls New Labour’s utilitarian supranationalism. Firstly, the split between European states over Iraq greatly reduced the British government’s ability to shape the EU agenda and secondly, the domestic unpopularity of the war made the government more defensive on European policy.  

Despite this rift, a number of key European objectives can be said to characterise the Labour government’s approach to Europe. First was a championing of EU enlargement which saw ten new countries, most of them from Central and Eastern Europe, join the EU in 2004. Historically, both Labour and Conservative had consistently supported this strategy and the focus on market integration which enlargement brought was as congruent with pro-Europeans as it was anti-Europeans. Second, the issue of the adoption of the Euro was taken off the agenda after the Chancellor Gordon Brown announced that a Treasury analysis had indicated that only one of the key economic tests had been met. Third, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which among other developments designated the post of permanent President of the European Council, established the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to represent the EU internationally and gave legal power to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, was to be approved via a referendum but remained permanently unratified after the French and Dutch rejections in May and June 2005. Indeed, it has been argued that the treaty was so injected with a British influenced neo-liberal spirit that it was

anathema to the French social model. \footnote{Bache, I. and Nugent, N. (2007) ‘Europe’ in Seldon, A. (ed.) Blair’s Britain: 1997-2007, p. 538.} However, perhaps this relates to what can be argued as one of the most important aspects of Blair’s tenure. That the British attempt to break with past hesitancies, standoffishness and outright conflict led to what has been called “the Anglicising of Europe”. \footnote{Gifford, C. (2010) ‘The UK and the European Union: Dimensions of Sovereignty and the Problem of Eurosceptic Britishness’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 321-338 (at 329).} Indeed, the British contribution closely identified with this process was summed up in a newspaper article by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, in 2003. He argued that

> British values also have much to offer, persuading a global Europe that the only way forward is inter-governmental, not federal; mutual recognition, not one-size-fits-all central rules; tax competition, not tax harmonization, with proper political accountability and subsidiarity, not a superstate. \footnote{Brown, G (2003) ‘British values can help shape a Europe for the 21st century’, The Daily Telegraph [online], 3 June. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3592144/British-values-can-help-shape-a-Europe-for-the-21st-century.html. [Accessed 7 Dec. 2011].}

These set of values clearly distinguished precisely what Europe should and should not be. Although Labour’s less antagonistic relationship with the EU was viewed as laudable, it is also evident that such influence was restricted at home. Europe continued to be viewed with scepticism within Britain. As Stevens wrote before Blair’s second electoral win, “[t]his government cannot much longer make Britain’s case in Europe unless it can make Europe’s – and the euro’s – case in Britain.” \footnote{Stephens, P. (2001) ‘The Blair Government and Europe’, p. 75.} In short, although Blair had succeeded in putting Britain into Europe, he had not successfully planted Europe into Britain.

The 2005 election produced a manifesto which promised to put the Constitutional Treaty to a referendum and to also continue with the five economic tests as a precursor to a parliamentary vote and final referendum on the Euro. \footnote{Bulmer, S. (2008) ‘New Labour, New European Policy? Blair, Brown and Utilitarian Supranationalism’, p. 604.} The Conservative manifesto, under its leader Michael Howard, adamantly opposed joining the Euro and supported the
renegotiation and restoration of the opt-out on the Social Chapter. Both main parties championed the enlargement of the Union to include Turkey and others. The slim Labour victory would produce a further two years of a Blair-led government that had the UK Presidency of the EU in 2005. Prior to this, Blair gave a speech to the European Parliament on 23 June 2005 in which he called for greater reform to economic and social policies, criticised the burdensome role agriculture played in the EU budget and queried whether the debate over the Constitutional Treaty had really brought Europe nearer to the people. Of his remaining tenure, Blair announced the following year that he would resign within 12 months thus handing over power to his long-in-waiting chancellor.

It has been well-documented that although Gordon Brown’s surface pro-Europeanism was apparent early on, he possessed little of Blair’s personability. As one biographer describes him:

He often arrived late in Brussels or Luxembourg, and made excuses to avoid staying for lunch. The tortuous sessions bolstered his conviction that European politicians were building a protectionist, anti-American fortress. Regardless of the formal agenda, he would use the meetings to deliver finger-pointing lectures about Europe’s insularity and failure to adopt Anglo-American policies.

It can also be noted that Brown’s brand of Britishness sought to enshrine Britain with its own values rather than position it as part of the ‘we’ of Europe. For example, in the British Council 70th Anniversary Lecture, given on 7 July 2004, Brown said that “British qualities and values can play a leading part in shaping a Europe that must reform, be flexible, be competitive, be outward-looking and build better trading and commercial relationships with

---


the USA.”\textsuperscript{602} The USA, therefore, is positioned as a better representative of these values than the EU. Conversely, this transatlantic theme, redolent after the 11 September attacks, possessed less clout by 2008. As Dumbrell notes, “[t]he European political landscape had also shifted with the more pro-American noises emanating from Paris and Berlin.”\textsuperscript{603} In addition, Europe itself was given new impetus. The lifeless Constitutional Treaty, after what had been called ‘the reflection period’, was revived by the German government in 2007 during its presidency of the EU.\textsuperscript{604} Major elements of the treaty included the merging of the pillar system to produce just one institution, the creation of a high representative for foreign policy and the enactment of legislation to formulate the Union as a single legal personality. However, there was sufficient argument to suggest that the Constitutional Treaty had merely been repackaged. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told \textit{El Pais} newspaper that “[t]he fundamentals of the Constitution have been maintained in large part … We have renounced everything that makes people think of a state, like the flag and the national anthem”.\textsuperscript{605} Despite a delay, due to an earlier rejection of the treaty in a national vote in Ireland – the only country to have a national referendum on the adoption of the treaty – the Treaty of Lisbon became law on 1 December 2009.

To conclude, the Lisbon Treaty is a significant event for analysing the construction of national identities for a number of reasons. Firstly, as a recent event, it enables a contemporary reading of Europe. This is particularly useful when considering the comparative element of this study and for revealing which British identities have been

transformed and which have remained the same over the three critical events. Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty is information-rich. One of the deeper background elements to the treaty relates to the issue of a national referendum. Both Labour and Conservative parties were routinely castigated for reneging on this promise. An *Economist* article derided the “pitifully unconvincing” argument that Labour used: that the treaty and the constitution were completely different propositions. This had the effect, once again, of calling on political spokespeople to define precisely what the EU was and what the treaty would enable it to become. Finally, the treaty existed within a paradigm of globalisation. States no longer possess the capacity to ignore the worldwide interconnectivities between actors. This issue of how to function in a global environment ties in to the retention of national identities and makes the broader issue of identity more trenchant. For example, in a 2000 speech by the then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook affirmed that “the age of globalisation has been paralleled by strong assertions of national identity and culture.” As a consequence, globalisation is taken as a given entity and galvanises debate over what impact such transnational processes have over national identities.

### 5.3 The Pro-Lisbon Debates

In this section, I examine the predicates relating to the pro-Lisbon positions as represented in Table 8. These are the descriptive traits evident from the sources listed in Appendix 3. The predicates and processes are summarised, the presuppositions explained and then the various

---

subject positions are discussed. As in the previous chapters, the documents, page numbers and columns for the appendix sources are given in square brackets.

5.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Lisbon Debates

To begin, and very similarly to all debates that predicate membership as a positive, the fear of seclusion is situated as an existential threat that goes against the prominent and agential role Britain is afforded. Isolationism ‘risks damaging this country’ [32-col.1249] and is a position that ‘Britain cannot afford’ [23]. Influence is, as expected, very much lodged within a high level of participation and again takes its animus from the reference to the ‘missing the boat’ argument that looks upon Britain’s early history with the Community as one blighted by missed chances and counter-productive prevarication. Subsequently, Britain is a leader ‘at the heart of international decision-making’ [2], ‘shaping the EU and making sure it delivers’ [32-col.1253]. Britain and Europe mutually enforce one another in a relationship of codependency. A second formulation reveals a dual identity in which one can be ‘proud to be British … and European’ [15]. In addition, there are several references to how Europe has consistently been articulated through ‘the prism of Britain’s past … that the EU is … a vast conspiracy against the UK’ [32-col.1319] and ‘the myth that we are threatened with a European superstate’ [32-col.1252]. Again, the anti-EU fixation is viewed as delusional and draws upon a long history of viewing Community relations as conspiratorial and malevolent. Also, the Labour member, Patricia Hewitt, referencing speeches she witnessed in the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee in the early 1970s, highlights the ‘chauvinism, protectionism and sheer little Englandism’ [33-col.176] of the anti-Common Market position. Finally, Britain is viewed as being part of a ‘multipolar world’ [32-col.1290]. The ‘old balance of power politics’ [32-col.1316] has receded and given way to a ‘new’ [2] Europe.
Within this new Europe, contestations between nation-states have been replaced by the need to recognise interdependence and association. Thus, the dominant role afforded Britain is part of a broader changing Europe that has shed its Cold War rivalries to function within a sphere where no single centre of power dominates. Britain is also perceived as having ‘led the enlargement process’ [33-col.196] which again reveals the desire to diffuse and decentralise power.

In contrast to the previous empirical chapters, Europe is viewed in a more multifaceted way that produces a greater number of readings or ‘Europes’. Europe is constructed in seven particular ways. It is firstly configured as a continuously changing entity. Far from static, enlargement is regarded as ‘perhaps Europe’s greatest achievement’ [5] and ‘was the biggest and most dramatic peaceful shift of population and power’ [32-col.1303]. It is ‘enlarged and growing’ [32-col.1266], ‘has changed forever’ [32-col.1316] and is ‘organic’ [33-col.204] and ‘plastic’ [33-col.204]. Change, therefore, is regarded as a means to accelerate decentralisation and is not equated with instability or insecurity. This diffusion of power has a unifying effect on the member states. Instead of rivalries and divisions, all members are instead viewed as belonging to an ever-broadening alliance. Subsequently, ‘there is no old Europe, no new Europe, no East or West Europe. There is only one Europe’ [15]. This singularising reading produces a representation of Europe as a unified and homogenous bloc.

Relating to Europe as a continuous and active body, the second construction reveals the broadening influence and agenda of the EU. Apart from the well-versed articulation of Europe as promoting free trade and reducing commercial barriers to trade, its authority is extended to also include many more challenges. These include ‘a stronger poverty focus’ [32-col.1248], ‘global warming’ [32-col.1253] as well as the threats of ‘climate change,
international terrorism and international crime’ [33-col.182]. Thus, instead of the duties of
the Union being solely reducible to a commitment to free trade and economic liberalism, its
influence is extended to include a much broader set of challenges of which the EU is seen as
instrumentally capable of meeting and resolving. This configures Europe as possessing a
moral role and duty to address domestic as well as international grievances.

A third manner in which Europe is constituted relates to how membership actively
strengthens rather than weakens individual member states. Membership is not only seen as a
means of bolstering national sway, but the process involves intergovernmental agreement
rather than supranational absolutism. The stress on the voluntary compliance implicit within
intergovernmentalism reveals how the Lisbon Treaty ‘offer(s) faster decision making’ [32-
col.1248] and ‘gives national parliaments a decisive and direct say for the first time in EU
decision-making’ [23]. By highlighting the Union’s intergovernmentalist structure, this also
reduces decision making and policy within Europe to the vying domestic interest groups
implicit within member states. This reductionism functions in contrast to many aspects
attributed to the Union in the anti-Lisbon debates, namely that it is a bloated, bureaucratic
superstate. Similarly, the emphasis on a shift to democratisation has the simultaneous effect
of distancing it from the oft-cited perception of it as a technical construct. Additionally, the
EU as *sui generis* places weight on its accomplishments. For example, Mark Lazarowicz, a
Labour Co-operative politician, called it ‘a success story’ [33-col.241] in that ‘27 member
states, representing so many nations, cultures and languages, have built up the institution; that
regional blocs across the world talk about emulating the European Union’ [33-col.241].
Membership therefore has not only accrued major benefits for its participants but has also
functioned as a role model for other organisations around the world.
Fourthly, Europe is envisioned as a vehicle and hub for generating free trade. Its antithesis – protectionism – is regarded as ‘the politics of defeatism, retreat and fear’ [15]. The EU was referred to by the then Foreign Secretary David Miliband as the ‘largest single market in the world’ [25]. Again, this predication highlights the all-encompassing nature of the Community. Membership is ensconced within the notions of market liberalism, anti-protectionism and the free flow of labour and capital. Its antagonism pitches isolationism as negative and alarmist which, as a policy, ‘protects no one at all’ [15].

A further configuration relates to the notion of sovereignty. Very similar to the discourses in the previous two empirical chapters, sovereignty is essentially a pooled concept in which individual actors, by giving up some autonomy, end up contributing to a network which effectively defends and protects their remaining powers and interests. Hence, by contributing to ‘a greater good’ [33-col.205], Britain ‘get(s) better results than if we were to act alone’ [32-col.1287]. Again, the opposing position instils a similar association with extremist and potentially dangerous associations. For example, the former Minister for Europe, Denis MacShane, identified how isolationism was ‘creating a network of unpleasant, ugly, anti-European parties’ [16]. Thus, isolationism is more broadly linked with an unsightly recourse to nationalism which is configured as a source of potential conflict between states. By revealing that ‘too often, the treaty is treated as a religion’ [32-col.1302], the fluid notion of sovereignty is highlighted to reveal that Europe, rather than as a rigidly deterministic mass, can contain the adaptability to ensure member states follow a path of integration of their own choosing.

A sixth illustration centres on how membership has done much to invigorate democracy and enhance peace and security. There are two aspects to this position. To begin with, a more
effectual defence policy is seen as ‘a complement to Nato’ [25] rather than an attempt to displace the existing security framework. That is, Europe possesses a broadening military dimension and not merely a commercial or economic one. Historical references to war-torn Europe abound. One of the advantages of the Community ‘has been to heal the rift between France and Germany’ [33-col.201] and ensure ‘the prevention of war in Europe’ [32-col.1249]. Consequently, ‘History, if nothing else, teaches us of the importance of a united Europe’ [32-col.1249]. Although these references cultivate the oft-cited image of a destructive past, the military aspect is widened to highlight new security alliances and arrangements. In addition, the EU is regarded as a model of ‘how different nations, tribes and faiths can live together safely and sustainably’ [33-col.182]. Subsequently, a creeping Europeanisation is underscored to reveal that trade and security linkages have deepened into a much more expansive network of commonalities and dependencies. This Europe-wide identity is lodged within the promulgation of similar political ideas and values. For example, closer association between member states has been responsible for the spreading ‘democracy and the rule of law across our continent’ [13].

