EAST ASIAN (SECURITY) INTELLECTUAL NETWORKS:
THEIR EMERGENCE, SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL
SECURITY
(THE ASEAN-ISIS AND ITS JAPANESE COUNTERPARTS AS A CASE STUDY)

By

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Abstract

This project aims at illuminating that agents’ ideas/perceptions on their (social) surrounding affect their deliberative actions to improve their regional security. The engaging/networking agents’ main attempt is to enlarge the scope of traditional security to accommodate more comprehensive aspects by using regional economic concerns as a spearhead before extending to other fields. Familiarity and socialising process through conferences and workshops are both positive outcomes and structure for agents’ ideas/perceptions on engaging/networking activities. Yet, agents’ (socially) collective identity has not commonly perceived as expected by a set-up framework.

This project is conducted in a circular style which is open for revising a set-up framework employed here for narrating the results in a chronological fashion. The framework is constructed from related concepts and theories. Main concepts are ‘active agents’, ‘intellectuals’, and ‘networks’. Main sources of theories are drawn mainly from constructivism, epistemic community, advocacy coalition framework, and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action (TCA). The TCA provides a useful path to fill in the gap left by the earlier theories whose concerns are grounded on agents’ outward-looking aspects of cooperation. Trust is a presupposition from all theories. Although there is a trend towards it, the research result can not apparently express it.
Acknowledgment

It is a pleasant to record my debts of gratitude to for this PhD thesis. Firstly, I am indebted to the generous of the Royal Thai Government through the Office of Higher Education Commission who granted me a full scholarship. Of course, without it, this project could not even take off the ground. My office, School of Political Science, Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University (STOU) also partly sponsored me to get through my last year at Birmingham. Yet, funding alone can not help me produce this work as it appeared, I would like to thank all my Ajar (lecturers at Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University) who had prepared and encouraged me to go on the academic path and have been my friends for all these years. Without their cares and understandings, I might not be able to start this project at all.

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I also would like to thank those who had their shares concerning my field works in many countries. From the Universitas 21, I received a research-travelling fund to conduct my field works in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The SIIA hosted me at Singapore, under supervision of Simon Tay who also works for the National University of Singapore (NUS), a network of the Universitas 21. At Indonesia, the CSIS granted me a status of visiting fellow, albeit a very short period. There, the late Hadi Soesastro was very kind, resourceful, and helpful for my project.

Last but not least, I am grateful for untiring understands and supports for my families (the Chalermpunrusaks, the Subnankeyos, and the Thammos) and friends. The last one were those who joined the Asian Research Group at UB, those who joined Care Group at Q’s place and at Aston University and my long-termed friends (Mi-Woranut, Kae-Gullinee, Pom-Chaiwatt) who were available for me when I asked for their comforts through international lines.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACFOD</td>
<td>Asian Cultural Forum on Development</td>
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<td>ACPECC</td>
<td>Asian Club for Promotion of Economic and Cultural Communications</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>ASEAN Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>AIA</td>
<td>ASEAN Investment Area</td>
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<td>AICO</td>
<td>ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme</td>
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<td>AIIA</td>
<td>Australian Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>AMF</td>
<td>Asian Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>AMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>AOTS</td>
<td>Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship</td>
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<td>APAP</td>
<td>Asian Pacific Agenda Project</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>APR</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Roundtable</td>
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<td>APT</td>
<td>ASEAN Plus Three</td>
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<td>ASA</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asia</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEAN-ISIS</td>
<td>ASEAN Institute of Security and International Studies</td>
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<td>ASEAN-PMC</td>
<td>ASEAN Post Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<td>ASPAC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Council</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>AYLF</td>
<td>ASEAN Young Leaders Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDIPSS</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAEC</td>
<td>Council for Asia Europe Cooperation</td>
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<td>CARP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (The Philippines)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council for Foreign Affairs (America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICP</td>
<td>Cambodia Institute for Cooperation and Peace</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>Chiang Mai Initiative</td>
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<td>CSCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>East Asia Economic Caucus</td>
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<td>EASG</td>
<td>East Asian Study Group</td>
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<td>EAEG</td>
<td>East Asia Economic Group</td>
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<td>EAVG</td>
<td>East Asian Vision Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECAFE</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UN agency changed to ESCAPE)</td>
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<td>EPG</td>
<td>Eminent Person Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESCAP</td>
<td>Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESRC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Council (the U.K)</td>
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FAEA  Federation of ASEAN Economic Association
GFJ   Global Forum for Japan
GMS   Greater Mekong Sub-region
HRC   Human Rights Colloquium
IAI   Initiative for ASEAN Integration
ICT   Information and Communication Technology
IDSA  Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (India)
IEA   Institute for Economic Affairs (London)
IFC   International Financial Corporation
IIR   Institute for International Relations (Vietnam)
IIR   Institute of International Relations (Taiwan)
IFA   Institute for Foreign Affairs (Laos)
IFRI  French Institute of International Relations
IGCC  Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation
IMF   International Monetary Fund
IRC   Information and Resource Centre (Singapore)
ISDS  Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (The Philippines)
ISEAS Institute of South East Asian Studies
ISIS  Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia)
ISIS  Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Thailand)
IR    International Relations
JCIE  Japan Centre for International Exchange
JERC  Japan Economic Research Centre
JFEC  Japan Foundation Endowment Committee
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency
JIIA  Japan Institute of International Affairs
JIMs  Jakarta Informal Meetings
LDP   Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
LIPI  Indonesian Institute for Science
METI  Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry (Japan)
MIT   Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MITI  Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
NEACD North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue
NETs  Natural Economic Territories
NIEO  New International Economic Order
NIRA  National Institute of Research Advancement (Japan)
NPSCD North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue
NUS   National University of Singapore
ODA   Overseas Development Assistance
OPTAD Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development
PAFTA Pacific Free Trade Area
PAFTAD Pacific Trade and Development
PBEC  Pacific Basin Economic Council
PD    Preventive Diplomacy
PECC  Pacific Economic Co-operation Council
PKI   Parti Kommunist Indonesia (Indonesia Communist Party)
PSAC  Presidential Science Advisory Committee (The Philippines)
RIIA  Royal Institute of International Affairs
RMSSAR Regional Maritimes Surveillance and Safety Regime
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>SARs</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndromes</td>
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<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific</td>
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<td>SCPC</td>
<td>Special Committee on Pacific Cooperation</td>
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<td>SEAFDA</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Forum for Development Alternative</td>
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<td>SEAFDEC</td>
<td>South East Asia Fisheries Development Centre</td>
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<td>SEANWFZ</td>
<td>South East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAPCENTRE</td>
<td>South East Asian Promotion Centre for Trade, Investment, and Tourism</td>
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<td>SEATAC</td>
<td>South East Asia Agency for Regional Transport and Communication</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asia Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>SGATAR</td>
<td>Study Group for Asian Tax Administration and Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIIA</td>
<td>Singapore Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>SOM</td>
<td>Senior Official Meeting</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
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<td>TCA</td>
<td>Theory of Communicative Action</td>
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<td>TDRI</td>
<td>Thailand Development and Research Institute</td>
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<td>TMSA</td>
<td>Transformation Model of Social Activity</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>VAP</td>
<td>Vientiane Action Plan</td>
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<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality</td>
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Introduction

For those interested in East Asia, the 1990s was a fascinating decade.\(^1\) Within that ten-year span, there were fanfares celebrating the inception of four fora that had hitherto been regarded as far-fetched dreams. The first was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a sole, official, state-level institution dealing directly with security matters. The second was the Council for Security Co-operation in Asia Pacific\(^2\) (CSCAP), which was intended to be a track II forum parallel with ARF as its academic counterpart. The third was the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), a forum for comprehensive consultations between East Asian and European Union member states. The last was the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC), a parallel track-II forum for ASEM. All were established in the first half of the 1990s. These fora have been active in getting involved with regional security specifically in terms of broadening scopes of security concern.

As part of the existing regional security architecture, these institutions have made the region more appealing and challenging to both scholars and policy makers alike, particularly when the linkage with track II diplomacy, derived from engaging/networking activities in particular for this project, is taken into account. The core of this project lies within this realm, in which like-minded individuals, whether they be academics, analysts, officers, and/or policy makers acting in their ‘private capabilities’, gather, produce and express their efforts to make conditions in the region more peaceful and less uncertain.

The mentioned fora are active within changed environments. Domestic and international agendas, particularly those seemingly linked to the well-being of domestic economic activities, and people’s migration in particular, were not as easily set up by states’ agents as they were in the Cold War period. Non-state actors’ movements were vibrant, to say the least; some have been actively involved in

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\(^1\) For this project the ‘East Asia Region’ geographically covers two main sub-regions. The first one is Northeast Asia consisting of China, Korea and Japan. Southeast Asia is the second one. It comprises ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

\(^2\) Generally speaking, the Asia Pacific region refers to a broader area including Australia, New Zealand, the small island-states scattered within the Pacific Ocean (the southern part in particular e.g. Papua New guinea and Fiji) and the United States. The geographical boundary is expanded to cover economic territories along the Pacific-rim on the Latin American continent in the forum like an Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC).
activities derived from the four fora since their inception. To those who had the chance to attend and report on the numerous conferences and street assemblies, the familiar names and faces circulating within those fora proved interesting, as they continue to do today. They seemed not only to know state-officers, non-governmental agencies, and media but also their peers, well enough to discuss serious matters and to make jokes among themselves. In other words, in all of these new initiatives, there were a small number of influential individuals.

The interest for this thesis derived from my observations of the activities of these individuals. Initially, it was surprising to note that activities seemed to involve a small group of scholars in East Asia, ASEAN and Japan. Some literature claims that those scholars are essential ingredients for understanding the dynamic movements related to security matters in the region, and that the four fora could not have been established without them (Evens 1994a, Leifer 1996, Lau Teik Soon 1997, Simon 1998, Midford 2000).

This project set out to understand the aforementioned non-state actors as active agents who not only participate but also encourage activities directly (and indirectly) related to the four fora. The activities specifically under my observation, have been related to regional security, especially within the broadening concept of comprehensive security favouring non-military, and with a lesser state-centric aspect. How, in fact, could this happen in a region so dominated by strong states? Of course, these activities did not evolve instantly, or out of thin air. The answer to this question forms part of my research questions. Other interesting questions include: to what extent and how do scholars from different countries join hands? The most basic question of all is ‘who were they?’ Further questions may be posed: when did they have the chance (or chances) to encourage such activities and under what condition(s) did said chances present themselves? Did they, in fact, create the chances? There is another related question: did they really have any impact on their respective governments’ policies, let alone regional policies?

In other words, this project aims to answer two main research groups of research questions. The first group of basic questions is not only concerned with who those active state- and non-state agents are; it is also concerned specifically with how they construct and expand the networking (engaging security matters (both non- and traditional understanding, state-centric and military-dominant)) which may be called ‘the East Asian Security Intellectual Networks’.

Introduction
The second group of basic questions is about assessing both their capabilities and their impact(s). The former covers their abilities as changing-agents (see Chapter 1), which particularly derives from their ideas in the specific sector of security. It also relates to their social function, examining whether they are independent enough to initiate an emancipating change, or are just part of their society and serve to reproduce the dominant order. The latter concerns their impact upon regional security and speculates whether their respective identities have changed to become more collective as the communicating process has progressed. Additionally, the researcher’s experiences from interviews initiate reflective questions related to the aforementioned groups of questions. They are: whether socialising processes of engaging/networking agents lead to agents’ collective identity or identities; and whether an elitist/exclusive nature of networking activities have any impact on socialising activities.

Attempting to understand a vibrant region like East Asia is not an easy task. A single framework based either upon a neo-liberalist perspective or a neo-realist perspective (of which, more explanation later) is not enough to comprehend such a region. Other approaches, too, may fail to determine the status quo in this dynamic and energetic region, particularly when the potentiality of non-state actors is being realised.

The following sections provide brief reviews of the different perspectives for comprehending the role of non-state agents, whose function and activities help shed new light on understanding regional security. The section will highlight the need to address how ideational factors could have a real impact on the establishment of such fora. The last section will provide key definitions and illustrate the structure of the thesis, before going on to explain why this project employs a qualitative methodology.

East Asia: In need of a study of the security role of non-state actors

Generally speaking, literature on East Asia has provided a Janus-faced image (co-operation and conflict) of the region. With a co-operative image, it is regarded as a prosperous region (particularly when it is viewed in a broader context including the Pacific-rim area), likely to be emulated. This image prevailed especially until the mid-1990s, and can be constructed largely through a neo-liberalist lens. As a result, economic-related matters almost dominate the literature concerning the region. Paul Krugman’s ‘The Myth of Asia’s Miracle’ (1994) and John Naisbitt’s *Megatrends Asia* (1996) are cases in point.

Introduction
Security concerns (from my observations), in both non- and traditional senses, were more or less discarded. It was mainly felt that they remained under the spell of bipolarity or the mantra of the Cold War, which classically separated the region into pro-West (favouring a democratic and capitalist system) and pro-East (dominated by communist-inspired authoritarian regimes). The literature related to security in Asia has been replete with concepts prioritising military and political aspects (Acharya 1993, Huxley 1993, Mak 1995, McGregor 1993). It is dominated by a neo-realist approach.

However, the changed atmosphere at both the global and regional levels (i.e. the demolishing of the Berlin Wall and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia) generated more space for scholars and policy-makers to rethink regional situations. But has it really ended, given the problems with North Korea and the China/Taiwan Straits conflict, (highly divisive and conflictive areas) derived from the experiences and legacy of the Cold War (in Northeast Asia in particular). At first glance, state-level questions appear to be keys in this era. There are two aspects to be considered here: on the one hand, the US leadership is in doubt. Is it trying to play down its regional role, and, if so, does it want to share its part with Japan or China? In broader terms, how is it possible for Washington to manage its triangular relationship with Tokyo and Beijing? (Steinbruner 1998, Hook 1998, Christensen 2003) This period of literature also raised questions regarding the intentions and capabilities of both Japan and China, assuming that they opt to venture along a leading path (Falk 1992, Cox 1998, Hawthorn 1998, Calder 2000, Blechinger and Legewie 2000). Further questions have been raised as to whether and how they can co-operate effectively, considering their turbulent historical legacy.

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3 Some literature pays attention to highly critical issues, i.e., North Korea’s perceived nuclear problem and tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Others are interested in regional arms races, territorial disputes, especially in the South China Sea, and domestic insurgencies, whether derived from economic, religious and/or ideological problems (Acharya 1993, Huxley 1993, Mak 1995, McGregor 1993).

4 Ken Booth (1998) calls it the ‘Cold War of the mind’ He proposes that the pessimist perspective regarding the existing conflicts, whether they are political-territorial and/or ethnic origin in many parts of the world, have deteriorated the world for long time. They might be worse if the state of mind is not able to be changed. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have contributed to spreading such a mindset. In the case of the former, the reason is blind accusation regarding a Marxist-Leninist ideology. For the latter, is it due to their suspect military programs and their international aid that prolongs their opponent’s suspicion? (Garthoff 1998)

5 Due to an uneasy contemporary historical legacy (Japan’s military action in World War II (1941-45), many Japanese governments’ attempts to take a significant role have been viewed by its neighbouring
On the other hand, there are questions derived from the co-operative side of
the region, in both political and economic terms, based loosely on a neo-liberalist
perspective. The enlargement of ASEAN to cover all ten states geographically located
in the region, and the inception of the ARF and ASEM suggested that co-operation
was becoming more popular. Yet, their relevance gradually faded from academic
coverage. So what is at stake here? Do their engaging and socialising experiences
drive them to perceive themselves as possessing a ‘collective identity’ (identifying
themselves with shared ideas/perceptions of their surroundings and claiming some
commonly accepted characteristics)? The relevance of the question lies in whether
flexible engagement in the style of the so-called ‘ASEAN Spirit’ or ‘ASEAN Way’,
with emphasis on informal consensus, and process-oriented phenomena, can engage

For this group of scholars, it became important to understand how socialising
processes could play a significant role in helping to intensify institutional-building
processes (Snitwongse 1995b, Chin Kin Wah 1995). There was some suspicion that
attempts to extend the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia or Asia Pacific Way’ ‘camouflaged’
Japan and Australia’s joint bid to increase their penetration of the Asian circle. But on
the whole, this literature was very positive about the cooperative future of the region.

Although there is no clarification on the rise of non-state actors in helping to
transform regional security, there is the question of whether non-governmental actors
can play more active roles in reinforcing regional security (Hook 2000) and in
developing regional democracy (Shuto 2000).

Much of this 1990s literature was concerned with speculation about conflicts
and interests, co-operation, and even the future prospects of the regional situation
(Ball 1999b). However, the passing of time has highlighted some of the inner
complexities of the regional situation, and certain theoretical frameworks have been
found wanting. As the thesis will show, an alternative approach lies in a constructivist
2002: chapter 3).

Alternative Security Experiences

countries as a means of returning to repressive policy. Yet, it does not mean that Tokyo has not tried.
Any attempt can be viewed as part of the process of the ‘Internationalising Japan’, which has been
conducted on many fronts; some of them directly engaging non-governmental actors’ activities (Hook
As Chapter 1 will show, constructivism helps broaden the horizons of East Asian studies, by placing less of an emphasis on structural factors (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003b), and giving new meaning to phrases including those of identity, sovereignty, even institution and international governance (Adler 2003). It does so by digging deeper into their historical contexts and explaining how they have been memorised.

From the mid-1990s onwards, literature applied this approach facilitates an understanding of historical memory as an essential ingredient for comprehending East Asian states’ foreign policies, not only as a basis, but also as a learning-and-engaging process, for states and non-state actors to construct and/or adapt their identities and norms (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, Kowert and Legro 1996). Put differently, how they define their identities and interests is at issue (Katzenstein 1996b, Berger 2003). One of the stumbling blocks to such a discovery is the geographical diffusion of learning centres and intellectual innovation in East Asia (Katzenstein 1996a).

Any understanding of East Asian affairs, according to constructivist approaches, is to say the least complex; even the meaning of the term ‘security’ applied within the region is elusive. What Muthiah Alagappa (1998a, 1998b, 1998d) refers to as the ‘conceptual travelling’ of East Asian security depends on the interplay between the identity of the nation (collective-self for being a nation-state) and the ideology of the state (structure of political domination). Each state’s definition of its ‘survival’ helps the prioritising of its own broadening security concept (including non-traditional forms, such as economic, environmental, and human security). The characteristics of international security systems (self-help, co-operative, or security community), in which states find themselves will also be taken into consideration (Gurtov 2002: chapter 2).

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6 Drawn from the Western experiences, there are three layers of exogenous factors that should be studied alongside their domestic counterparts. The first is whether there is an explicit institution, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The second is whether there is an Implicit institution shadowing both states and non-states’ actors. The last suggests international cultural patterns of ‘amity and enmity’ derived from historical backgrounds in each area (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996). What one should be aware of is that social learning at each layer, not to mention at the domestic layer, is a continuous process. It is difficult to indicate precisely ‘when and where’ should be the starting point. Additionally, norms seem to have an omnipresent quality covering from individual level (actors’ identities, interests and behaviours) to structural level (normative structure) (Kowert and Legro 1996).
Although to date there seems to be no clear idea of how to define the ‘Asia or Asia-Pacific Way’, the regional states’ experiences since the 1997 financial crisis seem to be of significance. The more limited the scope applied, the clearer the outcome presented. The establishment of the ‘ASEAN+3’, comprising China, South Korea, Japan and ASEAN members, and the establishment of a regional currency swap agreement, known as the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’, are good examples. Put another way, the more socialisation they have, the clearer the identity and institutional image they create. The enlargement of ASEAN, from six members to ten, reflects the significance of socialising processes. Although it may give rise to more internal problems, it helps construct the image of ASEAN as a reference for regional identity with a tendency towards intensifying institutional-building processes (Acharya 2001: chapter 6 and conclusion, Haacke 2003).

The emergence and existence of the ARF and the CSCAP have provided more fertile ground for alternative security ideas and practices, as will be shown in the chapters that follow. As part of the existing regional security architecture, these institutions have made the region more appealing and challenging to both scholars and policy makers alike, particularly when the linkage with track II diplomacy is taken into account. The core of this project lies within this realm, in which like-minded individuals, whether they be academics, analysts, officers, and/or policy makers acting in their ‘private capabilities’, gather, produce, and express their efforts to make conditions in the region more peaceful and less uncertain (Evans 1994a, Kerr 1994, Ball 1999a, Simon 2002).

It would be interesting to discern whether this dynamic area of open space in which non-state actors can play creative roles, implicitly democratising security matters for the ARF and explicitly for the CSCAP, involves more frequently those...

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7 The Initiative can be regarded as a result of intensified communication among countries, whose shared feeling and future (or common destiny) has been transformed by active agents’ efforts and actions. It is the case that the relationship between institutionalized-monetary agreements (as a structure) and agents’ ideas and behaviours is clearly discernible (Nabers 2003).

8 Discernible examples are to adopt a concept of ‘Troika’ for continuous and quick responses to preventive diplomacy, and to brush up a significance of an ASEAN High Council as dispute-settlement mechanism. Additionally, what used to be taboo topics related to members’ domestic concerns (i.e. money laundering and arms trafficking) have found their places in ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMMs) sessions as a better way to cope with new intra-regional disputes. Interestingly, military presence from ASEAN members in East Timor, albeit receiving an invitation from Indonesia, presented a question on its cardinal principle called ‘non-intervention’; whether it should be more flexibly engaged (Acharya 2001: chapter 6 and conclusion, Haacke 2003, Snitwongse 2003).

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who are affected by changes to the status quo. Logically, if this interactive area plays a significant part, the positively broadening impact of the spill-over effect facilitating the development of regional democracy may not be beyond reach. In other words, these questions, derived as they are from the changed atmosphere, help to confirm that regional prospects for non-state actors’ active roles are on the move (Ball 1999b, Hook 2000, Shuto 2000) However, as will be shown to be the case in this thesis, the longer time passes, the more complicated and complex situations and questions have become.

Tracing back through regional experiences, the expected spill-over effect from effective economic co-operation to other co-operative aspects, is not new. Within this sphere, apparent efforts forged between state and non-state actors (from ASEAN and Japan in particular) have been discernible since the mid-1960s. The existence and function of international economic fora at both state and non-state levels are cases in point. With regard to the former, examples are APEC and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The latter include the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC). Their overlapping activities nurture an image of complex regional multilateralism, although they are apparently based on states’ activities (Gilson 2004). The nature of this complexity will be mainly explored in Chapters 3 and 4.

It is already an accepted fact that economists, especially within Japan, Australia and ASEAN, played an important part in the inception of the previous fora (PBEC, PECC and APEC). Their attempts paved the way for the extension of the 'getting-to-know-each-other' process and related matters in the political field (Soesastro 1995a, Morrison 1997, PECC 2005). Their efforts have helped create and nurture a ‘we-feeling’ or ‘we-ness’ among active participants in tandem with the experience ASEAN has gained through the years through their diplomatic and political co-operation (Acharya 1997, 1998, 2001, Emmers 2003). The above mentioned feeling and co-operative activities have come to frame the sense of community which is identified in this thesis as a 'communicative community,' in which members accept their shared backgrounds and prospects for their community.

However, David Martin Jones and Michael L.R Smith (2001, 2002, and 2006) question whether the successive image for co-operative community is really the region-grown experience. Contemporary regional history full of implicit and explicit conflicts makes them sceptical. They point out that such an image should be regarded
as the regional self-delusive image initiated and nurtured by scholars, within and without the region, who rush to imitate a co-operative trend from the mid-1980s of the Western world. This delusive community of ‘we-ness’ itself breeds imitating scholars who nurture this regional delusive process in return. So, the process goes on. This is the reason why regional scholars cannot act (and/or react) in times of crisis, not to mention forecast it. The 1997 financial crisis is a case in point. According to them, this failure should not be a surprise case provided that regional scholars’ source of imitation (due to their close academic background), specifically the one-sided perspective of the way most American scholars see the world, is taken into account. Ironically, Jones and Smith also accentuate that whilst American scholars have too realistic a perspective regarding the Soviet Union to perceive a positive change, Asia-Pacific scholars have too idealistic perspective about their own co-operative region to perceive a negative change.

Alan Collins (2007, 2008) also questions on a similar point about constructing a regional community, ASEAN Community specifically, based on the ‘we-ness’ feeling of the people. For him, ASEAN Charter which is a foundational document to form the aforementioned community emphasises too little on the side of people-oriented agendas supported by civil society organisations (CSOs) in the region. The Charter reflects only concerns voiced by agents from track I and track II. Unless regional CSOs receive more serious attention by enlarging socialising norms to cover people-driven agendas, ASEAN Charter could not be materialised effectively. Both non-governmental and governmental agents in the region accept that civil society is important as a nurturing area for humans to learn to be themselves through interactive processes with others, and to learn to participate in the political arena. Yet, engaging agents from CSOs receive less attention than those of track I and track II. Even ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA) has not been able to draw wholeheartedly support from participating agents of track I and track II, though it acts as one of the important mechanics for regional economic security (Caballero-Anthony 2004). In other words, APA and regional CSOs do not receive support to act as essential and appropriate means to regional security in general.

What is hard to deny is that the existence and activities of participating agents, particularly as they are perceived to be indispensable ingredients in the creation of the aforementioned fora. The main component here is the overlapping membership of participants, who are elites in their respective countries, such as leaders and/or
members of intellectual institutions concerning security studies. These actors have been comprehensively acknowledged particularly in ASEAN and Japan, and seemingly utilise formal and informal channels for proposing and implementing their ideas (Adler and Barnett 1998a, Harris 1994b). As mentioned earlier, parts of networking agents are those who work for their respective governments, so it is not difficult for them to find and employ the formal channels. They seem to emulate and apply what they have learned during the processes (in terms of engaging ideas and networking-models), to help establish the aforementioned security fora (Evans 1994a, Kerr 1994, Simon 1998).

Some aspects have to some degree been overlooked; namely, the significance of ideational factors as driving motives for these non-state actors’ intentions and activities. Although it is difficult to totally separate out state- and non-state agents from each other within the scope of this study (see the discussions and examples in Parts 2 and 3), the intention is to highlight the significance of the latter. There has been little attempt to try to fill the gap. Richard Higgott (1994) emphasises that an idea is important for identity formation and policy learning among elite’s networks (academic and policy-makers in his study). Together, they help to generate agents’ perceptions of interests, which are likely to change throughout the learning processes. For him, it is the idea that makes such networks as PECC, APEC, ARF, CSCAP, ASEM, and CAEC materialise. It is the intellectual-cum-policy elites who constitute the energetic motor behind the scenes (see Chapter 1). Yet, we still have no knowledge of how such intellectual networks could be possible in the first place, especially across national boundaries.

Attempts have been made to shed more light on these non-state actors and their activities. A few studies provide the information that they are mostly civil servants, under the aegis of their respective governments, whose educational and training backgrounds affect their activities, including research, multilateral dialogues and institutional developments (Kerr 1994). In other words, their existence and activities cannot be totally separated from their governments’ support, for the latter are their resource channels in terms of funding, provision and implementation of their ideas (Morimoto and Kikuchi 1994). Charles E Morrison (2004) calls this close co-operation between track I and track II ‘track 1/track 2 symbiosis’, which is essential for track II in Asia-Pacific to be relevant to international policy networks. These networks, comprising PECC, PBEC, CSCAP and APEC Business Advisory Council
(ABAC), are fertile space for track II’s contribution to regional economic security. For him, participating agents from track II achieve the aforesaid contribution by providing novel ideas and approaches to their track I counterparts and international organisations on how to advance regional economic liberalisation. The ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) is included in his study.

Tadashi Yamamoto (1996) and Makiko Noda (1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 1996e, 1996f), the first to present an overall picture of the emerging track-II networks in the region, provide some details about academic institutions (mostly concerning economic aspects), including the influential ASEAN-ISIS. The ASEAN-ISIS comprises nine research institutions and is based in ASEAN members’ countries, apart from Myanmar (see further discussion in Parts 2). They also provide information of the more independently policy-oriented nature of their activities, compared with other institutions; and reiterate their relationship with governments (as sources of funds in particular). In addition, they also mention these institutions’ relationships with each other within or beyond their respective country’s boundaries. Yet, they tend to disregard the significance of these intellectuals’ ideas and intentions, which are necessary ingredients when constructing social networks. These neglected factors represent an important focus of this current study.

Structure of the thesis
Unfortunately, these individuals have never been significantly studied in their own right, although these elite intellectuals have been part and parcel of numerous dialogue-fors. They are not only members of academic institutions, but are also those who apply their intellectual capabilities to engage and expand networks, act as idea-carriers and are supporters of inclusive communication. Within these processes, they may also diffuse the concept of comprehensive security, which involves a focus on people and their surroundings, whether ecological or social. All of these factors will be developed in Chapter 1.

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9 The ASEAN Institute of Security and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), comprising eight institutes across the Southeast Asia region: 1) Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS); 2) Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP); 3) Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia; 4) Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Laos; 5) Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; 6) Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), Philippines; 7) Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA); 8) Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand; and 9) Institute for International Relations (IIR), Vietnam.
This project aims to study in particular people in ASEAN and Japan, who seem to have successfully persuaded their governments to establish the ARF in 1993 and have, since 1994, encouraged others (like-minded and non like-minded alike) to join in the expanded network. As regards those in ASEAN, most are members of their countries’ security-and-related-topic research institutions (which are mainly members of ASEAN-ISIS). In the case of those in Japan, it seems that the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), and the ASEAN-Japan Forum are their shelters (Noda 1996e). These will all be studied in depth throughout this work.

By summarising their activities (mostly through an analysis of international-dialogue fora and publications), it will be revealed that the engaging agents are both state- and non-state agents. The latter include academics and business people, as well as members of media organisations. Although they have different origins, they possess some shared backgrounds, particularly in terms of socio-economic status and educational backgrounds (see Chapter 3).

Put simply, they could be regarded as members of privileged groups in their own societies. Interestingly, what they have in common is their ideas/perceptions and intention/deliberation to improve their region from the high period of the Cold War (in the 1960s) up till the present time. The fixed shared perception is that economic development, and its spill-over effects, will culminate in domestic and regional resilience. This concept is the foundation for their preferred ‘comprehensive security’ concept. The way the concept has developed in the region is quite opposite from that of the European experience. Here, in East Asia, the concept of comprehensive security (initially emphasising the broad sense of non-traditional security) has been reinterpreted to focus more on the traditional dimension of security concept, which is state-centric and focuses on military and political aspects). These points are developed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

Suffice to say that their capability to influence domestic and regional policies is not straightforward. They might not directly influence state policy but they could be influential by encouraging high-ranking state-officers to participate in their numerous conferences and workshops. In this way they could transmit their ideas and/or proposals to socialise those from the governmental side. Although the final policy output side of agents’ ideational influence is not the main concern here, it is helpful to stress the point that participation might have a side effect; that is, it might result in
non-state agents being less independent. It is fair to point out that the collectiveness of this ability (not a collective identity) helps them to fulfil their social functions (creating venues for criticising, transmitting and/or transplanting alternative ideas and actions and making them available to a broader society). However, this does not mean that they produce only alternative concepts and proposals: as fund-receivers they are sometimes constrained to reproduce dominant state ideologies.

In order to present the study procedures and the research result(s) in an accessible organised style, the whole structure is divided into three parts: Part I: the background/state of the problem, the framework and the method; Part II: constructing and sustaining East Asian security intellectual networks; Part III: analysis and conclusion. Part I provides the narration for the other two chapters. Chapter 1 illustrates the connections of the three groups of theoretical concepts, in order to highlight the significance of the principal unit of analysis, namely 'intellectual agents'. It commences with definitions of ‘being agent’ and ‘being intellectual’. It also provides definitions covering intellectuals’ properties and characters as knowledge-generators/bearers/transmitters and, of course, their social functions. The latter particularly means criticising global, regional, and domestic (security) well-being and generating alternative venues that will encourage an atmosphere for a trust culture by establishing and connecting networks.

All aforementioned concepts are connected and employed as a core theme to analyse who those active agents are and to what extent they are chosen to be studied as main engaging/networking agents of track II’s activities for this project. These questions are at the centre for the first group of my research questions. In other words, these concepts are applied as the backbone for Part II and Part III in order to illustrate to what extent, and how they can form and sustain numerous fora for regional security architecture, specifically those four fora under investigation here.

The following section scrutinises concepts currently applied to studying intellectuals’ activities and networking. It concentrates on the more popular concepts, which include ‘epistemic community’, ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF), and co-operation based on a constructivist approach. The aim is to illustrate the degree to which they emphasise the means-ends paradigm (specifically the former two) - that they miss the internal logic of cooperation. Based on their emphasis, they cannot provide a satisfying answer as to what extent diversifying agents can cooperate in the first place.

Introduction
The last section indicates the extent to which Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) can be integrated, especially to fill the crucial missing gaps. In order to achieve this, cooperative mutual understanding should come before strategic action, although the two cannot be totally separated. The thesis will show that being strategic agents is acceptable as long as those involved aim to reach a mutual understanding. Viewed in an introverted fashion, the relationship (between communicative and strategic actions) can be comprehended as applying strategic action to achieve particular gains, as they are accepted as part and parcel of absolute gain.

Following connected logic from sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 1, my analysis regarding activities of engaging/networking agents is that they favour engaging activities towards a direction of communicative action. They prefer this direction rather than emphasis on having a legally precise solution for every regional conflict, which requires strategic movement as shown in Chapters 3 and 4. By preferring communicative action, I mean, they pay more attention on constructing mutual understanding that to create and help (mostly track I) to construct positive regional atmosphere is essential. This kind of atmosphere is expected to nurture chances leading to more stable and peaceful regional security. Put differently, avoiding discussion about apparent conflicts, and looking into shared visions to better the region is their guiding ways to reach mutual understanding.

The focus of Chapter 2 is on the research design and methodology. Qualitative methodology is the basis of this project, which is constructed in a circular fashion (see Chapter 2). Apart from historical illustration, this involves content analysis using ASEAN-ISIS and its Japanese counterparts’ primary documents, their leading members’ articles published elsewhere, along with secondary sources. These show the two primary problematics of the thesis: how agents perceive their surroundings (specifically global and regional); and their intention/deliberation to change and/or better their regional surroundings, which might be expressed via their observations, critiques of global and regional phenomena, and/or concrete proposals.

Interviewing (active interview/conversation) will help this project to collect more precise data, specifically the ways in which engaging/networking agents reflect on their experiences. This will prove valuable for observing and criticising their networking activities. Agents’ own reflections will help the researcher reduce an illusion based on placing too much emphasis on theoretical logic. The reflections also

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help the researcher concentrate more on questions whether socialising processes over long periods of time positively lead to closer co-operation and a collective identity as expected specifically by constructivism. Answers received from many interviewing sessions urge the researcher to present in Chapter 5 and Conclusion that outcomes from socialising processes can appear varied, apart from being only positive. Additionally, they also shed light on a related question as to whether an elitist/exclusive nature of engaging activities does affect theoretically expected socialising processes.

Together they (documents and interviews) will not only provide information on how they construct and expand their networks, but will also prove a source of reflection on the successes and obstacles associated with constructing, transmitting, and applying their ideas (particularly alternatives for alteration) on regional security. In other words, these resources will be compiled, analysed and employed to set up the result for the core narration of Part II by reconstructing agents’ social environments (global and regional specifically) regarded here as their structure for thoughts, intention/deliberation, and action/interaction.

The anticipation is that by tracing back agents’ actions and interactions, and their intentions/deliberations to expand and sustain their networks, it will be possible to discern how they overcome their difficulties due to enlarging networks and more diversifying agents. Part II’s focus is on ‘constructing and sustaining East Asian security intellectual networks’: it consists of two chapters. Chapter 3 emphasises the essential content starting from the 1960s when economists laid the ground for further co-operation amidst many uncertainties in the Cold War period. To a great extent, it led to the establishment of ASEAN-ISIS in 1984. Also within this time span, the Japanese launched the concept of ‘comprehensive security’. The chapter concludes with the initially ascending period of networking between 1984-1991 leading to the inception of both the ARF and CSCAP. In order to effectively present the picture of engaging agents’ activities, figures (see annex) charting their connections, and brief content reflecting their concerns at that moment, will be presented and explained to accompany each period of the study.

Chapter 4 continues on from the previous chapter with a similar pattern of presenting figures to accompany each period of the study. The first section will illustrate to what extent, and in what way, ASEAN-ISIS had to engage its Japanese counterparts. As well, it demonstrates how they were successful in persuading
ASEAN governments and other non/like-minded individuals to come on board. This section also includes a discussion of how both state- and non-state agents from Europe and East Asia formed themselves into groups, specifically derived from the long period of co-operation between Japanese and European intellectuals with links to Indonesian CSIS and their ASEAN-ISIS counterparts. The second section deals with the slow progress the networks exhibited until they found some revitalising projects, such as the promotion of the ‘ASEAN Community’ and ‘East Asia Community’. This part aims to establish that these two projects are not only compatible but well connected due to the intentions and efforts of those networks engaging agents, who seem to share experiences, ideas and visions about their region(s).

Part III comprises two chapters: Chapter 5 and Conclusion. Chapter 5 consists of three sections. The first section will analyse and reflect on whether the existing networking has been as it was meant to be. In order to effectively present the picture, eight figures charting their connections, and brief content reflecting their concerns at that moment, will be presented and explained. The main concern is whether their expanded networks have had any impact upon their function and status, particularly whether they are independent enough to take a critical leading role in bringing about change in security concepts and activities (for this project). The idea behind this concern is that the group may have to face more complex and difficult learning processes stemming from their own achievements. How they can manage the extension, and what lessons they learned during their first decade of interaction are guiding questions for this chapter. The second section aims to parallel what has been constructed thus far in Chapter 1, as a way to assess the set up framework as explained in Chapter 3. This section will demonstrate to what extent the set up framework needs flexible alteration to embrace a concept of trust that is not automatically cultivated along social processes derived from agents’ engaging/networking activities as anticipated by literature reviewed in Chapter 1. The last section presents that although engaging agents show no clear signs of actualised trust, the research result, empirically and theoretically, indicates that engaging activities generate familiarity that creates friendship, which could be regarded as an essential social quality towards constructing trust. Conclusion is the last chapter for this project.

In summary, this thesis sets out to answer two main research groups of research questions. The first group of research questions is essential as a guiding
foundation to comprehend the given nature of regional security architectures inspiring the set-up of this project which focuses on regional activities in the 1990s. This group of questions is not only concerned with who those active state- and non-state agents are; it is also concerned specifically with how they construct and expand the networking (engaging security matters, both non- and traditional understanding, state-centric and military-dominant) which may be called ‘the East Asian Security Intellectual Networks’.

The second group of basic questions is about assessing both their capabilities and their impact(s). The former covers their abilities as changing-agents which particularly derive from their ideas in the specific sector of security. It also relates to their social function, examining whether they are independent enough to initiate an emancipating change, or are just part of their society and serve to reproduce the dominant order. The latter concerns their impact upon regional security and speculates whether their respective identities have changed to become more collective as the communicating process has progressed. Additionally, the researcher’s experiences from interviews initiates reflective questions related to the aforementioned groups of questions. They are whether socialising processes of engaging/networking agents lead to agents’ collective identity or identities, and whether an elitist/exclusive nature of networking activities has any impact on socialising activities.
Chapter 1

A Fabricated Framework:
Comprehending Intellectuals, their Function,
and their Networking Activities

As may be observed from the research questions outlined in the Introduction, the concept of ‘ideas’ and their bearers/transmitters needs to be clarified in order to construct a definition of ‘being intellectual’. The essence of definition, including intellectuals’ social function, will pave the way for comprehending to what extent they construct, sustain, and expand their networking activities. This is the primary thrust of the first section.

In order to achieve these aims, the second section illustrates that although the present literature concerning knowledge-bound networking is insufficient, it nevertheless provides some degree of understanding. Its main shortcoming is that it lacks an internal logic of networking for better understanding. Finally, this chapter proposes that Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) may be considered a better complementary means due to its dialogical approach, given that TCA provides a sense of (socially) critical missions of criticising and unmasking the dominant concept of engaging/networking activities concerning security. In sum, this chapter constructs a framework aimed at comprehending the way in which the ‘idea’ (critical ideas on (regional) security for this project) plays a significant part in constructing and/or providing an alternative way of illustrating better regional security. In so doing, it does not ignore the importance of the idea-bearers, whose social function is not only to criticise, but also to assist others to emancipate themselves from distorted communication. In the case of this project, the focus remains throughout on security matters.

What makes the ‘intellectual’ become an appropriate and effective agent?

Before defining the concept of ‘intellectual’, this section will attempt to show on what basis it nominates ‘intellectual’ as a capable changing agent. Here, constructivism plays a significant role in constructing an understanding: it helps to construct the concept of being agents which helps this project nominates ‘intellectuals’ as effective agents. Margaret Archer (1988, 1995) points out that the constructivism provides a way of comprehending the vexatious fact of society based on dialectical dualism. It
criticises one-sided emphases, either those who emphasise human beings or those who emphasise their surroundings. At the same time, it highlights the relationship or ‘interplay’ between the two narrations \(^1\), as Colin Hay (2002) describes the concepts of ‘conduct’ and ‘context’ in comprehending the agent-structure problem. Yet, there is no a 50-50 blending formula. Anthony Giddens (1984) theory of ‘structuration’ places greater emphasis on the subtle structure of an agent’s memory based on her or his everyday life experiences. \(^2\) His approach, however, fails to explain to what extent and how constructed society can be changed or reproduced. Roy Bhaskar’s (1989, 1994) concept of ‘transformational model of social activity’ (TMSA), which signifies more assertive agents, illustrates their interwoven relationships with the ever-present social structure (inter-/intra subjective, personal actions and social relations) and its material nature. The combination of an agent’s (un)acknowledged motivation, (un)acknowledged condition and tacit/explicit skills will reveal whether consequences are unintended (reproduction) or intended (transformation). Bhaskar maintains that agents have of necessity to possess both opportunity and disposition to achieve their real interests.

Comprehension of Archer's more elaborate concept of ‘Time and Space’ (regarded here as an historically social background) is essential to any understanding of agents’ ‘emergent properties’, and of the shaping of the interaction process. She contends that the disjunction or conjunction of the three domains of cultural, structural, and individual properties at the intersection of time and space, frames the

\(^1\) Archer suggests that these approaches, which emphasise human being (such as individualism, intentionalism, idealism, subjectivism and rationalism), reduce the significance of structure to agents’ phenomena or ‘upward conflation’, as she terms it. Approaches emphasising human being’s surroundings (holism, structuralism, materialism, realism, objectivism and relativism) reduce agents to being merely properties of the structure, what she terms ‘downward conflation’ (Archer 1988, 1995).

\(^2\) Giddens argues that ‘agent’ and ‘structure’ cannot be separated as each constitutes the other as part of an on-going process. On the one hand, the knowledgeable agent (an actor possessing the capability to do things) is the key to understanding the social world. On the other the structure (rules/resources enabling and constraining agents’ action whether intended or unintended, mostly the latter) should receive equal attention, albeit in terms of a ‘virtual order’ detected in agents’ memory traces and expressed via the process of praxis within day-to-day activities. As a result, the structural properties of social system, being marked by the ‘absence of the subject’, as both medium and outcome of the practices, generate the ‘duality of structure’. While this logic overlooks agents’ intentions, it acknowledges the importance of their consciousness in ‘self-creating’ and ‘social-encountering’ processes (Giddens 1984).
status of the structure. Although she recognises the significance of the pre- and post-dated structure, her agents are more autonomous and opportunistic (Archer 1988, 1995). David Dessler’s (1989) proposal is less complicated. For him, the processes of interplay, including among agents, between them and their surroundings, determines whether structure can be transformed or reproduced. Expressed another way, it is essential to clarify the process of how a collective matters, and how it is constructed (Price and Reus-Smit 2000: 1784-1816). Colin Wight (1999) proposes that viewing agents from a multi-layered perspective, linking agent’s intentions and capabilities through a socio-cultural system to their positional practices, is helpful. In essence, then, capably changing agents are those who know and accept that they are both enabled and constrained by their surroundings, which are dynamic and not static. They also know and intend to take part in - even lead - activities that will help to maintain, shift, change and/or totally construct their surroundings.

In order to proceed, two main concepts need clarification: ideas, including closely related topics/ideologies; and intellectuals. With regard to the concept of ideas, the main questions posed here are as follows: what is the source of these notions; how have they impacted upon agents (their actions and interactions) and their surroundings; and by which method can they adequately be studied? Apropos of these queries, the primary questions are: who should be defined as 'intellectuals' and to what

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3 The cultural domain comprises the knowing subjects including individual agents and parts or groups that can be noticed from their socio-cultural interaction. For Archer, the structural domain signifies part of the structural conditions derived from the long-dead construction. In other words, they have no clear knowing subjects. The last domain is the agents’ ‘emergent properties’, meaning their capability to change things – their dispositions in particular (for further detail see Archer (1988, 1995). Walter Carlsnaes, who accepts the significance of this concept, proposes that it should be applied when one wants to analyse foreign policy effectively; structural factors are cognitively mediated by actors. Agents’ intentions and dispositions, which are expressed via their behaviour and bound by time/frame, should not be overlooked (Carlsnaes 1994).

4 Harry D Gould (1998) states that the significance of the interplay process is to indicate that the structure is both a medium for social activity and its outcome; it is a product and a by-product of the social action. Yet the same process of practices also generates multiple meanings based on different agents’ intersubjective understandings and practices that allow agents to comprehend ‘anarchy as an imagined community’ (Hopf 2000: 1758-1762). With the same logical understanding, Alexander Wendt (2000b) argues that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Alexander Wendt (2000b).

5 On this point, Roxanne Lynne Doty (1997) suggests that they should pay more attention to the close intertwining of power, truth, and knowledge.

6 This perspective proposes that there are three closely connected layers. The first, called ‘agency 1’, possesses the power to act in accord with its intention. The second, called ‘agency 2’ refers to the socio-cultural systems that helped agency 1 to become an agent. The last, ‘agency 3’, means those ‘positional-practice-places’ which agent 1 inhibits on behalf of agent 2 (Wight 1999).
extent should attention be paid to them? In other words, what are their social functions?

The significance of ideas: more than an aspiration

Individuals own perceptions of themselves and their surroundings, including their relationships with others, may be the main sources of their ideas. While Edmund Husserl (1958) emphasises the human experience as the kernel of human perceptions, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1960) place more emphasis on human ideas and/or consciousness. For Husserl, perceptions are grounded in experiences, which, he claims, are the absolute beginning (or principium, particularly for pre-philosophical) of knowledge. These are discursive areas where *cogito* learns the difference between ‘my natural world-about-me’ and the ‘ideal world-about-me’. The particular interpretation of them signifies the intentionally related modification of consciousness of agents (Husserl 1958: 87-91, 103, 109).

Husserl contends that the relationship between the intersubjectivity of agents and their acceptance of objective reality is the basis for phenomenological transcendental idealism. He further states that transcendental logic is possible only on a phenomenological basis. What he does not explain clearly is how the intentions of agents and their constitutive phenomena can provide for the constitution of meaning formation (Husserl 1958: 31-33). Husserl’s phenomenology is an elaborate procedure in which one is distinguished according to his/her perceptions of the way things *appear to be* rather than of what they think things *really are*. It is an epistemology that aims to deal with the problem of clarifying the relationship between the act of knowing and the object known. In this way, agents gain a more precise understanding of the conceptual foundations of knowledge (Wight 2006: 236).

Marx and Engels emphasise the notion that human ideas and/or consciousness are social products based variously upon their sensuous environment, their connections with other persons, and beast-like human nature – determined by society and society determined by it (Marx and Engels 1960: 19). Together, the two thinkers founded the concept of practical philosophy or the ‘philosophy of praxis’ (Gramsci 2003: 343-357), which is the essential basis of this study, given that it signifies the active intertwining process of social learning. Their expressed forms, understood as ‘cultural self-prescribing’ according to Jorge Larrañ, can be regarded as the identities
of agents, particularly their categorising references, including ‘I’ (active-self towards others’ attitudes) and ‘me’ (passive-self derived from others’ perceptions) (Larran 1993: 144-146). But it is difficult to separate the inward and outward aspects of human perceptions from the processes of social change. In effect, this intertwining reflection of ‘I’ and ‘me’ is the basic concept of defining the social learning process.

According to Larran (1993), the Humean and Nietzschean views of an imaginative self are a crucial point of diversion from regarding illusion as a cause of the human’s misrecognised ‘self’, as a reference to human ideas or perceptions. Marx and Engels stress clearly that this kind of perception which they term idealists, particularly the Young Hegelians, should be replaced by practical materialists. They propose that practical materialists should base their analyses on real-life (material) conditions determining both the existence and activities of human-beings: life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life (Marx and Engels 1960:

7 Piotr Sztompka’s work addresses their effects. As regards positive effects, he cites Max Weber’s work about the relationship between the Protestant (Calvinist) ethos and capitalist development. He claims that the Polish negative attitudes towards the state-system generated both the ‘structure of organised lying’ and the ‘grab-and-run’ capitalist development in their own society (Sztompka 1993: chapter 6).
8 Mark Goldie (1989) suggests that the philosophical critique of knowledge and the evangelical critique of popery should be a starting point, especially when Feuerbach overstepped Francis Bacon’s destruction of ‘idols’, aiming at only popery supremacy, and proposing that philosophy should address humanity, not God (Goldie 1989: 266-282). This process went on simultaneously with another process of ‘discovering’ the New World, which generated the still active discourse (defined as a way of representing and providing a particular kind of knowledge about a topic) of ‘the West and the Rest’ based on secular reasoning processes both defining themselves and excluding the ‘Other’ (Hall 2000: 185-255).
9 David Hume proposes that ‘self’ is nothing but a consciously fictitious conclusion of continuity of perception. Friedrich Nietzsche offers a more pragmatic (or relativist) notion. A habitual sense, which is indispensable from the condition of life, is an organic self. Though Nietzsche does not make clear how one may escape the many profound concepts of ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, and ‘knowledge-in-itself’, he makes it easier for those following suit by stressing that reason and knowledge are camouflaged shields of (cunning) ‘will to power’ (Larran 1993: chapter 2).
10 According to Larran, Vilfredo Pareto points out the exogenous aspects of how to study ideas, stating that ‘science’ will re-correct the false beliefs about ‘residues’ (ingrained habits) and ‘derivations’ (actions derived from the conjuncture between purely instinctive behaviours and experimental science) (Jorge Larran 1993: 147-150).
11 They argue that Feuerbach’s attempt to hand philosophy to humanity is not enough, because of being based on an abstract idea, albeit secularized, and limited to only a (German) civil society. They proposed that the philosophers, like themselves, should understand the revolutionary practice on human activities so that they can interpret the world in order to change it (Marx and Engels 1960: ‘These on Feuerbach’).
Put differently, social structure (perceived from the global, regional and domestic surroundings of agents) is the main source of an agent’s practical perception. What is important here is the interaction between their ideas (ideational factors) and their surroundings (material conditions). It is this interaction that drives engaging/networking agents studied for this project to propose and generate useful fora, initially in an economic field, that pave co-operative ways for a more stable regime. What should not be forgotten is that this interactive space has been positively employed by the mentioned agents since the 1960s, a period in which the Cold War was in top gear, as shown in Chapter 3.

John Torrance (1995) points out that Marx’s theory of ideas, that is, the basis of his perceptions regarding the emancipation of the human being, resulted from a dialectic process of his internal thinking: it reacts to the external environment but not necessarily in a linear fashion. A non-linear intertwining process of thinking provides a fertile ground for understanding ‘ideology’ as a means of deception exercised by the ruling classes, or deceptive beliefs arising from the material structure of society as a whole. There is no clear controlling power in the process.

Marxist ideas have not uniquely been produced in a scientific way as Marx intended. They have also been produced in a more humanistic way through the highlighting of the significance of subjectivity and psychological analysis, particularly for those classified as post-structuralists and post-modernists (Barrett 1991: chapter 5). This means that an endogenous view is welcomed back by socially concerned

12 For them, economic determinism, based on mode of production should be a key to decipher the real basis of ideology (of the ruling class as they criticised) consisting of three bases: the intercourse and productive power as an origin of class; the relation of state and law, the former regarded as a separate entity outside civil society; and natural and civilised instruments of production and forms of property which is related back to the first base (Marx and Engels 1960: 43-69).

13 Marx bases his theory leading to the conclusion that ‘base’ determines ‘super-structure’ or ‘materials’ determine ‘ideas’ on two steps. The first one is to understanding ‘social being’ by treating a society as a whole. The second is to reflecting the surface appearance of a capitalist economy which is constructed by two related ideas: personal dependence (buyers depends on basic producers such as proletariats); and the fetishism of the market (used-values should be more valued than exchange-values) (Torrance 1995: chapters 2-5).

14 This process generates various related meanings of ideology ranging from the broadest concept (a cultural signifying sign and a process of political power) to narrower concepts (ideas and beliefs drawn from the experiences of groups or classes in general). It can also be defined in more specific terms as a means to legitimise or promote the earlier mentioned groups’ interests or to oppress those of other groups. Herein lies a connected concept of the reproduction of social power which is related to the dominant classes’ activities of both imposing ideas and creating social unity (for further advantage) via their social powers (Eagleton 1991: Chapter 1).
agents, who anticipate that their concern may be a more helpful means of understanding to what extent an epoch of revolution could not be materialised as Marx expected. Agents’ perception does play a significant part in this failure for which George Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci were famous for their explanation.\textsuperscript{15}

It is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the ideas of an individual as products of interactive processes out of their surroundings, including the political arena. Philosophy, history and politics, especially when understood through sociological analysis, are not the sole sources for studying ideas. They are also expressed forms of agents’ ideas/perception, particularly when politics is viewed as related to every aspect of life (Mouffe 1979: 1-18, Hobsbawm 1989: 20-36). Yet, the words ‘idea’ and ‘knowledge’ in this project are viewed as social products of an earlier mentioned process, which is universal within the realm of the human learning process. An idea is not only a substantive knowledge of any particular discipline, which is relatively produced in keeping with the aforementioned process with the expectation of expertise. The characteristics of an agent’s interests may or may not be changed along with the interactive processes. Moreover, these changing perceptions depend on how agents’ interests and surroundings are defined.

Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ is a good point of departure for such a process. It signifies an ability to represent the ‘universal’ interests of the whole society to unite as a group of allies through self-organisation, aiming to gain the active consent of the masses in order to succeed.\textsuperscript{16} Hegemony can be viewed as an ideological struggle through which to articulate a neutralised or universal interest. Within this constantly negotiated and constructed process of articulation and re-articulation, an interest is not definitely fixed (Mouffe 1979: 168-204, 1981: 219-234,

\textsuperscript{15} While George Lukacs indicates that the problems lay in the lack of revolutionary class-consciousness of the proletariat, Antonio Gramsci seems to point out similar causes to those of Marx, particularly those derived from the mental labours (religious men for Marx, more diversified groups of people whom Gramsci called ‘intellectuals’ who create and establish an inverted world (Goldie 1989: 280-286, Torrance 1995: chapters 6-7).

\textsuperscript{16} There are two kinds of wars that need to be won in order to revolutionise society (by dethroning an existing hegemony and constructing a new one). The first is ‘war of the position’ on non-frontal grounds, e.g., economic and cultural aspects. The second is ‘war of the manoeuvre’ in the military field (Sassoon 1982a: 94-115).

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Laclau 1988: 249-257). Indeed, it is a source of producing a practical subject. The process is rather similar to that which Habermas explains in his concept of individuation through socialisation (Habermas 1995: chapter 6).

However, Habermas’s agent is less calculating in her manoeuvres. If Kantian epistemology presupposes intersubjectivity, the Habermasian interactive process is a source of reflection based on the condition of knowing as such, and the ‘critique’ of unconsciously produced constraints (Hesse 1982). This reflection not only provides critical understanding, down to human knowledge of comprehending themselves and their surroundings, it also encourages humans to overcome the distorted communication that blocks their true interests as agents who are free and capable to-do-good (McCarthy 1978, Ottmann 1982: 84). Only in this way can emancipation flourish. Emancipation here is understood as a stage at which human-beings become free from the distorted perceptions that they are not capable of liberating themselves from socially oppressed surroundings. Following this logic, emancipating agents can be regarded as initially engaging/networking agents who tried their best to overcome the ideologically divided world by constructing regional cooperation across ideologically and politically systemic differences. The many types of support they gave to the establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the extension of ASEAN members are explicit cases in point as shown in Chapter 4.

To what extent and how can ideas be observed and studied?
The main reason for the returning to the realm of ideas comes from an inability of the rational interest-based model to explain policy outcomes in an era of profound socio-economic change. It is not easy to study ideas in their own right as they can be treated as independent variables through which information about the external environment must pass. But, it is possible to find a middle ground, ‘programmatic beliefs’ as Sheri Berman (1998: chapter 2) terms them, to solve the problem. This middle ground not

17 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe propose that the struggle to achieve ‘hegemonic’ status is a rather contingent process within a discursive space. There is perpetual conflict within society but not necessarily between particular classes: it stems from the desire to co-operate (albeit mostly turning out to be against, at worst, or to compromise, at best) the dichotomous logics. The first is the logics of difference (particularity); the second is the logics of equivalence (universality). The above two authors emphasise that how this process is defined depends on internal frontiers within society; that means showing the limit of objectivity. Yet, what should not be overlooked is that if this process can be applied thoroughly, it could be regarded as having a universal quality, although the contents within the process may vary depending on time and space. (Laclau and Mouffe 2001).
only provides a referential guideline for the practical activities of everyday life, but also creates a reference for defining interests themselves (Jacobson 1995). In simple terms, ideas and practices should not be separated: they should be regarded as having intersubjective meanings (Bieler 2001). These meanings are derived from the aforementioned process of social engagement.

Within the economic realm, the study of ideas and their impact is more easily discernible. It is understandable that historical contingencies due to the long impacts of numerous wars (such as two world wars and the cold war) led scholars to study apparent cases as economic well-being and its derivatives, as these events directly affected the well-being of the people, specifically those who reside in the northern hemisphere. The logical case is the study of the impact of economic ideas (Keynesian and Thatcherism) upon economic and political policies generated by the helping hands of intellectuals from the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA), specifically for the aforesaid policies (Hall 1989). Another example is the study of how economic ideas led the French leaders to forge the European Union in the first place (Parsons 2002).

As regards international relations (IR) literature, as Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993) suggest, ideas can be considered a road-map for formulating and implementing foreign policies. The study of ideas also sheds new light on traditional realism, particularly Hans J. Morgenthau’s concept of ‘power politics,’ which offered a blended product of ideas concerning political theory, historical sociology, the relationship between social construction of political action and questions of political responsibility. Considered from this perspective, Morgenthau’s power politics aims to create a (probably) moral and political project

\[18\] Stuart Hall (1988) provides a critical study of how hegemonic Thatcherism (free market plus strong state) emerged and operated successfully. It is a good example for those whose concerns are with how alternative ideas (Thatcherism in this case) or ideologies can win. According to Hall, Gramsci’s concept of ‘historic bloc,’ the success derived from the capability to enter into a struggle and win space in civil society (previously preferred Keynesianism) was the key to understanding the phenomenon (Stuart Hall 1988).

\[19\] Goldstein and Keohane (1993) classify ideas, sometimes casual beliefs into three categories. The first is ‘world view’, deeply ingrained in cultures affecting modes of thought and discourse. Religious thoughts are regarded within this group. The second is ‘principled beliefs’ comprising normative ideas setting criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust. The last group is ‘casual belief’ regarded as shared principled beliefs and values. It is the last group that authority mostly applies when making a decision, since it acts as a road-map rationally clarifying goals or means-ends relationships for actors. More importantly, for them, ideas not only act as a ‘compass’ when an equilibrium of the situation is absent; they also serve as ‘glue’ connecting shared solutions.
(Williams 2004). Cases in point that illustrate this linkage include the social impact of Max Weber’s Protestant ethics, which created a new concept of ‘a new world of rationality of Protestantism’, and the movement towards decolonisation post World War II. Both can be regarded as products of the efforts of intellectuals.

However, studying ideas within IR is not a straightforward business, as Thomas Diez (1999, 2001) attempts to show in his work on EU integration based on analysing integration discourses. His point of interest is centred on two kinds of transformation. The first one is that the European Economic Community has been transformed from the liberal to the social democratic version. The second one is that English policies concerning European integration have been transformed from the perceived insular English (less interest in European Continental’s affairs) to the more Continental English.

The differences in norm acceptance within ASEAN countries are also useful examples. Amitav Acharya (2004) insists that the key is the localisation of norms, by which he means commonly accepted values, perceptions, and behaviours. It helps one understand the relative success of a co-operative idea of security focused on state-based co-operative activities related to traditional rather than non-traditional security. Conversely, the promotion of the idea of flexible engagement, or constructive intervention, which implies sub-state level engagement, ultimately failed.

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20 John A. Hall (1993) indicates that those intellectuals possessing power in co-operative style (non-zero sum distribution of power) to bring change to their societies and are aware of their moral destinies play a significant part here. They regard Weber’s Protestant ethics as a means to construct their social identities which in turn are references for articulating their social interests.

21 Robert H. Jackson (1993) points out that it resulted from the spread of humanitarian concerns (accentuating equality and condemning discriminatory governance). It was rooted in and derived from within Western civilisation, having the French Revolution in 1789 as its starting point. It benefited Developing World intellectuals and politicians campaigning for decolonisation.

22 Diez (1999, 2001) suggests that integration campaigns (policies where language can be observed but cannot exist apart from discourse) are open areas for political practising where power is constituted and the contestedisness of certain concepts can be observed. No matter how discursive they are, they can be stabilised by tying similar meanings of other discourses together or creating a meta-narrative which is presented as natural and unquestioned. The discursive nodal points of subject position articulate the meta-narrative which is (in the European case) an intertwined relationship between political ideas and (national) economic interests; both are regarded as meta-narratives per se.

23 The localisation of norms is a process in which local agents adapt imported ideas or norms that will be compatible with their existing (whether or not prominent) norms, mostly related to agents’ ideas (Acharya 2004).
Although they share, as Albert Yee (1996) concludes, a perception of treating an ideational factor as a causal mechanism, the rationalist and interpretivist methods remain at odds with each other. While the former ignores the need to clarify fundamental ideas (namely, capabilities, power, and mechanisms), the latter is overly replete with discursive language. John Kurt Jacobsen (2003) argues that critical constructivism that offers to unmask and demystify identity formation, provides not only a conceptual bridge but also a useful context to investigate relationships between cognitive and socio-economic processes. Indeed, Louis Althusser (1993) mentioned the linkage over a conceptual bridge between an agent’s cognitive and her material conditions (socio-economic structures) several decades ago. According to Althusser, agent’s cognitive condition, deeply implanted by ideological state apparatuses such as educational and religious institutions, makes agents inert and able to accept a false consciousness, praising the extant ideology of the capitalist dominant class 24 (Payne 1997).

Researchers can study ideas by regarding them as symbolic and representational, based on a perception that they are fundamentally social and intersubjective rather than collective or shared. Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes (1997) use the term ‘symbolic technologies’ to describe this phenomenon, the entangling of ideas with a broader set of linguistic and symbolic practices. In other words, ideas can be studied by incorporating two paths: emphasising the mechanism of meaning-building and emphasising the power aspect of language. For this project, the ways in which the concepts of comprehensive security have been condensed in the region (observed through numerous workshops and conferences, particularly the Asia Pacific

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24 Robert Gray (1989) provides a good example of ‘Bourgeois hegemony in Victorian Britain’, explaining that the bourgeois capability to forge a collaborative historic bloc aided by gifted protégés (intellectuals who have enough funds and time to create and organise such a project) is critical. The more landowning representatives (the aristocrat) were drawn to share political party leadership, the lesser forces were expressed against the bourgeoisie. There were some antagonisms between them but not enough to break their co-operative interests (liberal hegemony over the masses). As a result, there were no theoretically articulated alternatives. Although there were bourgeois evangelistic reforms aimed at defending and helping the disadvantage, actually, Gray claims, they caused reverse effects: fostering the cohesion and moral of the ruling class itself; and producing ‘subaltern intellectuals – more or less helping the ruling elites to secure their places by transmitting both elements ideology adopted from above and innovative ideologies which might be imposed on the hegemonic class itself. Tony Davies (1989), who uses Britain in the same period as a case study, points out that the ‘Oxford English Dictionary’, created by the support of the ruling class, and aiming at producing the ideological unity of ‘standard English’ (foundation of English literature) is a reflection of the imaginary unity of the social formation of ‘nation’ directly derived from ideas of a hegemonic class.
Roundtable – APT, the longest and continually organised forum for engaging/networking agents under investigation here, is an example of meaning-building. Encouragement for the broadening acceptance of the concept is an example of the power aspect of the term ‘comprehensive security’ (see chapters 3-4).

In sum, ideas possessed by agents are social products derived either explicitly or implicitly from interactive processes among agents and their surroundings, particularly the social. By using agents as foci, they can be studied from the perspective of two incorporated and on-going-processes. The first is to scrutinise how the interactions of agents with their surroundings are generated and the second is to understand how the actions of agents towards their surroundings are expressed, whether through critical comment or proposed policies. A useful means is to mark their expressions through their applied language.

The significance of ideas-bearers: Intellectuals as inspiring-changing agents
Two main questions will be addressed in order to clarify the significance of intellectuals as appropriate agents: how can people be regarded as intellectuals? And what is their social contribution?

An ability to think in an abstract and/or practical fashion, either passively or actively, may not be a sufficient gauge to judge whether one is intellectual or not. Social activities directly or indirectly derived from observed social intercourse should also be taken into consideration, particularly their directive aspects. How one defines these activities varies across time and space, given that defining them is a politically debated activity²⁵ (Leonard 1996). An understanding of the social context of the chosen periods is important because they represent the ‘spirit of the age’, or Zeitgeist (derived from a specific, historical and sociological context of the period). It also signifies people of the period, their occupations and social situations, explicates their emotional-psychological standpoints and indicates if and how their modes of thinking differ from those of other educated persons (Feuer 1976, Ludz 1976). Building upon this reflection, two main periods were chosen and set up for this project (see the Introduction and Chapters 3 and 4).

²⁵ Stephen T. Leonard (1996) describes how those who engaged in such activities changed from heavenly angels (aiming to achieve abstract values such as truth and good) to political agents (aiming to change their societies as they deemed fit).
Gramsci, who is more precise about the social function (directing activities) of the learned, said words to the effect that: All men are intellectuals but not all men in society have the function of intellectuals (Gramsci 2003: 9). The word ‘intellectual’ appeared after the nineteenth century. Tibor Huszar (1976) observes that before the nineteenth century, the use of the Latin term ‘intelligentsia’, expressing the level of cognition and the degree of philosophical and psychological comprehension, was not associated with persons of letters. Its new meaning signified them as a group of an independent social stratum constituting the better educated, people, who shared certain attitudes and accepted a cultural heritage, involving a specific combination of psychological characteristics, manners, life style and classical-values system. Those fitting this description were evident in Russia (until the October Revolution) and in Poland (until the communist upheaval of 1945). Aleksander Gella (1976) argues that 'intellectual' has a broader meaning, and links it to the generally educated people who emerged in the twentieth century, particularly in industrial societies.

This second meaning is worth pursuing and elaborating. It refers to active agents developing and disseminating a (rather Western-dominated) cosmopolitan culture, with an emphasis on universally humanistic values (such as equality and self-determination). The expansion of opportunities for personal contacts plays a crucial role, first with charismatic and cultured leading members of society, then extending to wider groups and the general public (Hodges 1976, Lopata 1976). Jurgen Habermas (1979, 2005), exploring the same social process, claims that it resulted in the construction of the public sphere. The communication established during the process nurtured the evolution of society.

26 Edward Shils (1990) extends this argument, drawing mostly from Western European history (since the 18th century). The intellectuals are categorised into three groups. The first comprises those who taught in schools and universities (interpreting and transmitting the results of past intellectual activities) under state control. The second consists of beneficiaries of private and princely patronage, persons not holding official positions and those who followed other occupations (practical intellectuals – judges, lawyers, journalists, civil servants and scribes, librarians, physicians, astrologers, etc.). The third comprises religious intellectuals (monks, priests, ecclesiastical administration) under the patronage of the church. Those who wanted more autonomy but less secure money, leading to (possibly) less respectability in the marriage institution (bringing more spending and responsibility) often became members of the ‘Bohemian’ society.
What made the latter meaning so appealing was the occurrence of the so-called ‘Dreyfus affair’.27 in France in 1898. Clemenceau coined the term 'intellectuals' to refer to those who supported Dreyfus. Clemenceau's intellectuals used their brains to uncover the truth of the affair (Gella 1976: 19, Williams 2001), the impact of which was so interesting that it entangled the word ‘intellectual’ (both as a noun and an adjective) with public affairs, particularly the moral and political aspects. Julien Benda (1969)'s *The Treason of the Intellectuals (Le Trahison Des Clercs)*28 is a very good case in point.

Benda maintains that it was their social condition that made these intellectuals become more humanised, and less purely ideal types. On the one hand, they accepted the changing way of thought, by praising particularity and practicality and denouncing universality and spirituality. On the other, they exploited the abovementioned thought through publishing and dispersing, in order to advance their personal careers because they were more appreciated by the bourgeoisie, which creates fame and sources of honour. In fact, they themselves became more and more bourgeois. In his conclusion,

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27 The affair was started in 1894 when papers discovered in a waste-bin in the office of the German military attaché made it appear that a French military officer was providing secret information to the German government. French Captain Alfred Dreyfus (came from a Jewish family migrating from Alsace when the German annexed the province in 1871) was tried for high treason and sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil’s Island, off coast of the French Guiana, by a secret military court, despite his protestation of innocence. Two year later when Lieutenant Colonel Georges Picquart, the then chief of army intelligent discovered that the guilty officer was actually a high-ranking officer and wanted to reopen the Dreyfus Case, he found that the military concerned more about preserving its image than rectifying its error. In return for his effort, he was transferred to Tunisia. The case reappeared in a wider society in 1898 when Emile Zola published his denunciation of the military cover-up in the newspaper. At this point public sentiment became more aroused and then the Catholic Church stepped in to declare that the affair was a conspiracy of Jews and Freemasons designed to damage the prestige of the army and thereby destroy France. Though Dreyfus was exonerated of the charges in 1906, French society has never been the same. Apart from passing legislation separating the church and the state, the controversy unleashed political issues (nationalism, socialism, anticlericalism, antimilitarism, etc.) as well as the moral ones (civic and human rights versus anti-Semitism and intolerance, manipulation of public opinion, responsibility of the press, etc.) (for more information please access at [www.dreyfuscase.com/html/dreyfus-affair.html](http://www.dreyfuscase.com/html/dreyfus-affair.html) and [www.wfu.edu/sinclair/dreyfus.html](http://www.wfu.edu/sinclair/dreyfus.html) accessed on January 28th, 2005).

28 Benda (1969) argues that intellectuals who deserted their classically humanistic values (e.g., seeking truth in a philosophical fashion – no matter how abstract it was, and muddling themselves with clearly practical political agendas) committed treason. He clarifies in his *The Treason of the Intellectuals* (first published in the French language in the 1920s) that their political passions (the movement against the Jews, the movement of the possessing classes against the proletariat, and the movement of the champions of authority against the democrats) are explicit causes (chapters 1-2).
Benda advocates the return of ‘universal fraternity’, namely, the love for humanity as a whole.\textsuperscript{29}

Although Ray Nichols (1978) accuses Benda of not having a concrete proposal and of applying an incoherent philosophy,\textsuperscript{30} Benda’s insight depicts quite clearly the (potentially eternal) state of the intellectuals and their public affairs. The relationship is complicated. It generates questions in both philosophical and practical terms: how to define the state of being intellectual, depending on human conscience, or their ability to perform their function as experts, or both; and how to define the intellectual’s public responsibility, especially within the political realm.

**What is the intellectuals’ social contribution?**

Before attempting an answer, a broader understanding of their social function would be helpful. Gramsci divided intellectuals, whose emergence coincided with concrete traditional historical processes, into two groups. First, there was the ‘traditional’ professional (rural-type), whose function was to link the masses of rural people to the (small) town petite bourgeoisie and to local and state administration. Second, there was the ‘organic’, represented as an urban-type group developed along the lines of the bourgeoisie, who mainly articulated the relationship between entrepreneurs and the instrumental masses (Gramsci 2003: 2-23). Their operations inclined to favour those in power: they created popular consent for them through cultural and social means (Vacca 1982). They were the real organisers of hegemony, creating popular consent dominated by the ruling class’s concept of reality framing social intellects including morality. Due to their subjugated conscience, according to the aforementioned logic,

\textsuperscript{29} Benda accuses the wide spread of realism (emphasising the negative aspects of human nature – unsocial and bloody) and romanticism (paying more attention to contingent feelings than to universally abstract thought). Together they were preached, extolling the virtues of courage and honour (leading men to risk their lives for no practical reason i.e., glory), harshness and scorn for human love (pity, charity and benevolence), and the cult of success (Benda 1969: chapters 3 and 4).

\textsuperscript{30} Nichols (1978) criticises two points, the first being that Benda placed too much emphasis on ‘idealisation’ (was more concerned with abstract and purified principles based on his paradigm (accepting the distinction between thought and action) than with the detailed texture of the actual events) of the kingdom of the cleric, which is a model for intellectual action, not a terrestrial realm (chapter 5). In other words, his methodology is problematic. The second, point is that Benda’s failure also resulted from his philosophical incoherence, particularly his pronouncement about the relation of men and civilisation. He failed to recognize that civilisation comprised not only morals founded on a mingled basis of abstraction (articulated conceptual, intellectualised art, science, law, and justice) but that it also had a practical side (where actual actions take place; they can be observed via speeches and actions) within which human’s actualisation had been planted (Ray Nichols 1978: chapters 5 and 8).

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at best they created a passive revolution, a gradual alteration in order to prolong the status quo, rather than a real revolution (Sassoon 1982b)

A particular case in point was the bureaucracy, particularly the technicians (intellectuals as experts of substantive knowledge) the ingrained division of state power and its principle of representation (Migliaro and Misuraca 1982). In this sense, the intellectuals acted as a form of ‘mobile glue' that would bind an ‘historic bloc'. Gramsci states that without them the ‘Modern Prince' will meet with difficulty. The prince is characterized as the political party, whose aim is not only to revolutionise society but also to create a ‘synergic entity' by developing, uniting, and universalising its members (Buci-Gluckman 1982, Sassoon 1980: 109-128, 146-161, Gramsci 2003: 24-43).

However, the relations among intellectuals themselves were also interesting. Gramsci suggests that their psychological attitudes towards the fundamental classes, the leading and the led, should be examined. Three questions should be carefully posed: did they have a ‘paternalistic’ attitude towards the led; did they see themselves as an organic expression of them; and did they adopt a ‘servile’ attitude towards the leading or did they think of themselves as leaders, an integral part of the leading? (Gramsci 2003: 97) Gramsci also points out the tendency of the intellectuals of the historically progressive class to subjugate the intellectuals of other social groups, by creating a system of solidarity between all of the intellectuals, and based on a psychological nature of a caste character (Gramsci 2003: 60). It is not clear whether or not the intellectuals are power-seeking. George Konard and Ivan Szlenyi (1979) subscribe to the notion that they are, particularly the socialist-economic intellectuals of Eastern Europe, with regard to controlling the central socio-politico-economic plans and their implementation. Yet, it is not a general phenomenon. Fortunately, not

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31 A complicated set of interwoven relationships created by the revolutionary class – for an historically concrete example see Stuart Hall (1988).
32 On this point, Renate Holub (1992) illustrates more by magnifying the emergence of an intellectual community of capitalism, which comprised three kinds of intellectuals: traditional (because they passed on the transcending predominant values and ways of the predominant class); organic (because they were created alongside the development of capitalism (in order to serve it)); and new (because they were also agents of new culture, in terms of organising and managing it. In other words, they were cultural elites (chapter 6). There seems to be some inclination within this group to follow Tibor Huzar (1976) when the ranks were revealed, i.e., the differences of income levels, ranks and social authorities; they may have accentuated the political and spiritual divisions among them. The events of the Russian October Revolution provide an example.
much evidence points in this direction. This suggests that intellectuals can be viewed as harbouring hope for helping to improve their own society for the benefit of the general populous.

This chapter will now pursue further the contribution of intellectuals directly derived from their roles and functions, which are closely related to each other. Generally speaking, they were recognized either as experts that develop and preserve the socio-politico-economic status quo, or as critics, who bring change to society. Elenor Townsley (2000) argues that the experts, with their substantive knowledge based in the main upon ‘natural sciences and technology’, and who were viewed as the 'helping hands' in the economy and administration, were more successful in being recruited and holding top official positions than the critics, most of whom possessed humanity and social science knowledge and who were seen as rather critical. She maintains that the real influence of the intellectuals upon society, using American society in the 1960s as a case study, was to create an ‘academic technical discourse’, enclosing society with their academic language, their technical expertise, and traditions.

Although Habermas does not clearly delineate whom this ‘technical discourse’ serves, he argues that the tendency to accept technology and science as a sole ideology is dangerous. Paying more attention to the communicative processes,

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33 Tracing back to the legacy of the Enlightenment intellectuals, Lloyd Kramer (1996) states that Rousseau can be regarded as a representative of the critics, who point out the negative side of the intellectuals’ activities. Voltaire seems to support the significance of the experts, specifically their roles in creating and maintaining society’s development. In contemporary times, he regards Foucault as representative of the critics (highly critical) whereas Habermas’s works are categorized as less criticized and (even rather) praised by the experts (emphasising the universal aspect of knowledge).

34 Habermas argues that mentioned knowledge provides an essential foundation for creating what is understood as scientifically rationalised control of objectified processes expressing the system in which research and technology are coupled with feedback from the economy and administration (Habermas 1997: 5, for further detail see ‘Theory of Communicative Action Vol.1: Reason and Rationalisation of Society’).

35 Daniel Lee Kleinman and Steven P. Vallas (2001) clearly demonstrate the relationship between the academics and the (capitalist) economy. Although they are convergent (as shown in the industrialization of the academy – not only having close contacts with commercial and industrial enterprises but also adopting business-like concepts of managing academic affairs, and in the collegiatisation of industrial research by adopting academic methods, including language and traditions), the economy has the upper hand when it comes to shaping agendas. Research projects within biological science are good cases in point.

36 This ideology penetrates into the conscious of the depoliticised masses. The highly praised technical means, in which Habermas termed ‘purposive rational action’, consist of two interrelated
rooted in social interests and in the value-orientation of a given social-life world, between the experts and the agencies of political decision-making should lessen the problem. The agencies should play significant roles in directing or at least helping the experts to determine the direction of technical progress on the basis of the traditionally-bound self-understanding of practical needs. In this way, the solution will show its practical consequences when it is transmitted into the totality of the historical situation (Habermas 1979: chapter 5). David J. Levy (1990) proposes that it should be the responsibility of intellectuals to attempt to relate the spheres of thought and activity not on the basis of technical expertise but on the application of the common sense of an educated citizenry, as derived from practical philosophy.

Edward W. Said (1994) insists that the concept of professionalism, namely working for a living, not daring to stray outside accepted paradigms, and making oneself marketable and presentable, hence uncontroversial and ‘objective’, is in itself a problem. The way out is to think and do things as amateurs and to know how to keep one's distance as an exile. Yet, such a free and clearly un-entangled spirit is not enough. Intellectuals should be on the same side as the weak and unrepresented parts. The first is the ‘instrumental action’ (technical rules based on empirical knowledge, ignoring social framework in which they are embedded). The second is the ‘rational decision’ (expressing a growing of technical control in terms of strategies based on analytical knowledge) (Habermas 1997: chapter 6). Habermas (1997: 79-80) hopes that together, agents’ political wills and the potential of technology should be more helpful: ‘Political rationalization occurs through the enlightenment of political will, correlated with instruction about its technical potential’. Therefore, what should receive more attention from the public is ‘whether a productive body of knowledge is merely transmitted to men engaged in technical manipulation for purposes of control or is simultaneously appropriated as the linguistic possession of communicating individuals. A sciencitcised society constitutes itself as a rational one only to the extent that science and technology are mediated with the conduct of life through the minds of its citizens’.

The meaning is that being amateurs provide opportunities that care and affection are emphasized instead of seeking profit, and expressing selfish narrow specialization: they should lead intellectuals to ask (rather philosophical and moral) questions in dept – e.g. to what extent they do what they do, who benefit from their works). For being an exile means being part of the host society but not totally being embedded with any particular interests from whatever groups (Said 1994: chapters 3&4).

On the point, Robert S Goizueta (1996) proposes that liberation theology should be a helpful mean by stressing the preferential option for the poor. It should defend the Christian faith against the practical atheist, who may proclaim belief in Jesus Christ but whose life denies the belief. He also states that the major challenge to global peace, from the perspective of the poor, has been not the rife between the Christian West and the atheistic East but the rife between the imperialist power of the North and the dependent nations of the South. Active scholars from the South also highly mark the latter point: Walden Bello’s criticising the unjust economic relations and their impacts in Asian countries (Bello and Rosenfeld 1992, Bello, Cunningham and Li Poh Khen 1998), Samir Amin (1997)’s indicating at African and the Third World problems, and Vadana Shiva (2002)’s argument...
should be the ones who ‘speak truth to power’, by weighting the alternative, choosing the right one, and then intelligently representing it where it can do the most good and cause the right change (Said 1996: chapter 5).

Peter Winch (1990) is more precise about the moral demands, or moral calling, of intellectuals, although he presents a philosophical argument: intellectuals are those who have chosen certain lives involving a commitment to certain values, which demand that they be defended if they are threatened by socio-political forces. But the precise nature of the responsibility that intellectuals should take is controversial. Alan Montefiore (1990) argues that finding and presenting truthfulness and validity for their own sake seems to be the main responsibility of intellectuals. For him, it is rooted in the human capacity for rational reflection and the capacity for language and discourse, for reflective awareness of oneself and one’s state at the same time as communicating with the other. Fritz Ringer (1990) places more emphasis on coherence and clarification when expressing one’s beliefs, as based on reliable observation and sound reasoning.

about their impacts on natural and social disasters (derived from the dams’ construction) are good cases in point. Sulak Sivalaksa (1994) also accentuates these messages, claiming that the intellectuals should speak out on behalf of the less fortunate, articulate their aspirations, remind the rest of the world that they really exist and deserve better. They should remind those in power that they, including the intellectuals themselves, are often ‘robbers’ who should reexamine their life-styles thoroughly and develop their critical self-awareness to be less greedy, less hateful and less deluded. They must have enough moral courage to speak out, although they may have to do it at the expense of their own peaceful lives (as Puey Ungpakorn – the former Governor of the Bank of Thailand and the former Rector of Thammasat University did in the 1970s when authoritarian power ruled Thailand).

On this point, Elemer Hankiss (1990), using Hungarian society after 1948 as a test case, concludes that they can be significant sources of social irresponsibility and expressed signs of the broader crises of social values. They emerged from three elements: destruction of the traditional value system, dysfunction of the new official value system, and obstruction of the social generation of new values. Because the responsibility is produced and reproduced by society, the intellectuals should help, using all possible means, to recover this process.

Dick Pels (1995), following Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘corporatism’, points out that the intellectuals may present universal values (though they should be regarded as a multiplicity of viewpoints based on agents’ strategic self-interests) and truth as their camouflaging shields to depoliticise intellectuals, who cast their peers descending into the political marketplace as traitors to the Spirit (like Benda, as I have already mentioned). On the other hand, by doing so, they also defend their corporatist privileges whilst others may think that they defend the social condition of possibility of rational thought. In other words, they are cunning enough to play a Knight-Templar role: as a priest (guardian of the truth, or at least pathway to truth) and a knight (guardian of interests- both of their masters and their own).

What should not be overlooked is that Ringer’s chosen language seems contradict to each other: the reliable observation seems to be universally accepted process (positivist aspect) whilst it is difficult to

Chapter 1: A Fabricated Framework
This section would like now to briefly conceptualise intellectuals by saying that apart from their moral obligations, how they construct and present their works can be regarded as their responsibility. They construct their work by raising problems and finding appropriate means to address them, and they present it to different people in a variety of ways.

It is difficult to deny that how they construct and present is contingent upon how they apply and master their languages. J.G.A. Pocock (1985) warns that if they are not aware that language through text does not take an innocent form, they may easily be trapped by the author’s speech act. Therefore, they should not interpret texts by ignoring - and/or separating them from - their historical context, particularly from the community in which the language is created. J.J. Lecercle (1990) calls it ‘textual responsibility’. In addition, they should also ask themselves: what are the purposes of the interpretation? Adopting this process helps to scope this work and to concentrate more on materials produced by ASEAN-ISIS and its Japanese counterparts and the scholars engaging them, particularly in the form of papers and monographs presented at workshops and conferences. How they can be utilised for this project will be explained in Chapter 2.

Gramsci proposes that the essential way of helping intellectuals to keep on the right track is to socialise them with humanistic values. The education system should play a significant role by not only supporting schools for training expertise in particular subjects, but also schools for general/classical knowledge (Gramsci 2003: 26-43). In return, intellectuals who are trained through this process should not ignore their own society: they should educate the masses (regarded as the ‘feeling ones’) in deny that the sound reasoning regarded as essential content may be derived from historical context. Martin Jay (1990) even points out that reason perhaps possesses a definition bound by cultural aspects. Though he accepts that communicative rationality (universal aspect of reasoning) helps us paraphrases and reproaches ideas from other eras and cultures, normative aspects of the field of humanities and arts are controversial issues in which intellectual-beings and their roles reside.

44 He means the messages may penetrate into their minds without their consents (effective way of ‘verbal rape’) and articulate their states of mind rather than perform an act of communication (Pocock 1985).

45 Also on this point’ Ian Maclean (1990) clearly points out that it should be the most important thing for interpreting the law: by adopting this process the interpreter may find the true intention of the law, to what extent it is created and passed. Jerry Jedlicki (1990) proposes that textual responsibility may have to be reinforced by moral and political responsibility, because their words, particularly those of historians, may inspire or extinguish hatred, may contribute to the shaping of an open or closed xenophobic society. Their conscious or subconscious choices of topics and interpretation may make people remember what ought to be remembered, or help them to forget the events they do not like to think about.
both general knowledge and particular expertise (Sassoon 1986). Grahame Lock (1990) stresses that these agents of classical philosophical values, in search of truth and good, should lead the masses on the right path, no matter how hard the path is, so as not to intimidate but liberate them.

The intellectuals’ ultimate aim, ideally and ironically, should be to eliminate themselves, because they are remnants of social distinction based on knowledge, by turning the entire society into a society of intellectuals (Eder 1994). Seymour Martin Lipset and Asoke Basu (1976) advocate less idealistic solutions as the ultimate aim. The fulfillment of their functions and roles lies in their capacity to provide a creative and critical dimension of their own legitimacy to their societies. In order to achieve this aim, intellectuals cannot play only one role (critical or expert) at a time: they have to know how to blend them together.

Paul Williams, observing the roles and functions of intellectuals, proposes that they engage in a process of reflection that can lead them to change what they take to be common sense; produce interpretations of the political world and construct visions of the possible or (un)desirable. They should also devise strategies and tactics to bring about their preferred vision and engage with a variety of individuals and groups whom they consider to be politically significant, in order to persuade them to take action in support of their preferred interpretation and visions (Williams 2001: 82-83).

In other words, intellectuals should play a double role: the role of expert or specialist in one or another field of intellectual work (such as writer, scientist, professor, and philologist) and the role of one who feels the call to actively participate, even assume leadership (Szacki 1990). They should dare to dream the different and/or impossible.

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46 Lipset and Basu (1976) categorise the intellectuals into four functioning groups: a gatekeeper of the classical philosophical values; a moralist, who is quite similar to the previous one about their values but expresses more political concerns and activities; a preserver, who prefers preserving the social status quo particularly concerning the state’s bureaucracy system but accepts if necessary; and a caretaker, who prefers the status of expertise closely engaged with the bureaucracy, sometimes does not regard herself or himself as intellectuals. Regarding the blending role, Farhang Rajaee (1994) indicates the same point for the Third world intellectuals. Although it may seem that they have four main tasks (explanation, innovation, distinction, and selection), in deed they are closely related. They are the ones who provide an explanation and interpretation (after selecting and distinguishing some values and events) of the world to their societies, which may make their citizens feel that they will preserve their traditions as well as make possible any change. In sum, they are both the guardians of traditions and vanguards of development. What should not be overlooked is that they may emphasise their roles and functions differently according to societies’ needs which vary across time and space. Selo Soemardjan (1994) writes about the performance of Indonesian intellectuals in their national development.
dream, as Elise Boulding (1994) proposes: they are the futurists being skilled in social
day dreaming, skilled to disperse their positive dreams in their communities.

In sum, the intellectuals involved in this project are not only those who possess the ability to think, whether in a creatively abstract sense, including philosophical ideas generating their social consciences, and/or in a practical sense, whereby they are more or less being trained to be a specialist in a particular area. They also intentionally engage in transforming that ability into concrete social activity by participating (directly or indirectly as mediators) in public affairs. They may do so by criticising society, by organising their peers and/or other people to forge networks or groups, since they may not effectively travel this path alone. And by directing and producing change they may bring better conditions to their societies (although it seems that they themselves define the meaning of the word ‘better’).

Following the aforementioned definition, intellectuals for this project are engaging/networking agents who perform two functions. As experts who have academic backgrounds in economic and/or political-science disciplines, they employ their substantive knowledge to facilitate networking activities in a concrete form. The establishment of PBEC and PECC (at the initial stage) which lead to APEC are explicit examples. Lessons derived from the success of economic (networking activities) partially make these agents together with those who have more concerns regarding regional security, specifically in the Cold War period, perform a function as critics. They not only criticise regional situations specifically in terms of economic well-being that expanded to cover the concept of comprehensive security, but also encourage each other (whether they are non- or governmental agents) to forge concrete and materialised networks as shown in Chapters 3 and 4. Their functions as experts and critics reinforce each other and help them to shape regional security architectures as they are today. Yet, how they may generate their networks and accepted possible means will be addressed in the next section.

Knowledge-activity bound intellectual networking
In order to provide an appropriate concept for studying intellectual networks derived from both capabilities and intentions of the intellectuals as defined earlier, it is useful to review literature concerning knowledge-bound networking. Although not much literature in the field covering East Asia is reviewed due to its availability, literature concerning the Western experiences is useful as a guiding perspective to shed light on
to what extent and how East Asian experiences should be perceived. The intention is not to deny the usefulness of concepts currently applied to studying the activities of intellectuals and networking. Rather, it is to clarify that they will be able to provide a better framework and understanding if they magnify the basis for generating intellectual networks, which is referred to here as 'internal logic'. This section would like to propose that the internal logic acts as an *a priori* (universal) understanding that helps engaging processes and dialogues to materialise and flourish. This section further proposes that Habermas’s TCA can serve that function. The next section explains to what extent and how TCA is capable of doing that.

*To what extent can international collaboration be forged?*

Drawing on inter-state co-operation, particularly from the United Nations and its special agencies, Ernst B. Haas (1980) argues that reducing the cost of international communication is a main priority. He emphasises that it is useful, specifically for the weaker states whose asymmetrical interdependence is obvious. Their engaging activities create substantive linkages, gradually bringing consensual knowledge to the fore, whether or not that is the intention of participants. In other words, their learning process or processes, based on the experiences of their engaging activities, lead to the creation of an international regime, helping participants to realise their differences through persuasion and compromise (Haas 1990). An international regime here is understood as agreed norms, rules and procedures regulating an issue area.

Playing down any economic aspects (as well as the role of the states) and advocating more social concern for non-state actors, Peter M. Haas (1992) argues that non-state actors can initiate effective international co-operation based on their knowledge, which he terms an ‘epistemic community’. For him, it is a network of professionals with recognised expertise. It can be established because they

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47 Applying a cognitive perspective, he accentuates that three kinds of issue-linkage can occur. Apart from the substantive linkage (as discussed in the main text), the other two are based on states’ tangible interests, albeit expected; ‘technical linkage’ aiming at enlarging groups for bargaining power, and ‘fragmented linkage’ consolidating groups for a specific issue which is not technical (Haas 1980).

48 Unfortunately, the learning process here means only learning within the context of regime construction, housed by international organisations in which the cumulative recognition of knowledge (specifically limited to scientific knowledge) is perceived as necessary for realising gains which are rather flexible according to self-designing being occurred and shifted along the process (Haas 1990).
acknowledge four commonly accepted principles: a shared set of normative and principled beliefs; shared casual beliefs; shared notions of validity (intersubjectively validating knowledge); and a common policy enterprise.

The concept flourished from the impact of internationally cooperative lessons by ecologists and scientists helping to lessen pollution in the Mediterranean and its surroundings. It was concluded that collaboration among these individuals provided functional public good and open information and fora benefiting all participants and led to calls for state cooperation \(^{49}\) (Haas 1989). Yet, it would not have materialised without suitable international settings: modern administrative states and complex decision-making processes. Put simply, the epistemic communities’ knowledge and actions will be effective as transmission belts when the authorities see that their networks can provide them with usable knowledge that is accurate, accessible, and contributes to collective goals \(^{50}\) (Haas 2004). What should not be overlooked here is that the agents’ capabilities related substantive knowledge and their intention to encourage change are not enough to emancipate the people (in terms of the populated environment and the way they perceived the problem). According to this logic, agents need to possess persuasive abilities, specifically towards the responsible authority.

Jerome Karabel (1996) emphasises the significance of usable knowledge for the relationship between the authorities and the intellectuals, claiming that technical intellectuals (scientists) possessing technical capital are more easily accepted by the authorities, particularly those relating to the military and economy. The authorities will accept creative intellectuals possessing interpretive resources that emphasise a value-oriented end, as long as they comply with state policy. \(^{51}\)

However, unexpected consequences may emerge during the process, particularly derived from the attempts of creative intellectuals. A renowned case is the

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\(^{49}\) The impacts affected both the international and domestic domains. As regards the former, governments committed to new environmental regimes; for the latter, there was pre-emption of decision-making by environmental ministries of participating countries (Haas 1989).

\(^{50}\) The administrative state is defined here as an expansive professionalisation and having deference to the ‘knowledge elite’ (rather being technocrats in his meaning). A knowledge-bound community (particularly concerning sustainable development and environmental programmes for his case studies) within such a state can make its voice heard and act as transmission belts (transmitted its developed knowledge to decision-makers) (Haas 2004).

\(^{51}\) Ironically, the relationship is a paradoxical one. The more the authority suppresses the defying intellectual, the more they gain ‘moral capital’ lessening the states’ legitimacy (Karabel 1996).
collaborative network of Soviet/Russian, American, and Western European peace researchers and policy-makers helping to bring an end to the Cold War.\(^{52}\) (Risse-Kappen 1994). Adler (1992) argues that the inception of the anti-ballistic missile arms control treaty in 1972 was an essential starting point. The scientists and policy-analysts in America did their best to package diversified concepts of the matter, so that they would be readily presentable when launching their ideas and efforts, not to mention diffusing them to a wider audience.\(^{53}\)

What should not be overlooked here is that although the concept provides a sound understanding of how the perceptions, intentions, and social learning of agents generate public policy, both at the domestic and international levels, there is still something missing. James K. Sebenius (1992) argues that there is no clear distinction between conflictive concepts and cooperative ones of social learning. An overarching co-operative concept also neglects the broader contextual analysis of the logic of bargaining and negotiation by placing too much emphasis on its dynamic aspects of cooperation.

It is useful to add that the success of this concept lies in the apparently accepted scientific knowledge, which is less, if at all, controversial and easier to be shared, particularly among peers, than controversial social-and-normative knowledge. This last form of knowledge requires more politicised forms of co-operation, which the scientific-knowledge concept rarely touches upon, but the social and normative concept tries to address. The overarching co-operative concept presupposes the intentions and capacities of agents to co-operate positively. This presupposition allows agents to cooperate without giving any clear explanation of what is behind their four commonly accepted principles: a shared set of normative and principled beliefs; shared casual beliefs; shared notion of validity (inter-subjectively validating

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\(^{52}\) These networks mainly comprised members of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and the Space Research Institute from Soviet/Russia, numerous members of the liberal arms control communities from the US, Western European peace researchers and European policy-makers within arms reach of Social Democratic and Labour Parties (Risse-Kappen 1994).

\(^{53}\) Most of them were members of the RAND Corporation, the Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) – mostly comprising research agencies from the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department. There were also scholars from either Harvard or Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) – together, they are sometimes called ‘Charles River gang’ and excreta. In order to effectively spread their ideas, they joined or set up numerous conferences (i.e. Surprise Attack Conference, Pugwash, and those set up by the ‘Doty’, ‘Dartmouth’, and ‘Panofsky’ groups) and frequently published their proposals in journals and newspaper (\textit{Foreign Affairs, The New York Times}, and the \textit{Washington Post}) (Adler 1992).
knowledge); and a common policy enterprise. Put simply, what makes these principles possible in the first place?

A primary concern of the ‘Advocacy Coalition Framework’ (ACF) is to understand to what extent and how public policy appears as it does. It presents a dynamic picture of public policy as a discursive area in which agents (whether individuals or groups at sub-, inter-, and state-levels) come to negotiate and cooperate on matters based on their common beliefs. The advocacy coalition framework proposes that the period of study has to be at least a decade or more. Otherwise, it will not allow researchers to observe the movements likely to be established. The policy-subsystem (as interaction of agents from different institutions seeking to exert influence over policy) is a prime area, for it is here that the dynamic interplay between the policy-oriented learning process and a belief system (a blending ground of self-interests and organisational interests) can be observed (Sabatier 1993: 16, 23-24, Jenkin-Smith and Sabatier 1993b: 5).

Paul A. Sabatier observes that a belief system is organised around a set of core values and policy strategies alongside implementing activities. This means that it assumes some psychological predilection for instrumental rationality and cognitive consistency on the part of policy elite. It is also grounded in a capacity for reasoned discourse involving major issues relevant to the elite’s favoured policy subsystems (Sabatier 1993: 33). Yet, it is not static: it can be shifted and/or changed along the policy-oriented learning process through which one identifies, refines and improves one’s understanding of how to pursue her/his interests (Jenkin-Smith and Sabatier 1993a: 40-44).

Richard P. Barke (1993) supports the notion that the advocacy coalition framework is useful for understanding to what extent the advisory groups have gradually worked well, particularly when success is defined in terms of congruence with political force, stability over time, and lack of legal challenge. The characteristics of advisory groups also matter. The material groups, emphasising the more concrete interests, are more attentive to their groups’ bottom-line position than

54 For precise information, they indicate that a policy-oriented learning process provides channel for three missions. The first is to improve one’s understanding of the status of goals and other variables identified as important by one’s belief system. The second is to help refine one’s understanding of local and causal relationships internal to a belief system. The last is to identify and respond to challenges to one’s belief system (Jenkin-Smith and Sabatier 1993a: 42-45).
the purposive groups, highlighting the more commonly accepted values (Jenkin-Smith and St. Clair 1993). In other words, the latter show relatively greater constraint over a wider range of issues, since commonly accepted values are so broad that they cannot easily signify concrete interests, let alone co-operative programmes.

When applied to numerous case studies, the ACF displays both its strengths and weaknesses as shown in the following discussion. Yet, it also effectively helps us to observe how dynamic exogenous events have impacted on policy change. The efforts of an advocacy coalition and the impact of exogenous factors should be regarded as highly intertwined (Mawhinney 1993). Otherwise, at best, a coalition can produce only what Anthony E. Brown and Joseph Stewart Jr. call a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, meaning without an explicit impact on policy alteration (Brown and Stewart, Jr. 1993). The ACF is limited by its lack of attention to the role of sectarian extremists within advocacy coalitions. John F. Munro (1993) proposes that it should give a more prominent role to differences between sectarians and pragmatists in many coalitions, as well as focus more on the differences between political crisis and stalemate as a primary cause of policy learning and change.

In their revision, Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkin-Smith (1993) accept that fundamental normative precepts are essential, due to their function of identifying and prioritising the basic values of social groups. In addition, they point out that more empirical components are needed, particularly those that help to balance a proper distribution of authority between government and market, and among different levels of governance. In sum, their revision emphasises the significance of historical data. Sabatier and Anne M. Brasher (1993) sum up this point concisely, stating that the more precisely one views a situation in broad contextual terms; the more likely one is to see variations in the general pattern of events. Significantly, the role of theory is to

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separate the critical variations from the merely curious. That is why theory plays a significant role in demarcating the critical variations from the merely curious.

The time frame of this study covers the period from early 1960s to 1990s because it was the period in which political movements from states’ cooperation and economic movements led to political and security movements in the later periods. By covering this period, it is possible to scrutinise more the policy-oriented learning process specifically relating to the establishment of ARF and attempts to realise an ‘ASEAN Community’ and an ‘East Asia Community’. Unfortunately, no matter how interesting advocacy coalition framework is, it does not explicitly investigate the learning process itself in depth, nor does it uncover the bases for policy bargaining or negotiations. Although the ACF well explains how such values and belief systems can be commonly accepted in the first place, particularly by those who have different cultural backgrounds, something is still missing. The reason is that it is not clear whether the framework can produce overtly promising results when applied at an international level; the level of study here.

There appear to be two principal ways to remedy the difficulty. On the one hand, the basis of what is the capacity of individuals to calculate their interests and strategic movements, in order to pursue their goals. An individual’s logic of consequences is the crux of rationalism. Agents choose or choose not to do something based on their expectation of what they will benefit from by making a particular decision and/or taking particular action. A good case in point is Robert D. Putnam (1988)'s notion of ‘synergic linkage’. For him, the chief negotiator has to be a good strategist knowing both how to bargain to create a tentative agreement, and how to separate discussion within each group, or coalition. He or she does this in order to generate acceptance and/or ratification. What is relevant here is that power, in terms of distribution and setting preferences, is at the heart of the game.

At the international level, negotiators also have to know how to balance their ‘double-edge diplomacy’ without hurting themselves. That means they have to make synergistic-issue linkages at three different levels: their own preferences; the specifications of their domestic politics; and the international negotiating environment of the time\(^\text{56}\) (Evans 1993, Moravcsik 1993). Yet, it is difficult to deny that this

\(^{56}\) For more precise information, the first level is the statesmen’s preferences (or acceptability-set), ranging from preserving or increasing domestic status, responding to international imperative to
approach cannot deal well with problems related to the formation of preferences and the constitution of subjectivity, particularly with such controversial concepts as justice, appropriateness and autonomy (Fearson and Wendt 2003). Although the scope of this study is less relevant in these aspects of power-play games, the awareness of preference formation in terms of concepts and proposals is a principal concern.

On the other hand, constructivism can provide another remedy by implanting a deeper understanding of agents’ decision making into the interactive activities of agents. Unfortunately, constructivist interactive way of thinking is not as clearly presented as that of Habermas. Jeffrey T. Checkel (1998) argues that ‘only bringing agency back in’ is not enough; more attention should be paid to systematically exploring how norms connect with agency. To remedy this, he suggests, researchers should carefully scrutinise how different characteristics of domestic politics impact upon compliance with international norms and how they come to be diffused domestically (Checkel 1997, 1991, 2004).

Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr (1997) also emphasise this linkage, although they base their argument on the significance of the decision-making elite; that is, exercising the power of choice. Decision-making elite are the centre of interaction within and between multi-level systems ranging from individual circles to global ones. For Friedman and Starr, the transformation of decision-making will occur when the political elite need change, not when they are compelled by external factors, as suggested by advocacy coalition framework. Yet, it is not practical enough to help us understand why these agents create or reject common international agenda (Dessler 1999).

What has been discussed thus far has not yet strayed beyond the importance of what is in the ‘hearts and heads’ of agents, in terms of their ideas and intentions, and their approaches and strategies. The significance of the discussion is that it sheds light

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Checkel points out that in a more democratic (or open) society, agents’ communicatively persuading skills and their socialisation will be able to create societal pressure forcing elite to accept norms. On the contrary, elite have to be effectively changing agents (elite learning dynamic) to diffuse their accepted norms in a statist and/or authoritarian regime (Checkel 1997, 1999, 2004).
on an interesting debate surrounding how to understand an agent’s logic, based on more interactive terms with their surroundings (Snidal 2003). It should be added that this interactive process also helps individuals to perceive who they are (Habermas 1995: chapter 7). In other words, rules and norms and shared principles are important. They provide the basic sense for agents to understand how they can, and/or should, proceed in given social circumstances (Dessler 1989).

Drawing on Wittgenstein’s theory of language, Ronen Palan (2000) proposes that the power of language represents the power of society: the real source of life is society expressing itself in words or sentences. Following this logic, Nicholas Onuf (2002) suggests that there are two kinds of rules on functional grounds: regulative rules, which are a medium of social control; and constitutive rules, which are a medium of social construction providing the operating ground for the former. The latter are comparable to Habermas’s validity claims for universal pragmatics. Suffice to say that ‘rules’ are products of intentional agents, who not only ameliorate natural constraints but also make their lives better by acquiring ‘common purpose(s)’. Onuf fails to present a clear picture of the extent to which a specific form of social inequality forces itself as the rule at a specific historical juncture.

Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton (2001), following the Gramscian concept of ‘organic intellectual’, point out that Onuf’s notion implies that the professional helps to define, (re)produce and/or transform the boundaries of rules or social forces. In other words, studying these effective agents and their activities can be a short-cut to a better understanding of the social world and how to change it. This project proposes that studying engaging/networking agents activities is a short-cut to understanding the

58 It helps to identify that the power of language represents the power of society or the real source of life is society expressing itself via words or sentences (Palan 2000).
59 Dessler following Searle comes to a similar definition when he describes public claims backed by sanctions as the regulative rules and convention being a stock of meaningful actions or signs for unchanging practices as the constitutive rules (Dessler 1989).
60 Nicholas Onuf explains that these rules are closely intertwined with the concept of ‘speech act’. It is defined as speaking in a form that gets anyone who is listening to respond to what a speaker is saying. It reflexes the effective power of rules in three forms. The assertive or principles provide useful information for agents’ decision making. The directive or imperative can be seen in a chain of command as organisations. The commissive or commitment rules are about rights and duties. An agent who successfully indoctrinates the contents of these rules, the directive in particular, is hegemonic. Yet, at the international level, Onuf proposes the word ‘heteronomy’ to describe the form of rule in which agents intend that they be ruled by what seems to be the unintended consequences of exercising their rights (Onuf 1998: 77).
social world of how the concepts of regional security have been perceived and transformed since the 1960s to become more comprehensive in terms of aspects (and/or dimensions) and to be more inclusive in terms of effectively engaging agents, specifically those proposed to be studied here.

Adler (1997) proposes employing the tracing back of an agent’s ‘cognitive evolution’ as a means of revealing what is hidden in the perspectives of an agent. This process can lead to a comprehension of how agents successfully introduce innovations to help, transform, even constitute, a collective understanding of how they institute internationalise ‘taken-for-granted’ facts whilst competing ideas and practices are de-legitimised. Martha Finnemore (1996) examines the more interactive aspect of an agent’s cultural environment, whilst at the same time not overlooking the fact that Western culture dominates sociological institutionalisation at all levels. For her, ‘force and faith’ cannot be separated, particularly where concepts of rationality, purposive action, individualism, and even bureaucratic systems and capitalism are concerned. It is important to stress that ‘force’ does not necessarily mean simply explicit force, but also includes implicit force.

Finnemore and Katheryn Sikkink (1998) argue further that an agent’s cultural norms are rich sources of their ‘logic of appropriateness’. This helps researchers to understand how norm entrepreneurs can fulfil the ideational commitments they call a ‘Norm Life cycle’. The cycle starts from the stage of emergence, then cascades. The last stage is the internationalisation of norms. However, it may be suggested that it is not enough to illustrate how the existing cycle can be broken, leading to the creation of a new cycle. It over simplifies and focuses only on positive aspects of engaging activities, in a similar fashion to epistemic communities. Due to oversimplification, it overlooks the possible movement of negative aspects without giving a clear explanation. Ole Jacob Sending (2002), who questions whether the communitarian base is a proper action-theoretical foundation for social matters, contends that the logic of arguing is more appropriate. He states that the logic of arguing is an inclusive concept of casual power of norms with normative authority and reasoning process.

