THE UNBRIDLING OF VIRTUE
NEOCONSERVATISM BETWEEN THE COLD WAR
AND THE IRAQ WAR

By

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A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

During the years between the Cold War and the Iraq War, neoconservatism underwent an important shift from a position sympathetic to realist thought to a position much closer to a particularly conservative form of liberal internationalism. This change has largely been ignored in the literature, and when discussed, simply attributed to new, more radical neoconservative actors replacing a more cautious cadre. This thesis utilises a ‘history of ideas’ approach to examine the evolution of neoconservative thought from an emphasis on stability and normality to one of ambitious transformation abroad and wide-ranging democracy promotion. It argues that this modification can be attributed to several material and ideational drivers. In material terms, the end of the Cold War and the ensuing decline of bipolarity in the international system in combination with the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001 were pivotal events in neoconservatism’s evolution. The former removed the primary constraint on the use of American power overseas, while the latter demonstrated, as far as neoconservatives were concerned, the cost to the US of inaction and restraint abroad. Ideationally, the advent of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, an embrace of liberal democratic peace theory, and a religious ‘turn’ in neoconservative thought, all contributed to the development of a neoconservative foreign policy much more sympathetic to ideas of democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention.
Acknowledgements

This thesis began life in late 2006 as a studentship funding proposal to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). President Bush – plumbing new depths of unpopularity – had just led his party to a humiliating midterm election defeat, Rick Santorum had just lost Pennsylvania by 18 points, and Barack Obama was still a relatively unknown senator who had served less than two years in Washington. The radically altered political landscape that faces me now writing this is a reminder that while I have thoroughly enjoyed working on this project it has been a lengthy process and thus much thanks is likely due. My two supervisors on this journey – David Dunn and Adam Quinn – are worthy of special mention. David showed great faith in me, encouraging me to apply while I was working for the Conservative Party in what he warmly described as the ‘swamps’ of Norfolk. Thanks for all your time and hard work on this, from the first tweaks to the research proposal to your recent accusations that my grammar had been negatively affected by my months living in Virginia! My thanks also go to Adam for his insightful input after joining the ‘team’ in the summer of 2008, especially as I’m sure your realist instincts recoiled reading much of this! I realise that supervising a thesis like this is a time-consuming process on top of all your other duties and I want to make sure you both know that your efforts have been very much appreciated. Jason Ralph and Oz Hassan also deserve mention for their helpful comments on an early version of the argument presented in this thesis which appeared in a special edition of the *International Journal of Human Rights* in 2011.

I would also like to thank the Department of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS) at the University of Birmingham for awarding me one of their much sought-after ESRC 1+3 quota studentships. The whole research project would never have been
possible without the financial backing this provided. I have thoroughly enjoyed my time in POLSIS. Living out in the shires during the bulk of my studies left me a little more detached than the average doctoral researcher living in the shadow of ‘Old Joe’ but I benefitted immensely from some good friendships and encouragement along the way. There was always a bond between the ESRC studentship award holders in the department – Laurence Cooley, Drew Futter, Ken Searle and Martin Monahan – after we all started on our PhD adventure with the MA in Research Methods in the autumn of 2007. I’m sure the others will echo my gratitude to Laurence for his quantitative data analysis skills and SPSS prowess which helped pull us all through. Due to the fact we shared supervisors and both studied US foreign policy after the Cold War, Drew in particular was always very helpful and encouraging – especially as he always seemed to be one step ahead of me in his PhD project. Thanks also go to Drew for reviewing my entire thesis – which definitely went well beyond the call of duty. Although he was firmly established in the department by the time I began my time in POLSIS, Anthony Hopkins also deserves special mention for his friendly support over the past few years. Tories in academia are notoriously few and far between – especially those fond of quoting President Reagan – so I am glad our paths crossed.

Between January and July 2011, I had the great privilege of being a Visiting Research Associate at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS-Johns Hopkins University) in Washington DC. Richard Lock-Pullan very kindly put me in touch with Professor Eliot Cohen who agreed to sponsor my time in Washington. Despite a very busy schedule, Professor Cohen was very generous with his time and was undoubtedly an aid in helping me obtain interviews with some of my ‘targets’. On that subject, I would also like to thank all the people I met in Washington – both those I formally interviewed and the
numerous conversations over breakfast and lunch with interested observers in various think tanks and institutions. Having travelled extensively around the United States on numerous occasions, my time in Washington – a city living and breathing political debate – surpassed all those experiences. The depth, breadth and vitality of political debate was refreshing, especially in comparison to what can often be a stifling consensus back home. Certainly Trollope’s observation that Washington was a city “most unsatisfactory” could not be further from the truth.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support over the past four years. They have had to make some sacrifices, especially financially, that would not normally have been required – Grace, I’m sure Daddy owes you some new toys now! Tracy, thank you for your love and encouragement throughout this whole process, especially during the times when it was not always obvious where we were heading. I would like to think that my wilful flouting of Benjamin Franklin’s maxim that a man shouldn’t take a wife until he has a house has been proven wrong. You’ve always been there for me through thick and thin and I love you very much.

My sincere thanks and gratitude go to everyone who has been involved in the process of producing this thesis. A few of you mentioned above have spent many, many hours on this project for which I will always be in your debt. It goes without saying that the responsibility for any errors remaining, however, is my own.

MJLM
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16 March 2012
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<td>INF</td>
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<td>IR</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
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<td>NYT</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
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Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, leading neoconservative intellectuals began to grapple with the future direction for American foreign policy in the absence of its primary geopolitical and ideological rival of the previous half century. Given the perceived bellicosity of neoconservatives in the months leading up to the Iraq War in 2003, the foreign policy views of many neoconservatives at the conclusion of the Cold War provides a striking contrast. Circumspection, caution, and a limited, more realist, foreign policy vision in 1989-91 gave way by 2001-03 to something altogether more boundless, idealist and ambitious. The Iraq War has obfuscated the reality that at the dawn of the post-Cold War era, a different form of neoconservatism seemed to be in the ascendancy from that which subsequently came to the fore. Why did such a change occur? This thesis seeks to explore ideological change in neoconservative foreign policy thought during this period, demonstrating both the extent of the change that occurred and the reason for it. In so doing it highlights, in particular, the decline of bipolarity in the international system; the 9/11 terrorist attacks; the political philosophy of Francis Fukuyama; the influence of democratic peace theory; and a religious ‘turn’ with increased ideological affinities and synergies between leading neoconservatives and the Christian Right.

A 1991 collection of essays taken from the National Interest, entitled America’s Purpose, demonstrates with remarkable clarity the surprising ideological distance that neoconservatism had yet to travel on its journey to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While there were signs of the future bearing for neoconservatism, most notably Charles Krauthammer’s essay on unipolarism, for the most part the leading neoconservatives in the volume articulated an unexpectedly limited foreign policy vision for the US. In their rush to champion the significance of Krauthammer, scholars have neglected to do justice to the
dominant neoconservative strain of thought of the time. Ideological change has not been suitably acknowledged, let alone analysed.

Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s Ambassador to the UN, took the opportunity in her essay to argue for a return to ‘normality’ for America, with the years of sacrificial interventionism abroad were now behind it. The world was not unipolar and ripe for American empire, but rather multipolar, with “endless competition for marginal advantages.” The United States was not on a global, transcendental mission, but instead should be focused on domestic policy, rejecting notions of advancing the “universal dominance of democracy”. Kirkpatrick (1991: 155-6, 160) seriously questioned whether it was ‘healthy’ for the United States to be too focused on foreign policy now that the Cold War had finished. Foreign policy, she argued, only dominated a society when it was mortally threatened by an adversary or when the government was driven by notions of imperialism, aggression and expansionism. Analogously, Irving Kristol (1991: 63) advocated a limited, almost realist vision for the US. For Kristol, the United States should not be engaged in a democratic crusade abroad, and argued that the “futility” of basing American foreign policy on spreading democracy overseas was obvious to most Americans. While Kristol rejected an unequivocally realpolitik parsing of the national interest, he nevertheless argued that the national interest should be the guiding principle for the United States. He explicitly rejected the notion that the United States should use its troops on humanitarian missions abroad, for example, even arguing that if another Pol Pot emerged in Cambodia, it was not the role of the United States to send American troops. By focusing on the national interest, Kristol hoped that the United States would, in a quite extraordinary choice of words, “disburden itself of the incubus of liberal internationalism, with its utopian expectations and legalistic cast of mind...” (1991: 73).
The title of Nathan Glazer’s essay in *America’s Purpose* is perhaps the most illuminating feature of the entire book. ‘A Time for Modesty’ certainly looks out of place compared with the themes of hegemony, benevolent empire, unipolarism and other such concepts that had come to define the neoconservatives by the latter stages of the 1990s. Glazer – the Harvard sociologist and leading neoconservative although he eschewed the label and almost never wrote about foreign policy – used his essay to question the need for the United States to retain a military presence in Europe. He further attacked Krauthammer for arguing that the US should be upholding peace in South Korea, and argued for a shrinking of the military establishment. The foreign policy role for the United States was emphatically “not to be the policeman of the world” (Glazer, 1991: 141). Applying H.W. Brands’ (1998: viii) taxonomy of US foreign policy-makers divided between exemplarists and vindicators, early post-Cold War neoconservatism occupied a more exemplarist position than the movement’s later, more vindicationist posture. These three essays by Kirkpatrick, Kristol and Glazer are remarkable given the course neoconservatism took through the 1990s. Jeane Kirkpatrick’s ideological journey saw her eventually support military action in the Balkans, and she conducted extremely covert diplomatic missions for President Bush in 2003 to persuade Arab countries to back the invasion of Iraq (Weiner, 2006). The Iraq War was also fully supported by Irving Kristol despite his earlier foreign policy pronouncements (W. Kristol, 2011). Certainly this would seem to suggest neoconservatism’s dominant themes of just over a decade previous had been sidelined.

During the 1991 Gulf War there was no recorded dissent from neoconservatives within the Bush administration such as William Kristol and Paul Wolfowitz toward the main thrust of the campaign or the decision to retain Saddam Hussein in power. Given that a little over a decade later, the neoconservative movement was being portrayed as the intellectual author
of the regime-change policy in Iraq, the shift is remarkable. Perhaps even more noteworthy is the extent to which this shift has gone largely unacknowledged in the literature. Where explanation and analysis of ideational change has been forthcoming, it has too often been content to analyse simply in generational terms, with any shifts in ideas being ascribed to changing personnel in the vanguard of the neoconservative movement (Guelke, 2005: 97-8). But this argument struggles to account for the fact that neoconservatives of the first generation had themselves become enthusiastic cheerleaders for regime change in Iraq by 2003, and ignores the second generation’s proclivity for realist positions in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.

The various published studies of neoconservatism have often suffered conceptually from ignoring ideological change. Yet, ideologies are contingent and changeable entities that should never be conceptualised as immutable or static (Bevir, 2000: 280). This thesis utilises a ‘history of ideas’ approach to analyse the evolution of neoconservative foreign policy thought between the end of the Cold War and Iraq War; approximately 1989 to 2003. In doing so, a comparative static or synchronic approach is rejected in favour of diachronic analysis. This thesis is not interested in merely describing what neoconservatives thought about foreign policy in 1989 and comparing it with what they thought in 2003. The focus is instead on exploring the process of change in thinking between those years. While claims will be made concerning a comparison of these two years, the focus of analysis falls upon the historical process between those two points. Why and how did the still predominantly realist orientation of neoconservative foreign policy thought at the twilight of the Cold War become replaced by a much more idealist approach by the dawn of the new millennium?
This thesis is primarily a work of intellectual political history, and represents to some extent an amalgam of political science, international relations, and history. Rather than confusing the reader, it is hoped this heterodoxy makes for a more rounded analysis than simply locating the thesis in just one of these academic disciplines. The focus is on neoconservatism as an elite ideology of a small group of intellectuals, most of whom locate themselves in think-tanks, academia, or the media rather than occupying government positions themselves. Thus, the focal point of this research is not public opinion polls nor party politics, neither is it official government documents or national security strategies. The direct effect that neoconservatism as a political ideology has had on the policy-making process itself is of lesser interest here, and one that has been thoroughly explored elsewhere (Halper and Clarke, 2004; Daalder and Lindsay, 2003). Instead the focus is more exclusively on neoconservatism itself, taking a step back from the policy-making process and interrogating the ideology itself and its evolutionary development. What are its fundamental features? How has it changed? Why has it changed? There are times when output from the policy-making process can be used to highlight aspects of neoconservative ideology, for example, Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad’s controversial Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in 1992. In large part, however, the focus will not be on official government discourse, but think-tank reports, op-eds, and various publications and interviews conducted with leading neoconservatives.

Despite the almost obligatory chapters on neoconservatism in recent books on contemporary US foreign policy, the academy has been surprisingly reluctant to fully engage theoretically with neoconservatism. Michael Williams (2005: 308) argues there has been little academic engagement with neoconservatism from IR theorists, which, given the power that the neoconservatives have supposedly wielded in setting the foreign policy
agenda during Bush’s first term, would seem to be an surprising omission. While there have been more academic contributions on neoconservatism since Williams suggested this, neoconservatism, remains academically under-discussed.\(^1\) This may be at least partly due to the fact that many leading neoconservative intellectuals have shunned a formal academic career in favour of careers in government, think-tanks and magazine publishing. Aside from infrequent contributions in *Foreign Affairs* or *Foreign Policy*, such as Kristol and Kagan’s 1996 article ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,’ for the most part they have not engaged in debate with their ideological adversaries in formal academic channels, often preferring a Fox News studio or a *Weekly Standard* editorial.\(^2\) While this, of course, does not of itself invalidate their arguments, ideology or intellectual capacity, it could be an explanatory factor in the academy’s failure to study neoconservatism more comprehensively and in more depth than it has hitherto chosen to.

It will be suggested in these pages that analysis of neoconservatism remains an important task. Given the capacity of neoconservatives to adapt their political ideology to changing political landscapes over the past forty years, and given their influence on the foreign policy-making process at key moments in recent history, further engagement with neoconservatism is essential. Indeed, Michael Williams (2005: 328-9) makes a powerful case for the continued relevance of neoconservatism within American political debate, due to its unique challenge to the politics of liberal modernity combined with its ability to fuse the domestic with the foreign, leading to a “powerful political logic and a rhetorical strategy” which means “it is unlikely simply to fade away”. Too often the academy, and IR

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in particular, has chosen to focus its research programme on a world it wishes existed rather than engaging with ‘reality’ as it presents itself. As Alexander Wendt (1999: 8-10, 75) has observed – it is still nation-states that should remain the fundamental focus points for research in international politics. This comes despite Wendt privileging a methodology that favours concepts of intersubjectivity and constructivism which in many ways challenge traditionally conceived IR. He argues that nation-states should be understood as the agents of international politics, objective facts that cannot simply be discursively wished away. Despite those who argue either the United States will be increasingly challenged by China and India for the title of dominant nation-state, or that the nation-state itself is becoming an anachronism in a global society and more regional forms of governance, the United States remains in economic and military terms, the only global superpower.\(^3\) Foreign policy ideologies, such as neoconservatism, that shape and have shaped US foreign policy remain central academic focal points for explaining international politics.

* * * * *

Chapter One provides a methodological foundation for the rest of the thesis by moulding together a tripartite theoretical component with a discussion of how the existing literature conceptualises neoconservatism. The theoretical section begins with a discussion of the concept of ideology and how it has been theorised by political scientists. What is an ideology? What are its main features? How does ideology relate to both political theory and political practice? Why is ideology nearly always viewed in the negative (as something that ‘other people’ have fallen in to) and is a more value-neutral definition

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preferable? The thesis then proceeds to the question of ideological change, through discussion of the ‘history of ideas’. How have historians of ideas conceptualised ideological change? Emphasis will be placed on the recent work of Mark Bevir, Michael Freedon and Colin Hay. The thesis then discusses the relationship between US foreign policy and ideology, stressing how scholars have argued there is a broad, bipartisan American nationalist ideology underpinning US foreign policy. The fourth part of the theoretical section grounds the thesis in a discussion of International Relations theory to supply definitional clarity to the key theoretical concepts of the thesis. The thesis overall argues for a shift in neoconservative foreign policy thought away from realism and towards a more ideologically ambitious idealism loosely based on a conservative variant of liberal internationalism. The author is aware that by grounding the thesis in three different academic disciplines the thesis may invite the charge of neglecting theoretical depth in favour of breadth. By locating at the intersection of Political Science, History and IR, however, and not focusing exclusively on one discipline, it is believed that a more well-rounded approach has resulted. This thesis chiefly is a work of political intellectual history with a specific focus on policy areas relevant to IR. It is not primarily a theoretical contribution devoted to the more abstract study of ideology or to theoretical debates within IR, although its content engages with both fields.

The second half of Chapter One focuses on how neoconservatism has been conceptualised by its main protagonists, critics, and observers in the academy. While the thesis primarily deals with neoconservative ideology as it relates to the conduct of foreign policy, the domestic roots of neoconservative thought will be acknowledged in this section, especially its concern with crime, authority, morality and the central neoconservative theme of virtue which is an essential point of linkage between domestic and foreign policy. Gertrude
Himmelfarb’s reading of the British Enlightenment as opposed to the French
Enlightenment, and the centrality of benevolence and virtue over pure reason, will be
stressed as a key feature of neoconservatism. Due to the original neoconservatives’ radical
roots some have sought to portray neoconservatism as too radical an ideology to sit within
the broader conservative corpus, however, neoconservatism’s focus on authority, morality
and stability are *sine qua non* of conservatism itself.\(^4\)

Turning more explicitly to foreign policy, the chapter examines how neoconservatism has
been portrayed in comparison with its main ideological rivals. What characteristics does it
share with the realism of a Henry Kissinger or Brent Scowcroft, the conservative
nationalism of a Donald Rumsfeld or Dick Cheney, or the neo-isolationist
paleoconservatism of Patrick Buchanan? What similarities and differences have been
identified between neoconservatism and the liberal internationalist school? Is
neoconservatism simply a conservative variant of liberal internationalism, with its focus on
democracy promotion and human rights – what has been described as “Wilsonianism with
teeth” (Mearsheimer, 2005) – or does it, while sitting squarely in the conservative sphere,
represent something altogether distinct?

How the relationship between neoconservatism and realism has been analysed will be
explored as a defining conceptual underpinning for the subsequent empirical chapters. Is
neoconservatism merely a realist subset or do its central features “lie in its contrast to

\(^4\) Both conservative libertarians and paleoconservatives argue that neoconservatism should not be regarded as
an authentic expression of conservatism in general. For a conservative libertarian critique of neoconservatism
please see Michael D. Tanner (2007) *Leviathan on the Right: How Big Government Conservatism Brought
neoconservatism is a synthesis of the thought of Strauss and Niebuhr, and does not rest on the same
classically liberal and traditional conservative traditions that have emphasised limited government. For a
paleoconservative critique of neoconservatism please see Patrick J. Buchanan (2004) *Where the Right Went
Wrong: How Neoconservatives Subverted the Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency* (New
York, Thomas Dunne). Buchanan (2004: 35, 53, 57-8) argues the neoconservatives a “tiny cabal” who have
pursued an agenda that is focused on utopian democratic imperialism that is the “antithesis of strategy”.
Realism” (Williams, 2005: 309)? Neoconservative emphases on hard power and the nation-state have been too readily viewed as ‘proof’ of neoconservatism’s realist bent. To what extent do neoconservatism’s concerns with democracy, human rights, and virtue as opposed to what it perceives to be an amoral realpolitik, show that Williams’ observation above is correct? Or do the humanitarian themes mentioned above, merely function as rhetorical veneer, masking what is essentially hard-line conservative nationalism, rather than being closer to either liberal interventionism or realism (Ryan, 2007)?

Chapter One concludes with a tripartite definition of neoconservatism, which argues that while there has been change in neoconservative thought in this period there are three fundamental themes that remain central to neoconservative thought throughout. First, an emphasis on virtue, and a highly moralised account of the political. Second, that domestic political life is an essential consideration in making foreign policy, both in terms of predicting the likely behaviour of other states, and in terms of the impact that American foreign policy has on domestic socio-political life in the United States itself. Third, in comparison with other foreign policy schools, there is a preference for the United States to use hard power to solve foreign policy crises, with an accompanying privileging of unilateralism.

Chapter Two explicates the state of neoconservatism at the conclusion of the Cold War, focusing mainly on the second half of the George H. W. Bush administration. What were the dominant strains of neoconservative foreign policy thought as neoconservatives came to terms with the end of the Cold War? What role should the United States play on the world stage, now that its primary geopolitical adversary had collapsed? Should the United States continue to pursue a balance of power or more novel forms of unipolarism and
power preponderance? How should the United States respond to the biggest foreign policy crisis of that time, following the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq? It is argued that the answers to these questions reveal a neoconservatism that was coming to terms with a new geopolitical and ideological landscape, and that its later more ambitious and unrestrained form should not obscure the fact that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a far more circumspect neoconservatism, certainly not diametrically opposed to realism, or, even perhaps surprisingly, neo-isolationism, appeared to be in evidence.

The seeds of neoconservatism’s transformation had, however, been sown. The few accounts of neoconservatism that touch on ideological change, invariably attribute change almost exclusively to material factors, the most obvious being the perceived unipolarity of the international system following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Charles Krauthammer’s much heralded trumpeting of American unipolarity, seemingly rested quite heavily on the fact that the Soviet threat was no more. The new role for the US was not one to be found in the abstract, but in response to the perceived structure of global politics (Krauthammer, 1991a: 23). This thesis argues, however, that this only partly explains the early stages of change in neoconservative thought. It will be argued that Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis is a further potent source of explanatory power for analysing change in neoconservatism. Fukuyama’s thesis has been often incorrectly viewed as striking an unduly triumphal tone in response to a collapsing Soviet empire. A closer reading reveals his thesis does not ultimately rest on the material collapse of the USSR – its publication marginally predates it – and is a more abstract philosophical defence of the ultimate victory of liberal democracy, rather than a simplistic boilerplate response to the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
Chapter Two concludes with discussion of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) document as a harbinger of the direction of ideological change in neoconservative thought. The document made an unabashed call for continued global American geopolitical predominance, and for the United States to prevent the emergence of any new geopolitical rival in Europe or Asia (Tyler, 1992a: 1). It is argued the DPG represented an important milestone in neoconservative ideological evolution, and is an essential component of the overall ideational change that occurred. The thesis nonetheless cautions against placing too much emphasis on this alone. Some scholars such as Halper and Clarke have seen the George W. Bush administration’s Iraq policy, and by extension that of the neoconservatives themselves, as a direct reflection of the DPG in 1992. In so doing, this once again precludes rigorous analysis of ideational change in neoconservatism by, in effect, stating that the predominant form of neoconservatism that existed and influenced Bush in 2003 was the same as that which produced the DPG in 1992 (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 146). It is argued in this chapter instead that important neoconservative foreign policy themes, most notably democracy promotion and humanitarian interventionism, were absent from the DPG, and were not developed until later in the 1990s.

Chapter Three focuses on the development of neoconservatism during the first term of the Clinton administration. While neoconservatives increasingly argued for humanitarian interventionism in response to Clinton’s perceived failures in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda, simultaneously they increasingly adopted his rhetoric and language of democracy promotion, which had hitherto been of lesser concern to them. Thus while aspects of Clinton’s policies abroad were presented as examples which were not to be followed, at the same time, the democratic peace thesis, coupled with the interventionism of the Clinton Doctrine, at the very least at the rhetorical level, moved more centrally into
neoconservative thought. The interventionism of Clinton’s first term revealed that neoconservatives had become generally supportive of certain interventions abroad and justified them at least partially, and often more systematically, on humanitarian grounds. They were still, however, largely reluctant during this period to use direct American military force to bring about regime change and democratic change.

The latter section of Chapter Three explores the relationship between neoconservatism and the Christian Right, and with religion more broadly. Early neoconservative intellectuals extolled the virtues of religion for the benefits it brought to society in the form of stability, but had a somewhat ambiguous personal association with religion. During the 1990s, however, there was a shift within neoconservatism to a far less vague relationship with religion that went beyond simply seeing its value as a source of stability. Leading neoconservatives went beyond seeing religion in merely instrumental terms, for example, with some regularly attending temple services and living in kosher homes. Both neoconservatives and the Christian Right also supported humanitarian interventionism and the promotion of political and religious liberty abroad. The last part of Chapter Three explores the significance of this in more depth. In what ways did increased neoconservative concerns with human rights and democracy promotion during the 1990s, and the idea of the United States as the indispensable nation, connect with similar themes that were developing within the Christian Right at this time?

Chapter Four discusses the evolution of neoconservative thought during Clinton’s second term. It begins by discussing institutional developments within neoconservatism, especially the creation of the Weekly Standard and the Project for the New American Century as vehicles for their foreign policy platform. It follows this with discussion of the
defence budget, missile defence and the expansion of NATO, and analysis of the US relationship with China. These topics were important for showcasing how neoconservatives were developing a more radical foreign policy platform which often put them at odds with Republicans in Congress as much as President Clinton. The libertarian and economically-focused philosophy underpinning Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America meant neoconservatives advocated positions on the defence budget and relations with China which differed markedly from the congressional Republican mainstream. Missile defence, however, was an issue that brought more unity; although neoconservatives such as Robert Kagan favoured it on the grounds that it would create a domestic political environment more conducive to overseas interventionism, rather than purely as a defensive measure.

The latter half of Chapter Four discusses the debate surrounding interventions in Kosovo and Iraq as embodying distinctive features that demonstrated ideological shifts in neoconservative thought. In the early 1990s neoconservatives had supported a limited policy of ‘lift and strike’ in Bosnia to protect the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) population from Bosnian Serb forces, and backed George H. W. Bush’s limited policy during the Gulf War of retaining Saddam Hussein in power after removing Iraqi troops from Kuwait. By the latter half of Clinton’s second term, however, their approach had hardened significantly. The neoconservative solution to the crisis in Kosovo was not a ‘lift and strike’ approach but full scale use of American ground forces to defeat the Serbian army and bring regime change and liberal democracy to Belgrade. Equally, in Iraq, Wolfowitz and other neoconservatives abandoned a limited policy of retaining Saddam Hussein in power and openly argued for using American military power to bring about regime
change, although they still retained a significant role for the Iraqi opposition in bringing this about.

Chapter Five examines neoconservatism after the Clinton administration until the start of the Iraq War in 2003. It will be argued the dominant strain of neoconservative thinking was now substantially altered from the realism-isolationism that featured at the end of the Cold War. Bellicosity in the name of the national interest, democracy, and human rights, now led many neoconservatives to support Bush’s offensives in Afghanistan and Iraq, and pressed him to go further in confronting Iran and North Korea. The impact of 9/11 on neoconservative thought will also be discussed. Were the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks a substantive turning point in neoconservative thought, or merely of instrumental value in enabling neoconservatives to more successfully make the case for a pre-existing foreign policy vision to be put into practice? The chapter argues the 9/11 attacks were important for moving neoconservatives such as Krauthammer, Perle and Wolfowitz to a position much closer to the one that Kagan and Kristol had sketched in the latter half of the 1990s. Neoconservatives, now conscious of the direct Islamist threat to the US, consistently linked a lack of political liberty in the Middle East to American national security. The links between George W. Bush and the neoconservatives, however, should not be overplayed. The neoconservative foreign policy worldview had developed after 9/11 into something that was more expansive and ambitiously radical than Bush was capable of delivering on, even if he was so inclined, and went beyond merely toppling Saddam Hussein and the Taleban.

The concluding chapter summarises the central argument that neoconservative foreign policy had undergone a substantive and fundamental shift between the Cold War and the
Iraq War. Neoconservatives ended the Cold War urging caution, restraint and normalcy, but began the new millennium in an altogether different position, urging the United States to throw off a moderate approach in favour of a more ambitious and far-reaching agenda. The use of unilateral American power to topple rogue states and promote American liberal democratic values was now viewed as essential. Two material factors and three more ideational drivers of change had been significant. The decline of bipolarity in the international system; the impact of the 9/11 attacks; Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis; democratic peace theory; and a religious ‘turn’ in neoconservative thought, all contributed to a substantial shift in neoconservatism toward a foreign policy emphasising liberal democracy, humanitarian interventionism, and US national security, all predicated on American hegemony.
Chapter One
Theoretical and Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a foundation for the subsequent empirical chapters in two significant ways. Firstly, the chapter draws upon existing theoretical literature in Political Science, History and IR, to explore the study of ideology, the ‘history of ideas’, and IR theory. It will be argued that a conception of ideology that is value-neutral and pertinent to both political theory and political practice, rather than privileging one over the other, is to be preferred. It is also suggested that ideological change is often too readily attributed simply to just material factors instead of ideational drivers. Drawing upon the ‘history of ideas’ literature, it is argued that ideology should be seen as something changeable and contingent, which alters in response to specific dilemmas. The best way to analyse an ideology is to diachronically trace its historical evolution by examining what people actually wrote and said. The theoretical section concludes with a brief discussion of IR theory, particularly as pertaining to realism and liberal internationalism.

Secondly, the chapter draws together the various ways in which neoconservatism has been conceptualised in the existing literature by both neoconservatives and academics. It is shown that at times it has been seen variously as an alternative form of realism; a conservative form of Wilsonian liberal internationalism; a theory of IR sharing much in common with Alexander Wendt’s ‘thin’ constructivism; a form of conservative nationalism with only a thin, rhetorical, liberal internationalist veneer; and a Likudite ideology privileging the interests of Israel above those of the United States. This thesis argues that for neoconservatives, the one overriding conceptual theme that is continually emphasised in both domestic and foreign policy is the centrality of virtue, which will also
be explored in this chapter. For many neoconservatives, especially in foreign policy, what distinguishes their approach is a signal attachment to what they perceive to be the intrinsic moral virtues of the American republican tradition. They consider these to be threatened by both a realism that strips the United States of its virtue through amoral realpolitik, and a liberal internationalism that forces it to relinquish its virtue to the international community, thus setting itself in opposition to notions of American exceptionalism. It is argued that there are three broad central pillars of neoconservative foreign policy thought that remain relatively constant throughout – a concern with virtue; a focus on domestic socio-political conditions both in other countries and the United States; and an emphasis on hard power, often used unilaterally to solve specific foreign policy dilemmas.

1.2 Ideology

It would be problematic to draw conclusions regarding neoconservative ideology without a consideration of what an ideology actually ‘is’. Its definition is somewhat nebulous, and certainly contested. Ian Adams (1993: 2-3) suggests that there are three main approaches to ideology. Early Marxists argued that ideology was just another type of false consciousness, used by the ruling class to further its interests, and Marx’s teachings were scientific rather than ideological. Liberals, on the other hand, equate ideology with closed systems of thought that make claims to truths which are absolute, ultimately leading to totalitarianism, since those in possession of the ‘truth’ should not be hindered by those who wish to stand in the way of truth and progress. From this perspective, liberalism is not an ideological doctrine in the sense that Fascism or Marxism are but instead a collection of perceptive philosophical principles, based around openness, tolerance and rationality. Conservatives, however, argue ideology is an attempt to apply abstract theory to the political, and that in contrast to this, conservatism rests on pragmatism and common sense,
ultimately treating society as an organic entity that cannot be ‘improved’ by recourse to the abstract. Ideology has thus usually been treated almost exclusively in the negative, with Marxists, liberals and conservatives all united in arguing ideology is not a label that applies to their scientific, rational or pragmatic systems of thought.

While admittedly attempting to be more objective about the issue of ideology, analysis of ideology by political scientists is often couched in terms of it being a ‘false’ mode of thinking, without which we would be better off. A prime example is David Hawkes (2003: 1) in his analysis of ideology and globalisation. In a similar construction to that of Marxism, he suggests the market economy “produces a systematically false consciousness: an ideology”. However, in recent years, this penchant for viewing ideology as inherently negative has been replaced by a more neutral or non-partisan definition. It has become “simply a set of political beliefs about how a society ought to be and how to improve it, irrespective of whether those ideas are true or false or good or bad” (Adams, 1993: 3). Tibor Mandi (2004: 1) refers to ideology as “a distinctive, more or less coherent system of political beliefs with a view to informing political action”. These definitions have enabled ideologies to be discussed without necessarily having to engage in factional and often highly partisan disputes.

While the concept of ideology has then been somewhat neutralised, and stripped of its negative connotations, other conceptual dilemmas nonetheless remain. Perhaps a central issue is where ideology stands in relation to political practice. Are ideologies conceived as being highly abstract theoretical structures of thought that are, in some sense, divorced from actual real world events? Or are ideologies orientated purely to the conduct of political practices? (Freeden, 2000: 303-308). Freeden argues that the debate over theory
versus practice, initially highlighted by Immanuel Kant, is a false dichotomy. Instead, he envisages a two-way flow between ideology and political practice, with both influencing and folding back on each other. Ideologies such as neoconservatism are often less interested in clarifying thought-practices but instead set about “providing readily available, applicable and widely consumable solutions for groups” (Freeden, 2000: 308). The relevance of groups should also not be overlooked, since “ideologies always are group practices” rather than the result of one individual political theorist (Freeden, 2000: 307). In that sense, an ideology consists of a synthesis of the political thought of its contributors, and to that extent is greater than the sum of its parts.

This thesis embraces this relatively broad conception of ideology. When it refers to ideology this does not connote any notions of false consciousness or merely a reflection of the ideas of the ruling elite. Ideology instead is utilised in a neutral fashion, almost analogously with the concept of ‘worldview’, as a broadly cohesive group of ideas that individuals hold to enable them to make sense of the world as they perceive it presents itself, and to enable them to develop policy prescriptions on the basis of that ideology or worldview. On the basis of this general definition of ideology, it is difficult to envisage actors who have political outlooks that are not ideological in any way. This does not of course necessitate endorsement of the rationalist model of ideologies as consciously articulated systems of belief, and there remains an important role for the “affective, unconscious, mythical or symbolic dimensions of ideology” (Eagleton, 1991: 221).

In the broader dialogue in political science between material and ideational explanations of politics, this thesis takes a position of scepticism towards approaches that ignore or downplay the role played by ideas in determining political outcomes, yet, acknowledges
that political actors must formulate ideas in a material environment. This thesis is somewhat sympathetic to Alexander Wendt’s form of ‘thin’ constructivism which eschews the materialism of realism or Marxism, but holds to a “rump materialism” – that basic material factors such as natural resources, geography, climate etc. still matter (Wendt, 1999: 93, 110-1). The most useful analysis of the interplay between the material and ideational, however, is provided by Colin Hay (2002: 208, 212-215). According to this argument, ideas are only ever “relatively autonomous” of the material. The material context in which political actors operate and develop ideas and ideologies imposes a strategic and discursive selectivity on the ideas constructed. Ideas are of signal importance, but do not develop in a non-material ‘vacuum’.

1.3 The ‘History of Ideas’ and Ideological Change

The ‘history of ideas’ as an academic sub-discipline, pioneered by Arthur Lovejoy in the first half of the twentieth century, was proposed as an amalgam of different academic disciplines sitting somewhere between history and philosophy, combining Anglo-American empiricism and German idealism (Parsons, 2007: 684). The discipline somewhat conservatively defended the western intellectual tradition and as a result declined in popularity. In recent years, it has emerged as a discipline less concerned with the grand sweep of western intellectual history over millennia, and more focused on contemporary intellectual history, as “a kind of gazetter (sic) of current intellectual discourse” (Parsons, 2007: 693).

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6 Indeed, the Journal of the History of Ideas itself was one of the few academic journals to receive clandestine support from the CIA during the Cold War (Parsons, 2007: 686).
It is impossible to write of the ‘history of ideas’, without discussing ideational change. To write of the ‘history of ideas’ is to write of change. Colin Hay (2002: 144-50) suggests that there are three analytical strategies for the investigation of change. Firstly, synchronic analysis, which “freezes” the object of analysis, and in effect scrutinises it at one specific moment in time, and can therefore reveal little about change. Secondly, comparative static analysis, which in effect takes two (or more) snapshots of the object of analysis, at more than one moment in time, to enable comparisons to be drawn. Thirdly, diachronic analysis, which is the favoured analytical strategy of this thesis. This approach “emphasises the process of change over time” and allows the analyst to map out and trace the interaction of variables and processes over time. Hay employs a helpful analogy from photography to elucidate the three approaches. The first approach is compared to a single photographic snapshot of one moment in time; the second is compared to a couple or series of snapshots over time; the third compared to a panning video shot over time (Hay, 2002: 148-9). The problem with both the synchronic and comparative static approaches for exploring ideational change is that they effectively remove the object of analysis from history itself.

At the centre of diachronic analysis is the necessity to explore the dilemmas and moments of ideational crisis that result in ideational shifts. By exploring ideational dilemmas, historians of ideas can analyse why individuals change their beliefs. This thesis seeks to examine a series of dilemmas that neoconservative intellectuals faced during the immediate post-Cold War environment, and in so doing develop a clearer understanding of why neoconservative foreign policy ideology shifted during the 1990s. The concept of ‘dilemma’ itself can be very broad. Dilemmas can arise from a change in material conditions; exposure to novel philosophical arguments; exposure to a different culture; a

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change in the political or geopolitical environment; a change in the scientific environment; or a previously unnoticed contradiction in thought. The fact that the dilemma intrudes from the outside is the crucial factor, as ideational change cannot be brought about simply by the application of the logic of the pre-existing idea (Bevir, 1999: 222, 225-6). While the idea of a dilemma provoking ideological shifts is certainly not novel in the philosophy of science – there are echoes of both Kuhn and Popper here – Bevir’s concept of dilemma is less circumscribed, which he partly attributes to the fact he is dealing with the logic of individual reasoning in general rather than exclusively how scientific knowledge changes.\(^8\)

Thus, for philosophers of science, it is usually ‘facts’ that are treated as dilemmas, but for Bevir, although facts can be dilemmas, the concept is much broader, and can be “any understanding that requires someone to modify his existing webs of beliefs if only by accepting it as true.” Another difference is that dilemmas that change webs of beliefs occur frequently and in an evolutionary fashion, whereas the paradigm shifts of someone like Kuhn, are far rarer and more revolutionary (Bevir, 1999: 228-9). This is not to say that Bevir’s understanding of ideational change cannot encompass revolutionary changes, but that frequently, individuals respond to a dilemma by “hooking it on to themes found in their existing beliefs and adjusting the rest of their beliefs accordingly” (Bevir, 1999: 236).

1.4 American Foreign Policy and Ideology

Unsurprisingly, as with the wider debate, Macdonald (2000: 181) argues that the concept of ideology in relation to US foreign policy is often used as term of disparagement, presented as the opposite of a pragmatic realism and the pursuit of national interest which

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has, in Macdonald’s view, dominated American foreign policy. Indeed, Osgood (1953: 1, 11) suggests that national interest and ideals are in conflict in the contemporary United States in much the same way as they were in ancient Athens, although idealism very infrequently overrules that self-interest. For Macdonald (2000: 181-182, 188) though, the national interest is not the opposite of ideology, instead he argues that this dichotomy can be transcended by seeing the national interest as constrained by ideology, with ideologies representing “blueprints” which are utilised to “move material reality in a particular direction”. Thus the Cold War should not be conceptualised as purely a material struggle, but one between two competing ideologies. Hunt (1987: 5, 7, 12) argues that George Kennan and William Appleman Williams’ treatment of ideology – the former dismissive on realist grounds, the latter economically reductionist – have been influential but should be transcended. For Hunt, a preferred definition of ideology, drawing heavily on the work of the cultural anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, should centre on the concept of ideology as a cultural system. This conception would take ideology seriously, but in a wider fashion than suggested by Williams. Hunt (1987: 16) favours a broad definition of ideology as a way to “elucidate complex realities and reduce them to understandable and manageable terms”. Hunt argues there is a strong connection between a broad American foreign policy ideology and a form of American nationalism, and this emerged in the early twentieth century grounded on three important themes. Firstly, that the United States’ desire for national greatness was very closely related to promoting liberty; Secondly, that attitudes to other countries and peoples were based on a form of racial hierarchy; Thirdly, that while revolutions abroad could be good, they could just as easily be bad (1987: 17, 19).

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9 Indeed, Macdonald (2000: 185) further argues that the dominance of realism in American foreign policy circles has almost made the concept of ideology “invisible”.

10 Interestingly, on the topic of ideological change, Hunt (1987: 16) argues that “permutations may occur” as a consequence of “changes in the cast of policy personalities”. This is the standard explanation of ideological change, when it is acknowledged at all, that is emphasised in discussion of neoconservatism. This thesis, however, takes the position it is insufficient for explaining the totality of ideological change in neoconservatism.
Taken together, these ideas at the core of a nationalist American foreign policy ideology are largely cultural and “expressions of a civic religion formulated to hold an ethnically, racially, regionally, and religiously diverse country together” (Hunt, 1987: 189).

The idea of civic religion is taken further by Anatol Lieven (2004: 5, 6) who describes the American civic religion as a form of “civic nationalism”, not to be confused with simply patriotism. This civic nationalism has two important strands, the first being the “American Creed” which is ideological, the second being the American nationalist “antithesis”, which is less ideological and more ethno-religious in orientation.11 Lieven suggests the latter strand is backward-looking, whereas the former strand, of which the neoconservatism of Irving Kristol is a prime example, attempts to be forward-looking, advancing American greatness on the back of the American creed. In a similar vein, H.W. Brands (1998: vii-viii) argues that the dichotomies between realism or isolationism on the one hand, and idealism on the other, are overstated, and the single idea of America being a progressive force in global politics is all pervasive. For Brands, any differences are primarily tactical or operational, rather than fundamental or ideological. While the primary cleavage in US foreign policy making circles is between exemplarists and vindicators, both share the same ideology positing the United States as the primary actor in progressively shifting global politics to better humanity. While liberalism, conservativism, and neoconservativism are obvious examples of more specific ideologies, the works discussed above are instructive in exposing the existence of a wider form of American nationalism that also functions as ideology, and one that in many ways transcends the domestic ideological divide.

11 Of course, under the broader definition of ideology favoured in this thesis, this latter conception of civic nationalism is also ideological.
1.5 IR Theory: Realism and Liberal Internationalism

This thesis claims neoconservatism became less realist between 1989 and 2003, and as an aspect of that change, liberal internationalism had more of an impact on neoconservative foreign policy thought during these years than it had hitherto achieved, most notably in relation to the role of the United States in democracy promotion efforts abroad and interventionism more generally. Having discussed ideology in general, a more detailed look at both realism and liberal internationalism is now required.

1.5.1 Realism

Realism has roots in both antiquity and modernity. Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* has been seen as a classically realist text. Its emphasis on military power and the fact that the weaker Greek city states were seen to portray the stronger Athens as the oppressor and the weaker Sparta as redeemer are largely seen as an affirmation of the balance of power thesis, and to run contrary to bandwagoning logic (Thucydides, 1972: Book V, chapters 17, 84-116). In modernity, realism developed during the twentieth century in response to the perceived failure of liberal idealism during the interwar years which embraced a form of utopianism that was ill-equipped to prevent the Second World War. The realist approach focuses largely on the restrictions placed on

12 Contrary to the prevailing narrative on Thucydides and realism, some neoconservatives have instead argued that the *History of the Peloponnesian War* emphasises core neoconservative principles, especially the type of virtuous society that is worth fighting for, and is actually a critique of realism, rather than a critique of an activist or more imperial foreign policy. Indeed, Charles (2006) argues that Pericles’ funeral oration champions the enlightened superiority of Athenian society over its opponents and that the “naivety of pure realism and the unique worth and heroic possibilities of democracy are at the core of Thucydides’ Histories and are at the root of his appeal to the neoconservatives”. Donald Kagan, the Yale classicist and progenitor of something resembling a neoconservative ‘dynasty’, has made the study of the Peloponnesian War his life’s work. See Donald Kagan (2005) *The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in Savage Conflict 431-404 BC*, (London, HarperPerennial).

13 Waltz (1979: 127) argues the stronger power will always be seen as more of a threat to other states than weaker powers, and that weaker states will seek alliances with each other to protect against the stronger state, rather than joining with the stronger state.
international relations by human nature and the idea that the international system is anarchic with no higher authority than the state (Lawson, 2003: 9).

For the realist, international relations are dominated by power, particularly military or ‘hard’ power. Hans Morgenthau, most associated with twentieth century realism, argued (2006: 5) that it was a mistake for political science to focus on motives or ideological preference instead of “the concept of interest defined in terms of power”. In addition to a focus on power, realists argue that stability in international politics is crucial. The chief mechanism for producing stability is the balance of power, which realists argue is also a principle with wider application, being enshrined domestically in the United States through checks and balances (Morgenthau, et al., 2006: 181).

A further refinement of the realist position in the form of neorealism or structural realism is associated particularly with Kenneth Waltz. Whereas realism as articulated by Morgenthau relied on a particular conception of human nature to drive its approach to IR, neorealism instead placed less of an emphasis on human nature, instead pointing to the structure of anarchy in the international system as the critical feature of international relations (Lawson, 2003: 80). Indeed, neorealism relies heavily on structuralism to explain international politics, whereas its critics have stressed that the structures of international politics are not universal but are the contingent products of particular historical conditions (Walker, 1993: 104-5). Waltz (2001: 27) does not explicitly demur from Morgenthau’s observations on human nature, but stresses that “the importance of human nature is reduced by the fact that the same nature, however defined, has to explain an infinite variety of human events”. Therefore, it is not human nature, but the ‘nature’ of the international system that is the most important feature of international politics. The world is not
characterised by liberal notions of interdependence but “bristling nationalisms”. Indeed, he argues (1979: 159) that it is logically wrong for liberals to treat the world as a single unit yet argue it is interdependent.

Emphasis on maintaining and managing the system versus changing or transforming it is an important distinguishing mark of realism, especially in relation to how neoconservatism developed in the post-Cold War period. Thus for realists the preponderance of American power after the Cold War presents a major challenge to international peace, as the international system lacks the inherent stability of a bipolar system (Desch, 2001: 526). Thus for the United States to base its foreign policy on the universal export of its own liberal democratic values appears foolhardy to the realist. Values, no matter how virtuous, are unable to trump the structural characteristics of the international system that promote power balancing. Instead, the United States should focus on being a status quo power, pursuing limited foreign policy goals. The domestic political situation of other states should be relatively unimportant to the conduct of US foreign policy, as it is not the internal characteristics of states that determine foreign policy behaviour but the structure of the international system. If states are driven by power and attempting to maintain their position in an anarchic world, then whether a state is a liberal democracy or repressively authoritarian is not the determining factor in the conduct of their foreign affairs.

Having established a theory of IR that places heavy emphasis on power, a pessimistic conception of human nature, and an anarchic international system, realists have been vulnerable to the charge that their approach is amoral, even immoral. It is here, given neoconservatism’s emphasis on morality in foreign affairs that perhaps the greatest contrast exists. Perhaps unsurprisingly, realists have been unprepared to accept the
‘amoral’ label which has frequently been applied to them. Morgenthau (2006: 6, 12) argues realism is not indifferent to moral claims, but the desirable and the possible should always be distinguished. He does not argue that morality has no place in foreign affairs, or that there are no “moral laws” that govern the universe; however, those moral laws should not be confused with a particular state’s “moral aspirations”, and moral principles should be “filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” rather than conceptualised universally and in the abstract. Amoral means in the practice of realpolitik, are also capable of serving moral ends. However, while neoconservatives may go too far in claiming to be unique standard-bearers for a values-based foreign policy, realists, seeking to defend the moral basis of their approach, may equally overstate the extent to which that morality impinges upon their strategic calculations. In addition to this, Quinn and Cox (2008: 1367-8) argue that realist foreign policy paradigms struggle with the fundamental liberal universalist thrust of US ideological history. Realism in the United States has not been considered part of the values-based ‘mainstream’ of US foreign policy history, instead endowing itself with an “insurgent tendency” with realism functioning as “a counterfactual worldview”.

1.5.2 Liberal Internationalism

If realism can be summarised with reference to power and an anarchic international system, then liberal internationalism emphasises a more optimistic conception of human

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nature with interdependence the most important characteristic of the international system.\textsuperscript{15} Liberal internationalism is not inattentive to the impact of power and military force on international politics, but argues that there are “systemic constraints on the use of force” and that patterns of power and interdependence “are closely related” (Keohane and Nye Jr, 1987: 727, 730). Although both the realist and liberal internationalist emphases on interdependence have a foundation in utilitarian thought, there are significant areas of divergence. Firstly, liberal internationalism perceives military force to be merely one variable of international politics among many, rather than the most important. Secondly, liberal internationalists place an emphasis on economic incentives in determining international political outcomes. Thirdly, liberal internationalists while not ignoring the state, nonetheless place an emphasis on other groups and actors both above and below the state level (multinational companies, NGOs, charities, pressure groups etc.) (Keohane and Nye Jr, 1987: 729). Whereas realism focuses on the autonomy of states, liberal internationalism stresses linkages between states. Here, the international system is not hallmarked simply by anarchy, but states can collaborate under conditions of interdependence to achieve collective security goals. There is a debate over whether this is based on a self-interested rationality, or the role of international institutions in counteracting and containing the negative effects of anarchy (Lawson, 2003: 41-2).

Woodrow Wilson’s legacy continues to loom large in the manner that the liberal internationalist conception of the international system is made manifest in the foreign

\textsuperscript{15} This thesis uses ‘liberal internationalism’ rather than other definitional labels that have been used for this school. ‘Idealism’ while often used as a counterpart to realism, is a broader term which is not explicitly indicative of liberalism or the basis of those ‘ideals’. ‘Neoliberalism’ is too easily confused with the Chicago School free market economics ideology of the same name. ‘Liberalism’ as a general political ideology is close to the meaning this thesis intends, but the addition of ‘internationalism’ to ‘liberalism’ usefully distinguishes it from simply the wider ideology.
policy of the United States.\textsuperscript{16} It is difficult to discuss liberal internationalism and US foreign policy without bringing definitional clarity to Wilsonianism. Indeed, a lack of definitional precision here is pointed to by the historian, Thomas Knock (2009: 30-1), who suggests that Wilsonianism is used imprecisely as what literary critics would call a “free-floating signifier”, with its real meaning and crucial element strangely absent. A critical question in regard to the relationship between liberal internationalism and neoconservatism is the extent to which the Wilsonian vision that lies at the heart of American liberal internationalism should be primarily identified with the promotion of liberal democracy and interventionism abroad, or with a much wider agenda to make formal multilateral institutions and international law the foundation of the international system.\textsuperscript{17} For Ikenberry (2009: 19-20), the two “logics” of Wilsonianism are evident in the idea of both expanding and deepening the international liberal order, seen with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan after World War Two. The former ambitiously sought to assist countries struggling to be free whereas the latter sought to strengthen and unite the West by aiding Europe financially. Do liberal internationalists primarily seek to spread liberal democratic values and combat totalitarian oppression in other states, or do they seek a deeper rule-based framework of liberal integration based on law and institutions? Smith (2009: 57) argues that US foreign policy failures in the Iraq War are ultimately a crisis for liberal internationalism. The promotion and spread of liberal democracy that were central to Bush’s Middle East policy are also pivotal to liberal internationalist thought.\textsuperscript{18} Thus the neoconservative influence on Bush has been overstated. In reality, liberal internationalists


\textsuperscript{17} This is not to suggest that liberal internationalism has not continued evolving since Wilson. Indeed, the immediate aftermath of World War Two represents a continued refining of the liberal internationalist position with the creation of the United Nations, NATO, Bretton Woods etc, and liberal internationalism has continued to evolve since. Nonetheless, the debate over Wilson’s legacy usefully highlights the central tensions in liberal internationalist thought (Ikenberry, 2009: 15-8).

\textsuperscript{18} Although Smith (2009: 56) does prefer to use ‘neoliberalism’ rather than ‘liberal internationalism’.
located in the Democratic Party did the “heavy lifting” for the Bush Doctrine, and therefore the “fingerprints” all over the Bush Doctrine are not those of Leo Strauss or Theodore Roosevelt but those of Woodrow Wilson. Multilateralism, international law and institutions are certainly Wilsonian themes, but it is the spread of America’s liberal democratic values that is more integral to Wilson’s project.


According to Smith (2009: 67-73, 77-8), the end of the Cold War advanced three important liberal internationalist principles. First, democratic peace theory. Second, the idea that democratic change is not something that necessarily needs to evolve slowly over centuries, but with the right conditions and actors, can occur anywhere rapidly. Third, the idea of sovereignty was redefined. The ‘right’ of states to intervene in other states on the basis of liberal values and human rights became a ‘duty’. Thus, the liberal internationalism of the Cold War evolved into a form of “progressive imperialism.” The neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC) , established in 1997, was merely reflecting the emphases of the Democratic Party’s Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), established in 1989, with the only difference between the two being one of tactics with the PPI giving a cursory nod to multilateralism.

In response to Smith’s account, Anne-Marie Slaughter (2009: 90-1) argues that he “twists Wilson and his legacy beyond recognition” and is guilty of conflating aggressive conservative adventurism with liberal internationalist concerns to build a law-based world order. Wilson was not interested in the fetishisation of liberal democracy per se, instead, a

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key emphasis of his famous fourteen points was the principle of self-determination, and following the unsuccessful United States intervention in Mexico, was a staunch non-interventionist. Liberal internationalism in the twenty-first century therefore owes three main principles to Wilson. Firstly, the authority of states rests on their ability to provide for and protect their citizens. Secondly, political and social transformation is a bottom-up process which cannot be imposed from above or the outside. Thirdly, any decisions on the use of force must be made collectively rather than unilaterally (Slaughter, 2009: 110-1). Tony Smith’s account of Wilsonian liberal internationalism is preferred in this thesis. Quinn and Cox (2007: 500-1) also point to “overlap” between neoconservatism and liberal internationalism, and emphasise that expanding liberal democracy abroad and the idea of the “liberal peace” has been a major feature of US foreign policy history. This goes beyond merely elections, but is concerned with “the impregnation of belligerent societies with liberal values” as a way of producing peace. They argue that the conception of “liberal universalism” in the United States emphasises expanding US liberal values as a precursor to peace, rather than necessarily arguing the case for that role to be played by multilateralism or international law. Slaughter’s account of liberal internationalism based solely on international law and multilateral institutions would leave very little scope for drawing any connections with neoconservatism. Nonetheless, even if the reality lies somewhere between Smith and Slaughter, there would seem ample scope for a conception of liberal internationalism that embraces both arguments. Neoconservative thought was 20This discussion between Smith and Slaughter in some ways mirrors the debate on the pages of Foreign Affairs between Robert Kagan, Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson. Although not a specific discussion on liberal internationalism, Kagan (2004: 67-68; 2005a: 171) argues it is a myth that American legitimacy during the Cold War rested on UN-based multilateralism, but instead was based on combating the strategic and ideological threat posed by the USSR combined with the structural legitimacy of bipolarity. The United States frequently defied international law throughout the Cold War. Tucker and Hendrickson (2004: 21-3), however, argue that US legitimacy was not based on ideals or moral purpose, but international law and consensual decision-making.
influenced by the aspect of liberal internationalism that emphasised the widening of liberal
democracy abroad, but rejecting the deepening narrative.

1.6 Neoconservatives on Neoconservatism

The second half of this chapter concerns itself with a review of the literature on
neoconservatism. While the focus will mainly be on the foreign policy aspects of
neoconservative ideology, it will be necessary to elucidate upon neoconservatism in the
round, including domestic aspects. Unlike some other philosophical approaches,
neoconservatism is difficult to conceptually dichotomise between the domestic and the
foreign, indeed, Michael Williams (2005: 328-9) suggests that this is one of its key
strengths and will aid its longevity. Irving Kristol, widely seen as the principal
neoconservative intellectual of the past four decades, has usefully provided his own
definitional clarity on neoconservatism. Writing in 1983, Kristol set out eight key features
which he argued were the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of neoconservatism,
and are listed below in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Irving Kristol’s Eight Features of Neoconservatism (I. Kristol, 1983: 75-77)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Disillusionment with contemporary liberalism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Anti-romantic (it is philosophical-political not literary-political).</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Philosophical roots are classical and premodern.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Belief in liberal-democratic capitalism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Market economy necessary but not sufficient for a liberal society.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Economic growth for social stability not material gain.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not libertarian. Conservative welfare state preferred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Family and religion as indispensable pillars of decent society.</td>
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</tbody>
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Perhaps what is most striking about Kristol’s eight points for our purposes here is that
none are explicitly concerned with foreign policy. There are no points relating to America
as the indispensable benevolent hegemon or the need for American unilateralism in
relation to the United Nations. This is not to argue that these ideas were not held by Kristol or other neoconservatives, but it is significant that he chose not to overtly include foreign policy themes in his eight foundational principles. This suggests that for neoconservatives, their ideological approach – although Kristol would almost certainly shun the label ‘ideological’ – to foreign policy is firmly rooted in a broader philosophical position that is primarily directed towards domestic concerns, namely liberal democratic capitalism, conservative welfarism, the family and religion. Indeed, as further evidence, in Irving Kristol’s 1995 collection of his essays from the previous forty-five years, out of forty-one chapters, less than five were written directly on foreign policy (I. Kristol, 1995b).