The concluding configuration makes reference to the conspiratorial beliefs that are seen as intrinsically embedded within the anti-positions. The sedition and intrigue regularly cited as inherent within the EU institutions by the Eurosceptic position are mocked. Europe is a foreign occupying power – ‘some alien force imposing its laws upon us’ [33-col.178] and is ‘about to devour us’ [33-col.204]. It is ridiculed as a plot within which ‘the other 26 member states are prepared to sacrifice their sovereignty in order to destroy ours’ [32-col.1282]. There are two broad aspects to this final reading. Firstly, suspicion of the EU and its institutions is regarded as blind and irrational verses a pro-EU position that is rational and pragmatic. Secondly, the attempts to view Britain’s relationship with Europe as a kind of Manichean
battle of good versus evil are delusional in that they readily ignore the continually dominant role played by national governments. That is, despite the power wielded by the EU and its institutions, it has not supplanted the powers of nation-states. This has the effect of showing that British influence within Europe has not occurred due to some shadowy conspiracy by political elites but has materialised because the EU is ‘an association of which we are willing and leading members’ [33-col.178].

Of the other countries mentioned, both the United States and China dominate the debates. The relationship with the US is configured in three important ways. Although making reference to ‘the special relationship’ [25], ‘a new relationship’ [3] is highlighted in order to draw attention to the fact that Britain, if it is to possess any Atlantic influence at all, can only achieve this ‘as full top-table participants in the EU’ [32-col.1290]. Indeed, MacShane stated that ‘the security challenges of the world are too serious to be handled exclusively by the US – or even exclusively by the US and Britain’ [33-col.210]. Multipolarity dominates and no single nation, even a Superpower, has unqualified recourse to unilateral action. Secondly and relatedly, this viewpoint functions in the aftermath of an American administration that had behaved unilaterally and had antagonised many European states with a ‘go-it-alone’ [33-col.210] policy. Such policies are regarded as ‘redundant’ [33-col210] and lead to the argument that ‘America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild our partnership with America’ [33-col.210]. Subsequently, The Liberal Democrat general election manifesto called for ‘a partnership of influence, not one of uncritical subordination’ [3]. Hence, America is configured as a mutually beneficial alliance but is part of a wider sense of community that places Europe of equal importance. A final point relating to America is the means by which a united Europe can check US power. This configures world politics as determined by power blocs and the best means of resisting
unchecked power is to form a counterweight. ‘Our best shot is to get Europe to stand up’ [30] is regarded as the most salient way of avoiding ‘a world where the US and China carve it up’ [30]. This configures the USA as less of an alliance and more a competitor.

China is similarly configured as a means by which British influence must be directed from within a cohesive Europe rather than via a unilateral policy. That is, there are a series of ‘special relationships’ with the US, China and India which enable Britain to exert a dominant role within Europe. Power, however, is not configured militarily but is instead about ‘effective influence when it comes to our relations with Russia, China, India and the wider world’ [33-col.248]. China, therefore, is regarded as an important country in which British relations directly impact on the networks within which Britain belongs. A close relationship between Britain and China results in closer links between Europe and China. Britain’s allies, it is said, should be ‘those countries that are democracies, that abide by the rule of law and that respect human rights’ [32-col.1270]. However, it is the sense of unity within Europe that can function as an authority to ‘influence China on the road to liberal democracy’ [32-col.1270]. As such, China does not possess the liberal values inherent within European nation-states but is capable of modification and democratisation.

Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are characterised as being part of a success story in that ‘thirty years ago, would anyone have predicted the reunification of Europe, with Communism finished and democracy taking root’ [32-col.1269]. The debate highlights two important aspects of these countries. The first is that they have successfully shaken off their Communist pasts and fully embraced liberal democracy. They are part of a broader Europe that Britain has helped shape. For example, the Labour politician Keith Vaz asserted that “all
the eastern and central European countries – look to the UK as their champion. We are the champion of enlargement and we led the enlargement process.”

British agency is bolstered by the notion that it functions as a model for newly admitted and potential EU states. Secondly, Europe is configured as a non-static entity in which its strength is boosted by the further enlargement. This process also includes ‘Turkey, the Balkans and Eastern Europe’ [1]. Thus, membership has the potential to bring nations like the Balkans, with tumultuous and undemocratic histories, into a European fold. The importance of enlargement and inclusion is marked by the suggestion that ‘we must reach out further to countries to the east and south’ [26].

Of the final countries and organisations mentioned, the scope of the EU is broadened to construct an organisation whose influence extends much further than the confines of Europe itself. Subsequently, ‘the concerns of British citizens lie outside our borders’ [32-col.1286], ‘the EU can play a role in promoting security and stability in neighbouring countries’ [33-col.158], and such influence stretches to ‘the Balkans, Lebanon and Chad’ [33-col.158]. Thus, the EU engenders security as well as political and economic stability in war-torn and politically fractious areas. Moreover, the fact that ‘Europe is the world’s biggest aid donor’ [33-col.158] positions it as a force for poverty prevention on a global scale. A final point refers to how ‘our continental partners … regard the present Commission as over-liberalising, over-Anglo Saxon, over-free trade’ [33-col.204]. Although this refers to the influence that British policy has had on European institutions, it also positions a British approach which is distinct, novel and even in opposition to other European states. It has been argued that such a contrast developed from the Blair government and, in particular, the “new ‘third way’ based

upon an Anglo-Saxon deregulatory economic model, the dynamism of which was contrasted with the rigidities of the continental economies.\textsuperscript{609} Thus, the British approach of trade liberalisation and the reduction of barriers are positioned in antagonism to recalcitrant and static Continental states which still continue to favour a system of protectionism and economic self-interest. This antagonism, although not dominant, alludes to the manner in which Europe is constructed from the perspective of a British political elite: less a solidified, homogenous institution and more a process that is continuously being remade.

To summarise the predicates in Table 8, Britain’s interests are lodged within an anti-isolationist, proactive stance in which Britain is both irreversibly part of Europe as well as a much broader multipolar world. Europe embodies a number of important configurations. First is the process of enlargement, regarded as integral to Europe’s future in reiterating its ever-modifying nature. Second is Europe’s broadening agenda, encompassing the challenges of global poverty and climate change as well as international trade. Third is the manner in which the treaty streamlines decision making and strengthens national policy by predicating the EU as a forum to realise national interests. Fourth is the role Europe has in reducing protectionism and expanding free trade. Fifth is the manner in which sovereignty is both transferable and pooled leading to both the strengthening of national influence and the greater good. Sixth is how Europe has contributed to peace, prosperity and democracy. Seventh is how anti-EU sentiment is wedded to baseless conspiracy theories and myths. The USA is an alliance of note but only one of several. Europe functions as the most important association which effectively is both the surest way of ensuring a close partnership with the US and of checking American power. As a consequence, the USA is part of a multipolar international system. The other notable relationship is with China. Its rising power status is taken as given.

Again, European unity is regarded as the most pertinent means of democratising China.

Central and Eastern Europe are classified as invoking Britain as a role model and as being a formation of states that have successfully freed themselves from totalitarian rule.
Table 8: Predication and Processes within the Pro-Lisbon Debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>At the heart of international decision-making</strong> [2]</td>
<td>Membership...boasts...international clout [2]</td>
<td>The United States and China: We can fashion a new relationship with the United States: a partnership of influence, not one of uncritical subordination [3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leaders in the European Union</strong> [2]</td>
<td>Security, and the prevention of war [32-1249]</td>
<td>If Britain moves itself to the margins of Europe...the...special relationship with the US will become a piece of historical nostalgia [25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outside...we would be weaker...more vulnerable</strong> [2]</td>
<td>The UK's...assets are valuable to the US, but without the political weight to drive Europe forward we are a far less useful ally [25]</td>
<td>The UK's...assets are valuable to the US, but without the political weight to drive Europe forward we are a far less useful ally [25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We will be leaders in a reformed Europe</strong> [2]</td>
<td>I don't want to live in a world where the US and China carve it up between them...Our best shot is to get Europe to stand up [30]</td>
<td>Brexit...influence China on the road to liberal democracy [32-1270]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We must remain fully engaged</strong> [5]</td>
<td>Britain cannot afford to be isolated [23]</td>
<td>As a result of Britain’s special relationships with the United States and now with China and India...that influence has been enhanced. Those connections will ensure that the UK will always have influence in Europe [32-1288]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Britain's interest is to be at the heart of Europe</strong> [6]</td>
<td>A modern Britain in Europe [32]</td>
<td>We cannot hope to...influence the direction of global US foreign policy to the extent that we can as full top-table participants in the EU [32-1290]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Same old divisions threatening isolation</strong> [7]</td>
<td>An enlarged and growing EU [32-1266]</td>
<td>We...are a leading member of the EU, play a huge role within the...Commonwealth, and have an important and close relationship with the USA [33-177]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The stability of our relationship with Europe</strong> [8]</td>
<td>Was the biggest and most dramatic peaceful shift of population and power in Europe since the decline of the western Roman empire [32-1303]</td>
<td>We want a powerful relationship with the United States, but I note that last year European growth was higher than that of America [33-209]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proud to be British and...European</strong> [15]</td>
<td>Britain cannot afford to be isolated [23]</td>
<td>The security challenges of the world are too serious to be handled exclusively by the US—or even exclusively by the US and Britain [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Isolated from influence and threatening isolation for Britain</strong> [24]</td>
<td>A Europe about to devour us [33-169]</td>
<td>The go-it-alone ideas expressed by Donald Rumsfeld...and some others...loosely called neo-conservatives are now perceived...to be redundant. America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild our partnership with America [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**A country like ours, with all the pillars of international power [30] (Isolationism)...risks damaging this country both politically and economically [32-1249]</td>
<td>To deny a central role for the EU...is historically illiterate [32-1269]</td>
<td>That is because it is not just about the projection of power on the international stage, but about effective influence when it comes to our relations with Russia, China, India and the wider world [32-1248]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broadening influence and agenda:</strong> Deliver a stronger poverty focus [32-1248]</td>
<td>Europe, as one that is more liberal, more open and more interested in global trade and global environmental questions [32-1311]</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia: Bring closer EU membership for Turkey, the Balkans and Eastern Europe [1] We must reach out further to countries to the east and south [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**'A Europe that addresses global poverty, global warming, global trade' [32-1253]</td>
<td>The challenges include climate change, international terrorism and international crime [33-182]</td>
<td>Thirty years ago, would anyone have predicted the reunification of Europe, and finished and democracy taking root [32-179]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Our vision of Europe, as one that is more liberal, more open and more interested in global trade and global environmental questions</strong> [32-1311]</td>
<td>The European ideal of keeping peace, stability and economic prosperity in Europe [32-1249]</td>
<td>We...are a leading member of the EU, play a huge role within the...Commonwealth, and have an important and close relationship with the USA [33-177]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The myth that we are threatened with a European superstate [32-1252]</strong></td>
<td>In a dangerous world...it is more important that we have strong international institutions, not just worldwide but at European level [32-1251]</td>
<td>We want a powerful relationship with the United States, but I note that last year European growth was higher than that of America [33-209]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>At the heart of Europe, shaping the EU and making sure it delivers</strong> [32-1253]</td>
<td>Eurosceptic, and in the end protects no one at all [15]</td>
<td>The security challenges of the world are too serious to be handled exclusively by the US—or even exclusively by the US and Britain [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>At the heart of the new European Union foreign and security policy structures [32-1265]</strong></td>
<td>The concern is...the proposition of power on the international stage, but about effective influence when it comes to our relations with Russia, China, India and the wider world [32-1248]</td>
<td>We...are a leading member of the EU, play a huge role within the...Commonwealth, and have an important and close relationship with the USA [33-177]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To deny a central role for the EU...is historically illiterate [32-1269]</strong></td>
<td>How different nations, tribes and faiths can live together safely and sustainably [33-182]</td>
<td>The go-it-alone ideas expressed by Donald Rumsfeld...and some others...loosely called neo-conservatives are now perceived...to be redundant. America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild our partnership with America [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We must either be there, influencing Europe—or we must walk away [32-1273]</strong></td>
<td>One of the benefits...has been to heal the rift between France and Germany [33-201]</td>
<td>That is because it is not just about the projection of power on the international stage, but about effective influence when it comes to our relations with Russia, China, India and the wider world [32-1248]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>As they are always going to Brussels to fight demons...to achieve great victories by beating off threats to our interests [32-1281]</strong></td>
<td>The EU...will have influence in Europe and the United States...will not have influence in Europe [33-209]</td>
<td>We want a powerful relationship with the United States, but I note that last year European growth was higher than that of America [33-209]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Britain's interest is to be at the heart of Europe...Is it not more sensible to have the EU subjugate us...than it is more sensible to be subjugated by the EU...Is it not more sensible to have the EU subjugate us...than it is more sensible to be subjugated by the EU...</strong> [32-1287]</td>
<td>The United States and China: We can fashion a new relationship with the United States: a partnership of influence, not one of uncritical subordination [3]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We live in a multipolar world [32-1290]</strong></td>
<td>The EU has been...a far less useful ally...and it is more sensible...to have influence in Europe...than it is to be subjugated by the EU...It is surely those countries...that are democracies...that abide by the rule of law and respect human rights...It is through the power of the EU collectively that we are far more likely to influence China on the road to liberal democracy [32-1270]</td>
<td>The security challenges of the world are too serious to be handled exclusively by the US—or even exclusively by the US and Britain [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We live in a multipolar world [32-1290]</strong></td>
<td>The security challenges of the world are too serious to be handled exclusively by the US—or even exclusively by the US and Britain [33-210]</td>
<td>The go-it-alone ideas expressed by Donald Rumsfeld...and some others...loosely called neo-conservatives are now perceived...to be redundant. America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild our partnership with America [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A modern Britain in Europe [32-1292]</strong></td>
<td>The concern is...the proposition of power on the international stage, but about effective influence when it comes to our relations with Russia, China, India and the wider world [32-1248]</td>
<td>We...are a leading member of the EU, play a huge role within the...Commonwealth, and have an important and close relationship with the USA [33-177]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We are no longer a front line in the old balance of power politics [32-1316]</strong></td>
<td>The EU has been...a far less useful ally...and it is more sensible...to have influence in Europe...than it is to be subjugated by the EU...It is surely those countries...that are democracies...that abide by the rule of law and respect human rights...It is through the power of the EU collectively that we are far more likely to influence China on the road to liberal democracy [32-1270]</td>
<td>The security challenges of the world are too serious to be handled exclusively by the US—or even exclusively by the US and Britain [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The prism of Britain’s past...that the EU is...a vast conspiracy against the UK [32-1319]</strong></td>
<td>To deny a central role for the EU...is historically illiterate [32-1269]</td>
<td>The go-it-alone ideas expressed by Donald Rumsfeld...and some others...loosely called neo-conservatives are now perceived...to be redundant. America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild our partnership with America [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Struck in the past...obsessed with myths [33-159]</strong></td>
<td>To deny a central role for the EU...is historically illiterate [32-1269]</td>
<td>The go-it-alone ideas expressed by Donald Rumsfeld...and some others...loosely called neo-conservatives are now perceived...to be redundant. America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild our partnership with America [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chauvinism, protectionism and sheer little Englandism [33-176]</strong></td>
<td>To deny a central role for the EU...is historically illiterate [32-1269]</td>
<td>The go-it-alone ideas expressed by Donald Rumsfeld...and some others...loosely called neo-conservatives are now perceived...to be redundant. America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild our partnership with America [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We led the enlargement process [33-196]</strong></td>
<td>To deny a central role for the EU...is historically illiterate [32-1269]</td>
<td>The go-it-alone ideas expressed by Donald Rumsfeld...and some others...loosely called neo-conservatives are now perceived...to be redundant. America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild our partnership with America [33-210]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>We want our influence...have a significant single market in the world [25]</strong></td>
<td>To deny a central role for the EU...is historically illiterate [32-1269]</td>
<td>The go-it-alone ideas expressed by Donald Rumsfeld...and some others...loosely called neo-conservatives are now perceived...to be redundant. America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild our partnership with America [33-210]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.2 Presupposition within the Pro-Lisbon Debates

Background knowledge helps construct a certain set of truths relating to the actors. As with the previous two empirical chapters, some of these presuppositions are lodged within a relationship of binarisation whilst others are more nuanced in their meaning. First of all, a clear process of innovative/obsolete envisions how a Europe of the future must embrace a contemporary, pioneering outlook against entrenched and resistant elements. A number of discursive practices highlight this position. For example, several references to ‘modern’ [32-col.1292], ‘reform’ [2], ‘new’ [2] [3] [32-col.1265] and ‘change’ [32-col.1265] [32-col.1316] [33-col.182] posit Europe as a progressive, developing force. Part of this articulatory practice focuses on the ever-increasing responsibilities of the European Union. Although more established references to trade and economic linking are expressed, the influence stretches into a focus on global poverty, climate change and international terrorism, crime and aid. However, it is important to point out that the presupposition of an ever-broadening Europe is not an elite-inspired exercise but is lodged within the very existence of the Union: that a limited, insular focus on intra-European issues will produce stagnation whilst a perpetual extension of influence into non-Europe invigorates and redefines its role and responsibilities.

