DEFINING IDEOLOGY IN THE PONTIFICATE OF GREGORY VII

by

Michael Richard Tivey

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Department of Medieval History
College of Arts and Law
The University of Birmingham
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This thesis explores the definition of ideology in the pontificate of Gregory VII (1073-1085) and in the reform movement which bears his name. The indeterminacy of historiographical notions of ‘Gregorian ideology’ is problematic. As a concept theorised in political science, ideology harbours a variety of connotations and meanings such that its generic use leaves important theoretical questions unanswered. Yet, in seeking to apply a theoretical definition, it is quickly apparent that the diversity of conceptual formulations grouped under the umbrella of ideology precludes any single, universally accepted definition of the term. Testing Gregorian reform for a concept of ideology therefore necessitates the prior definition of the concept itself. As a result, this thesis is as much an exercise in modelling a concept of ideology as seeking to address a historiographical ambiguity. The state of the question is this: can a definition of ideology be construed to theoretically prove or disprove a concept of ‘Gregorian ideology’? When coupled with the nature of Gregorian reform as one of the most complex aspects of Church history, defining ideology becomes an especially ambitious undertaking. The following analysis offers a discussion of how a theoretical concept can be applied to the sources.
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ABBREVIATIONS.

*Book to a Friend*  

*D.P.*  
*Dictatus Papae*

*Ep. Vag.*  

*Henry IV, Letters*  

*JEH*  
*Journal of Ecclesiastical History*

*Life of Gregory*  

*Peter Damian, Letters*  

*PG*  

*Reg.*  

*SG*  
*Studi Gregoriani*
To Emperor Henry IV  


74t

The *Collection in Seventy Four Titles*
INTRODUCTION:

Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085) is usually included among the foremost Churchmen of the central Middle Ages on account of his principal role in the papal reform movement of the mid- to late eleventh century. His pontificate has long been recognised as a formative period for European history in which the dynamic of papal reform was intensified and channelled into new directions, both in terms of curtailing clerical immorals and transforming the structure of Christian society more generally. Gregory’s pontificate was arguably defined by his efforts to transform the shape of papal authority. His ‘revolutionary’ conception of the status of papal authority in relation to secular power and his double excommunication of the German King Henry IV (r.1056-1106), in particular, can be interpreted as the seeds of papal monarchy. Indeed, the Gregorian reform can fairly be described as a conflict as much about authority as morality.

As one of the most debated pontificates, the historiography on Gregory’s reforming career is extensive. Since the main focus of this introduction is historians’ references to ‘ideology’ and the methodological issues involved in testing a theoretical concept of ideology, the introductory sections of each chapter will include a discussion of the appropriate historiography. There are a number of general remarks which should nevertheless be made at this stage.

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1 Ideology in its theoretical usage is distinguished from ‘ideology’ as historians have used the term, as such. The phrase ‘Gregorian ideology’ will be used in a provisional sense throughout. This is not to pre-judge the outcome, but is for the sake of convenience.
Among the main qualities of the vast literature are, for example, its perennial emphasis on the
tension between Gregory’s roles as ‘pastor’ and ‘politician’. The role of Gregorian reform in
precipitating a conflict between ‘Church’ and ‘State’ is also a longstanding historiographical
trend. Accordingly, Gregory’s pontificate is commonly linked with the so-called ‘Investiture
Contest’ of the late eleventh century.  

Gerd Tellenbach’s interpretation of the Investiture Contest as ‘the struggle for right order in the world’ has been especially influential in encouraging the view of Gregory’s relationship with Henrician authority as conflict over the emerging structure of Christian society. Another aspect of the historiography, although now restricted to more archaic works, is its confessional orientation. The seminal contribution of Augustin Fliche offers a supremely sympathetic portrait of Gregorian reform in the tradition of Catholic historiography: Gregory is portrayed as a saint while Henrician opposition to papal authority is presented as lay aggression towards the Church. The most recent English-language scholarship has been dominated by I.S. Robinson and H.E.J. Cowdrey; the former writing in the tradition of the Tellenbach School, and the latter primarily emphasising Gregory’s pastoral conviction as his motivation for reform.

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2 For citations and for a more detailed discussion see, below, p. 18. The inadequacy of the ‘Church-state’ characterisation of Gregorian reform is reflected in the replacement vocabulary of ‘power’ and ‘the holy’ proposed by Maureen Miller. Yet these terms, which are simultaneously loaded and nebulous in meaning, are not faultless alternatives, see Miller (ed. and trans.), ‘Introduction’, in Power and the Holy in the Age of the Investiture Conflict: a Brief History with Documents (Boston, 2005), pp. 5-6.


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For some historians, the widening of the scope of ‘reform’ in Gregory’s pontificate cannot be interpreted outside the bounds of revolution.\(^7\) A persistent tension within the scholarship has hence been the extent to which the Investiture Contest can be understood in a context of ‘reform’.\(^8\) By contrast, Gerhart Ladner’s scholarship has emphasised Gregory’s pontificate as the expression of a ‘reform’ ethic.\(^9\) The historiographical case for revolution in Gregory’s pontificate does not invalidate the abbreviation of his actions as ‘reform’, although there is the need to comparably distinguish between ‘Gregorian reform’ and ‘papal reform’. While the distinction is complex, in general, the former had specific ecclesiological connotations not shared by the latter.

The historiographical focus on Gregory has itself been subject to criticism. Approaches which have pedestalled Gregory – the approach of PG, for example, has been likened to a Namier-esque ‘Great man’ interpretation of history\(^10\) – to some extent fail to fully contextualise his pontificate within eleventh-century papal and other reform movements.\(^11\) Indeed, in seeking to test ‘Gregorian ideology’, this thesis has implicitly credited Fliche’s periodisation for papal


\(^8\) See below, pp. 18-19.


\(^11\) J.T. Gilchrist argues that periodising papal reform (and ‘papal ideology’ in his own words) as ‘Gregorian’ fails to put Gregory’s pontificate in full perspective: ‘the epochal decree of 1059 on papal elections or the correspondence of Leo IX and Humbert of Silva-Candida in 1053/54 concerning the Greek Church…demonstrated a papal ideology as forthright and precise as any that is found in Gregory’; see ‘Was there a Gregorian reform movement in the eleventh century?’, *CCHA Study Sessions*, 37 (1970), p. 6. In the strict sense, ‘Gregorian reform’ spans only the 1073-1085 timeframe of Gregory’s pontificate, yet the term can be plausibly extended beyond (but not necessarily prior to) these dates. While the main focus must remain here on Gregory, the antecedents and the legacy of Gregorian reform are important: the so-called ‘reform papacy’ (of which ‘Gregorian reform’ was a variant) which spanned from 1049-1122 will therefore be referred to throughout.
The status of Gregory’s pontificate is to some extent a historiographical construct, elevated artificially perhaps by the unique survival of his Register. Yet, on balance, his overarching stature is generally borne out in the primary literature whose authors (papalist and otherwise) were agreed on the landmark status of his pontificate. The inadequacy of the focus on Gregory in the tradition of constitutional historiography has also prompted recent interest in the socio-economic dimensions of Gregorian reform. The work of R.I. Moore and K.G. Cushing has attempted to historicise Gregory’s pontificate within a broader framework of eleventh-century social transformation.

The historiography is generally lacking in conceptual or theorised approaches, rooted as it is in a traditionally positivistic approach. Nevertheless, Ladner’s scholarship pushes for a more theorised definition of an ‘idea’ when exploring the idea of reform. A more recent and far more radical contribution has been Leidulf Melve’s analysis of the polemical literature according to the theoretical concept of ‘the public sphere’.

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12 It was Fliche who coined the phrase ‘Gregorian reform’.
15 For Ladner’s engagement with political theory and philosophy to define an ‘idea’, see The Idea of Reform, pp. 427-432. More generally, Ladner’s scholarship is concerned with the need to be specific about the differences between terminology such as ‘reform’ and ‘renewal’.
16 Melve analyses the formation of a ‘public sphere’ in connection with the propaganda exchanges of the papal and Henrician polemists. His particular focus is the rhetorical and linguistic strategies used by writers to articulate ideas and structure their contributions to the debate. In terms of his application of a theory to the sources, Melve has the advantage insofar as Jürgen Habermas’s concept of the ‘public sphere’ is more rigorously theorised than ideology. The process of testing is accordingly simplified for Melve with the benefit of a fixed theoretical model. Melve’s synthesis of history and theory is inspiring, yet it is almost too theoretically convoluted (and lengthy) to be truly engaging, see Defining the Public Sphere: The Public Debate During the Investiture Contest (c.1030-1122) (2 vols., Leiden, 2007); see the comments in C. Symes, ‘Review of L. Melve, Defining the Public Sphere: The Public Debate During the Investiture Contest (c.1030-1122) (Leiden, 2007)’, American Historical Review, 114 (2009), pp. 468-469.
Turning, now, to assess the problem of ‘Gregorian ideology’, the concept of political ideology is modern in origin and strict application, but it has become generalised to describe the politics of pre-modern societies, including that of the central Middle Ages. The terms ‘power’ and ‘authority’ derive from the historical terms potestas and auctoritas used to describe royal and ecclesiastical authority respectively, yet there is no translation for ideology in the medieval political vocabulary. While the papal and antipapal sources do broach a doctrinam Hildebrandi, ‘Gregorian ideology’ remains a historiographical construct.

No reader would of course be puzzled by the statement that Gregorian reform (or by extension the Investiture Contest) was ‘ideological’. If the question was posed, “what was the ideology of Gregorian reform?” the common-sense answer would surely be “papalism”. Yet, the generality of ‘ideology’ in the historiography – defined most basically as pertaining to ideas and principles – is, on closer examination, too vague to be of any real analytical worth. Moreover, it pays insufficient attention to the theoretical dimension of the concept in its political-science theorisation. Historians have as such become too complacent in their use of ‘ideology’, appropriating the concept uncritically without fully acknowledging its attendant conceptual baggage. While medievalists have probed for greater definition in other

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17 ‘Hildebrandine teaching’ is perhaps a fair translation here. Indeed, doctrinam may not have had the same political import as the modern derivative of the term, i.e. ‘doctrine’. For the primary material, see Paul of Benried, Life of Gregory, c.121, p. 362; Anon. Liber de unitate ecclesiae conservanda, Monumenta Germanica Historica, Libelli de lите, 2, liber 2, c. 3, p. 214, http://cit.brepols.net.ezproxye.bham.ac.uk/emgh/pages/Results.aspx?qry=e8d4314e-acda-4bb1-b2d1-cfe2e7e4707&per=0 [accessed 9.11.11].

18 In general terms this is the essence of Tellenbach’s interpretation that Gregory aimed to impose his ‘right order’ on the world.

19 Robert Dyson has argued for the development of papalism as an ‘ideology’ from the coronation of Charlemagne through to the Conciliar Movement. His account does not however address the concept of ideology in itself, nor does he question whether the evolution and vicissitudes of papalism over this longue durée might make its ideological consistency more tenuous, R.W. Dyson, ‘Medieval rulers and political ideology’, in E.D. English and C. Lansing (eds.), A Companion to the Medieval World (Oxford, 2009), pp. 354-371.
problematic terminology - the ‘tyrant of feudalism’ and the concept of crusade being examples\textsuperscript{20} - ‘ideology’ nevertheless remains prominent.

\textbf{‘Ideology’ in the historiography:}

The scholarship is by no means lacking in references to Gregorian ‘ideology’, whatever this is taken to mean. In Ullmannite interpretations, ‘ideology’ is seemingly used to convey an interpretation of Gregorian reform as concept-driven whereby ‘pure ideology determined the path of historical events’.\textsuperscript{21} A notion of ‘reform ideology’ is also broached in Colin Morris’s \textit{Papal Monarchy}, although again without theorisation.\textsuperscript{22} According to John Gilchrist, the themes of ‘ideology’ revealed in Gregory’s \textit{Register} include universal papal primacy, control of episcopal elections, and the reform of simony and nicholaitism.\textsuperscript{23} These were of course central Gregorian principles, yet whether they can be described as themes of ideology is another question. The term is liberally employed also in other scholars’ work.\textsuperscript{24}

The historiography is therefore non-specific in its use of ‘ideology’. No scholar has attempted to define ‘Gregorian ideology’ theoretically or chosen to eschew it on account of its basic problems.


\textsuperscript{22} Morris’s subchapter entitled ‘the beginnings of a reform ideology’ describes antecedents to the Gregorian reform such as monastic reform and the revival of canon law, see \textit{Papal Monarchy, the Western Church from 1050-1200} (Oxford, 1989), pp. 28-34.


\textsuperscript{24} See Ladner, ‘Two Gregorian letters on the sources and nature of Gregory VII’s reform ideology’, \textit{SG}, 5 (1956), pp. 225-242. In a broader perspective, James Brodman’s recent study of charity in the Middle Ages invokes a concept of ‘ideology’ to explain philanthropy on the basis that it is an unnatural act and therefore must be driven by a concept, see \textit{Charity and Religion in Medieval Europe} (Washington, 2009), p. 3
ambiguity. The term is instead cited to generally describe the ideas, principles, or philosophy of Gregorian reform, as distinct from the practicality of politics.\textsuperscript{25} As one theorist has summarised the popular reception of the concept, ‘ideology’ is invoked as ‘a popular form of criticism of political struggles which are defined by ideas or even by principles. “Ideology” (the product of “doctrinaires”) is then contrasted with “practical experience”, “practical politics”, and what is known as pragmatism’.\textsuperscript{26} In this ‘normative definition’, ‘the ideological’ becomes a broad-brush generalisation used to differentiate the theoretical dimension of Gregorian reform from \textit{Realpolitik} and the expediencies of papal lordship. Such an \textit{a priori} understanding is loosely defined and remains only ambiguously related to more theoretical conceptions of the term. This normative definition is also indicative of the hackneyed debate about \textit{how much} ‘ideology’ existed in Gregorian reform.\textsuperscript{27}

Yet, since historians clearly feel no insecurity in their use of ‘ideology’, and have accordingly not felt obliged to grapple conceptually with its definition, there remains the need to engage with what Gregorian ‘ideology’ is intended to signify. Its historiographical meaning is difficult to interpret exactly, however, given that ‘ideology’ is often used as a ‘lazy synonym’

\textsuperscript{25} The perceived dichotomy between ‘ideology’ and pragmatism is clear in John Moorhead’s summary of divide in the historiography of Gregorian reform: ‘[there is a gulf between] those who see papal history in terms of the working out of an ideology, and those who see it in more pragmatic terms, as a series of developments which may have amounted to little more than reactions to various circumstances’, ‘Papa as “\textit{bishop of Rome}”’, \textit{JEH}, 36 (1985), p. 350. Furthermore, as Stanley Chodorow has written of the Investiture Contest in its later stages, ‘the impact of the agreement on later negotiations between pope and emperor stemmed, I think, from its \textit{political} rather than \textit{ideological} aspects’, ‘Ideology and canon law in the crisis of 1111’, \textit{Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law}, Monumenta iuris canonici, Ser. C (Rome, 1976), p. 58, (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{26} See R. Williams, ‘Ideology’, in T. Eagleton (ed.), \textit{Ideology} (1994), p. 188. The normative definition can be likened to the ‘Napoleonic critique’ in which ideology was contrasted from power politics on account of its excessive abstractedness. ‘Ideologues’, according to Napoleon, ‘abstracted themselves from the practical realities of political life and insisted on developing fanciful theories that were both doctrinaire and impractical in equal measure’, see R. Porter, \textit{Ideology: Contemporary Social, Political, and Cultural Theory} (Cardiff, 2006), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{27} Rather than being conceived as one element of politics, ideology is here understood as a total framework which encompasses every aspect of politics, including political expediency.
for a canon of terms which share similar connotations.\textsuperscript{28} It is therefore necessary to replace the adjective ‘ideological’ with ‘ideational’ when a description of principles or ideas is desired.

**The history of ideology:**

The search for greater depth and specificity in the meaning of ‘Gregorian ideology’ can only begin after ideology has itself been deconstructed. As a political concept, ideology has its own history, ranging in its multitude of applications from the partisan to the academic. The concept is a comparatively recent addition to political thought, receiving its first and most significant formulations in the wake of the French and Industrial revolutions.\textsuperscript{29} Ideology was first conceived in the minds of Enlightenment philosophes as a science of ideas\textsuperscript{30} informed by the tradition of Lockean empirical philosophy.\textsuperscript{31} The classical definition of ideology was thus a concept used to denote reason and typify the ‘brave new epoch of secular scientific rationality’.\textsuperscript{32} Ideology was later conceptualised in its most influential sense in the writings of Karl Marx.\textsuperscript{33} The Marxist interpretation reversed the Enlightenment formulation by characterising ideology as a form of irrationality, mystification, and exploitation.\textsuperscript{34} Ideology accordingly acquired a deceptive and polemical function whereby it ‘conceals or naturalises

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The term was first coined in the work of the Enlightenment philosophe Antoine Destutt de Tracy, *Éléments d'idéologie* (5 vols., Paris, 1801-15).
\item Goldie, ‘Ideology’, p. 269.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
or otherwise legitimates an unjust form of power’. The Marxian reading has been enduring in theorisations of ideology, although not without significant modification. Ideology was more generally characterised as a pejorative term when used in association with the political history of the twentieth century. The decline of ideologies such Nazism and Sovietism then led theorists to diagnose the ‘end of ideology’. This interpretation has been short-lived, however, in what is perceived to be an ideologically pluralistic contemporary world.

Ideology has been the subject of extensive debate in the political-science scholarship of the last fifty years; it is this academic domain which is the primary context for defining ideology here. Ideology is generally understood by theorists as a specific type of political ‘belief system’ which can be defined by particular characteristics. The pejorative connotations of ideology and the partiality of its theorists are generally less pronounced in this relatively ‘value-neutral’ field of academic debate, although a significant Marxian influence continues to inform political science. Ideology has also been broadened beyond the scope of political science to become a thoroughly interdisciplinary concept. This has enriched its applicability

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36 The Marxian definition of ideology has been widened, for example, to permit the possibility of non-bourgeois ideology, see Eagleton, ‘Introduction’, p. 8. ‘Hegemony’ has also been theorised as a form of consensual ideological domination exercised by governmental and/or non-governmental means, M. Freeden, *Ideology: a Very Short Introduction*, p. 20. The seminal work of Louis Althusser has argued also that forms of ideological domination are manifested unconsciously in ‘material practices and institutions’, which become ‘ideological state apparatuses’, *Ibid.*., p. 15; L. Althusser, ‘Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation)’, in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (London, 1977), pp. 127-188.


40 Definitions of ideology have been drawn from academic fields including philosophy, sociology, anthropology, critical theory, and cultural studies. A particularly influential conceptualisation has been that of Clifford Geertz, ‘Ideology as a cultural system’, in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York, 1973), pp. 193-233. Historians have similarly broadened the application of ideology beyond ‘the political’. The term has been applied in the new cultural history of the papacy, for example, where aspects of the pope’s person have been described as ‘ritual expressions of papal ideology’, see A. Paravicini-Bagliani,
but heightened its overall indeterminacy. The analysis of popular political ideology has also influenced recent approaches.\textsuperscript{41}

Most recently, post-structuralism and the cultural turn have been brought to bear on the study of ideology. The concept is hence used to explore problems of epistemology and terminology. The ‘Freeden school’, in particular, has proposed that ideology is not a belief-system defined by set characteristics, but should be understood as a medium for ideas. Freeden’s ‘morphological approach’ reclaims the fluidity within definitions of ideology such that the concept of ideology becomes a device ‘specifically capable of coping with the indeterminacy of political messages’.\textsuperscript{42} While it is important to fully appreciate the theorisations of ideology, it is questionable whether this level of abstraction can be tolerated here. It is much more complicated to apply and contextualise such a definition in the sources for Gregorian reform. Indeed, the implication of post-structuralism is that ideology is less positivistic and, as a result, less conducive to being ‘tested’ according to set criteria: ‘ideologies can no longer be distinguished on the basis of the “presence” or “absence” of certain concepts or ideas’.\textsuperscript{43}

Rather than having fixed qualities or characteristics, and understood as ‘holistic and unitary entities’, according to Bo Strath, ideologies ‘should be seen as shaped by a variety of

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\textsuperscript{42}The act of disseminating ideology from above has been theorised as ‘indoctrination’ (see J. Plamenatz, \textit{Ideology} (London, 1970), p. 134), however, John Arnold’s analysis of lay ‘acculturation’ is a preferably more neutral term to apply to the popularisation of ‘ideology’ in this period, see \textit{Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe} (London, 2005), p. 28.

contradictions, differences, overlaps, and partial disengagements’.\textsuperscript{44} Seemingly, Gregorian reform needs to be tested against a more concrete, positivistic definition. As Freeden himself notes, the greater degree of theoretical abstraction actually decreases the utility of ideology for historians wanting to apply it.\textsuperscript{45}

**Definitions:**

A theoretically-based, watertight definition of ideology is almost as elusive as the ‘Gregorian ideology’ historians have alluded to. The multitude of definitions attributed to this single term has seemingly diluted its overall meaning. As one theorist has noted, ‘ideology has become a victim of its own popularity…it now means too much’.\textsuperscript{46} The plurality of its theorisations notwithstanding, this thesis cannot proceed without at least some working definitions of ideology. To survey a number of political scientists who do offer a formal definition, for Malcolm Hamilton, ideology is:

‘A system of collectively held, normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes, advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realise, pursue or maintain’.\textsuperscript{47}

According to Freeden:

‘A political ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions and values that (1) exhibit a recurring pattern, (2) are held by significant groups, (3) compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy and (4) do so with the aim of justifying, 

\textsuperscript{44} Strath further argues that ideologies should be ‘understood much more in terms of opposition, discontinuities and contradictions, internally as well as externally, than in terms of cohesion and continuity’, ‘Ideology and history’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11 (2006), pp. 39-40. As Freeden notes, ideology should be defined through its ‘conceptual malleability and ideational pluralism’, ‘Ideology and political theory’, p. 3.


contesting or changing the social and political arrangement and processes of a political community’. 48

If ideology appears vague in these examples, they do not quite equal the fluidity of Slavoj Žižek’s definition:

“‘Ideology’ can designate anything from a contemplative attitude…to an action-orientated set of beliefs, from the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations, to a social structure, to false ideas which legitimate a dominant political power’. 49

Ultimate definitions such as these seemingly permit anything to be interpreted as ideological; their generality is almost to the point of inutility. Ideology accordingly lacks a ‘critical edge’ and an overall meaningfulness. 50 Moreover, even if it were possible to meaningfully apply one of the above definitions, why should one be more valid than the others? It is not without irony, perhaps, that ideology should be used as a tool of rationalisation here. 51 In lieu of any uncontested and all-encompassing academic definition, it is arguably more instructive to develop definitional criteria for ideology which, if not define absolutely, at least allow ideology to be modelled.

48 Freeden, Ideology, p. 32, see also pp. 51-2, 54-5 for his development of this definition. According to Martin Seliger, ideology (1) has to be political, (2) does not have to be factual or moral or rational, (3) inherently overlaps with other ideologies and (4) is always action orientated, Ideology and Politics (London, 1976), pp. 15-16. Among the multiple entries in the Oxford English Dictionary, ideology is defined as: ‘the study of ideas; that branch of philosophy or psychology which deals with the origin and nature of idea; abstract speculation; impractical or visionary theorising; idealism; a systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics, economics, or society and forming the basis of action or policy; a set of beliefs governing conduct; the forming or holding of such a scheme of ideas’. http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.e.bham.ac.uk/view/Entry/91016?redirectedFrom=ideology#eid [accessed 5.10.11]

49 S. Žižek (ed.), ‘Introduction’, in Mapping Ideology (London, 1994), pp. 3-4. Žižek’s work represents the more inscrutable theoretical literature, it must be said.

50 McLellan, Ideology, p. 2.

Towards modelling a definition of ideology:

Worth consideration firstly is the ‘utopian’ characterisation of ideology in the classic work of Karl Mannheim. Mannheim’s thesis links ideology with a concept of ‘utopia’ in which visions of radical and transformative change are created through ideological distortion. Both ideology and ‘utopia’ engage in ‘reality-transcendence’ such that ideological ‘utopias’ are ‘idealised representations of the future that imply the need for radical social change’. For the present purpose, it can be summarised from Mannheim’s complex analysis that ideologies have a strong ‘utopian’ element and that ideologies generally work on a theoretical rather than a practical basis. In separating ideology from practicality, this ‘utopian’ model is a more explicit statement of the normative definition. The potential applicability of this model is suggested by Gregory’s ‘utopian’ vision of a reformed and hierocratically-structured Christian society. There is a significant literature on the idealism of Gregorian reform and the theoretical plane on which the sticking points of papal and Henrician ecclesiologies were debated. As Norman Cantor has argued, ‘it is well known that the Gregorians did not attain their ultimate aims, as all revolutionary ideologists have failed to put into practice their utopian ideal’. While ‘utopianism’ and idealism cannot be entirely equated, this model remains a useful link between a tendency of Gregorian reform and a theorisation of ideology.

55 It is important to distinguish here between the two meanings of ‘theoretical’. The term is used to describe both aspects of political science theory and the non-practical, intellectual level on which reform often operated.
56 The polemical exchanges between partisan authors during the Investiture Contest demonstrates that the ideological debate was explored on a theoretical basis rather than in actuality. As Ullmann has commented, ‘the traditional order of things was to be replaced by an order derived from purely speculative and abstract ways of thinking’, Medieval Political Thought (Harmondsworth, 1975), p. 116.
57 N.F. Cantor, ‘The crisis of Western monasticism 1050-1130’, The American Historical Review, 66 (1960), p. 56. Gregory’s concept of reform has in general been interpreted as a form of idealism: ‘as Gerhart Ladner reminded us reform and renewal were both historically contingent, but at the same time represented a
Secondly, ‘coherence’ is a commonly accepted characteristic of ideologies. ‘Coherence’ is understood here as the sense of structural consistency which allows ideologies to form a congruent and meaningful whole. Testing for ‘coherence’ therefore seems a logical way to approach the definition of a concept. It has been argued by extension that ‘coherent’ ideologies are programmatic. This model can accordingly illuminate the historiographical debate about the ‘Gregorian reform programme’. The variety of conceptual justifications Gregory invoked to implement the reform of clerical ethics can also support a discussion of the overall ‘coherence’ of any ‘Gregorian reform programme’ and, thereby, its ideological status.

Ideology can be modelled thirdly in terms of its inherent ‘contrast’ with another ideological form. Since ideologies always exist in relativity according to some theorists, ideology can

58 See Gerring, ‘Ideology: a definitional analysis’, p. 974; S.H. Barnes, ‘Ideology and the organisation of conflict: on the relationship between political thought and behaviour’, The Journal of Politics, 22 (1966), p. 514. Philip Converse seminally argued for defining ideology in terms of ‘constraint’ such that the concept becomes ‘a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the ideas are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence’, see ‘The nature of belief systems in mass publics’, p. 3. ‘Coherence’ is of course open to interpretation and some theorists are willing to tolerate a lesser degree of constraint than others. According to Hamilton, ‘we certainly seem to imply a system of interconnected ideas when we use the term ideology…the ideas may be loosely structured, ambiguous and even contradictory as long as they are in some way, and to some degree, interrelated’, see ‘Elements of the concept of ideology’, p. 22.

59 For a conception of ideologies as constituting ‘concrete programmes or strategies’, see W. Mullins, ‘On the concept of ideology in political science’, The American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), pp. 506-509. Also, ideology is always ‘action orientated’ according to M. Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London, 1976), pp. 15-16. This notion of ideology perhaps contradicts its ‘utopian’ tendency. While the idea of a ‘coherent’ ‘utopia’ can be justified, ‘utopianism’ is perhaps incompatible with ideological programmes grounded in political ‘action’.

60 Ullmann has insisted on the concept of a Gregorian manifesto, while Cowdrey has emphasised the plasticity of Gregory’s thinking, arguing that his reform did not amount to ‘formulated and balanced programme of renovation’, see Ullmann, A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1974), p. 148, PG, p. 508.

perhaps be defined here as a *relationship* in addition to an autonomous entity. There is potential for this model to correspond with Gregory’s pontificate in terms the development of reform in connection with the ideas and institutions which challenged it. While the main focus must remain with Gregory here, it will be instructive to explore potential counter-ideologies in the form of the proprietary church, episcopacy, and sacral kingship.

Fourthly, two further theoretical themes emerge as pertinent to Gregorian reform in Terry Eagleton’s analysis:

‘Ideologies are commonly held to be both naturalising and universalising. By a set of complex discursive devices, they project what are in fact partisan, controversial, historically specific values as true of all times and all places, and so as natural, inevitable, and unchangeable’.  

There may be many conceptual parallels with Gregory’s pontificate in this respect. His attempts to contextualise his papalist (and hence ‘partisan’) interpretation of Petrine authority, for example, in a ‘natural’ canonical tradition can be explored in terms of ideological ‘naturalisation’. The process of widening papal authority may also correspond with the ‘universalisation’ of ideology. In terms of attesting the ‘complex discursive devices’ through which any potential ‘Gregorian ideology’ was ‘naturalised’ and/or ‘universalised’, at the expense of becoming too abstract, the analysis will focus on the communicative channels through which Gregorian principles were disseminated. This will allow the discussion of primary material such as letters, conciliar records, canonical collections, and hagiography. It

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63 Eagleton, ‘Introduction’, pp. 9-10, (my emphasis). For the tendency of ideologies to universalise themselves, see also Freedon, ‘Ideology and political theory’, p. 5. Eagleton’s analysis is informed by a Marxian approach, yet it remains useful to consider here.
is perhaps more appropriate to consider these latter criteria as ‘functions’ of ideology, rather than evidence of its existence per se.

The present methodology is therefore to interpret ‘aspects’ of ideology by modelling definitional criteria. The above models form a definitional matrix which can be used as an interpretative structure to approach a definition of ideology. The selected models take account both of the content of ideas (the ‘utopia’ criterion, for example) and their structure and quality (the ‘coherence’ model.) Clearly there is potential for some degree of correspondence between theory and history here, although the collective compatibility of the models remains to be assessed. While these criteria will be the main basis for interpreting ideology, additional formulations will be referred to throughout. The primary sources to which these models can be applied will be introduced and evaluated in the course of each chapter.

Summary:

The analysis will proceed in three chapters. Chapter one will address the ‘spirituality’ of Gregorian reform, focussing on simony and nicholaitism, the influence of monasticism and the Early Church, and Gregory’s personal piety. The second chapter will turn to survey Gregorian reform in practice with special attention to testing the ‘utopian’ model of ideology. How the process of papal institutionalisation affected the ideational form and structure of Gregorian reform will be explored here in relation to canon law and papal government.