In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Irving Kristol (2003: 24) made the startling claim that “there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience”. His perspective here may be why foreign policy issues had not featured largely in his previous definitions of neoconservatism. The difference between a foreign policy ‘belief’ and foreign policy ‘attitude’, however, would seem to be one of semantics rather than substance, for Kristol then proceeded to provide four foreign policy ‘attitudes’ held by neoconservatives, which certainly could be seen as beliefs, and indeed as foundational principles of an ideology, if a value-neutral definition of ideology is preferred. Firstly, patriotism is a “natural and healthy sentiment.” Secondly, “world government” is to be opposed as it leads to “world tyranny.” Thirdly, the primary role of statesmen is to differentiate between friends and enemies. Lastly, apart from in very “prosaic” matters such as trade, the national interest is not a term relating to geography or borders, but is primarily an ideological term that trumps material definitions (I. Kristol, 2003: 24-5). William Bennett (2000: 292) has taken
this fourth principle further by arguing that American nationalism is not of the “soil” but is primarily of political ideals.

Like Kristol in 2003, Francis Fukuyama (2006: 4-5) has also condensed neoconservative principles down to four central ideas. Firstly, there is a need for liberal democracy. Secondly, human rights and the internal politics of other states matters. Thirdly, there is scepticism of the ability of international law and international institutions to solve security problems. Fourthly, social engineering “often undermines its own ends”.\(^\text{21}\) For Fukuyama, the central tension in neoconservative thought is between the first two principles and the last one. The increased neoconservative penchant for democracy promotion and ‘interference’ in the domestic politics of other states does not sit easily with scepticism about the role of social engineering (Fukuyama, 2006: 114).

Joshua Muravchik, the former National Chairman of the Young People’s Socialist League, and possibly, Irving Kristol aside, the neoconservative who has written most widely on neoconservatism itself, also suggests (2007: 21-2) that in the aftermath of the Cold War, four central neoconservative principles endured. Firstly, neoconservatives were moralists and admirers of American liberal values who did not hesitate in pronouncing “negative moral judgments” on brutal dictators of the ilk of Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein. Secondly, neoconservatives were internationalists who did not support isolationism but sought to proactively tackle international security problems before they had the chance to grow into larger threats. Thirdly, neoconservatives argued the use of military force rather than diplomacy or UN intervention, had greater efficacy in confronting adversaries and

\(^{21}\text{Despite Fukuyama having now distanced himself from neoconservatism, he has been included in this section as he was identified with it during the period of concern to this thesis.}\)
despotc regimes. Fourthly, neoconservatives supported *democratic governance* as a strategy for combating human-rights violations. For Muravchik, it is these themes that are central to the neoconservative approach to foreign policy, and conspiratorial notions that the neoconservatives represent a Likudite cabal behind the scenes, sinisterly manipulating American foreign policy in the interests of Israel, are to be discarded. The very fact that critics of neoconservatives such as Michael Lind, invoke both Leo Strauss and Trotsky as crucial intellectual forebears for neoconservatives despite the fact that a more disparate pair of thinkers would be difficult to find, is given by Muravchik as evidence of a penchant for anti-Semitism on the part of some of their critics, as the only thing linking Strauss and Trotsky would appear to be their ethnicity (Muravchik, 2003: 29-30; Lind, 2003: 10).

Some neoconservatives have drawn a connection between their foreign policy positions and liberal internationalism. Indeed, Irwin Stelzer, provides a definition of neoconservatism that is essentially Wilsonianism minus faith in international institutions, and Max Boot has coined the phrase “Hard Wilsonianism” (Stelzer, 2004: 9; Boot, 2002c: A12). Adam Wolfson (2004: 216, 224), however, suggests it is a mistake to portray neoconservatism as just a foreign policy ideology or “Wilsonianism on steroids”. He contrasts neoconservatism with both libertarian and more traditional Burkean conservatism, and argues that the unique feature of neoconservative thought compared with other conservative ideologies is that it gives primacy to the political. The state and big government are not perceived to be the enemy of the citizens in the same way as other forms of conservatism would suggest. The problem with the welfare state and big government “has less to do with political liberty than with the specter of moral corruption”. This shows the relative level of comfort that neoconservatives have with ‘big’
government compared with other conservatives, and is also important for introducing the idea of virtue.

The principal adversary of neoconservatism, both domestically and in foreign policy, is not socialism *per se*, but nihilism. Firstly, nihilism is perceived to undermine liberal democratic virtue at home through the counter-culture’s undermining of authority and morality, and secondly, undermine liberal democratic virtue abroad through forms of realism and liberal internationalism that amorally embrace *realpolitik* and multilateralism respectively. It can be clearly seen that both Kristol and Fukuyama’s synopses of the central tenets of neoconservatism distinguish it from realism by its suggestion that the internal regimes of states matter. It is further distinguished from liberal internationalism by its opposition to cosmopolitan forms of global governance and multilateralism, particularly as embodied in the United Nations.

The neoconservative emphasis on virtue is most clearly articulated by Gertrude Himmelfarb, the historian and wife of Irving Kristol. Although she does not explicitly write on foreign policy or neoconservatism, her work on the British Enlightenment and British cultural history is foundational to understanding the central feature of neoconservatism. In her 2004, *The Roads to Modernity*, Himmelfarb provides a fundamental revisionist challenge to the prevailing narrative of the Western intellectual tradition since the French Revolution. She claims her work is “doubly revisionist” in that she proposes the Enlightenment was, firstly, more British, not simply the product of Parisian salons, and secondly, it was more “inclusive” and not just the product of radical
left-leaning intellectuals. Under her schema, John Wesley and Edmund Burke, usually classed as conservative counter-revolutionaries, are instead portrayed as pivotal Enlightenment thinkers (Himmelfarb, 2004: 6). The passage below demonstrates Himmelfarb’s challenge to the dominant conception of the Enlightenment as primarily concerned with reason, rights, liberty and equality:

What is conspicuously absent is virtue. Yet it was virtue, rather than reason that took precedence for the British, not personal virtue, but the “social virtues” – compassion, benevolence, sympathy – which the British philosophers believed, naturally, instinctively, habitually bound people to each other. They did not deny reason; they were by no means irrationalists. But they gave reason a secondary, instrumental role, rather than the primary, determinant one that the *philosophes* gave it.

(Himmelfarb, 2004: 6).

The British Enlightenment’s emphasis on what she describes as the “sociology of virtue” was appropriated by early American political figures and combined with the American emphasis on the “politics of liberty” (Himmelfarb, 2004: 19, 234). For Himmelfarb, American exceptionalism rests on a conception of virtue that was firmly rooted in the British Enlightenment, whilst the French *philosophes*, with an emphasis on abstract reason and a strong anti-clerical streak, never adopted. The crucial aspect of Himmelfarb’s work, that places it firmly in the centre of neoconservative thought, is her conception of virtue as not restricted to the private sphere, but fundamentally wedded to the broader polity and the public sphere. Society itself is imbued with an ethos, a moral character, and is capable of acting virtuously. Indeed her analysis of Victorian Britain, points to precisely this issue, arguing against Marxist economic determinism and suggesting the virtues of a society are

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22 In addition, Himmelfarb (2004: 13) provides a further revisionist note here by suggesting that there was a “British” Enlightenment, and that the Scottish nature of it has been overplayed.

23 Himmelfarb (2004: 7) approvingly suggests that Hegel thought the United States owed much to Britain and almost nothing to the French.
a “determining factor in their own right(.)” in relation to economic and political realities (Himmelfarb, 1994: 78-80).

Both Irving and William Kristol have also placed an important emphasis on virtue. Irving Kristol’s (1996a: 312-3) advocacy of “liberal censorship” gives an indication of his conception of the ideal liberal democratic state. He rejects what he describes as “managerial” definitions of democracy in favour of a definition that places more emphasis on the “quality of public life”, the “character of the people”, and that democracy and self-government only makes sense if the ‘self’ is sufficiently imbued with “republican virtue”. Classical liberal democratic republican society was not, for Kristol, wedded to a narrow form of economic libertarianism. He had no sympathies with Hayek’s suggestion that capitalism did not “incarnate” an idea of justice or morality.24 Instead, “there was a strong correlation between certain personal virtues – frugality, industry, sobriety, reliability and piety – and the way in which power, privilege, and property were distributed” (I. Kristol, 1996c: 108). William Kristol (1996e: 439), deploying a similar argument to both his parents, links the “politics of liberty” with the “sociology of virtue” and argues that there is a pressing need to reinvent societal institutions “to promote virtue and foster sound character”.

There is both a top-down and bottom-up element to neoconservative thought. Socio-political institutions are to inculcate moral virtue in the wider citizenry, and at the same time, the government and societal institutions are to be a collective reflection of that virtue. More importantly, neoconservatives argue that the American state and social institutions are infused with a moral schema and should be proactive, even radical in the fostering of

24 An example of this Kristol suggests would be Abraham Lincoln’s Unionist North around the period of the Civil War (I. Kristol, 1996c: 108). Please also see Friedrich A. von Hayek (1944) The Road to Serfdom (London, Routledge).
this virtue. This is not the incremental change of traditional conservatism on the defensive, but a more moralised and far-reaching programme. Perhaps the most important implication to be drawn from this is that through their construction of the concept of virtue, neoconservatives have provided the American state almost with a moralised and proactive ‘personality’ or ‘character’. While the primary application is domestic, it is out of this foundation that neoconservatives have developed their foreign policy thought, and the chief reason why this thesis makes discussion of ‘virtue’ a central issue.25

1.7 The Academy on Neoconservatism

Peter Steinfels’ early analysis of neoconservatism during the Carter administration remains an important early contribution to the literature. His criticisms on the manner in which neoconservatism has been discussed remain valid. It has too often been viewed in terms of personalities and an emphasis on their motivations, especially their status as “liberal renegades”, rather than systematically interrogating the ideology. While Steinfels (1980: 15-22) strongly opposed neoconservatism on various points, he nonetheless recognised it was a serious and intellectual form of conservatism that America had hitherto lacked, unlike more agrarian or aristocratic forms of conservatism. The defence of a much harder, more fearful form of liberalism was intrinsic to neoconservative thought, which he argued was, while plausible, nevertheless less than what America was capable of. The manner in which leading neoconservatives became “liberal renegades” and switched parties has been widely discussed by both Steinfels and others.26 The purpose of this section is not to

25 For further neoconservative discussion on virtue please see James Q. Wilson (1996) ‘The Rediscovery of Character: Private Virtue and Public Policy’ in Mark Gerson (ed.) The Essential Neoconservative Reader (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley), pp. 291-304. Wilson (1996: 291, 302) suggests that public policy problems can only be solved “if they are seen as arising out of a defect in character formation”, and that the traditional understanding of the political was to improve the character of the citizens.

examine the history of neoconservatism as detailed by academics, but rather how the ideology has been conceptualised. Nonetheless, it is worth noting here that Steinfels argues that a series of events during the 1960s were crucial to the evolution of neoconservative thought. The neoconservatives perceived that liberalism had shifted to the left to the extent that it had abandoned the defence of traditional sources of authority and essential social institutions, especially the university, and had buckled under the threat posed by Soviet totalitarianism. According to neoconservative self-perception, it was not they that had shifted right, but liberalism had swung sharply to the left:

Pessimistic about human nature, sceptical about the outcome of political innovation, distrustful of direct democracy (the “mob”), it [neoconservatism] would defend the principles and practices of liberalism less as vehicles for betterment than as bulwarks against folly.

(Steinfels, 1980: 19)

The neoconservative defence of what they argued was the classical liberal tradition rested on five central themes according to Steinfels. Firstly, a crisis of authority had overtaken the West, with traditional social institutions fundamentally losing legitimacy. Secondly, that crisis was predominantly cultural, and an issue of values, virtue and morality, stemming from a decline in religion, rise in hedonism, and the malign influence of what Lionel Trilling termed the “adversary culture” and the “New Class”. The enemy of liberal republican virtue was nihilism. Thirdly, the American government was a victim of

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27 Such tipping points included the campus occupation at Berkeley (1964); anti-Vietnam demonstrations (1965-66); protests and riots at Columbia (1968); street battles at the Democratic Convention in Chicago (1968); minority frustrations and violence throughout the 1960s (Steinfels, 1980: 44-5)
28 In a similar way to how the radical left viewed the military-industrial complex at the heart of what was wrong with America, the neoconservative conception of the New Class was based primarily upon a “university-government-media complex” construction of what needed changing in the United States (Steinfels, 1980: 57)
overload and had failed partly by attempting too much, which had fed back into the wider
decline of authority. Fourthly, neoconservatives held that authority must be reasserted and
government protected. This brought about a paradox in neoconservative thought in that the
common man was to be venerated as a bulwark against hedonistic, nihilistic elites, and yet
there was a strong elitist strand in neoconservative thought running concurrently with this.
Lastly, international order depended upon stability at home. By focusing on the
Communist threat and the Third World’s denunciation of liberal democracy, the
neoconservatives hoped to generate patriotism and self-discipline (Steinfels, 1980: 53-68).

The direction of causality between the domestic and the foreign is difficult to
conclusively argue one way or the other. Does neoconservatism’s construction of threats
facing the United States stem from a desire to use foreign policy to steer domestic society
in the direction of stability and authority, or are the perceptions of threats faced by the
United States causing the neoconservative concern with domestic stability and traditional
authority, or are both true? Is foreign policy merely used instrumentally to shape domestic
virtue, or domestic virtue to shape foreign policy? Steinfels (1980: 68) favours the former
argument over the latter, suggesting that neoconservatives have used overseas threats to
fight domestic battles and discredit domestic ideological opponents.

A slightly different but nonetheless comparable set of questions is offered by James Mann
(2004: 368) in his analysis of Paul Wolfowitz’s career. Did Wolfowitz view American
military power abroad simply as a tool for the furthering of the ultimate goal of the
expansion of American liberal democratic virtues, or is the invocation of American
republican ideals simply used instrumentally in furthering the ultimate goal of American
power or empire. Mann suggests that Wolfowitz’s idealism often followed behind more

29 Interestingly, despite the fierce anti-Communism of leading neoconservatives, many were sceptical of the
merits of the Vietnam War as a foreign policy enterprise, but were more concerned with the domestic fall-out
and lack of stability it had generated (Steinfels, 1980: 68)
“hard-nosed” estimates of America’s national interest. Some have gone yet further. Maria Ryan’s analysis (2007: 4, 8) of post-Cold War neoconservatism argues that idealism did not ‘follow behind’, but essentially functioned merely as rhetorical veneer for a conservative nationalism that was not significantly different from that of Donald Rumsfeld or Dick Cheney. For Ryan, talk of democracy promotion and human-rights almost functions as a rhetorical red-herring; behind the façade the neoconservatives were only motivated by their perception of what was needed to further American power and the national interest.\(^{30}\)

For other academic observers, however, the distinction between conservative nationalism of the Cheney/Rumsfeld ilk and neoconservatism is an important step in being able to unpack neoconservative ideology. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay (2003: 15) both previously of the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution, argued that neoconservatism should be more accurately described as “democratic imperialism” and differed from a more hard-line conservative nationalism, whose adherents could more accurately be referred to as “assertive nationalists”. While both ‘groups’ were united in support for toppling Saddam Hussein and the Taleban, conservative nationalists were less enthusiastic about the promotion of democracy and human rights and the imposition of American values abroad.\(^{31}\) A more conservative-realist critique came from Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke (2004: 14) who argued that Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld shared key beliefs on American unilateralism and exceptionalism with neoconservatives, but should be more

\(^{30}\) The limitations of this argument are discussed in Chapter Two. Arguments of this type have been frequently deployed by radical critics of American foreign policy. Noam Chomsky (2004: 129) suggests that “lofty rhetoric is the obligatory accompaniment of virtually any resort to force and therefore carries no information. The rhetoric is doubly hard to take seriously in the light of the display of the contempt for democracy that accompanied it”.

\(^{31}\) President Obama has since appointed Daalder as the United States Permanent Representative to NATO, while Lindsay is a professor at the University of Texas at Austin.
accurately labelled “American nationalists”. While neoconservatives have taken the brunt of the blame for the Bush administration’s failings, it is this form of American nationalism that others argue has been the primary driver of foreign policy. Indeed, Steven Hurst (2005: 76) argues that neoconservatism’s influence on the Bush administration has been “marginal” and conservative nationalism was the “dominant influence” on Bush’s foreign policy. According to this argument, there are two broad clusters of divergence between neoconservatism and conservative nationalism. Firstly, neoconservatives argue that “ideas, values and democracy” are central to the conduct of foreign policy, whereas they would appear to be more marginal themes for conservative nationalists. Secondly, neoconservatives embrace “humanitarian intervention, peace-keeping and nation-building”, whereas again, conservative nationalists are less enthusiastic. Despite these divergences, however, neoconservatives and conservative nationalists have often agreed on foreign policy issues, although on the basis of differing rationales. For example in the case of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, the former wanted to emphasise humanitarian factors and Serbian aggression, the latter pointed to the credibility of NATO being at stake (Hurst, 2005: 81-3).

Given that many leading neoconservatives are Jewish, some have suggested this as an important driver of their foreign policy thought, and that in its coarsest form the interests of Washington have been subordinated to the interests of Tel Aviv. Michael Lind argues that neoconservatism has been influenced by a “far-right Likud strain of Zionism”, whereas Anne Norton has argued that for the neoconservatives, “Israel is America’s instructor. Israel has learned to discipline democracy” (Lind, 2003: 10; Norton, 2004:
208). According to Gary Dorrien (2004: 204-6), however, in an otherwise scathing assault on neoconservatism, the idea that the neoconservatives may be motivated by Jewish nationalism is “a species of prejudice” and if the neoconservatives are wrong “they deserved to be contended with on the basis of what they argued, not who they were”. The idea that neoconservatives are motivated by their Jewish identity would also seem to be negated by the fact that leading neoconservatives such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Michael Novak and Gary Schmitt are not Jewish. The only plausible way in which neoconservatism may be influenced by ethnicity, is Heilbrunn’s argument that the early neoconservatives were motivated by immigrant resentment and status anxiety towards the governing class. This was added to by a moralised conception of Jewish history that views “history as a drama of salvation and idolatry”, with neoconservatives functioning more like prophets than intellectuals, using ideas in a moral struggle (Heilbrunn, 2008: 13). Even this, however, seems to be over-stating the importance of ethnically-based intellectual traditions to neoconservative ideology.

The emphasis placed on virtue and morality by neoconservatives has been emphasised in the academic literature, although perhaps not as widely as might be expected. Analysis of neoconservatism that conflates it with neoliberalism would seem to have misunderstood this fundamental aspect of neoconservative thought. For example, Akram-Lodhi (2005a: 1; 2005b: 399) suggests that neoconservatism is “the intellectual foundation of the market-oriented ideology that has dominated the global system” and that the neoliberal, libertarian think tank, the Adam Smith Institute, is neoconservative. Susan George (2008: 25, 31) also makes this conflation by suggesting that both liberals and neoconservatives are obsessed with cutting taxes and reducing government benefits, despite neoconservatism

32 Norton makes the extraordinary, and frankly hard to believe claim that “Straussians” at the University of Chicago “told me that Arabs were dirty, they were animals, they were vermin.” (Norton, 2004: 210)
being relatively content with size of the government compared with neoliberals and other conservatives. Indeed, George makes the quite astonishing claim that “all neo-cons are neo-liberals”. The important differences between neoconservatism and neoliberalism hinge on neoconservatism’s conceptualisation of virtue. Wendy Brown (2006: 692, 698, 706-7) argues that neoconservatism is a “fierce, moral-political rationality” whereas neoliberalism is a “market-political rationality”. For Brown, the fundamental feature of neoconservatism distinguishing it from neoliberalism and older forms of conservatism is that it wholeheartedly affirms “moralized state power in the domestic and international sphere” where the American state sets the moral-religious compass for both domestic society and the rest of the world through the conduct of its foreign policy. Indeed, she further argues that the neoconservative governance ideal looks remarkably similar to some ecclesiastical authority structures, and that the state functions pastorally in relation to its “flock”.

The neoconservative theme of virtue is further unpacked in an article by Michael Williams, which almost certainly represents the most incisive analysis of neoconservatism to date. He argues (2005: 308-10; 322) that IR scholars have neglected and ignored neoconservatism instead of engaging with it, and that virtue is integral to understanding neoconservatism’s approach to international relations. For Williams, although neoconservatism is characterised as a subset of realism, in reality, many of its characteristics sit in contrast with realism. Realism has the potential to corrupt the virtue of a government and by implication the wider polity. Nihilism is presented as the fundamental ailment of Western democracy, virtue is stressed as the only way to meet the challenge it poses, and this is the foundation of the neoconservative approach to foreign policy. There is a three-fold neoconservative critique of realism according to Williams. Firstly, the realist obsession with defining what is the ‘national interest’ reveals an
approach that is severed from values and morally bankrupt. Secondly, realism does not connect with fundamental ‘American’ values, and thus is paradoxically not realistic as it will always lack widespread public support. Thirdly, realism causes society to decay through its embrace of what is perceived to be a morally duplicitous realpolitik. Williams (2005: 327-8) does argue, however, that neoconservatism shares points of agreement with both liberalism and social constructivism, especially the belief that “ideas matter” and are in some way constitutive of political realities.33

Although a significant portion of the literature analyses neoconservatism in ideological terms, this is not a unanimous position. Aaron Rapport (2008: 261) argues that neoconservatism is not an ideology, but is an explanatory theory of IR in the same way as constructivism and neorealism are also explanatory theories. Neoconservatism is not just an ideology that informs political action, but one that presents a coherent theory of how the international system operates. It holds to a series of propositions that “lead to generalizable conclusions regarding the outcomes of state interactions in the international system” and while similar to other IR theories “is not wholly derivative of any of them”. For Rapport, neoconservatism as an explanatory theory of international politics rests on a set of premises listed in Table 2 below:

33 An interesting linkage, noted by Williams, between neoconservatism and social constructivism is the role played by Peter Berger, whose work with Peter Luckman on the social construction of reality is important for constructivists. Berger was also a frequent contributor to neoconservative discussion (Williams, 2005: 328).
Table 2: Key Premises of Neoconservatism as an Explanatory Theory of IR (Rapport, 2008: 262-75)

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<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Human action is a function of the beliefs imposed on individuals by their social environment.</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>Human beings have basic, biologically determinant wants and needs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Liberal democracies are capable of satisfying humanity’s most basic wants and needs in both the short and long term.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>The character of political regimes determines the political character of their citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>The internal character of regimes is a predictor of their external behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Political ideologies are in constant competition with one another; at the extreme this conflict may take the form of existential conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>The distribution of ideologies among states determine the severity of conflict levels, which is to say the distribution of state identities defines the character of the international system’s structure.</td>
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Although according to Rapport, neoconservatism has a superficial similarity with realist and liberal IR theories, he argues that neoconservative IR theory shares many similarities with Alexander Wendt’s form of constructivism (Rapport, 2008: 261). Both neoconservatism and Wendt’s ‘thin’ constructivism are concerned with emphasising that ideas matter in international politics and are in some way constitutive of reality. Both also share a focus on the nation-state as the crucial feature of the international system, and the salience of what Wendt describes as brute material forces – geography, natural resources and military power, rather than “ideas all the way down” (Wendt, 1999: 20, 72, 94).

Rapport’s argument remains problematic. Neoconservative authors have largely confined themselves to specific topical foreign policy issues rather than producing general theoretical contributions to IR. Maria Ryan (2007: 4) argues neoconservative strategy is “incomplete” and that they merely responded to events during the 1990s, rather than providing systematic IR theories. Joshua Micah Marshall (2003: 146) states that
“(n)eoconservatism never really had a well-explicated theory of foreign policy in the first place. It developed as an ideological movement in the context of American domestic politics”. While Rapport’s neoconservative premises in Table Two are largely accurate, these have to be teased out of the neoconservative literature on the Iraq War or the United Nations for example. There is nothing in the neoconservative canon that would look similar to Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics or Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. A neoconservative theory of IR if such exists is scattered rather than found in one or two ‘authoritative texts’, and the vast bulk of neoconservative literature appears to be more policy-orientated or ideological than theoretical. This is not a criticism of neoconservatism but recognition that for the most part it has been more interested in providing foreign policy solutions for Washington policymakers, not theoretical paradigms for university seminars. These solutions are obviously underpinned by ideas, for example scepticism of global governance or belief in the supremacy of liberal democracy. These ideas, however, do not provide a systematic theory of how the international political system operates, but instead are ideas for how the United States should conduct itself in foreign policy. Neoconservatism would appear to be simultaneously less and more than an IR theory. While it lacks a completely systematic theory of the functioning of international politics, neoconservative perspectives on domestic politics, morality and human nature, make neoconservatism a unique ideology of the political in general, in a way that Wendt’s constructivist IR theory, for example, is not.\(^{34}\)

\(^{34}\) The distinction between what should be defined as ‘ideology’ and what should be defined as ‘IR theory’ is perhaps not as clear-cut as one might first think, and certainly contestable. For example, Behr and Heath (2009: 328, 345) in their analysis of realism and neo-realism, argue from a position that ideology represents false consciousness, that both forms are deeply rooted in the 20\(^{th}\) century historical context, and should not be assumed to be universal theories, but instead have developed as ideologies of national interest. Of course, from a starting position that ideology represents false consciousness, the distance between what is an ideology and what is a universal theory is necessarily greater than for one who utilises a more ‘neutral’ definition of ideology.
1.8 Defining Neoconservatism

Given that ideologies change over time, and given the fact that such change is the very focus of this thesis, there are obviously inherent dangers in seeking to provide a fundamental and immutable definition of neoconservatism. Firstly, if, as this thesis claims, what neoconservatism ‘was’ in 1989 was different from what it ‘was’ in 2003, then any suggestion of core neoconservative themes must by necessity be fairly capacious, somewhat equivocal, and able to encompass a range of foreign policy perspectives within a broad ideological umbrella. Secondly, the lines drawn between neoconservatism and its ideological competitors in foreign policy circles on the Right are occasionally not as stark as they may first appear. John Bolton, for example, is very rarely consistently labelled as a member of just one foreign policy school, and has at times been described as a neoconservative, a realist, and a conservative nationalist. There are very few people who would ever be doctrinally ‘pure’ in terms of any foreign policy school or ideological ideal-type. This presents a thorny issue for the analyst of ideological change, and is further problematised by the fact that not all neoconservatives use the label of ‘neoconservative’ to describe themselves as much as Irving Kristol did. There will therefore undoubtedly be readers of this thesis who will be surprised by certain omissions or inclusions. This thesis is not automatically deterred, however, by the reluctance of an individual to use the label ‘neoconservative’ to describe their ideological outlook. Charles Krauthammer, for example, who is a key neoconservative, eschews the label. Nonetheless, it is clear from an examination of his work that he subscribes to all three main neoconservative pillars as expanded on below.

35 Lynch argues that neoconservatism has been used ubiquitously by the left to describe anyone whose political opinions they find offensive, rather than giving it a precise definition. He argues that John Bolton, frequently described as a neoconservative instead provides policy prescriptions that are “grounded in a realist reading of international relations” (Lynch, 2005).
When considering central neoconservative themes, it cannot, by necessity, be a systematically watertight, scientific exercise; neoconservatives do not compose a monolithic group. There will be those who wholeheartedly embrace all aspects of neoconservatism, those who have an affinity with certain aspects without embracing the totality, and those who were previously content to be seen as neoconservative and have now significantly diverged from it. Thus while there is undoubtedly a core group of neoconservative intellectuals – who incidentally do not agree on every foreign policy issue on the table – there also exists a wider peripheral collection of sympathetic intellectuals, of whom John Bolton is a prime example. Although these are not doctrinally ‘pure’ neoconservatives, they have significantly contributed to the evolution of neoconservative discourse and debates in more than simply an exogenous fashion.36

Bearing the above caveats in mind, three central pillars to neoconservative ideology present themselves. Firstly, there is an over-riding concern with virtue, both domestically and in international affairs. This thesis argues that the conception of this in relation to foreign policy became more expansive during the period under investigation; nonetheless, virtue as a moralised theme is dominant throughout. Therefore while strategic considerations of the national interest are certainly not absent from neoconservative discourse, nonetheless, these are presented and justified with reference to the need for America to act virtuously. This distinguishes neoconservatism from a liberal internationalism, whose conception of morality is tied much more closely to supranationalism, and both realism and conservative nationalism, which are far more concerned with couching policy prescriptions in a more circumscribed way in terms of the national interest. This neoconservative use of virtue extends to both style and substance in

36 Please see Appendix One for table of neoconservative ‘generations’.
foreign policy. American virtue is not to be surrendered to what neoconservatives perceive to be either a nihilistic supranationalism or the morally duplicitous functioning of *realpolitik*.

While neoconservatism may strike the reader as being just another strain of American exceptionalist ideology, their conception of virtue differs from the standard exposition of exceptionalism in an important regard. Under the neoconservative framework, foreign policy is rarely constructed in terms of America’s blood, soil or geography. For neoconservatives, the goal of the United States in its foreign policy is less about remaking the world in Washington’s image *per se*, and more about remaking the world in conformity to an abstract ideal, loosely based on a particularly conservative reading of basic human rights and liberal democratic norms. There is thus nothing essentially ‘American’ about its ideological make-up, although they understandably suggest it is the United States that currently embodies those values better than other states do. Indeed, British neoconservatives at the Henry Jackson Society in London argue the European Union could also perform a similar anti-totalitarian, hegemonic role, in addition to or in place of the United States (Rogers, 2006). American neoconservatives have also often pointed to the virtues of British imperialism in the Victorian era rather than American exceptionalism.

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37 This should not though give the impression that American exceptionalism is absent from neoconservative thought, indeed, Seymour Martin Lipset wrote a whole book dedicated to it as a concept (*American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, 1997, New York, W.W.Norton). But it is strikingly different in tone from the more blood and soil form of American exceptionalist patriotism promoted by Patrick Buchanan (2004) for example.

38 James Rogers (2006) argues the European Union should transform itself from a “community of right” to a “union of might”. In a forceful conclusion and challenge to current EU practice, he suggests “global powers have special obligations and duties to discharge in the wider world, and are expected by their weaker partners to act as forces not only for international peace and security, but also as leaders on the global stage”. This certainly points to neoconservative thought being broader in scope and less inextricably bound to the idea of specifically American exceptionalism.
exclusively, and Sir Winston Churchill’s statesmanship is venerated as the prime example of how to conduct foreign policy.  

The second central feature of neoconservative thought is that it is an ideology of the political that is wider than merely foreign affairs. Domestic politics and society are of signal importance to neoconservatives. This has important implications for this thesis. Firstly, the domestic regime and socio-political characteristics of foreign states matter because they indicate the likely foreign policy behaviour of those states. The United States also has a moral responsibility as a liberal hegemon to concern itself with human rights abuses and the promotion of democracy in foreign states. Secondly, the domestic regime and socio-political characteristics of the United States matters. The manner in which the United States conducts its foreign policy is indicative of the condition of the domestic society from which it came, and foreign policy plays a role inculcating certain values in the domestic populace. A vigorous, robust, sober, and at times martial, foreign policy for neoconservatives has the benefit of combating the very values at home that they have always argued undermined the classical liberal democratic tradition, namely nihilism, hedonism, and general lack of self-restraint in society. So, for neoconservatism, the domestic is always closely related to foreign policy, both in terms of foreign states and the United States itself.

In addition to the emphases on virtue and domestic politics, the third central feature of neoconservatism is its stress on hard power and the use of military force in foreign policy.

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39 Max Boot has been the leading cheerleader for the United States to recreate British imperialism. In a provocative article in *The Weekly Standard*, a month after the September 11 attacks, he argued that “Afghanistan and other troubled lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets” (Boot, 2001: 28-29).

40 Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson’s (D-WA) campaign for the rights of Jews in the former Soviet Union to emigrate to Israel, culminating in the Jackson-Vanik amendment (1974) was an early example of the neoconservative emphasis on human rights.
crises. While the first two features distinguish neoconservatism from realism, this latter theme demonstrates the differences it has with aspects of liberal internationalist thought. An accompanying feature of this emphasis on hard power is a proclivity to unilateralism and rejection of multilateralism, especially in its United Nations guise.\textsuperscript{41} This is not to state that neoconservatives do not offer non-military solutions to various foreign policy crises abroad. Gregory Fossedal’s \textit{The Democratic Imperative}, certainly points to a variety of ways in which the United States can achieve its foreign policy goals, including economic development, public diplomacy and sanctions (Fossedal, 1989: 88, 115, 178). Nonetheless, it would be churlish to deny as a central feature that neoconservatives place greater faith in the efficacy of military force to solve foreign policy dilemmas, compared with almost every other foreign policy school. A prime example of this was David Frum and Richard Perle (2003: 97-145) who argued at the end of 2003 that US resolve was weakening following the intransigence of resistance in Iraq, and were widely criticised for their bellicosity. They urged, among other things, the United States to support the toppling of the Iranian regime, threaten military action against North Korea and suggested the “severest consequences” for Saudi Arabia and Syria if they both continued to support terrorist groups.

Taken together, these three central pillars of neoconservatism – an emphasis on virtue; a concern with the domestic socio-political environments of states; and a belief in the efficacy of hard power, often in a unilateral guise – present an ideology that is noticeably distinct from other foreign policy schools. While no one element is exclusive to neoconservatism, as a package they present an original, distinctive and coherent ideological worldview. Nevertheless, whereas these three broad themes remain relatively

\textsuperscript{41} Criticism of the United Nations is a long-running neoconservative theme, with an important early example, a speech in 1975 by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then Ambassador to the UN, denouncing the inherent anti-Semitism of a resolution equating Zionism with racism (Moynihan, 1996: 93-99).
constant features of neoconservative thought during this period, it will be argued that all three conceptions were interpreted more expansively by neoconservatives by the start of the Iraq War in 2003 than they had been in 1989 when Bush and Gorbachev heralded the end of the Cold War in Malta.

1.9 Conclusion

As a theoretical and methodological foundation, this chapter has explored definitions of ideology, followed by a brief survey of relevant aspects of the study of the ‘history of ideas’, ideology and US foreign policy, before a discussion of realism and liberal internationalism. It was argued that firstly, ideology should be given a broad definition similar to the idea of ‘worldview’, and that a value-neutral definition is preferable to one implying ‘false consciousness’. Secondly, ideologies are too often analysed synchronically rather than diachronically. Ideologies should be seen as contingent and changeable, especially in response to dilemmas or crises, widely conceived, which are important in explaining ideational change. Thirdly, realism and liberal internationalism, share aspects of neoconservative thought, yet diverge in significant ways. Crucial points of discussion included the extent to which realism, while privileging the concept of power and the national interest, can purport to be a moralised theory of IR in the same way as neoconservatism. In relation to liberal internationalism, a significant debate is the extent to which it is to be identified primarily with the promotion of liberal democracy (either narrowly or more widely), or is a much broader theory seeking the instalment of a rules-based, multilateral, pacific world order.

An important feature in the literature on neoconservatism is the concept of virtue and the way in which neoconservatism is concerned with a moralised basis for the conduct of US
foreign policy. This thesis also makes consideration of virtue a central concern. Whether this is partly of instrumental value in promoting domestic virtue remains a point of contestation. Whatever the ultimate purpose, the fact neoconservatives argue for a moralised role for the United States in international affairs is significant, and functions as more than mere rhetorical veneer. Unlike the standard conception of realism, neoconservatives argue that American liberal democratic values should be driving American foreign policy, not strict materialist conceptions of the balance of power or the national interest. In this way, neoconservatism also shares aspects of constructivist thought, specifically that ideas do matter. Unlike liberal internationalism though, neoconservatives argue that moralised American power should not subject itself to the dubiously moral claims of multilateral order based on international law. However, like realism, power and the nation-state are of central concern to neoconservatism. And like liberal internationalism, the spread of liberal democracy on a global basis is a key concern. The tension between realism and liberal internationalism forms the backbone of this thesis’s account of neoconservative thought in the aftermath of the Cold War. While it would be a mistake to conflate neoconservatism with either realism or liberal internationalism, it argues that there is some movement in neoconservative foreign policy thought from the former towards the latter during the period under investigation. It is to those years which this thesis now turns. The next chapter begins by examining the development of neoconservative thought at the end of the Cold War in 1989 until President Clinton assumed office in 1993.
Chapter Two  
End of Cold War to Defense Planning Guidance (1992)

2.1 Introduction
The toppling of the Berlin Wall and the turbulent events of 1989 came as no less a surprise to neoconservatives than it did to American foreign policy observers of other schools. Much is made in the literature of a generational shift in these early post-Cold War years, when a second generation of neoconservative ideologues were passed the baton by their more cautious, pragmatic forebears. Halper and Clarke describe it as a “generational hand-off”, arguing that between the end of the Cold War and the Bosnian crisis, “a complete generational transition” had occurred, a view endorsed by both Friedman and Ryan (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 98-99; Friedman, 2005: 230-31; Ryan, 2007: 77). However, any transition, if it occurred at all, was very far from being “complete”. Some second generation neoconservatives such as Daniel Pipes argued that the key concern for the United States in the Middle East was “stability” not the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, whereas some first generation neoconservatives, such as Norman Podhoretz, had been numbered among the fiercest critics of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy for not following through on its ideological rhetoric (D. Pipes, 1991: 9; Podhoretz, 1984: 59-60).42

This chapter examines the neoconservative response to the end of the struggle against the Soviet Union. It begins by discussing their assessment of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy, followed by looking at what they perceived to be the ramifications of the

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42 Of course, aside from the esoteric task of separating the two ‘generations’ by examining their foreign policy philosophies, the more mundane problem with the “generational hand-off” thesis is quite simply where one should draw the line. Which year does a neoconservative need to have been born by to qualify for ‘first generation’ status? With these caveats in mind please see Appendix One which provides a table locating the neoconservatives discussed in this thesis within the generational debate.
end of the Cold War for the future of US foreign policy. Their approach to the Gulf War is then analysed, demonstrating fundamental differences with the policies on Iraq favoured by neoconservatives in the late 1990s. Some called for regime change in 1991 – although not an American invasion – but most neoconservatives favoured a realist form of stability prioritisation, a position which by 2003, had fundamentally altered. A discussion of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis then follows, wherein it is argued that although neoconservatism appeared to be wedded to a form of realism in these years, the ideological underpinnings for a future shift in a more idealist direction were already being laid. The chapter concludes with an examination of the controversial 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). It is argued that while this document indicated a more stylistically brash form of neoconservatism with unipolarism as an explicit goal, it was, nonetheless, still absent themes of democracy promotion and more overt humanitarian intervention that neoconservatives would later advocate.

2.2 Reagan: A Neoconservative Assessment

Despite Reagan’s hawkish reputation, and the fact that numerous neoconservatives occupied important positions within his administration, initial conclusions drawn by neoconservatives on Reagan, as his administration came to a close, were decidedly mixed. Some pointed to a fundamental shift and re-energising of American foreign policy, others instead argued that Reagan had not delivered on his radically conservative promise. One of the most glowing tributes to Reagan, and certainly emblematic of the stereotypical neoconservative response to Reagan’s two terms in office, came from Aaron Wildavsky, whose piece in The National Interest over the winter of 1988/89, titled ‘The

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43 According to Sanders (1983: 287-88), over thirty neoconservatives who had sat on the Committee on the Present Danger during the Carter administration were given jobs by the Reagan White House. Neoconservatives in the new administration included among others: Kirkpatrick, Ikle, Adelman, Novak, Casey, Perle, Feith, Wolfowitz, Abrams and Muravchik.
Triumph of Ronald Reagan’, left the reader in no doubt of his affections. Reagan stood alongside Franklin Roosevelt as one of the two most influential presidents of the modern era, having “redirected both domestic and foreign policy”, lifted “the mood of fatalism that had heretofore gripped American foreign policy” and made American foreign policy proceed “exactly as Reagan said it would” (Wildavsky, 1988-89: 3, 7-8). Other neoconservatives were even less restrained in their assessment of Reagan’s success. For Zalmay Khalilzad, who achieved later notoriety for his involvement of the drafting of the 1992 DPG with Paul Wolfowitz, the imminent Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was a “watershed event”, almost certainly leading to a massive reduction in Soviet power in South-West Asia and a boon to anti-communist forces everywhere. In a statement remarkably free from caveats, Khalilzad (1988: 107-08) suggested that “American power was engaged in bringing about this Soviet failure…Afghanistan has shown what an activist, bipartisan, anti-communist American policy can accomplish against heavy odds”. In addition to Khalilzad’s focus on Afghanistan, Charles Krauthammer (1988: 145) pointed further afield to Cambodia, Angola and Nicaragua as examples where Reagan had challenged the Soviet Union. Reagan had reinvigorated US policy with his innovation that the United States would challenge Soviet spheres of interest when Washington chose to do so. The retreat of the Soviet Union from areas of the world where it had dominated was not simply a product of internal party developments within the Kremlin, but categorically a result of “American counter-pressure”. Michael Novak (1990: 35) further argued that although Gorbachev agreed to the process which led to the end of the Cold War, he would not have done so if Reagan had not been president, with his policies of increased military build-up and ideological warfare contributing to the new situation.
Not all neoconservatives were as sanguine in relation to the conduct of Reagan’s foreign policy. Norman Podhoretz, long-time Editor-in-Chief of *Commentary*, and with impeccable anti-communist, neoconservative credentials, had argued (1976: 35-41) that both isolationism and realism were neutering American foreign policy and sapping the will of the United States to defend the free world against Communism. Some of his harshest criticisms were reserved for conservative politicians who despite their rhetorical bellicosity, were decidedly less inclined to favour robust policy options when in office. Reagan had been a clear case of “mistaken identity”, and although conservatives perceived him to be championing the rollback of Communism around the globe, in reality he had “never shown the slightest inclination to pursue such an ambitious strategy.” Podhoretz reacted with amazement that Reagan’s critics on the Left could ever accuse him of pursuing a reckless foreign policy, and suggested Reagan’s approach of seeking to restore the military balance and negotiate with the Soviets was not substantively different from that of Richard Nixon. Reagan had failed to support the struggle against the Communists in Poland, indeed had actually “helped” the Soviets stabilise their position there, and had also failed to adequately strengthen the anti-communist forces in Angola and Afghanistan (Podhoretz, 1984: 60).

A further line of criticism and key touchstone issue for neoconservatives, was arms control and missile defence. Frank Gaffney (1988: 43, 50, 52) echoed Podhoretz’s criticism of Reagan having a yawning gap between rhetoric and policy delivery. Reagan had begun a strategic arms reduction process which ultimately culminated in the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in July 1991, and also signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in December 1987, which sought to eradicate

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44 With typical Podhoretzian flair (1976: 35), he also delivered a stinging rebuke to Henry Kissinger, stating he “often sounds like Churchill and just as often acts like Chamberlain”.
conventional and nuclear, ground-launched, ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 300-3400 miles. Reagan’s initial policy commitments had been “abandoned”, “none” of the arms control agreements would protect the United States and Gaffney suggested that Reagan on the campaign trail had balked at the idea of even talking with the Soviets at summits. The wider neoconservative disdain for arms control was further seen in critical reviews of Strobe Talbott’s *The Master of the Game* (New York, Random House, 1988), a biography of Paul Nitze. Richard Perle objected to being portrayed as the polar opposite of Nitze, and Donald Kagan argued that Talbott had fundamentally misread Nitze’s career, and accused Talbott of having an “almost religious” faith in the efficacy of arms control agreements (Perle, 1989: 88; D. Kagan, 1989: 71).

As Reagan’s second term came to a close, and during the initial period of the Bush administration, neoconservatives were divided on exactly how to construct their response to the legacy of the Reagan administration and the seismic geopolitical shifts occurring. Some were happy to claim victory for the United States in its ideological battle with the USSR, and laud Reagan’s role in bringing about a transformed reality in international relations. This was not, however, a unanimous position, as other neoconservatives were reluctant to declare success, ever conscious that the new situation that the United States found itself in could be ephemeral, and that a resurgent Russia could suddenly catch America with its guard down.45 Stephen Miller suggested in the latter half of 1989 that “(r)eports of the death of totalitarianism…have been greatly exaggerated” and that the worst option for the United States to pursue was to start behaving as if the Cold War was over. In direct contradiction of Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, discussed later in this chapter, Miller argued that totalitarianism “will always be with us” and that any change in

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45 Other neoconservatives neither claimed success in the Cold War nor warned of a continued Russian threat. Norman Podhoretz stated in June 1990, that he had stopped writing as he did not know how to conceptualise and think about the new reality he found himself in (Dorrien, 2004: 14).
Communist countries would likely take a very long time (Miller, 1989: 32). The neoconservative Sovietologist, Richard Pipes, also sounded a hesitant note in his analysis of the Soviet Union as late as 1991. While he acknowledged the Cold War “may” be over and the Soviet Union in danger of breaking up, nonetheless, he cautioned against the United States acting as if the Soviets were one less problem to deal with; argued that Soviet military spending was due to rise in 1991; and suggested it is unlikely “that the Soviet Union is beating swords into plowshares” (R. Pipes, 1991: 85-87). It is argued by both Dorrien and Ryan that neoconservatives found the end of the Cold War hard to stomach, due to the Soviet Union’s significance to them as an era containing an ideological foe to battle against (Dorrien, 2004: 14; Ryan, 2007: 63). This, however, overstates the role that the Soviet Union played in forming neoconservative thought, and underplays both the fundamentally domestic roots of neoconservatism, and the sense of triumphalism felt by many neoconservative supporters of Reagan.

Despite the lack of unanimity on whether the Reagan administration’s foreign policy had been successful, for the most part, neoconservatives had been generally comfortable to support Reagan’s approach. There was little appetite for the direct application of US military power to impose liberal democracy on another state by force. Instead, neoconservatives had mostly been content to back the Reagan Doctrine, which advocated the use of proxies to fight the Soviet Union, mainly in the developing world. A robust

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46 The year before this, Pipes had argued that it could not be foreseen whether the Soviet Union would become a modern liberal democracy; descend into chaos and civil war; or morph into a Chinese-style repressive state (R. Pipes, 1990: 25).

47 Anti-communism was a key neoconservative concern, but an anti-totalitarian perspective was considered the natural posture for a healthy, classically liberal, republican society. The neoconservatives were more concerned with ensuring the domestic vitality of that society by defending it from the radical left, which was their raison d’être rather than anti-communism per se.

48 For an interesting discussion of the Reagan Doctrine from a leading neoconservative see Krauthammer’s ‘Essay: The Reagan Doctrine’ (Time, 01/04/1985). Krauthammer gives a clear synopsis of the Reagan Doctrine, although interestingly, and as certainly a harbinger of the future shift in neoconservative thought,
anti-Communism was very much the favoured neoconservative strategy in the Reagan years, a form of aggressive containment that it hoped would lead to a rollback of Soviet power rather than the crusading militarism in the name of liberal democracy with which neoconservatism became associated in the late 1990s and during the George W. Bush administration. Why were the neoconservatives content to favour a robust application of the Reagan Doctrine in the name of anti-Communism, when they were later to offer strategies that were much more ambitious? Part of the reason was the strategic, material situation facing the United States. The United States could not use direct American military power to topple significant regimes they opposed without expecting a response from Moscow inflicting unacceptable costs. Nonetheless, the answer partly lies also in the ideational. While neoconservatives had advocated an approach that emphasised human rights and championed liberal democracy rhetorically in the abstract since the 1970s, this had yet to emerge as a fundamental aspect of their foreign policy thought or a key part of the rationale for military action in the future.\textsuperscript{49} Theirs was an outlook that was moralistic, but very much subjugated to the higher purpose of defeating Communism; they spoke the language of cold warriors rather than democratic gladiators.\textsuperscript{50} In the material absence of Communism in later years, there was more opportunity for that moralism to express itself. However, the material decline of the Soviet Union, while necessary, is not sufficient to explain the totality of neoconservative change.

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\textsuperscript{49} For an example of the somewhat limited emphasis placed on direct democracy promotion by neoconservatives during these years see Irving Kristol’s ‘Foreign Policy in an Age of Ideology’ (The National Interest, 1, 1985, pp.6-15). Kristol argued that the American people were “content” to live liberal democracy rather than “propagate” it, and with typical Kristolian flourish, that they “do not feel they have to quicken the rhythm of the future – they are not active midwives, only confident paediatricians”.

\textsuperscript{50} As Kirkpatrick made clear in her seminal ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’, the overriding principle for the United States’ foreign policy should be to subjugate other priorities to the moral imperative of fighting Communism, even if that meant supporting distasteful authoritarian regimes (Kirkpatrick, 1979: 34-45).
2.3 End of Cold War and the Future for American Foreign Policy

If the only thing restraining neoconservative intellectuals from unleashing their advocacy of a bold programme of democratic imperialism was the material reality of the Soviet Union, then its shattered stranglehold on Eastern Europe and its Third World satellites, coupled with an imminent domestic political collapse, would surely have precipitated a swift and decisive shift in that direction for neoconservatism. Instead, the collapse of the Soviet Union provoked neoconservatives to initially adapt their robust anti-Communism into a form of realist neo-isolationism, urging the United States to more passively enjoy the fruits of its Cold War labour. This continued through to the Gulf War, when neoconservatives supported the limited war aims of liberating Kuwait from Saddam Hussein and were neither advocates of regime change nor the imposition of democracy on Iraq itself. There has been a tendency, with the benefit of hindsight, to read a more radical form of neoconservatism into these early years of the post-Cold War era, and ignore the fact that neoconservatives of both the first and second generation were instead urging a more cautious approach by the United States.

Just as Jeane Kirkpatrick had penned the seminal neoconservative foreign policy text during the Cold War, her response to the passing of the Cold War was equally revealing, and in some ways a continuation of the caution displayed in ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards.’ Although liberal democracy remained the single best hope for seeing improved human rights and pacific behaviour in states, and although the United States should encourage its spread wherever possible, it should not, however, push for its “universal dominance”. The United States should also not attempt to balance power in Europe, India or East Asia, should not seek to manage the evolution of society in the USSR and “[i]t is time to give up the dubious benefits of superpower status and become again a usually
successful, open American republic…*A normal country in a normal time*” (Kirkpatrick, 1991: 161-63, emphasis added). It was now time for the United States to focus inward on domestic concerns, there was no “mystical” or “transcendental” mission left for it to complete, and the time for American sacrifice and heroism was behind it (Kirkpatrick, 1991: 155-56). This return to normalcy was echoed by Nathan Glazer, who, in an article revealingly titled ‘A Time for Modesty’, openly questioned the need for the United States to maintain a significant overseas military commitment.51 According to Glazer, it was not the job of the United States in this post-Cold War world to be the “policeman of the world” (1991: 135, 141). The role that the United States needed to play was that of exemplar, rather than directly interfering in the domestic affairs of other states, according to Glazer, who argued that this is precisely what the Founding Fathers of the United States had intended all along.52

Irving Kristol’s scepticism of the idea of the United States spreading democracy around the globe was apparent before the Cold War ended (1985: 11). Although the American people were, as citizens of an enlightened liberal republic, “sensitive” to human rights concerns and democracy, they would not support military action abroad on these moralistic grounds alone, and they were satisfied to enjoy and live the American “creed” rather than spend their time and energy seeking its promulgation. Now with the Cold War disappearing, Kristol returned to these themes arguing that:

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51 This was also suggested by Irving Kristol who argued that in the absence of a threat from the Soviet Union there was no need for the United States to keep its military in Europe, and any future unrest in Yugoslavia could be sorted out by the Europeans (I. Kristol, 1991: 64).

52 Even during the early years of the Reagan administration Glazer had cautioned against the United States acting as “the world’s moral policeman”, and that in the exercise of virtue, as well as power, there was a need for the United States to “learn moderation” (Glazer, 1981: 38).
The futility of a foreign policy whose purpose is to “enhance democracy” abroad is apparent to most Americans, and so the end of the Cold War has led to a resurgence of an isolationist temper.


Kristol argued for a form of realism in foreign policy that would focus explicitly on the American national interest, without falling back on a brutal 19th century resurgence of realpolitik. While he described isolationism as “nostalgic fantasy”, nonetheless, Kristol’s ‘realpolitik-free’ reality, did not appear to be fundamentally opposed to a form of neo-isolationism, even if nothing like the anti-Semitic, hysterical, isolationist “hemispheric bunker” of Pat Buchanan that had on occasion championed the rights of Nazi war criminals (Muravchik, 1991b: 35; Weigel, 1992: 42). Indeed, Kristol suggested (1991: 72-73) American troops should not be involved with overseas humanitarian missions, even if, for example, a Pol Pot re-emerged in Cambodia to decimate the population.

The immediate responses to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis from other neoconservatives illuminate the cautious realist/neo-isolationist neoconservative perspective at the closing of the Cold War. Himelfarb (1989: 25) argued that Fukuyama was overly optimistic on the long-term prospects for liberal democracy, as did Eliot Cohen (2011). While Communism was almost certainly dead Himelfarb made clear that she was “too traumatized by communism and Nazism to have any confidence in the eternal realities of history”. The universalisation of the liberal democratic ideal, which gripped neoconservatism as it ventured into the later years of the 1990s, was for

53 George Weigel (1992: 38, 42) argues that the realism displayed by Kirkpatrick and Kristol owes more to the Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr, than the realism of Bush, Scowcroft and Baker, which was more 19th century realpolitik in origin. He later also argued, linking realism with isolationism that realism was the “upmarket road” to isolationism.

54 Admittedly, discussing the responses to an article before the article itself, somewhat puts the cart before the horse, however, ‘The End of History’ is dealt with more explicitly in the section below on democracy.
Himmelfarb in 1989, nearer to fantasy than reality (Himmelfarb, 1989: 24-26). Irving Kristol (1989: 27) seemed initially caught in two minds on Fukuyama’s thesis, arguing in his idiosyncratic style in the space of a couple of lines that “I don’t believe a word of it” followed shortly by “[i]n truth it is quite persuasive”. While enjoying the boldness of Fukuyama’s thought, Kristol quickly resorted to his default position of the time. Any notion of American hegemony was surely only “temporary”; he put no stock in “waves of the future”; and instead of drawing from Hegel and Kojève as Fukuyama had done, went further back to Aristotle to argue that all forms of government were ultimately unstable, and this included American-style liberal democracy. He further declared it was “wonderful” that the US had prevailed in the Cold War, but, as a clear marker of his neo-isolationist leanings at the time, argued that victory in the Cold War “means the enemy is us, not them” (I. Kristol, 1989: 28). This last statement is crucial in demonstrating that the priority at the end of the Cold War for Irving Kristol, the preeminent neoconservative intellectual, was not to raise military spending, look abroad for new monsters to destroy, or seek to create a liberal democratic world on the back of American unipolarism. Instead, the priority was a change of focus back to the domestic and social battles which were the original neoconservative concerns.

Despite the “generational hand off” thesis, so ubiquitous in the literature, these positions outlined above were not without support amongst second-generation neoconservatives. They were not all eager to launch a global democratic crusade in the cause of unipolarism but often reflected the caution of the first generation. Eliot Cohen, who later became an original signatory to the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and an early advocate for regime change in Iraq, argued (1990a: 6-8, 12) that the decline of Communism was a plausible explanation for the decline in importance of the military in
the future. Although the United States needed to remain a superpower, this needed to be done on a significantly reduced budget with a spending floor of 4% of GNP, 20% less than the already low (at least by historical comparison with much of the Cold War) military spending figure of 5% of GNP. In echoes of Kirkpatrick’s construction, Cohen suggested that history after the demise of the USSR would be more “normal”, with fewer threats facing the United States, even if these threats would not be negligible. Despite the neoconservatives later essentially endorsing the democratic peace theory, Cohen argued that democracy did not necessarily lead to peace. And in implicit rejection of Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, Cohen argued that history was perhaps not linear, and the collapse of the Soviet Union revealed more about the “hollowness” of Marxism-Leninism, as it did about the march of liberal democracy.