A further presupposition focuses on a change/stasis binary. The European Union embodies transformation in a number of examples including the need for enlargement, the extension of its operations into humanitarian aid and to deal with climate change and its increasing sense of purpose and ambition. This is contrasted with a rigid, unwavering fetishism for out-of-date modes of thinking which include an obsession with myths and balance of power politics. The transnational nature of commerce, values and interests dilutes the ‘us versus them’ paradigm which is seen as redundant and emblematic of an isolationist sense of idealism.
A final presupposition relates to the shifting nature of political actors. Other states, hitherto largely ignored, are incorporated into the debates. The role of India, and in particular China, and their rising power status, helps generate a reality within which the political world is dominated by large states or robust associations such as the EU. Although seemingly obvious, this observation has two repercussions. Firstly, and related to the references to smaller, unstable states which include the Balkans, Lebanon and Chad, the larger actors are invested with a responsibility to less powerful actors. Again, this configures threats or ‘hot wars’ as stemming from non-unified, dissipated actors that do not belong to a larger cooperative. Secondly, the belief in the world being governed by regional blocs not merely makes the importance of the Union more acute, but also cultivates a multipolar world view in which closer concentration is naturalised. Europe, therefore, as a political and economic unit, is located as being on the right side of history.

5.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Lisbon Debates

The predication and presupposition produce a number of subject positions which show how the subjects and objects are located within the debates. First of all, as has been explained, Europe is predicated as seven related but sufficiently different subjects. These, in turn, produce five explicit discourses. The first is Europe as a project in progress. As a power structure, it is not vested with a finite nature or unchanging set of policy goals. Instead, despite possessing achievable ambitions, it is an evolving set of practices that continue to be redefined according to international challenges and circumstances. As such, its scope for influence is consistently changing and is no longer solely referred to as trade-based, economics-driven entity. The second is Europe as a humanitarian agent. In keeping with its expanding obligations, particular focus falls on Europe as a means to address global poverty,
climate change and international crime. This discourse, therefore, helps shift Europe away from the dispassionate, elite-governed and institution-building project to instead reconnect with the wider public. This humanitarian concern, one can argue, is attached to the attempt to build a more sympathetic ‘people’s Europe’. The third is *Europe as a community of intergovernmental nation-states*. Within this configuration, Europe is a voluntaristic organisation whereby agreement is powered by individual members and not by any federal institution. As such, the Community takes strength from this lack of coercion and recognises that the interplay between actors positions the nation-state as still the most adroit embodiment of authority. The fourth Europe configured is *Europe as an open market*. Rather than a free trade area, which is regarded as restricting trade from outside, this discourse seeks to create a network with other non-European actors. For example, the then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, gave a speech at the Mansion House in London which highlights this aspect:

> The Britain that will succeed in this open global economy will be the Britain that, true to our history, rejects any form of protectionism or parochialism and, instead, sees the channel not as a moat cutting us off, but as a highway to the world. That is why I am so keen to break down trade barriers between Europe and the USA, and to build strong trading links between Britain and Asia – especially between Britain and China and Britain and India.\(^6\)

The fifth position is *Europe as a global security alliance*. The global dimension makes references to other non-European actors and underscores how the EU functions as a complement to, rather than a replacement for other security alliances such as NATO.

In addition, Central and Eastern Europe are also located in a particular way. This can be described as *Central and Eastern Europe as European democracies*. The inclusion of these

---

states into the European family is imperative. Evident within this is the fear of fractiousness and the potential threat of the Balkanisation of Europe. However, although this instability is alluded to, an important change in the relationship between West and East Europe has occurred. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, which occurred in 1991, created a new European periphery of Central and European newly independent states. As these over the years had become absorbed into the European core, and by the time of the Treaty of Lisbon, a new periphery, including the Balkans and Turkey, had been formulated. This periphery is recognised as the next group of nation-states to be taken in and, as a consequence, is predicated as firmly attached to core Europe. This attachment is recognised by the periphery’s shift away from authoritarianism to free-market liberalism and the fact that they are correspondingly affirmed as democratic states.

Two non-European actors are also positioned. The first is the USA as a multipolar alliance. The USA is positioned as dominant and this is problematic in two main ways. Firstly, the image is hierarchical. That is, recent history is invoked to illuminate the danger of a ‘go-it-alone’ [33-col.210] America in which subordination to an overactive American foreign policy is now redundant. In keeping with the broadening influence Europe possesses, a partnership between the USA and Europe is called upon, rather than a relationship of subservience. Secondly, America’s dominant actor status is one in which a unified Europe functions as an important counterweight. The ability to modify US policy, particularly with reference to the splits within Europe open the War in Iraq and the broader War on Terror, is seen as an important requirement for unity within Europe. The second non-European actor positioned is China as a rising power. Again, China is perceived as a state with a considerable degree of agency and the democracy it may become can only occur via the initiative of a united Europe. This reading, very much like the positioning of the USA, formulates power as emanating
from certain blocs. Europe, in order to exert influence, must continue on its strategy of enlargement.

Finally, it can be argued that two additional configurations relate to a dualistic British attachment to Europe as well as to beyond. The first is *Europe as a global network* in which national borders no longer define particular policy. In this sense, Europe functions as a complex within which trade, cultural and historical linkages radiate. Secondly, *Europe as an Anglicised association* reveals the impact Anglo-dominant thinking has had on mainland Europe. In addition, as has been observed, it is a tradition that “does not look to the European social democratic tradition but draws its moral inspiration from English and Scottish liberalism and North American conceptions of civil society.” As such, this discourse is heavily value-laden and is invested with the ambition to mould Europe to embody what are seen as the Anglo-centric qualities of “liberty, pluralism, and a moral civil society.” In addition, the deregulation and trade liberalisation implicit in this process of Anglicisation have effectively dislodged the practices of state intrusiveness and protectionism that previously blighted European institutions.

**5.4 The Anti-Lisbon Debates**

In this section, I analyse the predicates and processes involving the anti-EU positions as represented in *Table 9*. As with the previous sections, the predicates are elaborated, the background knowledge – or presupposition – explained and then the subject positioning of the particular actors is presented.

---

612 Ibid.
5.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Lisbon Debates

Britain is assembled in a number of particular respects. First of all, due to what is regarded as an unremitting European focus, the EU is actually perceived as cramping Britain’s greater potential for trade and relations outside of this narrow sphere. That is, as a counterweight to the usual charge of isolationism, one specific facet of the anti-Lisbon debates constructs Britain as internationalist. Britain is consequently ‘a global trading nation’ [1] with ‘global influence’ [1] and with ‘horizons (which) extend much further’ [1] than its immediate neighbours. As such, Europe is a set of relations that effectively stifles Britain’s ability to play out its ‘unique role in the world’ [1] and encourage and solidify new relationships. Secondly, Europe is held responsible for muddying the nation’s sense of Self. This point relates to a societal feeling of non-belonging that EU interference has helped erode. For example, the UKIP general election manifesto of 2005 argued that when Britain is independent from the EU, and democracy reestablished, ‘individuals … will regain a stronger sense of belonging to a society with the family as the basic stable unit and a better set of values’ [4]. Thus, not merely is British society blighted by a plethora of European rules and restrictions, but membership has also weakened a national sense of unity. A further point regards how Britain, once again, sits apart from its Continental counterparts via its history, geography and national culture. ‘We have a maritime disposition’ [33-col.240] with a ‘different history and geography … Our institutions and our … law have tended to evolve … rather than be the result of invasions or revolutions’ [33-col.239]. Accordingly, Europe is composed of states whose histories have been punctuated, violent and revolutionary rather than a British history marked by gradual development and incremental change. A final configuration positions Britain’s membership of the EU as stifling its potential for leadership and instead ensuring it plays a subordinate role. ‘Being in Europe’s mainstream meant
following in others’ slipstream’ [20] and although the promotion of British interests is ‘no narrow agenda’ [7], it must take precedence over any commitment to other European states.

Europe is constructed as five distinguishable objects within these debates. To begin with, a political environment in which naturalised patterns of decentralisation, deregulation and transparency is threatened by a treaty that seeks to reverse this process. As such, the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, William Hague, identified how the Treaty of Lisbon goes ‘against the spirit of our age’ [7]. Instead of an ‘EU that acts by agreement among nations’ [7], there is ‘an over-arching government’ [17], ‘unelected enclaves of the European Commission’ [33-col197] and ‘a torrent of legislation from Brussels’ [33-col.232]. Subsequently, an early configuration positions Europe and its machinery as obstructing a political culture of liberalisation by imposing centralisation. In addition, Europe is divorced from its citizens and is being made by ‘the estrangement of a plutocratic elite’ [33-col.202] that has built ‘powerful institutions … remote from the ordinary citizen’ [33-col.232] and have produced a treaty with ‘appalling Eurojargon … completely inaccessible’ [33-col.232]. Thus, the Treaty is regarded as part of the next stage in the consolidation of power by European institutions. Coupled to this is what is seen as the supine complicity with which British political elites have effectively handed over power. A ‘cosy consensus’ [20] dominates in which further integration is unquestioningly accepted while pro-Europeans have been willing to do ‘anything for a quiet life, and never mind the national interest’ [32-col.1261]. A final point regarding the way in which Europe is constructed as an elitist enterprise is how Europe has absorbed some of the symbols of statism. The EU constitution, the establishment of an EU foreign minister and the European anthem and flag are all redolent of the ‘paraphenalia of a state or state in the making’ [32-col.1276]. As a consequence, rather than a loose amalgam of
nation-states, the EU is perceived as becoming a state in itself with all of the symbols and institutions deemed essential to wield power.

A second subject focuses on the intransigence and overtly static nature of the Union. There are two aspects of importance. Foremost, its rigidity is a barrier for those who, according to the Conservative party general election manifesto of 2005, ‘wish to see the EU evolve in a more flexible, liberal and decentralized direction’ [1]. ‘The fight for a deregulated Europe’ [1] is a quest for greater efficiency and for a Europe which is more influenced by an anti-centrist Anglo-Saxon ethos. Next, Europe’s inflexibility is also a barrier to meeting challenges implicit in an ever-changing political environment. That is, the EU will need to have a ‘nimble, flexible structure’ [19] in the 21st Century. Such a possibility is further hampered by ‘complex, bureaucratic’ [33-col.201] aspects that continue to blight EU structures, institutions and decision-making processes.

Third, Europe is constructed as non-organic and artificial. There are a number of specific aspects to this discourse. To begin with, as a top-down creation where the impetus and drive has come from elites and technocrats, the attempt ‘to create political union … from above undermines any tendency for one to grow naturally’ [29]. Consequently, Europe is a manufactured entity, does not possess an innate or natural structure and, as a result, does not meet citizens’ interests. Indeed, the EU is a fabricated construct which could only come about via what William Hague labelled as a ‘sustained deception’ [32-col.1260] in which commonality and fraternity are moribund. ‘[T]here is no single European electorate … no language of Europe … no shared political experience, no demos’ [33-col.234]. This fundamental lack of shared experience impacts on what Europe should be. It needs to be ‘an association of member states’ [13], each of them ‘determining … the amount of integration
… they are prepared to accept’ [32-col.1277], rather than a ‘dictatorship’ [32-col.1284] which is starting to adopt ‘the dimension of empire’ [20].

A fourth reading shapes the Union as a body lacking representation and democracy. Three elements are articulated within this formulation: the intrusiveness of the EU, the manner in which populist and citizen-oriented structures are compromised and the increasing centralisation of power within the Union. To begin with, the EU is regarded as impinging upon all areas not merely of political life but also in the domestic arena. For example, the Conservative member William Cash argued how there is ‘an avalanche of European laws … like a tsunami’ [32-col.1293] with an obsession towards standardisation, over-regulation and harmonisation. What is left is a society in which there is ‘scarcely any area where the EU has not taken over’ [33-col.201]. Furthermore, the threat to democracy is similarly affirmed. In this sense, democracy in not concerned with parliamentary sovereignty and national autonomy in a legislative sense. Instead, democracy is wedded to the consent of the people. Subsequently, the treaty is regarded as especially egregious not merely because it constitutes the ‘unwarranted power over our national life’ [33-col175] but also because ‘it is not politicians’ power to give away’ [13]. Again, identity is seen to be lodged very much within the Westphalian notion of the nation-state. The Union ‘lacks popular allegiance and legitimacy’ [33-col.234] and ‘it is not a single political entity on which democracy can operate’ [33-col.234]. The last configuration pits the EU as ‘taking powers away from the nation states’ [28], ‘an over-mighty Executive’ [32-col.1308], ‘undemocratic, complicated and remote’ [33-col.232] as well as ‘corrupt and unreformable’ [4]. The European Court of Justice, one of Europe’s instruments for its consolidation of power, is ‘activist’ [32-col.1309] whilst the Commission ‘not elected’ [10]. One aspect that deviates from this oft-cited image of the EU as an unstoppable bureaucratic force is the manner in which its power does not
automatically go unchecked. Nation-states do possess the capabilities to resist the Union’s encroachment. Consequently, in a 2009 speech, David Cameron declared that ‘European integration is not a one way street … powers can be returned from the EU’ [13].