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64 Eagleton continues his discussion by arguing that ‘naturalisation’ assumes that ideologies are ‘sealed universes…and admit of no outside or alternative’, ‘Introduction’, p. 10. This sense of insularity is furthered by another political scientist’s definition of ideology as a ‘closed cognitive structure…a state of dogmatic impermeability both to evidence and argument’, G. Sartori, ‘Ideological belief systems’, *The American Political Science Review*, 63 (1969), p. 403. This contradicts the supposed relativity of ideology in its ‘contrast’ model, as formulated above. The potential tension between different models is a reminder of the overall instability of ideology as a political concept.
Thirdly, the model of ideological ‘contrast’ will be applied to Gregory’s relationship with King Henry IV and aspects of Henrician ecclesiology. A general conclusion will then draw together research findings, reflect upon methodological issues, and, ultimately, judge the extent to which a theoretically-based understanding of ‘Gregorian ideology’ can be satisfactorily defined. The scale of the analysis will obviously be limited here; there is an immense literature in both fields and only select aspects of ideology and Gregorian reform can be assessed. The challenge remains to find a meaningful conjunction between history and theory.
CHAPTER ONE: GREGORIAN REFORM SPIRITUALITY

Introduction:

What can be termed the ‘spirituality’ of Gregorian reform is sidelined in the bulk of the more politically focussed historiography. It is rather Tellenbach’s reading of the ‘Investiture Contest’ as a conflict between Church and State which has traditionally been the main context for historiographical interpretations of ‘ideology’.¹ Among those historians making the case for Gregorian spirituality, August Nitschke has argued that ‘Gregory was not a political pope; the sole regulator of his conduct was his own religious experience’.² This judgement is reflected in scholarship which places a greater emphasis on the spiritual foundations of Gregorian reform. Ladner, for example, has explored the theological context for Gregory’s concept of renewal while Cowdrey’s PG places Gregory’s monastic spirituality at the centre of his pontificate.³

Gregory arguably was a ‘political pope’, however, in the basic sense that papal reform had wider political implications, especially when an aggrandised papal authority was invoked to justify it. While it has been argued that ‘sacerdotalism and the papal monarchy were considered institutional means to a greater spiritual end’,⁴ Gregory’s advocacy of these concepts entailed the restructuring of Christian society in a very ‘political’ fashion. This was all of course informed by Gregory’s ‘religious experience’, but it remains fundamentally

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'political’ nonetheless. Can, then, ‘politics’ ever be differentiated from ‘spirituality’ in Gregorian reform? While the resolutions of the national Investiture Contests entailed the institutional separation of spiritualities and temporalities, the medieval synthesis between spiritual and secular authority complicates any simple conceptual division. Just as spirituality, for the most part, cannot be divorced from its political context, neither were the political conflicts provoked by Gregorian reform at all ‘secular’ in the modern sense. Gregory was thus both statesman and priest.

In interpreting spirituality, I propose a broader focus than in Cowdrey’s article ‘the spirituality of pope Gregory VII’. The topics examined here will include Gregory’s reforms against simony, nicholaitism, and investiture, as well as the themes of monasticism, the Berengarian Controversy and Gregory’s personal devotion. Since this thesis aims to address a problem of terminology, it would be irresponsible to evade defining spirituality more exactly here. In terms of medievalists’ theorisations, Caroline Walker-Bynum and Gavin Langmuir have

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6 That the ‘symbiosis of Church and society’ was concurrent with ‘the irrevocable separation of the secular and divine’ during the Gregorian reform reflects the complexity of this topic, R.I. Moore, ‘Review of K.G. Cushing, Reform and the Papacy in the Eleventh Century: Spirituality and Social Change (Manchester, 2005)’, *The English Historical Review*, cxxi (2006), pp. 15-16.


8 According to Carl Erdmann, ‘the controversial question of how far his motives were religious and how far political is virtually insoluble, since both motives merged in him; his politics were religious, and his religion political’, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade* (Princeton, 1977), trans. M.W. Baldwin and W. Goffart, p. 150.

9 Cowdrey’s main concerns here are prayer, penance, Gregory’s monastic piety, his reading of the psalms and other scriptural material, and his Marian devotion, pp. 1-19.

10 Walker-Bynum’s use of the term is grounded in focus on popular religion and social history. She argues that ‘spirituality’ should be used to describe ‘how basic religious attitudes and beliefs are conditioned by the society within which they occur’, and should encourage the broadening of traditional Church history ‘from a history of mystical theology to a history of religious attitudes’, *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1982), pp. 3, 8.
interpreted ‘spirituality’ in the contexts of popular religion and individuality respectively.\textsuperscript{12} That Gregorian reform is, however, an issue of constitutional history and was a reform \textit{movement} (as opposed to a strictly individualised spirituality\textsuperscript{13}) questions the applicability of these definitions. The aim in this chapter is to use a notion of ‘spirituality’ as a corrective to the main historiographical interpretation of ‘ideology’ in relation to the clash of Church and State. Proposing to test the ideology of spirituality is to overcomplicate the question here; rather the term is adopted to broaden the historical focus for defining ideology beyond Gregory’s conflict with secular authority.

The theorisation of religion and politics is debated also in the political-science literature. According to Freeden, a religion becomes a form of political ideology once it seeks to ‘influence the social arrangements of the entire political community’.\textsuperscript{14} Certainly, the Gregorian version of Christianity did seek to influence the eleventh-century ‘political community’ in this sense, although such a modernist characterisation of ‘religious’ ideology as discrete and therefore distinct from other secularised ideological forms is surely an anachronistic analysis in the medieval context.\textsuperscript{15} Contemporary theorisations of ‘religious...

\textsuperscript{11} Langmuir has defined the equivalent term ‘religiosity’ as a basis for personal belief in contrast to the socially and institutionally based notion of ‘religion’, \textit{History, Religion, and Anti-Semitism} (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 136, 163, 172. His definition has been glossed as an ‘an individual response to the challenges of faith and the demands of worship’, see R.N. Swanson, ‘Unity and diversity, rhetoric and reality: modelling “the Church”’, \textit{Journal of Religious History}, 20 (1996), p. 160. (Incidentally, the depths of this debate in the fields of philosophy and sociology quickly become apparent in Langmuir’s work).

\textsuperscript{12} Neither does a concept of spirituality as rooted in a sense of Christian community quite equate with the intended use of the term here, see R.N. Swanson (ed. and trans.), \textit{Catholic England: Faith, Religion, and Observance Before the Reformation} (Manchester, 1993), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{13} The potential ‘atomisation’ of Langmuir’s concept of spirituality is problematic, (Swanson, ‘Unity and diversity’, p. 160) when the reform movement should be seen as shared spirituality here. Moreover, any sense of ideological ‘universality’ is impossible to affirm here if spirituality is always individualised.


\textsuperscript{15} In eleventh-century society, Christianity arguably influenced not just the ‘political community’, but the entire political cosmology; it thus cannot be considered to have been an ideology in competition with other political ideologies. The modernist perspective on religious ideology is that it is something to be ‘explained’ since it
ideology’ in terms of ‘fundamentalism’ are also unhelpful.\(^{16}\) That a significant proportion of the theoretical literature is informed by a Marxian critique is also significant for the study of religion.\(^{17}\)

**Simony, nicholaitism, and investiture:**

The papal campaign against simony and nicholaitism, and to some degree, investiture, formed the mainstay of Gregorian reform spirituality. These issues have been taken together to comprise a key part of the Gregorian reform ‘programme’.\(^{18}\) Gregory was indeed resolved to take firm action against what he perceived to be the principal threats to the Church’s liberty and moral purity, although the sense of ideological ‘coherence’ implicit within programmatic readings of reform remains to be qualified. Focussing firstly on simony and nicholaitism, while both issues are obviously distinct, they have been taken together in both history and

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\(^{16}\) See, for example, A. Heywood, *Political Ideologies: an Introduction* (3rd edn., Basingstoke, 2003), pp. 292-318. While it cannot be disproved that Gregorian reform (or seemingly any religious idea) was fundamentalist in Heywood’s theoretical terms, ‘a style of thought in which certain principles are recognised as essential truths’ (p. 299), the term has pejorative connotations and should therefore be avoided. Furthermore, ‘religious fundamentalism’ is an inherently relative term; it implies the existence of other less hard-line religious alternatives. In this sense, medieval religion may only be ‘fundamentalist’ in modern historical perspective.

\(^{17}\) Mannheim and Eagleton, for example, from whom three of the above theoretical models are respectively derived, are both inclined towards a Marxian concept of ideology as oppressing and distorting, although in a moderated form. At issue particularly here is the essentially negative characterisation of religion and religious agency which Marxism encourages: Marx’s arguments assume that religion must be false and thus try to explain why people subscribe to evidently mistaken beliefs, A. Grimes, ‘Ideology and religion’, in Manning (ed.), *The Form of Ideology*, p. 25. This approach arguably declines the challenge to ‘take seriously’ expressions of religious belief and must consequently be applied with caution to the history of spirituality, see J. Van Engen, ‘The Christian Middle Ages as a historiographical problem’, *The American Historical Review*, 91 (1986), p. 523.

historiography as the main focus of the clerical reformation in this period. The subtext to the reform of both practices was a broader process of ‘clericalisation’ which aimed, in ideological terms, to more rigorously ‘contrast’ the socio-religious status of the clergy from the laity; achieving this, perhaps ironically, by the ‘monasticisation’ of clerical ethics. Both practices were also interpreted in terms of the dangers of pollution and proprietary dislocation. On this basis, therefore, they will be analysed collectively. The terms ‘simony’ and ‘nicholaitism’ are of course partisan - more neutrally, the issue centred on the sale of ecclesiastical office and clerical unchastity - although these terms do capture the moral value reformers assigned to these perceived ‘abuses’.

Gregory’s uncompromising assault on simony as ‘the principal plague in the Church’ is evidenced by his principal hagiographer, bishop Paul of Benried, who, in the Life of Gregory, places Gregory’s reforms in a providential context by including a vision of his papal election featuring Simon Magus. Such spiritual rhetoric was the basis for Gregory’s procedural definition of simony in his conciliar ruling of November 1078. Gregory’s preoccupation

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21 Life of Gregory, c.113, p. 357. According to The Life, before his election, ‘the venerable Hildebrand…saw a vision predicting that he would soon acquire the papacy. Simon Magus appeared to him, capering and rejoicing on a ship, and he himself appeared to fall on him, to wrestle with him, to subdue him under his feet and to fetter him with indissoluble bonds. There are few who do not know that a ship signifies the Church, in which, before the pontificate of this blessed man, Simon Magus in the persons of his followers had certainly sported with sacrilegious venality, freely and shamelessly buying and selling ecclesiastical offices’, c.25, p. 275. This may have been a narrative device on Paul’s part since, in Gregory’s letters, his papal election is emphasised as a spontaneous event and no prior vision is mentioned, see Reg., 1.1., p. 2.

22 ‘Ordinations which take place through the intervention of a price or of pleas or of service to some person done for this intention, or which take place not by common consent of clergy and people according to canonical enactments…we have judged to be void, since those ordained in such a way do not enter through
with curbing simony is also demonstrable from the weight of the epistolary evidence.

Gregory’s letters of rebuke and imploration to the priests and laymen implicated in simoniacl appointments underlines the gravity of this issue. Almost immediately after his election in 1073, for example, Gregory turned his attention to the ‘undermining of religion’ on the part of the simoniacl Lombard episcopate.\(^23\) This campaign of letters, together with more practical measures such as legatine councils and boycotts of simoniacl masses,\(^24\) gave a reinforced emphasis to this guiding principle of the reform movement.\(^25\)

In conjunction with Gregory’s efforts to curb simony were his reforms against clerical unchastity. While ‘nicholaitism’ is not a term found in the Register, Gregory’s hostility to clerical ‘concubinage’ or ‘fornication’ is nevertheless made plain.\(^26\) Gregory’s letters strongly bear witness to his determination to eradicate nicholaitism. Shortly after his 1075 Lenten synod, for example, Gregory composed a trio of letters to senior German ecclesiastics to encourage their pursuit of reform against clerical marriage.\(^27\) Many of Gregory’s letter-treatises on nicholaitism are reproduced in the Life and were evidently thought to have aided

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\(^23\) See Reg., 1.11, p. 11.

\(^24\) See below, pp. 28, 72.

\(^25\) Gregory’s pontificate needs to be seen as the climax of an increasing hostility towards simoniacl priests on the part of the reform papacy and a more broadly based popular reform movement. Many localised pressure groups such as the Milanese Patarenes had encouraged protest against simony through their ‘raging intolerance towards the status quo in the church’, see K.J. Leyser, ‘On the eve of the first European revolution’, in T. Reuter (ed.), Communications and Power in Medieval Europe: The Gregorian Revolution and Beyond (London, 1994), pp. 2-3; see below, p. 74.

\(^26\) This term was rather used by cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, see Cowdrey, ‘Gregory VII and the chastity of the clergy’, p. 284. A variety of terms are used in the historiography to describe this aspect of reform: ‘clerical marriage’, ‘incontinence’, ‘unchastity’, ‘celibacy’. For a discussion of the distinctions see G. Macy, The Hidden History of Women’s Ordination (Oxford, 2008), p. xiii.

\(^27\) Gregory addressed bishop Burchard of Halberstadt: ‘we urgently enjoin and by apostolic authority command that you faithfully execute the things that you both heard before from our legates and that are more fully driven home by the testimony of this letter...that you cherish kindly the chaste and religious clergy’, Reg., 2.66, p. 160. He similarly addressed archbishop Werner of Magdeburg: ‘we enjoin and command you by apostolic authority that...to preach and more zealously to drive home the chastity of clerks’, Reg., 2.68, p. 162. He wrote similarly to archbishop Anno Cologne, Reg., 2.67, p. 160.
the case for Gregory’s sanctification. Gregory also legislated against clerical marriage, although in this respect he may only have been building upon the foundations of earlier reformers.

In terms of applying the concept of ideology here, it must be noted that the attempted prohibition of simony and nicholaitism was very clearly ambitious. Gregorian reform aimed to eradicate clerical practices which were institutionally and culturally commonplace and, as such, was minimal in its practical impact. As Christopher Brooke has commented, the reform cardinalate shared a ‘high idealism’ in its approach to curbing clerical marriage. There may then have been a ‘utopian’ element to Gregorian reform spirituality. Yet, even if the total purification Gregory desired was unachievable, his facilitation of legatine councils, and encouragements of lay boycotts of unreformed clergy, may be taken as evidence of his attempt to break out of this specific ideological mode. Gregory’s disciplinary actions against unreformed and disobedient bishops were also important: excommunication and deposition were not only applied to the offenders themselves but against those ecclesiastics failing to

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29 Gregory legislated against nicholaitism at his 1078 November synod, although the text of the decree is not included in the synodal record, see Reg., 6.5b, 282. According to Blumenthal, the decrees against nicholaitism issued by pope Nicholas II’s council of 1059 were more instrumental than any legislation of Gregory’s, see ‘Gregory VII and the prohibition of clerical marriage’, p. 253.
30 The ubiquity of simony and nicholaitism at the beginning of the reform papacy is emphasised by Bruno of Segni in the opening of his Sermon: ‘the whole world was plunged into evil; holiness had disappeared; righteousness had perished and truth had been buried… Simon Magus possessed the Church; bishops and priests were addicted to pleasure and fornication’, Sermon, c.1, p. 377. Bruno’s moralistic rhetoric is revealing of reformers’ attitudes, although it is not necessarily a reliable indication of the true extent of the sales of ecclesiastical offices and clerical marriage in this period. For the practical impact of reform, see Tellenbach, The Church, p. 349.
32 On the other hand, Peter Damian perhaps had a more realistic view of the chances of extirpating simony: ‘the poison of this heresy was so deep-rooted and so entrenched…indeed, it would have been easier to convert a Jew to the faith than to bring one of these heretical scoundrels to true repentance’, ‘Life of Saint Romuald of Ravenna’, in T.F. Head (ed.), Medieval Hagiography: An Anthology (New York, 2000), c. 36, p. 308, trans. H. Leyser.
33 The boycotts were driven by a specific theology (not to say ideology) of sacramental efficacy, see below, p. 27.
promote reform. At his November synod of 1078, Gregory also decreed that: ‘if any bishop shall, with pleas or money intervening, tolerate the fornication of priests, deacons, and subdeacons or the crime of incest in his jurisdiction…let him be suspended from office’. While the institutionalisation of reform is more fully addressed below, it is sufficient to note here that, despite the idealism of these aspects of reform, Gregory’s use of a variety of strategies to achieve practical results moderates a sense of ‘utopianism’.

Testing the applicability of ideology also requires attention to the languages with which reform was expressed and justified. The campaign against simony and nicholaitism was accompanied by strong spiritual rhetoric in which the bipolarity of purity and pollution was prominent. As the Life attests, Gregory had made it his task to ‘drive out of the Lord’s sanctuary both simoniacal heresy and the foul pollution of lecherous intercourse’. Indeed, Gregory’s descriptions of the unreformed episcopate were generally glossed by moralistic rhetoric: he wrote in July 1073 that the archbishop of Milan had ‘presumed to buy, like a base slave-girl, the Church… [and] prostitute the bride of Christ to the devil’. There is a similar language of sexual pollution in Peter Damian’s commentary. Moral purity, as well as being

34 Gregory reproved the archbishop of Mainz in September 1075, for example, for his perceived complacency in curtailing simony (and clerical marriage) in his diocese, having not convened a reforming council, Reg., 3.4, p. 178. Gregory excommunicated and deposed bishop Otto of Constance for his ‘disobedience’ by not promoting reform as Gregory had encouraged in prior letters, commenting ‘how dangerous it is, and how far removed from the law of Christ, not to be obedient, especially to the apostolic see’, Ep. Vag., 10, p. 25.
35 Reg., 6.5b, p. 285.
36 See chapter two, beginning p. 51.
39 Reg., 1.15, p. 16; Gregory’s demand to Otto of Constance prior to his excommunication was that he should ‘obey our commands by driving out from the Lord’s sanctuary the simoniac heresy and the foul defilement of polluting lust’, Ep. Vag. 9, p. 21.
40 As Damian passionately argued in one of his letter-treatises, ‘Are you unaware that the Son of God was so dedicated to the purity of the flesh that he was not born of conjugal chastity, but rather from the womb of a virgin?…Therefore, if our redeemer so loved the integrity of flowering chastity … by whom. I ask, does he
an important aspect of reform spirituality, was also an essential pre-requisite for clericalisation, whereby ‘to define a spiritual elite and to construct its social power within the western Christian tradition, the rhetoric of ritual purity was required’. 41

Concurrent with anxieties about purity, however, were fears about how simony and nicholaitism could reinforce the proprietary church. R.I. Moore has argued that Gregory’s campaign against clerical marriage was primarily motivated by the need to prevent the ‘privatisation’ of ecclesiastical property and thus entailed a notion of proto-communist ‘public ownership’ of the Church. 42 This is perhaps a more materialist explanation than most, although it rightly emphasises the important political and economic context to this aspect of reform spirituality. Since the sale of ecclesiastical office and/or its transmission by inheritance were part of the functioning of the proprietary Church system, 43 Gregory’s notion of libertas ecclesiae demanded the independence of the Church from the context of lay control in which this ‘abusive’ style of clerical livelihood could occur. Whether this focus on the ‘alienation of church property’ 44 actually outweighed desires for a morally uncontaminated priesthood is debatable. Robinson has argued that reform ‘was couched in moral terms, as an attack on the heresy of simony…but behind the rhetoric there was a realisation that the Church needed temporal wealth and the political power contingent upon wealth’. 45 For the Marxian

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44 Cushing, Reform and the Papacy, p. 99.
interpreter, this clothing of an economic motive in religious rhetoric is surely ideology *par excellence*. Yet dichotomising purity and property in this sense is perhaps misinformed. Papal reformers such as Pope Leo IX had articulated the temporal benefits of curtailing simony and nicholaitism in conjunction with moral purity.\(^{46}\) Likewise, it has been demonstrated that the ‘recovery’ of ecclesiastical property and rights on the part of reformed monasteries was not perceived to be in contrast with their reform spirituality.\(^{47}\) A contrast between property and purity cannot equate therefore with a contrast between ‘power-politics’ and ‘ideology’ in the normative definition; lordship had an ideational status for reformers since it engendered simony and nicholaitism.\(^{48}\)

The controversy over the sacramental capability of simoniae and nicholaite priests forms another context for interpreting this aspect of reform spirituality. The dispute was premised on the theology that the impurities a cleric sustained through sexual ‘fornication’ or simoniacal election diminished the efficacy of his own masses and ordinations. As Gregory argued writing to Otto of Constance: ‘how can a man be a dispenser or minister of the holy sacraments, when he can on no account be even a partaker of them’?\(^{49}\) It was on this basis that Gregory encouraged ‘the faithful of Italy and Germany’ to boycott.\(^{50}\) More radical,}

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\(^{46}\) Writing in 1051 to the cathedral canons of Lucca on the conditions of the true monastic life, Leo argued that the ‘value of a canonical life with the community of property is a salutary alternative to the moral scandal and material wastefulness of a married clergy’. Leo’s recognition here of the double benefit of clerical celibacy for the Church, both in moral and proprietary terms, is revealing, cited in Cowdrey, ‘The chastity of the clergy’, p. 269.

\(^{47}\) W. Ziezulewicz, “‘Restored’ churches in the fisc of St. Florent-de-Saumur (1021-1118): reform ideology or economic motivation?”, *Revue Bénédictine*, 96 (1986), p. 15. It has also been demonstrated that a dichotomy cannot be placed between spiritual and material gain in lay patronage of churches, see Howe, ‘The nobility’s reform of the medieval Church’, *American Historical Review*, 93 (1988), p. 336.

\(^{48}\) ‘Liberty’ from the proprietary system was an important part of Gregorian reform and so lordship cannot be seen as non-ideational in this sense, see below, p. 40.


\(^{50}\) ‘As for priests, deacons, and subdeacons who are guilty of the crime of fornication...we forbid them entry into the church until they repent...should any prefer to remain in their sin let none of you dare to hear their offices. For their blessing is made a curse and their prayer a sin’, *Ep. Vag.*, 32, pp. 85-87. As Melve has
however, was the position of cardinal Humbert who maintained that sacraments were actually ‘impaired by the moral defects of the celebrants’. While it was not Gregory’s personal theology that ‘the validity of the sacrament was undermined by the actions or character of the priest’, the lay boycotts he encouraged have nevertheless been interpreted as neo-Donatist.

Others were more liberal on this aspect of sacramental theology. Peter Damian, for example, placed more emphasis on ‘culitic purity’ and the moral judgement of the clergy to reject simony and nicholaitism: ‘for those who wallow in the filth of wanton pleasure, how can they dare in their pernicious security to participate in the sacrament of the saving Eucharist…how much better it would be for these men to withdraw from exercising their orders’. The important point here, as far as defining ideology is concerned, is whether the theological differences within the reform cardinalate on this aspect of sacramental spirituality create an overall sense of ‘incoherence’ which, in theoretical terms, precludes the application of ideology.

argued, Gregory’s rhetoric on this subject was strongly grounded in imperative of the clergy’s moral cleanliness, see ‘The public debate on clerical marriage in the late eleventh century’, JEH, 61 (2010), p. 690.

51 Morrison, ‘Gregorian Reform’, p. 184; Cushing, Reform and the Papacy, p. 96.


53 M.D. Lambert, Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from the Gregorian Reform to the Reformation (2nd edn., Oxford, 1992), p. 37. According to Guido of Ferarra, one of the Gregory’s schismatic cardinals, ‘[Gregory] taught contrary to the Fathers of the New Testament when he gave orders that the sacraments of schismatics and unworthy Ministers were not to be received, but rather spat out; and that the consecrations of excommunications…were invalid and ought not to be termed consecrations’, ‘On the schism of Hildebrand’, in P. Llewlyn (trans.), The Age of Gregory VII: Extracts From Two Gregorian tracts: http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/churchhistory220/topicfive/petercrassustreatise.html [accessed 1.8.11], b.2. According to Helen Parish, Gregory was less concerned with sacramentality than the importance of moral obedience to Rome. As such he resisted attempts to link clerical marriage with heresy and treated celibacy as an aspect of papal authority rather than a matter of doctrine, Clerical Celibacy, p. 112; see also Cowdrey, ‘The chastity of the clergy’, p. 285.

Lay investiture, the third issue within the reputed ‘reform programme’, is traditionally associated with the conflict between Church and State in Gregory’s pontificate, yet it remains relevant in the present context of spirituality in respect of its links with simony. That investiture was actually synonymous with simony was first articulated by cardinal Humbert’s *Three books against the simoniacs* (c.1058).\(^{55}\) This was a radical interpretation since, at the outset of the reform papacy, the movement to curtail simony co-existed with lay investiture, as demonstrated by king Henry III’s resolution of the papal schism at Sutri in 1046.\(^{56}\) By the time of the Gregorian period proper, however, many reformers believed that the function of the Church within Salian kingship ‘inescapably fostered a climate in which simony would be rife’.\(^{57}\) This seems to be at least one justification for the excommunication of king Henry IV in 1076: ‘he had polluted with the simoniac heresy the bishoprics and the many monasteries in which, for a price, wolves had been established instead of shepherds’.\(^{58}\) In the narrative of Berthold of Reichenau, a Gregorian-allied monastic chronicler, the proscription of investiture at Gregory’s 1078 November council is justified in terms of the protection of ‘religion’ and ‘Christian authority’ - spiritual rhetoric it would seem - although Berthold also comments that lay lords should not seize church lands.\(^{59}\) In the *Register’s* report of Gregory’s prohibition at

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\(^{55}\) As Humbert argued, ‘for how does it pertain to lay persons to distribute ecclesiastical sacraments and episcopal or pastoral grace, that is to say crozier staffs and rings, with which all episcopal consecration is principally effected and by which it functions and is sustained?’ ‘Against lay investiture’, in B. Tierney (ed. and trans.), *The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300: With Selected Documents* (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), p. 40.

\(^{56}\) See below, p. 98. In Damian’s *Life of Romuald* also, simony is clearly condemned although investiture on the part of Emperor Otto III is described without criticism, c. 22, p. 302.

\(^{57}\) Cushing, *Reform and the Papacy*, p. 97.

\(^{58}\) *Ep. Vag.*, 14, p. 35. Henry had been keen to re-establish royal control over the episcopate by nominating his own candidates, although this was interpreted as simony by Gregorians, see Robinson, *Henry IV of Germany, 1056-1106* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 369.

\(^{59}\) ‘Since we have learned that in many parts of the world investitures of churches are performed by lay persons contrary to the decrees of the holy Fathers and that from this there arise many disturbances in the Church – nay the ruination of holy religion – by means of which we have perceived that the very dignity of Christian authority is trampled underfoot, we have decreed that no member of the clergy is to receive investiture of a bishopric or an abbey or a church or a provostship or any clerical dignity from the hand of an emperor or a king or any person’, Berthold, *Chronicle* in I.S. Robinson (ed. and trans), *Eleventh-Century Germany: The*
his 1080 Lenten synod, no decrees mention any ‘heretical’ dimension of investiture linked with simony. Rather, the principal sins of those laymen who appoint ecclesiastics are ‘the crime alike of ambition and of disobedience’.

Clearly, there were a variety of justifications for the papal proscription of investiture; yet, more than being an issue of conserving ecclesiastical property, the crux of Gregory’s reforms against investiture was the idea that laymen should not confer spiritual office and, thus, an issue of ecclesiastical authority.

Reflecting on this discussion of simony, nicholaitism, and investiture, it is perhaps difficult to pinpoint Gregorian thinking on these aspects of reform spirituality. Concepts as diverse as sacramental efficacy, sexual pollution, proprietary alienation, and obedience to papal authority, were all invoked to justify reform. On the one hand, this conceptual variety undermines the intellectual ‘coherence’ of Gregorian reform and accordingly lessens the applicability of ideology. On the other, might this not be an indication of the diversity of ideas used to justify Gregorian reform rather than necessarily an indication of their ‘incoherence’? Since the point at which the ‘variation’ within the principles driving Gregorian reform gives way to ‘incoherence’ is debatable, the application of this ideological category is perhaps more subjective than scientific. If ‘incoherence’ is accepted, it might be possible to conceive of each of these themes as discrete ideologies in their own right; all perhaps equally ‘coherent’, although without collectively cohering to affirm a ‘coherent’ ‘Gregorian ideology’. Yet

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60 Swabian Chronicles (Manchester, 2008), second version, 1078, p. 217, my emphasis. (This is an adaptation of Reg., 6.5b, decree 3, p. 282).

61 Gregory also confirmed at this council his prohibition of investiture for lower ranks of the ecclesiastical hierarchy; lower at least than an archbishopric or abbacy, see Reg., 7.14a, p. 340. While investiture at the local level is important, conceptually, it was the prohibition of the royal prerogative of investiture which was most important for heightening the ideological ‘contrast’ between papacy and kingship.


63 Neither was there an overall clarity of sanctions or methods to achieve this reform, see Cowdrey, ‘The chastity of the clergy’, p. 275.
defining ‘subsidiary’ ideologies as such carries the danger of trivialising the concept of ideology itself.  

The model of the Early Church:

The image of the apostolic Church, as witnessed in scripture and in patristic writings, was the primary ideational and historical context for Gregorian reform spirituality. The ubiquitous references in the Register to scripture and the Church Fathers, especially popes Gregory I and Leo I, demonstrate the centrality of the apostolic period in Gregory’s mind. His dictum that ‘truth is superior to custom’ demonstrates, for Ladner, the grounding of Gregory’s ‘reform ideology’ in the concept of renewal he derived from the Early Church. In particular, this was his justification for encouraging the ‘universalisation’ of the Roman rite. With respect to the

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63 The problem of subsidiary concepts themselves becoming ideologies, or sub-ideologies, has been observed analogously with ‘mentalité’. As Robert Swanson has argued, ‘communal variants provide subsidiary identifications within the superior community of the mentalité…these possibilities of fragmentation and “subcultures” raise methodological problems with the model, centring on the basic validity of the concept of mentalité: if such subdivisions are allowed and acknowledged, are they not themselves mentalities, and does not this potential for fragmentation then become so reductionist that it permits absolute individualism[?]’, ‘Modelling “the Church”’, p. 162. According to Ullmann, all Gregorian principles were relative to the concept of Petrinity: ‘the papacy came to develop a number of principles...but seen from the angle of the papacy itself these were consequences or subsidiary principles arising from the fundamental principles adhered to by the papacy that it itself was founded by divinity through Saint Peter’, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (London, 1961), p. 31. It is perhaps possible to rank ‘principles’ in this sense, but this cannot extend to ideologies.


65 A notion of ideology can perhaps be positively affirmed here in relation to Gregory’s efforts to promote the universality of the Roman rite. Recalling that ideologies are said to ‘universalise’ themselves, Gregory’s attempt to universalise the Roman liturgy is significant. Gregory challenged several provincial liturgical rites and demanded the conformity of liturgical celebration to the Roman rite. This was inspired by his reverence for the Early Church and, likewise, his disaffection for the liturgical ‘customs’ which had developed elsewhere. He thus demanded that the local Churches to ‘relinquish uncatholic additions to the liturgy and return to the ancient custom’, Ladner, ‘Two Gregorian letters’, p. 238. Gregory oversaw the successful substitution of the Mozarabic rite and supported the Patarenes against the stubborn loyalty of their clergy to the Ambrosian rite. The universality of liturgy needs also to be seen in the context of papal authority. In Iberia especially the liturgical issue has been described as ‘acting as a very thin cloak’ for Gregory’s designs...
Early Church, the spirituality of Gregorian reform was perhaps more retrospective than revolutionary. In the context of the ‘customs’ which had developed since the Patristic period, however, such a retrospective remoulding of Christian society to the standards of apostolic ‘truth’ was not short of revolution. Gregory’s emphasis upon the Petrine commission and coenobitic monasticism were two of the most important aspects of his understanding of the Early Church and the Late Antique period, although the extent to which he preserved a sense of eschatology is debatable.

The histories of patristic popes and Fathers were also mined by reformers to inform the ecclesiological debates sparked by Gregorian reform. The first three sections of Bonizo of Sutri’s Book to a Friend, for example, are a history of the Church from Constantine, detailing the ‘authority of ancient examples from the holy Fathers’. That this material was deemed relevant to Bonizo’s overall purpose of legitimising Gregory’s pontificate illustrates how reform was historicised in the context of the Early Church with a view to rebutting claims of revolution or novelty. This polemical strategy can perhaps be understood as the attempted ideological ‘naturalisation’ of Gregorian reform whereby ‘partisan’ values, such as the


See below, pp. 33, 38 for discussions of Petrinity and monasticism. Andre Vauchez has argued that the waning of eschatology gave rise to Gregory’s ultimate aim to build the earthly city in Augustinian terms, but as a holy theocracy: ‘in the minds of the Gregorians, a palpable distortion occurred on the eschatological plane: anxious expectation of the final catastrope gave way to a desire to build the kingdom of God here and now’, The Spirituality of the Medieval West: From the Eighth to the Twelfth Century (Kalamazoo, 1993), trans. C. Friedlander, pp. 67-68. Brett Whalen has also argued that Gregory’s notion of Christendom was implicitly eschatological: ‘pushed to extreme conclusions, the political theology of the reform papacy implied a collapsing of the boundary between secular and ecclesiastical governance, leaving the pope as the sole impresario of a unified world that portended the coming of the kingdom of God’, Dominion of God, Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 2009), p. 12. Eschatology is de-emphasised, however, by Cowdrey, PG, p. 533. It would be interesting to explore the relationship between eschatology and papal institutionalisation, although there is not sufficient scope to do so here.

