

**Civil Society in the Era of Good Governance Dispensation:
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the Politics of
Engaging Government in Tanzania**

By

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Abstract

The thesis set out to investigate the politics of Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) engaging the Government in Tanzania. The aim of the study is to get an understanding of the context, ways and means in which NGOs in Tanzania engage (with) the government to influence its policies and decisions. The thesis also analyses the implications and role of NGOs in bringing about social change in Tanzania. The thesis shows the relationship of subordination that is constituted through the operation of NGOs within the social, economic and political institutions of Tanzanian civil society. It offers an insight into the neo-liberal views that informs the distribution of aid to developing nations, and the affect this has had on state-civil society relationships within the Tanzanian nation state.

Theoretically, the thesis uses Gramsci's notion of hegemony which applies both at national level and international level. The counter hegemony which Gramsci expounds in terms of war of manoeuvre and war of position has been highlighted in relations to works of NGOs and civil society development.

The thesis examines the engagement of Tanzanian NGOs to influence the process of NGO Policy and Act making; and monitoring the poverty strategies through the Campaign Against Poverty-Tanzania (GCAP-T).

The thesis posit the future of NGOs on how they could side and work with people to create a society based on people needs, vision and aspiration.

Key words: civil society, activism, advocacy, engagement, hegemony, NGOs, development, policy, laws, Tanzania.

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Dedication

To my daughter, Abigail Anande: she was born the same month I started this thesis. As she grew and mastered some basic Kiswahili words, whenever she saw me reading a book or typing on a computer, she would jokingly say *serikali na nchi* (government and country/state). Right up to the time I finished writing this thesis, questions and ‘myths’ about governance and state were still puzzling me.

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Introduction

Research Problem and the Aim of the Study

The main aim of this thesis is to gain an understanding of the context, the ways and means in which NGOs in Tanzania engage (with) the government to influence policies and decisions. The thesis also aims at analysing the implications and role(s) of Non-Government Organizations in bringing about social change in Tanzania. The background which led me to this aim is twofold. Firstly, many people especially in the International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank (WB); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs); and western donors claim that NGOs are doing a wonderful job in terms of serving and speaking for the poor. Secondly, it is asserted that NGOs are the projects of elites, and that their main beneficiaries are their staff and founders. Sometimes people who join and work with NGOs do not have the passion to serve people. In this thesis I have used the empirical case study of two campaigns by Tanzanian NGOs; that is the NGO policy and Act; and the Poverty Monitoring advocacy campaign, to track the interaction of NGOs with the government of Tanzania in shaping processes and outcomes of development policies.

Development thinkers and practitioners argue that NGOs have an important role to play in political, economic and social development in any given country (Foundation for Civil Society-FCS, 2009). Actions and activities of NGOs are geared towards providing channels by which people can participate in addressing socio-economic needs, hold government accountable, and facilitate dialogue that leads to social change (FCS, 2009). Often NGOs may argue that they

work with and for the people; and that their programmes, projects and activities aim at challenging the government to implement policies, programmes and laws that are geared towards addressing the problems (poverty) facing them. Tanzania is estimated to have more than 10,000 NGOs (TANGO, 2008). However, many of them, as noted by FCS (2009), are far from achieving their set goals. My experience shows that many NGOs spend much of their time in seminars, workshops, travelling, conferences and training for their staff. This implies that focus on the people who they purport to be serving is very little.

Overtime, I have been asking myself why activism and advocacy by NGOs is not making any serious impact in the country in terms of being able to work with people to influence government policies. While NGOs are busy working on programmes and projects that aim at benefitting people, they do not place much effort to make sure they work with people. They are outsiders, instead of forming and being part of the society and communities. When I was awarded a scholarship to conduct a Doctor of Philosophy degree (PhD) on NGOs, many different themes came to light. These include; organisational strengthening and capacity building; organisational development; policy and advocacy strategies; and coalition building and networking. But, all these focus on the NGOs as actors. Therefore, I opted for the theme which focuses on the relationship between the people and NGOs' actions. In search of an understanding of the relationships that exist between the two parties, I formulated some research questions to guide my enquiry. These are:

- i. To what extent are NGOs leading the people to real social change and sustainable development?

- ii. Why NGOs in Tanzania have not managed to become catalysts for people to engage with the government?
- iii. Is advocacy and activism by NGOs based on community and people's struggles?
- iv. To what extent has advocacy and activism by NGOs been successful in influencing government policies?
- v. Do NGOs behave differently when they engage in advocacy to defend their interest and that of the people?

In Tanzania, the space for civic participation in policy making has been growing steadily especially after the reintroduction of multipartism in 1992 and the collapse of African socialist (Ujamaa) ideology. However, the Rural Security Research Group-KIHACHA (2002) observes that the overall picture remains one where peoples' voices are marginalized or are belatedly solicited after key decisions have been taken. Although hundreds of NGOs may actively campaign around the issues that have been targeted in the policy, there is no significant role for NGOs in the development of these policies. If the goals of policies are to be achieved, ordinary citizens must feel a true sense of ownership and willingness to hold their government accountable. This can only happen if policies are 'owned' by the people and not appropriated by the state. NGOs could work with people in demanding participation in policy development and governance (KIHACHA, 2002).

Furthermore, people do not know exactly what NGOs are doing although the NGOs themselves claim to be speaking for them. One outcome of this scenario is that NGOs have not managed to bring about the changes they claim to be pursuing. At the same time, donors have been providing money to NGOs to support their activities because they think their activities target the vulnerable in society as Clack (1995, p. 20) notes:

Many argue that NGOs may be best placed for the task of fostering popular participation which includes articulating the needs of the weak, working in remote areas, changing attitudes and practices of local officials, and nurturing the productive capacity of the most vulnerable such as the disabled or the landless.

As someone with the experience of the NGO sector in the county and who has participated in the activities of NGOs such as workshops, seminars, and conferences, I noticed so many great ideas and strategies being propounded. In the field, however, practically very little happens. All these fora keep discussing the same problem and challenges facing NGOs in engaging the government to be able to influence decisions and policy making. The feeling is that nothing is happening and NGO's staff do not have the ability to deliver, hence more capacity building is needed. It is likely that there are still unclear issues to the NGOs; or they may have underestimated their role. In chapter two, section 2.2, I have explained in detail how my observations as a NGO actor, left me with more questions than answers, it also led me to want to understand in a systematic manner, why NGOs behave the way they do, hence this research was born.

Structure of the Thesis

This Thesis has eight chapters. *Chapter one* addresses the theoretical framework which has guided this study. The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one reflects on the civil society concept and how it evolved. It attempts to trace the development of the civil society in governance and development discourses. Over time intellectuals perceived the civil society differently due to changing conditions and developments. I prefer to discuss the civil society before jumping onto the NGOs because nowadays people tend to confuse NGOs with the civil society. There are several concepts of what civil society means. There are terms such as third sector, non-profit sector, philanthropy sector, non-governmental organisations, social economy, and public benefit organisations. In section two I discuss NGOs as expressions of the civil society. In the past twenty years NGOs have been given so much publicity and attention such that they obscure the civil society. NGOs have become synonymous to civil society. Section three is on the framework and is based on Antonio Gramsci's thinking on hegemony. NGOs are initiatives of elites and are being used by the governments and international development agencies as conduits for maintaining the ruling class (state) hegemony over society. Section four discusses how the NGOs are being used especially in the third world countries as conduits to propagate and advocate for globalization based on neoliberal principals.

Chapter two explores the methodology applied in the study. This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section discusses the research design as applied to the study. Section two is devoted to explaining the choice of study site. Sample, sampling and selection of the interviews is

discussed in Section three. Section four focuses on the data collection methods and tools that were used in the research. The main data collecting tools were face to face interviews guided telephone interviews guided participant observation, and e-mail correspondence. Section five explains how about the field process. In Section six, I highlight my attachment at the Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO) office where I conducted the participant observations. The section, also, explains my interaction with the NGOs interviewees who participated and how this interaction was done. The seventh section moves on to describe managing insider researcher. Section eight discusses ethical concerns that the researcher had to address. And section nine is about the limitation encountered during the field work.

Chapter three reviews the development of the civil society and NGOs in Southern- Africa. The aim is to present a picture of the context in which civil society and NGOs operate. Section one reviews the conceptualisation of civil society within the African context. There is an attempt to impose the western notion of the civil society in Africa. All recent attempts of incorporating the civil society into partnership with the state ignore the reality that African civil society is different. References are made to three arrangements which inform the civil society in the region and perhaps elsewhere in Africa: patrons-clients networks, self-help groups and ethical associations and traditional authorities. In section two, discussion is geared towards addressing the civil society within the State National building project in the period immediately after independence in the early 1960s. Many states engaged in national building projects and this project required all the citizens to speak with one mind. So the state had to incorporate all civic groups in the ruling party machinery and structures. Section three addresses the relationship between the state and NGOs. The relationship between the state and civil society has been that of 'cat and rat.' The ruling elites

see civil society as a threat to their positions. At the same time civil society thinks that the state is not doing enough to protect and provide for the community. In the neo-liberalization era, the state has invited the civil society as partners for development. Section four demystifies the argument that NGOs are a Panacea for development in Africa. In recent years the argument that for Africa to develop the state must enter into partnership with civil society has gained momentum. But there is evidence showing, that this is not the 'medicine' to cure Africa's underdevelopment. Section five discusses the role of the donor and NGOs, and the way to safeguard the interests of donor countries. If there was no money, may be the big noise about the role of NGOs in the governance and development would not be there.

Chapter four concentrates on the emergence, growth and development of NGOs in Tanzania. The aim of the chapter is to gain a broad picture of the development of civil society and later NGOs in the country. The information provided sets the background for Chapter five to eight. Section one focuses on the history of Tanzania which is the unification of two countries, Tanganyika and Zanzibar who united in 1964. Before they received independence, Tanganyika was a colony of Britain, and Zanzibar was under the sultanate of Oman. Section two explains how civil society was organised before colonial times. During this time, ethnic groups and tribes evolved into some sort of organisation. There were two main formations; state and stateless. Section three focuses on colonial times. Colonialists (German and United Kingdom) reoriented the Tanzania economy towards the international capitalist system. The colonial economy and governance produced a civil society distinct from that of pre-colonial times. In section four, I turn to the period immediately after independence up to the 1980s. After independence, the state entered into a project of building nationalism and development. The wisdom of the time was that the state can

do everything and one way of doing this was to adopt a single party system and shut-out all other civil actors. Section five revisits the period from 1980 up to the present. After the state had failed to deliver as promised, the civil society became unhappy and critical. They reacted to the situation by fighting for their freedom, and at the same time they started to provide social services which the government was no longer able to provide

Chapter five aims at giving an overview of activism and advocacy for policy change as practiced by NGOs in Tanzania. The chapter shows the context, environment, philosophy and motive that surrounds, guides and influences NGOs activism in Tanzania. Specifically, the chapter attempts to answer research questions i and ii that is to what extent NGOs are leading the people to real social change and sustainable development. And why NGOs in Tanzania do not seem to have managed to become catalysts for people to engage with the government. This chapter is closely linked with chapter four. In the last section of the chapter, some of the activities of NGOs especially in the early years of independence in the 1960s to 1970s are scrutinized. The chapter focused on the period starting from the 1980s, when activism and advocacy for policy change by NGOs started to be a common practice in the country.

Chapter six discusses how NGOs, under the leadership of TANGO, interact with the government to influence its decisions, policies and actions. The case shows how TANGO led NGOs to fight for space for NGOs to organise and implement their activities with minimum (or without) interference from the government.

Chapter seven focuses on the Poverty Campaign. It reflect on the way and how NGOs play the

game of influencing poverty reduction policies. The focus is on the campaign to force the government to implement the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and targets outlined in the MKUKUTA.

Chapter eight is a concluding chapter. It discusses the future of NGOs in Tanzania. The main argument of the chapter is the need for the NGOs to direct their attention to building and strengthening the capacity of the grassroots through working with them instead of the current practice where NGOs are doing things for and on behalf of the poor people. Such practice diminishes the impact of NGOs on the communities and development of the country. Since people are not part of the current advocacy work; NGOs need to go back to the drawing board and listen and work with people. Also the chapter highlights some areas for further research.

Chapter One

Conceptual Foundation and the Theoretical Framework of Civil Society and NGOs

1.0 Introduction

This chapter reflects on the theoretical framework that informs this project. The chapter takes an historical approach to build up the argument on the theoretical approach which has been used to guide this study of NGOs in Tanzania. The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one reflects on the civil society concept and how it evolved. It attempts to trace the development of the civil society in governance and development discourses. Over time intellectuals have perceived the civil society differently due to changing conditions and developments. I prefer to discuss the civil society before jumping onto the NGOs, because, nowadays people tend to confuse NGOs with the civil society. There are several concepts of what civil society means. There are terms such as third sector, non-profit sector, philanthropy sector, non-governmental organisations, social economy, and public benefit organisations. In section two I discuss NGOs as expressions of the civil society. In the past twenty years NGOs have been given so much publicity and attention such that they obscure the civil society. NGOs have become synonymous to civil society. It is because of this background I have narrowed down the focus of my thesis to the NGOs. Section three is on the framework and is based on Antonio Gramsci's thinking on hegemony. NGOs are initiatives of elites and are being used by the governments and international development agencies as conduits for maintaining the ruling class (state) hegemony over society. Section four discusses how the NGOs are being used especially in third world countries as conduit to propagate and advocate for globalization based on neoliberal principals and agendas.

1.1 Civil Society Conceptualisation and its Evolution

The concept of civil society is contested historically and in contemporary debates (Muukkonen, 2007). To date there is still no agreement of what is civil society. Over time, civil society has had different perceptions and meanings. This ambiguity arises from the change of the meaning of civil society concepts over time. The Centre for Alternative Development Initiatives – CADI (2004) argues despite their divergence, they all agree on one point, that Civil Society constitutes a dimension of society different from and sometimes even antagonistic to the state. These different viewpoints also recognize the voluntary nature of civil society and its importance as a forum for independent public expression, and always it connotes people's action (Seckinelgin, 2002). Kaldor (2003) notes that, this changing meaning arises from several factors: the changing content or coverage of the term-what it was not; the tension between normative and descriptive; idealistic and empiricist; subjective and objective implications of the concept and the relative emphasis on private and public or the individual and social. The content and coverage shows unique resemblance to my study, and hereafter I will discuss in detail these two aspects.

Braton (1994) argues that civil society is a complex concept and different writers emphasize different dimensions of civil society: Hegel, Marx and Engels focus on the material; Ferguson and de Tocqueville are more on the organisation; Gramsci and Harvel insist on ideology. Keane as cited in Braton (1994: p.53) says eighteenth century liberal philosophers saw civil society as a means of defending communities against potential abuse by political leaders. Fergusson (1967), whose essay on the *History of Civil Society* in 1967 recognized that the solidarity of society was undermined by commerce, industries, and by emergence of a centralized constitutional state.

For 17th and 18th century thinkers, the term civil society came to prominence during transition from absolute monarchies to the modern state, although it had a prehistory in ancient and medieval times, the concept was linked to the concept of 'civility'. Kaldor (2003) insists that civil society meant respect of individual autonomy, based on security and trust among people who perhaps never met. By and large, civil society was associated with those forms of political authority that were beginning to displace the absolute monarchies in Europe. Leaders were accountable to some form of legislature. Although the term civil society was not distinguished from the state, the importance of checking the state as a condition for civil society was given emphasis from the 17th century onwards. This concept of checking state power was later expanded by de Tocqueville (1969).

The development of private property was the basis of civil society and Locke (2009 [1690]) who was the first scholar to develop this notion argues that humankind possesses his own labour and if he adds this to the products of nature, the products become his. As time went on, Smith (1977) [1776], one of the enlightenment thinkers, elaborated on this notion by stressing the development of the market economy as the basis for civilised society. Later, Hegel (1991 [1820]) influenced by the Scottish political economists defined civil society as, the realm of difference, intermediate between the family and state. He equated civil society with bourgeoisie society (*Burgeliche Gesellschaft*) and included the market. This definition was later taken up by Marx, Engels and other 19th century thinkers. Hegel (1991 [1820]) emphasised that civil society is the realm of contradiction and the modern state is mediator.

Kaldor (2003) reflecting on the role played by Marx and Engels, argues that, to them, political associations were a reflection of material conditions-they capitalised on the Hegelian concept of *Burgeliche Gesellschaft* and emphasized the role of the economy. Marx and Engel see the state as an instrument in the hands of the dominant class. Civil society is above the state and it embraces all the material relations of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces-these include commercial and industrial life. Cohen and Arato (1994) improved on the Hegelian concept by saying cooperation as associations are considered to be the barrier against the intrusion by civil servants and the state. De Tocqueville (1969) insisted on associationalism and self organisation.

In the 20th Century, the concept was narrowed down to social interactions that are distinct from state and market by Gramsci (1971)-that is ideology and cultural struggles. Bourgeoisie society had established a powerful set of norms and institutions to sustain the hegemony of bourgeoisie rules based on the consent of the working classes. Gramsci says that is why capitalism was not possible to be overthrown in Western Europe although it was possible in Russia, the reason being in the west there was a proper relation between state and civil society.

Mhina (2003) thinks one important distinction among the varying conceptions concerns the question of supremacy. Between the conception that civil society is supreme in relation to the state or at least the government and the other view which attributes supremacy between the two forces to the state while locating the civil society in a limited realm as it seeks a legitimate space in relation to the state. Mhina (2003) insists that the argument for the supremacy of the civil society does not depend necessarily on whether or not the civil society is fully developed to be

able to assert its supremacy over the state. The argument is built on the principle that the legitimacy of the state emanates from the consent of its citizens, which expresses itself effectively through its votes and through expression in their civil society organisations.

In 1989 Bratton defined civil society as “an arena where manifold social movements and civil society organisations from all classes, attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements, so that they can express themselves and advance their interests” (Bratton 1989:417). In 1994 instead of coming up with a simple definition of civil society, Bratton identified five definitional notions about the nature of civil society and its relationship with the state. The first notion is that civil society is a public realm between the state and the family. The second is that civil society is distinguished from the political society. The third is that civil society is a theoretical rather than an empirical construct. In other words it cannot be directly observed, instead it is a synthetic conceptual construct that encompasses the wide variety of forms of popular action that occur in the public realm. The fourth notion is that, civil society is seen as the source of legitimation of state power. Lastly, although the state and civil society are conceptually distinct, they are best considered together (Bratton, 1994). In the following discussion I give a detailed account of these five notions which Bratton proposes.

Civil society is placed in the public realm because it is distinguished from the household arena and the state. Bratton (1994) explains earlier philosophers, like Hegel and Locke, had distinguished it from the family and the state. To Bratton the realm is public for two reasons: First, it involves collective action in which individuals join to pursue shared goals. Secondly, it takes place in what he calls institutional “commons” that lie beyond the boundaries of the household.

He cautions that the public nature of civil action should not be confused with politics in the “public sector”, in other words, the realm of the state.

One might want to assert that civic societies are private organisations separated from the realm of the state. To some people to declare them “public” entices the state to intervene in the running of civil society organisations (Mhina, 2003). One could argue that civil society is private only when they want to separate it from the government, but indeed civil society organisations are public because they belong to members. There cannot be civil society organisations without members of the public; otherwise it is a family or an individual affair.

Civil society therefore needs to be separated from government and private enterprise, the latter basically engages in the quest for individual gain and accumulation. Civil society organisations such as NGOs are public because they are accountable to the public, its members and the citizens who are served by them. The fact that civil society organisations belong to the public realm, has often brought ramifications in their relations with the state (Mhina, 2003). The state claiming to play its rightful regulatory role demands that NGOs be accountable to its members by providing reports and account statements regularly. Needless to say there have been times when the state has misused this prerogative to harass NGOs.

The second notion distinguishes civil society from political society with the latter including political parties, elections and legislature, is that these are institutions through which social actors attempt to aggregate their interests into winning coalitions and to manage political competition. That distinction does not mean that civil society is not or should not be involved in politics. In

fact, to many scholars think that civil society has to be involved in politics. Young (1994) observes that “civil” and “political” in Lockean usage are interchangeable terms.

On the third aspect concerning civil society being a theoretical concept rather than an empirical one, Bratton (1994) argues that civil society is a composite concept and its emergence depends on the establishment of linkages within each dimension. It is further argued that although political resources, organisation and ideas may be observed none can capture the quality and complexity of civil society as a whole. I believe that while one might not capture the full picture of the civil society, especially its potential, it is possible to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the civil society and certainly its manifestations. Usually civil society is composed of a myriad of organisations, from National NGOs to Community Based Organisations (CBOs), with a potential that we know we cannot capture completely but which we can pursue in an attempt to understand. The idea of Bayart (2005), that civil society summarizes at macro-conceptual level, micro-empirical actions that citizens employ for political ends, does not preclude pointed studies on the political manifestations of civil society at the micro level especially when networks and alliances are created.