Latha Varadarajan (2004)’s work on Indian identity and security seems to reaffirm Finnamore’s idea. It used Indian nuclear test of 1998 as a case study. In this case, Indian (elite) perceptions about their post-colonial identity, to some extent depressed by their weakness in capitalist terms, and their quest for an equal status and regaining their ‘shakti’ (strength) do play significant parts. In other words, constructivists cannot absolutely cut off economic material conditions as long as capitalism can be viewed as ideational inspiration.

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explaining the argumentation and reflexive action of agents. Sending's approach differs from that of Habermas when he points out that agents are strategic social constructivists, who know how to calculate, persuade, bargain, and win games.

The three main approaches to how one should study and comprehend intellectual networking reviewed thus far are useful for providing a helpful framework for comprehending engaging activities, specifically how socialising or learning processes based on shared norms, or principles, or belief system can lead to cooperation at both domestic and international levels. They all accept that it is essential to study the subject’s historical context to understand interactively socialising processes. Only the constructivist approach addresses to what extent agents should receive more attention as units of analysis, however, by not totally ignoring the structural side. The other two approaches fail to delineate their basis clearly. In other words, they overlook the process-makers and go straight to the process-making. For a project like this one, that overlooking generates the question of to what extent the engaging/networking agents bothered themselves, essentially in an initial period of cooperation at the height of the Cold War, to try to change their environment. Understanding only this process-making cannot help to find an appropriate answer regarding who these agents are.

In fact, even constructivism does not offer sufficient insight into how such processes can occur in different places and times, given that they are not totally alike. The processes per se are not totally different, provided that they are regarded as virtual places in which different agents can engage and make networks to achieve their shared norms, principles, or belief systems. But, it is worth reiterating, there are further difficulties to overcome.

The previously mentioned framework placed too much emphasis on the means-end paradigm, or purposive rational action as Habermas calls it, based on the mono-logical philosophy of the subject (Habermas 1972, Outhwaite 2003: 39). They fail to provide a means of comprehending how the aforesaid agents form perceptions and intentions that are not influenced by their social frames alone. A more cooperative view is likely to emerge if participants regard each other as partners instead of opponents (Eriksen and Weigard 2003: 23), as intellectuals studied in this project have done. It is worth scrutinising in greater detail their internal logic, which acts like an a priori understanding that helps their engaging processes and dialogues
materialise and flourish within such a discursive sphere as a socialising process. The following section proposes that Habermas’s TAC can fill this gap.

**Logic of arguing and ‘Theory of Communicative Action-TCA’:**

**A complementary way of understanding intellectual networking**

Within a virtually discursive space like socialising processes, particularly at the regional and international levels in which the social backgrounds of agents tend to differ, what can be observed thus far from previous illustrations is that agents do not overtly choose either a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness. Risse (2000), drawing on Habermas’s TCA, argues that they compromise both logics within the logic of arguing. His study of the international spread and acceptance of human rights provides a more elaborate understanding of the concept. The topic generates arguments and mobilises international public opinion, by which he means only those intentionally well-informed and closely connected with those who share similar concerns. It does this through the interactive sphere in which the ‘spiral model’ of socialisation can be significantly developed. Socialisation in terms of human rights has become more important with the passing of time, even in many developing states whose records regarding this matter are not exactly exemplary (Risse 1992).

Harold Muller (2004), who affirms this point, contends that the logic of appropriateness itself is culturally bound and needs to refer back to the intersubjective understanding embedded within the interactive sphere of communicative action. The significance of the interactive is that its discursive character provides ample opportunities for constructing and/or consolidating ‘will formation’ through a ‘struggle for recognition’ as equal partners or participants (Haacke 2005).

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62 The model signifies the concept of ‘self-entrapment’ of those states not possessing good records (e.g., Kenya, Indonesia and Morocco) once the five-step model started. First, repression stemming from international concern tries to persuade these states to step into the argumentative sphere. Second, most states persistently deny the argument. Third, their previous actions lead them to make tactical concessions through their own domestic pressures on matters. Fourth, they are coerced into complying with their ‘prescriptive status’ which leads them to the last step. Finally, they express rule-consistent behaviours on the matter (Risse 1999: 538).

63 A good example to magnify this point is the relationship between Beijing and Washington. Only through this lens can it be effectively deciphered. Marc Lynch (2002) argues that conflicts occur because their interpretation of engaging relations are not the same; while Beijing looked for reaching an understanding, Washington seemed to aim at strategic and short-sighted movements.
To date, the logic of arguing has not yet been popularised, although many scholars agree that it could provide a good foundation for establishing an international civil society, based on cosmopolitanism. It provides both sphere and opportunity for mediating differences and difficulties that are contingent when looked at through functionalist/rationalist perspectives (Lloyd Jones 2001, Diez and Steans 2005, Weber 2005). It is difficult to deny that an awareness of the complexity of the changing world, comprising more than just states and the market, but also including the activities of intellectuals from various organisations at various levels, makes the logic more appealing. The reason for being so attractive is that the logic of arguing carefully paves the way for scrutinising an interactively covert world, presenting existing positions and power relations. In other words, the mission of the logic of arguing is to unmask and/or eliminate if possible, the existing domination of interests and ideas by the powerful and/or the elite in terms of both structural and intellectual constraints. The end of the Cold War provided one such opportunity. This was particularly evident within IR, some of whose theorists questioned what had gone wrong with their understanding, let alone predictions, through the so-called ‘fourth debate’ (Diez and Steans 2005: 128-130).

Richard K. Ashley (1981) tries to persuade us that John H. Herz’s views of world politics could be regarded as an earlier attempt - even before the end of the Cold War - to empower humans as active agents capable of making their own futures. There appear to be traces of Habermas’s knowledge-constitutive interest in Herz’s thesis. Yet Herz (1981) rejected Ashley’s attempt to classify his idea, arguing that he did not preach altruistic moral principles but was in favour of substituting enlightened, long-range universal interests for unselfish moral principles. No-one knows for sure what his ideas on the matter would have been had he pursued them further; most likely, it may be suggested, they would have differed little from Habermas’s universal pragmatics (this will be discussed in more detail later in the last section).

Robert W. Cox (2001) suggests that the ‘real world’ in the twenty-first century consists of four aspects: the changing structure of the world due to globalisation; states and state systems both serving and against the previous aspect; the emerging and increasing veto power of the global environment (inspiring questions on the existing economic systems); and the increasing (re)emergence and importance of intersubjectivity, to a great extent based on religious-civilisation.
An emphasis on an interactive sphere does not only lift the veil obscuring capable and active agents but also sheds light on the characteristics of their interactive activities. On the one hand, it helps signify that the democratic organisation of politics based on a dynamic discursive sphere will help reconstruct world politics (Brown 2001). On the other hand, looking into the discursively interactive sphere reveals that bridging a universal philosophy and normative concerns will broaden the scope covering active agents who have access to speech communities possessing potential to become universal (Linklater 2001). It is this bridging area that the logic of arguing actualised and flourished. Yet, there has been no widely accepted blending formula to decipher the sphere, namely to find ways to empower the weak and to enlist the help and co-operation of the strong, including states. The careful balancing of utopian ideas (projecting a desirable future) and attempts to empirically solve the problems of steering media (administrative power and money) in systems transformation should be more seriously considered (Wendt 2001), particularly beyond national boundaries. Otherwise, the logic of arguing based on TCA is nothing but a theoretical paradise empirically 'lost' (Deitelhoff and Muller 2005).

There is, however, a proposal to mitigate the uneasy blended formula; that is, that individual instrumental rationality can be more helpful when considered as complementary to universal communicative rationality (Baynes 2001, Rengger 2001). Nevertheless, the way in which logic engages both individual rationality and culturally normative bonds tell us that the capacity of the logic of arguing, mixed with historical, social, economic and political forces, makes it more appealing and gives it more potential (Hutchings 2001, Deitelhoff and Muller 2005).

In essence, what we have learnt from the many attempts to find a way to comprehend what happens within a discursively interactive sphere is that it is based on compromise. The engaging/networking agents for this project have performed their functions according to this basis. Otherwise they could not achieve wide-ranging cooperation initially regarding economic issues since the 1960s, a period in which levels of economic development and different systems of political inclination did matter much (as shown in Chapter 3). The socialising experiences based on a compromising basis are essential for their cooperation to extend to political (and even military) aspects in later periods as illustrated in Chapter 4. At the very least, it needs to be logically open and dynamic enough to encompass not only the concerns of individuals, but those of groups and/or societies. This logic should also signify a
potential for universality. The encompassing quality of the logic would guide it through the tangled web of cultural differences within the discursive ground of engaging activities.

Habermas’s concept of communicative action is vital here as a bridge linking individuality and intersubjective plurality. His argument, based on the interactive sphere between the two ends of individual and intersubjective concerns can be regarded as a reconstitutive approach drawn from the development of linguistic and cognitive psychology. It helps agents to master their communication and interact with a meaningful symbolic configuration which has emerged and circulated within this interactive sphere (McCarthy 1982: 60). Agents’ capacity to master meaningful communication is the key for the logic of arguing to be successful. Within this process, there emerges the concept of a ‘generalised other’, which signifies a change from a general principle for human action to abstract morality led by principles (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 55-57). In Diana Coole (1997)’s interpretation, this is Habermas’ meaning of modernity. Modernity should be regarded as the process of struggle, not between reason and non-reason, but between communicative and instrumental reason, lifeworld and system, emancipation and reification. It is a struggle between different forms of reason and modes of rationalisation. In this sense, a universal community is essential for moral self-determination and ethical self-realisation. The normalisation within this logic theoretically leads to a growing ‘toleration’ of other forms of life (Hogengarten 1995).

This bridge should be able to act as a potential means for comprehending an intellectual’s critical and moral concerns. 65 It is useful to emphasise here that the intellectuals’ critical and moral concerns means their interest in human emancipation – read here as liberating human beings realising their own ability to know and to become enlightened, and caring for the less fortunate by destroying their delusions/illusions of self-impotence through distorted communication. Studying the intellectuals’ critical and moral concerns should also provide an understanding of an intellectual’s social functions and responsibilities. Richard Wyn Jones suggests a

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65 For Thomas Risse (1999) and Richard Wyn Jones (2001), the constructivist inadequacy of critical and moral concerns, security studies in particular for Jones and the international institutionalization of human rights norms for Risse, is an essential question vis-à-vis to what extent Habermasian critical theory should be engaged as an illumination, though adjustment might be needed in order to make it less utopian.
pioneering proposal that intellectuals might be effective agents who not only bring light into societies but also make and provide routes for emancipation (Wyn Jones 1999: chapter 6). For this project, the emancipation refers to engaging/networking agents’ attempts to liberate a concept of security at a regional level. They do that by realising their own capabilities to destroy delusions/illusions that they are subservient to given regional securities. On the contrary, they are capable enough to encourage the broadening concept of regional security to be more comprehensive in scope (as expressed in Chapters 3 and 4) and to be more focus on used-to-be-taboo topics when the regional environment facilitated as shown in Chapter 4.

The following sections illustrate how Habermas’s TCA can shed light on the entangled discursive area of interaction in which potential networking has been cocooned and hatched. This section, therefore, will proceed by trying to link together all concepts mentioned thus far with the anticipation that this more compound ‘critically logical constellation’ might facilitate a comprehension of the activities of security intellectuals in East Asia, particularly when ‘reaching mutual understanding’ in the region is not only a means for generating, sustaining, and expanding networks, but also a goal in itself.

The chapter will proceed with a brief chronological overview of Habermas’s project to unite human knowledge and interests aimed at empowering and emancipating humans themselves. It is necessary to accentuate the place and significance of theory of communicative action, emphasising how agents coordinate their actions rather than their motives because this emphasis can lead to potential concrete results (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 45). The significance of the agents’ coordination has already been alluded to in the earlier definitions of ideas and of being intellectuals.

_Critical Theory and Habermas’s Communicative Action_

Habermas has been regarded to some extent as an heir of the renowned Frankfurt Institute of Social Research (hereafter referred to as the Frankfurt School). Tracing the School’s origins may provide some clues to its complicated theories, which have covered not only apparent social and political problems, but also less apparent areas, such as cultural industries including constructing and mastering knowledge. The Frankfurt School’s first generation placed more emphasis on constructing and mastering knowledge (Jay 1973, Held 1980/2004). This emphasis could be regarded
as a strong foundation for Habermas’s concepts of universal rationality and communication.

‘Critical Reflection’ seems to be an appropriate phrase to summarise the constellation of theories that appeared in the turbulent period between the two wars (World Wars I and II), and which mainly comprised concepts from political economy, cultural criticism and psychoanalysis (Thompson and Held 1982: 3-4). It is, of course, derived from the reflexive ideas of agents, as they tried to understand complex situations and to leave critical messages for the next generations to decipher. It includes, in Habermasian terms, the deliberation of agents in encouraging and proposing an ideal logical programme for the creation of emancipatory societies, free from the distorted communication mentioned earlier (Jay 1973, Geuss 1981: Introduction, Wyn Jones 1989L Part I).

What should not be overlooked is that rather than downplaying structure, critical theory seeks to examine the interplay between structure and social practice through particular social phenomena (Held 1980/2004: 362). Because of this, critical theory not only seems compatible with constructivism at an ontological level, but also provides a clearer picture for normative concerns. All in all, it can be regarded as a theoretical weapon designed to unmask the elite’s way of establishing massive cultural apparatuses (Roderick 1986: chapter 5). Of course, producing and providing knowledge about security is part of this. It is also an encouraging means of helping agents realise that their form of consciousness may be ideologically false, and that the coercion from which they suffer is actually self-imposed by distorted communication (Geuss 1981: 61).

Although the Frankfurt School’s scholars are questioned about regarding themselves as Marxist descendents, as a result of paying less attention to direct economic determinants and the revolutionary role of the proletariat, they are keen to employ the dialectical process of Marxist thought. Additionally, they all reflect the transcendental character of critical knowledge, to a great extent basing their concepts on an historical understanding (Jay 1973: 43). For them, universality and particularity can in no way be separated. Only by regarding them as complementary to each other can critical knowledge find its true meaning. This complementary nature is a delicate blend of a transcendental Kant and an historical Marx through a dialectical Hegel, in the process of the dialogical reflection of an agent on self-formation and self-assessment (Habermas 1972: 231, Roderick 1986: chapter 1). What is interesting is
that although the self-formation process derives from interest-constitutive knowledge, signalling strategic rationality based on a symbolically structural phenomenon, it can be regarded as a dynamic-elusive middle-ground for nourishing and expanding knowledge-constitutive interests, provided that collectively institutional aims can overcome social constraints (McCarthy 1978: chapters 2.1 and 3.2). Put otherwise, dialogical knowledge-constitutive interests derived from interactive processes of self-formation are more significant than mono-logical interest-constitutive knowledge. The significance of the knowledge-constitutive interests is not only as the key to decipher the path for human emancipation but also as the expressed form of human intention to do good things.

The formulae that explain how to blend knowledge and interests in order to serve human emancipation vary. The first generation of the Frankfurt School favoured the philosophy of human despair, which appeared in the negative dialectic; Adorno, for example, prefers to keep an autonomous distance from a pressurised intersubjectivity (Coles 1995: 39). Habermas, who plays that side down along with the romantic element of Marxism, tries to add a more collectively systemic element, in a way presented as less humanised and too mechanical, with the expectancy of illustrating what a critical and rational enlightenment might do for humankind. 66

George Myerson argues differently, stating that Habermas’s project is more humane than its distinctive form suggests; the substance is often personal and addresses us individually in what must be a dialogue of imagination generated by participation in an argument that leads towards agreement. The point is that not only do we resolve the specific dispute; we also affirm a sense of sharing a world. Myerson emphasises that, according to the process, we share two worlds: a world out there and a world inside. The key result of this exchange is ‘unity’ (Myerson 1994: chapter 3).

Habermas’s attempt can be regarded as closely following in Marx’s footsteps in terms of knowing in order to change. Communication based on psychoanalysis aimed at re-symbolising the de-symbolised motive plays a significant part, casting unconsciousness back into the realm of normal interaction with oneself and the others (McCarthy 1978: chapter 3.4). In other words, the task of critical theory is to identify the formal conditions that make emancipation possible by presenting truth as an


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emancipated form of life, as expressed in communication (McCarthy 1997: xviii). Put simply, it should block liberal individualists from finding good excuses for being in exile in their own societies, not only the capitalists in the developed world but also those elsewhere affected by those dominant capitalists (Love 1995). In order to achieve their task, social scientists need to understand the ideologically distorted subjective situation of some individuals or groups, and explore the forces causing the situation. They need to be aware of ideologically distorting forces and take part in overcoming them on behalf of oppressed individuals or groups (Dryzek 1995: 99).

Habermas refers to private individuals acting as bourgeois and ‘homme’ as the ‘educated public’, namely, those sufficiently educated to share their fortunes at times by actively engaging in matters not only related to them but also to others. He regards the public as the good and potential blending area for an emancipatory mission (Habermas 2005: Part I and II). Though possessing little sense of liberal fashion, Habermas’s communicative action signifies no clear preference for pre-defined issues; they are internal to the process of discursive will-formation. The radical proceduralism of Habermas’s TCA may not only be regarded as a powerful criterion for demystifying discourses of power, but also as a crucial category for the critical examination of a given situation (Benhabib 1992: 95, Hohendahl 1992: 102). This means that norm-forming processes and public debate shaping identity and generating solidarity take place within the public sphere (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 55-57). Expressed differently, the enlightenment of political will, and the self-conscious of its potential, not only proceeds from the public sphere but also through it, by effectively empowering the communication of citizens (McCarthy 1978: 15).

The increasing commoditisation of - and intervention by state power into - private (economic-based) and intimate (family-based) spheres have blurred the lines

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67 Many critics regard Habermas’s concept as too rigid to cover diversified groups, who are members of stratified societies. They point out that his historical reading follows the Orthodox Marxist too closely on an economic dominant aspect. Multiplicity of publics in which those groups can engage is more preferable and can help lessen the image of ‘the bourgeois masculinist ideology label’ of the concept (Fraser 1992: 116, 137). For the French case, it is difficult to deny that the chaos of the terror after the 1789 Revolution also helped shape the French public sphere, not only the rather organised and calm salons (Baker 1992: 189-211). David Zaret (1992) suggests that the English Reformation, the favouring of science as a revelation and with printing helping to spread the discoveries were rather neglected by Habermas as a strong foundation for rational society in England. Michael Schudson (1992) questions whether Habermas’s concept can be applied to the origin of the American public sphere, not to mention for the same period as he did to England and continental Europe. The longing for the nineteenth-century political style is an illusion of a bygone day formulated only on the funeral pyre of participatory, communal and ritualistic politics composed by the hands of the elite.
Wararak Chalermpuntusak

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and the significance of the public as an arena of political discussion (Habermas 2005: 5-6). It is an area constituted through ‘communication networks,’ or structures of linguistically produced intersubjectivity. These networks of cultural industries, such as the press and electronic media, were first circulated around nuclear families (Schmid 1982: 63, Baxter 1987: 66). This ‘colonisation of the life-world’, as Habermas refers to it in his later work, not only determines the public sphere, but also renders it inadequate as a direct model for today’s democracy, especially in the sense of social integration (Habermas 1987: chapter 6, Calhoun 1992: 6, Postone 1992: 165). In other words, the life-world cannot express its true potential as a resourceful connecting space between structural components and the social sphere (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 46-47).

Though there are critiques urging Habermas to magnify his scope, it is difficult to deny the emancipatory potential of his concepts, particularly when he moved on to more transcendental steps. These steps enquire about universally valid claims in all speech as an important ingredient for the democratic will formation of the communicative community. They offer a way to decipher unsolved riddles in the public sphere (Calhoun 1992: 30-31). Henning Ottmann (1982) maintains that they can be evident on three levels: in freedom anticipated through an ‘ideal situation’; as ‘enlighteningly’ organising liberation from ideologies and the distortion of communication; and as ‘strategic action’, taking refuge in political strife. Put otherwise, agents enlightening about their distorted communication and aim at achieving an ideal situation of communication can participate effectively and deliberately in the public sphere by not being lost by the short-sightedness of strategic action.

A human being’s capacity for freedom depends not only on theoretical but also on practical activities. The ideal speech situation plays a role not only as a connecting sphere but also as a meta-norm, serving to delineate those aspects of the argumentation process that would lead to a rationally motivated consensus. According to Seyla Benhabib (1986: 282-297), the ideal speech situation, comprising three main characteristics that are rationality, justice and freedom, describes a set of rules that participants in a given discourse have to follow (the symmetry condition), and a set of relations (the reciprocity condition) that would have to be obtained between them. Without the ideal speech situation, communicative action is \textit{prima facie} neither genuine nor rational.
Nevertheless, the practical sense of Habermas’ aforementioned concepts should not be forgotten, particularly when applied to reality. Habermas’s praxis is composed of two key parts: work, or instrumental action, purposive-rational action; and communicative interaction. David Held points out that sometimes there is an in-between type: strategic action, aimed at social integration, which is both instrumental and bound to a context of interaction (McCarthy 1978: chapter 1-2, Held 1982: 257). His intention to recover a potential for reason, encapsulated in the forms of social production, may seem like that of Marx, in terms of combining empirical philosophy of history with practical intent through methodological rigour (McCarthy 1978: ix). He emphasises interaction between an agent’s ideas and her surroundings. Yet, he cannot avoid critiques as to whether it is appropriate to reduce interaction to action, then to communicative action based on norms. What is more, finding a common ground for norms may be no different to compromises among warring gods and demons (Giddens 1982, Lukes 1982, Meadwell 1994: 720).

Despite the previous critiques, it is difficult to deny that social action depends on an agent’s definition of the situation, and not solely as a matter of subjectivity. The meanings to which social action is oriented are primarily intersubjective and constitutive of the socio-cultural matrix in which individuals find themselves and act (McCarthy 1979: xi). The intention and potential of Habermas’s attempts to decipher and chart this complex and dynamic area, particularly through the theory of communicative action, have been important for those who want to understand activities happening in the discursive area in which no leadership is clearly prioritised. It is within this social area that the current study follows Habermas, to determine the perceptions and intentions of key agents through their interaction.

Social evolution takes place through interaction, by having language as a threefold mechanism. First, language arrives at a mutual understanding of an issue. Second, it coordinates action, in order to establish a relation of solidarity. Finally, it acts as a medium through which socialisation takes place (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 87-90). Similarly, social evolution emerges in three developmental stages. The first is the ontogenesis of individuals, or the forming of being individuals. This stage is based on the cognitive, moral and interaction spheres: the cognitive sphere holds the capacity for formal thought; the moral reflects moral judgement; and the sphere of interaction corresponds to the interactive competence of agents (Schmid 1982: 164). Laced together, these elements construct social spheres of learning: those of
productive force; those of identity-securing interpretive systems; and those of institutional steering capacities (Arato 1982).

What should not be overlooked here is the internal logic of interaction. The possibility of creating and maintaining successful mutual interaction between two or more individuals depends on a ‘bridgehead’ of shared expectations, linguistic skills, and the possibility of understanding. Thus, communicative structures lie at the heart of successful social action, or humankind’s practical interests, as Habermas regards it (Held 1980/2004: 310). It is this communicative structure based on the internal logic of interaction in which this researcher is interested. It not only shed light on theoretically comprehending to what extent engaging/networking agents attempt to forge regional networks, but also generates practical understanding on how, and in what way their networks appear as they are. What these engaging/networking agents have in common is shared expectations to better their regional-security environment. Their incrementally socialising experiences based on their communicatively linguistic skills through English, albeit not having English as their first language, made successful social action happen.

Michael Schmid (1982) argues that although emancipation and liberation have to come from a commitment to justice, derived from the last developmental stage, they cannot be sought in historical processes reconstructed through developmental logic. They lie only in us. Habermas, according to Held, does not clearly appoint his agency so as to promote a form of enlightenment, nor does he clarify to whom his critical theory is addressed (Held 1980/2004, 1982). Yet, this lack of information leaves room for experimentation, and this thesis applies intellectuals working on security matters as a test case. The aforementioned lack of information can be considered a ‘form of non-representational foundation’, or a ‘decentred perception of reality’; forming the interactive process; and blending the performative attitudes of participants and neutral attitudes of observers. It is the key structural element for identity transitions through so-called ‘universal pragmatics’ (McCarthy 1978).

Borrowing heavily from linguistics, particularly Austin’s theory of speech act constituting the cognitive and interactive use of language and Searle’s principle of expressivity regarding an agent’s sincerity, the basic universal pragmatic is expressed in the fact that it thematises the elementary units of speech utterances. Expressed differently, language houses universal validity claims leading to the comprehensibility of a given participant. This interactive process seeks to elucidate the performative
aspects of speech, which are mutually presupposed on the basis of the pre-theoretical knowledge of one another’s communicative competence. They are revealed by the ability to utter, by uncovering them through an analysis of the speech act in the ‘standard form’ (Habermas 1982: 255, Thompson 1982: 120). Within this framework, it is anticipated that systematic answers can be given to questions concerning a human’s capability to instigate and sustain the interactive process (Habermas 1979: 1-50, Held 1980/2004: 278).

Habermas illustrates that these claims are based on practical functions of utterances and the relations to their stages of origin, or ‘world’ as he calls it, in a trinity fashion. The first is a representational function, or truth, relating to the ‘external (or objective) world’. The argumentation proper to this dimension is theoretical discourse. The second is an established conformity, or rightness, connecting to ‘our social world’, legitimating normatively regulated interpersonal relations in the society within which the actual interaction takes place. Practical discourse or practical interest is (are) appropriate forms for this function. This is the foundation for understanding life-world, or ‘superstructure’, in Marxist terminology. Unfortunately, ‘our social world’ has been dominated by steering media (specifically money and power), covering social systems directed by theoretical discourse. The third is a sincerity of expression directed to ‘a particular inner world’ of the speakers or their subjective world. Discourse is not a mode of argument here. The more appropriate modes are aesthetic criticism for evaluating, and therapeutic critique, for clarifying systemic self-deception (Habermas 1979: 1-68, Roderick 1986: chapter 4). The degrees of significance and outward expression vary according to the way an agent balances the three worlds.

For this project, emphasis is placed more on an agent’s ‘social world’ and particular inner world, in order to fill the gap left behind by other network literature. The social world in which practical discourse reign is the main focus, due to the fact that it provides the way to comprehend an agent’s action in his/her interactive social sphere, through conferences and workshops related to his/her preferred concept of comprehensive security. Their particular inner world is employed here as a main source of understanding how they have embarked on the route of cooperation, irrespective of what global, regional and domestic circumstances might occur.

Rationality is the key to all the processes and stages; it should be understood as a basic stock of communicative rules of competence (Schudadelbach 1990: 281).
Its ultimate aim is to reach an ‘understanding’, at least in terms of linguistic expression, which is not only based on negotiations over common definitions of the situation, but also on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims. The latter leaves space for moral practical insights, partly embedded in worldviews (Habermas 1984: chapter 1). Communication for Habermas is the human's attempt to create a good life. Although its end point seems oppressive, Habermas’s emphasis on the process is democratic, ensuring that everyone has the same right to be heard in the argument about truth, which he terms ‘discourse ethics’ (Myerson 1994: 72-90).

On this point, Erik Oddvar Eriksen and Jarle Weigard claim that an agent’s communicative rationality means not only choosing efficient norms to obtain goals but justifying that choice and defending it against criticism. These are the main characteristics of the so-called ‘deliberative practitioners’, whose rational manners are interpreted as being based on dialogical consensus (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 121, 123, Wellner 1990: 311). Seyla Benhabib (1990) proposes that this type of consent should be perceived as the rationality of the procedure for attaining agreement. It is the core idea behind communicative ethics – the procedural generation of reasonable agreement about moral principles through an open-ended moral conversation. It goes without saying that the presupposition of an ‘ideal speech situation’, referring to a situation of absolute un-coerced and unlimited discussion between completely free and equal human agents, plays a significant part (Geuss 1981: 65).

However, everything does not necessarily proceed smoothly. There may be difficulties in the process of exchange. Norms have to pass the test of time; otherwise, norms as objects of agreement can turn into procedural constraints. Joseph Heath points out that this is the area in which Habermas errs; truth and assertion should go hand in hand whilst assertion acts as ‘truth - falsifying’ (Heath 2001: 193, 217). Additionally, Coole warns us that there are two dimensions of power that might obstruct Habermas’s concept. The first concerns the translation of meaning from the pre-reflective life-world into a discursive form. The second relates to processes that remain pre-discursive. This means that the communicative process may not reduce the pre-discursive circuits of power because they are continually reproduced within discourse itself (Coole 1997: 238). Hans-Peter Kruger (1991) emphasises that pre-linguistically motivated activities of life, the development of communication and cognition, cannot be totally submerged into the specific activities of linguistic communication and discursive thought. As a result, a question of whether group-
specific ways of life can be reproduced socially leads to an expansion of the content of activities of life to include the prerequisites, conditions, and consequences of this reproduction in society as a whole.

What should be noticeable is that the development of communication and cognition is not only considered as a presupposed discourse providing a moral-practical foundation for undistorted communication. It is also anticipated that communicative rationalisation, the widening over time with the unfolding of the linguistic possibilities of reason, will lead to ethical progress (McCarthy 1978: chapter 4.3, Brand 1990: ix-x). It is this convention that serves the institutionalisation of discourse, namely, the convention that helps to actualise the ideal content of the presupposition of argumentation under empirical conditions (Habermas 1990: 89-90).

This progress is a procedure of moral judgement; normative justification is tied to a reasoned agreement among those subject to the norms in question. Norm validation is based on a commonly accepted satisfaction of consequences that are complementary ingredients of the human learning process (McCarthy 1990: viii). Communicative ethics, confining their task to reconstructing moral points of view, play a role as a built-in normative principle of practical discourse, which is the basis of universal pragmatics (McCarthy 1978: ix). They demand willingness and ability to consider normative questions from the universalist standpoint of participants, and to regard every being as an equal, regardless of the actual constellation of relations in real life (Benhabib 1986: 320). In turn, this process leaves room for more encouraging progress of communicative ethics, which is regarded as a non-constrained access to a process of discursive will-formation; a process understood as a rational discourse of generalising interests, which are communicatively shared. It is within the realm of communication, the community of practical discourse, that reason plays its part in helping participants accept the proposed norms as righteous (Habermas 1997a: 89, 105, 108, 140).

Nevertheless, the application is not always smooth. Sometimes there are difficulties. The distinction between justification and contextualisation shows the limits of a rationalistic interpretation of communicative ethics and creates questions regarding the methodology of moral-developmental psychology and universalist ethical theory (Benhabib 1986). This prompts Karl-Otto Apel to regard discourse ethics as a regulative idea/principle of a long-term strategy of the realisation of the formal preconditions for an ideal community of communication at all levels of human
interaction (Apel 1990: 46, 54). His notion may well be compatible with that of Otfried Hoffe, who comprehends ethics as the way participants in discourses pledge responsibility for each other (Hoffe 1990: 212).

Philosophy, both transcendental and culturally-bound, as a stand-in and interpreter for the life-world, is always in discursive interaction. It is a reference for a participant’s consensual co-ordination, and the argument reached can at any point be evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims. The key concept is the ‘equalisation of power’, meaning a normative quality of discourse neutralising any imbalance of power and providing equal opportunities for realising one’s interests (Habermas 1990b: 1-20, 59, 72). Following this process, a commonly accepted moral universalisation emerges. The prudent application of universal moral insights and the support of motivations for translating insights into moral actions are possible.

However, at best it may only be to reach equal satisfaction, as Gunter Dex observes, based on an agent’s own understanding of moral aspects acquired through TCA (Dex 1991: 74-76). In other words, practical discourse ethics offer a procedure for testing the validity of hypothetical norms, not for producing justified norms. The reason is that discourse ethics derived from discursively interactive processes consistently oppose sceptical objection (Habermas 1990b: 108-109, 122, 127, and 177). Hans Joas insists that TCA, as understood on the level of theory of action, can produce only a social order founded on discursively reached agreement. It is still impossible to make any assertion about the normative precedence of this type over other types of social order (Joas 1991: 114). Thomas McCarthy argues that this should not diminish the significance of what Habermas develops as a notion of historically oriented theory of society with a practical intent retaining an intrinsic relation to practice. McCarthy insists that the gist of Habermas’s theory is that it is guided by emancipatory interests. Social analysis is undertaken from the standpoint of realising a form of organisation based on unrestricted and undistorted communication (McCarthy 1991: 139).

In sum, downplaying purposive-instrumental action may effectively help increase intersubjective cognition of reason, which should be regarded as the basis for a critical theory of society. The reason behind such a result is that the action not only aims at exercising control and manipulation, but also achieves efficiency and success, as embodied in technology and social systems, particularly economic ones (Habermas
1984: chapter 3-4, Roderick 1986: 100-101). It is this procedural rationality that forms a necessary condition for individuals to reach an understanding among themselves. They do that without coercion. The procedure also encourages them to understand and/or construct their identities without force (Habermas 1992: 228, 265, Brand 1990: 10).

What should not be forgotten, however, is that purposive-instrumental action and communicative action cannot be totally separated. Habermas clearly states that communicative and strategic actions do not differ primarily in terms of the attitudes of the actors, but rather with respect to structural characteristics. This is because the structure of language usage in communicative action, oriented towards reaching understanding, is superimposed on the underlying teleological structure of action. Interaction mediated through acts of reaching understanding exhibits both richer and more strictly limiting structures than does strategic action (Habermas 1991: 242).

Eriksen and Weigard argue that within the realm of their discursive practices there are three kinds of agreements that help diverse agents reach mutual understandings. The first is a ‘working agreement’ based on different but mutually acceptable reasons for support among agents. The second is a ‘mini-consensus’: agents simply exclude fundamental points of disagreement from the agenda. The last is a ‘quasi-consensus’: agents have analysed the conflict and been able to ascertain why they disagree, thereby establishing a platform for further cooperation (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 222-224).

For Joseph Heath, compromise is the key to blending instrumental action with communicative action. Yet, it has to be based on interests and rational insight; the interests are what make the compromise reasonable, while rational insight makes compromise reasonable for agents to accept (Heath 2001: 242-253). James Bohman (1997) argues that such blending formula cannot totally camouflage plural views.

Thus far, suffice to say a theory of communicative action based on universal pragmatics can be regarded as a foundation for Habermas’s programme of reconstruction at both the individual and societal levels (McCarthy 1979: xvii, Held 1980/2004: 328). As regards the last mentioned level, Habermas concludes that language serves three functions: reproducing culture and keeping tradition alive; social integration or co-ordination of the ideas of different actors; and the socialisation of the cultural interpretation of need. Together, they are anticipated to reorganise the
fundamental socio-cognitive concepts available at the preceding stage of interaction (Habermas 1990b: 25, 162).

To be more precise, communicative competence has three related concerns: to develop a concept of rationality; to construct a two-level concept of society, by integrating the lifeworld and systems paradigm; and to sketch out a critical theory of modernity, analysing its pathology in order to redirect rather than abandon the project of enlightenment (McCarthy 1984: v-vii). It contains the ability to follow commonly accepted rules, but not rules for the production of systems (Brand 1990: 19).

What Habermas offers is a theory directed not only at the explication of the nature of understanding through a mastery of the ideal speech situation and the structure of human reason. It is also directed at the conditions of discourse, by transforming Hegel’s dialectic into a process of real dialogue with others (Held 1980/2004: 397). It is a process in which mutual recognition, a prerequisite for self-identity, is procured through argumentative justification of claims to truth, moral rightness and sincerity that accompany every genuine speech act (Ingram 1997: 276). He also clarifies four presuppositions involved in discourse for rational communication: a genuine discourse aims at a rational consensus; attaining a rational consensus is possible; a true consensus can be distinguished from a false one; and only such a consensus can lay the truth claims as ‘objective’ (Roderick 1980: 82).

However, there are some difficulties surrounding the concept of rationality itself. Jon Elster and Ole-Jorgen Skog (1999) question whether there is the transcendental rationality that Habermas tries to present. According to their study, which is related to psycho-analysis, rationality and desire are closely related: the latter cannot be classified systematically. For them, social influences, plus a desire to be rational, are the key to understanding human behaviour, meaning that human desire to be rational is another form of desire. Eliot L. Gardner and James David (1999) regard it as focusing the mind on one's intention to do things. For example, Skog (1999) argues that it is logically possible for drug-abusers to become rational addictive persons, particularly when we comprehend the situation from their surroundings and perspectives. For Elster (1999), the human desire to win, particularly begetting the ‘near-win’ concept is regarded as the rationale for gamblers who persist with their gambling habit.

Nevertheless, Habermas’s theory of communicative action presents not only a procedural view of rationality based on an agent’s subjective, objective and social
worlds. It also presents the possibility of uniting knowledge and interests for the sake of humankind in the name of emancipation, by energising intellectual and practical bases for public discussion and effective control of public policy (Habermas 1972: chapter 3, White 1995: 6, Outhwaite 1996: 10, Eriksen and Weigard 2003: 4, 31). This quality, that is, procedural openness with no clear *a priori* prioritised norms/values, prompts this study to propose theory of communicative action as a complementary internal logic to previous frameworks for networking activities. Of course, on the surface it seems to be only a subjective quality. Yet, the dialogical aspect of it, its relationship with objective and social worlds, makes it an appropriate starting point from which to understand how agents from different backgrounds can co-operate, engage, and create networks to achieve their shared norms, principles, or belief systems. In other words, the universal quality of Habermas’s proposals vis-à-vis universal pragmatics helps one understand what those agents commonly possess within themselves in order to overcome their differences.

**Summary**

This chapter set out a framework for the case study to follow. It started with a definition of being an agent based on constructivist ontology. It then provided definitions of the terms ‘idea’ and ‘knowledge’, as social products crystallised from the interactive processes between agents and their surroundings. These two definitions are essential in that they helped to present ‘intellectuals’ as the capable changing agents at the heart of this study. In order to clarify who should be nominated as intellectuals, it also provided a further definition; that is, the sense of their social function of engaging with public affairs. Networking for bettering and influencing their societies are crucial missions.

All of the definitions presented in the first section set the core theme for Chapters 3 and 4. They help illustrate the ways in which agents perceive and interpret their surroundings; they also help elucidate what it is that drives them to construct regional networks, in terms of this project. In other words, to what extent and how they perceive their surroundings not only inspires their actions inwardly, actions derived from and concerned with themselves as capable engaging agents, but may also be construed as their structure for taking their particular forms of social action.

The second and the third sections directly dealt with concepts of networking. First, the section reviewed three approaches often applied to studying knowledge-
bound networking activities: an ‘epistemic community’; a ‘coalition advocacy framework’; and studies based on constructivism. It points out that they are helpful frameworks for comprehending engaging activities; specifically how socialising or learning processes based on shared norms, principles or belief systems can lead to co-operation at both the domestic and international levels. Knowledge-bound networking literature accepts that the historical context of the enquired subject is essential for studying interactively socialising processes.

Unfortunately, even constructivism has not offered more insight into how such processes can occur in different places and at different times, particularly when they are not totally alike. Processes *per se* are not that different, provided that they are regarded as virtual places in which different agents can engage and construct networks to achieve their shared norms, principles, or belief systems. But what makes them possess such qualities is not clearly delineated.

The chapter then proposed that Habermas’s theory of communicative action (TCA) can remedy the difficulty attributable to an inclination to place too much emphasis on the means-end paradigm. Knowledge-bound networking literature lacks enough provision for comprehending how agents form the perceptions and intentions that lead them to co-operate with each other on an equal basis. For this study, Habermas’s TCA offers a way to scrutinise their internal logic, which acts like an *a priori* (universally) understanding that helps their engaging processes and dialogues materialise and flourish within such a discursive sphere as a socialising process. It accepts that TCA presents not only a procedural view of human rationality but also the possibility of uniting knowledge and interests for the sake of humankind. The latter is the crux of the interest of this project.

However, the framework presented here should not be regarded as a one-way guiding framework (see Chapter 2), as this project set out to be interactive. It will be reconsidered in line with the study’s findings, once it has been applied to the activities of East Asian security intellectuals. In other words, reflection on the said activities will set the theme for the final part (the analysing part) of this project. The next chapter now goes on to the applied methods in Chapter 2. They were selected and combined not only to suit the set up framework but also to reflect the on-going social learning processes on which this project places emphasis.
Chapter 2: Qualitative Methodology
A Compatible Framework

The introductory chapter explained that this project was set up to investigate to what extent and how agents’ ideas/perceptions, particularly regarding their regional security, drive them to forge and sustain intellectual networks. The previous chapter sought to construct a framework by which to ascertain whether the process of engagement has had any impact on the engaging agents, in terms of their ideas, perceptions or activities. However, as it is based on an on-going-social-learning process the framework requires a qualitative rather than a quantitative methodology. This enables it to emphasise a means of inductive standardisation for constructing the particular kinds of questions asked at the outset. It is proposed here that a more appropriate way of conducting a research project should be to balance the relationship between theoretical concepts and the research methodology in an interactive way. By so doing, researchers (including this one) will be less likely to be lured into either a trap of ‘methodolatry’ (placing more emphasis on methods or means than ends) or a trap of ‘theoretical arrogance’ (ignoring empirical work) (Cooper 2001).

Engagement with such an interactive process will allow one to appear as a more reflexive agent. Reflexivity, as proposed by Jennifer Mason (2002: 5), is a highly creative process that encourages researchers to think critically about what they are (and/or have been) doing, and why. It not only confronts and challenges their personal assumptions but also makes them recognise the extent to which their thoughts, actions and decisions shape how they research and what they see.

Put differently, both deductive and inductive methods are needed. As Nigel Gilbert (2001) points out, these may intertwine during research, particularly within the social realm in which current concerns dwell. This combined and interactive path may well prove compatible with the constructivist standpoint upon which the original ontology was based (Burnham, Gilbert, Grant and Layton-Henry 2004: 22-20).\(^1\)

Pursuing this interactive logical track leads one to set a research design that favours a ‘research wheel’. This is because it not only highlights the essentiality of

\(^1\) According to Peter Burnham, Karim Gilbert, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry (2004: 22-29), this path is classified as the third category (critical realism) of criticising positivism (which is mostly favoured by those appreciating quantitative method); the others are Popperian neo-positivism and a group of conventionalist, humanist, or hermeneutic.
dynamic and on-going-process procedures, but also gives researchers an opportunity to redefine their ideas and techniques until they become less ambiguous. In other words, this circularity forces them to permanently reflect on the whole process and to view every step with critical eyes. It also grants them a chance ‘not only to ask the following questions repeatedly but also to answer [them] ...: how far the methods, categories, and theories that are used do justice to the subject and the data?’ (Flick 1998: 43) Yet, this process may prove unable to express its real capability unless it is effectively supplemented at some stage by the introduction of a linear style (Burnham et al. 2004: chapter 2, Gilbert 2001: 20-21).

Indeed, a cycle of specifying-collecting-analysing data supplemented by a linear style, either at the beginning (setting up, modifying, or simplifying hypotheses), the middle (collecting and analysing data) and/or at the end (modifying or simplifying theory or conceptual framework) could prove useful for a researcher’s process of internal falsification. It would provide opportunities for researchers to take their value-judgements and normative concerns into consideration at every step (Mason 2002: chapter 3). In sum, this is how the current project has been constructed. At this point, it is useful to be reminded of the significance of the middle and end of the cycle. This not only helps one to modify and allocate more space for those collected data that were initially ignored; it also makes one rethink the original framework, in order to shape it to be less abstract and more applicable to reality.

As far as this project is concerned, the term ‘qualitative research’ refers to research methods grounded in a philosophical notion of how social reality is understood, interpreted, experienced, produced and constituted by agents. As already delineated in the previous chapter, this position is interactive; indeed, it is dynamic, due to its communicative action at various levels. Expressed otherwise, it is crucial to understand the various multi-layers and textured complexity of the social world. For this project, the social worlds of agents comprise three different but closely related levels. Firstly, a subject’s views construe parts of his or her reality. Secondly, in conversations and discourses, phenomena are actively produced, thereby constructing reality. Finally, subtle structures of sense and related rules contribute to the construction of social situations through their generated activities. All in all, the social worlds of agents can be mainly perceived through their publications (related to conferences and workshops organised and attended by them). Content analysis (of which more explanation later) is one of the keys used here to filter out data necessary
for this project. Exclusive interviews will also be undertaken to reinforce information about the social worlds of agents and how agents perceive them.

One strong point of the qualitative method is that it offers holistic forms of analysis and explanation (or Verstehen, the epistemological principle, as Uwe Flick terms it\(^2\)), based on methods of data generation, which are both flexible and sensitive to the particular social context in which data are produced. Suffice to say that qualitative research opens a window for critically linking normative theories to the research project. It offers an on-going process for researchers to reflect not only on their thoughts and (social) concerns, but also on the ways in which they understand and interact with their surroundings in the interest of change, at the very least by pointing out the way or ways to implement change. This thesis considers the qualitative method suitable particularly when it is understood as a resourceful means of encouraging a circular way of conducting a research project. Not only is this style of on-going research compatible with the framework outlined in Chapter 1, it also testifies to the fact that a normatively open conversation (see Chapter 1) can be actualised.

**Constructing and conducting research questions**

Jennifer Mason proposes that using the concept of ‘intellectual puzzle’ as the basis of conducting a research is useful for helping researchers construct, clarify and proceed with their research puzzles (or questions) and projects. Intellectual puzzlement connects the ontological and epistemological positions of researchers, which are encapsulated in the project and grounded within the specific context of the project. There are four main types of intellectual puzzle: the ‘developmental puzzle’ aimed at understanding and explaining how and why x or y works; the ‘mechanical puzzle’, which is interested in how something works or is constituted (how x or y works and why it works this way); the ‘comparative puzzle’, indicating the interest of researchers in learning and explaining differences and similarities between x and y; and the ‘causal/predictive puzzle’, applied when researchers want to comprehend the influence x has on y or what causes x or y (Mason 2002: chapter 1).

When applied to this project these puzzles become the following:

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\(^2\) For a definition of this project of how agents acquire knowledge about their social world see the previous chapter, particularly the first and the third sections

Chapter 2: Qualitative Methodology and A Compatible Framework
- Developmental puzzle: how agents’ engaging activities, labelled here ‘East Asian Security Intellectual Networks’, are constructed, and who engages in these networks;

- Mechanical puzzle: how the process of network cohesion works (the intellectually and socially engaging process, or socialising process), and why it works that way;

- Causal/Predictive puzzle; what is the impact of the networking process on engaging and on regional security?

Two main groups of research questions have been formulated to address these puzzles within a more elaborate timeframe and a way of conducting the project. The first group of basic questions is not only concerned with uncovering who those active non-state agents are but was also concerned specifically with how they construct and expand their networking, engaging security matters through both non- and traditional understandings.

The second group is about assessing both their capabilities and their impact. 'Capabilities', which covers their abilities as changing-agents (regarded here as intellectual), are particularly derived from their (security-related) ideas. They also refer to social functions, namely, whether they are independent enough to initiate emancipatory change or are just part of their society and serve to reproduce the dominant concept of traditional security. As mentioned in the previous chapter, emancipatory change for this project refers to engaging/networking agents’ attempts to liberate a concept of security, dominated by a state-centric perspective, at a regional level.

'Impacts' concerns their impact upon the regional security and lead to observations regarding their respective identities and whether and how they have changed to become more collective as the communicating process continues. Experience gained from fieldwork urged this researcher to enlarge the scope of questions in order to shed more lights on agents’ perceptions towards their own regional socialising processes. These additional questions cover how they assess the success of existing networks, whether the relatively elitist and exclusive nature of their networks have any impact on their networking activities and the way they perceive their identity or identities.

These puzzles and research questions help one to find the way to limit the participating agents, to focus primarily on those in the ASEAN-ISIS, and those in the
JIIA and JCIE in Japan. These agencies appear to have successfully persuaded their governments to establish the ARF in 1993 and have encouraged others - like-minded and non like-minded alike - to join in the expanded network since 1994. Of course, their efforts in terms of creating and providing their ideas/perceptions and activities, did not come out of thin air. In order to decipher both development and mechanical puzzles more effectively, this thesis traced back to the earlier periods during which economists laid the ground for further co-operation (Soesastro 1995a, Morrison 1997, PECC 2005). This facilitated the establishment of ASEAN-ISIS in 1984, a fact that many active engaging agents point out. On this point, it is anticipated that the mechanical puzzle should play a significant part, in particular guiding the way to decipher to what extent the existing networks and activities function in the current milieu, trying to promote the concepts of ‘ASEAN Community’ and ‘East Asia Community’ as their next active movements.

As suggested in the Introduction, the causal/predictive puzzle has played a significant role in helping establish the themes for analysing the impact of the existing networking process. First, it is worth pondering several points: whether their sustaining and explanatory activities affect the engaging agents themselves; and whether they are independent enough to take a critical leading role in bringing change to security concepts and activities in the interests of better regional security.

It will then be necessary to discover more about whether their ideas/perceptions towards their own activities, identities and regional security have changed. In order to answer all of the related research questions, the framework in Chapter 1 offers a means for collecting, sorting out and analysing concerned data. As this project is fashioned after the ‘research wheel’, the last part will consist of reflections on the whole project, particularly the framework. In order to find answers to the aforementioned questions, content analysis will be employed as a core means of covering both textual and interview analyses. It is difficult to deny that by applying (qualitative) content analysis, this project is a subjective assessment of the content and value of the material applied to test hypotheses (Burnham et. al 2004: 236).

There are two connected hypotheses for this project constructed by this framework. First, the ideas and perceptions by agents of their surroundings, in terms

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3 Interviews (July 18th 2006 in Singapore, October 3rd and 27th 2006 in Bangkok, Thailand)
of regional security, can drive them to seek means of improvement. Second, an agent's function as a (critically) changing agent is bound (or constrained) by the ways in which he/she perceives his/her surroundings. The underlying intertwined hypothesis is that ‘agents’ shared ideas/perceptions lead to their intersubjective action to improve the regional security environment.

The framework set up in Chapter 1 helps construct a main theme for finding the required content from collected data, which will be sorted according to key concepts (agents’ ideas/perceptions, agents’ function as intellectuals, and agents’ engaging/networking activities). The process of charting and synthesising the original data and locating it within the above thematic framework involves an inspection of original terms, concepts and languages used within the collected data (Ritchie, Spencer and O’Conner 1006: 262). This means that reduction and ordering data are the keys to presenting analysed data.

Thematic analysis will help to systematically determine if there are any irregularities or regularities in terms of single words, themes or concepts. For this project, words and themes are seen to act as sign-posts, including the following: ideas/perceptions of regional surroundings, dialogues, socialising processes, comprehensive and/or alternative security, collective and/or regional identity. By employing such analysis, it is possible to clarify the conceptual categories that lead to the process of hypotheses testing and reformulating on the basis of the discovery of new relationships among data. Analysis will help (less subjectively) identify the process and meaning of interactive communication (Mostyn 1985).

In order to make content analysis more concrete, other forms of analyses (textual and interview) will be employed. As suggested in Chapter 1, texts produced by agents engaging with the networks’ activities are essential as sources for capturing their ideas/perceptions and/or reflections. Generally speaking, textual analysis refers to utilising deciphering processes of making meaning as a means of uncovering the social effects of texts. The interpretation of texts is a core element. What should not be overlooked here is that texts are produced according to the convention of documentary reality (Atkinson and Coffy 2006: 73). Thus, it is important to remind whosoever uses the documents that they should be understood in relation to both their production (authorship – particularly implied) and consumption (readership).

Flick, who explains this point cogently, sees texts as world making. They can, he claims, be comprehended by acknowledging three mimetic elements: as
transforming experiences and/or ideas of person being studied in narrative form; awareness of the construction of texts on the basis of previous elements when researchers interpret them; and feeding back those interpretations into everyday contexts (when reading the presentation of this finding). Flick’s argument is that people who read and interpret written texts are involved in the construction of their reality (Flick 1998: chapter 3). This approach is compatible with the current project. Agents produce numerous forms of texts, particularly proceedings from their conferences and workshops including monographs of their special events. These are employed here as a meaningful source material to help to decipher their (social) world and to realise their preferences.

To be more precise, discourse analysis will also provide a guiding means through textual analysis, particularly in the sections concerning agents’ action and representation, which appear in texts as well as interviews. Discourse analysis also provides a way to understand the multi-functional quality of texts: enacting social relations between participants; connecting parts of text together; and connecting texts with their situational contexts (Fairclough 2003: chapter 1). Connected with each other, text and context act as a gate-way to comprehend the actions of intellectual agents, representations, and identification. They are dialectically discernible from the social practices of agents, which (for this project) can be traced through their produced texts and interviews (Fairclough 2003: chapter 2). In other words, discourse analysis, which provides the meaning of ‘articulation’ as it refers to managing and combining different elements into a new identity, is understood here as a complementary and useful means of comprehending the actions and interactions of agents in forging and maintaining their group or networks (Howarth 1995: 115-133).

The main sources of texts for this project are secondary and tertiary documents, directly and/or indirectly related to its scope, according to the categorisation of Burnham, Gilbert, Grant and Layton-Henry (2004: 165-188). The former (secondary) are documents produced by members of ASEAN-ISlIS and its Japanese counterparts, JIIA and JCIE. The main sources for this group are the Asia Pacific Roundtable (APR) proceedings conferences papers and ASEAN-ISlIS Monitor (terminated in 1997).

Other documents include monographs and reports produced for specific occasions. The ‘Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003’ and the ‘2004 Japan-ASEAN Security Project: 1st Workshop for Team of Experts Report’ published by
JIIA (whose *Japan Review of International Affairs* terminated in 1997) are significant sources, along with proceedings from international conferences such as ‘Global ThinkNet Paris Conference 1999: The Role of Civil Society in Domestic and International Governance’ and the ‘Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Health and Human Security – Moving from the concept to action’ published by JCIE.

For the purposes of this thesis, priority will be given to papers and articles published by institutions whose activities have been active throughout the periods of this study. These institutions are the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which is a secretariat of ASEAN-ISIS (at the time of conducting this research project), and the Malaysian Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), which was a central organizer for the APR before ASEAN-ISIS took a leading role. The former publishes *Indonesian Quarterly*. Other less active institutions include the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) and the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand. The publications by the Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS) also offer useful data covering the whole of Southeast Asia.