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Gregorian interpretation of papal authority for example, were projected as ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’.\(^6\) Moreover, where some Early-Church precedents actually conflicted with Gregorian reform, they themselves had to be ‘naturalised’; for instance, where the scriptural basis for clerical celibacy was less assured.\(^7\) Repristination was not completely authentic therefore when a process of ideological ‘naturalisation’ was employed.

**Petrinity:**

Gregory’s emphasis on his status as successor of Peter was the most fundamental aspect of his relationship with the Early Church. His vicariate of Peter constituted his unique entitlement to primacy over the episcopate as well as an axiomatic justification for papal actions.\(^8\) On the basis of Gregory’s ‘total and abiding identification with Peter’s role in the Church and the world’,\(^9\) his spirituality was arguably defined by his Petrinity. Gregory’s fullest exposition of Petrinity is perhaps his 1083 letter to the ‘bishops and laymen’ of Flanders:

‘The care and oversight of all the churches has been committed by God to our small self. For the Lord Jesus Christ has appointed blessed Peter to be prince of the apostles, giving to him the kingdom of heaven and the power of binding and loosing in heaven and on earth; upon him, also, he has built his Church, committing to him his sheep that they should be fed. From that time, this principality and power have passed through blessed Peter to all who have received his throne, or who will receive it until the end of the world, by divine privilege and hereditary right’.\(^{10}\)

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69 For Eagleton’s theory, see below, p. 15. For the ‘naturalisation’ of the hierocratic theory, see below, p. 65.
70 The prominence of married clergy in the Old and New Testaments, for example, was problematic, see Blumenthal, ‘Gregory VII the prohibition of nicholaitism’, p. 253; Parish, *Clerical Celibacy*, p. 89; see below, p. 65 for a discussion of the ideological ‘naturalisation’ of the ‘legend of Paphnutius’ as a precedent for clerical marriage.
72 *PG*, p. 529
73 *Reg.*, 9.35, p. 436, cited in *PG*, p. 521. Gregory’s closing statement in one of his last letters is also revealing of this core principle: ‘so now my dearly beloved brothers, listen carefully to what I have to say to you. All who in the whole world bear the name of Christian and truly understand the Christian faith know and believe
This pastoral warrant to oversee the whole Church accords well with the ‘universalisation’ which is claimed to be the characteristic of ideology.\textsuperscript{74} Dedicating an explicit subsection of the analysis to ‘Petriunity’, however, is perhaps problematic in the sense that papal (Petrine) authority was in general the subtext to Gregorian reform. While Gregory’s reforms against simony, clerical marriage, and investiture were demonstrably justified by a variety of principles, the papal entitlement to lead reform was predicated on Petrine authority. A monarchic authority was also elaborated from the Petrine commission whereby Gregory claimed a hierocratic supremacy over secular rulers.\textsuperscript{75}

Gregory’s Petrine spirituality has been interpreted by Morrison as a \textit{doctrine} of ‘divine vocation’.\textsuperscript{76} Can it in fact be understood as ideological in the scientific sense?\textsuperscript{77} An area of particular debate here is the ‘coherence’ of Gregory’s Petrine identity; whether or not he perceived himself to hold a ‘mystical union with Peter’.\textsuperscript{78} Gregory’s sentence of excommunication pronounced against Henry IV in 1076 was delivered, in the epistolary record, as direct prayer to Peter.\textsuperscript{79} Gregory’s citation here of the Matt. 16:18-19 commission text demonstrates his self-identity as the most superior Christian in the Church, although there

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that St. Peter, the prince of the apostles, is father of all Christians and their first shepherd after Christ, and that the holy Roman church is the mother and mistress of all the churches’, \textit{Ep., Vag.}, 54, p. 135
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\textsuperscript{74} For the theory, see above, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{75} For discussion of Petriunity and papal monarchy, see below, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{76} Morrison, ‘Gregorian reform’, p. 180.

\textsuperscript{77} For a discussion of interpreting Marxian ideology within the theology of papal primacy, see M.J. Buckley, \textit{Papal Primacy and the Episcopate: Towards a Relational Understanding} (New York, 1998), pp. 22-25.


\textsuperscript{79} ‘The Christian people entrusted especially to you should be obedient especially to me through your vicarship committed to me…on your behalf I bind him [Henry] with the chain of anathema; and so I bind him with confidence in you that the people may know and approve that your are Peter, and upon this rock the Son of the living God has built his church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it’, \textit{Reg.} 3.10, pp. 192-193.
is no express indication of unity with Peter.\textsuperscript{80} On the other hand, the rationale of \textit{D.P. 23} is seemingly that a papal incumbent assumes Petrine sanctity.\textsuperscript{81} Historians have differed in their interpretations of this statement as the apparent institutionalisation of sanctity.\textsuperscript{82} This distinction between incumbent and office remained a bone of contention between Anselm of Lucca and cardinal Deusdedit, as well as a long-term problem for medieval political theory.\textsuperscript{83} In view of the ‘inconsistency and ambiguity’ – although not quite ‘incoherence’ - of Gregory’s Petrine identity,\textsuperscript{84} it is perhaps safest to conclude that the essence of the relationship was symbolic, although very powerfully so.

There may also have been an element of ideological ‘utopianism’ to Gregory’s Petrine spirituality. The universality of Gregory’s authority remained only theoretical since his interpretation of papal primacy had yet to be institutionalised, and even when institutionalised was resisted. The implication of Gregory’s claimed ‘universal episcopacy’ was that \textit{plenitude potestatis} was exclusively papal.\textsuperscript{85} This precluded any prior sense of collegiality enjoyed by

\textsuperscript{80} Rather, Gregory’s emphasis the inheritance of Petrine powers: ‘I believe it to be by \textit{your grace and not by my works} that it has pleased, and does please, you that the Christian people should be \textit{obedient especially to me through your vicarship committed to me},’ \textit{Ibid.}, p. 192, my emphasis.

\textsuperscript{81} ‘That the Roman pontiff, if he shall have been canonically instituted, is indubitably made holy by the merits of blessed Peter’.

\textsuperscript{82} Cowdrey argues that Gregory perceived ‘official sanctity’ to have literally entailed ‘personal sanctity’, something which transgressed earlier reformers’ ideas, \textit{PG}, pp. 526-529. This was revolutionary compared to Humbert’s earlier distinction between Peter’s ‘merits and his office’, see Gilchrist ‘Canon law aspects of the Gregorian reform programme’, in \textit{Canon Law in the Age of Reform, 11th-12th Centuries} (Aldershot, 1993), p 30. According to Ullmann, the nuance was that the inheritor of Petrine powers becomes sainted in the \textit{tradition} of Peter, but not in the liturgical sense, ‘\textit{Romanus Pontifex indubitanter efficitur sanctus: Dictatus Papae 23 in retrospect and prospect}’, \textit{SG}, 6, (1959/1961), pp. 233, 255; Klaus Shatz similarly argues that the essence of \textit{D.P. 23} was not ‘an automatic sanctity…but of a kind of sacramental “bestowal” of grace through the office’, \textit{Papal Primacy}, p. 88.


\textsuperscript{84} See Tellenbach, \textit{The Church}, p. 306.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 311.
the episcopate.\textsuperscript{86} Indeed, Leo IX’s notion of \textit{cardinalis}, ‘expressing the participation of its bearers in the primacy of Peter’ was clearly obsolete by the 1070s.\textsuperscript{87} The idealism of Gregory’s concept of Petrinity was therefore rooted in its radicalness; indeed, papal authority was theoretically-based precisely because its revolutionary implications had yet to be accepted.\textsuperscript{88} This interpretation of the ideological model allows for a relative sense of ‘utopianism’ through which the idealism of Gregorian reform is judged by the realistic standards of achieving it. To argue otherwise, that Petrinity was unconditionally ‘utopian’ would imply that there could be no basis in actuality for the Petrine inheritance and hence the Christian Church.

**The Berengarian Controversy:**

The incidence of the ‘Berengarian Controversy’ during Gregory’s pontificate illustrates another aspect of reform spirituality in its formation. The debate prompted by the Eucharistic theology of Berengar of Tours is a rare example of ‘doctrinal’ dissent where ‘heresy’ was more usually associated with challenges to papal authority.\textsuperscript{89} Berengar’s ‘spiritualist’ challenge to the ‘realist’ understanding of Christ’s presence during the Eucharist was controversial, yet, according to Cowdrey, the sacramental theologies of Berengar and Gregory were not far removed. Rather, Gregory was tolerant, if not even sympathetic, to Berengar’s

\textsuperscript{86} Critics argued: ‘unity of Christ’s body derived not from any personal sanctification through Saint Peter’s merits’, Morrison, ‘The spirituality’ p. 182.


\textsuperscript{88} When papal primacy was applied, for example during papal legation, it was strongly resisted by the episcopate, see below, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{89} Robinson, \textit{Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest: The Polemical Literature of the late Eleventh Century} (Manchester, 1978), pp. 22-24; see also J. Arnold, \textit{Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe} (London, 2005), p. 197
ideas.\textsuperscript{90} Although Berengar’s teaching was finally condemned at Gregory’s Lenten synod of 1079 - at which it was preached that ‘the bread and wine are substantially converted into the Lord’s body’, contrary to those who ‘tried to assert by certain quibbles that it is in symbol only’,\textsuperscript{91} - Gregory was hardly doctrinaire in his approach to Berengar’s ‘spiritualism’: ‘Gregory seems to have for long acted towards Berengar much as he did in other liturgical and sacramental matters: not by trying to establish and impose a single ruling but by exploring which varieties were and were not acceptable in the light of traditional authorities’.\textsuperscript{92}

This theological flexibility could be interpreted as an indication of ‘incoherence’ on Gregory’s part which, in turn, would preclude applying ideology. It is vital, however, to appreciate that no such ‘coherence’ existed in sacramental theology at this point. A ‘tradition of diversity’ instead prevailed,\textsuperscript{93} as revealed by the 1079 synodal report.\textsuperscript{94} While the issue of the real presence was temporarily abated by Gregory’s council, it of course resurfaced throughout the later period. Moreover, that the Eucharist was, according to Rubin, a broader cultural language for medieval Christianity in which its institutional (i.e. papal) theorisation carried only a limited weight, complicates how ideological ‘coherence’ is to be judged.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{90} PG, p. 496.
\textsuperscript{91} Reg., 6.17a, p. 300.
\textsuperscript{92} PG, p. 500.
\textsuperscript{94} Before Berengar’s teaching was addressed, the papal scribe records that ‘many beforehand…held one view about it and some another’, Reg., 6.17a, p. 300
\textsuperscript{95} Rubin, Corpus Christi, pp. 9-11.
Gregory’s open-mindedness towards Berengar’s teaching may also mitigate a sense of ideological ‘universalisation’ equivalent to his other reforms. While Gregory’s conciliar ruling was clearly intended to be ‘universalised’, both to the ecclesiastics present and in its record in the *Register*, his judgement was prompted more by political expediency since the German episcopate had begun to exploit his inaction for propaganda purposes.\(^96\) Since the issue of the real presence is not mentioned in canonical collections such as the *74t* and only once elsewhere in the *Register*,\(^97\) it may be argued that reformers were less concerned with ‘universalising’ Eucharistic teaching than with other aspects of the ‘Gregorian ideology’.\(^98\)

**Monasticism:**

Benedictine revivalism was an important context for reform spirituality and, institutionally, a key antecedent for the reform papacy.\(^99\) Indeed, Gregory’s reform of clerical ethics was particularly motivated by ‘modes of holy living taught by monasticism’.\(^100\) Monastic reform, with its Early-Church inspired emphasis on the apostolic life, was exemplified by the Cluniac reformers as demonstrated in Gregory’s ‘allocution in praise of Cluny’.\(^101\) This conceptual driving force for reform, together with the Benedictine personnel of the reform cardinalate,\(^102\) highlights the importance of this aspect of spirituality when defining ‘Gregorian ideology’.

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97. Prior to bringing Berengar to judgement, Gregory had written to Hugh of Cluny, seemingly for advice, see *Reg.*, 5.21, p. 270.
98. ‘Universalisation’ in this sense is a more neutral adaptation of Eagleton’s Marxian theorisation of ideology as a deceptive process.
101. ‘By God’s mercy it has come to such a height of excellence and religion under its religious and holy abbots that it surpasses all other monasteries, even much older ones, as I well know, in the service of God and in spiritual fervour’, *Ep. Vag.*, 39, p. 97.
Monasticism was also the basis for Gregory’s worldview. As Cowdrey argues, ‘Gregory’s conception of the religious life and his desire for order both within the Church and in “human affairs”’ was guided by his experience of the Benedictine rule.\(^{103}\) As such, Norman Cantor has interpreted Gregorian reform as desiring to transform ‘the world into a monastery with a universal abbot demanding obedience from all rulers’.\(^{104}\) This conceptualisation of the ‘bonds of society in terms of a Benedictine abbey’ was in reality, however, a ‘simplistic and inappropriate’ analogy on Gregory’s part.\(^{105}\) It was, in other words, too ideological in the ‘utopian’ sense. The compatibility of Cluniac monasticism with Gregory’s hierocratic outlook has also been questioned.\(^{106}\) Moreover, Gregory’s precise monastic status, on which Cowdrey’s entire case for Gregory is built, has recently been challenged.\(^{107}\)

In addition to inspiring its spirituality, reformed monasteries also provided an institutional basis for the practical application of Gregorian reform. In this respect, the hierarchically structured Cluniac filiation network, which has been likened to a ‘sort of autonomous ecclesiastical state’,\(^{108}\) was instrumental in transmitting papal authority in the locality. In expanding the network of papally-allied reformed monasteries, Gregory copied the granting of privileges of monastic ‘immunity’ which had been successfully used to swell the Cluniac network. As such, monasteries or churches were ‘exempt’ from lay or local ecclesiastical

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\(^{107}\) The *Life* records Gregory’s entry into a Roman monastery (*Life of Gregory*, c.9, p. 266), although Blumenthal has suggested that Gregory may have instead been a canon, see M.G. McLaughlin, ‘Review of U.R. Blumenthal, *Gregor VII: Fäpäst Zwischen Canossa und Kirchenreform* (Darmstadt, 2001)’, Speculum, 78 (2003), p. 140.

\(^{108}\) Iogna-Prat, *Order and Exclusion*, p. 29.
control and instead became the property of Saint Peter. More widely, Benedictine reform houses became allied with the Gregorian papacy with a view to applying reform. The monasteries of Monte Cassino and Hirsau, as well as the south-German monastic reform fraternity which included the houses of Reichenau and Saint Blasien, were all outposts of Gregorian reform, although the nature of these allegiances remained debated. Such a network of monastic contacts provided another opportunity for the ideological ‘naturalisation’ of papal authority, as is evidenced in Gregory’s letter to abbot Desiderius of Montecassino, instructing him to negotiate the terms of the papal alliance with duke Robert Guiscard.

As well as creating a basis for reform in practice, monastic immunity can be linked back to reform spirituality in the sense that the liberty of the Church was perceived to be ultimately at stake in curtailing lay rights of investiture. As Gregory wrote in 1080 to abbot William of Hirsau: ‘we wish and by apostolic authority command that no priest, or king, or duke, or count…may venture to claim for himself in that place any conditions of proprietorship – not by hereditary right, not by advocacy, not by investiture, not by any sort of power than might do harm to the liberty of the monastery’. The Cluniac model therefore made a key contribution to the Gregorian notion of libertas ecclesiae. This aspect of spirituality became

111 See Reg., 9.4, p. 404.
112 Reg., 7.24, pp. 355-356, my emphasis.
113 See Robinson, ‘Bibliographical survey’, p. 478. Gregory continued his allocution: ‘they [the Cluniacs] have never bent their necks before any outsider or earthly power, but they have remained under the exclusive obedience and protection of St. Peter…to possess fully the and perpetually the immunity and liberty which have been granted to it by this see’. Ep., Vag., 39, p. 99. Gregory’s symbolic privilege for Cluny in 1075 was thus ‘the classic example of the true liberty in subjection to the lordship of St. Peter, which it was Gregory’s purpose to foster in the Church’, Cowdrey, The Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform, p. 57, see also pp. 51, 55, 136. In the 74t, the concept of ecclesiastical liberty is additionally predicated on the teachings of pope
increasingly politicised, however, once the ‘juridical independence’ of reform houses began to conflict with ‘the logic of the imperial ecclesiastical system’.\textsuperscript{114} As Blumenthal has argued, ‘liberty in the middle ages could only be conceived of in the context of lordship’.\textsuperscript{115} Indeed, since Roman liberty was motivated more by ‘the reformers’ broader ideology of freedom from lay power’,\textsuperscript{116} whether it actually entailed the increased vulnerability of monasteries was perhaps beside the point.

\textit{The Clericalisation of Monasticism:}

Gregory’s own monastic credentials became the subject of polemic following the deterioration of his relationship with Henry in 1076. That he was a ‘false-monk’ and an illegitimate pope were charges levelled by Henrician publicists who were more generally aggrieved about Gregorian reform. Such accusations were mainly of propagandistic intent, although they also reveal the varying perceptions of monasticism in this period. Bishop Benzo of Alba, one of the most vehemently anti-Gregorian writers, argued in his tract \textit{To Emperor Henry IV} (c.1085) that Gregory, by becoming pope in 1073, had contravened his monastic vow of \textit{stabilitas} and had broken a prior oath he had taken against being elected.\textsuperscript{117} Gregory’s

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\item \textsuperscript{114} Logna-Prat, \textit{Order and Exclusion}, p. 28; Gregory had to intervene in 1075, for example, to prevent the monastery of Hirsau from being granted a royal diploma; he instead issued a papal privilege of exemption. Robinson, ‘Pope Gregory VII’, p. 478.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Blumenthal, \textit{The Investiture Controversy}, p. 51. According to Nelson, this typified the ‘Gregorian synthesis whereby religious \textit{libertas} was integrated within hierarchical \textit{ordo}’, see ‘Society, theodicy, and the origins of heresy: towards a reassessment of the medieval evidence’, \textit{Studies in Church History}, 9 (1972) p. 74.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Wood, \textit{The Proprietary Church}, p. 840
\item \textsuperscript{117} According to Benzo’s narrative, Hildebrand and Humbert of Silva Candida visited Cologne as papal legates in 1054. They were not well received, however, by the archbishop of Cologne who accused them of apostasy from their monastic oath in their capacity as papal legates: ‘since you are monks, this affair [the legation] does not concern you. You are runaways from St. Benedict and wish to be bound by no rule…the lord emperor should bind these sarabaites with an oath according to which they find themselves should never become popes’, \textit{To Emperor Henry IV}, p. 370, (see also n.54). This was the basis for Benzo’s accusation of
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oath breaking is also alluded to in the deposition letter penned by the conservatives among the German episcopate at Worms in 1076. Peter Crassus’s *Defence of King Henry* similarly emphasises how Gregory’s conduct mitigated his status as a monk. Despite referring to Gregory throughout as ‘the monk Hildebrand’, Peter maintains that, by leaving his monastery, Gregory had ‘discarded the yoke of the rule he was violating’. Phyllis Jestice has argued that none of these polemicists actually argued that a monk could not become pope, although this seems to be the implication of Benzo’s polemic where he insists that ‘the election of the pope in no way belongs to his [Gregory’s] office’.

Aside from the propaganda value of such accusations, the basis of the Henrician criticism was, according to Jestice, a critique of the clericalisation of monasticism in reform circles. The accusation that Gregory was a ‘sarabaite’ was thus part of a broader critique against the worldly Benedictinism manifested in the reform papacy and the ‘trend in monastic ideology that was slowly spreading…with greater emphasis on working actively for the salvation rather

\[\text{118 Addressing Gregory derogatorily as ‘Hildebrand’, the bishops’ wrote that: ‘it has pleased us to make known to you by the common counsel of all of us something which we have left unsaid until now: that is, the reason why you cannot now be, nor could you ever have been, the head of the Apostolic see’. While the bishops reprimanded Gregory for his failure to consult the Roman patrician (i.e. King Henry IV) on his election, as he had apparently promised on ‘oath’ at Pope Nicholas II’s synod of 1059, they do not explain why Gregory could never have become pope, see Henry IV, *Letters*, 11, pp. 148-149. That this particular charge had not been levelled until 1076 perhaps suggests that this was a calculated criticism intended to discredit him. In the propaganda version of the Worms deposition letter, however, this issue is not mentioned. Rather, Gregory’s salutation as ‘false monk’ can only been interpreted as a product of his handling of the episcopate, see Henry IV, *Letters*, 12, pp. 150-151.}\n
\[\text{120 P.G. Jestice, *Wayward Monks and the Religious Revolution of the Eleventh Century*, p. 268-269. The precedent of Pope Gregory I was dispelled by Peter who argues that Gregory I was forced to leave his monastery, whereas Gregory (VII) chose to leave, see *Defence of king Henry*, c. 5.}\n
\[\text{121 Moreover, this debarring of Gregory’s office [presumably of a monk] is a separate issue from any oath, according to Benzo, *To Emperor Henry IV*, p. 372.}\n
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than adhering exclusively to a prayer function’.  

Monastic preaching was especially derided by imperialist authors who cited Saint Benedict’s own writings on the dangers of ‘gyrovagues’, or uncloistered monks. Gregory’s approval of monastic preaching can be deduced, for example, from his letter of praise to the Vallombrosan community whose practice of the religious life had been particularly divisive. Benedictines were indeed intimately involved in the reform movement in their clerical capacities as polemicists and legates; those defending Gregory hence demonstrate a significant rethinking of the issue of stabilitas in favour of the worldly calling of reformers. In the Register, however, Gregory customarily maintains his protestation when elected: ‘I did not willingly come to holy orders…with great sorrow and groaning and complaint I…have been placed in your [Peter’s] throne’. 

Can this disagreement on the conditions of the monastic life be qualified as a form of ideological ‘contrast’? The theory is not detailed in its prescription of the conditions of

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122 Jestice, Wayward Monks, pp. 272, 254. In direct contrast to Cowdrey, Jestice uses this as evidence of the decreased importance of the monastic ethic within Gregorian reform: ‘the monastic issue was hardly central to the ideology of the ecclesiastical reform’, p. 275. As Walker-Bynum has commented, in terms of practising the religious life, there was an important tension in ‘the Gregorian ideology, between withdrawal from and service of the world’, Jesus as Mother, p. 13. Gregory’s early career in the curia as papal legate, ‘exercis[ing] the office of vicar of the pope’, is detailed in the Life of Gregory, cs. 16-17, p. 269, although he was made a deacon before this, c. 15, p. 269.

123 Jestice, Wayward Monks, p. 259.

124 Gregory wrote to the community of Vallombrosa to commemorate their late prior John Gualbertus: ‘his spotless faith shone wonderfully abroad throughout all Tuscany’, Ep. Vag., 2, p. 7.

125 Jestice, Wayward Monks, p. 274. Manegold of Lautenbach likened Gregory’s legatine activity to the evangelism of St. Mark (Robinson, ‘The Bible in the Investiture Contest: the south German Gregorian circle’, in D. Wood and K. Walsh (eds.), The Bible in the Medieval World: Essays in Memory of Beryl Smalley (Oxford, 1985) p. 74), although Lampert of Hersfeld, not the firmest of Gregorian writers, refused to be drawn on this issue. In Lampert’s narrative of Canossa, Gregory seemingly alluded to similar criticisms, or at least whatever would ‘impede my [Gregory’s] access to Holy Orders’. Gregory then neutralised ‘any doubt about all these allegations of scandal’ by successfully performing a Eucharistic ordeal to test his ‘innocence’, see ‘Account of Canossa’, in Miller (ed. and trans.), Power and the Holy in the Age of the Investiture Conflict: A Brief History with Documents (Boston, 2005), p. 98. There is no mention of this self-imposed ordeal in the narratives of Bonizo or Paul and it may be pondered whether this was a narrative device used by Lampert to avoid discussion of Gregory’s eligibility for holy orders. In other words, the issue is not countered by argument in Lampert’s account, but made incontestable through the witness of the ordeal.

126 Reg., 7.14a, p. 342.
‘contrast’ here, although it is logical enough to expect that ideologically ‘contrasting’ positions must themselves be equally ‘coherent’. Such a sense of ‘coherent’ ‘contrast’ cannot, however, be affirmed here since the conditions of monasticism were more generally in flux in this period than the Henrician polemic would imply. It has been argued that the Benedictine ‘mentality’ itself only assumed concrete form after c.1125 when forced to define itself against new (and rival) orders. The tensions which prompted the so-called ‘monastic crisis’ and the development of new approaches to the religious life surely indicate a sense of flexibility in contrast to any rigid monastic orthodoxy. Indeed, to take the long view, a greater ‘incoherence’ was to come in twelfth-century monasticism. Furthermore, the careers of the Vallombrosans illustrate how the line between active and contemplative monasticism remained ‘incoherent’. The prominence of the eremitical monasticism practised by Peter Damian and Dominic of Sora also cannot be ignored. According to Van Engen, there was in general less anxiety about the clericalisation of Benedictine monasticism in this period. Rather, aspects of ‘clericalisation’, such as pastoral care, were perceived as quite natural and

127 For the theory, see above, pp. 14-15.
129 The popularisation of the vita apostolica in the twelfth century presented a pluralistic challenge to the Gregorian idea of unity within the Church. The relationship between Gregorian reform and the developing apostolic movements is complex. While the popularisation of the vita apostolica largely post-dated Gregory’s pontificate, elements of a shared reform spirituality did exist. Indeed, groups such as the Cistercians were part of the broad-based reform movement of the eleventh and twelfth centuries of which the Gregorian papacy was only one part, see Jestice, Wayward Monks, pp. 10-11. Yet even if a degree of revivalist inspiration had been imparted by the reform papacy to twelfth-century apostolic movements, an important aspect of the new spirituality was its protest against the ‘over-endowment’ of the post-Gregorian church, Lambert, Medieval Heresy, pp. 38, 42; Morrison, ‘The Gregorian reform’, pp. 192. Furthermore, the popular profession of the apostolic life was problematic in Gregorian terms: the spiritual empowerment of the laity did not sit well with eleventh-century notions of clericalisation and the monastic elite, PG, p. 664. Gregory’s preoccupation with papal authority perhaps in fact affirms the difference between papal reform and the new groups attempting to revive the Early church: as Moore has noted, the New Testament revival spirituality was ‘quite distinct [from] the movement for the reform and aggrandisement of the Roman papacy’, see ‘Heresy, repression and social change in the age of Gregorian reform’, in P.D. Diehl and S.L. Waugh (eds.), Christendom and its Discontents: Exclusion, Persecution, and Rebellion 1000-1500 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 24.
not contrary to the monastic vow. A ‘coherent’ ideological ‘contrast’ between contemplative and active monasticism thus cannot be affirmed here.

**Personal spirituality:**

Gregory’s personal spirituality is a rarely explored dimension to his pontificate. The personal piety of the man behind the loaded title of ‘Gregory VII’ has been sidelined in favour of Gregory’s presentation in a political context. Yet, how evidence for Gregory’s personal piety can be used to define ‘Gregorian ideology’ remains important. The *Life* is the natural source for Gregory’s devotion. Paul records a selection of miracles, both in-life and post-mortem, as a measure of Gregory’s holiness. They attest a monastic holiness which was presented with a view to canonisation. One example is especially intriguing in terms of how reform was justified. Prior to his papal election, Gregory had during a legation in 1056 challenged the simoniac archbishop Hugh of Embrun to repeat ‘Glory to the Holy Spirit’. That the latter’s guilt was exposed by his miraculous inability to give Glory, underlines Gregory’s use of divine intervention to effect reform. Despite papal legislation against simony

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132 It is a step too far, however, to argue that the notion of ‘correct’ Benedictine behaviour can be described in theoretical terms as an ‘essentially contested concept’. See W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially contested concepts’, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 56 (1956), pp. 167-198. That is, that there can be no meaningful definition of the concept because of the extent to which it is contested, see Freeden *Ideology*, pp. 52-53.
133 A particular difficulty here is the task of reconstructing Gregory’s individual monastic piety independently from his official Petrine spirituality. An analogous problem is explored in relation to kingship in E.H. Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies: a Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton, 1959).
134 Miracles of healing, for example, are included in the *Life*, cs. 33-34, p. 282 as well as the vision noted above (n. 21.); see c. 124 for the post-mortem miracles, pp. 363-364. On canonisation and Paul’s use of miracles, see Robinson, (ed. and trans.), ‘Introduction’, in *The Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century, Lives of Pope Leo IX and Pope Gregory VII* (Manchester, 2004), p. 79.
135 *Life of Gregory*, c.17, p. 270; this miracle is also included in Bonizo’s *Book to a friend*, b. 6, p. 200; see Robinson (ed. and trans.) *The Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century*, pp. 200, n. 26, 279, n. 71. A similar miracle, (a trial of ordeal in this case) is recorded by Peter Damian, whereby Hildebrand exposed the guilt of a simoniac priest during a legation in 1050, see Robinson, ‘The friendship network of Gregory VII’, *History*, lxiii (1978), p. 6.
already being in circulation, it was Gregory’s miraculous agency which Paul used to justify reform in this instance. Bishop Guido of Ferrara’s *On the schism of Hildebrand* (c. 1085) also records important details of Gregory’s devotion. Guido’s portrait is all the more surprising considering he was a schismatic cardinal and a ‘hostile witness’ as such. His testimony perhaps demonstrates how personal holiness was perceived separately from the matters of ecclesiology which provoked his defection.

According to K.G. Cushing, such evidence for personal spirituality was used in Gregorian hagiographies less to attest individual sanctity than to present reformers in a wider context of reform. The *Life* of bishop Anselm II of Lucca, for example, whose career as canonist, polemicist and legate typified the new worldly reforming ecclesiastic, is not so much ‘a portrait of a holy man growing in spiritual life towards sanctity…[as an attempt] to locate and articulate Anselm’s personal sanctity within the context of the reform movement’. While the *Life* does describe themes pertaining to Anselm’s individual holiness (his prayers, preaching, and exertions for the poor), this was of decreased interest in the context of

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136 How Gregory’s divine agency was rhetorically employed in this instance compares with the narrative of a similar incident during Leo IX’s papal council at Rheims in October 1049. In the *Life of Leo*, the anonymous hagiographer records that when a defence of simony was offered to the pope, its unnamed orator was miraculously silenced: ‘when he began to speak, he was suddenly struck dumb in the presence of the whole assembly.’ The subsequent conversion of a simoniac bishop is then credited to this experience, whereby he ‘was so terrified by this miracle that he fled by night from the judgement of the council’ (Anon. ‘The Life of Leo’, in Robinson (ed. and trans.), *The Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century*, c. 2.10, pp. 138-9). Although the hagiographer does mention Leo’s legislative record at Rheims, it is seemingly less the merit of law which compels the bishop’s conversion than the witness of Leo’s miracle: ‘judgement is derived from divine signs rather than legal procedure’, L. Melve, ‘Intentional ethics and hermeneutics in the *Libelli de Symoniacis*: Bruno of Segni as a papal polemicist’, *Journal of Medieval History*, 35 (2009), p. 83.