The fourth core proposition is that the alternation of political initiatives between the state and civil society is necessary for the legitimation of state power. The question here is whether civil society is the source of legitimacy of the state or whether the development of civil society is a process of legitimation of state power. The better approach, in my opinion, is to emphasize the reciprocal relationship between the two. In the Lockean sense, civil society gives rise to the civil government. While sovereignty lies with the community where civil society is located, that

community recognizes that the civil government is important and at times it protects that community against itself, in other words it deals with parts of the community which threatens the whole community in the pursuance of sectarian interests.

The fifth notion is that of civil society and the state. It is generally recognized that the state and civil society need to be analysed together and neither can be understood in isolation from the other. Hegel (1991 [1820]) is seen by some scholars as one of the pioneer philosophers on the understanding of the relationship between civil society and the state. As observed above, Hegel distinguishes the family, the civil society in the middle and the state. Sabine (1973; p. 78) insists it should be noted that the Hegelian state was very much above the society. She says:

The state is divine will, in the sense that it is mind present on earth. It is not a utilitarian institution engaged in the commonplace business of providing public services, administering the law, performing police duties and adjusting industrial and economic interests, all these belong to civil society.

To Hegel the relationship between the state and civil society as he understood it was mutual, even though the state was superior and civil society inferior. This concept of state would be criticized, for example by Marx (1889) who sees the state as the manifestation of the class struggle and the instrument of the dominant class which controlled it. With such a conception of class struggle and class dominated state, Marx did not see that civil society organisations within societies would be distinguished along class lines based on class struggle. Proletarian and affiliated organisations would seek to smash the state machinery and transform society. Conservative organisations would

seek to preserve the system while “bread and butter” worker organisations would seek to bring some limited reforms.

It is interesting that a Marxist would be Antonio Gramsci (1971) credited with the analysis of civil society in a progressive relationship with the state, however, he would find it difficult to free it from being an instrument of state power. Gramsci identified two major superstructural entities, political society (or state) which rules directly through the coercive and juridical instruments of domination, and civil society which promotes ethical values among the populace through the exercise of ideological and cultural hegemony. According to Bratton (1994), Gramsci reversed Marx by granting primacy to ideological factors within the superstructure itself. Ideas and values no longer served simply to justify an existing power structure, but were formative forces capable of disrupting and redistributing power itself.

One understands the statement of The Centre for Alternative Development Initiatives (CADI (2004)) and that of Antonio Gramsci, who find it difficult to free civil society from being the instrument of the state. Classical Marxist analysis attributes the state as having two instruments, the first being that of coercion (army, police etc) and the other being that of ideology which justifies the actions of the state. For Gramsci (1971) to justify the existence of ideas which were formative forces capable of disrupting and redistributing power, he had to place civil society at a distance from the state, otherwise how could ideas which are supposed to justify the state be disruptive. Gramsci therefore identified civil society but did not delineate clearly its relationship with the state, which in Marxist terms was supposed to represent class rule.

The civil society and the state are therefore linked but they are distinct entities and the nature of relationship between the two has always to be analysed and established. As CADI(2004) states , despite the existence of many conceptions of civil society they all agree on one point that it constitutes a dimension of society different from and sometimes even antagonistic to the state. Haberson (1994) attributes the modern idea of civil society to Thomas Hobbes whose concept of “Commonwealth” is based on mutual and voluntary agreement among individuals to forgo individual preservation by granting a higher individual the authority to provide security for all. It should be noted, however, that for Hobbes the authority which was transferred to the Leviathan is almost total. At the same time his “Commonwealth” is engaged in fictitious corporation. There is therefore no space for an independent civil society in the Hobbesian Schema, “The state is unique only in having no superior, while other corporations exist by its permission” (Sabine, 1973). Hobbe’s Commonwealth is that of convenience to avoid war of all against all, it is created for the purpose of transferring power to the Leviathan.

A clearer view of modern civil society can be attributed to John Locke because he had a sound view of civil power. “Such power can arise only by consent, and though this may be tacitly given, it must be the consent of each individual for himself,” (Sabine, 1973). This is the original social contract which creates the community and henceforth this contract should move the way the greater majority of the community carries it, which is the consent of the majority.

John Locke regarded the setting up of a government as a much less important event than the original compact that make a civil society. The second contract between the civil society and the civil government is less important because it is temporal and it is for a given time which is the

term of office. “The form of the government depends upon what disposition the majority, or otherwise the community, make of its power. It may be retained or it may be delegated to a legislative of one form or another (Sabine, 1973). To John Locke, the community which produces the civil society is real and it is the covenant that gives rise to the state. In the Lockean context it is easy to understand why it is the state which needs to seek its legitimacy from the civil society and not vice versa.

While John Locke has made it clear as to where sovereignty lies between the state and community, the question remains as to what constitutes civil society in relation to the community or the society at a large. Locke links civil society to politics. Locke believed in the explicitly political and public nature of civil society, since people consciously and voluntarily created the community, it should be expected that they should be politically conscious in their relationship with the civil government.

In the current analysis, distinction is made between society in general, the civil society and the state. The civil society in that context can be a buffer against government or society, can be a broker between government and society, can be a symbol of political or societal norm setters and can be an agent of change, an integrator of groups articulating political interests and a midwife for regime change. According to Haberson, the central point is that these avenues of functioning are not necessarily ends in themselves but means to achieving the fundamental norm-formation purpose of civil society (Haberson, 1994)

It can be argued that civil society occupies the position between the society at large which could

be made up of families, class or ethnic groupings on one hand and the state. Civil society is composed of the politicized components of society. The space for civil society can keep on growing as more members of the society join up in various organisations. Such organisations therefore can play the Haberson's functions.

In the context of Africa, civil society plays the above functions with varying levels of impact and success. It arises from the underdeveloped nature of political systems and political communities. The Lockean community and the consequent civil society are underdeveloped in Africa. In many instances the general society is characterized by sectarian interests, conflicts and violence. As mentioned above, these tendencies have led some to deny the relevance of the concept of civil society in Africa. I will come back to this in chapter four and five, which I have devoted solely to civil society and NGOs in the Southern Africa and Tanzania context. However, when nationhood is in the ascendancy, it will lead to the emergence of real citizens, not tribal men masquerading as citizens. In such a situation civil society would be present and would grow as nationhood develops. We are therefore often faced by a situation where we say that civil society is supreme when in reality it is on the retreat from the attacks of the state, which is supposed to have arisen out of the consent of its citizens. The state in many instances has usurped the power of the citizens.

Tandon (1991) has argued that the relationship between the state and civil society needs to be reformulated in three significant ways of accountability. The first accountability implies rootedness of the state, its institutions and practices in the culture, morality, values and norms of civil society. He argues that alien forms of practices, policies and programs will result in the

weakening of these roots. The second dimension of this accountability is the mechanisms of critiquing, questioning, debating and rejecting policies. The third form of accountability is the recognition of the supremacy of the civil society *Vis a Vis* the state through the examination of any roles, policies and procedures by the civil society (Tandon, op.cited).

These are important points which need to be recognized, that states are unlikely to relax their domination on their societies without pressure from both the civil society and the political society-opposition parties. The civil society needs to play the card of the legitimation of the state. Few states can survive a prolonged crisis of legitimacy, the political aspects of civil society are therefore very important.

That assertion demands a conclusion on whether civil society, is political, social or cultural. CADI (2004) places civil society within the sphere of culture. It is argued that this cultural sphere is internally creative and not a mere appendage of the economy or the state. While independent from both, the cultural sphere can have endearing influence on both the economy and the state just as the latter two have had historically enormous impacts on culture. To CADI (2004), the activities of civil society build various forms of capital, social, human, institutional and ecological. It is argued that these various forms of “capital” need to be recognized by mainstream economists because currently they account for as much as 64% of the wealth generated by the global economy, but which is almost totally appropriated by business enterprises for their own good.

Earlier on we have seen that Bratton eliminates, from civil society, economic associations which neglect the dimensions of organisation and ideology as well as voluntary non-profit organisations

which provide services while ignoring the politics of the private sector. There seems therefore to be different views on the matter. In practice, the civil society is made up of various organisations, associations and sectoral or major groups representation involved in social, economic, cultural, and environmental and advocacy activities. Whether these activities reach political levels at all times is not important. I think what is important is for these organisations to play the expressive function. They need to mobilize and articulate the interests and needs of various citizens, including their demands on the government.

Another definitional/conceptual issue which needs to be resolved is whether the for profit private sector, belongs to the civil society. Bratton excludes from civil society informal private trade and manufacturing entities which neglects the dimensions of organisation and ideology at the expense of material transactions. He also excludes from civil society associational life which is partially collective but which emphasizes individual organisations rather than linkages among them. He finally excludes from civil society the voluntary sector which focuses only on organisations that are guided by the values of not-for profit sense ignoring the politics of the private sector. To him the concept of civil society embraces a sum of political activity that is qualitatively broader than any of these aspects which are not for profit (Bratton, 1994).

While Bratton wants to dismiss informal private trade and manufacturing entities who do not organize and mobilize, he is silent about formal enterprises. (Mhina, 2003) sees it is the formal private enterprises which need to be excluded from civil society. However, umbrella organisations of the private enterprises should be considered as part of civil society because they are engaged in creating linkages and represent associations, articulating the interests of different actors in the

private sector.

While it is a good thing to have a general perspective of what different scholars are saying about civil society, in the following section I have narrowed down my focus by giving more attention to civil society in relationship to NGOs and that way I am able to argue why in this study, my focus is on NGOs.

1.2 NGOs as Organic Expression of Civil Society

NGOs began to emerge in the nineteenth century. The most well known international NGOs are the likes of Anti-Slavery Society (1839) and International Red Cross-(1864) (Korey, 1998). Immediately after World War I in the 1920s-1930s, the world saw a proliferation of NGOs and other civil society groups as interests/groups looking for their own solutions to their needs and problems (Ibid.). There are various types of NGOs in the world today. From community development to bird watching, from environmental to gender rights, etc. NGOs have mushroomed throughout the world assuming various objectives and being engaged in different activities. The term “NGO” itself has become controversial as various organisations of different persuasion organically tied to various governments and international bodies have seen the light of day in many countries (Kaldor, 2003).

Often a question has been posed as to whether civil society organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are one and the same thing. If civil society refers to citizens with rights and obligations in a community, which is the covenant that gave rise to the state, then the NGOs have

to be distinguished from the organisations of the government. Kaldor (2003) joins hands with those who see civil society as tending to refer to social movements, associations, NGOs or non-profit. Theoretically, NGOs are organisations that operate within the civil society but are not controlled by the government. This makes NGOs almost synonymous with civil society organisations. At present, however NGOs have acquired a narrower meaning than that of civil society organisations. NGOs have been defined as organisations formed on a voluntary basis but operating with paid staff, either for the benefit of members or to provide services to or on behalf of others (Semboja et al, 1995). Not only have NGOs a narrower meaning but they have often been distinguished from grassroots associations and member service organisations such as cooperatives. Most also have been linked with external funding, from donors or from allied Northern NGOs (Ibid.). During my field work in Tanzania, Prince Bagenda of Political Risk Analysis in Africa (PORIS) confirmed this assertion when he told me “NGOs are donor driven , while Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are people organisations at grassroots” (Interview, 24/01/2008).

NGO is an umbrella term which encompasses a broad array of organisations, varying enormously according to their purpose, philosophy, sectoral expertise and scope of activities. In the development field, NGOs range from large international organisations and charities (mostly based in developed countries) to small community based self-help groups in developing countries (Nelson and Wright, 1995; World Bank, 1996). The Department of International Development (DfID) of the United Kingdom as cited in Seckinelgin (2002, p.) defines NGOs as:

All civic organisations, associations and networks which occupy civil society between

family and the state except firms and political parties. And who came together to advance their common interests through collective action. These include volunteer and charity groups, parents and teachers associations, senior citizen groups, non-profit think tanks, and issues based activities. By definition, all such civic groups are non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Chandhoke (2002) observes generally that civil society has come to be dominated by NGOs, even though other actors, such as political activists networking across borders and anti-globalisation movements, are playing an important role in this sphere. It is indicative of the power of the non-governmental sector that civil society has come to be identified with NGO activism both in influential tomes on civil society and in policy prescriptions of international institutions today.

Today governments and other international institutions recognize NGOs as civil society. A case of how the United Nations (UN) handles its relations with civil society illustrates this notion. Way back in 1907 Henri La Fontaine, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1913, created the Central Office of International Associations in 1907 to link up NGOs in different countries (Kaldor, 2003). When the UN was born, it picked up the idea of NGOs and ever since has been consulting with NGOs and has institutionalised procedures for consulting with these organisations since 1945. It is estimated that whereas in 1948, 41 NGOs enjoyed consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN, by 1968 the number had risen to 500. By 1992 the Economic and Social Council consulted with 1,000 or more NGOs. By 2003 this number reached tens of thousands (Korey, 1998; Kaldor, 2003).

It is because of this background I found myself being forced to narrow down the concept of civil society to focus on NGOs. Winch (1994) insists social science should always try to give meaning and understanding of the world as the societies and people understand and interpret it. Today, in Tanzania when a politician, donor, journalist, or a person from the private sector refers to civil society or civil society organisations in actual sense they mean NGOs. And practically most of the social groups engaging the government are NGOs.

In this study, I will adopt the definition as defined by NGO Policy of Tanzania (URT, 2001, p.15) which states:

An NGO is a voluntary grouping of individuals or organisations which is autonomous and not-for-profit sharing; organized locally at the grassroots level, nationally or internationally for the purpose of enhancing the legitimate economic, social and /or cultural development or lobbying or advocating on issues of public interest or interest of a group of individuals or organisations.

To be more specific and focused in this study I restrict myself to the the NGOs doing advocacy work with the intention of changing government policies, regulations and laws in favour of majority population. In here my attention being that of Tanzania advocacy NGOs. World Bank, (1996) sees the main purpose of advocacy NGOs is to defend or promote a specific cause.

1.3 Gramsci on Civil Society and NGOs

Various theoretical perspectives have been developed in an attempt to understand the engagement of NGOs with the state in the endeavour to influence the policy and governance direction. In my

case I have relied on Antonio Gramsci, in understanding the role of NGOs, as a framework of my reflection and analysis. Some of the ideas of Gramsci on civil society have been highlighted briefly in the proceeding sections in this chapter . But in this subsection, I focus more on Gramsci's thinking on especially how it fits in a study like this one with its context in Tanzania.

In the early stages of this thesis, before opting for Gramsci's thinking, I had thought of three other frameworks which I thought would be well suited to my study. However, as I continued reading and doing some reflections, I had to abandon one after the other. Initially, I thought about Social Capital which Putnam (1993) has written extensively about. After my initial research, I was not convinced with the idea of reflecting on NGOs' activities in Tanzania as social capital endeavour. Through personal experience and reading I was not able to get enough evidence to link NGOs with social capital in the Tanzanian environment. This led me to conclude that this framework would not be able to inform this project critically enough. Hence, I turned to social movement theory. Initially, I was captivated by this framework. But again, it did not take me long before I came to the conclusion that this framework is not sufficiently situated in studying NGOs in the Tanzanian context. Social movements are well developed in Europe and America. When one attempts to reflect on the work of NGOs in Tanzania, through the eyes of social movements, it fails to see how this fits in the framework of social movement. One of the major shortcomings they notice is the fact that NGOs are not rooted in peoples' struggles (Shivji, 2003). And this makes one want to see that somehow NGOs are sabotaging the efforts to build social movement forces. After abandoning social movement theory, I opted for Alex de Tocqueville and his thinking on the role of association in monitoring and checking state power. I thought because many advocacy NGOs aim at checking on state power, then this is an appropriate framework to

use in reflecting on the role of NGO's activism and advocacy. This new found love did not last long. I had to abandon de Tocqueville because his central argument is how associations help to foster democracy through holding governments to account. I was not comfortable with his thinking because the mushrooming of NGOs in the country is mostly due to availability of donor funds. Finally, I settled for Antonio Gramsci's thoughts. Although, I had to try different perspectives before settling down, this has helped me a lot in sharpening my understanding of civil society and NGOs from different perspectives.

Gramsci (1971), in his notes he wrote when was in prison in Italy focuses on hegemony. Gramsci defines hegemony as a form of control exercised primarily through a society superstructure. The use of hegemony by Gramsci has been interpreted as an effort to correct Karl Marx, by eliminating economic bias from social and historical analysis, hence he makes the Marxism more complete (Femia, 1987). Gramsci, as pointed out by Bobbio in Orvis (2001, p.15), 'saw civil society as a non-state sphere of outright domination (hegemony) controlled, directly or indirectly, by the bourgeoisie'. By hegemony, Gramsci meant the permeation throughout society of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations' society' Burke (1999, 2005). While Hadenius and Ugglä (1996) see civil society as neither performing a democratic nor creating egalitarian democracy. Chachage (2004) explains how Gramsci defines and understands civil society in very simple and straight forward words when he quotes Gramsci who says; "civil society is the realm where the 'hegemony or political power of one social group over the entire nation is exercised through subtle, intangible and invisible forms'. There is a dichotomy between political and civil society". Femia (1987, p. 27) asserts that "the state, when it wants to initiate an unpopular action or policy, creates in advance a suitable or

appropriate, public opinion, that is, it organizes and centralizes certain element of civil society”. The crucial point to his mind is that governments can rule and regulate. Governments can mobilize mass media and other ideological instruments to further its ideology, policies or programs. This is possible because various elites in governments, media or NGOs share similar world views and life style. When the (UN) through its different programs like United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP); and International Financial Institutions (IFS) like World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) tell governments of developing countries to work in partnership with NGOs, that is enough to make one to see clearly what Gramsci meant. Chachage (2004) explains how these institutions in the 1980s and 1990s rediscovered NGOs and through them it is easy to push for a globalization project which is based on neo-liberal agenda, hence it is easy to maintain the status quo and it helps them to exploit with less resistance. The dominant actors have in effect manipulated and dictated policies to redefine and shape the outcome/agenda to suit their respective interests.

Gramsci sees hegemony as involving both the consensual diffusion of a particular cultural and moral view through society and its interconnection with coercive functions: or when there is a corresponding equilibrium between ethico-political ideas and prevailing socio-economic conditions fortified by coercion (Gramsci, 1995). The emphasis on continual construction, maintenance, and defence of hegemony in the face of constant resistance and pressure is reflected in Gramsci’s strategic theory and potential for counter hegemony. Gramsci analysis aims to show how the society can resist cultural domination by ruling class. He contends that society should not rely on one strategy, rather he proposes multiphase approaches. He asserts the oppressed wage war of manoeuvres to challenge total domination. Here “war of manoeuvre” refers to an effort-

rising out of popular initiative-to directly challenge the dominant social forces. The war of manoeuvre or frontal attack, targeted directly at attaining state power might prove ineffective and transitory in certain countries (Morton, 2007). Gramsci (1971) opposes the war of manoeuvre, instead a more protected form of trench warfare could be conducted, known as the war of position. This involves struggle on the cultural front in civil society-to overcome the 'powerful system'- in an attempt to penetrate and subvert the mechanisms of ideological diffusion (Gramsci, 1971). War of position (also called a passive revolution) focuses on consolidating, fortifying, and perhaps gradually reforming a given social order. Additionally, a counter hegemony could entail an 'underground war' involving the clandestine gathering of arms assault troops (Gramsci, 1971). However, in terms of the war-of-position strategy, one has to bear in mind that a 'counter' hegemonic movement may lack an internal logic or social basis. This means that the formation of collective will might be thwarted and resistance dispersed into infinity of individual wills' scattered into separate and conflicting paths (Gramsci, 1971).

The struggle to establish counter hegemony could therefore be particularly weakened by absorbing or co-opting the active elements of opposition involved in projecting a war of position. Gramsci (1971) gives examples of how this game was played by Italian politicians in 19th Century. Such attempts to remove substantive differences and establish a convergence between contending social-class forces sometimes are encapsulated within the processes of transformation and changes. The war of position demands enormous sacrifices by infinite masses of people. So an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is necessary, and hence more interventionist government, which will take the offensive more openly against the impossibility internal disintegration-with control of every kind, political, administrative , etc., reinforcement of

hegemonic positions of the dominant group etc. The war of manoeuvre subsists so long as it is a question of winning positions hegemony cannot be mobilised. But when, for one reason or another these positions have lost their value and only the decisive positions are at stake, then one passes over to siege warfare; this is concentrated, difficult, and requires exceptional qualities of patience and inventiveness. Karl Marks (1855) as cited by Gramsci (1971, p. 239) sums up this scenario:

A resistance too long prolonged in a besieged camp is demoralising in itself. It implies suffering, fatigue, loss of rest, illness and the continual presence not of acute danger which tempers but of the chronic danger which destroys.

