YOUTH, CITIZENSHIP AND THE PRODUCTION OF ‘DANGEROUS COMMUNITIES’: REPRESENTATIONS OF YOUNG MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY

by

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This dissertation explores representations of young Muslims in Britain and Germany. The relatively recent focus on Islam in Western politics is contextualised within wider discursive shifts that frame ethnic minorities increasingly in terms of culture and faith, rather than race and ethnicity. Two case studies are explored – the Rushdie Affair and the Rüti Affair – to demonstrate the ways in which Muslims are ‘othered’ and constructed as ‘dangerous’ by non-Muslims. Media and political debates around these affairs are explored through the use of selected documents and discourse analysis. This highlights similarities in the ways Muslims are conceptualised in both countries as well as historic continuities. Representations of Muslims carry connotations of a Clash of Civilizations; an idea that has gained particular momentum following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Portrayals of Islam as archaic and anti-Western position it as a possible threat to nation, state and society. Gendered accounts render young males deviant and aggressive, while women are conceived as passive or oppressed. The discourses examined reveal concerns about Muslims as segregated and not ‘integrated’. Underlying notions of assimilation place particular demands on them to demonstrate compliance with apparent national cultures and values.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Researching representations of youth, culture and identity is important for understanding the educational experiences of young people: The ways youth are commonly talked about impact on their social location, how they make sense of themselves and relate to society. This dissertation therefore explores representations of young Muslims in Britain and Germany.

Islam, and Muslim youth in particular, have received much political, public and media attention in European and other Western countries over the last decade. Often represented as problematic by non-Muslims, Islam has been juxtaposed to Western values and lifestyles, as well as seen to symbolise a threat to national security (Abbas, 2005; Allen, 2005, 2010; Ansari, 2006; Brighton, 2007; Gerlach, 2006; Malik, 2009a; Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). This trend is frequently associated with the 2001 terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’ in the United States, the ‘7/7’ London bombings in 2005 and the attempted attacks on German trains in the same year. However, portrayals of Muslim communities as ‘dangerous’ predate these events. Moreover, it might form part of wider historical developments in the ways ethnic minorities are predominantly perceived, talked and written about by the white majority: In recent decades, discursive shifts have conceptualised ethnic minority communities in terms of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’ and most recently ‘faith’ (Allen, 2005, 2010; Pilkington, 2003).

Two case studies are used to explore how Muslim youth are represented and constructed as dangerous: The Rushdie Affair surrounding the publication of The
Satanic Verses in 1988 has been chosen for Britain, whereas the 2006 controversy over the Rüti-School, that is what I term the Rüti Affair, is investigated for Germany. Documentary and discourse analysis of political and media responses to these affairs has been employed. This is intended as means for anchoring discursive shifts at concrete points in history, thus allowing an analysis of key moments in the changing ways ethnic minorities are represented by the white majority population.

Conducting research on race and invoking the category of ‘Muslim youth’ runs the risk of falling into the same discursive confines – stereotyping, moral panics and crude cultural explanations – that I aim to deconstruct (cf. Bulmer and Solomos, 2004; Gunaratnam, 2003). It is therefore important to recognise that ‘Muslim youth’ do not present a homogenous group. The representations currently employed by politicians, journalists, educators and academics tend to conflate disparate ethnic and cultural groups while clouding differences of class, gender and ideology. However, ‘Muslim youth’ do exist as a representational category and thus this notion needs to be interrogated and negotiated if we are to gain insights into the experiences of young people who are living through times of social tension and moral panic around Islam (cf. Cohen, 2002).

The aim of this research is:

- To show how Muslim communities and youth in particular are represented as ‘dangerous others’ in British and German political and media discourses.
Research questions include:

- How are Muslim communities talked and written about by non-Muslims in British and German settings?
- What assumptions and associations are being made between youth, identity and citizenship?
- How are notions of culture, ethnicity and faith drawn on by commentators to describe and ‘explain’ behaviour and attitudes among Muslim communities?

Chapter 2 features a selective literature review in order to provide some historical and social context for understanding discourses of race, identity and citizenship in both Britain and Germany. The third chapter details methodology and methods employed. Then, the Rushdie Affair is analysed in chapter 4, while the fifth chapter investigates the Rütli Affair. Finally, the case studies are discussed and summarised in the concluding chapter.
IMMIGRATION AND POLICY RESPONSES IN POST-1945 BRITAIN AND GERMANY

Due to labour shortages following the Second World War both Britain and Germany, among other European countries, advertised for foreign labour. The resulting mass immigration meant a rapid and steady increase in minority ethnic populations, which was also driven by family reunification and natural population growth. In the aftermath of the Second World War, migrants came mainly from Europe in response to Britain’s need for labour. The British Nationality Act (1948) incentivised immigration from the Caribbean and South Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, as it gave British and Commonwealth citizenship to the UK’s former ‘subjects’ (Gogolin, 2005; Joppke, 1999a; Pilkington, 2003; Tomlinson, 2008). Until the late 1950s, there were no systematic policy responses towards the influx of immigrant workers and their families, and it was widely assumed by both migrants and the ‘host society’ that the newcomers’ stay would be temporary (Grosvenor, 1997).

In 1960s Britain, settlement was beginning to be acknowledged and policies emerged, focusing mainly on ‘assimilation’ to minimise alleged cultural difference and social problems attributed to ethnic minorities. They were often regarded as culturally, socially and cognitively inferior by the white population, which resulted in severe educational disadvantages, sometimes including dispersal practices of ‘bussing’ pupils to areas with less ethnic minority children (Grosvenor, 1997; Mirza, 2005; Race, 2011; Tomlinson, 2008). Speaking English as second language or non-standard English was regarded as an educational problem. Especially black parents began reacting to this with activism against bussing and banding, and the setting up
of Supplementary Schools (Grosvenor, 1997; Mirza, 2005; Simon, 2007; Tomlinson, 2008). While the first two Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968) attempted to encounter racial discrimination, Enoch Powell’s (1968) ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech highlights the widespread resentment towards black communities at the time. Furthermore, immigration began to be restricted through the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962).

West Germany also recruited workers on a large scale from the mid-1950s onwards. These Gastarbeiter (guestworkers) emigrated from Turkey, Southern Europe and North Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, and here too their stay was assumed to be temporary (Ackermann, 2005; Bade, 2003; Geisen, 2010; Hunn, 2004; Joppke, 1999a; Luft, 2007; Meier-Braun, 2002; Miller-Idriss, 2009). Because of this, social policies such as assimilation were not seen as necessary (Castles and Miller, 1993; Gogolin, 2006). With the economic recession of the 1970s, many of the manual positions filled by the migrants disappeared and the government reacted by issuing a recruitment stop in 1973 (Bade, 2003). By then, however, many Gastarbeiter, especially Turks, had begun to settle: Wives and children had joined them while more children were being born in Germany (Bade, 1994, 2003; Castles and Miller, 1993; Geisen, 2010). Rather than promoting integration or providing training initiatives to respond to the changing labour market, policies focused on incentivising immigrants’ return to their countries of origin (Bade, 2003; Hunn, 2004).

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1 East Germany will not be explored within the confines of this dissertation, as it had relatively little immigration (190,000 in 1989, mainly from Vietnam, Angola and Mozambique), and because the ethnic minority communities that are under scrutiny today have originally settled in former West Germany (Gogolin, 2005). Therefore, Germany should be read as synonymous for West Germany for the purposes of this text. Refugees from East Germany are ignored here, as are the considerable numbers of ‘ethnic German’ migrants who were expelled from the former Reich (Heimatvertriebene) or who have historically been settled in Eastern Europe ((Spät)aussiedler) – all of whom have privileged legal statuses to ‘non-German’ immigrants.
The 1970s in Britain are said by academics to be broadly associated with ‘integration’ models (Brighton, 2007; Grosvenor, 1997; Tomlinson, 2008). In 1966, the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins defined integration as: “not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity and cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Meer and Modood, 2008:7). The institutional racism evident not only in schools but in employment, the justice system and police, affected mainly young black males and led to increased anti-racist activism (Solomos, 2003; Tomlinson, 2008). In his 1971 seminal work *How the West Indian Child is Made Educationally Subnormal*, Bernard Coard (2007) argued that a ‘white oppressive education system’ constructed large numbers of black pupils as ‘educationally subnormal’ (Mirza, 2005; Richardson, 2007). This pivotal analysis identified structural racism as the key factor in black pupils’ educational experiences and challenged the cultural deficit model that sought to ‘explain’ poor performance. Subsequently, ‘underachievement’ became the framework used by educational researchers to describe a cycle of low teacher expectation, pupils’ alienation and poor educational outcomes (Mirza, 2005; Tomlinson, 2008). A third Race Relations Act (1976) aimed to aid integration to the labour market and society by promoting equality of access and opportunity, establishing the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) (Pilkington, 2003; Meer and Modood, 2008).

Historical accounts of 1980s Britain suggest that policy debates evolved from a focus on integration towards ‘multiculturalism’, which stressed Britain’s multiethnic society as cultural enrichment, at least on a rhetorical level (Ladson-Billings and Gillborn,
Due to the emphasis on positive representations of ‘diversity’ in schools and elsewhere, Troyna (1992) referred to it as the three Ss: ‘samosas, saris and steelbands’ model of multiculturalism (Mirza, 2005). The Scarman Report, following the 1981 Brixton riots, criticised discriminatory police actions, again highlighting institutional racism (Mirza, 2005; Solomos, 2003). The Rampton Report (1981) and Swann Report (1985) advocated multicultural education and for the first time linked underachievement to issues of race and class (Meer and Modood, 2008; Mirza, 2005). This signifies a move away from attributing educational problems to children and their families’ cultures towards questioning the education system itself (Race, 2011). Municipal multicultural and anti-racist education policies were implemented in many urban areas (notably by the Inner London Education Authority), while the activism of black parents and educators continued (Ladson-Billings and Gillborn, 2004; Mirza, 2005; Tomlinson, 2008). Whereas anti-racists tend to emphasise institutional racism, multicultural education has been criticised for lacking such political elements (Malik, 2009b; Mirza, 2005; Race, 2011; Sivanandan, 2008). This ‘softer’ state multiculturalism, focusing on representations of diversity, became seemingly more salient from the mid-1980s.