137 ‘He was constant in fasts and spent his time in prayer…and made his person a Temple of Christ…when all was occupied with secular business and the desires and ambitions of the world, he transcended in his mind all virtue, holding this life to be a pilgrimage not a homeland…’, ‘On the schism of Hildebrand’, b.1, c.2.


clericalised monasticism.\textsuperscript{142} The \textit{Life} of the Patarene priest Ariald of Carimate similarly concentrates foremost on its subject’s anticlerical preaching rather than personal devotion.\textsuperscript{143} Miller has also highlighted how hagiography functioned to positively affirm the worldly roles of reforming ecclesiastics as opposed to stressing their contemplative lives.\textsuperscript{144} Rather than being rooted primarily in personal holiness therefore, sainthood was assuming a greater political resonance. This is perhaps an example of the reputed social function of the phenomenon of medieval sanctity.\textsuperscript{145}

If this identification of a distinct genre of reform hagiography is correct, the context for understanding personal spirituality is transformed. That hagiography was becoming less provincial and assuming a broader polemical function implies the redefinition of the conventional, contemplative orientation of medieval sanctity.\textsuperscript{146} In theoretical terms, it may be possible to interpret this hagiographical trend as ideological ‘naturalisation’ whereby Gregorian reform principles were disseminated through \textit{Lives} as another normative channel of

\begin{itemize}
\item Anselm’s episcopal appointment ‘provided his hagiographer with an opportunity to display a man whose desire for a secluded contemplative life was outweighed by his obedience to Gregory, and was sacrificed to the burden of an active life in a cause of righteousness’, Cushing, ‘Events that led to sainthood’, p. 195.
\item ‘[Ariald preached:] “consider your priests who are more rich in worldly goods, more illustrious in building towers and houses, more puffed up with honours…these, as you know, openly take wives just like laymen, pursue debauchery just like the most wicked laymen”…now, while that man of God was saying these and many similar things, just about all the people were so inflamed by his words that these once venerated as ministers of Christ were proclaimed enemies of God’, Andrew of Stumi, ‘Description of the preaching of Ariald in Milan, ca. 1075’, in Miller (ed. and trans.), \textit{Power and the Holy}, p. 51; Cushing, ‘Events that led to sainthood’, p. 190.
\item According to Miller, there was an increased hagiographical stress on the ‘autonomous’ bishop who ‘eschewed extreme asceticism and valued the involvement of bishops in the affairs of the realm’. In the revision of the tenth-century text of the \textit{Life} of the sainted bishop Ulrich of Augsburg, for example, the eleventh-century hagiographer did not monasticise his subject but stressed his role in the world as a military leader, see ‘Masculinity, reform, and clerical culture: narratives of episcopal holiness in the Gregorian era’, \textit{Church History}, 72 (2003), pp. 52, 40, 32, 36.
\item ‘Sanctity…was only available to those who had withdrawn from the \textit{ordo secularis}. Sanctity and secularity were, in effect, mutually exclusive’, Nelson, ‘Royal saints and early medieval kingship’, \textit{Studies in Church History}, 10 (1973), p. 41.
\end{itemize}
communication. On the other hand, an examination of the Life of the reforming bishop Lietbert of Cambrai has concluded that his presentation is ‘ideologically neither [as] an “imperial” bishop, nor a “Gregorian”…[since] in this case, episcopal hagiography was insulated from the political agendas of the day’. Melve also has downplayed the propaganda element within hagiographical sources. According to Cowdrey, while there is a marked political element in reform hagiography, this does not diminish a sense of personal holiness. Hagiography was therefore used as a tool to ‘naturalise’ ‘Gregorian ideology’, although this was not entirely at the expense of reformers’ personal spirituality.

Conclusion:

This chapter has explored aspects of Gregorian reform spirituality to test a theoretical definition of ideology. A concept of ‘Gregorian ideology’ (still of course a provisional concept at this stage) is suggested here in its ‘utopian’ model and ‘naturalising’ function. It is perhaps doubtful, however, whether reform spirituality was as strictly ‘coherent’ as the notion of the Gregorian reform ‘programme’ would suggest. The variety of competing concepts which justified reform, coupled with Gregory’s varying approach to implementation precludes an overall sense of ideological ‘coherence’. Yet any ‘incoherence’ should not obscure the diversity of reform ideas and the difficulty of Gregory’s task of uniting diverging currents of

See p. 15 for the theory. Here, the ‘complex discursive device’ in Eagleton’s terms is the emphasis of polemical career over personal devotion.


149 Melve, Inventing the Public Sphere: The Public Debate during the Investiture Contest (c. 1030–1122) (Leiden, 2007), vol. 1, p. 27; Melve ‘Intentional ethics and hermeneutics in the Libellus de symoniacis’, p. 84.

150 Guido of Ferrara’s portrait thus presents a balanced spirituality, simultaneously personal and political: ‘[in] his admiring description of Hildebrand’s religious zeal and asceticism in a lavish and worldly environment…it was possible to present Hildebrand as a Christian exemplar both in his strenuous external activity and in his spiritual life’, PG, p. 56.
reform under papal leadership. Moreover, reform may have been necessarily ‘incoherent’ in its first stages, since reformers were inclined to apply different concepts experimentally to judge how reform could be achieved.

If ideology is demonstrable in its ‘utopian’ model yet indemonstrable on the basis of ‘incoherence’, a discrepancy within the definitional matrix might be developing here. This may be initial evidence for the inutility of the concept of ideology as formulated here.
CHAPTER TWO: GREGORIAN REFORM IN PRACTICE, CANON LAW AND PAPAL GOVERNMENT

Introduction:

Canon law and papal government have long attracted the attention of historians interested in the development of Gregorian reform beyond its theoretical dimension. Gregory’s pontificate is commonly identified with the beginning of a process of institutionalisation in the medieval Church whereby the pope ‘came in practice to acquire those powers of lordship and justice which in a distant and idealised manner he had long been recognised as possessing’.¹ That a notion of ‘the Church’ as a clerical corporation, in addition to the community of the faithful, was increasingly articulated in this period surely signals institutional development.² While linking Gregorian reform with papal institutionalisation is to deviate from Gerhart Ladner’s thesis that the concept of ‘reform’ was more personal than institutional,³ the development of papal government cannot be ignored in any discussion of defining ‘Gregorian ideology’.

In what respect can papal institutionalisation be linked with defining ‘Gregorian ideology’? As Walter Ullmann wrote of the development of papal government in Gregory’s pontificate:

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‘The form of government was monarchical. But it was not sufficient to state this monarchical form of government in ideological terms: it was necessary that the monarch also appears as a monarch to the world. The way in which this was achieved was by making the pope a monarch in form as well as in ideas’.4

In this application of the normative definition of ‘ideology’, Ullmann evokes the gulf between the ‘ideology’ of papal government and its realisation in more concrete terms. While the dichotomy between ideas and practice is surely the oldest problem in political history, the implication of both Ullmann’s argument and of the theoretical modelling of ideology as ‘utopian’ is that the concept of ideology specifically cannot apply in practice. It might, then, be argued that the histories of ideology and government should be written separately; that is, if ideology is ‘utopian’ and theoretically-based, whereas government is interpreted as a practical expression of ruling authority.5 Before resorting to this extreme, this chapter will explore the evidence for reform in practice with a view to further testing the applicability of ‘utopianism’ to Gregory’s pontificate. If a sense of reform ‘in practice’ can be attested, there may be the potential to reconceive the supposed ‘utopianism’ of Gregory’s pontificate. As two apparent manifestations of reform in practice, papal government and canon law especially recommend themselves as a basis for understanding the practical application of Gregorian reform.6 While they were not altogether exempt from the idealism which characterised other aspects of Gregorian reform, a discussion of canonical collections, papal councils, legation, and letters will nevertheless support an analysis reform in practice.

5 The gulf between ideology and practice is affirmed in the theoretical literature where it is argued that ‘ideology’ and ‘pragmatism’ are polar belief systems since ideology is dogmatic and unpractical, see G. Sartori, ‘Politics, ideology, and belief systems’, The American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), pp. 402, 405.
6 They can be counted among the normative channels of communication through which ideology could be ‘naturalised’. The analysis will of course continue to engage with models of ideology as ‘coherent’, ‘contrasting’, ‘universalising’, and ‘naturalising’.
Moreover, if there is evidence for the reduced ‘utopianism’ of Gregorian reform when institutionalised, there is a greater case for reform as practice than necessarily in practice here. In other words, the process of implementing reform in reality may have forced ideational rethinks which transformed Gregorian reform into a more practicable concept.⁷ As theorists including Martin Seliger have argued, political expediency does change the initial shape of ideology: ‘just as ideologies are conceived to guide action, so also the exigencies attendant upon conceiving and implementing politics affect the structure and nature of ideologies’.⁸ How any potential ‘Gregorian ideology’ may have been transformed by practical pressures pushes the limits of the normative definition, and thus merits assessment. Possibly there is the opportunity to use evidence for institutionalisation to demonstrate a less theoretically-grounded notion of ideology here. Indeed, practically based theorisations have been explored in the political literature, although to begin remodelling definitional criteria is to overcomplicate the enquiry at this stage.⁹ Canon law and papal government obviously overlap, although they have been introduced separately here.

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⁷ For example, reformers’ ideal of the Early Church was mitigated by twelfth-century papal institutionalisation, as contemporaries such as Bernard of Clairvaux observed with regret. As Brenda Bolton has argued, ‘the difference between the actual primitive Church and the elaborate administrative machinery set up to realise the aims of papal advancement was so great as to cause them to be in direct opposition to each other. As the reforms progressed it became increasingly difficult to conceal this disparity’, The Medieval Reformation (London, 1983), p. 18.


⁹ Freeden has argued that ideology should be a less theoretically inclined political concept: ‘Ideology is rather a different venture than a political philosophy. It is, above all, a political tool situated firmly within the political domain. Ideologies are not models of what political thinking should be…but embrace the patterns of political thinking actually produced by social groups for the consumption of social groups’. Ideology thus has ‘historical formation’ according to Freeden, see Ideology: a Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2003), pp. 70, 76. Other theorists have argued how a concept of ideology can be applied to institutionalised, non-utopian forms: ‘ideologies…require organisation to make them politically significant’, see S.H. Barnes, ‘Ideology and the organisation of conflict: on the relationship between political thought and behaviour’, The Journal of Politics, 22 (1966), p. 530; W. Mullins, ‘On the concept of ideology in political science’, The American Political Science Review; 66 (1972), pp. 507-509.
Canon Law:

In 1956 Stephan Kuttner declared that ‘the great issues of the reform were fundamentally issues of canon law’. This judgement holds true in recent scholarship where a continued emphasis is placed on the vital function of canon law. The idea of Roman legal primacy was indeed intrinsic to reformers’ concept of papal authority. Canon law was, according to Ullmann, the unique authoritative basis on which the papacy could assert its primatial jurisdiction over the Church and the principal characteristic by which Gregorian reform was distinguished from the reform efforts of the Salian patricians. The incontestability of papal judicial and legislative authority is evidenced throughout the Register and the so-called ‘reform collections’, as well as in the variety of narrative sources written by ecclesiastics in the entourage of the reform papacy. In the Life of Gregory, for example, Paul of Benried glosses his citations from the Register by remarking: ‘what impudence, what extraordinary audacity that a bishop should despise the decrees of the apostolic see’. Papal primacy was in this sense predicated on the singular legal authority of the Roman Church. Canon law was

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13 Despite Gregory’s reinvigoration of canon law as a basis for papal authority, Gregory has not been interpreted as the consummate canonist, see Blumenthal, ‘Papacy and law’, p. 215. There were very few direct citations of the Register in subsequent legal collections and his canonical record was significantly outranked by the lawyer-popes of the twelfth century, see Gilchrist, ‘The reception of Pope Gregory VII into the canon law (1073-1141)’, in Canon Law in the Age of Reform, 11th-12th Centuries (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 72-73; PG, p. 684.
14 It is worth noting that Paul’s commentary (Life of Gregory, c. 37, p. 285) dates from 1128, by which point papal legislation had benefited from increased institutionalisation. The universality of papal legal authority was not substantially accepted, however, until Gratian’s Decretum of c.1140, see B. Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism (2nd edn., New York, 1998), p. 26.
therefore a key ideational principle of Gregorian reform as well as a potential means of institutionalisation.

In terms of how law was used as a tool or channel of communication to disseminate Gregorian principles, the so-called ‘reform collections’ are important.\(^{15}\) While canonical collections such as the *Collection in Seventy-Four Titles* (c.1050-c.1070s)\(^ {16}\) and bishop Anselm of Lucca’s *Collection of Canons* (c. 1083)\(^ {17}\) had a clear reform agenda, the existence of a specifically ‘Gregorian’ canonical identity remains historiographically contested. The debate has centred upon the degree of unity which can be interpreted between the reform collections and whether their supposedly revolutionary status can be attested.\(^ {18}\) While many historians have, in broad terms, credited ‘reform collections’ such as the 74t and Anselm’s *Collection* as being inherently Gregorian in nature, those subscribing to John Gilchrist’s interpretation have found this more tenuous.\(^ {19}\) That the reform collections may have been

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\(^{15}\) While canonical sources are important for the present purpose of testing a notion of ideology, conceptual history has not been readily applied to the history of canon law. Canonistic studies are arguably of a positivistic bent, emphasising a rigorous philological approach to papal history which is strongly grounded in the close analysis of documents, their transmission, authorship, and dating. For a historiographical commentary see A. Chapman, ‘Review of: B.C. Brasington and K.G. Cushing (eds.), *Bishops, Texts and the Use of Canon Law Around 1100: Essays in Honour of Martin Brett* (Aldershot, 2008)’, *Ecclesiastical Law Journal*, 12 (2010), pp. 1-2. Such a heavily ‘documentary’ approach is perhaps difficult to align with the nature of an abstract political concept such as ideology which takes the broader sweep. This caveat notwithstanding, the following discussion attempts to explore how conceptual history can engage with canonistic studies. The principal sources examined in this chapter will be legal collections, although ‘subsidiary’ canonical material such as decretal letters and conciliar records are also important. It is therefore necessary to accept a more inclusive definition of a canonical source which can include, for example, ‘biblical excerpts, patristic selections…disciplinary prescriptions of general councils, papal decretals and synodal enactments’, Ryan, *Saint Peter Damiani*, pp. 6-7, 1; C. Rolker, *Canon Law and the Letters of Ivo of Chartres* (Cambridge, 2010), p. 163.

\(^{16}\) Referred to hereafter as ‘74t’. For the dating of this collection, see below, p. 59.


\(^{18}\) See below, p. 61.

\(^{19}\) Gilchrist denies that Gregory effected a ‘revolution in papal ideology’ on the basis of the continuity of canonical material such as the pseudo-Isidorean decretals in the work of the supposedly ‘revolutionary’ reform canonists, ‘Introduction’, in *Canon Law in the Age of Reform*, pp. xii-xiii; Cushing, ‘Polemie or handbook? Recension Bb of Anselm of Lucca’s Collectio Canonum’, in B.C. Brasington and K.G. Cushing (eds.), *Bishops, Texts and the Use of Canon Law around the Year 1100*, p.69, n.1.
compiled to address the insufficiencies of existing works authored by non-papalists counts towards the idea of a specifically ‘Gregorian’ collection.\textsuperscript{20}

On the other hand, the influence of ecclesiologically conservative collections such as Burchard’s \textit{Decretum} (c.1023) in the works of supposedly Gregorian compilers such as Bonizo of Sutri and Bernold of Constance, counts against this interpretation.\textsuperscript{21} That there was a degree of disunity between the multiple collections existing in this period also problematises the idea of a ‘coherent’ Gregorian canonical genre. As Gilchrist argues, ‘there was no one collection used by the reformers, thus there could be no monolithic unity, no single mentality that could assert itself over others’.\textsuperscript{22} This canonical plurality is of course a reminder that the reform collections pre-dated the landmark compilation of fully systematic collections such as Gratian’s \textit{Decretum} of c.1140,\textsuperscript{23} although a degree of ideological ‘coherence’ can perhaps be read into the incipient systematisation of eleventh-century collections.\textsuperscript{24} These issues notwithstanding, it is still possible to conceive of many collections produced by canonists in the entourage of the reform papacy as disseminating the Gregorian conception of papal authority. As regards institutionalisation, the practical utility of the collections remains to be assessed.

\textsuperscript{20} Cushing, \textit{Papacy and Law}, p. 111. Paul Fournier argued that new collections such as the \textit{74t} were compiled to replace ecclesiologically obsolete collections such as Burchard’s \textit{Decretum}, (c. 1020), ‘Le premier manuel canonique de la reforme du XI\textsuperscript{e} siècle’, in \textit{Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de L'Ecole Française de Rome}, xiv (1894), cited in Rolker, \textit{Canon Law}, pp. 45, 63. None of the reform collections, however, claim to be officially commissioned, see Robinson, \textit{The Papacy}, p. 208.

\textsuperscript{21} See Rolker, \textit{Canon Law}, pp. 54-56 for a discussion of Bernold’s use of canonical sources in his ‘Swabian recension’ of the \textit{74t}.

\textsuperscript{22} Gilchrist, ‘Introduction’, in \textit{74t}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{23} The watershed compilation of Gratian’s \textit{Decretum} has encouraged the common periodisation of the reform collections as ‘early medieval canon law’, see J.A. Brundage, \textit{Medieval Canon Law} (London, 1995), pp. 18-43.

\textsuperscript{24} Elements of a scientific and systematic approach did exist in the works of the reform canonists according to Ryan, \textit{Saint Peter Damiani}, p. 143; see also Kéry, \textit{Canonical Collections of the Early Middle Ages}, p. 204; R. Knox, ‘Finding the law (developments in canon law during the Gregorian reform)’, \textit{SG}, 9 (1972) p. 465.
Any analysis of Gregorian canon law must take issue with the *D.P.*: a document of twenty-seven legal theses recorded in the *Register* in March 1075. The main thrust of the *D.P.* is its weighty statements on aspects of papal authority. There is no mention of the three defining issues of Gregorian reform spirituality (simony, nicholaitism, and investiture); rather, the *D.P.* addresses more directly the relative status of papacy and empire, especially in clauses 8, ‘that he [the pope] alone can use imperial insignia; and 12, ‘that he is permitted to depose emperors’. As Fliche argues, the import of the clauses (‘adamant in their brevity’) was that papal ‘pre-eminence is not limited to the spiritual domain since it practises its sanctions over the temporal order’. Colin Morris, however, has argued that this document should not be interpreted as a ‘blueprint for papal absolutism’ in both spheres. The prominence of the episcopal question in Gregorian reform also explains the rationale of the clauses which deal with the papal right to depose, judge, and translate ecclesiastics. The *D.P.* is therefore ultimately concerned with papal authority and, it may be postulated, the means of achieving the reforms against the three principal ‘abuses’. However, that the *D.P.* is patently not a canonical collection but only a list of rubrics characterises it as a superficial document which does not reveal the nuances of canon law. While the *D.P.* remains the most famous source for Gregorian reform, its purported value as the best insight into Gregorian thinking has been contested. Both Cowdrey and Blumenthal decline to characterise the *D.P.* as shorthand for

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25 Hereafter referred to as ‘*D.P.*’
26 There is another reputed manuscript of the *D.P.*, the ‘Dictatus of Avranches’, although this text is the subject only of one footnote in Cowdrey’s exhaustive study of Gregory, *PG*, p. 502, n. 35.
28 According to Morris, it was rather an exercise in ‘defin[ing] the emergency powers inherent in the Roman see’, *Papal Monarchy, the Western Church from 1050 to 1250* (Oxford, 1989), p. 112.
29 See *D.P.* clauses 3, 25, 19, 13 respectively; *PG*, p. 605.
Gregorian reform,30 although Tellenbach has argued that this document does constitute the ‘quintessence of Gregorianism’.31 The principal interpretative problem here is whether the D.P. can be understood as the definitive Gregorian manifesto (at least for 1075).32 The radical papalism of the D.P. certainly gives a flavour of Gregory’s intentions and the distinction between Gregorian and pre-Gregorian reform becomes arguably more acute when it is considered,33 yet since many clauses were not commonly invoked in practice,34 the D.P. cannot be interpreted as a truly ‘coherent’ statement of Gregorian reform.

Whether this radicalism can extend to a sense of ideological ‘utopianism’ is debatable. The image of papal jurisdiction proposed in the D.P. was undoubtedly idealistic considering how it was contested by the episcopate and secular rulers when applied. Yet that canonical precedents existed for most clauses perhaps lessens this ‘utopianism’.35 While there is little evidence for the reception of the D.P. into canon law,36 individual clauses were incorporated into subsequent reform compilations such as Anselm’s Collection, albeit with canonical substantiation.37 Overall, the D.P. cannot be used as evidence for the institutionalisation of reform: that it was not a published ‘collection’ lessens its potential to have ideologically

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32 According to Southern, ‘taken as a whole, these statements comprise a complete programme of action’, *Western Society and the Church*, p. 102; see also Morris, *Papal Monarchy*, p. 112 for a summary of the debate.
33 The distinctiveness of the D.P. has led some historians to suppose that it was a newly commissioned collection designed to address the political inadequacy of existing canon law, see Morris, *Papal Monarchy*, p. 112; Robinson, ‘Pope Gregory VII: bibliographical survey’, *JEH*, 36 (1985), p. 470.
35 Gilchrist has shown that many of the theses are mirrored in the works of cardinal Humbert of Silva-Candida, as well as the 74t, see ‘Canon law aspects of the eleventh-century Gregorian reform programme’, in *Canon Law in the Age of Reform*, p. 38; see also Cushing, *Reform and the Papacy*, p. 75.
36 Its transmission was limited to the *Liber Tarracensis*, *PG*, p. 502-503.
37 Anselm did not accept D.P. 24, for example, that allowed inferior clerics the right to accuse their superiors, see Cushing, *Papacy and Law*, pp. 221, 107-108.
‘naturalised’ Gregorian reform. Its clauses are pertinent issues of reform, but there are seemingly better sources for interpreting ideology in canon law.

**ii) The 74t:**

The importance of the 74t has been strongly underlined since its characterisation as ‘the first canon law manual of the eleventh-century reform’.\(^{38}\) The text is a detailed anthology of ecclesiastical authorities grouped under a variety of titles, although its ‘handbook’ status is problematic.\(^{39}\) While the selection of texts and their interpretation reveal a reformist inclination on the part of the unknown compiler, that the 74t is an unequivocally Gregorian publication is less certain. Its non-papalist orientation is particularly apparent where the 74t sources numerous titles in defence of episcopacy from the pseudo-Isidorean decretals; for example, the canons under the titles that ‘sheep cannot accuse their shepherds’ and ‘that no one absent can be judged’.\(^{40}\) Such immunities were an impediment for Gregory in his attempts to enforce a reformed spirituality on the clergy.

The influence of the decretals within the so-called Gregorian collections questions the notion of a papalist canonical genre.\(^{41}\) That the superiority of the Roman see was invoked by pseudo-Isidore only to protect episcopal rights is surely problematic when trying to establish the

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\(^{40}\) 74t, t. 9, cs. 74-81, t. 13, cs. 103-107, (pp. 111-127); for a list of the pseudo-Isidorean titles, see Gilchrist, ‘Introduction’, in 74t, p. 15; see Blumenthal, ‘The papacy and canon law’, p. 206; Rolker, *Canon Law*, pp. 81-82, 86.

\(^{41}\) See Robinson, ‘Church and papacy’, in J.H. Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 269, 272-273; Robinson, “‘Periculosus Homo’: pope Gregory VII and episcopal authority”, *Viator*, 9 (1978), p. 119. The episcopal orientation of texts such as the 74t reveals the greater variety of stakeholders in the interpretation of canon law in addition to the Gregorian polemicists.
evidence for a specifically papal rather than sacerdotal ideology here.\textsuperscript{42} This is not to say, however, that the document does not have a Gregorian (and therefore revolutionary) dimension. The compiler did impose a Rome-centric spin upon his pseudo-Isidorean material, for example, by modifying the text of pseudo-Fabian to permit the papal deposition of bishops.\textsuperscript{43} Yet some episcopalist canons may not have been entirely incompatible with papal primacy over the episcopate, as espoused by \textit{D.P. 3}.\textsuperscript{44} Anselm of Lucca, for example, could affirm an episcopalist principle such as the prohibition of inferior accusations without compromising his conception of papal primacy.\textsuperscript{45} Nevertheless, the prominence of the episcopalist titles in the \textit{74t} remains problematic: the collection surely cannot be interpreted as an ideologically ‘coherent’ product of Gregorian reform if the text is not straightforwardly papalist in content.\textsuperscript{46}

As regards the actual institutionalisation of Gregorian reform, the collection itself can only provide limited evidence. The fact of its production does indicate the demand for a manual from which canonical authorities could be sourced. The practical content of the \textit{74t} also suggests its function as a consultative text for use in ecclesiastical judicial proceedings. Any ideological ‘utopianism’ is less marked therefore. To fully understand reform in practice, an examination of the reception and application of \textit{74t} would be necessary, although cannot be attempted here.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{43} Robinson, ‘Church and papacy’, p. 274.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{D.P. 3}: ‘That he alone can depose bishops or reconcile them’.
\textsuperscript{45} On the compatibility of Gregorian and pseudo-Isidorean material, see Cushing, \textit{Papacy and Law}, p. 120, c.f. Robinson, ‘“Periculosus Homo”’, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{46} The ‘incoherence’ of content is not aided by the uncertainty of authorship and dating when attempting to classify the \textit{74t}.
\textsuperscript{47} The dissemination of the \textit{74t} is evidenced by the density of its citation in Anselm’s \textit{Collectio}, although there is comparably little evidence that other Gregorian canonists such as cardinal Deusdedit or Bonizo of Sutri used the collection, Gilchrist, ‘Introduction’, in \textit{74t}, pp. 32-33.
iii) Law and Revolution:

Historians of the Gregorian reform have been persistent about the issue of revolution in canon law.\textsuperscript{48} Reform canonists have rightly been seen as revolutionary both in respect of the transformation of canonical material in its Gregorian exegesis and the ‘methodology’ used to demonstrate the canonical historicity of Gregorian ideas. A sense of revolution has been particularly invoked to describe the canonical justifications contrived to support papal monarchy.\textsuperscript{49} In the ‘distortion’ of Gelasian dualism in the 74\textsuperscript{t},\textsuperscript{50} for example, the canonist manifestly revolutionised the original intent of his sources such that Henrician critics were partly justified in accusing the Gregorians of being ‘‘peverters of the scriptures” and authors of “fraudulent compilations”’.\textsuperscript{51} Such evidence for canonical distortion can be linked with the ‘deceptive function’ of ideology in its Marxian formulation whereby ideologies supposedly use strategies of mystification and delusion to disguise truths that would otherwise threaten their basis of power.\textsuperscript{52} That material gleaned from Carolingian canonists, for example, was ‘re-employed quite possibly in a new context’ in the 74\textsuperscript{t},\textsuperscript{53} might therefore signal the ideological ‘distortion’ of its authentic meaning. In Anselm’s Collection also, canonical sources were ‘redirected’ away from their authentic meaning.\textsuperscript{54} It was papal primacy, moreover, which was the basis of power in Marxian terms justified by any canonical


\textsuperscript{49} The D.P. is commonly invoked in this respect (See Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy, p. 90) although no canonical sources are of course cited to affirm its theses.

\textsuperscript{50} Robinson, ‘Church and papacy’, pp. 289, 299. Papal monarchy and the ecclesiological implications of this ‘distortion’ will be the focus of the third chapter, see below, esp. p. 89.

\textsuperscript{51} Robinson, ‘“Periculosus Homo”’, p. 117.


\textsuperscript{53} Blumenthal, ‘The Papacy and canon law’, p. 211.

\textsuperscript{54} Anselm modified the text of pseudo-Damasus, for example, to reinforce papal primacy in episcopal judgement, see Cushing, Papacy and Law, p. 155.
distortion here. Insofar as the revolution thesis is tenable therefore, there may be mileage for the Marxian trait of ideology.

The precise nature of any ideological ‘distortion’, however, needs careful interpretation. It is difficult, for one, to know whether there was a wilful process of misinterpretation on the part of compilers, or whether canonical sources were unknowingly cited in their distorted or forged form.\(^{55}\) Furthermore, Leidulf Melve’s analysis of the hermeneutical and rhetorical strategies applied by Gregorian canonists perhaps makes the notion of ‘distortion’ appear a little crude.\(^{56}\) The compilation technique which has been interpreted as ‘distortion’ was canonists’ choice of the citation or omission of texts from existing collections. The selectivity with which canonical material was appropriated from prior collections, as distinct from its subsequent ‘distortion’, is thus important. As Chodorow has summarised this, ‘the history of the law during the Investiture Contest depends on an accurate understanding of the arrangement and rearrangement of texts to expound particular doctrines’.\(^{57}\) Anselm, for example, selected only the Gregorian content of the 74t for his Collectio.\(^{58}\) The intertextuality between reform collections is significant therefore when assessing transmission of any potential ‘Gregorian ideology’.

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\(^{55}\) In respect of reformers’ use of the pseudo-Isidorean decretales, for example, papal ideas were ‘shaped, not so much by Catholic tradition in its historical form, as by the image of tradition in the minds of the ninth-century forgers’, see Morris, *Papal Monarchy*, pp. 31, 111. Gilchrist has argued for the difficulty of differentiating between genuine and false documents in pseudo-Isidore, ‘Introduction’, in 74t, pp. 17-18.

\(^{56}\) Melve’s focus is the discursive context for debate in the eleventh century, see ‘Intentional ethics and hermeneutics in the *Libellus de symoniacis*: Bruno of Segni as a papal polemicist’, *Journal of Medieval History*, 35 (2009), p. 95 for an analysis of Bruno’s ‘theoretical basis for intentional ethics’; see also *Inventing the Public Sphere: The Public Debate During the Investiture Contest (c. 1030-1122)* (2 vols., Leiden, 2007). More generally, the incipience of scholasticism in this period and its influence on the reinterpretation of texts in the work of canonists such as Bernold of Constance, should not be dismissed in overly simplified terms as ‘distortion’, see H. Fuhrmann, *Germany in the High Middle Ages c.1050-1200* (Cambridge, 1986), trans. T. Reuter, p. 72.


\(^{58}\) Cushing, *Papacy and Law*, pp. 80-81.
Contemporaneous with evidence for canonical distortion, however, was also reformers’
commitment to canonical authenticity. Gregory himself had the highest sensitivity to
canonical tradition and the moral importance of conforming to this tradition as part of his
Early-Church inspired spirituality. For example, Gregory linked his Petrine legislative
entitlement to the apostolic and patristic tradition, as he explained to archbishop Anno of
Cologne: ‘you know, brother, that we do not fashion these orders by our own whim, but by
the compulsion of our office we make public binding laws of the ancient fathers’.\textsuperscript{59} This ethic
of continuity is present also in the \textit{74t} in the citation of pseudo-Damasus: ‘all those things
which have been instituted by the apostolic constitution and by the tradition of the fathers
should always be held in unquestionable awe and authority’.\textsuperscript{60} It is on this basis that some
historiography has rejected the revolution thesis. According to Gilchrist, Gregory’s
faithfulness to legal tradition means that his ‘reform ideology’ was entirely \textit{canonical} by
contemporary standards.\textsuperscript{61} Ladner also has been less inclined to see Gregorian canon law as
revolutionary than as an expression of Christian ‘renewal ideology’.\textsuperscript{62}

Such affirmations of canonical orthodoxy may of course have been polemical. This is
suggested by the defensive tone of many of Gregory’s decretal letters. Writing, for example,
‘to all the faithful in Germany’ following his 1076 excommunication of Henry IV, Gregory
declared: ‘should anyone think that this sentence was passed unreasonably or unjustly, then

\textsuperscript{59} Reg., 2.67, p. 161
\textsuperscript{60} 74t, t. 23, c.178, p.168.
\textsuperscript{61} See Gilchrist, ‘Gregory VII and the juristic sources of his ideology’, pp. 10-11; also pp. 14, 37 where
Gilchrist argues that, by the standards of Gregory’s day, his ‘constant appeal to the canon law was
objectively and soundly based’.
\textsuperscript{62} Ladner, \textit{The Idea of Reform}, p. 9; Ladner also argues that: ‘if some modern interpreters of the Gregorian age
would characterise it as a period of revolution rather than of reform, such uncertainties of terminology are in
doubt due to the insufficient investigation of the Gregorian concepts of renewal’, see ‘Two Gregorian letters
on the sources and nature of Gregory VII's reform ideology’, SG, 5 (1956), p. 221; also Ladner, ‘Terms and
supposing him to be ready to give due assent to the true interpretation of the holy laws, let
him consider the matter with us...patiently hearing what not we but divine authority
 teaches’. Authors writing in the papal entourage were also apologists for Gregory’s
interpretation of canonical authorities. Bonizo of Sutri’s Book to a Friend, for example,
marchals a vast amount of patristic and early-medieval material to defend Gregory’s
deposition of Henry: ‘this was indeed neither innovatory nor reprehensible, because it was
done as commanded by the rules of the holy Fathers’. The perceived importance of
maintaining canonical tradition coupled with the need to refute charges of innovation also
encouraged reform canonists to substantiate their (often innovatory) statements by researching
the appropriate canonical authorities. Gregory’s supposed instruction to Peter Damian to
compile a reform collection is worth recalling here. Evidence for canonical research on the
part of the ‘south German Gregorian circle’ also reveals how compilers such as Bernold of
Constance ‘came to furnish Gregorian intellectuals with arguments and exempla for their
polemical writings’.