These prioritised sources of data also include related web-page content from the aforementioned institutions’ official websites, linkage websites created for special events, namely, their network-establishment anniversaries, ASEAN official website, foreign ministry websites of key actors’ countries, and national/international news agency websites. In order to competently access important documents and data, these sources, which present the ideas and activities of intellectuals, will also be scrutinised, along with articles and books published by other sources including materials produced by Japanese and Western sources.

**Active Interviews/Conversations**

Interviews are valuable for generating and collecting more precise data. Particularly important is finding an appropriate technique to elicit the reflections of agents on their personal ideas/perceptions and experiences engendered by their activities in a network. Interviews are essential to analysis, especially questions about whether their engaging experiences have in any way impacted on their ideas/perceptions and the ways in which they think about their identities or identity.

In order to facilitate the process, this project will apply an elite interviewing strategy based on a semi-structured style - what Nigel Fielding and Hilary Thomas
(2001: 144) call a ‘non-standardised or unstructured interview’. The word ‘elite’ here does not precisely refer to interviewees’ socioeconomic backgrounds; it will be assumed that they are socio-economically better placed than their country fellows. Rather, 'elite' refers to interviewees’ experiences as experts (Leech 2002b) in engaging activities within the periods chosen for this study.

This appropriately focused style will help in the gathering of more in-depth information about ideas, attitudes and experiences. This can only occur fully after both sides (researchers and respondents) pass through a ‘rapport’ period, establishing a friendly attitude towards each other (Leech 2002b). It is this rapport period that facilitated the researcher to extend interview sessions naturally, specifically when basic information regarding this project was given in an informal way. That means this researcher gained more time for interviews than expected. It also smoothly paved the way to turn interview sessions into friendly conversations (see related concept below). Moreover, most of the senior interviewees used this period to exchange general views covering many topics, including current situations in Thailand and studying PhD courses in the United Kingdom in particular. ‘Guided questions’ not only help researchers to apply their techniques of probing and prompting more easily, but also generate chances for respondents to provide their information in a relaxed and informal way (Burnham et al 2004, Devine 1995, Fielding and Thomas 2001: 211-217).

The term ‘active interview’ suggests that meaning, derived from the interactive process, is not constantly reformulated anew but reflects relatively enduring local conditions such as the research topics of the interviewer, biographical particulars, and local ways of orienting these topics. This type of interactive interviewing process is based on practical reasoning, defined as interpretive practice involving respondent and interviewer as they articulate ongoing interpretive structures, resources, and orientations (Holstein and Gubrium 1995: chapter 2).

Robert G. Burgess (1995: chapter 5) proposes that the interview should be regarded as a ‘conversation’ helping researchers to gain access to situations that through time, place, or situation are closed for them. Put another way, the interview is essential for gaining access to the biographies of individuals, and for obtaining details of situations that the researcher has not witnessed, but which may be of vital interest to her/him.
It may be that details of the backgrounds of prominent interviewees come to be revealed in interviews, a factor that may prove useful not only for comprehending the ideas, attitudes and actions of interviewees, but also for cross-checking information gathered from other interviewees.\(^4\) It is essential particularly regarding the elusive evolution of networking activities in Southeast Asia and attempts to stretch beyond the region. Guided by this technique, Chapters 3 and 4 are not only constructed according to the periods of time concerning networking/engaging agents’ main activities, but also according to their areas of interests. Chapter 3 emphasises economic aspects which are closely related to engaging agents’ preferred concept of comprehensive security, whilst Chapter 4 expressed engaging agents’ extended interests to a more traditional sense of security, directly related to policies of regional states, which used to be regarded as taboo topics. Yet, the extended topics, such as transnational migration and drug trafficking which flourished again after the 1997 financial crisis, could be considered as part of the concept of comprehensive security.

G. Mishler’s (1986: chapter 2) proposal regarding how to conduct interviews seems compatible with the above technique, although he is more precise about the ways in which the interview should proceed. Mishler sees it as a ‘speech event’, in which the interviewer and respondent attempt to ‘fit’ their questions and responses to each other and to develop discourses. Following Mishler and Burgess, the current work aims to pay close attention to all of the linguistic and paralinguistic features appearing routinely and naturally during the talk and to systematically eschew standard written texts. Indeed, paralinguistic features during many interviews, specifically related to questions regarding at which scale of satisfaction (from 1—the least to 10—the most) that they want to put by their own judgment, signified their uncertainty. These features helped this researcher to probe more questions in order to re-check about their perceptions regarding their experiences on regional socialising processes. Generally, their placements seemed high (even at 7-8 in some cases) but their facial expressions seemed to tell another story.

Moreover, transcription should be carefully done in order to make it reflect, and be sensitive to, as many queries and uncertainties surrounding the research questions as possible. It is crucial to focus on the relations between meaning and

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\(^4\) Experiences from interviews (July 5\(^{th}\) and 14\(^{th}\) 2006 in Singapore, August 28\(^{th}\) and September 14\(^{th}\) 2006 in Tokyo, Japan and October 3\(^{rd}\) 2006 in Bangkok, Thailand)
speech, but not at the expense of ignoring the limitations of the data employed. The contextual meaning of (verbal) data that appears throughout the interviewing process should also be counted.

What is interesting about regarding interviews as purposeful and creative conversations is that it empowers the respondents. This implies accepting that they not only speak in their own voices and tell their own stories, but also understand that their interests are respected. This project will be structured along the lines of a radical transformation of the power relationship between interviewer and interviewees. The latter will not simply be regarded as passive informants, as entities answering only what is asked. They will be accepted as active and contributing participants who occupy an equal footing. For this project they are ‘research collaborators’ (at best) or (active) ‘informants’ (at worst), as Mishler (1986) proposes.5

By regarding interviewees as research collaborators, it is anticipated that they will become aware of the interpretative terrain at hand in which their ability to 'storytell' offers an orientation. They will provide ‘theoretically coherent’ descriptions, accounts, and explanations. In other words, they will be treated as agents capable of improvising upon and/or speaking about, informational and interactive challenges that may spontaneously arise during the interviewing process (Holstein and Gubrium 1995: chapter 3). Stephen K. Tagg emphasises that the three essential entities for the life-story interview (regarded here as the agents’ reflections on their ideas/perceptions and experiences derived from their engaging activities with the networks) are events, actions and places (Tagg 1985: 165).

For this project, interviewing provides a helpful means of comprehending an agent’s own reflections about his/her or their preferred concept of comprehensive security. In addition, it is important to uncover how he/she evaluates his/her own activities. Both their concepts and activities to some extent are affected by global and regional circumstances. In other words, the improvisation and modification of

5 Elliot G. Mishler (1986) argues that there are three pairs of relationships between the interviewers and respondents that can radically transform the power relation (previously accepted that the former is superior and the latter is oppressed inferior). The first is 'informants and reporters'. This pair seems to credit the respondents rather than the interviewers while the second pair, ‘research collaborators’, and seems to accept them on an equal footing. The third pair, ‘learners/actors and advocates’, seems to favour the first more than the other two since the researchers are those who learn from the respondents and try their best to support the respondents’ ideas and performances (chapter 5).
information through interviews are crucial for effectively comprehending ideational factors in perceptions and activities.

**Interview Questions**

Burgess and Mason provide sound methods of transforming research questions into more practical interview questions. Burgess proposes three styles of questions that may help researchers to achieve their goals. The first is *descriptive*, allowing informants to provide statements about their activities; the second is *structural*, attempting to ascertain how informants organise their knowledge; and the third is *contrast*, allowing informants to discuss the meaning of situations and providing an opportunity for comparing and contrasting situations and events in the informants’ world(s) (Burgess 200: chapter 5).

Mason offers a seven-step guideline for circular-style qualitative research. The first step is to set up comprehensive research questions, based on the researcher’s ontological position. This project is based upon a constructivist-styled position. The second is to translate the previous material into a mini-research question, being aware of a researcher’s epistemological standpoint. Knowledge, as understood in this project, is no less than a social product. The third step concerns the possible interview topics and questions. The fourth is to cross reference back to the second and the first steps. The fifth and sixth steps (following on from the third step) are to set up a loose interview structure or format, including standardising questions (as shown below). The last is to cross reference back to the third step (Mason 2002: 72). This project is based on interview questions created as a set of guidelines for the semi-structured component, based on what Burgess and Mason suggest and with particular attention to the fifth and sixth steps due to their reflective and open characteristics.

For the first puzzle, the questions are as follows: How do the interviewees perceive global/regional (and/or domestic) security? Where did the idea of constructing and/or engaging the networks (particularly ASEAN-ISIS and its Japanese counterparts) stem from?

The second puzzle: How do they construct, sustain, and expand their networks? Have they gained cohesion from the socialising process? This is also related to the question of identity in the third puzzle. Have they changed their ideas regarding security, particularly pertaining to regional scope, during the socialising process? If so, why?
Questions pertinent to the third puzzle include the following: What social role(s) or function(s) do they think (or claim) that they have been playing/fulfilling? What are their perceptions vis-à-vis their relationships with their particular governments? Do they think of themselves as a group? How do they define themselves? How do they perceive their impact (derived from their ideas and/or performances) upon regional security and/or regarding the general situation? How do other people see them, particularly the officials who may or may not transmit their ideas and/or proposals into policy? Why do they see them in this/these particular way/s?

Most of the potential interviewees were members and/or intellectuals engaging with the activities of the institutions forging the networks, particularly those from the SIIA, the Indonesian CSIS, the Malaysian and the Thai ISIS, the JIIA, and the JCIE, who formed the first group of interviewees. The second consisted of officers from Thailand and Japan, mainly due to limited access to bureaucratic systems of other countries (for example Indonesia and Malaysia), and partly due to inconvenient times for appointments (specifically in the case of Singapore). It was anticipated that they could help to clearly decipher the third puzzle, particularly with regard to questions as to whether and to what degree the ideas, actions and interactions of these intellectuals impacted upon regional security, their respective countries’ policies, and ASEAN’s policies. In order to enlarge the numbers of interviewees for a further selective focused group, a ‘snowballing’ technique was also applied; namely, magnifying related-focus groups for further interviews by using respondents’ personal networks (Aber 2001, Devine 1995: 141-146).

**Impressions gained during the field work**

The first impression gained from my various periods of field work conducted in Singapore, Thailand, Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia was that utilising connections, (friends and friends of friends) is essential for getting access to key interviewees. This researcher strongly agrees with Kenneth Goldstein that ‘it would be foolish not to take advantage of any points of access that one has’ (Goldstein 2002: 671). However, it was difficult to gain access to foreign ministries, Japan was an unusual case for this study due to the character and background of the JIIA, which played a key part. Affiliated with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the JIIA’s funds - and (some) members of its staff are supported by - MOFA, which means staff
positions have to be rotated. Yet, there are few staff members working in the area of academic research. Interviews were conducted with both staff and visiting researchers, aided by the aforementioned connections that helped this researcher gain access to MOFA circles, specifically through the networks of the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee (JFEC).

Official letters of introduction were necessary for conducting interviews although they may not have been sufficient to persuade some high-ranking officers to oblige a PhD candidate, specifically in the case of the Japanese interviewees. Some professors connected with the Thai Foreign Ministry agreed to be interviewed. This kind of connection paved the way for a natural rapport, particularly when interviewees could refer back to other interviewees with whom this researcher had conducted and completed interview sessions. The natural rapport that developed during interview-sessions followed by that which developed during conversations made further probing less intrusive or apparently less intrusive (Leech 2002: 667-668). The key interviewees helped this researcher form specific questions around how they gauged the success of existing networks and how they defined collective identity which are essential as complementary to clearly set-up questions. They are parts of guiding questions for Chapter 4 which also provide analytical content for Chapter 5.

By seeking further clarification one can identify a speaker’s methods of using categories and activities to gauge the existing networks. It is a 'round-about' way of identifying the (cultural) knowledge and logic being applied. Carolyne Baker (2006: 164, 175) argues that ‘what we hear and attend to in these interview accounts are members’ methods for putting together a world that is recognisably familiar, orderly and moral’. Reflecting upon how interviewees move through these processes not only provided usefulful information for the analysis, but also led to further reflection on the framework being applied. It became clear that it was necessary to enlarge it to accommodate the concept of trust, as examined below.

For information about events and persons, the snowballing technique led this researcher to a large group of informative interviewees, specifically in Singapore and

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6 Fortunately, in the case of the Japanese interviewees, Japanese nationals, particularly those who shared a similar academic background, having received post-graduate degrees from the United Kingdom, were really helpful in facilitating the interview process.
Indonesia. Some interviewees derived from this technique invited this researcher to observe their own conference and to mingle with their group when socially ‘informal’ talks took place. From interview-sessions in Singapore, one of the key informants asked his secretary to find space to invite this researcher to join the IDSS annual conference regarding the role of security experts and regional security. He even went straight to ask the director of the IDSS for a signature so that this researcher could join the event for free, since the organizer was already clear all money was paid for the registration. Illness at that time forced this researcher to be unable to attend. There was no close relationship (in general) between the observer’s presence and the place accorded the observer by the ‘other’ a situation that ethnographical researchers might encounter (Baszanger and Dochier 2006: 21). Nevertheless, it was an interesting social space that helped this researcher (and perhaps others also) to identify and reconstruct the perspectives and patterns of action and interaction that are part of diversely social world (Miller and Fox 2006: 38).

There are some particular observations worth mentioning here. There was some reservation in participants who did not express their greetings freely, especially the current heads of member institutions of ASEAN-ISIS and earlier members. Some leading participants seemed to question the presence of a researcher. Ironically, the head of the Thai-ISIS and some of the institutions previous members seemed agitated with the presence of this researcher. The previous director of the institution came to the rescue by saying that it was she who had invited the researcher. However, the tension subsided when a very senior member of the Indonesian-CSIS said that he had made an appointment with me from our previous interview-sessions in Jakarta. He stated clearly that he wanted me to have first-hand experience of the ASEAN-ISIS style of conference. Moreover, he also offered to help this researcher to secure more appointments with ASEAN-ISIS members, specifically the senior ones who had encouraged the success of the networks. These experienced agents (at least those having more experience than the current head, at the time of conducting this project) tried their best to encourage this researcher and other invited

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7 Although some leaders of institutions – members of ASEAN-SISI – were aware of my presence as an observing researcher, most of the participants were not. Thus the situation allowed me to distance myself somewhat from the general participants.

8 The IDSS 10th Anniversary Conference on The Nature of Policy Relevant Knowledge in Asian Security Affairs (5-6 August 2006, Sentosa Spa and Resort, Singapore)
guests that their networks were inclusive. Also from the same conference, the head of the Philippines’ ISDS invited this researcher to participate in a conference organised by the ISDS that might persuade this project to scrutinise more about the relationships between the ASEAN-ISIS and its activities regarding track-III. Unfortunately, the short notice for the conference was not compatible with the schedule of this project. Nevertheless, the outcome of a slightly discomforting event at the Thai-ISIS conference was that many participants exchanged views with the researcher regarding how networking activities could be more inclusive provided that leading participants expressed exclusive and distinct attitudes. These observations were somewhat similar to those of the younger participants interviewed both before and after the mentioned conference took place.

James A. Holstein and Faber F. Gubrium (2006: 142-143) opine that interviews are a collaborative accomplishment, involving participants in meaning-making work in the process. This is difficult to deny given that the researcher is often personally part of this meaning-making work. Discourse analysis, based on the theme set up in Chapter 1, is helpful on this point, particularly when analysing conversation has fundamentally gone through a form of interaction that Sue Wilkinson (2006: 188) refers to as ‘talk-in-interaction’. According to what has been said thus far, cognitive phenomena are simply parts of social practices (Potter 2006: 216).

In other words, the intersubjective meaning-making is still at the core. But it is not the sole analysis. With its connections with both an analysis of action and a context management, conversational analysis can be effectively analysed in a sequence of actions. It can be undertaken by applying three steps: being responsive to context by producing a ‘next’ action; the creation of context by producing that next action; and the showing of understanding by these means (Heritage 2006: 231-234). Employing a prompting technique is not only compatible with the way conversations go but is also helpful for the researcher to reflectively analyse interaction. Emphasis on interaction can be regarded as a way of validating the unfolding information; what Perakyla (2006: 291) calls validation through the ‘next turn’. This means that the interactants display their interpretations of what is going on to each other, especially what was going on in the immediately preceding turn of talk. Reflecting upon these sequences helps one construct observations, starting from observing participants, their interaction with each other, their surroundings, and their actions and interactions related to the existence and observations of the researcher.
Accepting that the researcher is part of this meaning-making work requires one to reflect upon one’s own experiences in the field. Suffice to say that an active sense of interviewing brings one to a narrative resources and orientation of the interviewees. It is the way to understand the rotating role between being a speaker and a listener. Their insights and the methods they use to describe the meanings derive from the particular social world of which they are a part; namely, their 'habitus' (Mitler and Glassner 2006: 134). Holstein and Gubrium’s (2006: 156) suggestion regarding ‘de-constructing’ interviews/conversations to show the reader how both the ‘hows’ and ‘whats’ of the narrative of their lived experiences are formed is also helpful.

For the data presentation, after applying a set up framework, the illustration is divided into two parts. The first is the main content of Part II, which consists of two chapters aimed at clarifying my first hypothesis. The second is related to the notion that agents’ ideas/perceptions of their surroundings (regional security in this case) drive them to find ways to better them.

**Data Presentation after Applying the Framework**

It is necessary to clarify that engaging in argument, following Mason, means the construction of a perspective, an interpretation, or a line of a reasoning analysis. It is a relational process in which researchers continually think about engaging with those with whom the argument is being made and the ground upon which they base the argument (Mason 2002: 173). Apropos of the former, this thesis aims to address those who have been engaged in intellectual networking within the East Asia region. It is anticipated that this academic project will illustrate that (on-going) reflection will illuminate the significance of the philosophical and sociological grounds of being part of the communicative-action projects.

Tracing back to the way this project was set up, Part II provides some answers to the developmental and mechanical puzzles. To be more precise, Chapter 3 looks back at the 1960s, a time during which networking facilities were starting to emerge as a result of economic efforts. Later, the facilitation of socialising provided a fertile ground for the establishment of ASEAN-ISIS in 1984. Also within this time span, the Japanese launched the concept of ‘comprehensive security’, which allowed them to have more space for conducting flexible foreign policies in the region. Chapter 3
concludes at the initially ascending period of networking between 1984-1991, which culminated in the inception of both the ARF and CSCAP.

The illustration continues in Chapter 4 and comprises two related sections. The first deals with questions of to what extent and in what ways did ASEAN-ISIS engage with its Japanese counterparts. It also analyses how they were successful in persuading ASEAN governments and the other non/like-minded individuals to ‘come on board’. The second section deals with the slow progress of the networks, until the revitalising projects such as the promotion of the ‘ASEAN Community’ and the ‘East Asia Community’ emerged. This part aims to show that these two projects were not only compatible but well connected due to the intentions and efforts of the networks-engaging agents, who seemed to share the experiences, ideas and visions of their region(s).

The focus of the last part is upon reflective analysis. It starts with a brief review of how agents’ ideas/perceptions towards their surroundings, specifically their global and regional contexts, help them to construct and persist in consuming their preferred concept of comprehensive security. By doing so, it highlights the significance of ideational factors upon agents’ networking activities. In order to determine whether or not and how changing contexts affect the thematic content of their networking activities, it provides figures to help magnify these points (see Chapter 5). The main reflection will be drawn from engaging agents’ experiences gathered during interviews. It then proceeds with the question of whether their expanded networks have had any impact on their function and status. In particular it seeks to determine whether they are independent enough to take a critical leading role in bringing change to security concepts and activities.

In the final section, the main content drawn from the aforementioned analyses helps to reflect on the weak and strong points of the framework for better revision, specifically in order to accommodate the concept of trust. The observation is that trust is a social-foundation concept, which is normally presupposed without clear definition. It is accepted that due to the limited space and scope of the original project it cannot be dealt with more extensively than already done so in Chapters 1 and 5. It is anticipated that reflecting on the original framework, and indeed upon the whole project, should serve to energise and revitalise the notion that communicative action is a helpful starting point for understanding track II’s activities in East Asia. It could also lead to better change, should it have the chance to prosper.
Part II: Constructing and Sustaining East Asian (Security) Intellectual Networks

Chapter 3
Constructing East Asia (Security) Intellectual Networks

The 1990s was a vibrant decade that witnessed the inception of many international fora as consultative and co-operative organs. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) are cases in point. To a great extent they are regarded as the results of numerous co-operative efforts of what is termed here ‘East Asia (Security) Intellectual Networks’. They represent mingling networks of state-representatives and non-state agents, who seek to engage in improving their regional security. The latter are emphasised in this thesis, particularly the co-operation between those from ASEAN countries and Japan, whose efforts to no small degree helped to establish the aforementioned fora. It becomes even more interesting when the region is perceived as being dominated by state-centric activities.

The main focus of this chapter is as illustrating the origins, processes, and activities that have helped to shape these networks. In order to achieve this, the chapter will follow the path established by the framework set up in Chapter 1. In other words, it will attempt to reconstruct agents’ historical contexts (specifically at global and regional levels, including domestic), particularly addressing the political and economic spheres. The historical context is regarded here as the inspiration for an agent’s actions which are structured by their perception on their regional security and social surroundings. This interplay process helps agents determine whether their regional security structure can be transformed as suggested by networking literature reviewed in Chapter 1.

Within this discursive space, the interplay process, traces of internal logics of Habermas’s theory of communicative action can be discerned. The logic, for this project, is: truth about regional security of engaging/networking agents; their moral rightness expressed by having no precise solutions for every conflict before joining networking activities; and their sincerity to learn to know each other and to compromise by accepting shared principles. The most commonly accepted principle is their mutual understanding to improve their regional security. It is anticipated that
placing more emphasis on regional context will prove an essential means of unravelling the ways in which agents generate and maintain their networks.

With the above concerns in mind, this chapter is structured chronologically using the inception of the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) in 1984 as its point of departure. The first time frame presented here will be traced back to regional activities in the 1960s, a starting decade that saw the formation of international economic and political fora (or organisations), which have provided fertile ground for the inception of intellectual networks. Their legacies help one comprehend the networking activities in later periods. Although some concrete platforms (specifically in the political realm, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in particular, due to the changed environment – more discussion of which later) have already fallen, both the engaging and networking experiences have endured. The spill-over effects seem to be expressed in somewhat fluctuating content in terms of regional security and politics.

The main body of this chapter focuses on the 1980s as a result of the creation of the ASEAN-ISIS. Economic and political activities came to be linked with non-traditional security, although the state/military-centric focus looms large. Also within the same period the idea of ‘comprehensive security’ was established in Japan, allowing it to be more easily accommodated by its ASEAN counterparts. This chapter mainly provides information concerning who those intellectual-networking agents are, and how they perceive and interact with their surroundings.

The last section of this chapter addresses more specifically their security concepts and related activities, most of which – in the case of this thesis - occurred between 1984 and 1991. It was during this period that new elusive ideas were carefully and gradually aired; then transformed into the inception of the ARF and the CSCAP as illustrated in the next chapter. The guiding questions for this chapter are drawn from both the first and the second groups of research questions. These questions cover who those active state- and non-state engaging agents were, how they constructed and expanded their engaging/networking activities, did these engaging agents share similar ideas on security, and how the process of network cohesion worked and why it worked out that way.

The contradictory and uncertain regional context before 1984

Politics-led state activities and economics-led private activities

Chapter 3: Constructing East Asian (Security) Networks
Tracing back through regional contemporary history, East Asian countries have experienced contradictory and uncertain phenomena. To a great extent they have acted as catalysts for contextual change affecting agents’ perceptions of their surroundings, enabling and/or constraining agents’ activities, derived from an interacting process, the context of which has also changed. It is this interaction that will be narrated here. In terms of trying to break free from a confined space, the foundation of the interacting process has been globally ideological conflict. Irrespective of whether it was expected or not expected, the interacting process helped to generate overt regional experiences of networking. It was more explicitly successful in economic rather than political fields as early as the 1960s.

Washington’s sweat, energy, and strategies, especially what is referred to as its ‘hub-and-spoke’ approach, must be acknowledged. Together, it helped to establish what Peter J. Katzenstein (2005) calls the 'American Imperium accentuated in the globalising era by American soft-power' (as seen in the domination of American cultural products) (Nye 1990). Whether intentionally or not, American efforts have provided fertile ground for domestic and regional actors. The earlier period (specifically two decades after World War II) was a space in which would-be engaging/networking agents (both governmental and non-governmental) could assert their concerns, although initially they faced limitations.

To be more precise, Washington’s containment policy and its ability to almost solely shoulder all responsibilities provided great chances for countries in the region to concentrate on their domestic difficulties, such as activities that included reaching out and co-operating so that they could ease their problems and establish better positions for themselves. Most of these countries were young nation-states whose nation-building processes were unfolding. These included Thailand even though it had never been colonised and was less devastated by World War II than other nations in the region. For these young-nation states ‘Third World countries’ threats came mostly from within, particularly when the core values of the regime were often at extreme variance (authoritarian rules) with the core values cherished by large

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1 Provided that ancient Asian merchants’ networks are included, the history might be traced back to the Medieval Age or earlier. Kazuo Furuta (1997) points out that at least Asian Merchants’ networks carrying Europe goods (cotton in particular) appeared in the late 19th century. Shanghai as the centre extended its reach in various directions, not only within main land boundaries but also within western Japan (Nagasaki and Kobe) and Korea (Inchon and Pusan).
segments of the population, who preferred more democratic rule, over whom they ruled (Ayood 1986: 11). Global, regional, and domestic contexts, specifically in East Asia that was full of these young nation states, for the would-be engaging/networking agents were neither helpful nor encouraging, but challenging as agents’ initial structure for thought and interaction.

Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia faced different consequences from American security domination. For Japan, although the Korean War in the first half of the 1950s made it feel insecure, American intervention indicated that Washington was reliable. But the Japanese had to accept this 'security' at their own expense, by shouldering American bases and gradually increasing shares of their national defense expenses whilst at the same time expanding their economic interests into Asia. Indeed, it was ‘economic diplomacy or keizai gaiko’ which was the key to Japan’s approach termed ‘Yoshida Doctrine’² (Mendle 1995: Introduction). It not only helped Japan to accumulate wealth and regain international recognition but also enabled it to exercise its leadership based on the moral and universal values of democracy, peace, and participation, embedded in America's Constitution (Drift 1980, Edstrom 1999: chapters 1 and 15, Nakanishi 2001).

The 1960s were significant for understanding the emergence of co-operative trends at various levels (state, sub-state, and inter-state) in the region, which helped construct a primary structure for agents’ thought and interactions. Due to fewer domestic difficulties, Japan now had a better chance to provide energetic contributions. In fact, this whole period was a time of ascension for Japan. Many movements from both official and non-official efforts flourished. The role played by the Japanese could not be ignored, specifically as co-operative organisers and/or facilitators and even fund-givers. This was a period in which both the Japanese and the world so appreciated the story of Japan’s rapid economic success that they wanted results of that success to be shared by others. The Japanese, both government and the people, whether they were state- or non-state agents, explicitly directed their intentions and interests towards Asia-Pacific to share their good fortunes. Whether

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² Yoshida Shigeru, the first post-World War II Japanese Prime Minister (1946-1947, 1948-1954), announced that in order to rebuild the war-devastated country, emphasis should be first placed on economic and social reconstruction within the parameter of the new Constitution. The other two emphases were: the creation of a strong economy based on the belief that economic strength and technological achievement was the key to future power and influence in the world; and a decision to rely on the US for security matters (Edstrom 1999: chapter 2).
their internationally outward performance should be considered as the way to mitigate their neighbours’ bad memories regarding Japan’s World War II legacies or not, is not the main focus of this writing. The point is to propose that the economic success and the energetic movements because of it provided ample facilitating environment for the flourishing of regional engaging/networking activities.

Ikeda Hayato, who was Japan’s Prime Minister in the early 1960s, accentuated the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ by implementing a clearer cut between the economic and the political (Seki bunri). This distinction was the result of turmoil due to the revision of the Security Treaty. Ikeda also increased the country's interests in Asian policy by emphasising that Japan’s prosperity and peace were closely linked to that of Asia. He aired to the (then) Australian leader his concern over Indonesia's hostile policy (Konfrontasi or Confrontation) towards its neighbouring countries (Walton 2006).

Morinosuke Kajima, a businessman and politician (LDP), observed the same trend. Unfortunately, his proposal to establish a Pan-Pacific organisation aimed at administering a Marshall Plan-type of Asia Development Fund (to a large degree sponsored by the Japanese government) attracted no serious attention (Soesastro 1983b: 181, Rezasyah 1996).

The movements in the Japanese private sector were energetic, although they still followed the government's clumsy lead. The cooperation of the five states (at government-to-government level) was highlighted in 1963 by (a non-governmental agent) Saburo Okita of the Japan Economic Research Centre (JERC), who proposed

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3 Japan’s Asian policy (especially related to China) can be traced back earlier than Japan’s first stage of Modernisation (from the Meiji period until the country's devastating defeat in 1945). Wolf Mendle explains that in the early period, most policies reflected the fluctuation and alteration between acceptances of their inferior status vis-à-vis the Chinese court and a certain show of independence with a hint of equality. In the Tokukawa era (1603-1868), Chinese philosophy cast spells on Japanese self-consciousness. But, in the late era up to early modernization, the Japanese acquired a concept of unique national identity Nihonjiron) within the encompassing of Chinese-civilisation and response to rivalries in world politics. Japanese self-assertiveness over other Asian countries seemed to accumulate over time up to August 1945 (Mendle 1995: chapter 2).

4 It might be difficult to deny the relationship between Okita’s idea of Pacific’s cooperation and a ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’. He used to participate in a Showa-juku (Showa Institute), a private school established by the Showa Kenkyukai (Showa Research Society) headed by Prince Fumimaro Konoe (who was prime minister three times between 1937 and 1941). It was Showa Kenkyukai that generated the ideas about an East Asian Cooperative Body and a New Order in East Asia, which were the founding stones for the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (Wood 1993: 38). He was a Director of Japan’s Economic Planning Bureau in the early 1960s, and was one of three Asian economists who had undertaken an ESCAFE (the former name of ESCAPE) study of ‘Regional Economic Cooperation’ in 1961 (Soesastro 1983a: 17).
the idea through a report entitled ‘Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Area’ (Wood 1993: 38). Together with Kiyoshi Kojima of Hitotsubashi University, and his colleague Hiroshi Kurimoto, they undertook numerous discussions with their university colleagues and business persons who were interested in their ideas, focusing on common interests in economic relations, transportation, communication and cultural exchange. Finally, during the JERC’s first international conference in November 1965, Kojima proposed the formation of a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) (Rezasyah 1996, Borthwick 2005). Two years later, several Japanese business groups (mostly bankers and industrialists), together with groups from Australia, enlarged their bilateral meeting to be more inclusive. New participants were from Canada, New Zealand and the United States. These joint activities saw the emergence of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) (Borthwick 2005).

Fortunately, Okita and Kojima received a good response from Tokyo in terms of finance and supporting policy. In 1967, Miki Takeo (who was then Foreign Minister) announced the ‘Asia-Pacific Policy’ which decreed that Japan should contribute to the amelioration of the North-South problem in Asia by using economic development as a means of removing the causes underpinning ongoing regional

5 Wood (1993) pointed out that Kojima received his impressions and inspiration from the 1964 East-West Center conference in Honolulu on ‘Economic Cooperation for Development and Trade in the Pacific’ together with his experiences from working on regional economic co-operation with one of the big names in the field: Bela Balassa (pp. 41-42).

6 Gaimusho (Foreign Ministry) sponsored tours to various places opening up a significant chance for Kojima to meet potential friends, like-minded colleagues supporting the idea of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation: Peter Drysdale and John Crawford from Australia; Frank Holmes from New Zealand; H. Edward English from Canada; Howard P. Jones, Harry G. Johnson and Hugh T. Patrick from the United States (Wood 1993: 42).

7 The prestigious Keizei Doyukai (Committee for Economic Development): the audience signified its importance. Policy was based on: an ‘awareness of common principles’; regional corporaton in Asia; cooperation among advanced nations within the Pacific area; and more extensive programmes (Soesastro 1983a: 18). This could be regarded as a good chance for Japan to restart the unsuccessful series of Ministerial Conference for the Development of Southeast Asia, known as SEADMIC and SEAMCED through which it wanted to promote ideas of a regional cooperative institution. A ministerial conference centered on the economic development of Southeast Asia, the MEDSEA (from 1967 regarded as founding members of ASEAN countries) took place in Tokyo in April 1966. It was the first time after the war that Japan convened an international conference with no prior notice given to the United States. From 1960 to the mid-1970s, the Japanese government initiated and supported many organizations: the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC) and the Southeast Asian Agency for Regional Transport and Communications (SEATAC) in 1968; the Asian Pacific Coconut Community in 1969; the Study Group for Asian Tax Administration and Research (SGATAR) in 1971; the Southeast Asian Promotion Centre for Trade, Investment, and Tourism (SEAPCENTRE) in 1972; and the Southeast Asia Log Producers Association in 1974 (Mendle 1995: 105, Rezasyah 1996).

A consultative and co-operative style of engagement operated within regional security and the political arenas which the Japanese had successfully joined and helped to organise. The establishment of the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC) in 1964 provided them with just such a chance to practice and promote their regionally consultative and co-operative skills. Although it had a short life (terminated in 1975 after the fall of Saigon), C. W Braddick (2006: 36, 39) and David Walton (2006: 23-24) claim that there can be little doubt that it built up a sense of community and consciousness of common interests and objectives among members. Its success was based on the level of intimacy and frankness in dialogue, although it was intangible and less spectacular. Here Japan’s leadership was famous for developing consultation in a relaxed and informal atmosphere.

Also within this period, the emergence of non-governmental networking fora was discernable. Although the Japanese shared an essential role as co-operative organisers and/or facilitators and even fund-givers, earlier fora were inspired by prominent American figures. The ‘Williamsburg Conference’ (initiated in 1956) was an early case in point under the aegis of the Asia Society (based in New York and supported by John D. Rockefeller III) (Taylor, Milner and Ball 2006: 46-47). The Dartmouth Conference (supported by the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation) was initiated as a result of co-operation between non-governmental agents from America and Japan. Edwin O. Reischauer (who was the American Ambassador to Japan in 1961-1966) also played a part in persuading Tokusaburo Kosaka (a prominent Japanese iron industrialist) to provide for the Shimoda Conference. Starting in 1967, the Dartmouth Conference became a sphere in which eminent officers, politicians (such as Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was later Japan's Prime Minister in 1982-1987), and business persons (such as Akio Morita of Sony Corp) mingled together (Yamamoto 1994).

Apropos of the countries of Southeast Asia, the first two decades after World War II (the mid-1950s to mid-1960s) were 'adventurous' to say the least. On the one hand, there were attempts to establish regional organisations. Before the mid 1950s,
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established under American aegis. Despite its name, only Thailand and the Philippines were true regional members. When London announced its intention to withdraw from the East of Suez in 1956, its lack of efficiency was accentuated. Its inefficiency was due to the refusal of a potential regional country (namely Indonesia) to become a member. This was also a main reason underpinning the success of the less relevant Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) comprising Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Yet the thwarting of MAPHILINDO, comprising Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, was attributable to a different reason, namely Indonesia’s aggressive policy of Konfrontasi (Huxley 1987: 194, Sirikrai 1990: 249).

On the other hand there were conflicts that led to war. The infamous Indo-Chinese War, which later became the ‘Vietnam War’ (as the Americans call it) or the ‘American War’ (as the Vietnamese call it) was a good case in point. Yet, what explicitly caused regional inter-state antagonism resulted from the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963. Sukarno, who was then Indonesia's President, led his country under the banner of ‘guided democracy’, which was viewed by nationalists as a remnant of British neo-colonial design. Sukarno launched his Konfrontasi programme based on coercive diplomacy and small-scale arms activities due to many reasons. Apart from announcing it as a reaction to the Dutch authority's plan to liberate West Irian, Sukarno’s main point was to express his country’s strong position regarding the Philippines’ controversial claim over the British colony of North Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah), which planned to become part of Malaysia. To further complicate matters, Indonesia had to face a devastating internal rift involving the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Kommunist Indonesia: PKI.) Its members were accused of murdering several Indonesian generals during an abortive coup in 1965. The PKI was suspected of receiving Beijing’s support during the period of the ‘Cultural Revolution’. (Lau Teik Soon 1986: 189).

The situation changed with the ascension to power of Lt. General Suharto in 1966. Suharto’s ‘New Order’ not only brought internal stability but also created an atmosphere of friendship in the region. Jakarta emphasised that its concept of ‘ketahanan nasional’ (national resilience) was the key, further emphasising that

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8 Most of the Indonesia take one only like the renown Sukarno and Suharto

Chapter 3: Constructing East Asian (Security) Networks
national security lay neither in alliances nor under any great power’s military umbrella but in ‘self-resilience’. This concept rested on domestic economic and political strength and stability, infused with a high national morale. It was also anticipated to help to provide regional peace by constructing a concept of regional resilience as the sum of individual countries’ national resilience (Joesoef 1974: 80, Anwar 1990, Emmers 2003: 10-13). Resilience, as the basis for a comprehensive concept of security, gradually widened and became accepted in the region, due to its core concept of national development aimed at eradicating poverty and backwardness as the root causes of the internal insurgences which threatened to destabilise regional security (Kusuma-Atmadja 1990: 163).

Regional cooperation was first discussed in 1966 when Tunku Abdul Razak (Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister), Adam Malik (the Indonesian Foreign Minister), and Thanat Khoman (the Thai Foreign Minister) held talks in Bangkok on the normalisation of Indonesian-Malaysian relations. As a result of these talks, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was inaugurated in August 1967 by the Bangkok Declaration, with explicitly non-political aims. Instead, economic and cultural co-operation was highlighted. But the early success of the Association was not as had been intended, due to a lack of functional economic integration. On the contrary, political issues were its real glue. In other words, ASA became extended and transformed. What should not be overlooked is that the founding members all had political notions of regional peace and stability in mind (Swasdiyakorn 1974, Xuto 1974). Their attempts received good responses, particularly when Leonid Brezhnev, the (then) Soviet leader, called for the establishment of an Asian Collective Security Agreement in 1969, a call that aimed to build up a security network on bilateral bases against China (Lau Teik Soon 1986: 183).

To summarise (see Figure 1 on p.212), the regional context, specifically the early post World War II period (1950-1960), may be seen as a mixed blessing. This kind of structure, that is, acted both to enable and to constrain agents’ perceptions and activities. On the one hand, the negative aspects of the ideological conflict, including those derived from colonial experiences, were glaringly apparent. There were many unsettled territorial and political issues, military skirmishes, and wars in both

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9 This led wags to comment that the acronym actually stands for (A)dhoc (S)trategies (E)ntity of an (A)mbiguous (N)ature (Jackson 1984: xi).
Northeast and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, uncertainty regarding peace undoubtedly encouraged the regional state- and non-state agents to be more co-operative and inclusive as best as they could in terms of geography and other aspects. Initially, prominent engaging actors included Saburo Okita and Kiyoshi Kojima. Their links within and outside of Japan were crucial, specifically when the regional atmosphere was about to change. A rough concept of regional community (represented as the Asia-Pacific) was discernible. Japan, which was better off in terms of economic well-being, steered the regional co-operation in a more economic direction with encouragement from non-government agents, particularly from the mid-1960s on. Although Southeast Asia continued to be dominated by the regional governments’ military and political issues, the inception of ASEAN and its acceptance of the concept of ‘regional resilience’ extended from the Indonesian concept of ‘national resilience’ indicated that the region inclined to accept less traditional security concept which would become the basic concept for ASEAN intellectuals’ comprehensive security.

1970s: observing more energetic non-governmental agents

The 1970s proved one of the turning periods for both Japan and the ASEAN countries. Discussions and attempts to achieve closer economic and political cooperation came not only from government and business, but also from academics. This was a period of more explicitly extended networking with more directed and focused concerns, first expressed in the attempts of domestic-based individuals and/or institutions and non-governmental agencies. Together, they all helped to construct ‘Track-II Diplomacy’.

In 1970, Eisaku Sato (who was then Japan’s Prime Minister), declaring that the dawn of Japan’s ‘New Pacific Age’ had arrived, tried to steer Tokyo’s international co-operation towards Asia. However, he was careful not to let it contradict that of Washington. The harsh and negative response elicited when his successor Tanaka Kakuei toured the ASEAN countries opened Tokyo’s eyes to the difficult reality. But despite that, Japan’s international role still showed some positive signs,  

10 The trip triggered a flare-up of deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment in these countries, particularly in Bangkok and Jakarta, which had been fostered by what was seen as Japan’s arrogant behaviour as a rapidly rising economic power with growing influence in the region (Masaki 2007). They tended to regard Japan as nothing but an ‘economic animal’.
encouraging - even providing opportunities for - inter-state-, state-, and sub-state-networking activities. Tanaka’s successor Miki Takeo’s foreign policy placed more emphasis on Asia, proposing that his country could become a successful bridge spanning the East and the West.

Whilst Japan was struggling with its own international image, ASEAN presented a different one. The creation of the Association on the basis of personal friendship and mutual understanding had successfully paved the way for more diplomatic co-operation though there were still different ideas on how to manage the regional affairs. The idea of regional cooperation had been increasingly extended beyond the inter-governmental level to business people, academia, journalists, and ordinary citizens (Ishak 1974, Wanandi 1979: 53-54). The result was a convergence of political outlooks regarding decisions revolving around how to fit regional planning and cooperation more integrally into the national development plans of member states.

The announcement of a ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality’ (ZOFPAN) in Kuala Lumpur in November 1971, signifying ASEAN members’ attempts to neutralise their region in terms of non-intervention by outside powers, was an early example of this planning (Joesoef 1974, Malik 1974, Dijiwandono 1984). Yet, members continued to disagree on how to practice the concept. Indonesia was against it due to its potential for domination; Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines worried about their closeness to the US (as their external guarantor) (Emmers 2003: 61-69). The politically convergent meaning of it was that the region could jointly prevent the predominance of any great power. It also implied that it was the regional states that would set the rule or at best manage the great powers in a balanced fashion (Wannadi 1984: 201).

As opposed to the previously mixed image of government activities, the early 1970s were energetic years of initiative for non-governmental activities, particularly those directly engaging with the networking under investigation here.

In 1970, Tadashi Yamamoto, one-time personal aide to Tokusaburo Kosaka, established the Japan Centre for International Exchange (JCIE), a non-profit, non-government organisation that aimed to proactively and innovatively respond to the evolving needs of Japan’s international role. It laid claim to three main focuses: building co-operation and community in East Asia; strengthening human security responses to the challenges facing ‘our’ world today; and exploring and promoting a

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more active international role for Japan (JCIE 2006: 4-5). It came as no surprise in 1973 when David Rockefeller, who was then Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank and a leader of the philanthropic community in the US, asked the JCIE to help establish the Trilateral Commission. The Commission, a non-governmental forum comprising leading private citizens from Europe, North America and Pacific Asia, aimed to promote mutual understanding and closer co-operation through discussions and shared perspectives on common political, economic, and foreign policy challenges (Yamamoto 1994: 21). The Commission could be regarded as a fertile ground for nurturing the idea and practice of being inclusive a powerful linkage to affect governmental policies.

In September 1971, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was established in Jakarta, Indonesia, under the leadership of two law graduates of the University of Indonesia, Jusuf Wanandi and Harry Tjan Silalahi. Its earlier patrons were two senior military officers close to President Suharto, namely Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Hoemardani, who supervised Indonesian political and economic affairs. Hoemardani’s extensive links with business circles (Japanese in particular) made CSIS’s outreach activities tangibly possible. These activities included international exchanges with many important states in the ASEAN region, notably Malaysia and Singapore (Sudarsono 1988: 21). CSIS’s early movements expressing its firm existence were mostly engaged with similar institutions in the West; the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) in 1972, the RAND Corporation, the University of California at Berkeley, the Chicago Council, the Council on Foreign Affairs in New York, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston and other key institutions in Washington D.C (Hourn 2002: 5-6). The CSIS’s trips to the US proved really productive when Hadi Soesastro, who had worked for the RAND Corporation, decided to join CSIS in Jakarta, becoming one of the key members of the institution and its engaging/networking activities.  

More co-operative processes continued throughout the 1970s in both the political and economic dimensions and at both governmental and non-governmental levels, despite the world and the region being witness to many unexpected, often disturbing, phenomena. Apart from US President Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing,  

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11 Interview conducted October 20th 2006, CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia
followed by the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, 1975 was a memorable year: the fall of Saigon and the American withdrawal from Vietnam led to the rise of symbolic red stars all over Indochina; the establishment of the Council for Security Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, where people from NATO and the Warsaw Pact constructed friendships and promoted human rights; and six economic powers (the US, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan) held an economic summit for the first time (Irize 1997: 156-161). It was also the year that Japanese and European intellectuals joined hands to establish one of the long lasting international conferences; the ‘Hakone Meeting’. This forum provided a social space in which scholars, business leaders, journalists and policy experts from both sides sought to deepen their respective understandings of the problems faced by each side. At first, it did not proceed smoothly as both sides paid more attention to their relations with the US than they did to overlapping areas of concern. But its significance grew with the passing of time (Satoh 1984).

Hanns W. Muall (1984: 64) suggested that the Hakone Meeting could be regarded as a helpful means of clarifying and accepting that there was no such thing as a ‘quick fix’. Yet, it could mitigate the vulnerability of Japanese perceptions that they were being discriminated against by both Europe and the US (Yoshino 1984: 74). The meeting raised three main questions: what kind of world do both sides want; what are the commonalities between them; and how can Japan and Europe, together and separately, provide for orderly change and greater predictability in international relations (Maull 1988: 8-9)? The core institutions that helped to deliver a fruitful conference were: the JCIE, the European University Institute in Florence, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik (the German Society for Foreign Affairs) in Bonn, and the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (French Institute of International Relations) in Paris (JCIE 1984: v-vi). They also, with collaboration from Indonesia’s CSIS, helped to inaugurate both ASEM and the CAEC (for further discussion see chapter 4).

Movements from non-governmental agents were unquestionably vibrant and the people-centred activist movement was also energetic. The Asian Cultural Forum on Development (ACFOD), which was set up in Bangkok in 1975, initially had regional networks in the Asia-Pacific region covering inter-exchanging-action programmes for workers, peasants, fishermen and women (Shuto 2000: 120). The
process, led by Kojima and Okita, sought closer economic cooperation. It went well in accordance with ongoing efforts to encourage closer intellectual cooperation.

Peter Drysdale of Australia National University (ANU) proposed a more progressive and inclusive step - aimed at the industrialised countries only - to form an Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD). His proposal was officially supported by both Okita and Crawford in 1976. In order to help it materialise, the Japanese government unofficially funded many programmes aimed at supporting better understanding in terms of technical scholarship and economic and cultural communication (Wood 1993: 43-48, Borthwick 2005: 6).

In the interests of governmental co-operation, in 1976 ASEAN created more affirmative documents: the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. They accentuated the need to promote national and ASEAN resilience in terms of political and economic ties, the latter being directly related to the perceived Japanese domination of the region. Only firmer economic co-operation could guarantee and reinforce the visibility of ASEAN in a time of regional turbulence and Japanese economic domination (Wanandi 1980: 49, Parrenas 1990: 213-215, Rolls 1991: 317-318).

Everything concerning cooperation seemed to be hastened when Japan’s ‘visibly active’ international role – in the form of the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ - was announced in August 1977 by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda during his tour of ASEAN countries. It was aimed at reassuring these states that Japan would take

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12 This proposal was highly recognised in 1979 when Professor Hugh Patrick (then at Yale, now at Columbia) and Peter Drysdale wrote a report presented to US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations using OPTAD as a centre piece. The East-West Center in Honolulu, Lawrence Krause of the Brooking Institute (at that time) and Richard Sneider, a former US Ambassador to Korea, all supported the proposal (Borthwick 2005: 7).

13 In 1974, the Japanese government entirely funded an Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS) in order to train workers from regional countries and other developing countries. The Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) was also created to supervise the association. In the same year, the Asia Club of Japan (originally named Asia Club for Promotion of Economic and Cultural Communications: ACPECC) was organised to promote communication among Asian people (Samad and Muhammad 1994: 261).

14 A speech delivered on 18 August 1977 in Manila, in the Philippines, can be summarised according to three principles: Japan rejects the role of military power; As a true friend of the Southeast Asian countries, Japan will do its best to consolidate the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on a ‘heart-to-heart’ understanding with these countries; Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries (Saeki 1978: 15). In March of the following year (1978), Japan announced a contribution of ¥ 5 billion to the ASEAN Cultural Fund as a sign of genuinely creating heart-to-heart communication (Samad and Muhammad 1994: 263, Maswood 1988: 265).
peaceful steps in its active role (political acts) and it especially proclaimed the
Japanese to be good supporters of regional economic development.\footnote{In order to avoid the negative effects from this short-sighted hit-and-run economic policy, Daoed Joesoef (1978) proposed that so many areas deserved priority consideration: the modern methods of production through which the value-added could be increased or established; improving the quality of the local products or at least reducing their costs; paying attention to import substitution (less significant with the passing of time); the strong-linkage effects of the investment; and investment contributing to the expansion of the export. In the case of Indonesia at that time, agricultural development in terms of transferring knowledge and experience about small-farm management (including cash-crops and rubber smallholders) and developing the linkages between agricultural machineries and small scale metal industries (as import substitution) were essential economic cooperation from Japan in order to reduce the poverty of the general people (Kamiya 1978: 80-91, Miki 1978, Rangkuti 1978, Soedjatmiko 1978, Soehoed 1978).} Included in the
Japanese plan for the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ was the acceptance of ASEAN as an equal
partner, creating the necessary conditions for a stable, particularly the relationship
between ASEAN and Indochinese countries, and peaceful world based on a free trade
system.

CSIS organised a major conference in 1977, with the aim of planning the
future of East Asia under the theme ‘What’s next for East Asia?’ Many participants
from the US and Asia attended, including from Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Japan. This kind of activity continued in later years with closer
collaboration between members of ASEAN and institutions in the US. Robert A.
Scalapino, a prominent participant, encouraged efforts to set up an ASEAN centre in
the region based on the networking already in place.

Topics were varied. They included traditional security concerns (the regional
role of major powers, including Japan), the ongoing turmoil in Cambodia, and
economic co-operation (Hourn 2002: 6-8). It was the last-mentioned topic that
brought ASEAN scholars close to Japan, before extending their interests to cooperate
with like-minded participants from America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Narongchai Akrasanee's experiences (one of Thailand's most energetic and engaging
agents) confirm this point. According to him, a shared belief in the positive aspects of
liberal capitalism and development was the glue binding ASEAN and Japan,
particularly under the energetically bridging role of Tadashi Yamamoto.\footnote{Interview conducted October 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2006 at Saranee Group, Bangkok, Thailand} Few
participants from ASEAN and their governments withheld their support. They came
together because they observed a trend towards integration, first in its economic form,
and then in terms of institutions. In the words of Hadi Soesastro, they wanted to ‘position ASEAN in the wider region’.¹⁷

In late 1979, Japan seemed to catch on after Fukuda met incumbent US President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), who suggested that Southeast Asia was an area for which Japan had to take responsibility (Shibusawa and Yano 1978: 43). Japan saw itself as the ‘new type of great power’ based on economic and moral virtues (Edstrom 1999: 95). This concept was close to that of ‘civilian power’. The term signifies a state which actively promotes civilising international relations. Despite its having been generated in Europe as a means of understanding (West) Germany’s active international role, the term could be compatible with what Japan was trying to achieve, through its emphasis on replacing the military enforcement of rules with the internationalisation of socially accepted norms (Harnisch and Maull 2001: 1-9). Fukuda saw a necessity to help facilitate more institutionalisation in order to create a new type of super power. The Japanese government could utilise the status of being a civilian power and develop its internationalising process through it (Lie 1977, Yano 1977). Of course, the need for raw materials and markets played its part in Japan’s Asia policy (Kuroyanagi 1978, Panglaykim 1978, Mendle 1995: 106).

In 1977, Japan’s perception of security was about to be broadened in order to accommodate the changing environment and leave room to allow more internationally flexible activities. It was the Nomura Research Institute that first urged this broadening, by introducing the concept of ‘comprehensive security’. This encouraged Japan’s leadership to bolster its economic contributions as a means of shouldering an international security responsibility. This meant utilising ‘economic cooperation’, particularly through international industrial adjustment, to generate international security, efficiency, and justice (Shinohara 1983).

In 1978 the Study Group on Comprehensive National Security (commissioned by Masayoshi Ohira, the then Japanese Prime Minister) presented the concept in a more organised way. Not only were traditional military elements included, which was of least concern at the time, but also political, economic, ecology/energy, and natural disasters were added. These had the potential to affect the country and its people’s well-being (Chapman, Drift and Gow 1983: Introduction, Edstrom 1999: chapters 6-7,

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¹⁷ Interview conducted October 20th 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia.
9). Japan incorporated economic as well as political and military aspects within the concept in terms of interpretation of security due to its unique dependence on overseas supplies (raw materials and markets) and less direct pressure from traditional security issues (Maull 1984: 66). The economic aspects of Japan’s comprehensive security were about to be tested when in 1978 the US recommended that Japan had not played an international role commensurate with its economic status (Wood 1993: 218). Ohira responded by being more assertive towards Pacific co-operation through existing networks generated and sustained by his Foreign Minister Okita, who also chaired the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group before becoming a minister.