In order for the state to continue with domination of every sector of society, it raises a great deal of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level or type which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development and hence to the interest of the ruling class. Williams (1977.113) sees among other things that hegemony tries to neutralize opposition. “The decisive hegemonic function is to control transformation or even incorporate alternative opposition”.

Fowler (1994) as cited in Clay (1996) sees one of the intentions of NGOs is to reform the way that society works or alter the way its costs and benefits are distributed. The size of NGOs in a state is determined by the dominant ideology in the society guided by the regime in power and the expressed policy preferences, legislation, public versus private investment voices and other means. When citizens engage in different associational life it helps to promote the creation and preservation of civic virtue which entails elements of war of position (Wolfe, 1997).

In recent years there has been an increase of scholarly writings stressing the need for states to expand the ways in which citizens can have more say on governance. The argument put forward is that in the era of globalization this is the best choice for the states if they want to increase their legitimacy. Globalisation creates a strong impetus and logic to the downward devolution of power. The most notable and celebrated work is 'The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy' by Giddens (1998) who in the last decades of the 20th century saw the trend of governments towards entering into partnership with civil society to foster community renewal and development. Initially he uses Britain as his case study, and later in his following two books he expands his focus and also documents reactions of other scholars who commented on his thesis (Giddens, 2000; Giddens et al, 2001). The advance of globalization makes a community focus on both the necessary and possible, because of the downward pressure it exerts. In that way governments should expand the role of the public sphere by being more transparent and open. Unlike in the past, governments and citizens increasingly now live in a single information environment and existing ways of doing things comes under inquiry.

For instance, Giddens (2000) criticizes United Kingdom (UK) executives for holding too much power, while forms of accountability are weak. Governments could re-establish more contacts with citizens, and citizens with governments. He goes further by proposing that government could go as far as inviting people to input into policy formulation because this has been the practice in Scandinavian countries like Sweden. Governments should not be expected to react and listen to civil society when things have gone wrong, rather, in the era of globalisation governments can rely and draw upon the resources of the civil society for what is needed for effective governance

(Giddens, 2000). Although Giddens was addressing issues in the UK; many countries worldwide responded by following and implementing his ideas (Giddens et al, 2001).

One view of NGOs is that based on a democratic imperative view that once formal democracy is established (and this occurred in many Africa countries in 1980s and early 1990s), NGOs continue their role of making material and social demands. Groups no longer seek formal power within government by opposing those who hold power. Instead, they seek to change the agenda by proposing sustainable solutions to social problems (Merere, 2004). Civil society activists do not want to see democracy limited to electoral politics imposed by foreign superpowers, rather they want to see people participating in everyday decision processes (Nash, 2006).

In the case of many developing countries, unlike in the West, where NGOs were people initiatives to pressurise governments, NGOs were the initiative of donors as Shivji (2003, p. 2) explains:

NGOs, as they developed in the West, were essentially pressure groups to keep those in power, the state and the government, on their toes. In our case, as the donors became disenchanted with states, they took a fancy to NGOs, thus undermining the state and its institutions while, at the same time, placating their own constituencies back at home who demanded civil society involvement. Participation and consultation are supposedly part of the so-called “good governance” insisted upon by donors. They provide the imperial countries with the means to legitimize the neo-liberal policies of hegemonic Western powers and the IFIs (International Financial Institutions) in our countries.

Chachage (2002, p.15) gives a comprehensive analysis as to why the World Bank and IMF have stood firmly to promote civil society and NGO participation in the governance in Africa. He says:

...thus struggle for broad democracy were derailed by the late 1980s, even the civil society relationship discourse was radically transformed to the one that supported liberalisation and operation of market forces in response to what was termed 'informal' or 'second' economy. The World Bank and IMF promoted this conception backed by scholarly words of both Western and African origin. The belief that civil society organisations (re-conceptualised as Non-Governmental Organisations-NGOs) in Africa have an important role to play.

Seckinelgin (2001) reveals how at the United Nations level, the international Chamber of Commerce and the UN Secretary General label groups of activists who demonstrate against globalisation as enemies of the poor. He questions and calls for security of the rules which establish their rights if they refuse to behave like other groups who have been working with business. These groups are trade unions, consumer organisations and other representative groups. He praises those groups that are responsible, credible and reliable.

One of the reason which made me to opt for hegemony advanced by Gramsci as my framework is because I want to see to what extent it is applicable in the Tanzanian context and environment. In recent years, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donors have been arguing and pushing for governments in the developing world to give more room to civil society organisations and NGOs. They claim that NGOs constantly monitor government. Also they see this as a way of

making sure people are meaningfully participating in deciding on their governance. Another reason which pushed me towards the Gramsci way is because the growth and development of NGOs in Africa and the developing countries of Asia, Latin America and even Eastern Europe is mainly associated with democratisation and the free market economy. For the past 20 years or so, there has been a voice from donors and other international development actors who have been tying aid with democratisation development and one way they use is it to force governments to create an enabling environment for civil society and NGOs to flourish.

1.4 NGOs and Perpetuation of Globalization Based on Western Liberalism

A good piece of analysis which translates Gramsci preposition is that of Seckinelgin (2001). Seckinelgin in *Civil Society as a Metaphor for Western Liberalism* concludes that the usage of civil society in the specific context of development implies a normative rethinking of social relations within developing societies. This normative approach to civil society is an attempt to realign social relations within developing countries parallel to the western liberal model of social arrangements between state, market and the third sector (civil society). He arrives at this conclusion because of how international institutions especially International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Bilateral Donors of western countries like the Department for International Development (DfID) of the United Kingdom, use the language of civil society in the context of development as a metaphor¹.

He gives an analysis of two reports, one by the DfID and another by the World Bank to defend his

¹ The Oxford Dictionary defines metaphor as 'the figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989:676).

case. In the report by the DfID of 2000, the DfID has formulated a set of new strategies for making government work for the poor. The report sets goal for alleviating poverty in the developing world by bringing people into the development process. And one way of achieving this goal is by strengthening both global and national civil society voices in the developing nations. Churches and other faith groups, human rights and womens' organisations grouped together as NGOs, are given as the location of these voices. The argument takes these associations and organisations as the locus as they are assumed to speak on peoples' behalf (Seckinelgin, 2001).

The reason they opted for the NGOs is because they are newly emerging organisational forms around the world, they were thought to be more conducive, as they appear to be more reform oriented and small in size to the sorts of changes perceived to be necessary for a healthy democracy. And at the same time it is assumed that the involvement of NGOs and civil society will, in time, improve the quality of government.

Seckinelgin (2001) is convinced that the observation about the emergence of associational life as the outcome of the troubles of modern system constitute the context within which the metaphor of civil society organisations is meaningful. It is with this understanding that the language of metaphor signifies an idea of civil society where a particular form of associational civil life is the outcome of a particular judicial and political system. Therefore, it becomes much clearer that the metaphor of civil society organisations is not referring to any inspirational civil society or to one that may actually exist in developing societies (Seckinelgin, 2001). It is referring to a particular form of civil society where governments are reluctant to take part in the social realm, and it is

identifiable with the particular associational life in which individual people need to re-establish social links. As a metaphor in the reports, it is not only assumes this particular context of separation of the social from the political implicitly, but, also as a basis of policy recommendations, it invokes the receiver to produce the reconstitute the understanding of civil society in this image (Seckinelgin, 2001).

Some scholars see these economic and financial crises as a consequence of unfettered globalisation, as a result of the working of the free and unregulated market (Rhodes and Higgot, 2000). The neo-liberal agenda had after all failed to deliver the much promised benefits of greater growth, stabilisation of financial markets, and political order. Income disparities had increased, the number of the poor had grown drastically, and people had been deprived of their livelihoods and security of life. A global economic order had been forged through globalisation without any prospect of justice, or democracy, or redistribution. And this posed problems for the defenders of globalisation. For if a system is widely perceived as unjust, it will necessarily engender resistance (Rhodes and Higgot, 2000).

The insistence of involving NGOs by some international organisations like the World Bank, IMF and other bilateral donors, is a deliberate social political process to create an organisational culture which makes developing countries to behave and think like western society. It is a civilization mission (Seckinelgin, 2002). These organisations argue that for developing nations to register development they must bring people into the development process. They insist and assume NGOs will speak on peoples' behalf. Pearce (2004) sees that the development NGO community, found itself gaining unexpected respectability and potential funding from the world of official donors.

Northern NGOs had to find Southern counterparts. However, Pearce (2004) argues, even at that early stage, for example in a 1992 Development NGO Conference, there were tensions within members who were urged to weigh risks as well as gains implicit in the opportunity to scale up support for wholesale economic liberalism.

The situation among development NGOs was not helped by the tensions between Northern NGOs and Southern NGOs when donors by-passed Northern NGOs and gave funds directly to Southern NGOs. Criticism of both Northern and Southern NGOs increased. Pearce (2004) talks about the negative outcome of those who chose to become “the delivery agency” for a global soup kitchen. He suggests that the backlash had begun and that NGOs were no longer seen as offering significant advantages neither in community development nor in complex emergencies. Instead they were “useful fig-leaves to cover government inaction or indifference to human suffering” both in complex emergencies and in economic restructuring.

Pearce (2004) like Chachage (2003a); and Shivji (2003) warn NGOs to avoid being “happy agents of a foreign aid system”. They argue that they should rethink their mandate, mission and strategies by looking towards the gradual replacement of foreign aid agendas by a broader agenda of international cooperation in which NGOs reshape the roles and seek alliances around common goals with other social and civic organisations.

After seeing that NGOs are becoming more and more like agents of the liberal economy, Chachage (2003a) and Shivji (2003) have called on NGOs to return to the role of being promoters of social change and of non-market values such as cooperation, non violence, respect for human

rights and democratic processes, and to make these the bottom line in decisions over economics, environment, social policy and politics. Shivji (2007, p. vi) sums it up well when he reminds those who want to celebrate NGOs in Africa that:

...the transformation from a colonial subject society to bourgeois society in Africa is incomplete, stunted and distorted. We have the continued domination of imperialism-reproduction of the colonial mode-in a different form, currently labelled globalisation or neo-liberalism. Within this context, NGOs are neither a third sector, nor independent of the state. Rather, they are inextricably implicated in the neoliberal offensive, which follows on the heels of the crisis of the national project. Unless there is awareness on the part of the NGOs of this fundamental moment in the struggle between imperialism and nationalism, they end up playing the role of ideological and organisational foot soldiers of imperialism.

1.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have focused on the understanding and practice of civil society and NGOs from a global perspective. In chapter three I focus more in the Southern African context where we see the role and application of the concept of NGO. In chapter four, I give an account of NGOs at the national level (Tanzania). In these two chapters, I will be able to interrogate and analyse the applicability of issues that emerged in this chapter. More importantly, we see to what extent NGOs' activities help to cement the status quo of state and act as a hegemony and ideological tool for the benefit of the ruling class.

Chapter Two

Research Methodology

2.0 Introduction

This chapter intends to show the methodological approach which has guided this study. Methodology is the point at which methods, theory and epistemology coalesce in overt ways in the process of direct investigation (Harvey, 1990). This chapter is divided into ten sections. Section one gives an account and a reflection of how this research was born. The second section discusses the research design as applied to the study. Section three is devoted to explaining the choice of study site. Section four discusses the sample, sampling and the selection of the interviewees. Section five focuses on the data collection methods and tools that were used in the research. The main data collecting tools were face to face interview guide, telephone interview guide, participant observation, and e-mail correspondence. Section six explains how the field processes. It highlights my attachment at Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO) office where I conducted the participant observation. The section, also, explains the interaction with the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and how interviewees participate in the interview and how this interaction was done. The seventh section moves on to describe the management of insider researcher. In section eight there is a discussion about data analysis and interpretation. Section nine discusses ethical concerns that the researcher had to address. And section ten is about the limitations encountered during the field work. Because of my background in the NGO sector, this section gives a reflection on how this research was born.

2.1 My Journey into the Mysterious World of NGOs

My interaction and experience with the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and civil society for several years aroused in me a curiosity to undertake a thorough and analytical study to understand the ‘mystery’ of NGOs and the civil society world. I have interacted and worked within the NGOs sector in Tanzania for more than 16 years now. In 2000-2006, before leaving for my studies, I was with the Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO) as an Advocacy Officer. TANGO being a network of NGOs, gave me an opportunity to gain the firsthand experience of the NGO and civil society sector in the country. The aim and purpose of most NGOs is to contribute towards development in the country. This is done through provision of social services; policy engagement; activism; advocacy; and campaigns. They claim to be complementing the government in the provision of social services such as; health, education and safe water in places where these services are not provided by the government. For NGOs providing advocacy services, the aim is to hold government to account so it prepares and implements policies and programmes which aim at freeing people from poverty, and to build a strong and vibrant civil society to fight against all forms of injustice. The assumption is that with a vibrant civil society in place, it will be easy for people to champion their own social and economic development. The main architects of a vibrant civil society concept are the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and NGOs rarely question this thinking (Chachage, 2003a). I have elaborated more on the role of the WB and IMF in chapter one which is on theoretical framework.

It was so captivating to join the TANGO for policy advocacy engagement duties because I knew I was now a member of 'the army' that would transform the country to make the voices of common people heard. Over time however, the reality of the NGO world started getting clearer to me. Questions about the role of NGOs in bringing social change in the country through policy activism and advocacy started troubling me. These were questions to do with ideology, motives, strategies, approaches, methodologies, legitimacy, accountability, ownership, participation and impact. In particular, one challenging question kept coming back from time to time. "Is it true that NGOs are leading the people to real social change that is sustainable and people based development? No answer came forth easily; and thus this project is part of the search for an answer.

When I was informed by the sponsor of my graduate studies in June 2005, that they would fund my studies, I have continued to engage with the NGO community in the country and to develop my proposal for my university application. I started to collect data for this project at this time. I remember the first proposal I submitted for application was titled 'the Role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Enhancing Participatory Governance in Tanzania'. My thinking by then was that I wanted to see how people are being brought close to governance machinery. As I continued searching and observing, my thinking took a new shape. I developed an interest in interrogating and asking about the way things are done, why, what are the motives behind, the genuiness of these programmes and activities by NGOs. I was anxious to be to tell and explain what exactly is happening. This matches the view that while doing qualitative research we should always strive to go beyond the observable and bring to the light those hidden meanings and actions.

2.2 Research Design

The research design enables the researcher to have a blue print which the research will follow. The research design gives direction, process and procedure on how the main aspects of the research will be carried out. Hakim cited in (Knowles, 2006, p.123). explains “research design deals primarily with aims, uses, purposes, intentions and plans within the practical constraints of location, time, money and availability of staff. It is also very much about style”. Research design is the first thing that needs to be done in social research before other things such as data collection can take place. However, in qualitative research like this one, research design is not supposed to be a linear process where one stage follows the other. Maxwell (2005, p. 2) insists that research design should be a reflective process operating at every stage of the study.

The activities of collecting and analysing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or refocusing the research questions, and identifying and addressing validity threats are usually all ongoing more or less simultaneously, each influencing each of the others.

Design must also fit well with its uses and environment. Maxwell, (2005, p. 5) further stresses:

...you will need to continually assess how this design is actually working during the research, how it influences and is influenced by environment, and to make adjustments and changes so that your study can accomplish what you want.

The design of this study is a case approach one. Iacono et al. (2009) argues that case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding a phenomenon within its natural setting. In the case study, attention is paid to contextual conditions, regarded as highly relevant to the phenomenon being investigated, whereas an experiment typically deliberately separates the phenomenon from its context and focuses on a number of variables. I have used the TANGO and NGOs of Tanzania engagement with NGO Policy and Act enactment process; and the Global Call Against Poverty-Tanzania (GCAP-T). These case studies has helped me to achieve the main aim of my study which is to get understanding of the context, ways and means in which NGOs in Tanzania engage with the government to influence policies and decisions. The first case study examines how NGOs engage the government in making sure it enacts the NGO Policy and Act which do not jeopardise the very existence of NGOs. This is addressed in chapter six. The second case study deals with NGOs in their poverty monitoring campaign, and is discussed in chapter seven.

2.3 Choice of Study Site

The main site of study was Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. I chose and interviewed 20 NGOs and one of them, Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO) was used as the centre and focus of my study. In particular, I used TANGO for intensive study which helped me to generate information for chapters six and seven. A number of reasons made me choose NGOs based in Dar Es Salaam. Firstly, the majority of NGOs in Tanzania are based in Dar Es Salaam. Secondly, the two campaigns that I have used for this study were mainly implemented in Dar Es

Salaam. And finally, my work station before leaving the country to pursue PhD studies in the United Kingdom was based in Dar es Salaam. As I explained earlier in the introductory section, my experience of the advocacy and activism of NGOs which stimulated my curiosity to undertake this study happened in Dar es Salaam. As I pointed out earlier, the role of NGOs in bringing social change in the country through policy activism and advocacy started troubling me in Dar es Salaam. These were questions to do with ideology, motives, strategies, approaches, methodologies, legitimacy, accountability, ownership, participation and impact. In particular, one question kept troubling me from time to time. Are NGOs leading the people to real social change with sustainability and is it people based development? Because it is in Dar es Salaam where I witnessed most of these incidences and challenges, I thought it would be more appropriate and wise to undertake intensive study there instead of choosing another area in the country.

Choosing TANGO for intensive study was prompted by two major reasons. Firstly, TANGO coordinated both campaigns which I have used in this thesis project. Secondly, I have worked with TANGO and I was aware of these two campaigns. Since I was familiar with TANGO and knew how these campaigns were done, it left me with a lot of questions. So getting the chance of undertaking independent study like this gave me reason to be able to answer some of those questions. In section 2.6 below I have discussed how I managed the bias which might be caused by researching the situation where one is an insider. Secondly, because there is trust between me and TANGO staff I saw this as an opportunity. I also knew that it will make my job a bit easier instead of going to a new NGO which would take me time to familiarise with their internal politics. Another factor that made me choose TANGO was partly that I participated in both the NGOs Policy and Act and GCAP-T campaigns.

2.4 Sample, Sampling and Selection of Interviewees

My sampling procedure was purely purposive. I chose people who I knew were conversant with the issues of the NGO Policy and Act process and the Global Action Against Poverty –Tanzania (GCAP-T) which were the main issues under my study. For the NGO Policy and Act process engagement which was done in the years between 1996-2005, I aimed at the respondents who had been with their NGOs for more than five years. For the GCAP-T campaign, because was still ongoing during the data collection time (2008), I did not set criteria in terms of time the officers had served with their current organisation to be interviewed.. All the people I interviewed knew and were aware of both the issues under investigation. I was able to interview 12 Chief Executive Officers and 10 Senior Programme Officers/Managers. Also, I managed to interview three University lecturers in Dar es Salaam who had strong connections with NGOs in terms of research, affiliation or association. In total, I conducted 24 interviews. Being able to get such high calibre officers simplified the availability and reliability of information because they are and have been involved in many activities and processes within their organisations and even outside.. All the interviewees have been working in the NGO sector for more than ten years. This long experience proved to be a very great advantage to this study because they could discuss issues from an historical point of view and very broadly.

2.5 Tools of Data Collection

Field work plays an integral part in an empirical study. I relied on five main data collection tools namely: documentary review; in-depth interviews guide; participant observation form; email

listing groups (e-groups) and email correspondence and telephone interview guide. All these tools are closely related. Although different approaches were applied in this study, the main purpose was to ensure that they complemented each other. The findings are presented in a narrative way because this thesis is qualitative.

2.5.1 Documentary Review

This project has relied on documented information which has not been analysed. This information included activity, project and programme reports; meeting reports; letters and other correspondence materials; posters; and brochures. Others included newsletters and magazines; staff meeting minutes; books and journals. During the fieldwork which I conducted in Tanzania, I was able to use the libraries and resource centres of NGOs and other institutions in Dar es Salaam. The TANGO Resource Centre provided me with a lot of information. The resource centre stores a lot of information about NGOs in Tanzania and elsewhere. Apart from using their Resource Centre, they allowed me access to their office files. They went as far as allowing me access to their computers for information stored in electronic form.

I used other NGOs library and resource centres as well. NGOs which gave me access to their resource centres which had volumes of information about NGOs in the country included HakiElimu; Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP); Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA); Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) and the University of Dar es Salaam. Staff of these organisations were helpful in selecting and making available to me the documents which had information related to my study. Information gathered from these resource

centres has been applied in all chapters of this thesis. However, chapters five, six and seven have more information obtained from these NGO resource centres. Documentary review has positive aspects. Knowles explains the positive side of this approach:

This method views the author as a self-conscious actor addressing an audience under particular social and political circumstances. The task of the researcher is to read the text of its symbols-as anthropologist does with rituals. The reading may be derived from secondary sources and/or other research methods such as observational studies. The researcher considers not only how existing interactions are construed, but also how new ones are developed and employed. Whilst the author's meanings are important, analysing the reader's social situation is also crucial to interpret the text (Knowles, 2006.134).