Even those second-generation neoconservatives who repudiated the cautious tone of Irving Kristol, Kirkpatrick et al. articulated little more than a surface-level rejection. Ben Wattenberg’s call for “neo-manifest destinarianism” and the promotion of liberal democracy looked on first reading like a dramatic new course for American foreign policy. In reality, however, it was little more than an argument that the US could use Hollywood and public diplomacy a little better to spread American values, and do more to attract foreign students. Such proposals were hardly evidence of advocacy of the promotion of liberal democracy across the Middle East down the barrel of a gun. Indeed, Wattenberg (1991: 113) explicitly stated that the US needed “fewer tanks and less covert intelligence”, replacing them with “information diplomacy”. While the tone was certainly different from that of Kristol, Kirkpatrick and Glazer, the actual policy – fewer tanks – looked similar. Likewise, Carl Gershman (1991: 40), who had been an aide to Kirkpatrick at the UN, argued that the promotion of democracy should be a central concern for the United States,
which again sounded rhetorically ambitious. Nonetheless, in terms of policy detail, Gershman suggested this could be done on “limited resources”, helping those countries that wanted to help themselves and argued that the US “cannot force others to do what they are not prepared or willing to do for themselves”. This was hardly the cornerstone of a doctrine that in due course would put American troops on the streets of Baghdad in 2003.

Further evidence of the cautious approach of second-generation neoconservatives can be seen in Gary Schmitt’s early assessment of George H. W. Bush’s foreign policy. Schmitt later became the Executive Director of PNAC between 1998 and 2005, and was intimately associated with the less cautious form of neoconservatism that prevailed in the late 1990s. Writing in 1989-90, however, Schmitt (1989-90: 108, 110-111 emphasis added) argued that Bush’s foreign policy was appropriate for the geopolitical situation the United States found itself in, and echoing Nathan Glazer’s choice of words noted earlier, that “a bit of modesty in one’s policy-making seems quite in order.” Instead of castigating Bush’s cautiousness and lambasting Baker and Scowcroft for their amoral realpolitik, Schmitt instead suggested that they were doing an excellent job of appropriately reining in the euphoria which was accompanying the close of the Cold War. By being low-key and not pushing too hard in areas like Panama and Poland, Bush’s self-restraint was achieving great success for the United States. William Kristol, Gary Schmitt and Tom Donnelly – all key second-generation neoconservatives later intimately associated with PNAC – acknowledged in interviews with the author of the thesis, that at the start of the 1990s, they had been sympathetic to realist foreign policy paradigms (Schmitt; Donnelly; W. Kristol, 2011).
Not all neoconservatives, however, welcomed the end of the Cold War by embracing a more cautious or isolationist position. The primary challenge to the prevailing narrative of caution, normalcy and withdrawal came from Charles Krauthammer. For Krauthammer (1991b: 9, 11-13), the material end of the Cold War had enormous ramifications for the conduct of American foreign policy. The Cold War victory had literally “made the world safe for democracy”. This was not, however, a call for the United States to take up arms to impose democracy in other countries. In fact Krauthammer explicitly rejected doing so, and argued that the regime in Communist Nicaragua without the backing of the Soviet Union, for example, and other such outposts of Communism, were likely to wither without the United States needing to do anything to ensure their downfall. Krauthammer instead called for the United States, using the European integration process as a model, to create a “unipolar world whose center is a confederated West” which would integrate North America, Europe and “democratic” Asia in a grand “super-sovereign West”. It should not be the goal of the United States to go around the world attempting to democratise the peripheral states one by one, but seek the unification of the West and create a democratic, supranational confederation. The ultimate aim for Krauthammer was to make Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis a reality.\footnote{This is, interestingly, the precise accusation that Fukuyama aimed at neoconservatives following the Iraq War. He endorsed Ken Jowitt’s suggestion that Bush had signed up to his End of History thesis, but attempted to bring it into reality by speeding up history in an activist “Leninist” style, instead of waiting more passively for events to transpire according to Fukuyama’s more “Marxist” social teleology (Fukuyama, 2006: 55).} The United States could not sit back passively and expect it to happen automatically, but should be actively engaged in making it happen, starting with the unification of the democratic centre: “The United States must wish and work for a super-sovereign West economically, culturally, politically hegemonic in the world”. Yet not long after penning these words, in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute in late 1990 which then gravitated toward the pages of Foreign Affairs, Krauthammer’s discussion of a unipolar super-sovereign 	extit{West} had been replaced by the
United States itself: “The centre of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies” (1991a: 23-24). Krauthammer did not argue that this “unipolar moment” would last in perpetuity, but within a “generation or so”, would likely be replaced by a more multipolar system including other powers of similar stature to the United States.

Even though Krauthammer criticised both realism and isolationism in his doctrine of unipolarity, there was little room for democratic expansionism. The key concern for the United States as the unipolar power was “stability”, except the focus for US foreign policy was now taken off Communism and placed instead upon rogue states and weapons of mass destruction. Krauthammer (1991a: 27-31) argued that the key threat to the United States was the “Weapon State”, of which Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a prime example. Krauthammer explicitly rejected the Kristol and Kirkpatrick approach of withdrawal and a return to normalcy, and yet his article on unipolarity in Foreign Affairs did not represent a fundamental challenge to the neoconservative status quo. It was still far from being what Ryan (2007: 78-79) argues was “the unifying touchstone of second generation neoconservative foreign policy”. Krauthammer’s article was hardly the rallying call for second generation neoconservatism but more like a mild rebuke to Kirkpatrick and Kristol for allowing their robust anti-Communism to slightly fade when the United States still faced other threats. Krauthammer’s idea was less a manifesto for second generation neoconservatives to wrest control of the future direction of neoconservative foreign policy thought, and more the case of urging neoconservatives to apply their hardline anti-Communism to “Weapons States” who threatened the United States in a unipolar world in an analogous way to which the Soviet Union had done in a bipolar world. Maintaining geopolitical stability required the United States not to retrench and retreat, but to maintain
its power and posture on the global stage to counter new threats, but there was no unpacking of the themes of democracy promotion or humanitarian interventionism.

2.4 The Gulf War

The 1991 Gulf War offers a window into the state of neoconservative thought at the end of the Cold War, and gives a stark contrast with the approach later associated with neoconservatism in the late 1990s. Benevolent hegemony, benign imperialism and the forceful promotion of liberal democracy were not the hallmarks of the neoconservative approach to the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1. Instead, the prevailing neoconservative viewpoint endorsed the limited policy aims of the Bush administration of removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and largely stopped short of advocating regime change in Iraq. Neoconservatives were content to play the stability card in a very similar way to their more realist contemporaries, and feared the consequences of a more radical policy. One might well expect the neoconservatives within the administration to toe the policy line, yet support for the limited war aims of 1991, went wider than simply the neoconservatives on the federal government’s payroll.

The threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had been outlined by neoconservatives in the years leading up to the Gulf War. Daniel Pipes (1986: 95, 99) highlighted what he described as the “scourge of suicide terrorism”, and argued that Iran, Iraq and Syria were all sponsoring suicide terrorism not so much driven by fanaticism but by state-driven agendas.56 Iraq was also a key concern for Zalmay Khalilzad. Although Khalilzad achieved more notoriety for his role in the drafting of the 1992 DPG, another paper which

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56 In a harbinger of what later became a central thrust of the Bush Doctrine, Pipes (1986: 96, 99) argued that it was futile for the United States to focus its efforts on either deterring or stopping the terrorists from carrying out their operations, but instead should seek to punish their state sponsors.
he drafted at the State Department in 1988, on reflection, proves to have been just as interesting. Khalilzad, then working as a senior State Department official, argued that the United States’ position of treating Iran as the major threat in the Middle East was misplaced, and instead, argued that Iraq now posed a graver menace to American interests and the peace and stability of the wider region (Gigot, 1990-91: 6). There was a sense among neoconservatives that with the ending of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the United States had missed an opportunity to reorientate its entire posture towards the Middle East (Gigot, 1990-91: 5).

It was Khalilzad’s mentor, Paul Wolfowitz, who had done most to point out the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Although Irving Kristol is usually ascribed the title of ‘godfather’ of neoconservatism, Wolfowitz – who has sat directly in the upper echelons of the American government for much of the past four decades – has been the public face of neoconservatism in office. Wolfowitz was a protégé of the political theorist, Allan Bloom, as an undergraduate at Cornell, before moving to Chicago to complete his doctoral thesis under the nuclear strategist, Albert Wohlstetter. Following the completion of his research in Chicago, and after a short period at Yale, Wolfowitz moved to Washington in 1973, where he began his career working for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (Mann, 2004: 34). In 1977, then working as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs in the Carter Administration, he started work on the Limited

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57 As both a Muslim and ethnic Pashtun, Khalilzad certainly helps to dispel the myth that all neoconservatives are Jewish and thus put the interests of Tel Aviv above Washington.
59 Interestingly, Wolfowitz’s thesis arguing against the construction of nuclear powered desalination plants in the Middle East emphasised the threat to the region posed by nuclear weapons proliferation, and it certainly did not exclude Israel. However, it emphasised themes that look distinctly familiar in the wake of the Iraq War, for example, the difficulty with inspecting sites and the risk of clandestine use of nuclear material (Mann, 2004: 30).
Contingency Study. Wolfowitz was charged with assessing threats to the United States that could occur in the developing world, and began with a focus on the Persian Gulf. Although the study’s primary concern was with the possibility of the Soviet Union seizing the oilfields of the Middle East, Wolfowitz widened its scope to include discussion of whether Iraq also had the capacity to present the same threat, especially the potential for an Iraqi invasion of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The report concluded that Iraq posed a direct threat to other states in the region and also a more “implicit” threat causing other states “to accommodate themselves to Iraq without being overtly coerced.” The report recommended that the United States fully commit to balancing Iraqi power with increased visibility of US power in the region (Gordon and Trainor, 1995: 6-9, 480; Mann, 2004: 80; Solomon, 2007: 25).

During the Reagan administration, Wolfowitz worked as Director of Policy Planning at the State Department followed by a period as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, then a spell as US ambassador to Indonesia. Bush’s election victory over Dukakis in 1988, however, brought Wolfowitz back to the Pentagon, where he became Undersecretary of Defense for Policy – a role he held for the entirety of Bush’s term in office – and Iraq loomed large once again. Solomon argues that Wolfowitz was instrumental in keeping the Pentagon from falling into a “myopic” focus on the USSR, and in the autumn of 1989, ordered a review of US defence policy in the Persian Gulf region. The explicit threat to be assessed this time was an armed seizure of the Saudi oilfields by a hostile Middle Eastern power, of which Iraq was of course the most likely candidate (Solomon, 2007: 27; Mann, 2004: 172-173).

60 Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, was reportedly worried the report would leak to the Iraqi government and sour relations between Washington and Baghdad, with the Iraqis possibly concluding the US report was written at the instigation of Saudi Arabia (Mann, 2004: 82).
On 2 August 1990, when Saddam Hussein sent Iraqi forces over the border into Kuwait it was not as much a shock for Wolfowitz as it seemingly was for others, but an eventuality explored by him since at least the early days of the Carter administration. Despite Wolfowitz’s focus on the threat posed by Iraq, it was largely hallmarked by an emphasis on the impact of Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti oilfields falling into the hands of the Iraqi dictator. Wolfowitz was certainly not wedded to conceptions of regime change in Iraq itself, or indeed of Iraq being a fertile ground for planting the roots of liberal democracy, both of which he was later closely associated with. The most interesting question surrounding the conduct of the Gulf War was not the issue of whether the United States should use military force to remove Iraq’s military from Kuwait. Neoconservatives were largely united in arguing that it was an appropriate response to do so, and it could easily be justified on both realist and liberal grounds in addition to neoconservative concerns. Iraq had violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a neighbouring state, was in clear violation of international law, and the United Nations had approved the use of force to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The more interesting question concerned what the US-led coalition should do once Iraq’s army had been ejected from Kuwait. Should the coalition forces push on to Baghdad and topple Hussein’s regime or essentially stop at the Kuwait-Iraq border and adhere to a strict interpretation of the remit of the UN Security Council resolutions? Discussion of the views of neoconservatives in the higher echelons of the Bush administration during the Gulf War centres largely on Wolfowitz himself.

William Kristol served as Chief of Staff to Vice-President Dan Quayle, and was somewhat

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61 Incredibly, Colin Powell (1995: 461), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time, suggests that as late as 1 August 1990, the day before the invasion, General Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command, discounted the notion that Saddam Hussein would launch a full-scale occupation of Kuwait.

62 A series of UN Security resolutions were passed which related to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Among others, Resolution 660 called for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait (2 August 1990); Resolution 661 placed economic sanctions on Iraq (6 August 1990); Resolution 665 authorised a naval blockade against Iraq (25 August 1990); Resolution 678 gave Iraq a deadline of 15 January 1991 to comply with Resolution 660 or face “all necessary means” to enforce the resolution – the trigger for military action (29 November 1990) (United Nations, 1990a; United Nations, 1990b; United Nations, 1990c; United Nations, 1990d).
at arms-length from the foreign policy making process, thus not in a position to have significantly contributed to the debate. Other neoconservatives such as Khalilzad were in more junior positions. There was, however, no recorded dissent from Bush’s decision not to force regime-change in Iraq from any neoconservatives in the administration.

Two pivotal issues dominated the decision by Bush to keep Saddam Hussein in power at the conclusion of the Gulf War. Firstly, the question of the legality of forcing regime change on Iraq. As in the debate before the Iraq War in 2003, whether there was scope for such action in the UN resolutions was hotly contested, and could possibly have pulled apart the coalition that Bush had carefully assembled. Secondly, Bush’s national security team feared the wider consequences of leaving a power vacuum in Iraq, especially given the perceived threat from Iran ever since Khomeini’s 1979 revolution. Reflecting the realist approach of James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, the Bush administration ultimately concluded that the cause of stability in the Middle East would be damaged if the United States removed Saddam from power.

For Wolfowitz, and neoconservatives outside the administration such as Richard Perle, the only real issue of contention once the war had begun was the precise timing of the ceasefire, and then after the war whether more could have been done to prevent Saddam attacking the insurgency he faced. According to Mann (2004: 190), “(n)o one in the first Bush administration was seeking to remake the political institutions of the Middle East”. Wolfowitz did not advocate the use of military force to topple Saddam Hussein until as late as 1997 (Solomon, 2007: 69). In the early stages of the Gulf War planning, Wolfowitz

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63 Somewhat mischievously, Jacob Weisberg (1990) writing in the New Republic, referred to William Kristol as “Dan Quayle’s brain”

and his civilian aide, and fellow neoconservative, Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby had favoured a plan drawn up by Henry Rowen, a scholar at the Hoover Institution, which called for the United States military to take up a position in Western Iraq. This plan was not, however, a precursor to regime change, but a ploy to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait to defend Baghdad. The plan, labelled Operation Scorpion, also favoured by Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, was ultimately discarded in favour of Schwarzkopf’s full frontal assault (Mann, 2004: 186-188). Wolfowitz’s central contention during the war was that Powell had pushed too strongly to call a ceasefire after just 100 hours of the ground war, leaving parts of the Iraqi army intact, and was equally displeased that the United States did nothing to prevent Saddam Hussein from using helicopters to attack his domestic opponents. For Powell, however, as he readily admitted, leaving Saddam Hussein with enough power to balance the Iranian threat was a central consideration (Powell, 1995: 531).65 These were relatively minor points of disagreement between Powell and Wolfowitz, compared to the overarching agreement that Saddam Hussein should not be toppled. Writing three years later, Wolfowitz (1994c: 87) maintained that leaving Saddam Hussein in power was the correct decision, and for the United States forces to have occupied the whole of Iraq and forced regime change would have been deeply problematic. Indeed, Wolfowitz compared the situation with MacArthur in the Korean War after the stunning victory at Inchon, and argued that even after an emphatic victory and removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, an American occupation of Iraq would have been entirely different, just as it had been in Korea. In a further revealing historical comparison, Wolfowitz downplayed bringing democracy to Germany after the Second World War, and argued that what was important was reversing Hitler’s European conquests.

65 Powell’s account in his memoirs of these days (1995: 527-531) is somewhat contradictory, claiming within the space of just four pages, firstly, that the United States would have “loved” to have seen Saddam overthrown, and then stating that the success of revolts against Hussein was not an American goal, and that a strong Iraq was needed to threaten Iran.
Wolfowitz’s position on the Gulf War is an illuminating microcosm of the state of neoconservatism during the very early years of the post-Cold War period. On the one hand he favoured bold military strategy, opposed the reluctance of the realists to fully destroy the Iraqi army when it had the opportunity, and argued that the United States could have done more to prevent human rights abuses by the Iraqi dictator against Kurdish and Shia opposition. Yet on the other, he concurred with the argument that removing Saddam Hussein from power would leave an unstable vacuum at the heart of the Middle East, and he at no point raised the possibility of regime change in Iraq. Wolfowitz’s position reveals a hybrid form of neoconservatism that continued to be distinct from realism, yet remained a long way from advocating the more radical policy prescriptions it espoused in the later years of the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.

Outside the administration, and unencumbered by the necessity to support the administration’s policies, neoconservatives also showed a reluctance to press for regime change in Iraq. Daniel Pipes (1991: 9-10) argued “[t]he overriding American interest in the Gulf is stability”, and other priorities such as democracy, low oil prices, human rights were secondary to the wider cause of stability in the region. Indeed, far from arguing that the United States should remove Saddam from power, Pipes suggested that President Bush should announce explicitly that the US would not be seeking to topple the Iraqi regime. If the United States were to launch an extended military occupation of Iraq, it would be “one of the great disasters in American foreign policy” with American troops subject to “suicide attackers, car bombers, and other acts of terrorism”. Fred Barnes, who later became Executive Editor of the neoconservative house journal, the Weekly Standard, was another admirer (1991: 44, 46) of Bush’s conduct of the Gulf War in 1991. Peaceful containment would never have succeeded in removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Bush had restored
American prestige and strengthened the US bargaining position vis-à-vis a host of other states. Bush had not gone “intervention crazy” but chosen to play the role of “broker” rather than “boss”. Barnes offered no criticism, only an indifferent “maybe”. Again, this is hardly the neoconservatism of the popular imagination in the early years of the twenty-first century.

Support for Bush’s Gulf War policy was also found among the first generation of neoconservatives. Norman Podhoretz (1990: 21) argued that a war to liberate Kuwait was essential to prevent valuable resources from falling into Saddam Hussein’s hands and to discourage other states from reckless aggression against other states. Podhoretz later spent part of the Gulf War in Israel, and recounted a conversation he had with an Israeli official, which sheds yet more light on the prevailing neoconservative viewpoint at the time. The Israeli official claimed in conversation with Podhoretz that it was complete folly for the United States to leave Saddam Hussein in power at the conclusion of the Gulf War, and suggested that the United States needed to fully occupy Iraq, just as with Germany in 1945, and launch a similar project to the Marshall Plan allowing democracy to spread across the Middle East. Podhoretz, however, clearly showed his opposition to such an ambitious strategy: “(w)ith this he loses me, I see no chance that the United States today will either wish or be able to do such a thing” (Podhoretz, 1991a: 23). There was absolutely no suggestion from Podhoretz that Bush had erred in leaving Saddam Hussein in power. Instead, Podhoretz argued that liberating Kuwait was enough to restore American confidence and prestige (Podhoretz, 1991a: 20-21). 66 This was also the position taken by Irving Kristol. For Kristol, Bush’s decision to leave Saddam Hussein in power

66 In a colourful aside, but again instructive as a comparison with how neoconservatives later came to assess Bush’s conduct of the Gulf War, Podhoretz recounts blowing kisses to the television set in his room at the King David Hotel, when Bush appeared on CNN promising to liberate Kuwait and smash Iraq’s military capabilities (Podhoretz, 1991a: 20).
was correct, and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East was emphatically not a key national interest for the United States. Indeed, he later stated that “no civilized person in his right mind wants to govern Iraq”, and even that it was not in the interest of the United States to always combat aggression in a general sense (Kristol quoted in Dorrien, 2004; Vaisse, 2009). Jeane Kirkpatrick had an even more limited vision of the United States’ role in the crisis in the Gulf. Indeed, writing later in the summer of 1991, John Judis argues that although she did ultimately back the Bush administration’s Gulf War policy, early in the crisis, she had “equivocated” on the use of force (Judis, 1991). In November 1990, Kirkpatrick (1990a) suggested that there were alternatives between appeasement and a full scale ground assault, and that if ground troops were needed at all they should be Egyptian, Saudi or other Arab forces, rather than American troops, with the US role restricted to aerial campaigns. What is clear from Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, and Kristol, is that all three supported the Bush administration’s limited war aims, with no suggestion that the United States should have even considered topping Saddam Hussein’s regime, let alone introduced liberal democracy to Iraq.

Other neoconservatives went out of their way to agree with the realist perspective, espoused by Powell, Baker and Scowcroft, that toppling Saddam would destabilise the Middle East rather than increase the prospects for peace. Cohen (1990b: 22-27) argued that the stated objectives of the Gulf War were to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait and achieve the wider security of the Gulf region, whereas the other possible unstated objectives of destroying Iraq’s weapons and removing Hussein from power had the potential to destabilise the Middle East by removing Iran’s “traditional foe”. Bush, unlike Reagan, failed to grasp the “politics of passion”, nonetheless, Bush was a “decisive” war leader and understood the imperative of secrecy. In addition, Colin Powell, later to assume the role of
neoconservative villain, was described as “solid and politically savvy”. Writing before the war began; Cohen offered three potential strategies for the United States military to follow during the conflict.67 Even with three possible strategies, however, the idea of regime change in Iraq itself, and the United States sending its military into Baghdad to impose democracy, did not feature in Cohen’s list.

Richard Perle, who has earned something of a reputation as the most bellicose of neoconservatives also did not criticise Bush’s decision to refrain from imposing regime change on Baghdad in 1991. Perle (1991: emphasis added) stated that there were “compelling reasons” to remove the Iraqi dictator from power due to his human rights abuses and support for terrorism. Nonetheless, for the United States to actually invade Iraq, “could prove costly, and would probably be unnecessary”. Perle was content to play the long game in the hope that tough United Nations sanctions would eventually build up enough pressure to lead Iraqis to overthrow Saddam. The idea that military action by the United States was “unnecessary” certainly did not become a dominant motif during the 1990s. In interviews before the Iraq War in 2003, both Richard Perle and William Kristol were questioned for the PBS programme, Frontline, in which they passed comment on the state of their thought at the close of the Gulf War in 1991. Kristol (Frontline, 2003a) confirmed that although he did not publicly articulate his views on the end of the war in 1991, he now argued that it was not a mistake, and indeed was “defensible” to finish the war after just 100 hours of conflict on the ground. It was the later decision to not support the Iraqi rebellion against Saddam’s regime, which he suggested was more problematic, especially for Wolfowitz. This was also emphasised by Richard Perle (Frontline, 2003b), who suggested that the main reason why he did not push for the United States to topple

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67 The three possible strategies that Cohen (1990b: 25-26) emphasised were: 1) Siege and military blockade; 2) Victory through air power; 3) “Normandy Revisited” – Kuwait liberated after an extensive air campaign.
Saddam Hussein in 1991, was that most people simply expected the regime to be toppled by internal forces within Iraq. However, as noted earlier, Wolfowitz still supported the decision to leave Saddam Hussein in power as late as 1994 on the basis of stability, and despite his suggestion that the United States could have done more to prevent Saddam Hussein’s crushing of domestic insurrections; these very rebellions could have left Iraq ‘unstable’.

Although the majority of neoconservatives supported the central thrust of the Bush administration’s policies during the Gulf War, there was early dissent, most notably from Joshua Muravchik and Charles Krauthammer. Muravchik (1991c) suggested in April 1991, that the only way for the United States to successfully withdraw from the Gulf War was to “ouster” Saddam Hussein. Muravchik also raised the tentative possibility of democracy in Iraq, but suggested even though democracy was too much of a hope for Iraq, that “there are degrees of unfreedom (sic) less brutal, more humane than the Baath regime”. Nonetheless, Muravchik’s suggestion was far from a radical construction, and indeed argued that a balance of power, a central feature of realist thought, would be the best outcome for the Middle East along the lines of pre-First World War Europe. The United States would not be aggressively toppling another regime but merely aiding a domestic uprising against a tyrannical regime as it had done on numerous occasions in the past. Krauthammer (1991d) also called for Saddam Hussein to be toppled, and argued that the Bush administration was “squandering a unique opportunity” and that leaving a weakened Saddam Hussein in power was “a gross political misjudgement”. Nonetheless, as with Muravchik, Krauthammer did not favour a ground assault on Baghdad by US forces, but merely the United States aid the domestic insurrection against Saddam Hussein.

68 Later in 1991, Krauthammer (1991g), despairing of Bush’s decision not to press for Saddam Hussein’s removal at the conclusion of the Gulf War, stated that the United States should seek to assassinate him.
His most revealing comment, however, came a week after the bombing of Iraq had begun in January 1991, when he argued that while the United States should seek to eliminate Saddam Hussein, beyond that “Iraq’s internal politics are not our concern.” The United States should seek the unconditional surrender of the Iraqi army, but emphatically not attempt to establish “a MacArthur regency in Baghdad” (Krauthammer, 1991c, emphasis added).

In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, neoconservatives broadly supported President Bush’s approach to the conflict. Post hoc criticism of Bush’s limited approach during the second half of the 1990s should not obfuscate the fact that neoconservatives largely supported how the Gulf War was executed. Most neoconservatives, aside from relatively minor disagreements concerning the exact timing of the ceasefire and lack of support for Saddam’s domestic opponents, were content to lend their support to the Bush administration’s conduct of the Gulf War; satisfied with the outcome of the war; and viewed the military victory as a sign of America’s rehabilitation after the debacle of Vietnam. Even those such as Krauthammer and Muravchik who wanted Saddam Hussein removed from power, had a relatively limited aim with doing so, and certainly were not calling for the United States to impose democracy on Iraq. In 1991, there was very little appetite among the neoconservatives for a wide-ranging, ambitious policy of regime change and democratisation in Iraq.

Although Krauthammer (1991d) did advocate greater democracy and pluralism in the Middle East, it was advocated in a general way, rather than as a specific democratisation project in Iraq imposed at the barrel of an American gun.
2.5 Democracy and the End of History

The Gulf War revealed neoconservatives as still wedded to their dominant Cold War anti-totalitarian posture, and far from embracing the themes of democratic imperialism or “Wilsonianism with teeth”, with which they would be later associated (Mearsheimer, 2005). This next section takes a step back from the historical events of the early post-Cold War period to consider Francis Fukuyama’s seminal ‘End of History’ thesis, described disparagingly by Tony Smith (2007: 49-50) as the only original, theoretical, neoconservative contribution to the post-Cold War debate on the democratic peace. It is argued that Fukuyama’s thesis laid the intellectual foundation and some of the ideological groundwork for a more expansive form of neoconservatism in the later years of the 1990s. Although, as discussed earlier, specific aspects of his thesis were criticised by neoconservatives for being utopian and ahistorical, Fukuyama’s work provided an important theoretical narrative by pushing the idea of democracy into a more central position in neoconservative discourse. Neoconservatives had always been passionate defenders of American liberal democracy and regularly quoted Tocqueville. Yet by the end of 1990s, their relationship to the idea of liberal democracy had shifted from the abstract to one where its promotion abroad became central to the foreign policy agenda and mission of the United States. Fukuyama’s work has been widely singled out – usually for opprobrium – as a key contribution to the triumphalism of the early post-Cold War period. However, this thesis argues that Fukuyama’s ideas did not just impact Western political discourse at the end of the Cold War in a general sense, but played a role in establishing a philosophical foundation for a later shift in neoconservative thought, although Fukuyama (2006: 55), as an ex-neoconservative, would later accuse the George W. Bush administration of misappropriating his work.
Fukuyama, like Paul Wolfowitz, had studied as an undergraduate at Cornell under Allan Bloom, before writing his PhD thesis at Harvard under the neoconservative, Harvey Mansfield, and Samuel Huntington. Following the completion of his PhD, Fukuyama spent two periods of time during the 1980s working for the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, where he worked for Wolfowitz, in between spells working in the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation (Solomon, 2007: 43).\footnote{For further detail, James Mann has provided an interesting account of the relationship between Wolfowitz and Fukuyama (Mann, 2004: 22-26; 74-75)} Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis appeared as a short article in the *National Interest* in the summer of 1989, before an extended version in the form of a full-length book appeared in 1992: *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, Free Press). Fukuyama’s work was more philosophical with a discussion of the entire scope of human history, than direct policy prescription. Undoubtedly, the tumultuous geopolitical events of the 1980s and the ending of the Cold War would have influenced Fukuyama’s thought and enabled his ideas to gain a more sympathetic reading than they might have done twenty-five years earlier. Nonetheless, there is nothing in his work that suggests it could not have been written at the height of the Cold War. His argument on the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy was based more upon a philosophical construction and wide-ranging discussion of human nature, than on thawing relations at the Cold War’s end.\footnote{This is not to suggest that actual contemporary geopolitical events were of no interest to Fukuyama, or suggest he did not write about them. Indeed, Fukuyama (1989: 3; 1992: xiii) makes clear reference to the spread of democracy in various states over the previous years. Nonetheless, these events are not used as the basis for his argument, which he instead grounds in a more abstract defence of the ability of liberal democracy to satisfy human nature.}

At the centre of Fukuyama’s thought is a reading of Hegel via the Russian-born philosopher, later French statesman, Alexandre Kojève, which rejects the excessive material determinism of both Marxism and neoliberal economics. Instead “it is the ideal that will govern the material world *in the long run*” (1989: 4). For Fukuyama, ideas such
as liberal democracy can achieve ascendancy, and ultimately triumph in the ideational sphere, vanquishing ideological opponents, even before such a ‘victory’ is made manifest materially. While this opens up Fukuyama to the charge that his thesis is tautological, nonetheless, it is much more difficult to point to recent ‘real-world’ in some way to ‘disprove’ Fukuyama’s thesis. Indeed he explicitly stated that events, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, cannot be used to disprove his thesis as his argument is not that liberal democracy triumphed in 1989 or 1992 in practice, but that it has triumphed in the realm of ideas. While liberal democracy is not currently universally victorious in practice, and there will still be “discontinuities in historical development”, this should not cloud the overall picture as the liberal democratic idea has emerged victorious (1992: xii, 45).

The reason that liberal democratic capitalism as an idea represents the final stage in the evolution of human society, according to Fukuyama, is twofold. Firstly, modern natural science has a homogenizing logic to it. All countries seeking to be wealthy modern states simply have to follow a path broadly leading in a capitalist direction to bring wealth to their citizens. Secondly, capitalism is, however, only a necessary but not sufficient explanation and the other half of the explanation lies in there being a fundamental need for recognition rooted in human nature, that ultimately only liberal democracy fulfils (1992: 91, 177). According to Fukuyama it is only when capitalism is combined with liberal democracy that the end of history is reached. American and French democracy developed before industrialization, and therefore cannot really be understood as a development related to economic efficiency. Instead, liberal democracy does not arise from “Economic Man” but from “a specifically “Democratic Man” that desires and shapes democracy even as he is shaped by it” (1992: 135). It is here that Fukuyama leans most heavily on Hegel,
arguing that Marx’s economically and materially determinist account of history is flawed, and instead the “struggle for recognition” is the fundamental shaper of human history. Hegel’s dialectical view of history suggested that regimes are replaced by more successful ones if essential contradictions remain in the existing regime. For Fukuyama, liberal democratic capitalism, with its ability to provide economic efficiency and wealth combined with its ability to ‘recognise’ its citizens, brings into question whether any fundamental contradictions remain which could possibly lead to the liberal democratic idea ever being trumped (1992: 136). Fukuyama’s thought here sits firmly within orthodox neoconservatism, which has always been more concerned with the social and the political over the economic. Support for capitalism has always played second fiddle to more social or political concerns, perhaps best exemplified in the title of Irving Kristol’s 1978 book, Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York, Basic).

Hegel’s version of liberalism is “nobler” than that of Hobbes or Locke, according to Fukuyama, as man is more free and public-spirited, less materialist, and not driven simply by economic needs but by a desire to have their moral status as human beings recognised by other men (1989: 18; 1992: 145-50). The liberalism of Hobbes or Locke on its own, leaves open the question of why civic democratic life occurs at all, as the population would find it difficult to transcend the over-arching impulse to self-preservation. Fukuyama here refers to this idea of the need for recognition as thymos, a Greek word at the root of the noble virtues of morality and self-sacrifice, yet also at the root of less noble attributes including a lust for power, wealth and status (1992: 170-189). Democracy is not primarily concerned with economics, but has developed and been driven by the need for

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72 Fukuyama (1992: 187) also makes the distinction between megalothymia – a desire to be recognised as superior to others, and isothymia – a desire to be recognised as the equal of others. According to Fukuyama, Madison saw US-style liberal democracy as the best way to channel thymos in “a benign way to indulge man’s natural pride”.

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human beings to be recognised as moral actors. For Fukuyama, it is the only socio-political system that provides human beings with the recognition that they require.\footnote{Interestingly, Fukuyama in both his article and book, suggests that parts of the Islamic world are the only areas of the world where there is still a fundamental challenge to the liberal democratic model, although he suggests the importance and relevance of this is curtailed by the fact this alternative theocratic model has very limited appeal outside of certain Islamic states (1989: 14; 1992: 211-12).} It is this thymotic dimension and the need for recognition when combined with capitalist economics that provides the basis for the end of history. Thus, for Fukuyama, the final state at the end of history is an amalgam of Locke and Hegel:

The universal and homogeneous state that appears at the end of history can thus be seen as resting on the twin pillars of economics and recognition...The human historical process that leads up to it has been driven forward equally by the progressive unfolding of modern natural science and by the struggle for recognition.

(1992: 204)

Having established these two pillars of liberal democracy, and stated why liberal democracy represents the final stage of human socio-political evolution, Fukuyama then turns to a more practical consideration of how democracy itself comes about in a society, and it is here that clear arguments are made that resurface among other neoconservative intellectuals in the latter half of the 1990s and the run up to the Iraq War in 2003. For Fukuyama, although liberal democracy represents the end of history, there is no suggestion that it simply automatically and spontaneously occurs in a given society at a given time. Instead

Democracy can never enter through the back door; at a certain point, \textit{it must arise out of a deliberate political decision to establish democracy}...Stable liberal democracy cannot come into being without the existence of \textit{wise and effective statesmen} who understand the art of politics and are able to convert the underlying inclinations of peoples into durable political institutions.

(1992: 220, emphasis added)
According to this, democracy is not simply something that arises organically from the bottom up, but has a significant top down element to it, with “wise statesmen” able to play a crucial role in bringing about stable liberal democracy. In 1991, some neoconservatives pressed for the United States to merely play a supporting role to a ‘bottom up’ Iraqi insurrection against Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of the Gulf War. By 2003, however, this had evolved into a much more ‘top down’ approach with ‘wise’ American statesman playing the role of midwives to Iraqi democracy, leading to the introduction of new political institutions and democratic elections.

Fukuyama provided a further contribution to the evolution of the neoconservative perspective on liberal democracy with his reflections on culture. He argued that it was a mistake to say that there were certain cultural thresholds that must be met before a society was able to make the transition to democracy. He provided the example of India, which has a very different political culture from most other democracies, and the examples of German and Japanese authoritarian states being quickly turned into democracies after the Second World War. Indeed, every democracy in existence had at some point been an authoritarian state (1992: 221-22). Fukuyama’s themes re-emerged in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, especially the suggestion that liberal democracies did not simply emerge out of the ether, but needed to be willed into being by wise statesmen and the idea that there were no cultural barriers that posed a fundamental challenge to the successful birth of democracy in a state.74

Fukuyama (1992: 252) also went on the offensive against realism in foreign affairs. While realism had been “appropriate” for the Cold War as the world had operated according to its

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74 A further theme with relevance for later neoconservative thought that Fukuyama touches on (1992: 236) but does not extensively develop, is the idea that Islamic fundamentalism “bears a more than superficial resemblance to European fascism”.
premises, nonetheless, in the post-Cold War world, realism had become “reductionist” and a “theoretical framework beyond its appointed time”. States were not simply motivated by self-preservation but by thymos and the need for recognition just as individuals did. States did not simply pursue power but sought various different ends and were motivated also by the concept of “legitimacy” (1992: 257). Realists were also wrong to suggest that the domestic political regimes of states did not significantly influence their foreign policy behaviour. The domestic politics of other states mattered, according to Fukuyama, because liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. He here fully endorsed Michael Doyle’s democratic peace thesis (Fukuyama, 1992: 262-263; M. Doyle, 1986: 1151-52).

Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ therefore contained a number of key themes which would eventually come into ascendancy in neoconservatism in this period. Firstly, the idea that liberal democracy was the ultimate end-point of human socio-political development, even if it was not yet realised in the ‘real world’. Secondly, liberal democracy was not something that developed automatically in a ‘bottom up’ fashion in states but needed wise statesman to decide to bring it into reality. Thirdly, there were no impassable cultural barriers that could prevent a state becoming democratic. Fourthly, realism was a doctrine for a bipolar Cold War, and not a suitable paradigm for the post-Cold War period. Lastly, the domestic politics of states mattered as it affected their foreign policy behaviour, especially as liberal democracies did not go to war with each other.

Yet, despite Fukuyama’s argument that liberal democracy had ultimately triumphed in the realm of ideas, he was not particularly enthusiastic at such an outcome. Drawing heavily on Nietzsche, who argued that human greatness was only possible in aristocratic societies, Fukuyama contended that liberal democracies produced citizens obsessed with toleration and the personal health and safety of the body, rather than virtuous citizens who tend to
value questions of morality above those of tolerance. In aristocracies, there were possibilities in the moral sphere that are not possible in liberal democracies where “(m)en with modern educations are content to sit at home congratulating themselves on their broadmindedness and lack of fanaticism” (1992: 307). Thus Fukuyama’s view of liberal democracy is somewhat paradoxical. It is the final end-point of human socio-political evolution and triumphs due to its ability to provide economic wealth and provide the recognition its citizens crave. Yet it simultaneously produces societies that are hallmarked by dullness, with little outlet for virtue, moral excellence and struggle for a just cause. Indeed, he partly attributes the cause of the First World War to the fact that liberal democratic life in Western Europe had bored a generation of European men, and it was a rebellion against a century of bourgeois peace (1992: 329-331).

It is this paradox that critics of the neoconservatives have drawn upon to suggest that their support for liberal democracy is merely rhetorical or tactical, and that deep down they are actually committed elitists, with little passion for the politics of liberal democracy (Norton, 2004: 95-96, 120; Ryan, 2007; Lind, 2003: 10-13). It is here that the links between Leo Strauss and neoconservatism are frequently drawn. Norton (2004: 120) suggests that Strauss’s idea of natural right is not an argument for the extension and promotion of democracy but the limiting of democracy. Indeed, the idea of natural right, according to Norton, is presented as an alternative to the democratic “consent of the governed”. However, as Fukuyama has argued, the links between Strauss and neoconservatism have been wildly overstated. While some neoconservatives, such as Irving Kristol have drawn

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75 Of course, strictly speaking, the nineteenth century had not been entirely peaceful after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 – the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars for example – yet there had not been a continent-wide conflagration.

76 For an exploration of the idea of natural right see Leo Strauss (1953) *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press). Contrary to Norton, the primary thrust of Strauss’s argument is to neither defend or attack liberal democracy as an idea, but an assault on relativism and nihilism (Strauss, 1953: 1-8)
inspiration from Strauss’s writings, many such as Robert Kagan have not. Strauss’s emphasis on the importance of political regimes and his attacks on relativism and nihilism certainly have been reflected in neoconservative thought, but the idea that Strauss was anti-democratic and that the neoconservatives were inspired to invade Iraq on the basis of his writing seems misplaced. Indeed, Murray (2005: 20) suggests that “Strauss’s oeuvre is no invader’s handbook”.

Even though Fukuyama explores the potential downsides to liberal democracy, it is a significant overstatement to suggest that this means neoconservatives were anti-democratic and elitist. Fukuyama (1992: 313) argues that it is possible to be fully within the “Christian-liberal” tradition, “believe” in democracy and reject Nietzsche’s morality, while still appreciating Nietzsche’s insights on the pitfalls of liberal democracy. For example, Fukuyama (1992: 337) argues that liberal principles threaten notions of patriotism, which can potentially imperil the survival of a political community. Nonetheless, he argues that liberal democracy satisfies the three essential needs of man – reason, desire and thymos – better than any other political system in history. His reflections on Nietzsche’s aristocratic leanings and elitism are therefore best seen as caveats rather than a fundamental challenge to his overall embrace of liberal democracy. Fukuyama’s answer to the fact that liberal democracies can atrophy, degenerate and succumb to opponents, is that liberal democracies that fight occasional wars are far healthier and more robust societies than those that live in Kant’s perpetual peace (1992: 329). This is yet another theme from Fukuyama that reappears in neoconservative discourse in the later years of the 1990s and into the George W. Bush administration: the idea that fighting just wars overseas is a contributor to the strength and vitality of the American polity back home.
If Fukuyama’s work focused on liberal democracy from a more abstract, philosophical perspective, the other two book-length, neoconservative studies of liberal democracy in this period were more directly policy-orientated. Gregory Fossedal’s *The Democratic Imperative; Exporting the American Revolution* (New York, New Republic/Basic), published in 1989, and Joshua Muravchik’s, 1991 book, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny* (Washington DC, AEI), both sought to place democracy promotion centrally in the foreign policy agenda of the United States. These two books have not been widely read but are worthy of further study as examples of early post-Cold War neoconservative linkage of democracy promotion and US foreign policy. Fossedal, like many neoconservatives, had previously written editorials for the *Wall Street Journal* in the mid 1980s, before taking up a research fellow position at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, where he wrote *The Democratic Imperative*. Muravchik, who had previously been National Chairman of the Young People’s Socialist League, had then followed a similar left to right journey as many of the early neoconservatives, ending up as a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he penned *Exporting Democracy*.77

In large parts of the book, Fossedal points to examples in American history where the promotion of democracy by the United States has been successful, including post-World War Two experiences in Germany and Japan through to the Philippines in the mid-1980s (1989: 16, 33). In a direct repudiation of orthodox realism, Fossedal suggests that it is not *geopolitik* that is the pivot for history and international relations but *ideopolitik*. To understand the conduct of American foreign policy is not a matter of coming to terms with the technology, geography, resources of the United States, but to understand its ideological

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77 Gary Dorrien (2004: 80-81, 114-123) discusses the contributions of both Gregory Fossedal and Joshua Muravchik to neoconservative thought.
foundation, to understand liberal democracy itself. (1989: 36). What he sought was not a fetishization of democracy itself *per se*, which he suggested was simply a process. Rather, the goal for the United States in the conduct of its foreign policy was, as the framers had suggested, to secure the rights of mankind. Fossedal argued that these human rights were to be found on the pages of Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Jefferson, Mill and lastly Strauss. These were the rights that, in a clear linkage to Strauss’ conception of natural right, “flow from nature and from “Nature’s God” itself” (1989: 218). Fossedal’s democratic vision was not limited to the American polity, but rooted in a universal conception of human rights. The United States should be actively involved in spreading liberal democracy itself as it was the democratic process which offered the best chance of fostering these rights in other states.

Joshua Muravchik’s *Exporting Democracy*, bears a remarkable resemblance to many of the themes of Fossedal’s work highlighted earlier. As with both Fukuyama and Fossedal, Muravchik began by explicitly rejecting realism as a doctrine to guide US foreign policy. Interpreting the end of the Cold War, he argued that the United States did not win because of its superior technology, munitions or diplomatic skill. Instead it won the Cold War “almost without trying” as it was the very potency of the idea of liberal democracy on which the United States is founded that ultimately brought about the collapse of Communism as it could not compete at the ideological level, and the “élan of democracy provided the context for communism’s terminal crisis” (1991a: 1, 4). The potency of democracy, according to Muravchik, lay not in the fact that it was a natural state of human affairs, but that it met an innate human need to be treated with dignity. This of course bore a close similarity to Fukuyama’s idea of *thymos* and the need for recognition.
For Muravchik, there were three primary reasons why the United States should be interested in spreading democracy abroad. Firstly, out of sheer empathy for fellow human beings. Secondly, the more democratic the rest of the world was, the more likely the United States would face a benign international political environment. Thirdly, the more democratic the rest of the world was the less likely there would be conflict and war in general. As with Fukuyama, Muravchik in this third point endorsed the democratic peace thesis. The consent of the people needed to begin a war is difficult to achieve, and also, the “ethics” of democracy are conducive to peace rather than conflict (1991a: 8-9). For Muravchik, the historical record in Germany, Japan, and India proved that democracy could indeed be “transplanted” to distant and differing cultures and not just survive but put down roots and prosper.78

In terms of the precise strategies that the United States should use to foster democracy, the options available were very similar to those provided by Fossedal. The US could use covert action by its intelligence services to fund and support foreign groups that are sympathetic to democratic ideals. It could also support guerrillas fighting against non-democratic governments, along the lines of the Reagan Doctrine, although Muravchik cautioned that this was maybe more effective as a tool for strengthening US security rather than explicitly aiding the spread of liberal democracy (1991a: 125-144). Other options included direct broadcasting to plant the seeds of democracy in foreign states and the use and expansion of educational exchange programmes to expose foreign students to liberal democratic values, although Muravchik cautioned against the idea that they would all automatically become democrats (1991a: 189-197). He also pointed to the examples of South Korea and Taiwan to show that economic development and progress could lead to

78 Muravchik claimed that the idea that democracy could technically be “exported” was a straw man, and that the United States instead could “influence” other countries to make them more democratic. Bizarrely though, this straw man appeared on the front cover of his book: Exporting Democracy (1991a: 81).
greater levels of democratisation, which the United States could also support. Nonetheless, he suggested that the exact relationship between economic and political development remained “indeterminate” and warned against expecting economic growth to always lead to democracy (1991a: 188).

An interesting feature of both Fossedal and Muravchik’s work on democracy is that both argue that the ultimate aim of American foreign policy is to create a democratic world in which the United States is eventually transcended by other democratic states. Muravchik argues that American decline is a good thing, if it finds itself being lowered to just one country among many thriving democracies. Indeed, not just a good thing, but “our greatest triumph” (1991a: 11). In a similar vein, Fossedal suggests that his advocacy of liberal democracy does not rest on the fact that it is a peculiarly American value, but because it is a universal value. Therefore the expansion of democratic space in global political life is to be welcomed and in an extraordinary phrase considering how neoconservatism is often perceived, “the decline of American material hegemony should be a primary goal of American foreign policy” (1989: 240, emphasis added). This seems to be a significant challenge to the central thrust of Ryan’s argument (2007) that neoconservatives were focused solely on maintaining American unipolarity, with talk of democracy or human rights only functioning as rhetorical flourish. Neoconservative intellectuals argued that the success of placing democracy promotion at the heart of US foreign policy would be measured by the extent to which the United States was overtaken by other democracies. This is hardly evidence of an argument for a Pax Americana ad infinitum, even allowing for a certain amount of rhetorical hyperbole.
Yet reading Fossedal and Muravchik on democracy, with the benefit of two decades of hindsight, one is struck by the fact that despite their undoubted challenge to the more semi-realist form of neoconservatism that had hitherto been in the ascendancy, and the reality that they had brought democracy promotion into a much more central position in neoconservative thought, it remained a very cautious approach. At times in Muravchik’s 1991 book, he came close to advocating the use of direct American military power to bring democracy to another state, but always seemed reticent to fully follow through with his argument. So, for example, he explicitly ruled out attacking other states to impose democracy, and yet added the caveat that there should nonetheless be no “blanket prohibition” against doing so (1991a: 117). Elsewhere, he praised the power of American coercion in bringing about democratic change, and yet he argued that it was never the direct purpose of any particular conflict, and was never an act of initiating an aggressive war for the purpose of democracy’s imposition (1991a: 82, 91). Therefore, their various foreign policy prescriptions for promoting democracy discussed earlier, all seem somewhat limited and restrained compared with later neoconservative arguments, and there is no argument deployed to advocate that American troops should be directly involved with bringing democracy to another country. Fossedal and Muravchik undoubtedly lay some of the intellectual foundations for later more radical and expansive neoconservative work to build upon, and placed the idea of democracy promotion more centrally in neoconservative foreign policy discourse. Yet simultaneously, their writing is evidence of the fact that neoconservatism in these very early post-Cold War years still held to a relatively limited and cautious approach. Democracy promotion had started to feature more prominently in their work, and yet the role the United States had to play in such promotion was certainly restrained, with the most radical suggestion being a continuation of the Reagan Doctrine of supporting various guerrilla groups in their struggle against anti-democratic regimes.
2.6 Defense Planning Guidance (1992)

The philosophical reflections on democracy of Fukuyama coupled with the direct policy prescriptions of Fossedal and Muravchik were evidence of the groundwork being laid for a shift in neoconservative thought to place democracy promotion more centrally in the neoconservative vista. The controversy over the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) at the Pentagon in 1992 represented a further staging post in the evolution of neoconservative thought. Dick Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, had requested that Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, draft a policy paper setting out the overall strategic situation which the United States faced in the post-Cold War world. Although it took the form of a standard Defense Planning Guidance which was drawn up every two years as a matter of practice, its argument appeared to be anything but run of the mill. Indeed, when it was leaked to the *New York Times* it created a furore and public relations fiasco that eventually led to a redrafting (Dorrien, 2004: 38-43; Mann, 2004: 209-215; Tyler, 1992a).\(^{79}\) The 1992 DPG was widely described as the Wolfowitz Plan despite the fact that Zalmay Khalilzad had a more active role in drafting the paper. It attracted controversy due to its unabashed championing of American unipolarity, the decline of the Cold War’s system of bipolarity, and its policy goals to prevent rival challengers to American military supremacy.\(^{80}\)

According to the initial reporting of the DPG in the *New York Times*, the document sought to promote the concept of “benevolent domination by one power”, and repudiated the existing international collective security arrangements of the Cold War. Instead of collective action through the United Nations, the paper openly speculated that ad hoc

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\(^{79}\) This thesis does not delve deeply into the precise events surrounding the leaking of the document and the largely bureaucratic convulsions that followed its leaking. These are ably explored by both Dorrien (2004: 38-43) and Mann (2004: 209-215).

\(^{80}\) Unfortunately, the second part of the document is still classified, so we are still somewhat reliant on the reporting of the leaked document by the *New York Times* and interviews with the relevant individuals.
coalitions of the willing were a more preferable way of dealing with certain crises as they arose. The 46-page document made the case for the United States to actively prevent and persuade other states to not pursue a greater role in world affairs and thereby challenge American dominance. The paper opposed, for example, any joint European security efforts outside of the confines of NATO. It also provided justification for the Bush administration’s ‘Base Force’ proposal of a 1.6 million member military in the next five years. Looking to the future, the report flagged up the potential threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially if those weapons fell into the hands of hostile, authoritarian regimes, and also advocated a global anti-missile system (Tyler, 1992a; 1992b).

Commentators and academics have both made much of this 1992 document. According to Ryan (2007: 96), the DPG documents were “the defining documents of second generation neoconservatism”. For Mann (2004: 214-215) the DPG shaped the rest of the 1990s, and even after the Democrats took back the White House in January 1993, the DPG was never directly repudiated, but they merely added their own themes of globalization, open markets and democracy to it. Halper and Clarke (2004: 146) argued that the National Security Strategy of the Bush administration in 1992 had its intellectual roots in and reflected the “strategic world-view” of the 1992 DPG. And yet, despite the radical and revolutionary label that has been attached to the document, and despite the controversy generated by it at the time, there are considerable question marks over whether this really was evidence of a radical shift for both US foreign policy and neoconservative thought.\(^8\) Rather than

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\(^8\) Indeed, commenting a few years later in an interview, Wolfowitz claimed that he was baffled by the amount of controversy the document had generated, and argued that it was simply an explanation as to why the United States needed to maintain troop deployments overseas, rather than bring them all home now that the Cold War had finished (Mann, 2004: 213-214) And writing at the time, Krauthammer (1992) also argued that the DPG was not terribly novel, and contained many elements which Cheney had already publicly announced.
announcing a new fundamental alteration in policy, it was more a case of needing to justify maintaining a Cold War ‘posture’ in the post-Cold War world, to maintain high levels of defence spending and military power to deal with the perceived threats of the post-Cold War world just as the United States had done during the Cold War. While the language of the document was more strident and explicit regarding the United States’ position vis-à-vis the rest of the world than before, the actual substance of the document was not nearly as far-reaching or novel as has been stated. Indeed, the very fact that the document was never explicitly repudiated by the Clinton administration when it took office is also suggestive of the fact that it was not substantively as radical or controversial as it had appeared to some at the time. The controversy was a question more of style than of substance, with the language and style of the DPG proving more provocative than the actual detail of the policy content, especially to the European allies of the United States. This is not to argue that style was unimportant, but it should not eclipse the fact that the DPG was more an exercise in continuity and maintaining the status quo as a radical departure from orthodoxy.

Leaving aside the question of how radical the policy document appeared to a wider audience, for the evolution of neoconservative thought at least, it revealed a neoconservatism in transition, but still well short of the ideological position in which it found itself in by the turn of the millennium. The DPG showed neoconservatives had taken steps away from the cautious realism and calls for modesty that had heralded its approach during the waning years of the Cold War. And yet there was little discussion of the idea that the United States should be using its military power for democracy promotion and human rights, and scant evidence of the national interest being framed in ideological rather than material terms. With the benefit of hindsight, foreign policy analysts have perhaps
read too much into the 1992 DPG. It is difficult to see how the 2003 Iraq War automatically flows from its pages. Rather than being a defining document for a new unabashed form of neoconservatism, it is better seen as an example of how neoconservatives were gradually shedding their Cold War ‘semi-realist’ inclinations. It was an assertion of American primacy unencumbered by the Soviet Union, yet not an embrace of a more expansive vision or mission for American foreign policy they later adopted. Indeed, one could say it was less the case that the neoconservatives had fundamentally altered their foreign policy ideology and more that the end of the Cold War had so dramatically altered the geopolitical status quo that now simply maintaining a Cold War military ‘posture’ in the post-Cold War world appeared as more radical and novel than it first appeared.

2.7 Conclusion

The early post-Cold War period revealed that neoconservatism from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century looked surprisingly cautious, with much ideological distance still to travel. The initial response to the ending of the Cold War demonstrated that many neoconservatives preferred a neo-isolationist, semi-realist foreign policy for the United States; to passively enjoy the fruits of its Cold War victory, focusing more on domestic problems. Meanwhile, the Gulf War had confirmed that while neoconservatives still held to a robust form of anti-totalitarianism, there was little appetite for a radical policy of regime change and the imposition of democracy on Iraq. Indeed, many neoconservatives seemed in thrall to realist conceptions of stability and the balance of power in the Middle East. Yet, even in these early years, there was evidence of a nascent ideological shift. Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ had laid a philosophical foundation for neoconservatism’s evolution by framing the post-Cold War period as the triumph of the liberal democratic
idea. Fossedal and Muravchik had begun to explore precisely how the United States could turn the idea of liberal democracy into a reality on the ground overseas through the conduct of its foreign policy, even if at this stage they were reluctant to link it to the direct use of American military force. The collapse of the Soviet Union had also put the United States in a less constrained geopolitical position. The 1992 DPG revealed a neoconservatism that was more bold and assertive, at least stylistically, even if the actual substance of the document was perhaps less radical than it first appeared. American unipolarity was indeed being championed, even if the question of what do with that unipolarity was still largely at the embryonic stage, and thus not fully addressed. Nonetheless, with Clinton defeating Bush in the 1992 presidential election, a whole series of foreign policy crises arose on the foreign policy horizon that would more emphatically reposition neoconservatism in a more idealist location, and see neoconservatives advocate far more radical foreign policy prescriptions than had hitherto been proposed.
Chapter 3
Clinton I: Somalia to Bosnia

3.1 Introduction

Breaking a twelve year Republican grip on the White House, the election of Bill Clinton to the presidency was in some respects an unanticipated outcome. In the warm afterglow of a crushing victory in the Gulf War a little over eighteen months previous, President Bush enjoyed public approval ratings that could be labelled stratospheric without resorting to hyperbole. Yet, following economic trouble, and with the conservative vote haemorrhaging to the well funded campaign of Ross Perot, the 1992 presidential election saw Bush defeated by the young governor from Arkansas, 22 years his junior. Having occupied few positions in the Bush administration, Clinton’s arrival in office completed the distancing of neoconservatives from executive power. The rest of the 1990s witnessed neoconservatives in opposition, critiquing the conduct of American foreign policy, and building an alternative foreign policy platform. This would serve the function of policy advocacy aimed at President Clinton, in addition to shaping congressional Republican foreign policy approaches with a view to informing the next Republican president.