A final formulation relates to how Europe is divisive and anti-global in its practices. At the outset, common policies on agriculture and fisheries are regarded as ‘damaging to free trade and conservation’ [1]. National decision making is looked upon as essential in these areas. Furthermore, Europe has been responsible for shying away from ‘decisions that demonstrate unity’ [22]. What it has actually achieved is to bring about a level of divisiveness by falsely assuming a sense of commonality. Subsequently, ‘old tensions are re-emerging’ [33-col.202] whilst one prediction laments that ‘it will disintegrate, causing enormous trouble’ [33-col.203]. The EU, therefore, is regarded as an inadequate organisation for forging harmony and has done little to dislodge the security fears that exist between nation-states. Finally, the Union ‘should be concentrated on adapting to globalisation’ [31]. In all these regards, Europe is treated as an ineffectual player dominated by an ethos characterised as a ‘low-growth continental system’ [33-col.235]. Such a position sits in stark contrast to Britain possessing ‘a global role’ [33-col.235] that can reach out to fashion up-and-coming powers and encourage links with foreign networks. In this sense, Europe’s strength and ability to deal with the surge in globalisation is limited because it seeks to curtail the opportunities inherent within global trade and economic liberalisation.

A number of other states also feature. The United States is predicated as an important alliance that moulds and produces a ‘distinctive British foreign policy’ [5]. However, this policy is also impacted ‘through new friendships and alliances beyond North America and Europe’ [5]. Subsequently, the alliance is notable but also one of several. In addition, it is configured as
strained, once again by reference to an administration that has alienated European leaders. The ‘fractured Atlantic alliance’ [22] is ripe for ‘repair’ [22] and a new administration is a welcome catalyst for building a friendlier, less combative relationship between the USA and Europe as a whole.

France, Germany and the Continent as a whole are unsurprisingly configured negatively. They can each be apportioned separate and distinctive postulates but it is worth noting that a unified interpretation pervades these readings: that France, Germany and the Continent are frequently used interchangeably and that they all possess a threat value. First of all, France contains a number of important characteristics. The political system is dominated by ‘backward-looking parties like the French Socialists’ [20]. France is governed by regressive _dirigiste_ forces that hark back to a Delors-era period of centralisation and protectionism. The French-led suspension of enlargement in the wake of the Irish ‘No’ vote in June 2008 is regarded as a ‘classical negotiating ploy’ [21] while the Treaty as a whole is slated as ‘a European manoeuvre … concocted by the Eurocrats, by Germany and by France’ [32-col.1295]. Reminiscent of the Maastricht debates, France is construed as a self-serving nation that exploits European affairs as an extension of its foreign policy. Subsequently, it covertly pushes for self-interest under the cloak of pro-European rhetoric. Germany is similarly demonised. The treaty was ‘railroaded through by the German presidency’ [33-col.196] whilst both Germany and France have been responsible for cultivating the hysterical notion that unless EU rules and treaties are slavishly adopted by all member states, ‘we will be at Germany’s throat, we will be fighting the French, or we will be after the Spanish’ [33-col224]. Consequently, the EU is a joint German-French venture and an environment of fear has been nurtured to ensure conformity and subservience to EU doctrine. In terms of the Continent as a whole, the treaty ‘locks us into a continental system that is in defiance of our
historical experience, outlook and trade’ [33-col.234]. The Continent possesses a deep historical effect on the construction of British policy and attitudes as ‘much of our history has been bound up with what happened elsewhere in Europe, but we are more than that’ [33-col.234]. Again, a focus on Europe and Europe alone risks closing off the many other organisations, states and international groupings that Britain has historically and culturally forged. In this sense, ‘the treaty tries to switch off that maritime global magnetic field and suck us irreversibly into a continental destiny’ [33-col.235]. In addition, ‘the continentals often express themselves in antagonism to the Anglo-Saxon’ [33-col.240].

Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are part of a common European heritage and must therefore be part of the ongoing enlargement process. In addition to diluting the Franco-German bloc, the admission of other nations would ‘(make) Europe more diverse’ [2] and would ‘entrench stability’ [13] particularly in ‘the Western Balkans where so much European blood has flowed’ [13]. Nascent democracies, however, run the risk of being alienated if they are not sufficiently supported. The fractious nature of Central and Eastern Europe is highlighted to reveal that these states have only recently become newly dependent and still carry a significant risk of implosion and fissure.

Of the final countries mentioned, and reiterating the manner in which Europe is seen as a threat to building broader relationships, ‘we will stand for … an EU that looks out to the world, that builds strong and open relations with rising powers like China and India’ [13]. William Cash stated that the ‘common resource of the English language’ [32-col.1294] as well as the ties of ‘economic co-operation’ [32-col.1294] position India as a source of British collaboration. Such a position is orchestrated by the importance of India as both a democracy and a historical link.
To summarise the predicates within the anti-Lisbon debates, Britain is internationalist and global in its influence and aspirations. Its full potential is viewed as constricted by a plethora of limiting and power-sucking European rules and agreements. Similarly, it is classified as maritime and gradualist in its political and social evolution. Europe is elitist, inflexible, non-organic, centralised, undemocratic and non-unifying. The US is configured as an important association in need of repair from a new administration. France and Germany are part of a dominant axis that has moulded Europe in their own image. Such a policy is perceived as bullying, uncompromising and based on the mythical notion that the unity imposed by EU membership has forged peace between European nations. The Continent is classified as limiting British interests in other regions by tying Britain to a restricted set of trading practices. Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are key players in that they are part of the enlargement process in which greater diversity and harmony can flourish. This also has the effect of unsettling the Franco-German dominated nature of the EU. India has common links to Britain founded on democracy, historical ties, economic cooperation and language. Its rising power status is seen as an opportunity for and not as a threat to British interests.


Table 9: Predication and Practices within the Anti-Lisbon Debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elitist:</strong></td>
<td>Against the spirit of our age [7]</td>
<td>- The United States: Distinctive British foreign policy...will also be advanced through the alliance with the United States...through new friendships and alliances beyond North America and Europe [5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We seek an EU that acts by agreement among nations [7]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ever greater centralisation of power beyond the democratic control of the people [7]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has taken a wrong turn and urgently needs reforming [12]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have taken too much power over issues that are contested aspects of public policy [14]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An over-arching government. [17]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominated by a cosy consensus that deeper European integration is per se a good thing [20]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Anything for a quiet life, and never mind the national interest’ [32-col.1261]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paraphernalia of a state or state in the making [32-col.1276]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undermines this country and its voters, it was pushed through by deceit...rammed through by the Whips [32-col.1293]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The iron determination of the EU institutions not to give up their powers [32-col.1298]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unelected enclaves of the European Commission [33-col.197]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Embedding of the estrangement of a photocraft elite, who want to create a united states of Europe as a political entity [33-col.202]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appalling Euroyargon...completely inaccessible [33-col.232]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Powerful institutions...remote from the ordinary citizen [33-col.232]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A torrent of legislation from Brussels [33-col.232]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inflexible:</strong></td>
<td>Wish to see the EU evolve in a more flexible, liberal and decentralised direction [3]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The fight for a deregulated Europe [1]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Needs reform to become more efficient and...accountable [3]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(EU will need to have a)...nimble, flexible structure [19]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe...needs greater flexibility, the treaty moves more power to the centre...nations need the freedom to compete [32-col.1254]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aspects of Europe...are complex, bureaucratic [33-col.201]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As non-organic/unnatural:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An association of member states [13]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Treaty gave the EU ‘the dimension of empire’ [20]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership is...missing in today’s Europe [22]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trying to create political union...from above undermines any tendency for one to grow naturally [29]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustained deception [32-col.1260]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different member states determining...the amount of integration...they are prepared to accept [32-col.1277]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When it comes to a dictatorship...we lose out [32-col.1284]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is no single European electorate...no language of Europe...no shared political experience...no demos [33-col.234]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralised power/Lack of democracy:</strong></td>
<td>More democracy...openess, less waste...less bureaucracy [3]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unelected Commission [3]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A political project designed to take control of all the main functions of national governments [4]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is undemocratic, corrupt and uninformable [4]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People should only be led and governed with their consent [7]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The nature of democracy is really at stake [9]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The European Commission, which is not elected, and the governments of member states which are elected [10]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No guarantee that the last word on our laws stays in Britain [13]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ultimate authority as resting with the EU [13]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The steady and unaccountable intrusion of the EU into almost every aspect of our lives [13]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European integration is not a one way street...powers can be returned from the EU [13]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is not politicians’ power to give away [13]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taking powers away from the nation states [28]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denial of democracy is not far away [29]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erosion of our national democracy [32-col.1263]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A treaty that lacks democratic legitimacy [32-col.1278]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An avalanche of European laws...like a tsunami [32-col.1293]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The treaty takes us further towards a superstate [32-col.1296]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centralised, harmonised, and obsessed with standardisation and over-regulation [32-col.1299]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An over-mighty Executive, who do damage to us [32-col.1308]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activist...always increasing the federal power [32-col.1309]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will hold powers that the British people never gave permission to hold [33-col.175]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unwarranted power over our national life [33-col.175]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scarcely any area where the EU has not taken over [33-col.201]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An overcentralised, over-regulated Europe [33-col.202]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Underdemocratic, complicated and remote [33-col.232]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It lacks popular allegiance and legitimacy...is not a single political entity on which democracy can operate [33-col.234]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>As a non-unifying, anti-global threat:</strong></td>
<td>Damaging to free trade and conservation [1]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shies away from taking the...decisions that demonstrate unity [22]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Needs to be...a commitment to free trade [29]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Should be concentrated on adapting to globalisation [31]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What I want to see is a confederation [32-col.1310]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old tensions are re-emerging [33-col.202]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It will disintegrate, causing enormous trouble [33-col.203]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Our global role is our strength, but we are being forced to choose a low-growth continental system [33-col.235]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: All entries are based on the text provided and are categorized under the respective topics.*
5.4.2 Presupposition within the Anti-Lisbon Debates

Two principal presuppositions provide background knowledge. The first centres on the way political power is seen to diffuse. That is, a citizen/elite binary exists within which, from the position of Britain, political authority resides in the citizen while power within the EU is located in elite structures. As a consequence, this positions both Britain and Europe in hierarchical ways. Britain is situated as possessing a home-grown, organic and democratic structure within which political figures act as guardians for the people. Europe, by contrast, is placed as an anti-populist executive whose legitimacy is estranged from the electorate.

A second presupposition focuses on how the deepening of integration, rather than being a source of closer harmony, is potentially disintegrating. In the third reading of the Treaty of Lisbon in the House of Commons, William Cash explained:

> Old tensions are re-emerging. There is protectionism at the heart of French policies. There are problems between the European Union and Kosovo, whose Parliament is standing out against the European Union. There are enormous strikes in Germany, which are barely reported, and 19 per cent unemployment in the eastern part of Germany. The Spanish economy is faltering. NATO is under threat. Russia is reawakening.  

Subsequently, the received wisdom of European integration functioning as a means of tying states’ interests into a web of dependency whereby conflict becomes improbable is inverted: that a united Europe is largely illusionary and its centralising policies, bureaucracy and lack of democracy actually contribute to destabilisation. In short, diversity is emblematic of a system within which national governments must retain their powers and identities. Any attempt to conglomerate these forces risks breeding tensions and nationalist impulses.

---

The processes of predication and presupposition reveal how the subjects are positioned within the debates. Europe is formulated as two objects. Firstly, there is Europe as a protectionist power. Although this ethos is driven by Germany and France as its protagonists, Continental Europe as a whole is structured as deeply insulated. Its vision is stunted and global reach limited by an exclusive preoccupation with mainland Europe. Secondly, there is Europe as federal executive. Related to the dominant citizen/elite presupposition, Europe is positioned within a federal projection of power that seeks to emasculate civic and localised institutions. Its executive status affords it a managerial and overbearing nature.

Other states mentioned are utilised in contrast to the narrowness evident within Europe’s elite-governed structure. India, for example, is positioned as an economic alliance in which its strengthening economic clout, coupled with common patterns of trade and language, provide an opportunity for Britain to exercise its transnationalism. Britain here is positioned as exceptional in that it alone possesses the historical prerequisites and present capacity to mould new alliances. In addition, Central and Eastern Europe as European democracies position Europe in much more open and liberal terms. Central and Eastern Europe are regarded as the means to dilute the Franco-German led monopoly on EU affairs. Furthermore, the criticism of Europe being preoccupied with closing itself off in a protectionist policy is adulterated by enabling previously occupied states to enter and shape Europe. This diversity is seen as paramount to forging a less exclusionist Europe. Finally, the USA is situated as a fractured alliance. That is, American unilateralism is derided as destructive. The US is positioned as one of several alliances that no longer solely fashions a
particular British foreign policy but is still attributed with the credentials of a ‘friendship’ and a new relationship, therefore, is prescient.