The documentary approach has two main weaknesses which a researcher needs to be aware of. Researchers might end up being uncritical and unreflective in their readings unless they take into consideration the process and social construction. Therefore, being aware of this, it was important for me to be critical of every document I consulted. With my background of working in the NGO environment where most of these documents were based somehow made my reflections easier. Another weakness I had to be aware of is the one which has been documented very well by Knowles, (2006, p. 134).

...given its social context and identity, the researcher will give a selective and biased understanding of a document and may deliberately choose and select particular documents.

Because I was aware of this caution that Knowles has given, I therefore, tried as much as I could to consult all documents I could put my hands on. Even when some of the issues in some of the documents were not appealing to me; I would not give up easily

2.5.2 In-depth Interview

Apart from documentary review, I used in-depth interviews for collecting data. I prepared the interview guide in which I indicated a number of issues and areas for asking questions and directing the interview towards. One of the writers who define interviews nicely is Cannel and Kahn (1996) who define it as a form of social interaction in which the behaviour of both interviewer and respondents starts from their attitudes, motives, expectations and perceptions. It is a one-to-one exercise where an interviewer asks a given sets of questions from an interview guide. Boyce and Neale (2006:3) say that one advantage of in-depth interviews is “that they provide much more detailed information than what is available through other data collection methods, such as surveys. They also may provide a more relaxed atmosphere in which to collect information-people may feel more comfortable having a conversation with you about their program as opposed to filling out a survey”. The in-depth interview aimed at exploring the respondents’ perceptions, opinions, facts and forecasts as well as their reactions to particular situations raised in the interview.

In-depth interviews enabled me to obtain clarification on explanations and opinions on different issues. In-depth interviews require one to be a good listener and be flexible. As the interviews progressed, a lot of issues and insights cropped-up. This requires an observational mind to note and also an ability to follow up on these issues without distracting the interviewees from losing

direction and a sense of what they were saying. I tried and encouraged my respondents to narrate their views in as much detail as they could. In one case, after we had established the topic for discussion they started sharing their story for almost five minutes without any interference from me. In a way they would ask me questions for clarification and in the process of replying it helped them to continue with their narration. Although I let my interviewees feel free to define the agenda of the interview, I tried as much as I could to make sure the objective of the interview was not overridden by their agendas. I recorded interview responses in a notebook.

Conducting interviews poses some challenges and problems to a researcher. Flick (2006) outlines some of these challenges as sometimes incorporating some targets which cannot be matched in every situation. In my case, however, this shortcoming was addressed by the fact that I requested NGOs to appoint officers who work on policy and advocacy programmes and projects to be the interviewees. Also conducting in-depth interviews can be time consuming in terms of interviewing, transcribing and analysing the data (Boyce and Neale, 2006). Indeed, conducting interviews proved to be a tough job and time consuming, however, to me this was not a big problem because I had allocated enough time for the field work.

2.5.3 Participant Observation

In this study, I was able to adopt the role of participant observer to gather some information. I borrowed the ideas and processes proposed by Dorman (2001) in her thesis titled, “Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe”. In her study, she argues that in studying NGOs, the best way to get a true picture is to go about it through learning from the inside. Dorman asserts

that researchers studying civil society and NGOs should not rush to generalise for dictating the research direction, methodology and framework of analysis. In situations like this, a researcher is like going to the NGO playing field blind-folded. Many researchers use donor projects for research as a unit of analysis, rather than the organisations themselves. At the end of the day many studies end up saying what the donor wants to hear, or reflect the money the donor poured in the investigation.

I kept a diary where I documented all the issues that I observed and that were relevant to my project. My experience of keeping a diary is the same as that of (Toner, 2008, p. 72) who states “...diary to be an effective means of reflecting on the developing research experience particularly during intensive periods of fieldwork and in charting my personal relationship with the research”. To avoid repetition, section 5.5.1 below explains in details how I participated in TANGO activities.

The main problem of participant observation is that it fails to go deep enough to unveil subtle and unspoken words, symbols and interaction, which carry more weight and speak louder than what they record. Because I was situated at TANGO where I knew the organisational culture, it helped me not to miss out on these subtle and unspoken words, symbols and interactions. For instance, there are words that staff use which an outsider cannot understand. One such word is *Kihacha*, which refers to an informal activity which one gets as a result of affiliation to a particular organisation, and has personal financial reward afterwards.

Another methodological flaw, which researchers like Dorman (2001) have noticed is the

tendency of many studies rushing to investigate what NGOs are doing but rarely explaining why and how they operate and how they become involved in those processes. One needs to go deep into the darkest corner to reveal and expose the whole mechanisms which make things happen the way we see them. The social domain under observation is treated as static and human agents are regarded as machines.

2.5.4 Use of E-groups and Emailing Listing and Email

Qualitative methods have adopted using the internet as a tool, resource and issue for research. Such areas are e-mail interviews, online focus groups and virtual ethnography (Flick, 2006). I have made use of NGO related e-mailing lists to gather some information which has informed and enriched my study immensely. These groups are: TAFESAssociates@yahoogroups.com, Policy Forum, wanazuoni@yahoogroups.com, Foundationmailinglist@thefoundation-tz.org and wanabidii@googlegroups.com. With the exception of wanazuoni@yahoogroups.com and wanabidii@googlegroups.com, I have subscribed to the rest of the networking groups and I have been an active member for more than five years. I have been an active member in terms of initiating discussion topics and also in contributing on what others have to say. One thing I have appreciated and am able to rely on in these groups is that members speak their own mind openly and confidently. This has convinced me what they say is actually what they think and what happens. I remember one incidence in September 2007, where one member in tafesAssociates@yahoogropus.com initiated a discussion on the role of the NGOs in development and it generated a very hot discussion especially by members who worked or had previously worked in the NGOs sector. I will bring up this discussion later in chapter six and we will be able

to see how this study was able to benefit from such e-groups.

Social researchers have concluded that there are advantages to using the internet for data collection. Wright (2005) explains that the internet enables researchers to access a certain population which under normal circumstances would be hard and difficult to reach. Wright (2005, p. 20) continues to say: “it takes advantage of the ability of the internet to provide access to groups and individuals who would be difficult, if not impossible, to reach through other channels. In many cases, communities and groups exist only in cyberspace...” One advantage of virtual communities, as sites for research, is that they offer a mechanism through which a researcher can gain access to people who share specific interests and attitudes.

Gathering data online and using the internet helps to save time in two ways. First, the researcher may reach many people in a short time and, second, the researcher may collect data while doing other things like conduct face to face interviews. Online surveys enable the researcher to reach many people with similar characteristics who are scattered in different geographical locations in the shortest time possible. Wright (2005, p. 12) concludes that “a researcher interested in surveying hard-to-reach populations can quickly gain access to large numbers of such individuals by posting invitations to participate to newsgroups, chat rooms, and message board communities.” In face to face interviews it would be very difficult to reach people with the same characteristics even when available in the same geographical location.

Online research helps to cut-down the costs. Using online communication helps to cut down the cost of paper, printing, photocopying and mailing. Wright (2005, p.15) aptly puts in a very vivid

way when he says “Similarly, conducting online interviews, either by email, or in a synchronous "chat" format, offers cost savings advantages. Costs for recording equipment, travel, and the telephone can be eliminated. In addition, transcription costs can be avoided since online responses are automatically documented”. On the other side, researching using internet facilities has some limitations. The main limitation arise from sampling. Wright (2005, p.18 sums up it well when he says; “relatively little may be known about the characteristics of people in online communities, aside from some basic demographic variables, and even this information may be questionable.” Associated with this is self-selection. In many internet communities there are individuals who are likely to completely respond to online survey. This makes it difficult for a researcher to generalise the findings. The magnitude of the two risks were reduced by the fact that in a number of incidences, I requested people who were informed about the issues to volunteer to provide information. I always went for people who I knew had the required information.

2.5.5 Telephone Interview

Using telephone interviews has a number of advantages. Babbie (1986) has highlighted them; the main one being the economic side of it; telephone interview saves money and time. In the face to face interview one has to travel several miles to a respondent’s home and sometimes end up finding no one there, return to the research office and drive back the next day. But with the telephone interview, one’s fingers make the trips. Telephone interviews were mostly done after coming back from the field. I used telephone interviews to follow up on issues which needed clarification after data analysis, interpretation and writing. Also I used telephone interviews for people who did not participate in face to face interviews but had information which was relevant

to my study. For instance, I made a telephone call to Adam Foya because of his involvement in the project under Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) in Tanzania, which has managed to build capacity of local communities they work with because of their approach. The need to talking to him arose when I was writing chapter eight which focuses on the future of NGOs in Tanzania.

By conducting telephone interviews, one can dress in any way without affecting the answers of respondents. And, sometimes respondents will be more honest in giving socially disapproved answers if they do not see the interviewers with their eyes. Also, telephone interviews can give the researcher control over data collection if several interviewers are engaged in the project. If all interviews are conducted from the research office, it is possible to get clarification from the supervisor, whenever problems occur.

On the other side this method has some weaknesses which might affect the findings. Babbie (1986) explains that the main weakness is sampling. Telephone interview are limited to people who have telephones. Telephone interview tend to produce a substantial social class bias by excluding other people from the studies. This was not a problem to me because officers interviewed have access to telephones which are provided by their employers.

2.6 The Field Process

Field work was conducted from January to May 2008. After arriving in Tanzania, I reported to the TANGO office. In previous communications, TANGO had agreed to me being based in their office during the data collection. When I reported at the TANGO office, I had time to explain the

aim and approach of my study. We discussed my role as a researcher and theirs as the host organisation. Besides from TANGO, I made contact with other NGOs that I had intended to interview. As I have mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, the interviews and their organisations were selected based on their role in the NGO Policy and Act: and GCAP-T Campaign which are focus of the study. TANGO played a central role in assisting me to identify the NGOs and the people who had participated in the two advocacy programmes which this study has investigated.

2.6.1 Participation in the Day-to-day Routine of TANGO

During the field work I was based at the TANGO office for a period of five and half months. I participated in some of the processes and activities which were taking place at the TANGO office. Although I had been working with TANGO for a number of years before this time I was aware that my role was to look at the different processes and actions with an open and inquisitive mind. I used my previous connections and networks to gain access to all of the documented information. From 2000 until September 2006 I worked with TANGO as a Policy Engagement and Advocacy Officer. With TANGO being an umbrella NGO of more than 650 member organisations; this gave me many opportunities to participate in many advocacy and activism campaigns, organised by NGOs, throughout the country. Also occasionally, I had the privilege of participating in the campaigns and activism activities at the international level. During my field work I was able to use my experience and my interaction with the TANGO and NGOs community to reflect and inform myself more about the work related to the theme of my thesis.

2.6.2 Interviews with NGOs

Apart from TANGO, where I spent most of the time, I was able to visit 20 NGOs leading in advocacy in Tanzania. All these are based in Dar es salaam. NGOs interviewed included Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA), Women in Social Entrepreneurship (WISE), HakiElimu, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Campaign for Good Campaign (CGG), Concern for Development in Africa (ForDIA), Political Risks Analysis in Africa (PoRIS), Environment and Gender Care Organisation (ENVIROCARE), Land Research Institute (Hakiardhi), Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) and Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA). Others included Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), National Organisation for Legal Assistance (Nola) and Agenda 2000 Participation. Others were Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) and Citizens' Global Platform (CGP).

The process of interviewing started before I went back to Tanzania. I remember when I was in my first year of my thesis; I met Tanzanian's students who were studying master's degree at the University of Birmingham. They had worked with local and international groups in Tanzania for quite sometime. I had very long discussions with them. Their insight helped me shape the direction and nature of my study. Things like what to ask and how to conduct interview were mainly obtained from them.

Many NGOs in the country are based in Dar es Salaam. These figures also indicate how advocacy and activism work is done in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam is where many of the headquarters of many government departments are based. This means that the main NGOs' can have interaction with the

Central Government. Experience shows that in some rural districts in the county, one hardly finds anything like 5 NGOs doing the serious work of interacting with local government authorities.

2.7 Managing Insider Researcher

Most of my career life has been in the NGOs and civil society sector, therefore, the great challenge I constantly faced during the whole course of this study and more during fieldwork is how to be objective. For me to conduct a study like this it is as if someone asks me to write a story about myself. Coupled with this, I know the thinking of many NGO members, staff and volunteers. Hence, the way I saw this study it was an inquiry from the inside. Insiderness specific features include ethnicity, age, gender, class, family identity, occupation and organisation (Dobson, 2009). My conception of insiderness in research concurs with that of Brannick and Coghlan's (2007) which means is studying an organisation (as well as other organisations part of a wider sector) that a researcher has/had worked in.

Because I have been an NGO worker and volunteer for many years, as explained earlier in the chapter, it has enabled me to accumulate substantial knowledge and information on how things are done in the NGOs sector. Harris (2001) acknowledges the role of the researcher in the research process, and the self in social research. Harris further argues that self can be used a source of knowledge. She further says one's carer experience could lead to academic and research interests. My professional experience played a key role in the choice of the research topic, the research method, and the presentation and interpretation of the findings. One main outcome and benefit, is that this process made me more critical and reflective.

Iacono et al (2009, p. 43) explains how they used their work experience and it “allowed (them) to capitalise on their experience in the field to contribute new insight and a different perspective to the subject matter. They further agrees that the experience of researcher could be treated as data. However, the responsibility of turning the experience into data lies with the researcher, as well as that of minimising the subjectivity. Iacono et al proposal corresponds well with my situation because for instance, the information in chapter six and seven, partly I got involved with them because they were some projects I was managing when I was working with TANGO. For instance, chapter seven which is based on poverty campaign, when it started I was the coordinator of that campaign for the first three months.

A common challenge involving an insider researcher is to maintain the dual identities as a professional and scholar (Dobson, 2009). Couple with this the main challenge I faced constantly was that of how to remain objective. To attain certain level of objectivity, requires one to invent some strategies and tools to minimise the subjectivity. However, this does not mean one could not take a position in some of the issues. Atkinson (1990); Davies (1999); Skoldberg (2000); Frampton, et al. (2000) have documented different experiences and advices of how an insider manages to collected data meanwhile remaining objective.

On my case, to minimise subjectivity, advices given by (Iacono et al, 2009, p. 45) proves to be of great help and guide: She proposes:

- “Incorporating vignettes of practice, photographs, quotes from company (organisation) files etc., and letting the facts speak for themselves;

- Analysing the evidence objectively through within-case and cross-case analysis and pattern-matching, comparison with the extant literature, triangulation of data sources and of theories;
- Alternating between inside and outside enquiry;
- Distinguishing as appropriate facts from personal reflections (e.g. in the use of the first person pronoun ‘I’).

In section 2.5.1, I explained how I accessed many related documents from TANGO which complimented and provided essential information that filled in the knowledge gaps. Also in section 2.5.3, I discussed at length my awareness of the challenges an insider researcher can face and suggested means to mitigate them.

2.8 Data Analysis and Interpretation

Throughout my studies I kept a diary where I documented all the information I gathered (interview, telephone communication, emails) about this research. The process of data management and analysis started right away in the field. Data analysis and interpretation was an ongoing process. Immediately after each interview or discussion, I analysed my field notes for two main reasons: first, to identify the specific themes that emerged in each interview and/or discussion. Second, to identify gaps that needed fine-tuning by either going back to the respondent

or by improving future interviews or discussions.

My first step at data analysis was to read each transcribed interview and develop a summary of the key themes which I had identified in my conceptual framework and research questions. I summarized the respondent's feelings, opinions and beliefs. Since the conceptual framework (see chapter one) was broad enough, the chances of leaving some information unanalyzed were rare.

The whole process of observation and collecting qualitative data and the process of analysis and interpretation is a very demanding job as Rudestam and Newton's (2000, p.45) note. These authors claim that "sifting and resifting of huge amounts of transcripts or open-ended responses into a coherent pattern generally takes as much effort and leads to as much frustration as the statistics". To me this was the main challenge I encountered, but with perseverance and focus was able to overcome it.

2.9 Ethical Concerns

The Ethical Issues of Punch (2002), guided me in this study and I strove to observe them as much as I could. Punch insists in getting permission from institutions overseeing research, getting the consent of interviewees and protection of their reputation. Research ethics of both the United Kingdom and Tanzania were observed and permission to conduct research was sought from the responsible institutions like the University of Birmingham and Commission for Science and Technology of Tanzania (COSTECH). I made sure I got informed consent from all the people who participated in the research project. During the field work I took precautions to observe

ethical issues as required in conducting research. These issues include getting informed consent, privacy, confidentiality, avoiding harm and exploitation (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). Before conducting face to face to face and telephone interviews, I explained the aim of my study to interviewees and asked them if they were willing to participate in my study. All respondents agreed to be interviewed, or replied back to the email I had sent them. Some would tell me, that because the information was for academic purposes, they did not find it difficult to give me their consent. I asked them to allow me to use their names, NGOs and positions in my thesis and they all consented. They said because my information was for academic purposes they did not see any harm in revealing their names. I think the reason why they allowed me to reveal their names is because I was known to them and I had been working with them for number of years hence they trusted me.

Data and results of the research were kept and used for the intended purpose of this research and was not shared with third parties not related to this study. Also, I will not use the results in any inappropriate manner that might harm my informants. After submitting my report to the university I will provide a copy to TANGO, in order to increase ownership; there may be recommendations or issues they what to pick up and work on. Also I had to convince myself that the study does not pose any serious risk to anybody involved because it did not involve vulnerable people and the topic under study is not one that was regarded as sensitive and needing extra care.

All of my interviewees were free to talk about their experience of how NGOs carry out their advocacy and activism in Tanzania. Some were both critical and sympathetic to NGOs.

6.10 Limitations Encountered

At every stage of data collection, I was very careful with those factors and issues which could affect the response as well as reliability and validity of data. However, there are issues which I encountered which have been an obstacle to the study. Since most of the respondents knew me and knew I have worked with NGOs in the country they sometimes tended to be surprised by my questions and would ask me why I have to ask them because they assumed I should have known the answers. Sometimes, I could sense they were not telling me everything because they assumed I already knew them and or if they told me it would not make any difference. I tried to minimise this by encouraging them to talk as much as they could regardless of whether or not I knew those issues. Also by structuring the interviews in the form of conversation helped the interviewees to talk about anything they wished without thinking about what I already knew.

Other limitations such as those associated with the quality of instruments, threats to external validity and the interpretation of the gathered data were controlled through rigorous training before I started fieldwork.

6.11 Conclusion

In this chapter I have addressed issues and procedures I followed to gather data for this study. I have used a case study in this thesis. Data was collected using interview, participant observation, e-groups, internet and email. The data collection has been on a continuous basis. This approach has enabled me to undertake the study smoothly.

The next chapter addresses the question of NGOs and civil society in Southern-Africa. It highlights the way that from the late 1980s, NGOs have been given much attention and make them sound as if they are civil society themselves.

Chapter Three

Civil Society and the Development of NGOs in Southern-Africa

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the development of the civil society and NGOs in Southern-Africa. The aim is to present a picture of the context in which civil society and NGOs operate. Section one reviews the conceptualisation of civil society within the African context. There is an attempt to impose the western notion of the civil society in Africa. All recent attempts of incorporating the civil society into partnership with the state ignores the reality that African civil society is different. References are made to three arrangements which inform the civil society in the region and perhaps elsewhere in Africa: patrons-clients networks, self-help groups and ethnic associations and traditional authorities. In section two, discussion is geared towards addressing the civil society within the State National building project in the period immediately after independence in the early 1960s. Many states engaged in national building projects and this project required all the citizens to speak with one mind. So the state had to incorporate all civic groups in the ruling party machinery and structures. Section three addresses the relationship between the state and NGOs. The relationship between the state and civil society has been that of 'cat and rat'. The ruling elites see civil society as a threat to their positions. At the same time the civil society thinks that the state is not doing enough to protect and provide for the community. In the neo-liberalization era, the state has invited the civil society as a partner for development. Section four demystifies the argument that NGOs are a panacea for development in Africa. In recent years the argument that in order for

Africa to develop the state must enter into partnership with civil society has gained momentum. But there is evidence showing, that this is not the 'medicine' to cure Africa's underdevelopment. Section five discusses the role of the donor and NGOs, and the way to safeguard the interests of donor countries. If there was no money, may be the big noise about the role of NGOs in governance and development would not be there.