The Study Group called for an international symposium to discuss options for ongoing Pacific economies’ co-operation, in order to create an institutional mechanism to help the economies in the Asia Pacific to work constructively with the Western hemisphere. The way to fulfill this role was to construct common bonds by overcoming cultural diversity, in the interests of facilitating and increasing the confidence required for long-term co-operation. The appropriate way to achieve this was to create a private standing committee of 15-20 ‘persons of authority’, that could initially manage a series of international conferences on Pacific co-operation. Members of the committee should comprise both state- and non-state agents possessing backgrounds from economics and business. It had the chance to become an informal consultative forum for discussion surrounding regional issues of common interest. In the long-term, the forum might establish ‘working groups’ to study regional issues, make recommendations by consensus, and develop into an intergovernmental consultative organisation with a permanent secretariat (Davies 1980, Pang 1981: 10, Edstrom 1999: chapter 9, Elek 2005b: 15, Patrick 2005: 140-142). Their quest received a good response from the PBEC. At the 12th general meeting, it gave its approval to the concept of a ‘Pacific Economic Community’. From that point on, PBEC became actively involved by virtue of its significant business driving force for the more inclusive and co-operative region (Borthwick 2005: 5-6).

With hindsight, their efforts widely generated discussion about the stalled process of building a ‘Pacific Community’, mostly due to economic difficulties and political uncertainties that lingered on into the 1980s. As regards the prevailing economic problems, it is difficult to deny that North-South disparities continued and
the breakdown of the postwar monetary system was also significant. In addition, a flexible exchange rate and wide fluctuations of key currencies (namely the US dollar and the Japanese yen) were introduced, in tandem with regional protectionism and ‘stagflation’. At the same time, Australia and New Zealand's shift towards the Asia-Pacific and the ‘Asian Tigers’ (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore), along with the 'opening' of China, seemed to identify them as potentially challenging economic forces.

The insular trend of US foreign policy after the Nixon doctrine, the intrusions of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan and Vietnam into Cambodia (in 1979), and the increasingly accepted significance of ASEAN, were the main reasons for the ensuing political uncertainty (Akrasanee, Ariff, Estanislao, Pang, Soesastro, Tan, and Wanandi 1980: Introduction, Roth 1980: 23-24, Hirano 1981, Lee 1983, Mangkusuwondo 1981). Japan tried to become more active in international political arenas. It contributed financial assistance to Turkey at the same level as France, and bore 70 per cent of the cost required to deepen and widen the Suez Canal to dimensions through which a large American aircraft carrier could pass. In addition, it was the first country to commit increased economic aid to Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Satoh 1984: 27). Unfortunately, these actions were not viewed as not being commensurate with Japanese economic might.

Whilst officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry tried their best to persuade their national and international counterparts to accept possible membership of forms of international (economic) cooperation, the Japanese did not have to 'go it' alone. It

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18 From the perspectives of the international-political-economic theorists and world-system theorists, the North-South problems derived from an asymmetric (economic) relationship between the developed economies (mostly residing in the northern hemisphere) and the developing countries that used to be referred to in more inferior terms as ‘less developed’). The latter tried to unite for more bargaining power (like the Crain Group, Group-77 etc.) and even proposed the New International Economic Order (NIEO) to the United Nations (particularly via UNCTAD), albeit with lack of success (for more background see Brown 1997: chapters 8-10).

19 A macroeconomic term describing a period of high price inflation combined with slow output growth and high unemployment (see more description, historical background and related theories at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stagflation accessed on January 10, 2007

20 At first, Tokyo proposed the ‘five-plus-five’ formula comprising five from developed countries (namely Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US) and five from ASEAN’s founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Later South Korea was
found active colleagues in Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser21 and in Sir John Crawford, Chancellor of the Australia National University at the time, who in turn had the support of the PBEC committee. This was the period that the Australian government and their business community tried to find their spaces in the Asia-Pacific region. Their energetic intention met with that from the Japanese. Together, their engaging/networking agents laid the foundation for the first meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC – more discussion of which later).

In order to avoid harsh criticism of Japan’s leadership, Okita allowed his Australian counterpart (Crawford) to take the lead in organising the ‘Canberra Seminar’ in September 1980 (Ariff 1981: 29, Wood 1993: 90-91). The path, however, was not so smooth that no alteration was needed. Scepticism was already in the air before the second seminar was held in Bangkok two years later, proposed by Snoh Unakul of Thailand.22 He urged for endorsement of the concept of a tripartite standing committee, comprising officials in their private capacity as academics and business people (Elek 2005a). Most were members of the G-77 and/or from ASEAN countries (English 1983: 99).

To appease the sceptics from ASEAN countries, the Jakarta based CSIS provided fora and publication on the matter. The conference convened in 1979 (the 7th Japanese-Indonesian conference entitled ‘Japan-Indonesia Relations: Past, Present, Future’) noted what had transpired. Two themes from the conference were related and reflected the trends of the time. The first, political-security issues mostly concerned Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia). The second was capital-technology transfer, namely how to decrease dominant Japanese funds by channelling them into particular sectors like agriculture, energy and human resources.

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21 Ohira met Fraser at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meeting in May 1979, in Manila, the Philippines (Wood 1993: 90).
22 Borthwick summed it up stating that several international meetings and lecture series from 1979 to 1980 were remembered as playing significant roles in shaping the course of the debate. Among them were: lecture series sponsored by the East-West Centre (Hooper 1982); the Asia Dialogue at Oiso, Japan (JCIE 1980); the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Jakarta), Indonesian Conference in Bali in 1980; a conference on the Pacific community concept (Easter Island, Chile, 1979); and a security conference related to debate help in Pattaya, Thailand in 1979 (Borthwick 2005: 7).
The shared perception by the participants was that Japan should and could be a constructive partner. Its insistence on ‘omni-directional diplomacy’ by maintaining a position as a ‘non-military economic power’ could well prove compatible with ASEAN’s concept of ‘resilience’, deriving from military to politico-economic and socio-cultural elements (Kuriyama 1979, Moertopo 1979b, Ushiba 1979b). The bulk of Japanese public opinion between the 1950s and 1960s also supported the view of omni-directional diplomacy23 (Kuriyama 1979). Fukuda initiated it to allow Japan to play a more constructive political role in bridging relations between conflicting nations (Sudo 1992: chapter 6). He had in mind the Southeast Asian nations. There was even a claim by the Japanese that their aid programmes rendered ASEAN’s ‘resilience’ and its economic development a success by shouldering the American presence (Oshima 1988: 38-39).

Although it started with the adoption of the resolution on the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) supported by the UN General Assembly since 1974 (Alatas 1984: 11), the dialogue concerning NIEO achieved little success. At best, it should have concretely supported the linking of the trilogy of development: the equal distribution of development; sufficient high growth of the economy; and national/regional stability (Hoemardani 1979: 5). The CSIS panelists proposed that due to its economic power, Japan should assume political influence and responsibility, the perfect role being to provide solutions for the North-South Dialogue (Wanandi 1979a).

However, one of the most cited conferences was held in January 1980. It was called ‘Asia-Pacific in the 1980s: Towards Greater Symmetry in Economic Interdependence’. There were two main perspectives for these events. First, the US wanted a more institutionalised organisation. Second, Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad, wanted an informal forum for the more free discussion of ‘hot’ issues, and the cul-de-sac ‘North-South problem’. Mahathir proposed that the focus should be upon the destruction of tak kenal maka tak cinta (‘we don’t know one another therefore we don’t like (love) each other’) (Mohammad 1980, Roth 1980: 23-28), as a forerunner to constructing a friendly atmosphere for deepening and broadening cooperation.

23 With hindsight, the meaning of ‘omni-directional diplomacy’ has gradually unfolded: it means omni-directional unequal distance diplomacy within the framework of unequal diplomatic relations.
However, Krause and Kojima, adopting positive tones, saw cooperation as a useful means, not only of helping to increase ASEAN’s economic-cum-political consolidation, but also as a mediator for transmitting economic and technological aid from developed to developing countries (Kojima 1983, Krause 1983). Ultimately a peaceful region would emerge as a result of long-term regional development and (mutual) understanding (Lee 1983).

In 1981, ASEAN scholars proposed the establishment of a loosely-structured non-governmental organisation (contrary to the US perspective). The aim of this was to comprise the aforementioned tripartite focus on economic, environmental, social and cultural issues, and to promote and study these issues in a cooperative fashion (Akrasanee et al 1981, Soesastro 2005b: 32). What is worth noting is that these issues indirectly engaged with political issues, within a broadened security concept in a comprehensive sense favoured by both ASEAN and Japan.

Also in 1981, CSIS, with the collaboration of the East Asian Institute of the University of California, Berkeley, organised a ‘US-ASEAN Conference’ in Bali, Indonesia. The conference, with the theme of ‘Economic, Political, and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980s’ was an important stepping stone for the intellectual networking under examination in this thesis (Soesastro, Jowono and Hernandez 2006: 3-4). It was there that potential would-be engaging/networking agents from ASEAN initially socialized by getting-to-know each other. At the meeting, participants from the ASEAN region built up more familiarity. Key scholars included Narongchai Akrasanee (Thailand), Noordie Sophiee (Malaysia), and Carolina G. Hernandez and Jesus Estanislao (the Philippines) (Hourn 2002: 9).

This networking cooperation was particularly helpful as far as the Asia-Pacific economic community was concerned. A seminar was held in Bangkok, Thailand, in June 1982, organised by the Thailand Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee and the John F. Kennedy Foundation (Thailand) with the assistance of the UN agency the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). It was fruitful because of its connection with Narongchai, who managed to mobilise funding from Tokyo to launch a project on ‘ASEAN and Pacific Economic Cooperation’. The good relationship established with intellectuals from CSIS’s networks was an added bonus (Soesastro 2005a, Wood 1983: 98).
From this seminar, the name ‘Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference: PECC’ officially emerged, and the International Standing Committee was set up.\textsuperscript{24} The status of the tripartite conference (in terms of regular multilateral meetings) was confirmed. The process was nurtured by the anticipation that the ‘habit’ of conducting regular regional dialogues supported by thorough presentation, broad representation, and interests of high-level tripartite (English 1983: 98-99, Wood 1983: 89, Young 2005).

It is worth noting here that these activities went on whilst ASEAN continued to deepen its rules, norms and the more common objective of regional integration. The concept of consensus as unanimity was gradually abandoned, due to its time-consuming process within the period of expanding scope of interests, as the concept of a ‘coalition of the willing’ was increasingly accepted. In addition, patterns of consultation were broadened to include military and intelligence (Lau Teik Soon 1986: 192). Yet, the most prominent trend was ASEAN’s attempt to pave the way for more economic cooperation at governmental level. The attempt emphasised the meaning of ASEAN’s vision of comprehensive security, namely that economic development and political stability should interact positively and go forward together in the same direction (Weatherbee 1984, Sudarsono 1984, Pauker 1984, Emmerson 1984).

The inception of task forces for PECC also encouraged the preparation of papers with the cooperation of international study groups based in several research centres in the region. It was anticipated that they would serve as mini conference-cum-consultation fora (Akrasanee 1983: 81, English 1983: 98). The participants agreed to set up their own national committees for progressive works and to persuade their respective governments to be more cooperative. One year earlier (1981), Okita chaired a newly established Special Committee on Pacific Cooperation (SCPC) as a working group within the Japanese Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), an affiliate

\textsuperscript{24} The PECC-ISC was referred to by some as the ‘Pacific Mafia’. Young regarded it in a positive light as ‘Pacific Statemanship’, comprising Crawford, Okita, Thanat Khoman (Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand), Moertopo (Indonesian’s deputy head of Intelligence, minister for information and defense, and personal advisor to President Soeharto), David Sycip (senior advisor to PCI Management Consultant, the Philippines), Eric Trigg (senior vice-president of Alcan Aluminum, Canada), Ambassador Richard L. Sneider (vice-chairperson of the Washington-based Pan-Pacific Community Association), and Nam Duck-Woo (chairperson of the Korea Trader Association and a former prime minister and finance minister of South Korea), and the only one who was not at the Bangkok Meeting.

The significance of PECC lies in the fact that Tokyo had given official approval and full support to its process. As a result, governmental officials in ASEAN countries took serious notice of the PECC proposal. Earlier proposals, such as those of the PAFTA and OPTAD, had been ignored, partly because they were discussed in exclusive non-official circles and were seen - by extension - as a reflection of the domination of developed countries (Wanandi 1986: 41). The PECC process was different. It offered a spirit of inclusiveness in terms of engaging agents and their networking processes, from official and non-official circles alike. In addition, economic matters were prominent as already suggested.

Although Okita insisted that Japanese efforts had thus far had nothing to do with politico-security matters, he was unable to deny the indirect link, particularly the external force from the US as *sine qua non* for its security (Okita 1983, Soesastro 1983b: 184). Economic cooperation in the region could not be separated from attempts to provide for political and security co-operation. At least, movements from ASEAN scholars indicated that much. Those who met at economic conferences also met at political conferences. US-ASEAN conferences proved a significant series of networking activities that led to the consolidation of co-operation whereby scholars from America, ASEAN, Japan and Korea became familiar with - and cooperated with - each other.

To sum up (see Figure 2 on p.213), from the 1970s to the early 1980s, a regional cooperative outlook became firmly established despite the fact that the region experienced economic hardship resulting from oil crises, political and security problems from military intervention, to massive floods of refugees. Movements from non-state agents were clearly visible. Not only did agents from Japan try to extend their networking activities as far as Europe through conferences relating to economic and political issues, but those from ASEAN also encouraged their enlargement.

Tadashi Yamamoto from JCIE was quite prominent due to his connection with intellectuals and engaging agents from Europe, who participated in the long engaging inter-continental cooperative forum like the ‘Hakone Meeting’ and from the US, whose cooperation with those from Europe and Japan constructed the renowned ‘Trilateral Commission’. Engaging experiences within economic fields not only inspired agents to extend their networks to other fields but also socialised them to
accept the significance of inclusiveness (in terms of issues and geography). ASEAN scholars, Narongchai (Thailand) and Soesastro from Indonesia’s CSIS in particular, have joined in activities across fields since the initial periods. Intellectuals in the region regarded economic issues to be part and parcel of their security definition. At least some of the founding members of the ASEAN scholars’ network agreed to the concept, namely, Jusuf Wanandi (Indonesia), Noordin Sopiee (Malaysia), and Carolina G. Hernandez and Jesus Estanislao (the Philippines). Participants from the US, Canada, New Zealand and Korea who agreed to the concept proved to be potential networks for the later period.

The expansion (derived intellectuals from ASEAN and Japan) appeared in terms of both linkages with more diversified countries and more exchanges and discussions on political and security related issues. Successful efforts, particularly in the case of the PECC process, had to be shared with state representatives. The significant link was Okita who changed from being a non-governmental to a governmental engaging agent when he ascended to the position of Foreign Minister of Japan in the late 1970s. The appointment should not have been a surprise at all when the process of tracing back to his background as an important non-state agent who had had abundant regional networking experiences was taken into account. During earlier periods, he was not only energetic in regional networking activities, but also incrementally accumulated regional knowledge of economic contours in terms of who was who, and what kind of substantive knowledge was specifically at issue. His expertise and deliberation to provide for better regional economic environment were matched by the Japanese government’s assertive international role at that time. The regional context, whether within state or non-state agents’ activities, was by then familiar through informal consultation, common interests in regional issues and consensus.

The significance of these ‘informal’ characteristics was perceptible in the success of ASEAN-ISIS networking activities although it was difficult to deny that they were also discernible in the political cooperation of states. Malaysia's Noordie Sopiee (1986) highly praised ASEAN's continuous and repeated discussions, deliberation and multi-decision making. Talk, talk and more talk became ASEAN's effective ‘meat grinder’ to mince difficulties and differences. The Philippines' Carolina G. Hernandez argued that ‘to some extent ASEAN-ISIS had the experience of the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC). There was already an
economic co-operation mechanism. There was a development co-operation model. That was what ASEAN-ISIS had in mind’ (Hourn 2002: 18). In other words, the would-be ASEAN-ISIS scholars favoured PECC informal characteristics comprising informal consultation, accepted common interests (economic development fostering political stability) and consensus.

Initially ascending period of networking

*Early movements before the formal establishment of ASEAN-ISIS*

The previous section illustrates the regional context and incremental networking activities, with an emphasis primarily on economic matters. These were in fact incorporated under the broad umbrella of security of both states and non-state agents. They provided the discursive arena, in which the engaging agents perceived, interpreted, interacted and formed their ideas and activities. It was this interplay process that guided engaging agents to assert that their regional security structure, based on comprehensive concepts emphasising economic aspects at that stage, should be altered. This section will focus more upon how and to what extent earlier engaging agents consolidated and extended their efforts in the name of ‘ASEAN-ISIS’. Experiences from consolidating and expanding activities provide essential venues for their socialising processes thus far.

CSIS continually played a leading role in networking activities, which focused more on the Southeast than in the earlier period by organising numerous conferences and workshops. Between 1981 and 1988, five US-ASEAN conferences were convened. Apart from scholars from CSIS, Kusuma Snitwingse, M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra (from Thailand, who was a friend of Narongchai), and Carolina G. Hernandez actively took part and continued to collaborate with one another upon returning home, as did Lau Teik Soon of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) and Chan Heng Chee of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).

These were scholars who sought to make themselves relevant to foreign policy by building up networks and presenting what they were thinking, although there were some constraints due to their (respective) official obligations. Kwa Chong Guan, who was at SIIA and joined the process in its embryonic stage, reflected:
‘[W]e were hoping that by linking up ... ideas we will provide another platform to discuss things together in an unofficial and informal way. We ourselves can contribute an alternative way of thinking’.25

His statement was aimed at what seemed like cul-de-sac issues at that time, both economic and/or political. As well, there were deteriorating security matters.

At a meeting in Bali in 1984, a consensus was reached that would lead to the inception of an informal grouping of regional institutes. The idea first appeared in the form of a suggestion from Donald Emmerson of Stanford University to Jusuf Waandi when they met at US-ASEAN conferences organized under the auspices of Robert Scalapino, University of California, Berkeley (Wanandi 2006: 31-33). Its working name at that time was the ‘ASEAN Institute’. Engaging agents came together with the idea that they ‘should develop the idea of regional order together in political and security fields. It should not be only economic. But at that time, of course, economic (aspect) was focused [upon]’.26 In order to achieve their goal, they decided to become more efficient and effective by combining their resources to ‘avoid duplication’, particularly when mobilising funds and resources (Hourn 2002: 9-10).

The names of agents who appeared there are listed in the caption of the group photograph. Members of the group, who later became founders of ASEAN-ISIS, included: Jusuf Wanandi (CSIS, Indonesia), Noordin Sopiee (ISIS, Malaysia), Lau Teik Soon (SIIA, Singapore), Kusuma Snitwongse (ISIS, Thailand), and Carolina G. Hernandez (the University of the Philippines). The last mentioned was encouraged to establish a similar institution in the Philippines. Finally, the network became a network of institutions, with five institutions as the original members acting as the focal institution in each of the member countries (Soesastro et al 2006: 5-7). In the same year, noted Mexican poet Octavio Paz commented that ‘dialogue keeps us from denying ourselves and deny[ing] the humanity of our adversary’ (Coker 1988: 61). In other words, dialogue - not monologue - should energise and empower people in their life-world, as Habermas proposes in his theory of communicative action (see Chapter 2).

25 Interview conducted July 18th 2006 at IDSS, Singapore
26 Interview conducted October 20th 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia
Up to this point, engaging agents were those who familiarised themselves with discursive discussion centred on political and security related issues with diverse participations. Most interesting of all were their experiences with PECC’s inclusive and informal process, which embraced representatives from governmental, non-governmental (mostly intellectuals whether or not from academic fields), business persons and journalists. Many founding members of ASEAN scholars’ network accepted that PECC process represented their benchmarking model for constructing ASEAN-ISIS. Their main characteristics were informal consultation, acceptable common interests (economic development fostering political stability) and consensuses.

The first half of the 1980s saw a period of consolidation of a co-operative atmosphere, seemingly on a governmental level within both the political and economic realms. On the one hand, the US trade policy's tough and hard stance faced being modified under the threat of the Section 301 of the Trade Bill. This added to the uncertainty being felt by many countries in the region (Tanaka 1988: 25). On the other, the future seemed brighter, partly due to China’s big swing towards four modernisations: namely agriculture, light-industry, science and technology, and defence. But it was also a period that echoed resentment towards Japan’s superior economic organisations and performance. In addition, there were differences between Tokyo and Beijing over issues concerning Japanese textbooks regarding contemporary history and the significance and status of the Yasukuni Shrine. Most worrisome was whether Japan intended to remilitarise (Maull 1987, Shibusawa 1987).

At the governmental level, an ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) was launched, which was expected to be a two-tiered forum for Pacific co-operation. The first tier consisted of project co-operation (Human Resources Development as a pilot project); the second, which was ostensibly to have been a form of policy dialogue, failed to start until the early 1990s, when it took off thanks to the initial efforts of non-government agents (Simandjuntak 1990: 32).

Movement at the governmental level was attributed to efforts by both Japan and ASEAN. Japan saw a necessity to establish more familiarity and personal acquaintances through informal exchange and conferences at the international level. The inception of the UK-Japan 2000 Group in 1984 was a case in point (Wallace and Roper 1988: 8-9). Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who was Indonesia's Foreign Minister in 1984, proposed closer economic co-operation based on a formula of ‘6+5’ (6 ASEAN
members and 5 including Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the US) (Okita 1987: 502-503). Japanese efforts became more effective and energetic as a way of softening the hard criticism levelled at their economic domination. An idea circulated that Japan wanted to use this cooperation as a platform for adjusting international economics, by increasing more horizontal international division of labour - to complement Japan's vertical division labour (Shibusawa 1983: 137-139).

This idea had its genesis in the perceived close connection that existed between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), later the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry (METI), and many sogo shosha (general trading firms). The MITI White Paper published in 1988 confirmed this role again as a means to achieve its strategic thinking for Japanese interests that lay in promoting the idea of inclusive and cooperative region. It emphasised the private sector’s support of Japan’s ‘Flying Geese’ model in Asia. The process was hastened after the Plaza Accord agreement was signed in 1985, under pressure from the US to correct its own huge current account and trade deficit (Saeki 1988, Kikuchi 2001). Japanese efforts to

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27 The characteristics of Japanese horizontal international division of labour were based on the connection between the government sectors setting the broad outline of the national targets, bureaucracy implementing and connecting with the latter group, and business groups, carrying operational plans, particularly those with sogo shosha such as the Fuyo Group (Fuji Bank as a centre), the Dai-ichi Kangyo Group centered around the Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank. They are the sine qua non for business groups. On the other hand, the sogo shosha or Japanese multinational corporations would invest via a ‘package deal’, comprising management, technology, capital and international networks (all linked back to the headquarters) (Panglaykim 1981: 54-62).

28 Kaname Akamatsu coined the phrase ‘flying geese pattern (genko keitai) of development’ in the 1930s. Originally, he was asked to find means for increasing the Chrysanthemum Throne’s interests after the Imperial Army’s victory. The idea re-emerged in English in the early 1960s. The core concept is the stratification of development divided into three aspects: intra-industry ascending from import to production to export; inter-industry upgrading from consumer goods to capital goods, the same as from simple to sophisticated technology; and international via relocating the two previously mentioned from developed to developing countries. The last aspect was the origin of ‘A Theory of Unbalanced Growth in the World Economy’. Saburo Okita, who revitalised it at the PECC’s 4th meeting (1985), stressed that in the Asia-Pacific the US developed first in the 19th century; then Japan began a catching-up process. When Japan was (or has been) ascending, room was (or has been) left for followers who wanted to join and take advantage of its distinctiveness of supporting the stratification of division of labour (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flying-Geese-Paradigm, accessed on January 14th, 2006, and http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/prsp/FGeese.htm, accessed on January 14th, 2006).

29 On September 22, 1985 the G-5 nations (France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US) met at the Plaza Hotel, New York. They tried to find appropriate means for sustaining growth and expanding markets in both developed and developing countries, and to manage a sound basis for continued and balanced expansion with low inflation. They stressed that in order to achieve expected objectives exchange rates should play a role in adjusting external imbalances by better reflecting fundamental economic conditions. Orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies (their targets were the Japanese Yen and Deutsche Mark) against the dollar was needed. The US could gain more exports due
broaden international economic cooperation were directly linked to the high-speed depreciation of the Yen after the Plaza and Louvre Accords, from 240 Yen to the dollar in September 1985 down to 150 Yen by mid 1986 (Noguchi 1987: 20-22). It is interesting to note that Japan and Europe (European Community members at the time) seemed to be on the losing side of struggling to defend their currencies. Within a short period after applying the Accords, the Central Banks in Japan and Europe spent around US$ 90 billion dollars on intervention (Lambsdorf 1988: 66). Okita’s proposal of a ‘Japanese Marshall Plan’, which could be viewed as supplementary to the process, aimed at devoting a portion of Japan’s savings and current account surpluses to the growth of developing countries, in order to avoid their agitation, as occurred in the 1970s (Okita 1987).

The depreciation of the Yen could also be regarded as a significant milestone for accelerating the processes of regional co-operation, including security aspects. Generally speaking, it was accepted that economic development and cooperation could lead to the strengthening of domestic pluralism in peaceful democratic countries. Any alteration to the economic and socio-cultural dimensions of the regional threat perception could spill over to other areas (Paripatra and Samudavanija 1986). Perceptible movements were viewed in the ASEAN region, some of whose members experienced leap-frog economic growth following the Japanese industrial relocation. To some extent, they absorbed the Japanese style of social networking, relying on such social norms as homogeneity, harmony, mutual trust, and consensus. They synchronised with a state strategy designed to extract higher gain from world markets (Akrasanee and Prasert 2003: chapter 5).

Non-government movements, such as conferences and intellectual exchange, continually flourished. They were anticipated to act as fora providing and accelerating effective means of conveying agents’ thoughts to each other through mutual trust constructed through exchanging processes between persons not just upon rhetoric words (Viravan 1986, Yoshino 1986). Issues raised may have differed from forum to forum, but generally they shared some characteristics that were not for airing at formal fora. They could be regarded as ‘fora for complaining’. The ‘Japan-Thai

to a 51 per cent decline of its currency versus the Yen. Yet, the depreciation continued. The Louvre Accord was signed in 1987 to halt the decline. As regards the Japanese, the Yen’s rapid appreciation led to the asset-price bubble in the late 1980s and Japan's long recession since then (for more detail please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plaza-Accord, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm850922, and http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=6872 all accessed on January 16, 2007).
Symposium’ organised by the JCIE provides one example. Accusations levelled about unfair Japanese treatment in economic terms extended to technical assistance from the Thai side. Japanese representatives elaborated upon their increasing sense of nationalism and expressed their concern regarding the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay and the deployment of SS-20s in Asian Siberia, topics rarely raised at the formal fora (Viraphol, Akrasanee and Xuto 1986, Shibusawa and Yamamoto 1986).

The connection between economic and political issues was more easily discernible, as far as non-governmental agents were concerned. They actively mingled within discursive areas of interest. Cases in point were the connection via Hadi Soesastro (Indonesian CSIS) and Narongchai Akrasanee, who had never been a member of the Thai ISIS but who had energetically engaged in networking activities since their embryonic stages. They were also involved in the PECC process as well as the Federation of ASEAN Economic Association (FAEA), comprising selected economic professionals from the ASEAN countries (Hourn 2002: 17-18).

In 1986, a changing atmosphere became recognisable in terms of economic and political issues. As regards the former, Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was then Japanese Prime Minister, accepted the recommendations of the Advisory Group on Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony, chaired by Haruo Maekawa, a former governor of the Bank of Japan. The ‘Maekawa Report’, published in April 1986, proposed that Japan should continue with its large current account imbalances. Not only should this act as a means to manage the Japanese economy - to buy more foreign foods, but it should also encourage the harmonious development of the whole international economy. As a result, Japan should be encouraged to undertake an historical transformation in its traditional policies on economic management and the nation’s life-style (Noguchi 1987: 22-24, Schaub 1987).

From a political perspective, as earlier change came first from the Soviet’s Alexandr Iakovlev, Head of the Central Committee promoted by Mikael Gorbachev (who was President of the Soviet Union at the time), who questioned the prominence of the ‘US-first’ orientation of Soviet foreign policy (Kimura 1987). The most significant communication, facilitating a positive changing global atmosphere in the later periods, came directly from Gorbachev himself, particularly in a speech he delivered in Vladivostok in which he called for some mechanism in Asia-Pacific equivalent to the successful CSCE process, which had ensured more stable security.
since 1975 (Huxley 1993: 76). While it immediately inspired numerous high-ranking official visits to China from Poland and East Germany, no tangible impact was seen in the region (Glaubitz 1987). At that time, such a change was an unexpected event for Asia-Pacific engaging/networking agents, specifically either from America or from ASEAN. For David Martin Jones and M. L. R. Smith (2001, 2002, 2006), these agents had been hooked on the concept of ‘Sovietology’ which should be understood here as the Soviet-first orientation of US foreign policy. It was this policy that also dominated both the making of and the implication of regional security policies. Nevertheless, what should not be overshadowed by this dominant paradigm was that the sprouts of regional socialising processes from engaging/networking activities were about to flourish when they received externally accelerating activities or agents, particularly from the USSR (more discussion of which later). Yet, those engaging agents from the governmental side seemed less prepared.

Suharto (the then Indonesian President) was unable to persuade other ASEAN leaders to agree to support a regional (Southeast Asia) nuclear-weapon free zone, as incorporated in the Manila Declaration 1987 (Leifer 1989: chapter 5). Nevertheless, raising the issue indicated some degree of change in a region dominated by economic considerations and the Cambodian problem. One good sign was that the changing atmosphere mentioned earlier steadily eliminated the tension between the Soviet Union and China. Negotiations regarding the normalisation of relations were initiated in August 1988. Diplomatic ties between Moscow and Beijing were restored during Gorbachev’s official visit to China in May 1989 after the Soviet Union ceased its support for Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia (Emmers 2003: 83). What should not be overlooked is that Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech signalled positive change; he urged more inclusive and cooperative action and a more peaceful environment. Governmental agents partially went along with this path; the establishment of ‘ASEAN 6+5’ and ASEAN-PMC were examples of ASEAN countries’ efforts.

In sum (see Figure 3 on p.214), from the early to mid 1980s, the global and regional environments in which agents interacted in order to construct ideas related to their networking activities were dominated by economic factors. The economic downturn and recession were so serious that they received priority from advanced industrial countries. In order to close their financial gap and boost their economies, Plaza and Louvre Accords were agreed. Yet, this was not enough for Japan, whose trade surpluses were so massive that its trading counterparts thought it right to force...
Japan to be more responsible. The ‘Maekawa Report’ signified another major effort made by Japan to mitigate negative perceptions of its economic performance. Southeast Asia was one of the Japanese favoured destinations for relocating their high-cost and environmental-burdened enterprises. Both ASEAN governments and intellectuals became energetically involved in the movements.

However, politico-security problems did not fade from the scene. Engaging agents employed them as a means of focusing their themes for co-operation. Within this cooperative boundary, agents from the ASEAN countries flourished. Their interaction with their counterparts from America encouraged them to think of consolidating their core networks within their own Southeast Asia region. This was the origin of the ASEAN-ISIS.

Consolidating (security) networks: the inception of ASEAN-ISIS in 1988

The consolidating processes of networking and co-operation became more obvious in the late 1980s, notably in 1987 and 1988. In particular, 1987 witnessed a great movement of second track activities: the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific was created (and organised in 1989). The Japanese government provided generous financial support, while voluntary contributions came from UN member states. The ‘Kathmandu processes’ was its centre stage; it was here that track-II agents gathered to discuss disarmament and arms control. The process was extended to set up the ‘Kanagawa Symposium’ for discussion surrounding disarmament and security in broader terms (Taylor et al 2006: 45-46).

In 1987, a Japan-ASEAN Conference entitled ‘Global Trends and Regional Issues’ was convened between January 29-31 in Tokyo, as a result of ASEAN’s suggestion to Seizaburo Sato of Tokyo University two years earlier. The conference was hosted by the JIIA in collaboration with leading international research institutes of ASEAN countries through the CSIS, Malaysian ISIS and Thai ISIS (‘A Note’:1987). The ASEAN institutes presented themselves as more concretely consolidating networks.

In the same year, heads of research institutions in ASEAN countries reached a decision to establish a formal association. CSIS took the initiative to contact Nono Anwar Makarim, who in his capacity as solicitor, drafted documents for the inception of the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). At the
ASEAN Institutes meeting in Singapore in June 1988, the ASEAN-ISIS Charter was signed by founding leaders Jusuf Wanandi (CSIS, Indonesia), Noordin Sopiee (ISIS, Malaysia), Carolina G. Hernandez (Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), the Philippines), Lau Teik Soon (Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore), and Kusuma Snitwongse (Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand).

ISEAS declined an invitation to participate on the grounds that its mandate was a regional research institute, not a national research institute developing a national policy alternative, as was the case with members of ASEAN-ISIS, whose research interests and activities covered both their respective national and regional interests. Each member institute independently conducted fundraising for its own projects and programmes until the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) undertook to support ASEAN-ISIS activities in 1996 (Hourn 2002: 11-12).

Member institutes evinced different characteristics in terms of direction and relations with their respective governments. SIIA resembled the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR in the US) and RIIA in the UK, in terms of a loosely structured organisation of professionals who were interested in international affairs. Although at one time it shared space and a part of its budget with the National University of Singapore (NUS), it relocated its office to share space with other international organisations. Their independence was easier discernible in terms of fund raising and staff (Hourn 2002: 14, 21).

ISIS Thailand was different, being affiliated to the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. Whilst it has had to comply with the Faculty’s direction, due to its limited staff and budget it has had enough free space to raise funds outside for each individual project. Unfortunately, it cannot contribute much in terms of economic-related policies and activities. Space has been left for Narongchai Akrasanee (a Thai economist) to fill the gap. He has tried to build upon his connections with the younger generation of Thai economists, particularly from the

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30 Interview conducted July 18th 2006 at IDSS, Singapore

Chapter 3: Constructing East Asian (Security) Networks
Thailand Development and Research Institute (TDRI) and Ministry of Finance to encourage them to participate within the existing networks.\textsuperscript{31}

ISDS is the result of Caroline Hernandez’s efforts. Hernandez has engaged as an individual within the ASEAN-ISIS context since its initial period. ASEAN-ISIS was set up in April 1991 and registered with the Philippines’ Security and Exchange Commission as an independent, non-stock, non-profit, professional research and training organisation in January 1992 (Hourn 2002: 24). The Malaysian ISIS, located within the country's exclusive government compound, has received generous support from the government. Conversely, the Indonesian CSIS has received less support from the Indonesian government. The Indonesian CSIS has enjoyed close relations with the authority since its inception. The CSIS has received very good and generous support from the (Chinese-Indonesian) business community and the press, particularly the \textit{Jakarta Post}, owned by the Wanandi family.\textsuperscript{32}

These engaging agents, ASEAN intellectuals in particular, share some historical backgrounds apart from their belief in the power of liberalism and economic development to help stabilise domestic and regional arenas. Most of them share a social and economic elite status as well as sharing expertise in their respective fields (Chapter 2). All of them graduated from American educational institutes, whether or not they were a part of American attempts to counter a different ideology in the region. In other words, their US-based education, or should be regarded as socio-politico, background, emphasising on the power of economic liberalism does matter. It does that not only as part of their ingrained structure for thought, but also as shared principles guiding their engaging/networking activities (see Chapter 1). Although most of them worked for educational institutions supported by their governments or worked directly for governmental bureau in one area or another, some used to work for international institutions. Narongchai and Soesastro were examples of the latter.

ASEAN, as both institution and region, seems to continually receive more attention from Japan in the broader sense. The large amounts of Japanese direct investment and Official Development Assistance (ODA) that poured into the region

\textsuperscript{31} Interview conducted October 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2006 at Seranee Group, Bangkok, Thailand and Interview, October 26\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

\textsuperscript{32} Interview conducted October 3\textsuperscript{rd} at Seranee Group, Bangkok, Thailand, Interview conducted October 20\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia, and Interview, November 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2006 at ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
were, to say the very least, impressive. Yet what should not be forgotten is that it also increased Japan’s function as the Pacific region’s ‘growth pole’ from both the demand side (increasing exports to the archipelago) and the supply side (acting as a base for capital goods) (Soesastro 1988).

What was seemingly quite novel was that the domestic consensus within Japan increasingly supported the country’s proactive leadership in three distinct areas: the environment; energy; and food-related concerns. Although Tokyo tried to be more active in a subtle way - a faithful mediator leading from behind - in dealing with the Cambodian problem (such as Prime Minister Suzuki Senko’s attempts), it achieved little credit and success. However, movement in Japanese business circles was different. Representatives invited Hun Sen (Khmer Prime Minister at that time) to Tokyo to persuade him to change the cause of the Cambodian problem (Wood 1993: chapter 10, Calder 2000). The general atmosphere was so encouraging that both state and non-state agents acted in ways that did not occur to them in earlier decades. It is interesting to note that the ‘comprehensive approach’ to security, with its particular stress on diplomacy for security purposes, signified a trend towards alleviating public concern in Japan and elsewhere about shifting too rapidly towards a military response to security problems (Satoh 1982).

In the case of the Japanese, comprehensive security was the linkage of politics and the economy as a means of protecting peace. Suzuki Senko made this clear when he visited ASEAN countries in 1981. He inherited the concept from Masayoshi Ohira, who had died suddenly in 1980 (Sudo 1981: 20). Wandi argues that there was a subtle difference between ASEAN and the Japanese parallel concepts of ‘comprehensive security’, although generally their definitions seemed to be convergent. While the Japanese were more precise about concrete concepts and policies regarding food and energy, that of the ASEAN covered ‘[all] aspects of life that have to be taken care of, the economic, political as well as military part, then social part, even cultural part’.33 Put otherwise, ASEAN comprehensive security concepts see security with a more holistic perspective than that of Japan whose core concept firstly revolts around economic necessity before extending to other aspects. For ASEAN, domestic and regional resilience is at the core of the concept; there is no

33 Interview conducted October 27th 2007 at the (Thai) ISIS’s 25th Anniversary Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand
clear pre-given priority for security agenda, apart from the common perception of improving the region. As a result, ASEAN version of the concept is much more flexible to respond to changing environment than that of Japan.

With the dawning of the 1990s, the co-operative activities in the region intensified. Activities and projects undertaken by ASEAN-ISIS in collaboration with other institutes were many and condensed. In addition, the PECC process initiated the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). Some member institutes were also members of the PECC, for example CSIS, SIIA, and Malaysian ISIS (Hourn 2002: 33). In the meantime, apropos of ASEAN-ISIS, Hourn concludes that at least four themes of conferences were already established and proceeding. The first was the ‘Second Quadrilateral Project’ involving scholars from ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, and the US (1987-1988. The first event to take place spanned from early 1983 to mid-1984). The second theme was the ‘ASEAN-Japan Conferences’ (1987-1989). The third was the ‘ASEAN-Pacific Islands Conferences’ (1987-1989). And the fourth was the ‘ASEAN Young Leaders Conferences’ (1989-1992).

Other conferences were convened before the 1990s: the ASEAN-Korean Conferences (in 1987); and Southeast Asia Forum and Southeast Asia-China Dialogues (both in 1988). These conferences, particularly those that were continuations of the earlier conferences, were conducted mostly under themes related to multilateral security co-operation and the role of ASEAN in the progress of regional process making in the Asia-Pacific region (Hourn 2002: 15-16). The longest and most successful series of conferences was the Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR) which was inaugurated in 1987. Governmental, non-governmental, academics and journalists came together just before ASEAN-PMC to develop a co-operative security dialogue process. Dialogue was the key as Peggy Mason pointed out in 1992: ‘[T]hroughout the three days, both in and out of the session, participants whether in groups or duos, were engaged in dialogue, networking or track two diplomacy’ (Isa and Teoh 1992: 7).

What should be noted here is that there were divisions of responsibility concerning organising regional programmes. The APR had been the function of Malaysian ISIS; the Human Rights Colloquium (HRC) had been associated with the

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34 Mason who was the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, External Affairs and International Trade, attended the conferences)
ISDS; the ASEAN Young Leaders Forum (AYLF) used to be associated solely with the CSIS. The inclination to establish close relations based on historical backgrounds helped to pair-up arranging activities. As the most energetic and long-running of the institutes, the CSIS had been handling ASEAN-ISIS’s bilateral relations with the US. The Thai ISIS was responsible for bilateral talks with China; and the SIIA was in charge of the dialogue meetings with the Taiwan Institute of International Relations (IIR) (Hourn 2002: 31).

The movements of the PECC process were very productive, whether viewed from state (particularly Japan and Australia) and/or non-state agents’ perspectives. As regards the governmental agents, there was close international co-operation. MITI, together with Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), encouraged other regional counterparts to firstly initiate moderate communication at the official-and-minister level. Prime Minister Nakasone mooted the idea publicly in San Francisco and at PECC VI in Osaka, Japan. It was again that the Japanese let Australia take the lead so that accusations of perceived domination were avoided, despite the fact that the Japanese were criticised for not playing broader and more imaginative political and economic roles (Wanandi 1990b).³⁵ What should be noted is that Nakasone’s assertiveness of Japan’s international position saw him trying hard to transform the Japanese society into being more internationalised by applying positive gaiatsu (outside pressure) from the US (Wood 1993: chapter 11).

ASEAN and PECC were closely consulted in order to get the on-going consultative process functioning smoothly. Prime Minister Takeshita stressed that Japan would support the establishment of any Pacific regional organisation that had ASEAN’s support. The proposal was part of his ‘International Co-operation Initiative’, which focused on both politico-security and the politico-economic fields as Japan’s contribution to the world and the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, the first-ever senior official meeting was held in Sydney under the banner of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), having been officially proposed in Seoul in January 1989, by Australia Prime Minister Bob Hawke (Wanandi 1988, Simandjuntak 1990, Habib 1990, Elek 2005a).

³⁵ Japanese-image concerning Gaimusho (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) played down the idea; its performance was changed when MITI’s minister was transferred to head Gaimusho (Elek 2005a).
The numerous efforts made by both state and non-state agents (from Japan and ASEAN in particular as far as this project is concerned) contributed to how the scope of the Asia-Pacific region should be perceived and how the co-operative activities should proceed. Economic functional considerations, based on liberalism and development, were at issue, not traditional geographical definitions of the region. It was the compromise that made APEC’s geographically cooperative scope so broad, as preferred by those agents from Australia, the US and even Canada. This kind of compromise was generated by a blending of instrumental action, negotiating to decrease differences, with communicative action, reaching mutual understanding to establish region-wide comprehensive cooperation, albeit emphasizing economic aspects at an initial stage (see Chapter 1). Additionally, activities derived from economic functional considerations covered more and more non-traditional security matters, as preferred by those agents from ASEAN and Japan. Although engaging/networking agents did not mention community building clearly at the time, the way they emphasised a preference for a process-oriented rather than a result-oriented approach demonstrated that community building occupied a place in their thinking (Watanabe 1995).

To some extent Japan expected that processes (flexible diplomacy) derived from PECC, APEC and other institutions (formed by Japanese helping hands) would help in building a consensus on politically sensitive matters. Although the sensitive issue at that time meant facilitating liberalisation, it also showed signs of spill-over effects generating more dialogue surrounding more seriously politically sensitive matters, as Harris, Adler and Barnett maintain (Harris 1994b, Matsunaga 1995, Yamakage 1995, Adler and Barnett 1998) (see Chapter 4). The themes of numerous conferences and workshops reflected not only ASEAN intellectuals’ concern over the Japanese threatening economic policies in particular, but also the direction they should take to solve regional difficulties in ways that governmental and non-governmental engaging agents desired.

Although 1989 was regarded as the year the Cold War ended, Yukio Satoh (then Director-General for Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo) doubted that its cessation would bring much change, particularly in Northeast and Southeast Asia.

36 The matters mostly concern the Japanese ability to be more open and flexible about its own domestic market and distribution system, which are difficult to penetrate.
There were still remnants of the old ideologies in the region. Soviet troops were still stationed in the East of Poland; North Korea was developing nuclear-weapon programmes, not to mention the many potential conflicts in the Southeast Asia region. As Yukio Satoh observed that ‘The end of the Cold War rarely changed the geopolitics at all’. Seizaburo Sato argued that three hurdles clouded the Japanese way of explicitly engaging with regional security developments alteration. The first was how to overcome strong public opinion against open acceptance of a collective self-defence policy. The second was the popular fear that such a move would provoke the Soviet Union into a new round of the arms race. The third was the fear harboured by Japan’s neighbours regarding the expansion of its military forces (Sato 1990: 11-14).

Conflict continued, particularly in the Southeast Asia region, and glimpses of change were becoming evident. Whilst the Cambodian problems (Vietnamese troops and the Khmer four factions) were showing more positive signs, difficulties in the South China Sea were surfacing. Cases in point that occurred in 1988 included the Chinese-Vietnamese naval encounter, and the arrest of a Philippines' ship by the Malaysian authorities (Harris 1996: 40-41). Fortunately, the regional context in general was less hostile and looked more fertile for co-operative activities, which could serve as catalysts and stepping stones for more concrete co-operation, especially in the political arena. States and non-state agents both had their fair share of trying to construct more cooperative regional atmosphere.

The ‘cocktail party’, initiated by Professor Mochtar (Indonesia) and Nguyen Co Thach when the former visited Hanoi in July 1987, was intended to facilitate informal meetings among the Khmer factions. It proceeded to become the ‘Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs)’ in 1988 (July) and 1989 (February). These efforts enabled Indonesia to open negotiations with Phnom Phen and Hanoi, and to co-chair the International Conference on Cambodia in October 1991 (Emmers 2003: 105). Jakarta also sponsored a successful series of multilateral dialogues and workshops on ‘Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea’, launched in 1990 and initiated by co-operation between Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia and Townsend-Gault, a Canadian academic. The CIDA was the main source of funding.

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37 Interview conducted September 14th 2006 at the JIIA, Katsumigazeki Building, Tokyo, Japan
In the same year, the Malaysian ISIS proposed the inception of a Regional Maritime Surveillance and Safety Regime (RMSSAR) for Southeast Asian waters. An atmosphere of friendship led to the Bundung Workshop in 1991 at which the notion of the declaration on the South China Sea was drafted. Finally, in July 1992, the ASEAN foreign ministers signed the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (Taylor et al 2006: 55-57, Bateman 2007: 11-11). Political Change could also be discerned in the North Pacific, where the process of ‘North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue’ was initiated by Canada in the mid-1990s (Jin 1991: 6). These activities reflected a more co-operative regional atmosphere encouraged and facilitated by engaging/networking agents as mentioned previously.

Change, particularly in the political arena, was now in the air. As Hadi Soesastro, with his long engaging experience in regional affairs observed, ‘[T]here appears now to be a shift of focus from economics to security issues’. Engaging agents, seizing a more co-operative regional atmosphere created by the post Cold War world and their expertise in regional affairs, called for more and rapid change, especially from their respective governments, to establish greater regional order. For them, greater regional order could be created by enhancing the efficacy of the extant formal and informal mechanisms for consultation, confidence-building, and conflict resolution. A report from the heads of an ASEAN-ISIS meeting (in Bangkok 1990) affirmed the call, particularly regarding the Mekong River and the South China Sea. They proposed that Japan could play a helpful part in the scheme for burden sharing, by providing financial and technological support for ASEAN’s sea line of communications (which were also vital for Japanese well-being). In addition they called for a more consolidating framework for ‘ASEAN PECC’ (Paribatra 1991: 10-11).

What may be concluded here is that the engaging agents’ attempt (at worst) to accommodate and (at best) to bring more change in their direction of preference persisted and produced more profound milestones concerning regional security. In the case of attempts from governmental engaging agents, ‘ASEAN 6+5’ was created and later developed into ‘Dialogue Partners.’ ASEAN-PMC was also set up as a flexible and consultative forum for more expansive issues, namely, regional problems and

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38 Interview on October 20th 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia

Chapter 3: Constructing East Asian (Security) Networks
security. In the case of non-governmental engaging agents, ‘ASEAN- Institute’ was set up as a cobweb of initially networking activities by engaging scholars from ASEAN countries, although the initial concept was not their own. The ASEAN-US Conference cosponsored by the Indonesian CSIS and UC at Berkeley was a platform proposed and encouraged by their US counterparts. Later, the name was changed to ‘ASEAN-ISIS’ in 1988. Substantive themes for cooperation remained unchanged; regional economics and politics must complement each other as an important part of nation-state building and comprehensive security. Details of how agents achieved that, and what lessons were leaned from their engaging experiences, will be recounted in the next chapter.

Summary
The guiding questions drawn from the first and second groups of research questions for this chapter were: who were those engaging/networking agents that initiated and nurtured engaging/networking activities; how they constructed and expanded their networks; how the cohesive networking activities worked out and why they worked out that way; did these engaging share similar ideas on security; and did their activities prove effective and energetic networks? In other words, this chapter illuminated to what extent political and economic phenomena within the time span from the 1960s to early 1990s were seen to provide insights into intellectual networking activities. They were activities derived from ASEAN and Japan and also mingled with the discursive networking space under scrutiny here.

This chapter found out that not only did engaging/networking agents who participated in regional activities attempt to construct regional (at first, economic) cooperation, they also energetically tried to consolidate and expand their networking activities. The inception of the ASEAN-ISIS was intrinsic in the existing networks developed in the 1960s, whilst the existing networks paid more attention to economic co-operation. ASEAN-ISIS focus had been upon highlighting (comprehensive) security concerns since its start. Yet, ASEAN-ISIS scholars were not alone in embarking upon an alternative regional co-operative direction, which appeared at both state (ASEAN, APEC) and non-state levels (PECC).

Non-governmental cooperation, with the support of numerous governments, proved an important driving force for bettering the regional context by prolonging facilitation and constructing channels for cocooning and nurturing friendships based
on shared visions. The question of whether they could lead to trust as the constructivists suggest is addressed in Chapter 5. Shared visions based on the concept that liberal capitalism and development held the key to the consolidation and expansion of their activities, first under the guiding banner of an economic aspect, flowed in to other aspects, political and security in particular. The shift came as no surprise given that the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ was taken into account by tracing back and observing engaging agents’ regional activities.

As long as agents’ ideas and actions could not be plucked from thin air, the regional context had to be regarded as their resource. On the one hand, at some point it barred them from stepping further into rather unproductive traditional security areas, especially territorial disputes and military-related matters. On the other, oppressive political environments encouraged them to try harder to utilise what was available to them at the time, within the economic field, in order to make themselves more apparent and relevant. Although they were limited in terms of budget and staff, ASEAN scholars were keen on playing a go-between role. They both consolidated and divided their resources and responsibilities, in order to better deal with their counterparts, particularly those from Japan, the US and the Asia-Pacific countries.

As far as the Japanese were concerned, whether they first intended to or not, they helped to generate and accelerate a fertile regional context for co-operation (Katzenstein 2000: 8). Their success was based on the establishment of their ‘global buying network’ and far-flung regional production networks, combining horizontal and vertical networks as mentioned previously, supported by a broad array of trade, aid, investment, and cultural policies (Soesastro 1990, Katzenstein 2005: 8). It was the prolonged Japanese network with Europe that paved the way for those from ASEAN-ISIS to coordinate the inceptions of ASEM and CAEC. ASEAN’s scholars are more active in explicit ways, whereas the Japanese are good in a subtly encouraging role, apart from initiating regional economic cooperation.

To a great extent, those attempts were derived from the US’s compulsion regarding Japan, namely to link economics and politics with security in the 1970s and 1980s (Shiraishi 1998: 44). In other words, the so called ‘porous region’ (encouraging

39 Japan’s regionalisation (intellectual exchange included) is rather the extension of domestic coherence across different domains of policy, not guided by the whole master plan. It is more responsive than directive towards the changing international conditions.
and facilitating non-state agents’ movements, as well as those of the states) was more or less under the aegis of the American 'Empire' (Katzenstein 2005). Vulnerability left both Japan and many other countries in the region having to comply with American plans as a *sine qua non* for (their economic) growth, not long-term stability. Yet, both state- and non-state actors tried hard to change the cause in order to make themselves less dependent on the US and be more directly relevant to and cooperative for their own regional affairs. They anticipated creating and facilitating long-term stability in the region. Japan was keen to bridge international interdependency with its national power and channel it into more informal processes in a bid to soften the negative images resulting from World War II and their economic success (Kato 2000). ASEAN scholars have captured the trend well enough to channel Japanese cooperation in a direction that not only facilitates their activities, but also encourages them to support the broader ambition of constructing a more expansive regional community.

The next chapter will illustrate more about their attempts to link broader supports not only from Japan and other countries in the region but also from other regions in order to construct a more stabilised, inclusive, and peaceful region.
Chapter 4: Strengthening, consolidating and revitalising networks

Chapter 3 discussed how agents’ ideas and perceptions of their surroundings (the regional environment in particular) transform them into energetic engaging agents. Not only do they construct shared ideas about regional affairs, but they also extend their concerns and networking activities across their own respective countries. They helped to initially construct what this thesis terms ‘East Asian (Security) Intellectual Networks’.

This chapter also illustrates and analyses the ways in which they interacted with each other within discursive areas of changeable ideas and actions that helped them to synthesise and crystallise their ideas and actions. Although they may differ regarding the degree to which, and how they should approach their counterparts from governmental sections and how regional environments should be transformed/created/developed, they nevertheless agree that their ideas and perceptions should not go unheeded.

The prospect of economic cooperation reinforced the efforts and actions of these engaging agents; their belief in liberalism and economic development united them. From within this discursive area, numerous capable and intentional agents emerged, namely, both non-governmental mainly from academia and also governmental agents acting in their own private capacities. Clearly the governmental agents opted not to discard their governmental links; rather, they used them as one of many available resources that would both sustain and boost their networking activities. The emergence and sustainability of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) are cases in point.

In order to proceed, questions guiding this chapter are drawn from both the first and second groups of research questions, albeit emphasising more on the latter. The basic questions underlining the narration of this chapter are who were they, specifically those relating to the expanded network, and to what extent and under what circumstances did they join these engaging/networking activities? The questions from the second group of research questions and additional ones from fieldwork are: whether their socialising processes had any impact on their networking activities and their perceptions on these activities; whether they were capable as changing-agents
transmitting their ideas, at least to their track I counterparts in order to transform the regional security environment.