5.5 Self, Other and National Identities

The array of Self/Other configurations are summarised in Table 10. As in the previous empirical chapters, the table is organised into the various debates; the Self and Other arrangements; the categorisation of friendly, non-friendly and radical Others; the particular characteristics of the relationships between the Self and Other and the sources taken from Appendix 3. In the first place, in the pro-EU debates, the EU and more broadly Europe are regarded as a friendly Other as the commonality and dependence between the entities construct the Other as both an extension of the Self and as a means of protecting and promoting the values the Self wishes to export to the international stage. The synonymy between the EU and Europe can be understood via the impact EU processes have had. Any mention of ‘Europe’ is unmistakably wedded to the infrastructure, nature and role of its apparatus. Central and Eastern Asia and Eurasia are categorised as a friendly Other as they express common values and are fundamental to the process of enlargement. The USA is perceived as a non-radical Other in that it is regarded as one of several special relationships and does not possess an overriding uniquely role outside of Britain’s more immediate relationship with the rest of Europe. China is also a non-radical Other as it is not immediately configured as a threat to the Self, and although embodying negative features, nonetheless retains the capacity to reform. Non-attachment to the mainland is configured as a radical Other. That is, the sense of belonging and interdependence between Britain and mainland Europe is constituted as a fundamental reliance and exclusion is regarded as a serious threat.
In the anti-debates, India has the status of a rising power, is not configured as threatening and instead creates benefits for the Self based on a sense of kinship determined by deep-seated economic, historic and linguistic dependencies. Likewise, Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are also constituted as a friendly Other. In this case, Britain is part of a broader European Self and responsibility for the Other is explicitly stated. The Other is part of this European Self and the Europe is regarded as the means to ensure this sense of ‘we-ness’. The US is a non-radical Other as it alludes to a rupture within the relationship between Self and Other which although reparable is nonetheless demonstrable. The EU and Europe are a radical Other is that they are a direct threat to the interests and nature of the Self. France, Germany and the Continent are all configured similarly in that they seek to import a vision of Europe which jars significantly with the Self’s history and pattern of trade.
## Table 10: Self and Other within the Pro and Anti-Lisbon Debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Debate</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Categorisation</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Pro-Lisbon Debates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The EU / Europe</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Process of strong linking:</em> clear dependence on Other; singular and unifying notion ties Self to Other; common liberal values and global ambitions; capable of meeting global challenges; vehicle within which Self has greater influence; capable of ensuring peace, stability and prosperity; expanding and promoting liberal and democratic values via enlargement; intergovernmentalist and non-Federal; new, dynamic and malleable</td>
<td>2, 5, 13, 15, 24, 32, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Process of strong linking:</em> importance of inclusion within the EU; common values defined by democracy, unification and the end of Communism; Other looks to Self for inspiration; clear association between Self and Other</td>
<td>1, 26, 32, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The USA</td>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Process of mild differentiation:</em> a new relationship, influence but not subordination, relationship possesses value as long as Self is part of a unified Europe, security challenges cannot be met by Other alone, one of several special relationships, predatory, less important economically than Europe, potential for Other to abandon previously alienating foreign policy</td>
<td>3, 25, 32, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Process of mild differentiation:</em> rising power not configured as an immediate threat, ability to be influenced, undemocratic but capable of reform, potentially predatory</td>
<td>30, 32, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain as part of the mainland / Continent</td>
<td>Britain as detached from the mainland / Continent</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Process of strong differentiation:</em> strength of inclusion vs. weakness of exclusion; stable vs. unstable; mainstream vs. slipstream, participation vs. isolation; at the heart of Europe vs. on the periphery; central role vs. subordinate role; leading vs. following; moderation vs. extremism; multipolar system vs. unipolar system; forward-thinking present vs. backward, myth-laden past; enlargement vs. stagnation</td>
<td>2, 6, 8, 15, 16, 23, 24, 28, 32, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Anti-Lisbon Debates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Process of strong linking:</em> Self is part of a transnational network that seeks to build strong relations with Other, Other is described as a ‘rising power’, historical ties between Self and other based on economic collaboration, free trade and language</td>
<td>13, 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Process of strong linking:</em> Other brings diversity to Self, links help forge stability for both Self and Other, potential for Other to ‘turn against’ Self if responsibilities are not met</td>
<td>2, 13, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The USA</td>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Process of mild differentiation:</em> an important friendship than affirms a particular British policy but one of several which stretches beyond North America, regarded as a ‘fractured’ alliance, capable of repair</td>
<td>5, 22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Due to the discursive contestations, and the range of Others produced, a number of national identities are generated. The positioning of a number of threats and alliances, as indicated by the formulation of Others, has repercussions for elite interpretations of Britain’s sense of Self. I argue that these conflicting notions of identity can be revealed via the following categorisations of friendly, non-radical and radical Othering.

### 5.5.1 National Identity and Friendly Othering

Four friendly Others are evident, two in each of the debates. The first friendly Other within the pro-Lisbon debates is the EU and Europe as a whole. There are several configurations that construct particular British national identities. Firstly, there is clearly a feeling of mutual dependence which constructs the Other as a singular entity. This hegemonised construction categorises a Britain that is part of the Other in terms of shared interests, values and identities. What is also apparent is the manner in which Britain is categorised as a global entity. This process is bolstered by the fact that such internationalism can only occur by engendering a close relationship with the Other. Subsequently, the Other is both an entity and a process within which the Self can extend its international authority. Secondly, the Other is the means by which peace, stability and prosperity can be strengthened. British national

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>The EU / Europe</th>
<th>Radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: democratic vs. undemocratic; civic power vs. institutional, bureaucratic power; flexible vs. intransigent, part of an association of member states vs. hegemonic superstate; elected member states vs. unelected Commission; non-encroaching vs. Empire-building; natural and home-grown vs. artificial and elite-driven; island status vs. mainland status; maritime vs. landbound</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>France, Germany and the Continent</th>
<th>Radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process of strong differentiation: forward-looking vs. backward-looking; free-trade vs. protectionist; maritime and global vs. limited and Continental; Other concocted by Eurocrats; fear used to consolidate power; Self possesses unique historical experiences, outlook and pattern of trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33 | 20, 21, 32, 33 |
identity here is configured as non-isolationist. Parochialism is positioned as unrealistic and defunct. Thus, the Self cannot maintain any sense of sovereignty or sway without being inextricably tied to the Other. Thirdly, such influence is positioned within the notion of Europe as an intergovernmentalist venture rather than a Federal one. That is, Europe is representative of the competing domestic interests implicit within individual member states rather than as a supranational entity. Fourthly, enlargement is also very much a central focus of the British position. This places its identity within a wider European framework that seeks to promote liberal and democratic values via the widening of the Union. Finally, and similarly, the EU is regarded as new, dynamic and malleable. Its subsequent attachment to Britain similarly imports these qualities into British national identity. Therefore, instead of Europe being regarded as a monolithic entity with a fixed and static existence, it is actually continuously being made due to the contributions by member states. Perhaps as a reaction to the much-articulated criticism of the EU as old, stagnant and bureaucratic, its flexibility and dynamism is a clear rebuff to this commonly held position.

Secondly, in the pro-Lisbon debates again, Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are configured as a friendly Other. There appears a clear association between Self and Other. However, the importance relates to the manner in which the Other must be included within a broader European sense of community. The Other is characterised as having undergone a chaotic shift within its own identity. Having dispensed with Communism, it has embraced democracy via unification. The Other looks to the Self for inspiration on this passage. Its desire to implant stability and European values is closely tied to the influence and sense of responsibility implicit within the Self. That is, British national identity is closely tied to possessing the responsibility to nurture a democratic environment within which emerging sovereign states can flourish.
The third friendly Other is positioned in the anti-debates. India is classified as having historical ties with the Self based on economic collaboration, free trade and a common language. This articulation also occurs against the background of India as a rising power. That is, it is not a peripheral economy but is in the process of reasserting itself internationally. The Self, therefore, is part of a transnational network that seeks to build strong relations with the Other. Such relations, as already mentioned, are built on historically defined notions of kinship and mutual cooperation. Thus, British national identity is configured as extra-European in that it embodies a special, non-geographically bounded status.

The final friendly Other, similar to the pro-Lisbon viewpoints, configures Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia favourably. There are several aspects to this last configuration in which the Self is regarded as the EU. Firstly, Europe is defined as lacking in diversity. Consequently, one means of importing diversity within is structure is to develop strong links to Central and Eastern Europe. Diversity is required as an attempt to unshackle Europe from what is regarded as its Franco-German dominated mindset. Hence, greater heterogeneity effectively dilutes any centralisation of power within the Union and shapes it more in what is regarded as the Anglo-Saxon mould: a decentralised, liberalised and free trade oriented group of voluntarily participating member states. Secondly, the strong links between the Self and Other help cultivate a sense of co-dependency emboldened by the mutual desire for stability. In this sense, an Other firmly anchored to the Self in terms of policy and identity reinforces mutual security. Thus, the welfare of the Self is inextricably linked to the well-being of the Other. Finally and analogously, this relationship places a level of responsibility on the Self. That is, British national identity becomes wedded to the notion of assistance and safeguard for flourishing democracies that are potentially at risk. This dimension further positions Britain as an animated and active shaper of events inside and outside of the EU.
Three non-radical processes of Othering occur, two of which have been extracted from the pro-Lisbon debates. The first of these is the USA. In this discourse, the much-lauded and somewhat overused reference to ‘the special relationship’ is threatened. What is called for is a relationship based on mutuality and not on subservience. This pitches British national identity as being bolstered by a sense of national awareness: that a strong transatlantic relationship is as important for America as it is for Britain. This feat, it is argued, can only be accomplished by Britain functioning within an Anglo-Saxon moulded EU in which all member states function in accordance with a unified stance. Thus, one formation of identity effectively becomes a bridge between Europe and the USA due to the fact that it retains elements of both. Furthermore, the US is classified as one power among many. The interdependency between the US and Europe is based on a network of security, trade and shared interests. As a result, two concepts feed into British national identity. The first is that Britain’s sense of Self is characterised by its ability to forge several important relationships. It is transnational, transatlantic as well as European. Secondly, and bearing in mind the US is invested with a potentially predatory agenda, Britain is regarded as a means of checking unqualified power. That is, by being part of the European Union, Britain has more sway in European and non-European arenas.

The second non-radical Other is China. Although perhaps historically regarded as a threat, China contains two main characteristics which construct a less antagonistic relationship. First of all, China is classified as undemocratic. However, this is not a static configuration but instead introduces its capacity for reform and modification. As a result, Britain is regarded as a potential galvaniser of this process. Thus, one aspect of British national identity reveals
Britain’s ability to exert pressure. This pressure is applied not militarily but via the spread of democratisation. As a result, China, although not redolent with European values, nonetheless possesses the ability to reform and such modification can only come about via the prodding of influential states. In addition, China is partially constituted as predatory. Again, this forces British national identity to be part of a much broader European sense of Self in which coalescence is the best means of defence against unstable states. Subsequently, China’s non-radical composition is positioned due to a mildly threatening component that nonetheless possesses the potential to reconstitute itself when enticed to do so.

The final non-radical Other again is the USA and is taken from the anti-Lisbon position. As in the pro-treaty debates, the US is configured very similarly. Again, the alliance, although important, has been ruptured and requires resolution. Thus, British national identity is not wedded to a static role in its relationship with the US. Instead, this role is modifiable and governed by a sense of equivalence on the world stage. Britain, therefore, is classified as active and preponderant rather than supine. The notion of ‘the special relationship’ is regarded as outdated as a new relationship based on parity and mutual respect is highlighted.

5.5.3 National Identity and Radical Othering

Analogous within the Maastricht debates, the first process of radical Othering configures non-attachment to mainland Europe as a viable threat. To begin with, due to its marked connection with Europe, Britain is stable, preeminent and authoritative. Europe is seen as a means within which Britain can exert its sense of Self. A duality exists within which Britain is incontrovertibly European and expresses common characteristics and values, and the EU as a facility within which British interests can be furthered. Subsequently, Europe creates an
environment within which a key number of British national identity characteristics can be forwarded: solidity, strength and leadership. A second feature of national identity within this discourse centres on the environment within which British identity operates. The political environment is multipolar. This projects a Self which functions within a region where no single state can dominate and yet several can function as key agents of authority. British national identity is therefore regarded as non-exceptional and tied to a network of European states. Non-participation is linked to a national feeling of subordination and peripheral influence. The issue of multipolarity further reinforces the notion of stability in that no single authority is allowed to dominate and that diversity flourishes. A final element of national identity related to non-attachment configured as a radical other concerns how the discourse alludes to a sense of rationalism and pragmatism positioned in contrast to largely myth-laden fears and emotionalism. The relationship with the EU is couched in terms of matter-of-factness and the need for expediency. The EU seemingly is here to stay and British identity is wrapped up in the fact of its existence. Subsequently, this commonsensical approach recognises the immutability of the Union and is positioned in conflict with an almost hysterical, fear-mongering obsession that blights the anti-Lisbon camp. This has the effect of purporting an identity based on a sense of reason and pragmatism.

A further impact on British identity concerns the way in which the EU and Europe are configured in the anti-positions. Again, there are several significant effects on the way British national identity is characterised. Firstly, British institutions are regarded as protective of a civic sense of identity. That is, parliament’s duty is to provide a democratic and non-centralised system of civic responsibility and protection. This authority is threatened by an undemocratic, institutionalised and largely interfering European leviathan. Subsequently, parliamentary sovereignty is once again fused with popular sovereignty in order to project the
idea that a threat to British institutions is simultaneously a threat to every British citizen. Therefore, an early identity-related configuration positions Britain as civic, democratic and with power structures which serve its citizens rather than its political elites. A further configuration of national identity positions Britain as a member state freely volunteering the level of participation in European affairs it wishes to take. This association suggests that a largely peaceful sense of coexistence between members is being ruptured by the Empire-building implicit within the European project. Its institutions are regarded as encroaching and elitist as against a national identity which is non-combative and anti-imperious. National identity is, therefore, positioned as harmonious within a system of nation-states and is at risk due to the persistent attempts by the EU to forge its own power against the interests of the very states it is supposed to serve. A third configuration of British national identity highlights the organic and home-grown nature of British institutions, laws and practices. This alludes to a kind of built-in pattern of power that has evolved gradually and therefore not been the construct of violent rivalries or the result of victories of powerful interests. By contrast, the radical Other is regarded as a concoction by Eurocrats who have consolidated power by projecting a mythical belief in anarchy and conflict occurring without the EU’s apparatuses of power. A final point reveals how the island-status Britain possesses still feeds into political elite notions of identity. Although the island status is configured as a means of security, it also functions as a way of instilling an identity that still looks to far away nations for its sense of Self. In this sense, to be European is positioned as too narrow an artifice for Britain to absorb or attempt to be. Instead, the maritime nation looks outward to distant opportunities in a way the landbound Continent never can. In this, British national identity contains a global element that cannot be constrained by a sole preoccupation with its European neighbours. The final radical Other which configures British national identity positions France, Germany and the Continent as a homogenous unit. They can be grouped as a single entity because they
all possess similar and complimentary characteristics. This is perhaps indicative of the idea that the anti-discourses very much take their animus that the EU has consistently been a Franco-German tool conveyed under the masquerade of Eurospeak. Two aspects dominant this process of Othering and subsequently feed into British national identity. Firstly, Britain is seen as forward-looking in its support for EU enlargement and its impetus based on the desire to see a more deregulated, less centralised EU. By contrast, the most obdurate counterparts to this position are France, Germany and the Continent as a whole. Again, this is due to the fact that the EU is both seen as a Franco-German dominated project and because it is infected with a **dirigiste**, authoritarian ethos that jars decidedly with the Anglo-Saxon attempt to inject it with transparency and efficiency. Secondly, Britain is characterised as possessing a history, pattern of trade and outlook that differs quite strongly from those on the Continent. British exceptionalism is celebrated as a strength against which the Continent is treated as a unified and limited whole. British national identity is configured as vibrant, diverse and all-encompassing in contrast to a Continental identity treated as narrow and uniform.