In Germany, the children of Gastarbeiter were initially conceptualised in terms of nationality, but when their citizenship status no longer excluded them from compulsory schooling regulations in the late 1960s, they came to be defined in terms of linguistic and cultural differences (Flam, 2007; Geisen and Riegel, 2009). During the 1970s and 1980s, white educators’ and academics’ deficit view became particularly salient (Diamant, 1972; Flam, 2007; Geisen, 2010). Ethnic minority youth were thought to suffer from conflicts between the cultures and values of ‘home’ and
‘host country’; impacting negatively on their psyche and identity formation (Ackermann, 2005; Diamant, 1972; Flam, 2007; Geisen, 2010; Geisen and Riegel, 2009; Öztürk, 2007). Families were seen as unable to facilitate socialisation and compensate for ostensible social shortfalls of young people (Geisen, 2010). Turkish culture, which was the main focus of concern, was portrayed as backward and patriarchal compared to an apparently modern Western culture (Castles and Miller, 1993; Geisen, 2010). The resulting educational disadvantage further exacerbated labour market discrimination – both of which persist to this day (Castles and Miller, 1993; Flam, 2007; Luft, 2007).

When large numbers of ethnic minorities had entered the German school system by the 1970s, educational responses centred on preparation for their assumed return in partially separate classes, as well as on temporary integration and assimilation (Castles and Miller, 1993; Cohen, 2009; Diamant, 1972; Flam, 2007; Geisen, 2010; Geisen and Riegel, 2009; Luft, 2007). This Ausländerpädagogik (foreigner pedagogy) of the 1960s and 1970s was challenged in the early 1980s as intercultural education emerged, which replaced ideas of deficit with those of cultural difference (Flam, 2007; Geisen, 2010). It was itself criticised when antiracist educators emphasised ethnic minority youth’s agency as well as structural inequalities in the 1990s (Flam, 2007; Geisen, 2010) – noticeably later than in Britain.

From the mid-1980s, an emergence of multicultural ideas in Germany meant positive aspects of difference were emphasised, with diversity in language and culture conceived as enrichment and an asset to society (Geisen, 2010). Multiculturalism was regarded as a way of promoting cohesion among social groups (Ackermann,
2005), with a seemingly similar interpretation to the British three Ss model. Nevertheless, it did not dominate policy discourses to the extent it did in Britain, where ‘state multiculturalism’ was adopted, but presented a more contested ideology: While promoted by leftwing politicians, conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) continued to cling to the “myth of temporary residence”, whereas others advocated assimilation or integration (Castles and Miller, 1993; Cohen, 2009; Joppke, 2004; Schmitt, 2010; cf. Schiffauer, 2008).

It is frequently argued that policy approaches and social attitudes in Germany are marked by an ethno-national concept of the state, and an understanding of citizenship and nationality based on race and biology (Castles and Miller, 1993; Cohen, 2009; Gogolin, 2005; Luft, 2007; Pilkington, 2003). This suggests that ‘Britishness’ may constitute a more accessible identity for ethnic minorities. Restrictive citizenship and immigration policies, in particular, have and continue to exclude ethnic minorities from state and nation (Castles and Miller, 1993; Hunn, 2004; Schmitt, 2010):

“Germany’s citizenship laws have thus sought to deny migrants full political rights in the host society and consequently have undermined the development of multiculturalism and integrationist policies in the country.”

Cohen (2009:273)

Miller-Idriss (2009), however, contests this view, arguing that (white) youth in contemporary Germany challenge old ideas of nationhood, redefining it in cultural terms, thus modifying the boundaries of nation and belonging.

Correspondingly, ethnic minority communities in Britain and Germany arguably began to be framed in terms of culture and faith, rather than race or ethnicity during
the 1980s and 1990s in Britain and Germany (Allen, 2005, 2010; Pilkington, 2003). Ideas of innate characteristics and biological determinism inherent in notions of race were increasingly challenged in Britain, while the term’s link to Nazi eugenics meant its use in German everyday language was beginning to be displaced by the word culture from the mid-1950s (Pautz, 2005). Years of emphasis on cultural diversity and multiculturalism also contributed to this conceptual shift. Despite changing terminology, differences are still seemingly racialised within these concepts, even when framed positively (Baumann, 1998, cited in Ackermann, 2005; Geisen, 2010; Mirza, 2005): “It is the connotation, not the denotation of race, which is significant in the shift towards culture.” (Pautz, 2005:46, my translation). While culture might constitute a subtler way of essentialising people, it remains a means of explaining people’s attitudes and behaviours through ideas of fundamental difference – albeit seemingly linked to nurture rather than nature. Gilroy (1993, 2004) has pertinently argued that ‘race’ and ‘culture’ may be two sides of racialisation’s coin: He contends that prior to the emergence of biological notions of race in the 19th century, race was often perceived in terms of culture. Current concerns with culture and faith may therefore be less a movement onwards than a delving back into the murky relationships of race. Speaking of Britain’s increasing emphasis on culture, citizenship and identity, Gilroy (1993:23) writes:

“One of the ways in which this form or variety of racism is specific is that it frequently operates without any reference to either “race” itself or to biological notions of difference [...] Before the rise of modern scientific racism [...] the term “race” did duty for the term “culture”. No surprise then, that in its post-war retreat from fascism the term has once again acquired an explicitly cultural rather than a biological inflection.”
Especially over the last decade, conceptions of ethnic minorities evolved towards faith as a main signifier; and Islam in particular is now a predominant way white people talk and think about ethnic minorities: Arguably there is a sense in which Pakistanis in Britain and Turks in Germany, for example, have ‘become’ Muslims in the eyes of the majority population, and perhaps in those communities’ own self-perceptions too (Abbas, 2005; Allen, 2005, 2007; Hunn, 2004; Kundnani, 2007; Pilkington, 2003; Tiesler, 2007). Nevertheless, concepts of race, ethnicity, culture and faith are intertwined rather than distinct. Importantly, they all function as markers of difference and signal who may or may not be included in notions of nation and society, while the power to define rests with the white majority.

Despite a general shift from assimilation to integration and multiculturalism in British and German policy discourses over recent decades, this development might be partly rhetorical rather than rooted in changing attitudes: The onus remains on ethnic minorities to adapt and fit in, while ideas of cultural deficit persist (Gogolin, 2005; Grosvenor, 1997; Mirza, 2005; Nowak, 2006; Pilkington, 2003; Tomlinson, 2008). Nieke (2007) maintains that this is part of a global trend of neo-assimilation discourses since 2001, where integration, acculturation into mainstream society and core values are emphasised. There is evidence that assimilation discourses are particularly marked in Germany, where policy rationales focus on national security and the prevention of threats to public order – therefore emphasising the control of immigration and settlement: While demanding immigrants’ willingness to adapt, integration initiatives are framed as obligations where the state may sanction lack of compliance and end people’s stay (Gogolin, 2005; cf. Geisen, 2010).
DISCOURSES OF FAILED MULTICULTURALISM AND SEGREGATION

In Britain, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and the resulting MacPherson Report (1999) highlighted institutional racism in the police force and argued that the recommendations of the Scarman Report (1981) had not been adequately implemented (Race, 2011). The MacPherson Report gave rise to a fourth Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000), which constitutes a significant piece of anti-racist policy. It too recognised the structural processes of institutional racism and obliges all public organisations, including schools, to have an anti-racism policy (Gillborn, 2008; Race, 2011). However, only a year later the Cantle Report (2001) instead frames ethnic minorities in terms of their deficits, focusing on segregation and apparent problems within communities (Tomlinson, 2008). It arose out of the disturbances in the towns of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in 2001. Supposed problems with community cohesion also resulted in the establishment of Citizenship as a mandatory subject in secondary schools (Race, 2011). The 2000s further present aims to monitor and promote equality in education, including strategies to improve the attainment of underachieving groups such as Pakistanis (Gogolin, 2005; Mirza, 2005).

During the era of ‘New Labour’ in Britain (1997–2010), critiques of state multiculturalism increased, now both from the political left and right (Malek, 2006; Meer and Modood, 2008; Solomos, 2003). At the beginning of the 21st century, widespread debates within politics and the media have declared multiculturalism as failed or dead (Abbas, 2005; Brighton, 2007; Gilroy, 2004; Goodhart, 2004; Joppke, 2004; Kundnani, 2007; Meer and Modood, 2008; Mirza, 2000; Tomlinson, 2008). Such discourses reflect and are exacerbated by various seemingly conflicting
definitions of multiculturalism (Meer and Modood, 2008; cf. Ladson-Billings and Gillborn, 2004; Race, 2011). The decline of multiculturalism was fuelled by a new political agenda focusing on social or community cohesion, active citizenship and Britishness (Brighton, 2007; Meer and Modood, 2008; Tomlinson, 2008). Concerns about segregation of ethnic minorities were reflected in attempts to amalgamate diversity within a British meta-identity, emphasising shared values, civic engagement and Third Way ideas of rights and responsibilities (Burnett, 2004; Solomos, 2003; Tomlinson, 2008). The head of the CRE, Trevor Phillips, warned shortly after the 2005 London bombings that Britain was “sleepwalking into segregation” and pronounced multiculturalism dead (Meer and Modood, 2008; Mirza, 2005; Race, 2011). Nevertheless, New Labour also continued to promote diversity, but interestingly while stressing its economic potential (Fairclough, 2000; Meer and Modood, 2008). Post-New Labour (from 2010), segregation discourses continue and most recently (February 2011) Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron (2011) prominently declared that state multiculturalism has failed– notably at a conference on security and Islamist terrorism in Munich (cf. Collins, 2011).

In Germany, political and policy developments in the 2000s saw the emergence of a coherent integration policy, together with changes in immigration (2005) and citizenship law (2005) (Gogolin, 2005; Miller-Idriss, 2009). Naturalisation of ‘settled’ ethnic minorities was made easier; partly redressing the jus sanguinis based citizenship policy. It is particularly significant given that Germany never developed an overarching policy framework addressing immigration and integration (Gogolin, 2005). This is rooted in politicians’ continued denial that Germany presents ‘a country of immigration’ (Einzwanderungsland), meaning the settlement of ethnic
minorities has arguably at best been tolerated by the white majority (Ackermann, 2005; Bade, 2003; Gogolin, 2005; Joppke, 1999a; Miller-Idriss, 2009; Nick, 2005). While it has started to become publicly recognised by leftwing politicians since the 1990s, the notion of Germany as a country of immigration has been strongly rejected by some conservatives until today (Ackermann, 2005; Bade, 1994; Hunn, 2004; Luft, 2007; Meier-Braun, 2002; Miller-Idriss, 2009; Nowak, 2006; Schiffauer, 2008). This starkly contrasts with Britain, which developed policies around race relations and equality from the 1960s onwards (Gogolin, 2005). Whereas Britain has a long history of legislating and monitoring around race, Germany has only recently begun to do so – although centred on nationality rather than ethnicity (Geisen, 2010; Woellert et al., 2009). Immigration and its social consequences have, however, been managed pragmatically on a municipal level despite a lack of national policy (Bade, 2003).