This chapter also argues that a spill-over effect occurred when most of the engaging agents became sufficiently familiar with each other to expand further upon perceived difficult issues as part of their broad definition of (comprehensive) security. Familiarity was regarded here as an impact from socialising processes derived from activities mentioned in the previous chapter. It was not considered necessary for them to strike at the sore nerves of traditionally territorial disputes and states’ sovereignty when the time was not ripe. The numerous international seminars convened on global and regional affairs, supported by ASEAN-ISIS and its counterparts (either in Japan or the US), are regarded here as significant stepping stones for increased focus on direct security matters. A broader definition of (comprehensive) security remains at the heart of these agents’ networking activities. This emphasis will be examined more closely in this chapter.

The chronology of events is at the core of this long tracing back process. This chapter illustrates two connected sections: the first demonstrates to what extent and how the above engaging agents placed an emphasis on more traditional security concepts. The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Council for Asia Pacific Cooperation (CACE) offer a basis for illustrating how ideas and discursive activities were transmitted/translated into concrete fora. Additional guiding questions are as follows: to what extent and in what way did ASEAN-ISIS closely engage with its/their Japanese counterparts? And how successful were they in persuading ASEAN, other governments and other non/like-minded individuals to get on board?

The second section deals with the slow progress of the networks, that is, until they discovered some interesting projects that would revitalise their activities, such as the promotion of the ‘ASEAN Community’ and the ‘East Asia Community’. The aim here is to shed light on these two projects, which are not only regarded as compatible, but also as well connected. The reasons for these perceptions are due to the intentions and efforts of networking-engaging agents who share experiences, ideas and visions about the region. Questions concerning identities are also addressed, particularly those involving the abundance of activities that took place in many areas.
Ascending periods of success

*Early 1990s: a very energetic period for engaging agents*

The 1990s were full of positive and negative signs that helped to construct agents’ perceptions, actions and interactions. Apart from ideological diminishment, the end of the Cold War opened up ample room for the shifting of global and regional powers. It also signified the uplifting and spreading of people power, irrespective of whether they supported a negative (nationalism and separatism) or a positive trend (participation and democracy). Here, the latter was a result of a ‘social and political awakening’ (Sopiee 1993, Paribatra 1993).

Gone was significant power in terms of actual control and in terms of offering simply alternatives to the Soviet Union. There was even a prediction by Francis Fukuyama that the US domination, based on liberal democratic belief and systems would lead to the end of human’s struggling history\(^1\) (Fukuyama 1993). What has overshadowed the concept of geo-economics is the important return of geo-politics as a fertile ground for catalysing the linkage of three concepts: economic liberalisation aimed at generating growth; democratisation; and peace on both domestic and regional levels (Chan 1992). These potentially and discursively conflict-prone areas are what Robert A. Scalapino (1994) calls the ‘Natural Economic Territories’ (NETs), which cannot be precisely demarcated by politics, let alone the traditional concept of security based on states’ sovereignty.

The many attempts to normalise relations by nullifying prior enmities (such as the US and Vietnam, Vietnam and China, and China and India) should be regarded as parts of the positive process. Most interesting of these was the Sino-Soviet normalisation signed on May 16, 1991, which signified the positive settlement of the border dispute between the two with the Amur River as the demarcation line (Zagoria 1988: 14, Okazaki 1991: 34). Celebrations were held everywhere, particularly in the West. But the agents in the Asia-Pacific region viewed it with suspicion. Yukio Satoh, one of the significant supporters of multilateralism asks: ‘What makes the Asia-Pacific region different from Europe is that the core of the Cold War does not much change’, citing the situations in Korean Peninsular, and the Taiwan Straits as apparent

\(^1\) This is what Fukuyama suggests when he argues that there would be no ideologically dialectical driving force to advance human history.
cases of partition from the Cold War’s legacy. A Japanese scholar warned that apart from strengthening economic resilience and restructuring the international economic system, the following three traditional security methods should not be ignored: the strengthening of conventional deterrence; the link between theatres; and developing an effective intercepting system to capture a variety of hostile missiles (Sato 1990).

What should be emphasised here is that although the dawn of the decade brought uncertainties with it, glimpses of positive change could be perceived in Asia. For some observers, such a positive new report announced the diminishing of the US’s military might in the region in 1990 (Yuzawa 2007: 37-38). Contributing to further uncertainty on the wider Asia continent was the outbreak of the wars in the Middle East: Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US invaded Iraq under the banner of the United Nations Security Council. These events were accompanied by power-shifting trends, namely, the opening up of China, and Japan’s unsettling self-defining position whether it should shoulder more international burdens (Chin 1991, Heisbourg 1992). The latter, combined with the extremely poor image that distinguished Japan due to its large monetary contributions to help Kuwait without risking lives of her nationals, forced Japan to renew its efforts to rebuild its image. Otherwise, Japan might be perceived with less moral respect by international communities as a selfish middle-rung power who knew only how to spend her money to buy off her international responsibilities (Motofumi 1991, Yuzawa 2007: 39-44). To sum up, the changing atmosphere required all of the regional players to reflect and question whether the system they had been familiar with, particularly in terms of policies, either at the bilateral or regional levels, was still in fact relevant.

Scalapino (1990: 27) suspected that the old saying ‘familiarity breeds contempt’ might prove true. The region's long legacy of power domination was revealed when its conflicting ideological veil was lifted. If the protectionism in the technology trade could not be dealt with satisfactorily, the trend could worsen (Simandjuntak 1991: 179). Another matter that could no longer be ignored was the significance of domestic politics and foreign policy; there was no longer a clear

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2 Interview on September 14, 2006, at the JIIA, Katsumigazegi Building. Tokyo, Japan

Chapter 4: Strengthening, consolidating and revitalising networks
demarcation between low and high politics (Bunbongkarn 1990). On this point, there was a call from ASEAN intellectuals saying that intellectuals and research institutes should be more readily accepted, for not only do they act as extra resources that lessen the burden of foreign ministries (as in the case of Indonesian CSIS, the University of Indonesia, and the Indonesian Institute of Science - LIPI), but also as an effective means of setting up and implementing co-operative programmes (as in the case of the Filipino Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme - CARP) (Hernandez 1990, Wanandi 1990a). In Singapore, the linkages between the ministries (of foreign affairs and of defence) and researchers attached to strategic studies institutes were apparent, particularly with those from the SIIA (Katsumasa 2003: 101). It was difficult to deny that activities derived from engaging/networking intellectuals were affected by domestic power politics that they would like to diminish in order to convey more of their ideas.

There were also questions about the effectiveness of ASEAN, a regional institution with its concept to promote a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN). How it would handle the question of whether a Southeast Asia nuclear-free-zone (SEANWFZ) should be established (Alagappa 1988a, Snitwongse 1990, Djiwandono 1991a, Rauf 1994, Kusuma-Atmadjya 1994). The question of whether Japan would remilitarise was also attracting interest from regional countries, and for this reason the Japanese government promoted more assertive diplomacy based on a non-military contribution and by calling for more multilateral consultations at both regional and global levels (Hamzah 1991, Kiyofuku 1990, 1991).

Later, in the spring of 1991, Japan set up a guideline for its official development aid (ODA) covering a multitude of concerns from ecology and freedom of information to human rights records, in order to be compatible with the Western standards. Somewhat ironically, Japan refused to sign the Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights when its voice was needed (Deng 1997, Villacorta 1998). It may be observed here that the resurgence of political difficulties made not only Japan but also many countries in the region reluctant to rush ahead with changes that could affect their internal difficulties. In addition, the resurgence of political difficulties not only made things hard for engaging agents (governmental and non-governmental alike),

3 The direct intervention from the Thai military into foreign policy making process towards Myanmar in the late 1980s due to the shortage of the timber concession in Thailand was an apparent case in point.

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they also dissuaded non-governmental agents to rush their networking activities. Those difficulties were the harsh perceptions regarding frequent wars in the Middle East and the uncertain regional leading role taken by Japan and China in particular. Waiting for, and reading the right signs from governmental agents were their beneficial tactics. On the surface, waiting for track I agents to give initial hints, for examples encouraging track II opinion-giving activities or even asking for consultation, could be considered as taking the role of scholar-bureaucrat, as Jones and Smith (2001, 2006) notified. Yet, what should not be overlooked is that those engaging/networking agents did not totally reify the existing regional security order. On the contrary, waiting to read the right signs should be perceived as a tactic (Habermasian instrumental action of the reading of this project) accompanying their routine activities aimed towards constructing mutual understanding about the improvement of their regional security. The mutual understanding is read here as Habermasian sense of communicative action (see Chapter 1). Nevertheless, this understanding and the aforementioned perceptions might be altered in later periods mainly due to changing environmental structure for engaging/networking agents’ thought.

Put differently, the uncertainties associated with a rapidly changing environment required regional countries to do something; either accommodate the change, or channel it into the direction preferred by all, namely, multilateralism, fashioned after the success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At that time, multilateralism was their mutual understanding in the sense of communicative action. Many agents not only voiced their perceptions and proposals but even tried to persuade others to accept them as shown below.

Gorbachev came in early; even before the end of 1980s he indicated that he wanted to take the lead in channelling the change into the direction emulated CSCE. He first discussed the subject with India's Rajiv Gandhi in May 1985, subsequently reiterating it in his speeches at Vladivostok in July and in Krasnoyark in September 1986. Not only did his speeches help the Soviet leader to appear reasonable and conciliatory, they also indicated Gorbachev’s intention to push forward with the programme for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, with which he sought to identify as part of his country’s identity. The Malaysian-ISIS was quick to sense the changing climate when it organised the First Asia-Pacific Roundtable conference under the sponsorship of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund of New York. The event,
which was titled ‘Confidence building and conflict reduction in the Asia Pacific’, attracted 80 participants, mostly from Asia-Pacific countries (Alagappa 1988b). Also present at the APR, Australia Foreign Minister Bill Hayden (1989-1996) proposed the application of confidence building measures (CBMs) as part of broader regional security building. Gorbachev’s senior advisor from Policy Planning Department confirmed Gorbachev’s statements at the 2nd Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR) meeting in 1988, stating that the ‘establishment of broad, equitable and mutually beneficial co-operation among all Asian states is a sound guarantee for removing a threat of war and improving the political climate’ in the region (Boutilier 1989, Sergiev 1989). It should not be overlooked here that the sign given by Gorbachev had a positive impact on the acceleration of regional engaging agents’ activities.

Scholars from Australia and the US also used the APR to highlight European experiences on CBMs as the way to solve regional territorial problems. Proposals for naval activity ranged from freezing nuclear capable aircrafts in Asia to creating submarine free zones or anti-submarine warfare free zones (Findlay 1989, Prezyestup 1989). Yet, the most interesting, experimental and ready to be implemented CBMs for solving the Cambodian (or Kampuchean at that time) problem came from a Malaysian scholar, Noordin Sopiee (1989) of ISIS. Various talks and meetings ranging from small groups of leaders or high officials directly responsible for the problems to international conferences were his key components for success due to their potential to mitigate (at worse) and/or dissolve (at best) difficulties and different views regarding the problem. Comparing to what used to be thought of as a cul-de-sac problem; the Cambodian problem was viewed with brighter hope through many talks both official and non-official. Also at the APR meeting the following year, Malaysian Prime Minister (Mahathir) positively advocated the CBMs for regional affairs (Evans 1991: 57-58). Although nothing concrete eventuated, there was a trend that governmental and non-governmental engaging agents saw things in a more cooperative direction. In other words, official support could make a different for regional networking activities regarding security.

Thus far, multilateralism for regional security was still a popular topic. In 1990, the Philippines’ Foreign Minister (Raúl Sevilla Manglapus) alluded to it in his

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4 They were from The United States, the Soviet Union, The People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
opening statement entitled ‘ASEAN towards an Economic Treaty and a Security Dialogue’, delivered at the 23rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). But proposing that ASEAN should begin to engage in dialogue on regional security issues was as far he could go. Several days later, a more elaborate idea came from Australia’s Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who debated it at the ASEAN-PMC in his statement entitled ‘Leading through Dialogue and Decision’. Suggesting that ASEAN’s dialogue partners could become the embryo for a regional dialogue on politico-security issues, he named the proposed forum a ‘Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia’ (CSCA) (Wanandi 1991c: 110, 1991d: 323, Acharya 1993: 60). In the same year, reiteration of the need to create new habits of dialogues and cooperation based on the adaptation of the CSCE in the Pacific, was presented by Joe Clark (Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs) at the APR. It was a time that many official and non-official engaging agents saw necessity to relentlessly encourage more changes for regional comprehensive security matters through numerous fora.

The Canadian proposal, which became crystallised by the autumn of that year, gave birth to the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD). First organised as a colloquium in Victoria, Canada in April 1991 by York University, it led to a more fundamental conference in the early spring of 1993. The cooperative security concept of the forum was based on the twin notions that the threats to security were increasingly diverse and multi-dimensional. It had two operative tracks: the first concentrated on government officials, mostly policy planners; the second involved non-governmental organisations including academics. Together, they were the creators and the main component of a series of international conferences and workshops (Evans 1991: 58-60, Jin 1991, Mason 1993: 155).

Japan was positively affected by the appeal of multilateralism. Its reconsideration of the idea began when Yukio Satoh assumed the position of Director General of the Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1990. Sato tried to find an appropriate way to respond to the invitation of the Soviet. In the meantime, he helped Taro Nakayama, the then Japanese Foreign Minister, to organise the Asia-Pacific Foreign Ministers’ Conference on the sideline of the 45th UN General Assembly. The aim was to gather support for multilateralism after having received good support from the Japan-Korea Conference

\[5\] They mostly came from Canada, the US, China, the two Koreas, Japan and the Soviet Union.
in May. In July 1990, preparations commenced for the Japan-Soviet Foreign Minister Conference scheduled for the September.

Taro Nakayama proposed that the first policy meeting for CBMs take place in December (Yuzawa 2007: 23-25). Japan and Yukio Satoh were ready to venture more on the route to multilateralism.

To sum up, not only did the changing climate and the positive signs emerging in the late 1980s help the regional players to reflect on their experiences, it also encouraged them to cooperate more with each other. Fortunately, the condensing of their experiences, the intensification of their intentions to reap the benefit of the momentum of the trend, and the positive feelings they gained through numerous meetings, conferences and workshops, specifically at the APR, encouraged the agents from ASEAN and Japan to cooperate closely for the construction of important international fora in the region.

New initiatives from ASEAN-ISIS and the Nakayama Proposal

Up until 1991, it was obvious that governments in the region, apart from Japan, were slowly beginning the process of regional, political and security dialogue. Gorbachev was an external actor in this project. In his official visit to Japan in April 1991, he conveyed his idea directly to Tokyo’s leader. He presented two proposals that brought a degree of discomfort to Toshiki Kaifu, who was then Japan’s Prime Minister. They were disarmament talks in the North Pacific which had always been rejected by the US and a security conference attended by the foreign ministers of all the Asia-Pacific countries in 1993 (Habib 1991: 259, 1994).

The non-government agents were serious about pushing forward further change. They seized this chance, aware that the governments also wanted to change their policies no matter how reluctant they appeared. The ASEAN-ISIS initiative was a successful case in point. The most important matter for the government agents was the discussion concerning ASEAN's way forward. Additionally, they not only called for reflection on - and a search for - an appropriate framework, but they also called for more efficient and effective way(s) to utilise the existing regional institutions, including those already established and joined by ASEAN. ASEAN’s unity was crucial to the ideal international community confronting diversified problems (Kusuma-Atmadja 1991, Lau Teik Soon 1991, Mangkusuwondo 1991, Wanandi 1991a). Tracing back through time, it may be suggested that the existence and
activities of ASEAN provided a background for the institutionalising process, no matter how weak it was compared to the European experience.

ASEAN-ISIS scholars saw the time as ripe for proposing their ideas for the region’s metamorphosis. The eagerly awaited ASEAN Summit Meeting in Singapore (the 4th scheduled in 1992) would be their testing platform. The report entitled ‘Strengthening the Structure and Mechanism of ASEAN’ prepared by a panel of eminent persons was crucial (The Fourth Summit 1991). In order to better prepare the proposal, ASEAN-ISIS members organised meetings and conferences in a bid to attract more ideas and comments. There were two events that should be emphasised as the discursive space in which engaging agents from ASEAN and Japan communicated in order to reach a mutual understanding and produce a concrete outcome.

The first was entitled ‘ASEAN and a New Asian Pacific Security Structure’ (2-3 June, 1991). As one of the main organisers, the CSIS invited Paul M. Evans of NPCSD and Yukio Satoh as their special non-ASEAN guests, inviting them to share their experiences and ideas on the changing regional climate. Satoh confirmed Japanese public support for a more active international role (Jin 1991).

The second, an ASEAN related conference sponsored by the Filipino and Thai governments (named the ‘ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific region: Prospects for Security Co-operation in the 1990s’) was held in Manila on 5 June 1991. The most important experience for Satoh was the lively clarification of the ‘expectation on Japan from ASEAN’s perspectives’, preferring close cooperation and not the Japanese ‘go-it-alone’ way of managing regional affairs. In other words, it left ample room for Japan’s initiative. At the two fora, the European experiences of confidence building measures were questioned for direct application and NPSCD was initiated as the spin-off from the Canadian efforts.

In order to get more support from the US, Satoh mentioned clearly in his presentations, particularly at the second conference, that there was nothing compared to the US-Japan alliance. But a multilateral security arrangement could be an effective supplementary option (Yuzawa 2007: 28-29). He deliberately used the term ‘reassurance’ rather than ‘confidence building’ (based on the concept of avoiding miscalculation on military confrontation in Europe), signifying his aspiration to reduce tensions among existing hostile enemies (Evans 1996: 207). Satoh stated:

6 Interview on September 14th 2006, at the JIIA, Katsumigazegi Building Tokyo, Japan
Among Asian countries, we had much historical scepticism. To overcome this and to increase economic interdependence, the most important way was to enhance the level of ‘reassurance’ among Asian countries.7

To sum up, the results from previous attempts were a proposal called ‘A Time for Initiative’ from ASEAN-ISIS and the Nakayama Proposal from Japan.

ASEAN-ISIS presented the proposal ‘A Time for Initiative’ to the respective governments. The proposal illustrated four areas in which ASEAN could significantly contribute to the changing climate: an Asia-Pacific political dialogue; a new regional order in Southeast Asia; the strengthening of ASEAN; and the enhancing ASEAN economic cooperation. Regularising the ASEAN Summit once every two years and institutionalising more of the ASEAN Secretariat were the keys to the third area. The fourth supported the proposed East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) as a step towards establishing an East Asian Caucus within the diversified APEC8 (Stubbs 2002). Yet, the most interesting initiative was the first, which was closely related to the second. ASEAN-ISIS scholars proposed that the ASEAN-PMC should initiate a constructive discussion surrounding Asia-Pacific stability and peace after the end of their usual meeting. ASEAN-PMC meetings had a record of dealing rather effectively with political issues (Afghanistan, Namibia, and Middle East), among the more prominent being Indochinese refugees and Cambodia-related problems.

It was also suggested that the agendas and arrangements for each ASEAN-PMC initiating ‘Conference on Stability and Peace in the Asia Pacific’ should be prepared by a senior official meeting (SOM) of the ASEAN states and dialogue partners (A Time 1991, Wanandi 1991b, 1995b). The issues regarding the establishment of SOM and its functions made ASEAN-ISIS scholars uncomfortable with their Japanese counterparts. They did not anticipate hearing about them when Taro Nakayama, the Japanese Foreign Minister, delivered a speech calling for the

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7 Interview, September 14th 2006, at the JIIA, Katsumigazegi Building, Tokyo, Japan

8 The idea was proposed by Mahathir Mohamad, the then Malaysian Prime Minister. Later, the name was change to East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) in order to mitigate the sense of regional blocking. Yet, the untimely proposing due to concerns about the condensing process of creating European Union and the US’s weak economic capability made the proposal unpopular. Nevertheless, ASEAN did not totally play it down. It might be viewed as a potential option while APEC’s effectiveness was doubted. The rationale was mainly due to different expectations from the Anglo-American side (wanting more legally binding forum and agreement) and the East Asian side (emphasising only facilitation and technical assistance). In the meantime, ASEAN’s unity and capability were also questioned because of its plan to enlarge membership.
official establishment of an Asia-Pacific security dialogue, namely, the ‘Nakayama Proposal’ (Akaha 1995, Simon 1995: 18, Midford 2000, Yuzawa 2007: chapter 1). Nakayama’s idea was to expand and institutionalise further the ASEAN-PMC as a process for mutual reassurance. His final draft, which included the SOM, was prepared by members of the Asia Bureau, who included Yukio Satoh’s report of the meeting he had with ASEAN scholars. He was not there to leave out the SOM part, which originated with ASEAN-ISIS.\(^9\)

At first the initiatives were not warmly welcomed, particularly when the Nakayama Proposal came somewhat as a surprise. They were viewed by regional governments, ASEAN in particular, as untimely. In addition, both non- and governmental agents did not expect that Japan would take the lead. Yet the following events proved that engaging agents from ASEAN-ISIS read the right signs, albeit slowly but incrementally accepted, for regional security architecture. Although the ASEAN-ISIS proposal was finally discussed and accepted by the 24th AMM in Kuala Lumpur (19-20 July 1991) as an ‘appropriate’ base for addressing regional peace and security issues, no concrete programmes or even serious discussions followed. Although it was endorsed at the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore (January 1992), generally the officials saw it as untimely (Ball 1994a, 1994b). Of more significance was the need to accelerate ASEAN economic cooperation. The Singapore Declaration and the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (AEC), which was announced on this occasion, provided the basis for the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (Soesastro 1995b). Scholars from ASEAN-ISIS were to say the least surprised at Japan’s spontaneous action, namely, at how quickly Yukio Satoh was able to persuade his government, ‘We did not expect a quick response from Japan. We knew it was hard even to persuade our own respective governments’ Jusuf Wanandi accepted that ASEAN-ISIS had rather underestimated Yukio Sato’s efforts at that time.\(^10\)

From late 1991 to 1992 was the time when all of the regional engaging parties were about to change their minds. Several obvious events triggered the change. First

\(^9\) Interview, September 14\(^{th}\) 2006, at the JIIA, Katsumigazegi Building, Tokyo, Japan

\(^10\) Interview, October 27th at the (Thai) ISIS 25th Anniversary Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand. Although it is not the focus of this study, it is hard to deny the significant role played by Yukio Sato (sometimes spelled as Satoh in English). For deeper research on this point and to read how Japanese domestic politics affected the policy, see Yuzawa (2007)
came the decline of American forward deployment in Southeast Asia. The US announced that it would withdraw all of its military bases from the Philippines in November 1991. However, the actual withdrawal from Subic naval base took place in late 1992. Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December was a key factor (McGregor 1993, Umezu 1993, Yuzawa 2007: 44). Third was China’s announcement in February 1992, proclaiming a new law pertaining to the territorial sea, including the Spratlys and the Senkakus, and the seemingly offensive upgrading capacity of its navy. And whilst later in July, at the AMM, Qian Qichen (the then Chinese Foreign Minister) assured other participants that China preferred to settle the issues through quiet diplomacy, the serious concerns of other could not be easily assuaged (Lee 1994, Paik 1994).

The Japanese worked hard on tracks I and track II. In the case of track II, Kazuo Takahashi, who was then Programme Director of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (one of the main supporters for the APR), stated clearly that the Asia-Pacific community would have to expand its geographical coverage. It needed to restructure the relationship among its members in order to develop itself into a political structure. At the 6th APR in June 1992, which was attended by prominent persons from tracks I and II, Wanandi reiterated that the ASEAN-PMC could be a workable starting point for regional dialogue. For Wanandi, the ASEAN-PMC had the absorbable capability to include both the ‘like-minded’ and the ‘not yet like-minded’. The inclusiveness was the main rationale that supported multilateralism in the political security field fashioned after the creation of the feeling of ASEAN-ness, signifying the Association’s long-term capability to absorb regional differences. It meant that the fora accepted the different and even conflicting perspectives on regional security issues (Wanandi 1993a, Acharya 1994a). Scalapino (1993) states that creating an official space to cover issues so critical to Northeast Asia accompanying the un- to semi- official meetings of the NPCSD would prove a promising development for the forum.

Around the same time, the idea of creating an ‘Asia Pacific Community’ was also being mooted within the region, particularly by Japanese NGOs, who expected

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11 Those prominent figures from track I were: Le Mai, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam; Georges Kiejman, Minister Delegate of Foreign Affairs, France; Hor Namhong, Minister of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia; Paul Wolfowitz, the US Undersecretary of Defence for Policy; Peggy Mason, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, External Affairs and International Trade
that the associated outward-looking activities could eliminate their own society’s sense of superiority. In the long run, they could jeopardise Japan’s relationships with other Asian countries. Alternative developments related to human rights also received attention, particularly the joining of forces between the environment-oriented NGOs and the Southeast Asia Forum for Development Alternative (SEAFDA), who not only questioned, but also helped to disseminate information about the double-standards and inconsistencies in the Western treatment of human rights. The result was the initiation of the People’s Plan for the 21st Century Campaign for the People’s Forum, held during the World Bank/IMF Meeting in Bangkok in 1992 (Minju and Aoki 1996, Pongsapich 1996). The topic was picked up due to the various countries that were prepared to take part in the Asia Regional Preparatory Meeting for the World Conference on Human Rights. It was the topic that engaging agents under investigation here were also interested in, specifically those from the Philippines, as it was compatible with the concept of comprehensive security. The event was to take place in Bangkok, Thailand (from 29 March 1992 to 1 April 1993).

It is worth observing that the degree of attention that regional intellectuals gave the topic showed that they could not ignore topics mainly perceived outside the region as they were increasingly becoming part of their structural environment. In addition, the human rights topic should also be regarded as a clear signal for regional intellectuals to consider their preferred concept of comprehensive security, that is, to seriously engage with this topic.

The liveliest movement, trying to turn the topic on conferences’ and workshops’ papers to a concrete movement came from ASEAN-ISIS, whose scholars presented a memorandum to both the ASEAN Secretariat and the SOM for the Manila AMM in 1992, encouraging ASEAN to study the matter at a deeper level in order to decide upon a suitable direction following the Vienna Human Rights Conferences of June 1993. The establishment of an ASEAN Commission on Human Rights was proposed (Mahaubani 1992, Wanandi 1993b, 1994a, Jones 1994).

The notion of regional community-building was also floated, with Noordin Sopiee of Malaysian ISIS a key figure. The focal point was an ASEAN Community residing within a Southeast Asian zone of peace, independence, prosperity and cooperation. To achieve this, within the ASEAN community, three things should be developed and promoted: sense of community, cohesion and commitment to ASEAN. In addition, the Association should also enhance its institutional and organisational
skills in two areas; resolving of bilateral issues and tensions and establishing maritime safety and surveillance. This plan aimed at covering the whole of Southeast Asia, constructing a true Southeast Asia (ASEAN-10) and being a meaningful player in the Cambodian game. Although ASEAN’s interlocutor with Vietnam co-chaired the Paris International Conference on Cambodia in October 1991, a meaningful initiative was beyond ASEAN’s reach. The initiative was the international co-operation between the UN Security Council members, Japan and Australia (Anwar 1995).

East Asia was Noordin Sopiee’s (1997) wider theatre. Two areas were significant, namely, defusing the South China Sea problem and establishing a zone of peace, independence, prosperity and co-operation in East Asia. In the Pacific region, according to Sopiee two matters needed to be achieved: establishing the ASEAN-PMC process as the Asia-Pacific regional security dialogue process; and establishing a strong position of ASEAN within APEC. At the global level, ASEAN should unite resources (including people power) with other like-minded agencies in order to improve the system. These concerns helped to conceptualise the theme of the 7th APR (The making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific).

To sum up, a preference for multilateralism was in the air from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Otherwise, it would not be easy for regional agents to propose concrete proposals that would be accepted in the wider circles, namely, ‘A Time for Initiative’ and the ‘Nakayama Proposal’. They were related in terms of concepts to embrace the inception of a regional forum that would focus on and enfold security topics, irrespective of whether they were traditional or comprehensive. Their engaging agents penetrated through each other’s areas, Japan’s and ASEAN’s in particular. APR, CSIS, ASEAN-PMC, AMM and the ASEAN Summit as their significant fora, and Nakayama, Satoh and Wannandi as examples of their penetrating agents were crucial ipso facto. APR and ASEAN-ISIS networks of conferences played essential roles as platforms on which to both trade and mingle ideas. Whilst the two proposals had not yet been actualised, participating agents concentrated on energising comprehensive security matters, specifically those engaging with human rights. ASEAN-ISIS went a step further, proposing the set up of an ASEAN Commission on Human rights (see the next section). It was through these fora that Asian intellectuals urged their counterparts to reconsider whether it was appropriate to directly apply the European-CBMs experience to Asia. It was also the interaction of these fora that
encouraged them to aim higher to construct Asia Pacific and/or the ASEAN community (see Chapter 5).

**ARF and CSCAP: results of broad cooperation for content and procedure**

Energetic movement by both non- and governmental agents was easily perceived in the first half of the 1990s. It was the former’s networking movement that made this short period vibrant and colourful. ASEAN-ISIS became engaged in most of the activities from the Western to the Eastern Pacific Rim, including the annual meeting of the National Defence University in Washington, D.C., the NPCSD, and a series of conferences organised by the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at the University of California in San Diego (funded by the Ford Foundation) (Evans 1983: 138). However, the most interesting came from the co-operation of the four institutions: the ASEAN-ISIS, the Pacific Forum in Honolulu, the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, and the JIIA. They started a multi-parties communication on Security-Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (SCAP). One of the early first results was PACNET, a fax networking organised by Pacific Forum in Honolulu linking scores of research institutes in Japan, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia and the US.

Their efforts, together with cooperation from previous periods, encouraged them to crystallise their region-wide track-II networks. The result was the inception of a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in 1993. Jusuf Wanandi, a long-time and significant engaging agent, reflected that he regarded the inception and extension of CSCAP as regional track-II’s (ASEAN-ISIS in particular) success. These region-wide networks and support stimulated them to put more energy into persuading their respective governments, specifically East Asian governments, to accept the establishment of a region-wide official security forum, as will be explained below.

CSCAP’s Secretariat has been the Malaysia ISIS since its inception. This network has also been linked to the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), the Asian Secretariat of which has been the JCIE since 2005, which was established in 1993 by Susan Shirk, the then Director of the IGCC (Ball 1994a, Taylor et al 2006: 12

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12 Interview on October 3rd 2006 at Saranee Group, Bangkok, Thailand
13 Interview on October 27th 2006 at the (Thai) ISIS 25th Anniversary Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand
30-32, 36-38, Yuzawa 2007: 50-51). What should not be forgotten is that these scholars also exploited their extended network to bolster their attempts to change the regional security architecture. The JIIA, in association with ASEAN-ISIS and the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA), organised a conference titled ‘Enhancing Security in Southeast Asia’, this was another case of exploiting a chance to extend more co-operation (Building 1993: 7). Such cob-web conferences and seminars not only helped participants to share more socialising processes but also functioned as their platforms for consolidating their ideas and actions. It is worth emphasising here that many attempts to broaden the scope of security matters, such as comprehensive security and a focus on areas of conflict can be observed from these fora.

However, the APR was still their most impressive assembly. Constructing and sustaining multilateralism for regional security was among their key concerns. The 7th APR (1993) continued to express the view that the ASEAN-PMC would provide an important component for maintaining a non-military way of engaging the major powers in the region for its overall progress and stability. In fact, China and Russia had already joined the AMM as guests in 1991. Moreover, both Vietnam and Laos would accede to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in 1992 (Harris 1994a, Lee Lai to 1994). Although there was no clear evidence that the expansion of an official forum resulted from the efforts of non-governmental agents, it was difficult to deny that the existing networks comprising governmental and non-governmental agents under investigation here had no part at all. There was even a plenary session of the 7th APR indicating that the relationship between security and states should be reconsidered and re-conceptualised, since the region was a fertile ground for observing the intermingling of comprehensive, common and co-operative security. Only the concept of common security was understood as directly related to the states’ traditional security and political co-operations; the first and the second were perceived as having a broader scope to address/cover the diverse backgrounds of the states, according to their nation-state building process (Noor 1993, Dewitt 1994a, 1994b).

It is worth pointing out that many high profile persons who have been intimately involved in the on-going networking processes are the key to constructing more inclusive region - caring for more comprehensive security matters. These include SR Nathan (President of Singapore), Han Sung-Joo (former South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs), Jim Kelly (former US Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs), Yukio Satoh (Japan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations), Stuart Harris (former Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Jusuf Wanandi, and Tan Sri Noordin Sopiee (Taylor et al 2006: 33).

Most of the above-mentioned had been associated with regional networking activities since earlier times (see Chapter 3). Fruitful networks have been based on individually charismatic founding leaders of member institutes and their own extending networks. Malaysia-ISIS and its close connections with the Japanese Nomura Research Institute and its affiliates is a good example (Noda 1996a, 1996b). Most engaging agents shared the experience of being members of somewhat closed societies in a period of ideological conflict. Few people were able to sojourn abroad, to enjoy different experiences in the relatively open societies in which they could learn and work. ‘It was hard to contact those outside our own countries, that’s why we poured our hearts into turning a nigh impossible thing into a reality, as you have seen’ said Narongchai, reflecting on this point.

Most of the energising engaging agents had directly experienced the PAFTAD and the PECC process and its derivatives attributed to the inception of APEC. These activities, creating and expanding intellectual networks, provided both ideas and models upon which to construct inclusive security fora. These engaging agents even had an aspiration to parallel that of the CSCAP and the PECC (Ball 1993, Evans 1994b, Wanandi 1994b, Yamamoto 1996). The key was (or rather has been) to keep the conference circuit in the region in constant motion, creating critical support for ideas that might just work. Thus far ASEAN-ISIS has played this crucial role, according to a long-term engaging agent (Hernandez 1993).

The government agents from Japan and Singapore were efficient. Kiichi Miyazawa, the incumbent Japanese Prime Minister, persuaded US President George Bush (1989-1993) to support political dialogue in the Asia-Pacific through the ASEAN-PMC. His attempt was witnessed in the Joint Declaration on the Japan-US

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14 Although it is beyond the scope of my study, it is worth noting the vast network of Nomura Research Institute in order to magnify the potentially extended networks for the existing networks under investigation here. They include: the Brookings Institute (US), the Centre of Asian Studies (Hong Kong), the Centre for Policy and Implementation Studies (Jakarta), the Korean Development Institute, the Centre for Research and Communication (the Philippines), ISEAS (Singapore), the Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research (Taipei), and the Thailand Development Research Institute.

15 Interview, October 3rd 2006 at Saranee Group, Bangkok, Thailand
Global Partnership in January 1992. He reiterated the message again at the National Press Club in Washington DC in June 1992, by emphasising more that it was the way to enhance a sense of mutual reassurance. The message and timing were not surprising given that Yukio Satoh, who had a share in the ideas presented in the Nakayama Proposal, had drafted the Miyazawa’s speeches after he became Director General of the North American Bureau. In July 1992, the Japanese officials from the foreign ministry proposed enlarging the Japan-ASEAN Forum to cover political and security issues. It was also at this forum that the first ASEAN-PMC SOM was scheduled.

Thus far, the concept of multilateralism loomed large in the region. It not only occupied space in governmental agents’ interactions, but was also regarded as a cocooning concept for further consolidation of networking by non-governmental agents. For governmental agents, multilateralism was taken further when Singapore assumed the chair of ASEAN’s Standing Committee from July 1992 to July 1993. Obvious cases of regional multilateralism were the expansion of the ASEAN-PMC dialogue and the establishment of ASEAN-PMC SOM, first held in Singapore in May 1993.

It was agreed at the 26th AMM in Singapore on July 23-24 1993 that henceforth the ASEAN-PMC would be extended and known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Apart from the six ASEAN countries and their seven major trading partners, the forum included Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea. Initially chances of success were viewed by critics outside the region to be slim due to disagreement over common security agendas. Additionally, the newly established ARF was limited to dealing only using non-military means, reifying its image as a 'security talk shop' (Djiwandono 1994, Leifer 1996: 27-31, Mak and Hamzah 1996, Yuzawa 2007: 43-46). Yet, the Japanese engaging agents, both governmental and non-governmental, rather relentlessly supported it, their rationale being that the forum not only acted as a bridge between the ‘West’ and ‘Asia’, but also between ASEAN and China. It was a means to maintain constant communication (Hook 1998: 159-188, Umezu 1993: 82).

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At that time ASEAN comprised six states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei). Their dialogue-partners consisted of the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and the European Community.

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Efforts by long-term engaging non-governmental agents made both the ARF and CSCAP eye-catching fora, however, of late their mantras of multilateralism have declined somewhat. Although CSCAP and its derivatives serve as essential debating venues for ideas and initiatives before they become recognised by more serious formal bodies, such as the SOM and ARF, there have been questions as to whether they might be overburdened by too many issues. Acharya (1994a, 1994b) argues that cooperation with the United Nations regional institutions to develop a system of preventive diplomacy might be helpful for regional engaging agents. Yet, what should not be forgotten is that those engaging agents established the CSCAP as a parallel forum to cooperate with the ARF in order to achieve better regional security in general.

As suggested earlier, this short period, with its diversified movements and topics, was remarkably vibrant, indicating that the regional (social) environment was about to change. ASEAN-ISIS wanted to accelerate the process, first and specifically at the ASEAN level. A series of international conferences was organised in a bid to find a way to effectively enlarge the Association to cover all geographical areas (Myanmar and the Indochinese states). It started in 1988 under the banner of the Southeast Asia Forum.

Whilst track I was rather slow, track II’s activities were different. Preparations to enlarge ASEAN-ISIS to cover research institutions from the Indochinese states were scheduled. Yet, there was also effective cooperation between the two tracks. The ASEAN-Vietnam Study Group, whose members from Vietnam became parts of ASEAN-ISIS networks, under the aegis of Anwar Ibrahim (then Malaysia's Minister of Finance) and funded by the Management for Change Project of the CIDA, provides a good example of the co-operation. In 1992, the Thai-ISIS and Singapore’s Information and Resource Centre (IRC) co-organised an international conference titled ‘Towards One Southeast Asia in the 21st Century’ at which the ASEAN-Vietnam Study Group Report on ‘Shared Destiny: Southeast Asia in the 21st Century’ was launched. Through ASEAN-Vietnam Study Group, the process of enlarging ASEAN as proposed by ASEAN-ISIS scholars, previously mentioned, took place.

The process was condensed in the form of the 5th Southeast Asia Forum titled ‘One Southeast Asia’. The main concept was that ASEAN should have no problem in accommodating Myanmar and the three Indochinese states (Towards 1993a, Balakrishnan 1993). On this occasion, Anwar Ibrahim argued that ASEAN could
embrace the ‘diversity of the region as a source of strength, rather than conflict’ (Towards 1993b). It was reiterated by engaging agents that ASEAN should promote mutual understanding through bilateral and multilateral meetings in different ways and at different levels. The activities of tracks II and III were viewed as a way to diminish the differences and accompanied track I activities such as in their cooperation to reconstruct Indochina (Anwar 1993, Khamsy 1993).

Only through the political process of consultation and accommodation fostered by frequent interaction at multi-levels could the potential newcomers, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, comprehend, construct and familiarise themselves with the ‘spirit of ASEAN’, with emphasis on informal, consensus and process-oriented phenomena (Acharya 1997, 1998, 2001: chapter 2). This was also reiterated in 1994 at the 6th Southeast Asia Forum entitled ‘Lessons from the Past, Signposts for the Future’. At this forum, Vietnam’s Institute for International Relations (IIR) was officially welcomed as part of ASEAN-ISIS, prior to Vietnam officially becoming part of ASEAN the following year (Balakrishnan 1995a, Snitwongse 1995a).

The PECC and the APR were still employed as significant fora by engaging agents (governmental and non-governmental) to express their support regarding the idea of regional inclusiveness that had been nurtured since the 1960s (see Chapter 3). Encouragement to construct a wider community resurfaced in incumbent Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's opening speech titled ‘Open Regionalism’ delivered at the 10th PECC meeting ‘The Way Forward’. Yet, as far as the Asia-Pacific community was concerned, it was limited to emphasising East Asia, although the Pacific community was mentioned (Mohamad 1994). Adullah Ahmad Badawi (1996), who was then Malaysian Foreign Minister, in his opening speech at the 9th APR (1995), called for the removing of the cold-war mindset, encouraging more cooperation even in the difficult areas (Balakrishnan 1995b).

Sopiee (1995, 1996) a long-term ASEAN-ISIS scholar, also employed the same APR in 1995 to emphasise the psychological/cultural change or revolution to remove the cold-war mindset. The change should comprise three areas: a regional consciousness revolution; a confidence revolution; and an assertiveness revolution. Many issues presented at the 9th APR (1995) reflected these concerns: the impact of dependent media upon domestic and regional societies; how problems of population movements (both from economic reasons and refugees) impacted upon regional

Concerns expressed within the APR urged serious thought about relationships among and within states. At first the thought was dominated (but not hegemonically) by the US. There was a question of ‘stateness’ reflected in diversified questions ranging from political identity to economic and cultural cooperation, more or less blurring the line between political amity and enmity. The APR reiterated that the definition of national and regional security interests should be reconsidered, due to their complex natures (Alagappa 1997).

Thus far, track II activities proved that they were useful, specifically when they strayed into the socially related-diversified problems that often occurred in the natural economic territories (NETs). The ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP were at the forefront of providing venues for dialogues. Wanandi indicates that their success came from the perception that ‘they not only provided new thinking but also created trust and solidarity’. To enlarge upon this point, 1994 first witnessed the enlarging unofficial-regional-dialogue process to include Vietnam, Russia, and North Korea as members. India’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) gained entry as an associate member (Acharya, Dewitt and Hernandez 1995, Wanandi 1995a). Nevertheless, Wananadi also pointed out that ‘the enlargement of the CSCAP can be regarded as ASEAN-ISIS successful activities’. Put differently, track II activities could be considered as regional CBMs covering ASEAN, ARF, and CSCAP. They provide a potential path for the region to be more inclusive in terms of geography and security issues (Cossa 1997).

Engaging agents not only maintained the dynamic momentum of multilateralism energetically initiated in the earlier periods, they were also astute enough to recognise the right moment for their initiation. As regards multilateralism, the numerous conferences and workshops that revolved around ASEAN-ISIS are prominent cases of promoting the concept of multilateralism and inclusiveness. The latter included the concept of comprehensive security. The ASEAN-ISIS key method not only engaged officials from their own respective countries and Japan with the

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17 Interview on October 27th at the (Thai) ISIS 25th Anniversary Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand
18 Interview on October 27th 2006 at the (Thai) ISIS 25th Anniversary Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand
socialising processes, but also persuaded them to accept diversified or different ideas and/or activities regarding regional security related matters. One of the Japanese officials they invited, Yukio Satoh has continued to play a prominent role in supporting multilateralism.

It is worth noting that the agents' strategy to engage the prominent senior officials gave them more time not only to exchange but also to plant their ideas during the course of their association with the prominent senior officials. An example is the way in which these engaging agents tried to find an acceptable path to ameliorate their economic difficulties and differences through, for example, the PECC.

Their socialising processes through numerous conferences, seminars and workshops were also their means of enlivening the concept of regional community with a more precise definition, particularly in terms of geographical areas than that proposed earlier (see Chapter 3).

To sum up (see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 on p. 215 and p. 216), what should not be forgotten is that the idea of uniting ASEAN had also taken root and started to bear fruit. The enlargement of ASEAN to accommodate Vietnam and Laos at the governmental level and the accession of IIR (a research institute in Vietnam) to ASEAN-ISIS at the non-governmental level were cases in point. Also we can see that PECC was still active. Networking activities went on in terms of both extending and consolidating their scope of cooperation. With more than usual co-operation from the Eastern Pacific Rim countries (Seoul Forum, Pacific Forum, and JIIA), and from academic institutions in the Western Pacific Rim and North America (NPCSD, IGCC, National Defence University - Washington, D.C, UC-San Diego), SCAP was established, initially with modest ambitions. Later it was linked with the newly established NEACD originated by North American and Japanese intellectuals (having JCIE as its Secretariat) and Australia’s AIIA. The result was the inception of CSCAP as a track-II paralleling the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

**Constructing ‘community’: a catch-concept for networking revitalisation**

It is no underestimation to say that the trend of the momentum was less dynamic from the mid-1990s on, due to static activities in terms of quality rather than quantity. The reverse trend occurred before the end of the decade. This section, outlining how the trend was changed and revitalised, particularly by the promotion of the ‘ASEAN Community’ and ‘East Asia Community’, shows that these two were compatible with
the intentions and efforts of networking-engaging agents, who shared experiences, ideas and visions of their region.

**ASEM and CAEC: further ascending steps before the 1997 financial crisis**

This section argues that networking activities in the region resulted from close cooperation between state- and non-state agents. The support given to the inception of both the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) followed a similar pattern to one another. The main difference was that the ARF and CSCAP were regarded as mostly initiated by track II, whereas the ASEM and CAEC (intended to parallel ASEM) were the result of a hard push by track I. Track-II agents shared in the significant activities that made them happen; CAEC's involvement in particular can be traced back to the longer processes of regional networking activities since the 1970s. Thus, the reason why ASEM and CAEC should be included here is that their existence and activities have been part of regional networking agents' structure for thought and action since their inception.

The apparent initiation of ASEM came from Goh Chok Tong, who was Singapore's Prime Minister when he visited France in 1994. The idea assumed a more precise shape at the subsequent World Economic Forum’s inaugural ‘Europe-East Asia’ summit in Singapore in 1995. In the same year, the EU-ASEAN senior officials' meeting took place. But all was not necessarily plucked from thin air. Singapore was not alone in its efforts to overcome a fear of a 'European fortress' following the announcement of a plan to construct the Single Europe signifying that European Union (EU) should be more than Asian’s ‘boutique’ (Leifer 1998: 204, Lehman 1998, Piei and Khalifah 1998). As usual, economic concerns took precedence. Han Sung-Joo (the then South Korean Foreign Minister, who had been familiar with Asia-Pacific economic cooperation since its inception) wanted to close the gap between Korea and the EU. To this end, he set up a ‘Wisemen’s Group’ to study the future of EU-Korea relations. The report proposed that intensive efforts were needed in image building and diversifying exchanges were required (Maull, Segal, and Wanandi 1998, Nuttal 1998).

Japan was reluctant to establish closer links between Asia and Europe, in the main due to unclear signals from the US as to whether it was happy with the idea or not, until Washington gave positive signs - even helped to institutionalise and hasten the concrete action plan for APEC (Wanandi 1997, Harding 1998). Tokyo was quick
to seize the chance for its familiar fields, albeit within limited scope. What should be stressed here is that the success of PECC and APEC, as successful processes that engaging agents under investigation here have helped to construct and sustain, can be considered as an ‘organic approach’ to political activities that not only worked really well for the region, but also encouraged further cooperation.

Between 1993 and 1995, APEC's focus was upon whether it could go any further than simply being an elitist talk-shop and photogenic session. Fortunately, the sporadic emergence of growth areas lured Indonesia into becoming more inclusive further than ASEAN (geographical area) and hastened its regional cooperation. In 1993 at Blake Island in the US, APEC leaders agreed on this vision; in 1994 at Bogor, Indonesia, they agreed the goal. In 1995 at Osaka, Japan, they proposed the ‘action’ plan (Soesastro 1997a).

It is worth proposing the notion here that experiences from previous cooperation demonstrate how the interplay between economic and political dimensions can come together, which has been a fundamental concept that engaging agents have promoted, albeit sometimes subtly, since their regional networking activities emerged in the 1960s (see Chapter 3). The mingling of economic and political dimensions acts as a structure for thought and action for all engaging agents. Therefore, it should come as no surprise when regional intellectuals argue that they should imitate the success of APEC for further constructing the cooperation of the diversified backgrounds between Asian and European countries that turned out to be participants of ASEM (Higgott 1998, Soesastro 1997b, 1998).

Based on numerous regional experiences (some more negative than positive), it is understandable that Japanese agents viewed new initiatives as part of their complicated relationship with Asia. Socially, it was so discursive that from the Japanese perspective a successful ‘social game’ was required (Tanaka 1999). Every engaging agent knows that it is necessary to be successful in social circles as much as possible. Equally necessary is the participant’s self-confidence to take action based on a sound background and intentions beyond mere tactics. In other words, ASEM could provide an optional path for Tokyo to highlight its role as mediator between Asia and the West. What should not be overlooked is that the meeting helps to illustrate the

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19 Every engaging agent knows that it is necessary to be successful in social circles. Equally necessary is the participant’s self-confidence to take action based on a sound background and intentions beyond mere tactics.
clearer scope of being Asia: as already suggested, the Asian side turned out to be within the scope of the EAEC proposed by Mahathir Mohamad (Gilson 1995, Heisbourg 1998: 231, Stubbs 2002). It re-emerged through the ASEM framework, when concerns about regionalism were reduced (Beeson 2003). The Asian side, comprising ASEAN, China, South Korea and Japan, represented the same composition for the establishment of an ASEAN Plus Three (APT) after the Asian financial crisis in 1997.

In contrast, the European side was more concerned with the rapidly changing political climate in the region. Although economic and political cooperation was evident, mixed signs confused those who were not closely engaged with the Asian dynamism. Rudiger Machetzki (1998) argues that the Europeans, as former colonial powers, either ignored or failed to understand the regional perceptions of nationalism. This perception, particularly in the case of human rights and related problems, proved an obstacle for smooth cooperation (Hernandez 1998, Kwa 1998).

The European side expressed concern regarding regional political and security uncertainty, due to the many controversial issues that emerged between 1993 and 1996. Within this period, a tendency towards arms accumulation in the region was raised (Sudarsono 1997). Although regional institutions and networking activities had thus far presented themselves as softening barriers to prevent extreme unilateral ventures, questions surrounding a clearer regional direction persisted (Wanandi 1998). On the one hand, APEC’s Eminent Persons Group (EPG) presented a vision for more institutionalising of the Asia Pacific Economic Community, on the other, the ARF (with the help of CSCAP) was questioned regarding whether it was really effective under ASEAN leadership. There was also the question of whether it would be better to deepen and broaden its role to cover human rights and a regional nuclear weapons-free zone (Tay 1997, Soesastro 1998).

The North Korean nuclear issue was still active, although there were signs of reconciliation between the two Koreas in October 1991. The year 1995 was perceived as dangerous: there was clearly an emerging concept of a ‘China threat’ as Beijing showed its military might in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait in retaliation.

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20 Scholars from the region emphasised that most social problems were not derived from different values on human rights as many Asian states tried to insist. They were derived more from urbanisation and modernisation without properly utilising their own social capital. People uprisings in many regional countries were good examples: Myanmar (Burma at that time) with its ‘8-8-88’ movement; Beijing and the May 1989 incident; and Bangkok with the May bloodshed-uprising 1992.
for the US issuing a visa to Lee Teng Hui, the incumbent Taiwanese President.21 For Japan, it was a disastrous year. It had to contend with three major events: the Kobe earthquake, Tokyo’s sarin gas incident, and the high appreciation of the Yen (Ahn 1997). It was also the year that the Bangkok Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone was signed (Nostis). The EU viewed these issues with no small discomfort as they had no say in them. There was even a perception that the difficulties in East Asia might come to resemble Europe in 1914 (Heisbourg 1998: 234). The EU’s attempt to find the common perception initiated by the European Commission in 1994 for its Asian policy had failed (Leifer 1998: 198-212, Nuttal 1998). Meanwhile, at government level, where there was failure to determine whether Asia and Europe should become closer, non-government agents were on the move.

In the spring of 1993, the JCIE launched a survey titled ‘Non-governmental Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community’. The report, which was published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore in 1995, gave details of research institutions in 15 regional countries. Unfortunately, because they emphasised institutions within states’ boundaries, little information was provided regarding regional or international linkages. Nevertheless, it was the first to be undertaken in the field. It was updated in January 1998 in preparation for a conference convened in Bangkok by the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium (APPC) entitled ‘Support for NGOs in Asia Pacific’ (Yamamoto 1997). What was signified by the survey was that Japan was serious about emphasising its ‘Asianness’ and intended to put forward a project based upon the ‘Asian Community’ (Chin 1997).

In an attempt to combat the many negative signs derived from different perspectives specifically between Asian countries and the West, many engaging agents tried hard to insert positive signs into the region by organising more conferences, seminars, and workshops. Attempts by both governmental and non-governmental agents to define the ‘preventive diplomacy’ (PD) as a way to reinforce the regional CBMs were one example. During 1993 and 1994, there was a series of three meetings on ASEAN-UN Cooperation on Peace and Preventive Diplomacy co-sponsored by the Institute of Policy Study in Singapore and the Thai Ministry of

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21 Lee Teng Hui may have visited Cornell University as its alumnus but Beijing regarded American action as violating the Shanghai Communiqué emphasizing that the US has accepted the ‘One China Policy’.

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Foreign Affairs. These objectives were to consider and revise the *Agenda for Peace* proposed in 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was then UN General Secretary. The JIIA and the Japanese National Institute of Research Advancement (NIRA) also expressed interest (Acharya 2000). Although, it rarely went further than on paper and within the conference rooms, engaging agents (governmental and non-governmental) pushed harder their efforts to express their views and concerns through various publications.

Also in 1995, the CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive Security and Co-operative Security tried hard to persuade regional countries to value the self-resilience, inclusiveness and prominence of economic security concern, the basis of which was pragmatically mutual respect and egalitarianism for regional solidarity and successful international co-operation (Hassan 1995, Rolf 1995). The trend from the mentioned efforts was that engaging/networking agents gave their favour to the concept of co-operative security, emphasising less demand on non-offensive military postures and more demand on transparency in terms of military and political aspects. The rationale for such a direction was that Asia-Pacific was incrementally politically cosmopolitan due to its inclusiveness that was nurtured and flourished by many decades of regional networking activities. Nevertheless, not all engaging agents shared liberal values, except for a free market (see Chapter 3). At best, it could be a communitarian system – a community of communities and even this looked less likely at the time (Singh 1995, Yamamoto 1995). The concept of human security also received attention as a potential obstacle that could harm the existing networking activities, mainly due to varying perceptions and different prioritisation given to the definition of human security. Many engaging agents in Asia had been bound by their traditional discourse of giving prior significance to society, not to individuals. Following this logic, in other words, individuals as human-beings can be only an object of security. Engaging agents outside Asia wanted more emphasis on human beings as the subject of security since they were regarded by these agents as directed and vulnerable victims (Hussain 1997).