Clinton’s two terms in office saw a series of foreign policy crises in countries whose names are now synonymous with the events that defined Clinton’s foreign policy legacy – Somalia; Haiti; Bosnia; Kosovo; Iraq – in addition to the overarching strategies of democratic enlargement and assertive multilateralism. At each stage, in their house journals and op-ed columns, neoconservatives wrestled with what was occurring, occasionally supporting, more frequently dissenting. This chapter largely discusses the

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82 On the 3 March 1991, President Bush’s approval rating was recorded by Gallup at an unprecedented 89% - only eclipsed by the 90% achieved by his son in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Gallup, 1991; 2001).
period of Clinton’s first term, examining how neoconservative responses to the events of those years demonstrate the evolution of their thought away from the more cautious, semi-isolationist approach in the immediacy of the Cold War’s conclusion, to a radical foreign policy platform that supposedly would be “picked off the shelf” by President Bush after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 4). It begins by focusing on their initial reaction to Clinton’s election victory in November 1992, followed by discussion of the democratic peace theory and the administration’s doctrines of democratic enlargement and assertive multilateralism. Specific foreign policy crises in Somalia (1992-4), Haiti (1994-5) and Bosnia (1992-95) are then dealt with in turn, explicitly analysing the neoconservative critique. Particular attention is drawn to the importance ascribed to humanitarian concerns and democracy promotion relative to conceptions of American power and a narrower view of the national interest. The chapter concludes with an extended discussion of the relationship between neoconservatism and the Christian Right and social conservatism more widely. The culture wars of the 1990s saw a greater degree of convergence between social conservatives and neoconservatives in the domestic political arena, and also a significant alliance on foreign affairs, sharing a greater proclivity for humanitarian interventionism.

3.2 Reaction to Clinton’s Victory

Neoconservative intellectuals had decisively shifted into the Republican Party with Ronald Reagan’s defeat of Jimmy Carter in 1980. It was not a surprise, therefore, when the prevailing attitude in 1992 was to support President Bush in his election battle with Bill Clinton. During Bush’s four years in office, the United States had won the Cold War, defeated Saddam Hussein’s Iraq on the battlefield, and looked set to dominate a post-Cold
War era of peace and prosperity. Clinton on the other hand, was an unproven entity who had cut his political teeth working on the 1972 presidential campaign of George McGovern; the embodiment for the neoconservatives of everything that was wrong with counterculture American liberalism. For Gertrude Himmelfarb (1994: 71), the “New Class”, the academic-media complex, was now firmly ensconced in the corridors of power bent on denigrating bourgeois values and the puritan ethic. Despite 57% of Americans voting for conservative candidates in 1992 (Bush and Perot), and the fact that many more Americans self-described themselves as conservatives than liberals, William Kristol (1993: 33-36) argued that following Clinton’s victory an all-pervasive liberalism had invaded the “key institutions of society.” The defeat of the Soviet Union had left American liberalism with no ideological competitor to its left and it was now free to run amok, with the potential to push “feminism, environmentalism, or multiculturalism” to “destructive extremes”. Many neoconservatives were also deeply wary about the personnel of the Clinton administration. The only difference for Elliott Abrams between the people that Clinton would appoint and those that Dukakis would have appointed had he won in 1988, was that those same people were now four years older. Norman Podhoretz drew a similar comparison, but with Carter instead of Dukakis (Barnes, 1992: 14). Any neoconservative who was tempted to back Clinton was not a genuine neoconservative according to William Kristol, indeed, going so far as to label them “pseudo-neocon” (Kristol quoted in Barnes, 1992: 14).

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83 For the neoconservative argument that the United States had actually contributed to winning the Cold War, rather than simply the Soviet Union losing it see Joshua Muravchik (1994) ‘How the Cold War Really Ended’ Commentary, 98(5) pp. 40-45.

If these perspectives were the expected neoconservative reaction to Clinton’s ascent to power, they were not shared with unanimity by neoconservatives. Far from criticising Clinton’s victory, Joshua Muravchik had campaigned for it. Although Bill Clinton had worked on McGovern’s campaign, and his wife Hillary was widely seen as something of a radical, he was considered politically moderate. Indeed, according to Dumbrell (2009: 7), Clinton was a “militant man of the centre”. Firstly, Clinton had distinguished himself in the campaign from certain liberal orthodoxies on race, crime and welfare. Secondly, he had campaigned to the right of Bush on foreign policy, urging tougher action on China, Serbia and Cuba, and criticising his opponent for “coddling” dictators. Thirdly, and from today’s perspective somewhat peculiarly, his selection of Al Gore as his running mate was seen as a relatively conservative choice, especially given Gore’s backing for military action undertaken by Bush during the Gulf War and his support for Israel (Dumbrell, 2009: 14). Today, Gore’s environmental activism, Nobel Prize, and election battle with Bush in 2000 have resulted in him becoming something of a liberal icon. Back then, however, Gore’s endorsement had adorned the dust jacket of Gregory Fossedal’s *Democratic Imperative*, and his wife Tipper had led a campaign against obscenity in popular music which had endeared her to many conservatives. In addition to these points, Clinton had accepted the chairmanship of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) in New Orleans in March 1990, attracted by their emphases on welfare reform and economic growth (Clinton, 2004). The DLC was established to push for more centrist, moderate policies, in opposition to the more radical policy platform on which both McGovern and Mondale ran in 1972 and 1984 (Muravchik, 1992a: 22; 1993a: 19). The DLC was also closely affiliated with the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI). Formed in 1989, the PPI was in many ways a forerunner of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) of the late 1990s. Indeed, Tony Smith suggests that there was a “virtual convergence of opinion” between the PPI
and PNAC (T. Smith, 2009: 77). Further to the ideological affinity with the policies of the Clinton campaign, some neoconservatives such as Joshua Muravchik had been actively courted by the campaign, with the distinct possibility of actually joining the administration in some capacity if Clinton won the election.\footnote{Among others, Edward Luttwak, James Woolsey, Paul Nitze and Joshua Muravchik signed an advertisement that appeared in the New York Times endorsing Clinton’s campaign (Rosenfeld, 1992). Writing a few months after taking office, Muravchik (1993b: 17) expressed his personal disappointment in being passed over for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy and Human Rights, following what he claimed to be a systematic campaign by some on the Left against his appointment.}

The brief flirtation with Clinton by neoconservatives like Muravchik, however, was to subside very quickly. Indeed, Muravchik argues that it started as early as the interregnum between Clinton’s election win and his inauguration. Two appointments at the State Department in particular began to distance Clinton from his few neoconservative admirers. The selection of Warren Christopher as Secretary of State and Clifton Wharton as his deputy were problematic. Christopher had been relatively anonymous on foreign affairs since the end of the Carter administration, and the fact that he had been deputy to Cyrus Vance in that administration was hardly a good foundation for a Clinton-neoconservative rapprochement. Wharton was even less well known in foreign policy circles. Although Woolsey’s appointment to head up the CIA was welcomed, and Aspin at the Pentagon was not significantly criticised, the State Department appointments had raised doubts among the neoconservatives who had backed Clinton in the election campaign (Muravchik, 1993b: 16-17).

Within months of Clinton’s inauguration, however, there was not merely disagreement with Clinton’s choice of personnel, but his approach to foreign policy. Central concerns included slashing the Pentagon’s budget by $120 billion instead of the $60 billion he campaigned on; a move in defence planning from being able to fight two major regional
wars to one and a half; and outsourcing the Bosnian crisis to the United Nations and the Europeans despite campaigning hard on the issue and criticising Bush’s approach (Muravchik, 1993b: 19-20). The quotation below by Muravchik clearly encapsulates neoconservative feeling toward Clinton very early in his presidency, and this by the neoconservative who was on balance most sympathetic to his foreign policy:

Much that Clinton has done since the election gives the impression that the inner compass that was forged in the McGovern campaign, and perhaps in his marriage to Hillary, pulls him to the Left until the force of public opprobrium deflects him back towards the Center. If that is so, we may be in for three-and-a-half more years of zigs and zags.

(Muravchik, 1993b: 22)

Most neoconservatives were set against Clinton’s presidency from the very beginning, and the few that were not, had joined their colleagues in united opposition well before even the first year of the administration had finished (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 84).

3.3 Democratic Peace Theory and the Clinton Administration

Before examining the neoconservative response to the Clinton administration in detail, it will be useful to first examine the ideological roots of the doctrines which informed Clinton’s approach, focusing on democratic peace theory, democratic enlargement, and assertive multilateralism. The doctrine of ‘democratic enlargement’, elucidated most forcefully by National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, posited that American security was best enhanced by abandoning the Cold War posture of containment in favour of expanding the global sphere of market democracy.86 This rested on four main objectives: strengthen existing market democracies; consolidate new market democracies; contain

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86 Dumbrell (2009: 17) argues that Lake’s beliefs fused a cautious nature which developed post-Vietnam, with a firm belief in humanitarianism and the promotion of democracy.
aggressor states; and encourage these states to shift in the direction of market democracies (Travis, 1998: 256). Clinton’s democratic enlargement philosophy rested on democratic peace theory which, although classically elucidated by Immanuel Kant, had in more recent years been most influentially outlined by Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett. Doyle argued that even though liberal democratic states regularly resorted to war against non-democracies, their behaviour was pacific with regard to fellow democracies. The fact that the United States was able to peacefully replace the United Kingdom as the global hegemon was offered as an example of the democratic peace in action.87

In seeking to further understand Doyle’s democratic peace theory, Bruce Russett (1996) provided an answer as to why democracies did not go to war with each other. He argued that democracy played an independent explanatory role beyond other variables such as stability, wealth, and economic growth. Russett suggested that two things were crucial: democratic norms and democratic structures. In democracies, a central norm is that domestic disputes can be resolved through dialogue and the democratic process without recourse to violence. Thus the foreign policy behaviour of democracies is pacific toward one another since they reflect this domestic norm in their inter-state relationships. Structurally, in democracies broad popular support is needed for wars, and therefore they are rare occurrences, and democratic societies recognise that other democracies are similarly constrained.88 Nonetheless those same democratic norms and structures said to prevent war between democracies are the very same things which inform foreign policy decision making for democracies when faced with threats from non-democratic states. Therefore, these can “prod those states into war with illiberal states.” It is only when a

87 Of course, the two world wars which also played a major part on British decline and the American ascendancy were hardly peaceful in their own right, but for Doyle the fact the US and UK did not fight each other is significant (M. Doyle, 1996: 29).
88 It is of course very difficult at times to analytically separate cultural norms and structural factors when considering democratic peace theory (Russett, 1996: 103).
liberal democracy views the other state as also being a liberal democracy that war is not seen as not as an option (Owen, 1996: 117, 131).  

Democratic peace theory, as espoused above by Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett, performed much of the intellectual heavy lifting for Clinton’s democratic enlargement vision. On occasion, Clinton’s rhetoric perfectly aligned with the central features of Doyle and Russett’s arguments:

Democratic nations do not go to war with one another. They don’t sponsor terrorism or threaten one another with weapons of mass destruction. Precisely because they are more likely to respect civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law within their own borders, democracies provide the best foundations on which to build international order. Democracies make more reliable partners in diplomacy and trade, and in protecting the global environment, something we must do more of in the years ahead...Our task then is to stand up for democracy as it remakes the world.

(Clinton, 1993, emphasis added).

Although it is clear that democracy promotion was far from being a completely novel theme in US foreign policy, there was at the very least rhetorically, movement towards it by the Clinton White House. Indeed, Cox (2000: 226) argues that there was no other idea

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89 There have been numerous academic critiques of democratic peace theory, and space constrains a fuller discussion. Christopher Layne (1996: 159, 190, 198) argues that realism remains a better indicator of likely state behaviour rather than democratic peace theory, that democratic peace theory relies on correlation not causation, and that the logic of the democratic peace “inevitably pushes the United States to adopt an interventionist strategic posture” in regard to non-democracies. For David Sprio (1996: 240-241, 261), apart from a brief period of time during World War One, the fact that democracies do not go to war with each other is “not statistically significant” and is largely a result of the structural conditions of the Cold War. According to Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1996: 303, 332), states that are in the process of democratization can be belligerent as old elites can use nationalism in a vie for power in a democracy. For the United States to seek to tilt China and Russia toward democracy is “like spinning a roulette wheel, where many of the potential outcomes are likely to be undesirable”.

90 Indeed, Karin von Hippel (2000: 1) suggests that the United States has been engaging in democracy promotion since the middle of the nineteenth century and ‘Manifest Destiny’. Other scholars suggested, pointing less far back in the historical record, that there was in fact far greater continuity between George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton on democracy promotion than has often been assumed. Carothers (1995: 15) argues that the Bush that Clinton attacked in the 1992 campaign was an earlier incarnation of the president, and that by 1992 Bush himself had also seen the need for the US to acknowledge the importance of democracy. Michael Cox (2000: 220) points out that there was much more similarities between Bush and Clinton in this area than either of them cared to admit and Tony Smith (2000: 95) also suggests that President
coming out of the academy which had as much influence over the direction of the
American government’s policy as democratic peace theory. Clinton had campaigned in
1992 attacking President Bush for being weak on democracy promotion, especially in
relation to Haiti and China, and now in power, sought to place a much greater emphasis on

Clinton’s advocacy of democracy promotion was not rooted in some misty-eyed,
sentimental attachment to the idea of democracy itself, but very much grounded in the idea
that it enhanced US national security. Clinton’s critics accused him of embracing a utopian
Wilsonianism, yet, he was far more interested in serving the American national interest
and improving American security than burning with democratic missionary zeal (Cox,
2000: 221). For Clinton, democracy was seen as: the best form of government for
stabilising the former Communist states of Eastern Europe; an important factor in why
states rejected international belligerence; the political “gold standard” for the new
millennium as non-democrats had a large legitimacy deficit; and important for the US to
promote as it reflected US values and linked the domestic with the foreign, a key Clinton
concern (Cox, 2000: 225-227). Whereas in the Cold War, democratization was seen as a
part of the containment policy with regard to the Soviet Union and international
communism, with Clinton, democratization was now seen as a strategy for a more general
international peace and security (von Hippel, 2000: 94).

The relationship between market capitalism and Clinton’s democratic enlargement
doctrine is contested, and here a key point of difference between neoconservative
perspectives on democracy promotion and the Clinton approach can be observed.

Bush had favoured democracy for the former Communist states of Eastern Europe far more strongly than he
is given credit for.
Although supporters of the free market, neoconservatives have tended not to emphasise this as much as more libertarian conservatives have done. Democracy promotion for the neoconservatives was bound up in a discourse that emphasised American national interest and a moral mission much more than a market economy per se. For Clinton, however, the idea of the market economy was intrinsic to the overall democratic enlargement project, a fact that was not lost on his neoconservative observers (Khalilzad, 1995: 10). The neoconservative approach to democracy promotion was partly rooted in a larger political theory of the virtue of liberal democracy and the role of the United States in promoting it. The emphasis from the Clinton administration, however, was “a developed political economy about the relationship between democracy and democracy promotion on the one hand, and the market and global capitalism on the other” (Cox, 2000: 235).

The emphasis on the market in combination with democracy promotion was most clearly seen with the Clinton administration’s approach to Russia, on which Clinton focused the his foreign policy on during the first few months after taking office. Of the initial $1.6 billion originally proposed by Clinton in aid for Russia, only $48 million was set aside for democracy promotion efforts (Marsden, 2005: 50). In the policy hierarchy with regards to Russia, American economic and national security interests came ahead of any notion of promoting democracy. It was a much bigger priority for the United States to develop a market economy in Russia than a fully functioning liberal democracy (Marsden, 2005: 55, 67, 124). Clinton’s critics suggest that whenever there was a conflict between markets and promoting democracy, Clinton would always opt for promoting markets. Using the precise accusation levelled by critics of neoconservatism, Marsden (2005: 129) argues that

91 Clinton also felt it was more important to keep Boris Yeltsin in power than push too hard for democracy, as Yeltsin was perceived to be the only person capable of pushing through the market reforms necessary for Russia, and was the best chance of bringing the stability necessary for liberal democracy in the long-term (Marsden, 2005: 125).
“[d]emocracy promotion was little more than rhetoric, a good idea but of secondary importance to achieving US objectives of greater power and prosperity”.

If democratic enlargement had potential for substantial cross-over appeal to neoconservatives, assertive multilateralism was unlikely to prove so attractive, or at least not the ‘multilateralism’ part. Originally labelled by Madeleine Albright during her tenure as US Ambassador to the UN (1993-97), assertive multilateralism had the Gulf War as a significant precedent: a US-led, UN authorised, multilateral intervention to uphold international law and punish an aggressor state. At the centre of this new doctrine, Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13) detailed the precise US role in foreign peacekeeping operations, even allowing US troops to operate under UN command if the president thought it was appropriate (Gellman, 1993; R. J. Smith and Preston, 1993).^92 In many ways, it was a doctrine designed to appeal to a broad range of diverse American perspectives. To conservatives, in the process of penning their ‘Contract with America’ with its call for limited government, it promised a degree of American withdrawal as it anticipated a significant amount of burden-sharing with allies. To liberals, it endorsed a multilateral, UN-based and international-law based world order. To liberal interventionists, the word “assertive” had certain appeal. In some ways, assertive multilateralism was a slippery enough construct which could be interpreted to offend as few interested constituencies as possible and garner a wide base of support (Sterling-Folker, 1998: 278). The difficulty with assertive multilateralism, aside from provoking long-term neoconservative grievances against the United Nations, was that it was inherently contradictory, with impulses to intervention and assertion, at the same time as passing the baton to allies. It may have played well for Clinton the candidate in 1992, but for Clinton

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^92 Opposition to Clinton’s policy in Congress and wider public opinion eventually led the directive to be redrafted and released as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25).
the president in 1993, the fundamental problem was that the implicitly presumed international coalition ready to assist in UN operations and interventions for American foreign policy objectives, such as those in Bosnia, simply did not exist (Sterling-Folker, 1998: 279).

3.4 American Interventionism in Clinton’s First Term

The foreign policy crises President Clinton faced in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia were far from sudden, unforeseen events that simply materialised out of the ether to challenge or derail his presidency. All three were inherited from the Bush administration, had featured in the 1992 presidential campaign, and would provide the backdrop for Clinton’s foreign policy approach in his first term, helping define the basis on which neoconservatism continued to evolve through these years.93

3.4.1 Somalia

The UN and US intervention in Somalia was significant for the fact that there was little in the way of noteworthy geopolitical, strategic or economic justifications for the use of military force. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary General, was keen to use Somalia as a test case for how the UN could intervene in a failed state for solely humanitarian reasons. President Bush, having just lost the election to Clinton, was unencumbered by the constraint of impressing the American electorate when he launched Operation Restore Hope in December 1992. The operation involved sending 25,000 American troops to

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93 The focus in this section will not be on the minutiae of these foreign policy situations, or a day-by-day account of the actual historical record. Instead, the analysis will take a step back from this to provide a broader consideration of the neoconservative foreign policy vision during these somewhat turbulent foreign policy events. For an excellent detailed discussion of the American interventions in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia please see Karin von Hippel (2000) Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). For an interesting discussion of Clinton’s foreign policy more broadly see John Dumbrell (2009) Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000 (Abingdon, Routledge).
Somalia to support the UN mission with the primary aim of protecting humanitarian food relief following the toppling of the government of President Siad Barre and an ensuing civil war between various rebel factions. What began as a purely humanitarian mission quickly escalated following the murder of 24 Pakistani troops by General Mohamed Farah Aidid’s rebel group in June 1993. American forces were then drawn into a mission to capture Aidid, leading to the death of 18 US Army Rangers in Mogadishu in October 1993. Following the sight of the bodies of US soldiers being dragged through the streets on CNN, US public opinion quickly turned against American involvement in Somalia, and Clinton promised a withdrawal of all US forces by March 1994 (von Hippel, 2000: 58-61).

The neoconservative response to Bush and Clinton’s efforts in Somalia was largely critical, mainly on quite similar grounds to the realist critique that it did not serve the national interest (Krauthammer, 1999c: 6). There were certainly no clarion calls for nation-building and imposing democracy in Mogadishu. Patrick Glynn, a neoconservative scholar at AEI, strongly opposed the American intervention in Somalia, and suggested Clinton had failed to jettison Colin Powell’s military philosophy of American interventions being guided by what was “doable” instead of being led by a clear articulation of the national interest. This Powellite doctrine, described as “naked machtpolitik” informed Bush’s original decision to intervene in Somalia but not Bosnia, on the mistaken grounds that the former was achievable whereas the latter could have proved

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94 Some scholars have however suggested that President Clinton misread public opinion, and there was actually support for escalation of the conflict, even though there was indignation at the deaths of the US troops. 71% of Americans still supported US involvement in peacekeeping missions shortly after the US Army Ranger deaths in Mogadishu. See Steven Kull, I.M. Destlet & Clay Ramsay (1997) The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public (College Park, MD, Program on International Policy Attitudes, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland).

95 As will be seen later in this chapter, Charles Krauthammer (1999c: 6) did not find the American national interest to be present in any of President Clinton’s foreign policy interventions, including Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti.
much more problematic (Glynn, 1993: 17, emphasis in the original). Aside from settling scores with their conservative foreign policy rivals, such as Powell, Somalia was an opportunity for neoconservatives to critique Clinton’s notion of assertive multilateralism. Clinton was accused of serving the vision of the UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali, and again, not paying enough attention to the American national interest. For Muravchik, although Cheney, Powell and Bush had all supported the sending of troops to Somalia in December 1992, their aim was for American forces to be used in a limited way, merely to help deliver humanitarian aid. Clinton had allowed the mission for the deployed troops to escalate because he was in fundamental agreement with Boutros-Ghali’s vision for UN multilateral peacekeeping missions which chimed with his administration’s doctrine of assertive multilateralism. The American intervention had little to do with the American national interest, and there was simply no notion of US troops being sent there as an act of self-defence by the United States. The US needed to be “wary” of risking the lives of American soldiers in situations not related to self-defence, as “an implicit premise of our national polity is to value ourselves before others and...the burdens are not equally shared among us” (Muravchik, 1993c: 20-21).

The twin critique of assertive multilateralism and of interventionism not in the national interest was picked up by Wolfowitz (1994a: 29-32). In a wide-ranging assessment of Clinton’s first year in office in Foreign Affairs, he accused the White House of always attempting to shift responsibility for action to the United Nations or European partners instead of leading from the front. Although he praised Clinton for his policy on economic integration with NAFTA, on Somalia “Clinton tried to improve on a modest success and ended with a sizable fiasco.” Clinton’s policy had not just cost the lives of American

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96 Having left the Pentagon after Clinton’s victory, Wolfowitz returned to academia less than three months later, where he was appointed Dean at Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington (Mann, 2004: 227).
soldiers, but had damaged the image of the United States on the world stage and its ability to lead in the future. Somalia was of “little importance” to American security, and Clinton had paid a heavy price in a peripheral arena. Yet even in some of these damning neoconservative verdicts of Clinton’s failure in Somalia, there were nonetheless indications that distinguished them from those of other more realist or isolationist inclined conservatives, and evidence of a nascent shift in neoconservative thinking. Wolfowitz had been scathing of Clinton’s approach in Somalia, and yet found space to commend Clinton for not choosing an isolationist path. Clinton had damaged the interests of the United States by appearing weak in a peripheral area of the world but:

The mistake in Somalia was not the original decision to intervene. The initial success of Operation Restore Hope demonstrated that the United States had the means to save tens of thousands of innocent lives at almost no risk to American forces; to have done nothing would have placed the United States in the position of people who witness a murder that they could prevent simply by picking up the phone.

(Wolfowitz, 1994a: 32, emphasis added)

This echoed Wolfowitz’s ideas at the end of the Gulf War, when he voiced his concerns that the United States could have done more at little risk to its own forces, to prevent Saddam Hussein using helicopters to brutally suppress Shiite opposition. The difference here of course, and what makes Wolfowitz’s paragraph above more noteworthy, was that Somalia was considered a peripheral state compared with a core concern like Iraq. Wolfowitz was arguing that it was legitimate for the United States to use its own military to provide humanitarian assistance in a state that was not central to the US national interest. Of course, favouring the use of US troops to provide humanitarian assistance and stabilization was not the same as advocacy of using military force in a frontline combat capacity or a nation-building project. It was evidence, however, that Wolfowitz envisioned
a US foreign policy that went beyond merely a narrow national interest, in a way that was distinctive from realism or isolationism.

William Kristol and Robert Kagan’s 1996 *Foreign Affairs* article, ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, has been widely seen as one of the defining neoconservative texts of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Gary Dorrien argues it represented something of a neoconservative “manifesto” (Dorrien, 2004: 125; W. Kristol and Kagan, 1996). A piece that Kagan penned in September 1994 for *Commentary*: ‘The Case for Global Activism’, however, was arguably just as significant, although undoubtedly *Commentary*’s smaller readership base limited its impact.97 Kagan’s article is important as it represented a fundamental challenge to how the neoconservatives had hitherto conceptualised their foreign policy approach.98

According to Kagan’s argument, the end of the Cold War had liberated the United States from the restraints of a bipolar world order. It was thus now free to pursue a foreign policy that was consistent with both its “material needs and philosophical predilections” (R. Kagan, 1994: 40, emphasis added). It was not appropriate for the world’s remaining superpower to focus simply on core geopolitical arenas or vital interests. Instead, reflecting both the American national interest and humanitarian and liberal democratic ideals, the US needed to have a much wider foreign policy vision. When the United States had focused on building a “decent” world order instead of narrow national interest, he argued that American “vital” interests were almost ‘automatically’ looked after. It was only when the US exclusively focused on those “vital” interests that the greater threats to American

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97 In an interview with the author, William Kristol suggested that Robert Kagan’s influence on post-Cold War American foreign policy has been under-estimated (W. Kristol, 2011).

98 The novelty of Kagan’s argument was not lost on Commentary’s editors, who devoted several pages of their December 1994 issue to letters in response from Francis Fukuyama, Paul Wolfowitz and Elliott Abrams among others.
survival emerged. Framing American foreign policy in a wider, more ideological fashion also had the benefit of strong public support. Pointing to both Bosnia and Somalia, Kagan suggested that US public opinion was not pressing for withdrawal and passivity from the White House, but was more critical of “half-hearted policies and weak and incompetent execution.” The public supported the use of force beyond merely narrowly defined material interests (1994: 42-44). Drawing on familiar material from the 1930s, Kagan argued the Second World War was partly caused by Western failure to respond to acts of aggression against people in the periphery, including Abyssinia and Manchuria. In a startling list of issues that should provoke an American response as potential threats to world order, he included: aggression; political illegitimacy; genocide; mass starvation; nuclear proliferation; and violations of international agreements. If it was impossible to judge conclusively whether Serbian aggression in Bosnia in the 1990s would be the equivalent of Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1930s, or whether a civil war in Somalia or cancelled elections in Latin America could trigger a wider conflagration, then it behoved the United States to not simply focus on a few limited core national security arenas. Kagan’s argument was aimed not just at President Clinton, but at the Republican Party which he argued was being blown off course; vacillating between isolationism and realism under the spell of Gingrich’s argument that the US was overextended, and thus was “teetering on the edge of historical transformation”.

The response to Kagan’s article from his fellow neoconservatives was decidedly mixed. Elliott Abrams (1994) was concerned that Kagan’s argument would swing the pendulum back too far the other way, from not being interventionist at all, to being too interventionist

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99 For historical inspiration, Kagan (1994: 41) pointed to the example of Theodore Roosevelt who he argued “first grafted principled ends to the exercise of power” and that, controversially, Woodrow Wilson had merely followed Theodore Roosevelt’s theme in his conduct of US foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere.
in places where the US national interest was not involved. Francis Fukuyama (1994) argued that it was difficult to be excited about US intervention in Somalia or Bosnia or other ethnic conflicts and that the US should only send its sons to be killed for strategic countries like Poland rather than on the streets of Kigali or Sarajevo. However, there was not simply criticism of Kagan from other neoconservatives, but also areas of agreement which hinted at a shift in neoconservative thinking. Fukuyama found aspects of Kagan’s argument “appealing” and admitted that he was “not a hard-core realist” with a narrow view of the national interest. It was important that the United States did not shrink from using its power and building a world order that only “a dominant great power can provide”. Wolfowitz and Muravchik both agreed with Kagan’s argument that there should not be such a binary distinction between what represents a core national interest and a peripheral one. Historically, certain geographical areas such as the Sudetenland in 1938 which appeared peripheral at the time, would with hindsight have benefitted from being seen of core significance (Muravchik, 1994b; Wolfowitz, 1994b). Muravchik argued, though, that Kagan was wrong to view threats to the wider peace such as Bosnia and North Korea as analogous to more limited ‘domestic’ catastrophes such as Haiti and Somalia. A fundamental agreement between Kagan and Wolfowitz appeared to be that the United States could not afford to rest on a narrow realist interpretation of the national interest. For Wolfowitz, although the US could not avoid being selective in its foreign policy choices, the United States should nonetheless not rely on a “Metternichan calculation” but be guided by “an idealistic basis for international action.” As the Cold War had left the United States without a superpower competitor, “there appears to be so little power opposing us that there are possibilities of getting involved almost everywhere”.
3.4.2 Haiti

The UN and US intervention in Somalia had challenged the traditional norm of non-intervention in another state on the grounds of humanitarianism. The situation in Haiti, where the UN Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, provided a deeper challenge to the norm of non-intervention on the grounds of upholding democracy (von Hippel, 2000: 92). Under pressure from President Bush, in December 1990, after decades of human rights abuses and tyrannical rule by Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’, democratic elections had taken place in Haiti. The result gave the populist Roman Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide – an exponent of radical liberation theology – an overwhelming victory, securing 67% of the vote, and thus became Haiti’s first democratically elected president. Yet, in September 1991, Aristide was toppled in a coup led by Aristide’s Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Raoul Cedras, and Aristide escaped into exile. Two years later, in July 1993, Cedras and Aristide signed the Governors Island Accord which specified that Aristide would return to power in October 1993 and Cedras’s junta would be granted amnesty. Yet by May 1994, the agreement had still not been put into action, and sanctions were imposed. These followed Madeleine Albright’s request that the UN Security Council pass a resolution to restore Aristide to power – which it duly did on 31 July 1994. A multinational force of 27 countries began their intervention on 19 September 1994, and Aristide arrived back in Haiti on 15 October 1994 aboard a United States military plane. The multinational force remained under a Chapter VII mandate for six months which turned into a Chapter VI

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100 UN Security Council Resolution 940, passed on 31 July 1994, approved the creation of a multinational force to remove Haiti’s military leadership, restore the elected President, and create a “secure and stable environment” (United Nations, 1994).
mandate peacekeeping operation under the authority of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which eventually withdrew in June 1996 (von Hippel, 2000: 92-105).  

Unlike the Somalia intervention, where there were signs of some support from Wolfowitz, Kagan and Muravchik, Clinton’s policy in Haiti faced more opposition by neoconservatives. Charles Krauthammer (1994b), continuing his hostility to US interventionism in the absence of a clear national interest, argued that whereas Somalia was an “afterthought” from the Bush administration, Haiti had become Clinton’s “model”. The problem with the intervention in Haiti was that “altruism is a sentiment, not a strategy.” In a clear rebuff not just to Clinton but also to the new direction for neoconservatism being tentatively charted by Wolfowitz, Muravchik, and Kagan, he argued in a paraphrase of Lord Palmerston’s oft-quoted dictum: “America has no permanent sentiments, only permanent interests.” If the United States had no interests in Haiti, and was only motivated by altruism, it had no business involving itself in its internal affairs. Of course, for the Clinton administration, a new assertive multilateralism, and international-law based world order was in itself a key national interest for the United States. Krauthammer (1994a) unsurprisingly dissented from this. His scepticism on both the Haitian and Somalian interventions was also backed by Jeane Kirkpatrick (1994: 33) who suggested both missions were dangerous, expensive, and emphatically not in the US national interest. Wolfowitz (1994a) counselled Clinton not to make the same mistakes in Haiti that he made in Somalia, and allow US troops to get sucked into a difficult conflict.

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101 Former President Jimmy Carter played a significant diplomatic role in his capacity as a private citizen to negotiate a peaceful end to the junta’s rule, although undoubtedly the imminent arrival of the multinational force was also significant. Some controversy ensued when both Colin Powell and Jimmy Carter referred to Cedras as “a man of honor” after Clinton had described him as a “murderer” (von Hippel, 2000: 103-104). For Carter’s reflections on this period please see Jimmy Carter (2007) Beyond the White House: Waging Peace, Fighting Disease, Building Hope (New York, Simon and Schuster), especially pp. 37-53.
Joshua Muravchik (1993c: 21-23) pointed out that the situation in Haiti was an issue of democracy, and that democracy was a “humanitarian concern” as a lack of democracy was a direct affront to human rights. A denial of democracy could also have implications for American security, as more democracies meant the US was safer. This was further evidence of the developing neoconservative endorsement of the democratic peace thesis. The “threshold” for the use of American force to “spread democracy” was lower compared to other issues; a lack of democracy made the United States less safe, in a way that other humanitarian concerns did not. Muravchik suggested that although Aristide was an unsavoury character, he had been legitimately elected, and it was in the US interest to see democracy succeed in Haiti. He stopped short, though, of endorsing US force to reinstate Aristide, stating instead that the US should “muddle through” and seek a negotiated solution. Writing a year later, Muravchik’s views on Haiti had hardened against the intervention. In an attack on Senator John Kerry’s (D-MA) support for the use of military force to restore Aristide, he articulated a common neoconservative critique of interventionists on the Left: that they only supported US interventionism when it was stripped of any notion of invoking the American national interest. In 1993, Muravchik argued that the democratic wishes of the Haitian people needed to be respected, but now (1994a: 51-52) Aristide was described as “fiercely anti-American” and that while it was true that Aristide was democratically elected, he was nonetheless not a democrat himself. While a year before, he advised the US to “muddle through” when a non-democrat wins an election, now the advice was that the US should not be supporting non-democrats, even when they won elections, especially when combined with the fact that no American lives or interests were present.\(^\text{102}\) The logic for intervention in Cuba for Muravchik was a

\(^{102}\) For a discussion of the brutal human rights record of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, including allegations of support for Osama Bin Laden, please see Lynn Garrison (2000) *Voodoo Politics; the Clinton/Gore Destruction of Haiti* (Los Angeles, Leprechaun) and Lynn Garrison (2004) *Aristide; The Death of a Nation* (Los Angeles: Leprechaun).
stronger one than intervention in Haiti. Cuba’s regime was no more democratic or peaceful than Haiti’s, and generated considerably more refugees for the United States. The fact that Haiti was considered a greater priority for intervention than Cuba was the result of pressure from the Democratic Congressional Black Caucus (Muravchik, 1995a: 38).

The neoconservatives had concluded for the most part that Haiti did not represent an essential national interest for the United States. Muravchik had left the door open for military intervention in principle in such a situation, but Aristide, although democratically elected was considered to be both too anti-American and anti-democratic. Elliott Abrams (1996: 86-87), however, in contrast to the other neoconservatives argued that the Caribbean was an area of special interest for the United States, and that the Monroe Doctrine still held. Migration and the drugs trade had obvious impacts on the United States, but for Abrams, both democracy and human rights were also important. Failed states were “far less acceptable in our front-yard.” The best thing that the island nations of the Caribbean could do for the stability of the region was to rely on the United States as the guarantor of prosperity and security. The threshold for US intervention in the Caribbean was therefore lower than it would be for equivalent abuses of democracy and human rights in regions of the world that were more removed from the United States.

3.4.3 Bosnia

The 1992-1995 Bosnian War claimed the lives of over 100,000 people, left 1.8 million people displaced, and became the defining foreign policy crisis of President Clinton’s first term in office.103 As with the crises in Somalia and Haiti, the Bosnian conflict straddled the

Bush and Clinton administrations. The collapse of Yugoslavia had led to four separate Balkan wars, but it was the Bosnian War that proved to be the most bloody and intransigent conflict of the four. Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power in 1987 had stirred up nationalist Serbian grievances that with the turmoil at the end of the Cold War provoked a corresponding nationalist sentiment in the other republics that constituted Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991, leading to the First Balkan War between Serbia and Slovenia which lasted ten days, followed by the Second and Third Balkan Wars between Serbia and Croatia. The Bosnian Parliament declared independence on 3 March 1992 after a referendum of the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina – boycotted by the Bosnian Serb population – resulting in a 99% vote in favour of independence. The war this triggered saw both Croat and Serb forces laying claim to Bosnian territory. The Croat-Bosniak war ended in February 1994, but the war between the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and the Bosnian Serbs continued into 1995, when ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnia by Bosnian Serbs culminated in a series of massacres in Markale, Tuzla, and, most notoriously, the genocide at Srebrenica. These atrocities against the civilian population finally provoked widespread NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, eventually culminating in the Dayton Peace Agreement being signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (von Hippel, 2000: 127-140).

The three and a half year conflict that Dayton brought to an end, provoked fundamental debates in the US foreign policy community over: the role of NATO; the geopolitical
criticism of the Conservative Party’s conduct during the war please see Brendan Simms (2001) Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London, Allen Lane/Penguin). Simms, President of the Henry Jackson Society, argues the crisis represented the deepest nadir in British foreign policy since Suez, as the UK attempted, at times alone, to stifle both the attempts by the US and NATO to aid the Bosnians (2001: 2, 5).

104 The International Court of Justice ruled that, overall, the Bosnian War was not an act of genocide against the Bosniaks by the Serbs per se, but may have constituted a crime against humanity. The Court concluded, however, that the specific events that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995, where more than 8,000 Bosniak males were murdered did meet the criteria for genocide (Simons, 2007).
importance of Europe relative to other regions of the post-Cold War world; the role of the United Nations in preventing conflict; the legitimacy of humanitarian interventionism; the international norm of non-intervention and by extension of the basis of the Westphalian state system itself. As with the cases of Somalia and Haiti, the neoconservative response to events in Bosnia revealed a range of opinion from those who argued that Bosnia was not a core US national interest and therefore should be left to the Europeans to sort out, to those who argued the US had both moral and strategic interests to meet in ending the Bosnian conflict. In its totality, however, the debate over the war in Bosnia represents another step in the evolution of 1990s neoconservatism, as a limited, neo-isolationist/realist vision retrenched in favour of a more activist approach with American power being used in service of more ambitious ideological and material goals. While some still held to a non-interventionist form of neo-isolationism in the name of a narrow national interest, other neoconservatives increasingly argued for American intervention of some form, justified not solely on ‘realist’ grounds such as the need to maintain NATO and American power, but to uphold humanitarian and liberal democratic norms.

In one of the earliest extended attempts by a neoconservative to engage with the Bosnian issue, Joshua Muravchik (1992b: 30-31) presented an overview of the foreign policy debate on Bosnia. The war had transformed the foreign policy landscape of the United States. Whereas before, liberals had usually been more divided on questions of the use of US military force, on Bosnia, they had now “virtually been unanimous in hawkishness.” Instead, it was conservatives of all political stripes, who were now divided over whether the use of the American military to intervene in Bosnia was required. The frequently repeated claim in the literature on neoconservatism alleging a generational change in foreign policy views is once again not a dividing line. Jeane Kirkpatrick and Norman
Podhoretz, both of the first-generation, were supporters of at least some form of US action in Bosnia, whereas some second-generation neoconservatives, who were supposed to have more radical views, such as Charles Krauthammer and Elliott Abrams, urged the United States to focus its foreign policy on more central, narrow national interests.\footnote{Norman Podhoretz, one of the central figures in the early generation of neoconservatives, was also an early enthusiastic cheerleader for the new direction that neoconservatism began to take after the Gulf War. He argued (1991b: 56) that he was sympathetic to Wilsonianism, especially how it was espoused in Muravchik’s \textit{Exporting Democracy}. Podhoretz argued the US needed to make the world safe for democracy and reject the triumph of realism after the Gulf War. At the conclusion of the war, Podhoretz (1995c) argued that although “lift and strike” would have been the best policy, conservatives should still support Dayton, and accused Reaganites of sounding more like the draft-dodging Clinton in his youth, than Ronald Reagan.}

Abrams, like Krauthammer, had championed American leadership and unipolarity to uphold the international order, and had stated the distinction between the core and periphery was blurred in the post-Cold War world. Yet he argued (1992: 62) that Europe should not dominate American foreign policy thinking as much as it once did, and it was simply not in the interest of the US to devote too much time and resources to areas like Bosnia or Armenia, as they were “not matters seriously affecting the security of the United States”.\footnote{His article titled ‘Why America Must Lead’ in the Summer 1992 issue of the \textit{National Interest} seemed a slightly strange location to make the case for American inaction on Bosnia. Leadership and inaction seem unlikely bedfellows (Abrams, 1992: 56-62).} The war in Bosnia provoked a fiercer response from Krauthammer (1995b: 15-17) who suggested that it was not in America’s interest to be sending peacekeepers as they ended up simply being “targets.” The appropriate role for American power was only to be used when regional balances of power or the global order were profoundly threatened, not to be wasted on civil wars of “marginal importance.” The biggest threat to NATO was intervening militarily in an arena of limited significance, not staying out of such conflicts.

For other neoconservatives, however, the situation in Bosnia did merit an American response. The claim from President Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker, the United States “did not have a dog in that fight” was strongly opposed by Perle and Muravchik as
an example of amoral realism (Muravchik, 2007: 21). The question was what shape that American response should take. Should the United States be content to merely impose sanctions on Serbia; lift the embargo and arm the Bosniaks; use air strikes against Serbian military positions; or insert American forces as ground troops? An answer appeared in a letter to President Clinton, published on 2 September 1993 in the Wall Street Journal. The headline signatories were Margaret Thatcher and Reagan’s Secretary of State, George Shultz, yet beneath their names were a number of key neoconservatives including Jeane Kirkpatrick, Frank Gaffney, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. The letter explicitly supported Clinton’s favoured approach of “lift and strike”: a combination of lifting the embargo on military aid and arms exports to Bosnia, with the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, and a much stricter enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. The rationale for this action was twofold. Firstly, if the Western nations did not act in the face of Milosevic’s brazen aggression, they would be looked on with contempt by other states elsewhere which would weaken their power. Secondly, there were wider geopolitical implications and threats to European security in not acting, including the risk of Serbian aggression being replicated in former republics of the Soviet Union in particular (Thatcher, et al., 1993).

When Warren Christopher was unsuccessful in his attempt in 1993 to persuade Clinton’s European allies to support ‘lift and strike’, neoconservatives argued that the president, and by extension the United States, had been shown to be weak by being unable to convince the Europeans of what they perceived to be the right course of action. Wolfowitz (1994a: 31; R. Kagan, 1995a: 20) was highly critical arguing that Clinton had criticised Bush’s policy on Bosnia, and yet had not managed to effectively alter the status quo, “leaving the situation unchanged except for the appearance of American weakness and inability to
lead”. The neoconservatives who favoured American action on Bosnia were not, however, in favour of going beyond ‘lift and strike’, at least not pre-Dayton. Insertion of US ground troops was considered too risky, relative to the benefit to the national interest of being successful, and they worried that Clinton was prone to excessive “experimentalism” in the deployment of troops abroad (Wolfowitz, 1994a: 32). Frank Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy suggested that Clinton’s decision to replace 23,000 mainly British and French peacekeepers with 25,000 American troops was a mistake, and that the United States should concentrate on using airpower to punish the Serb force in both Bosnia and Serbia combined with lifting the arms embargo and arming the Bosniak government (Center For Security Policy, 1994). Khalilzad (1994: A1) was also a keen supporter of arming the Bosniaks as a way of saving the lives of Bosniak civilians and American ground troops, as the troops would be superfluous to requirements in the event of the lifting of an arms embargo. By the time of the Dayton Accord, however, Wolfowitz (1995) supported both the lifting of the arms embargo and the use of American peacekeepers.

Following on from the rationale for the use of American military force offered in the September 1993 letter to the Wall Street Journal, a further issue of importance remained the need to maintain the integrity of NATO. Bosnia could not be separated from the wider issue of European security and the Western alliance, of which NATO was the

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107 Although Brendan Simms (2001: 1-10) argued that the British government in particular had absolutely no interest in being led anywhere near the direction which Clinton wanted them to follow on Bosnia, which could hardly be blamed completely on Christopher or Clinton.

108 Not all neoconservatives agreed with the dominant perspective that intervention was needed in Bosnia to protect the viability of NATO. Krauthammer argues that withdrawing from the issue of Bosnia entirely would have been better for NATO, and Fukuyama argued that Kagan’s idea of “use it or lose it” with regards to NATO was misplaced, and that NATO would be stronger if it did not get involved with ethnic conflicts like the one raging in Bosnia (Krauthammer, 1995b; Fukuyama, 1994). Irving Kristol, continuing his theme of partial American withdrawal from foreign affairs in general, argued that Europe in general did not matter anymore, its phase of world history had ended, and that NATO should be allowed to pass into obsolescence (I. Kristol, 1995a).
integral institution. Bush’s attempts to marginalise Bosnia as a peripheral issue denied this important fact (R. Kagan, 1995b: 27-28). The inability of the United States and its allies to effectively deal with the Bosnian question raised significant doubts over the long-term future of NATO-led security. There was also the risk of damaging delicate relations with Muslim states, who could take offence at American intransigence in the face of Serbian Orthodox Christian soldiers killing Bosniak Muslim civilians. These both appeared to be important aspects of the neoconservative justification for military action in Bosnia. (Wolfowitz, 1994a: 33; Khalilzad, 1995: 24; Muravchik, 1995a: 37-40; The Weekly Standard, 1995a: 7; 1995b: 7-9).

The likely damage to NATO and impact on American unipolarity is the primary factor why Ryan (2007: 125) argues that the neoconservatives were interested in using military force in Bosnia. She states that there was nothing to fundamentally distinguish them from other conservative foreign policy schools, and that talk of virtue, morality, democracy and humanitarian concerns did not develop beyond a rhetorical fig leaf. Yet this narrative is challenged by the record in three ways. Firstly, Clinton’s first term saw the bulk of the Republican Party embrace Gingrich’s Contract with America, which embodied a defined shift in the direction of non-interventionism and a scaling back of American interests abroad. The neoconservatives appeared to be travelling in exactly the opposite direction. Secondly, also discussed later, the 1990s witnessed an upsurge in neoconservative writing on morality, religion, values, and virtue, which Bacevich (1995: 35) argues could not be confined simply to the cultural sphere in which this work was taking place but was bound to influence their foreign policy views. It seems implausible that in a general intellectual climate that was in many ways dominated with discussion of morality, that it did not play
an important part in their foreign policy calculus. Thirdly, while Ryan is correct to suggest that democracy promotion did not loom large in the neoconservative discourse on Bosnia – that would come later – there was though a concern with wider humanitarian issues in Bosnia that went beyond a mere token rhetorical gesture. This is not to say that this was the primary motivator for the neoconservatives, but it was an important ingredient in the strategic mix. The fact that humanitarian justifications for US intervention in Bosnia did not appear in isolation from other themes of American power and the wider strategic situation in Europe does not provide justifiable grounds for seeing the humanitarian factors as little more than rhetorical window dressing.

At the start of the crisis, Jeane Kirkpatrick (Larry King Live, 1992) argued that the United States could not sit back and watch a humanitarian disaster unfold in Bosnia. An early *Weekly Standard* editorial (1995a: 7) proclaimed that the US would be a “niggardly power” if it did nothing to prevent “horrifying bloodshed” in the Balkans. The Center for Security Policy (1993) argued that without the use of force from NATO and the US, thousands of innocent civilians would die, and Sarajevo “will be effectively, if not literally, burnt to the ground while the West fiddles”. George Weigel (1995: 42) penned a wide-ranging essay on the universality of human rights in *Commentary* that was largely absent national interest themes. In it, he suggested that European parliamentarians had failed to meet the challenge to human rights posed by Serbia in Bosnia in the early 1990s, which he described as “a pusillanimity unseen since the days of Neville Chamberlain”.

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109 Of course this does not necessarily mean that what the neoconservatives were advocating in foreign policy was actually ‘moral’, but that their claim to be moral, taking place in a wider climate of renewed interest in questions of morality is significant for their advocacy of interventionism in Bosnia.

110 By contrast, Ryan suggests that the liberals who supported US intervention in Bosnia did so without any consideration of the national interest and were only motivated by humanitarianism. The idea that liberals were only motivated by disinterested humanitarianism, while neoconservatives were largely motivated by an attempt to maintain US power and dominance in Europe seems to feed into a somewhat Chomsky-esque reading of American foreign policy. Please see Noam Chomsky (2004) *Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance* (London, Penguin).
Eliot Cohen (1994: 22; 2011) saw the Bosnian intervention as primarily a humanitarian endeavour with any notion of the strategic benefit to the US only possibly being realised in the long–term, though he was concerned about the overextension of the America military overseas in Clinton’s numerous deployments, nonetheless. As noted earlier, Kagan (1994: 40-43) argued that genocide, mass starvation and political legitimacy were not things that the United States could ignore, as they were threats to world order in and of themselves, and the US should seek to form a world order that was not just consistent with its narrow material needs, but congruent with its broadly liberal democratic philosophical underpinnings. For Muravchik (1992b: 34, emphasis added; 1993c: 22) Serbian aggression in Bosnia threatened European stability and international order, but there was also a clear humanitarian basis for action. The Bosnian Serb forces had perpetrated a “terrible crime” and “at some extreme point, humanitarian abuses in themselves do warrant intervention”, even in the complete absence of direct American interests, although the threshold for risking American lives should be high.

The US interventions in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia were important in revealing a neoconservatism in transition in the post-Cold War world. Gone were the calls for a return to normalcy and neo-isolationist realism. While some neoconservatives such as Charles Krauthammer had abandoned it in favour of an American unipolarity with a narrow set of national interests, others such as Joshua Muravchik and Robert Kagan had begun to articulate a strategic and ideological rationale for American interventionism, and a more activist US foreign policy. This was still a long way from ‘imposing democracy down the barrel of a gun’, but the direction of travel had been established.
3.5 Ideological Bedfellows? Neoconservatism and the Christian Right

The tendency in the literature to treat neoconservatism in an isolated foreign policy ‘bubble’, neglects the fact that many leading neoconservatives wrote widely on social and domestic issues. Indeed, few wrote exclusively on foreign policy. Thus the relationship between the neoconservatives and social conservatives of the Christian Right has been left relatively unexplored by the academy. Although both have drawn frequent fire from a similar range of critics on both the Left and Right, these attacks have tended to focus on one or the other, rather than an exploration of the ideological affinity between the two groups. This is somewhat surprising given that both neoconservatives and religious conservatives rose to prominence as political movements largely in reaction to the same 1960s counterculture. Yet the prevailing narrative states that neoconservatives were from a secular Jewish background, not particularly interested in the same moral issues as that of social conservatives, and as agnostics and atheists, were only interested in the instrumental value of religion as a stabilising force in society. Indeed, according to this account, the attraction of Leo Strauss’s work was that it provided an intellectual foundation for their social conservatism, without the need for theological justification (Dorrien, 2004: 132).

Stuart Croft (2009: 122) argues that religious conservatives should be treated in a separate foreign policy category from neoconservatives as the former were interested in moral issues of conscience like abortion, whereas the latter were not. Yet this perspective on

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111 It is this proclivity for analysing neoconservatism purely as a foreign policy ideology that almost certainly contributes to more cynical readings of it. If, as Michael C. Williams suggests, neoconservatism should be seen as an ideology of the political in general, rather than merely concerned with foreign policy, it is extremely difficult to conclude with Ryan that neoconservatives were only interested in American power and not morality, democracy and human rights (Williams, 2005: 325, 328; Ryan, 2007: 8, 17). Neoconservatives themselves have also been critical of the critique exemplified by Ryan, instead suggesting the idea that states are only motivated by power is a “prejudice of our time”, and that cynical dismissals of other motivations such as morality or honour are “naive” (D. Kagan, 1998: 1, 7).

112 Interestingly, Croft (2009: 125) also suggests that what separates religious conservatives from both neoconservatives and realists is that the former argue that military force should only be used in the “service of peace and not merely in their national interest”. This, however, seems to indicate excessive difference between neoconservatism and the Christian Right than can be justified. Certainly many neoconservatives make very similar arguments to this.
neoconservatism and the Christian Right is problematic in two regards. Firstly, it downplays excessively the extent to which religion played a role in the earlier development of neoconservatism, and secondly, it ignores a noticeable upturn in neoconservative interest in questions of morality and religion throughout the 1990s. Indeed, the permeation of a moralistic, religious discourse in neoconservative circles in the 1990s is “a development of signal importance” that could not simply be confined to discussion of domestic policy but would likely infuse their discussion of foreign policy (Bacevich, 1995: 35).

Religion has never been completely insignificant to the development of neoconservatism. Neoconservatives in the 1970s and early 1980s did not consist solely of secular Jews, but drew many Roman Catholics to their ranks including Patrick Moynihan, William Bennett, Michael Novak, Richard John Neuhaus and George Weigel. Novak and Neuhaus had both written lengthy studies in relation to religion and politics in the early 1980s. Novak, an AEI scholar, in The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (1982, New York, Simon and Schuster) had made a philosophical defence of democratic capitalism as a political system which made frequent recourse to conceptions of morality. Neuhaus, firstly as a Lutheran minister than later becoming a Roman Catholic priest in New York, had warned in The Naked Public Square (1984, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans) against an encroaching secularism that threatened to delegitimize religious contributions in the public square. Yet, in the 1990s, discussion of religion and morality became more widespread in neoconservative discourse. This was clearly apparent in a symposium for Commentary in November 1995.

In a discussion of “The National Prospect” facing the United States, nearly all of the

113 For a critique of Novak, Neuhaus and Weigel from a Roman Catholic perspective please see Thomas R. Rourke (1997) A Conscience as Large as the World: Yves R. Simon Versus the Catholic Neoconservatives (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield). Rourke (1997: 69, 258) argues that they are wrong to suggest that liberal democratic capitalism is most conducive to realising the common good. Instead it has “endemic moral problems” with a “tendency to mold the moral-cultural system into its own image and likeness”.

neoconservative contributors framed their remarks with reference to religion, culture and morality.\footnote{It was this symposium, Bacevich (1995: 34-35) suggests, that was the clearest indication of a shift in neoconservative thought, and evidence of a widespread embrace of religion}

Elliott Abrams (1995: 24) argued that religion remained a potent force in American politics and that the 1990s was witnessing a religiously-inspired counterrevolution to the 1960s counterculture. The 1994 GOP election landslide was taken by Richard Pipes to mean that the counterrevolution and “revulsion” against liberal values was alive and well (1995: 96). Irving Kristol (1995c: 74) cautioned that the culture war over religion and morality was only at the beginning and that due to the prevailing culture being a form of “hedonistic paganism” the battle over culture was set to continue. Despite previously being somewhat coy on his own religious views, Kristol also used the opportunity to state that he had religious leanings toward a form of Judaism known as Modern Orthodoxy. For Midge Decter, Podhoretz’s wife, the end of the Cold War meant that the fundamental issue of American political life, the fight against moral nihilism, could now be fought without it being “masked” by the struggle against Communism. Moral responsibility and the need for personal virtue was the key to improving the national prospect (Decter, 1995: 46; H. Mansfield, 1995: 85). Decter’s construction was almost the precise opposite of Ryan’s argument: instead of the neoconservatives using a moral discourse to disguise their advocacy of American power, Decter’s argument hinted that their strong anti-Communism had obscured their primary concern for morality and virtue.

Even neoconservatives who tended to focus more exclusively on foreign policy – Joshua Muravchik, Robert Kagan and Eliot Cohen – also commented on the culture war and morality. Muravchik pointed to an erosion of moral values, the problems of rampant
illegitimacy and high rate of divorce, and Kagan suggested that “vital issues” were at stake in the culture war. He suggested that there was a link between the domestic and the foreign, although he warned against neoconservatives neglecting foreign policy to solely write on culture, religion and morality (R. Kagan, 1995c: 68-69; Muravchik, 1995b: 86). Eliot Cohen (1995: 43-44) warned that the family needed to be shielded from the liberalism of the state, and that a “revival in religious awareness” needed to be nurtured. This was not solely for the benefit of the United States but the whole world, for “[i]f the United States really is corrupt, decadent and disintegrating, it will not long exercise international leadership or use its tremendous power to shape international relations for the good”. It is clear that for the neoconservatives of the mid-1990s, the United States was facing a moral “emergency” which had implications for the conduct of its foreign policy. Neoconservatives argued that the US needed to be ‘re-moralised’, and Michael Novak (1995: 90) suggested – connecting with a burgeoning expansionist discourse – that American liberal democracy was emphatically “not an idea for Americans only”, but had universal appeal.