German political discourses of the 2000s bear an intriguing resemblance to British ones: Segregation concerns are expressed in ideas of ‘parallel societies’, echoing Cantle’s terminology of ‘parallel lives’. Ethnic minorities are said to be unable or unwilling to integrate, instead choosing to segregate themselves (Bukow et al., 2007; Fisch, 2007; Flam, 2007; Geisen and Riegel, 2009; Köster, 2009; Nick, 2005; Nowak, 2006; Pautz, 2005; Schiffauer, 2008). Problems are attributed exclusively to ethnic minorities in cultural and deficit explanations. The current preoccupations with segregation in Britain and Germany are not a new phenomenon, however, but can be traced back to the 1960s (Bade, 2003; Castles and Miller, 1993; Race, 2011).
Similarly to debates around Britishness, discourses of a German *Leitkultur* (dominant culture) emerged from 2000 (but were superseded a few years later)\(^2\). It too was conceived as a homogenous national culture and apparently unique but actually largely unspecified values that ethnic minorities should subscribe to in order to overcome segregation in parallel societies (Joppke, 2004, 2008; Nowak, 2006; Pautz, 2005; Schiffauer, 2008; cf. Lammert, 2006). The *Leitkultur* discourse presents a reimagining of German nationhood involving hegemony and New Racism (Nowak, 2006; cf. Allen, 2005, 2010; CCCS., 1982; Gilroy, 2002):

“The *Leitkultur* debate was a racist exclusionary debate, which did not operate through a biological notion of race, but used an equally functioning concept of culture.”

Pautz (2005:10, my translation)

Just like in Britain, alleged segregation was blamed on multiculturalism: “With the talk of the emergence of parallel societies it is attempted to express the failure of the conception of the multicultural society.” (Nick, 2005:249, my translation; cf. Pautz, 2005). Its demise was declared by politicians including Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) in October 2010 (Luft, 2007; Nowak, 2006; Pautz, 2005).

**REPRESENTATIONS OF ISLAM**

Segregation debates in British and German politics and media during the 2000s have focused largely on Muslims and Muslim youth in particular (Abbas, 2005; Bukow et al., 2007; Fisch, 2007; Flam, 2007; Gerlach, 2006; Köster, 2009; Nowak, 2006; Schiffauer, 2008; cf. Lammert, 2006).

\(^2\) The concept *Leitkultur* is based on Bassam Tibi’s work (who used it in a European context), but has subsequently been appropriated in a somewhat different and specifically German context in public, political and media discourses (Nowak, 2006; Pautz, 2005).
2006; Nick, 2005; Öztürk, 2007; Pautz, 2005; Schiffauer, 2006; Tomlinson, 2008). Contemporary notions of Islam are associated with the paradigm of a *Clash of Civilizations* developed by Huntington (2002) during the 1990s, which has gained particular momentum following 9/11 (Allen, 2010; Carens and Williams, 1998; Geisen and Riegel, 2009; Gilroy, 2004; Pautz, 2005). His hypothesis suggests that cultural identity (which is imagined as homogenous and distinct), rather than ideology, will be the main source of post-Cold War conflict (Allen, 2010; Gilroy, 2004; Pautz, 2005). Non-Western cultures are depicted as fundamentally different, so that migratory processes pose threats. This is embodied by Islam, which is constructed as diametrically opposed to the West (Pautz, 2005). Huntington's ideas are used in political discourses to legitimise Western dominance, and are thus less about cultural difference than about power struggles (Gerlach, 2006; Malik, 2009a; Pautz, 2005). Muslims today are represented as homogenous and ‘dangerous’, with Islam as a “neo-oriental and despotic monolith” (Pautz, 2005). Contrasted with apparently Western notions of enlightenment, modernism, civility, liberalism and democracy, Islam is depicted as archaic and patriarchal as well as associated with violent extremism (Abbas, 2005; Allen, 2005, 2010; Bielefelft, 2008; Brighton, 2007; Bukow et al., 2007; Elgamri, 2005; Gerlach, 2006; Hafez and Richter, 2007; Köster, 2009; Kundnani, 2007; Pautz, 2005; Pilkington, 2003; Rommelspacher, 2007; Schiffauer, 2008; Tomlinson, 2008; Von Wensierski and Lübcke, 2007). Gendered accounts, such as those around forced marriages, ‘honour killlings’, the hijab and niqab (cf. Joppke, 2009), portray males as chauvinist and uneducated, while women are constructed as passive or oppressed victims. In Germany, discourses of ‘islamisation’ and *Übertremdung* (over-foreignisation), construct Muslims as a threat to Western values (Bielefelft, 2008; Gerlach, 2006; Hunn, 2004; Nowak, 2006;
Öztürk, 2007; Pautz, 2005). While ideas of fundamentalism, problematisations of Muslims and the phenomenon of Islamophobia have become particularly salient post-9/11, they have been manifested since the 1980s, however (Allen, 2005, 2010; Carens and Williams, 1998; Castles and Miller, 1993; Elgamri, 2005; Malik, 2009a; Öztürk, 2007; Tiesler, 2007; cf. Runnymede Trust, 1997).
METHODOLOGY

A comparative approach has been employed in this research because contrasting different countries situates phenomena in a meaningful context; revealing parallels and distinctiveness in conceptualisations of ethnic minorities and processes of racialisation. Comparative designs also provide a critical lens that highlights and questions aspects which may otherwise remain unacknowledged or accepted as given (May, 2001).

The focus is on Europe because such research is particularly relevant at a time when ideas of the apparent decline of the nation-state as well as notions of a common European identity and citizenship gain significance. European economic and political integration beyond national boundaries, together with globalisation and social changes following post-1945 mass immigration, are increasingly challenging notions of fixed collective identities based on constructions of shared history, territory and ethnicity: Instead, postmodern ideas and Cultural Studies (under the influence of Hall and Gilroy) redefine identities as multiple, fluid and socially constructed, while thinking of culture as pervasive in all aspects of life and involving power relations (Ackermann, 2005; Cox, 2009; Geisen, 2010; Hall, 1990; Nick, 2005).

Germany and Britain were chosen as I have links to both countries, having been born in Germany and living in Britain since 2002. Beyond this, the two countries offer an intriguing comparison because although both witnessed mass immigration and the emergence of ethnic minority communities post-1945, they responded differently.
regarding their social and educational policies. Furthermore, both countries offer unique histories, with Britain being significantly shaped by its former Empire and Germany by its role in the Second World War.

In addition to a comparative element, this research also incorporates a historical perspective as an understanding of the past, while worthwhile and interesting in its own right, helps contextualise the present. Comprehending how ideas around race evolved over recent decades enables effective analysis of the ways ethnic minority communities are perceived and represented today. Documentary research presents a useful means of investigating cultural histories of race, nationality and identity. As cultural artefacts, documents reproduce power relationships, views and attitudes, but also construct social reality, making them ideally suited to exploring representations of culture and ethnicity (May, 2001).

This research concentrates on exploring discursive shifts: that is, points in time when paradigmatic changes occurred in the dominant ways ethnic minorities are thought and talked about in news media, political and policy debates. To investigate these shifts, the concept of ‘policy moments’ is used: These are historical moments, such as political events, debates or documents that reflect these evolving discourses, capturing key points within this change (Neal, 2003). Policy moments include legislation, government and think-tank reports, speeches, media coverage as well as academic texts. They are regarded as historical artefacts and cultural representations, and analysed accordingly. The focus is therefore not on the content of a document per se, but on the ideas it invokes and the discursive shifts it
represents (Neal, 2003). This Cultural Studies based approach combines aspects of sociology, history and discourse analysis.

By situating discourses within policy moments, abstract constructs are made tangible and researchable. When researching ideas of nation and national identity “we need to explore concrete sets of historical relations and processes in which these ideologies become meaningful” (Nazir, 1986, cited in Cox, 2009:55). Narratives of nationality and identity can be manifested in immigration policies (Cox, 2009): German immigration policies highlight that while immigrants were desired, at least as labourers, during the 1950s and 1960s, the recruitment stop of 1973 signals the end of their welcome status (Gogolin, 2005).

Following an initial review of the literature, one policy moment for each country was identified as a case study, that is the Rushdie Affair in Britain and the Rütli Affair in Germany. They have been selected to illuminate developments in the ways Muslims in Europe are represented – emphasising the shift away from race towards faith as a marker of difference, as well as ideas of Islam as a threat to nation, state and society. In this respect, the literature review was instrumental in the data collection stage as it highlighted which texts, events and discourses are of key importance.

METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

For the Rushdie Affair, an open letter from Minister of State John Patten to leading Muslims has been selected to represent political responses. More weight, however, has been placed on analysing media coverage, both for the Rushdie and Rütli Affair.
Articles were chosen from compilations for the Rushdie Affair: One collection was published by the Birmingham *Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* in their journal ‘Muslims in Europe’ (Nielson, 1989). A more detailed selection of press coverage is found in *The Rushdie File* (Appignanesi and Maitland, 1990). This approach was largely dictated by practical considerations as news archives are not as easily accessible for this period. It is noted, however, that this may constitute a limitation because the act of pre-selecting articles involves analysis and interpretation which might introduce bias.