This researching of canonical texts to historicise the polemical content of Gregorian reform
can be interpreted theoretically as the attempted ‘naturalisation’ of ideology. According to

63 Ep., Vag., 14, p. 41.
64 Book to a friend, b.7, p. 235. Church history was similarly used to a propagandistic end in Guido of
Osnabrück’s Liber de controversia: ‘the author redefines the function of history from being a means of
commemorating and conserving to also serving a polemical function in conflict solution’, Melve, Inventing
the Public Sphere, p. 84.
65 Chodorow, ‘Ideology and canon law’, p. 73.
66 In 1059 Peter Damian wrote to Hildebrand: ‘you frequently asked me...that when I read through the decrees
and statues of the Roman Pontiff, I should from here and there thoughtfully excerpt whatever specifically
was seen to belong to the authority of the Apostolic See, and put it all together in some small volume as a
67 Robinson, ‘The Bible in the Investiture Contest: the south German Gregorian circle’, in D. Wood and K.
Walsh (eds.), The Bible in the Medieval World: Essays in Memory of Beryl Smalley (Oxford, 1985), pp. 66-69, 76. A key contributor to this circle, Bernold of Constance was engaged in archival work to provide
Gregory’s ideas with ‘abundant and weighty justification’, although this could also extend to canonical
modification, as for example in his compilation of the ‘Swabian appendix’ to the 74t: ‘Bernold was at pains
not only to garner canonical material but also to seek to harmonise in a Gregorian sense’, PG, pp. 266-268.
Eagleton’s logic, the contextualisation of ‘partisan’ (i.e. papalist) principles within the apparently ‘natural’ and ‘unchangeable’ canonical orthodoxy was a strategy to legitimate ‘Gregorian ideology’.\(^{68}\) Collections such as Anselm’s and the 74\(t\) also ‘naturalised’ their papalist content in this sense by the re-wording of canonical texts to support the Gregorian interpretation. Papal authors likewise attempted to ‘naturalise’ canonical evidence which was contrary to the reform cause. In justifying the proscription of clerical marriage, for example, Bernold of Constance had to deconstruct, or ‘naturalise’, patristic defences of clerical marriages such as the ‘legend of Paphnutius’.\(^{69}\) In the narrative sources, there was perhaps the opportunity for less subtle ‘naturalisation’ whereby canonical citations and historical precedents could be glossed with a polemical commentary. In Bonizo’s defence of sacerdotalism, after detailing his chosen examples from Church history, he bluntly comments: ‘who unless he is weak in the head, does not know that royal power is subject to bishops?’\(^{70}\)

Ideological ‘naturalisation’ should also be considered in relation to the idea of *necessitas*. The perceived urgency of tackling ‘abuses’ constituted, according to Gregory, the ‘necessity’ of new law, as well as his entitlement to decree it as needs demanded.\(^{71}\) The import of *D.P. 7*, for

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\(^{68}\) According to Eagleton, ideologies ‘naturalise’ ‘partisan, controversial and historically specific values’ in order that they appear ‘natural, inevitable, and unchangeable’, see ‘Introduction’, p. 15.


\(^{70}\) *Book to a friend*, p. 238

\(^{71}\) According to Robinson, *Veritas* often meant for Gregory VII not what was written in the “canonicial decrees”...but what the utilius and necessitas of reforming politics dictated’, “*Periculosus Homo*”; pope Gregory VII and episcopal authority’, pp. 131,127; Blumenthal, ‘The papacy and canon law’, pp. 216-217;
example, ‘that he alone is permitted according to the necessity of the time to impose new laws’, is mirrored by a carefully-worded statement of this position in the 74t. Yet any ideological ‘naturalisation’ in canon law might have been logically unnecessary if necessitas could be invoked. Perhaps novelty itself was ‘naturalised’ through Gregory’s recourse to necessitas.

Many other principles of Gregorian reform could not, however, be substantiated and thus remained ideologically ‘unnaturalised’ in this sense. Gregory often left to his successors the task of locating the ‘specific vindications for his revolution’; indeed, the absence of any ‘naturalisation’ is surely demonstrated par excellence by the D.P. Moreover, how unconvincing the supposed ‘naturalisation’ of canonical sources was for Gregory’s critics is demonstrated by Henrician polemicists such as the Roman lawyer Peter Crassus: ‘it is his [Gregory’s] pleasure to hold the decrees of the Holy fathers to be no longer of any account, the laws no longer to have any validity, and to set up controversial innovations in all matters of religion’.

Chodorow, ‘Ideology and canon law’, pp. 64-65. Gregory’s approach to legislation has been interpreted as a ‘defence of novelty’ within an ecclesiastical culture which did not permit innovation, B. Smalley, ‘Ecclesiastical attitudes to novelty c.1100-c.1250’, Studies in Church History, 12 (1975), p 115. Smalley argues that Gregorian canonists de-stigmatised novelty and widened the possibilities for innovation, see pp. 128-131.

72 Reg. 2.55a, p. 149.
73 ‘Just as there are some decrees which can for no reason be altered, so there are many which either from consideration of the times or out of some necessity ought to be modified’, 74t., t.23, c. 180, p. 169. This justification for legislative novelty was denied by more traditionalist canonists such as Ivo of Chartres, see Rolker, Canon Law, p. 197.
74 Cushing, Papacy and Law, p. 39.
75 According to Cowdrey, in the D.P., ‘Gregory VII had in his mind a series of trenchant yet only provisionally formulated theses about papal prerogatives which he was concerned to warrant and if necessary to modify when he had been presented with the relevant ancient texts’, PG, p. 507.
76 Peter Crassus, ‘Defence of King Henry’, in P. Llewelyn (trans.), The Age of Gregory VII: Excerpts From Two Gregorian Tracts: http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/churchhistory220/topicfive/petercrassustreatise.html [accessed 1.8.11], p. 5, c. 4. Peter’s canonical work represents the Romanism movement within the Henrician entourage. While he dissented from the Gregorian approach to canon law, it is doubtful that there existed a ‘coherent’ ideological ‘contrast’ between Roman and canon law here. There was an exchange of Biblical material, but a legal exchange had not yet developed in this eleventh-century period, see Landau, ‘The development of law’, in D.E. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith (eds.), The New Cambridge Medieval History.
In terms of institutionalisation, the purposeful compilation of the reform collections indicates the desire of reformers to disseminate Gregorian ideas, as well as the practical need for canonical authorities which could be readily cited. Yet a theoretical dimension perhaps remained insofar as the revolutionary collections functioned as polemical treatises, negotiating and exploring ‘the legitimacy of claims to power’. A sense of ‘utopianism’ may have remained therefore if it can be shown that reform collections were designed for use primarily on a theoretical basis.

Papal Government:

The developing functions of late eleventh-century papal government are significant in the present context of analysing the links between ideology and institutionalisation. The Gregorian papacy precipitated important changes in the organisation of the Church; in particular, the evolution of more sophisticated administrative and representative functions within the papal curia. This process of institutionalisation spurred the formation of a ‘corporate’ Church in which twelfth-century papal monarchy could assume practical form.

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77 Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law*, p. 177; The reformist canonical collections have been described as ‘more works of propaganda than practical manuals’, Cushing, *Reform and the Papacy*, p. 85.

78 It is important to consider, on the one hand, whether the institutionalisation of papal government can mitigate the application of ideology on account of the reduced ‘utopianism’ government ‘in practice’. On the other hand, this sense of institutionalisation should not be taken too far; the bold aims of Gregorian government in fact had a marked ‘utopian’ dimension in their own right.


Papal government has itself been considered ‘ideological’ in the normative definition, similarly to canon law; that it was theorised as the ideational basis for papal authority in addition to being a mechanic of achieving reform in practice. Historians have thus posited a notion of governmental ‘ideology’. A basic issue of terminology must also be confronted here. ‘Government’ is a no less problematic term than any other modern construction at issue here and one with which historians have been accordingly circumspect. Thomas Bisson, for one, has argued that, while it is ‘useless to define the phenomenon or insist on it’, the broad notion of ‘government’ remains important. A recent political-science examination of the relationship between contemporary government and ideology has concluded that the position of government is occupied by whoever dominates the political discourse. The medieval context obviously differs in that ‘leadership meant lordship’ and thus whoever dominated lordship more commonly occupied the position of ‘government’. The domination of ‘political discourse’ is of course important in the current context of testing ideology as a form of ideational ‘domination’, although the role for ‘pontifical lordship’ in this eleventh-century period means that papal authority can with only some degree of legitimacy can be construed as ‘government’. In Gregory’s pontificate, papal government is perhaps best understood as occupying a place between lordship and diplomacy; as a process, responding to ‘political discourse’ and practical pressures of rule. While Gregory’s personal contribution to this

84 Southern, Western Society and the Church, p. 111.
governmental development was limited, what has been credited to his pontificate is the decisive use of papal councils and legation.

i) Papal Councils:

The conciliar approach to implementing papal reform took on an added momentum during Gregory’s pontificate. The authority of the emphatically ‘Roman’ council as the universal legislative assembly was theorised according to the principles of papal primacy contained in D.P. Papal synods functioned as another important channel of communication. In the biannual synodal reports in the Register, it is apparent that the primary functions of papal synods were to legislate for reform and to bring the disobedient episcopate to judgment, despite the D.P.’s claim that the pope could judge bishops in their absence. The backdrop to this conciliar agenda was always Gregory’s primatial entitlement to preside over the Church.

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86 PG, p. 688.
88 D.P. 16: that its universal validity was conferred by the pope’s headship and 17: that no other council was valid without papal sanction; PG, p. 589. Recalling that ideologies are said to ‘universalise’ themselves, the concept of the universal papal council is significant. That Gregory perceived the decrees of his councils to have been ‘binding on the whole Church’ was surely an aspiration to ‘universalise’ papal authority, despite being at the same time ‘utopian’, see Robinson, The Papacy, p. 131. Yet, this statement of universality within conciliar records is inconsistent. When comparing Gregory’s councils of 1079 for instance, the assembly in November was retrospectively titled a ‘universal synod’, (Reg., 6.22, p. 306 (cited in R. Somerville, ‘The councils of pope Gregory VII’, SG, 13 (1989) p. 37)), whereas the Lenten assembly was described only as ‘holy synod’, although presided over by the ‘universal pontiff’, Reg. 6.17a, p. 300. As Robert Somerville has noted, it is difficult to deduce a ‘coherent conciliar theory’ from the Register, ‘The councils’, p. 37. Indeed the theorisation of the universal papal council (as well as the pope’s relationship with that council) remained ambiguous for centuries, see Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory, pp. 43-44. Realistically, however, Gregory’s synods remained only ‘Roman’ and not ‘ecumenical’ assemblies, Tellenbach, The Church, pp. 314, 122.
89 This claim of D.P. 5 was canonically revolutionary according to Gilchrist, (‘Canon law aspects of the eleventh-century Gregorian reform programme’, pp. 28-29), yet there is a discrepancy between the canons of the 74t on this point. According to t.10, c.85, quoted from pseudo-Meltiades, the pope should monopolise episcopal judgement: ‘do not judge bishops nor condemn them without the authority of the Roman see…for it has been decreed from the time of the apostles to reserve this privilege to this holy see’, (p. 116), whereas, on the authority of pseudo-Victor, t.10, c. 83, the pope only has an appellate function, p. 155.
Hence Roman synods were, ideationally, the ‘ceremonious expression of Petrine power’, as well as an instrument of government in the practical sense.

The conciliar reports demonstrate the shift in Gregory’s agenda from reform aims such as the enforcement of papal primacy over the episcopate to the later dominance of the Henrician crisis. The ideational development of Gregorian reform is therefore apparent in its conciliar history. Records are, however, of varying quality. There is no explicit mention of Gregory’s reforms against simony or nicholaitism at his Lenten councils of 1075 or 1076; rather, the gravity of these reforms has to be inferred from his general correspondence. By contrast, the Register’s entry for the Roman council of November 1078 extensively records Gregory’s legislation against ‘abuses’ such as simony as well as the first ‘full’ prohibition of lay investiture. This record has been interpreted as the essence of the Gregorian ‘reform programme’. This council does not, however, loom large in the major chronicles of Gregory’s pontificate; in particular, the criminalisation of investiture, an issue which has dominated the historiography, is not mentioned either by Paul, Bonizo, or Bernold of Constance. The poor reception of this council in the narrative sources, as well as the broader inconsistency of synodal evidence, perhaps weakens the historiographical notion of a

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91 In this respect, synodal evidence is perhaps more valuable source evidence than the D.P. which only provides a historically specific insight into the development of Gregorian reform, PG, pp. 508-510.
92 Conciliar records are therefore fragmentary, partly because there are also no recorded conciliar decrees prior to 1078, see Somerville, ‘The councils’, pp. 35, 45; see Reg. 2.52a, p. 145 and 3.10a, pp. 191-193.
93 See Reg., 5.14a, pp. 260-263.
95 It was instead the rival claimants to the German crown which dominated this 1078 council, according to Paul, Life of Gregory, c.102, p. 344; Bonizo, Book to a friend, b. 8, p. 244; Bernold of Constance, Chronicle, 1078, p. 263. It is only the revised Chronicle of Berthold of Reichenau, which fully details Gregory’s reforms against simony, clerical marriage, and investiture in addition to the developing Henrician crisis, see ‘Chronicle’, second version, in Robinson (ed. and trans.), Eleventh-Century Germany: The Swabian Chronicles (Manchester, 2008), 1078, pp. 219, p. 217.
‘Gregorian reform programme’ and thereby the ideological ‘coherence’ of Gregory’s conciliar legislation.

It also remains difficult to use conciliar evidence to demonstrate the institutionalisation of Gregorian reform. While it has been argued that legatine councils in particular were the most effective and canonical means of ‘disseminating Gregory’s reform ideology’, the synodal reports in the Register are only descriptions; there is no detail of discussion or voting among attendants. Nor can we glean any indication, other than from the tone of Gregory’s post-conciliar letters, of the reception of conciliar legislation when it was disseminated. Papal councils are perhaps therefore limited evidence for papal ‘government’ as such. According to Robinson, Gregory used synods as an opportunity to influence the episcopate through his personal ‘charisma’. This style of governance may not have been strictly institutional, but remains an example of Gregory’s pragmatism in using councils to effect reform in practice.

**ii) Legation:**

Papal legates provided a vital diplomatic function for papal government in the localities of Christendom. Legates were in effect papal ambassadors who could invoke a delegated apostolic authority according to D.P. 4: that a papal legate outranks an ecclesiastic of any

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96 Rennie, ‘Hugh of Die and the legatine office’, pp. 28, 34.
97 For example, see Gregory’s letter to Burchard of Halberstadt, cited below p. 75.
Legation was vital in negotiating the institutionalisation of Gregorian reform at a local level, encouraging the episcopate to recognise Gregory’s decrees while strengthening concurrently the notion of papal primacy. The use of legation to achieve reform in practice perhaps indicates the greater pragmatism of Gregorian reform; but the necessity of legation (as of the boycotting of masses) is perhaps also an implicit sign of Gregory’s failure to influence the episcopate. That reform needed to be enforced, in other words, suggests its limited ideational appeal and the necessity of forced institutionalisation ‘from above’.

Papal legation was tested in Gregory’s relationship with the French episcopate, particularly through his protracted dispute with archbishop Manasses of Rheims. Manasses had challenged the legitimacy of bishop Hugh of Die as Roman legate on the basis that he was a ‘native’ bishop of France. In Die, localised reform was linked with papal primacy by the conferral of legatine authority on Hugh, although his status did not equate exactly with *legatus natus* according to the twelfth-century formulation. Hugh’s authority was nevertheless perceived as a challenge to the episcopalist understanding of the ecclesiastical hierarchy championed by Manasses. Writing to Manasses in 1078, Gregory was obliged to defend the principle of delegating judicial primacy to a prelate ‘of whatever nationality’.

Bonizo records the similarly hostile reception of Gregorian legation on the part of archbishop Liemar of Bremen.

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100 See Gilchrist, ‘Gregory VII and the juristic sources of his ideology’, p. 20. This principle was contested by Ivo of Chartres who insisted that: ‘papal legates...did not have the fullness of power and could not impede episcopal elections. Equally they should not interfere with episcopal jurisdiction by absolving defendants sent to Rome by their diocesan,’ cited in Rolker, *Canon Law*, p. 199.

101 Legation was also employed in the conflict between Gregory and Henry, for example in convening Gregory’s unfulfilled hope of a council to resolve the interregnum, see *Reg.*, 5.15, p. 263-264.


103 Robinson, ‘Church and papacy’, p. 283.

104 *Reg.*, 6.2, p. 276; see Rennie ‘Hugh of Die and the legatine office’ p. 44 for a discussion of this letter.

105 *Book to a friend*, b. 8, p. 240.
In terms of measuring its institutionalisation, the legatine office cannot be matched here with its formulation by the twelfth-century decretalists.\footnote{Robinson, *The Papacy*, pp. 148-159.} Rather, Gregorian legation demonstrates a strong degree of structural flexibility in which definitions of legation, of legates’ jurisdiction and of distinctions within the legatine office were not ‘coherently’ defined: ‘[it was] a flexible and developing instrument of papal government, transformed *ad hoc* to meet Gregory’s immediate needs’.\footnote{Rennie, ‘“Uproot and destroy, build and plant”: legatine authority under Pope Gregory VII’, pp. 168-172, quote at p. 170.} The ‘incoherence’ of legation in both its theorisation and operation perhaps implies that a concept of ideology is less applicable here. This sense of institutional ‘incoherence’ is only apparent, however, in teleological perspective when compared to the more systematically institutionalised legation of the later period. Rather, the developmental picture of Gregorian government is perhaps more complex than ‘incoherent’ here.

A purely ‘ecclesiastical’ conception of legation can only provide a limited assessment of the institutionalisation of Gregorian reform. In recognition of the episcopal unwillingness to implement reform,\footnote{Gregory expressed his disappointment at the lack of reform on the part of the episcopate reform when writing to Duke Rudolf of Swabia in 1075: ‘[the bishops] have made no endeavour to extirpate so execrable a custom [simony] by prohibition or to punish it by any rigour’, *Reg.*., 2.45, p 135; see also *Reg.*., 2.45, p. 135 for Gregory’s opinion of the episcopate: ‘for neither do they transgress through ignorance, or as being thoughtless, but, resisting the Holy Spirit for presumptuous obstinacy, they cast aside divine laws of which they are well aware and despise apostolic decrees’. See Robinson, ‘“Periculosus Homo”’, p. 1; Robinson, ‘The friendship network of Gregory VII’, p. 22.} historians have looked elsewhere to understand reform ‘in practice’; in particular to the role of ‘friendship networks’.\footnote{Robinson, ‘The friendship network’; Rennie, ‘Extending Gregory VII’s “friendship network”’; J. Howe, ‘The nobility’s reform of the medieval Church’, *The American Historical Review*, 93 (1988), p. 339.} Through creating political alliances with both clerical and lay groups sympathetic to reform, the institutionalisation of Gregory’s ideas could be more effectively enforced. Networks such as the south German Gregorian monastic circle, for example, were ‘required alternately to publish papal decrees and to admonish or
even rebel against unreliable bishops’. Indeed, that the chronicles of Bernold of Constance and Berthold of Reichenau are so well informed about Gregorian reform suggests the extent of their role in its implementation. Gregory also instructed duke Rudolf of Swabia to ‘publish and proclaim these same things [Gregory’s legislation on nicholaitism] both in the king’s court and also throughout other places and assemblies of the kingdom’.

More controversial, however, was Gregory’s patronage of the Milanese Patarenes. The political ‘friendship’ he developed with Erlembald, the lay knight and Patarene leader, led to Gregory’s sanction of their popular anticlericalism and boycotts of simoniae’s masses. Most notably, Gregory was so dependent on his alliance with countess Matilda of Tuscany that he had to discourage her from her exchanging her aristocratic role for the religious life. Indeed, Matilda’s political, propagandistic, and military efforts on behalf of the Gregorian papacy can be counted as a vital influence on reform in practice. Since the institutionalisation of Gregorian reform was dependent on the support of these networks, it can be observed how the reality of application had changed the ‘utopian’ nature of reform. In his letters, Gregory’s emphasis on clericalisation and the incontestability of papal authority had to be tempered with the need to persuade and negotiate with parties who did not share his conception of reform or Petrinity. Indeed, on many occasions, he was less idealistic about his recipients’ duty to promote reform without prior encouragement.

113 Reg., 2.45, p. 136; see H.L. Parish, Clerical Celibacy in the West c.1100-1700 (Farnham, 2010).
114 Gregory wrote to Mathilda, ‘because you do not, like many princes, thrust God from your palace but rather you invite him by the sacrifice of righteousness to come into to it…come to the aid of wretched and oppressed churches’, Reg. 1.50, p. 56.
116 For example, Gregory assembled a friendship network to attempt to rebuild his relationship with Count Robert I of Flanders, whose potential to be a key agent of clerical reform had been tarnished by his recent
While reform in practice could not have been achieved without such extra-legate support, there is no especial evidence to indicate that ‘friendship networks’ were equated with a concept of legation. Gregory’s letters to ecclesiastical legates proper used a variety of titles, but ‘legate’ always featured. His sole conferral of legatine authority on a layman was also transient. Rather, such an extra-legate agency was universally expected according to Gregory’s understanding of the ‘obedience’ due to the Roman Church, as well as his conception of lay allies as fideles sancti Petri. The duty of institutionalising reform was therefore binding on all Christians. Moreover, the Patarenes’ anticlericalism whereby ‘ministers of Christ were proclaimed enemies of God’ would surely count against their categorisation as ‘legates’. A broadening of the concept of ‘legation’ also presumes too much in its picture of centre-periphery relations. Indeed, it cannot be proven that local reforming communities always worked under papal instruction, as the concept of (papal)

investiture of the bishop of Thérouanne, see Robinson, ‘The friendship network of Gregory VII’, p. 18. Gregory’s diplomatic attempts to persuade are also evident in his letters to the German episcopate. He addressed bishop Burchard of Halberstadt: ‘dearest brother, we believe you to be not unaware of the decrees of the holy apostolic see about the chastity proper to ecclesiastical orders as they were published far and wide through letters and through legates’, Reg., 2.66, p. 159; Gilchrist, ‘Pope Gregory VII and the juristic sources of his ideology’, p. 5. Such epistolary evidence demonstrates Gregory’s attempt to negotiate reform, although that ‘letters and legates’ had thus far been unsuccessful also indicates the failure of reform in practice in this diocese.

Leyser, for example, has emphasised the ‘upsurge and mobilisation of the masses in the battle for the libertas ecclesiae’, ‘On the eve of the first European revolution’, pp, 13, 19.

PG, p. 595.

The pope looked to all men, and especially those with any kind of ecclesiastical, social, or political pre-eminence, for active service in this world in the cause of St. Peter’, Cowdrey, The Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform, (Oxford, 1970), p. 139; Robinson, “Periculosus Homo”, p. 111. In terms of the fideles sancti Petri, Gregory praiseworthily referred to Erlembald as ‘the most strenuous knight of Christ’, although notably not ‘of Peter’, Reg., 1.27, p. 34.

Andrew of Stumi, ‘Description of the preaching of Ariald in Milan, ca. 1075’, in Miller (ed. and trans.), Power and the Holy in the Age of the Investiture Conflict: A Brief History with Documents (Boston, 2005), p. 51. As Cowdrey has argued, ‘the Patarenes’ aggressively lay character was an especial offence; it violated the right order of Christianity that lay mobs should be assembled to judge and coerce the clergy’, ‘The Papacy, the Patarenes, and the church of Milan, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 18 (1968), p. 34. This complaint was levelled in Henry IV’s 1076 letter to Gregory which argued that the papal encouragement of lay activism was counter-intuitive to the ‘right order’ of Christian society: ‘through you all administration of ecclesiastical affairs has been assigned to popular madness’ letters’, Henry IV, Letters, 11, p. 148; see also Robinson “Periculosus Homo”, p. 115.
legation would imply. Such friendship networks were not papal government proper: the necessity of extra-legate alliances in fact indicates the limited extent of institutionalisation in strictly ecclesiastical terms. Nevertheless, the evidence for this broader institutionalising agency is perhaps a sign of the reduced ‘utopianism’ of Gregorian reform.

iii) Government and centralisation:

The general thrust of Gregorian government was interventionist, ‘root[ing] itself into the midst of provincial politics’ in order to deliver reform in the locality. This was justifiable according to Gregory’s judicial primacy which he claimed as the corollary of papal primacy over the episcopate. Papal government, in the form of interventionary letters and legates, hence served to centralise ecclesiastical judgement. Papal intervention was perhaps ironic considering Gregory’s emphasis on libertas ecclesiae. More precisely, however, this was

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121 The Patarenes, for example, had links with Rome but remained a local movement, perhaps more inclined towards moralistic reform than papalist ecclesiology. Peter Crassus nevertheless interpreted their identity as explicitly papal: ‘you Patarenes claim that you defend your pope Gregory in the name of God, declaring him to be a holy man ruling from the Holy See...so why Patarenes, do you not release your bondage in defence of your pope and this exaltation of him as though he were the ruler of the Church, when he is unanimously condemned as being outside the Church?’, Defence of king Henry, c.3. Other studies have underlined the gulf between papal and local reform, for example, John Eldevik has emphasised how the reforming career of Siegfried of Mainz demonstrates the ‘the diversity of reform ideology within the Church during this period’, see ‘Driving the chariot of the lord: Siegfried I of Mainz (1060-1084) and episcopal identity in an age of transition’, in J.S. Ott and A.T. Jones (eds.), The Bishop Reformed: Studies of Episcopal Power and Culture in the Central Middle Ages, (Aldershot, 2007), p. 188. Studies of provincial reform are an important reminder that the Gregorian papacy did not monopolise reform and that independent reforming communities must not be conflated with notions of ‘papal reform’.


123 Rennie, ‘Extending Gregory VII’s “friendship network”’, p. 479. The concept of ‘intervention’ is of course a negative view of Roman primacy; hence accusations of intervention often came from episcopalist critics such as the circle of Cambrai, PG, p. 412.

124 As Peter Landau has summarised, an important consequence of Gregorian reform was ‘a hierarchical restructuring of the ecclesiastical courts, with the pope at their head as the supreme and omnicompetent ecclesiastical judge’, ‘The development of law’, p. 144; J.P. Canning, A History of Medieval Political Thought: 300-1450 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 95-96.
Indeed, put bluntly, churches were perhaps at ‘liberty’ to be governed by the papacy in place of any lay patron or local bishop.

Gregory was particularly keen to reprove archbishop Siegfried of Mainz, for example, for the latter’s judgement of the episcopal dispute concerning the payment of tithes to his diocese by bishop Jaromir of Prague. This was perceived by Gregory as a challenge to papal primacy according the principle of D.P. 21: ‘that the greater cases of whatever church should be referred to it’. An essentially provincial dispute was thus implicated in Gregory’s desire to make the Church more hierarchical. Gregory’s intervention in the dioceses of Siegfried of Mainz and Manasses of Rheims encourages the understanding of Gregorian government as top-down process whereby the idea of papal primacy was transmitted to the locality through interventionary diplomacy in the form of letters and legates.

On the other hand, it has been argued that this apparent process of centralisation was shaped equally – perhaps more so – by local appeals for papal justice than by papal intervention. Papal primacy was thus at the initiative of the appellants. Can such appeals be interpreted as the successful institutionalisation of a ‘Gregorian ideology’? It is important to think critically about the rationale behind such demands for papal judicial authority and the reception of any potential ideology in local reform movements. The transmission of ideology has been theorised in terms of forces of ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ which determine the

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126 As Gregory wrote, ‘there has come to our ears a shocking report about you...that you have let such a thing enter your head: namely, that the suit which they have between them [the bishops of Prague and Moravia] and which has already so often been referred to an apostolic hearing should be removed from our judgement to the scrutiny of your own will’, Reg., 1.60 p. 63.
128 See Tellenbach, *The Church*, p. 324
overall shape of the concept. Can litigants be understood in this sense as ‘consuming’ the judicial primacy ‘produced’ by the Gregorian papacy? 

According to Cowdrey, papal government was a ‘two-way process’ in which petitions created a significant proportion of papal business. His analysis does not, however, account for petitioners’ motives – or ‘consumption’ in the ideological sense - in terms other than the inherent merit of the idea of papal primacy. The growth of papal government should rather be studied in conjunction with the forces of ‘consumption’ which allowed the idea of papal judicial primacy to become institutionalised. What Roman authority actually represented for those ‘consumers’ who implicated themselves in this ideological scheme is therefore important. As Anne Duggan has argued, narratives of the establishment of ‘papal monarchy’ have often encouraged an imbalanced focus on ‘the evolution of central institutions and less on the external pressures which made those institutions necessary’.

Many appellants may have been members of Gregory’s ‘friendship networks’, whereby the responsibility delegated to these reform communities was then reciprocated by their appeals

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132 PG, pp. 606-607.

133 This point has also been emphasised in respect of medieval state formation, whereby ‘the existence of permanent institutions does not prove that subjects have accepted them as necessary’, Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, p. 8.

134 It is Duggan’s view that: ‘the emergence of the papacy as the primary judicial and legislative authority in the Latin church can be seen as the working out of a deliberate programme of papal aggrandizement, but the functioning of the process of consultation and appeal reveals a different picture: not of a relentless papal machine but of an constant dialogue between diocesan bishops and the papal curia’, see ‘De Consultationibus: the role of episcopal consultation in the shaping of canon law in the twelfth century’, in B.C. Brasington and K.G. Cushing (eds.), Bishops, Texts, and the Use of Canon Law Around 1100, pp. 191.
for papal judgement. Pets__ Petitions for *libertas Romana* may also have been an additional source of litigation ‘from below’, although the granting of papal privileges was in Gregory’s interests also. It may be misleading, however, to implicate appellants in an ideological dialogue when they may not have been ‘consuming’ the same ideology which the Gregorian papacy was ‘producing’. Bishops appealing to the papacy, for example, may have done so only to become more powerful in their own dioceses. The difficulty of interpreting appellants’ motives is also to some extent a problem of the sources since the survival of Gregory’s *Register* provides only a one-sided picture of papal intervention, either requested or unwilled. The one-directionality of this ideological transmission is also questionable. Provincial reform communities can themselves be seen as ideological ‘producers’ according to the historiography which has diverged from papal centralisation in explaining eleventh-century reform. Furthermore, it is fundamental to recognise that a positive ‘enthusiasm’ for papal justice on the part of the episcopate was a mid-twelfth century development and that

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136 Robinson, *The Papacy*, p. 210. Gregory acknowledged a request for regional primacy on behalf of archbishop Gebuin in his privilege for the Church of Lyons: ‘you [Gebuin] have asked of us that we would confirm the dignity granted by our predecessors to the church over which by God’s providence you are known to preside, and to safeguard from hostile attack by the defence of the apostolic see whatever belongs to it’, *Reg.*, 6.34, pp. 315-316; see also Gregory’s response for the Abbey of Romans’ petition for liberty, *Reg.*, 2.59, p. 153.