If anyone embodied the neoconservative rapprochement with religion it was William Bennett. Perhaps more than other neoconservatives, he has bridged the gap between the Christian Right and neoconservatives, having written extensively on religion, morality and foreign policy. Like many of the original neoconservatives, he began his career on the Left, only to switch to the Republican Party like Jeane Kirkpatrick had done in the early 1980s. Bennett was appointed Secretary of Education for Reagan’s second term, and crucially, with reference to how neoconservatism would evolve in the 1990s, William
Kristol became his chief of Staff.\textsuperscript{115} In 1997, Bennett became one of the founder signatories to the Statement of Principles for Kristol and Kagan’s Project for the New American Century, discussed in detail later (Project for the New American Century, 1997). Bennett’s speech to the 1992 Republican Convention, in which he repeated Plato’s statement that the most important political issue facing a society was how to raise its children, was later described by fellow neoconservative David Brooks, as the most important moment of the Convention.\textsuperscript{116} This was followed late the next year by the publication of The Book of Virtues (1993, New York, Simon and Schuster) which proceeded to top the New York Times non-fiction bestsellers list in January 1994 and remained in the top ten for almost an entire year. The book, an 800-page anthology of moral tales from various sources of the Western canon including Greek mythology and the Bible, had the explicit aim of inculcating moral virtue into American people, especially children. Bennett’s goal (1993: 12) was to inspire adults and then children in turn to take the idea of morality seriously and to “anchor our children in their culture, its history and traditions”. The neoconservatives had always been comfortable talking about virtue and the perils of nihilism, but Bennett seemed to articulate these themes more explicitly, provoking a widespread discussion of these issues in neoconservative circles as well as wider American society. Moreover, he did so in a way that was more unapologetically religious in tone. In the Commentary symposium in November 1995, he had written that it was time for the United States to “remember God”, that the American middle and upper classes had been “de-moralized” which had not just damaged American society but US

\textsuperscript{115} Kristol and Bennett remained close throughout this period, and Kristol made a serious attempt in 1994 to persuade Bennett to run for the Republican presidential nomination against Dole. After Bennett declined, Kristol then pushed for Dole to pick Bennett as his running mate in 1996, but again Bennett opted not to put his name forward (Easton, 2000: 338-341).

\textsuperscript{116} Perhaps not as great an achievement as it may at first seem given both Bush and Quayle’s palpable inability to provide rhetorical fireworks.
foreign policy. As for Eliot Cohen, for Bennett moral and religious decline at home was harming the United States abroad and its sense of historical national mission. This new religious ‘turn’ in neoconservative thought during these years was not strictly circumscribed to general discussions of morality and virtue. As well as writing more on religion and issues of morality, neoconservatives of both the first and second generation were themselves becoming more religious (Abrams, 2011; W. Kristol, 2011). Irving Kristol and Gertrude Himmelfarb attended synagogue, despite earlier claiming “no passionate attachment to Judaism”; William Kristol attended temple services with his family, as did Elliott Abrams who started a kosher home, and both families were active in their congregations (Friedman, 2005: 231; I. Kristol, 1995b: 4). David Brooks, and his wife who converted to Judaism following their marriage, also started to attend temple services, and Brooks (2003) commented, in words that other neoconservatives would seem to echo, that he was “a recovering secularist”. 117 Norman Podhoretz’s interest in religion seems to have also been piqued during these years. His book on the Jewish prophets of the Hebrew Bible was the result of several years of study, and was certainly remarkably different in tone from all his other published monographs, with Isaiah, Ezekiel and Jeremiah among others being interpreted and presented through a neoconservative lens (Podhoretz, 2002c).

As neoconservatives appeared to be increasingly sympathetic to religion, there was an accompanying warming of relations between neoconservatives and the Christian Right. This was most clearly manifest on the numerous occasions when Jewish neoconservatives went into print defending the Christian Right from attack from liberal political commentators and Jewish groups which had accused socially conservative Christians of

117 In an interesting aside, Brooks (2003) also argues that the foreign policy community in general has been blind to the impact of religious thought on the conduct of international relations, being “at least two decades behind” scholars who discuss the impact of religion on domestic political life.
being anti-Semitic or viewing them as a threat to ‘Jewishness’. Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Elliott Abrams and David Brooks, all openly called for an increased religiosity in American life and wrote pieces defending the Christian Right, particularly on the anti-Semitism charge, with Podhoretz (1995b: 27-32; 2000: 213) even going so far as defending Pat Robertson against the Anti-Defamation League. For Irving Kristol (1994b: 39), the imperative for Western civilization was now to “breathe new life into the older, now largely comatose, religious orthodoxies” and Brooks (1999b) approvingly noting that the Moral Majority created by Paul Weyrich and Jerry Falwell had built the very institutions that had thrust conservatism centre stage in American politics. And this new religiosity was not to be restricted to a form of civic religion. Abrams (1997: 67, 84-85, 135), arguing as a practicing Jew, suggested that it was essential that Judaism as a religion with a theological belief in God should be the centre of Jewish life, and that there was common cause to be had with Christian evangelicals. For the neoconservatives in their defence of the Christian Right, the attacks on religious conservatives from liberal critics were less a matter of their religion, than of their conservatism. They duly noted that the Left were not critical of religious conservatives when they marched with Martin Luther King Jr, opposed the Vietnam War, or when Roman Catholic groups opposed US nuclear weapons policy in the 1980s (Abrams, 1997: 71-72; Abrams, 2011; Podhoretz, 1995b: 31).

In addition to defending the Christian Right in print, neoconservatives developed strong personal links with leading figures on the Christian Right. Gary Bauer, a leading religious conservative who later became a candidate for the GOP presidential nomination in 2000, struck an important “alliance and friendship” with William Kristol, and their families regularly holidayed together (Friedman, 2005: 232; Schmitt, 2011). Bauer would

[118] In typical Kristolian fashion, Irving Kristol (1994a: 20) suggested that the Jews of America had absolutely nothing to fear from the Christian Right because Christians “appear to be more interested in marrying Jews than in persecuting them”.
occasionally write for Kristol’s *Weekly Standard* and became one of the original signatories to PNAC’s Statement of Principles in 1997 (Bauer, 1996b; 1998; Project for the New American Century, 1997). Ralph Reed, the Executive Director of the Christian Coalition also developed links with neoconservatives. Reed’s appearance in 1995 in front of both the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) won him neoconservative admirers for the fact he was attempting to build bridges between Evangelicals and the Jewish community, and he was seen as a moderating force on the more extreme wing of the Christian Right (Friedman, 2005: 219-220; Abrams, 1997: 84-85; 2011). Reed was also close with William Kristol, having developed a friendship following a skirmish over federal funding of the arts in 1990, when Kristol, as Vice President Quayle’s Chief of Staff, had brokered a deal. Reed and Kristol had met to discuss political strategy and the future of the conservative movement over lunch a few weeks after Clinton’s election victory in 1992 (Easton, 2000: 250).

The Christian Right, according to Marsden (2008: 3-4), represents sixty million Americans (approximately one in five of the total population) and consists of conservative evangelicals and conservative Roman Catholics, largely excluding the mainline Protestant denominations that tend to be both more politically and theologically liberal. The Christian Right largely abandoned the Democratic Party toward the end of the Carter administration, disillusioned by Carter’s lack of interest in the social issues which were of central concern to them including school prayer and abortion. This was made all the more

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119 Bauer had effectively written a Christian Right manifesto in 1996, in his book *Our Hopes, Our Dreams: A Vision for America* (Colorado Springs, Focus on the Family), which called for a return to traditional morality in discussion of education, pornography, abortion and family values. David Brooks (1999a, 1999b) also wrote approvingly of Gary Bauer’s efforts to “meld patriotic sentiment with Biblical morality”.

120 There are a number of terms that seem to be used as labels when discussing the Christian Right, including ‘social conservatives’ and the ‘Religious Right’. As Marsden (2008: 5) suggests, the term ‘Christian Right’ is preferable as it is more precise than the other terms as ‘social conservatives’ encompasses non-religious conservatives and ‘Religious Right’ includes religious conservatives that are not strictly ‘Christian’.
bitter due to Carter campaigning in 1976 as a self-professed evangelical. Marsden (2008: 2-31) argues that 12 key evangelical political organisations were formed during the four years of the Carter presidency that continue to influence public policy to this day. The most important of these was Rev. Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, formed in 1979, which was then followed by Rev. Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition of America in 1987, within which Ralph Reed would become very influential.\textsuperscript{121}

The Christian Right is a diverse network of different churches, denominations, and interest groups, yet Croft (2009: 122-125) suggests that they are united around four foreign policy concerns in addition to their more well-known positions on issues of conscience such as abortion, gay marriage, school prayer and declining morality in society. Firstly, support for global Christian solidarity. The United States should not prioritise strategic alliances with states like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Uzbekistan if those states persecute Christians. Secondly, there is strong support for Israel largely based on an eschatological belief of historical events that must take place in Israel before the second-coming of Christ. Thirdly, there is support for global social justice: the United States must not ignore the poor, disabled, unborn, sick and oppressed abroad. Fourthly, there is concern for environmental security, based on a theological position regarding the role that humanity must play as “stewards” of God’s created order. Crucially for the relationship between neoconservatives and the Christian Right, leading evangelicals have endorsed the democratic peace thesis and wholeheartedly support efforts by the United States to promote democracy overseas, on the basis that it leads to a more peaceful world, improves the conditions of persecuted Christians in authoritarian states, as well as instrumentally opening up countries that are currently ‘closed’ to evangelistic efforts. Marsden (2008: 89-112) goes as far as to suggest

\textsuperscript{121} Marsden (2008: 247) cautions against ascribing too much influence to the Christian Right in influencing US foreign policy, and that they are better seen as “supporters” rather than “shapers” of it, and are “riding” the bandwagon rather than “steering” it.
that for the Christian Right, democracy promotion and promoting the gospel have become virtually “indivisible and interchangeable concepts”. For neoconservatism itself in these years becoming increasingly sympathetic to religious concerns and interested in issues of using American power to promote liberal democracy abroad, important ideological synergies between the two groups were clearly emerging.

This was also apparent in domestic politics. Leading neoconservatives did not spend their time solely agitating for war in Kosovo or Iraq, but became sympathetic to many of the same social issues that animated the Christian Right. Norman Podhoretz (1997: 34) and William Bennett (1999) both called for a greater degree of censorship, especially of sexually explicit media content which was deemed to be corrupting society’s virtue and public morality, and David Brooks (2000) argued that a liberal elite had “domesticated lust by enshrouding it in high-mindedness”.122 William Kristol used his position as editor of the *Weekly Standard* to press the case for a number of key concerns for the Christian Right. According to Kristol (1997a; 1997b) the GOP needed to use the courts to oppose Clinton on a range of social issues including abortion, gay rights, crime and assisted suicide, and argued that the “American idea” was inconsistent with “racial preferences, abortion on demand, appeasement of China, judicial usurpation...”. It is very clear from this last quotation how social issues of morality and foreign policy issues such as Clinton’s supposed appeasement of China were intricately linked and bound together in a certain idea of what “America” actually meant. Foreign policy was not the only arena in which the neoconservatives battled, but merely one front in what they saw as a more general war against liberalism for the soul of the American republic. The specific issue of abortion

122 Bennett (1997) also went on the attack against homosexuality, another concern of the Christian Right, arguing that “promiscuity, disease, and death shadow and stalk much of the homosexual community” and that wherever homosexuality was present, pederasty was never far behind. He concluded an article in Kristol’s *Weekly Standard* by arguing that “Homosexuality should not be socially validated, for reasons rooted in custom, tradition, natural law and teleology, morality and faith”.

was, as it was for the Christian Right, of crucial importance for William Kristol (1998a), who argued that the Republican Party needed to attack Clinton on his refusal to ban partial-birth abortion. The 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision held the “key” to a whole range of moral issues of conscience including assisted suicide, gay rights, cloning and the status of the family. It was “the centrepiece of the modern expansion of judicial power” and “its repeal is crucial to reviving republican self-government”. Kristol (2000b) would also later urge George W. Bush to make the issue of abortion a central feature of his 2000 campaign against Gore, and argue that a Bush victory in the presidential election offered a real opportunity to overturn Roe.

The 1998 Lewinsky scandal offered further evidence of the warming relations between neoconservatives and the Christian Right. Prominent neoconservatives lined up to lambast President Clinton’s conduct, in addition to viewing it as symptomatic of a moral malaise which had gripped the United States domestically with clear ramifications for the conduct of its foreign policy. Bennett’s The Death of Outrage (1998, New York, Free Press) was a typically uncompromising evisceration of Clinton. Clinton’s behaviour embodied the main moral hazard that the United States faced now it did not look at the totalitarian threats of Nazism and Communism. The chief threat to American liberal democracy now came from “within”, from “decadence, cynicism and boredom” (Bennett, 1998: 130). Many neoconservatives condemned Clinton, calling for his impeachment and resignation, including William Kristol who campaigned with the slogan “Al Gore for President” (W. Kristol, 1998b; 1998c; 1998d; Krauthammer, 1999a; Abrams, 1999). For the neoconservatives and the Christian Right, Clinton’s conduct had revealed the United States at its worst: nihilistic, lacking in personal honour, and uninterested in foreign policy except

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123 Nina Easton (2000: 395-400) argues that William Kristol played a crucial role in leading the Republican charge for Clinton’s impeachment in 1998, having previously been reluctant to pursue the various sex scandals that seemed to hover over Clinton’s career.
when cynically using it to cover moral failure. In light of this, it is not difficult to see how notions of a sober, highly moralised, activist foreign policy in which the United States would pursue almost a moral ‘mission’ by vanquishing tyrants and exporting liberal democratic virtues abroad gained increased traction with neoconservatives. The goal to restore American honour through foreign policy redemption which in turn would bring a new degree of moral seriousness to American domestic life was an attractive proposition for neoconservatives during the latter half of Clinton’s second term.

The neoconservatives and the Christian Right would be tapping into a potentially rich political vein with this approach. The sociologist, Seymour Martin Lipset, who had been numbered among the early neoconservatives in the 1960s before drifting away, argues (1996: 20, 63, 65) that Americans are essentially “utopian moralists who press hard to institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices.” This morality for Lipset is essentially Protestant-inspired, and “determined the American style in foreign relations...support for war is as moralistic as resistance to it”. In many ways, the links between the Christian Right and neoconservatives that developed during the 1990s should not have been unexpected. There were clear ideological affinities that had existed for many years, and it was Rev. Billy Graham who had stoked the fires of anti-Communism in the 1950s even before the neoconservatives had done so (Berger, 1997: 54). Yet by the 1990s, the Christian Right, especially under Ralph Reed’s leadership of the Christian Coalition, had moderated their more extreme elements, were increasingly politically savvy, and certainly interested in applying their moralised domestic approach to foreign policy (Easton, 2000: 213-221; Wolfson, 1995: 47). Neoconservatives had become more interested in religion and the domestic issues of conscience that motivated the Christian Right, enabling crucial bridges to be built between the two groups, and giving
succour to notions of benevolent American hegemony. As an example of how far neoconservatives had progressed, Kristol would comment shortly before the 2000 presidential election that the idea of American liberty rested on morality, which in turn rested on religion. The Bible was not just something to be devoured for “empty rhetoric” or a “public-policy position paper”, rather it was something which should inform the whole of the “practice of public life” (Bottum and Kristol, 2000)

3.6 Conclusion

The Clinton administration failed to live up to neoconservative expectations in the first term, especially those including Muravchik who had supported Clinton’s election campaign. Despite some campaigning against the George H. W. Bush administration’s realism in foreign affairs, neoconservatives accused Clinton of adopting a very similar approach when in office, especially when it came to US relations with China. Although neoconservatives began showing their sympathies with democratic peace theory, they were critical of the manner of the Clinton administration’s appropriation of the idea. They were especially critical of a lack of delivery in relation to its doctrine of democratic enlargement, and considered assertive multilateralism dangerously naive and utopian. Although on occasion supportive of President Clinton, neoconservatives tended to be sharply critical of many of Clinton’s foreign policy appointments. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher in particular, with his ill-fated attempt to garner European support for ‘lift and strike’ in Bosnia, was singled out for neoconservative opprobrium.

Clinton’s first term in office coincided with a series of foreign policy crises that saw neoconservatives move further away from the more realist-isolationist paradigm that hallmarked their response to the end of the Cold War. They offered limited support with
caveats for President Clinton’s interventions in Somalia and Haiti and followed this with bolder advocacy and support for a ‘lift and strike’ policy in Bosnia to lift the arms embargo and deploy US airpower. This was still some distance from ordering US tanks into Belgrade to topple Milosevic’s regime, yet, the range of arguments deployed in the Bosnia debate showed a greater degree of willingness to use American hard power on what was still largely a humanitarian cause, than had hitherto been seen. Realist arguments concerning the threat to NATO of inaction in Bosnia were also used by neoconservatives but humanitarian arguments predominated. Indeed, this was precisely why at this stage, Krauthammer still demurred from the emerging neoconservative consensus.

These developments in neoconservative foreign policy during these years took place within a wider political framework than simply foreign affairs. Neoconservatism as an ideology of the political more generally also evolved through the 1990s. The 1995 symposium in *Commentary* was important in highlighting the emerging social conservatism of many neoconservatives. Additionally, Elliott Abrams and William Kristol, in particular, went to some length to bring about a rapprochement between neoconservatives and religious and social conservatives. This was not restricted to neoconservatives resorting simply to support an instrumental use of religion as a force for societal stability, but an alliance emerged in support of domestic social conservative concerns on abortion and family breakdown, in addition to supporting an increased role for democracy promotion efforts, and the encouragement of political and religious freedoms overseas. Neoconservatives were not simply becoming more interested in the social benefit of religion, but were themselves increasingly religious and energised by the same social, political and foreign issues as leading figures on the Christian Right. This is not, of course, to argue that every neoconservative became more religious in these years or that their
foreign policy philosophy flowed unadulterated from their theology. There was, however, a keen interest in socially conservative and religious hot-button issues and this continued through Clinton’s second term and into George W. Bush’s administration, where the neoconservative-Christian Right alliance was an important source of support for Bush’s foreign policy.
Chapter 4
Clinton II: The Weekly Standard to Kosovo and Iraq

4.1 Introduction

If the foreign policy crises of Clinton’s first term in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia demonstrated a nascent shift for neoconservatism away from its immediate post-Cold War moorings, the events of Clinton’s second term showed neoconservatives decisively charting a new course in their foreign policy approach. Arguments in favour of regime change in Belgrade and Baghdad during Clinton’s second term differed substantially from their earlier more limited constructions during the Gulf War and the Bosnian War. Regime change and the promotion of liberal democracy replaces stability and self-defence as the dominant neoconservative leitmotifs of the period, and in so doing, partly prepared the groundwork for George W. Bush’s foreign policy agenda after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The development of this burgeoning neoconservative discourse was first widely acknowledged in discussion of Kagan and Kristol’s 1996 Foreign Affairs article. There were important institutional developments during these years, however, which provided additional momentum to these ideas, giving support to neoconservative thought which previously relied on the relatively infrequently published Commentary or the National Interest. This chapter begins by examining the founding of the Weekly Standard and the Project for the New American Century and argues that both were important vehicles for distributing neoconservative foreign policy views in Washington. This is discussed within the wider context of relations between neoconservatives and the congressional Republican Party. An important feature of the evolution of neoconservative thought during the 1990s was the increasingly critical line it took with Republicans in Congress, especially the isolationist tone of Gingrich’s ‘Contract with America’ and the party’s preference for
Pentagon budget cuts and close commercial ties with China over human rights, democratic reform and the defence of the status of Taiwan. Despite these disagreements, the chapter also focuses on areas of alliance between neoconservatives and congressional Republicans surrounding the development of a system of national missile defence and the establishment of the ‘Rumsfeld Commission’. It also explores neoconservative arguments in favour of the expansion of NATO, not simply as a defensive measure against outside threats, but as a symbol of the expansion of liberal democracy. Neoconservatives also suggested that the types of missions that NATO undertook should be expanded, with an increased expeditionary role for NATO forces outside of Europe.

The latter sections of the chapter provide analysis of the neoconservative positions on Kosovo and Iraq. These two foreign policy crises are pivotal for revealing the extent to which a neoconservative discourse privileging the aggressive promotion of liberal democratic and humanitarian norms through the use of hard US power and regime change had replaced arguments for caution, stability and limited self-interest. In Kosovo, the conflict between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) led neoconservatives to push Clinton to back full-scale US military involvement including the use of ground troops to force Serbian forces out of Kosovo, and then seek to topple Milosevic’s regime in Belgrade, again with the use of US military power. The contrast with their approach to the Bosnian crisis is illuminating, as they had previously not sought the introduction of US ground forces in the Balkans or the destruction of the Serbian regime. Neoconservative arguments on Kosovo mirrored their developing strategy for Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s regime was now not to be retained as a bulwark against Iranian power or as a force for stability; rather, the US needed to bring about regime change in Baghdad, and seek the creation of a liberal democratic regime. The plans at this stage during
Clinton’s second term favoured the use of American military power to create a safe haven within Iraq for a functioning Iraqi opposition and provisional government to develop, which would in turn seek to depose Saddam Hussein. The Wolfowitz Plan, as this became known, was still some way from the full-scale US invasion of Iraq of 2003 – this was not a call for US forces to invade Baghdad – but it showed that neoconservatives were committed to more revolutionary themes of regime-change and the imposition of liberal democracy in place of autocracy, even if it was still somewhat at arms-length.

4.2 From the ‘Project for the Republican Future’ to the ‘Project for the New American Century’

If the relationship between the Christian Right and neoconservatives during the Clinton years increasingly resembled a meeting of like minds, the relationship between neoconservatives and the Republican Party – especially its elected representatives in the House and Senate – was altogether more enigmatic. As the neoconservatives gradually defined the US national interest more widely, with concurrent calls for increased defence spending and interventionism in South-East Europe and the Middle East, the Republican Party in Washington seemed to be headed in an opposing direction: emphasising tax and spending cuts and limited government. Between 1993 and 2000, neoconservatives often found themselves attacking their own party’s foreign policy positions as much as they were President Clinton’s. Neoconservatives were able to form important alliances with members of Congress on the need for National Missile Defense (NMD), the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the need for a tougher line on Iraq. This was aided by new-found influence from the founding of the Weekly Standard (1995) and the Project for the New American Century (1997). Yet, they simultaneously struggled to persuade on the need for increased Pentagon funding, and military action in the former Yugoslavia, as significant sections of the GOP remained loyal to both a libertarian
ideology stressing limited government and the neo-isolationism espoused by Pat Buchanan. It was not until 2000, when it became clear that the leading contenders for the Republican nomination, Bush and McCain were both somewhat sympathetic to the foreign policy direction advocated by the neoconservatives, that neoconservatism ceased to operate as an ‘outsider’ ideology, and played a more central role in shaping the direction of the GOP’s foreign policy platform.

In November 1993, William Kristol created the Project for the Republican Future, funded by $1.3 million from a variety of conservative foundations and investors. The ‘Project’ essentially involved Kristol and two assistants sending political strategy and policy advice memos by fax to leading Republican politicians and interested media observers. The method bypassed the GOP party machine and political advisors completely, and went uncensored and unsolicited into the offices of key conservative politicians on Capitol Hill, bringing Kristol important influence with the party’s hierarchy, including Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole. Indeed, Kristol has been credited with playing a central role in stiffening the resolve of the GOP against Clinton’s healthcare plan which was defeated in 1994 (Easton, 2000: 270-283). According to Norman Podhoretz (1995a: 50), Kristol had become the *de facto* “intellectual leader” of the Republican Party. Kristol’s rise to prominence within the GOP was evidence of what Podhoretz declared as the end of neoconservatism, and he penned a eulogy to the movement. Neoconservatism had now, he argued, fallen into line behind Newt Gingrich, and there ceased to be any meaningful differences between neoconservatives and other conservatives, with the exception of having a less restrictive view of immigration. Interestingly, as late as March 1996, he could still argue that “only a tiny handful” of the neoconservatives supported “expansive
Wilsonian interventionism” and that realism now had the “upper hand in the neoconservative community” (Podhoretz, 1996: 19, 24).

The defining document of mid-1990s Gingrichian conservatism – the Contract with America – was credited with delivering the Republican Party its landslide election victory in the 1994 midterm elections (Republican Members of the House of Representatives, 1994b). The GOP took control of the Senate, and achieved a majority in the House for the first time since 1954, with Tom Foley (D-WA), the first incumbent Speaker to lose his seat since the nineteenth century. The ‘Contract’ was a radical document, firstly, it was the first time since the First World War that a congressional election had been fought at a national level on a tight policy platform, and secondly, the content of the document itself was seen as a radical change to the status quo, promising a shrinkage in the size of the federal government, lower taxes, welfare reform and a return to traditional moral values. Much that was in the ‘Contract’ appealed to neoconservatives, who certainly favoured welfare reform and lower taxes, combined with emphasis on traditional moral values including tougher laws on child pornography. Yet the overriding ‘flavour’ of the document was undoubtedly fiscally libertarian. Neoconservatives, while supporting the central tenets of free market capitalism, nonetheless, had always tended to do so with significantly less gusto than other conservatives (I. Kristol, 1978). As such, while the message of low taxes and limited government was backed by neoconservatives, it was issues of culture, society, morality and foreign policy that truly animated them. William Kristol, shortly after the 1994 election victory, articulated his concerns about the links between the Republican Party and big business, arguing that the Republicans needed to avoid being seen to be

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124 Only three years later, Podhoretz (1999: 29) changed his mind, discussing distinct neoconservative positions on foreign policy and the range of intellectuals who held those positions.

125 There is some evidence to suggest that the actual impact of the ‘Contract’ was less than claimed, with a majority of voters claiming never to have even heard of it (Easton, 2000: 288).
legislating for special interests in the business community (Easton, 2000: 296). This would be a theme that neoconservatives would return to during Clinton’s second term, as they castigated both the president and the Republican Party hierarchy for appeasing China for the sake of commercial interest.

The ‘Contract’ largely considered matters of domestic policy, taxes and welfare, yet there was some consideration of foreign affairs. Point Six of the ‘Contract’ concerned foreign policy, where there was a pledge to introduce a bill to the floor of the House titled ‘The National Security Restoration Act.’ It promised to reverse the “downward spiral of defense spending”; seek to develop a system of national missile defence; and reemphasised the commitment to NATO, all of which the neoconservatives favoured. Yet, there were also problematic sections for the neoconservatives. It suggested US military personnel should only be under US command and control when on multilateral operations, and it also called for deployment of US military overseas to be tightly restricted to only missions that were in the national interest of the US (Republican Members of the House of Representatives, 1994a). This latter clause implied criticism of Clinton’s efforts in Somalia and Haiti, and hinted at a warning against US military deployment in the former Yugoslavia. In a period when neoconservatives were expanding their conception of the national interest, and increasingly advocating interventionism abroad, congressional Republicans seemed to be more interested in limiting US military deployments overseas, and clinging to a much more limited conception of the national interest. Robert Kagan described the Republican Party’s foreign policy approach for the two years before their 1994 landslide as “disparate and half-formed” and argued that following their election victory, these mistaken attitudes were now evolving into law, with the GOP rejecting Reagan’s foreign policy legacy. John McCain (R-AZ), who just four years later would be lauded by the neoconservatives for his
interventionist stance on Kosovo was condemned, along with his fellow senators Gregg (R-NH) and Coats (R-IN), as the leaders of a neo-isolationist, realist trend in the Republican Party that opposed US military action in Bosnia. Whereas Clinton seemed to be sympathetic to the need for at least some form of military action abroad, the Republicans had retreated warning of “swamps, sand traps, neo-colonialism and ‘another Vietnam.” Kagan further argued that the Republican Congress had only supported missile defence rhetorically but in practice had reduced spending on it, and that they were further damaging American interests abroad by cutting the budget for foreign aid. In a pithy statement, Kagan commented that “the party looking to limit things has found a doctrine which makes of limits a virtue.” Neoconservatives argued that the anti-government zeal of the 1994 election victory was harming the United States’ foreign policy.

For neoconservatives such as Muravchik and Kagan, the assertive, interventionist foreign policy they advocated for the United States needed high levels of defence spending, which ran directly counter to Gingrich’s ‘Contract’ philosophy of tax and spending cuts. Although the Republicans in Congress had added to the Pentagon’s budget, it was not enough to reverse the decline in budget projected by Clinton in his first budget, which took a further $127 billion away from the Department of Defense over five years, on top of what President Bush had already cut (Muravchik and Kaplan, 1996: 44). The 1990s was set to be a decade of record-breaking prosperity for the United States, yet it was spending

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126 The Democrats during Clinton’s first term were described by Podhoretz as “positively bloodthirsty” in foreign policy when compared with the Republican Party (Podhoretz, 1999: 25).
127 Muravchik (1996b) would later use a Weekly Standard article to highlight the benefits of foreign aid being sent to Indonesia, where it aided human rights and also funded Indonesian economists to come and study in the United States.
less each year on defence, which would not be aided by Republican tax cuts (Muravchik, 1996a: 36-43). Despite this, the Republican revolution in 1994 was still fundamentally viewed as a positive outcome for most neoconservatives, but they suggested that if it remained obsessed with limiting the role of government it posed dangers to US domestic society and foreign policy. There was nothing intrinsically wrong with rolling back the state as long as this was also combined with a broader revivification of American civic life, an activist foreign policy, and a sense of America’s role in the world (W. Kristol, 1995e; 1999b; Brooks, 1997b).

An important step in the evolution of neoconservatism came in 1995, when the conservative media magnate, Rupert Murdoch, agreed to fund an idea developed by William Kristol, David Brooks and John Podhoretz for a new conservative magazine. The *Weekly Standard* was designed to be a neoconservative equivalent of the *New Republic*. It has played a central role in dispersing neoconservative ideas on both domestic and foreign policy to key Washington insiders, and acted as a forum for internal policy debate among neoconservatives (Easton, 2000: 372; Heilbrunn, 2008: 213-218). Less high-brow in tone when compared to other neoconservative magazines such as *Commentary* and the *Public Interest* which published longer pieces less frequently, the *Weekly Standard*, with a weekly circulation of just 60,000 brought Kristol and the other neoconservatives a greater level of influence among elite Republicans. Kristol became the editor; a position he holds to this day. The crucial development for the magazine with regards the evolution of

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129 Fred Barnes, one of the leading political journalists in the US at the time, who wrote for the *New Republic*, was headhunted by the *Weekly Standard* and became the new executive editor (Easton, 2000: 372). With the arrival of the *Weekly Standard*, and as a symptom of the direction neoconservatism was taking, from the mid-1990s onwards, it was noticeable that the number of neoconservative contributions to the *National Interest* declined, having previously been quite prolific.

130 Virtually all the leading neoconservatives have written articles for the *Weekly Standard* including William Kristol; Robert Kagan; Elliott Abrams; David Brooks; Michael Ledeen; Irving Kristol; Norman Podhoretz; William Bennett; Joshua Muravchik; Eliot Cohen; Max Boot; Paul Wolfowitz; Zalmay Khalilzad; Charles Krauthammer; Gary Schmitt; Thomas Donnelly and Gertrude Himmelfarb. Of all the prominent neoconservatives discussed here, only Jeane Kirkpatrick has not written for the magazine.
foreign policy ideas was Robert Kagan’s appointment as contributing editor. Kagan had worked under Elliott Abrams at the State Department during the Reagan administration, and then as speechwriter to Secretary of State George Shultz. According to Heilbrunn (2008: 214-217) and confirmed in the author’s interviews with leading neoconservatives (Schmitt, 2011; Donnelly, 2011; W. Kristol, 2011), before Kagan’s arrival at the Weekly Standard, Kristol followed the somewhat cautious, semi-isolationist, “cramped view of the national interest” that his father had articulated at the end of the Cold War. Following Kagan’s arrival at the Weekly Standard, Kristol increasingly wrote on issues of foreign policy, often in tandem with Kagan, and his ideas gravitated towards Kagan’s. The relationship, which harnessed Kagan’s developing themes of American hegemony and democracy promotion to Kristol’s Washington connections and publishing power, would play a pivotal role in the development of neoconservatism during Clinton’s second term.

Much to the chagrin of the Republican Party hierarchy, the Weekly Standard was determined to be an independent neoconservative voice, rather than sycophantically towing the party line. Indeed, Kristol (1996d) spent some time writing off Bob Dole’s election chances, and urging the party not to tie its fortunes too closely with what he perceived, correctly as it turned out, to be a losing ticket. Nowhere was this

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131 This was evidenced by Kristol supporting Colin Powell for the GOP nomination throughout 1995. This despite Powell and his realism becoming something of a bête noir for the neoconservatives in Clinton’s second term and into George W. Bush’s administration. William Kristol’s ‘President Powell?’ in September 1995 and Kagan’s ‘The Problem with Powell’ in July 2000, both in the Weekly Standard, provide an excellent demonstration of the shift that occurred in the latter half of the 1990s. Kristol used the first edition of his new magazine to openly talk up a potential Powell presidency, yet by 2000, Kagan had castigated Powell’s approach, arguing that “(t)he problem with Powell is his political and strategic judgment” (W. Kristol, 1995d; R. Kagan, 2000g). In the space of just five years, the Weekly Standard’s line had gone from touting Powell as being of presidential timber, to openly questioning his suitability to serve as George W. Bush’s Secretary of State. Donald Kagan had also strongly criticised Colin Powell’s approach during the Gulf War (D. Kagan, 1995: 41-45).

132 Heilbrunn (2008: 216-217) states that Robert Kagan was “an idealist, a crusader” who was determined to defeat realists like Fareed Zakaria and chart a different course for the Republican party’s approach to foreign affairs.

133 Unsurprisingly, Senator Dole was not on the best of terms with Kristol, who had spent a lot of time in 1994 trying to get Bennett to stand, then tried with Colin Powell in 1995. By 1996, although expecting some
independence from the party more on display, than on issues of foreign policy. The neoconservative contributors to the *Weekly Standard* began to construct a foreign policy platform that was as much in conflict with their own party’s foreign policy positions as President Clinton’s. Ideas of benevolent hegemony, democracy promotion, and the use of American power to promote the US national interest and human rights, which had begun to emerge in the early 1990s, now began to solidify and to be stated with fewer caveats. The *Weekly Standard* offered an ideal outlet to disseminate their foreign policy approach to a wider audience of interested Washington observers; all potential allies in helping their foreign policy ideas become reality.

Despite Kristol and Kagan’s frequent joint contributions in the *Weekly Standard* and op-ed columns in the *New York Times*, their most significant article, and the seminal 1990s neoconservative text, was the 1996 article ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’ in *Foreign Affairs*[^134]. They argued (1996: 19, 23, 27, 32) that the United States needed to return to embrace the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan, and emphatically reject both the liberal internationalism of Bill Clinton and the realism of Henry Kissinger that still gripped the Republican Party. The United States should instead pursue “benevolent global hegemony” as the “the only reliable defence against a breakdown of peace and international order”. They suggested that it was no coincidence that the two most successful Republican presidents of the twentieth century – Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan – were also the most comfortable in pursuing such a mission for the United States. Their critics suggest that “hegemony” was the ultimate goal for the neoconservatives and the end in itself (Ryan, 2007). But Kristol and Kagan’s article

[^134]: Heilbrunn (2008: 221) argues the article was “the foundation for the new neoconservative crusade”. This was the moment when the new direction neoconservatism was heading became public.

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pointed to a variety of moral goals that American hegemony was intended to serve, and indeed, argued it was a mistake to suggest morality and American power were mutually exclusive when they were instead “almost always in harmony.” This entwining of US national interest and morality required the United States to be involved in “actively promoting American principles of governance abroad” to include promoting a respect for basic human rights and liberties, free market economics, and the very idea of democracy itself. Podhoretz (1999: 29) would later argue that the suggestion that the United States should do “everything” in its power to spread democracy, was the neoconservatives’ “main political idea”. Aside from democracy promotion, the American hegemonic order had other important principles, namely that there should be no genocide, no acts of aggression by one state against another, and no major widespread serious human rights violations. If the United States was prepared to tolerate these things, doubts would be raised in rogue states about the willingness of the United States to maintain both its principles and its hegemony (R. Kagan, 1996a: 30).

There was also a fundamentally domestic moral goal to be served too. By placing humanitarian interests at the heart of American foreign policy, this would have the knock-on effect of re-moralising domestic American society. Indeed, they even claimed it was impossible to achieve the domestic re-moralisation of US society that the neoconservatives and the Christian Right advocated without pursuing a morally-orientated agenda abroad: “The remoralization of America at home ultimately requires the remoralization of American foreign policy” (W. Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 31, emphasis added). For the neoconservatives, the counterculture of the 1960s could not be unravelled and domestic society imbued with traditional moral virtue, without a concomitant repudiation of what it
saw as amoral realism and nihilistic liberalism at the international level.\textsuperscript{135} It was also not enough to be a passive, neo-isolationist, shining “city on a hill”. This was lacking in virtue and “a policy of cowardice and dishonour” (W. Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 31).\textsuperscript{136} The relationship between foreign policy morality and domestic morality was not, though, simply uni-directional. Kagan (1996a: 26) argued that the foreign policy of the state should reflect the moral impulses of the domestic citizenry. This of course leads to something of a paradox in neoconservative thought. US foreign policy also needed to be more moral to promote domestic morality. Neoconservatives described domestic society as nihilistic and decadent; yet foreign policy was supposed to reflect domestic society. Despite this paradox, the linking of domestic renewal and an activist foreign policy remained a constant theme. David Brooks (1997a) trumpeted a return to a “national greatness” discourse in the United States, approvingly noting Tocqueville’s observation that the domestic citizenry would “slide into domestic mediocrity if its citizens are not inspired by some larger national goal.” There was a danger to US liberal democracy if its foreign policy was simply a matter of commerce and self-interest instead of a national mission to “advance civilization itself”.\textsuperscript{137}

Many of the same arguments used by Kristol and Kagan in \textit{Foreign Affairs} featured in Muravchik’s 1996 book, \textit{The Imperative of American Leadership} (Washington DC, AEI Press). Acknowledging that his thesis was out of step with the call for limited government so much in vogue with congressional Republicans, Muravchik argued that the United

\textsuperscript{135} Kagan (1997b: 26) would later argue that there could be no domestic renewal of American society if the United States clung to a foreign policy of cynicism, despair and lack of confidence in the idea of liberal democracy.

\textsuperscript{136} The concept of honour was closely related to their moral arguments, and features prominently in neoconservative discourse (R. Kagan, 1996a: 26; D. Kagan, 1997: 42).

\textsuperscript{137} Brooks suggested that the dominance of postmodernism in the academy and society had intellectually damaged ideas of progress and order, and stripped the United States of its role “as the vanguard of civilization” (Brooks, 1997b).
States needed to be the world leader, and “more than” simply the world’s policeman. This was heady stuff, considering that the dominant view at the time in the Republican Party balked even at the idea of ‘world policeman’ status. As with Kristol and Kagan, he suggested that the differences between what was the moral thing for the US to do in foreign policy and what was in its interest were overstated, and that the history of US foreign policy was “laced with idealism” (Muravchik, 1996a: 1, 22-33, 159). The purpose of US pre-eminence in the global system was not merely power in and of itself, but power and US leadership for a purpose. Muravchik argued that there had been a clear case for the United States to intervene militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and that Clinton had refused permission for administration officials to describe it as genocide so that he would not be forced to intervene. He also noted approvingly Winston Churchill’s advice to David Lloyd-George in 1918, that the United Kingdom should use military force to impose democracy on Russia and crush the nascent Communist revolution.

The criteria for the use of American force abroad contained in the Weinberger Doctrine and a similar list drawn up by Warren Christopher, were too narrow, and once again, lacking in moral clarity. Muravchik (1996a: 153-181) argued that the Roman Catholic doctrine of ‘just war’ and the moral criteria for such an undertaking needed to be given greater weight in consideration of when force should be used. The US was justified in using force abroad for self-defence, and also, like Kristol and Kagan, where its interests and values combined. The US should not intervene militarily on the basis of values alone, except for cases of genocide, where one ethnic group is slaughtering another, and the US had a responsibility to protect in such a situation. On democracy, Muravchik again endorsed the democratic peace thesis, yet he stopped short of stating that military force

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138 Francis Fukuyama (2000: 26) argues this construction, which was typical of the arguments used in the latter half of the 1990s by neoconservatives, is problematic as there is too much ambiguity, with the precise mix of interest and values never adequately stated.
was justified to impose democracy on a state in the absence of other factors, as it could not be justified under international law. On the surface this looked like a similar argument to that made in his previous book in 1991, yet, his thinking had shifted. If the US was drawn into a military intervention, then once US troops were present on the ground it should be America’s policy to attempt to democratize the country in which it was intervening, in a similar fashion to Japan and Germany after the Second World War, instead of trying to simply stabilise the situation via non-democratic means. Democracy was a universal value, and the West could easily export its goods, technology and entertainment, so why not its political system? For Muravchik, the United States should not go to war to impose democracy, yet if the US went to war on another basis, the US should also attempt to impose democracy at the end of the conflict. Considering the neoconservatives nearly always had an array of suggestions of conflicts the US should enter into for ‘other reasons’, these conflicts would de facto likely become seen as at least partly being wars for democracy’s imposition, even if other rationales were used to justify the initial use of force. The idea that democracy promotion should be the new polestar of American foreign policy was also taken up by neoconservative AEI scholar, Michael Ledeen (1996b: 148). He argued that the US should insist that its authoritarian allies across Africa, the Middle East and Asia allow democratic elections, and that the US should simultaneously seek to weaken and force regime change on its enemies and support the “democratic forces seeking to defeat them.” The United States was “the most revolutionary force on earth” and needed to be on a mission to spread democracy and fight tyranny (Ledeen, 2000: 36-37). Heilbrunn (2008: 219) referred to Ledeen’s views as “neoconservatism on steroids”.

On the topic of democracy, Robert Kagan (1997c: 23-26) repudiated the seminal neoconservative text of the Cold War. He argued that Jeane Kirkpatrick’s ‘Dictatorships
and Double Standards’ was now a text for the neoconservatives’ critics on the internationalist Left and the isolationist Right, who favoured US inaction when faced with authoritarian regimes. The bright optimism of Francis Fukuyama had been roundly rejected by the academy, in favour of the pessimism of Paul Kennedy, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert D. Kaplan, and Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ which posited democracy as only a Western value. Although Clinton had begun well with his doctrine of democratic enlargement, his second term had seen him falter, and both the White House and Republican Congress prioritised commerce in Nigeria, Kazakhstan, Armenia, China and Indonesia, over humanitarian concerns and pressure for democratic reform. The consensus in Washington was now that democracy was not suitable for the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, China, and the Islamic world. Kagan noted similar arguments had been used about Russia, but that the 1990s had witnessed a dramatic change and the “generally pacifying effect of democracy.” In words which would resonate during the first term of George W. Bush’s administration, Kagan argued that the US should be doing much more to support “democratic voices” in the Middle East, and holding authoritarian states there to much higher standards of democracy, even if it risked short term instability.

1997 proved to be a critical year in the evolution of neoconservatism. The nascent ideas of American hegemony for the purpose of promoting US interests and values, which had appeared on the pages of Commentary and the Weekly Standard, were given a new outlet with the founding of the Project for the New American Century. PNAC has assumed a fair degree of notoriety among neoconservatism’s critics as an example of the hubris that enveloped their thinking during Clinton’s second term (Chernus, 2006: 49). Heilbrunn (2008; 217-218) described PNAC as “essentially a front organization to champion the
democratic crusade and, specifically, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.” Co-founded by
William Kristol and Robert Kagan, it used many of the same tactics Kristol had honed at
the Project for the Republican Future. It relied on sending faxes to key Washington
insiders and important media outlets, thus providing neoconservatism with a wider
audience. PNAC was located in the same building on Washington’s 17th Street NW that
housed AEI and the *Weekly Standard*. The proximity of location was certainly not
coincidental, as many of the neoconservative signatories to PNAC’s ‘Statement of
Principles’ were also AEI scholars and *Weekly Standard* contributors. PNAC was
described as “an essential element” of the “defense establishment to be”, and many of the
signatories went on to take up prominent positions within George W. Bush’s
administration (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 103-105). PNAC’s original list of signatories
was not exclusively neoconservative, but featured prominent conservative politicians
including Gary Bauer, Jeb Bush, Steve Forbes, Dick Cheney, Dan Quayle and Donald
Rumsfeld.139 At the centre of the document (Project for the New American Century, 1997)
was a clarion call for “American global leadership” in opposition to Clintonian
incoherence and the failure of Republican politicians on Capitol Hill to offer their own
strategic vision. The United States had to play the pivotal role in maintaining global peace
and security, and on that basis, the ‘Statement’ urged four main points. Firstly, the US
must ramp up defence spending to meet its global responsibilities and to effectively
modernise. Secondly, ties with democratic allies must be strengthened, and regimes that
are hostile to both US interests and values must be challenged. Thirdly, the US should do
all it can to promote political and economic liberties abroad. Fourthly, the US needed to
stop being in denial about its unique role and the situation it found itself in, and come to

139 The neoconservatives who signed the ‘Statement of Principles’ among others included Elliott Abrams,
William Bennett, Eliot Cohen, Midge Decter, Frank Gaffney, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis
Libby, Norman Podhoretz, George Weigel and Paul Wolfowitz (Project for the New American Century,
1997).
terms with the fact that it had to preserve and extend world order that was beneficial to American principles and interests. It was on the basis of these four points that PNAC and neoconservatives more widely responded to the foreign policy events of Clinton’s second term. From these four points flowed four particular issues that dominated neoconservative discourse during these years. Firstly, a range of relatively technical fiscal and strategic concerns relating to defence, including the Pentagon’s budget, National Missile Defence (NMD) and the expansion of NATO; secondly, how the United States should respond to the growing threat from China; thirdly, the endgame in the former Yugoslavia, and how to counter Serbian aggression in Kosovo; lastly, removal of the threat posed by Iraq through support for the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad.

4.3 The Defence Budget, NMD, and NATO Expansion

The size of the Pentagon’s budget has been a long-running neoconservative concern stretching back to the Carter administration. Whether it was defeating Communism in the early 1980s or maintaining American hegemony in the late 1990s, the neoconservatives were unanimous in arguing that it could not be done without significant increases in the percentage of US GDP devoted to defence. Kristol and Kagan (1996: 23) argued that the US needed to spend somewhere in the region of $60 to $80 billion more on defence than the approximately $260 billion it was then spending. The end of the Cold War had raised the number of overseas military interventions that the United States was involved in, yet there had not been a concomitant increase in the resources devoted to these operations. Eliot Cohen (1997) stated that both Clinton and Gingrich’s Republicans had been complicit in this level of underfunding and it had wide bipartisan appeal, noting Gingrich’s promise to turn the Pentagon into a ‘Triangle.’ At the end of the Cold War, the military had employed 2.1 million people in the US, which had declined to 1.4 million people by
1997. On military hardware, Cohen pointed to the fact that General David Shalikashvili the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had argued that the US military needed $60 billion per annum simply to modernise equipment, whereas current spending levels on this were below $40 billion. In 1990, Cohen had suggested that the US needed to revert to a more “normal” posture after the Cold War and reduce spending, but now he argued for a spending increase and a fresh strategy for the new American role of “global hegemon.” The US needed to sustain the Pax Americana, for which its military had become a global “constabulary” force. The case for increased defence spending was taken up frequently by PNAC’s executive director and AEI scholar, Gary Schmitt, who argued in a series of articles that the Pentagon’s budget was far too low. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in May 1997 and the National Defense Panel (NDP) in December 1997 had both failed to see the strategic need for significant increases in funding. By 2002, US defence spending would stand at just 2.7% of GDP compared with the 6-9% range during much of the Cold War (Schmitt, 1998b). The defence establishment and the Clinton administration had clearly failed to cast the strategic vision which would necessitate the required higher levels of defence spending. Instead of spending increases for the period 1991-2001, the army would be reduced from 18 to 9 divisions, the navy reduced from 546 ships to around 300, and the air force from 36 fighter wings to 18.\footnote{Even the relatively modest, at least by neoconservative standards, Base Force proposals had required 12 army divisions, 456 ships, and 28 wings (Schmitt, 1998a).} US defence spending needed to rise to at least around 3.5% of GDP to provide a further $40 to $60 billion per annum to the Pentagon’s budget (Schmitt, 1998a: 52, 56). Although Clinton had made some improvements to the budget in his second term, these were largely “an illusion” as only $4
billion of the heralded $12 billion increase was effectively ‘new money’, and there was still an overall real-terms decline (Schmitt, 1999a).\textsuperscript{141}

The neoconservative calls for increased military spending culminated in the 2000 PNAC document ‘Rebuilding America’s Defences’. It sought to offer a comprehensive assessment of where the Pentagon should prioritise its resources, and differed from both the QDR and NDP which had assumed a flat or shrinking budget. The report compared the post-Cold War strategic environment to the Cold War, and made the case for the type of military that was needed for the new landscape the US faced. Whereas the Cold War was bipolar with the main aim being to “deter Soviet expansionism”, the post-Cold War period was unipolar, and the main strategic goal for the US was to “secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter the rise of new great-power competition; defend key regimes; exploit transformation of war” (Project for the New American Century, 2000: 2). The US military faced four important missions: firstly, to defend the homeland, especially from WMD; secondly, to update the concept of being able to fight two major regional wars, so it had enough force to fight “multiple” large scale wars; thirdly, to perform “constabulary duties” and preserve the peace in key regions short of fighting a major war, for example in the Balkans, patrolling the no-fly zone in Iraq and maintaining “presence” in East Asia; fourthly, to transform the armed forces and exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (Project for the New American Century, 2000: 5-6). To accomplish these goals, the Army’s budget needed to rise from $70 billion to $90-95 billion and the Air Force needed to maintain 18-19 active wings plus eight in reserve. The Navy required a new forward base in South-East Asia and the Marine Corps to be provided with a forward basing of a second Marine Expeditionary Unit in East Asia. The US should maintain its

\textsuperscript{141} For FY2000 alone, Schmitt (1999a) argued there was a budget deficit at the Pentagon, with the army underfunded by $2.5 billion, the navy and air force combined by $3 billion, and the marine corps by $0.9 billion.
military presence in Europe, but its overall posture needed to be more Asia-Pacific in focus. Aircraft carrier presence in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf was to be reduced in favour of increased presence in the Pacific, where two-thirds of the carrier groups should be based. In addition to these terrestrial concerns, the paper called for global missile defences for the United States and its allies, and full military control of space and cyberspace (Project for the New American Century, 2000: 16, 20, 23, 31, 39, 47, 51). This change in posture was largely a response to a perceived rising threat from China, discussed in detail below.

The protection of the US homeland from missile attack through developing a system of missile defence has been a central feature of Republican foreign policy since Reagan advocated SDI in March 1983. Unlike other planks of the radical foreign policy platform that neoconservatives developed during Clinton’s second term, missile defence had real crossover appeal with other Republican foreign policy factions, and enabled neoconservatives to build important bridges with erstwhile foreign policy opponents on the Right. For the neo-isolationist Right led by Pat Buchanan, missile defence was the opportunity to defensively protect the homeland without the need for the US to involve itself in potentially messy foreign interventions. For the libertarian Right, missile defence reduced the need for foreign interventionism which was more costly in the long run. For the neoconservatives, missile defence offered the opportunity to defend the homeland, but more importantly, argued Robert Kagan (1998a: 307, 311) it gave the US confidence to be able to pursue an activist foreign policy, secure in the knowledge that it was safe from missile attack and was “the essential foundation for the next phase of American global activism.” NMD would guarantee American freedom of action abroad, and prevent a threat of ballistic missile attack constraining US foreign policy.
An important step in building support for NMD across the Republican Party and more widely came in 1998 with the founding of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, more colloquially known after its chairman as the Rumsfeld Commission.\textsuperscript{142} National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 95-19 in November 1995 had stated that no country other than the declared nuclear powers would develop ballistic missile capability to threaten the 48 contiguous states of the US or Canada within the next fifteen years (Director of Central Intelligence, 1995).\textsuperscript{143} In crucial opposition to the NIE, James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA and neoconservative ally, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that the intelligence assessment was flawed as it ignored Alaska and Hawaii, the overseas bases of the US military and key allies. It also failed to appropriately consider the possibility of “technically feasible” threats or alternative future scenarios. The US needed theatre missile defence (Navy Upper Tier and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense – THAAD) and to develop a system of national missile defence by pushing for greater flexibility within the current ABM treaty (Woolsey, 1998: 337-342).

From the neoconservative perspective, the NIE was flawed as it underestimated the ballistic missile threat to the United States just as the intelligence community had done in the past. The strategic environment faced by the US was altered by the fact that many more states had the potential capacity to manufacture ballistic missiles and WMD (R. Kagan and Schmitt, 1998: 21).\textsuperscript{144} The Rumsfeld Commission was created by Congress in 1997 to

\textsuperscript{142} The Rumsfeld Commission featured experts drawn from both the GOP and Democratic parties, including Paul Wolfowitz and liberal hawk, former CIA Director, James Woolsey, who was close to the neoconservatives, but was considered to be liberal on social and domestic policy issues (Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 1998).

\textsuperscript{143} It also explicitly downplayed the ballistic missile threat from Iran and Iraq, and argued that states that already had ballistic missile capability would not sell them to states that did not yet possess them (Director of Central Intelligence, 1995).

\textsuperscript{144} Maria Ryan argues that the attempt by neoconservatives to offer a different assessment of the intelligence mirrored that of the neoconservatives in 1976 involved with Team B, tasked with providing an alternative
answer and investigate such concerns. It began hearing evidence early in 1998 and reported back to Congress in July of the same year with the unanimous backing from all the appointees to the commission, including Dr. Richard Garwin, a registered Democrat and a staunch opponent of missile defence, although he did back short-range boost-phase defences (Mann, 2004: 241). The commission, which focused on all 50 states, rather than the contiguous 48, considerably diverged from the original NIE. Instead of 15 years, it reported that in addition to any potential existing threat from China and Russia, North Korea and Iran could launch a ballistic missile attack on the United States within just five years of choosing to do so, and Iraq could do so within ten years.\textsuperscript{145} Significantly, the report argued that for some of those years, the United States could be unaware that a decision to develop ballistic missiles had been taken. Not content with simply disagreeing with the original NIE’s findings it also suggested that the ability of the US to collect intelligence was eroding, and that there needed to be a thorough review of intelligence practices (Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 1998). North Korean ballistic missile tests within weeks of the report further served to emphasise these points.

By endorsing neoconservative concern regarding the missile threat the US faced, the Rumsfeld Commission’s report significantly strengthened the neoconservatives’ hand, and further increased their demand for NMD. Although the commission’s report did not prescribe NMD as the solution to the threat – it had been told to specifically avoid doing so – the clear implication was that the US needed to take the threat more seriously. For neoconservatives, this meant either NMD needed to be developed or multilateral arms

\textsuperscript{144} These were of course the same three countries that George W. Bush (2002a) would refer to in his ‘Axis of Evil’ State of the Union speech after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
control agreements strengthened. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they favoured the former over the latter (Gaffney, 1998: 24; R. Kagan, 1998a: 307; R. Kagan, 2000d; Schmitt, 1998d; R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999j; Kirkpatrick, 2000: 34; Krauthammer, 1999b). The neoconservative perspective on the UN and multilateralism more generally is well known. They were unlikely to place the United States at the mercy of a multilateral arms control agreement if a working NMD system could be achieved.\(^{146}\) When the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was strongly rejected by the Senate in October 1999, finishing well short of the two-thirds majority for ratification, neoconservatives congratulated the Senate for its stand, arguing that it was the Senate’s “finest hour” and the most “courageous” action since authorising the Gulf War. Arms control agreements were for “utopian fantasists of the arms control theocracy” who sought to restrict the United States’ freedom of action, but would ultimately let America’s enemies off the hook (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999j). Global order depended on the security of the United States, and its security could not be outsourced to the United Nations, but depended on NMD: American hard power. And as Kagan had suggested, this was not merely a defensive measure for the neoconservatives as conceived in the past, but functioned like a psychological shot in the arm: to give the United States the confidence it needed to pursue an unconstrained, activist foreign policy.