The Rütli Affair was selected as a case study as it was a salient moment in the changing ways Germany’s Turkish and Arab communities have been understood. Its direct relevance to young people and education makes it well suited for this study. Media analysis is particularly appropriate given that the response to the affair was largely driven by the media. Three print news media were selected for analysis of both press and political responses. They were chosen to reflect the breadth of the political spectrum, target audiences and types of publication, while featuring large circulation, thus presumably representing and shaping public opinion. The conservative *Bild* tabloid newspaper has been selected as it is frequently cited by other media and regarded as an opinion leader due to its substantial circulation and impact. It targets a working class readership and is seen as controversial due to sensationalist reporting. As current affairs magazines offer more opinion and editorial pieces than daily newspapers, the weekly and highly regarded left-liberal *Der Spiegel* has been chosen for its appeal to a wide but professional audience. As this study is interested in the national response to an apparently local event, regional newspapers have not been included. Of the national daily newspapers the
conservative-liberal *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) has been selected. While online content (*Spiegel Online* and *FAZ.NET*) was ignored, the weekend editions of *FAZ* and *Bild* were included as they (while editorially distinct) often demonstrate the papers’ political stance more directly, such as in commentaries. A limitation of *Bild* is that it is not always clear whether articles available through their online archive constitute print or online-only content.

Articles were located by searching for ‘Rütli’ in the papers’ online archives, and skimming them revealed general themes which were later studied in depth for representations of ethnic minorities (cf. Thomas, 2009). Colour coding aided this process and gave rise to categories and tables to support detailed analysis. Key agents and responses were also identified, which proved useful for accessing political debates – indicating the intersections of media and political discourses. In addition, the letter written by teachers of the Rütli-School which triggered the affair is also examined.

Analysis of texts was based on critical discourse analysis (CDA), which lends itself to this research as representations are at the centre of discourses (Fairclough, 1995; Hall, 1997; Van Dijk, 1991). Discourses can be viewed as dominant ways of talking and thinking that both reflect and affect social process through the dissemination and reproduction of ideas. They can therefore be seen as social practices in themselves which impact on ‘ways of being’ and perceiving the social world. Able to influence public and political opinion, they are said to be particularly powerful when one is not aware of their effect (Nick, 2005). Because CDA recognises that social phenomena cannot be divorced from their historical, cultural and ideological context, it situates
and deconstructs concepts of ethnicity, nation and identity within it. Since discourses are tightly linked to power relationships, it is a particularly relevant framework when exploring race and social justice: CDA can help uncover the historical persistence of racial prejudice, which is a prerequisite for effectively engaging with these discourses and ultimately shape public attitudes (Nick, 2005).

Questions that guided analysis of the two policy moments are:

- When, how and why do texts refer to ethnicity, faith, cohesion and diversity?
- What are the underlying assumptions and meanings in key terminology used?
  Does a difference in wording signify a conceptual difference?
- Are there dissonances or ambiguities within texts and discourses?
- What is presented as obvious fact or common sense, suggesting an implicit consensus that makes definitions or explanations redundant?
INTRODUCTION

The Rushdie Affair refers to the 1988 publication of the novel *The Satanic Verses* by Salman Rushdie, and the international response it provoked. Rushdie, who is of Indian descent and from a Muslim family, moved to Britain in his youth and consequently settled there. His novel *Midnight’s Children* (1981) was particularly well received, winning the prestigious Booker Prize. *The Satanic Verses*, despite literary acclaim, was heavily criticised as blasphemous and defamatory to Muslims (Ahmedi, 1997; Ahsan and Kidwai, 1993; Akhtar, 1989b; Allen, 2010; ISESCO, 1992; Mazrui, 1990; Siddiqui, 1989). Muslim people and organisations protested globally, calling for the book to be banned. Immediate condemnation originated in the so-called ‘Muslim world’ and the book was banned in many countries with large Muslim populations, including India and Pakistan (Ruthven, 1991; Weller, 2009).

On 14 February 1989, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini issued an Islamic ruling or *fatwa* calling for Rushdie and anyone associated with the publication or translation of *The Satanic Verses* to be killed, as a punishment for alleged blasphemy and apostasy. This resulted in a breakdown of already volatile diplomatic relations between Iran and several European countries, including Britain, in March 1989 (Ruthven, 1991; Weller, 2009). Rushdie himself lived in hiding for some years. In countries with large numbers of Muslims there were partly violent protests, and in both ‘Muslim’ and ‘Western’ countries some people involved with the publication and translation of *The Satanic Verses* were attacked, resulting in the death of several people (Allen, 2010; Kuortti, 2007; Ranasinha, 2007; Ruthven, 1991; Weller, 2009). In Britain, there were
demonstrations by Muslims with copies of the book being burned, most notably in Bradford. Accounts of the Rushdie Affair contrast the offence and upset felt by Muslims with the author’s freedom of speech and artistic expression. Supporting Rushdie was frequently regarded as protecting human rights and Western liberal values, while Muslims were said to defend their faith and the prophet Muhammad against libellous insults (Ahmedi, 1997; Ahsan and Kidwai, 1993; Lawton, 1993; Levy, 1993; Ruthven, 1991; Webster, 1990; Weller, 2009).

It should be noted that several high profile Muslim individuals and organisations defended Rushdie, while Christian and Jewish leaders lamenting perceived blasphemy in society sympathised with the hurt and anger felt by Muslims (Appignanesi and Maitland, 1990; cf. Abdallah, Adnan and Adonis et al., 1994). The fatwa in particular was often criticised not only on humanitarian grounds, but as not in accordance with Islamic theology and law. The majority of Muslims in Britain did not support such violent action and protests were largely peaceful. Moreover, Iran’s motives were seemingly based on a political agenda, rather than mere religious sensibilities: The *fatwa* represents an attempt to assert control and dominance both within Iran and in the ‘Muslim world’, in particular against Saudi Arabia (Malik, 2009a; Mazrui, 1990; Siddiqui, 1989; Sullivan, 1989). While this analysis focuses on the immediate response to *The Satanic Verses*, the Rushdie Affair is still invoked more than two decades later; the writer’s knighthood in 2007, for example, resulted in renewed controversy.
On 4 July 1989, the Conservative Minister of State John Patten (1990) wrote an open letter to “influential British Muslims”. It aimed to reach Muslims in Britain by addressing their purported leaders, representatives and spokespersons: The letter ends with an appeal to share its message with “your community”.

Patten clarifies the position of the government, frequently speaking in the first person plural:

“[W]e have no power to intervene with publishers or to have *The Satanic Verses* removed from bookshop shelves. Nor would we seek or want any such power [...] freedom of expression prevails for as long as no law is broken.”

Patten (1990:86)

Patten defends Rushdie’s book on the basis of democratic liberties of freedom of speech as well as “the rule of law”. Nevertheless, he repeatedly expresses empathy for the “upset and hurt” caused by the book.

The main focus of the letter is, however, concerned with the role of Muslims in British society. Patten (1990:84) argues that the Rushdie Affair demands an evaluation of “our objectives and priorities: about what it means to be British, and particularly what it means to be a British Muslim”. His letter stresses the need for British Muslims to participate fully in “our society” and “be part of the mainstream of British life” (1990:84). As this is presented as an aspiration for the future, it implies this is not currently the case. The reason seems to be found in the behaviour of Muslims themselves: “Modern Britain has plenty of room for diversity and variety. But there cannot be room for separation and segregation.” (Patten, 1990:84). Elsewhere,
however, Patten might be seen to concede that the protests of British Muslims against the publication of *The Satanic Verses* can be construed as engagement with their roles as citizens through exercising democratic liberties. He also points out that violent protesters only constitute a minority. The text generally echoes an assumed resistance to integrate, however, rather than considering in how far British Muslims might feel marginalised or excluded.

Patten does, albeit unwittingly, invoke notions of opposition between being Muslim and being British. On the one hand, hybrid identities of ‘British Muslim’ are referred to, and Patten asserts that being part of British society does not mean a diminishing allegiance to their culture or faith: “Putting down new roots in a new community does not mean severing the old.” (1990:85). On the other hand, Patten frequently implies juxtapositions between Muslims and British mainstream society by assuming a fundamentally different “way of life” where life in one’s country of origin is distinct from that in Britain (1990:85). The letter creates an image of seemingly incompatible contradictions between being Muslim and being a law-abiding citizen who knows about British law, history and the democratic system of government. This picture is conveyed through expressions such as: “Of course, British Muslim children should be brought up faithful in the religion of Islam [...]. Nobody could or should suggest otherwise. But [...]” (Patten, 1990:85). Similarly, it is stated: “It is quite natural and reasonable for the parents of an Asian child, born in Britain, to want to bring that child up able to speak their own mother tongue. But [...]”. Patten argues: “No-one would expect or indeed want British Muslims [...] to lay aside their faith, traditions or heritage. But the new roots must be put down and must go deep, too.” (1990:85, original emphasis). The emphasis then, is figuratively and literally speaking on the
‘new roots’ Muslims should be putting down in Britain. Integration is framed as an expectation and even demand, while Muslims that do not speak English or know about its history and culture are portrayed as the norm. The metaphors employed also invoke ideas about the importance of belonging and identity as a foundation for integration. However, the letter also invokes aspirations towards integration which require both immigrants and ‘mainstream society’ to adapt. The text does demonstrate a number of contradictions, though, in the way ethnic minorities are represented: While Muslims are praised for their “respect for the law” one moment, for example, it is also assumed they need to learn about and adhere to British laws. Thus, ambiguous and conflicting images are created.

Looking closely at the language employed can arguably reveal some covert assumptions held by Patten: For example, he talks about children being “born here into ethnic minority communities” as opposed to being born into families or British society. This could be seen to indicate that second and third generation immigrants are foremost defined by their ethnicity and have to come to belong to Britain through active engagement with society and “knowledge of institutions, history and tradition”. Active effort appears to be required, rather than young people acquiring such knowledge by living in Britain. As such demands are not made of the white British population, it is implied that learning these things is a prerequisite for Muslims being included in concepts of nation and society.

The text tends to portray Muslims as communities rather than individuals, who are assumed to have “leaders and spokesmen”, and are thus arguably homogenous enough to be represented by one person, or possibly even unable to speak for
themselves. The letter seems to conceive faith as a sub-set of ethnicity, suggesting they are somewhat interchangeable concepts. Expressions such as “Muslim and other ethnic minority groups” and “all ethnic minority groups, including Muslims” point to this.