3.1 Understanding Civil Society within the Southern-Africa Context

Mamdani (1996) argues that the Africanist discourse on civil society resembles an earlier discourse on socialism, that it is more programmatic than analytical, more ideological than historical. He disagrees with its two claims, first that civil society exists as a fully formed construct in Africa as in Europe, and secondly that the driving force of democratization everywhere in Africa is the contention between the civil society and the state. This is contestation of the idea of the progressive nature of the civil society. To illustrate his scepticism, Falton, (1999) has shown many weaknesses of civil society movements in Africa. One important weakness is that that organisation of civil society reflects the lopsided balance of class, ethnic and sexual power. This tends inevitably to privilege the privileged and marginalize the marginalized. Given this background, Orvis (2001, p. 20) advises that in order to be able to have a definition which allows inclusion of a wide array of political activities, whether long established or recent, civil society in Africa could simply be defined as 'a public sphere of formal or informal, collective activity autonomous from but recognising the legitimate existence of the state'. By adopting this definition it allows the inclusion of a wide array of political activity. This also helps to avoid coping too much from the Western European understanding of civil society but at the same time

not be too far from it.

Mamdani (1996), Flaton (1999) and Orvis (2001) reflect that there is a need to broaden the understanding of civil society. By broadening and reflecting on what we mean by civil society in the African context, this allows us to be able to be accommodating. This enables us to accommodate those groups whose literature has been ignored or left out unintentionally or intentionally. This scenario is the ignorance of African reality and history. Kasfir (1998) cited in Orvis (2001 p. 20) suggests that the conventional definition of civil society, which normally is aligned by de Tocqueville associational outlook, needs to be broadened by dropping the normative elements in the definition, in order to include ethnic and other types of political activity ignored or condemned in the literature. Ethnic, religious, regional, gender, class are some of the central aspects to consider when one tries to understand contemporary civil society in Africa. Orvis (2001, p. 27) summarises very well what civil society in Africa comprises when he states:

Almost all discussion of civil society in Africa has focused on the voluntary associations assumed by the conventional view to be based on liberal democratic norms. I will argue that patron-client networks, ethnic associations, self-help and cooperative groups, and some 'traditional' authorities are important elements of African civil society, based largely on the norms of moral ethnicity.

These groups are worth noting. Someone with African practical experience will appreciate that this is what actually happens. Kelsall (2008) in referring to the findings of the Commission for Africa formed by former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, acknowledges the importance of

'recognising the salience of patronage, patron-client relations, big-man culture and religion to development. The report goes further to cite the case of Somaliland and how they have managed to build their country based on the structure of local clans. It is worth quoting the Africa Report as cited by Kelsall (2008, p. 2):

The challenge is to harness the cultures of Africa to find the workable hybrids for the rest of the continent. The overall lesson is that the outside prescriptions succeed where they work with the grain of the African way of doing things.

In the following section, I will discuss in more detail these three groups as elaborated by Orvis.

Patron-client networks: These are widespread and crucial because they provide resources to all those involved. Ranger (1994) (cited in Orvis 2001, p. 27) observes that normally the patron-client networks usually exist within ethnic groups. The relationships that exist are based on the obligations of moral ethnicity. The norms demand that patrons provide essential resources to clients when needed, and clients provide loyalty and support to patrons. These networks provide both social and economic security to both parts. The tenet for these networks is for patrons to provide essential resources to clients, and clients to provide support and loyalty to patrons when asked to do so. Politicians are the main proprietors of such arrangements.

One argument which comes out strongly to deny patron-client networks and ethnic or political blocs or groups placed in the civil society is the notion that they are antithetical to democracy as well as to civil society. Orvis (2001) highlights the fact that patron-clients networks are too

hierarchical, unequal and of limited autonomy to clients against that of patrons. Orvis further sees patron-client networks as being too nebulous and informal; hence it is a very difficult in the conventional view of civil society to welcome them on board.

I strongly agree with arguments put forward by Orvis (2001) to justify why we should count patron-client network as part of civil society. They do not undermine the above arguments and their arguments are based on the reality of what is on the ground especially in the Southern African context. Patron-client networks, although are informal groups, pursue their collective interests vis-à-vis the state hence provides means of both political participation and accountability of their leaders. Voting patterns in the region which are based on ethnic and tribal or locality gives members access to the state. Clients do change their patrons and they prefer to go for one who is best suited to articulate their interest vis-à-vis that of the state.

In Tanzania a patron is known as *mzee* while clients are known as *wapambe*. During elections the *wapambe* play a big role to make sure the *mzee* sails through. So how one manages and organises their *wapambe* matters a lot. In the early stages of primary voting which normally takes place within parties, many *wazee* emerge and as the process makes progress, the weaker *wazee* are defeated and they might join the camp of other strong *mzee* to form a strong block. Also, there is a new culture where *wazee* who live in urban areas who are vying for political office mobilize people who come from the same district/constituency living in big cities like Dar es salam, Arusha, Mwanza and other towns to travel and vote in their home constituencies. During field work I was informed of one incident whereby in the 2000 and 2005 general elections, one politician from the Kilimanjaro region who was competing in a parliamentary seat, mobilized

people from his constituency and they travelled to their home constituency for registration and when the time for elections came they travelled back to vote. In both elections he won. The intention of sending people who live in urban areas is to ensure they scoop enough votes. Clients who live in Dar es Salaam were happy because the patron worked so hard and their constituency was promoted to district status and a lot of money was allocated to set up a new district headquarters. The setting up of a new headquarters has produced employment and business ventures to local population (Ombeni, interview 2/3/2008). This act of people going back to vote in their place of birth/origin goes against the elections laws of Tanzania. According to elections rules one is allowed to vote in the area of his residence. Many of those who travelled upcountry to vote are no longer living in their country side homes.

Self-help groups and ethnic (home) associations: Ethnic, regional, and hometown associations and self-help are part of African civil society. These are closely related but conceptually distinct to client-patron networks. These groups are everywhere in the towns of Southern Africa. Home associations bring together those in the urban diasporas who share a common place of rural origin. Home people in towns form these groups first to act as social and economic security. Home town associations fit in a modern definition of civil society because they have formal structures and decision making processes (Orvis, 2001; Mercer& Evans, 2008). The main function of these groups is to fundraise and help members form development projects like schools, clinics, water, etc. They go as far as articulating the interests of their local community vis-à-vis that of the state. These groups nowadays have gone beyond borders and now they are found especially in Europe and America (Mercer and Evans, op. cited).

Mercer and Evans (2008) have documented comprehensively the case of Tanzania home associations and how they are practical in promoting education in rural areas. They say in Tanzania, unlike NGOs, District Development Trusts (DDTs) are the most familiar type of associations known to wide sections of the population. NGOs are a recent phenomena while records abound to show how home associations were formed in colonial Tanganyika by urban diasporas with the aim of helping each other.

Mercer and Evans (2008) systematically give case studies of two District Development Trusts (DDTs) of Newala and Rungwe districts. Newala formed the Newala District Trust (NDT) in 1989 and the Rungwe District Education Trust (RUDET) in the early 1980s. These are among many DDTs formed in nearly every district, and in some wards and villages which sprung in the 1980s and 1990s. Most of the DDTs are concerned with construction and running of secondary schools working in tandem with district councils. Government consider DDTs to be NGOs. From the time when NDTs were established to 2008, they were able to mobilise resources and construct about six secondary schools. In Rungwe, RUDET from 1982 to 2005 was able to be part of the construction of 31 secondary schools. Politicians are behind such initiatives.

Ngethe and Kanyiga cited in Ndegwa (1996, p. 10) says that by 1990 there were about 20,000 self-help groups (*harambee*) in Kenya. These played a big role in developing the country and they were a great 'feature of Kenya's political and civic life-and they become potential and actual clients of political patrons and state'.

Traditional authorities: The colonial regimes and later the new independent states abolished the

binding authority of the traditional chiefs and other forms of leadership. In the new independent era local chiefs have become part of civil society. Many of local chiefs have become leaders of the new governments. Some local authorities play the function of settling disputes. Sometimes they can represent the interests of their ethnic groups. Although they play all these roles, they gain non-binding authority. The traditional authorities can become party of civil society vis-à-vis the modern state. Orvis (2001) continues to show how traditional authority is well placed in pursuing the collective interest of their communities more effectively than NGOs and other forms of modern civil society. It is possible because traditional leaders are part of the community while NGOs are run bureaucratically like much government machinery. Sometimes NGO's staff do not share the local community perception. Sometimes their salary and income make them look much better than the local community income. And this brings up concerns that NGO's staff are better off because of the problems of the community.

In some areas like southern Tanzania, the local religious leaders have more power than government and political leaders. Local leaders known as sultans and *Mamwinyi* still rule today. They greatly influence all district development plans. Before districts implement anything they must consult with them and unless they give their consent nothing will be implemented. District administration admit that they cannot do anything without first gaining the approved of these local leaders. (Maro, March 13th, 2009). Orvis (2001) further reveals how the council of elders in Kenya have become central in the politics of Kenya in recent years.

Afro News in their website <http://www.afrol.com/articles/32141> reports how the 2009 African Union (AU) Chairman, President Mohamed Gaddafi of Libya, fought vigorously to try to promote

the place of chiefs and traditional leaders, to be recognised as officially part of the AU. Earlier in August 2008, he had organised a forum of over 200 African chiefs and traditional leaders in Libya. In this summit they bestowed on him a title of 'King of Kings'. During the AU annual summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January 2009, he sponsored a number of traditional leaders from a number of African countries to attend the summit. The objective of Gaddafi in restoring the place of kings is twofold: one is to solve the problem of when political leaders have failed and the second is part of his 'grassroots' advocacy plan to force the issue of a single government on unwilling (African) governments. For Gaddafi recognising traditional leaders is taking us back to the proposition by Kelsall (2008) of recognising all informal civil society groups and other forces that shape development paradigms and governance in African societies.

All the above groups are active in the African political, socio-economic scenario. These African arrangements, 'provide an autonomous public sphere of collective political activity whose very existence has the potential to limit the state's reach and create some element of political accountability and means of participation' (Orvis, 2001, 18). The neoliberal agenda of Western Europe has no interest in that and that is why these groups do not receive much attention in the literature on African civil society. And when they appear, they tend to receive bad names such as 'tribal/ethnic/traditional' etc. A revisit of the historical development of the modern understanding of civil society will give us a clue why the above reality does not receive much attention in the literature.

As we noted in chapter one, there is a deliberate move from the actual civil society to promote NGOs. Wallace Mayunga (Interview, 13/02/2008) admits NGOs are not driven by the people's

demand; rather it is the donor agenda that motivates people to establish NGOs.

3.2 Civil Society and NGOs in Post-Independence Africa and State Building Project

When discussing the actual existing civil society, Mamdani (1996) argues for the need to grasp the major shifts in the history of the relationship between civil society and the state in Africa. He then presents four moments in that history and only one, the fourth, is post-colonial the rest are colonial. To him the post-colonial period is characterized by the collapse of an embryonic indigenous civil society of trade unions and autonomous civil organizations and its absorption in political society.

Falton (1999) argues that while civil society was a potentially liberating factor in any political calculus, it was not always civil. To him civil society in Africa could be quite uncivil, replete of antinomies the result is that in many situations in Africa there is lack of a civic community marked by an active public spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations and a social fabric of trust and cooperation (Falton, 1999). This might be true in many African countries but it is not true that it is a generalized tendency throughout the continent. Certainly Tanzania would not fall into that category because a real community exists where citizens of different ethnic and religious origin cooperate in their lives. Certainly the trade unions and such movements as cooperatives of peasants played a progressive role during colonialism, yet in his own categorization they were still subjects. It becomes difficult to categorize them as civil society, however embryonic. It is usually recognized that civil society is linked to citizenship.

The bigger part of Mamdani's book discusses the African when she was a subject and not a citizen. Cooper (1999) observes that what is missing in Mamdani's book is half of its title. In a bizarre way he does not address the question of citizenship which is at the centre of civil society. I would agree with these scholars that there are many problems facing the African civil society and that it is not fully developed. However, I think that one cannot write civil society off. The struggle for civil society reflects the search for citizenship which is not only a valid one but a necessary agenda just as is the search for democracy. What Falton and Mamdani are presenting are fetters to citizenship and nationhood. The struggle to the two, however, cannot be abandoned, but more importantly there are no alternatives to the two in modern Africa. The continent has to move from sectarian politics to civil society.

In Tanzania for example, nationhood and citizenship has been in the process of construction and nurture since independence. It is ironic that the prescription of the embryonic indigenous civil society mentioned above went together with an attack on ethnicity and regionalism which has allowed the construction of Falton's "civic community" which would facilitate the growth of civil society. When analysing Tanzania it has been the custom among scholars on civil society to present the first regime (1961-1985) as being responsible for undermining civil society organisations. It is then argued that the entry of multiparty politics in the 1990s unleashed the civil society movement. Indeed, it is true that the regime established a corporatist system of dealing with citizens through organizations controlled by the ruling party but the same regime attacked sectarian interests. As a result of that, the civil society in Tanzania has greater potential than civil society organizations elsewhere based on ethnicity and sectarian interests (Mhina, 2003).

Many African states gained independence in the 1960s and few in the late 1950s and the 1970s. After independence many nationalist governments established policies and laws that would have state control over non-state actors, NGOs and civic groups. Many of these organisations were suppressed and forcibly affiliated to the development of one party. (Mamdani, 1990: Mpangala, 2001) reveal that the state national project gave governments 'mandate and legitimacy for bringing civic organisations inside nationalist networks throughout what is known as structural reforms'. Other groups like churches and NGOs, although remained 'outside' but were indirectly (symbolically and rhetorically) united with the government (Dorman, 2001). The whole trend and development of civil society in Africa especially from 1950s-1980s was played under the politics of inclusion and exclusion- you either join us and survive or oppose the power and you perish. Many found themselves in a state where there had little or no choice except to join the caravan to the promised land of 'nationalism and development'.

Nyang'oro (1999) sees the 1990s as the renewal and rebirth of civil society in Africa. He gives an account of some developments in countries like Benin and Mali where major changes and reform happened. One cannot satisfactorily examine the reality of political development in Africa without paying attention to the role played by NGOs. In Eastern and Southern Africa NGOs played a significant role in bringing about changes in Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Zambia (Mutunga, 1999). The leadership of most of these NGOs are now occupying the political offices in these countries. In Zambia, the first president, Kenneth Kaunda, was defeated by Frederick Chiluba who had a background in the trade unions. The forces that removed Kaunda from power were gathered around and spearheaded by trade unions (Nyang'oro, 1999). Kenya

saw the ban of multiparty politics in 1982. From here the mantle of politics was carried in the hands of civil society groups. Civil society groups like the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) and the Nairobi University Students stood up firmly in opposing the oppressive laws and regime of former President Daniel Arap Moi. In collaboration with church and international pressure these groups managed to pressurize the government and the country returned into multiparty politics and in 1992, Kenya saw pluralist elections taking place.

In the most characteristic form, Molutsi (1995, p. 180), for example, states:

The experience of post-colonial state-society relations in Africa shows that peace and security are matters not to be left to the state alone. In sub-Saharan Africa in general and southern Africa in particular, the state became the enemy of its own citizens and therefore a major threat to both national and personal security. Several other players must be brought to the fore in order to keep peace and ensure security in society. Civil society defined for our purposes as a network of organized, self-governing and autonomous organizations operating at the national, regional and international levels-has a major role to play in the maintenance of peace and security.

3.3 Relationship of NGOs and State

Literature shows that the process of democratization in Africa has been largely led by civil society groups. Gaventa (1982) cited in Dorman (2001) studied the oppression of coal-miners in the Appalachians by local elites and international investors. He examines the interaction of social

forces and individual decisions across a long historical trajectory. Dorman insists that this is one of the key issues which is lacking from current studies of the process of challenging authority. One of these processes and projects being activism and advocacy by NGOs must be understood in the context from which it is derived. Before rushing to question and appraise NGOs, one must examine and understand the nature of the existing governance system especially immediately after independence and now in the days when globalisation is the main determining factor for all aspects of people's life.

A further point needs to be made. While NGOs may not be uncivil, they do not necessarily contribute to 'democratisation. These and other reasons discussed in the following section, lead us to conclude that NGOs do not provide an internal development panacea. NGOs in Africa have been known for 'gap filling' and supplementing the state agenda. A good example is that Tanzanian NGO Policy (URT, 2001) clearly states that "The government recognises the significant role and contributions of NGOs in society and considers them as important partners in the development process." The policy further insists that the government shall work in partnership with NGOs in the delivery of public services and programmes. This position by Tanzanian government fits well in the assertion by Dorman (2001) that 'most NGOs in developing nations have decided to provide development goods, often in cooperation with the government.

To say NGOs are doing voluntary work is not correct. Mostly when many authors regard NGOs as voluntary in the Africa context, is because they do not receive funds from the national budget and they are not entitled to tax exemptions. If there was no money from donors, few NGOs would bother to go out there and claim they are serving people. Because of this background many NGOs

die a few days after receiving their registration certificate. With such a background one would wish to question how NGOs are building a strong and vibrant civil society as the World Bank, IMF and other donors claim. Also how are they (NGOs) contributing in poverty reduction, while their existences depend on the 'mercy' of those has proved to be the source of the backwardness of the continent-that is donors (Hangcock, 2006).

To Braton (1990), formal structures in the third world and in African countries in particular, are too complex and bureaucratic and this hinders common citizens and grassroots access and reach the state that mainly have power control. In this case NGOs have been formed (mainly by elites) as alternative means to articulate community interests and needs. Okoye (2003) hints how that after military dictatorship had given way to elected government in Nigeria, NGOs were engaging in activities which enabled people to have more of a voice in the way the country is governed. He gives example of several NGO networks formed with the intention of pushing the people agenda forward. For instance, other coalitions of NGOs emerged with the aim of facilitating a people-centred approach to the review of the 1999 constitution, which was a product of the military regime, to make it a credible and reliable instrument for good governance and human rights observance. One such coalition was the Citizens' Forum for Constitutional Reform (CFCR), with a membership of about ninety NGOs spread across the country. CFCR strategy was to secure the participation of the citizens in the constitutional review exercise through workshops and other activities, and present the input gathered to the PTCR, to forestall a superficial review process.

Many states in Africa have come into conflict with civil society and NGOs because they accuse them of being engaged in politics. Certainly most of the activities of NGOs can be regarded as

political, advocacy activities are mostly political because they often concern politically marginalized groups. The same applies to economic empowerment which usually points to areas where the government has failed to reach which is a political statement. The term which should be used to distinguish civil society from political society is partisanship. At least the government could ask that NGOs cease from being overly partisan, and that they should serve adherents of different political parties.

NGOs at an individual level and as coalitions are challenging the governance and oppressive structures. Meena (1999) documents how women in the countries of Tanzania, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana have joined hands together and formed coalitions to fight for gender equality and the wellbeing of women and children. Issues they address include discriminatory laws which put women on the losing side in the legal system of the country; equal participation in decision and resource allocation processes, bodies and organs; access to education and training; and access to economic capabilities. The main means they use to achieve their engagement is through change/amendment of the constitutions and through working with the relevant government structures and mechanisms i.e. parliament and law reform commission.

Governments see NGOs as opposition to current regimes. To them there is no clear line between opposition parties and NGOs. Kazombaue (1999) asserts many governments want to restrict NGOs to the abstract notion of non-governmental-meaning for governments non-political as a way of controlling their activities. However, practically they cannot box NGOs in the non-political world because, if even if they do not say they are doing politics but, the facts is that they are providing services which were supposed to be provided by governments. Politics among other

things include resource allocation and provision. The reason as to why African governments regard NGOs as opposition is due to the nature of the governance they practiced immediately after gaining independence in the 1960s. The majority went for the one party system and opposition was not allowed. In the absence of opposition parties, NGOs assumed the role of speaking for the poor. They went as far as providing for the poor and they started asking questions as to why they were poor (Nyang'oro, 1999). Once the question of the cause of poverty is brought under scrutiny, it opens up a series of questions that are directly related to power relations and resource distribution in the society.

Because NGOs are increasingly asking questions why people are poor, they have been subjected to criticism and harassment by governments. They are frequently charged that they are engaging in politics and thus they are engaging themselves in politics which they were not registered for. In the late 1990s and early 20th century, many countries, especially in eastern and southern Africa, came up with or reviewed NGO legislations. The governments claimed that the review and these new legislations, aimed at coordinating NGOs activities that had been increasing in number. On the other hand NGOs viewed these initiatives as an attempt to control them. Some of the countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Uganda were affected by these legislation excesses. In Tanzania the process of enacting the NGO Policy and Act started in 1996 and was finalized in 2002. We will see a detailed account of the NGO Act in Tanzania in chapter six.

Kazombaue (1999) documents the experience in Namibia where NGOs have found themselves in this dilemma and under accusation that NGOs are engaging in politics instead of doing development work. Under the umbrella organisation, the Namibia Non-Governmental Forum

(NANGOF) have adopted a position that would not engage themselves in partisan politics. They however, stated clearly that their activities have political implications because they are addressing people's needs like human rights, democracy, and development in general. (Nyang'oro, 1999) documents the experience of this in Uganda, where while the government insists that NGOs are eager to engage in political matters which are far beyond their mandate, NGOs have put it clearly that any development work by NGOs, to improve the lives of people was at its core political.