If the debate over NMD revealed glimpses of neoconservatism’s evolution during Clinton’s second term, the issue of NATO expansion offered further clues. In the autumn of 1997, the Senate held a series of hearings regarding expanding NATO eastwards into

\(^{146}\) Charles Krauthammer (1995a) argued that UN multilateralism is “irrelevant” and that global peace and stability can only come about through either US hegemony or a realist balance of power. George H. W. Bush’s and Clinton’s talk of new world orders and multilateral based peace was “nonsense, dangerous nonsense, as dangerous as the nonsense that followed the first two great wars of this century”. Muravchik (1996c: 54) concurred adding that the only time the UN had embarked on multilateral intervention in Korea and Kuwait, it would have happened anyway unilaterally by the US if the UN did not exist.
the former Soviet satellites of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Despite initial ambivalence from Clinton and earlier support from leading Republicans for the idea, by the latter half of 1997, Muravchik (1997b: 40-44) argued that the situation had reversed somewhat, with Clinton now making all the running on the issue, with the Republican Party attempting to apply the brake. 14 GOP senators had written to Clinton with questions indicating they were far from comfortable with the proposal. For Muravchik, NATO’s expansion was essential for ensuring future Bosnian-type crises did not materialise by tying the countries of Eastern Europe into a Western, US-led security alliance. Allaying Republican fears of the cost being prohibitive, he argued that the new member countries would need to contribute to the alliance and not just free ride under the American security umbrella. For neoconservatives, the European Union was never likely to be able to replace NATO as a security organisation, and if NATO did not expand eastwards and the US retreated back across the Atlantic, the void would likely be filled by Russia or a strengthened Germany, which was not in the interests of either the United States or the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe (W. Kristol, 1997c). NATO was a major building block of world order, ensuring cooperation and collective action against security threats. Joining NATO was inherently in the interests of the three new countries, and it was the security interest of the US to have as many partners in NATO as it could get. Russia would not be threatened by such an undertaking, but instead the move would help Russia more easily join the democratic world by realising the futility of any future imperialist notions (Schmitt, 1997a; 1997b).

What is striking about the neoconservative arguments relating to NATO’s expansion is that they do not primarily centre on NATO being a defensive pact for either Eastern Europe or the United States as it would be interpreted under realist doctrine, or even
according to the arguments that neoconservatives themselves made earlier in the 1990s regarding NATO and Bosnia. While that defensive point is certainly made, the primary purpose of NATO for the neoconservatives had become much wider (W. Kristol, 1997c). Quoting former British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, Muravchik (1997b: 45) argued that NATO was more than a defence pact and the protection of territory, but was almost a spiritual organisation charged with the goal of protecting Western ideals more generally, including political liberty and the rule of law. NATO was a “community of nations” held together by their values and ideals as much as their defensive security interests (Schmitt, 1997a). On this basis, NATO’s expansion made perfect sense, allowing fellow democracies which shared the same values to join that ‘community.’ In addition to allowing new members to join, there needed to be “a greater emphasis on democracy” in NATO, and an expanded range of missions for it to take part in, of which Kosovo, discussed later, was a perfect example. Although France in particular feared American “hyperpower”, the neoconservatives argued that they had nothing to fear because redefining NATO’s mission would “contribute to European empowerment by establishing the principle of fighting for common ideals” (Muravchik, 1997b: 45; Muravchik, 1999a: 32). Their position on NATO expansion was far from being purely altruistic: the United States clearly benefited from a prosperous, stable Europe. Nonetheless, they argued that the Europeans themselves had even more to gain from NATO’s expansion, and from agreeing to become partners in a more activist mission for NATO.

4.4 China

During Clinton’s second term, the neoconservative positions on the Kosovo intervention and Iraq received most attention, obscuring the fact they were equally prolific in their discussion of China. The charge against Clinton and the Republicans in Congress was that
they had prioritised commercial interest with the PRC and the need to maintain strong trading links with China by granting ‘Most Favored Nation’ (MFN) status, instead of favouring humanitarian concerns and the strategic interest of the US. During the 1996 presidential election, Robert Kagan (1996b) accused Clinton of being “the spiritual godson of Henry Kissinger” and standing “shoulder to shoulder” with Dole on a flawed China policy. Clinton and Dole were charged with wilting in the face of pressure from the US business community, who had prioritised a Chinese “gold rush” that was not just running against America’s national strategic interest but ran counter “to the basic liberties of more than a billion people living beneath the yoke.”

After the Tiananmen Square massacre, China revealed itself to be the key opponent of US liberal values in the world, a fact attested by its human rights abuse, aggression in the South China Sea and dubious arms sales to other unsavoury regimes. Neoconservative concerns with China can be categorised into three distinct areas. Firstly, the abuse of the human rights of its domestic population; secondly, the threat it posed by providing material support to rogue states; and thirdly the direct threat it posed to Taiwan and the wider East Asian region.

Humanitarian concerns centred on political liberties and the lack of liberal democracy in China, in addition to the explicit human rights abuses directed at the Chinese population, especially relating to religious freedom, where neoconservative concerns closely linked with their allies in the Christian Right. Neoconservatives took issue with the idea that democracy was inevitable in China, and that all that the US needed to do was engage in trade, and eventually political, economic, and religious freedom would follow. Trading with China alone would not lead to political reform. Neoconservatives argued that their unease for the Chinese population was based on America’s liberal universalist creed, and

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147 Kagan and Kristol (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999a) would also later claim that the Republican Party seems “to love commerce more than it loathes Chinese communism”.
the spread of democracy was aided best when the US threw its “weight behind our beliefs” (R. Kagan, 1997a). Although there was wide consensus in Washington that China’s MFN status needed to be retained – indeed it was made permanent in 2000 – neoconservatives argued that the American people more widely did not support appeasing the Chinese regime given its egregious human rights record. Only 29% of Americans supported Chinese MFN status being renewed in a 1999 opinion poll (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999e). Since Tiananmen, the Chinese regime had cracked down and persecuted religious minorities including the Falun Gong sect, as well as Christians in non-state controlled churches, and Tibetan Buddhists. Rather than reducing as Americans traded with China in the late 1990s, neoconservatives argued that there was clear evidence that the number of human rights abuses were increasing substantially. Falun Gong members were being brutally killed; Protestant and Catholic groups had suffered “severe harassment”; and dozens of leading democratic activists including Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai and Qin Yangmin had been given long prison sentences (R. Kagan, 1999b). As US engagement with China had increased, Chinese economic power had also increased yet political reform had decreased (Schmitt, 1999c). This was the exact opposite of what Clinton’s policy of engagement was supposed to be achieving, argued the neoconservatives. The Chinese regime showed no signs of being more amenable to reform (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999a; 1999e; 2000a; R. Kagan, 2000e; 2000i).¹⁴⁸ Instead of Clinton’s engagement, and “excuses” for Chinese abuses like forced abortion and religious persecution, the United States should consider economic sanctions to reflect “moral disapproval” of their regime, in addition to the threat they posed to the US (Abrams, 1998; R. Kagan and Kristol, 1998c).¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Kagan (2000a) argued Clinton in the end did not even deny that human rights violations were on the increase in China, with James Rubin, the State Department’s chief spokesman openly admitting such deterioration.

¹⁴⁹ Abrams (1998) argued that sanctions should have been extended to a range of countries including Burma, China, Iran, Iraq and Libya. Even if only symbolic, that symbolism was important to demonstrate “civilized outrage”.
needed to be revived on a similar basis as the Jackson-Vanik amendment (1974) had done during the Cold War with the issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Western trade with China needed to be on the basis of increased freedoms for the Chinese people. The policy of engagement through trade with China betrayed America’s democratic revolution (Ledeen, 1996a; 1997; R. Kagan, 1996b).

Aside from the domestic human rights abuses and the lack of liberal democracy, neoconservatives accused China of threatening US interests by stealing technology and exporting advanced nuclear and ballistic missile technology to other states, especially Pakistan and Iran, which threatened peace in the Middle East and South Asia. China had sold nuclear technology to Pakistan which in turn led to an Indian nuclear test response in 1998 which had severely destabilised the South Asia region (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1998c). In January 1999, President Clinton, despite this, claimed that China was a reliable nuclear partner, yet within a few weeks of that statement, China had sold specific chemicals to Iran that were crucial in developing their nuclear weapons regime. China had showed no interest in improving human rights within its borders and appeared to have no qualms about selling US security and nuclear secrets for “immediate...commercial advantage” (Schmitt, 1999b).

On the question of Taiwan, the neoconservatives fused arguments of defending liberal democratic values with the hard realities of American national security interests. The situation that the US faced in Taiwan had been radically altered by two important factors.

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150 In June 1998, the House of Representative’s Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China was created to investigate Chinese espionage in the United States. Its report, known after its chairman as the Cox Report, argued that China had stolen sensitive material relating to seven different US thermonuclear warheads, and also information regarding MIRV technology had also fallen into their hands (The United States House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People's Republic Committee, 1999).
Firstly, the end of the Cold War reduced the need for the United States to appease China to deal with the bigger threat from the USSR. Secondly, the death of the authoritarian Taiwanese president, Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1988 had led to the introduction of democratic elections. These two changes led neoconservatives to argue that “the need for ambiguity has disappeared” and that Clinton should give his full backing to Taiwanese democracy (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999h). Yet according to neoconservatives, Clinton had both resuscitated and extended Nixon’s China policy, refused to give backing to Taiwanese independence, offer it a seat at the UN, or argue for a “two Chinas” policy (Waldron, 1998: 15). Clinton’s policy on China was tantamount to and “virtually indistinguishable” from appeasement of Beijing (W. Kristol, 1997a). Clinton was failing in his duty to fully support a fellow liberal democratic nation and in doing so was also harming US strategic interests in the region. The US needed to build much stronger ties with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, as those three democracies were “our true strategic partners” for helping to project US power and values into the wider East Asia region. Missile defence was not just something for the American homeland, but those three countries needed to be placed under its missile shield umbrella (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999a; 1999e). Neoconservatives openly speculated about the likelihood that Beijing was plotting a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. Indeed, Kagan (2000b) devoted an entire column in the New York Times describing exactly how China would be able to invade Taiwan before any American carrier group could do anything about it. For the neoconservatives, Taiwan represented a strategic piece of territory that needed to be defended by the US to hem China in and stop it being able to effectively ‘escape’ into the Pacific. Taiwan also represented as a nation, the “genuine universality of American political ideals.” The democratic transformation that had occurred there in the previous decade had been the first peaceful democratic transfer of power in over 5,000 years of Chinese history, and the US needed to defend Taiwan as it
proved democracy was not just a Western value and ‘Asian’ values were not inimical to its spread (Schmitt and Donnelly, 2000). A PNAC statement on Taiwan, argued that the US was obligated to unambiguously defend Taiwan, support the Taiwan Relations Act, and do all it could to deter Chinese aggression toward Taiwan and its outlying islands. Clinton’s ‘One China’ policy was “dangerous” and directly contradicted America’s moral and strategic interests (Project for the New American Century, 1999b; R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999h; 1999i).

Neoconservatives had argued that Clinton’s engagement policy to China was foolish, unrealistic and betrayed American values and strategic interest for short-term commercial gain. It was made even more imprudent by the fact that China considered the US to be its principal adversary. Neoconservatives did not advocate starting another Cold War against China, although the upshot of their policy proposals could have had that effect. Their policy prescriptions for the US, instead, centred on a combination of engagement with and containment of Beijing, coupled with recognition of Taiwanese independence (Waldron, 1998). The US needed to complete a number of policies in this regard including: firstly, to revoke China’s MFN status; secondly, provide much stronger condemnation of Chinese human rights violations; thirdly, allow arms exports to Taiwan to defend itself; fourthly, ban the import of Chinese goods produced by forced labour; fifthly, introduce a missile defence system in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan; sixthly, apply economic sanctions to China in response to providing Pakistan with nuclear

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151 A 1993 report by senior Chinese military strategists argued the United States should be considered by China to be the “international archenemy”; the US was always given the role of ‘enemy’ during Chinese military exercises, and the Chinese government regularly whipped up anti-American hysteria, especially following the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. All these were given by Kagan (1999e) as evidence of the futility of Clinton’s engagement policy. Wolfowitz (1997: 7) argued that China in the 1990s had a greater sense of grievance about the state of the international system than Germany had before the First and Second World Wars.

152 Khaililzad’s (2000: 32) favoured policy was one of “congagement”. The US should still seek to trade with China, but be far more strident about its human rights abuses. Cohen (2000: 25) argued China was a problem that required a “sophisticated blend” of containment and accommodation.

4.5 Kosovo

The conflict in Kosovo during Clinton’s second term provides an excellent case study in the evolution of neoconservative thought. Although not perfectly analogous, the similarity between the situation the United States faced in Kosovo in 1998-1999 and that which it had faced previously in Bosnia, allows for comparisons and contrasts to be drawn. A largely Muslim population of a former Yugoslavian province was once again demanding self-determination accompanied by Serbian aggression with the threat of genocide and wider regional instability. 153 Whereas in Bosnia, neoconservatives had mostly argued for a ‘lift and strike’ policy to allow arms to reach the Bosniaks accompanied by airstrikes at Bosnian Serb positions, in Kosovo a far bolder policy was favoured. They urged the US to authorise NATO airstrikes against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia itself and the insertion of NATO ground troops to force Serbian troops out of Kosovo, with the ultimate aim of bringing about Kosovo’s independence and a liberal democratic revolution in Belgrade and Pristina.

The Dayton Agreement which brought about the end of the Bosnian conflict in 1995 was largely welcomed by the neoconservatives for bringing the war to a conclusion. Paul Wolfowitz (1998a: 102) paid testament to the “pushiness” of Richard Holbrooke in agreeing a pact to end the suffering, when compared to the “passivity” of both Bush and Clinton. The actual substance of the agreement, however, was more problematic. Wolfowitz argued that the document was “flawed” and the product of a “flawed policy”. By agreeing to a multi-ethnic future for Bosnia, the peace was established, but at the expense of rewarding the aggression the Bosnian Serbs had shown as they were permitted to retain many of their military gains (Muravchik, 1999b: 21). Donald and Fredrick Kagan (2000: 417-419) also suggested that a central failure of Dayton had been the absence of discussion of the question of Kosovo, thus merely postponing that problem for a future date.

Kosovo had largely avoided being drawn into the wider conflagration during Clinton’s first term, but starting in 1996, and increasingly into 1997, levels of violence in Kosovo steadily increased. Murders and assassinations were conducted by both the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) directed against Serbs living in Kosovo, and by Serbian police and security forces against the ethnic Albanian population. By 1998, Serbian violence toward the KLA had significantly intensified, and the KLA was functioning more like an armed guerrilla movement than a small-scale terrorist organisation, with the aim of securing independence for Kosovo. The Serbian military crackdown on the KLA culminated in a massacre at Račak in January 1999, where 45 Albanians were killed by

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154 Holbrooke’s refusal to shake the hand of Ratko Mladic, the Chief of Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army, during the negotiations, when a string of European diplomats had no qualms about doing so, brought special mention from Wolfowitz. It appealed to the neoconservatives’ traditional conceptions of honour. Holbrooke, unlike many in the Clinton administration understood the need to right the moral wrong of US policy, and reassert American leadership in Europe (Wolfowitz, 1998a: 102).

155 The British Foreign Office website published a full and detailed timeline of precise incidents of violence in Kosovo by all sides up to June 1999 (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999).
Serbian troops, triggering wider calls for NATO military action (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999). This occurred despite a brief ceasefire at the end of 1998 brokered by the US Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill and Richard Holbrooke.

As with President Bush after the Gulf War and President Clinton on China, neoconservatives were critical of Clinton for essentially subscribing to the ‘inevitability thesis’ – that Milosevic would simply one day be deposed as a matter of course – thus “excusing himself” of the need for action (R. Kagan, 1997b). When the level of violence increased in Kosovo during 1998, and significantly well before the Račak massacre, neoconservatives called for swift and decisive US military action. PNAC drafted an open letter to President Clinton in September 1998, placed as an advert in the New York Times, signed by many of the leading neoconservatives including Jeane Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams and Paul Wolfowitz, in addition to other conservatives including John Bolton and Richard Armitage, and liberal hawks including Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY).

The letter “written out of deep concern for the plight of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo” argued that the US could not just let “carnage” occur as it had in Bosnia, and that there could be no peace in the Balkans while Milosevic remained in power in Belgrade. The “pact with the devil” had outlived its usefulness, and the US must commit to do all it could to support Milosevic’s replacement with a democratic regime. The letter called for the US to take five steps: firstly, address the humanitarian crisis and force Serbia to end its violence against the population in Kosovo with “massive Western pressure”; secondly, increase funding to the democratic opposition in Serbia; thirdly, tighten sanctions against Milosevic; fourthly, cease all diplomatic bargaining with Milosevic; lastly, support a trial for Milosevic in The Hague as a war criminal (Project for the New American Century, 1998c).
1998c). The neoconservative tone was even less restrained away from the formal PNAC letter, where there was little need to maintain a wider bipartisan consensus. Schmitt (1998e) argued that the US needed to use direct military force to drive Serbian forces from Kosovo, and that this should not be purely defensive, but rather should keep going to destroy the Serbian military machine and undermine Milosevic’s regime. From the very earliest neoconservative contributions to the Kosovo debate, it was clear that their aims in Kosovo were far more ambitious than they had been in Bosnia. Regime change in Belgrade became a constant theme.

Following the Račak massacre, PNAC produced another letter to Clinton in the *New York Times*. This time, the signatories were drawn from an even wider pool, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Bob Dole and Caspar Weinberger. The letter argued that Milosevic represented an obvious humanitarian threat to the people of Kosovo and the wider stability of the region. It called on NATO airpower to be used to force the Serbs from Kosovo to allow the insertion of NATO ground troops and to restore self-government to Kosovo within a democratic federal framework. Only US power could stop Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing and maintain the credibility of both NATO and the US (Project for the New American Century, 1999a). The spectre of genocide and ethnic cleansing in particular drew a sharp response from the neoconservatives, with Kagan (1999d) arguing that the United States had “an abiding moral interest” in preventing it (E. A. Cohen, 2000: 24). Indeed, Heilbrunn (2008: 10-13) argues that due to the influence of Jewish thought on neoconservatism, the shadow of the holocaust has always loomed large in their foreign policy thought. Coupled with their humanitarian concerns, the credibility of the US within NATO was also an important motivation for pressing for military action. Kagan (1999c) suggested the damage to NATO of inaction would be “irreparable”. Ryan (2007: 319)
argues that this was the main reason why neoconservatives advocated the policies they did in both Kosovo and Iraq; only being motivated by maintaining American power.\textsuperscript{157} Certainly, Ryan is correct to suggest that this made an important contribution to the neoconservatives’ calculus. William Kristol (1999a) argued that if NATO failed to defeat Milosevic in Kosovo, it would be “the end of NATO as an effective alliance” and that NATO needed to be seen to be defending peace and liberal order, especially on its doorstep. Yet, to view US and NATO prestige as the overriding motivation, and ignore the numerous humanitarian arguments made, as Ryan (2007) does, is excessively one-sided. Jeane Kirkpatrick (The Washington Times, 1999) who had just a decade earlier called for a return to ‘normality’, and was reluctant to even support the Gulf War, now urged US action in Kosovo, arguing that what was occurring on the ground was “the closest thing to genocide” since “Pol Pot’s ‘killing fields’” and “Hitler’s gas ovens at Auschwitz”.

As with China and the need for increased defence spending, neoconservatives were scathing in their criticism of congressional Republicans who opposed President Clinton and US military action in Kosovo. Kagan (1999d) accused them of taking the “Neville Chamberlain” line on Kosovo, expressing little more than” indifference” to ethnic cleansing. He maintained that although the United States would undoubtedly survive if it simply ignored the Yugoslavian conflicts, thousands of people of the Balkans would not (R. Kagan and Abramowitz, 1997). The accusation from the neoconservatives was that the Republicans in Congress were too keen to play party politics with national security, and unnecessarily oppose Clinton, instead of offering their own systematic foreign policy vision (The Weekly Standard, 1998a). This culminated in the spring of 1999, when NATO began its air campaign on 22 March targeting strategic Serbian positions in Kosovo, and

\textsuperscript{157} Francis Fukuyama (2000: 26) offers the exact opposite interpretation of neoconservatism during this period, arguing that often, the neoconservatives were too ambitious, and the policies they advocated only had a very thin veil of national interest attached.
within Serbia and Belgrade itself, following the collapse of the Rambouillet Conference. This had somewhat surprised some neoconservatives who had argued as late as 1 February, that Clinton only seemed to offer the threat of force, and seemed hesitant to actually use airpower, let alone ground troops (R. Kagan, 1999c). The response from the GOP to the bombing campaign, with the notable exceptions of a few including Senators McCain and Dole, appalled the neoconservatives. When Republican senators voted 38-16 against the use of NATO airstrikes in Kosovo, Kagan and Kristol (1999b) stated that it was now “hard to tell” whether the GOP was now the party of Reagan or Buchanan. Their actions had, in their view almost unbelievably, made Bill Clinton look like a great moral leader even when mired in the Lewinsky scandal. 158 80% of the Republicans in the House had opposed a US peacekeeping force for Kosovo and 70% of those in the Senate had opposed the bombing campaign. They called on the GOP to renounce Buchanan’s foreign policy views, as his perspective threatened to poison Republican foreign policy in the same way that Eisenhower’s failure to censure McCarthy had damaged the cause of anti-communism during the Cold War (W. Kristol, 1999b; R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999d).

Kosovo was significant for the prominence it brought to John McCain. With calls for strong military action and ground troops, the neoconservatives argued he was now effectively leading public opinion on the issue even more than Clinton was (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999c). By April 1999, the neoconservative goals for the Kosovo campaign had evolved to the point where liberating Kosovo from Serbian troops, and the insertion of American ground troops, was the minimum requirement for the US. There could now be no negotiation with Milosevic and emphatically no return to the *status quo ante*. Montenegro and Kosovo should be granted the right to break away from the Serbian state,

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158 Kagan (2000c) also argued the GOP’s Buchanan-inspired neo-isolationism had made “Clinton and Gore look like Harry Truman and Dean Acheson”.

war criminals should be captured, and Milosevic driven from power. This could be done through US material support for Serbian democratic forces, but significantly, Kagan and Kristol (1999c) argued that the possibility of US troops marching on Belgrade should “remain an option”.

Not every neoconservative, however, fully backed US action in Kosovo. Muravchik was concerned that the war violated international law – admittedly not a typical neoconservative concern – and Kosovo was not a separate legal entity like Bosnia had become. He was also concerned that there were not atrocities on a large scale until after the NATO bombing campaign began, a fact also noted by Krauthammer, who would not significantly share Kagan and Kristol’s expansive vision for neoconservatism until after 9/11 (Muravchik, 1999b: 17-18; Krauthammer, 1999c: 5).159 Muravchik, however, was the only neoconservative who was less hawkish on Kosovo than he had been on Bosnia. Krauthammer and Muravchik aside, the neoconservatives seemed united on the idea that the Kosovo conflict was both in the strategic interest of the US as it needed to maintain NATO’s credibility and stabilise South-East Europe, and was also a demonstration of American humanitarian and liberal democratic values (Podhoretz, 1999: 30-31). Although Podhoretz recognised Muravchik’s concerns as valid, he nonetheless was happy to receive the Wilsonian epithet, as it was the goal of the US “to make the world safe for democracy”. He approved of the emerging international norm of humanitarian intervention and the principle that sovereignty should not be an excuse for dictators to hide behind.

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159 According to Krauthammer (1999c: 5-7) the humanitarian catastrophe started when NATO’s bombing campaign began, mainly because the US “eschewed overwhelming force” and was “feckless and tentative”, not using meaningful force against Serbian infrastructure until the 41st day of the campaign. The American national interest was nowhere to be seen in Kosovo.
The final strand of neoconservative justification of the war in Kosovo centred on the
global impact of US policy in the Balkans. Kosovo was not viewed as an isolated crisis by
the neoconservatives. Authoritarian leaders in Beijing, Baghdad, Tehran and Pyongyang
were perceived to be closely monitoring how Clinton dealt with Milosevic. Policy failures
by the US in Kosovo would have far reaching ramifications in other theatres. Kagan
(2000e; 2000i) argued that the world’s most powerful dictatorial regimes in Iran, North
Korea, China, Iraq and North Korea worked as closely together as the world’s democratic
states did. They would make no attempt to make moves to abide by liberal democratic
norms if the US was seen to be letting Milosevic openly flout those norms. The US needed
to shape the geopolitical situation in Kosovo, or its failure to do so in effect meant that
Milosevic was doing so instead. And if Milosevic succeeded in Kosovo, why would
Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong-Il, and Jiang Zemin not think that they could equally succeed
even in the face of American pressure? Kosovo was a crucial test case for the
neoconservatives in demonstrating the United States’ determination to confront tyranny
and send a sharp warning to the world’s dictators. If the United States could bring about
Milosevic’s demise, it would show that the US was prepared to defend both its values and
its interests, and the triumph of democracy in Serbia would “rank as the most important
international event of the post-Cold War era” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999c; 1999f; 2000b).

The links between the world’s dictatorships was an obvious concern for the
neoconservatives. They argued that there was evidence that Milosevic’s regime had
received material support from both China and Iraq, as well as having close contact with
the Libyan regime (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999g). It was however, less the material
support that Milosevic received from Baghdad that concerned them, and more their
assessment that the Serbian regime had been emboldened in its confrontation with the West by American political weakness in Iraq. For Milosevic had observed that Saddam Hussein could defy American power on a number of occasions and survive in power (Muravchik, 1999b: 21; D. Kagan and Kagan, 2000: 419).  

4.6 Iraq

The neoconservative response to the end of the Gulf War in 1991 had been supportive of President Bush. American force had been used to drive Saddam Hussein’s military out of Kuwait, and Iraq had been contained. While, as discussed earlier, there was minor dissent to the effect that the US should have gone on to topple Saddam’s regime, the majority of the neoconservatives supported President Bush’s decision to finish the conflict when he did. They either were confident that Saddam Hussein was needed as a bulwark against Iranian power, or with ironic echoes of the ‘inevitability’ charge that they would level at Clinton, that Saddam’s downfall by domestic opposition was now a certainty. Yet a series of defiant gestures by Saddam’s regime throughout the 1990s combined with the new direction that neoconservatism was taking, culminated in neoconservative calls for regime change to mirror their advocacy of that policy in Serbia, and in doing so lay the intellectual foundations for the 2003 Iraq War.

Saddam Hussein’s defiance of the containment regime during the 1990s has been well documented. In addition to sporadic compliance with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) tasked with monitoring and inspecting Iraqi weapons sites, a series of events led neoconservative views on Iraq to solidify, and question whether Iraq

160 Donald and Frederick Kagan (2000: 365, 387) also argued that Saddam in turn had learned lessons from Clinton’s handling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, where in 1994, instead of resorting to punitive measures, Clinton had attempted to bribe the regime in Pyongyang with light water reactors.

The 1996 operation in Irbil particularly concerned neoconservatives, both for what it revealed about the Iraqi regime and the limited American response. Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks on a range of radar and anti-aircraft targets in southern Iraq, despite the Iraqi aggression taking place in the north of the country. They argued that this was a token gesture that had done nothing to directly target the actual geographical location of where Saddam’s force had been deployed (Ledeen, 1996c; D. Kagan and Kagan, 2000: 390). The 1996 military action was also significant for the fact that it confirmed that the United States’ clandestine attempts to subvert the Iraqi regime through covert funding of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in Kurdistan had failed, as members of the Iraqi National Congress, including, key neoconservative ally Ahmed Chalabi, were evacuated out of Iraq. Wolfowitz, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee described the debacle as Clinton’s “Bay of Pigs,” with key allies of the US abandoned in their attempt to undermine Saddam Hussein (Wolfowitz, 1996; Ledeen, 1996c). Khailizad (1996) also stated, in echoes of the debate before the 2003 invasion, that there was evidence that Iraq was sponsoring terrorism and it was increasingly necessary for the United States to explore policy options aimed at facilitating regime change in states that sponsored terrorism that threatened US interests.
Toward the end of 1997, and after yet another obstruction of United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in October, neoconservatives began to openly demand that the US support a policy of regime change in Iraq for the first time. AEI’s David Wurmser was the first to break ranks on the front page of the *Wall Street Journal*, calling for the United State to foment a widespread insurrection, resurrect the INC, and abandon the idea of a coup or being able to continue to contain Saddam (Wurmser, 1997). Wurmser’s column appeared on the same day as the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1137, which called for Saddam to cooperate with UNSCOM inspectors and condemned violations of previous resolutions. It was the third Security Council resolution of 1997, after resolutions 1115 and 1134, which had made the same points (United Nations, 1997a; 1997b; 1997c).

A month after Wurmser’s column, Wolfowitz and Khalilzad (1997) added their voices to advocate regime change from the pages of the *Weekly Standard*. They argued that Iraq would continue to not comply with UNSCOM and that Saddam’s non-compliance would effectively mean that WMD would not be found. This would lead to an increase in international pressure to drop weapons inspections, sanctions, and the policy of containment completely. Their six-point plan for US policy in Iraq largely formed the basis for neoconservative Iraq policy during Clinton’s second term. Firstly, the US needed to coordinate strategy with states in the region which Iraq threatened including Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Khalilzad, 1997). Secondly, the US needed to revive the Iraqi opposition which would entail not just CIA manipulation of exile groups, but supporting a broad-based provisional government, and remove sanctions to those areas of Iraq not controlled

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161 Wurmser directed the AEI’s Middle East Program, and was considered very close to Richard Perle. Indeed one reason why Perle had a relatively scant written record during these years, was that, according to Wurmser’s wife, her husband was “Perle’s pen” and that “Perle was too busy making money to write” (Meyrav Wurmser in Heilbrunn, 2008: 224). Wurmser, Perle and Douglas Feith had also worked closely providing foreign policy advice to Binyamin Netanyahu in 1996 in a document titled ‘A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm’, which was seen as suggesting a radical departure for Israel from the Oslo peace process, including fighting Hezbollah and Syrian targets in Lebanon and working to destabilise Middle Eastern threats including Iraq (Martin, 2005: 48-50; Heilbrunn, 2008: 224).
by Saddam Hussein. Thirdly, Saddam Hussein needed to be delegitimised internationally by indicting him as a war criminal. Fourthly, forces opposed to Saddam should be armed and trained. Fifthly, Radio Free Iraq, defunct since 1996, needed to be restored. Lastly, the United States needed to militarily protect Iraqi military units defecting to the provisional government. At this stage, the plan did not call for American ground troops, but military support, including air support, for Iraqi opposition groups (Wolfowitz and Khalilzad, 1997).

An interesting feature of neoconservative arguments used for regime change in Iraq was that they seemed to be less about Saddam Hussein breaking specific UN resolutions or defying UNSCOM, but more the effect of these things seemed to have on the wider international community. Instead of leading to increased calls for Iraqi compliance, the neoconservatives noted the opposite was occurring. Sanctions were seen to be harming the Iraqi people, Saddam Hussein was seen as less of a threat, and therefore the containment architecture built to keep Saddam “in a box” was deemed to be falling apart. Thus, the neoconservative arguments for regime change need to be framed within the wider landscape of their belief that containment could not be maintained indefinitely. Military action needed to take place before Saddam was completely free and able to develop weapons programmes which would ultimately make his ouster virtually impossible (Wurmser, 1997; Wolfowitz and Khalilzad, 1997; R. Kagan and Kristol, 1998b; Project for the New American Century, 1998a).

Neoconservative arguments for regime change in Iraq built steadily into 1998, and an apparent bandwagoning effect for Saddam’s removal developed. This was aided by neoconservative ‘institutional’ support for the policy, when at the end of January 1998,
PNAC published a letter addressed to President Clinton. It stated that US policy toward Iraq was failing, containment was collapsing, and it was likely that soon, the US would be unable to ensure that Saddam Hussein’s regime was not producing WMD. The only solution for the US was to seek to remove Saddam’s regime from power as the sole method to guarantee the safety of US troops in the Gulf, its allies in the region and the global supply of oil (Project for the New American Century, 1998a). Kagan and Kristol (1998a) followed up the PNAC letter in the *New York Times* and argued that the only way Iraq would ever be compliant with UNSCOM was if the regime was removed from power. Taking Khalilzad’s and Wolfowitz’s ideas even further, they suggested that the US needed to use ground troops to force Saddam Hussein from power, and that the greater risk to wider instability in the Middle East was if his regime remained in power rather than its removal. Even Krauthammer (1998) who had hitherto been the most reluctant of the neoconservatives to advocate the use of US military force during Clinton’s time in office, was supportive of the campaign to remove Saddam. The Iraqi dictator represented more of a direct threat to the US national interest than Aidid, Cedras or Milosevic had done. As a foretaste of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s 2003 ‘shock and awe’ strategy, Krauthammer argued that the US needed a massive and prolonged air campaign in Iraq targeting the secret police, Republican Guard, army, and presidential palaces; not a piecemeal approach but a sustained attack against the pillars of Saddam’s power.

The February 1998 agreement brokered in Baghdad by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan did nothing to assuage neoconservative fears regarding Iraq. Kagan and Kristol (1998b)

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162 They suggested (1998a) the troops necessary for such a task included four heavy divisions and two airborne divisions, all of which were currently available to be deployed. Kagan (1998b) attempting to goad Clinton to action, argued that Saddam Hussein was now potentially in a stronger position than Hitler in 1936, because he had the advantage of categorically knowing what the United States was not prepared to do. Saddam Hussein’s removal was essential for a more benign Middle East, but Clinton only offered token cruise missile strikes.
argued that Annan had now subtly adopted the position of Saddam Hussein’s “advocate” against the United States. Iraq was now permitted to sell more of its oil, sanctions had been weakened, and even though weapons inspections were allowed to continue, the Iraqi regime had been given four months without inspections to conceal any WMD, and they had been very difficult to find even before those four months due to Iraqi intransigence.

The consequence of Annan’s diplomatic manoeuvrings for US policy were highlighted in a second PNAC letter in May 1998, this time addressed to the Republican leadership on Capitol Hill, Speaker Newt Gingrich and Majority Leader Trent Lott (Project for the New American Century, 1998b). The letter argued Annan’s diplomacy had set the United States on a course, whereby in a year’s time, Saddam Hussein would be effectively liberated from the containment regime. Rejecting the efficacy of the UNSCOM inspections as “Potemkin Village” in style, US policy on Iraq was described in the letter as a “capitulation to Saddam.” Clinton had failed to rise to the challenge of the January 1998 PNAC letter. It now fell to the Republicans in Congress to press for regime change in Iraq; support a provisional government in areas of Iraq outside of the regime’s control; indict Saddam Hussein as a war criminal; and “establish a peaceful and democratic Iraq in its place” (Project for the New American Century, 1998b, emphasis added). There was no support for installing an authoritarian strongman instead of Saddam’s regime, to ‘balance’ the power of Iran. The letter backed the use of US power to depose Saddam Hussein and introduce democracy to Iraq.

The lobbying of Gingrich and Lott combined with Iraq’s continued lack of full compliance with UNSCOM over the summer of 1998, delivered the desired result for PNAC. On 29 September, a bill was introduced into the House to make regime change in Iraq the official

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163 On the 5 August 1998, Iraq decided once again to cease compliance with UNSCOM, and demanded the oil embargo be lifted and UNSCOM itself relocated to Vienna or Geneva (Borger and Tran, 1998).
policy of the United States. After passing the House with an emphatic, bipartisan 360-38 vote, it proceeded to the Senate, where it passed with unanimous consent with no amendments, and the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 was signed by President Clinton on 31 October. The act authorised $100 million in military assistance to Iraqi opposition groups seeking to topple the Baathist regime (Library of Congress, 1998). Two weeks before the bill was introduced in the House, Wolfowitz delivered an important statement to the House National Security Committee Hearings on Iraq. Highly critical of President Clinton’s approach, which he described as “a muddle of confusion and pretence”, he argued that the United States needed to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam’s “tyrannical grasp” and remove a terrible threat to Iraq’s neighbouring states in the Middle East. Again, eschewing the direct need for US ground troops to invade Baghdad, Wolfowitz offered a plan for Iraq, that would later be endorsed by both Robert Kagan and a Weekly Standard editorial (R. Kagan, 1998c; The Weekly Standard, 1998b). Wolfowitz’s idea was for the United States to use its airpower to create a liberated zone in the south of Iraq just like the one in the north. US military protection of this region would allow a provisional government to operate and begin to build legitimacy and function as an alternative to Saddam’s regime. The provisional government would also be given direct control of Iraq’s largest oilfield under international supervision, and would effectively become a “safe area” for units in Saddam’s Hussein army to defect to. Crucially, Wolfowitz (1998b), argued that such a scheme could never get off the ground through multilateral channels at the UN, but needed direct hard military power from the US. American power would be used to create conditions conducive to allowing the Iraqi people the opportunity to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in a broad based uprising.
Just weeks after signing the Iraq Liberation Act, in December 1998 Clinton authorised Operation Desert Fox in response to continued non-compliance from Iraq with UNSCOM. It consisted of a four day cruise missile and bombing campaign by the US and UK aimed at various sites in Iraq including suspected WMD research facilities and air defence batteries. Half a billion dollars of missiles were used in the four day assault, yet Kagan (1999a) again accused Clinton of tokenism. Indeed, he argued that damage had been done, because now the three permanent members of the UN Security Council, who did not take part in the attack, were openly calling for sanctions on Iraq to be lifted and for UNSCOM to be abolished. Containment was collapsing and it was Clinton and not Saddam Hussein who increasingly looked like he was now trapped “in the box”. With sanctions likely to be lifted and UNSCOM inspections terminated, Iraq would likely rapidly rearm and become a serious threat once again (D. Kagan and Kagan, 2000: 397-398).

The neoconservative position on Iraq that had developed over 1997-98 was summarised in a 1999 book by Wurmser, the title of which – *Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein* (Washington DC: AEI) – left the prospective reader in no doubt of the argument contained within. The text eschewed justifying regime change in Iraq purely on the basis of US national interest. Instead, in the typical neoconservative construction, US policy needed to be motivated by American ideas in addition to “geostrategic considerations” (Wurmser, 1999: 8). The removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime was less about the precise threat he represented to both his own people and the wider region, than about challenging its “underlying ideas”:

...the problem is not restricted to the monstrosity of Saddam’s character. Rather it is the inherent threat and violence of tyrannical government itself... Not the tyrant alone, but tyranny itself must be challenged.

(Wurmser, 1999: 8).
The arguments used by Wurmser (1999: 11, 116) included a range of humanitarian and strategic factors, and pointed to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to Iraqi civilians, neighbouring states and US interests. Yet the overriding impression on examining Wurmser’s Iraq policy is that it was about much more than simply Iraq. As an early sign of what Mearsheimer would later argue was the neoconservatives adopting domino theory in reverse, the toppling of Saddam Hussein would signal that despotism in the Middle East would no longer be tolerated by the United States (Wurmser, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2005). The US assumption that the Middle East was “exotic” and somehow immune from the influences of Western liberal democratic thought was flawed, as Perle also agreed in the foreword (Perle in Wurmser, and Wurmser, 1999: xiv, 132; Perle, 2011). The way to a more stable Middle East – which was in the US national interest – was to embrace the politics of democratic liberty and reject “totalitarian tyranny” and “evil” in all its guises. Even more ambitiously, and echoing Gertrude Himmelfarb’s arguments relating to the French and Anglo-American enlightenments, Iraq represented a golden opportunity to assert the supremacy of the American Revolution over global affairs, with its concern for liberal democratic virtue and “sweep away the two-hundred-year-old Zeitgeist of the French Revolution” (Wurmser, 1999: 131, 137). The neoconservative construction of the Cold War had posited it as primarily an ideological conflict between the US and USSR. With the Soviet Union’s demise, the United States’ victory over communism needed to be extended from Eastern Europe to other regions of the world, particularly the Middle East, where equally tyrannical regimes existed like Baathist Iraq which threatened America’s ideals and interests (Perle in Wurmser, 1999: xiv).

Neoconservatives were not just aided in their expansive vision for US foreign policy by some congressional allies in the GOP, but formed alliances with hawkish Democrats,
equally keen on using American power abroad to promote democracy, human rights and the national interest. Some Democrats were signatories to PNAC documents. Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), who had cosponsored the act which authorised the Gulf War in 1991, signed both PNAC letters to Clinton on Kosovo. Zbigniew Brzezinski had signed the second PNAC letter to Clinton on Kosovo. James Woolsey signed the letters to Clinton, Gingrich and Lott on Iraq, the second letter on Kosovo, and the statement on Taiwan (Project for the New American Century, 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1999b; 1999a). Solarz and Wolfowitz (1999: 160-161) penned a joint letter to *Foreign Affairs* in the spring of 1999 arguing that the campaign to remove Saddam from power was bipartisan and supported by the vast majority of the House and Senate, including Solarz and key Democratic senators including John Kerry (D-MA), Robert Kerrey (D-NE) and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT). Lieberman, even after becoming Al Gore’s running mate, was considered a key neoconservative ally. Kagan (2000h) argued that Lieberman thought Clinton’s foreign policy to be “feckless, inept and immoral”; was critical of how little of the $100 million promised in the Iraq Liberation Act actually reached the Iraqi opposition; thought the Bosniaks should have been supplied with arms; and that Clinton was too slow to send troops to East Timor.

### 4.7 Conclusion

By the time of the 2000 presidential campaign, it had become clear that neoconservatism at the start of the new millennium had undergone significant change during Bill Clinton’s eight years in office (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 102). Although marginally favouring the former over the latter, both McCain and Bush were claimed as ‘Reaganites’ and Lieberman’s appearance on the Democratic ticket pleased them after his criticisms of Clinton’s foreign policy (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999k). Neoconservatives who had begun
the 1990s calling for a return to normality and supporting the limited war aims of George H. W. Bush in the 1991 Gulf War, concluded the decade by arguing for massively increased defence spending, confrontation with anti-democratic China and radical regime change in Belgrade and Baghdad with the imposition of liberal democracy to replace tyranny. Paul Wolfowitz, for example, fully supported the main thrust of the George H. W. Bush administration’s approach to the Gulf War and Iraq, but from 1997 onwards, favoured a much more radical policy of regime change, and developed a plan to use American hard power to create a safe haven within Iraq itself with the ultimate aim of overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime.

The neoconservative response to the intervening crises in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, during Clinton’s first term revealed a neoconservatism in transition. They certainly became more interested in foreign interventions that were not simply reflections of a narrow national interest, for example ‘lift and strike’ in Bosnia, yet they did not press for radical regime change and democracy’s imposition like they did in Clinton’s second term in an analogous situation in Kosovo. This shift was not simply one of generational change. Norman Podhoretz and Jeane Kirkpatrick were enthusiastic supporters of the new direction that neoconservatism was taking, whereas some ‘younger’ neoconservatives like Charles Krauthammer were still resistant to a foreign policy that put democracy and human rights centre stage.

As the past two chapters have demonstrated, as the years passed since the end of the Cold War, the lack of systemic bipolar restraint in the form of the Soviet Union had essentially freed up US foreign policy to pursue a more radical agenda. This agenda was aided by an increasingly religious turn in neoconservative thought and a close alliance with the
Christian Right which shared many of the neoconservatives’ foreign policy objectives regarding American power and its utility for promoting political, economic and religious freedoms. This ‘religious turn’ coming soon after Fukuyama’s ideas concerning the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy suggested a less pragmatic, more ‘ideological’ future for neoconservatism. The institutional developments were also of significance. The establishment of both the *Weekly Standard* and PNAC, in 1995 and 1997 respectively, gave the neoconservatives a more regular platform for foreign policy debate and the opportunity to influence their colleagues and build a collective sense of identity than *Commentary* had provided, in addition to giving a much higher profile to their ideas amongst key Washington policy-makers.

The future for neoconservatism as indeed for US foreign policy more widely, now rested on the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. Although most neoconservatives supported McCain during the Republican primaries, his defeat to Bush did not unduly dishearten them. Wolfowitz had been a long-standing advisor to the Bush campaign and in November 1999, Kagan and Kristol (1999k) described George W. Bush’s speech in the Reagan Library as the strongest articulation of American global leadership since the end of the Cold War. The prospect of Bush in the White House therefore offered potentially a tremendous opportunity to put their ideas of American hegemony in the service of global order, democracy and human rights into action.
Chapter 5
Dawn of the New American Century

5.1 Introduction

The neoconservative origin of the Bush Doctrine has been frequently asserted, with an emphasis on the link back to the 1992 DPG and the close proximity of neoconservative intellectuals to the policy-making process itself. Indeed, Tony Smith (2007: 15-16) suggests that Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2005, was the “primary agent” in President Bush’s “conversion” to the liberal internationalist cause. The drawing of a link between the Bush Doctrine and neoconservatism was not restricted to observers, but also claimed by neoconservatives themselves. In late 2005, the worsening security situation on the ground in Iraq seemed to offer every encouragement to neoconservatives to disassociate themselves from the Bush Doctrine. Yet, a symposium in Commentary revealed that leading neoconservatives remained strong supporters of Bush’s foreign policy. William Kristol (2005: 43) argued that he had spent the latter half of the 1990s “advocating something more or less like the Bush Doctrine avant la lettre” and now had spent four years defending the actual doctrine itself. Kristol’s formulation is informative, as it elucidated the dominant interpretation of neoconservatism during these years. They had spent the second half of the 1990s advocating an increasingly ambitious foreign policy agenda based on US power and the promotion of liberal democracy and humanitarian interests. Yet, they were outsiders with little access to the Clinton administration until Bush’s arrival in the White House in 2001 offered them opportunity to put their nascent ideas into action.

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164 This is not to say they were uncritical of the post-war situation in Iraq. Robert Kagan (2005b: 43) repeated the frequently heard accusation that there were simply not enough American troops on the ground in Iraq. Perle (2005: 53) made the point that there had been tactical mistakes in Iraq and strategic ones in the failure to confront Syria and Iran. Daniel Pipes (2005: 54-55) argued there had been a failure of public diplomacy, and that the timeframe for elections in Iraq had been too hasty.
The narrative described above, however, obfuscates two important factors in the development of neoconservatism in the lead up to the Iraq War. Firstly, before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many neoconservatives were far from avid supporters of President Bush’s foreign policy approach, carrying on from their somewhat tepid backing of then-Governor Bush during the presidential election campaign. Secondly, it was not until after 9/11 that some neoconservatives, most notably Charles Krauthammer, and to a certain extent, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, embraced the more radical direction that had been charted by William Kristol and Robert Kagan in their 1996*Foreign Affairs* article (Perle, 2011). In this respect, it was not the advent of President Bush to the presidency that was the crucial event for neoconservatism during these years, but 9/11. The terrorist attacks had effects in both directions. For President Bush, having spent the previous eight months following a more unilateralist version of his father’s realism, the destruction of the World Trade Center made him more receptive to the neoconservatives’ overtures.  

For the neoconservatives, 9/11 was significant as the final unifying staging post in the evolution that had begun in the 1990s. It had brought in previous sceptics like Krauthammer, and led other neoconservatives such as Wolfowitz to contemplate much more direct uses of hard US military power to achieve their goals. It was also significant for bringing neoconservatives to focus on the threat posed by Islamist terrorism, when previously they had been more focused on the threats posed from traditional state actors.

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165 The foreign policy views of President Bush are not the direct focus of this thesis. There is, nonetheless an extremely interesting debate surrounding the relationship between Bush and Wolfowitz in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. At the 15 September meeting at Camp David to discuss the US response, two precisely opposite accounts of what happened have emerged. The first suggests that during a break in proceedings, Andrew Card, the White House Chief of Staff, took the opportunity to tell Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz that the Pentagon needed to speak with one voice, meaning that Bush felt that Wolfowitz who had spoken earlier, should quieten down. The second interpretation states that over coffee, Wolfowitz expounded to Bush on the need to tackle Iraq, and Bush told Wolfowitz that he would appreciate it if he was more vocal in the general discussion (Keller, 2002).

166 This is not to argue that neoconservatives had not written on terrorism before 9/11. Daniel Pipes, for example, had frequently written on the subject. It had usually though been discussed in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and not explicitly and systematically elucidated with reference to the nexus between terrorists, state sponsors and weapons of mass destruction in the construction of the Bush Doctrine. Kagan
This chapter begins by examining neoconservatism during the latter stages of the 2000 presidential election campaign. It considers the neoconservative assessment of George W. Bush’s likely foreign policy approach, before discussing their critique of Bush’s foreign policy in the months before 9/11. The lack of significant budget increase for the Pentagon and the accusation of weakness over Bush’s handling of the Hainan Island incident emerged as two central points of contention between the White House and neoconservatives during the first few months of 2001. The remainder of the chapter centres on the aftermath of 9/11, reflecting on the neoconservative response to the attacks, and their foreign policy prescriptions for Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond. It is argued that the centrality of Iraq to the narrative of neoconservatism’s evolution during the entire post-Cold War period is particularly illuminating, and is a useful prism for analysing neoconservatism more generally. The neoconservative position on Iraq had gone through four phases. From not favouring regime change in the 1991 Gulf War, it eventually favoured Iraqi-led regime change in the late 1990s, then supported the idea of US-led regime change after the 9/11 attacks, and ended by backing a position where the idea of simple regime change in Iraq had been transcended by a wider transformative agenda for the Middle East. Despite accusations from their critics on both the Left and Right that they were wide-eyed idealists on some form of crusade, for the most part, consideration of the national interest was still important. It was, however, increasingly entwined with a moralised discourse, with the promotion of liberal democracy more centrally located in neoconservative discussion than it had hitherto been.

and Kristol’s edited collection of largely neoconservative essays in 2000, *Present Dangers* (San Francisco, Encounter), for example, included no chapter that specifically analysed the threat posed by terrorism.
5.2 2000 Presidential Election

Considering that President Bush’s first term in office is widely considered to be heavily influenced by neoconservative thought, it is perhaps surprising to find that many neoconservatives were less than enthusiastic Bush supporters during his primary electoral battles with Senator McCain for the Republican nomination in 2000. This lack of ardour for Bush continued into the general election campaign against Vice-President Gore, and persevered into the first few months of his presidency. This was not a unanimous position as some neoconservatives worked on the Bush campaign, and conspiracy theorists and bloggers frequently produced lists of the neoconservatives who swelled the Bush administration’s ranks from the very beginning. Yet, it is undeniable that during the 2000 campaign, Bush the candidate left many neoconservatives cold. The level of indifference toward Bush reached the point at which Robert Kagan (2000j) claimed that he could not notice any discernible differences on foreign policy between Gore and Bush, except on support for foreign interventionism, where Gore was actually closer to the neoconservative position than Bush.

At the end of 1999, the Weekly Standard made it clear that both Bush and McCain, the frontrunners for the GOP nomination, were suitable improvements on President Clinton (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999k). Yet, it was clear from McCain’s performance in the debate over Kosovo and Bush’s links to his father’s realism that the sympathies of the neoconservatives at the Weekly Standard lay with the senator from Arizona rather than the Texan governor.\footnote{McCain had travelled a similar foreign policy journey to neoconservatives during the 1990s. Along with Senators Gregg (R-NH) and Coats (R-IN), McCain had led congressional Republicans in opposing US military action in Bosnia, yet by the late 1990s was numbered among the most hawkish and interventionist members of Congress (R. Kagan, 1995a: 20; Judis, 2006).} McCain was praised for providing strong opposition to Buchanan’s isolationism; reinvigorating the idea of American citizenship; and ‘remoralizing’ US
politics where “honorable behavior on behalf of a great nation” would be a central theme (W. Kristol, 1999b; Brooks and Kristol, 2000).\textsuperscript{168} McCain was, however, chastised, as were Bush and Gore, for failing to embrace a significant spending increase for the Pentagon, when there was bipartisan support and pressure from senior military figures to increase the budget (W. Kristol, 2000a). After Bush defeated McCain for the nomination, neoconservative support from the \textit{Weekly Standard}, waxed and waned depending upon Bush’s speeches and policy positions. In June, he was praised for making missile defence a “central plank” of the Republican Party’s foreign policy platform and embracing the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission (R. Kagan, 2000f). Yet, in October, Bush was criticised for hinting at a swift US withdrawal from the Balkans while Milosevic still held on to power and the US mission remained unfinished (W. Kristol, 2000c).\textsuperscript{169}

Despite the criticisms of Bush from the neoconservatives’ house journal, other neoconservatives worked directly for the Bush election campaign. Wolfowitz was drafted into the Bush campaign as early as the autumn of 1998, when he became Bush’s principal foreign policy advisor alongside Condoleezza Rice. At the beginning of 1999, a wider foreign policy team was drawn up for Bush by Wolfowitz and Rice, which included another neoconservative, Richard Perle, alongside other more realist Republican foreign policy experts including Richard Armitage and Robert Zoellick (Mann, 2004: 251-252).\textsuperscript{170} In the summer of 1999, Wolfowitz (quoted in Heilbrunn, 2008: 230) reportedly commented that Bush was “another Scoop Jackson”. But for the bulk of the general

\textsuperscript{168}John Judis (2006) has highlighted the historical links between John McCain and neoconservative thought. McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign emphasised similar themes to those he had emphasised in his campaign for the nomination in 2000.

\textsuperscript{169}Condoleezza Rice (2000: 45-62) would also have tempered neoconservative enthusiasm for Bush with its sceptical tone regarding the US role in nation-building and interventionism abroad. Rice advised Bush on foreign policy and was widely regarded as a protégé of Brent Scowcroft.

\textsuperscript{170}Perle claimed that George W. Bush differed from his father in that he was not experienced in foreign affairs, but had an ability to get to the heart of a matter and did not get “mesmerized” by Washington “policy talk” (Heilbrunn, 2008: 230).
election campaign in 2000, Bush’s foreign policy positions did not owe much to the neoconservative former senator from Washington. Bush’s campaign was largely absent the expansive themes that hallmarked the emerging neoconservative worldview; indicative of both the fact that neoconservatives were only one part of Bush’s foreign policy advisory group, and that Wolfowitz, for example, still retained a pre-9/11 paradigm for Iraq. The first presidential debate between Bush and Gore was notable for Bush declaring “I don’t want to be the world’s policeman” and his disapproval of a nation-building agenda for US troops (Commission on Presidential Debates, 2000).

The week before the election, Kagan and Kristol released *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (San Francisco, Encounter); a collection of essays by mostly neoconservative authors on a variety of state-specific and thematic threats. Although the book did not break significant new ground, it distilled in one volume the neoconservative foreign policy worldview that had developed during Clinton’s second term. The book developed themes including regime change, morality in foreign policy, the threat from China and Russia, and the need for a new hard-edged American internationalism. It is striking, however, for the fact that even in late 2000, less than three years from military action in Iraq, the idea of using US military power to directly remove Saddam Hussein from power was still not advocated. Kagan and Kristol (2000c: 20) wrote of the need to pursue variations of the Reagan Doctrine approach of aiding rebel groups and supporting dissidents in combination with economic sanctions as a way of forcing regime change in rogue states that presented threats to the US. Perle (2000: 99-110; 2011) castigated Clinton for not doing more to support the Iraqi opposition and not attempting to foment a rebellion inside Iraq. He argued that a lethal insurgency with US backing would succeed given the fact that most Iraqis opposed the regime. He did not,
however, argue for a ground invasion of Iraq with American troops. Wolfowitz (2000: 320-321) argued that it was essential to view human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy. Utilising the example of the Philippines in the 1980s, in which he was closely involved, it was better to have a healthy functioning democracy without US military bases, than a closer military relationship with no liberal democracy. It should not be the goal, however for the US to impose democracy, and there were limitations of using the military to nation-build. Instead of using force, the US “must proceed by interaction and indirection not imposition”. More philosophically, and in a further articulation of the need for a more moral foreign policy discussed in the previous chapter, William Bennett (2000: 300-301) called for a moralised approach to foreign policy. Once again linking the personal morality of President Clinton to wider foreign policy issues, he speculated that Clinton’s moral failings with Monica Lewinsky had led Republicans in Congress to doubt his moral leadership and therefore oppose his interventions in Kosovo when they might have otherwise supported him. Bennett argued that the United States needed to develop a “principled internationalism” that held “universal truths” in high regard.