The letter ends with a vision of “a Britain where Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and others can all work and live together, each retaining proudly their own faith and identity, but each sharing in common the bond of being by birth or choice British.” (Patten, 1990:87). Patten also relates the “laws and standards we share”, with strong parallels to the cohesion discourses of the 2000s: There is a common concern about segregation, expressed in assertions that ethnic minorities should be familiar with civic duties (“rights and responsibilities”) as well as British history, laws and institutions. Patten’s letter invokes ideas of an overarching British identity and shared values to foster cohesion, very similar to those later recounted by New Labour’s Gordon Brown (2006a, 2006b, 2007) for example. In parallel to contemporary debates, connotations of assimilation are invoked, suggesting that one’s “objectives and priorities” ought to centre around maintaining a Muslim identity merely within a meta-identity of being British (cf. Asad, 1990). As additional demands are being placed on Muslims in order to belong, this suggests a difference in status that does not fully include them in British society. This paradoxically means they are required to ‘integrate’, while also being excluded from full civic participation.
MEDIA COVERAGE AND NOTIONS OF HOMOGENEITY

Western media largely ignored the protests of Muslims about *The Satanic Verses* at first; only in early 1989 after the ‘Bradford book burning’ and Khomeini’s *fatwa* did widespread national coverage and debate emerge (Akhtar, 1989b; Allen, 2010; Appignanesi and Maitland, 1990; Parekh, 1990; Sardar and Davies, 1990). The press has been criticised by some, Muslims and non-Muslims, both at the time and more recently, for fuelling the affair through negative and stereotypical representations of Islam (Ahmedi, 1997; Cottle, 1991; Elgamri, 2005; Parekh, 1990; Sardar and Davies, 1990; Van Dijk, 1991). Nevertheless, reportage is not uniform and beyond the tabloids attempts at dialogue are demonstrated. Articles are written not only by journalists but by scholars and writers too, including ethnic minorities and Muslims. The coverage analysed also comprises of letters by political and religious figures.

Analysing media responses to the Rushdie Affair with a particular focus on Britain poses challenges, as it is often unclear when an article refers to the kind of Islam promoted by sections in Iran for example, or to Muslims in Britain. While trying to uncover these blurred boundaries, it becomes clear that this in itself constitutes a significant means by which Muslims are depicted: That is, as one relatively homogenous group whereby Islam apparently binds them together across geospatial, cultural, linguistic, political and historical divisions. Seemingly, not many non-Muslims are “trying to make a distinction between Iran’s leading crazy person and the other 900 million Moslems” (Leo, 1989:249), the implication being that such differences are negligible or irrelevant. Depictions of Islam in relation to ‘Muslim countries’ are more overtly negative, however, using words such as ‘barbarism’,...
‘medieval’ or even “homicidal dogmatism” (Appignanesi and Maitland, 1990:243). These notions are more veiled when speaking of Muslims in Britain.

Similarly to ideas of homogenous Muslim communities, concepts of ‘one authentic Islam’ are also pervasive and drawn on by both Muslims and non-Muslims. The Rushdie Affair is said to have united various Muslim groups and strengthened fundamentalist influences, aided by the promotion of Islam as a singular ideal (Appignanesi and Maitland, 1990; cf. Cottle, 1991; Malik, 2009a; Parekh, 1990). Endorsed is a “definitive Islamic monolith” which “foster[s] a deliberate archaism [and] putative utopia”, including the “seclusion and subordination of women” who are “relegat[ed] to motherhood” (Al-Azmeh, 1989:213). This mirrors the way Islam is often depicted by non-Muslims. Al-Azmeh (1989:213) alludes to how the Rushdie Affair was utilised to reproduce orthodoxies and serve political agendas:

“Salman Rushdie [...] has become a token by means of which the authors and purveyors of this particular brand of recent Islam can project their demonology, and foist upon the various Muslim communities in this country a uniformity which has no justification in their histories or traditions. Muslims generally, including British Muslims, belong to many nationalities, cultures, classes, and are divided, like everybody else, by different and contradictory ideological and political directions.”

IDEAS OF MODERATE AND FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIMS

Despite assertions of commonality, media reporting around the Rushdie Affair often makes distinctions between ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘moderate’ or ‘ordinary’ Muslims. Moderates living in Britain are described as liberals who “have embraced its values” (Bose, 1989:94) Fundamentalists, in contrast, are “murderous” and “would prefer to
live in an exclusive society, to have their children taught in their own schools, eating their own food, living the lives of an unassimilated, self-protective sect” (Bose, 1989:94). The implication that Muslims may either integrate or preserve their heritage contradicts views of Britain as a “multicultural nation”, meaning to “accept and tolerate a wide variety of people and opinions” (Bose, 1989:94). Speaking of a “Moslem community” or “co-religionists” indicates commonality beyond the moderate/fundamentalist binary, similar to that suggested between Muslims ‘at home and abroad’, whereby notions of religious fanaticism embody the crude forms of prejudice against Islam.

These conceptual divisions are problematic considering that media discourses appear to equate ‘devoutness’ with extremism that does not tolerate dissent. While some scholars claim this to be rooted in a historic lack of theological criticism, reformation, enlightenment and secularism in Muslim countries (Appignanesi and Maitland, 1990:95, 215-6, 220), it is generalised to Muslims being intolerant, as expressed in violence, incivility and barbarism, with their faith and cultures marked by outdated traditions. It may instead be argued that “fanaticism is often merely other folk’s passion” (Akhtar, 1989a:230).

The fundamentalist/moderate dichotomy gives rise to calls for liberal Muslims and their leaders to speak out publically against Khomeini’s fatwa in order to “civilise the more barbarous instincts of their co-religionists” (Bose, 1989:97) and “ensure that their zealots obey the law of the land – not the dictates of a bloodthirsty medieval bigot” (Independent, 1989b:101; cf. Barnett, Blackstone and Bragg, 1989:8). Labour MP Michael Foot (1989:231-2) also argues that Muslims “settled” in Britain “have
every interest and duty to say how strongly and unshakably they oppose the Ayatollah” and Bhikhu Parekh (1989:124), deputy chairman of the CRE, claims they would otherwise “remain open to the legitimate charges of violating the integrity of the British state and failing to live up to their minimal obligations as its citizens”. This places the onus on Muslims themselves to demonstrate that they are subscribing to democratic ideals, thus assuming they may reject ‘Western values’. It also shows how assumptions of homogeneity support notions of leaders who may steer communities, also evident in Patten’s letter (cf. Malik, 2009a; Parekh, 1990). The demands seem paradoxical given the emphasis on religion being resigned to the private realm.

**ISLAM, SOCIETY AND THE LAW**

Such secular perspectives dominate Western media reporting. An article in the *Independent* (1989a:55) commenting on the book burnings in Bradford suggests that offended Muslims should simply not read *The Satanic Verses*, instead of “impos[ing] their feelings [and values] on the rather larger non-Islamic part of the population”. Seemingly a reminder of their status as ‘minorities’, such statements appeal to British Muslims to act accordingly by conforming to the lifestyles of the majority population. Apart from depictions of disorder and non-compliancy, the piece includes positive stereotypes of Muslims as “notably law-abiding” with “strong family [and spiritual] values”. These conflicting portrayals are strikingly similar to those in Patten’s letter; and the apparent need to mention that Muslims are law-abiding implies it is defying expectation.
Consider this extract from the *Sunday Sport* (1989:103):

“\nIn Britain we believe in live and let live. We might not agree with what Rushdie wrote, but we defend his right to say it. Moslems, Hindus, Buddhists and Rastafarians are all welcome to our tolerant society. But there is only one law for all of us. Those who say their deep religious convictions prevent them from obeying the law of this land should quit Britain immediately and go to live in a country where the conflict does not exist.”

Here, the direct contradiction between Islam and Western ideals of law and order are suggested more strongly. Advocacy of assimilation is stressed by emphasising territory: ‘law of the land’ implies that authority is geographically-bound and invokes images of identity based on place, while “obeying” suggests obedience (cf. Independent, 1989b:101). The compliance demanded seems to extend beyond legalities, but relates to wider culture and lifestyle. Muslims are “welcome to our tolerant society” only as long as they adhere to the values and way of life of the majority population. Contrasting the multitude of religions with “one law” implies a reluctant subscription to a multicultural ethos of “live and let live”. In line with several authors who refer to the Voltairean notion of “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”, the article invokes ideas of the Enlightenment, which is frequently juxtaposed to an allegedly outdated Islam.

**NOTIONS OF CONFLICT AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ARCHETYPES**

Many observers conceive the Rushdie Affair as a conflict between Islam and the West, endorsing religious devotion and principles of liberalism respectively. Proponents might be said to pursue their ideologies of “religious passion [and] freedom crusades” with similarly dogmatic vigour (Jakobovits, 1989:21; cf. Bhabha,

“Westerners often portray the Ayatollah as engaging in a holy war against the Western values of toleration and freedom of expression. At the same time, many Muslims view Mr. Rushdie’s book as being in the Western tradition of defamation of Islam and as part of the West’s Crusade against basic Islamic values of community responsibility and obedience to God.”

Voll (1989:253)

“On one side we have fanatical, medieval and intolerant Islam: the whole apparatus of cliché dates back to the Crusades. On the other side, we have the godless, materialist and hypocritical West. Centuries of European condescension mixed with exotic fascination towards Islam were bound to result in a discourse about ‘us’ as unseeing as our Orientalism has been about ‘them’.”

Ignatieff (1989:254)

Other authors point out that the controversy accentuates this ostensibly historic tension by reifying prejudices on both sides. Muslims’ anger is contextualised by feeling that “their religion and culture have been humiliated in the West for too long” (Teheri, 1989:90). They may have “reason to think the Crusades are not over yet [and] one wonders whether or not there is some truth in the old Muslim accusation that there is still a Western conspiracy [...] against Islam” (Akhtar, 1989:230). This sense of prosecution is said to originate in hundreds of years of negative and offensive representations of Islam in the West (Sullivan, 1989:234-5). Bernard Lewis concludes that “the growing tendency of the non-Muslim world to perceive and portray the Muslim as a tyrant at home, a terrorist abroad and a bigot in both [...] is a major tragedy of our time” (Sullivan, 1989:236). The strong reaction of some Muslims towards The Satanic Verses in turn “may confirm among some a reactionary prejudice that Moslems, and by extension other, non-white, non-Christian people,
are prone to be barbarous and brutal, delighting in inflicting medieval punishments on those they consider their enemies” (Bose, 1989:94). It is “reminding Britons of the intolerant face which Islam has all too often shown abroad” (Independent, 1989:56) or as Edward Said puts it: “Islam is reduced to terrorism and fundamentalism and now, alas, is seen to be acting accordingly, in the ghastly violence prescribed by Ayatollah Khomeini.” (Appignanesi and Maitland, 1990:165). Rushdie himself reflects: “The zealot protests serve to confirm, in the Western mind, all the worst stereotypes of the Muslim world.” (Sunday Times, 1989:3).