It is surprising that NGOs and even church related NGOs, do not want their activities to be dubbed political. However, their activities are political as is the case with the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK). From the beginning of the protest against one-party rule in Kenya, NCCCK was in the forefront in organizing seminars and disseminating information calling for reopening the door for multiparty democracy (Mutunga in Nyang'oro 1999). Nkiwane in Nyang'oro (1999) tells of the interesting case of the direct participation of NGO in politics. Unlike in some countries, where NGOs have fought to maintain their non-political status, in Lesotho in the mid-1990s, the Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN) decided to take an active role in politics. Following the political malfunctioning of the government which was caused by disagreement between Prime Minister Ntsu Mohkele and the military, King Letsie II suspended the constitution and dismissed the Prime Minister. The leading political institutions in the country came to a standstill and confusion reigned. Had it not been for the LCN intervening in things it would have not been easy. The Board of LCN under the leadership of Executive Director, Caleb Sello, had to play a role of mini-shuttle diplomacy to mediate the contending camps and finally constitutional government was restored.

Although LCN can claim to have been non-partisan in this crisis, its role of bringing the conflicting sides to the negotiating table is purely political. Two years after, in 1999, the LCN managed to mediate and restore a functioning political system in Lesotho after it almost collapsed. After this success, LCN became so powerful and this made the government lack respect in the eyes of the people. This made the government unhappy. As a result, the government started a systematic sabotage to destroy it. It achieved this by constantly calling the LCN part of the opposition.

In countries like Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, civil society coalitions have played a major role in the critical political discussions on the nature of the constitution, and on issues of political participation of people in making decisions for the country. NGOs have managed to engage governments effectively and to ensure rulers do not bend the rules and regulations to suit their own desires. In Zambia and Malawi, NGOs and civil society were able to stop leaders from amending the constitutions in order for them to stay in office. Despite Malawi's NGOs being regarded as the weakest in Southern and Eastern Africa, they managed to campaign successfully to oppose President Bakili in seeking a third term which is against the Malawi constitution (Kiondo and Nyang'oro, 2006).

In Uganda NGOs are facing hard times after the enactment of new NGO legislation that is clearly seeking to exercise crippling control over this sector, than has been the case previously. One cannot help but speculate over the reasons for the NGO Registration (Amendment) Bill 2001 having been rushed through parliament in April 2006 after a few hours of debate, particularly given that it had existed as a draft bill for over four years. The state of civil society in Uganda will

therefore be much different from 2006 on, than was the case prior to the latest general elections. While we should avoid drawing direct connections between the third-term debate in Uganda and the passing of this legislation soon after the elections, one cannot help concluding that what transpired from this debate , may well have influenced what is happening in that country today.

In South Africa, civil groups have played a leading role in bringing down the apartheid regime. Civic groups like the South African Christian Council (SACC) and the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) were in the forefront of the demand for a democratic South Africa. Their efforts bore fruit when the world witnessed the apartheid regime passing power over to the African National Congress (ANC) after a democratic election. In a study by the Institute of Democracy of South Africa [(IDASA, 2001] in South Africa on the public participation in policy process, revealed that NGOs identified strongly with their role in contributing to policy, as well as the discrepancy between intent and actual engagement with policy.

3.4 Good Governance, Partnership and the Poverty Reduction Project

Promoters of NGOs in Africa are influenced by Herberson's thinking that is cited in Lewis (2002, p. 575), that NGOs and civil society are the missing ingredient for the development of Africa. He says:

Civil society is the hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments improve governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a

generation ago.

Although Herbeson might be right; the interpretation of what he meant is totally wrong. The civil society which is being referred to is not the civil society rooted in people's daily experience and relations. Instead, there is a promotion of NGOs which is formed by elites residing in cities and towns (Chachage, 2003). Elites form NGOs and export them to the grassroots in the villages and claim them to be civil society.

The current agenda of partnership both undermines the autonomy and also contributes to the unstabilizing rather than challenging the social and status quo (Hean, 2001). A close examination of policy oriented, donor funded civil society has become an instrument in building consensus around the dominant development agenda. The development agenda, which was the main agenda of Africa, has been put aside and poverty reduction has become the order of the day. When donors agreed the agenda of poverty reduction, they included civil society in the package. This has led to the maintenance of the status quo which is abject poverty and social transformation is nowhere in sight (Chachage, 2002). In chapter six I have discussed in detail how poverty reduction has replaced the development agenda.

The widespread poverty in Africa has been blamed on the poor policies which governments have been implementing (Mamdani, 1990). Due to the hangover of colonialism and pressure from western donor nations, most of the economics and policies are in favour of economic arrangements which produce a few people who are rich while the majority are wallowing in poverty (Bond, 2003). Bond argues that the presence of multinational companies from Western

countries in these countries continues to place their economies in a tough position to compete globally. A big per cent of the profits accrued from the investments fly back home (Europe, America and Japan) to benefit the economy of the mother countries. African countries are poor because of continuing to implement socio-economic policies mainly prescribed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)-World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These policies affect both economic and social development (Chachage, 2003, Mbilinyi, Kitunga and Chachage, 2003).

The proponents of neo-liberalism have blamed the poverty of Africans by saying those who are poor are in that condition because they are work-shy, they cannot budget, save and invest; and not because they are exploited, powerless, dominated, persecuted and marginalized (Chachage, 2003; Chachage, 2004). The continent is endowed with a lot of natural resources. Investors are being sought day and night to come and invest in the country. Laws and regulations have been reviewed or enacted to encourage more investments from outside.

With the exception of a few cases like that of South Africa, where NGOs and civic groups started as political actors in opposition to apartheid, most NGOs in Eastern and Southern Africa were established as welfare organisations to meet the increasing demand of service provision in the late 1970s and 1980s. During this time the state started to withdraw from the provision of social services which they had promised when they were fighting for independence and immediately after gaining independence in the 1960s. The withdrawal of the state was primarily prompted by a worsening of economic conditions following the 1973/74 oil crisis; the inability of the state to appropriately respond to the crisis; the persistent decline in the price of primary commodities on

the global market and the subsequent failure of the earlier import substitution development strategy to take off (Nyang'oro, 1989). The economic failure led to a substantial diminishing in the state's ability to perform any meaningful management of the economy. As the economy continued to deteriorate, the authoritarian tendency of the state increased. This was because the state legitimacy felt threatened and governments feared to lose out on power. Thus, any attempt to address the consequences of economic decline would have political implications (Nyang'oro, 1999).

Economic failure in Africa induced a response from international community. The principal respondents were the International Financial Institutions led by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB); who blamed African states for failure to manage their economies (World Bank, 1981). Later studies by the WB attempted to apportion the blame between internal and external factors; the thrust of these studies was that African states were primarily responsible for the economic crisis by adopting too much centralisation of economic activities (World Bank, 1989). The response by IFIs was largely driven by a neo-liberal ideology which emphasised a market driven economy strategy, a strategy which obviously was in sharp contrast to statist ideology which had dominated development thinking in Africa since independence. International actors thus began to look for alternative avenues for the dispensing of aid to Africa. The rationale for this new strategy by both official/governmental and international non-governmental agencies was that the state in Africa had become so incompetent and inefficient that it was necessary to find new avenues for providing economic aid. NGOs in Africa were seen as the best option (Nyang'oro, 1999).

Ironically, pressure on African states did not come from IFIs and western governments alone, it also coincided with the voice of those who emphasise grassroots development especially voluntary organisations who did not trust the state because of the way it treats its people (Shivji, 2003). More importantly NGOs were seen to be close to the people because their activities touched people directly and they are on the ground. However, this was strange for IFIs and grassroots to share the bed given the fact that they both had different agendas of development which most of time opposed each other (Mbilinyi, 2003).

On the other hand, the concept has also been taken up by western governments and international institutions who understand civil society as ‘catching up’ with the west and who find the concept useful for implementing programmes of economic and political reform. Cooperation with civil society was seen as a way to legitimise programmes of economic reform and to stabilise market societies. This also provided a rather more cynical explanation for the spread of ‘civil society’ in the developing world: since donors have adopted the dogma that strengthening civil society is good for development, using the language of civil society is good for funding applications (Anheier et al. 2001). However, some have warned that NGOs are not the magic bullet of development in Africa (Edward & Hulme 2004; Nyang’oro, 1999).

The majority of NGOs who are engaged in democracy programmes and projects seek to maintain procedural democracy (Shivji, 2003). This is very real in South Africa where NGOs receive a lot of money from donors for projects that ensure that procedural democracy is maintained. For NGOs which want to bring about social changes it is not easy to get money from donors. Donors have their policies which explain explicitly that for NGOs to receive money they should fit in with

their policy and is not otherwise. Others have argued that NGOs are implementers of donor projects. Hearn (2001), observes how in South Africa major donors mostly funded NGOs that fell within the categories of democratic organisation, human rights and legal aid, conflict resolution, organisations servicing NGOs and think tanks. For the first seven years of free South Africa, these NGOs succeeded in changing the debate on democracy. Instead of focus on housing, jobs, and reliable and decent income, the debate now is about procedural democracy. Unlike governments, to most people, democracy means access to jobs, houses, reliable income, good health services and education of children (Kitunga, 2003).

Poverty reduction, which has been the preoccupation of many African governments in the last ten years or so, has managed to bring in NGOs as third partners to work alongside governments and donors. It is not surprising to find that NGOs know more about poverty strategies than most civil servants. Elsewhere, poverty is synonymous to NGOs. When you mention poverty to people in villages; what comes to mind first is NGOs more than government or any other players like political parties. Commenting on this state of affairs Yusuf Ssesanga in Tafesassocites@yahoogroups.com explains:

They are all over Africa and they are the antidote to Africa's poverty-so think many a proponent of NGOs. Indeed some of them have done tremendous work. For example, an objective person cannot deny the work Compassion International has done among the poor children, or the advocacy work done by Oxfam. Many NGOs are doing a good job. The question is can poverty in Africa be alleviated through NGOs? My answer is an emphatic No! And here is why. Show me one country that has developed as a result of NGOs, I will

show you a liar. I could be less informed, but I am not aware of any. Economies world over grow as a result of trade and good governance. Any country that does not produce or leaves production to foreigners (also called investors) to produce on its behalf as the elite nationals concentrate on humanitarian work cannot grow economically. If there's any slight growth, it will not be sustainable. For a country to achieve sustainable economic growth, its young and elite people must be involved in production. In Africa however, our elite are happily employed with NGOs funded by American and European entrepreneurs. We have left business to our uneducated brothers and foreign investors. And the African politician likes it that way.

Because NGOs employ the would-be troublesome elite, the politician can with impunity sell (read steal) their countries' resources to foreigners to the detriment of the common people. While the elite are too busy with their NGO work, a certain contract to sell the nation's resources is being signed somewhere in state house. An elite entrepreneur would however be more conscious of such criminality taking place because if the playing field is not even, his business interests will be undermined. And if we have a critical mass of entrepreneurs who do not condone the misadventures of the politicians, they (the politicians) would maybe try to clean their act. After all the entrepreneurs would be controlling the economy, so annoying them would be tantamount to committing political suicide. But now that foreign investors control the economy, the politician must do whatever it takes to please them, even if it means selling his country, provided he's still called the big man.

True, NGOs have a role to play, but they can also affect our economies negatively, like they have done. They have taken Africa's young elite who would otherwise be thinking business and involved in real production not beggardom. Not only valuable creative power is wasted in writing begging proposals to donors, but this begging attitude is perpetuated in the population hence sustaining the dependency syndrome in a resource rich Africa. How good it would be if the creative power was directed towards business creation! Africa would be dreaming of a better future''.

Mwakatundu response on Yusuf's observation was so catch, he says;

True African development will never be brought in by either western aid nor NGOs grants and advocacy campaigns. Our thinking must change, our relationship with these rich nations must change, and our understanding on true development must as well change. If it does not change, neo colonialism will take different forms at the expense of our growth.

Declare Mushi who has worked with the Health NGO based in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania for more than 10 years before becoming Tumaini University lecturer thereafter concluded the discussion which was started by Yusuf when he says;

1. NGOs offer first aid to a fainting economy
2. NGOs in Africa are like new software designed for old computers with poor functioning hardwire.
3. Very few of us join NGOs in order to fight poverty.
4. The problem of NGOs lies on who runs them and why people join them otherwise their paper work and proposals are fantastic
5. Interestingly,

unsustainable NGOs are trying to promote sustainable economy.

The above dialogue, clearly indicates that key actors in the NGOs know that NGOs are the solution of the poor countries in the region.

In Africa, civil society and NGOs must be understood from the way colonial powers integrated civil society in the power. So for civil society institutions to succeed they must dismantle that form of power (Mamdani, 1996). Mbele has argued in Kwanza Jamii (2009) that development defined by western countries and then transported to developing world. The set standards and worse enough these emerging nations accept such thinking and concepts without much questioning. Mbele sees this as nothing more than neo-colonial ideas which was spread and continues to spread through schools, the media, and many other institutions. He wants Africa to wake up from the slumber and start defining and setting standards for their development without consulting their former colonial masters. Anything done and said by Europe and the USA, Africa tends to see as development. Africa's criteria of education, governance, democracy and so on are set by them, when they are late in setting them, the continent is not happy, and will pressurise them to come up with one. The starting point is what development is in the African context. After coming up with a clear definition, then strategies and infrastructures for taking the continent to the development according to their definition will be thought and set accordingly.

I like the way Mbele ends his discussion because he explains what development should mean to all nations and more so to Africa:

... let us return to the original question: what is development? Development is the changes that take place in something or in a condition of any kind, in different aspects of life—changes which are beneficial in terms of the objective reality of the thing or condition in question. In a society or a country, development enriches the life of humans, preserves and enriches the environment, is congruent with human dignity, respect, and justice. Development springs from within a society or a country, in response to its needs and the decisions based on the will of the community, decisions which stem from independent, intelligent thinking, promoting liberation. Development does not adversely affect the environment but preserves and enriches it. Development does not bring about classes, oppression, or injustice in society. Not everything under the rubric of development needs to be home-grown, however. Communities and countries can borrow from outside. However, such borrowing has to follow the principles I have mentioned and is based on mutual respect, not coercion (Joseph Mbele, www.kwanzajamii.com).

3.5 Role of Donors in Setting Agendas for NGOs

Literary NGOs in Africa depend on donors mostly from Europe and America for almost 100% of their funding. In a study by the DCU (2007) in Tanzania, it reveals about 93% of NGOs receive funding from donors. The other 7% are still negotiating with donors. Most of the NGOs in Tanzania get their funding from Western Europe. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development- OECD (1997) cited in Anheier et al. (2001) indicates that governments and International Institutions, since the early 1990s, have greatly increased the development funds channelled through NGOs. Also, foundations and corporations are increasing the money they are

giving to NGOs. A good number of NGOs receive technical assistance in terms of human resources. However, the recipient NGOs do not know how much this is. On many occasions this expertise is less experienced, have graduated from colleges, but since they know money from their countries is being used to run the recipient NGOs projects they become heavy headed and know all. Expertise and local knowledge from local staff is not taken serious. This has led to the downfall and failure of many projects.

Who pays the piper chooses the tune. Vogel (2006) observes that American Philanthropy has been exporting American hegemony to the third world. Charitable money plays an important role both in democratic and economic development and cooperation use this under the bias of cooperate social responsibilities' agenda, which dictates strategic corporate philanthropy in the hope of opening markets (Harvard Business Review, as cited in Vogel, 2006). Although international philanthropy 'resides' within the domestic gift economy, it must be conceptualized in terms of its special function at the site of direct boundary exchanges between the USA and world societies. While the domestic gift economy structures the inner social order, international philanthropy operates in the foreign-policy arena of the US state (Berman 1983 in Vogel, 2006).

Big donors like the United States Agency for International Development have stated clearly that they will not support any group which threatens America's interest. In this way the USAID does not give grants to any NGO or other civil groups which are openly opposes American policies.

In 2006, TANGO published a story through its Newsletter, Semezana on how in Europe, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is forcing African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries to

adopt trade and economic policies which eventually will strangle the economies of these countries. The director of MS Tanzania, a branch of an NGO based in Denmark (MS Danish) who partly finances the production of this newsletter wrote back to TANGO complaining that TANGO should not produce such a report because it goes against the foreign policy of Denmark, who give money to MS (Interviews, Zaa Twalangate², March 14, 2008).

Funding from the donor will not be there always. Horn (2008) has noticed that in some countries like Namibia they have started to notice a decline in funding from donors. At the same time the state is again the main recipient of donor money. The probability, if money from donors stops flowing, is that we might see many NGOs ceasing to exist. With a limited number of NGOs, which after all is an imposed project which has no root in the daily experience of African people, promoters of liberal democracy might wish to turn to the civil society which people have lived with for centuries.

To Mamdani (1996:5), if Africa wants to liberate herself and contribute to the world then she should not go the European way. She should consult her past and do things based on African foundations. For the nationalist newly independent governments, conflict and opposition were foreign elements in Africa. To avoid this it was necessary to strengthen the state power and make it monolithic on the one hand, and weaken civil society in terms of its organisational capacities, on the other (Chachage, 1994).

² Zaa Twangalete is the Editor of Semezana

3.6 Conclusion

The chapter has managed to highlight groups which form a crucial part of civil society. They are patron-client networks, ethnic associations, self-help and cooperative groups, and some 'traditional' authorities. Donors and IFIs have promoted NGOs in place of traditional civil societies because they find it easy to work with them and they can be easily used as modernisation vehicles. NGOs are being established and manned by elites who can speak and write in languages which are understood by donors. They can write and win funding proposals and write both financial and activity reports which can be easily submitted to western funders and in that way it is easy to show accountability. Some authors are still sceptical of NGOs. Many people even those who have worked with NGOs; do not see NGOs as a solution to the underdevelopment of the country.

However, NGOs have been able to play a significant role in making sure that the ruling class does not regard a country as their personal company where decision are made to suit the needs and pleasures of the owners. Governments are deploying different tactics to strangle the NGOs to ensure they do not cause unnecessary noise in their project of safe-guarding their interests. In chapter four, I focus on Tanzania and see how NGOs and civil society is fairing in influencing policies, decisions and other endeavours which affect the way country and governance institutions are directed and guided to serve people.

Chapter Four

Emergence, Growth and Development of Civil Society and NGOs in Tanzania

4.0 Introduction

This chapter reflects on the development of civil society and NGOs in Tanzania. The aim of the chapter is to gain a broad picture of the development of civil society and latterly NGOs in the country. The information provided sets a background for chapter five to eight. Section one focuses on the history of Tanzania which is the unification of two countries, Tanganyika and Zanzibar who united in 1964. Before they received independence, Tanganyika was a colony of Britain, and Zanzibar was under the Sultanate of Oman. Section two explains how civil society was organised before colonial times. During this time, ethnicity and tribes had evolved into some sort of organisations. There were two main formations; state and stateless. Section three focuses on colonial times. Colonialists (German and United Kingdom) reoriented the Tanzania economy towards the international capitalism system. Colonial economy and governance produced a civil society distinct from that of pre-colonial times. In section four, I turn to the period immediately after independence up to the 1980s. After independence, the state entered into a project of building nationalism and development. The wisdom of the time was that the state can do everything and one way of doing this was to adopt a single party system and shut-out all other civil actors. Section five revisits the period from 1980 up to the present. After the state had failed to deliver as promised, the civil society became unhappy and critical. They reacted to the situation by fighting for their freedom, and at the same time they started to provide some social services

which the government was no longer able to provide.

4.1 Revisiting the History of Tanzania

Tanzania is the unification of the two countries, Tanganyika and Zanzibar who united in 1964. Tanganyika gained her independence from the United Kingdom in 1961. Zanzibar was under the Sultanate of Oman and she gained her independence in 1964 through a revolution (Kimambo & Temu, 1969). Tanganyika was conceived as a nation way back in 1884-85 when imperial European nations held a conference in Berlin, German; to decide who should get what part of the African continent. This conference was convened by Chancellor Bismarck of German. Germany had to call this meeting, following the scramble and conflict over raw materials and control of land. This was the period following the industrial revolution in Europe. After this conference, Tanganyika was allocated to Germany, and it was like this until 1919 when Germany was defeated in World War I (Iliffe, 1979). From 1919, the League of Nations placed Tanganyika under a British mandate until her independence in 1961 (Kimambo & Temu, 1969).