137 Cowdrey argues that monastic exemption was used to create outposts of Gregorian reform in ‘strategically vital monasteries’, *The Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform*, pp. 172-174; see above, pp. 39-40.


139 The papalist rhetoric of some letters, for example, may obscure the appellants’ original motives.

140 A broadened focus on the sources of ideological ‘production’ can form a corrective to the centralist and constitutional historiography which has paid insufficient attention to non-Roman currents of reform. Many historians have therefore made the case for a less Rome-centric orientation to the history of the eleventh-century reform movement(s), arguing that the historiography has been influenced by the papalism of many primary sources which undervalue the reforming contribution of local movements as well as lay society. See Howe, ‘The nobility’s reform of the medieval Church’, p. 337; Leyser, ‘On the eve of the first European revolution’, pp. 2-3; and Miller, *The Formation of a Medieval Church: Ecclesiastical Change in Verona 950-1150* (New York, 1993), pp. 5-6, 12-14, for a discussion of a less-institutionally conceived understanding of reform. On the whole, an institutional approach has remained dominant (see, for example, Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, p. viii) and insofar as it is *papal* ideology at issue here, the focus should for the most part remain on centralised government.
analyses such as Duggan’s should not be pre-dated too liberally.\textsuperscript{141} The popular institutionalisation of papal judicial primacy is more properly a feature of the later period,\textsuperscript{142} since in Gregory’s pontificate, papal centralism often had to be pursued by intervention.

**Conclusion:**

This chapter has explored how aspects of canon law and papal government can be understood in a context of reform in practice. A particular focus has been whether evidence for the institutionalisation of Gregorian reform can challenge its supposed ‘utopianism’ in ideological terms. Overall, it is difficult to interpret law and government as the straightforward realisation of a reforming ideal. Not only was reform especially ambitious, but there remained big institutional strictures on achieving reform in practice throughout (and beyond) Gregory’s pontificate. Indeed, canon law and papal government, supposedly forms of implementation, did to an extent, display this same ‘utopian’ trend. In this context, the implementation of Gregorian reform could perhaps remain only ideological in the ‘utopian’ sense. With respect to the other theoretical models, the revolution thesis in canon law qualifies a concept of ideology in its ‘distorting’ and ‘naturalising’ functions. Ideological ‘coherence’ is less demonstrable, however, in the conflicting content of reform collections such as the 74t and, in governmental terms, in the unsystematic and experimental nature of papal legation.\textsuperscript{143} There

\textsuperscript{141} As Tellenbach has written of the episcopate in Gregory’s pontificate: ‘there can be no question of their [the bishops] having followed the doings and proclamations of pope and curia with attention, let alone enthusiasm’, *The Church*, p. 312. Southern also argues that the penetration of papal jurisdiction at the micro-ecclesiastical level was only after c.1140, *Western Society*, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{142} See P. Zutshi, ‘Petitioners, popes, proctors: the development of curial institutions, c.1150-1250’, in G. Adenna (ed.), *Pensiero e Sperimentazioni Institutizionali Nella “Societas Christana” (1046-1250)* (Milan, 2007), p. 278; according to Barraclough, it was the density of judicial appeals in this period which truly stimulated the development of curial administration and the professionalisation of papacy monarchy, *The Medieval Papacy*, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{143} The experimental nature of Gregorian government means that historians should focus on *aspects* of institutional, rather than institutionalisation *in toto*: ‘it does not make sense…to ask if one or another
may have been an institutional ‘mentality’ lacking in Gregory’s concept of reform, although this cannot be explored here.\textsuperscript{144}

The emerging picture of ‘Gregorian ideology’ is perhaps ambivalent thus far. The discrepancy between the structural ‘incoherence’ of papal government (which disprove ideology) and the ‘utopianism’ of legal and governmental pretensions (which prove ideology) suggests how these theoretical models are pushing in different directions and that, consequently, the overall concept of ideology might be more tenuous.

\textsuperscript{144} Howe, \textit{Church Reform and Social Change in Eleventh-Century Italy: Dominic of Sora and his Patrons} (Philadelphia, 1997), p. 161; \textit{PG}, p. 696. Indeed, the institutionalisation of a ‘spirit’ of reform, which was by nature personal and volatile, remained a long-term problem for the medieval Church.
CHAPTER THREE: GREGORIAN REFORM AND IDEOLOGICAL ‘CONTRAST’.

Introduction:

Ideology has been modelled in terms of its inherent ‘contrast’ with another ideological form.¹ According to some theorists, it has an inbuilt relativity which necessitates its definition in ‘contrast’ to an ideological other: ‘a value, belief, or attitude is ideological only with reference to something else which is not, or which is differently ideological’.² On the basis of this model, testing ideology in Gregorian reform begs the question of what (other) ideological forms it defined itself against. How can the foci for reform, for example, those aspects of clerical immorality perceived to threaten the Church’s liberty and moral purity, be conceived of as ideologically ‘contrasting’ with Gregorian reform? It is demonstrably flawed to consider concepts such as sexual purity or sacramental efficacy as sub-ideologies or ideologies in themselves; rather they must be addressed collectively when testing an overall concept of ideology in Gregorian reform.³ The same principle applies to concepts such as lay investiture, episcopality, and sacerdotal kingship, which typified the broader ideational ‘order’ against which Gregorian reform self-defined. To an extent this ‘order’ was manifested in the authority of Henry IV of Germany (r.1068-1105). The model of ‘contrast’ thus provides the theoretical justification for examining the long debated relationship between Gregory and Henry.⁴ The focus of this chapter is therefore how ideological ‘contrast’ can be read into the conflict

¹ For the theoretical outline see K. Knight, ‘Transformations of the concept of ideology in the twentieth century’, American Political Science Review, 100 (2006), p. 624. This is an important theme, although the precise conditions of ‘contrast’ are (predictably) vague in their theoretical prescription.
³ See above, p. 31.
⁴ The focus on Henry is justifiable here since it was his breach with Gregory in 1076 which affected the course of the Gregorian papacy most fundamentally.
between Gregorian reform and the concepts grouped within Henrician kingship and emperorship respectively.\textsuperscript{5}

Not every aspect of Gregorian reform can of course be interpreted as ‘relative’ to Gregory’s conflict with Henry. There is no historiographical consensus over whether the expansion of papal authority which provoked the tensions with the Salian monarchy actually marked a different trajectory from that of the reform of clerical morality and appointment.\textsuperscript{6} The politicisation of ‘reform’ is without doubt one of the most complex aspects of Gregory’s pontificate. While his reform spirituality undoubtedly influenced his conflict with Henry, it is in respect of the political clash of papacy and kingship that a concept of ‘reform’ perhaps becomes least valid. Indeed, secular authority (and kingship as its exemplar) acquired a new status in ‘contrast’ to papal authority during what has been termed the Gregorian ‘revolution’.\textsuperscript{7} Attempting, however, to forcibly separate evidence for ‘reform’ and ‘revolution’ (despite the importance of the distinction) overcomplicates the task of attesting an overall ‘Gregorian ideology’.\textsuperscript{8}

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\textsuperscript{5} The distinction between kingship and emperorship is important. While it is difficult to extract the two, it is misleading to compound them. Henry’s authority will be broached as ‘kingship’ until the distinction can be properly analysed, see below, p. 100.


\textsuperscript{8} It is useful to agree with the opinion of R.I. Moore that Gregory’s concept of reform was inherently hierocratic: ‘reform meant hierarchy, and could do no other’, see ‘Between sanctity and superstition: saints and their miracles in the age of revolution’, in M. Rubin (ed.), \textit{The Work of Jacques Le Goff and the Challenges of Medieval History} (Woodbridge, 1997), p. 65.
Overviewing the interpretation of the conflict between Gregory and Henry in the historiography, there has been a tendency to dichotomise papacy and kingship as contrasting political theologies or ecclesiologies. \(^9\) Scholarly emphasis on the contestation of *libertas ecclesiae* between Gregory and Henry reflects the penetration of Tellenbach’s longstanding interpretation of the Investiture Contest as a struggle for ‘right order in the world’. \(^10\) Within this, historians have emphasised the specific contest of supremacy and universality between papacy and kingship. The historiographical notions of papal monarchy and caeseropapism, for example, reflect how Gregory and Henry straddled the spheres of authority prescribed by Gelasian dualism. The convergence of spiritual and secular authority within each ‘hybrid’ jurisdiction is interpreted by Morrison as the basis for an inevitable contest for superiority: ‘there could be but one head, the regal pontiff or the pontifical king’. \(^11\) A conflict between Church and State has also been read into the conflict between papacy and kingship. \(^12\) Such an interpretation is inadequate, however, in a number of respects. It fails for one to register the

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\(^9\) Robinson has characterised the conflict as the struggle between ‘two contending hierarchies, each basing its claims to legitimacy on a different interpretation of ecclesiastical order’, *Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest: the Polemical Literature of the Late Eleventh Century* (Manchester, 1978), p. 6.


\(^11\) K.F. Morrison, (ed. and trans.), ‘Introduction’, in Morrison and T.E. Mommsen (trans.), *Imperial Lives and Letters of the Eleventh Century* (New York, 1962), p. 40. Ullmann similarly argued that the conflict represented a ‘diametric’ contrast between rival theorisations of the Church, in which neither ‘absolutism…could concede any point to the other’, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages: a Study in the Ideological Relation of Clerical to Lay Power* (London, 1955) pp. 295, 352-354. According to Joseph Canning, it was the increasingly ‘parallel’ jurisdictions of ecclesiastical and secular rule which was the source of tension in this period, see *A History of Medieval Political Thought 300-1450* (London, 1996), p. 83. More than any parallelism, however, it was surely the overlap between these, whereby ‘the ideas and ambitions cherished by each interpenetrated those of the other’, which was the greatest source of conflict, R. Folz, *The Concept of Empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century* (London, 1969), trans. S.A. Ogilvie, p. 75.

vital episcopal context to the crisis of 1076, as well as the sense in which the German episcopate, effectively a component of the ‘state’, remained opposed to the Roman Church.

The artificiality of implicating Gregory and Henry in a Church-State polarity is heightened by the eleventh-century concept of ‘the Church’ as the Body of Christ which engrossed all of Christian society, including ‘the state’. The secular connotations of the ‘state’ are also misleading since kings were not unequivocally perceived as laymen. Historians are also divided on the status of lay investiture as the focal point of conflict. Whereas Tellenbach and Robinson are convinced that the issue did dominate, Alfred Haverkamp argues that investiture was secondary to the more fundamental dispute of ecclesiology between Gregory and Henry. The papal-Henrician conflict has also been interpreted more broadly in relation to aspects of social change which intersected with (and resulted from) Gregory’s efforts to shape his interpretation of ‘the right order’.

According to Robinson, the tension between papacy and kingship (manifested, for example, in the investiture crisis at Milan at this point) should not obscure the vital episcopal impetus to Gregory’s deposition at the council of Worms in 1076, although Henry was necessarily implicated since he was ‘head’ of the German church and co-author of the Worms letters, see “Periculosus Homo”: pope Gregory VII and episcopal authority’, Viator, 9 (1978), p. 103. By contrast, Alfred Haverkamp places more emphasis on the Milanese crisis as the precipitator of the breach of 1076, see Medieval Germany 1056-1273 (2nd edn., Oxford, 1992), trans. H. Braun and R. Mortimer, p. 115.

There were clearly multiple ideational conflicts intersecting at Worms and the tensions between episcopacy and papal primacy were very significant. The main focus will remain here however on papacy and kingship. This was part of the basis for papal monarchy, see below, p. 87. According to Tellenbach, ‘the notion of the Church as an autonomous part of a total society is so much a current one today that it is often applied unreflectingingly [to history]’, The Church, p. 351; Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society, pp. 444-445; Ladner, ‘Aspects of medieval thought on church and state’, p. 444; R.H.C. Davis, A History of Medieval Europe (2nd edn, Harlow, 1988), p. 239.

Accepting reformers’ claims of lay domination at face value does not take account of the influence of the idea of sacral kingship, see T. Reuter, ‘The Church in the early eleventh century’, in The Papacy, Religious Change and Church Reform, 1049-1125 [accessed 7.11.11].

Robinson, The Papacy 1073-1198, Continuity and Innovation (Cambridge, 1990), pp. ix-x, c.f. Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, p. 129. The magnitude of the investiture issue also rests on the dating of Gregory’s systematic prohibition of lay (and specifically royal) investiture, see below p. 95.

Many historians have interpreted the conflict in terms of a change in the relationship between lay and clerical authority. According to Tellenbach, Gregorian reform desired to impose a more rigorous ‘contrast’ between the ‘closed spiritual hierarchy’ of the clergy and the ranks of the laity, The Church, p. 351. R.I. Moore in particular has emphasised how Gregorian clericalisation entailed a broader social transformation in which socio-religious roles were newly delimited, see Formations of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe (2nd edn., Oxford, 2007) pp. 130-131; Moore, The First European Revolution; Moore,
There is a historiographical basis for ‘contrast’ therefore which can be used as a source of debate for the interpretation of ideology here. Within the broader theoretical framework of ‘contrast’, the analysis will also engage with the above theorisations of ideology. The ‘universalising’ function, for example, may be especially applicable here. While it is tempting to invoke a concept of ‘hegemony’ to describe the dominance of inter-spheral hybrid authorities such as papal monarchy and caeseropapism, this term has a specific meaning within the political-science literature on ideology and must accordingly be applied with care. 19 ‘Totality’ will be used instead of ‘hegemony’ to denote a sense of supremacy in inter-spheral authority. 20 In terms of the available source material, the narrative sources in which partisan authors replayed the events of the Investiture Contest to debate the legitimacy of the Gregorian and Henrician cases will be particularly useful in here in exploring ‘contrast’.

Many relevant topics cannot be discussed here. 21 Nor can the following analysis attempt to test concepts of Henrician authority themselves for ideology according to the definitional matrix. The focus will rather be on the relational importance of kingship and emperorship to defining a potential concept of ‘Gregorian ideology’.


19 Ideological ‘hegemony’ alludes to the Marxian concept of consensual domination formulated by Antonio Gramsci. This must be differentiated from the normative application of the term in the historiography. For example, Robinson has described the ‘secular domination’ of the tenth-century papacy as ‘imperial hegemony’, see ‘Church and papacy’, in J.H. Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c.350-c.1450 (Cambridge, 1988), p. 297.

20 The idea of competing ‘totalities’ does not accord well with the contemporary historiographical emphasis on ‘micro-Christianities’, (see. K. Gill, ‘Medieval Christianity: the state of the field’, Religion Compass, 1 (2004), pp. 1-17), although testing a concept of ideology is unavoidably an exercise in high-political history.

21 Such topics include the schism between the Latin and Greek churches, the episcopal question, papal ‘feudalism’, and the many other test cases for Gregorian authority other than in Henrician Germany.
Papal monarchy:

The catholicity of the Roman Church, as declared in D.P. 2 and 11, was a central theme of Gregory’s pontificate. Papal universalism was premised on the Church and the world being synonymous such that papal primacy applied to Christian society as the Body of Christ in its entirety. Linked to this was the concept of Christendom which was also used to embody papal universality, and thereby papal monarchy, although with added conceptual input from the idea of ‘Roman empire’ fusing with the universality of the Church. The jurisdictional scope of papal authority was also broadened by Gregory, from beyond the confines of Gelasian dualism to a new monarchic status. Historians have disagreed, however, on how this universality and monarchy associated with papal authority were conceptually substantiated. Kantorowicz, for example, wrote of the ‘imperialisation’ of papal authority. This view is informed by hostile contemporaries’ emphasis on Gregory’s ‘usurpation’ of Henrician authority. Morrison has furthermore shown how the monarchisation of papal authority through Gregory’s ‘regal pontificalism’ was commensurate with his attempt to desacralise kingship, such that a concept of ecclesiastical monarchy would be exclusive to the papacy.

22 ‘That the Roman pontiff alone is by right called “universal”’; 11: ‘That this name is unique in the world’.
26 Commenting on the duality of priesthood and royal authority, for example, Henry IV noted how ‘one man, [Gregory] has arrogated both for himself’, Letters, 13, p. 152. For the main discussion, see below from p. 96.
On the other hand, in contrast to any sense of appropriation of secular authority, Gregory’s concept of papal monarchy has been attributed by other historians to his totalising interpretation of papal primacy. Papal primacy was the essential pre-condition for papal monarchy in the sense that Gregory’s primatial authority was widened beyond spiritual affairs. The broader, ‘political’ application of primacy was then designed to legitimise, and indeed obligate, papal authority in the secular sphere. While ‘papal monarchy’ is often characterised in reference to Gregory’s consolidation of papal primacy over the episcopate, the most apposite sense of the term in the present context is in its relativity to Henrician authority and hence pertains to secular authority.

Papal universality was expressed primarily in the person of the pope, and the monarchic primacy Gregory claimed was thereby defined in relation to the Petrine commission. As he wrote in 1074, ‘we trust in the Lord Jesus Christ that blessed Peter the apostle, whom the Lord Jesus Christ, the king of glory, has made prince over the kingdoms of the world’. The papal-monarchic entitlement to bind and loose on earth was also an extrapolation of Petrine authority to judge in heaven. As Gregory argued in his 1076 letter to bishop Hermann of Metz, ‘if the holy apostolic see, deciding through the pre-eminent power that is divinely conferred upon it, settles spiritual matters, why not also secular matters’? This logic was

28 The pope’s claim to political supremacy became, in the context of the struggle with the German king, the most important aspect of the papal primacy, Robinson (ed. and trans.), ‘Introduction’, in The Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century, Lives of Pope Leo IX and Pope Gregory VII (Manchester, 2004), p. 12; C. Morris, Papal Monarchy, The Western Church from 1050 to 1250 (Oxford, 1989), p. 133. According to Ullmann, ‘wherever the line of distinction between spiritual and temporal matters might have been drawn, for papal governmental ideology the distinction had no operational value’, Medieval Political Thought (London, 1975), p. 105.

29 Historians have conceived of ‘intra-ecclesiastical papal primacy’ as papal monarchy in this sense, see Blumenthal, Investiture Controversy, Church and Monarchy from the Ninth to the Twelfth Century (Philadelphia, 1988), p. 118; K. Pennington, Popes and Bishops: Papal Monarchy in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 2-4; Canning, Medieval Political Theory, p. 95.


31 Reg., 4.2, p. 209.
repeated at Gregory’s 1080 Lenten synod. Papal universality was in this sense distinct from any notion of universality appropriated from secular authority, although that this charge was alleged by Gregory’s critics is implied by his insistence that papal authority did not aspire to ‘worldly advantage’. Neither was papal-monarchic authority derivative of the Donation of Constantine; rather, according to Whalen, Gregory’s ‘ideology of universal authority’ was referenced entirely from the Petrine commission.

Gregory’s concept of papal monarchy was also rooted in the transformation of Gelasian dualism. The Gregorian reading departed from the authentic ecclesiology by omitting Gelasius’ qualification that papal superiority was in spiritual or sacramental matters only. The Gelasian canon was then published in its revised interpretation in the 74t: ‘There are two powers by which this world is chiefly ruled…the sacred authority of the pontiffs and the royal power. And of these the responsibility of priests is weightier’. Dualism was thus ‘distorted’

32 As Gregory explained his sentence of excommunication and deposition against Henry, ‘if you can bind and loose in heaven, on earth you can take away from and grant to each one according to his merits empires, kingdoms, principalities, duchies, marches, counties and all men, Reg., 7.14a, p. 344, cited in Tellenbach, The Church, p. 331.

33 ‘Gregory himself never claimed the territorial or jurisdictional universality associated with the Empire, nor did he ever describe himself as heir to the Caesars. His greatest claims were based rather upon his belief in the moral hegemony of the papacy’, see Morrison, ‘Canossa: a revision’, Traditio, 18 (1962), p. 130.

34 Writing to ‘all the faithful in the Roman empire’, Gregory argued ‘no consideration of worldly advantage urges us against bad princes and impious priests, but the contemplation of our office and the power, by which we are daily constrained, of the apostolic see’, Reg., 4.1, p. 208.

35 Whalen, Dominion of God, p. 26, c.f Folz, The Concept of Empire, p. 12 who does emphasise the Donation as lending a concept of empire to papal authority.

36 As Pope Gelasius I had written in the fifth century, ‘although you [Emperor Anastasius I] are the ruler of the human race, nevertheless you devoutly bow your head before those who are leaders in things divine…in the reception and proper administration of the heavenly sacraments you know that you ought to submit to Christian order rather than take the lead’, ‘Letter to Emperor Anastasius I’, in B. Pullan (ed. and trans.), Sources for the History of Medieval Europe From the Mid-Eighth Century to the Mid-Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1971), p. 46.

37 74t, t. 41, c. 227, p 199. In Anselm of Lucca’s Collection of Canons, Gelasius’ letter to emperor Anastasius was similarly doctored to emphasise papal authority. In the 74t, the letter is cited under the title ‘On the sacerdotal authority and royal power’, yet in Anselm’s Collection, the letter is cited under the rubric title, ‘quod auctoritates pontificum’, (my emphasis). Anselm therefore placed a specifically papalist spin on the letter, see Cushing, Papacy and Law, p. 171. This links with the attempts of Gregorian exegetes to ideologically ‘naturalise’ non-papalist canons, see above, p. 65.
to permit the superiority of papal authority in broader terms than Gelasius had prescribed. Gregory elaborated upon the hierocratic interpretation of Gelasianism in his 1081 tract to Hermann, noting ‘how much more should consent be accorded to the bishop of the see which both the supreme godhead wished to be superior to all priests and also the subsequent devotion of the whole Church has continuously celebrated’. Gregory’s emphasis here on the ‘devotion of the whole Church’ may be interpreted as an attempt to ‘universalise’ the scope of papal monarchy in the ideological sense. Gregory also seemingly equated the imperial and royal powers by applying his version of Gelasianism in the context of kingship.

While Gregory’s monarchic rhetoric indicates a sense of hierarchical ideological ‘contrast’ with other authorities, the implied *plentudo potestatis* should not be pre-dated too liberally in this period. The practical universality of papal monarchy could not yet be realised for all the reasons discussed in the previous chapter. It is therefore important to note the degree of ‘utopianism’ within Gregory’s elaboration of papal primacy, despite the fact that this would (contradictorily) qualify ideology in its own right.

38 Robinson, ‘Church and papacy’, pp. 287-289, 298.
39 Gregory continues that ‘it is fitting that the necks of the faithful should in general be subjected to all priests who rightly handle divine things,’ Reg. 8.21, p. 388, my emphasis.
40 This may have been because Gregory was attempting to exercise papal monarchy over a range of kings, not just the king of the imperial (Salian) dynasty. He expounded his interpretation of Gelasian dualism in relation to kingship when writing to William I of England: ‘He [God] has provided that it should be ruled by the apostolic and royal dignities through different functions. However, by this distinction of greater and lesser the Christian religion so directs itself that the royal dignity, after God, is governed by the care and direction of the apostolic’, Reg., 7.25, p. 357.
Gregory’s substitution of dualism for papalism has been interpreted as an attack on ‘medieval equilibrium’ and ‘hierarchical complementarity’. Occasional allusions to dualism, however, on the part of Gregorian authors perhaps bring the ‘coherence’ of papal monarchy into question. Gregory wrote to duke Rudolf of Swabia in 1073, for example, arguing that ‘the priestly and imperial powers should be conjoined in the unity of concord’. The absence of any hierocratic theme is also evident in Gregory’s early letters to Henry in which the spiritual and secular powers are cast in a ‘symmetrical fashion’. Similar ecclesiological statements can be found in the narrative sources. The Life of Gregory, for instance, notes that, on Gregory’s receipt of Henry’s conciliatory letter of 1073, ‘the whole church rejoiced hoping that by God’s grace the priestly and the royal powers would be united in cleaning up all the filth that everywhere burdened the church’. Furthermore, Bonizo characterises Henry’s deposition sentence pronounced against Gregory at Worms as ‘the letter that destroyed the unity of the Church’. Such evidence underlines Cowdrey’s scepticism about characterising papal monarchy in Gregory’s pontificate. Indeed, these expositions of unity and interdependence were rather the conservative political theology of Peter Damian; a reformer, but by no means a Gregorian. The dualism implied in papalists’ references to ‘unity’

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44 See Reg., 3.7, p 183; L. Melve, Inventing the Public Sphere: the Public Debate during the Investiture Contest (c. 1030–1122) (Leiden, 2007), vol. 1, p. 191.
46 Book to a friend, c. 7, p. 234
47 PG, p. 609; 695-697.
48 As Peter wrote to Henry IV in c. 1065, ‘as both dignities, namely the royal and the sacerdotal, are primarily joined to one another in Christ...so they are united in the Christian people by a kind of mutual agreement. Each, in truth, needs the other for what he there finds useful, since the sacerdotal is protected by the defensive capability of the empire, and royal power is supported by the holiness of the priestly office, Letters, 120, c. 10 p. 392. Yet, this unity did not preclude, according to Peter, the papacy’s right to bind and loose on earth: ‘is there a province throughout all the kingdoms of the earth that is exempt from its authority, at whose will heaven and earth itself is bound and loosed?...He who granted to the blessed custodian of the keys to external life the powers of earthly and heavenly dominion founded the Roman Church...clearly, it enjoys his privilege and is supported by his authority’, Letters, 65, p. 27; Robinson, Authority and Resistance, p. 118.
perhaps characterises the spiritual and secular powers as ideological ‘co-relatives’. Yet insofar as references to ‘unity’ and ‘concord’ between Gregory and Henry need not have entailed their equality, papal monarchy and thereby the hierarchical relativity of papacy and kingship may not have been mitigated. Indeed, that Henry’s ‘destruction of unity’, in Bonizo’s words, was interpreted as act of ‘disobedience’ indicates the hierarchical connotations of the relationship between the two powers.49

Reflecting on the potential for ideological ‘contrast’ within papal monarchy, it may be argued that Gregorian reform was indeed defined by its relativity since it endeavoured to make Christian society hierarchically relative to papal authority on account of its universality and inter-spherical totality. To further explore this, it is necessary to examine how Henrician authority contested the hierarchical status imposed upon it.50 Although difficult, it is particularly important to distinguish here between languages of royalty and emperorship in the sources.

**Henrician authority:**

**i) Kingship:**

Henry’s exercise of royal authority gave impetus to many aspects of Gregorian reform. In comparison with emperorship, kingship was to a certain extent a form of lordship.51 Lordship

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49 See below, pp 102-103.
50 Again, the intention here is not to test an ideology of Henrician authority as such but to explore its relational importance in the context of the supposed ‘contrast’ inherent in ‘Gregorian ideology’.
51 Henry’s royal lordship was disputed militarily in Germany as well as ideationally in concert with the papacy. Internal lordship was indeed a major problem for Henry who suffered the repeated rebellion of the Saxons as well as other aristocratic factions, see Robinson, *Henry IV of Germany: 1056-1106* (Cambridge, 1999), p.
is a different enterprise to ‘ideology’ according to the normative definition, yet aspects of Salian lordship arguably should be considered in an ideational context. The proprietary church, for example, was a form of royal lordship, but this was ideational in the sense that royal investiture was premised on Henry’s ministerial authority. Indeed, Henrician kingship did have a pronounced ideational dimension. In terms of the ideological ‘contrast’ between kingship and papal monarchy, there were two principal aspects to the royal reaction: the defence of Gelasian dualism and an insistence on the divinity of kingship.

Focussing firstly on the theocratic basis for royal authority, Henry’s ministerial status was emphasised through references to his ‘anointing’ and his status as vicariate of God. In Peter Crassus’s *Defence of King Henry*, for example, the divinity of kingship is strongly underlined: ‘King Henry, by God’s concession entered into kingship…that this is the origin of kingship is clearly witnessed by the Prophet Daniel: “the kingdom belongs to God, to give to who he wishes”’. ‘Sacerdotal kingship’ in the Salian tradition was also premised on Old Testament exemplars of priestly kingship such as David and Solomon. Such interpretations of kingship as a ministerial office provided a basis to contest the status of royal authority within papal monarchy. As Henry insisted in his deposition letter to Gregory, ‘you dared to threaten to take the kingship away from us, as though we had received the kingship from you, as though

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kingship and empire were in your hand and not in the hand of God’. The polemicist Wenrich of Trier meanwhile attacked Gregory’s claim to bind and loose royal authority on the same grounds. Henrician kingship therefore ideologically ‘contrasted’ with papal monarchy by insisting upon its derivation from and accountability to God. While a historiographical notion of ‘royal ideology’ has been broached in respect of ministerial kingship, this lacks theoretical definition.

The implication of ministerial kingship was that Henry had ecclesiastical authority. In the tradition of Carolingian and Ottonian kingship, Henry self-identified as head of the Church and, likewise, conceived of the Church as a subcategory of the realm. In this context the German and north-Italian episcopate became an instrument of lordship within the institutional apparatus of the realm. Indeed, while the existence of a ‘coherent’ Reichskirchen system remains contested, it was generally typical of pre-Gregorian episcopality that German prelates were subject to the king. Henry therefore held ecclesiastical authority both ideationally and institutionally, as both minister of Christ and head of the proprietary Church.

In view of Henry’s exercise of an ecclesiastical, and therefore inter-spheral, concept of

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55 Henry IV, Letters, 12, p. 150
56 Wenrich contested the Gregorian claim to ‘change the anointed of the Lord like common villains whenever they please; to order them to come down from the throne of their fathers and, if they do not do so at once, curse them with an anathema’, cited in Morris, Papal Monarchy, p. 131.
57 John Arnold has argued for the ‘ideologies of power’ through which, quoting from Marc Bloch, he understands Capetian and Salian monarchs to have ‘imbued their kingship with sacral elements such as being anointed “king, investing heavily in holy relics, and claiming a quasi-sacramental power principally through the Royal touch”’, What is Medieval History? (Cambridge, 2008), p.116; M. Bloch, The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France (London, 1973), trans. J.E. Anderson. See also Blumenthal, ‘Canossa and royal ideology in 1077’, Manuscripta, 22 (1978), pp. 91-96.
60 Weinfurter, The Salian Century, p. 100.
kingship, the ‘contrast’ between kingship and papal monarchy may have been one of totalities of authority.

Royal investiture in particular can be understood as the practical application of the idea of priestly kingship. Gregory’s prohibition was accordingly targeted as much against this aspect of royal spirituality as the perceived abuse of ecclesiastical property during investiture. As Knox has argued, ‘for reformers, denying lay investiture was a brief way of saying that spiritual authority does not belong to the state’. The status of the investiture issue as the focus of the ideological ‘contrast’ between papacy and kingship is, however, open to question in terms of the dating of Gregory’s prohibitive legislation. The idea that ‘the Gregorians’ sacerdotalism demanded the prohibition of lay investiture’, has been challenged by Rudolf Schieffer’s argument that Gregory’s ‘sacerdotalism’, arguably exercised in the crisis of 1076-1077, in fact pre-dated his first systematic proscription of lay investiture in 1078. This has encouraged the de-emphasis of the investiture issue in some historiography.

