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Models of corruption

Amar, Amshika (2012)
M.Phil. thesis, University of Birmingham.

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Abstract

In this thesis we formulate two theoretical models of corruption making two contributions to Economic literature. First, we formulate a model where economic agents (who would want to work in the bureaucracy), heterogeneous in their public sector motivation i.e. some of them would like to work in the bureaucracy who are the motivated agents while others would not like to work in the bureaucracy. Second we formulate a model with two competing governments where honesty is modelled as a function of bureaucratic wage rate which affects the firm's investment decision to invest in a given bureaucracy of a government. The firm has a choice of investing in either of the two bureaucracies dependent on its proximity to the bureaucracy. Both the above models are based on aspects that are not previously covered in literature. In Chapter 1 we review relevant literature on corruption and the various popular and well-cited models of corruption. We then turn to psychological and organization literature to study motivation and then to studies of competition between governments and its efforts to attract FDI. In Chapter 2 we set up the economic model with motivation and in Chapter 3 we set up the model with competing governments and the efforts to attract FDI.

Type of Work:M.Phil. thesis.
Supervisor(s):Greenwood, Richard and Albornoz-Crespo, Facundo
School/Faculty:Colleges (2008 onwards) > College of Social Sciences
Department:Birmingham Business School
Subjects:HB Economic Theory
HG Finance
HJ Public Finance
Institution:University of Birmingham
ID Code:3281
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.
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