After becoming Tanzania in 1964, Tanganyika was referred to as Tanzania Mainland, and Zanzibar, was referred to as both Tanzania Isles and Zanzibar. Zanzibar retained certain autonomy while Tanganyika lost all hers to the Union. Letting Zanzibar retain some of her autonomy and maintaining her name, while part of Tanzania, has led to political misunderstandings between the two countries all these years. Tanzanian Mainlanders complain that how does Zanzibar continue to maintain her name and some autonomy while the other loses hers. Zanzibaris complain of how Tanganyika has swallowed up their country, and how resource allocation favours Tanzania

Mainland. Under the articles of the Union, some things were agreed under the union and some were left out to be under the government of Zanzibar. Under such arrangements, NGOs issues are not union matters (URT, 1965). Much of this discussion and research in this section focuses on Tanzania Mainland (Tanzania).

4.2 Civil Society in the Pre-colonial Period

There are 120 ethnic groups in Tanzania. As elsewhere in Africa, Tanzania in classical political thought and in theories based on natural law, civil society was indistinguishable from state. The period preceding colonial time, ethnicity and tribes had evolved in different social formations (Kiondo and Mogella, 2006). The dominant formations are state and stateless social formations. Either one ethnic group or several ethnic groups occupied one geographical area and their neighbours respected their boundaries (Iliffe, 1979).

Under state formation, society organised under chiefdoms. The head was the chief with subheads like army and militia. In Tanzania they are known as sungusungu, rugaruga and village headmen. These chiefdoms undertook all the function which the modern state does. Kiondo and Mogella (2006, p. 19) further state:

the role of this institution was to foster tribal cohesion and integration; organise social production including its distribution; defend tribal land and its territorial boundaries against outside invasion; adjudicate all tribal affairs including conflicts; and to promote the general welfare of the whole tribe.

Kiondo and Mogella (2006) have noted that pre the state; there were two forms; age-state system and kinship clans. The age system consisted of different hierarchies and, layers of age-set groups. The elder group exercised power over other groups. These class systems were headed by the head of clan and were slightly like chiefs but did not exercise power over the whole clan.

Within these two dominant society formations there emerged associations and groups to undertake various economic, security and entertainment in order to allow society to function properly. Mwalimu (1998) identify three main groups; cultural, recreational/entertainment and production/economic.. Social cultural groups comprised groups like traditional midwifery, fortune tellers, diviners, rainmakers, ritualists, magicians and so forth. These groups performed their activities individually, but their place in society was known. The entertainers engaged in activities like traditional dances. The entertainers were organised in groups because their activities were not possible without some sort of organisation. Those groups engaged in economic activities included communal cattle herding, communal fishing and communal hunting. Also there were trade groups who engaged both locally and long distance. Some of these groups were under chiefs or sub-chiefs or clan elders and others operated independently (Kimambo, 1985).

To date, some of these groups are still functional and have great influence, but most literature has concentrated on the modern understanding of civil society, that is well organised groups and have some sort of leadership which in a way are parallel to political parties. All these groups form the roots for modern civil society in Tanzania.

4.3 Civil Society in the Colonial Period

Colonial times saw tremendous social and civil changes because of the introduction of new economic and political systems. The main objective of colonial power was to harvest economic opportunities in the colonies for the benefit of the home countries. It is in this period when cash crops like coffee, sisal, cotton, cashew-nuts, etc. were introduced. Also consumer goods like beer, cigarettes, construction of railways and roads took its course. Colonial governments bought new forms of economic arrangements and relations which was exploitative. Meena (1992) points out that, civil society groups emerged in Tanzania from the early days of colonial rule in opposition to the draconian nature of the colonial system.

The new economic ventures led to new social relations. And this led to the loss of dignity and humanity for Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris. Hydén (1980, p. 46) explaining the nature of exploitation and resistance of Tanganyikans to the British says:

The British officers created a political situation over which they gradually began to lose control...As a result of the colonial policy of agricultural development through coercion some 75,000 persons were convicted before the native courts in 1946 alone.

This new dominance by foreign powers led people to react to the situation by engaging in constant resistance. There were resistance wars like the MajiMaji war of 1905-07 in southern Tanganyika, and the Chief Mkwawa of Iringa war against Germany in 1891-98. Hydén (1980.45), writing on Tanzanian peasantry during and after colonialism, says 'when some of the demands on peasants

became too harsh, they resisted colonial policies, particularly in agriculturally critical years'. Apart from direct confrontation, citizens engaged in other forms of civil resistance like refusing to pay taxes.

Like elsewhere in Africa, the struggle for independence led to the creation of NGOs and other civil society organisations, mostly that were of a welfare orientation and were political and social in nature (Bujra & Adejumobi, 2002). At that period, citizens formed associational groups on a voluntary basis to address community problems collectively. These groups mainly were of peasants workers, petty bourgeois, tribal organisations and churches. Colonial governments were so oppressive that people's wellbeing was not a priority to them at all. Their main aim was the production of agriculture, transportation, light industries and administrative machinery.

Colonial governments introduced and promoted the production and regulation of cash crops. One outcome of this was the emergence of the peasantry. Crops introduced were coffee, sisal and cotton. After the First World War of 1914-18, the production of cash crops increased tremendously. Maddox G et al (1996) in *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania*, shows how the Colonial environmental protection policies and practices by British colonists affected peasants negatively and this forced them to enter nationalist movements. Gibson cited in (Kiondo and Mogella, 2006, p. 21) points out in Kilimanjaro the number of coffee growers increased from 27,572 in 1942/3 to 45,000 in 1960/61. Also in other regions like in Mara and Sukumaland the same trends were recorded. Peasants were given low prices and were forced to grow these crops. Peasants formed organisations to demand for better pricing of their crops and produce. One of these organisations is the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association, which was

formed in 1925 with the aim of monitoring and controlling the middlemen traders especially Asians. Peasants who grew coffee formed cooperatives to discourage the middlemen in the marketing of cash crops. In Kilimanjaro, they formed the Kilimanjaro Planters Association (K.N.P.A) in 1925, under the leadership of Joseph Merinyo. The main objective of the K.N.P.A was to secure better prices for their coffee, which was the main cash crop for export (Towo, 1998). Towo (1998) continue to explain how in 1924, the Bahaya people from Bukoba formed the Bukoba Bahaya Union who in 1936 changed its name to the Bukoba Native Growers Association. This process was spearheaded by Clemency Kiiza and Rwamugira. This association fought for a better price, security of peasant land and better methods of growing coffee.

The most developed civil society sector during colonial times was the worker movements. Workers formed trade unions and welfare associations to demand for better working conditions and better wages. However , there were few workers mainly because industries were discouraged by the colonialists. Sectors which had many workers include plantations, mining, transport and public services such as schools and hospitals.

In 1922 Martin Kayamba, led other workers to form the Tanganyika Territory Civil Servants Association. In 1930s it transformed into the Tanganyika African Civil Servants' Association. Its main members were clerks, skilled workers and teachers. Although this was recorded as a trade union; on looking at its objectives the association looked more like a staff association than a trade union. It did not pose any threat to colonial government because it was just like a social club of elites (Chachage, 2003). In 1927, a Motor Drivers Association was formed by motor drivers and mechanics in Moshi. Their main concern was for a fair salary. They organised a strike for a higher

salary. Another association was the African Association (AA) which was formed in 1929. The first workers associations were the African Railway Associations formed in 1929. Trade unions for African cooks and house servants were formed in 1935. The aim of this Association was to fight for better wages and working conditions. In 1948, AA changed its name to Tanganyika African Association (TAA). Alongside the formation of TAA, other small associations with close working relationship with TAA were formed. These were the African Labour Union, the African Government Employees, the Teachers Association and the Association of Cooks and Domestic Servants in Dar es Salaam. As we will see later, TAA later was transformed to a political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which mobilised Tanganyikans and led them to independence in 1961. Workers faced problems such as low wages, harsh working conditions, and use of brutal punishments like whipping.. The method used by workers to press for their demands and rights was mostly through strikes. For example, in 1947 there was a major strike by dock workers in Dar es Salaam. Most of these trade unions were weak and they were poorly organised.

Urban migrants also formed ethnic associations to provide social services like burial assistance and loans. By 1954 there were 51 such organisations in Dar es Salaam, with a total membership of 6,500. Some of these associations proved to be very influential. The Wazaramo Union for example, successfully lobbied the colonial administration to make them withdraw their support to unpopular local leaders and replace them with leaders who had broader popular support.

As time went on, these small interest groups joined force to form larger groups which ended up in political movements. Mpangala (2001) explains how the Tanganyika Civil Servants Association was which formed in 1922 and in 1927 was transformed into the TAA and in 1954 was

transformed into a political party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which led the struggle for independence. In 1961, Tanganyika gained independence from United Kingdom, and TANU became the ruling party and in 1977 it united with the African Shiraz Party of Zanzibar to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi, and to date it is still in power.

Religious bodies especially Islam and Christianity organised into associations. The new religious identities cut across linguistic and ethnic lines, and so did sports-clubs and dance societies. The Beni dance societies, popular from around 1890 to 1930, provided not only recreation, but also mutual aid for their members and training in organisational skills. The colonial authorities barred African civil servants from joining these societies and suspected them of being a cover for political activity as they developed a well-organized network with branches in all the major towns. Those which you can say were NGOs were Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, and Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), and Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA). They were all affiliated to religious institutions. The increased function of the civil sector, specifically NGOs occurred during the centralization of the state in response to the socialist policy in which the state assumed many functions for providing welfare to the majority of the poor people.

Most literature paints a positive picture of civil groups during this period and; that they were established by the initiative of natives. Others like Chachage (1986) show that the colonial government was involved in their establishment. Chachage (ibid.) points out how the Secretary to Native Affairs, Philip E. Mitchell, engineered the formation of the elitist Tanganyika Territory Civil Service Association (TTCSA) in 1922. It enjoyed the official backing of Governor Donald Cameron because of its usefulness in "improving" the conditions of Africans (Chachage, 1986,

p.197). This association changed to the African Association (AA) in 1929, Tanganyika African Association in 1947, and finally Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954. The latter became the nationalist party. This intervention even stretched to tribal organisations that enjoyed the backing of the colonial government. As it has been pointed out elsewhere, the British preferred indirect rule, organizing around tribal lines helped to cement their philosophy of governance because that way it delayed the nation becoming united and forming a strong national identity.

4.4 Independence Period to the 1980s

It is clear that the independent government in Tanzania Mainland (Tanganyika) was put into place by a popular civic movement which involved many Tanganyikans who organized in cooperative movements such as trade unions and its umbrella organisations, the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika (CUT) and the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL). The civic movement was finally organized around the political party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).

After independence in 1961, NGOs and other civil society groups were free and autonomous. In 1965, Tanzania became a one party state and this affected the political parties and other social groups. The government saw that it was the only actor who knew what people wanted and had to guide the development agenda. Thus free civil society groups and NGOs were seen as a threat to the development and nationalistic agendas. Their freedom was strangled and many were incorporated into the bureaucratic system of government. In the political arena, the government and the ruling party were one thing (Mpangala, 2001).

The honeymoon between the state and civil society organisations was short lived. Their independence was attacked by the state and a corporatist system was established under which matters concerning trade unions, cooperatives, women and youth came under the direct control of the state and its ruling party (Jennings, 2003). The civil associations sector did not expand widely within the twenty years of post-independence, as civil society faced new political and structural constraints, among them stringent laws that granted the government considerable power to control organisations through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The few existing NGOs, which continued to operate after independence, were mainly involved in social welfare and service delivery and not in any type of advocacy activity. They came under stiff competition from the ruling party's interest groups, i.e. the party's women wing "Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania" (UWT), Youth wing "TANU Youth League" (TYL) the workers movement the "National Union of Tanganyika" (NUTA) the parents wing "Tanzania Parents Association" (TAPA) and the Cooperative Union of Tanzania. The NGO sector and party associates were therefore incorporated into the state system to secure the compliance of the people from local communities (Mbilinyi, et al, 2003).

Omari (1994) observes that as the government was busy in curtailing the freedom of people organisations and other independent group;, overseas personnel who managed international associations (NGOs) left the country taking along with them the funds. Programmes stopped, and locally trained personnel who had led indigenous civic associations were offered better jobs in the civil service. This left the associations without experienced leadership. The political climate changed. The new government knowing very well how strong civic associations could become as pressure groups took deliberate measures to transform locally based associations and affiliated them to the party. It is argued that when the country adopted a one party system in 1965, the

government feared that the existence of autonomous popular NGOs could threaten the survival of the system and the implementation of its policy. As a strategy to suppress opposition and contain independent opinion the government deliberately stifled foreign based NGOs and either abolished or suffocated local NGOs (Omari, 1994). A glaring example of the latter is the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA) which was disbanded in order to give way to the formation of the Ujamaa villages (Coulson, 1982).

A new development strategy was adopted by which the government took positive steps to promote peoples' self-help. Using the slogan "*Uhuru na Kazi*" literary meaning "*Freedom and Work*" the government mobilised people to undertake various development activities on a self-help basis. People responded enthusiastically and organised themselves into groups to implement a range of activities in education, health, water supply and all sorts of community services. Village development committees were formed to coordinate peoples' efforts. At grassroots level, the role of organising development actions was slowly being assumed by these development committees. Self-help organisations under the guidance of village development committees appeared to be filling adequately the role initially played by NGOs (Omari, 1999).

Possibly because of the good work that self-help organisations were doing at grassroots level, in terms of mobilisation and organisation, at least for the first ten years of independence, the few NGOs which were operating in the country did not see the need to have their own structures at that level. At grassroots level NGOs were unknown. About 80% of the NGOs operating then were sources of supplementary funds for projects run by village development committees (Omari, 1999). NGOs built capacities for fund raising often times from donors in the north. Skeleton staffs

were recruited for project supervision and administration.

The picture that prevailed for about fifteen years after independence was that NGOs did not administer the services directly to their target groups. The nature of the roles NGOs played meant that they did not need to employ technical staff. Technical personnel were not required because actual operations in terms of implementing the activities in the field was done by the government using its extension services. NGOs like The Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) and Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FFHC) which appeared to be the most active at the time did not have a direct relationship with the grassroots. So when self-help groups were assisted by an NGO, the group did not distinguish what was government support and what came from the NGO. In the eyes of self-help groups any assistance which reached them was seen to be coming from the government.

Because NGOs did not have their own structures at grassroots level, NGOs depended on the government and village development committees for implementing projects. NGOs did not employ technical people but generalists who were primarily involved in fund raising and administration. At grassroots level, self-help groups were transformed to conform to the needs of coordination by village development committees. Being the executive arm of village governments, village development committees complied with government orders given through policy directives from time to time. In turn peoples' self-help groups were directed to implement programmes which complied with government priorities. When NGOs assisted self-help groups to implement projects, in essence they were assisting the government to implement her policies regardless of whether the programmes met the felt needs and aspiration of individual community members.

4.5 Resurgence of Economic Crisis and the Mushrooming of NGOs

In the 1980s and 1990s, the consequences of the corporatist system manifested itself in a number of ways. Firstly, the rift between the state and the civil society led to the loss of the civil society base (peasants abandoned state controlled cooperatives and workers ignored state controlled Trade Unions). There was an undermining of the authority and legitimacy of the state in the process. Secondly, the NGO space was reduced, with the consequence that when populist state policies could not be maintained; many people went without basic services. Thirdly, local and community initiatives were stifled by the absence of community based organisations (Omari, 1994).

Starting early in the 1970s, Tanzania began experiencing a series of economic difficulties. The crisis came about due to both external and internal environmental economic conditions (Bagachwa, et. al. 1994). The external environment was as harsh as the local environment. The crisis was caused by many factors: oil prices rocketed (prices doubled twice within four years i.e. in 1974 and 1978); terms of trade worsened; the East African Community collapsed in 1977 forcing the country to start building almost from scratch most of the facilities which were provided by the community forcing the government to make quick re-allocation of priorities (Bagachwa, 1994).

Bagachwa, et al. (1994) reiterates in the 1970s that Tanzania implemented a number of policy measures which had far reaching consequences. The measures were designed to transform substantially both the economy and society. There was en masse nationalisation of investments, institutions and properties; countrywide resettlement of the peasantry in designated villages; the

abolition of District Councils and Cooperative Societies. The structure of government changed whereby the government carried a major decentralisation of its structure. These policy measures shocked not only the economy but also the entire society.

While absorbing the economic shock, drought came which triggered an acute shortage of food. This necessitated the government spending colossal sums of foreign currency to import food. Compounding this problem, Tanzania was forced to go to war to evict the aggressor Iddi Amin of Uganda in 1978. The war caused much loss of life and property and it put the country in deep financial crisis as it had to spend a large sum of foreign exchange to import arms and ammunition. The situation worsened as interest rates and debt servicing requirements kept rising and trade and exports went in a downward spiral. Again this strangled the country's import capacity inevitably provoking serious shortages in raw materials, spare parts, machinery and consumer goods, all of which reinforced an already hard hitting economic and social situation.

The crisis challenged the wisdom of entrusting the government with the monopoly of ideas and policies for the development of the country. It made clear that the government alone could not be expected to meet all the development needs of society.

4.6 Political and Economic Liberalisation of the 1980s

Tanzania started to embrace economic reforms and trade liberalization in the mid-1980s. This led to an increase in the formation of new NGOs for credit income generation, lobbying and advocacy for women empowerment and human rights issues. Exponential growth of Non-Governmental

Organisations is recorded at the beginning of the 1990s when the country had 163 registered NGOs (Kiondo, 1993) and by the end of 1994 the number had grown to 813 (URT, 1995). In the wake of the global political and economic changes, the NGO sector had multiplied as was noted in the speech of the Minister of Home Affairs. Between 1995 and May 2001, an additional 2,350 NGOs were registered. The number of NGO's mushroomed with the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s. Apart from the availability of funding from donors, another major reason for the growth is that people who used to work in the civil service and industries had nowhere to go and NGOs were the nearest and possibly the cheapest alternative.

Liberalization and the introduction of multiparty politics started in 1992. It meant that the corporatist system had to be abandoned and pluralism in the NGOs was introduced. It led to an increase in the number of NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs). There were great expectations that the state-civil society relations would improve greatly. There were consultations between NGOs and the government in the drawing up of an NGO policy. The final NGO policy and the NGO Act however indicated a clearly hostile relationship. Two theoretical issues can be raised. One, concerning state-civil society relations in Tanzania; and the other concerning NGOs-civil society relations in Tanzania. Concerning state-civil society relations, we could ask the question as to why, the state is not supportive of civil society? Since it is non-military, the Tanzanian state draws its legitimacy from civil society. Without the support of the majority of its citizens, the legitimacy of the state would be greatly undermined.

While the first regime might have undermined the independence of civil society, it worked to build nationhood and Tanzanian citizenship. This is social capital which is preventing generalized

sectarian rifts in the country. The question why are the improved state-civil society relations of the 1990s being allowed to deteriorate when the state still needs the civil society. Members of parliament seem to be in the lead in this onslaught on NGOs at the National level and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in their constituencies. They fear that the leadership of NGOs and CBOs at the level of constituencies would eventually vie for their positions. It is in the interest of the state to prevent such an onslaught of citizens' efforts to enhance its legitimacy by mobilizing them.

What comes out clearly is what Ndumbaro and Kiondo (2007.6) summarise by saying:

The nature, strategies, scope of activities, and the organisational forms adopted by current non-for-profit organisations significantly differ from the early ones and they insist that these differences are due to socio-economic and political fact context of the time.

Ndumbaro and Kiondo (2007, p. 10) summarise well the motivational factors which forced people to establish NGOs in 1980s and 1990s. These are:

The need to fill the gap left by state withdrawal from social services delivery. The effect of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) including increasing social differences, and the elevation of environmental concerns to the top of global policy agenda. The need for certain social groups including women to organise and articulate their interests. The move by international aid agencies, as they lost trust in the state, to encourage voluntary organisations (thereby by-passing government organisations). And privatisation and

retrenchment programmes that increased the number of unemployed people who turned to voluntary organisations as their alternative.

4.7 Conclusion

NGOs and civil society has travelled a long journey, and at the same time has taken different faces and characteristics which were necessary for the environment and reality of the time. Initially, NGOs and civil society were concerned with local areas. The colonial regime led to the birth of civic groups which were mainly focusing on the groups' interests verses that of state or other powerful forces. As time went on, they supported the country to become independent. Independence led to hard times for civil society. Their freedom was restricted and incorporated within that of the state through the machinery of the ruling party. In the 1980s and 1990s, change to the global political environment and internal dissatisfaction forced the state to open the door for civil society and NGOs to operate.