65 Historiography has traditionally credited pope Nicholas II’s legislation of 1059 as the first prohibition of lay investiture: ‘that no cleric or priest shall receive a church from laymen in any fashion, whether freely or at a price’, The Legislation of 1059, in B. Tierney (ed. and trans.), The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300: a Short History with Documents (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), p. 44; see, for example, Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society; H. Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, c.1050-1200 (Cambridge, 1986), trans. T. Reuter, p. 54. This is challenged by Schieffer’s case, see Die Entstehung des Päpstlichen Investiturverbots für den Deutschen König (Stuttgart, 1981); Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, p. 107. The Register records Gregory’s 1078 synodal legislation as such: ‘that is forbidden for anyone to receive the investiture of churches from the hand of laymen’, 6.5b, p. 282. Schieffer’s case perhaps carries more weight on the basis that the investiture issue is not mentioned explicitly in either the Worms deposition letters or Gregory’s justifications for excommunication and deposing Henry in 1076 (although Henry’s ‘simoniaca’ nomination of the episcopate is, see above, p. 29). The events of Canossa are also linked problematically to the ‘Investiture Contest’ in its revised dating. I agree with Blumenthal that ‘no definite unambiguous prohibition of investiture could have caused the great clash of 1076’, The Investiture Controversy, p. 121.
66 Tellenbach’s The Church has conceded interpretative ground to Schieffer on the reduced importance of investiture in the broader scheme of Gregorian reform, although continues to credit Gregory’s legislation of
Moreover, if Gregorian reform was defined in ideological ‘contrast’ to Henrician kingship, the implication of this revised dating is that the scope of its relativity (i.e. to include prohibiting investiture) was developing throughout the pontificate. The dating of legislation notwithstanding, Gregory’s ban on investiture in theory undermined the practicality of royal lordship by removing the right of clerical appointment, while destabilising also the ‘ideological foundations of royal theocracy’ through his attendant attempts to desacralise kingship. While what could be termed ‘royal hegemony’ over the Church was maintained elsewhere throughout the reform period, notably in England, Gregorian reform specifically ‘contrasted’ itself against Henry’s inter-spheral royal authority by attempting to deconstruct ministerial kingship.

A sense of inter-spheral totality within Henrician kingship is lessened, however, by Henry’s advocacy of dualism in response to papal monarchy. One of the most prominent Henrician texts, the Liber de unitate ecclesia conservanda, criticised Gregory’s perceived appropriation of royal power as such: ‘since God himself has thus arranged things and has instituted these two, the royal power and the sacred authority of priests, by which this world is chiefly ruled, who can attempt to go against this except one who resists the ordinance of God?’ That Gregory had transgressed God’s ordinance through his ‘arrogant usurpation of new power’

1075 as a general prohibition, (p. 177). For a discussion of the historiographical impact of this interpretation, see Miller, ‘Crisis in the Investiture Crisis narrative’, pp. 1570-1573.

67 Schieffer’s dating therefore suggests that the ideological ‘coherence’ of any ‘reform programme’ might need reconsideration.


70 While ‘royal hegemony’ may indicate royal control in the generic sense of the term, to invoke a theoretical sense of ‘hegemony’ here would necessitate proving how an ideology of kingship became culturally dominant and accepted at all levels of society. Since this is far more complex, ‘hegemony’ should be avoided.

was also the charge of the German episcopate at Worms. The defence of royalist authors was therefore to emphasise the duality of the ‘two divinely instituted powers’ as an expression of ‘peace and concord within the overall unity of the Christian community’. Dualism was also advocated, for example, in Henry’s 1076 letter to the German episcopate in which the Salian chancellor Gottschalk of Aachen, the likely co-author, introduced the analogy of the two swords: ‘every man is constrained by the priestly sword to obey the king as the representative of God but by the kingly sword both to repel enemies of Christ outside and to obey the priesthood within. So in charity the province of one extends into the other, as long as neither the kingship is deprived of honour by the priesthood nor the priesthood is deprived of honour by the kingship’. There was a degree of overlap therefore within dualism according to the two swords theory.

This Gelasian political theology seemingly weighs against any sense of totality or universality within Henrician kingship. A notion of royal supremacy can, however, be read into the first clause of Gottschalk’s analogy; that the priestly sword supports obedience to the king. While such an interpretation does not accord with the ecclesiology of the Liber de unitate, the idea of priestly obedience to royal authority bolsters the sense of inter-spherical authority Henry derived from ministerial kingship. There is seemingly an ambivalence, therefore, in the

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72 Henry IV, Letters, 11, p. 148. Part of Peter Crassus’s commentary also centred on how Gregory ‘rejoices in wielding the royal power with his army’, Defence of King Henry, c.4. Papal-military authority was an increasingly controversial theme throughout the reform period, although cannot be discussed here.

73 Canning, Medieval Political Thought, p. 101


75 There are other themes in Henry’s letters relevant to exploring the ideological relativity of papacy and kingship. For example, an ‘ideology of peace’ has been posited in respect of the presentation of Henry as preserver of peace and Gregory as war-monger in the Henrician polemic, (‘The flame of discord which you [Gregory] stirred up through terrible factions in the Roman church, you spread with raging madness through all the churches of Italy, Germany, Gaul and Spain’, Henry IV, Letters, 11, p. 148, see Weinfurter, The Salian Century, p. 98; Robinson, Authority and Resistance, p. 95) although this cannot be explored here.

76 Melve, Inventing the Public Sphere, p. 212.
Henrician sources concerning the relative status of kingship. According to the two swords kingship was dualistic, yet according to the logic of ministerial kingship, it was totalising and inter-spherical. The interpretation of Henry’s kingship depends on the extent to which he modelled his authority on the precedent set by his father, king Henry III, at the synod of Sutri in 1046.\footnote{Henry intervened as king and was crowned emperor and made patrician subsequently according to Benzo of Alba, \textit{To Emperor Henry IV}, c.2, p. 368.} Henry III’s resolution of the papal schism, by acting royal protector, invoked an inter-spherical, \textit{rex} and \textit{sacerdos} conception of kingship in which the ‘universal supremacy’ of the royal office was made plain.\footnote{Morrison, ‘Introduction’, p. 23.} This sense of royal totality at Sutri is positively described in Peter Damian’s \textit{Liber Gratissimus},\footnote{According to Peter, ‘he [king Henry III] who cut off all the heads of the many-headed Hydra of simoniacal heresy with the sword of divine courage…the Roman church should be ordered according to his will and that no-one should elect a priest to the apostolic see without his authority’, in Tierney, (ed. and trans.), \textit{The Crisis of Church and State}, p. 37-38. Peter’s text of 1052 differed here from the papal election decree of 1059 in which the right of papal election was legislated to belong exclusively to the cardinalate.} although in Gregorian perspective, Henry III’s actions, which included the ultimate act of investiture, the deposition and installation of the pope, were interpreted as royal domination.\footnote{This is demonstrated in the negative commentary of Bonizo of Sutri, see \textit{Book to a Friend}, b. 5, p. 187. Henry III is, however, positively presented in Bruno’s of Segni’s tract of the 1090s, ‘The sermon of the venerable bishop Bruno concerning simoniaes’, in Robinson (ed. and trans.), \textit{The Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century}, c.2, p 378.}

For Morrison, ‘between the “pontifical” king of the Saliens and the “royal” pontiff of the reformed papacy there was no ground for amicable compromise’.\footnote{Morrison, ‘Introduction’, p. 4; according to Ullmann there existed a diametric contrast between these ecclesiologies whereby ‘control of the sacerdotium by the protector’ rivalled ‘control by the sacerdotium of the protector’, \textit{Principles of Papal Government}, p. 295.} Yet attesting such a ‘contrast’ of totalities or universalisms is perhaps not as straightforward. The \textit{Life of Emperor Henry IV} actually emphasises the ‘criminality’ of Henry’s attempt to depose Gregory,\footnote{Describing Henry’s intention to depose Gregory after having been excommunicated a second time, the anonymous author thought that: ‘the king however perceiving that the pope was inclined to strip him of the kingship and that he would not be content with any act of obedience from him other than his renunciation of the kingship, was forced to relapse from obedience into rebellion, from humility into swollen pride and readied himself to do to the pope what the pope intended to be done to him. Cease I pray O glorious king cease from this attempt to cast down the ecclesiastical head from his summit to make yourself a criminal by}
example, while the apparent caeseropapism exercised at Sutri was in fact perceived as ‘harmony between the spiritual and the secular’ by Salian contemporaries.\(^8^3\) Indeed, while a concept of ‘Christocentric kingship’ was articulated elsewhere as a basis for royal supremacy (in England for example in the \textit{Norman Anonymous}\(^8^4\)), in Henry’s case, the ‘contrast’ between Salian kingship and Gregorian reform was seemingly not in any fixed state of relativity. If a judgement has to be reached, for the most part, despite there being an inter-spheral totality implied in his priestly kingship, Henry emphasised a dualistic relationship with papal authority.\(^8^5\) A dualistic ‘contrast’ between kingship and papacy was of course incompatible with Gregory’s concept of papal monarchy which demanded a hierarchical relativity. His thinking was rather based on the example of Canossa, whereby, in complete reversal to Sutri, royal authority was proved subject to the pope.\(^8^6\)

\(^{8^3}\) Fuhrmann, \textit{Germany in the High Middle Ages}, p. 38; Robinson, \textit{Authority and Resistance}, p. 92; Robinson, ‘Church and papacy’, p. 297.

\(^{8^4}\) The text of the Anonymous explains that: ‘kings receive in their consecration the power to rule this church…and reign together with Christ…in this world, then, the priestly authority and the royal power hold the principate of sacred government. Some seek to divide the principate in this fashion, saying that the priesthood has the principate of ruling souls, the king that of ruling bodies…Christ, God and man, is the true and highest king and priest…it is clear therefore, that in Christ the royal power is greater and higher than the priestly’, ‘The “anonymous of York”’ in Tierney (ed. and trans), \textit{The Crisis of Church and State}, p. 77, my emphasis; see Nelson, ‘Kingship and empire’, p. 242; Folz, \textit{The Concept of Empire}, p. 8; Oakley, \textit{Kingship}, pp. 103-105.

\(^{8^5}\) I cannot agree with Ullmann’s judgement that Henry conceded that he was not \textit{rex} and \textit{sacerdos} and instead advocated dualism, since the picture is more complex. See \textit{The Growth of Papal Government}, p. 345.

\(^{8^6}\) At Canossa, despite being a consecrated king, Henry was proved to be subject to papal authority, see Reuter, ‘Contextualising Canossa: excommunication, penance, surrender, reconciliation’, in J.L Nelson (ed.), \textit{Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities} (Cambridge, 2006) p. 148; Havercamp, \textit{Medieval Germany}, p. 131. According to Ullmann, ‘Canossa’ threw an ‘ideological’ conflict into relief between Romanism and Germanism in the Church, \textit{(A Short History of the Papacy}, p. 158), although this narrative has been questioned. Thomas Bisson argues that ‘ideology’ (his word) was not so important at Canossa since it was the ultimatum of the German nobility and essentially a political pressure which had coerced Henry into seeking absolution from Gregory. The events of Canossa should not be over-intellectualised therefore since the dispute of the right order ‘unfolded as consequences rather than generators of crisis’, \textit{The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government} (Princeton, 2009), pp. 205-206; Miller, ‘Crisis in the Investiture Crisis Narrative’, p. 1576. Moreover, events were at mid-stage at this point in 1077 and further development and radicalisation was to come
**Emperorship:**

Henry’s unfulfilled aspiration to be crowned emperor was at least one aspect of his disillusionment with Gregory at Worms. Although Henry was never officially emperor in papal perspective (his imperial authority formally deriving from his coronation by his antipope Clement III in 1084), his perceived entitlement to imperial authority underlines the importance of Henrician emperorship when analysing ideological ‘contrast’. It is difficult to discuss emperorship and kingship separately since many of the above themes of ‘contrast’ between kingship and papacy can also relate to Henry’s imperial authority. Indeed, a revivalist emphasis on Romanism had linked Salian kingship with a concept of Rome-based emperorship in the Ottonian tradition. On this basis, historians have argued for a degree of conflation between concepts of kingship and emperorship in Salian perspective. According to Nelson, by the time Henry III became king in 1028, ‘German kingship had become inseparable from Roman emperorship’. Folz has similarly argued that that Henry III’s claim to be ‘king of the Romans’ encapsulates the ‘ever closer assimilation between the regnum and the imperium, and at the same time the increasing Romanisation of the Saliens’ image of the Empire’. This merging of kingship and Roman emperorship makes the precision of the ideological ‘contrast’ with papal monarchy difficult to establish, yet the distinction arguably cannot be denied.

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87 Henry’s charge that Gregory ‘had snatched away with arrogant boldness all the hereditary dignity owed me by that see’ (Letters, 11, p. 146) may be interpreted as Gregory’s failure to crown Henry emperor, as the former had indicated in 1073: ‘if the good customs, life, and religion of any private person or of another prince redounded to the honour and increase of holy church that of him [Henry] who is the head of the laity, who is king and who with God’s permission will be emperor at Rome’. Reg. 1.20, p. 23.
89 Nelson, ‘Kingship and empire’, p. 246; according to Weinfurter, the Salian kingdom was seen as the ‘continuity or the renewal of the ancient Roman empire’ link between kingship and Roman tradition, The Salian Century, p. 155.
90 Folz, The Concept of Empire, p. 69.
The distinction can perhaps be affirmed by testing the universality, and thereby ‘universalising’ function of ideology, associated with Henrician emperorship. Henry IV’s universal imperial authority was described by Benzo of Alba in the tradition of Ottonian-Salian Roman emperorship, whereby it was ‘proclaimed throughout the whole world’ and entailed ‘world domination’. 91 In the *Defence of King Henry*, by contrast (written prior to Henry’s imperial coronation), while his authority is described with reference to the tradition of Christian emperors, there is no explicit reference to the ‘universality’ of royal authority throughout the world in this sense. 92 While it may be possible to use universality as a basis to distinguish between kingship and empire, inter-spheral totality was not of course restricted to imperial authority. Henry’s claims for an inter-spheral protectorate over the Church were made while king as well as while emperor. 93 That supreme authority could be claimed in a context of kingship is surely demonstrated by the concept of papal monarchy. It is significant that Gregory’s inter-spheral and universal authority was as papal *monarch* and not as papal *emperor*.

It is difficult therefore to pinpoint the distinction between royal and imperial authority; certainly, any distinction between dualism and totality does not equate with the distinction between kingship and emperorship. The conceptual flexibility, or ‘incoherence’ perhaps, in the transition from kingship to emperorship consequently makes the relativity of Henrician authority difficult to interpret. In terms of lordship at least, that imperial authority obviously meant something distinctive for Henry’s relationship with the German episcopate is suggested by his 1084 letter to bishop Theoderic of Verdun, persuading him to accept his newly imperial

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92 Peter Crassus, *Defence of King Henry*, c.2; for the debate on the dating of this work, see Robinson, *Authority and Resistance*, pp. 77-79.
authority. On the other hand, that the universality of imperial rule was ‘more a matter of ideology than of reality’ is a reminder that any advantages of imperial authority were largely theoretical.

**Papal attitudes to kingship:**

The Gregorian concept of kingship merits further assessment here in respect of whether an ideologically ‘coherent’ view of royal authority can be attested in papal thought. The difficulty of confirming ‘coherence’ is suggested by the vicissitudes within Gregory’s view of kingship, ranging from its functionalist role in the hierocratic papal order to its elective nature, and from being divinely ordained to being secular in character. While no conflation of kingship and emperorship existed in papal perspective, the nature of royal authority, particularly following Henry’s absolution at Canossa in 1077, is by no means clear in the papal sources. The intention here is less to test Gregory’s ideology of kingship than to assess how papal concepts of royal authority affect the definition of ‘Gregorian ideology’ in its relational capacity.

The status of the royal office within the hierarchical functionalism of papal monarchy is firstly made evident in papalist authors’ justifications for Henry’s deposition. The particular emphasis on Henry’s ‘disobedience’ in sources such as Bonizo’s *Book*, for example, emerges

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94 ‘Know, too, that we have been ordained by pope Clement and, by the consent of all the Romans, were consecrated as emperor on the Holy Day of Easter’, Henry IV, *Letters*, 18, p. 166.
95 Tellenbach’s statement of ideology in the normative definition alludes here to its ‘utopian’ model, *The Church*, p. 65.
96 To do so fully would involve the application of the other theoretical models which there is not sufficient scope to do here. Moreover, testing for ‘sub-ideologies’ within the broader heading of ‘Gregorian ideology’ is to dilute the concept, see above, p. 31.
as the main rationale for Gregory’s sentences of anathema. In the Register, both the excommunication and deposition of Henry in 1076 are expressly justified in terms of his disobedience: ‘because he has disdained to obey like a Christian…for it is fitting that he who seeks to diminish the honour of your [Peter’s] church should himself forfeit the honour that he seems to have’. Royal obedience is linked primarily here with Gregory’s Petrine authority, although elsewhere in the Register Gregory’s justifications are broadened to include a greater range of auctoritates. Besides invoking Gregory I’s teachings on kingship, Henry’s disobedience was interpreted according to Gregory (VII)’s exegesis of 1 Sam. 15:23 whereby faith was equated with obedience and disobedience was likewise equated with heresy. Writing in 1077, for example, in preparation of his anticipated synod to judge Henry’s kingship, Gregory threatened renewed excommunication on this scriptural basis: ‘he who disdains to obey the apostolic see incurs the crime of idolatry’. In comparison, in his positive appraisal of the kingship of Alphonso VI of Léon-Castile, while ‘obedience’ is not mentioned explicitly, Gregory’s comment that Alphonso’s ‘humility…is scarcely or most seldom wont to be found with royal power’, implies the disobedience of other kings, presumably Henry.

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98 According to Bonizo, ‘the dispute between the pope and the king arose solely from the fact that…the king set his mouth against the heavens and attempted to drive from his throne the lord pope of the elder see of Rome. The second excommunication, however, was pronounced because, although the king had been admonished once, twice and three times not to do battle and to provide a council in his kingdom, he refused to obey’, Book to a Friend, b.9, p. 257.

99 Reg., 3.10a, p. 192. This theme is echoed in the Life of Gregory where Paul quotes from Gregory’s Register: ‘kings shall lose their offices and shall be deprived of the communion of the Lord’s body and blood, if they presume to scorn the commands of the apostolic see’, c.97 p. 338. Paul’s insistence in making this point reveals how this was an issue of ongoing controversy almost fifty years after the events.

100 Gregory comments in the same letter that: the Christian people entrusted especially to you should be obedient especially to me through your vicarship committed to me’, Ibid., p. 192.

101 According to Gregory VII’s quotation of Gregory I, a disobedient king should ‘forfeit his office with its power and honour’ as well as incur excommunication, Reg., 8.21, p. 389.


103 Reg. 9.2, p. 400.
Gregory’s discussion of the ‘serviceability’ or ‘utility’ of kings and the legitimacy of their deposition on account of reduced ‘serviceability’ furthered his ‘functionalist’ interpretation of kingship. Commenting on the deposition of king Childeric III in 751, Gregory argued that it was ‘not so much for his iniquities as for the reason that he was not useful for so great a power’. The implied link here with the concept of rex inutilis reinforces the status of kingship as conditional on utility as well as obedience, as well as the superiority of papal authority as the presumed arbiter of royal utility. On the basis of the Childeric precedent therefore, Henry’s deposition reflected not only his ‘iniquities’ but the expiry of his ‘usefulness’ due to his contravention of the function of kingship within papal monarchy.

Gregory’s concept of kingship emerges relatively ‘coherently’ in the above examples. His emphasis on royal ‘obedience’ has strong hierocratic connotations which emphasise the relative status of kingship. The function of royal authority within papal monarchy therefore entailed that ‘deposition and absolution from the bond of fidelity… [was] the natural, although distinct, complement of the spiritual penalty of excommunication’. Gregory of course excommunicated duke Robert Guiscard without ever deposing him, although this may have reflected Robert’s potential ‘utility’ to the Gregorian papacy, especially when the Norman alliance is considered as an ‘attempt to secure reform through power-politics’.

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104 Reg., 8.21, p. 391, my emphasis; see PG, pp. 621-622.
105 Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, pp. 301, 287. However, Edward Peters has de-emphasised Gregory’s literal use of the Merovingian precedent on the basis that Childeric did not have iniquities, whereas Henry did, see The Shadow King: Rex Inutilis in Medieval Law and Literature, 751-1327 (London, 1970), p. 44.
The interpretation of the Gregorian concept of kingship is complicated, however, by the ambiguity of Henry’s legal status post-Canossa: had he in fact been restored to the royal office as well as full communion? The implication of Henry’s oath at Canossa is that his kingship was restored.\(^{108}\) In the *Life of Emperor Henry IV*, Henry is similarly recorded as having ‘received the loosing of the ban’.\(^{109}\) Yet, according to Paul of Benried, although Henry regained communion at Canossa, he remained deposed from the kingship.\(^{110}\) It was in fact recorded by the anti-Henrician annalist, Lampert of Hersfeld, that Henry willingly accepted his deposition.\(^{111}\) At Gregory’s 1080 Lenten synod, he explained that, ‘I did not restore him to the kingdom from which I had deposed him’. However, that Gregory then declared ‘I take away from him all royal power and dignity…and I forbid that any Christian should obey him as king’, surely implies the continuity of Henry’s royal authority after 1077.\(^{112}\) The exact status of Henry’s authority is therefore unclear in the papal sources. The ‘grave inconsistencies’ in Gregory’s outlook, especially after 1080,\(^{113}\) have prompted historiographical disagreement on this point.\(^{114}\) Moreover, the implication of this ‘incoherence’ is that the ideological ‘contrast’ within papal monarchy was not fixed. Incidentally, this sense of ‘incoherence’ within the papal sources is arguably more evident in

\(^{108}\) This is entitled ‘the oath of Henry, *king* of the Germans’, although the oath acknowledges that Henry’s kingship is politically contested by the German episcopate and aristocracy, *Reg.*, 4.12a, p. 222.


\(^{110}\) *Life of Gregory*, c. 89, p. 329.

\(^{111}\) Lampert records that, from 1077, ‘the king was to use no trappings of the royal dignity, none of the insignia…all those who had sworn loyalty to him should meanwhile be unencumbered and free from the bond of oath and from the duty of keeping faith with him before God and men’, in Miller, (ed. and trans.), *Power and the Holy*, p. 98.

\(^{112}\) *Reg.*, 7.14, pp. 343, 344. In Gregory’s 1081 letter to Hermann of Metz, Henry is also addressed as ‘king’.


\(^{114}\) See Robinson, ‘Bibliographical survey’, pp. 461-462. Ullmann, for example, is of the view that Henry was not restored to the kingship in 1077 and that the crown was left vacant, *The Growth of Papal Government*, pp. 302-303. As Gilchrist has shown, between 1076 and 1080, Henry is addressed as ‘king’ while, from 1080, he is addressed ‘Henry, whom they call king’. The latter salutation was recognition of Henry’s de facto exercise of power in spite of his renewed excommunication, see ‘Gregory VII and the juristic sources of his ideology’, in *Canon Law in the Age of Reform*, pp. 31-32, 36. On the other hand, it is argued by Morrison that Gregory’s 1076 sentence of deposition in fact carried no canonical weight since it was a moral as opposed to a juristic sentence, and thus Henry remained king post-Canossa, ‘Canossa: a revision’, pp. 138-139, 145.
the *Register* than in the narrative texts. While the polemical literature (on both sides) was informed by teleological perspective, Gregory’s letters were written at specific junctures of the pontificate and hence demonstrate the conceptual development in his approach to Henry’s kingship.

Equally problematic for establishing a sense of ‘coherence’ is Gregory’s apparent sanction of the German nobility’s election of Rudolf of Swabia as king at the council of Forchheim in 1077. This would logically rule out any intention of restoring Henry, but that Gregory subsequently refused to recognise Rudolf and instead claimed the radical entitlement to arbitrate between the two kings (which led to his remaining neutral until 1080), problematises his view of Henry’s status until then. Moreover, Gregory’s implicit sanction for elective kingship in approving Rudolf’s election (if not his kingship) surely contradicted the hierocratic principle that royal authority was bound and loosed by the papacy. Gregory’s support for Rudolf’s election was premised, according to the Saxon chronicler Bruno of Merseberg, on the principle that ‘the people should have the power to make the man they wanted king’. The idea of elective kingship was further elaborated by the papal polemicist Manegold of Lautenbach into a theory of contractual kingship which offered an additional justification for deposing kings. Manegold justified Henry’s deposition on the basis of his violation of the ‘compact by virtue of which he was appointed’.

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115 Gregory’s consent to Rudolf’s election is not entirely clear. Gregory later denied this at his Lenten synod in 1080, (*Reg.*, 7.14a, p. 343) and was perhaps forced to support Rudolf’s election on account of his alliance with the German nobility, *PG*, p. 171. As the papalist *Chronicle* of Berthold of Reichenau narrates, Gregory ‘was not fully aware of the confused circumstances of the present case [Rudolf’s election]…he declared publicly that he could make no decision about this until there had been a careful examination of both parties’, second version, 1078, pp. 201-202. On the revolutionary nature of Gregory’s claim to judge, see Tellenbach, *The Church*, pp. 243-244.


of the ‘ascending thesis’, however, there is again a tension between the implication of Manegold’s argument and the ‘descending thesis’ of papalist ecclesiology.\(^{118}\) On the other hand, that Gregory’s support for elective kingship was linked with his emphasis on the ‘suitability’ of kings perhaps resolves this tension.\(^ {119}\) In the *Life*, the papal deposition of Childeric and the German princes’ right of election are in fact cited in juxtaposition as justifications for Henry’s deposition.\(^ {120}\) Royal accountability to aristocratic electors was perhaps linked with papal authority to depose unaccountable and therefore ‘unsuitable’ kings, it may be presumed.\(^ {121}\)

Another aspect of ‘incoherence’ within Gregory’s concept of kingship emerges in respect of his attitude to royal spirituality. The development in Gregory’s attitude is revealed by comparing his two letters to Hermann of Metz. Whereas Gregory argued in 1076 that the claim of the ‘royal dignity’ to excel that of the episcopal – his reading of Henry’s attempt to depose him - was a manifestation only of ‘human pride’,\(^ {122}\) his 1081 commentary equates kingship with the worst excesses of lordship.\(^ {123}\) Gregory’s emphasis here on the ‘nefarious origins’ of royal authority is his most explicit reappraisal of kingship in Augustinian terms.\(^ {124}\)

\(^{118}\) While Manegold does mention Henry’s disobedience to papal authority, it is his contractual theory which confirms the legitimacy of Henry’s deposition. For the ascending/descending theses, see Ullmann, *A History of Political Thought: the Middle Ages* (London, 1965), pp. 12-14.

\(^{119}\) See PG, pp. 626-628.

\(^{120}\) ‘It is certainly the case that Childeric, king of the Franks was deposed by the authority of Pope Stephen…Henry was appointed as their king by free men according to this contract: that he should be pre-occupied with judging his electors justly and governing them with royal foresight…it was for that reason, independently of the judgement of the apostolic see, that the princes could justly reject him as king’, *Life of Gregory*, c. 97, pp 338-339. It has also been noted how the ‘descending’ and ‘ascending’ theses may not have been as polarised as Ullmann claimed, see Oakley, ‘Celestial hierarchies revisited’, p. 55.

\(^{121}\) The ‘unsuitability’ or ‘inutility’ of kingship may have been judged by the German electors therefore.


\(^{123}\) ‘Kings and dukes have had their origin from those who, being ignorant of God, by pride, rapines, treachery and murder – at length by practically all crimes whatsoever, with the devil, the prince of the world, indeed, urging them on, have presumed by blind greed and insupportable presumption to lord it over their equals, namely men’, Reg., 8.21, p. 390.

While evidence does exist for papalists’ debasement of royal spirituality prior to Gregory’s pontificate, the content of Gregory’s 1081 tract was a marked departure from the political theology of conservative reformers such as Peter Damian. This view of kingship can be interpreted as an attempt on Gregory’s part to deconstruct the ‘quasi-sacerdotal character of sovereigns’ and thus affirm the premise of papal monarchy that spiritual authority ‘descended’ only through papal authority. This sense of secularisation is also to some extent the implication of Gregory’s support for contractual kingship, whereby kingship by popular mandate de-emphasised the sacrality of the royal office. According to Bloch, Gregory’s 1081 expression of kingship ‘[has] the essential features of a doctrine that is perfectly firm and coherent as a whole’. This incidental reference to a defining characteristic of ideology perhaps indicates the ideological potential of this particular variant of Gregory’s concept of royal authority. This cannot comparatively ‘cohere’, however, with Gregory’s views elsewhere on the divinity of kingship, or with his confidence in the spirituality of secular authority more generally.

Gregory’s rejection of ministerial kingship is disproved also perhaps by the canonical ideas applied to Henry’s deposition. Henry’s case was equated with that of a disobedient bishop

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125 See the citation above of Humbert’s Three books against the simoniae, p. 29.
126 See above, p. 98; J.J. Ryan, Saint Peter Damiani and his Canonical Sources (Toronto, 1956), p. 154.
127 Bloch, The Royal Touch, p. 70. In this respect, Gregory is argued to have ‘sponsored the first great ideological revolution in the religious and political life of the West’, F. Oakley, Kingship: The Politics of Enchantment (Oxford, 2006), p. 110. It was ideologically ‘utopian’ on Gregory’s part to think, however, that sacral kingship could be abolished; it had a lasting appeal in medieval monarchy and continued to frustrate papalist intentions as such, Bloch, The Royal Touch, p. 149; Chenu, ‘The evangelical awakening’, p. 236. (‘Utopianism’ of course attests ideology in its own right although this would contradict with the inapplicability of ideology on the basis of ‘incoherence’ here).
129 Also in 1081, for example, Gregory wrote to king Alphonso of Léon-Castile, explaining that ‘God, the creator and ruler of all things and the ineffable bestower of all dignities, who gives salvation to kings…’, Reg., 9.2, p. 401, my emphasis. Gregory’s positive view of lay rulership is also demonstrated in his letter to Countess Mathilda of Tuscany which describes her as model for holy noble conduct and implores her not join a convent, Reg. 1.50, pp. 55-56.
who could, canonically, according to Gregory, be deposed in his absence.\textsuperscript{130} This apparent concession of Henry’s ‘episcopal’ status allowed royal polemicists to contest Gregory’s judgement by citing the pseudo-Isidorean decretals and thereby underscore the illegitimacy of Henry’s deposition. In Peter’s \textit{Defence}, for example, the canonical invalidity of deposing a bishop in his absence is cited in rebuttal of Gregory’s actions.\textsuperscript{131} Ministerial kingship was therefore implicit in the canonical procedure of Henry’s deposition. On the other hand, Bonizo’s apparent recognition of the inapplicability of canon law to the deposition of kings, as well as the Gregorians’ later denial of Henry’s episcopal status, perhaps weakens the case for ministerial kingship in papal perspective.\textsuperscript{132}

Gregory’s concept of kingship was therefore open to a degree of variation in several respects. While the vicissitudes within his thinking can perhaps be credited partly to conceptual experimentation, his outlook was also circumstantial. Gregory’s alliance with the German princes complicated and transformed his concept of kingship as well as changing the relativity between papal monarchy and royal authority. As one historian has commented, ‘a pope so reliant on allies had no choice but such ideological gymnastics’.\textsuperscript{133} The reality of applying papal monarchy therefore meant that Gregory had to be a tactician as well as a theorist.

\textsuperscript{130} Gilchrist, ‘Gregory VII and the juristic sources of his ideology’, p. 25

\textsuperscript{131} Peter’s use of the decretals to underline the irregularity of Henry’s treatment is not included in the English translation of the \textit{Defence}, although there is a reference in c.1 to the canonical work of Gregory I; see Gilchrist, ‘Canon law aspects’, p. 33; Robinson, \textit{Authority and Resistance}, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{132} At the council of Gestungen-Berka in 1085 the Gregorians denied the premise of the decretals that Henry had been uncanonically deposed in his absence. According to Bonizo, while critics argued that Gregory ‘excommunicated the king unjustly, according to the degree of Felix…which reads “no-one who has been despoiled of his property or expelled from his see [i.e. in absence] can be excommunicated or judged before everything has been restored to him” and so forth. \textit{This text seems to apply specifically to bishops, but even if that were not the case, it will be demonstrated very clearly both that it offers no support to their argument and that the king was justly excommunicated},’ \textit{Book to a Friend}, b.9, pp. 256-257, my emphasis.

Conclusion:

The rationale of this chapter has been to explore Gregory’s pontificate in relation to the modelling of ideology as a relative political form, defined in ‘contrast’ to another ideological entity. Attesting the ideological status of Henry IV’s royal and imperial authority has not been attempted, although its relational importance has been explored. Gregory’s concept of papal monarchy was arguably relative, or ‘contrasting’, in the sense that it prescribed a functionalist hierarchy for Christian society. Ideas and institutions such as sacerdotal kingship and episcopacy stood to lose from Gregory’s application of reform as their relativity with papal authority was transformed. Their autonomy, or at least their ‘concord’ with the Roman Church, was replaced by a hierarchical ‘contrast’ in papal perspective.