CRITIQUE OF THE MEDIA

Some newspaper articles challenge negative representations of Muslims evident in reporting on the Rushdie Affair. It is satirised as suggesting: “No complexities, please. We are busy shaking our fists at the Ayatollah.”, thus resembling “war-fever journalism, which is usually accompanied by sloganeering and a hardening of stereotypes” (Leo, 1989:249). It is recognised that “Muslims are offended by the Western media’s frequent association of Islam with violence, intolerance, and backwardness.” (Sullivan, 1989:325). Akhtar (1989a:228) laments the “prevalent image of Islam as an anti-intellectual creed” and observes: “Most journalists visiting a remote northern city called Bradford were visibly surprised to meet devout Muhammadan chaps who spoke English and even read books now and again.” Parekh (1989) supports this view: “Thus they are infantilised, ridiculed as illiterate peasants preferring the sleep of superstition to liberal light, and placed outside civilised discourse.” Another author (Allemang, 1989:216) also caricatures reporting on the affair:
“And if you Moslems are still going to get worked up over a few pages of prize-winning prose, at least behave like gentlemen. "Those offended have every right to denounce and picket, but not to threaten and intimidate,‖ pronounced an editorial writer in The New York Times. But this definition of the right to protest is just one more way in which Westerners would impose their values on the Islamic world."

While raising an interesting point, such cultural relativity views might reinforce ideas of Muslims and non-Muslims being distinguished by essentially different cultures. When Allemang goes on to explain: “But the Islamic world does not work in the same way.‖, ideas of profound difference and otherness are reiterated by creating an image of distinct spheres of influence and ways of being.
CHAPTER 5: THE RÜTLI AFFAIR

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses what I refer to as the Rütli Affair, which was at the centre of intense media, political and public debate in Germany during 2006 (Geisen and Riegel, 2009; Gerlach, 2006; Luft, 2007). It was triggered by a letter (Eggebrecht, 2006), that teachers of a Berlin school sent to the local authority to complain about the situation at their school, which was subsequently leaked to the press. The Rütli-School is a *Hauptschule*, which constitutes the lowest of Germany’s three-tier secondary school system, whereas the *Gymnasium* is comparable to grammar schools and the *Realschule* to comprehensives (Cohen, 2009). It originally presented a school type for destined blue collar workers, but today provides pupils only with limited career prospects. The Rütli-School is located in the Berlin district of Neukölln, which has large ethnic minority communities, many of whom originally settled as *Gastarbeiter*. It is also a very deprived area, with many people unemployed and in receipt of benefits.

ORIGINS OF THE RÜTLI AFFAIR: THE LETTER TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITY

On 28th February 2006, teachers of the Rütli-School sent a letter to the local education authority, with the request for it to be distributed to various people and agencies. It is a plea for help and support as teachers feel they can no longer cope and are exhausted due to “unbearable strain” (Eggebrecht, 2006:2, my translation). This is reflected in high sickness rates and staff shortages, which further exacerbate problems and also affect the positions of head and deputy head.

3 Please note that all quotes in this chapter have been translated by me.
Students’ aggression and violence towards both school building and teachers is discussed in detail. Complaints include a lack of respect towards staff: “In many Year groups, classroom behaviour is marked by a complete rejection of curriculum and learning materials, as well as misanthropy. Teaching staff are not acknowledged, objects deliberately thrown at them, instructions ignored.” (Eggebrecth, 2006:2).

Short-term solutions such as additional funding, the recruitment of more teachers, and specialist staff to help with “de-escalation” and “crisis intervention” are suggested. However, it is argued that: “Perspectively, the Hauptschule has to be discontinued in its current form, to be replaced by a completely new type of school.” (Eggebrecth, 2006:3). Indeed, much of the letter is devoted to a critique of the school system:

“When we look at the development of our school over recent years, we have to conclude that the Hauptschule arrived at a dead end […]. What point is there in collecting all those pupils who are not shown any perspectives to live their lives purposefully, neither from parents nor the economy, in one school. In most families our pupils are the only ones that get up in the morning. How shall we explain to them, that it is important to attend school and aim for a qualification? The pupils are mainly preoccupied with obtaining the latest mobile and to design their outfit so as to avoid being laughed at, to belong. School for them is also a stage and power struggle for recognition. The multiple offender becomes a role model. There are no positive role models for them in school. They are among themselves and do not meet youth who live differently to them. Hauptschule isolates them, they feel excluded and behave accordingly.”

Eggebrecth (2006:3)

While the letter addresses concerns around youth violence and crime, alienation and the school system, these are embedded within a wider focus on race and ethnicity. The letter begins with a paragraph outlining the large proportion of ethnic minorities
at the school, especially the continuously rising numbers of students from Arab backgrounds. This group is said to form the majority at the school with 34.9%, followed by pupils of Turkish heritage with 26.1%. The figure for students of “non-German origin” is stated to be 83.2%. It is pointed out that none of the school’s staff come from “other” cultural backgrounds, presumably meaning members of staff are exclusively white Germans. Although little direct reference is made to race, ethnicity, culture and faith during the rest of the letter, this opening paragraph frames the concerns later detailed in a particular way. The reader is left to assume that these Arab and Turkish pupils are the disruptive, aggressive and uncooperative ones. Positioning the statistical account of the school’s ethnic minority population so centrally, strongly invokes this association. Furthermore, a lack of support from Arab and Turkish parents in enforcing discipline is mentioned: Appointments are not attended and telephone conversations are hindered by deficient language skills. This is attempted to be tackled through two social workers of Turkish and Arab descent which are to be provided by the third sector. The teachers, however, do not anticipate this will be sufficient and exclaim: “We are helpless.” (Eggebrecht, 2006:2).

**POLITICAL RESPONSES**

When the Rütli-School teachers’ letter came to the attention of the press on 30th March 2006, it triggered an immediate debate among politicians and the media around the *Hauptschule*, youth violence and the integration of ethnic minorities. Berlin’s senator for schools Böger from the centre-left *Social Democratic Party for Germany* (SPD), announced immediate measures “to enforce civilising principles”,
including the positioning of police officers outside the school and the appointment of two social workers, two educational psychologists as well as a new interim acting head. Dismissing suggestions that the school and the *Hauptschule* as such should be closed, he argued that a “difficult clientele cannot be resolved organisationally”. Politicians across the political spectrum felt the Rütli-School did not present an isolated case but signified “the tip of the iceberg”. The responses from the centre-right, conservative *Christian Democratic Union* (CDU) and its sister party the *Christian Social Union* (CSU), were notably forthright and criticised accordingly by liberal and centre-left politicians⁴: Language constituted a key focus which was linked to social problems and segregation. Proposals included making language and integration classes obligatory “if necessary”, as well as compulsory nursery attendance and language tests as a prerequisite for entering primary school for “children of foreigners” (*Ausländerkinder*). Sanctions for non-compliance of such ‘integration measures’ may include fines and even deportation, such as for repeat offenders ‘resisting integration’. The criminalisation of segregation is also suggested, by introducing the offence of ‘integration refusal’ to Alien Law. This demonstrates how race is linked to deviancy, criminality and problems with language and cohesion.

Volker Kauder (CDU), the chair of the CDU/CSU faction in the *Bundestag* (lower house of parliament), called for a National Action Plan for Integration in a guest commentary for the *FAZ*. He criticises “multicultural dreamer[s]” of the political left for not prioritising integration accordingly:

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⁴The *Christian Social Union of Bavaria* (CSU) only operates regionally but is represented at federal level in the lower house of parliament (*Bundestag*) in the form of a faction with its sister party CDU, referred to as the *Union*.  

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“[I]t should be clarified how much the reality especially in cities distinguishes itself from the naive notion of multicultural street party romanticism [...]. Problems [...] were hypocritically concealed. And so the self-appointed guardians of political correctness demand that news coverage of violent crime mentions at best suspects of “Southern” or “Mediterranean” appearance. Even the reference to a criminal’s broken German, not irrelevant to the prosecution, seemed to constitute degrading discrimination to the multicultural language police.”

Kauder, 2006:2

Kauder claims that: “Sober realism is what is called for here. The illusion of social harmony is in any case a poor political advisor.” However, his assertion that unless his idea of a National Action Plan is implemented, “the situation at the Berlin [Rütli] school will become the norm in cities” is alarmist, despite Kauder refuting this. He also suggests that: “When cultural difference is then instrumentalised to turn the explosive mixture of inherited lack of perspective and propensity towards violence against mainstream society, this may lead to events like we were able to witness in the French suburbs.”

Referring to statistics about the educational underachievement of ethnic minority youth, Kauder claims that “the numbers speak clearly and worryingly” and talks of “catastrophic evidence”. He invokes a picture of ethnic minorities as a danger to the state, where the existing minority population as well as continued immigration of low-qualified people threatens civic order and social security. Kauder argues that trajectories for ethnic minorities extend to the second and third generation with an “inheritance of dependence on social benefits” that presents an unacceptable “waste of resources”. Ethnic minorities are viewed in financial terms, which is also reflected
in economic terminology such as “dirigistic” and *Transferzahlung* to describe social benefits.

In a gendered account, he portrays women on the one hand as seemingly more ‘desirable’ ethnic minorities and agents who should be capitalised on. On the other hand, they are also represented in terms of cultural deficit, whereby integration may be regarded as liberation from cultural constraints and passivity or victimhood:

“And we need to strengthen immigrated women. The girls and women are often exceptionally committed and function as a driving force for social change, but are more constrained by culturally prescribed roles, especially when they originate from the Muslim cultural sphere.”