### 5.6 The Production of British National Identities

*Figure 6* summarises the findings within this chapter and presents the various British national identities produced. As before, it is organised into the processes of Othering, with pro- and anti-positions and the consequent discourses which have been utilised from the subject positioning in this chapter. These readings of Europe contain the British national identities listed. I then assert that six British Selves have been produced. As iterated in the previous empirical chapters, these British selves are images of nationhood that have been formulated by elite perceptions of national identity.
**Figure 6: British National Identities in the Debates over the Lisbon Treaty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Othering</th>
<th>Pro/Anti</th>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>British National Identities</th>
<th>Britain’s Selves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>Europe as a Project in Progress</td>
<td>European Adaptive</td>
<td>Interventionist European Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe as a Humanitarian Agent</td>
<td>Liberalising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe as a Community of Intergovernmental Nation-States</td>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe as an Open Market</td>
<td>Prosperous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe as a Global Security Alliance</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe as European Democracies</td>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>India as an Economic Alliance</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Free Trade Catalyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe as European Democracies</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>USA as a Multipolar Alliance</td>
<td>Historicised</td>
<td>Liberal Interdependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>China as a Rising Power</td>
<td>Trade-driven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>USA as a Fractured Alliance</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
<td>Global Nation-State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reform-driven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uniting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Global</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen from the figure, the analysis within this chapter has produced a more expansive display of discourses and a correspondingly broader invocation of identities. First of all, from **Britain as a European nation-state** in the referendum debates to **Britain as a liberalising power** during the Maastricht Treaty, Britain during the Lisbon Treaty is an **interventionist European power**. Six discursive constructions of Europe produce this Self. Firstly, **Europe is a project in progress**. The structure of Europe is perceived as ever-evolving and ever more willing to engage with other international actors and mould the international environment. From the 1975 referendum, one can see a particular dominant reading of Europe as a means to safeguard security. By the time of the Maastricht Treaty, this had been implanted with a free market ethos that pushed for deregulation and unfettered trade. By the most recent debates, Europe continued to be regarded as an evolutionary project in which new remits forged a more global and interventionist role with Britain as its key shaper. Secondly, and relatedly, this embryonic responsibility produces **Europe as a humanitarian agent**. In this sense, the Union’s burgeoning role develops from a securitised stabiliser into a deliverer of aid and welfare. As a consequence of these two readings of Europe, British national identity is **European, adaptable, liberalising, and expansionist**. Thirdly, **Europe as a community of intergovernmental nation-states** highlights the power structure within the EU. Supranational institution building is still firmly resisted to reveal an authority and drive that still resides within the sovereign state system. As such, Europe is a network of voluntary but self-interested alliances. Fourthly, **Europe is an open market**. The previous chapter similarly centred Europe as a free trade area and positioned the proliferation of commerce as a fundamental bulwark of prosperity and stability. However, a free trade area suggests an intra-regional series of trade agreements that is too restrictive and limiting an arrangement. As a consequence, the trading element is reconfigured to position Europe as an
internationalist rather than regionalist entity. These two elements produce the following British national identities. Britain is configured as prosperous, pragmatic, participatory and moderate. The fifth discourse is *Europe as a global security alliance*. Unlike the security alliance formulated in the previous chapter, the global nature of this association suggests that threats are worldwide in scope and must therefore be dealt with via as wide a network of nation-states as possible. This produces national identities that are dependent and stable. The final discourse is *Central and Eastern Europe as European democracies*. From Maastricht, one can see the transition of these states from historically destined but unstable new entrants to the European family of nations to fully fledged participants in a developing, vibrant political and economic project. As such, Britain is unified and democratic.

The second Self is **Britain as a free trade catalyst**. *India as an economic alliance* helps produce this reading. Apart from India’s mushrooming power, historical and cultural linkages are utilised to underscore the importance of a trade network beyond Europe. In addition, *Central and Eastern Europe as European democracies* help position the idea that patterns of trade flourish between states that have open political and economic systems. As such, British national identity is historicised, trade-driven, diverse and democratic.

**Britain as a liberal interdependency** is the third Self. Two readings of non-European states formulate this. The first is *the USA as a multipolar alliance*. In this sense, Britain is fashioned as a more dominant complement to a transatlantic relationship in which several ‘special relationships’ reign. As such, Britain is imbued with a greater sense of Self and responsibility. This is complemented with the second formulation, *China as a rising power*. Whereas with the
USA Britain’s pattern of influence is historically embedded, China possesses the potential to reform and such a transformation is contingent on Britain as an open, value-laden catalyst for political change. As such, Britain is *liberal* in the sense that it is willing to fashion markets and alliances worldwide. It is also *interdependent* due to such relationships and, as a result, *reform-driven*.

In addition, **Britain is a global nation-state**. Only one formulation, the *USA as a fractured alliance*, formulates this understanding. British identity is *global* and *uniting*. As such, this reading is orchestrated towards the notion of the nation-state as the most pertinent means of dealing with the souring of the relationship between Britain and the US.

From **Britain as a cooperative European power** in the 1975 debates to **Britain as a global European authority** during Maastricht; two discourses, *Europe as a global network* and *as an Anglicised association*, produce **Britain as an Anglo-Saxon network**. This evolved conceptualisation is centred on the notion that a ‘social Europe’ dominated by excessive legislation and protectionist thinking is being seriously challenged by a ‘British Europe’ in which trade, free marketeering and openness govern. An important identity generated, therefore, is that Britain is *culturally essentialist*; that it contains a fundamental essence stemming from a unique cultural and historical status that is able to mould and fashion the Europe it sees itself very much as a part of. In addition, Britain is *liberal* in that it is forward-thinking and moderate, as well as *competitive* and *progressive*.
Finally, Britain is a hyperglobalist nation-state in that it possesses a maritime, globalist identity drawn from the negative positioning of two readings of Europe: Europe as a protectionist power and Europe as a federal executive. Again, this can be contrasted with the two preceding chapters in which Britain was first configured as a sovereign parliamentary body and secondly as a sovereign civic body. Here we see the ever-emboldening of the nation-state as the means to resist supranational intrusions and the notion that past configurations of identity are particularly resilient and on-going. In addition, sovereignty, from an executive-centred reading early on in the debates, is extended to filter into all aspects of British society. As such, identity is also civic, flexible and pluralist. Finally, it is liberating in that the retention of national autonomy is an emancipatory goal within which self-government is the heavily guarded structure by which the other values and identities are protected.

CHAPTER SIX: ACCOUNTING FOR CHANGE - THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH NATIONAL IDENTITIES

6.1 Introduction

This final empirical chapter examines the array of identity configurations, discourses and British Selves over the historical junctures to provide a comparative element. The original contribution of the thesis is recapitulated in the form of identifying the discursive struggles that have taken place over the three events examined. That is, as a means of summarising how British national identity has been configured, this section seeks to highlight patterns of similarity and dissimilarity between the various readings of subjects and objects.

The following figure shows the array of discourses developed from an analysis of the processes of predication, presupposition and subject positioning; British national identities and the formulations of Britain’s Selves over the three historical events. Figure 7, therefore, is a composite of information extracted from figures 4, 5 and 6. Table 11 condenses the data to show just the formation of British Selves over the events. What follows is an explanation of the images of nationhood implicit in the range of British Selves. The patterns of likeness that pervade the debates are first observed and are then followed by an examination of the themes that echo discontinuity. As a result, this chapter argues that although much of the literature has asserted that identities, although subject to change are “sticky” and “sedimented over time”, with

---

British national identity being perceived as more resolute than most, the empirical findings suggest the disruptions that punctuate the discourses are as much a part of the production of British national identities as the continuities. As such, some discursive constructions, it can be argued, are clearly both event and time-specific.


### Figure 7: The Production of British National Identities: a Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The European Communities Membership Referendum</th>
<th>The Treaty of Maastricht</th>
<th>The Treaty of Lisbon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discourses</strong></td>
<td><strong>Identities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Britain’s Selves</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Security Bloc</td>
<td>Multiple European</td>
<td>Europe as a Security Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as Established</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>Europe as a Community of Intergovernmental Nation-States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Network of Sovereignties</td>
<td>Fading power</td>
<td>Europe as an International FTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA as a Security Alliance</td>
<td>Militarily influential</td>
<td>Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA as Cultural &amp; Historical Linkage</td>
<td>Defensive</td>
<td>Peaceful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Transnational Cooperative</td>
<td>Culturalised</td>
<td>Prosperous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Superpower</td>
<td>Historicised</td>
<td>European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth as Past</td>
<td>Transatlantic</td>
<td>Adaptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth as Past</td>
<td>SECURITISED NATION-STATE</td>
<td>Liberalising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Superpower</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Expansionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as its Historical Antithesis</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR as not Europe</td>
<td>Trade-driven Global</td>
<td>Participatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Federal State</td>
<td>Internationalist</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Syndicate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth as Past</td>
<td>Global Internationalist</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td>FREE TRADE CATALYST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational NATION-STATE</td>
<td></td>
<td>INTER-VENTIONIST EUROPEAN POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative NATION-STATE</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIBERAL INTERDEP-EPENDENCY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOVEREIGN CIVIC BODY</td>
<td></td>
<td>GLOBAL NATION-STATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Federation</td>
<td></td>
<td>ANGLO-SAXON NETWORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Souverel Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>HYPER-GLOBALIST NATION-STATE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>Identities</th>
<th>Britain’s Selves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a Project</td>
<td>Europe as a Humanitarian Agent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Progress</td>
<td>Europe as a Community Of Intergovernmental Nation-States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Adaptable</td>
<td>Europe as an Open Market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deregulated</td>
<td>Europe as a Global Security Alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Alliance</td>
<td>Central &amp; Eastern Europe as European Democracies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti- protectionist</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetarist</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically</td>
<td>Historically</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>Free trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oligarchal</td>
<td>China as a Rising Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform driven</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalising</td>
<td>Reform-driving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperous</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>Essentialist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Globalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified</td>
<td>Civic / Flexible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Liberating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

292
Table 11: Identifying Images of Nationhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Othering</th>
<th>Pro/Anti</th>
<th>Britain’s Selves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>EUROPEAN NATION-STATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>TRANSatlantic, SEcuritised NATION-STATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-radical</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>TRANSnational EUROPEAN POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>TRANSnational NATION-STATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>COOPERATIVE EUROPEAN POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>SOVEREIGN PARLIAMENTARY BODY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2 Identifying Images of Nationhood

6.2.1 Continuity

Globalism, Globalisation and Britain as a Global Actor

A first identifiable dominant trend concerns the fact that all processes of Othering point towards a pattern of growing British influence. This position is perhaps more commonly associated with those individuals critical of European Union institutions, leadership and governance. A recent edition of The Economist, for example, states that “[s]omething close to a Cutty Sark vision for Britain – nimble, free and ready to roam the globe in pursuit of profits – fills the dreams of Conservative politicians and policy types.” As analysed over the three empirical chapters, the viewpoints within the anti-positions produce a diverse range of criticisms which all seek to stifle and threaten Britain’s naturalised, exceptional and global identity. As such, Britain’s Self functions as a universalist power that views Europe as too geographically bounded, politically rigid and economically bureaucratic to accommodate. However, what is striking is that within the pro-positions, British identity is not merely lodged within a European structure but is also conveyed as a global authority operating within a globalist-defined international system. As a definition, globalism “seeks to describe and explain nothing more than a world which is characterised by networks of connections that span multi-continental distances.” Globalisation “refers to the increase or decline in the degree of globalism. It focuses on the forces, the

dynamism or speed of these changes.”

Although a ‘logic of no alternative’ has been analysed to produce an image of globalisation as a non-negotiable external economic constraint with reference to New Labour, we can actually see that the attempts to formulate integration as a reaction to, a response to and a shaper of increasing globalisation is a dynamic that started earlier.

From Table 11, global identity can be plotted over the three pro-positions according to the three practices of Othering. Starting with the practice of friendly Othering in the first configuration, in 1975 Britain was perceived as a European nation-state. The nestling of this articulation stems in part from the ‘Cold-War Europe’ reading that dominated political thinking coupled with the ‘Britain in decline’ thesis. By the time of Maastricht, globalising linkages became defined less through security considerations and more via the proliferation of economic ideologies. Rosamond, for example, argues that “strategically motivated actors within the EU have utilized the concept of globalization to create cognitive allegiances to the idea of ‘Europe’/the EU as a valid economic space.”

This economic space, one can argue, had become legitimised in such a way that economic and market liberalisation became routinely associated with many of the dominant identifiers of Britain. These value-laden characteristics position Britain as prosperous, democratic and ensconced with a historically prevalent and naturalised sense of leadership. Again, the dissolution of the USSR helped demonise statism and made any attempt to deviate from the inherent logic of liberalisation less able. By the time of the Treaty of Lisbon,

---

619 Ibid.
globalisation was being constructed as the means to further empower an ever more internationalist notion of British nationhood. As identified by Ash, the EU has become the means to play out Britain’s world role. With reference to the pro-configurations stemming from non-radical Othering during the referendum, Britain functioned as a transnational European power. That is, although identity was firmly embedded within the burgeoning and novel European structure, identity held out to non-European linkages, namely the Commonwealth and the USA. In fact, European unity was seen as a necessary precursor to retain and develop these associations. During Maastricht, the British Self had moulded into a reformist role model within which globalism became not merely an economic or trade-bound system of affiliation but one in which the seismic shifts in Central and Eastern Europe echoed a reinvention of British identity. This new identity saw Britain as a promulgator of European values of liberty and independence. Interestingly, within the pro-positions during the Maastricht debates, the USA did not appear as a formative influence on British identity. As such, this suggests what one scholar called at the time the possibility of “a post-‘special relationship’ identity”, shorn of the Atlanticist illusions of the past and reinvigorated by the emergence of newly independent fledgling nations positioned firmly within the European sphere. During Lisbon, Britain became reformulated as a liberal interdependency. It is perhaps important again to highlight that this configuration is not merely the market liberalism associated with the burgeoning of trade and opening of markets but also about the extension of rights and need for global action. David Cameron, in his speech to the 2006 Conservative Party Conference, articulated this brand of liberalism:

---

Again, the concept of interdependency formulates an international structure within which isolationism is an unreality. The burgeoning status of China also creates a formative influence on Britain’s global identity. Firstly, it helps drive the need to fashion a consolidated response to dealing with China’s rising power status. As such, it provides an opportunity for Britain to try and animate the EU into a less parochial entity that possesses responsibilities and impact far beyond the confines of its immediate sphere. Secondly, it contributes to constituting the political world as being separated into global blocs. A united Europe, framed by a proactive Britain, possesses an international sway that enables a more much formidable global reach. The final Selves formulated from the various pro-positions, this time produced via radical Othering, similarly identify the manner in which Britain plays out its global identity. In the pro-membership debates, Britain is initially constructed as a cooperative European power. Although firmly lodged within a European axis that takes its animus from the Soviet/Communist threat, what is interesting is the manner in which European unity not be used as a catalyst for reinvigorating seclusion. That is, British identity must not revert to an antediluvian narrowness that hankers after its former Empire but instead must display internationalism and partnership as the best means of both reconciling states’ interests and resisting the encroachment of Communism. In the early 1990s, Britain had become cast as a global European authority in which global influence was firmly situated within an attachment to Europe. Again however,