There is evidence for the contravention of dualism by both Gregory and Henry, yet that their conflict amounted to a ‘contrast’ between competing totalities or universalities (‘universality’ being itself a model of ideology) has to be judged more carefully. On the one hand, the fullness of inter-spheral authority claimed at points by Gregory and Henry attests to an incompatible ‘contrast’ between them, even though such ‘contrast’ was actually derived from the similarity or overlap of jurisdiction. On the other hand, in the instances when dualism was asserted, the Gregorian-Henrician relationship was mutually dependent and thus correlative. Ideological ‘contrast’ still existed in a dualistic context, although not in any hostile sense since papal authority was defined in juxtaposition with Henrician authority. On balance, that concepts of authority and relativity were changing on both ‘sides’ – with Gregory’s

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134 This was the context for the division of spiritualities and temporalities usually thought to be the long-term product of the Gregorian reform.

135 See Tellenbach, *The Church*, p. 315; Murray, ‘Review of Cowdrey, *Pope Gregory VII*’. Gregory’s approach to political relations was by no means systematic according to Cowdrey: ‘in Gregory’s estimation, it may be
assertion of papal monarchy being the more stable here – perhaps precludes any well-defined (and strictly ‘coherent’) ideological ‘contrast’.

concluded that more turned upon the moral and religious disposition of the ruler than upon the niceties of political theory’, *PG*, p. 611. Leyser has similarly argued for the incoherence of Henrician polemic on the basis that ‘the political vocabulary of this prolonged crisis’ did not form ‘the base of a coherent secular political theory’, see ‘Polemics of the papal revolution’, pp, 50, 52.
This thesis has explored how a theoretically-based concept of ideology can be historically defined in the pontificate of Gregory VII. By way of a general conclusion here, two principal questions need to be addressed. Firstly, is there evidence (and what is evidence) for ‘Gregorian ideology’? Secondly, does ideology itself emerge from this thesis as a ‘useful category of historical analysis’?¹

With respect to the modelling of ideology as a form of ‘utopia’, there is demonstrable potential for this theoretical category to apply. Gregory’s concept of reform generally operated with a strong degree of idealism. His intended eradication of simony and nicholaitism remained largely ‘utopian’ in this eleventh-century period, despite his varied efforts to practically implement reform. Moreover, the ecclesiological implications of Gregorian reform remained largely theoretical. Gregory’s claims for papal primacy over the episcopate and secular rulers contradicted the prevailing ‘order of the world’ which legitimated sacerdotal kingship and episcopacy; two of the most powerful sources of spiritual and secular authority. By contrast, the pragmatism of post-Gregorian papal reformers such as pope Calixtus II may be interpreted as an indicator of the declining ‘utopianism’ and, accordingly, the declining sense of ideology associated with the reform papacy, in favour of a compromise over the Investiture Crisis.² The ideological ‘utopianism’ of Gregorian papal

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² The Concordat of Worms of 1122 is surely an example of a tempered Gregorian idealism in which concessions were permitted. Calixtus II moderated the idealism of Gregory’s stance on investiture by permitting the investiture of prelates with ‘regalia’ within the ‘German kingdom’, providing that they had first been canonically elected (and presumably) consecrated, see ‘The Concordat of Worms’, in B. Tierney (ed. and trans.), The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300, a Short History with Documents (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), p. 91; Blumenthal, The Investiture Controversy, p. 173. The increased institutionalisation of
monarchy was rooted then in the political reality of this late eleventh-century period. The ‘utopia’ model is thus used here less in a literal sense than as an analogy to describe the dissonance between Gregory’s idealism and reality.

The ‘utopianism’ of Gregorian reform notwithstanding, Ladner has argued that an idealistic politics may have been more typical of this period: ‘it is a “fact” that past political thinkers were not, on the whole, in the habit of…believing that the gap between the existent and the desirable was “unbridgeable”’. Since Gregory evidently believed that ‘abuses’ could, as well as should be curbed, if only due ‘obedience’ was shown to him, his ‘utopianism’ is perhaps rooted more in historical perspective than in contemporary perception.

The applicability of ideology in its ‘utopian’ model depends also on the evidence for Gregorian reform ‘in practice’. While Gregory’s attempts to institutionalise reform through canon law, papal legation, and papal councils were ineffective in realising the scale of change he desired, his efforts to achieve reform on a practical as well as a rhetorical basis should be credited. A sense of ‘utopianism’ is also lessened by the fact that the course of Gregorian reform in practice was driven by political circumstance. Gregory’s concept of kingship, for example, was transformed by the expediency of his political alliances. His ideal of clericalism was similarly compromised by the necessity of creating extra-legatine alliances to effect reform. While it is a step too far to argue that Gregory altered his principles to fit practical needs, his pragmatism must not be overlooked. As one reviewer of *PG* has noted, Cowdrey does not ‘notice the streak of an ideologue in Gregory, for he always seeks to present him as a

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pragmatist who learned as he went along’. Since a ‘utopia’ theoretically cannot be institutionalised, it was rather a moderated form of Gregorian idealism which was achieved in practice. Indeed, that this model of ideology cannot fully apply to reform in practice suggests its suitability as a concept for the study of intellectual history as opposed to political history ‘proper’. Debating the extent to which Gregory’s ‘utopianism’ was mitigated in practice is in fact to bring the analysis full-circle back to the normative definition of ‘ideology’ and the dichotomy between ‘ideology’ and expediency.

Gregorian reform has also been tested against the ‘coherence’ of ideology and, by extension, its potential to be programmatic. For the most part, it is difficult to attest an overall sense of ‘coherence’ here. The vicissitudes and flexibility within Gregory’s approach to reform undermine a strict sense of ‘coherence’ and lessen the applicability of ideology as such. While the core principle of papal primacy was fixed unnegotiably in his outlook, the scope of ‘reform’ was transformed throughout Gregory’s pontificate in a way which undermines any

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4 H. Mayr-Harting, ‘Review of: H.E.J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, 1073-1085 (Oxford, 1998)’, English Historical Review, 116 (2001), p. 139. Whether Gregory can be understood as an ‘ideologue’ has not been addressed here. The term is not linked with the models of ideology adopted here and has no formal definition as such. According to one textbook, an ideologue is a political actor who holds fast to their (often idealistic) principles, despite the circumstances, see R. Eccleshall, A. Finlayson, V. Geoghagan, M. Kenny, M. Lloyd, I. MacKenzie, R. Wilford (eds.), ‘Introduction’, in Political Ideologies: An Introduction (3rd edn., London, 2003), p. 13. Gregory may qualify as an ideologue in this sense, although this depends on the degree to which Gregorian reform can be considered an individualised ideology centred in Gregory, as opposed to a reform movement. Gregory’s being an ideologue also depends on the tenability of a concept of political ‘individualism’ in this eleventh-century period, see L. Melve, “‘The revolt of the medievalists’: directions in recent research on the twelfth-century Renaissance’, Journal of Medieval History, 32 (2006), pp. 236-238.

5 It may be possible, in other words, to distinguish between ideology (in its ‘utopian’ model) as concept which deals with ideas on a theoretical basis and the application of ideas in political reality. Ideology may be especially appropriate in this sense since, as Robinson has argued, the Investiture Controversy did not have a ‘permanent effect on the political and social structure’ since it was instead most influential ‘in the history of ideas’, Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest: The Polemical Literature of the Late Eleventh Century (Manchester, 1978), p. 7. Indeed, while Gregory’s papacy did not end successfully in the short term, as demonstrated by his death in exile, it was his ideas which were most influential; as Ladner has argued, ‘reform ideology of the Gregorian type once formulated continued to be used’, see ‘Terms and ideas of renewal’, p. 3.
historiographical notion of a ‘reform programme’. This reinforces Cowdrey’s thesis that Gregory was more flexible than programmatic in his approach to reform and conflict resolution. The variety of concepts employed by reformers to justify a reformed clerical spirituality, together with Gregory’s open-minded approach to the Berengarian Controversy, also weigh against a sense of ideological ‘coherence’. While interpreting such aspects of reform as evidence of ‘incoherence’ may, to some extent, be a reductionist reading of the development of reform, it nevertheless forms a looser intellectual and structural consistency than ideology can support. Since what remains is less formulaic, there is perhaps the need for theoretical models which can tolerate a greater degree of internal conceptual variation.

The apparent ‘incoherence’ of Gregorian reform should be balanced, however, with the broader context of ‘incoherence’ in this period of Church history. With respect to the aspect of sacramental theology which provoked the Berengarian Controversy, Gregory’s pontificate pre-dated the greater theological ‘coherence’ of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. The apparent ‘incoherence’ also of the Gregorian canonical collections, in terms of the tension

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6 From the initial priority to reform clerical ‘abuses’, to a broader pre-occupation with the relative status of papal and royal authority, then, finally, to the prohibition of lay investiture and the denial of the spirituality of kingship; Gregory’s thinking was arguably evolving.

7 See PG. For Joseph Canning, that Gregory was ‘no great theoretician’ precludes any effort to ‘apply an articulated interpretative structure to the understanding of his thought’, A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450 (London, 1996), p. 93.

8 Since ‘coherence’ may be an unnatural and ahistorical feature of political movements (see G. Prudovsky, ‘Can we ascribe to past thinkers concepts they had no linguistic means to express?’, History and Theory, 36 (1997), pp. 22-23) it may be better to model the structural cohesion of Gregorian reform in terms of ‘discourse communities’; a model designed to explore internal diversity within concepts, see R.N. Swanson, ‘Unity and diversity, rhetoric and reality: modelling “the Church”’, Journal of Religious History, 20 (1996), p. 165. It also may be possible to engage with Freedon’s ‘morphological’ theory in which ideologies are premised as ‘relatively fluid arrangements’ in which the addition or subtraction of subsidiary concepts does not change its overall status, see, Ideology: an introduction (Oxford, 2003), pp. 39, 44-45.

between their papalist and episcopalist titles, can be similarly explained by the fact that such compilations pre-dated the canonical harmonisation of Gratian’s *Decretum*. The very essence of the revolution thesis, moreover, is that Gregory’s pontificate was concurrent with a period of social and political change. Periods of revolution, it may be argued, do not naturally lend themselves to strict ‘coherence’, even if they may be ideological in other senses. Judgements on ‘coherence’ should therefore account for the developmental nature of ecclesiastical ideas and institutions which did not yet possess a fully ‘coherent’ shape. It is likewise important to avoid artificially programmatising the evidence for reform. Yet, placing too much emphasis on the notion that ideas become ‘coherent’ or ‘fully formulated’ only after a certain point is perhaps too teleological an approach to history.

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10 Also, Gregory’s seeming ambivalence towards ministerial kingship can be linked with Gary Macy’s thesis that there was a broader ‘incoherence’ surrounding the concept of ordination before the twelfth century, see *The Hidden History of Women’s Ordination: Female Clergy in the Medieval West* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 47-48, 111.


12 This tendency has been noted in the historiography which has been influenced by ‘the philologico-combinatory method’ or ‘the process of putting order into history, arranging – as if they were components of a coherent whole – sources of diverse dates, character, and reliability in such a way as to end up with an account with no gaps, in which the story’s unbroken thread unwinds according to the implacable prescription willed by the historian in his role as *deus ex machina*,’ see D. Jognia-Prat, *Order and Exclusion: Cluny and Christendom Face Heresy, Judaism, and Islam (1000-1150)* (New York, 2002), trans. G.R. Edwards, p. 31. As Timothy Reuter has also written: ‘it is modern historians who have deduced the existence of “reformers” and a “reform programme”…there is no problem about that in itself, as long as we do not start to suppose that people in the eleventh century necessarily thought in the same terms’, T. Reuter, ‘Ideas of reform, medieval and modern’ in *The Papacy, Religious Change and Church Reform, 1049-1125* [accessed 1.7.11]. See also, J. Eldevik, ‘Driving the chariot of the lord: Siegfried I of Mainz (1060-1084) and episcopal identity in an age of transition’, in J.S. Ott and A.T. Jones (eds.), *The Bishop Reformed: Studies of Episcopal Power and Culture in the Central Middle Ages* (Aldershot, 2007), p. 187.

13 It might be argued, for example, that Gregorian reform was ‘incoherent’ on the basis that it did not achieve the comparative clarity of twelfth-century papal councils, see Robinson, *The Papacy 1073-1198, Continuity and Innovation* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 131. The flaw in this approach to history writing can be observed analogously in the reception of Jacques Le Goff’s thesis on the beginning of Purgatory ‘proper’ (J. Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory* (London, 1984), trans. A. Goldhammer). As one critic has written, ‘Le Goff provides a somewhat static treatment of the subject. Instead of looking at the development of the idea, he measures each manifestation of Purgatory according to the yardstick of the fully-formed doctrine’, see B.P. McGuire, ‘Purgatory, the communion of saints, and medieval change’, *Viator*, 20 (1989), p. 65, my emphasis.
may be a quality of reform conceivable only in hindsight links with Ladner’s argument that idealism is also an issue of modern perspective.

Gregorian reform has been additionally tested in terms of the ‘contrast’ of ideology with a counter-ideological form. This model has been explored in relation to the ideational conflict between Gregorian reform and Henrician kingship and emperorship respectively. While it has been beyond reasonable scope to rationalise ‘Henrician ideology’ in similarly theoretical terms, a sense of ‘contrast’ does emerge between papal monarchy and pontifical kingship in respect of the contestation of inter-spheral authority and ‘universality’ (itself an ideological category). This model is perhaps too broad, however, to permit any meaningful definition of ideology. Since political ideas rarely exist in isolation, relativity can be attested in almost any concept and ideology can accordingly be defined potentially everywhere.

With respect to the remaining modelling criteria, a concept of ideology can be attested in its ‘universalising’ and ‘naturalising’ functions, as theorised by Eagleton.\textsuperscript{14} Papal authority was ‘universalised’ in the ‘partisan’ and hence ideological sense through Gregory’s presentation of his authority as Petrine and therefore ‘natural’ and ‘unchangeable’, yet this was of course at the expense of episcopalism and sacerdotal kingship. A process of ideological ‘naturalisation’ can be interpreted in the dissemination of Gregory’s more revolutionary ideas through normative communicative channels such as hagiography and canonical collections. The modification of canonical sources to legitimate the hierocratic theory, for example, can be understood as the attempted ‘naturalisation’ of reform. These categories should not, however, be considered as major definitional criteria. ‘Naturalisation’ and ‘universalisation’ are perhaps

\textsuperscript{14} For the citation of Eagleton’s theorisation, see above, p. 15.
too inchoate to provide a sufficiently tight definition of ideology and would benefit from greater theorisation.\textsuperscript{15}

Many methodological problems have arisen in the process of applying a concept of ideology to the sources. The selection of the above definitional criteria is, for one, open to criticism. Why exactly should a concept of ideology modelled in these terms be more valid than any other formulation?\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, there is a certain sense of fragmentation within the definitional criteria since, when applied, the ‘coherence’ and ‘utopia’ models yield different results. The absence of the former theoretically disproves ideology whereas the presence of the latter proves ideology. This discrepancy between the models when combined indicates the broader flaw in the modelling approach. If it really is the case that the only unity between these models is their characterisation as forms of ideology, it is tempting to drop the overall aim to test ideology in favour of accepting these models as theoretical qualities of Gregorian reform in their own right. Is it not better, in other words, to conclude that Gregorian reform was ‘utopian’ or ‘incoherent’ than attempt to apply a political concept which is so provably problematic? It is indeed a wonder that political scientists retain their long-term commitment to ideology by further elaborating and re-theorising the term, despite the plethora of its meaning.\textsuperscript{17} Yet ‘ideology’ is a concept within which the historiography remains stuck. Since

\textsuperscript{15} Again, a case is too easily made for the ‘universalisation’ and ‘naturalisation’ of all political concepts, not necessarily in Eagleton’s Marxian terms, but in projecting their value to win support.

\textsuperscript{16} While there is no absolute validity in the matrix of categories construed here as ideology, there again exists no all-encompassing and uncontested template which could replace the modelling approach. Faced with definitional pluralism, there is surely more validity in testing a range of definitions than in applying a single definition. The definitional criteria selected for this thesis were refined from an initial range of models. It could follow from this that this thesis has specifically modelled theoretical criteria to fit Gregorian reform and thus defeats the objective of applying an independent, theoretical concept of ideology. Yet, an element of pre-selection was vital since it was only possible to test select criteria here. Also, without choosing the most appropriate models, arbitrary criteria would have otherwise been applied.

\textsuperscript{17} The insistence of academics in formulating their political, social, anthropological, and cultural formulations as ideology begs the question of why they do not create new terms to fit their analysis. While many theorists note the excess of meaning in ideology, few are sceptical of its overall value as a political concept which is ‘sufficiently precise and practicable’, see R. Williams, ‘Ideology’, in Eagleton (ed.), Ideology, p. 189.
Historians will doubtless continue to use the term without due acknowledgement of its theoretical connotations, it needs to be analysed and defined the best it can.

The discussed imprecision within the above models suggests also that political-science theorisations of ideology themselves lack adequate definition and, as a consequence, may be too nebulous to enable any meaningful concept of ‘Gregorian ideology’. Categories such as ‘coherence’ and ‘contrast’, for instance, are broad-ranging to the extent that their applicability to Gregorian reform becomes too great a matter of interpretation. If the principle of a scientific definition is that it ought to be unnegotiable, the process of testing is arguably more subjective than scientific here. Another unresolved methodological issue is whether the present approach can permit an understanding of Gregorian reform as more or less ideological at different points.\(^{18}\) The developing ‘sophistication’ of Gregorian reform is an area of significant historiographical debate, yet this methodology is seemingly ill-equipped to scientifically measure the incremental development of ideology.\(^ {19}\) An additional methodological dilemma concerns the potential for ‘sub-ideologies’. The analysis has declined to test subsidiary concepts of Gregorian reform such as clerical celibacy as ideologies since this is to dilute the overall concept of ideology. Yet exactly how widespread

\(^{18}\) There is no scientific way to measure ideology by halves here. The line between ‘incoherence’ and complexity, for example, is a matter of interpretation.

\(^{19}\) Cowdrey’s comparison of Gregory’s two letters to bishop Hermann of Metz leads him to conclude that, by 1081, Gregory had ‘come to a more sophisticated and positive understanding of the superiority of sacerdotium to regnum than he had expressed up to 1076’, PG, p. 613. Other historians have also passed judgement on the ‘quality’ of the papal and Henrician polemic in ‘reaching fundamentals’ and countering the opposing case, see K.J. Leyser, ‘Polémics of the papal revolution’, in B. Smalley (ed.), *Trends in Medieval Political Thought* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 45-46; W. Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government: a Study in the Ideological Relation of Clerical to Lay Power* (London, 1955), pp. 349, 357. Attempts to measure the sophistication or degree of ideology have been explored in the political-science literature, although in very abstract terms, see J. Gerring, ‘Ideology, a definitional analysis’, *Political Research Quarterly*, 50 (1997), p. 976.
and/or significant does a concept have to be before it is eligible to qualify as an ideology?\textsuperscript{20}

The possibility and classification of super- and sub-ideologies is an unresolved tension when the concept is applied.

These methodological problems notwithstanding, there is still merit in the application of theory to historiographical debates in terms of how problems can be approached in new ways. Indeed, if there is a greater theoretical depth to historians’ concepts of ‘ideology’, is there not the need to ask more searching questions of other historiographical terminology? Perhaps categories such as ‘religion’, ‘ecclesiology’, and ‘government’ should be similarly theoretically dismantled. Dipping one’s toe in these waters, however, leads to an ever-increasing list of sub-enquiries and, in the extreme, an insecurity about the validity of more fundamental historiographical constructions.\textsuperscript{21} Many further historical questions have also been prompted by this enquiry, none of which could be satisfactorily explored here.\textsuperscript{22}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} While judging the significance and/or spread of a concept links with ideological ‘universalisation’ and ‘naturalisation’, this perhaps conflicts with the logic of the ‘utopia’ model in which a concept seemingly does not require ‘acceptance’ to be classified as ideological. Yet this, in turn, depends on whether ‘utopias’ are popular or individualised.
\item \textsuperscript{21} If concepts such as ‘ideology’ and ‘spirituality’ are dismantled, this is perhaps a step on the road to denying a unity in Church history, see G. Macy, ‘Was there a “the Church” in the Middle Ages’?, \textit{Studies in Church History}, 32 (1996), pp. 107-116
\item \textsuperscript{22} Many other themes in the history of Gregorian reform could have been studied. For example, the growing gender debate surrounding this topic, the issue of papal warfare, and the conflict between papalism and episcopacy. Studying the greater variety of polemical and canonical literature would also help to further explore the applicability of the above models of ideology. There also may be interesting links between ideology and christianisation, insofar as the dissemination of any ‘Gregorian ideology’ was dependent on the prior christianisation of eleventh-century society. How political ideology may have been a second-order concept in comparison with more fundamental socio-economic processes is thus an important direction for future research. Moreover, how any ‘Gregorian ideology’ was accepted and contested in localities merits further assessment. This could be examined in further detail on a case-by-case basis. How the continuing influence of eschatology in Gregorian reform may have been a barrier to institutionalisation would also be interesting to explore. This study could be additionally expanded by extending its chronological focus to encompass the entirety of the reform papacy (c.1049-c.1122). Evidence for ‘Gregorian ideology’ could then be contextualised in the broader history of papal ideational and institutional development. Further (and especially non-English language) historiography could be employed here, as well as a greater range of theoretical models.
\end{itemize}
In summary, it cannot be concluded here that there was a Gregorian ideology in any definitive sense. The tessellation of the modelling criteria when combined is problematic such that no overall concept of ideology can be satisfactorily affirmed. The potential for this internal discrepancy is inherent in the modelling approach; indeed, since only aspects of ideology can be interpreted, there is little scope for the incontestable proof or disproval of ideology according to any single definition. While ‘ideology’ in Gregory’s pontificate may be self-evident in the generic definition of the term, this negative conclusion has to be accepted as the result of using a theoretical approach.

If historians use terminology because it supposedly confers ‘meaning’, this conclusion points towards less meaning in the concept of ideology. Indeed, its heuristic value is questionable since it arguably creates more problems than it solves. Yet if historiography seeks to go beyond the generic use of concepts and engage with theory, such problems of methodology and interpretation are surely inevitable. The dilemma is this: historians need to draw upon concepts to give meaning to their interpretations, yet concepts need to be historicised when formulated to have any value. Ideally, history and theory should work in symbiosis; the reality, as demonstrated here, is less straightforward. On balance, what has emerged from the definitional process is nevertheless of interest. It is thought-provoking, for example, to contemplate the ‘naturalisation’ of Gregorian reform, irrespective of ideology. Moreover, there is at least some merit in defining the ideological more precisely, even if an incontestable definition cannot be reached. This negative conclusion is therefore a better statement of ideology in Gregory’s pontificate than its a priori presumption.
In the final analysis, a mature conclusion should perhaps remain provisional. It is crucial to recognise that it is the specific modelling of ideology which has yielded this negative conclusion. Very different findings may result from the application of other theoretical categories. This fact suggests the opportunity for the further application of theory to Gregory’s pontificate, yet it is also an indication of the ‘incoherence’ of the very concept of ideology. Indeed, if one conclusion is certain, it is that the evidential basis for ‘Gregorian ideology’ is dependent as much on interpretative criteria as historical sources.
APPENDIX: DEFINING THE IDEOLOGICAL IN THE MEDIEVAL.

The modernity of ideology as the product of a contemporary political vocabulary is to some extent problematic when the concept is ‘exported’ to the medieval period. That ideology is exclusively modern is implied by political scientists who have argued for a shift from the politics of the ‘ancien régime’ to that of the modern ‘world of ideologies’. Jürgen Habermas, for example, has argued that ideologies are primarily the result of modern, pluralist societies, whereas traditional beliefs rely on more ‘restricted, hierarchically structured, coherent entities’. Any arguments for eleventh-century pluralism notwithstanding, the implication of periodising ideology as ‘modern’ and restricting its historical applicability as such is that testing for ideology in Gregorian reform may be anachronistic. Indeed, ideology in its

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1 As John Plamenatz has argued, ‘only with the demise of the medieval approach to politics...and more broadly the guild approach of the ancien régime, is it possible to talk of a properly ideological discourse’, *Ideology* (London, 1970), p. 61. See also B. Nelson, *Political Thought from Socrates to the Age of Ideology* (2nd edn., Englewood cliffs, 1996); W. Mullins, ‘On the concept of ideology in political science’, *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (1972), pp. 503-504. Many theorisations are formulated in a specifically post-medieval context; the interpretation of D. Hawkes, *Ideology* (London, 1996), for example, conceives of ideology as a form of domination in the Marxian tradition, masked in the contemporary world by globalised consumerism, (pp. 7-8).

2 Cited in D. McLellan, *Ideology* (2nd edn., Buckingham, 1995), p. 2. The supposed ‘coherence’ of ‘traditional beliefs’ can, however, be used to affirm a concept ideology according to its modelling here. The ‘coherence’ of medieval ideology is affirmed also (although perhaps a little uncritically) in one scholar’s emphasis on the ‘ideological character of the unity of the middle ages...[and] the universal acceptance of Catholicism within the geographic West...[as an] ideological framework accepted by all parties’, see R.V. Burks, ‘A conception of ideology for historians’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 10 (1949), pp. 191-192. Where other political scientists have experimented with ‘ante-dating’ ideology, the centrality of the concept of socio-economic class in the Marxian concept of ideology to which many theorists subscribe has encouraged their focus on feudalism, see for example N. Abercrombie, S. Hill, and B.S. Turner, *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (London, 1980). While there may be potential to examine the social formation of a clerical ‘class’ as a ‘separate and superior caste’ in the Marxian definition (see J.P. Canning, *Medieval Political Thought 300-1450* (London, 1996), p. 97), theorists’ references to ‘feudalism’ introduce an additional uncertainty to the debate since this term is now fundamentally contested by historians, see S. Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: the Medieval Evidence Re-Interpreted* (Oxford, 1994). In the sense that theorists borrow terminology such as ‘feudalism’ from historians, while historians borrow terminology such as ‘ideology’ from theorists, there is perhaps a circularity with which problematic terminology is spread between disciplines without being fully understood.
classical Enlightenment definition was formulated specifically in contrast to the perceived image of ‘the medieval’.

More than being a problem of mere semantics therefore, claims for ‘Gregorian ideology’ have to confront a more fundamental question of mentalité. If ideology truly ‘belongs to modernity’, as has recently been declared, could ideological thinking actually occur in the Gregorian period? There is an almost Freudian dilemma here in interpreting the ideological in the medieval insofar as whether something that is not named can still exist. Whether having the vocabulary to describe a concept enables its possibility of being expressed depends upon the extent to which the specificity of language denotes meaning. This is a complex debate which there is no real scope to explore here. That there is an impossible conceptual barrier to confront, however, is perhaps dispelled by the example of medievalists who have been positive about pre-dating modern political terminology in similar fields. Moreover, there is nothing innately modernising about the present models for ideology it would seem.

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5 This Freudian analogy is explored in relation to the consciousness of gender in medieval thought in R.M. Karras, *Sexuality in Medieval Europe: Doing Unto Others* (London, 2005), p. 150; see also G. Prudovsky, ‘Can we ascribe to past thinkers concepts they had no linguistic means to express?’, *History and Theory*, 36 (1997), pp. 30-31.


7 According to Susan Reynolds, even though a medieval word did not exist to describe ‘the state’, the concept was generally understood, ‘The historiography of the medieval state’, in Bentley (ed.), *A Companion to Historiography*, p. 120. Also, R.I. Moore has likened Gregory’s desire to free the Church from proprietary control to a form of proto-communism. This is a considered use of modern terminology which is used as an aid to better understanding the topic, see ‘Property, marriage, and the eleventh-century revolution: a context
One potential problem of mentalité might nevertheless concern the sense of externality within the concept of a ‘Gregorian ideology’. Would contemporaries, in other words, have conceived of Gregorian reform as a distinct ‘alternative’ to the status quo in the Church? On the one hand, the Gregorian emphasis on continuity with the Early Church would of course de-emphasise any sense of externality; on the other, the more revolutionary of Gregory’s ideas may have contributed to a sense of discreteness in ‘the’ Gregorian ecclesiology. Indeed, while historians may (according to their varying criteria) be able to recognise the plurality of ideologies in the late eleventh century, for Gregory there was perhaps only one; the ‘ordering of the world’ according to the Roman Church. This debate has been explored in relation to applying the concept of ‘religion’ to the medieval period. Peter Biller has argued that an externalised notion of a ‘religion’ was conceivable, whereby ‘systems of faith and worship’ could be understood ‘from the outside’ in the modern sense.8 This debate should also be linked with attitudes to the developing pluralism of the religious life in the late eleventh-century period.9

Testing for ideology in the medieval context links with the historiographical tradition of interpreting medieval politics as the origins of modernity.10 Such a modernising, political-science orientated approach is now deemed passé in favour of anthropological perspectives which instead stress the ‘alterity’ of medieval politics.11 Clearly, Gregorian reform must be

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8 Biller, ‘Words and the medieval notion of religion’, pp. 352-353. Yet, historians have continued to argue that ‘the concept of religion is an eighteenth-century creation and its application to the study of the middle ages is wholly inappropriate’, see D. Iogna-Prat, Order and Exclusion: Cluny and Christendom face Heresy, Judaism, and Islam 1000-1150 (London, 2002), p. 4.


11 See Nederman, Lineages of European Political Thought: Explorations along the Medieval/Modern Divide from John of Salisbury to Hegel (Washington, 2009), xv-xx.; M. Colish, ‘Intellectual History’, in J. Van...
understood within its own historical parameters. The act of reading a concept of ideology into the sources must be accordingly sensitive to any aspects of the topic which are alien to modern perspective. A common objection to a theorised approach to history is its potential to distort and to become prescriptive.\textsuperscript{12} Political-science theory is intended to function here, however, as an aid to understanding only.\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, this thesis seeks to explore the theoretical dimensions of a term which has, in fact, been originally (and uncritically) applied by historians.

The exact reasoning of political scientists who argue for the modernity of ideology is hard to distil. Their concepts of ideology are most likely theorised according to a specifically post-Enlightenment political philosophy; relying, for example, on such concepts as liberty and political individualism. Others may engage with the cultural theory and post-structuralism; concepts not completely unsuited to the Middle Ages, although rarely applied. How far theorists can study aspects of political thought such as ‘public opinion’ is also limited by the availability of sources for the Middle Ages, although this in itself does not necessarily preclude the conceptual applicability of ideology. In summary, the possibility of defining

\textsuperscript{12} A particularly sceptical opinion is offered by Geoffrey Elton: ‘Historians captured by theory may tell you that they test their constructs by empirical research but they do nothing of the sort…let us look at interpretative and ideological theory. It does not matter which such theory we choose: they all arise from the same ambition and all do equal harm to the independent understanding of the past’, see ‘The claims of theory’, in \textit{Return to Essentials: Some Reflections on the Present State of Historical Study} (Cambridge, 1991), p. 15, 11.

\textsuperscript{13} For the role of theory in facilitating a greater critical awareness, see M. Fulbrook, \textit{Historical Theory} (London, 2002), p. 85; R.J. Evans, \textit{In Defence of History} (London, 1997), pp. 243-248. The intended function of political science here compares with William Dray’s comments on the suitable role of philosophy in historiography: ‘to clarify and, where it seems appropriate, to offer a critique of the framework of basic concepts and assumptions within which historians conduct their enquiries’, see ‘Philosophy and historiography’, in Bentley (ed.), \textit{A Companion to Historiography}, p. 765.
ideology in a medieval context is governed, as is the possibility of the concept in almost any other respect, by its specific theorisation. If there is a school of political science which, for whatever reason, emphasises the modernity of ideology, this ultimately does not prevent the discussion of medieval ideologies and, thereby, the objective of this thesis.
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