The sum of these events also caused concern for European and Asian scholars, who supported cooperation between the two regions for more than two decades

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22 The issues were publicised in the first half of the 1990s, mostly by the Brandt Commission, the Bruntland Commission and the Commission on Global Governance under the aegis of the UN.

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specifically for those engaging with the Hakone process, and did not want this chance to pass by without doing anything. The most significant movement of the second track can be traced back to a workshop convened in March 1995 by the European University Institute in Florence. It was attributed to the cooperation of Hanns Maull of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Gerald Segal, who earlier created the Pacific Asia Programme and was with the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and Jusuf Wanandi of Indonesia's CSIS. Their efforts resulted in the inception of the Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation (CAEC) fashioned after PECC and CSCAP. Their efforts could be considered as a good example of both utilising and adding values to the existing familiar networks.

Apart from the EU Commission, the Koerber Foundation and the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, its main sponsors were those familiar with multilateral institutionalising processes in the region: the Asia Pacific Agenda Project, which had been a centre piece of the JCIE’s Global ThinkNet activities since 1996, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, the Nippon Foundation and the Foreign Ministry of Japan (Maull, Segall and Wanandi 1998: xv-xvi, JCIE 2006: 10). It is worth stressing that most of them were friends who had familiarised themselves with socialising processes either through the ‘Hakone Meeting’ or via ASEAN-ISIS's networking activities as mentioned in the previous chapter. Their progress was based upon more than 20 years of experience in informal meetings. The cross-continent networking between Asia and Europe not only officially consolidated networking activities of their non/governmental agents, but also expressed the potential to be a social space that different views regarding different issues could be mitigated smoother than when they discussed with official fora. Although CAEC started with more traditional political concerns than PECC and CSCAP, its structure allowed it to be more open to comprehensive security because its networking agents had firm backgrounds with PECC and CSCAP.

The first ASEM was convened in Bangkok in March 1996, at a time when the European side was concerned about the escalation of international trading in arms, apart from trade: most of the high purchasing-powers were East Asian (Babbage 1997, Bates 1997, Wattanayakorn 1997). Efforts to cover nuclear weapons free zone in the region had not gone as far as ASEAN expected (Anggoro 1996, Krause 1998, Segal 1998). The anticipation from the Asian side was that the European side could contribute its own ideas and experiences through comprehensive security, especially
how to institutionalise the international community and effectively manage the North Sea (Soesastro and Wanandi 1996, Gault 1997, Maull 1998). Asian engaging agents expected that European experiences from managing conflictive areas like the North Sea might shed light on how they could manage high-potential conflictive areas such as the South China Sea.

The widespread financial crisis, which had its genesis in Bangkok approximately one year after the First ASEM Summit, was the crisis that not only devastatingly devalued many currencies - in particular the Indonesian rupiah, the Thai baht, and the Korean won - but also discredited the Japanese model of development and led to questions about neo-liberal approaches (Acharya 1999). Non-governmental activities were also criticised for not being efficient enough to warn their track I counterparts in advance about the crisis. What can be suggested here is that although ASEM might have less impact on policies of their respective countries in the early stages, the ongoing-socialising processes still offered essential and lively experiences for the next generation of both sides to have each other's mutual benefits taken into consideration (Wanandi 2000a).

The urgent initiative to mitigate the situation came first from Tokyo. Since 1994, the Japanese Ministry of Finance had seen a need to set up a regional mechanism for stabilising the Asian currencies by reducing their dependence on the US dollar: 1994 was the year of Mexican currency crisis (Kikuchi 2002a). Unfortunately, Japan received no good response even from ASEAN. In order to confront the financial crisis effectively, ASEM was the Japanese government’s anticipated hopeful platform to float the notion of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). The idea regarding AMF could go no further. Many critics within and outside of the region viewed it as overlapping with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At that time, ASEM proved no match for a serious crisis. Its early socialising process was too weak to confront the financial crisis.

The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was issued at Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 from the need of East Asian states to cooperate among themselves within the ASEM framework. Engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, warmly welcomed it and regarded it as a forum for providing more effective for communicating and condensing the sense of common destiny constructed by the 'coalition of willingness' (Tay 2002).
The Japanese government seized the chance to express its intention and capability to take a lead by proposing the linkage between the concepts of multilateralism and its trade agreements. Again the potentiality of receiving benefits from boosting regional trade kept the momentum of regional networking activity, specifically in terms of trade, going\textsuperscript{23} (Tay 2002). The ongoing networking activities meant more inclusive chances to cover non-governmental agents’ concerns. The Miyazawa Initiative (named after the Japanese Prime Minister of the time, Kiichi Miyazawa) injected US$30 billion into the Asian currencies. It led the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ (CMI) to a series of currency swap agreements (which were apparent examples) (Kikuchi 2002, Nabers 2003). All in all, closer co-operation among East Asian countries was being actively developed and the role of intellectuals was also actively involved with slightly different functions from their earlier periods of co-operation that required them to wander beyond national boundaries. After the inception of the APT, the role of the engaging agents, specifically for non-governmental, seemed to emphasise more on facilitating and accelerating track I activities, mainly due to the contents of the policies which were within the same direction of their preferred concept of comprehensive security.

Earlier, a condensed vision for constructing an international community came from ASEAN non-governmental agents; those from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia played a significant part. Malaysian-ISIS was very active. Indeed, it had experiences with helping the Malaysian government draft Vision 2020. Noordin Sopiee was a key agent here. ASEAN’s 2020 Vision was a way to construct an ‘ASEAN Community’ that was progressive, peaceful and prosperous. In order to achieve its construction, Sopiee (1997) argued that ASEAN must be fully and firmly democratic, imbued with the fullest social justice. These desirable characteristics would enable ASEAN to win over the masses as well as the elites. This version followed the ASEAN-ISIS Draft of Pacific Concords, which was first circulated in May 1996. It was a revised version of a paper initially prepared for the ASEAN SOM in 1994 under the title ‘Norms and Principles for Regional Political and Security

\textsuperscript{23} It was as Simon Tay explained with a metaphor of the bicycle theory of free trade. Unless trade talks continue to move forwards, they will – like the bicycle – fail and fall.

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Cooperation\textsuperscript{24}, an updated version of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976) (Evans 1997, Hassan 1997). It is worth emphasising here that the financial crisis helped regional intellectuals (mostly from ASEAN and Northeast Asia) to hasten their consideration of an integrative vision viewed through the engaging agents’ activities within the APT framework, ASEAN included.

The momentum of dynamic multilateralism seemed to swing back. The intellectuals tried to keep it going, irrespective of whether they were from non- or governmental agencies. At the time, being non-governmental agents apparently led them to choose a deeper track of reflection, whilst the governmental agents proceeded along a deeper cooperative path trying to reach further to people as the backbone of every society. For the non-governmental agents, the idea of empowering civil society was seen to offer an effective alternative to conventional society giving priority to the ruling and the advantage groups. They proposed that it was essential not to put too much emphasis on economic development under the banner of market liberalism. An important experience from such a wrong-footed policy was the Assembly of the Poor in Thailand, who suffered chronically from policies favouring infrastructure construction to accommodate the growth of the city. Lessons from the past showed that creating political space or channels to absorb them was crucial. So did the more direct link between tracks II and III\textsuperscript{25} (Gomez 2000, Jumbala 2000, Lizee 2000, Ronas 2000). This link, or what should be termed as an interplay process for this project, has been anticipated from both track II and track III, particularly for the latter as the way to mitigate ASEAN-ISIS externally perceived image of an exclusive ‘elite’ club. The interplaying relationship should expand participation (general public-oriented) of the ASEAN concerns (Caballeo-Anthony 2004: 581).

What could be analytically summarised here (see Figure 5 on p. 217) is that around the mid 1990s, Asian leaders’ focus was more on economic concerns due to their perceptions that a ‘Single European Project’ might harm them. Han Sung-joo (one of the familiar faces in the Asia Pacific (economic) networking and one-time

\textsuperscript{24}Norms and principles mentioned in the document are: strengthening the identity of regional process; strengthening the forces for security co-operation in the area by reinforcing existing norms and principles; and provides a clearer normative and conceptual framework for the formulation of strategies and measures appropriate for security cooperation in the region.

\textsuperscript{25}Suffice to say that according to many papers presented at the 13\textsuperscript{th} APR, the poor have scarified their traditional occupation. Although civil societies are not new, particularly in the former colonised societies, the rapid widespread of them was.
Korean Foreign Minister) tried to find a more cooperative path between Korea and Europe in order to mitigate Korean economic difficulties. Effective change eventually occurred when the Singaporean leader loudly announced at the World Economic Forum (1995) that Europe and East Asia should cooperate more closely. Tokyo followed suit by supporting both the Asia-Europe Business Conference and the Asia-Europe Young Leaders’ Symposium.

At track-I level, ASEAN, ASEAN-PMC and ASEAN-SOM played their parts as organisers and mediators to transplant and transmit an idea of cross-continental cooperation. The result was to initiate the establishment of an Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) as a forum at which each side could directly consult, co-operate, and voice their concerns and interests to each other. Although their interests may not have appeared alike, their concerns could seem compatible when the concept of comprehensive security was taken into consideration. ASEAN-SOM also acted as a mediator between tracks I and II in ASEAN via ASEAN-ISIS, whose activities in this period covered more tangible security difficulties, specifically in the South China Sea. It was also a geographical area in which NIRA and JIIA were interested as well as Northeast Asia, specifically the Korean Peninsular - an area in which they could cooperate under the UN banner entitled ‘Co-operation on Peace and Preventive Diplomacy’.

Japan’s JCIE played a significant role as coordinator and facilitator for regional networking activities. Its long-term connections with numerous research institutes in Europe via the ‘Hakone Meeting’ provided a fertile ground for linking Europe’s track-II to those of Asia via CSIS and ASEAN-ISIS. These connections generated the track-II parallel to ASEM: CAEC. There have been three pairs of regional cooperation in which ASEAN-ISIS and its Japanese counterpart have played their parts: PECC-APEC, CSCAP-ARF, and CAEC-ASEM. JCIE also encouraged more region-wide cooperation by supporting two energetic and effective projects to project regional future, namely, ‘Global ThinkNet’ and ‘Asia Pacific Agenda Project (APAP)’, which provide cross-cultural opinions and experiences to construct acceptable views on regional matters. Their derivatives included the ‘Asia Pacific

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26 His success as a Foreign Minister could be regarded as a success of regional economic networking, according to the JCIE (interviews 31 August 2006 and September 13 2006 at JCIE, Tokyo, Japan)
Philanthropy Consortium’, an elusive idea designed to support and/or construct the so called ‘Asian Community’.

**Engaging Activities after the 1997 financial crisis**

Before the dawn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the region witnessed an interesting tendency derived from APT members' forming of a network of ‘Free Trade Agreements’ (FTA). Indeed, the idea of constructing such a network could be traced back to the 1960s, the decade that non-governmental agents took the lead due to an ideological conflict and suspicious perception that hung in the air (see Chapter 3). At this time, when an ideological conflict was not the problem and economic and financial difficulties were common in the region, the governmental agents indisputably took the lead in order to create more effective means to solve the problems. Keizo Obuchi, the incumbent Japanese Prime Minister, seized the chance when Kim Dae-Jung, the South Korean President officially visited Japan in autumn 1998 to launch the idea of constructing a free trade area between the two countries. In March 1999, it was confirmed when the two agreed upon a ‘Japan-Korea Economic Agenda 21’ (Yamazawa 2001).

The year 1999 was another milestone in East Asian history. It proved that East Asian ways of approaching problems (informally, functionally, and incrementally) could contribute to peace and stability based on Japanese (economic) and Chinese (cultural) community networks. The APT members’ adoption of the joint statement on East Asia Co-operation, which covered financial, monetary, fiscal and other common interests, confirmed this (Chunlai 2002, Kikuchi 2002b, Sastrohandoyo 2002). In addition, the Singaporean government boosted the process by proposing an FTA with Japan, which materialised in January 2002. The Japanese government enlarged the scope to study the possibility of an FTA with ASEAN as a whole in 2000, In November 2001 it sealed an agreement to finalise negotiations with the Association within ten years (Munakata 2002, Kimura 2003).

What should not be overlooked is that in hindsight Tokyo’s policies and efforts could be considered strategic responses from the initiatives of Seoul and Beijing\textsuperscript{27} (Cai 2003). Many FTAs were derived from the proposal put forward by the

\textsuperscript{27} The important catalyst for the Japanese reaction was China’s aggressive effort to establish a comprehensive and closer relationship with ASEAN. The procedure thus far included an FTA,
cooperation between the networks of selected intellectuals called ‘East Asian Vision Group’ (EAVG) and APT officials known as the ‘East Asian Study Group’ (EASG). Both were attributed to Kim Dae-Jung’s initiative to explore practical ways and means of deepening and expanding the existing cooperation among members of the APT. Due to EAVG and EASG efforts, the inception of the East Asian Forum and a proposal for establishing an East Asian Community were included as a new potential project to consolidate networking activities enlarged and sustained by engaging agents (Kikuchi 2002a, Lee 2002, Yamazawa 2004).

Although Korean initiatives came mostly from the government, they resulted from a changing environment in the region that the Seoul Forum members played a part in constructing an inclusive region (see Chapter 3). As for China, it is difficult to deny that engaging agents under investigation here had a part in helping China to be more internationalised, specifically through a series of conferences such as ASEAN-China conference organised by ASEAN-ISIS, mostly chaired by Thai-ISIS. ‘Along the way, the Chinese agents changed a lot. From not accepting any Western style, ideas, methods, or even wearing Western suits, to being more internationalised and talking about economic development and an inclusive region’, Narongchai reflected.\(^{28}\)

After convening and producing their proposals, the results would be sent back to their track I counterparts through two broad frameworks for co-operation: from EAVG to EASG for the APT framework, and from ASEAN-ISIS to ASEAN-SOM for the ASEAN framework. It is worth noting that ASEAN-ISIS scholars had the two aforementioned main channels through which to voice their ideas, given that their respective governments were part of the APT framework. Three main ASEAN-ISIS member institutes had better chances to transmit their ideas to their official counterparts in their respective countries than other members; the Indonesian CSIS, Malaysian-ISIS and the SIIA (see Chapter 3). For Singapore’s case, sometimes the SIIA and the ISEAS worked together in order to persuade their governments to support their ideas, such as a draft for ASEAN Charter.\(^{29}\) In the case of the Japanese intellectuals, their connections with the ASEAN-ISIS and EAVG through the web of

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\(^{28}\) Interview October 3\(^{rd}\) 2006 at Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand

\(^{29}\) Interview on July 19\(^{th}\) 2006, at SIIA, Singapore
connections circled around the JIIA affiliated institution to the Japanese foreign ministry. They also had their links with the Trilateral Commission through wide connections centred on the JCIE, a forefront non-profit institution in Japanese society since the 1970s, which really counted when transmitting their ideas.

Suffice to say that for the governmental agents, the Japanese government played a significant role in sharing initiatives and efforts to provide fruitful regional structures for expressing, exchanging and finding common ideas/perceptions for bettering the regional environment. Japanese engaging agents were considered significant initiators and providers of the regional socialising process, specifically those covering the fields of scholarship (Inoguchi 2002). Although these movements from the mid-1990s were emphasised at the state level, they could be viewed, according to definitions given in Chapter 1, as parts of a constructed socialising process for regional agents. It was this dynamic process that led to the trend of creating a regional community and a shared identity: the ‘East Asia Community’ project.

Whilst the new ideas took time to become formalised, there was sufficient space left for reflection and deeper thought upon what engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, had done thus far; about what topics should be played down in order to make room for much more needed and urgent topics. The APR in Kuala Lumpur provided a significant venue.

The 13th meeting in 1999 under the theme ‘Beyond the Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities’ reflected their notion that positive concepts could emerge from negative ones. The difficulties regional engaging agents faced forced them to seriously consider a more formal road for achieving mutual peace and prosperity, not merely as an option but as an imperative (Badawi 2000). It was at this APR that the imperatives of human security concept were strongly highlighted as matters that were easily affected by all dimensional changes of the regional environment. This concern was engaged with engaging agents’ consideration as to whether regional security architecture (in a comprehensive sense) should be more institutionalised and concretised. For concerned topics which covered human security imperatives, many questions from regional engaging agents were deeply scrutinised by the APR participants including: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; managing the pressure of globalisation; the status of state sovereignty; the proper role of international institutions in times of crisis, particularly how to effectively manage the
international capital flows; the impact of the events upon domestic and regional social and cultural changes; and challenges to human insecurity (Emmerson 2000, Higgott 2000, Hitchcock 2000, Fukushima 2000, Owada 2000, Teo 2000, and Yusuf 2000). It was the security of the marginalised people in many societies, now more easily perceived both by engaging agents and ordinary people than during previous periods when security related topics were taboos for those outside governmental circles and the concept of comprehensive security was still an alien concept, which sparked the contemplation of comprehensive security. Although the participants emphasised more on the state aspect: the comprehensive security could be compatible with human security, for as mentioned earlier, human beings’ freedom from fear and want were the foci of the concept (Hussain 1997, Acharya 2002, Caballero-Anthony 2002). A more specific case was the role of women in times of peace and war or even during peaceful reunification in the war-torn countries (Hontiveros-Baraguel 1997, Lee 1997, Whitworth 1997).

For consideration regarding more institutionalising processes, two main institutions of regional security architecture (namely ARF and ASEAN) were questioned as to whether or not they could play more active roles. The rationales for such concerns were tensions regarding weapons of mass destruction for the former, and the enlargement by adding new members for the latter. Engaging agents anticipated that the ARF could provide and facilitate better regional security and politics. Upgrading the ARF scheme to cover preventive diplomacy and closer cooperation with CSCAP was understood by regional engaging agents as an effective solution. Unfortunately, the devastating blow delivered by the financial crisis made this concretising process unlikely to happen, due to perception that this expected cooperation was less crucial than the chance of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. Track II and their activities could prepare the venue for more serious discussion, specifically on the Northeast Asia difficulties, on the basis of trust and confidence initially constructed along the way through NPCSD, CSCAP, and the ARF in particular (Boyce 1999, Cossa 2000, Godement 2000, Job 2000).

Engaging agents from ASEAN saw an opportunity to enhance their plan to effectively unite and enlarge ASEAN include all Southeast Asian countries by adding Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia in order to construct an ASEAN-10 as previously mentioned. Although the Indonesian government’s influence had declined due to the country’s chronic problems, the extant networking processes continued to
pave the way for nurturing ASEAN’s ‘Unity in Diversity’. No voice against the united direction was raised, although there were worrisome opinions that the different backgrounds of the newcomers might lessen the strength of ASEAN. The potential track II activities, anticipated to mitigate the differences, were the annual ASEAN-ISIS Colloquial on Human Rights, as a forum to diminish different concepts and practices on human rights issues, and the ASEAN Young Leaders' Forum, as a forum to cultivate young generations of regional engaging agents (Chalermpalanupap 2000, Hernandez 2000a, Leifer 2000, Luan 2000, Norodom 2000).

In sum, the engaging agents agreed that reflection on the recent experience of the financial crisis was directly concerned with security. It confirmed that their efforts to promote comprehensive security did not go in vain. On the contrary, comprehensive security seemed to be more precise on the subject of security; human security was highlighted. The intertwining of economic and political areas could be seen as part of the relative safety of human beings from emergencies caused by natural or man-made disasters at national, regional, and international levels, whether in terms of political, economic, societal, and environmental spheres (Hyun and Kin 2000, Mo 2000). The trend to emphasise on human security proved a very interesting challenge for engaging agents to find ways in which to construct what Abdullah Badawi (2002), the current (2008) Malaysian Prime Minister calls ‘sustainable security’ based on strong and good governance and democracy (Desker and Singh 2002, Yamamoto 2002). Indeed, the talk about the relationship between good governance and democracy was not new. It could be considered as the re-emergence of difficulties derived from the struggling processes of the nation-state building for many countries in the region (see Chapter 3).

What can be analysed in summary here for this brief period (see Figure 6 on p. 218) is that the content of the 13th APR well reflected the more energetic governmental agents’ responses to the changing regional environment after the 1997 financial crisis, which had the potential to diminish their legitimacy both domestically as well as internationally. ‘Sustainable security’, based on the concept of comprehensive security, specifically emphasised stronger economies as a means of constructing an ASEAN Community by ASEAN engaging scholars. ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was initiated after the crisis by the Asian side within the ASEAN framework. There were also a handful of bilateral agreements to deliver free trade areas (FTAs) as another counter-balancing means: Japan-Korea Economic Agenda
21; Japan-Singapore FTA; Japan-ASEAN FTA; and China-ASEAN FTA. The Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) proposed by Japan failed to be accepted while the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) proposed by ASEAN could be materialised.

The Korean leader, who was an extremely energetic agent, proposed the setting up of selected intellectuals whose missions were to find ways and/or means of soliciting more effective and concrete regional cooperation: EASG for official agents and EAVG for non-official agents. Suffice to say that the concept of constructing an ‘East Asian Community’ was discernible no matter how elusive it may have been perceived to be. The newly established EASG and EAVG were keen to connect with the already existing organs: ASEAN-SOM for the former and ASEAN-ISIS for the latter.

Broader co-operation towards mitigating a negative changing environment was attributed to the construction of intensified cooperation. The ASEAN-ISIS ‘Draft on Pacific Concord’ and its cooperation with ASEAN-SOM to initiate ‘ASEAN Vision 2020’ were examples of attempts to intensify cooperation that could prove compatible with another theme from the 13th APR calling for the construction of an ASEAN-10/ASEAN Community. The key basic concept was ‘Unity in Diversity’.

East Asian Community: Boosting networking activities

The concept of ‘community-building’ in the region was not new. The attempt could be traced back to the Trilateral Commission’s report entitled ‘Community Building with the Asia Pacific’, published in 1997 before the Asian financial crisis. The Commission’s concept of community still had an economic factor as its main driving force. The existence and development of APEC were its evidence of a loosely de facto community in the region. The balance of power and deepening economic interdependence among states were the Commission’s priority, followed by social aspects comprising shared interests in the ongoing process of developed norms and rules. The report aimed at changing perceptions of regional societies and people in order to eliminate violence as an option for solving disputes. Good governance was regarded by the report as the glue to binding would-be participating countries and promoting political will. The Commission’s report also enshrined the concept of global partnership and enhanced the existing institutional building process (Morrison, Kojima and Maull 1997). Parts of the ideas were adopted by the Japanese government.
in terms of the previously mentioned FTA promotion, and more intellectual cooperation in the region supported by the Japanese government.

Tokyo had a fair share in turning the financial crisis into a binding process of constructing a community; from this angle, the crisis could be regarded as fortuitous (Acharya 1999). The Commission’s definition of community as ‘groups of people, countries or state linked by close ties of interdependence and a sense of shared destiny through mutual vulnerabilities’ was highly promoted by the Japanese government (Morrison, Kojima and Maull 1997: 2). When Ryutaro Hashimoto (1998), the Japanese Prime Minister, joined the celebrations marking the 30th ASEAN Anniversary in 1997, he proposed initiatives to strengthen social aspects by increasing dialogue and exchange.

Hashimoto attended the first Japan-ASEAN Intellectual Exchange Open Symposium organised by the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), part of ASEAN-ISIS family, in March 1998 in Manila. There, Japan’s identification and strategic role were widely discussed, including its help to institutionalise a deeper regional cooperating framework. People-to-people contact was comprehended as a potential means of achieving the goal (Dao 1998, Hernandez 1998a, Rajaratnam 1998, Samego 1998, Snitwongse 1998).

The Japanese government was generally energetic in community building: dialogue and conferences were its effective means. Starting with the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), Keizo Obuchi, who was then Japanese Prime Minister, proposed in December 1998 that on the one hand, JIIA and ASEAN-ISIS were the main institutions responsible for producing a report accentuating appropriate ways to implement the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) in order to help ASEAN newcomers adjust themselves to becoming part of a plan for achieving ASEAN Vision 2020, as mentioned in the previous section. The report was scheduled for the Japan-ASEAN Summit meeting in Singapore in November 2000. The recommendations from the report were to reinforce financial mechanisms to effectively expand and/or to create new mechanisms and cooperation, and social and environmental aspects

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30 The report cited the negative effects of the globalisation phenomenon fuelled by the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution, especially the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997, as the main reason for consolidating cooperation. Most of the recommendations concerned financial stability and progress. Apart from CMI, other financial institutions such as the International Financial Corporation (IFC), World Bank, and Asian Development Bank (ADB) should lend more of a hand. The two sides should not lessen the significance of international economic cooperation
2000). On the other hand, Obuchi chose Okinawa due to its significance in terms of geographical position, and its historical and symbolic setting as a place for regional intellectual cooperation that the Japanese government should highly promote, as suggested by the Trilateral Commission’s report that was initially supported by Hashimoto government\(^{31}\) (Inamine 2000, Takashima 2000).

Okinawa’s most important qualities were its political and security aspects, both domestically and internationally\(^{32}\) (Gabe 2000). The Naha G-8 Summit meeting in 2000 in Okinawa presented it with an opportunity to be a hub for regional intellectual exchange. Before the summit, there was an intellectual dialogue titled ‘Community Building in Asia Pacific: Dialogue in Okinawa’ (Hernandez 2000b). Common topics included: seeking a greater Japanese contribution, and questions about the existing institutions’ relevance and efficiency. The existence and efficiency of regional institutions, ASEAN, APEC, and ARF in particular appeared to be unsatisfactory for solving problems related, inter alia, to domestic and regional financial issues, security in East Timor, and the environmental haze that drifted from the Indonesian archipelago (Hernandez 2000b, Tay 2000).

The most significant result of networking activities and intellectual exchanges supported by the Japanese government was the on-going exchange of ideas and institutions (namely the WTO, APEC and AFTA). They should also generate other cooperative areas such as generating the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO), the development of the Mekong Sub-region, and support e-commerce. Facilitating mechanisms such as establishing common cyber law, consolidating the rule of law for social and human development should not be ignored. Moreover, they should reinforce attempts to reform the UN system as well as to improve the efficiency of the ARF. Last but not least, people-to-people contact, particularly via the establishing of the linkage of an ASEAN University system with that of a Japanese system, the existing exchange programmes for journalists and editors via global and regional environmental issues were also mentioned.

\(^{31}\) Imamine Keichi (2000), who was then Okinawa’s Governor, claimed that due to its Pacific-crossroads position and beautiful environment setting, his prefecture was perfect to be Japan’s and the Asia-Pacific’s ‘Wellness Island’. His meaning was to propose Okinawa to be a hub for personal, physical and information exchanges via establishing various communications, financial and physical distribution system and facilities and training people to run them. In addition, Okinawa’s Cornerstone of Peace, the monument devoted to the fallen at Okinawa’s battle fields in World War II, no matter whether they were on the side of the Imperial Army or the Allies, can be regarded as non-biased symbolism that should be the basis for creating an inclusive community.

\(^{32}\) It goes without saying that the most significant feature of Okinawa is its security aspect as the main base for US forward deployments. Thus far, it is regarded as the backbone not only of Japan’s security but also as an important means of stabilising the Asia-Pacific region. Its position was jeopardised due to the 1995-rape incident (a 12-year-old Japanese school girl was raped by three American service men). The fire was increasingly fanned when the locals understood that both Tokyo and Washington ignored their difficulties, in terms of their safety and environmental problems. Both wanted cheap commitment at their expense. Choosing Okinawa as a prestige-summit location could be understood as another way of buying off the locals.
experiences of engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, as the driving force and spearhead for more regionally institutionalising processes. It was difficult to deny that success of conveying and transmitting their ideas under the coverage of regional engaging agents’ preferred concept of comprehensive security could not be achieved unless political commitments and leadership were ready to pave the way (Estanislo 2000, Soesastro 2000). In other words, compliance from official counterparts, non-engaging agents in particular, was an important factor for the flourishing of engaging/networking activities. A senior ASEAN security scholar pointed out that only close cooperation - specifically between ASEAN and Japan - on a regional basis could lead Japan out of its long period of recession (Wanandi 2000b). Again, it is useful to note that these proposals had a chance to become policy for implementation by the intellectual linkages available in the region: ASEAN-SOM for ASEAN-ISIS and the foreign ministry for JIIA in particular (see Chapter 5).

The Okinawa-based scholars, Kurayoshi Takara, Tsuneo Oshiro and Morisada Maeshiro (2000), responded by proposing the ‘Okinawa Initiative’ intending to transform the prefecture into an internationally intellectual-exchange, based upon ways to merge the Japanese with the international society and to think of themselves in universal terms. The inclusive concept of Okinawa’s Cornerstone of Peace was a case of expressing the Japanese support for universal values (Takashima 2000). Civil societies, covering non-governmental organisations and movements in the region were urged to become more seriously engaged in order to find a shared definition for human security. It could be achieved through less-cost communication, namely, the Internet world could open up such a chance (Evans 2000).

The concept of security had never been more criticised, especially that of the relationship between gender and war and peace-building was ignored, after a massive trend of trans-national migration specifically after the 1997 financial crisis and the ’11 September 2001’ attack on the US (Dupont 2003, Griffen 2003, Martin 2003, Rico 2003a, Tingo 2003). Retaliating in the name of the 'war on terrorism', American leadership and its ‘moral clarity’ were the big questions raised at the 16th APR (2002) in Kuala Lumpur. Many states joined the attempt either to counter terrorist acts or at least to sweep them 'under the carpet', in line with their efforts to link terrorism either overtly or covertly with illicit acts. Numerous scholars voiced the opinion that such tactics could prove useless unless their root-causes (domestic/international problems related to people’s mental and economic statuses) were treated (Badawi 2003,
McFarlane 2003, Morrison 2003). The more explicit problems causing terrorist acts were poverty, religion and nationalism, religion in this context meaning an understanding between Muslims and others, in particular Christians (Berthier 2003, Solomon 2003, Sopiee 2003). The APR scholars tried to insist that whatever happened should not be considered a result of the two religions’ differences. In order to tame the harsh perception linking Muslims and terrorism, they also tried to find an acceptable path to promote Islam as a true religion of peace, moderation, openness and democracy. Rather, they should be regarded as emerging from the same roots and sharing the concept of human happiness (Falaakh 2003, Marui and White 2003, Wanandi 2003). In other words, engaging scholars emphasised that the promotion of democracy and human rights was the appropriate way to suppress the causes of terrorism (Bunbongkarn 2003).

Apart from the scope and content for further consideration regarding terrorism, engaging/networking agents participating at the 16th APR also voiced their concerns regarding regional states’ interactions relating to the American ‘war on terrorism’. At the regional level, there were diversified viewpoints on matters of Southeast Asia as the second front of anti-terrorism, due to the linkage between regional Islamic fundamentalist activities and the Al Qaeda network. The arrests of extremist activists Ramzi Ahmed Youseef and Abdul Hakim Murad in the Philippines in 1995 was a case of undeniable linkage with the Al Qaeda. A controversial diversified opinion was whether countries in the region should be more cooperative with the US policy against terrorism. The resurgence of the US military and economic strength urged regional governments agree to accept the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism adopted in November 2001. On the one hand, not only did it strengthen their national mechanisms to combat terrorism, but it also discussed and explored practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN’s role in the international community (Kraft 2003, Naukim 2003, Sukma 2003). On the other hand, the ARF was questioned by critics specifically outside the region as to whether it should become more institutionalised and de-linked from ASEAN (Desker 2003, Shigeie 2003).

33 The ideas were not only to re-emphasise CBMs and to deepen preventive diplomacy but also to enhance and/or engage defence ministers for more effective problem-solving.
What could not be avoided was that the spread of arms to the region gave rise to a fear of a regional arms race (Ball 2003). The trend decreased and/or marginalised what had earlier been regarded as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and anti-nuclear movements (Hawke and Cozens 2003, Ogawa 2003). The result was either uncertainty or a reluctance to strengthen national defence policies, especially those related to maritime Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula (De Los Santos 2003, Hartfiel and Job 2003, Prasetyono 2003, Ramarkrishna 2003).

Amid threatening uncertainty, trans-national crimes prospered and were understood as potential linkages to terrorism despite there being many domestic and international frameworks to counter them. Apart from ARF and CSCAP, the Transnational Organised Crime Conference (Hong Kong, March 2002) and the attempt by the Asia Pacific Group on Money-Laundering were set up to find a way to solve the problems (Lock 2003, Salvador 2003).

In the same month (November 2001) ASEAN and China reached an agreement to set up a free trade area that would serve as a locomotive to turn their combined economies into the world’s largest free trade zone after China paved the way to becoming a member of World Trade Organisation (WTO). From the engaging agents’ points of view, this agreement might enhance a chance to significantly expand their preferred concept of comprehensive security. At least, China appeared to be heading in that direction, albeit emphasising only economic matters. Yet, what should not be overlooked was that economic aspects and their related matters had been the main driving forces for regional engaging/networking activities since the 1960s (see Chapter 3). Although others outside the region, who feared the combining of forces in particular, viewed the attempt with some scepticism, Chinese scholars tried to convince other counterparts, that catching up was a natural means to commensurate and contribute to Chinese modern civilisation and other countries, such as Japan, could also benefit from the movement (Garnaut 2003, Pham 2003, Fukushima 2003, Tay 2003, Wang 2003, and Yuan 2003).

The intellectual networks, specifically those residing in ASEAN and Japan, thus far, paved the way for transmission of ideas regarding comprehensive security.  

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34 The result was apparent in terms of budget increases and weapons acquisition, fighter aircraft and submarines in particular.
35 They announced the plan at the 2000 ASEAN Summit, promising to create a market of more than 1.7 million people.
Judging from the end result of networking activities alone might not be an appropriate way to comprehend such a region-wide on-going process of networking activities, as this project intends to do, although it is hard to deny that such a perspective should be included. Viewed from the process-driven (or Habermasian procedural) perspective, engaging/networking agents at least widened or at most generated paths to present their ideas and/or concerns covering regional security matters and architecture. Nevertheless, they might be viewed as inclined to be absorbed into the pre-existing order, scholar-bureaucrat as Jones and Smith (2001, 2006) term them, owing to funding problems and getting official chances to publicly air their concerns and ideas.

What should not be easily stepped over is that the pre-existing order of the 1990s onwards resulted from long-term on-going processes of regional-environment alteration that engaging agents under investigation here have had their share of participating in.

At that point in time, those trans-national comprehensive security ideas included traditional areas like terrorism, and economic well-being, and marginalised issues, such as gender-war and environment. Practically, the APR and the ASEAN-SOM were the main channels for traditional issues, mainly due to parts of reality that engaging agents were governmental agents, acting on their private capabilities, from ASEAN countries and ASEAN-ISIS scholars did play a significant part in establishing the channel to present their ideas to ASEAN-SOM before the AMM. Yet, the SOM from the country that chairs ASEAN at that time will decide whether it needs ASEAN-ISIS service. For the Japanese side, JIIA and JCIE, including the Trilateral Commission, approached marginalised issues as their main areas.

As time passed, the more the characteristics of East Asian regionalisation based on the market-driving force became accentuated. It may not have emerged as a political project as it did in Europe, but economic projects were becoming inter-linked. The emergence of the ‘Economic Partnership’ between Japan and ASEAN was an effective case of cooperation developed from market-driven forces covering all aspects under the umbrella of the concept of comprehensive security.36 Their free trade agreement was anticipated to promote far-reaching co-operation in areas of

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36 The successful blending formula came from using the relationship of horizontal international specialization between Japan and Singapore as a stepping stone. The reason was they could agree to find an acceptable sine qua non: whilst the former wanted to avoid agricultural products, the latter wanted to put aside petrochemical products.
investment, agreement, standard certification and intellectual rights. Yet, it could be viewed partly as the Japanese response to China’s perceived offensive steps over regional activities, particularly the establishing of an FTA with ASEAN within ten years.

Junichiro Koizumi, the incumbent Japanese Prime Minister, proposed an ‘Initiative for Development in East Asia’, emphasising that structural reform in both Japan and ASEAN was needed. What should not be overlooked is that Japan tried hard not to lose its regard for multilateralism by encouraging the expansion of a regional community to cover Australia, New Zealand and India in order to try to counter-balance China in the APT (Otsuji and Shiraishi 2002, Shiraishi 2002). He emphasised in Singapore that cooperation on education and human resources development should be the foundation, announcing that the year 2003 would be the ‘Year of Japan-ASEAN Exchange’, the year to showcase and highlight Japanese intentions, from governmental and non-governmental agents, that they should not only be economic and political aspects (Koizumi 2002).

The ‘Tokyo Declaration for Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan Partnership in the New Millennium’, issued at the end of the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in 2003, was another document for engaging agents. Not only was it regarded as another milestone signifying Japan’s more assertive approach to its active international role, but it could also prove a good framework for Japan and ASEAN acknowledging each other, as crucial pillars of the emerging East Asian Community and for deepening cooperation within it (Yeo 2006). JIIA, together with the Okinawa Peace Assistance Centre (OPAC), followed the lead by co-organising another international conference. The conclusion was that Japanese contributions in terms of experience, knowledge and finance for regional poverty reduction were more than welcome. It was anticipated by regional engaging agents that it would lead to the enhancement of communities and civil society in the region, as well as improve

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37 It aimed to better regional well-being, stability and security (covering non-traditional issues such as terrorism, piracy, energy security, infectious diseases, the environment, narcotics and human trafficking).

38 More concrete proposals including sensitive issues were presented so that an accepted stance could be found on various issues. Again, enhancing governance capability was given priority, specifically by those countries severely affected by the negative side of the flooding globalization.

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regional countries’ governance and public administration for achieving (regional) social stability (Kikuchi 2003, Sayasith 2003, Tingo 2003).

It was also expected to be a helpful means of lessening the so-called ‘ASEAN Divide’, a digital divide particularly derived from different levels of economic development between the Associations’ old and new members. ASEAN as a whole would adopt both centralised and decentralised systems to suit their population profiles: the former for rural populations, the latter for the urbanised populations (Lim and Wi 2005). Japan’s serious participation in the ‘Initiative for ASEAN Integration’ (IAI) was crucial, especially through numerous programmes in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). In order to accentuate its role, the Asia Pacific Agenda Project (APAP), under the aegis of the JCIE, sponsored a regional research project titled ‘Vision of Asia Pacific in 2020’ to illustrate the region after the 1997 financial crisis, September 11, and the rapidly spreading severe acute respiratory syndrome known as SARS. It was a cooperation aimed at regaining the confidence of regional scholars from six countries in the region. At the end of the process was a regional projection titled ‘Pacific Asia 2022: Sketching Futures of a Region’ (Tay 2005c, Yamamoto 2005).

These numerous conferences, which were convened to reduce the tendency towards severe nationalism in the region, provided innumerable chances for people-to-people contact ranging from face-to-face to the Internet, as shown by conflicts specifically regarding ethnicity, race, and religion derived from unsettled nation-state building processes and the continued lack of good governance (Tangsupvattana 2005). From these numerous conferences, engaging agents, whether governmental or non-governmental, reiterated the significance of the revision of security concept and its broadening to cover demographic changes, due to a burgeoning aging population, trans-national migration, and environmental changes in the region (Lebel 2005, Yu 2005). They paid more emphasis on cross-border issues. Although these issues could prove problematic, they seemed to highlight the idea that people and states were not

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39 The gap has been so wide that the developing countries cannot easily catch-up with the advance developed countries. While Hong Kong drew up the Digital 21-IT, Singapore has had the ICT 21 master plan. Japan has gone further to have a Global Information Infrastructure plan aiming to implement a nationwide optical fibre network by 2010 (Jamus Jerome Lim and Yap Ching Wi (2005) ‘Digital Dreams and Divergent Regimes: The Impact of ICT on Pacific Asia’ Pacific Asia 2022 (2005), p. 75)

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threatened by military attack from external powers, but rather from issues directly

It is worth noting that although the regional agents are categorised here as
governmental and non-governmental, behind their functions as intellectuals and their
statuses as agents they were people likely to perceive and transmit their experience of
cooperation. Put simply, the more regional institutionalisation became a requirement,
the easier would be the emergence of the ‘East Asian Community’ (Chanto 2003,
Cheow 2003, Yanagihara 2003). On this point, non-governmental agents’ demands
were more explicit. Scholars from both sides proposed that the aim could be reached
via support for human resources and social development, such as, establishing
University links and helping to train judges, solicitors, and the police about matters
related to human rights and the environment (Ali 2003, Morada 2003). It is within this
orbit that Okinawa could play a decisive role by highlighting its universal character to
express the significance of ‘word power’. The Japanese government seemed to agree
that this should be the true meaning of the Okinawa Initiative’ as an interesting means
to deliver Japan’s non-military power (Oshiro 2003).

In order to clarify suitable and commonly accepted means to cope with
security challenges, and to encourage more regional cooperation and partnerships,
track II conferences continued. In 2004, a seminar was convened entitled ‘Toward
East Asian Community Building’, at which matters raised looked little changed from
previous topics. However, there was more emphasis on traditional security concerns
returned as potential challenges. Although this forum opted to pay more attention to
institutional political actors, such as, parliamentarians in the region, it reiterated that
the existing economic-cooperation frameworks should be deepened and extended as a
strongly threaded foundation for further steps to be taken. There was a common idea
that difficulties could be overcome using a functional approach, which meant
gradually increasing and deepening cooperation in some areas and incrementally
spilling over cooperation from one area to others (JCIE 2004: sections I&II). The
reiteration told us that engaging agents’ preferred concept of comprehensive security
was still relevant. Not only did the intertwining relationship between economic and
political aspects still play significant parts in numerous regional fora, the intertwining
relationship encouraged broader scope to cover social, cultural and environmental
issues such as trans-national migration, people-to-people exchange and environmental
degradation respectively.

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Strengthening intellectual exchange was anticipated by participants and networking agents alike, not only to reinforce the functional approach, but also to provide knowledge and policies designed to overcome potential difficulties.\(^{40}\) Sharing knowledge and/or interpretations of various kinds of phenomena (including the spreading of popular culture) was understood by engaging agents as a decisive way of generating a commonly accepted regional identity (JCIE 2004: sections III & IV).

‘The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation’, co-sponsored and organised by the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and ASEAN-ISIS in 2005, presented a clearer image and direction for constructing the community.\(^{41}\) Generation upon generation of a successful middle class was cited by participants as a crucial ingredient for the success of community building and deeply transplanting Western-oriented universal values. The reason was to some extent they had grown and familiarised themselves with democracy concepts, specifically liberty and freedom in terms of voicing one’s own opinions and exchanges of ideas and activities derived from them (Hernandez 2005, Ito 2005). There were activities and processes that engaging agents promoted since the 1960s. These activities nurtured multilateral exchange and acceptance of differences in the region. On this point, Simon Tay’s (2005a) conclusion was that Asian culture could be perceived in the streets of Shanghai, Singapore and Tokyo (Shibuya). It was merged with the influences of J-pop, films directed by Ang Lee, and California’s sushi rolls. New technology allowed them to communicate their similarities, differences and interdependencies. And although they communicated in English, their own particular accents would prevail.

In addition, engaging agents from track II anticipated, due to closer cooperation with their official counterparts after the 1997 financial crisis, receiving more cooperation from track I in order to boost the functional approach. It is this approach based on the functionality of interlocking and/or overlapping regional fora. The familiarity (whether positive or negative, emphasising more on the former) which was quintessential for socialisation emerged out of these interlocking cooperative

\(^{40}\) That time saw the rising of nationalism, difficult historical legacies, the emerging China and its difficult relationship with the US, and the potential to normalize Japan. They were viewed as obstructing the path to constructing the community.

\(^{41}\) It should be an open community comprising universal values (albeit with a scent of Western concepts) including rather controversial human rights. It was a result of the widespread regional economic prosperity, telecommunication and transportation technology, and increasing education and mobility of people.
structures. The facilities to breed familiarising processes were there to be employed, the result was up to how those facilities (regional networking architectures) were used and what kind of content (which varied according to different space and time) was put into the processes. At that time, regional cooperation was on the rise. The changed environment required changed knowledge. Diversified trans-national problems that governmental agents encountered required diversified knowledge from various academics that non-governmental agents and their networks could supply more easily than governmental agents. Whilst non-governmental agents accepted that governmental support in terms of funds and receiving their consultation was essential for their flourishing. Put differently, let the process of community building grow naturally and incrementally and become a 'coalition of the willing' (Tay 2005b) which might be termed ‘Community of Willingness’.

The experience of these socialising processes, the explicit and mutual receipt of economic exchanges in particular, could cultivate a sense of confidence and trust, which are essential values for establishing regional community that have grown from engaging agents’ preferred concept of comprehensive security. Without agent intention/willingness to engage in cross-border cooperation, numerous conferences and international fora would not materialise. Without these fora, engaging/networking activities, regional socialising processes, and regional architectures, economic and political/security in particular might not be able to be what they have been since the 1960s. Put otherwise, what should be emphasised is that these conferences and fora help to provide a more ample, fertile foundation upon which to construct the regional community. A recent example is ASEAN’s Vientiane Action Plan (VAP) to guide the process of building a caring community in 2020 (Lim 2005, Takeuchi 2005).

It has been difficult, thus far, to deny that engaging agents (particularly from Japan and ASEAN) have been rather active in organising and arranging conferences and workshops, which are helpful means of expressing their ideas and concerns over regional matters within the scope of comprehensive security. They are also good supporters of their respective governments’ policies (covering international and regional cooperation for this project). There were two related reasons here: the relationship that those policies had to topics within the scope of their preferred concept of comprehensive security; and their realisation that supporting and fostering governmental policies related to regional cooperation not only helped in constructing
regional cooperative structure, but also encouraged broader regional socialising processes that might pave the way for a truly peaceful and inclusive region.

To sum up the last period concerning engaging agents’ structure for thought and actions, specifically their networking activities (see Figure 7 on p. 219), the situation in the region at the dawn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century was still uncertain due to the 9/11 incident and the bomb blasts in Bali, Indonesia, all of which were regarded as ‘terrorist’ acts by the US administration and its supporters. The spread of trans-national crimes was added to the equation. Yet, regional networking movements and the content of their activities showed positive signs and received good support from their respective governments, the Japanese in particular due to their increasing trend of being a more responsible non-military power in the region. From Ryotaro Hashimoto via Keizo Obuchi to Junichiro Koizumi, Japanese agents emphasised the significance of social aspects to the strengthening of positive cooperation in the region. ASEAN intellectuals agreed on the point which could enable them to construct the caring society they (particularly those from track-I) had promoted in ASEAN’s Vientiane Action Plan (VAP).

It is important to emphasise that during the Koizumi period (2001-2006) at track-I level, Japan and ASEAN cooperated more closely. This included the announcement of the ‘Year of ASEAN-Japan Exchange (2003)’, the setting up of ‘Initiative Development in East Asia’ and ‘Economic Partnership’ followed by numerous FTA proposals. The governmental cooperation encouraged and facilitated more non-governmental engaging activities. At track-II level, apart from the Japanese GFJ’s conference entitled ‘Prospect for East Asian Community Building and Regional Cooperation’, JIIA and JCIE were energetic. As regards the former, close cooperation with ASEAN-ISIS encouraged it to propose a report accentuating diverse ways of effectively implementing the Hanoi Plan of Action to actualise ASEAN Vision 2020, projecting a concept of ASEAN as a ‘caring society’.

JCIE was more focused on regional community building when it closely coordinated with ASEAN-ISIS. On the one hand, participants encouraged a more integrative path for uniting ASEAN, specifically in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). On the other hand, participants, specifically those from JCIE via APAP, tried to predict the regional future on two stages: Vision for Asia Pacific in 2020 and Pacific Asia 2022 Sketching the Future of the Region. One of JCIE’s conference
themes summed up regional efforts (from both track-I and track-II) nicely in the title ‘Toward East Asian Community Building’.

**Summary**

The narration for this chapter was constructed by having the following questions as its guideline. From the first group of research questions: who were those engaging/networking agents, especially those relating to the expanded networks from earlier periods and to what extent and under what circumstances did they join their networking activities. The questions from the second group included the following: whether their socialising processes had any impact on their networking activities and their perceptions on these activities; whether they were capable as changing-agents to transmit their ideas; and how their ideas and discursive activities were transmitted/translated into concrete fora. Additional question were as follows; to what extent and in what ways did ASEAN-ISIS closely engage with its/their Japanese counterparts? In addition, how successful were they in persuading ASEAN, and other governments and non/like minded individuals to get on board?

The followings are answers to the aforementioned questions in brief. The end of the 1980s brought a new environment for engaging agents, who had tried hard to accommodate the uncertainties and even harder to channel the tide into a direction preferred by all, namely, multilateralism fashioned after the success of CSCE in Europe. Many agents effectively persuaded others to accept their various proposals. This resulted in the Nakayama Proposal from the Japanese government and a proposal called ‘A Time for Initiative’ from ASEAN-ISIS. Their efforts were incrementally crystallised in the first half of the 1990s in two forms: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the only official security forum in the region; and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), the most region-wide track II forum made for ARF.

Together, CSCAP and ARF, encouraged engaging agents, both governmental and non-governmental, to practice confidence building measures (CBMs), as the Japanese agents preferred to regard them as 'procedures for reassurance'. ASEAN-ISIS with its connections with ASEAN-SOM played a mediating role with support in terms of information and opinions from numerous regional conferences and workshops such as the APR, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-China. The focus of the engaging agents is upon reaping the right moment for their initiations through the on-
going momentum of cooperation. Numerous conferences and workshops have been both participatory to and revolved around ASEAN-ISIS: their invitations to senior officials to participate on various occasions are the useful and resourceful means they employ. Fortunately, the numerous officials they have invited have continued to play prominent roles in supporting multilateralism and even a concept of constructing international communities: ASEAN Community and East Asian Community, for example.

These cooperative experiences thus far indicate that engaging agents’ favoured concept of comprehensive security (covering economic/developmental as well as what used to be regarded as marginalised issues in particular) is still relevant. Experiences from previous cooperation show how the interplay between economic and political dimensions can come together. Moreover, the intertwining relationship between economic and political aspects that encourages networking activities in the region also acts as a structure for thought for all engaging agents; networking has become prevalent in the region.

Whilst new ideas take time to become formalised, the engaging agents are utilising the intervening time to sharpen their thoughts about what they have done thus far, and what topics should be played down in order to make room for much more needed and urgent topics. The APR in Kuala Lumpur still provides a significant venue for such a re-evaluation.

The characteristics of East Asian regionalisation have been accentuated with the passing of time. It may not emerge as a political project as was the case with Europe but there is a trend towards increased political cooperation. It is within this framework that engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, from ASEAN and Japan have cooperated closely and fruitfully. Other engaging agents from China and South Korea have played their parts, particularly in the abundant activities derived from APT’s framework, apart from many previously existing fora in which ASEAN-ISIS has had a significant role to play such as the APR and CSCAP. There is a general push towards the idea of more regional institutionalisation. Thus, ultimately an easier emergence of the ‘ASEAN Community’ and/or the ‘East Asian Community’ might occur.

The next chapter will present two things. The first is to assess and reflect whether the agents’ expanded networks have had any impact on their social function and status. The second, which is the bigger part of the chapter, is to review and assess the

Chapter 4: Strengthening, consolidating and revitalising networks
the set up framework in order to propose further alteration to make it more responsive for reality in the field.
Part III: Assessment and Conclusion

Chapter 5: The East Asian (Security) Intellectual Network – A Critical Assessment

As mentioned in Chapter 2 that this thesis was conducted by attempting to balance the relationship between theoretical concepts and methodology in an interactive way, reflexivity was crucial for two related aspects. Firstly, reflexion from engaging agents’ own experiences can be regarded as a litmus paper for assessing their social functions and status; whether they are as expected by set-up concepts in Chapter 1. Secondly, reflexion in terms of experiences after analysing the collected data can indicate to the researcher, as this one, whether the applied theoretical concepts need alteration. If so, what should the remedy be?

This chapter, therefore, consists of two related sections. The first one indicates whether the agents’ expanded network have had any impact on their function and status, particularly whether they are independent enough to take a critical leading role in bringing about change in security concepts and activities. In other words, can they put into practice the lessons learned during their decades of interaction? The second section illustrates the strong and weak points of a fabricated framework set-up in Chapter 1, which part should be altered and what concepts should be added.

Critical Reflection and Assessment of Networking Experiences

It is worth noting that networking activities based on the East Asian experience showed that the more track-II agents engaged with track-I agents, the less the former show signs of being independent. Their conferences and workshops had to receive good support and cooperation from their respective governments in order to produce effective impacts. Yet, the success of their long-term engaging experiences with close co-operation from governments in the region make the characteristic of these networking activities appear like ‘track 1/track2 symbiosis’ as Charles E. Morrison (2004) terms it. This concept of symbiosis leaves room for engaging agents to express their persuasive capabilities since their track I counterparts did not manoeuvre everything, albeit sometimes having upper hands particularly in times of regional crisis like that of the 1997-financial crash. In other words, this concept is closer to that which this project found out than the Jones and Smith (2001, 2006) observed track
II’s characteristic as ‘scholar-bureaucratic’ (see also Introduction, Chapter 4). The cooperation between non-governmental engaging agents in ASEAN and Japan and their respective governments to construct ARF and their commonly accepted idea to construct regional community such as ASEAN Community and East Asian Community is a case in point of non-governmental engaging agents not becoming independent (as illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4). Most of them still relied on funds and resources including information from their track-I counterparts. The reason why track-I agents showed less interest in track-II’s activities was that regional track-II agents’ skills were limited, specifically before the establishment of the PECC process. Their expertise was clustered around economic development policies and market-driven economies that they regarded as part and parcel of their preferred concept of comprehensive security. Yet, they could not clearly forecast even a domestic situation, let alone a regional situation when their region and respective countries were hit hard by the financial crisis in 1997.