Europe is very much formulated as a pliant entity within which Britain functions as a chief vehicle for modernisation and change. The final British Self, formulated during the Lisbon deliberations, is as an Anglo-Saxon network. As has been mentioned, all pro-positions have sought to instill Europe as a commonality of values. Throughout many of the configurations, Britain is perceived as a harbinger of these. However, what is particularly pertinent about the final Self is the manner in which a global Britain becomes concretised. By way of example, Gordon Brown, speaking to the British Council in 2004, neatly sums up the manner in which British national identity, encompassing certain traditions and institutions, can effectively globalise Europe:

A Britain that thinks globally not only builds from our traditions of openness and outward-looking internationalism but builds upon huge British assets and strengths – the British Council itself, the BBC, the BBC World Service, our universities and our long-felt sense of obligation to the world’s poor.625

To conclude, there initially seems a contradiction related to moulding identity to the sanctity of nation-state units, in which Britain and other European and non-European actors are very much categorised as sovereign bodies, and the realisation that global forces render such units as secondary. However, the British state is very much linked to the propagation of globalisation in two ways. Firstly, by constructing Britain as a global actor, Britain stands at the forefront of the attempt to forge greater linkages not merely within Europe but beyond. Over the debates, Britain is located as transnational, interdependent, cooperative, global and hyper-globalist. Even though globalism might be defined via increased interconnectivity, this process comes about not merely due to extant forces but by nation-states. Britain is consistently referred to as a dominant shaper:

in the pro-debates as an actor invested with status to mould linkages to Europe and beyond. In the anti-debates as an actor resisting the stultifying narrowness of a Euro-centric orbit when Britain’s interests, due to its historical, culturalised and unique identity, actually lie far beyond the confines of the protectionist Continent. Secondly, in both pro- and anti-positions, the desire for widening over deepening is remarkably consistent. With reference to Eastern enlargement, Anthony Browne, European correspondent for The Times, argued that

\[enlargement – first championed by Margaret Thatcher in 1988 – has shifted the centre of gravity in Brussels. It is providing the death-knell of the Franco German vision of a high-tax social Europe and sealing the domination of the Anglo-Saxon free-market, transatlantic vision.\]^{626}

Within the discourses relating to enlargement, spatial references to ‘core Europeans’, ‘peripheral Europeans’ and ‘potential Europeans’\(^{627}\) are clearly evident. Support for the entry of Central and Eastern European states during the Maastricht debates and championing the entry of the Balkan states and Turkey around the time of the Treaty of Lisbon can be made sense of in the attempt to supplant the ‘Europe as Franco-German hegemony’ threat with an Anglo-Saxon model of cultural cosmopolitanism, economic liberalisation and trade-driven association.

\textit{A Britain of Values}

It is very apparent that Britain’s sense of Self is a value-laden configuration. The readings of Europe and other objects, far from implying a detached and stony evaluation of narrow interest, imply that certain virtues are consistently attached to Britain. What is important, however, is not

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
that values matter. Their purpose is well-established in nurturing a national identity. More specifically, it has been suggested that the role of shared values has three purposes. Firstly, to pursue policy or ideological goals by aligning a particular policy to the values of the people; secondly, to mobilise the population in times of national tension such as war; and thirdly, to encourage inter-regional unity when faced with multiple territorial boundaries within a state.\textsuperscript{628} However, one might also add that particularly in light of the empirical finding, the invocation of values is also an attempt to create a Britain not born anew but, in the words of George Orwell, “an everlasting animal stretching into the future and the past, and, like all living things, having the power to change out of recognition and yet remain the same.”\textsuperscript{629}

Several recurring values pervade the discourses. First of all, and as has already been highlighted, the agency afforded Britain in the debates over all three events constructs it as a power that matters, even if this is coupled to an admittance of decline. The characteristic of leadership is frequently referenced and is read as essentialist and historically pre-given. That is, it is not a state-sponsored attempt at exercising power but is embedded in the make-up of the British Self. Thus, the reading of Britain as a natural leader is innate. This quality appears in both guises: as the shaper and prime catalyst of development and stability in the pro-positions and as the instigator of free trade and open markets beyond the narrow Continent in the anti-debates. From \textit{Table 11}, one can see that from the pro-perspective, Britain has moulded from a European to a liberalising to an interventionist nation-state. Subsequently, the changing nature of the EU is also

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
reflected in this: that in the 1970s, the Community organ prioritised the sustenance of security and encouragement of free trade. By the 1990s, with the advent of the Single Market and the early framework for the single currency, trade had shifted in importance. It had become a truly global ambition to forge both worldwide commercial and financial networks. By the late 2000s, Europe had taken on an interventionist role to exercise influence over global, economic, climatic and environmental concerns. As a mirror of this, British identity became more assertive and more willing to try to continually drive Europe into an ever-expanding set of responsibilities. In contrast, the anti-position went from Britain as sovereign bodies in the first two events to a hyperglobalist nation-state in the Lisbon debates. Again, it seems British interests, and consequently identity, far from the isolationism frequently associated with such a position, was intent on cultivating a more self-assured role for itself. To sum up, the various values that represent Britain as a leading actor can be revealed by the identities in Table 11: militarily influential, dominant, liberating, securitised, leader, influential worldwide, authoritative, expansionist, reform-driving, progressive and globalist. Such identities traverse all discourses and can subsequently be classified as a core component of the British Selves.

A second value is stability/prosperity. This dualism is evident as both are treated as natural preconditions for the other. As dominant predicates, they are invoked by EU supporters to highlight how the peace and stability inherent within European integration have garnered a material wealth and subsequent standard of living that simply could not have occurred within a fragmented and destructive Continent. Wartime references, particularly in the referendum debates, very much focus on Europe’s annihilative past as a means to bring to light a materially advantaged and thriving present. EU opponents position peace and prosperity within a dual
requirement to forge further trading and commercial links and a recognition that Europe functions too frequently as a means to hinder financial rewards from these natural trading patterns. Similarly, although the Maastricht debates coincided with the break-up of the former Soviet Union and allowed elites to formulate Britain as a chief catalyst for social change and economic well-being, the concept of the Anglo-Saxon model lives on in the disputes over the Treaty of Lisbon. For example, Jonathan Freedland, journalist for The Guardian, affirmed that the trend in Europe is in Britain’s direction. For nearly a decade, the old Franco-German motor has been stalling as both nations have struggled economically: new members have been reluctant to follow their example. Enlargement has brought in ex-communist states which prefer so-called Anglo-Saxon liberal economics to the French model, with its statist protections and regulations.630

Third, Britain is heavily ensconced with democratic values. However, democracy is not exclusively defined in a parliamentary, legisatory or constitutional sense. There are three important aspects related to the elite reading of Britain as a democracy. Firstly, this quality is very much linked to Britain’s capacity to exercise influence. From the heralding of Central and Eastern European states as European in the Maastricht debates to championing Turkish entry to the EU in the Lisbon debates, democratic values are an attempt to forge commonality between nation-states and are a vehicle for Britain to take what political elites see as a prevailing role in widening Europe. Secondly, democracy is stabilised within a web of closely related concepts that equates it within a broader spectrum of values. As such, democracy is the essential precondition for political stability, prosperity, peace and free trade. States that do not exhibit these tendencies, such as the Soviet Union during the referendum debates, are othered. Finally, democracy is

utilised in both debates. That is, it is a cross-cutting identity that gets seized upon in the battleground over discursive meaning. Each debate contains the attempt to position its protagonists as the true standard bearers of democracy. In much of the anti-led arguments, the Community is berated for its lack of democracy: it is ruled by bureaucrats not elected officials, it supersedes national democracies and its size is indicative of its intent to strip away local power. The opposing camp instead frequently argues that Europe, providing an intergovernmental consensus dominates, is a mechanism for exporting democratic values and a model for how democratic nation-states might successfully play out their interests. In this sense, Britain, as a harbinger of democratic values, democratises Europe and contributes to regulating member state behaviour.

6.2.2 Discontinuity

Temporal and Conceptual Othering

A number of distinct temporal and conceptual Others were generated within some of the events. Temporal Othering means that “what we are can be defined in terms of critical distance from what we once used to be.”\(^{631}\) In the 1975 referendum, Britain’s past was conceived as a radical Other in the pro-membership debate. As has already been articulated, negative imaging of war-torn Europe, a struggling post-war British recovery and the myth-laden return to Empire all help constitute a present that was being formulated in opposition to its past. However, what is

informative is the manner in which this temporal configuration is not evident in the other two historical junctures. This dislocation can be enumerated with three observations. Firstly, and most simply, in 1975 many of the British political figures within the membership debates had had personal experience of the Second World War. Indeed, many of the wartime allusions would have possessed a deep and profound level of embeddedness for the populace. To provide one example, the Keep Britain in Europe campaign published an advertisement in a national newspaper stating “[f]orty million people died in two European wars this century. Better lose a little national sovereignty than a son or a daughter.” As such, war references had a particular level of potency and helped structure both the ‘Europe as a security bloc’ and ‘Europe as its historical antithesis’ discourses. Secondly, the lack of temporal Othering during Maastricht and Lisbon suggests that this process has a particularly lifespan and is event-specific. One scholar has noted the recent return of geopolitical Othering with Europe being constituted via its opposition to Islam and the USA and, as a consequence, signifying the loss in importance of temporal Othering. Subsequently, one can argue that the narrative of ‘Europe as past’ threat in 1975 had shifted to a much more tangible spatial threat signified with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Balkan Wars. Thirdly, by the time of the Lisbon treaty, security discourses had become distinctly weaker in both pro- and anti-positions. However, the weakening of temporal Othering occurred not merely due to wartime experiences becoming more distant in the national memory. In fact, one can argue that the changing nature of Europe left no room for political elites to harbour worn-out and over-used references to the Second World War. In short, the

---

meaning of Europe had changed. One can notice, for example, particularly with reference to the pro-positions in the categorisation of friendly Othering during the Lisbon debates, that the discourses over Europe and subsequent British national identities had multiplied quite radically in comparison with the previous empirical episodes. The security discourses of ‘Europe as a humanitarian agent’ and ‘as a global security alliance’ instead looked towards reinventing Europe’s security identity not in relation to Europe’s battle strewn past, but to a challenging and reinvigorating future. Again, it is worth noting that Britain is very much deemed as being the primary catalyst for Europe’s role rebirth.

In the Maastricht and Lisbon debates, non-attachment to the mainland/Continent was orchestrated as a conceptual Other vis-à-vis the pro-treaty positions. Similar to temporal Othering, conceptual Othering projects certain characteristics onto a particular notion and links the Self to or differentiates the Self from such a concept. In addition, there are several other formulations that highlight the conceptual nature of Europe. For example, the construction of ‘Europe as a family of nation-states’, seen within the anti-positions of the Maastricht debates, projects the image that no single unit of power dominates. Europe is a heterogeneous but linked set of relationships in which power is distributed linearly rather than vertically. That is, political influence is an across-the-board concept that individual states exercise under the inviolability of their own domestic identities. It is not an exercise in which a small cabal of dominant states push integration to serve their own ends. As such, the British involvement with decentralisation, liberalisation and trade is very much wrapped up in this attempt to dilute top-down power structures and effectively stymie supranationalistic ambitions.
The conceptual Othering of non-attachment to the mainland/Continent in the pro-Maastricht debates produces Britain as a global European authority. Several of Britain’s identities – influential worldwide, authoritative and securitised – are stabilised via this process of Othering. The issue of influence and the fear of not being in a role to exercise it was echoed by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, in his resignation speech in 1989. He reaffirmed that “it is vital that we maximise Britain's influence in the Community … we will not be able to exert that influence effectively, and successfully provide the leadership, as long as we remain largely outside the EMS.” The second example of conceptual Othering is identically lodged in a fear of non-attachment and is visible in the pro-configurations during the Lisbon debates. This process contributes to producing a British Self as an Anglo-Saxon network. However, unlike the previous example, the influence that attachment brings helps fashion Europe into a much more British construct. British influence is seen as part of an importance process of modernisation and progressivism that moulds Europe into a network of multipolar linkages. As such, British attachment to Europe helps formulate the Continent as a whole into a forward-looking and dynamic set of associations. This process produces two chief identities: Britain as liberal and progressive.

To sum up, both temporal and conceptual Othering play a role in formulating several British Selves. What is also important is that both of these practices help strengthen the argument that identity need not be governed by the exclusion of a geographical, political or ethnic state or group but might come into being by the fear of what the Self may become. The formation of the

---

Other, therefore, might be perceived as a national state of mind and not just a physically bounded construct.

**The Changing Nature of Sovereignty and the Nation-State**

A further strand is the issue of sovereignty and how it has metamorphosised particularly with reference to the anti-membership/treaty positions. Within the pro-positions, it retains a very fluid form over the duration of the three events. Sovereignty, however, can be said to possess several meanings: the legal right of final decision, the integrity of national decision-making and the power for a state or society to exercise control over its destiny. In addition, the loss of one formulation might produce gains in another. This notion of malleability, that sovereignty is a means to an end rather than an untouchable idol, features in all of the supportive viewpoints and is instrumental in welding Europeanness to Britain. Indeed, all pro-configurations that factor the EEC/EC/EU as a friendly Other structure Britain as possessing a European identity, as can be seen in Figure 7.

However, sovereignty undergoes a transformation in the opposing camp. From Table 11, one can see within the 1975 debates that sovereignty was very much lodged within a parliamentary-centric reading. Britain is positioned as a sovereign, parliamentary body. Key stabilisers within this formulation are the fact that Britain is unitary, democratic and liberated. From the perspective of a particular kind of nation-state, Britain possesses a unitary identity in which

---


636 Ibid.
parliament serves as the sole function of governance and democracy can only flourish with the retention of the powers of a sovereign parliament. In addition, the nation-state as a body helps propagate two more British identities. Identity is both local and organic and therefore operates in contrast to an EEC which is classified as bloated and concocted. Nonetheless, both sovereignty and the nation-state are classified as elite affairs. The Treaty of Maastricht saw a shift within which parliamentary sovereignty became fused with monetary and economic sovereignty. Thus, the preservation of Sterling became wedded to the broader fight to resist Europeanisation and the adoption of the Euro was symbolic of the latest attempt by Europe to raid national boundaries. In this way, the British Self became reformulated as a sovereign, civic body. Civic because European integration now no longer merely threatened the British mechanisms of state, but was also interfering with over-regulatory impulses to change the fabric of British life. Again, as a body, rather than a nation-state, helps to purvey certain British identities. Britain is classified as integrated, unified and citizen-driven. By the time of the Treaty of Lisbon, sovereignty had been reformulated once again to place authority within the inviolability of the nation-state and had injected the British Self with a hyper-globalist nature. As a nation-state, Britain is now invested with more internationalist identities that enable it to operate as a distinct challenge to the EU’s supranational ambitions. As such, British identities are maritime, globalist and liberating. Sovereignty, therefore, far from being narrow and inward-looking, did not prevent states forging alliances and networks elsewhere. As such, one can posit that the comparative success of the British ‘Eurosceptic’ position can be very much attributed to two notions of sovereignty. Firstly, the capacity to configure sovereignty as an issue that permeates all aspects of life – political, societal and civic – helps to solidify its importance. Secondly, that the international system is constructed as dominated by the interaction between sovereign units and attempts to transfer
governance to supranational institutions defies this pure logic. As such, the EU, particularly with reference to its size, encroachment and federalist ambitions, quickly becomes configured as a threat.