In December 2000, the protracted legal battle over the Florida recount finally concluded in Bush’s favour with the Supreme Court’s landmark 5-4 decision. If they believed that Bush’s election victory heralded the second-coming of Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson’s foreign policy philosophy, the president’s Cabinet appointments quickly brought the neoconservatives a different perspective. Most discussions of neoconservatism provide an obligatory list of neoconservative appointments to the new Bush administration, as evidence of some sort of neoconservative take-over of the American government (Dorrien, 2004: 142-143). Yet, the startling fact is that such lists of the more junior positions betray the fact that none of the three top-level foreign policy jobs were filled by a
neoconservative, and that George Tenet, a Democrat, was allowed to continue as Director of the CIA. Even more interesting, given the fact that Dick Cheney was often portrayed as being the key neoconservative ally at the top of the administration, the vice-president-elect was given a central role by Bush in selecting the top level appointments to the administration (Mann, 2004: 261; Dorrien, 2004: 142). Neoconservative disappointment at Powell’s nomination as Secretary of State was further exacerbated by the fact that Wolfowitz, having advised Bush for two years in the run-up to the election, was not given a more senior position than Deputy Secretary of Defense. It had been widely hoped that he would land the top job at the Pentagon rather than just becoming Rumsfeld’s number two, with Richard Perle also seen as a potential candidate for the Secretary of Defense nomination (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 116).171

This is not to disparage the positions leading neoconservatives filled within the Bush administration. Douglas Feith was appointed number three at the Pentagon, as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Richard Perle, declined Feith’s job and was appointed in an advisory capacity as Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee; Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby became Cheney’s Chief of Staff; and Elliott Abrams became Senior Director for Near East, Southwest Asian and North African Affairs on the National Security Council. The significance, however, of these appointments has been overstated. At no other point in American history would the foreign policy of the United States ever have been described as being controlled by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and a handful

171 Halper and Clarke (2004: 119) interpret Wolfowitz’s appointment as Deputy Secretary of Defense as evidence of Cheney’s influence and that it “foreshadowed the emerging neo-conservative network”. Such an interpretation, however, relies on a good deal of hindsight. Wolfowitz’s appointment instead indicated that the high-water mark for neoconservative influence in this period did not reach Cabinet level. The jobs the neoconservatives received were “at best, second-tier positions” and certainly not as Dorrien suggests an “extraordinary harvest of appointments” (Heilbrunn, 2008: 230; Dorrien, 2004: 143).
of ideologically sympathetic colleagues scattered in more junior positions in the administration.172

5.3 The Road to 9/11

5.3.1 The Case Against Bush: Pentagon Budget and China

The neoconservative critique of the early months of the Bush administration coalesced around two issues that were also raised during Clinton’s second term. A new activist phase for American foreign policy required an urgent increase of the Pentagon’s budget, which they argued had effectively withered on the vine for the eight years of the Clinton administration. In addition to raising the defence budget, neoconservatives urged President Bush to demonstrate stronger leadership with China, which had emerged as a likely strategic competitor to the US, and a threat to US interests and values. There was little in the form of a honeymoon period for President Bush in his relationship with the neoconservatives.173 Scepticism of Bush’s foreign policy agenda, which lay somewhat dormant during the legal battle over the election result, did not take long to resurface.

Criticisms of the administration began the day after Bush’s inauguration and continued sporadically until the 9/11 attacks, and occasionally after. The catalyst for the early opprobrium proved to be the low level of funding for the Pentagon, a frequent neoconservative point of disagreement with President Clinton. On 21 January, Gary

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172 Conspiracy theories abound surrounding neoconservatism and the conduct of American foreign policy. The classic example remains the BBC documentary series The Power of Nightmares (2004). It argued neoconservatism and Islamist terror were two sides of the same coin, and neoconservatives deliberately manufactured fear to raise support for their foreign policy ideas. Given the fact that many neoconservatives are Jewish, and the enduring historical potency of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, it seems to this author, there is ample scope for critiquing neoconservative thought without recourse to anything that smacks of the conspiratorial. Max Boot (2004: 45-52) and David Brooks (2004: 41-42) have both given a vigorous defence against the charge that a neoconservative cabal were involved in a Zionist plot that placed the interests of Israel above the US.

173 Despite William Kristol’s Weekly Standard being required reading among administration staff, Kristol had called the election for Al Gore on election night, and in doing so ensured he was somewhat persona non grata at the White House (Tanenhaus, 2003).
Schmitt, PNAC’s Executive Director, in a joint piece with Thomas Donnelly, a colleague at AEI and PNAC (2001a), urged Bush to request an immediate $18 billion increase for the Pentagon. Continuing their lionisation of President Reagan, which began with their 1996 *Foreign Affairs* article, Kagan and Kristol (2001a) argued on 22 January that Bush seemed more like an “Eisenhower” than a “Reagan”. Bush offered too much continuity with Clinton’s foreign policy agenda. Bush should instead end the engagement policy with reference to China; work to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime; push for the introduction of a missile defence system; and offer a vastly increased budget for the Pentagon, above the proposed $4.5 billion increase currently on the table.¹⁷⁴

Throughout 2001, the constant refrain from neoconservatives was one of under-funding at the Pentagon. The precise level of spending increase advocated by neoconservatives varied. Robert Kagan (2001c) wrote that the outgoing Clinton defence officials argued that there was a $60 billion shortfall in the Department of Defense’s budget. Schmitt and Donnelly (2001c; 2001d) estimated that due to the pace of modernisation slowing during the Clinton years, an upwards increase of almost $100 billion would be needed. This was necessary to restore the ability of the United States to fight two medium-sized wars concurrently, in addition to prepare for a possible Chinese strike on Taiwan, which was not currently suitably catered for in the budget. This was not the neoconservatism that had greeted the close of the Cold War with calls for retreat and consolidation. The neoconservatives recognised that their expansive foreign policy vision could not be accomplished on a shoestring budget. They feared that in largely accepting the Pentagon budget recommendations it inherited from the Clinton administration, President Bush had

¹⁷⁴ A week earlier, Kagan (2001a) argued that during his first six years in office, Clinton had effectively cut $160 billion from the Pentagon’s budget, with the chickens now coming “home to roost” on President Bush’s watch.
chosen to privilege a tax cutting agenda over issues of national security and American greatness (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001b; 2001c).

Astonishingly, neoconservative disquiet with the lack of significant increase in defence spending was not restricted to those outside the administration. In testimony before the House Budget Committee in July 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, argued that Bush’s current budget was insufficient for meeting the needs of the twenty-first century. Instead of the $4.4 billion increase in real terms, he stated that a further $18.4 billion on top of that was needed to boost spending to $328.9 billion. The current level of around 3% of GDP being spent on defence, should be raised to around 3.5%, still relatively low by historical standards which averaged around 8% (House Committee on the Budget, 2001). Other neoconservatives argued that even this increase suggested by Wolfowitz before the committee was much lower than the extra $35 billion that Rumsfeld had petitioned Bush for. After Congress had discussed the increase, it was also likely to be even lower than the amount stated by Wolfowitz (W. Kristol and Schmitt, 2001). Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were both urged to resign by Kagan and Kristol (2001f) to highlight the fact that Bush only approved $18 billion compared with the $35 billion that Rumsfeld had requested from the president.

On 1 April, a Chinese interceptor fighter jet collided with a US Navy surveillance plane carrying 24 US military personnel over the South China Sea. The collision killed the Chinese pilot and severely damaged the American plane, causing it to make an emergency

175 Wolfowitz also made a comparison with the situation in 1950, when General Omar Bradley requested an extra $18 billion from President Truman, which Truman did not fully grant. The United States then found itself at war in Korea just six months later, with the Pentagon requiring an extra $48 billion. Wolfowitz argued it was more prudential to make the investment earlier, as this would help deter threats, and posited that higher defence spending by Truman would possibly have meant Acheson could have defined Korea within the US defence perimeter, thus preventing the war from occurring (House Committee on the Budget, 2001).
landing on the island of Hainan, where the American crew were held captive for eleven
days.\footnote{For a fascinating account of the incident from the perspective of the American pilot please see Shane Osborn (2001) \textit{Born to Fly: The Untold Story of the Downed American Reconnaissance Plane} (New York, Broadway).} The incident proved to be the first major foreign policy crisis for the Bush administration. The week before the collision, Robert Kagan (2001d) had urged President Bush to show democratic leadership on the issue of Taiwan and stand up to threats from China that warned the US not to recognise the Taiwanese state. With an American crew held hostage on Hainan Island, neoconservatives pressed Bush hard on the issue as an opportunity to deliver the strong leadership they had advocated, and stand up to Beijing. This was the first major test case for President Bush to prove himself as an ‘Eisenhower’ or a ‘Reagan’ in the eyes of the neoconservatives. They argued that the incident was not the result of a maverick Chinese pilot, but a result of Beijing’s policy of sending fighter jets near to American planes as a deliberate act of hostility. President Bush was urged to recall the US ambassador from Beijing in response to the kidnapping (Schmitt and Donnelly, 2001b). Although Bush initially showed strong opposition, Kagan and Kristol (2001d) argued that Colin Powell diluted the American position by expressing regret over the “accident”. The American government eventually agreed to give compensation to China for the loss of their pilot and to gain the return of the US crew, although it was not as large an amount as Beijing requested. Krauthammer (2001d), reflecting his slightly less bullish approach to foreign policy, disagreed with other neoconservatives, arguing that Bush should be congratulated for bringing the hostages back home, and that the US could extract a price from the Chinese government at a future date of its choosing, for example, preventing the Olympic Games from being held in Beijing in 2008. The implication of this approach, however, was that at that moment, the United States had not yet extracted its ‘punishment’ from China for its behaviour. Krauthammer’s endorsement of Bush was partly an act of faith that Bush was playing the long game. David Brooks (2001a)
remained unconvinced. The ‘spy plane’ crisis had exposed the fault-lines in the US foreign policy landscape. According to Brooks, Bush was supported by the bulk of the GOP’s east-coast, realist establishment “that looks back to events like the Congress of Vienna as paradigms of foreign policymaking.” Accusations once again surfaced of the Republican Party putting its faith in commerce rather than raising questions of human rights and democracy.

The idea that Bush initially showed hawkish tendencies before Colin Powell and the State Department bureaucracy watered down his approach developed into a frequent neoconservative trope throughout Bush’s first term, especially in their analysis of China. When Bush declared on 25 April that he would commit the US to the defence of Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack, neoconservatives were quick to note their approval, and argued that the US ‘One China’ policy was starting to collapse. The ending of the Cold War had removed the strategic need for the US to back the lesser of two evils and the era of “strategic ambiguity” was coming to an end (R. Kagan, 2001e). But support quickly evaporated when they alleged that Bush was undermined by officials in both the State Department and White House, who almost acted like Bush had misspoken. Powell, Rice and Rumsfeld were silent on the matter and did not go on the record to support Bush’s position, with only Cheney supporting Bush’s statement publicly (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001e). The relationship of the US to Taiwan was a key concern for neoconservatives keen to improve both the strategic position of the US in the region, and to strengthen the forces of liberal democracy in the countries adjacent to China. At the same time as China held captive the crew of the Lockheed EP-3E, debate raged around what defence technology was appropriate for sale by the US to Taiwan. The government in Taipei was particularly interested in acquiring Aegis-equipped destroyers as central components of a naval-based
missile defence system, considered vital to protect Taiwan from the rising number of PRC short-range missiles aimed in its direction. Despite neoconservative lobbying on behalf of Taiwan, the Bush administration refused to sell Aegis to Taiwan in an attempt to placate Beijing. Instead of the missile defence system that Taiwan argued it needed, the Bush administration agreed to sell eight diesel-powered submarines (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001e).177

The neoconservative goal for China was for the US to push for democratic change in Beijing to mirror what had occurred in Taipei. Instead, the Bush administration favoured keeping Taiwan at arm’s length, and to avoid anything that might destabilise commercial relationships with China. William Kristol (2001b) argued that a “project worthy of a great power” would be to see a “peaceful transformation” to democracy in China predicated on a foreign policy of “military strength, political boldness and moral clarity”. A highly moralised critique permeated neoconservative discourse on Bush’s China policy in 2001. Moral clarity, for example, meant that Secretary Powell should not have been impressed when China released a few token US citizens accused of spying, when other US citizens remained imprisoned by the regime, alongside “democracy activists, Falun Gong members, Tibetan Buddhists and Christians still being held, tortured and sometimes murdered” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001g). Neoconservatives were certainly not urging deployment of the 101st Airborne Division into Beijing on behalf of their cause, but they differed from what they saw as Bush’s approach which emphasised stability and commercial interests as sacrosanct. The neoconservative strategy favoured dropping the ‘One China’ policy and forging much closer US ties with the democracies that circled China, particularly Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This would take the form of the

177 In addition to not being what the Taiwanese government wanted, it was alleged the eight submarines would likely never make their way to Taiwan as, bizarrely, the US did not actually build them (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001d, 2001e).
exploration of a free trade pact with Taiwan, enhancing direct public diplomacy efforts in China, and creating some form of new regional security architecture; a NATO for East Asia (Schmitt, 2001a; W. Kristol, 2001i).

5.3.2 The Case for Bush: Missile Defence, Unilateralism, and Religion

Despite the question marks over the Pentagon budget and administration policy on China, the neoconservative perspective on Bush’s nascent foreign policy was not all unsympathetic. Strong support for Bush’s missile defence policy was evidenced alongside support for a perceived unilateral turn in American foreign policy. Missile defence had been an important concern for neoconservatives throughout the late 1990s. They had praised Bush’s presidential campaign for placing a strong emphasis on the necessity for developing NMD, and now in power, supported the administration’s attempt to make the policy a reality. The link between missile defence and unilateralism was clearly seen in the neoconservative calls to abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty. Again, the impact of the decline of bipolarity in the international system on neoconservative thought was obvious. Krauthammer (2001a; 2001f) argued that Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the ABM Treaty were both relics of the bipolar system. A multilateral world order was “inherently less stable” than a unipolar one in which the US effectively kept the peace as the “world’s foremost anti-proliferator” and “balancer of last resort everywhere.” For the US to function in this capacity, it needed a comprehensive system of missile defence, as it was as important as airpower had been to the twentieth century.178 Krauthammer (2001f) also implicitly endorsed Francis Fukuyama’s End of History thesis in his discussion of the impact of the end of the Cold War. The demise of the USSR had not just created a unipolar world but represented the death of the “last great existential threat...to the liberal idea”.

178 Krauthammer (2001f) actually coined this the ‘Bush Doctrine’, a year before notions of pre-emption and democracy promotion became more commonly referred to as this.
In July 2001, the day after informing the House Budget Committee that the Pentagon needed more funding, Wolfowitz told the Senate Armed Forces Committee (2001b) that the ABM Treaty had essentially left the US homeland defenceless against missile attack. Pointing to the fact that 28 countries had some form of ballistic missile capability, he argued for the abrogation of the ABM treaty and for an “aggressive exploration of key technologies” to begin to give precedence to US security over a treaty which he argued had cost the US a decade of post-Cold War technological innovation. Given that Rumsfeld had been a key advocate of NMD during the Clinton administration, Robert Kagan (2001b; 2001f) identified him as the key figure to push missile defence to centre stage. Kagan argued that Rumsfeld had made the Europeans appreciate that Bush was serious on missile defence, but the problem was that Colin Powell and possibly Condoleezza Rice were sceptical of the efficacy of such a plan. In addition, numerous Democrats lined up in opposition, including Richard Holbrooke, Joe Biden and Tom Daschle; and 43 Democrats in the Senate also opposed John Bolton’s appointment as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Abrogation of the ABM treaty was important for neoconservatives to develop a system of missile defence, in addition to being symbolic of the fact that the United States would not rely on “a web of parchment accords” for its security but its own military strength (Schmitt, 2001b).

Unsurprisingly, given his earlier association with the idea of unipolarity, Krauthammer (2001e; 2001c) was a keen supporter for a wider unilateralism in US foreign policy, and especially scathing toward European opposition to Bush, describing European nations as states that had “spent the better part of the last 500 years raping and pillaging vast swaths of the globe”. In addition to it constraining US freedom of action, he argued that a

179 Bolton, like Rumsfeld, is best considered a conservative nationalist ally of neoconservatism. Bolton is a strict national-interest conservative and argues that humanitarian issues, promoting liberal democracy, and the nature of foreign regimes are of little importance for the conduct of US foreign policy (Lynch, 2005).
convincing case had been made by Douglas Feith that, the US was legally freed from the ABM Treaty with the collapse of the Soviet Union.\(^{180}\) Neoconservatives did not argue that the US should maintain its current number of nuclear weapons, indeed they explicitly called for a reduction in nuclear weapons. It was, however, to be done on American terms, and not subject to multilateral arms control agreements that did little to monitor or punish states with malign intentions (Krauthammer, 2001g). Yet, in their support for various unilateral action, whether on the ABM Treaty, Kyoto or the International Criminal Court, neoconservatives cautioned against justifying unilateralism solely on the grounds of narrow national interest. They were critical of Bush for reaching for “small-minded America First arguments” instead of arguments of the wider damage to other countries of such policies (Gedmin and Schmitt, 2001). Often, neoconservatives were not against multilateralism per se, as Krauthammer often appeared, but were against specific multilateral treaties, and the United Nations in particular given their argument that the UN treated democracies and dictatorships alike. As we have seen earlier, neoconservatives were strong supporters of multilateralism in its NATO guise and were keen on exporting such a model for East Asian democracies.\(^{181}\)

The eight months before the 9/11 terrorist attacks should not be viewed as a period of significant ideological evolution for neoconservatism. The agenda had largely been set during Clinton’s second term, and in evaluating President Bush against it, the administration had often been found wanting. American benevolent hegemony in the

\(^{180}\) Coupled with the rejection of the ABM Treaty, the administration’s refusal to push the Senate to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on global warming was also held up by Krauthammer as an important step in protecting US interests, as the treaty excluded China and India.

\(^{181}\) Even the phrase ‘coalition of the willing’ which has come to be associated with neoconservative thinking on the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, has been criticised by neoconservatives as a far from ideal situation, and that multilateral interventions through NATO were preferable (R. Kagan and Asmus, 2002; W. Kristol, 2003c). Robert Kagan (2001h; 2001i) has also argued that to rhetorically favour unilateralism could be damaging as the US needed strategic alliances to retain its pre-eminence, although such alliances should always be preceded by American “unilateral determination to act”.
service of the national interest and ambitious universal ideals continued to be emphasised although there remained a reticence to use direct hard military power, even with Iraq. An example of how far neoconservatism had travelled since Kirkpatrick’s ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’ article had advocated that the US support friendly autocracies in 1979, came in a *Washington Post* op-ed in June 2001. Kirkpatrick in a joint article with Richard Holbrooke (2001), appealed to President Bush and NATO for greater action in the Balkans. NATO needed to finish the job it had started, to maintain security, and to protect human rights and build democratic institutions. NATO had kept peace and stability in the Balkans and now needed to continue to do so and stop instability spreading to Macedonia. This was extraordinary, firstly, for the fact that Kirkpatrick wrote a joint piece with Holbrooke at all; and secondly, for the reality that ten years earlier, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, she initially argued that the US should not use military force against Saddam Hussein in what was arguably a much clearer breach of American security interests.  

Neoconservatives, in this period, continued to articulate a highly moralised discourse, with clear links to issues that motivated their allies in the Christian Right, and supported Bush’s domestic agenda. William Kristol argued that the goal for President Bush should not simply have been to ape Reagan’s achievements in cutting taxes or a strong foreign policy:

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182 By contrast, Krauthammer (2001c) remained at this time exceedingly critical of US action in the Balkans and argued it remained a prime example of the follies of American interventionism in peripheral areas of the world.
Tax cuts are good, and missile defense is important – but they are traditional, Reagan-era agenda items. If this president is to have a distinctive legacy, it’s likely to be that he brought an end to decades of government hostility to religion and inaugurated a neo-Tocquevillian era in which religion and liberty, pluralism and faith are no longer at odds...And the administration needs to begin explaining to the American people its broader intention to re-link liberty to morality, rights to faith.

(W. Kristol, 2001a: emphasis added)

This excerpt is crucial for understanding the state of neoconservatism at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Foreign affairs were only a part of a broader political ideology that was seeking to reverse what it saw as four decades of social liberalism that had alienated notions of freedom from morality and religious faith. While Kristol directed his comments to domestic politics, the ramifications for US foreign policy were clear. The neoconservatives were not seeking to just re-link liberty to morality, but liberty and morality to the US national interest and its foreign policy. Even the more national-interest based neoconservatives such as Krauthammer (2001b) were calling for a greater influence of religious discourse in the public square. He described it as a “great day” when Joe Lieberman was nominated as the Democratic Party’s candidate for vice-president in 2000 due to his unabashed discussion of his faith, and came to a vigorous defence of John Ashcroft, Bush’s nominee for Attorney General, when he was criticised on account of his religious views. According to Krauthammer (2001b), “the American experiment has always recognized its source in the transcendent”.

Neoconservative support for the Christian Right manifested itself not simply in the realm of the abstract or esoteric, but in actual support for policies that energised religious conservatives. Elliott Abrams (2001) took up the case of Sudan, where the government in Khartoum had been bombing largely Christian targets in the south of the country. Abrams
argued that the US should support a strict sanctions framework against the regime, and that if it failed, that Washington should support the opposition and force regime change, or divide the country in two. He drew parallels with the British Empire ending the slave trade in the nineteenth century as an example of what the US should be using its unrivalled power to emulate, when 10% of the British naval budget was used solely to prohibit the slave trade from operating. In the two years between Bush’s inauguration and the Iraq War, William Kristol authored at least ten separate articles in the Weekly Standard arguing for the banning of cloning and embryonic stem-cell research, in addition to co-editing a book on the subject in 2002 with Eric Cohen (W. Kristol, 2001c; 2001h; 2002d; 2002e; 2002i; 2002k; E. Cohen and Kristol, 2001a; 2001b; 2002; Bottum and Kristol, 2001) At first glance, it may seem that there are few links between Kristol’s support for a ban on cloning and embryonic experimentation on the one hand, and support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the other. Kristol, however, argued after 9/11 that Osama bin Laden and Michael West, the President of Advanced Cell Technology both represented significant threats to the United States. Terrorism and stem-cell research were both “grave threats to a dignified human future.” The extract below from an article he co-authored with Eric Cohen is worth quoting at length as possibly the best example of how Kristol’s approach to foreign affairs fused neoconservatism’s foreign policy vision with traditional social conservative concerns.

183 The enduring status of William Wilberforce’s campaign to abolish the slave trade, as perhaps the leading example of faith-based conservative political action, meant Abrams argument was particularly potent for generating foreign policy synergies with the Christian Right. Please see John Piper (2007) Amazing Grace in the Life of William Wilberforce (Wheaton, IL, Crossway) and Eric Metaxas (2007) Amazing Grace: William Wilberforce and the Heroic Campaign to End Slavery (New York, HarperCollins).

Perhaps it is significant that the genetic challenge and the challenge of terrorism seem to have arrived together. For both require us to confront fundamental questions about life and death, good and evil, civilization and barbarism. The new genetics leads us to expect an indefinite extension of life, to believe that medical science may one day smooth the jagged edges of our morality. Terrorism confronts us with the permanent fragility of life, and with the destruction that modern technology, in the hands of evildoers, can unleash upon its creators.

(E. Cohen and Kristol, 2001b).

First generation neoconservatives also embraced a similar construction. In perhaps the only theological commentary on the Hebrew Bible to link a discussion of the minor prophets with Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler, Norman Podhoretz (2002c: 326-359) argued that a passage in the book of Jeremiah was the “the greatest warning against appeasement ever made.” He further stated that moral and spiritual laws governing the earth were as binding as the laws of physics on the natural world, and attacked what he perceived to be the prevailing antinomianism and relativism of Western society since the 1960s. Again, as Kristol did in the passage quoted above, he linked domestic moral concerns with foreign policy and argued that the Western embrace of a new form of Paganism was leading the US to become vulnerable from outside threats.

5.4 The Road to Iraq

5.4.1 Post-9/11: Afghanistan and the War on Terror

Written the week before Al Qaeda’s assault on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, but not published in the Weekly Standard until after the terrorist attacks, David Brooks’ ‘Farewell to Greatness’ (2001b) is illuminating as to the state of neoconservatism at this pivotal moment in American history. Discussing US foreign policy through the prism of popular entertainment, Brooks bemoaned the fact that Star Trek and Gilligan’s Island had been replaced by the Simpsons and the X-Files as popular programmes that had caught
something of the *zeitgeist*. Captain Kirk’s intergalactic mission to depose tyrants and create liberal democracy, despite the restrictions of the multilateral ‘Prime Directive’, had captured the imagination of Americans during their Cold War battle with the Soviet Union. But by the 1990s, in the *Simpsons* and the *X-Files*, the American mission had been buried under a tide of multicultural globalisation and government conspiracy. These shifts in popular culture pointed to an America that had lost confidence in its ability to project its power and values overseas, and now felt threatened by outside forces. The terrorist attacks out of the clear blue sky on that late summer morning in 2001 were therefore significant in two ways. The American public now felt threatened like they had not been since the Cold War, and instead of being passive, were looking for leadership to avenge the victims of the terrorist attacks. There was wider public support for a more bellicose foreign policy from the American government, than there had been pre-9/11, and almost certainly a greater tolerance for American battlefield casualties. Secondly, the threat to the US from radical Islamist terrorism was all too apparent. The potential cost to the US of not embracing the ambitious foreign policy agenda that they had charted in the second half of the 1990s, now reduced the threshold for the use of direct hard military power to achieve their goals. Confronting rogue states, promoting liberal democracy and human rights, and raising military spending to protect the national interest had all been significant weapons in the neoconservative armoury pre-9/11. How much harder would neoconservatives press for these policies to be pursued now that it had been catastrophically proven that the US faced a significant threat from terrorists and their state sponsors?

In the pre-9/11 era, the bulk of neoconservative foreign policy analysis was focused on the threat to the US posed from China, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The threat from terrorism directly to the US homeland was not a major feature of their articles and essays, nor was
an in-depth discussion of the Taliban in Afghanistan often proffered. In *Present Dangers* at the end of 2000, Afghanistan was barely mentioned as representing a threat to the US; Al Qaeda did not feature in the index; and Osama bin Laden was only discussed as a secondary feature of the chapter on Iran (Gerecht, 2000: 136-137). Reuel Marc Gerecht – a former CIA officer who headed up PNAC’s Middle East Initiative – penned the few neoconservative articles in the *Weekly Standard* pre-9/11 that explicitly dealt with the threat posed by Islamist terror to the United States. In March 2001, he argued (2001a) that the US had been slow to comprehend the international dimension to what was occurring in Afghanistan and that it was in the US interest to “put Mr. Bin Laden out of business”. By July, (2001c) in reference to bin Laden, he suggested that the “Saudi militant is unquestionably going to come at us again”, although he argued that he would most likely strike against US interests in the Third World. He further warned that Al Qaeda was learning to fight alongside Taliban forces in Afghanistan, and terrorist sleeper cells were almost certainly part of bin Laden’s plans against the US. Bin Laden was set on defeating the forces of secular, liberal democracy in the Middle East, and in a prophetic warning Gerecht argued that the “Taliban chieftain Mullah Omar ought to discover that dead Americans mean cruise missiles coming through his bedroom window and cluster bombs all over his frontline troops”. Daniel Pipes (2001) also wrote on bin Laden and the terrorist threat before 9/11, although often his main focus was on what the US should do with reference to Palestinian terrorism against Israeli citizens. After a long list of terrorist attacks, Pipes stated that Islamism now represented a serious “global threat” and the US needed to devote more resources to combating it. By the end of May 2001, Pipes, in the *Wall Street Journal*, argued that bin Laden had terrorist sleeper cells in at least six American cities. In perhaps one of the earliest examples of what later became part of the

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185 This should not be seen as implied criticism of the lack of foresight of neoconservative intellectuals. The threat posed by terrorists to the American homeland was not a major theme in any of the major foreign policy schools across the political spectrum.
Bush Doctrine, he further argued that the US needed to embrace a military strategy rather than a law enforcement paradigm, and explicitly target regimes that harboured terrorists that threatened the US, not just the terrorists themselves (Emerson and Pipes, 2001).

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the threat from Al Qaeda was not primarily conceptualised as a threat from Islam on the West, but through the neoconservative trope of an assault on morality. Islam was not the enemy per se, it was nihilism. This had echoes of earlier neoconservative opposition to the 1960s counterculture, Soviet totalitarianism, and relativist social liberalism during the culture wars of the 1990s. Neoconservatives wrote of their fears of Al Qaeda acquiring weapons of mass destruction, as “nihilism will soon be armed with the ultimate weapons of annihilation...the nihilist will have the means to match his ends” (Krauthammer, 2001l: emphasis added). Neoconservatives were obviously far from alone in expressing that the acts of terrorism of 9/11 were immoral. They were, however, more comfortable in using a moralised discourse with reference to the war on terror and frequently using terms such as “good” and “evil”. The war on terror was not solely conceptualised as a traditional battle over resources or more tangible national interests, but as a far more ideological, moral struggle for the survival of Western “civilization” (Krauthammer, 2001l). Podhoretz (2001) wrote of the “soul” of the US being at stake, that there needed to be a “new birth” in American confidence, and the US needed to avoid both the “moral and intellectual confusion” of being in alliance with unsavoury regimes. Brooks (2001c; 2001d: emphasis added) argued that the US needed to explicitly conceptualise the use of force in its foreign policy in “moral terms” and that “good people must exercise power over destructive people.” This contrasted with the radical Left which neoconservatives perceived to always be arguing that virtue resided with the powerless against the powerful. He also praised President Bush’s performance a
month after 9/11 for producing “every idea” as “infused with moral purpose”. The American people wanted Bush to be Rudi Giuliani “on a global scale”.

On 12 September, the *Washington Post* published Robert Kagan’s immediate response (2001h) to the terrorist attacks.\(^{186}\) He expressed the need for the US to confront terrorism with “moral clarity and courage”. This moral clarity, however, was not to be directed solely at the terrorist perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, but the governments that supported them. The US needed to prepare for war against one or more such regimes (Krauthammer, 2001h). The case for doing so could not be oversimplified, argued Krauthammer (2001i), as there had almost never been such a clear case of good and evil. It was not a time for “agonized relativism” but for “clarity”. He stated that those who searched for greyness and shades of wrongdoing instead of the stark black and white, good and evil, were to use Lance Morrow’s phrase, “too philosophical for decent company”. Post-9/11, Krauthammer moved much closer toward William Kristol’s and Robert Kagan’s foreign policy approach. Whereas before he had been highly critical of nation-building, ten days after 9/11, he claimed (2001i; 2001m) that the US had saved Bosnia and Kosovo from Serbian aggression, then later that he now supported nation-building in “places that count”. He still occasionally objected to what he described as a “liberationist” rationale for action in Afghanistan. After 9/11, however, and as became even clearer with Iraq, he undoubtedly shifted to a position where he justified the use of US power abroad on the grounds of promoting liberal democracy and humanitarian causes, and explicitly advocated democratic peace theory (Krauthammer, 2001k; 2002a; 2002c). The argument that 9/11 changed everything for the neoconservatives by rallying them to the nation-building and democratization cause is almost certainly an overstatement (Balint, 2010: 186). It was,

\(^{186}\) Kagan’s column actually first appeared on the Washington Post website on the afternoon of September 11 itself.
however, somewhat closer to the truth for Krauthammer, and to a lesser extent Wolfowitz and Perle, than other neoconservatives.

On 20 September, President Bush addressed a special joint session of Congress demanding that the Taliban break all ties to Al Qaeda and hand over terrorists to the United States or face the consequences (G. W. Bush, 2001). The same day, PNAC published a letter in support, written to the president and signed by a panoply of neoconservatives including first generation neoconservatives such as Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, Donald Kagan, and sympathetic liberal internationalists including Martin Peretz, the editor of the *New Republic*, and Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY). The letter called for five foreign policy measures in response to the terrorist atrocities: capture or kill bin Laden, destroy Al Qaeda and give military assistance to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan; use military force to support the Iraqi opposition to topple Saddam Hussein even without a link between Iraq and 9/11; demand Iran and Syria cut links with Hezbollah and threaten retaliation if they did not; support Israel as an ally in the war against terrorism; and introduce a large defence spending increase (Project for the New American Century, 2001). This was the first such letter or statement signed by a group of leading neoconservative intellectuals that PNAC had produced for over two years.

The two months between the collapse of the World Trade Center and the abandonment of Kabul by the Taliban regime on 12 November was a period of heated debate over the most appropriate response from the US. There were wider arguments surrounding how far the war on terror should be broadened and what countries should also be considered targets, most notably Iraq. There were also more strategic and tactical issues to be resolved with Afghanistan. How much should the US rely on airpower versus ground troops? What
would be the role of Special Forces versus more conventional army battalions? What was the status of the Northern Alliance, and how far should the United States be seen to be in alliance with it? What was the favoured post-war outcome: a sympathetic strongman or liberal democracy?\textsuperscript{187} From the very first days of the Afghanistan campaign, neoconservative tensions with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld were apparent.\textsuperscript{188} Neoconservative opposition to Colin Powell is well known, and William Kristol (2001d) argued in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 that Powell was trying to undermine Bush by drawing a distinction between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Equally importantly, however, was the divergence between neoconservatives and Secretary Rumsfeld and the Pentagon more broadly after 9/11 (Feith, 2011; W. Kristol, 2011). Rumsfeld arrived at the Pentagon with plans for a particular interpretation of the pre-existing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The Rumsfeld Doctrine expressed the Secretary of Defence’s proclivity for a leaner army, with more emphasis on technology and utilisation of special forces. At the same time as Rumsfeld articulated this, neoconservatives were pulling exactly the opposite way. Nations could not be built on a foundation of night-vision goggles, hi-tech precision bombing, and low numbers of troops. William Kristol (2001f) argued that novelty in warfare had been overstated, and a traditional commitment of a large number of ground troops may be needed to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban (F. W. Kagan, 2002).\textsuperscript{189} To make possible the widespread use of ground troops in the war on terror, neoconservatives

\textsuperscript{187} For a detailed discussion of the combat operations of \emph{Operation Enduring Freedom} and \emph{Operation Anaconda} in Afghanistan during 2001-2002 please see Benjamin S. Lambeth (2002) \emph{Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom} (Santa Monica, CA, RAND).

\textsuperscript{188} A strange feature of the popular impression of Rumsfeld is that he is usually considered a neoconservative. This is not aided by one of the leading books on neoconservatism presents Rumsfeld whispering in Bush’s ear on the front cover (Halper and Clarke, 2004). Max Boot’s recent review (2011) of Donald Rumsfeld’s autobiography leaves the reader in no doubt of the neoconservative perspective on Rumsfeld. Boot argues that Rumsfeld was one of the two worst secretaries of defense along with Robert S. McNamara. Boot suggests Rumsfeld’s much narrower conception of the national interest than Bush was a key factor in why it took so long for the American mission in Iraq to succeed, and was ultimately far more damaging than any sniping in the press against Bush from Secretary Powell’s staff. Earlier neoconservative assessments were less hostile, please see Midge Decter (2004) \emph{Rumsfeld; A Personal Portrait} (New York, HarperCollins).

\textsuperscript{189} Indeed, perhaps counter-intuitively, the neoconservatives were closer to the Powell Doctrine’s penchant for overwhelming force than the light military footprint of the Rumsfeld Doctrine.
continued to make calls for increased spending for the Department of Defense (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001h; Donnelly, 2001). During the first few weeks of *Operation Enduring Freedom*, heavy reliance was placed on aerial bombing against Taliban and Al Qaeda targets. Their initial intransigence, however, in the face of American airpower led to early doubts about the initial strategy pursued by the Bush administration, and increased neoconservative calls for the swift introduction of US ground forces to quickly expel the Taliban from Kabul. At the end of October, William Kristol (2001g) argued that President Bush had unnecessarily restricted US operations to bombing campaigns alone, and that these would not suffice to bring about the desired outcome. Even by the middle of November, with the Taliban fleeing Kabul, neoconservatives called for more US ground troops. The US needed to insert the Tenth Mountain Division and two Marine infantry battalions into Afghanistan to mark “the beginning of our involvement in Afghanistan” and needed to be involved with “[s]ecuring the country, creating a state” (Schmitt and Donnelly, 2001f). Although neoconservatives were not supporters of Rumsfeld’s light footprint approach, they at least appreciated his more aggressive posture on Afghanistan compared with Powell and Haass at the State Department. Foggy Bottom’s softly, softly, ‘build-a-coalition’ approach was making it less likely that the US could quickly depose the Taliban. The US needed to make a “major deployment of American ground troops” to “make Afghanistan a terrorist-free zone” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001l). The military was also heavily criticised, especially General Tommy Franks, who they viewed as more interested in the exit strategy for Afghanistan than defeating the Taliban and liberating Afghanistan (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001m; E. A. Cohen, 2011).190

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190 The relationship between the top military brass and neoconservatives was often strained. An oft-quoted example of this was General Franks’ assessment of Douglas Feith: “I have to deal with the f****** stupidest guy on the face of the earth almost every day” (Franks quoted in Woodward, 2004: 281). A more subtle, and certainly more highbrow, example was Eliot Cohen’s 2002, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime* (New York, Free Press). Cohen’s thesis stated that the best civilian political leaders involved themselves in military decision making, and did not delegate all decisions to the military (E. A. Cohen, 2011).
Exit strategies were not the priority for neoconservatives in Afghanistan. Nation-building was instead their central focus. The US needed to topple terrorist-supporting regimes like the Taliban in Afghanistan then provide long-term security to “allow nation-building to proceed in those countries where terrorists once found haven” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002b). Max Boot (2001) argued that what Afghanistan needed was not simply a large US invasion force but “the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets”. Boot, a Russian émigré and at 32, the youngest member of the neoconservative foreign policy establishment, stated that the problem of Afghanistan was the United States’ precipitous pull-out after 1989. He argued from the examples of Bosnia, East Timor, Cambodia and Kosovo that Afghanistan could effectively become a de facto “ward” of the international community under US leadership. The goal in Afghanistan was not simply to topple the Taliban and Al Qaeda and cut-and-run but “feed the hungry, tend the sick, and impose the rule of law”. Other neoconservatives warned of the dangers of the “pseudo-realpolitik contempt for nation-building” which had been seen previously in sections of the Republican Party (W. Kristol, 2001f).

From the very first few days after 9/11, however, the neoconservative focus had turned toward military action against Iraq. The War in Afghanistan was portrayed as analogous to the North African Campaign during World War Two (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001k). Fighting Rommel’s Panzer divisions in the Libyan deserts was all well and good, but it was never going to be the decisive blow in defeating Hitler’s Third Reich. Kagan and Kristol argued that the United States was now involved in a “clash of civilizations”, which would require the application of American power across Central Asia and the Middle East.

Cohen, 2002: 14). Regardless of the truth of Cohen’s thesis, it was hardly likely to endear neoconservatives to the uniformed top brass at the Pentagon. According to reports, Supreme Command, was read by President Bush in the summer of 2002 (Weisman, 2002).
and beyond just the opening salvo in Afghanistan. Neoconservatives identified Iraq as the next step in the campaign after Afghanistan; the country in which the nexus between terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and an authoritarian state was most evident. Iraq represented an ideal test-case for the neoconservatives to prove their argument that American interests and ideals were not mutually exclusive. Toppling Saddam Hussein would remove a threat to the national security of the US and the states of the Middle East, in addition to giving the US the opportunity to bring democracy and human rights to the heart of the Arab world.

5.4.2 Post-9/11: Iraq and the War on Terror
Regime change in Iraq along the lines of the Wolfowitz Plan had been supported since it was developed during Clinton’s second term. The seven and a half month period of the Bush administration before the September 11 attacks did not witness any significant alteration to this position, only the occasional re-stating of it. In March, Kagan and Kristol (2001c) accused Bush of following Clinton’s “feckless approach to Iraq”, and embracing containment instead of regime-change. Powell’s recent announcement of dropping most sanctions on Iraq in favour of ‘smart’ sanctions was described as “a retreat”. Then in May, Reuel Marc Gerecht (2001b), again explicitly restated the Wolfowitz Plan for establishing protected zones in Iraq from which Chalabi and the Iraqi opposition, under a US security umbrella, could attempt to overthrow the Baathist regime. A combination of ideological and material factors since the end of the Cold War had brought the neoconservatives to the verge of advocating direct US military force to bring about regime change in Iraq. The art of the counterfactual does not sit easily within political science, yet, without the September 11 terrorist attacks as the final piece in the ‘jigsaw’ of the evolution of post-Cold War

191 Gerecht (2001b) argued that 50,000 troops or two divisions of the US army would be needed to help topple Saddam Hussein, but at no point did he suggest they would march on Baghdad, only that they would support the Iraqis to liberate themselves.
neoconservatism, it is a matter of some conjecture whether neoconservatives would have deviated from continuing to advocate the Wolfowitz Plan during Bush’s first term.

Within a few months of 9/11, neoconservatives had concluded Saddam Hussein’s regime could no longer be tolerated. The US could not afford to wait and rely on the Iraqi opposition forces to secure its policy goals in Iraq. For many neoconservatives, it was less a case of months, and more one of weeks or days. Paul Wolfowitz had stated on the record at his nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Forces Committee (2001a) in February that he had “never” supported a US invasion in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein. This was technically true in respect that he had not called for US troops to literally fight their way to Saddam Hussein’s presidential palace in Baghdad, but he had favoured US support for the Iraqi opposition to do precisely that. According to reports, however, at the very first senior level meeting of the Bush administration after 9/11 at Camp David, Wolfowitz made the case for expanding the war on terror to encompass removing Saddam Hussein from power (Woodward, 2002: 83-86). Given that Saddam Hussein had proven links to Islamist terrorists, it was illogical argued Wolfowitz, to circumscribe the use of US military force to Afghanistan. The logic of removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan also meant Saddam Hussein should be removed from power. Wolfowitz’s opening gambit in the Laurel Lodge at Camp David was followed five days later by PNAC’s letter to President Bush. The letter, even after 9/11, still backed the more limited Wolfowitz Plan rather than a more ambitious US invasion of Baghdad. It was significant, however, for linking Saddam Hussein to terrorism. The letter argued that even if Saddam Hussein’s fingerprints were not directly on the 9/11 attacks, the US needed to remove him from power with the help of Iraqi opposition due to his more general sponsorship of Islamist terror.

192 Emphasis has been placed on the Camp David meeting on 15 September, but Wolfowitz had also in hinted at a much wider campaign than simply Afghanistan in a series of media briefings over the previous two days (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001; Mann, 2004: 300-301).
Neoconservatives were understandably keen to search for any evidence that would directly tie Saddam Hussein to 9/11. Their case for removing Saddam, however, rested on a wider calculus of terrorism and state sponsorship than simply 9/11. PNAC’s letter quoted Colin Powell’s observation that Saddam Hussein was “one of the leading terrorists on the face of the Earth” (Project for the New American Century, 2001). If 9/11 had shown what terrorists were capable of when backed by a barely functioning state in Afghanistan, the potential threat posed by the nexus between terrorism and a more modern state with a history of using weapons of mass destruction like Iraq was even greater.

By the end of September and into October, neoconservatives began to conceive of regime change in Iraq as a direct result of a full-scale American invasion that went beyond merely supporting the Iraqi opposition. It was argued that bin Laden and Al Qaeda should be the first target, but the “larger campaign must also go after Saddam Hussein...to preempt and strike first.” The US could easily defeat Saddam Hussein’s regime, and then the bigger challenge would be occupying Iraq after the war and maintaining a constabulary force there (Schmitt and Donnelly, 2001e). Kagan and Kristol (2001i) argued that the Iraqi opposition should be backed by the US to topple Saddam, and that it was illogical if Iraq did not share the same fate as Afghanistan, especially given the regime’s WMD history. They crucially now added, however, that regime change must occur “if necessary, by using American military force”. The type of military force required to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime from power would be a large number of ground troops “killing our enemies until they surrender” (W. Kristol, 2001e).

193 Among the most controversial examples is that of the AEI researcher, Laurie Mylroie (2001) who attempted to draw connections between Saddam Hussein and the 1993 World Trade Center Attack, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the attacks of September 11, and various anthrax attacks in the US shortly after September 11. Justin Vaïsse (2010: 262-263) argues Mylroie had “an increasing weakness for conspiracy theory”. Neoconservatives also repeated the accusation that Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the 9/11 attacks had met Iraqi intelligence agents in Prague in April 2001, although this was later disputed as a case of mistaken identity involving other individuals of the same name (W. Kristol, 2001g).
Not one of the neoconservatives conceptualised the appropriate American response to 9/11 as being restricted to military action in Afghanistan. Krauthammer (2001j) published a road map for the war on terrorism at the end of September. Stage one involved destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; stage two, a concerted effort by the US to persuade Syria to cut all links to terrorist groups; the goal of stage three was to press for regime change in Iran and Iraq. He argued that change was possible from within in the former, but increasingly unlikely to occur in such a fashion in the latter. Regime change would need to be provided by outside forces to topple the “most dangerous terrorist regime in the world”. For Eliot Cohen (2001a) the 9/11 attacks had instituted World War IV – the Cold War was World War III – and the war on terrorism was a war on militant Islam.\footnote{Norman Podhoretz (2002a: 27) has become more associated with the idea of the war on terror being World War IV, but he attributed the idea to Cohen.}

The West was accused of consistently failing to understand the ideological roots of conflict. Afghanistan would prove that the US could crush Al Qaeda and the United States then needed to “mobilize in earnest” and target other regimes that sponsored terrorism, most notably Iraq. Iraq had links to Al Qaeda, a proven record of WMD usage, and had attempted to assassinate a former US president in Kuwait. It was now time for the US to make up for a wasted decade of flying cruise missiles into empty buildings. In addition to the action being necessary, Cohen further argued that it would be easy for the US to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Iraq’s defence budget was 0.5% that of the US, and its army one third of the size it had been in 1991 when the US-led allied effort had obliterated the Iraqi army with much less technologically advanced weaponry than was now in its possession. Cohen (2001b) argued that a large ground force would still, nonetheless, need to be used, but not of the same size as \textit{Operation Desert Storm} in 1991. Cohen’s assessment of the relative ease with which the Baathist regime in Iraq could be toppled by American power was particularly important given his status as a leading
academic authority on military history and strategy. As an example of Cohen’s standing among neoconservatives, on the dust jacket of Cohen’s *Supreme Command*, William Kristol wrote that if he could only advise President Bush to read one book, that would be it.

The distinctiveness of the neoconservative position on Iraq was not simply predicated on the idea that the US needed to preemptively combat terrorists, their state sponsors and the WMD threat. Indeed, such a construction could be made firmly on the grounds of a strict, limited parsing of the national interest, and from well within the realist school. Henry Kissinger, for example, the arch-proponent of the *realpolitik* that many neoconservatives found objectionable, has continued to back the Iraq War on such grounds, and the need to humiliate radical Islam (Woodward, 2006: 408-409; Krauthammer, 2002d; W. Kristol, 2002l). The neoconservative case for an American invasion of Iraq, however, made consistent appeals to the need for American foreign policy to promote liberal democratic norms in Iraq. Justification for this was based on humanitarian solidarity with victims of a brutal totalitarian dictatorship coupled with the transformative power of liberal democracy. US power could be used to topple Saddam Hussein and in doing so, help create a new, more pacific order in the Middle East which would be more sympathetic to American interests.

### 5.4.3 Transformative Liberal Democracy and Human Rights

Following the Bush administration’s ham-fisted attempts to manage the aftermath of the Iraq War, some neoconservatives have attempted to downplay any suggestion that their rationale for the US invasion was anything other than an expression of the national

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195 Kissinger often supported President Bush throughout his two terms, even with his liberationist rhetoric, which he viewed as important for generating public support to combat America’s enemies and play traditional power politics (Woodward, 2006: 409).
security interests of the United States. Perle (2005: 53; 2011) argues that at no point in the run-up to the Iraq War did neoconservatives state that democracy could be imposed on Iraq by military means, and it is a caricature to suggest that the Bush Doctrine involved a democratic crusade. Douglas Feith (2008: 234; 2011) has made the case that neither President Bush nor the neoconservatives advocated the Iraq War on grounds of spreading liberal democracy. Two points are pertinent in regard to this. If the Bush administration’s effort in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 was the advert for imposing democracy on a rogue state, it was perhaps understandable, that some neoconservatives later sought to distance themselves from it. Secondly, the dichotomy that Feith raises in his memoirs between going to war to impose democracy, and going to war to defeat an enemy for reasons of national security and then attempting to make that country democratic, is not nearly as stark as he has presented (Feith, 2008: 234). To advocate regime change, it is somewhat illogical to conclude that the one advocating the policy has not considered what type of regime will replace the outgoing one, and thus in doing so forms part of the logic for the argument to change the regime in the first place. Liberal democracy was not some sort of afterthought for the neoconservatives after Saddam Hussein had been toppled, but an intrinsic factor in the calculus to use military force to topple the regime. Neoconservatives spent the eighteen months between the attacks of 9/11 and the Iraq War making the case for the United States military to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime from power and replace it with a liberal democratic regime which would both improve the lives of Iraqi citizens and trigger a wider democratic transformation across the Middle East. This was, of course, framed with reference to the national security of the United States. This should not detract from the fact, however, that their emphases on humanitarian causes, liberal democracy and American power were novel, distinguished them from other schools of foreign policy, and

Ironically, this has numbered neoconservatives alongside their more radical critics on the Left who have argued that neoconservatism has never been really concerned with humanitarian issues and the promotion of liberal democratic norms.
were the culmination of ideas which had evolved from much more realist premises at the end of the Cold War.

The issue of Iraq was seldom treated by neoconservatives in isolation. Saddam Hussein’s regime was not presented as one circumscribed threat to US national security. It was, instead, always framed after 9/11 as either one front in the wider war on terrorism – as the next stage after Afghanistan – or was framed as the crucial first step in a wider democratic transformation of the Middle East. Unsurprisingly, given their instrumental role in the evolution of neoconservative thought during Clinton’s second term, Robert Kagan and William Kristol (2001k) were the first neoconservatives to explore the potential transformative effects of liberal democracy in the Middle East after 9/11. At the end of October, they argued that the United States should have stopped propping up moderate dictatorships in the Arab world a long time ago, and that the US needed to push for democratic change in the Middle East just as it had attempted to do in other regions of the world. The significance of the ending of the Cold War was highlighted as it “lowered the risk of promoting reform.” 197 The US had missed a crucial moment in history over the previous decade when the demise of the USSR meant that it could have more forcefully pushed for democratic change. It was time to abandon the “tiptoe through the tulips” approach of the State Department. Removing Saddam Hussein, according to Eliot Cohen (2001b), offered the United States the opportunity to remove a “monster” and to replace his regime with a more “moderate influence on the region”. What Cohen hoped for however, was not simply a moderating influence on the Middle East, but for regime change in Iraq to “begin a transformation of the Middle East that could provide many

197 The significance of the end of the Cold War cannot be overstated. Max Boot (2002a) argued the central Cold War policies of deterrence and containment were not the policies of choice for the United States, but necessitated by the strength of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the USSR meant the logic of that necessity had been shattered.
benefits to the populations of an unfree region” and “make us infinitely more secure at home.” Cohen’s construction is significant for viewing regime-change in Baghdad as an important step for improving human conditions in Iraq and the wider region, which would have spill-over effects in making the US safer. American security was effectively being presented as in a symbiotic relationship with the populations of the Middle East. The freer the Arab people became; the safer the American people were. The root cause of terrorism for neoconservatives was autocracy and tyranny where the grievances of the people went unaddressed, leading to rage and fanaticism among sections of the population. It was only in democracies that people learned to compromise and embrace moderation. Neoconservatives concluded 2001 arguing that the US needed to pursue a strategy of fomenting political change in the Middle East through a combination of military and non-military measures with the clear principle in mind that “the more terror-loving tyrannies the United States can topple the better.” This would be better for the populations of the tyrannies that were toppled and the populations in other states who would be emboldened and inspired to press for democratic change (Muravchik, 2001; 2011).

With such an ambitious agenda for the United States, the need for decisive action rather than multilateral inaction was a frequent neoconservative trope. Whether the US acted unilaterally or not was not the defining issue, indeed, it was compared to having the same relevance as whether a pitcher in baseball was right or left handed (Brooks, 2001e). Neoconservatives were keen on the multilateralism inherent in NATO but were extremely concerned about a US-led, Arab-based coalition to prosecute the war on terror and topple Saddam Hussein. Kagan and Kristol (2001j) described such an attempt as “a coalition of the wicked”. Podhoretz (2002a) warned Bush about getting too close to morally dubious regimes in his quest to meet other objectives. The grand strategy for US foreign policy
should, instead, be a wider transformation of the Middle East, not allying the US to regimes that were only marginally less morally bankrupt than Saddam Hussein’s. Podhoretz’s transformation over the previous decade had been extraordinary. From praising Bush and Baker’s caution in the 1991 Gulf War, Podhoretz now found himself in the vanguard of neoconservatives calling for radical change to the status quo in the Middle East. The war on terror could not be won while Saddam Hussein remained in power in Baghdad. Although he cautioned that the US could not create fully-fledged capitalist democracies in the Arab world overnight, he nonetheless argued that it was not outlandish to expect “huge changes” in the Middle East and that “the long-delayed reform and modernization of Islam” was now near at hand. Podhoretz maintained that centuries of slow, piecemeal social reform was not needed for democracy to take root, but instead could happen much more quickly like in Japan and Eastern Europe. The US military could be needed to directly topple up to seven regimes in the Muslim world, beginning with Afghanistan and Iraq.

If the transformation of Middle Eastern tyrannies into democracies was not incentive enough for President Bush to consider removing Saddam Hussein from power, neoconservatives argued that even wider issues were at stake. It was suggested that what the United States chose to do in Iraq would “shape the contours of the emerging world order, perhaps for decades to come.” What was at stake was whether the twenty-first century world order would be favourable to the principles of liberal democracy or would continue to be a world where “tyrants are allowed to hold democracy and international security hostage” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002a). Kagan, and liberal scholar, Ronald Asmus (2002, emphasis added) argued that the US needed to “shape a world where terrorists find no haven and where democratic people can flourish.” The task for this
American generation was analogous to that of the 1940s generation that saved liberal democracy during the Second World War. The US needed to pursue a policy of “enlightened self-interest” with the primary goal of promoting democracy throughout the Arab world as an “antidote to radical Islam”.

The fact that Kagan co-wrote with a liberal internationalist like Asmus, who had served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs during Clinton’s second term, was significant, as had been the Holbrooke-Kirkpatrick article on the Balkans the previous year. The neoconservatives had certainly not written forty page articles on democratic peace theory for the American Political Science Review, or sparred with Doyle or Russett at academic conferences. Yet, although Doyle did not generally appear in the footnotes of Commentary or the Weekly Standard, rarely did neoconservatives venture into print in discussion of what US policy should be toward Iraq and the Middle East, without at least implicit endorsement of democratic peace theory. In addition to co-writing interventionist pieces with leading liberal scholars and practitioners like Asmus and Holbrooke, other linkages emerged. PNAC’s letters to President Bush on the war on terrorism, the defence budget, and Iraq, were all signed by leading liberal advocates of a muscular American foreign policy and the democratic peace.¹⁹⁸ These individuals were not peripheral figures in the foreign policy-making circles of the Democratic Party. Neoconservatives built alliances with leading liberal interventionists to pressure President Bush to pursue a transformative agenda for the Middle East that was partly predicated on democratic peace

theory which had largely been developed on the Left.\textsuperscript{199} Tony Smith (2007: 50, 91, 95, 110, 180) has been scathing in his criticism of post-Cold War liberal internationalism. He accused the neo-Wilsonians on the Left of giving the neoconservatives “a loaded gun”, and that Doyle and Russett gave the Bush Doctrine a “strong intellectual undergirding” which it may have otherwise lacked. Smith argues that apart from Fukuyama, all the intellectual heavy-lifting for the neoconservative agenda during Bush’s first term did not originate on the Right. Liberals had spent the 1990s arguing that regimes that violated human rights were illegitimate; that democratic countries were more peaceable; and that democracy should not be limited to the West but had universal appeal. He further maintained that many of the policy positions taken up by PNAC had aped those produced by the PPI. Smith’s analysis, however, almost certainly overstates the extent to which neoconservatives were passive recipients of liberal ideas. Indeed, Gertrude Himmelfarb’s (2004) account of the Enlightenment questions whether liberal democracy as an idea itself should be seen as flowing from liberal Parisian salons rather than more conservative British, especially Scottish, sources. Nonetheless, although overstated, Smith’s analysis is helpful for drawing out intellectual synergies between neoconservatives and liberal internationalists during the post-Cold War period, and how the “first cousins” came together to produce the Bush Doctrine (Smith, 2007: 164).