Kauder (2006:2)

This comment also indicates how Muslims are regarded as a particularly challenging subset of ethnic minorities. They are referred to using the term *Kulturräum*, meaning ‘cultural space’\(^5\). This commonly employed language emphasises the apparent cultural difference of ethnic minorities, and this ‘otherness’ appears particularly marked among Muslims. Giving it a spatial dimension draws on similar imagery to the discourse of parallel societies. Interestingly, the political left is portrayed as similarly removed from reality and contrasted with apparently hard facts and “overwhelming” statistical evidence which “[w]e have known for some time”. Kauder’s political approach is moreover portrayed as “[s]ober realism”, presenting an antidote to the ‘dreaming’ of proponents of multiculturalism as well as an apparently exclusive solution to the threat posed by ethnic minorities. While depicting himself as a voice of reason and lending authority to his argument through the use of statistics, Kauder’s

\(^5\) Also sometimes *Kulturkreis*, literally ‘cultural circle’ – a term originating from anthropology but now in common usage.
language is emotive, alarmist and polemic; equally offensive to people committed to multiculturalism and leftwing politics as it is to ethnic minorities.

Chancellor and CDU party leader Angela Merkel announced plans for an Integration Summit in early April 2006, based on Kauder’s ideas. The Integration Summit was criticised for not inviting some Muslim groups to attend, highlighting issues of representation as Muslims in Germany do not have a single commonly recognised umbrella organization (meaning Islam does not legally constitute a religion) (cf. Gerlach, 2006). An additional Islam Conference was later announced, partly to address this. These resulted in the publication of the National Integration Plan (Bundesregierung, 2007) and were followed by further annual summits and conferences in subsequent years, including a Youth Integration Summit in 2007 and a Young Islam Conference in 2011. This signifies a move to central integration policies, but while dialogue is emphasised, political discourses reflect ethnic minorities’ apparent duty to integrate in order to be ‘good citizens’. Debates surrounding these summits also reflect a focus on young people and ideas of Muslims presenting a particularly ‘integration resistant’ group.

The Rütli Affair contributed to educational reforms in many Ländere (federal states) aimed at abolishing the Hauptschule or integrating it with other school types. In 2007, plans emerged for the Rütli-School to be subject to a multi-million pound investment as part of a pilot project: Combined with the neighbouring Realschule and a local primary school, the Campus Rütli was created, which also incorporates facilities such as a kindergarten and youth club, thus offering all-day care for all ages (cf. Campus Rütli, no date).
MEDIA REPORTING ON THE RÜTLI-SCHOOL

The Rütli-School teachers’ letter led to widespread news coverage, particularly during the first two weeks of April 2006, when the letter became public. Later it is frequently referred to as an aside reference, highlighting how the school soon became emblematic of wider issues; employed by the media to evoke images ranging from ‘failed integration’, urban deprivation and areas of large ethnic minority settlement to youth violence and an outdated school system. Today, the Rütli-School is predominantly mentioned when discussing Islam and segregation. Indeed, many articles refer to similarities to other urban schools nationwide, mainly Hauptschule.

Coverage features a multitude of anecdotes from teachers, and while the Rütli-School’s teachers have been banned from talking to the media by the Berlin senate, some do so anonymously.

The media as well as politicians commonly refer to ethnic minorities as “foreigners” (Ausländer) or “immigrants”. The new policy-driven term of people “with migrant backgrounds” is rarely employed. When used, it is usually placed in quotation marks, indicating scepticism to what seems to be perceived as imposed, ‘politically correct’ language. Terminology suggests that even third generation migrants are seen predominantly and overtly as ‘other’ and not German. This indicates that they continue to be excluded from concepts of nation and society. None of the expressions utilised allow for notions of being both German and from ethnic minority backgrounds\(^6\). It also renders many statistical references inaccessible, as it is unclear who exactly is meant by “foreigner”. The use of statistics is noticeably

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\(^6\) The German language does allow for such notions, however; an existing example being the term Deutschtürke (German Turk) as an equivalent to say British Pakistani.
common, especially by FAZ and Spiegel. It is often cited, for example, that half of all people in Germany below the age of 40 will be from “immigrant families” by 2010. This prognosis may present the realisation that Germany is indeed a ‘country of immigration’, but it appears to reflect more of a fear of ethnic minorities becoming the majority in terms of numbers and the alleged Überfremdung associated with it. One FAZ article (Wehner, 2006) details that pupils with migrant backgrounds present the majority in two-thirds of schools in several of Berlin’s inner-city districts: This provides little insight into actual numbers, but arguably reflects a fear of ethnic minorities ‘taking over’ and displacing white German culture and values.

ETHNICITY AND LANGUAGE
Language ability features frequently in media reporting, in accordance with political discourses. It is stressed that German language is needed for societal engagement and access to the labour market, and thus presents the basis for ‘integration’. Measures such as providing teachers for German as a second language are proposed; something which is not common but long established in Britain (Gogolin, 2005). In line with conservative politicians, some journalists consider enforcing compliancy to learn German, while one article (Schwägerl, 2006b:35) advocates the closure of “crisis schools” and contemplates ‘bussing’ to redistribute students to districts “where they won’t be preoccupied with overcoming the secondary problems of their encapsulation, but where they will need to open their eyes to the German reality of the year 2006, for a start because nobody understands Arabic.” This comes at a time when such proposals were long discredited in Britain.
Some articles parody the behaviour and language of ethnic minorities: “This is how the inhabitants of this world talk: Eh, man, eh. Slut. Killer. Crass. There are many “sch” and “ch” sounds in this language, barely any complete sentences. Filthy Germans, this is how they talk.” (Berg et al., 2006:24). Such caricatured accounts portray these young people as alien and dehumanised. Another article also seems to mock a Rüttli-pupil, who “stammers [a rap song] into a reporter’s microphone [to] demonstrate that he is the coolest in his clique”:

“The rapper and his hymn of the ghetto could be classed as an example of somewhat successful linguistic integration. But the occasion of his performance suggests the opposite. The teachers of his school […] capitulate to lacking German language skills, lack of respect and violence of their Turkish and Arab pupils. They have nearly all been born in Germany and yet they have never arrived here.”

Wehner (2006:3)

Importantly, while the Rüttli-School’s letter strongly implies that their problems are related to particular ethnic groups, reports such as this leave no doubt about the link. While the letter only highlights parents’ insufficient German, political and media debates now attribute language deficits to young people themselves. Parents are portrayed as not involved with their children’s education, even described as “anti-educational”, and not instilling ambition or providing direction (Schwägerl, 2006b:35). One Rüttli-School teacher explains that threats of phoning pupils’ fathers may be effective “with the Kurdish kids, the Turkish kids, the Lebanese kids”, but often a mother answers the phone “who does not speak a word of German” (Berg et al., 2006:34).
Although integration is at the centre of media debates around the Rütli-School, there is no detailed discussion as to what it entails; merely occasional references to what it is not. While some authors are adamant it does not constitute assimilation, they nevertheless talk of ethnic minorities adapting and fitting in, with the onus to adjust consistently and exclusively placed on them. A picture is created of some ethnic minorities not making enough effort to integrate, even resisting it or being ‘integration unwilling’, as some politicians say. These groups are said to be Turks and Arabs, and ultimately Muslims. In line with politicians, newspapers highlight the lack of cohesive integration policies, suggesting that “German integration policy […] has so far barely been worth its name” (Wehner, 2006:3). Echoing Kauder’s sentiments, this is linked to the political left’s apparently misguided belief in multiculturalism, which is portrayed as an idealised notion of diversity as an “everlasting street party” (Von Wrangel, 2006:2) and only ever referred to as having failed. It is equally recognised that German politician’s denial of being a ‘country of immigration’ meant integration policies were not regarded as necessary. Consider these extracts from the FAZ:

When these children are now fifteen, they represent fifteen years in which a particular form of government debt has been amassed, the attention deficit. Ignored by the right and placed under multicultural nature conversation by the left, they have grown into an absurd parallel society.”

Schwägerl (2006b:35)

“Instead of integration, which allegedly means obligatory adaptation, leftwing social policy makers rely on the romanticism of a supposedly peaceful coexistence of cultures. The Greens saw a crime in every deportation of asylum seekers and idealised foreigners just like the [left-wing] Linkspartei still does today. And the [CDU/CSU] Union, while it accepted immigration, failed
to accept Germany for what it was: a country of immigration, “with the highest net gain of migrants” in Europe, as officialese puts it."

“The Germans have treated the “foreigners” mostly with seeming tolerance. But this was nothing more than indifference and shyness to deal with the migrants, even take them on, especially the Muslim ones. Instead one left them to it and ignored them and they isolated themselves in their own world. The result of this mutual ignorance can be seen in the statistics of police and the department of public prosecution.”

Wehner (2006:3)

Speaking of “nature conversation” not only mocks advocates of multiculturalism, but conjures an animalistic picture of ethnic minorities. Young Muslims are represented as living segregated lives, having been failed by lacking integration policy. Wehner (2006) suggests that Muslims pose a particularly challenging group who need to be confronted. This idea of tension and the critique of multiculturalism as leftwing idealism are also evident in the following extract:

“The reason for the lack of integration of immigrant children [Ausländerkinder] into civic society is mainly that at the times of Multikulti blissfulness this was not the aim of immigration policy. For far too long the expectation that immigrants and their children must fit in here has been foregone. Therefore an actually ‘lost generation’ has grown up, who are moving towards unemployment as hardly any of their relatives master the national language.”

Kohler (2006:1)

There is a frequent theme of ethnic minorities living segregated lives in ‘parallel societies’, and this is reflected in the rhetoric employed, with terminology often involving ‘world’, ‘reality’ and ‘ghettoisation’:

“[T]hat the wholly normal insanity of everyday life lead to the public capitulation of teaching staff, that was new. What is going on there? What kind of world is appearing there? When one looks at the reality of the Rütli-School and other schools in Berlin and nationwide, the reality of the
Hauptschule in particular, then it looks by now like the Bronx once did. It is like the collection of many small copies of towns such as Karachi or Lagos, that is towns which are not controllable, not governable anymore. In Germany it is not whole metropolises, only quarters, but they are separated from the rest of the town, they are ghettos. And a lost world seems to have formed next to the entirely normal German reality there by now, which has already manifested itself and has nothing to do with the other reality anymore.”