Although British discourses take nation-states to be the prime actors within the international system, there are a number of distinct differences as to how the nation-state is formulated. First of all, nation-statism does not fit neatly into the pro/anti dichotomy. That is, rigid determinations of it may well be equated with a simplified Eurosceptic position but there is not sufficient evidence to argue that an aversion to Europe is synonymous with an emboldening of the British nation-state. Most positions within the debates take the nation-state as a given, pre-existing entity. Neither is an attachment to the nation-state indicative of insularity and non-participation in international affairs. As has been seen from the empirical chapters, elites frequently held out for much broader linkages to states and organisations that both pre-date European integration and view a preoccupation with the Community as too restrictive. Subsequently, the issue of insularity or is read in different ways. The pro-camp often views EU dissenters as lodged within an insular mindset incapable or unwilling to accept the expiration of Britain’s imperial identity. The anti-camp frequently perceives EU enthusiasts as lodged within a similarly blinkered mentality that refuses to recognise the wider world out there: a world that Britain helped to shape and an opportunity that EU backers fail to seize. As has also been mentioned, the emboldening of the nation-state is not symptomatic of blinkeredness. The proliferation of international allegiances and networks within the debates attest to the fact that nation-statism is lodged within a reading of political power as residing within the structures of sovereign governments. As such, internationalist or global images of Self do not contradict or threaten this national autonomy.
The Role and Status of Actors

Despite a wide array of actors that have informed British national identity, and the fact that a core number have consistently cropped up, the status of most of the actors has changed over the historical events. Fundamentally, as non-European states, the USA and the USSR/Russia have been dominant. The USA has operated according to the much-referenced allusion to affinity, cultural linking and, in another way, the long since redundant ‘Greece to their Rome’ ploy aimed at “civilizing and guiding the immature young giant.” As can be seen from Figure 7, the USA appears in two discourses: as a security alliance and as a cultural and historical linkage. Somewhat surprisingly, the USA did not function as a particularly strong informer of British identity over the Maastricht debates. Even the anti-positions reveal a Britain preoccupied with counterbalancing what is regarded as the Franco-German hegemony but the USA is not pitched as a viable substitute. However, by the time of the Lisbon debates, the USA appears as a fractured alliance and a new rapport, based more on mutuality, is called upon.

Effectively, ‘Cold War Europe’ had transposed into ‘multipolar Europe’ in which no single state power dominated. The issues that dominated the international sphere, such as international terrorism, global warming, climate change and poverty reduction all soldered the notion that such global responsibilities could only be tackled via mutual address and not via individual, non-collective action. Again, the USSR was consistently othered in the first historical juncture to construct it as a non-European entity and existential threat. With the dissolution of the USSR, the

---

discursive field correspondingly shifted into two camps: the first retaining the Cold War rhetoric that alluded to authoritarian and communist characteristics and the second ushering in an array of potentially progressive elements, including democratisation, reform and cooperation, which all symbolised the potential for a new mutualism. By the time of the Lisbon debates, discourses on Russia had become noticeably fewer. The burgeoning of other states, as threats and opportunities, had transplanted Russia to reveal that it no longer functioned as a key informer of British identity.

France and Germany as European states have also functioned as key signifiers. In the anti-referendum debate, France stands out as the vehicle most at odds with British ambitions. Undoubtedly linked to the two French rejections of British entry to the EEC, which were still quite fresh events in 1975, and along with the invocation of much deeper historically embedded rivalries, France functioned as a metaphor for the Community as a whole and seemed to embody everything Britain opposed. By the time of the Maastricht Treaty, Germany had become the major antagonist and its threat value made much more alarming by the employment of a readily available array of references to wartime expansionism and Teutonic swaggering. Finally, a level of consistency is applied to the Commonwealth. Since the 1975 debates over the referendum, it is configured as in decline and this trend continues into the Lisbon debates. This entertains the argument that some actors, although peripheral, still possess influence for British identity because even if the present relationship is materially weak, historical discourses of attachment and linkages may still abound. In short, these political units, due to their consistent presence within the debates, have had a powerful effect not merely on how British elites have constructed the British Self but on how Europe as a whole has been invested with meaning.
Apart from these key actors, a number of other entities have transpired, particularly in the Lisbon debates. References to the Balkan states, Turkey, India and China all reveal the shifting, fluid nature of identity construction. Firstly, both the Balkans and Turkey are vehicles for the British pursuit that has cut across all political parties and both pro- and anti-configurations. Once again, the goal of widening over deepening is unfailingly regular. This is governed by the attempt to rupture the pushiness of ‘protectionist Europe’ and replace it with ‘liberal Europe’. This is also the desire to challenge the cultural/core aspects of Europe and shift its centre of gravity away from Franco-German diktats. By way of example, David Cameron, in a speech given in Ankara in 2010, stated the following:

Do you know who said this: “Here is a country which is not European … its history, its geography, its economy, its agriculture and the character of its people – admirable people though they are – all point in a different direction … This is a country which … cannot, despite what it claims and perhaps even believes, be a full member.” It might sound like some Europeans describing Turkey. But it was actually General de Gaulle describing the UK before vetoing our EU accession.638

As such, Europe is positioned as a club in which the benefits of membership need to be extended beyond the core of the original signatories of the Treaty of Rome. Similarly, the Balkans, in particular regarding the wars of the 1990s, is another region ripe for EU membership. In this sense, Europe possesses a planetary pull designed to absorb and dissipate ethnic tensions and bloodshed. Again, Britain is positioned as a staunch advocate and humanitarian agent of enabling such fractious states to be stabilised under the European family of nations. Finally, both India and China can be categorised as recent informers of British national identity. India possesses a level of historical, cultural and commercial contingency in which Britain is imported with a

degree of transnationalism. China remains potentially unstable within the Lisbon debates but again has the potential to be regarded as a fellow nation-state via the influence of a Europe with Britain, not without.
Conclusion

Recapitulating the Findings

The purpose of this study has been to make an original contribution in the academic field. What, therefore, can be said to have been discovered? Several aspects can be recapitulated. To begin with, and perhaps most importantly, discourses, identities and the derivative British Selves can be characterised as possessing both continuity and discontinuity. Identities, as has been mentioned, have been commonly taken as ‘sticky’, and change, when it happens, is slow and incremental. However, the instability in the discourses, which is evident within Figure 7, certainly points towards a level of identity disruption. Relating to this, the empirical findings suggest several discoveries about British national identity. Firstly, the permanence of certain discursive tropes over the events is clear. Britain is both a global and value-laden actor and the consistent articulations of these identities is not in dispute. Far from being curios of the past, such configurations are so potent that they continue to be played out in the present. A recent incident to generate a flood of discussion over Britain’s relationship with Europe occurred due to the European Council Summit of 8-9 December, 2011, when the current Prime Minister, David Cameron, refused to sign up to the “fiscal stability union”\textsuperscript{639} designed to deal with the gamboling financial crisis. In response to this decision, Cameron’s statement abounded with familiar themes that are so deeply woven into the fabric of Britain’s discursive history that they are utterly naturalised:

It (the Treaty) would not just have meant a whole new bureaucracy ... it would have changed the nature of the EU – strengthening the eurozone without balancing measures to strengthen the single market. ... We are a trading nation, and we need the single market for trade, investment and jobs. The EU makes Britain a gateway to the largest single market in the world for investors ... and membership of the EU strengthens our ability to progress our foreign policy objectives, too, giving us a strong voice on the global stage on issues such as trade and, as we have seen in Durban this week, climate change and the environment.640

The British national identity being constructed from this example is still firmly attached to visions of firm leadership, open markets, the image of Britain as a ‘gateway’ or vehicle to proliferate trade, and the notion that the remit of the EU, instead of an insular fixation with developing ever more overbearing legislation, must address the challenges of external threats to the environment.

However, what is also apparent from this study is the level of discursive instability. Even within the configuration of Britain as a global player, dissent occurs. Firstly, there are the various layers of meaning. As a global actor, one can see this in the range of reformulations within which Britain’s globalness sits, such as a transnational, cooperative, transatlantic, reformist, European, interdependent or hyper-globalist actor. As such, being global invites the question: global to whom? It has over the course of the discourses been to a number of varying units, including at times the Commonwealth, the USA, the EU states, Europe as a whole and potential Europeans. Secondly, the disruption in the discourses reveals that certain sacred strongholds of meaning – sovereignty, the nation-state, security, unity and independence – are actually prone to quite dramatic shifts in meaning. What is revealing is not that ‘Britain is a sovereign nation’ is not in dispute, but that such commonplace phrases make sense only in so far as they operate within a

discursive field that positions sovereignty in such a meaningful way. As such, shifts in British national identity, far from rare, are actually the norm.

A second claim made in this study concerns at least when considering the case of Britain, the underdeveloped exposition of both temporal and conceptual Othering. Britain has been traditionally very much considered a historical entity in which its essentialism of the past flows uninterruptedly into the present and continues into the future. It contains an essentialist identity in which a core set of characteristics can be apparently plotted over many years and even centuries. However, the ‘past as Other’ and ‘concept as Other’ formulations have questioned this convenient narrative. Certain bastions of identity, such as the Second World War, have had their role in helping to construct a supine and capitulating Continent and equally to imbue Britain with a greater moral and physical presence. Equally as well is the more abundant position throughout the early section of the discourses that such a conflict was instrumental in Europeanising Britain. What is further suggested is that the conceptual fear of isolation acted as the glue to keep Britain firmly attached to the Community.

Thirdly, as identity is as much about belonging as not belonging, radical Othering, although frequently regarded as such, does not automatically refer to a process of demonisation or exclusion. The temporal Othering in the 1975 referendum, for example, in which Britain’s past is configured as a threat, produces a positive embrace of European idea and thinking. In addition, the process of identity production is as governed by friends as well as foes. As such, this study has introduced two neglected elements and the role they have played in forging British national identities, non-radical and friendly Othering. Similarly, Othering, very much like the discursive
processes that have produced it, does not necessarily remain static. It can be argued that from the 1975 Referendum debates, the USSR had a dominant role in forging European unity and British attachment. By the time of the Lisbon Treaty debates, along with the emerging challenges and opportunities of states like China and India, Russia had a less formative influence on British identity.

Finally, although the construction of identity is forged out of difference, and is certainly taken as a process that is a permanent part of the human collective, commonality is as much a potent force as dissimilarity. No unit – be it political, ethnic, geographic or statist – can derive an identity and therefore exist without its positioning against an Other. This project was inspired by the notion that difference need not degenerate into antagonism and that we-feeling, although too often the contrary, can be forged by friends and not via the seemingly eternal pursuit of enemies. As such, and as one noted scholar observes, “[a]nalyses of collective identity formation should contribute, however timidly, to our living in difference, and not to some of us dying from otherness.”

*Future Applications*

To conclude this study, it is worthwhile outlining the manner in which this dissertation might inform other areas of inquiry. An obvious albeit important point is that although this research project has focused on Britain, its theoretical and methodological framework can be applied elsewhere. Discursive techniques, be they employed to reveal predicates, presuppositions, subject positioning, themes or metaphors, are not specific to a particular political body and can

---

subsequently be applied to reveal the identities of any state or non-state actors. In addition, although the focus has been on political elite perceptions of phenomena, a discursive reading might be applied to any group, be it civil, societal, institutional or media related. Relatedly, although this has been a single case study, there are no obvious limits on using it to provide a comparative analysis between two or more units.

As Self/Other relations frequently imply a superior and an inferior, and notwithstanding the aforementioned argument that Othering might not routinely require a process of demonisation and exclusion, hostilities do tend to be more apparent when the Self and Other are highly polarised. Hence, there is a moral imperative to try and ascertain what formulates identity as a means to understanding patterns of belligerency and conflict that may be enacted towards others. This study recognises how identities might conflict when they come into contact with one another as well as identifying the processes and images frequently acquainted with negative imaging, and an identification of these patterns has implications for foreign and security policy.

Finally, although the time frame applied in this dissertation is lodged within modern British political history, there exists a seemingly endless number of identifiers that, when brought to light, can help convey how identity is constructed according to differing periods. In the same way that this thesis has argued that a singular and unified Europe has not discursively and historically operated as Britain's Other over the examined events, a wide range of ‘Europe as Other’ Others might be investigated. These can include temporal, conceptual, geographical, political, cultural and material agents. As multitude of Others produces readings of many different Selves, one might utilise the theoretical framework implicit within this study to reveal a
panoply of historical Europes that again impact on the way the EU, Europe or its constituent members are configured. The Europes in this study have included ‘Wartime’, ‘Cold War’, ‘Social’, ‘Liberal’, ‘Anglo-Saxon’, ‘Multipolar’, ‘Progressive’ and ‘Global’, to take a few examples. The scope for further inquiry might be broadened to include ‘Medieval’, ‘Christian’, ‘Catholic’, ‘Renaissance’, ‘Napoleonic’ or ‘Empire’ Europes for a longer historical study. More contemporary configurations might focus on how ‘Multicultural’, ‘Regional’ or even ‘Eurozone Crisis’ perceptions of Europe impact on national identities. Finally, historiographical investigations might further open up academic inquiry to consider both temporal and conceptual Othering, particularly given Europe’s fratricidal and tumultuous past. The uncovering of all these Europes, along with the linkages that stabilise and inform them, can contribute to the fundamental constructivist premise that who we are still determines what we do.
Appendix 1

13b. Sked, A. ‘Reflections of a Eurosceptic’.
13c. Dalyell, T. ‘No regrets: Then, Now or For the Future’.
13f. Williams, R. ‘The 1975 Referendum and Beyond’.
13g. Benn, T. ‘The New Roman Empire’.
13i. Taylor, T. ‘1975 Referendum’.

320
17. ‘Britain’s New Deal in Europe’, Pamphlet sent to every household in Britain prior to referendum on the European Community, 1975.
Appendix 2


27. Owen, Lord David (2007), ‘We can put the brake on Brussels’, *The Sunday Telegraph* [online], 9 Dec. Available at:

29. Stuart, G. (2009) ‘The EU will have to surrender to survive’, *The Daily Telegraph* [online], 7 March. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/4954319/The-EU-will-have-to-surrender-to-survive.html.


Bibliography


327


‘Rising to the Crisis’ (1940) The Economist, 14 Sept.