In other words, what track-II agents could do in the area of taking the lead was at best minimal unless the track-I agreed to comply with their ideas which could turn out to be successful proposals such as in the case of establishing ARF and ASEM. Yet, what should be remembered here is that track-II agents also comprise governmental agents acting in their own capacities and interests. The significance of these agents is that in reality it was not difficult for them to convey what they learnt from the need of non-governmental agents to the respective governments if they decided that it matched with what their government wanted. The roles played by Kojima and Satoh from Japan were good examples for this point before the inception of APEC and ARF. The mediating role played by ASEAN-SOM, specifically regarding AMM, ASEAN-PMC and ARF, and its connection with ASEAN-ISIS networks of scholars was also in the same direction (as explained in Chapter 4). Nevertheless, it was difficult to deny that the significance of governmental engaging agents could not be easily actualised without facilitating paths such as numerous informal fora organised by non-governmental engaging agents. Experienced track-II

1 Interviews on July 5th 2006 at IDSS, Nanyang University, Singapore, and at SIIA, Singapore, on September 7th 2006 at the Royal Thai Embassy, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, Japan and on October 2nd 2006 at the (Thai) Foreign Ministry, Bangkok, Thailand

2 Interviews on September 7th 2006 at the Royal Thai Embassy, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, Japan and on October 2nd 2006 at the (Thai) Foreign Ministry, Bangkok, Thailand
agents accepted that the best they could do would be to actualise their intentions/deliberations and know how to utilise what domestic and regional chances were left open for them.³

However, Tay argues that although track-II had no power in itself to implement the generated ideas, it was free from the constraints of implementation and free to consider what may be possible and desirable, no matter how marginal it may be (Soesastro, Joewono and Hernandez 2006, Tay 2006). Although they might accept that the basic agreement should be to reach a mutual understanding about bettering regional security and regional well-being in general, their means to achieve these ends could be varied in line with the socially engaging processes. As a result, historical contexts as structure for agents’ thoughts and actions are important both in enabling or constraining the content and procedures of their engaging/networking activities.

In order to be successful agents in the region, regional engaging agents, non-governmental agents in particular, have to know how to be either politicising intellectuals or intellectual politicians (particularly those who have had direct formal-political experience). To act as politicising intellectuals, they have to know how to air, exchange and/or even trade their ideas/intentions effectively by utilising every means that they can find. Similarly, to act as intellectual politicians, they have to know how to intellectually present themselves, their ideas/intention, and their activities as part and parcel of the shared and accepted regional good, to better regional security for this study. In addition, they have to know how to negotiate and compromise with other engaging agents in order to make their ideas widely accepted, no matter how the idea had to be changed, and adopted by policy makers. In other words, they may have to be more strategic than they expected before getting involved in the discursive areas of networking activities. They could be both on some occasions.⁴

The theoretical observation regarding being a successful agent is that ‘time and space’ really does matter, not only as conditions for agents’ perception towards their surroundings, but also as conditions for cultivating their intentions and actions. Put otherwise, global/regional/domestic environments in various periods, from the 1960s to the dawn of the 21st century, not only provided materials for agents’

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³ Interview on July 19th 2006, at SIIA, Singapore
⁴ Interview on July 19th 2006, at SIIA, Singapore
structure for thought and actions, networking activities regarding the aim to better their regional security, but also enabled and constrained agents’ structures vital to the delivering of their actions. In other wards, it confirms that the ideational factor is significant in agents’ dialectical processes of thinking and taking action.

In response to whether they can achieve a common identity as expected by networking and constructivist literature, their answers varied according to how long and how close they had been engaged in the networking processes. Senior agents, whose experiences date back to the late 1960s - mid 1970s, see themselves as having some common functional identity. This means that they see themselves as a group of intellectuals who act as components of a mechanism employed to better their societies (both domestic and regional). At best, they see themselves as a group that can compromise their differences, mainly due to due to different economic, historical and cultural backgrounds of nation-state building processes, in their attempts to reach a mutual understanding of the vision for the region. Yet, this sharing perception is less evident in agents who have not engaged with the networks for more than a decade. A decade might be too short for cultivating a young generation whose interests and concerns nowadays are much more diversified, according to various domestic and regional issues, than in the past through the hi-speed information technology and flashing media coverage. They could contact each other so much more easily after the Cold War that they saw no necessity in putting hard effort in to doing so. There was no more basic obstacle, namely an ideological conflict that they commonly see as a big hurdle obstructing their path of bettering the regional security. Although their areas of interests could be better connected than the past, their networks for each interest look smaller and have lesser impact. In addition, the younger generation incline to be more insular, in terms of giving their priority to domestic issues.

It is worth pointing out that geographical identity - whilst roughly perceived - was not particularly strong. Indeed, in line with the domestic difficulties that developed after the 1997-financial crisis, younger agents placed higher emphasis on domestic concerns, particularly those directly engaged with more traditional security

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5 Interviews on October 3rd 2006, at Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand, October 20th 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia, and on October 27th 2006 at Thai-ISIS 25th Anniversary, Bangkok, Thailand
6 Interview on July 5th and July 6th at IDSS, and on July 14th 2006 at NUS, Singapore, Interviews on October 3rd 2006, at Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand, and Interviews on October 18th 2006 and October 19th 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia
concepts. The most popular concern was their respective countries’ sovereignty, specifically in terms of national economic policies. The Indonesian younger generation of engaging agents were at the forefront, mostly due to the harsh policy from the IMF that their country had to comply with in order to receive financial support.\textsuperscript{7} So here the generation gap is discernible. Moreover, the observation from the perceptions and activities of the younger generation of non-governmental engaging agents presented a different picture from the overall picture that governmental engaging agents presented. For governmental agents, more serious regional economic cooperation did emerge from the ashes of the financial crisis; the APT was an explicit example. For non-governmental agents, there were two pictures. On the one hand, for the long-term engaging agents, their activities went along with that of track-I. On the other hand, the younger non-governmental engaging agents were less concerned with the broader cooperative aspect, although they accepted the significance of it.\textsuperscript{8} Nevertheless, regional engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, shared a belief in the efficacy of a functional approach starting from economic cooperation, then spilling over to other co-operation, specifically political and security co-operation of the efforts of agents under investigation here.

ASEAN-ISIS book entitled ‘Twenty Two Years of ASEAN-ISIS: origin, evolution and challenges of track two diplomacy’ reflected on how their networking activities should be revitalised (Soesastro, Joewono and Hernandez 2006). The first thing to determine would be whether they are really as inclusive as they say. Both young and new members voiced this concern. There were calls for ASEAN-ISIS to be able to accept criticism, feedback and critical comments either from internal or external sources, specifically the latter (Sotharit 2006: 123).\textsuperscript{9} This meant that perceptions of ASEAN-ISIS networks may have been that the networks were unduly exclusive, a characteristic that may have made potential engaging agents doubt their

\textsuperscript{7} Interviews on October 18\textsuperscript{th} 2006 and October 19\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia, and on November 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2006 at ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
\textsuperscript{8} Interviews on July 10\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at IDSS, and on July 14\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at NUS, Singapore, Interviews on October 18\textsuperscript{th} 2006 and October 19\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia, and on November 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2006 at ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
\textsuperscript{9} Interview on July 5\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at IDSS and SIIA, on July 6\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at IDSS, on July 10\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at IDSS, Singapore, and on July 14\textsuperscript{th} 2006 at National University of Singapore (NUS)
criteria to invite other agents to join their circles, whether there be any other criterion apart from personal familiarity.10

The aspect that should be seriously considered here is the dominance of the personal characteristics of senior agents. In a positive sense, it is a quality of leadership. Take for example Noordin Sopiee and Jusuf Wanandi’s substantial contribution to track-II diplomacy in the region, which demonstrates how heavily these processes rely on personal linkages and intellectual inputs that individual participants are willing and able to provide (Ball and Taylor 2006: 116, Evans 2006: 103). Yet, it also has a negative side. The younger agents felt ignored, that they were not part of this somewhat exclusive club, partly because of the generation gap as previously mentioned and partly because of the too established characteristics of the networks based on a regional economic aspect that was less appreciated by the younger ones.11 A solution to the problem could be that a process of leadership election should be adopted to replace the practise of leadership rotation of the member institute in order to render the process more open and transparent regarding agenda setting for conferences and workshops (Bunbongkarn 2006: 143). In other words, personal characters and interests of the long-term engaging agents affected how the networking activities and agenda emerged out of the socialising activities were formed.

The other point that agents should pay attention to in order to revitalise their networks according to long-term engaging agents is a decision regarding their own future direction. Their networks, thus far, have neither been clearly based on professional expertise nor on a common world view. Rather, they are rather grounded in an ad hoc and shifting constellation of interests and perspectives that sometimes, but not always, find a common theme. Nevertheless, these engaging/networking activities, thus far, have guided them to nurture regional communities based on agents’ interests and concerns to reach their mutual understanding of improving their regional security environment. Firstly, they preferred an economic aspect as a spearhead for spill-over effects of functional approach. For them economic stability and

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10 Interviews on July 4th 2006 at SIIA, and on July 10th 2006 at IDSS, Singapore, and on October 28th 2006, Thai-ISIS 25th Anniversary, Bangkok, Thailand

11 Interviews on October 3rd 2006 at Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand, October 20th 2006, at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 2nd, ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
growth are part and parcel of their concept of comprehensive security. Later, on-going networking activities from the mentioned spill-over effects paved the way for engaging agents to breed familiarity through numerous conferences and workshops. This is the way of socialisation that helps them hand on to their nurtured concepts of comprehensive security. In other word, what they have in common is a broad concept of comprehensive security with no precise and pre-designed definition. Sometimes that might cause them some clumsiness particularly when regional security faces difficulties, such as what happened after the 1997-financial crisis. As a result, consensual knowledge reaches less than its preferred destination via the path of discussion and socialisation (Evans 2006: 1000).

Their clumsiness is both their weak and strong point. As regards the weak point, it takes quite a long time to achieve commonly perceived goals. The strong point is that compromising attitudes will help them to overcome short-sighted difficulties. Although it is difficult to consolidate diversified interests at a wide level such as CSCAP and CAEC, it might prove beneficial to seriously start more institutionalising processes at the sub-regional level. ASEAN-ISIS should have a more precise plan relating to ASEAN integration and ASEAN’s external relations in terms of policy research and seminars addressing political-security, economic and socio-cultural issues (Bunbongkarn 2006: 142).

Reflection on the setting-up of a framework

The agents examined here include those who know and accept that they are both enabled and constrained by their surroundings (specifically regional and global environments), which are not static but dynamic. They also know about - and consider taking part in and even taking the lead in - activities that help to maintain, shift, change and/or totally [re]construct their surroundings. It is worth accentuating that emphasis is placed more on the input side (how they construct and transmit their ideas) than on the output side (how their ideas are implemented in this thesis, for reasons as explained in Chapter 1). More space was saved to the study of agents’ ideas, intentions/deliberations, and knowledge that make them capable of implementing change.

This project reaffirms that the process that helps agents to construct their ideas which in turn constructs their intentions/deliberations and actions is a dialectical one. Based on this process, agents construct their knowledge and then take
the normative step towards reaching their goals, namely to self-consciously set the purposes and goals which ought to govern the future course of history (Benhabib 1986: 157). They aim for a mutually reachable understanding to improve their region. Dialogues, workshops, and conferences are their main socialising venues for encouraging consensus. The practice of engaging in dialogue is their strong point; in fact, it is regarded as the sole possible procedure through which they can discover whether they can recognise both the norms and interpretations of their needs that predominate the networking of dialogues (Wellmer 1990: 311). Getting involved in this process *per se* signifies their ethical concern that the dialogical concept of dialogue is more important than their *a priori* designed concepts and interpretations.

This is the way they construct and nurture their preferred and commonly accepted ideas on regional security, in terms of broadened and without any pre-designed of comprehensive security.

Taking account of the definition of these agents as being ‘intellectuals’, one may encounter more constraints, particularly within the scope of the output side (implementing agents’ ideas, and intentions/deliberations). Although many agents have diversified backgrounds, based on their training for substantive knowledge (economics, political science and law in particular), they all share the philosophical notion of improving their region. Their individual consciences pledge them to be part of this on-going socialising process. This is also linked to their intentionally engaging in transmitting that ability into concrete social activities by participating either directly or indirectly as mediators in public affairs. This process can be regarded as their external dialectical process of socialising, undertaken through conferences and workshops as the discursive space of their networking activities. It is within these discursive spaces that their output-side activities may be observed.

However, the result of this study does not clearly signify the agents’ focus on their own domestic concerns, which could have widely concrete impacts. The themes (of conferences, workshops, and publications) specified here concern comprehensive security, which engulfs domestic and social well-being as well as that of their region as significant ingredients of both domestic and regional security. Although there might be a slightly different emphasis on the meaning of comprehensive security between engaging agents from ASEAN and Japan, who were the main agents for this study, their comprehensive concept had a rather similar origin that was to encourage more space for the agents, governmental and non-governmental, to be more relevant.
in order to tone down the hostile feeling in the region. The gradually conceptualised concept (from discursive to a more concretised idea) can be regarded for this study as the concept of ‘national and regional resilience’ within their engaging/ networking processes (see Chapter 3 for the origin of the idea and Chapter 4 for the development of the idea). With reference to their ability to organise and forge networks, it might not be an exaggeration to regard this part as indicative of their success. It is this concept, commonly accepted by engaging agents within and without the region (namely those outside ASEAN in particular), that helps them to form a core of discursive networks in the earlier periods. Later, this sprouting core was developed into ASEAN-ISIS networks.

In addition, their networking efforts also affect the content of discussed security matters. Security discussions have been both broadened (to cover all aspects of their preferred comprehensive security concepts) and [re]focused (either on what used to be traditional taboos or on topics picked out from the comprehensive concept). Their networking and socialising encouragement has effectively changed the economic (since the 1960s), political (apparent since the 1970s) and security, in a more traditional sense (since the 1990s), contours of the region. What should not be overlooked is that the regional social contour, people demographic regarding trans-national migration in particular, has also changed. This is attributed to the interactively mingling effects of the three previous changing contours, specifically after the hard-hit they received from the financial crisis in 1997.

The thesis has discussed that the concept of networking (reviewed in Chapter 1) is generally helpful for comprehending knowledge-bound engaging activities. Yet, the result does not totally fit with concepts of an ‘epistemic community’ and a ‘coalition advocacy framework’, because of their ad hoc characteristics, particularly in terms of concrete policies. Nevertheless, provided that a revised networking concept is applied under the broad concept of constructivism, the result will appear more appropriate, because it specifies how socialising processes can lead to co-operation. It accepts that the historical context of the explored subject is essential for studying the content of the interactively socialising processes.

Unfortunately, this broad concept is still not enough to offer insight into how such processes could have emerged and been prolonged in different places and times, particularly when they are not totally similar (see Chapters 3 and 4). All networking literature reviewed here presupposes that ‘trust’ will flourish as a result of the
socialising process (more discussion later). On this point, the results of the study are mixed. On the one hand, there is a notion that the more agents engage with the socialising process the more they might generate trust for further cooperation, though they may have to overcome some difficulties.

On the other hand, many agents notified their own observation that the more they get to know each other, the less they want to become closely engaged. The progression of getting to know each other was a rather diminishing return in some areas, according to their experiences. Some engaging agents gradually played down their networking activities when they thought that the activities were too static, as happened after the inception of ARF and CSCAP (see Chapters 3 and 4). They might resume or even help to expand the networking relationship when they saw chances for changing, such as the changing global/regional/domestic environment after the financial crisis in 1997, the 9/11 incident, and a trend from governmental cooperation to boost free trade areas in the region (see Chapter 4). Yet, some long-term engaging agents even used a metaphor that too close cooperation might generate a relationship like that of the relationship between the tongue and the teeth. The former could get hurt by the latter, if they are too close. This is the reason why they opt not to wander into diverse fields that could enhance the content of their networking activities: closer acquaintance could be seen as a regressive step in attempts to construct a common identity such as the unsettled geographical identity of the region in the case of ARF and the East Asian Community. For the former, non-governmental engaging agents for ASEAN countries in particular wanted the forum to be more inclusive, as much as possible. For the concept of East Asian Community, whilst engaging agents from Japan in particular wanted it to be more inclusive to include India and Australia, other engaging agents wanted it to be more focused around East and Southeast Asia region (see Chapter 4).

Chapter 1 proposed that Habermas’s theory of communicative action might prove a remedy to the difficulty that mainly lies in the inclination of networking literature to place too much emphasis on the means-end paradigm. Networking literature tends to decrease the significance and impact of agents’ surroundings upon

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12 Interview on July 5th, July 6th, and July 19th 2006 at IDSS, Singapore, on October 3rd 2006 at Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand, on October 20th 2006, at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia, on October 27th 2006 at Thai-ISIS 25th Anniversary, Bangkok, Thailand, on November 2nd, ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Chapter 5: The East Asian (Security) Intellectual Network – A Critical Assessment
their understanding, not to mention their decision-making. It also lacks enough provision for comprehending how agents form the perceptions and intentions that lead them to co-operate with each other on an equal basis. What is still not clear theoretically is what makes agents think that they can cooperate despite their different backgrounds? Habermas’ theory of communicative action offers a procedural view to scrutinise their internal logic, which acts like an a priori (universally) understanding that helps their engaging processes and dialogues to actualise and flourish within a discursive sphere, such as a socialising process. Theory of communicative action also offers the possibility of (internally and externally dialectical) uniting knowledge and interests for efficiently functioning as intellectuals (as defined in this project). Social integration and socialisation can also emerge out of, and be reproduced by, discursive networking activities.

This study also reaffirms what David Ingram (1987: 22) observes – that Habermas tries to establish linkage within the division of (socialising) argument: linkages between logic, rhetoric and dialectic. The first refers to the consistency of argument – comprehensive security leading to domestic/regional resilience and to constructing a broader community. The second suggests that the procedural judgement of arguing is the key, as expressed through numerous conferences and workshops. The last one is the agents’ interaction with their geographical and social surroundings, albeit with more emphasis on the latter. In other words, the study accentuates what Habermas attempts to imply - socialisation acts as a mediating process between individuals’ psyche and society (meaning their networking fora in this study), although it may not be totally mediated (d’ Entreves 1997: 22).

Agents’ experiences inform us that it is difficult to have a pre-established harmony in an already (generally communicative, for this project) unconscious and inter-subjective social world of diversifying agents (whitebook 1997: 185). Be that as it may, the Habermasian discourse model does not show any sign of submerging individuality into collectivity. On the contrary, according to Benhabib (1992: 111), it not only presupposes but also defends individual autonomy and consent. This is also the reason why a collective identity could not be easily achieved by engaging agents. For example, the informal procedure preferred by regional engaging agents, such as the PECC process, provided the fertile ground for the flourishing of track I and track II activities since engaging agents, specifically the governmental agents who acted in their own capacities, enjoyed no obligation without their consent. Yet, when the
engaging/networking activities encountered identity questions as in the case of the inception, directly related to governmental activities in particular, such as APEC, ARF, ASEM, and even the construction of East Asian Community, the reference of the collective identity was not easy to be sorted out (see Chapter 4 and the first section of Chapter 5).

However, this does not suggest that Habermas’s ‘ideal community of communication’ is of little use, specifically its counterfactual conceptions of rational consensus functioning as regulative ideas guiding (local) practices in which persons possess equal communicative competencies (Ingram 1987: 187, Apel 1990). The result from this study shows that the consensus of engaging agents in the broad sense of comprehensive security has been usefully applied as a regulative guideline for networking activities in terms of procedure and content. The consensus is also useful to identify in which areas that socialising process should be added and/or increased. Theoretically, on this point this study agrees with Dietrich Bohler (1990), that (procedurally) a transcendental pragmatic can be regarded as a criterion of a validity of pure argumentation of agents’ moral philosophy signifying that argumentation and ethics presuppose each other. This can be demonstrated by the regional engaging agents who preferred to imitate the characteristics of PECC process that has been a model for both formal and informal fora in the region. Engaging agents, ASEAN-ISIS scholars in particular, accepted that without the PECC model of inclusiveness, specifically meant without prejudice about different backgrounds, and no precise pre-designed outcome, regional architectures might not be structured as they have been. In other words, the inception and existence of ARF, CSCAP, ASEM, and CAEC as parts of regional architectures are theoretically attributed from the intertwining process that argumentation and ethics presupposes each other.

The abundant conferences and workshops initiated by the APR in particular are examples of discursively socialising space in which agents can ‘talk it out’ through the universally non-coercive dialectical and dialogical process of critical discourse (Heat 2001: 308). It is a process underpinning dynamic regional change

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13 The ethics acts as the basic means while the argumentation acts as a consistency way of testing and solving differences.
14 The process helps to reveal particular mistakes and particular insensitivities in order to reconsider by engaging agents without coercion.

Chapter 5: The East Asian (Security) Intellectual Network – A Critical Assessment
in terms of economic, political and security aspects. The persistence of engaging activities, particularly based on the experiences of engaging agents with networking processes since the earliest period when differences were viewed as alienated and hostile should be considered as the agents’ expression of their ethics and morale, especially in terms of their social responsibility (Hoffe 1990: 216). Examples from empirical findings are continually long-term efforts of regional engaging agents recognising their opened dialogical and dialectical networking activities through numerous conferences, either supported by governments such as ASEAN-Japan dialogues, or supported by non-governmental organisations like APR, or supported by both governmental and non-governmental organisations in the case of attempting to construct regional community.

Theoretically, these activities might not be actualised as they have become unless these engaging agents have an ideal situation of what their region should be in their mind. In other words, their activities expressed that they accept the principle of universal moral respect, being broad minded and inclusive for the interpretation of this study, and the principle of egalitarian reciprocity, which are regarded as basic elements for theory of communicative action by Seyla Benhabib (1990: 337). The principle of universal moral respect can be reconciled well with the agents’ inclusive principle accepting even those from hostile countries, specifically during the Cold War period; otherwise, the inception of ASEAN and its derivatives such as ASEAN-PMC and a series of conferences such as APR and ASEAN-China dialogues could not come into being from the initial stage. The second can be seen in the preference that agents give to the dialogical process of communicating without a priori designed results. The result from the study complies with Benhabib’s (1992: 9) idea that communicative ethics is ongoing (procedural open end) moral conversation for a way of life, meaning regional affairs for this project. Examples for procedural open-end conversation networking activities are numerous conferences and workshops, fashioned after the PECC process, supported and attended by regional engaging agents.

From the observations of this study, socialising and networking consolidation has become denser with passing time, particularly in terms of nurturing familiarisation, whether or not it is positive. Specifically after big events such as the end of the Cold War which brought about the inception of ARF and CSCAP, the consolidation of European projects generating the EU and begetting ASEM and
CAEC, and the impacts from the 1997 financial crisis that gave birth to the APT and the concept of constructing regional community (see Chapters 3 and 4). There are three main factors relating to the consolidating process: how strongly agents believe in their own ideas, actions/interactions; how they are able to seize the chance for change, or even create the chance if need be; and how they can generate the social quality called ‘trust’ in order to pursue objectives based on their shared perceptions. The last factor cannot be clearly deduced from TCA. With reference to this point, Jay M. Bernstein (1997) rightly points out, if indirectly, that communicative reason expresses only intersubjective recognition; it cannot ground it. Examples are reflexion from their experiences from long-term engaging agents who pointed out the negative side of too closely networking activities and perception from both long-term and young-generation engaging agents who pointed out that different ways of perceiving social environments were keys to their decisions regarding networking activities, not the other way round (see the previous section).

Before scrutinising more the concept of ‘trust’ that might act as a helpful supplement at worst - or glue at best - connecting the result of the study to networking literature and to theory of communicative action, it is worth clarifying the usefulness of Habermas’s strategic and communicative action for this study. These modes of action are not matters of free choice. They will be chosen through three (related) processes: cultural tradition, social integration and socialisation (Habermas 1990: 99. This research shows that they cannot only be separated: they can also be complementary.

Communicative action, aimed at reaching mutual understanding on constructing a better, more open and stable region and based on a comprehensive concept for regional security, should be treated as a foundation (ultimate objective). From what was illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, what should be mentioned regarding this point is that engaging agents since the initial period, the 1960s, came to join their efforts without a high anticipation for any pre-designed outcome. They regarded conferences and workshops, whether or not supported by governments in the region, as potential social space that they could jointly thread their intentions and actions to improve their region, firstly in an economic aspect and later in a communicative way. Their communicative action proved useful by generating gradually concretised cooperation with minimal anticipation above reaching mutual understanding for every period of cooperation, no matter how small it might be. In addition, communicative
action should also be regarded as a mediating glue for whatever subordinate or substantive objectives prevail (economic, political and security cooperation). Communicative action aiming at reaching mutual understanding to improve the region within the broad scope of the concept of comprehensive security and encouraging the ongoing cooperation is at the core for regional engaging agents who express their preference of gradual but incremental steps of closer networking activities. Without it, their cooperation could not reach the stage of trying to construct regional community as in the case of ASEAN Community and East Asian Community.

Mutual understanding of ultimate and/or detailed objectives should precede success-oriented strategies. Reflection on this intermingled process reveals that agents’ cooperative strategic actions are derived from their shared beliefs and discursive commitments, asserting more the significance of ‘how to do’ (signifying their bargaining and compromising) over ‘what to do’ (Schnadelbach 1990: 281, 289). The analysis in Chapters 3, and 4, and the previous section, confirms that no matter how global and regional environments have changed, agents’ networking activities still prevail to achieve what regional engaging agents intended to do to improve their region under the broad concept of comprehensive security. In other words, networking activities of engaging agents exist and flourish, although they could be regarded as agents’ reflexion to global and regional changes at some periods, such as their action after the 1997 financial crisis (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, their networking activities could also be considered as their means to bring changes that were more positive to improve their region. An example of which being when regional engaging agents (non-governmental in particular) tried hard to organise conferences and workshops by firstly highlighting the significance of economic aspects that could help them reach mutual understanding more easily than other aspects. The famous PECC process emerged from this, then engaging scholars from ASEAN countries established their networks of institutional links, followed by the APR and other conferences and workshops, supported by governmental and non-governmental organisations, which even led to the idea to construct a regional community such as the ASEAN and East Asian Communities. In other words, if agents had given priority to ‘what to do’ over ‘how to do’, things might not turn out as they did.

However, should there be different ideas derived from different interests, this can be overcome by encouraging agents to find a single appropriate answer (at a time)
drawn from the intrinsic characteristics of their accepted norms. A transcendental pragmatic necessity underlies this process (Heat 2001: 308-311). In other words, emphasis on agents’ rational insights shows that their mutual understanding of their shared interests makes compromise reasonable. Informal characteristics of the PECC process and the long-term APR forum helps engaging agents to compromise their differences, specifically regarding global/regional/domestic environment in order to reach absolute gains for all.

In addition, they help develop mutual understanding to improve the region within a broad concept of comprehensive security rather than partial gains of some individual engaging agents and/or the interests of their respective countries (Heat 2001: 135-165, 248-253, Apel 1990: 40). Empirically, economic well-being based on economic development (expressed sense of liberalism) and comprehensive security (expressed in a more neutral sense) plays a role in agents’ expected absolute gain to improve their region. For economic development, engaging agents preferred market-driven economies under the sponsorship of their respective governments that could be seen from the attempts of engaging agents, ASEAN scholars and the Japanese agents covering governmental and non-governmental, who helped to construct the PECC process generating APEC and supported the APT and its derivatives such as the CMI. For comprehensive security, the APR could be considered as a social space that engaging agents gave their priority to gradually play down interests of their individually respective states. As a result, they could have more space to pay attention to the well-being of the people.

By all means, all the mentioned concepts and activities, supported and/or generated their activities could not have existed unless regional agents showed positive attitude towards each other. This study regards that attitude as ‘trust’. Yet, literature employed in Chapter 1 did not give much account on the concept. The next section, therefore, tries to illustrate theoretically how collective intention as trust could be considered as the way to reflect on what has been missing from a threaded framework constructed in Chapter 1.

Trust: social qualification to unite networking activities

Piotr Sztompka (1999: 147) proposes that trust not only helps us to speak but also to listen. Conferences and workshops, either formal or informal, function appropriately in this sense, even if they are satirised as mere talk-shops. According to
Sztompka, trust is an expected conduct derived from two kinds of agents’ qualities of actions: instrumental qualities (regularity, reasonableness, and efficiency); and moral qualities (morally responsible, kind, gentle, truthful, authentic, straightforward, fair, and just). From a narrow perspective reliant upon agent’s subjectivity, they could be observed as rational calculations of agents’ actions in order to maximise utility under risk and to minimise loss in a risky situation (Sztompka 1999: 60-62). From a wider perspective, they encourage sociability and tolerance, overcome the pluralistic ignorance syndrome, increase chances for more cooperation, strengthen bonds between individuals, and contribute to feelings of collective solidarities (Sztompka 1999: 105). The mingling of the results of these two groups of qualities is at the core of understanding outcomes of networking activities perceived in the region as early as the 1960s.

It is worth noting that being a capable agent requires knowing how to utilise these qualities effectively in order to deliver her/his intentions/deliberations. The informal and inclusive characteristics as appeared from the PECC and the APR processes were keys to two groups of qualities needed to generate trust. Theoretically, there is a trend towards feelings of collective solidarities, although long-term engaging agents perceived them at a minimal level as functional identity as explained in the first section of this chapter. Yet, empirically there has not been any clearer evidence than attempts from engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, to construct collective regional identity such as ASEAN Community and East Asian Community. Without these two groups of qualities, these initially collective identity constructions might be difficult to form and receive attention from the engaging agents and the general public. In other words, constructing the ‘Community’ as a uniting unit, whether in a narrower sense like the ASEAN Community or in a broader sense as an East Asian Community, has a long and uneasy path on which engaging agents have to wander. Trust, as a necessary social quality for constructing a community, might be consolidated from familiarisation. Yet, as a result of this project, it points out that familiarity does not necessarily generate trust specifically in a positive sense that is required to lay the foundation for constructing a uniting Community. Unfortunately, the scope of this project did not cover the question of how to generate and pamper that positive trust. Be that as it may, what engaging agents can anticipate for the time being is that their networks of communicative
communities aimed to improve their regional comprehensive security could provide them nourishing venues to construct the Community.

Keith Hart (1988: 186), who proposes a rather neutral and (actively) mechanistic concept of trust, suggests that human relationships, activities and actions are the source of collective intention and action. There is also a rather passive concept related to earlier discussion derived from human rationality, namely, that it is related to a sensitive way of adapting to environmental conditions, vulnerability and even penalty (Bateson 1988: 27, Lorenz 1988: 197).

In line with the results of this project, it is likely that trust generated along the socialising process might be grounded on reputations accumulated from the past, manifest in a sense of confident expectation of the intention of another free agent (Dasgupta 1988: 53, Dunn 1988: 83). According to Niklas Luhmann (1988: 99), familiarity is the key to establishing trust and confidence, the asserting of expectations of self-assurance and self reference. It is worth notifying here that empirically, for this project, familiarity, from long-term engaging agents in particular, has not presented only a positive side of generating trust, but also presented a negative side of potentially breeding contempt due to too long and too close familiarity.

However, a summed up trend from long-term engaging/networking activities is that familiarity does breed friendship more than contempt. As Diego Gambetta (1988: 217) argues, networking – followed by socialising processes - is the key to dissolving an extremely restrictive sense of human subjectivity and to encouraging progressive and positive intersubjectivity of human beings. Gambetta (1988: 229) is correct insofar as agents’ intentions to do good make them choose ‘trust’ as their choice. Examples from this study are that engaging agents persuaded each other and their respective governments to trust each other’s good-will to improve the region after the end of the Cold War and after the occurrence of the 1997 financial crisis. ARF and CSCAP were established as results of their attempts after the end of the Cold War. The APT and the idea to construct regional community were attributed from their efforts after the 1997 financial crisis.

Thus agents’ ideas and intentions/deliberations have encouraged East Asian (security) intellectuals’ networks to grow up, even though they have had to overcome global, regional and domestic difficulties before differences among diversifying agents could be accepted as normal.
Summary
Lessons learnt from more than 40 years of regional engaging agents’ networking activities told us that non-governmental agents alone might not effectively deliver significant changes to improve their region. The establishment of official regional architectural fora such as APEC, ARF, ASEM, and APT told us a story of cooperating activities between governmental and non-governmental engaging agents. Yet, what should not be overlooked here is that their explicitly successful cooperation, the construction of APEC, ARF, and ASEM in particular, initially came from informal networking activities and processes. These activities came into being through the intention and creation of engaging agents, both non-governmental and governmental agents who acted in their own capacities and who shared perceptions regarding improving their region.

The informal characteristic of engaging agents’ networking activities, specifically the PECC process and other processes fashioned after it, makes them free from constraints of implementation, and makes them free to desire considerable change, because the informal characteristic itself lacks concrete power to implement engaging agents’ ideas. This project regards engaging agents’ positive freedom (freedom to) as more important than negative freedom (freedom from) due to the significance it gives to ideational factors in engaging agents’ dialectical processes of think and taking action. It is within this discursive dialectical space that engaging agents express their discourse ethics in term of giving priority to ‘what to do’ over ‘how to do’. That means they have to be strategic agents in order to cultivate and transmit their ideas to the general audiences outside their conference-and-workshop environments. They might express amorphous ideas on how to improve their region but they presented no precise pre-decided improvement plans.

Socialising processes play a significant part as their means to learn and mitigate their differences and to share and strengthen their common values. What they have shared, thus far, is that their mutual understanding to improve their region. The reflection from this understanding is that they also have their intersubjectively accepted ideal regional situation in their mind. Within this ideal situation, everyone can become potential engaging agents. In other words, they are open to uncertainty in terms of regional environment and engaging agents’ perception. The PECC process and the APR process are socially dialectical engaging processes that they learn to act as components of mechanisms employed to improve their region.
As shown in Chapters 3 and 4 and the first section of this chapter that when regional fora derived from their efforts came into existence, they would become part and parcel of engaging structures for thoughts and action/interaction. That means with passing time, engaging agents have to take more regional architecture, economics, politics and security, into consideration. Some fora, such as ARF and ASEAN-SOM might ignore or constrain their progressive changes if governmental agents, whether they are engaging agents or not, see that those changes might hinder their respective governmental policies. Yet, some fora such as APR and CSCAP are more positive due to their more informal characteristics. Informal characteristics, together with being inclusiveness, make engaging agents’ activities expressing their potentiality to construct socially common identity among engaging agents. Theoretically, specifically drawn from constructivist literature, it should be along that line of thought. Although, East Asian engaging/networking activities provide a different picture; experiences from engaging activities, whether derived from long-term or young generation of engaging agents, show no clear signs of submerging individuality into collectivity as Habermas proposes in his discourse model (see Chapter 1 and the first section of this chapter).

Although engaging agents are not totally capable of altering their regional environment as they see fit, along the lines of their preferred concepts of comprehensive security, they render help in terms of ideas more than actions, to construct the region as it has become. Unfortunately, this project cannot indentify trust as social necessity, emerged out off socialising processes, for binding all engaging agents to join, consolidate and expand their engaging/networking activities as literature employed in Chapter 1 expected. Yet, after trying to remedy what the fabricated framework set up in Chapter 1 missed out, by adding literature regarding trust, this project concludes that socialising processes breed familiarity that leads to friendship. It is friendship that makes the history of East Asian (Security) Intellectual Networks possible as illustrated in details in Chapter 3 and 4.
Conclusion

This project was originated by the interest in the vibrant movements of track II diplomacy, which are regarded here as networking activities of engaging agents, including non-governmental as well as governmental agents acting in their own capacities, in order to improve their region, with particular focus on the 1990s. Their activities increasingly render the changing of regional contours, specifically in terms of politics and security. The inceptions of ARF, CSCAP, ASEM and CACE (along with their engaging processes), together with robust fora, the PECC and the APR processes in particular, for comprehensive security discussion at which agents could meet, exchange, and discuss security related issues in order to better their regions and contribute them more inclusive, resulted from these movements.

In order to systemise the scrutiny of this project, two related groups of questions have been set out. Within the first group, the first question asks ‘Who are those active agents who have helped construct and sustain the existing networks that engage comprehensive security matters?’ The second question asks ‘To what extent and how have they constructed said networks?’ which is termed here as the ‘East Asian Security Intellectual Network’. Within the second group, their capability and impact(s) are assessed. Regarding capability, the project is concerned with their ability as changing agents that specifically derived from their ideas related to the concept of comprehensive security. This area of concern also covers the assessment of their social function, whether they are independent enough to initiate an emancipating change, or are just part of their society and serve to reproduce the dominant order. For the impact, this project aims at assessing the impact(s) of their activities and ideas upon their own networks rather than upon their societies, domestic or regional, as mostly shown in Chapters 3 and 4 and the first section of Chapter 5. In other words, this project also looks at assessing the theoretical speculation as to whether their respective identities have changed to become more collective as the communicating process has progressed.

Qualitative methods, comprising data collection including from field work and interviews, fashioned after the ‘research wheel’, emphasising the essentiality of dynamics and on-going process procedures in order to redefine ideas and techniques, were employed to conduct this project. The advantage of this research style for this project is that the researcher can permanently reflect on the whole process of
conducting research, started with specifying, then collecting and analysing collected data. At the beginning, this project was defined and redefined both the scope, in terms of periods and region, and redefined research questions before being focused on and modifying the concepts of being engaging agents, their capacities and social functions.

Proceeding on, the research-wheel technique reminds this researcher not to ignore the process of internal falsification, particularly meaning value judgement regarding normative concern, specifically related to the concept of being agents employed here for this project. The research has to be aware that agents’ structure for thought and action for every period of study can both enable and constrain their ideas and actions. In other words, agents’ aspiration to improve their region might not meet with their real capability, no matter how strong a deliberation they possess. Yet, it is difficult to deny that their ideas and actions regarding the concept of comprehensive security affecting the improvement of regional security help to construct regional security architectures such as APR, ARF, and CSCAP in particular.

Moreover, the essence of this project is to assess the engaging/networking agents and their activities. As suggested in Chapter 1 that as they are being regarded as intellectuals, they have to be assessed on the basis of two premises: ideas and social functions. Therefore, how agents perceive and interact with their surroundings, then consolidate, construct, and translate these experiences into networking activities were this project’s main concerns. Yet, networking activities based on the East Asian experience showed the trend of less independent engaging agents due to lack of enough independent funds and less reliable information, specifically regarding states’ policies and their impacts. That means experiences from the engaging agents show that the best they could do would be to actualise their intentions/deliberations and know how to utilise what domestic and regional chances were left open for them.

This project illustrated agents’ attempts to change their social environment in a time slot covering the early post-World War II period to the first decade of the 21st century with the specific focus on the 1980s and the 1990s. At the early periods, particularly from 1950 to 1960, engaging agents’ structure of thought and action was a mixed result of territorial skirmishes, ideological conflict and a sense of cooperation and geographical inclusiveness. Seeds of networking activities could be discerned. A rough concept of regional community (presented as Asia-Pacific) was evident. Japan, whose position was now better than some, was headed in an economic direction
(under the banner of ‘Yoshida Doctrine’) encouraged by non-governmental agents, particularly from the mid-1960s onwards. The Southeast Asia region remained dominated by respective governments’ military and political issues.

Prominent figures included Saburo Okita and Kiyoshi Kojima, whose links within and outside of Japanese territory were energetic and helpful for more precise non-governmental agents’ networking activities in the later periods. Additionally, the regional atmosphere, particularly in Southeast Asia, was about to change partly due to the inception of ASEAN, which adopted and broadened the Indonesian concept of ‘national resilience’ to ‘regional resilience’. This meant that Southeast Asia was preparing to embrace a security concept broader than the traditional concept based on a military aspect alone, the basic concept for ASEAN intellectuals’ comprehensive security.

From the 1970s to the early 1980s, global and regional environments both inspired and helped to shape governmental and non-governmental networking activities stemming from economic hardship including two oil crises, global and regional economic stagflation, and an un-consulting Nixon Doctrine. By contrast, there was a discernibly cooperative atmosphere in Europe and Southeast Asia. Regarding the latter, the emergence of CSCE in Helsinki, the announcement of the ASEAN ZOPFAN, ASEAN Concord and TAC were cases of generating cooperative atmosphere. The rapidly changing global and regional atmosphere influenced Japan to declare the following three related policies: the ‘New Pacific policy’; the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’; and the ‘Comprehensive Security Policy’. The last mentioned was initially – and continues to be - favoured by agents from within and without the region; the reason being that the concept broadens and indirectly engages not only political and economic but also cultural and environmental aspects.

Within this period, Tadashi Yamamoto from Japan initiated the JCIE whose intellectual networking activities, particularly concerned economic and political issues with Asia, Europe and America. His connections with the latter two saw the creation of the renowned ‘Trilateral Commission’. His links with European intellectuals helped close the distance between Japan and the EU; the ‘Hakone Meeting’ flourished along the way. Okita was still engaged in activities from the previous period which became extended and received more attention when he assumed the post of Foreign Minister in the late 1970s. His intellectual networks with Australia bore fruit in terms of a proposal to construct an Asia Pacific economic community. The explicit result

Conclusion
was the inception of the PECC, famous for generating an informal procedure, consensus, and the spirit of inclusiveness. APEC was initiated by the PECC process.

Through these years, networking activities flourished due to agents’ intentions to improve their regional atmosphere. Although they may have had different origins (participating agents came from different countries across the region) their cross-regional activities showed that they held commonly shared visions about their regions. The engaging agents accepted that only through economic development would their societies (domestic and regional alike) become stable and strong enough for political development leading to threat-free regional security. Although their favoured concept of comprehensive security, based on the concept of national/regional resilience rendered by economic development, was viewed by critics within and outside the region as rather hollow, due to it not directly engaging with regional states’ security problems, it was helpful to mitigate potential conflicts derived from different ideological inclination.

For ASEAN, intellectuals from Indonesian CSIS were the most energetic, specifically Yusuf Wanandi, whose effort to link academic activities within and outside of the region generated and strengthened ASEAN-ISIS. What should also be emphasised here is that Wanandi and Noordin Sopiee of Malaysian ISIS developed close connections with their respective governments. This proved useful for ASEAN-ISIS engaging agents and their Japanese counterparts for the establishment of significant fora for security discussions initiated in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War, the breakdown of the USSR, and a trend of more intensive consolidation of the European countries. These fora are: ARF, CSCAP, ASEМ, and CAEC. ASEAN-ISIS through its renowned APR was a centre for discussing security issues within and outside the region. Malaysia-ISIS, with good support from CIDA, the Sasagawa Peace Foundation (Japan) and its own government, mainly organised the forum. Yet, not only did the outcomes derived from the governmental agents’ performance affect non-governmental agents – they themselves were also affected by them.

Theoretically and empirically, what this project presented is that the historical context of the explored subject, engaging agents under investigation here, is essential for studying the content of the interactively socialising processes. With the passing of time, agents absorbed socialising experiences (whether from governmental or non-governmental fora) that could foster their networking activities. These experiences could be summarised as follows: homogeneity and harmony; mutual trust; and
consensus. These characteristics may be regarded as ‘positive perceptions that enabled the fostering of networking activities’, and were carried on as common assets to deeper cooperation.

Dialogues, workshops, and conferences, specifically through the PECC and the APR processes, have been their main venues for encouraging consensus (paralleling and sometimes converging with track-I preferences).

The practice of engaging in dialogue has been their strong point; in fact, it has been regarded as the sole possible procedure through which they can discover whether they can recognise both the norms and interpretations of their needs that predominate the networking of dialogues. Getting involved in this process per se signifies their ethical concern that the dialogical concept of dialogue is more important than their a priori designed concepts and interpretations.

However, whether or not trust could be generated along the socialising processes as anticipated by literature reviewed in Chapter 1 was analysed. The results of this study are mixed. On the one hand, there is a positive observation that socialising process might generate trust for further cooperation. Otherwise, how could engaging agents prolong their networking activities amid the changing environment? Yet, many agents, specifically the long-term engaging ones, claim that the more they get to know each other, the less they want to become closely engaged. This idea obstructed them to wander energetically into diverse fields that could enhance the content of their networking activities, a traditional aspect of security.

With reference to their ability to organise and forge networks, without a priori designed outcome, it might not be an exaggeration to regard this part as indicative of their highest success. The convening of numerous international economic and security fora in the region can be cited as the result. In addition, their networking efforts also affect the content of discussed security matters. Security discussions have been both broadened (to cover all aspects of their preferred comprehensive security concepts) and [re]focused (either on what used to be traditional taboos or on topics picked out from the comprehensive concept).

Increasingly traditional security concerns were receiving more attention, particularly at the two main ASEAN-ISIS fora. At the APR, panel presentations called for the reconsidering of whether ASEAN should be regarded as the Second front for anti-terrorism in the region and whether ARF should respond more rapidly to regional crises. But comprehensive security issues were still relevant. For example, the APR
called for papers appropriately dealing with root causes of terrorism and the promotion of Islam as a religion of peace. Additionally, CSCAP’s activities showed signs that comprehensive security issues were regarded as closely linked with traditional issues. The support it gave to the ‘Transnational Organised Crime Conference’ and ‘Asia-Pacific Group on Money-Laundering’ provided good examples.

Nevertheless, their success could not lead to a common identity as expected by literature reviewed in Chapter 1. Senior agents, whose experiences date back to the late 1960s - mid 1970s, see themselves as having some common functional identity, meaning that they regard themselves as a group of intellectuals who act as components of a mechanism employed to better their societies (both domestic and regional). At best, they see themselves as a group that can compromise their differences in their attempts to reach a mutual understanding of the vision for the region/s (a stable and better region for all). In other words, they shared a belief in the efficacy of a functional approach starting from economic cooperation, then spilling over to other forms of co-operation, specifically political and security co-operation of the efforts of agents under investigation here. Unfortunately, this shared perception is less evident in agents who have not engaged with the networks for more than a decade. The younger generation of engaging agents, specifically those who joined the networks in the 1990s and had the slow movements of the engaging networks as their environment, did not feel that they were part of the exclusive engaging club.

In addition, agents’ sense of a geographical identity (as an ASEAN or an East Asian) - while roughly perceived – was not particularly strong. The only clear concept of collectively geographical identity is the concept of constructing the ASEAN Community that flourished from the concept of ‘One Southeast Asia’, strongly supported by engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, in ASEAN. Whilst the concept to construct the East Asian Community was encouraged by the Japanese engaging agents to even cover Australia and India, there were questions as to whether they should become part of the plan.

Although trust might not be clearly perceived among the socialising processes of engaging/networking activities, two principles that should be the basic elements of Habermasian ideal speech situations could be discerned. The first principle is the universal moral respect perceived through engaging agents’ inclusive principle through the PECC and the APR processes in particular. The second is the principle of...
egalitarian reciprocity perceived through the preference that agents give to the
dialogical process of communicating with *a priori* designed results. Yet, socialising
and networking consolidation has become denser although not evenly. There are three
main factors relating to the consolidating process: how strongly agents believe in their
own ideas, actions/interactions; how they are able to seize the chance for change, or
even create the chance if need be; and how they can generate the social quality called
‘trust’ in order to pursue objectives based on their shared perceptions.

Although trust is still a problematic concept, this project indicated that it could
be generated as long as engaging agents’ intention to do good made them choose
‘trust’ as their choice. This chosen path is essential for the success of Habermas’
communicative action, understood here as aiming at reaching mutual understanding
on constructing a better, more open and stable region which should be anchored on a
comprehensive concept of regional security. Only through this prism of trust as a
foundation for communicative action, could communicative action, applied here as
complementary internal logic of agents’ networking cooperation, be perceived as a
glue to bind strategic and communicative actions. Reflection on this intermingled
process reveals that agents’ cooperative strategic actions are derived from their shared
beliefs and discursive commitments, asserting more the significance of ‘how to do’
(signifying their bargaining and compromising) over ‘what to do’.

**Final Remarks**

The main focus of this project is based on agents’ - defined as intellectuals -
ideas and social functions. The concept of idea (their interactively social product)
helped to reconstruct their surroundings in order to illustrate to what extent and how
they generate and participate in their networking activities. Their ideas and
intentions/deliberations relevant in their initial periods helped them to bring change,
and to express the significance and impact of ideational factors upon the alteration of
East Asia’s economic, political, security, and social contours.

Regarding agents’ social function, it is interesting to point out that the more
the region is liberalised in terms of political ideology, the less their role and function
is independent of their fund-givers and their respective governments’ policies. This is
not because they are subservient to higher authority, rather, it should be appropriately
viewed as a result of global and regional changing environments being more open and
less hostile to accommodating differences and competition in the region. On this
point, it is worth noting that those changes resulted from their engaging/networking activities.

After applying the set-up framework, most of the definitions have helped an understanding of how agents construct and transmit their ideas among diversifying agents across time and space. The difficulty one encounters when defining them as intellectuals comes to the fore when their impact on their wider audiences is taken into account. What should not be forgotten is that despite their familiarity, it is difficult to exert influence over their track-I counterparts unless they know how to seize the opportunities as they occur as a result of environmental change and utilise them to deliver their ideas and their derivatives.

This interactive procedure is a dialectical one that can be observed in the relationships between agents and their changing surroundings and among agents themselves. The combination of networking literature and Habermas’s TCA is helpful on this point. It provides an elaborate conception about how diversifying agents can communicate and project change. While the former provides the external aspect of networking activities, the latter signifies the internal aspect. It is necessary to add that the dialectical relationship between these aspects is the key to understanding how Habermas’s TCA might be applied to real situations. Strategic action and communicative action should be blended, letting the latter have privilege in order to construct the fertile conditions that lead to the emancipation of the human being. The result of this research suggests a need to propose that trust should be more seriously treated as an important ingredient in encouraging the smooth changing and sustaining of networks with good intentions/deliberations. Only in this way can presuppositions regarding trust in networking literature and Habermas’s TCA be remedied.

Agents’ ideas and intentions/deliberations to improve their respective regions not only help them forge networks, but also help them to provide an experimental space in which to create a culture of trust which, in turn will enable them to overcome difficulties and differences and sustain and expand their networks.
### 1950s

**Governmental Cooperation**
- SEATO, ASA

**Ideological conflicts**
- Territorial disputes
- Japan’s “Yoshida Doctrine”

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**Non-governmental Cooperation**

- Rockefeller Foundation  
  (Williamsburg Conference)  
  (1956)

- Ford Foundation  
  = Dartmouth Conference

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- Japanese Foreign Ministry  
  (PAFTAD – 1968)
- PAFTA (1963)  
  (Ignored)
- Kiyoshi Kojima
- Saburo Okita

- PBEC (1965)  
  Bankers + industrialists from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States

- Matsumoto  
  = Shimoda Conference (1967)  
  Interesting participants:  
  Edwin O. Reischauer,  
  Kosaka Tokusaburo,  
  Akio Morita etc.

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1960s

- American/Vietnamese War  
  Skirmishes in Southeast Asia  
  Indonesian “ketahanan nasional” → national self-resilience

- ASPAC (1964)
- ASEAN (1967)
- Governmental Cooperation
Significant conference "Asia-Pacific in the 1980s"

(JP Foreign Minister in the 1970s)

JIIA (1970)
ECI (Florence)
RIIA (London)
German Society for Foreign Affairs
FIIR (Paris)

1970s to early 1980s

Noted attendants:
Narongchai (Thailand)
Noordin Sopiee (Malaysia)
Corolina G. Hernandez and Jesues Estanislao (The Philippines)

Global and regional environments
- Japan's 'New Pacific Policy', 'Fukuda Doctrine', and 'comprehensive security'
- ASEAN's ZOPFAN
- Nixon Doctrine
- Shanghai Communiqué
- 2 oil crises
- economic stagnation
- Afghanistan / Cambodia problems

Non-governmental networking activities in term of both politics and economics
(for more clarification please link with figure 1 by using 'PBCC' as a connecting point)
1980s

Global and regional environments
- PLAZA and Louver
- Accords
  - Japan’s Maekawa Report
  - USSR’s presence in Vietnam
  - Cambodian problem / cocktail party, JIM
- Gorbachev’s Vladivostok Speech
  - ASEAN – ‘6+5’
  - ASEAN – PMC
  - FAEC

Key characters for successful non/governmental co-operation
- homogeneity
- harmony
- mutual trust
- consensus

Non/governmental networking activities

- Japan – Thai Symposium
- Malaysia (Noordin Sopiee)
- Philippines (Hernandez)
- Japan – ASEAN Conference
- Japan – ISIS
- Indonesian CSIS, Thai – ISIS,
  Malaysian – ISIS, SIIA,
  Hernandez (as an individual then construct ISDS)
  Main activities
  - APR (Malaysian ISIS)
  - HRC (ISDS)
  - AYLF (Indonesian CSIS)

PECC Processes

APEC

Katmandu process
Kanagawa Symposium

US
(main partner UC, Berkeley)
‘ASEAN-US Conference’ proposal
‘ASEAN-Institute’

Canada
‘Managing Potential Conflict in South China Sea’

Proposal solution to solve conflicts in Mekong River and South China Sea

Figure 3: regional networking activities and the origin of ASEAN – ISIS
Global and regional environments
- The end of the Cold War
- mushrooming of green peril and human rights
- uniting UNSC against Iraq
- SEANWFZ

From late 1980s to mid 1990s
(Multilateralism was in the air)

The 4th ASEAN Summit accepted
the significance of constructing
Japan-Korea in conference on
a similar topic

ASEAN-PMC
Australian idea

- the 23rd proposed to engage more security issues
- th 24th ' A Time for Institutive'

ASEAN-ISIS

Idea for 'Asia Pacific Community'
Concern for human rights

APE
Malaysian = ISIS
(sponsored by
Rockefeller Fund)
to Cambodian case

Australia
America apply
Europe apply
Europe

Canada
adopts then applies
CSCE
to Asia

Japan
Yukio Satoh, Toro Nakayama proposal
at UNGA for
CBMs in the region

ASEAN Community
ASEAN-10

Figure 4.1: The initial networks proposing and accepting the emergence of ASEAN Regional
Figure 4.2: The inception of a Council for security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Extended networks from Figure 4.1 and the re-emergence of regional community building
From early to the first half of the 1990s

Global and regional environments
- human rights problems
- arms accumulation
- N. Korea’s nuclear problem
- China/Taiwan
- South China Sea

Figure 5: The construction of an Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM, and a Committee for Asia-Europe Co-operation (CAEC), non-governmental networking agents and their issues of concerns
Figure 6: The inception of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and regional activities (from both track I and track II) including ideas to construct regional communities.
Figure 7: networking activities from non/governmental agents and main content from the activities

From the late 1990s to the early period of the 21st
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