5.4.4 State of the Union to Operation Iraqi Freedom

Neoconservative advocacy of regime change for Iraq and democratic transformation across the Middle East largely predated the adoption of these policies by the Bush administration. President Bush’s State of the Union address at the end of January 2002 gained notoriety

\textsuperscript{199} This is not to argue that there are, in addition, more conservative origins of the idea of the democratic peace, for example, Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’. And some would argue there is an almost common sense quality to the idea of the democratic peace. Kagan (2005b: 42) suggests that lack of democracy has always been seen by the US as a source of aggression.
for the use of the phrase, “axis of evil”, in reference to regimes like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and their terrorist allies.\(^{200}\) The speech is significant, however, as much for what it did not say as for what it did. Although Bush argued, as previously, that the US would regard state sponsors of terrorism and terrorists themselves as legitimate targets, there was no mention of the promotion of liberal democracy or grand themes of Middle East transformation. Indeed, the word ‘democracy’ did not feature once in the entire speech (G. W. Bush, 2002a). Neoconservatives, however, applauded the speech for its moral clarity and robust approach to preemption in the face of threats faced by the United States, and continued to press the president to pursue a transformative agenda for the Middle East. William Kristol (2002a) argued that the speech was important for shifting the threat from terrorists to the regimes that sponsored them. The United States was “at war with tyranny in general”, especially “dangerously hostile tyrannies”. The United States was now required to pursue an agenda of promoting political liberty and justice across the Islamic world. Despite the word ‘democracy’ not appearing in the State of the Union address, some neoconservatives effectively acted as if it were there already. Immediately after the speech, promoting liberal democratic principles abroad was now seen by some as a central feature of the Bush Doctrine and the only path to peace was for US power and political principles to be asserted abroad (Schmitt and Donnelly, 2002). The State of the Union was viewed by neoconservatives as being the most important shift in American foreign policy since Reagan ridded the United States of its policy of détente in favour of confrontation with the evil empire of the USSR. The war on terror had been transformed into a war to

\(^{200}\) There is some debate over who in the White House actually originally coined the ‘axis of evil’ phrase. Bush’s neoconservative speechwriter, David Frum, has been widely credited with its creation. It has been criticised as “rhetorically self-indulgent” and a case of “unschooled speechwriters imposing policy conundrums” (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 139). Some of the criticism seems unfounded. Bush’s critics seem to suggest he was simplistically presenting North Korea, Iran and Iraq in some sort of organised alliance, but the actual text of the speech reveals these states were given as examples of just some of the states that threatened the US. The text does not indicate these three were on some sort of exclusive ‘hit list’ that Bush was now rhetorically-bound to invade (G. W. Bush, 2002a).
uproot “dangerous tyrannies” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002c). The neoconservative requests
to boost the Pentagon’s budget were now finally being heeded by the administration
whereas before 9/11 it had turned a deaf ear to them. The announcement of a $38 billion
increase plus a $10 billion war reserve was taken as a sign that the president was serious
about matching his lofty rhetoric with action. In the immediate aftermath of the State of
the Union, Kagan and Kristol (2002a) wrote that US forces may be needed in East Asia,
Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. This was a war to “defend Western
civilization” and victory would entail US forces toppling enemy regimes and terrorists, and
allowing “nation-building to proceed in those countries where terrorists once found
haven”. Removing Saddam Hussein from power had the potential to transform the Middle
East by isolating Iran, intimidating Syria to change its behaviour, removing Saudi Arabia’s
political leverage over the Middle East, and making the Palestinians more amenable to
negotiation (W. Kristol, 2002b).

More realist-inclined neoconservatives, like Charles Krauthammer, were also now
increasingly sympathetic to the course charted by Kristol and Kagan. Krauthammer
(2002a) took up the theme that the US had missed a golden opportunity to mould the
Middle East in the early 1990s when it “bestrode...like a colossus.” If the US had invaded
Iraq in 1991, it could have been the “first example of an Arab democracy, spreading its
influence and planting seeds in neighboring dictatorships.” He warned that the United
States should not miss the opportunity again. This, remember, from the neoconservative
who had been most resistant to notions of basing US foreign policy on notions of
democracy promotion and humanitarian interests. Indeed, Krauthammer (2002c) went so
far as explicitly endorsing the theory of the liberal democratic peace in his discussion of
the Israel-Palestine issue. He argued that democracy coming to the Palestinian territories
was crucial for the prospects of long-term peace and that while there is “never any guarantee of peace...democracy comes close.” He stated that the Bush Doctrine’s push for peace through democracy in the Middle East should not exclude Palestine. It is striking, looking at neoconservative thought in the months between 9/11 and the Iraq War, how little disagreement there was. Neoconservatives agreed that US national security required the elimination of radical Islamist terrorists and their state sponsors. And that the interests of peace, prosperity and human dignity in the Middle East and the wider world, were best served in the long-term by liberal democracy replacing tyrannical dictatorship in Baghdad which would serve as an attractive model for other states of the Middle East to embrace political liberalisation. Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and Osama bin Laden’s suicide terrorists were not the root problem *per se*. The threat to the US and the threat to the peace and security of the Middle East was identified as a political culture of “tyranny, violence, fanaticism, bigotry, and fantasy.” The solution was a combination of hard and soft power to bring about nothing less than a political transformation of the Middle East (Muravchik, 2002a).

An interesting test case for the neoconservative commitment to the cause of liberal democratic transformation of the Middle East was the relationship of Saudi Arabia to the United States. The protection of the Saudi regime had been part of the *casus belli* for the 1991 Gulf War; to protect Saudi Arabia and its oil from falling into the hands of Iraq. Yet, the fact 15 of the 19 terrorists on 9/11 were Saudi Arabian citizens was not lost on neoconservatives (National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, 2004: 231-241). Saudi Wahhabism stood accused by William Kristol (2002f) of being the underlying ideology behind Islamist terror and a significant font of instability for the Middle East and the West. In the wake of 9/11, neoconservatives argued that the US
needed to treat Saudi Arabia as part of the problem not part of the solution to security in the Middle East. Neoconservatives were highly critical of the Bush administration’s refusal to criticise human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi state was experiencing a “moral” crisis, the establishment was “deeply implicated” in the 9/11 attacks, and eighty percent of the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay were of Saudi origin. There was also evidence provided that the Saudi government was bankrolling Palestinian terrorism to the total of $33 million in 2001. Instead of entertaining Saudi politicians at his ranch in Texas, Bush was urged to condemn Saudi terror and human rights violations, and insist the US had “no stake” in preserving the status quo (W. Kristol, 2002g; 2002h; D. Pipes, 2002a: 26).

Given the importance of Saudi oil exports to the functioning of the global economy, this was a radical, verging on revolutionary proposal. Neoconservative discourse on the Middle East increasingly eschewed caution. With the end of the Cold War there was no longer a compelling logic for retaining Saudi Arabia as a key ally. US oil policy could be directed away from the Persian Gulf to parts of the former Soviet Union (Woolsey, 2002). Instead, the US needed to pursue “disequilibrium, if not outright chaos” in the Middle East, starting with Saddam Hussein’s regime, that “might start the fall of dominoes in the Gulf” (Hanson, 2002: 23-28). Stability, in and of itself, was not considered a moral good. Some tyrannies, like Stalinist Russia, had been remarkably stable, whereas democracies like post-WW2 Italy had been remarkably unstable. Boot (2002b) argued that US Middle Eastern policy had been far too cynical and had paid the price on 9/11. Now was a time for moral clarity to depose the “Butcher of Baghdad” which could “send the dominos toppling, leading to more freedom in the most oppressed region of the world”.

201 These themes in relation to Saudi Arabia continued after the invasion of Iraq and through the rest of 2003. William Kristol (2003c) was highly critical of attempts by the 9/11 congressional report to formally redact twenty-eight pages detailing Saudi Arabian links to the 9/11 terrorists. David Frum and Richard Perle (2003: 129-142) were even more outspoken, arguing Saudi Arabia should not be treated as an ally, and as ultimate punishment for Saudi support for terrorism, the US could consider supporting the splitting up of the country and the creation of an independent, Shiite, Eastern Province.
By contrast, the Bush administration in the spring of 2002 appeared set on a different track. When Cheney was sent to the Middle East in March to garner support from Arab leaders for removing Saddam Hussein from power he was criticised for viewing a close relationship with Riyadh as instrumental in defeating Iraq. The trip was compared to Warren Christopher’s ill-fated 1993 trip to Europe to raise support for military action in Bosnia (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002d; 2002e). In addition to cosying up to the House of Saud, the Bush administration drew fire from neoconservatives over its willingness to negotiate with Arafat, and being too hard on criticising Israel’s right to self-defence in the face of Palestinian terrorism. PNAC produced a letter to Bush in April 2002 urging the president to stand with Israel as an ally which shared a “common enemy” in both Islamist terrorism and the regime of Saddam Hussein (Project for the New American Century, 2002) Indeed, the path to a wider peace in the Middle East did not lie in trying to ‘solve’ the Israel-Palestine question – a State Department distraction – but the road that “leads to real security and peace...runs through Baghdad” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002e; 2002f; 2002g; D. Pipes, 2002b; W. Kristol, 2002c).

If neoconservatives spent the spring of 2002 worried over the direction of Bush’s foreign policy and whether he was, to quote Margaret Thatcher, “going wobbly”, two speeches in June would prove sufficient for calming their fears (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002h). Bush’s Commencement Speech at West Point Military Academy on 1 June, followed by a speech on the Middle East from the Rose Garden of the White House on 24 June were seen by neoconservatives as significantly adding to his themes of pre-emption and the war on terror of the State of the Union address (G. W. Bush, 2002b; 2002c; W. Kristol, 2002j). The 2002 State of the Union had been described as the most important statement in US foreign policy since Reagan abandoned détente, but Bush’s speech on June 24 on the
Middle East was now seen as the “most profound” statement on the Middle East since Truman. The Bush Doctrine meant that the US had now set itself on a course in the Middle East to defeat terrorists and their state sponsors, and replace the hole left by them with “democratic and liberal principles for the sake of peace.” Bush had put on the record his vision of a liberal, democratic peace extending from Israel-Palestine, to Jordan and Iraq (W. Kristol, 2002j). Charles Krauthammer (2002c) praised Bush for having reconciled the American national interest in achieving peace and stability in the Middle East with the spread of American liberal democratic values. Bush was the first president since Woodrow Wilson to have “sliced across national borders and civilizational divides with an unqualified assertion of a moral norm.” He had articulated a belief in the universality of Western norms embodied in the American constitution, which was nothing short of a “liberation theology” (Gerecht, 2002: emphasis added). Gerecht argued that once the Iraqi regime had been toppled, it could likely provoke a transformative uprising in Iran, and that once Iran embrace liberal democracy, the rest of the Middle East would follow swiftly.

Even though neoconservatives retained doubts about the strategic direction of the State Department, Bush was now considered supportive of the wider neoconservative strategy for the Middle East and attention turned to what Iraq should look like after the United States removed the Iraqi regime from power. Robert Kagan (2002a) remained wary of Bush’s commitment to nation-building given his scepticism on the campaign trail in 2000, and a certain reticence on the ground in both Afghanistan and Bosnia to fully follow through on the nation-building project. The model for the US in Iraq, Kagan suggested, should be nothing less than that of the United States in Japan post-1945. The goal in Japan was not to simply remove a potent threat to American national security, but to “rebuild Japanese politics and society, roughly in the American image.” Kagan approved of the fact
that American troops remained stationed on Japanese soil sixty years later and argued that the approach with Iraq in 2003 should not be radically different. For the neoconservatives, this did not necessarily mean that Iraqi democracy would culminate in a strictly Jeffersonian model, indeed, Wolfowitz (quoted in Keller, 2002) argued that the democracy the US created in Japan after the Second World War was not identical to the American experience. Even if Iraq ‘muddled through’ with a democracy resembling post-Ceauşescu Romania, it would be preferable to the status quo. Wolfowitz maintained that whatever the precise form of democracy that Iraq ended up being, it would, nonetheless, in a variation of the domino argument, “cast a very long shadow, starting with Syria and Iran, but across the whole Arab world.” The threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction alone, was not justification enough for sending American soldiers to die on the battlefield.\(^{202}\) Despite Perle later claiming in 2005 that the Iraq War was not an exercise in democracy promotion, in 2002, he was not so reticent to expound on such themes. Perle (quoted in PBS: Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, 2002) explicitly endorsed democratic peace theory on PBS, and argued there was “very little we can do” to make the world more peaceful than “promoting a democracy”. It was in the United States’ interest in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein, even if it meant short-term instability and chaos, because the instability and chaos of tyranny was worse in the long run. Due to Iraq’s well educated population, for Perle, it represented an excellent test case in whether democracy could flourish in the Arab world.

Although the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), published in September 2002, has been commonly seen as the defining document of the Bush Doctrine, there was surprisingly little direct interaction with it by neoconservatives at the time (United States

\(^{202}\) Bill Keller (2002) argued that Wolfowitz had a moral streak that struck an affinity with President Bush’s religious beliefs. He argues they both reinforced each other’s faith in the ability to transform the Middle East.
The September 2002 NSS codified and consolidated ideas of preemption and the democratic peace that Bush had already expressed, rather than set a dramatic new course. Two lengthy articles in *Commentary* by Podhoretz in September and Muravchik in December are prime examples of the neoconservative assessment of the way that the Bush Doctrine had unfolded in 2002. According to Podhoretz (2002b: 22-28) the 9/11 attacks had transformed Bush from a realist to a democratic idealist. The debate in US foreign policy after the end of the Cold War had been between Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ and Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’. Bush had proven that he was firmly in Fukuyama’s camp. This was clear evidence that neoconservatives saw their foreign policy ideology linking back to Fukuyama’s thesis, even if Fukuyama (2006) would later repudiate the connection. For Podhoretz, Bush’s democratic idealism rested on a rejection of moral relativism and an assertion of the right to preempt threats to its national security by targeting regimes that sponsored terrorism. The US needed the “stomach to impose a new political culture” on its enemies it defeated in the Middle East. Aside from Iraq and Iran, the regimes in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Palestine all deserved to be overthrown. The domestic political culture of the Middle East had led to endemic, systematic abuses of human rights, and this had manifested itself in external aggression and terrorism. The Bush Doctrine, however, resurrected Wilsonianism and revealed a “sensitivity to moral considerations and an enlightened self interest”. Ultimately the safety and well-being of American citizens required the safety and well-being of citizens of the Middle East which was intimately linked to democratisation. At times this needed to be done militarily through brute force, like in Iraq, whereas in other states like Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it could be achieved more through persuasion and less of a ‘blank cheque’ approach to those governments (Muravchik, 2002b: 24, 28-30). Regardless of the

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203 Although Max Boot (2004: 46) would later claim that the 2002 NSS was a “quintessentially neoconservative document”.

method of choice in each state, the underlying reality was that the United States had a central leadership role in establishing and preserving the peace in the Middle East (D. Kagan, 2002) The Bush Doctrine, at least in its abstract, rhetorical state, had the neoconservatives’ full support, although quibbles remained over inconsistencies in the way it was applied by the administration in a less than systematic way. Its continued close embrace of the regimes in Islamabad and Riyadh, for example, threatened to undermine the principles of the doctrine (Podhoretz, 2002b: 25-26).

After the summer of 2002, neoconservatives were convinced that Bush was set on imposing regime change on Iraq through military force, yet potential pitfalls lay ahead. Domestic opposition on the Left remained in addition to resistance from members on the UN Security Council, especially France. David Brooks (2002) attacked the Left as being in “a fog of peace” in which they were unwilling to provide a viable alternative to removing Saddam Hussein from power. He argued that they were obsessed with their local demons and ignoring the bigger problem, so while “Saddam is boring...Wolfowitz tears at their soul”. Attacks from the Left were partly neutralised by wide, bipartisan support for Bush’s Iraq policy. In October, two-fifths of Democrats in the House voted for the joint resolution: ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002’, which was signed into law on 16 October, and were joined in doing so by over half the Democratic Party caucus in the Senate (United States Government, 2002b). While this would never placate the radical, Chomskyite fringe, it effectively countered any suggestion that this was simply a Republican policy. A more serious challenge would come from French-led opposition from other states on the UN Security Council. Robert Kagan’s widely-read analysis of transatlantic relations was an important feature in both American and European debates on Iraq and the future of the transatlantic alliance. The thesis first
appeared as ‘Power and Weakness’ in June 2002 in *Policy Review*, before appearing in extended form in his January 2003 publication, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York, Knopf). Kagan contended that the United States and Europe were growing apart, and that to speak of a unified West was increasingly anachronistic. The United States remained locked in a Hobbesian world where it needed to embrace martial policies to maintain its security. Europe on the other hand, had chosen to enter a post-historical, Kantian peace, which had led it to place an emphasis on more pacific policies. Regardless of the accuracy of Kagan’s thesis, it was unlikely to encourage fellow neoconservatives to advocate that the US give France and Germany much sway over the direction of American foreign policy in Iraq.

Alongside Kagan’s argument, long-running neoconservative objections resurfaced concerning the lack of moral legitimacy of the United Nations, stemming back to perceived 1970’s anti-Semitism (Krauthammer, 2002b; 2002e). UN-based theories of deterrence could not keep Saddam Hussein contained. The stark choice left for the United States was preemptive war or choosing to live with Saddam Hussein’s WMDs (Krauthammer, 2002g). The fact that North Korea had recently revealed its nuclear programme in the face of opposition from the UN and the international community, necessitated the United States move against Iraq before it was too late (Schmitt and Kristol, 2002). There was deep scepticism among neoconservatives concerning the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1441, which passed on 8 November following President Bush’s decision to support Tony Blair’s request that UN cover was required before military action proceeded in Iraq (United Nations, 2002). Krauthammer (2002f) argued

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204 The European edition was published a month later with a slightly different title, *Paradise and Power* (London, Atlantic).

that the resolution had effectively placed Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC, in the driver’s seat in determining the outcome in Iraq, instead of President Bush. Although this gave a “window of legitimacy” for military action, the inevitable delays would give the Iraqi regime time to hide its WMD and prepare for war.\textsuperscript{206} Other neoconservatives described the UN route as a “trap”, and argued that it threatened to derail Bush after the success of the 2002 midterms which had provided him with broad support for action. Crucially, the UN process and Hans Blix could not remove the threat, because the danger was not WMD \textit{per se} but the Iraqi regime, as Kagan and Kristol (2002i) explained: “The problem is not just Saddam’s weapons. The problem is Saddam.” By embracing Resolution 1441, they argued that Bush had dangerously undermined this logic.

In January 2003, at a debate at AEI on the respective roles the UN and the US should have in declaring war, Jeane Kirkpatrick (quoted in Daifallah, 2003) argued that the United States should continue its course and invade Iraq even if the UN did not support military action. Saddam Hussein’s regime was “thoroughly illegitimate” and was an “illegal regime which abuses its own people and has for years”. In the years after the Iraq War, Jeane Kirkpatrick (2007) expressed her concerns with the Bush Doctrine, and has thus been numbered among the critics of the more expansive form of neoconservatism developed during this period. Both Tony Smith and Justin Vaïsse (2007: 49; 2009) argue that Kirkpatrick and Irving Kristol held to a more cautious realism during Bush’s first term. Yet, there is little to indicate that she held a substantively different perspective than William Kristol or Robert Kagan in the run-up to the Iraq War. She signed PNAC’s letter to President Bush in the immediate aftermath of 9/11; fully supported the military campaign to topple the Taliban and Al Qaeda and build liberal democracy in Afghanistan;

\textsuperscript{206} Krauthammer’s scepticism concerning the UN continued right up to the Iraq War, when he urged (2003c) the United States not to turn over control to the United Nations after the fall of Baghdad; “the principle purpose of the Security Council is not to restrain tyrants but to restrain the United States”.

was an enthusiastic supporter of regime change in Iraq; in addition to calling for continued US intervention in the Balkans with Richard Holbrooke (Kirkpatrick, 2001; Cole, 2002). In March 2003, shortly before the Iraq War began, she led a US delegation to the UNCHR and declared her commitment to universal human rights, urging the UNCHR to do all it could to help those attempting to move states into a transition from non-democracies to democratic governments (Kirkpatrick, 2003). This was a very long way from her early post-Cold War calls for a return to normalcy and reluctance to even support the limited goals of the Gulf War, and even further from her support for the Argentinian Junta in the Falklands War, and autocracy versus totalitarianism in ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’. Indeed it could be argued that she was even more directly involved in the lead up to the Iraq War than those writing articles in Commentary and the Weekly Standard. It later emerged that Kirkpatrick was tasked by President Bush while at the UNCHR in Geneva in March 2003, to participate in secret diplomacy with Arab leaders to persuade them to back President Bush’s policy on Iraq, or at the least to not publicly object (Weiner, 2006). The precise views of Irving Kristol between 9/11 and the Iraq War are less well known given that there is very little published material in these crucial months. His silence has been interpreted as tacit disapproval of the foreign policy direction his son was partly leading. In the author’s interview with William Kristol (2011), however, he stated that his father had fully supported military action in Iraq in 2003. Certainly Irving Kristol’s writings in the late 1990s showed awareness of the new foreign policy direction that neoconservatives were taking, and offered no rebuke. Indeed, he argued that it was an “ingenious effort to wed realism to idealism” (I. Kristol, 1996b). In his essay on neoconservatism published in September 2003, after the invasion of Iraq, Irving Kristol (2003) again proffered no criticism of either the Bush Doctrine or neoconservative support of it. He, instead, argued in much the same way that all neoconservatives of this period had
done so, that the American national interest was not a geographical term but an ideological one, and that the unrivalled power of the United States gave it responsibilities to protect democracy abroad.

In the final few weeks before *Operation Iraqi Freedom* neoconservatives continued to press for regime change in Iraq, and repeated the justifications for doing so that had hallmarked their discourse since 9/11. Krauthammer (2003a; 2003b) argued that regime change in Iraq offered the opportunity for a “real birth of freedom” and that the US was in a race against time to stop Iraq and such hostile states from obtaining WMD capacity before it was too late. Max Boot (2003) urged the United States to topple the Iraqi regime and in doing so insert the powerful “antibiotic” of democracy into the “diseased environment of the Middle East”, and that now was the time for the US to provide the Middle East with “effective imperial oversight”. William Kristol (2003b) pressed the US to have a morally-informed foreign policy that meant prioritising influencing the political regimes of foreign states. American security and freedom was “inextricably linked” to the character of foreign regimes. Other neoconservatives argued that the US had a responsibility to invade Iraq to save human lives from Saddam Hussein’s brutality, and pointed again to the likely wider effects in Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian territories of liberal democracy replacing Baathist dictatorship in Baghdad (F. Kagan, 2003; Schmitt, 2003).

Neoconservative arguments in favour of a US invasion of Iraq were most definitively collated in Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol’s, February 2003 monograph, *The
If Tony Blair is often credited for being the most cogent defender of the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War, Kaplan and Kristol’s book comes a very close second. It detailed and endorsed the arguments that removing Saddam Hussein was necessary for reasons of self-defence relating to WMDs and Saddam Hussein’s bellicosity in the region, and the likely breakdown of the containment and the sanctions regime. They argued (2003: 18-25) that Saddam Hussein’s regime had links with numerous terrorist groups including Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK); Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK); Palestine Liberation Front (PLF); Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO); in addition to having offered Osama bin Laden sanctuary in 1998, and funded Al Qaeda in Sudan. It is most striking, however, in its emphases on the need to invade Iraq for humanitarian reasons and the wider liberal democratic peace in the Middle East. Indeed, the very first chapter of the book (2003: 1-14) is not a discussion of the WMD threat, but a specific account of the systemic human rights abuses of the Baathist regime, detailing the imprisonments, gassings, shootings, bombings, and torture of thousands of Iraqi people, and criticising previous US indifference to them. They stated (2003: 95) that the “ultimate goal” of replacing Saddam’s regime was not primarily removal of a threat to the United States or the wider Middle East region; it was to establish liberal democracy in Baghdad. They acknowledged the benefits to US security of Iraq becoming a democracy and it reverberating through the Middle East, but they argued (2003: 95-104) that establishing liberal democracy in Iraq was a moral good in and of itself and rejected any suggestion that the Arab world was not a suitable location for liberal democracy. They further argued that one of the reasons why it would still be difficult soil to plant democracy was precisely because the United States had followed realist maxims, especially in its close relationship

207 Heilbrunn (2008: 245) argues that this book has not received the attention it deserves, given it was the most lengthy neoconservative foreign policy text on Iraq. Heilbrunn criticises it as being the best example of the “moralistic hubris” of the neoconservatives. Kaplan’s status as a liberal hawk at the New Republic, was also evidence of the clear links between neoconservatives and liberal internationalists.
with a Saudi Arabian state that had helped create a poisonous Islamist ideology. They accused the foreign policy establishment of being “consumed by the lessons of Vietnam” when the rest of the world “plays by Munich rules”, and concluded that the only thing standing between “civility and genocide” and “order and mayhem” in various locations around the world was American power. It was time for the United States to lose its Niebuhrian moral caution, and assert its “benevolent influence” on the global stage (2003: 109, 117-119).

As the final act of pre-Iraq War neoconservatism, PNAC published a letter on 19 March signed by leading neoconservatives and liberal interventionists. It presented the case that regime change in Iraq would achieve three goals: disarm Iraq of its WMDs; establish a peaceful and stable democratic government; and be an important stepping stone to the wider democratic development of the Middle East. Regime change in Iraq was “not an end in itself, but a means to an end”. The final paragraph of PNAC’s pre-war advice presented the ultimate neoconservative foreign policy goal: removing the Baathists from power in Baghdad and then “(t)he successful disarming, rebuilding, and democratic reform of Iraq can contribute to the democratization of the wider Middle East” (Project for the New American Century, 2003b: emphasis added). Whether this represented utopian fantasy as their critics claimed or wise, morally-informed statesmanship as their supporters countered, remained to be seen.

5.5 Conclusion

As the first Tomahawk cruise missiles rained down on Baghdad’s Dora Farms complex in an attempt to decapitate the Iraqi regime, it was clear that neoconservatism had undergone an ideological shift since President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev proclaimed the end of
the Cold War in Malta in December 1989. Indeed, it was not even the neoconservatism of 10 September 2001. Themes of retreat, limits and caution had disappeared. Picking and choosing dictatorial allies on the basis of who was the lesser evil had vanished as a concept, along with any real notion of keeping autocratic regimes in power to maintain the balance of power, or only backing opposition groups in attempts to topple threats to the United States. Instead, the peculiarities of the post-Cold War era had left a preponderance of American power, and the United States with a unique opportunity to fashion international crises it faced according to its liberal democratic virtues, for the benefit of its own citizens and those of states which were recipients of its benevolence. This is not to say that neoconservative foreign policy prescriptions lacked any consideration of the national interest of the United States. They claimed, however, that due to American unipolar power, that it was possible to achieve a much closer congruence between American power and American liberal democratic virtues. The idea that the US could use its power abroad to simultaneously ‘solve’ national security issues and promote human liberty and democracy had been developed by neoconservatives in the latter half of the 1990s. Yet, the potential of these ideas had not been fully perceived – even by some neoconservatives themselves – until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led neoconservatives to more fully conceptualise the threats that the United States faced as largely based on a lack of political liberty.

Throughout the first two years of George W. Bush’s administration, it is striking how neoconservative arguments for regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq and the wider conduct of American foreign policy were infused with the drivers of change that were identified in earlier chapters. These can be broken down into broadly material and ideational factors, although neither is completely mutually exclusive of the other. Materially, the two geopolitical shocks that almost bookend this period were extremely
significant in framing the evolution of neoconservative foreign policy discourse. The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union had fundamentally altered the structure of the international system leading to a massive concentration of power in the American state. This realisation of unipolarity was acknowledged by neoconservatives during the two years before the Iraq War, as it meant there was little countervailing power to prevent the United States from imposing its power and values on Afghanistan and Iraq. The impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was the second crucial material aspect in changing neoconservative thought. The destruction of the World Trade Center led neoconservatives to argue that a lack of political liberty overseas was a direct threat to the United States, as well as the peoples of the Middle East. Thus, a robust, expansive, interventionist foreign policy in the service of democracy and human rights was not simply a political vanity project, but an essential aspect of securing the United States. Without the collapse of the Soviet Union and the World Trade Center, it would have been difficult to project that neoconservatism would have followed the course it did.

Yet, these material catalysts for change in neoconservative thought, while necessary, were not sufficient in explaining shifts in their ideology of US foreign policy. Close analysis of neoconservative discourse between George W. Bush’s inauguration and the invasion of Iraq reveals that a range of more ideational factors were also important in determining change. In the run up to the Iraq War a wide range of neoconservatives endorsed the theory of the democratic peace. They did not always label it as such, and they certainly did not reference Michael Doyle, yet, the idea that democracies did not go to war with each other permeated neoconservative discourse. Their embrace of the democratic peace brought neoconservatives into close proximity with leading liberal interventionists who, while not so enamoured by American unilateral action, were nonetheless, prepared to make common
cause with neoconservatives to ensure that the theory of the democratic peace was not simply an abstract theory but able to be tested on the proving ground of Iraq and Afghanistan. The signatories to PNAC’s various letters to President Bush are testament to the close ideological relationship that had developed between neoconservatives and liberal interventionists. The case for a foreign policy based on enhancing US security through the promotion of democracy and human rights, also found roots in Fukuyama’s thought at the close of the Cold War. Both Norman Podhoretz and Charles Krauthammer clearly acknowledged their debt to Fukuyama, explicitly linking his ‘End of History’ thesis to the Bush Doctrine and their belief that no significant ideological challenges to liberal democracy now remained.

The overriding feature of neoconservatism during Bush’s first term, however, was a highly moralised account of American foreign policy that placed a high value on the moral virtue of the exercise of American power. The theory of the democratic peace and Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ showed the importance of liberal democracy as an idea to neoconservatives, yet this did not necessitate such a moralised edge. Neoconservatives argued that morality in foreign policy mattered, and that humanitarian causes were an important aspect of the strategic decision to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. Morality was relevant in terms of achieving specific goals in foreign policy, for example, human rights abuses of domestic regimes in foreign states did indicate likely foreign policy behaviour. Yet, morality mattered in another sense: the conduct of American foreign policy affected US domestic society. If the United States’ foreign policy lacked a moralised centre, this would detrimentally affect broader conceptions of civic morality back home. Neoconservatives increasingly drew links between threats to domestic morality and national security which brought them into common cause with leading social
conservatives. This was perhaps, best exemplified by William Kristol’s argument that scientists seeking to experiment on embryonic stem cells and develop cloning represented a threat to human dignity and an affront to morality that he equated with Osama bin Laden’s network of terrorists. Thus the neoconservatives attempts to ‘re-moralise’ American foreign policy can be viewed as part of a much wider socially conservative prospectus, where invading Afghanistan and Iraq were as much an expression of morality as tackling pro-life issues and battling liberal relativism in American domestic society.
Conclusion

Issues and Shifts

Events on the ground in Iraq following the March 2003 invasion severely damaged the standing of neoconservatives. Those outside the administration were seen as cheerleaders for presumptive triumphalism and guilty of over-simplifying the causes of the terrorist threat the United States faced. Those within the administration, notably Feith and Wolfowitz, were charged with foolishly disbanding the Iraqi Army and embarking on widespread de-Baathification, resulting in pervasive instability and anarchy on the streets of Baghdad. Neoconservative analysis of US failures on Iraq quickly consolidated around two lines of critique. First, the US had been too slow to hand over power to Iraqis to run their country and thus stunted the path to Iraqi self-determination. Secondly, the US had attempted to achieve peace and stability in Iraq with far too few American troops, and did not invade with sufficient force to provide the security that a transition to democracy required. It is striking, however, that few neoconservatives recanted their original view that the United States had acted prudentially in removing Saddam Hussein from power, although Fukuyama (2006), and to a lesser extent Kirkpatrick (2007), became high profile critics of the Iraq War. Most neoconservatives continued to maintain that Bush had been correct to invade Iraq, and were later staunch advocates of the ‘Surge’ in 2007 during Bush’s second term that increased the number of US soldiers on the ground in Iraq, successfully bringing more stability to Iraq.

Feith (2008: 515-517, 2011) has vociferously defended the administration on both charges, and argues US troop numbers were insufficient and the US maintained an occupation government in Iraq for too long due to the CIA and State Department having “anxieties” about the legitimacy of Iraqi exiles in the eyes of the Iraqi people. US failure was not attributed to a result of neoconservative optimism, but the fact the CIA had very little credible intelligence on Iraqi society.
While the necessity or otherwise of the Iraq War will remain disputed by historians for decades to come, neoconservative advocacy of the conflict represented the final act in the ideology’s evolution in the early post-Cold War period. From the perspective of 1989, it would have been virtually impossible to have predicted the destination at which neoconservatism had arrived just fourteen years later. In 1989, close analysis of Fukuyama’s or Muravchik’s work could have indicated a possible direction of travel for neoconservatives in favour of democracy promotion as a crucial aspect of national security. These were, however, certainly not rubrics for the use of American hard power to reshape the Middle East. The end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War witnessed neoconservatives urging caution and a limited approach that could easily be incorporated within existing realist or neo-isolationist paradigms. From the vantage point of 1989, and without knowledge of the intervening fourteen years, neoconservative support for the 2003 Iraq War borders on the inexplicable. Why did an ideology that largely developed as a stringent ‘national-interest-orientated’ reaction to the threat from Soviet totalitarianism and that responded to the immediate aftermath of the Cold War with calls for a return to ‘normality’, develop into a much more ‘ideological’ and universalist advocacy of using American power to reshape foreign states into liberal democracies for the benefit of US national security and the health and wellbeing of the local population?

The 1991 Gulf War was a textbook example of neoconservative caution in the early post-Cold War period. In responding to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, neoconservative opinion initially ranged from Kirkpatrick’s view that the US should not use military force at all, to Perle’s perspective that regime change needed to occur but would happen organically through the Iraqi opposition. The more prevalent neoconservative argument stated that Iraq’s army needed to be forcibly removed from Kuwaiti territory, but Saddam
Hussein needed to be maintained in power as a bulwark against Iranian adventurism. Arguments concerning the transformative power of liberal democracy to radically alter the status quo in the Middle East were completely absent from neoconservative discourse. By contrast, neoconservative arguments after the 9/11 terrorist attacks were infused with a liberationist tone, eschewed notions of stability, and fully embraced the possibility of the widespread transformation of the Middle East which could begin with the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime by American force. While the upshot of these developments for neoconservatives would be enhanced US national security, the prospect of enhanced humanitarian conditions and the widespread furthering of liberal democracy were also important arguments deployed in their prescriptions for US foreign policy.

In a much shorter space of time between the early and late 1990s, the beginning of a neoconservative ideological shift was apparent in their analysis of the Balkans. During the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, neoconservatives proffered a range of perspectives ranging from Krauthammer’s suggestion that Bosnia was a peripheral issue and not a vital US national security interest, to the more dominant neoconservative view that the US should support a policy of lift-and-strike. This would have had the effect of allowing arms to flow to the Bosniaks to enable them to defend themselves with accompanying NATO and US airstrikes at Bosnian Serb positions. Yet, by the 1999 Kosovo campaign, although Krauthammer remained dissenting, neoconservatives openly called for US ground troops to expel Serbian forces from Kosovo, to topple Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in Belgrade and introduce democratic reform. In the space of just five years, neoconservatives had shifted from advocating a position which supported arming an ethnically Muslim group against Serbian aggression and at most aiding them with the limited use of airpower, to backing the direct imposition of US ground troops not simply to defend a victim of that
aggression but to seek the destruction of the Serbian regime. In both Iraq and the Balkans, neoconservative foreign policy evolved from a limited prescription that would at its fullest extent see the US support opposition groups against what they viewed as tyrannical regimes, combined with the limited use of American airpower, to backing regime change through the direct use of US hard power and the imposition of ground troops.

This shift in neoconservative thought, best exemplified in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, was also evident in other foreign policy arenas, particularly in relation to missile defence, NATO’s expansion, and relations with China. Since the early 1980s, a national system of missile defence had been seen as an important requirement for US national security by conservatives of all stripes, and neoconservatives were no exception. Yet, analysis of neoconservative discourse in the late 1990s, especially around the period the Rumsfeld Commission was in existence, reveals neoconservatives had moved significantly beyond the traditional defensive conception of a missile shield. Robert Kagan argued that NMD was important not so much for the protection it afforded the US homeland *per se*, but for the fact that protection would embolden US public opinion to support much bolder and ambitious foreign policy interventions overseas, given that a rogue state would be less able to blackmail the US. With the American state secured behind a missile shield, the US would be in a much stronger position to use its power to maintain international order, confront dictatorships, and export its liberal democratic model. Parallel to this, the expansion of NATO was also conceptualised less as a defensive measure for US national security, but more as an expansion of the liberal democratic ideal. Expanding the membership of NATO also offered the opportunity to redefine NATO’s mission. Instead of a defensive posture vis-à-vis Russia, NATO could be used offensively, with the number
of missions it undertook expanded, and a greater emphasis on promoting liberal democracy outside NATO.

On China, and especially Taiwan, by the end of the 1990s, neoconservatives had drawn sharp lines of demarcation from other conservative foreign policy schools. The Clinton administration and the bulk of the Republican Party in Congress stood accused of privileging commercial ties with Beijing to the detriment of the humanitarian interests of the Chinese population and wider strategic interests of the United States in East Asia. Neoconservatives urged the US to revoke China’s MFN status and revive the early 1970s policy of linkage. Increased commercial ties between the US and China needed to be predicated on improved human rights for Chinese citizens. Neoconservatives also highlighted the wider danger that the Chinese state posed to the US through its military and trade links with states such as Iran and Pakistan. By the start of George W. Bush’s administration, neoconservatives openly called for the United States to make democratic change in Beijing a specific foreign policy goal to mirror what had occurred in Taiwan. Neoconservatives urged the US to drop the idea of ‘One China’, and instead forge much closer ties with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, creating new international security architecture along similar lines to NATO. The end of the Cold War reduced the necessity to be strategically ambiguous; instead, the US should throw its full support behind Taiwan by creating a free trade agreement, give assurances of full US military assistance in the event of Chinese aggression, and openly extol Taiwanese democracy as an example of what needed to be emulated in Beijing.
Drivers of Change

The change that occurred in neoconservative thought during these years can be attributed to a range of drivers. These catalysts can be categorised generally under two headings of material and ideational causes. At first glance, this taxonomy appears overly simplistic. It is not always an unproblematic task to neatly and definitively circumscribe a driver of change as exclusively one of ideational or material origin. Democratic peace theory, for example, is an idea, yet, it could be argued it is an idea resting on events in the material world. Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis is primarily a work of political philosophy and thus more ideological in scope, yet, it could be cogently argued that would never have been written without the material events which occurred at the end of the Cold War. As Colin Hay (2002: 208, 212-215) has argued, ideas are only ever “relatively autonomous” of the material. The material context in which neoconservatives developed their foreign policy approach imposed a strategic and discursive selectivity on the ideas which were created. This thesis, however, is not primarily a theoretical contribution to the debate in political science on the relative importance of material versus ideational factors. It places drivers of change in categories from which some readers may regard as less distinct from one another in reality than presented here. It is helpful, however, to categorise in this way to summarise the central claims made.

Material Factors: End of the Cold War and 9/11

Although there were obviously numerous material foreign policy crises during the period under discussion, the impact of the end of the Cold War followed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001 were the most important in influencing the new direction that neoconservatism took during this period. The decline of bipolarity in the international system and the accompanying rise of American unipolarity that the end of the Cold War
brought about was almost certainly the most crucial driver in the changes that occurred within neoconservative thought. If the Cold War had continued into the 1990s and early twenty-first century, it is impossible to conceive that neoconservatives would have abandoned the underlying logic of Kirkpatrick’s 1979 ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’. That leitmotif had favoured supporting authoritarianism as part of the more important struggle against totalitarianism. The removal of the Soviet Union as a counterweight to American power, however, reduced the fundamental constraint on the exercise of American power, and freed neoconservatives to develop foreign policy ideas that could be far bolder than those which could have been attempted without the thawing of US-Russian relations. Essentially, the main constraint on America’s freedom of action in the post-Cold War world was now more likely to be US public opinion rather than the countervailing power of other states overseas.

The realisation that the ending of the Cold War had dramatically opened up new possibilities for American foreign policy infuses neoconservative discourse throughout this period, from the development of the DPG in 1992, to US interventionism in the Balkans and into Iraq. Although Krauthammer was one of the first to champion the ‘unipolar moment’, it was Robert Kagan and William Kristol, with the publication of their 1996 article in *Foreign Affairs* and the later development of PNAC, that pushed neoconservatism to embrace themes of national greatness, democracy promotion and humanitarianism overseas. These policies were predicated on an American hegemony that simply did not exist while the Cold War continued.

For other neoconservatives, especially Krauthammer, Perle and Wolfowitz, it was not until after the shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that they more readily embraced the agenda that
had been drafted by Kagan and Kristol. The ending of the Cold War had removed the primary overseas constraint on US foreign policy, but it was not until after 9/11 that neoconservative discourse more comprehensively linked the security of the US homeland with lack of political freedom in the wider Middle East. It was also of instrumental value for neoconservatives that both President Bush and US public opinion were more amenable to a more radical neoconservative response post-9/11. Not all neoconservatives concurred with Kagan and Kristol’s approach while a direct threat to US national security seemed distant, but the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought the immediacy of the threat to the US much nearer.

Ideational Factors: Fukuyama, Democratic Peace Theory and a Religious Turn

Working concurrently with the two seminal material events of this period were a series of more ideational drivers of change. Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, democratic peace theory, and a religious ‘turn’ in neoconservative thought, all contributed to placing the idea of promoting liberal democracy abroad with a greater concern for humanitarian interests, more centrally in the neoconservative foreign policy vision. Fukuyama’s thesis – more often simplistically parodied than comprehensively analysed – was the defining philosophical contribution to the early post-Cold War period. This was true across the political spectrum in the United States, and more specifically among neoconservatives. Podhoretz argued that this era would be defined by a battle of ideas between Fukuyama and Huntington’s more realist and pessimistic ‘Clash of Civilizations’. Podhoretz made clear that he favoured Fukuyama’s framing of global politics. Fukuyama’s Hegelian construction of the broad sweep of human history posited that the idea of liberal democracy would never likely be superseded. Its unique ability to satisfy the human need for recognition and to drive technological change and economic growth meant that the
regimes of Slobodan Milosevic, the Taleban, and Saddam Hussein, for example, were not simply threats to American national security but on the wrong side of History. Although neoconservatives had been attached to the idea of liberal democracy before Fukuyama’s thesis, during the Cold War they more readily supported authoritarianism in the wider battle against the Soviet Union. Fukuyama’s thesis provided an important philosophical bolster to the very idea of liberal democracy and the direction of human history. This is not to argue that all neoconservatives approved of every aspect of his thesis; certainly some like Eliot Cohen and Irving Kristol found it overly simplistic or utopian. It added, however, an overarching and distinctively universalist aspect to the idea of liberal democracy. It was not simply a concept with American or Western application, but had universal appeal and would never be bettered as an idea. This was not just a political system for American WASPs, but spoke to the deepest needs of human society in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and the wider Middle East. All neoconservative discourse during this period took place in the shadow of Fukuyama’s meta-narrative. It is much easier to envisage why Kagan and Kristol’s arguments on the use of American hegemony to spread democracy and political liberty abroad gained traction among neoconservatives when they wrote in an era in which the defining philosophical contribution stated that liberal democracy had conquered all its ideological opponents. Indeed, Fukuyama accused the Bush administration and neoconservatives by association, of taking his ideas and attempting to artificially speed up the thrust of his argument through the use of American power.

Yet, neoconservative arguments for giving democracy promotion a central position in US foreign policy did not simply flow unadulterated from Fukuyama’s philosophy. Democratic peace theory, developed in academia by Michael Doyle among others, and
widely embraced by the more centrist wing of the Democratic Party of which Bill Clinton was a leading figure, was also a driver of change in neoconservative thought. Throughout the latter half of the 1990s to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush administration, neoconservatives frequently justified the idea of bringing democracy to rogue states with direct reference to the concept that democracies did not go to war with each other. Changing the political system of domestic regimes in Belgrade, Kabul and Baghdad, and then on to Tehran, Riyadh and Damascus, would alter the foreign policy behaviour of those states, reducing the likelihood of foreign aggression and consequently lessening the threat to US national security. The impact of democratic peace theory on neoconservatism has been both under and over estimated. In interviews with the author, neoconservatives generally acknowledged their familiarity with Doyle’s thesis, but tended to, perhaps understandably, downplay any intellectual debt they owed. On the other hand, Tony Smith argues that neoconservatives simply borrowed all their ideas from a liberal internationalist tradition, from the Progressive Policy Institute all the way back to Woodrow Wilson, and in doing so denies neoconservatives any real agency and originality in their foreign policy discourse. Neoconservatives certainly developed their arguments in a wider intellectual and political environment in which ideas surrounding the democratic peace, especially in Clinton’s first term, were predominant. These ideas, however, were not simply and uncritically appropriated by neoconservatives, indeed, they were very swift to reject accompanying liberal arguments on multilateral institutions. There is also the fact that at a basic level, it did not require a PhD from an Ivy League institution to hypothesise that wars between liberal democracies do not abound widely.

A neoconservative foreign policy that sought to use American power to preserve US hegemony, and use that position to reshape rogue states into liberal democracies developed in an ideational climate that had been significantly shaped by Fukuyama’s philosophy and
a wider embrace of democratic peace theory. It also coincided with a religious turn in neoconservative thought. Given the numerous anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that have been attached to neoconservatism, some neoconservatives, even those religiously-inclined, have been reluctant to fully acknowledge that religious thought played a role in their post-Cold War foreign policy philosophy. Yet, analysis of neoconservative discourse during the 1990s and into the early years of the Bush administration, reveals neoconservatives to be widely interested in religious issues and increasingly embracing of a more socially conservative prospectus. This was even evident with those such as Robert Kagan who held no personal attachment to religious belief. This positioned neoconservatives within the Republican political mainstream in a manner that had not hitherto been seen. It is also more than coincidental that at the same time as neoconservatives turned greater attention to questions of domestic morality and social conservatism, their foreign policy increasingly reflected an approach more sensitive to questions of morality and humanitarian interests than realpolitik. This is not to simplistically suggest that religion and more realist foreign policy positions are mutually exclusive. Certainly, familiarity with the work of Reinhold Niebuhr would quickly scotch such a conclusion. However, the 1990s saw a rapprochement between social conservatives of the Christian Right and neoconservatives, in which Gary Bauer, William Bennett, William Kristol and Elliott Abrams played important roles.

During the 1990s, the Christian Right pursued a foreign policy agenda that pushed President Clinton to protect religious and political liberties abroad, defend Israel, and was generally supportive of a foreign policy that sought to bolster American power for the service of specific moral goals. This mirrored the changes afoot within neoconservative thought during these years. This is not to argue for a simple uni-directional causal flow
from the Christian Right to neoconservatives in foreign policy or vice-versa, but for a form of ideological cross-pollination between the two groups. Neoconservatives increasingly positioned themselves in the Republican Party mainstream and became more interested in questions of religion, morality and social conservative issues such as abortion. These were policy areas which animated large sections of the Republican base. Simultaneously, the Christian Right, which to this point had been seen as obsessed with the abortion issue and school prayer, for example, became increasingly energised by the need for a more moralised approach to US foreign policy. Broadly stated, the Christian Right-neoconservative rapprochement brought about a significant ideological alliance, at least at the elite Washington level. The Christian Right began to become much more interested in questions of foreign policy at the same time as neoconservatives showed increased amenability to the placing of issues of morality, political and religious freedom more centrally in US foreign policy. This coincided with increased neoconservative sympathy with the Christian Right’s social conservatism. This culminated in a series of editorials and articles by William Kristol in the *Weekly Standard* during Bush’s first term, and in an edited book, in which he argued against abortion and cloning and directly linked the domestic battle for pro-life issues with the foreign policy objectives of defeating Al Qaeda.

**Counter-arguments**

The shifts in neoconservative thought during the decade and a half after the Cold War and the drivers that contributed to these modifications effectively counter two arguments that are raised in discussion of neoconservatism during this period. The first relates to the suggestion that changes in neoconservative thought were not really changes *per se* but changes in the personnel in the neoconservative vanguard. Thus these years did not so much witness an ideological shift but a generational one, with the first neoconservative
generation of more moderate ex-Democrats being replaced by a cadre of more radical and ideologically more conservative neoconservatives. Aside from the very obvious difficulty in determining where to draw the line temporally between the neoconservative generations, the argument itself suffers from a central flaw. Key figures within both the first and second generation cohort of neoconservatives simply do not fit within the simplistic stereotype. Norman Podhoretz, one of the standard-bearers of early neoconservatism during the 1970s, was easily numbered among the most bellicose of neoconservatives during the latter half of the 1990s and into the Bush administration. Jeane Kirkpatrick travelled an analogous journey to her younger comrades, from cautious realist in the early 1990s to supporter of regime change and the imposition of liberal democracy in the Balkans and Iraq. And even Irving Kristol, perhaps the most realist of neoconservatives in his foreign policy views, recognised the new direction neoconservatism was taking in the latter half of the 1990s and fully supported the invasion of Iraq (W. Kristol, 2011). Among younger neoconservatives, Charles Krauthammer was a consistent critic of Kristol and Kagan’s neo-Reaganite approach to foreign affairs, and a more realist-inclined, national interest conservative throughout the 1990s before 9/11 finally shifted his position. This is not to suggest that neoconservatism was monolithic, but that the policy cleavages were not as stark as has been suggested, and certainly not fundamentally along generational lines.

In addition to countering the argument that neoconservatives were generationally divided, the central thrust of this thesis also effectively opposes the argument, primarily associated with the radical Left, that neoconservatives were not interested in liberal democracy and humanitarianism, and that these arguments were only deployed to mask their real interest
in perpetuating American hegemony. This line of critique is extremely problematic and suffers from the fact that neoconservative foreign policy arguments during this period, especially during the late 1990s and into the Bush administration, frequently invoked human rights abuses in rogue states. They were also staunch supporters of the idea that a lack of political freedom in these countries directly contributed to aggressive foreign policy behaviour which threatened US security and humanitarian interests more widely. Regime change, for example, was not favoured simply as a strategy to remove a dictator in Belgrade or Baghdad and have him replaced with an authoritarian ‘strongman’ who would be more amenable to American interests. Instead, the development of liberal democracy was the favoured policy. The neoconservative preference for regime change and the introduction of liberal democracy across the Middle East, instead of supporting stability and the status quo, reached its apotheosis in late 2003 with the publication of Perle and Frum’s *An End to Evil*. Aside from the ideologically ambitious, verging on hubristic, nature of the title, its central argument stated that the US should not stop with regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan but needed to confront the Iranian, Syrian and Saudi Arabian regimes and force democratic change with the threat of American military action for non-compliance. This was not a handbook for the cynical use of US power to further hegemony but a highly ideological, ambitious and explicitly revolutionary manifesto for the wider Middle East. And again, from the vantage point of 1989, this would have been almost inexplicable. The neoconservative *leitmotif* was not simply to use American power to preserve and extend US hegemony, but to use that power as a revolutionary agent of change to protect both US national security and humanitarian interests more generally. Instead of a cynical power grab, US power was intended paradoxically to ultimately subvert American hegemony by playing an important role in toppling dictatorships. This

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209 Analogous arguments were prevalent during the Iraq War when President Bush was accused of only being interested in invading Iraq to gain access to Iraqi oil, and that talk of democracy and human rights was merely rhetorical veneer.
would establish liberal democracies abroad which they hypothesised would eventually challenge the relative power of the United States in a more systematic fashion than any rogue state ever could.

This analysis should not necessarily be taken as tacit approval of the neoconservatives’ moral and philosophical framework. Whether their approach to foreign affairs was more ethical than other schools is another question entirely to the one discussed in this thesis. What is significant however is that neoconservatives considered morality and virtue to be an important foundation for how the United States conducted its foreign policy. Their numerous critics on the Left would almost certainly be better served engaging and debating the ethical and moral underpinnings of this approach rather than cynically dismissing it all as rhetoric hiding their ‘true’ interests. Such arguments perhaps reflect a wider philosophical bent to often reject conservative political arguments wholesale as simply self-interested reflections of the powerful. The cynical reading of neoconservatism suffers from ignoring the increased universalist and moralised edge to neoconservative thought during these years. The virtues neoconservatives perceived to be inherent in the American political system were not something to be closely guarded, protected and reserved for the United States alone.

A series of material and ideational factors had combined to significantly shift neoconservative foreign policy discourse in a new direction. The threat posed by the USSR during the Cold War had created a fundamental constraint on the freedom of action of US policy-makers and the ideas deemed plausible by foreign policy intellectuals. The removal of this material constraint created a ‘dilemma’ which allowed new ideas to gain traction which were previously considered unviable. What followed saw neoconservative
conceptions of virtue fuse with a bolder interventionist foreign policy programme which favoured utilising hard American power in the service of the national interest, humanitarian causes and the promotion of democracy. This occurred during a period in which neoconservative thought was being shaped by Fukuyama’s championing of liberal democracy, the impact of democratic peace theory, and a religious turn in neoconservative thought which also had the effect of drawing some neoconservatives much closer to the Christian Right. This evolutionary change was quickened by a second external material shock – the ‘dilemma’ of the 9/11 terrorist attacks – which allowed the more ambitious neoconservative foreign policy ideas to prevail. These five drivers of change – two material external shocks or ‘dilemmas’ and three ideational developments – led neoconservatives to redefine what it meant for the United States to act virtuously in its foreign policy, and ultimately provided an important theoretical underpinning to the Bush administration’s approach to Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11.
Appendix One
Generations of Neoconservatism

The standard narrative of neoconservatism highlights two generations. Broadly stated, the first generation were concerned with the policy debates of the 1960s and 1970s, whereas the second generation are more associated with the late Cold War and post-Cold war period. Justin Vaïsse (2010: 283-287) provides a further refinement to this debate by splitting the first generation into two groups: dissenting liberal intellectuals and Scoop Jackson Cold War Democrats. The difficulty with this analysis, whether one adopts a two or three generation taxonomy, can be seen with Vaïsse’s appendix on the subject where he offers numerous caveats to his generational lists which serve to undermine his argument. For example, of the 25 names listed as second generation, 15 of them he argues should also be considered as third generation. The table this thesis offers below, therefore, should be viewed as an approximate aid to where neoconservatives were located chronologically rather than as evidence of profound philosophical difference. The table is not aimed to be exhaustive but focused largely on those discussed in this thesis. Broadly stated, the first generation were all born before the Second World War, with the second generation born during or some time after the conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Generation (born pre-1939)</th>
<th>Second Generation (born post-1939)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Bell</td>
<td>Elliott Abrams</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midge Decter</td>
<td>William Bennett</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nathan Glazer</td>
<td>Max Boot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gertrude Himmelfarb</td>
<td>David Brooks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donald Kagan</td>
<td>Eliot A. Cohen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeane Kirkpatrick</td>
<td>Thomas Donnelly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irving Kristol</td>
<td>Douglas Feith</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrick Moynihan</td>
<td>Francis Fukuyama</td>
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<td>Michael Novak</td>
<td>Frank Gaffney</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Pipes</td>
<td>Reuel Marc Gerecht</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norman Podhoretz</td>
<td>Frederick Kagan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aaron Wildavsky</td>
<td>Robert Kagan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Zalmay Khalilzad</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Charles Krauthammer</td>
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<td>William Kristol</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Joshua Muravchik</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Daniel Pipes</td>
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<td>Richard Perle</td>
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<td>Gary Schmitt</td>
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<td>George Weigel</td>
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<td>Paul Wolfowitz</td>
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<td>David Wurmser</td>
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Appendix Two
Interviews

During an institutional visit to SAIS-Johns Hopkins University in Washington in the first half of 2011, various neoconservatives discussed in this thesis kindly allowed the author to formally interview them in relation to their foreign policy views during the post-Cold War period. Interviews were semistructured and broadly followed the same format with each interviewee – focusing on the evolution of their foreign policy thought. This came in addition to more informal discussions with other figures at numerous think-tank and institutional events in Washington. Unfortunately, despite persistent and increasingly creative attempts to secure interviews, not every neoconservative figure discussed in the thesis granted the author an interview. While this was an obvious disappointment, it was more than compensated by the fact that the interviews with those who did agree to speak with the author offered a fascinating insight into the events discussed throughout this thesis, and the author was grateful for their time.

Professor Eliot A Cohen 12 April 2011
Joshua Muravchik 20 April 2011
Elliott Abrams 9 May 2011
Richard Perle 11 May 2011
Gary Schmitt 12 May 2011
Thomas Donnelly 20 May 2011
Douglas Feith 22 June 2011
William Kristol 6 July 2011
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