Berg et al. (2006:23-4)

Other articles also describe reality as German, whereas “foreigners” are said to live in parallel worlds (Schwägerl, 2006b; Wehner, 2006). Such language accentuates the perceived ‘otherness’ of ethnic minorities and emphasises how estranged they are from what white Germans seem to deem normal life. The imagery of two worlds colliding is further stressed through frequent use of language of conflict and war. The situation at the Rütli-School is likened to a battleground where ethnic minority pupils “terrorise” their environment – the term “capitulation” is employed markedly often. One FAZ article (Kohler, 2006:1) points out that the Rütli-School's letter's language of “de-escalation” and “crisis intervention” invokes images of war, while utilising similar terminologies when asserting that intervention against “disintegrative forces” seems too late for the school, as “the pupils ‘with immigrant background’ have taken over”. Similarly, a Spiegel article notes that school senator Böger's statement that “[w]e will not move from any position”, dismissing the closure of schools, utilises “vocabulary from the frontline” (Berg et al., 2006:28-9). Another report speaks of a “state of siege” in the light of the media presence (Küpper, 2006:4). One Rütli-School teacher laments the “war of being worn down” and remarks: “You are fighting for your existence around here.” (Berg et al., 2006:34). The Rütli Affair is evidently located within wider contemporary discourses around parallel societies, which mirror the British focus on cohesion. Segregation is presented as an outcome of ‘failed’
multiculturalism, pointing to an interrelationship of these discourses. Language of conflict also invokes ideas of a Clash of Civilizations.

Integration is framed as ethnic minorities’ duty, whereas it is the role of the state to demand and enforce it by sanctioning noncompliance (cf. Gogolin, 2005). Relating to prognoses for demographic development soon meaning the majority of young people will be from ethnic minority backgrounds, one author states:

“It will be important for the Germans that at least the majority of this majority will not constitute society’s losers, are not hostile towards Germans but will become naturalised out of conviction. For this, migrant children need to learn German in kindergarten, the parents have to integrate, at least linguistically, and if necessary compulsory so. Otherwise generations of migrant children without school-leaving qualifications and employment will burden the welfare system, the violence of migrant youth will increase, parallel worlds will be strengthened and new ones will emerge. Germany cannot afford this.”

Wehner (2006:3)

Another journalist writes:

“Many of their parents could practice their encapsulation so perfectly because nobody told them to their face that after twenty years in Germany they speak damn bad German and will now have to live without the dole.”

Schwägerl, (2006b:35)

These two extracts portray ethnic minorities not only as segregated, but fundamentally in economic terms: as unemployed benefit recipients who pose a threat to the welfare state by being a drain on resources, thus echoing Kauder. Wehner’s (2006) account is particularly alarmist, but both draw on representations of ethnic minorities as resisting integration in favour of segregation. Schwägerl (2006b) speaks of the “guardians” of social security benefits and gross national product, suggesting that the state needs to protect its assets and wealth from ethnic
minorities. The *Spiegel* (Berg et al., 2006:26) relates an anecdote of an Arab pupil’s response to a question about what he would like to do for a job: “I want to become *Harz IV*, referring to social benefits, while another student gets out his passport and says “Doesn’t matter, you can’t deport me now.”

**MUSLIMS AND ISLAM: FAITH, ETHNICITY AND CODED REFERENCES**

Muslims are presented as a particularly problematic subset of ethnic minorities, strongly associated with social problems and deviance – purportedly associated with 70% of violent crimes in Berlin (Wehner, 2006:3). Like British cohesion discourses of the 2000s, German debates around the Rütli-School racialise crime and violence, linking it closely to young Muslim men – similarly to how black males were conceived in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Burnett, 2004; Solomos, 2003). Yet, there are often no direct references to Islam; instead people are referred to in ethnic terms, possibly because this is seen as more acceptable. Faith descriptors might constitute a particular taboo due to Germany’s historic sensibilities. Interestingly, when Muslims are referred to more directly, descriptions invoke notions of culture. Islam is portrayed as a way of life which imparts different values and produces youth who, at least in part, are aggressive and challenge norms. The following extract describes Islam as uncivilised, and compares Muslim youth to violent rebels:

“The Berlin Rütli-School has now given the problem an extremely ugly face. The state, personified by teachers, capitulates to a primitive counterculture marked by Islamic aspects, to the anti-ambition of youth who boast about the negative headlines of their gangs and neighbourhoods, and who pick up a cobblestone in the vein of Intifada-children as soon as a cameraman appears.”

Schwägerl (2006b:35)
Furthermore, Muslims are portrayed in notably gendered ways. Neukölln is described as a place “where the headscarf-wearing women and girls and the Turkish boys with baseball caps shape the streetscape” (Wehner, 2006:3). While girls are portrayed as passive and suppressed, boys are represented as macho chauvinists: “Respect is gained by those who protect their own, that is the Turkish or Lebanese sister from sex and love and this big glittering West, while fucking German sluts.” (Berg et al., 2006:24).

Often Islam merely features as an aside reference, stating that something applies especially to Muslims. This conveys the impression that they present a particularly problematic group of ethnic minorities, where the alleged negative impact of multiculturalism comes to the forefront most visibly. At other times, religion is mentioned while Islam is implied, such as when referring to large families, traditional values and codes of honour. Conversely, sometimes the media and politicians merely speak of ‘certain groups’. Whichever way Muslims are talked about, an underlying notion of ‘good' and ‘bad’ immigrants frames them as undesirable and ‘refusing’ to integrate. This idea of Muslims being unable or unwilling to integrate has received renewed attention in Germany during 2010–2011, when the then head of the German Central Bank and Social Democrat, Thilo Sarrazin (2010), published his highly controversial book ‘Germany abolishes itself’. He warned of social and economic problems that would allegedly result from demographic developments; focusing particularly on Muslims as having ‘integration problems’ and reflecting biological notions of difference and cultural deficit views.
DISCOURSES OF GERMAN VICTIMHOOD

All newspapers include references to German pupils attending schools like the Rütli-School, where they constitute a numerical minority. ‘German’ pupils exclusively means white, and they are described as victims of violence and crime perpetrated by ethnic minorities, who are by implication non-Germans. Muslims in particularly are said not to respect Germans and Western values, while calling female teachers “bitches” and fellow pupils “pork eaters”. Young white Germans are portrayed as a suppressed minority who have to assert themselves, or try to fit in by emulating the language, behaviour and values of their ethnic minority classmates:

“The last remaining German fellow pupils begin to imitate their gibberish so as not to attract attention or to please.”

Schwägerl (2006:35)

“And German children, only 17 percent at the Rütli-School but elsewhere 80 or 90 percent, are not any more constructive, talk markedly bad German, talk the slang of the immigrants, because respect is gained by those who segregate themselves from the world outside the ghetto, who do not put up with anything, who are not gentle and soft.”

Berg et al. (2006:24)

Paradoxically, there is no reference to ethnic minorities being the target of prejudice, discrimination or social exclusion. Instead, they are depicted as impacting negatively on the education of fellow German youth, just like they have been decades before, with language still a key focus. Similarly, the numerous references to crime statistics do not consider ethnic minorities being disproportionately often targeted by police, or interpret them as an outcome of their disadvantaged status and structural inequality – analyses that have been recognised in Britain for some time.
MEDIA CRITIQUES OF THE TABLOID PRESS

Both the FAZ and the Spiegel include detailed reports about the conduct of the tabloid press outside the Rütli-School in the days after its teachers’ letter became public. It is suggested that some media coverage is heavily exaggerated and misrepresentative. While some articles recognise that pupils may play up to the media and “satisfy the sensation seeking tabloid press”, it is also relayed how journalists actively encouraged rowdy behaviour. There are suggestions that photographs of pupils throwing stones at reporters were practically staged (Küpper, 2006:4)\(^7\). Reports on the nature of media coverage give some indication as to why one school was able to trigger a national debate on integration and how events were “scandalised”:

““Position yourself a bit more with your legs apart”, one can hear one photographer say to the boys, who are posing in front of the gate.”

Encke (2006:27)

“A photographer grabs a group of 13-, 14-year-old Arabs, organises them in gangster pose and tells the children to pull their hoodies over their faces because it looks more dangerous that way.”

Berg et al. (2006:25)

While Berg et al. (2006:25) suggest that “the whole is reminiscent of a visit to the zoo”, there appears to be a fine line between satirising tabloid coverage and displaying the attitudes one attempts to criticise, considering that the same article earlier derogatively caricatured the language of ethnic minority pupils at the Rütli-School. Nevertheless, all newspapers show aspects of more nuanced analyses

\(^7\) Interestingly, this is the type of image the Bild chose to display, judging by the captions; the photographs themselves cannot be accessed online, possibly due to the controversy surrounding their inception. It should, however, be noted that criticism extends beyond the tabloid press: One Spiegel feature (Berg et al., 2006) uses a similar picture which was subject to an investigation that concluded there was no evidence suggesting the photographer paid the young person depicted.
which seemingly contest other, more common accounts: The education system is criticised for not providing teachers from Arab or Turkish backgrounds for example, and it is hinted that the precarious legal status of those under scrutiny challenge views of their obligation to adapt and fit in.
The two case studies examined, together with the review of the literature, highlight how Muslims are constructed as ‘dangerous’ communities amid discursive shifts from race to faith. Representations of Islam as in conflict with the West predate 9/11, however, and historical continuities as well as cross-national parallels can also be found in concerns around segregation. While the parallels between Britain and Germany are fascinating, it appears that Britain has been more ‘progressive’ in its early development of policies around race relations, diversity and equality (Gogolin, 2005). In Germany, ideas of Muslims’ duty to adapt to mainstream society are particularly marked. In both countries, however, it appears that Muslims are excluded from full citizenship and nationhood, as demands are made of them to adhere to purportedly shared national values, identities and laws, that are not addressed to the white majority. In this sense, what all discourses problematising ethnic minorities have in common is a renegotiation of the relationship between citizen, state and nation. Underlying notions in the discourses examined conceive Islam as a potential threat to society and civic order. In both the Rushdie and Rütli Affair, Muslims are homogenised and constructed as not ‘integrated’, but deviant and aggressive. Historical notions of assimilation and cultural deficit persist, but are more overt in Germany, where Muslims are conceived as unable or unwilling to integrate. Nevertheless, the fact that Islamophobia is expressed seemingly more blatantly in German media and political discourses, does not necessarily mean that its presence is less marked in British society. For both the Rushdie and Rütli Affair, the media was instrumental in constructing Muslims as dangerous; shaping public, political and policy discourses. Stereotypes dating back to the 1980s and beyond, of Islam as uncivilised and associated with fundamentalism, were reified as both the Rushdie
and the Rütli Affair have been utilised for political means. Therefore, the current moral panic around Islam might present less of a production of dangerous communities per se, than a reproduction of existing prejudice that becomes pervasive in a given political context.


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