Chapter Five

In the Beginning: NGOs Welcomed Good Governance and Democracy

5.0 Introduction

This chapter aims at giving a general overview of the activism and advocacy for policy change as practiced by NGOs in Tanzania. The chapter shows the context, environment, philosophy and motive that surrounds guides and influences NGO's activism in Tanzania. Specifically, the chapter attempts to answer research questions one and two that is to what extent NGOs are leading the people to real social change and sustainable development. And why NGOs in Tanzania do not seem to have managed to become catalysts for people to engage the government. This chapter is closely linked with chapter four. In the last section of that chapter, some of the activities of NGOs especially in the early years of independence in the 1960s to 1970s are scrutinized. The chapter focused on the period starting from the 1980s, when activism and advocacy for policy change by NGOs started to be a common practice in the country. Activism could be defined as the doctrine or practice of vigorous action or involvement as a means of achieving political, economic, social or other goals, sometimes by lobbying, demonstrations, protests, etc. (Med, 2004). Shultz (2002:3) defines an activist as "someone who takes non-violent action to bring pressure on powers that are in pursuit of a public goal".

Section one deals with situational analysis which analyses the way current activism was 'born'. The economic hardship of the late 1970s and early 1980s made people more critical of the government. In section two, the chapter turns its attention to the early activism initiatives waged in the country. The first initiatives were closely associated with the struggle for the widening of democracy especially the reintroduction of multiparty democracy. Activism for other issues like gender equality, environment, economic justice and children's rights were the outcomes of the struggle for a widening of democracy. Section three concentrates on the trend and dynamics of NGOs in the 2000s. Section four is devoted to interrogating and analysing the nature, style and strategies of advocacy carried out by NGOs. The majority of NGOs have fallen in to the trap of doing advocacy for people instead of doing it with them. This is the main setback because such paths do not empower people, instead, it leaves NGOs well informed about the issues they work on, but that knowledge does not benefit the population. Section five discusses networking and coalition building among NGOs.

5.1 Economic Hardship and the Failure of Governance in the Late 1970s and 1980s

In chapter four, I briefly discussed some of the economic hardships facing the government in the 1970s. This section gives a detailed account of some of the challenges faced the government in the 1980s. By the turn of 1980, Tanzania was experiencing very severe economic hardship, which had been caused by three main factors: (i) the world economic crisis (oil crisis) of the early 1970s, (ii) the severe drought of 1973-74 and (iii) the war between Tanzania and Uganda that was fought in 1978-1979. Both the world oil crisis of 1973-74 and the severe drought which lasted from 1973-74 had a very negative impact on economic growth. The situation was so tough that many families

had to depend on the government for a free food supply. As if those two mishaps were not enough, when President Iddi Amin of Uganda came to power through a coup d'état in 1972, he started to claim the Kagera region, in North-Western Tanzania was part of Uganda. He kept claiming so and instigating Tanzania for a considerable long time (Lupogo, 2001). In October 1978, Uganda invaded Tanzania with the aim of 'claiming' back Kagera. Tanzania responded and the two nations entered into war. The war ended in April 1979 with Uganda losing the war and Tanzanian forces ousting Iddi Amin from power. Amin went into exile in Libya briefly and then moved to Saud Arabia. He was there until his death in 2003. After the war, Tanzanian soldiers remained in Uganda for a number of years supporting the new government from possible retaliation from Amin.. During the war period, Tanzania witnessed a spirit of nationalism and solidarity (Ibid.). The war cost the nation a fortune, and its impact continued to haunt the nation for many years. After the war, President Nyerere informed the nation to prepare themselves for 18 tough months. He challenged every citizen to 'tighten' their belts during this time. By saying tighten the belt he meant that people should be very careful in the way they used the scarce resources available because the state was in a bad way financially. "When these months ended nothing had changed, instead things turned worse" (Alfred Magalla, Interview, 20/03/2008). All three factors put the government in a very tough situation to govern. While all this was happening, it gave fertile ground for sections of the society to start questioning the ability of the government in power and the ruling party, to steer the nation to the right path of development.

The pressure resulted in the coup d'état attempt of 1982 (Lupogo, 2001) in which soldiers and citizens planned to stage a coup d'état, but the government managed to arrest the situation before it took off. The major reason put forward by those involved in the coup attempt, was economic

hardship and the lack of democracy. They claimed Nyerere had failed to take the nation to the paradise which he had promised Tanzanians when the country got independence in 1961 (Mwijage, 1996). They claimed that while people were experiencing a tough life, Nyerere and the government were not doing enough to solve these problems but also was not capable of doing so. Apart from lacking the ability to solve these problems, he was not ready to listen to voices which were giving alternative options. The country needed new leadership which would solve these problems (Mwijage, 1996). But new leadership was not possible because the country was under a single party system (URT, 1992). With a single party system it was hard to expect any serious changes even when there were new faces in the office. They always defended and implemented the ideology and policies of the party. In addition, Nyerere had not indicated that he was prepared to step aside and let another member from the ruling party, -Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), lead the country (Campbell and Howard eds. 1992). Although the government pre-empted the coup d'état before it happened, it did not solve the problem, and instead the number of dissidents increased. It also made the people conclude that, since the coup d'état had failed, a political means was the only way to go. It turned out that, most of the people who wanted to overthrow Nyerere were in the forefront in demanding pluralism in politics. When multiparty politics was reintroduced in 1992, most of them joined opposition parties (Kaiza, 2003).

In 1983 there was an attempt by the then Prime Minister; Edward Sokoine to bring some change from within. Over time some business people had used illegal means to amass wealth by selling goods at high prices. This was contrary to the socialist ideology which the country was following. It was forbidden for individuals to own property and wealth, like in capitalism where only a few people are extremely rich while the majority are wallowing in poverty. This situation made people

question the government's ability to rule and implement what it was preaching. There was a famous saying around which said that: 'the government is on holiday' (Nestory Maswe, Interview, 20/3/2008). By looking at the way things were happening, one can conclude that Nyerere had run out of strategies and the power to run the country. As was discussed in chapter four, it seems at this juncture, that the policy of co-opting civil society in the state and governance machinery was backfiring. Nyerere's luck changed with the reappointment of Edward Sokoine, who was an ardent follower of socialism, as Prime Minister. Some people claim that Sokoine was more socialist than Nyerere. Sokoine's reappointment served a purpose for a short time.

Sokoine embarked on a very tough initiative of bringing reform in the economic sector. His actions challenged the way the government and party had arranged and allowed business to be run in favour of a few rich people. In 1983, he initiated an economic reform which was termed as a 'war against economic saboteurs' popularly in Kiswahili known as "*vita dhidi ya wahujumu uchumi*" (Shivji, 1995). During this time, because goods were not available in the shops, business people were selling them at exorbitant prices. And once they acquired these goods they would hide and sell them in secrecy (Mwijage, 1996). Sokoine managed to arrest many big business people. His crusade did not last long because he was killed in a car accident in April 1984. There were rumours that his enemies within the government and the party engineered his death (Mwijage, 1996).

After Sokoine's death, Salim Ahmed Salim was appointed as Prime Minister. Salim did not continue with 'the war' that Sokoine had started; instead he opened the doors for the market to operate. Because internal production of goods had almost ceased, he allowed business people to

import goods from outside the country. Before this there were many restrictions on importing goods from outside the country. In a way it is like Salim laid the ground for a free market economy. But he did not last long because in the following year 1985; there was a new Government under President Mwinyi who replaced him with Joseph Warioba. Mwinyi's government continued to implement the free market economy which had been pioneered by Salim (Bagachwa and Cromwell (1995).

All these hardships forced the Nyerere government to enter into negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assistance to help recover the ailing economy. The IMF came up with conditions which Nyerere did not agree with (ibid). Two that angered Nyerere were to devalue the Tanzanian currency, the Shilling. The other condition was to liberate the economy by letting it be run by private companies instead of the government. To Nyerere who was a staunch believer in socialism this was an insult. He suspended negotiations with the IMF. People all over the country demonstrated in support of Nyerere's decision. However, his stand did not last long, the crisis continued to hurt people and slowly, the government started to open the doors to a neoliberal economy (Wangwe, 2001). The introduction of the neo liberal economy meant it had to open up to more voices apart from that of the ruling party. Nyerere was able to read "the writing on the wall" that the socialist ideology would not endure the test of time. He saw that the free market economy was unopposed and he was not ready to lead the country in pursuing such a policy. Therefore, he decided to step aside.

In 1985, Nyerere relinquished power and his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi welcomed the neoliberal economy with open hands. He made a U-turn from the socialism ideology of Nyerere to

a free market economy. This was officially done by the Zanzibar Declaration of 1991 when the Chama Cha Mapinduzi Central Committee met in Zanzibar and officially renounced the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which till then was the blue print for socialist ideology, and the main pillar of socio-economy life in the country. Chama Cha Mapinduzi was the ruling and only party at that time. Prince Bagenda (Interview, 24/01/2008) thinks “Mwinyi opened up so rapidly, instead he should have done it step by step”.

The economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s had undermined the Government’s capacity to provide essential social services to people. People realized that the Government was no longer able to provide for them and this made it lose its credibility in the eyes of the people. Donors begun to criticize Tanzania’s socialist policies and recommended an adjustment to structures (Repoa, 2000). But while donors were busy criticizing the Government, they did not bother to look into how global economic arrangements favour developed nations while on the other hand it makes developing nations weaker and weaker (Hancock, 2006). For example, Hancock further argues, while developed countries have freedom to determine the price of their products they sell to developing nations and elsewhere, developing nations do not enjoy the same liberty. Their products are exported to the north, mainly in raw form; the prices are fixed by buyers, who normally make sure the prices are always low. Omar (1992) tells of how people now focused on initiatives from among themselves.

The nature of the state in Tanzania during this period helped ‘the overgrowth of a non-accountable public bureaucracy’ which was unable to deliver the goods and services to the people. Other means to deliver the goods to the people at grassroots level had to be developed either by the local

people or by international donor agencies (Kiondo, 1992). The international community was pushing for the formation of alternative structures which would bypass the established bureaucracy in social services delivery and implementation of programmes to reach the poor (Bratton, 1990). NGOs seemed to be the viable alternative. Hence donors started giving massive amount of funds to NGOs. During the same period the people at grassroots were developing self-reliance groups and structures which would help them solve their developmental problems. Kiondo (1992) notes that this period witnessed the rapid increase in the number of NGOs. In the 1980s, 40 new NGOs were registered, which is about 60% of all the NGOs registered in the three decades post-independence in the country. Omari (1992) concludes that because of the economic hardship the country had been facing at this time, it had to accommodate this new trend even if it did not like it. This scenario led people to start questioning the wisdom, that the government knew all about their problems and was willing to solve them. People realised that without external pressure the government will not fulfil its promise of making sure every citizen has their daily bread.

Most literatures have documented the formal organisations which have led them to conclude that there were very few NGOs which existed in the first 30 years of independence. Omari (1992) disagrees with this assertion, as he says during this time and even before independence there were many informal groups and even today after the increase in the of number of NGOs to thousands, till there are many informal groups playing a big role in serving communities. Chapter three examined how groups like self-help and traditional leadership groups have had to play a significant role in making sure civil society gets what it wants from the state. The early initiatives of advocacy were mainly concerned with making room for political participation. In the following

section I will review some of the initiatives, which were mainly a mix of political activism and party politics.

5.2 NGOs and Civil Society and the Demand for Democracy and Good Governance

NGOs and civic groups had been shaping the agenda of the country long before independence. As we saw in chapter four, the independent government in Tanzania was put into place by a popular civic movement with its umbrella organisations; the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika (CUT) and the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL). The civic movement was finally organized around the political party, Tanganyika African National Union--TANU (Kiondo, 1995).

When NGOs engage in activism and advocacy they refer to the constitution of Tanzania which empowers them to do so. The constitution emphasizes that the government shall be accountable to the people and people shall participate in the affairs of their government in accordance with the provisions of the constitution (URT, 1977). Earlier work by NGOs set a foundation/precedence upon which many NGOs continue to carry out activism and advocacy. Many government policy documents on programmes like economic development, environment, health, education, good governance, explicitly explain that NGOs will play a key role in the implementation of that particular programme. The situation was not like this in the previous years (before 1990s). This scenario begun to gain momentum when the government embarked on implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative in 1999 (Chachage, 2003). Today, it is not surprising to find that NGOs are more informed about poverty reduction strategies and government policies than many senior civil servants and politicians who are supposed to be on top of such policies.

Serious involvement of civic groups in the development and governance of the country goes back to 1992 when the constitution of Tanzania was amended to make it a multiparty state. At this time, NGOs started to be registered in large numbers. NGOs who have made significant achievements after 1992, were the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)-1994, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)-1994, Women Legal Aid Clinic (WLAC)-1994, Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA)-1995, HakiArdhi-1998, HakiElimu-2001, Maarifa ni Ufunguo-1999, HakiKazi-2000, Envirocare-1996 and ForDIA-1997.

There were two main factors for NGOs and civil society to demand improvement in governance. These were the economic hardship of the 1970s and early 1980s, and the failure of the single party to allow democracy and competing ideas and policies to prevail. The political and social struggles that started during the previous period explains about the frictions in relationships, when civil society was emerging and struggling to grow (advocating for democracy and good governance). However, the state seemingly throttled the nascent civil society, managing the social, economic and political reform by way of developing and enforcing policy and legislation (LHRC, 2005).

The defence of democracy and good governance has been the preoccupation of the emerging NGOs and political parties since the early 1990s in Tanzania. Since that period individual activists, political parties and civil society in general, have been demanding that the state and the market, increase the entry-point to political, social and economic participation, electioneering, rule of law (and justice), promotion of human rights, accountability and that transparency would be extended, enhanced and internalized at all levels in society. Kaiza (2003) thinks that the totality

of active engagement on the part of NGOs and other civic groups, and political parties and the corresponding response in the political, social, economic and legal structures; and functioning, provide a comprehensive practical reality if we were to define a defence to democracy and good governance in Tanzania.

NGOs pioneered the demand for the reintroduction of multiparty democracy. The National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR) [1991] has recorded how most of the political parties, NGOs and the prominent individual activists, in Tanzania today, are the outcome of the National Conference for Constitutional Reform, which was convened in the Diamond Jubilee Hall, Dar es Salaam in June 11-12, 1991. Individual activists, (proponents) demanded that the government introduce a multiparty democratic system and freedom of association in Tanzania. The main activists were Dr. Ringo Tenga, Professor Mwesiga Baregu, Mabere Marando, Harun Kimaro, Mashaka Chimoto, James Mapalala, Ndimara Tegambagwe, Chief Abdallah Said Fundikira, Prince Bagenda, and Christopher Mtikila. (Ibid.). They engineered the holding of the conference that brought together Tanzanians from all over the country, including many students from the University of Dar es Salaam. The conference participants demanded the re-introduction of the multiparty system. The independent Tanzania had experienced the short lived multiparty political system that was outlawed in 1965.

Informed and guided by the notion of ethical political practice and that the new constitution must precede switching from one party to a multiparty political system, conference participants finally, resolved to establish the National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR). This committee, headed by Chief Abdallah Fundikira, as Chairperson, and Mabere Marando, as Secretary, was

charged with the role of implementing the conference recommendations (NCCR, 1991). Some estranged and disillusioned leaders and proponents of the NCCR, with bitter feelings and despair for losing the struggle for a new constitution had soon or latter decided to join or established either political parties; which never, lasted to realize their stated goals; or Non-Governmental Organisations (Kaiza, 2003).

A number of NGOs such as the Tanzania Legal Education Trust Fund (TANLET), the Liberty Desk, The Media Institute of Southern Africa (Tanzania branch), and The Association of Journalists and Media Workers (AJM) played a pivotal role in pushing for constitutional reform. . Others like the African International Group of Political Risk Analysis (PORIS), Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania (BAWATA), Dar es Salaam University Students Organisations (DARUSO), Muungano wa Vijana Tanzania (MUVITA) Chama cha Walimu Tanzania (CWT), and University of Dar es Salaam Academic Staff Assembly (UDASA)-played a pivotal role that would finally usher in good governance and the defence of democracy and human rights in Tanzania.

Immediately after the June 1991 conference, because of responding to the demand for institutional support for carrying out its mobilization activities, NCCR established working relationship with TANLET. The latter had been founded two years earlier to disseminate legal and human rights knowledge in Tanzania. TANLET was based at the University of Dar es Salaam and its founding members and leaders were those then in the ranks of the NCCR. Reacting to the NCCR-TANLET collaboration, the government through the Administrator General, in November 1991, threatened to deregister TANLET, if the trust could not abide by the objectives it was established for (Kaiza 2003; LHRC, 2008). TANLET, in September 1995 transformed itself into the Legal and Human

Rights Centre (LHRC). and has been leading a number of national campaigns for promoting good governance and the defence of democracy and human rights. This has been through projects such as the Citizens Coalition for New Constitution (CCNC) that started way back in 1998 (LHRC, 2005).

Student movements from the Higher Learning Institutions worked with NGOs to push for a widening of democracy. The Dar es Salaam University Students Organisation (DARUSO) and University of Dar es Salaam Academic Staff Association (UDASA) strongly supported NCCR. The DARUSO leaders, including Harun Kimaro who was DARUSO President at that time; Matiko Matare and Ludovick Kashaju Bazigiza³ the outgoing DARUSO President were personally involved in the organisation of the June 11th-12th conference. The government and the ruling party, CCM, perceived that the combined support for NCCR by the University of Dar es Salaam students and lecturers was a great threat, and responded with closing down the university in 1990 (Malyamkono, 1999). Students' leaders, vocal students and some lecturers were reprimanded, with various measures that finally lead to silencing them forever. Ten students, including DARUSO President Matiko Matare, the Late Ludovick Bazigiza, the late Idrisa Al-Nuru and many others were dismissed from the university. However, towards October 1991, the same students were re-admitted after appeal. Another strategic measure that the government took was to replace and dismiss from the University staff list, the then popular Vice Chancellor, Professor Geoffrey Mmari, who was replaced by the less popular, Professor Mathew Luhanga. The government then hatched the plan to evict the popular and vocal Professor Mwesiga Baregu

³ Bazigiza was the President of Muungano wa Wanafunzi Tanzania (MUWATA), the students organisation affiliated to the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi through the party – youth wing UVCCM. Bazigiza had said that, in 1989, when he was in North Korea to attend the World Youth Festival, that he opposed acts of corruption by the leader of Tanzania delegation, (the late Moses Mnauye) the ruling party henchman who was also the Party Deputy Secretary General. On arrival in Dar es Salaam Bazigiza was detained by the government. As a result, University of Dar es Salaam students' strongly supported Bazigiza. This resulted in the detaching of the UDSM from MUWATA, thus prompting the launching of the UDSM Autonomous Students body (DARUSO).

from the UDSM academic staff membership, by transferring him to the Institute of Adult Education and later, by offering him the deputy ambassador post in Rome, Italy. Baregu declined both offers and instead left for sabbatical leave in the United States (US) in 1991/92 (Kaiza, 2003).

Professor Aikael Kweka, of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) who held the post of CCM parastatal Secretary at UDSM, was reprimanded too, and transferred to teach at the Institute for Management Training For Educational Personnel (MANTERP) in Bagamoyo. Professor Kweka must have angered the CCM and the government for his public utterances, when he supported the proposal for Tanzania to go for a multiparty system in Nkrumah Hall, in 1991, when the UDSM community held the public dialogue with the Nyalali Commission. Three years latter Professor Kweka was allowed back to his original post at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) of UDSM (Kaiza, 2003).

Young people also formed NGOs to champion for the widening of democracy to allow them to be more active in the governance of the country. The nationwide youth representation vacuum that was created by the introduction of multiparty political system in 1992 culminated in the launching of youth organisations such as Muungano wa Vijana Tanzania (MUVITA). Originally, during the politics of monopoly, all young people in Tanzania were represented by the ruling CCM youth wing (UV-CCM). In 1993, unemployed youth, living in Dar es Salaam, but unknown to the circles of CCM, launched MUVITA (Poris, 1999). MUVITA was prompted by the growing concern for youth representation and participation in governance structures. Youth unemployment and the fading opportunities for self advancement had reached unacceptable levels. MUVITA members

also worked very closely with the NCCR. It seemed that the government ignored MUVITA. This can be explained by the fact that most of MUVITA leaders were, by the interpretation of the government, paupers who were without financial, educational or organisational capacities and would do nothing politically to harm the ruling party CCM and the government. Coincidentally in 1993, teachers under the leadership of Peter Mashanga launched a nationwide strike demanding that the government address their demands for better pay. Similar demands from teachers led to high level collaboration between MUVITA and Chama Cha Waalimu Tanzania (CWT). The government response to the teachers was to establish their autonomous trade union-Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) or Chama Cha Waalimu (CWT) (Poris, 1999).

The government's response to MUVITA came in 1995, when it developed the National Youth Policy which allowed for the establishment of the National Youth Council. However, such government responses to address youth demands were too late. Some in MUVITA, in 1994 established the National Youth Council of their own, independent of the government. By 1997 the tension between government and youths claiming to have established the autonomous National Youth Council had become high. As a way to prevent the confrontation, the Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (ForDIA) organized the two day (15-16) July, 1997), National Youth Forum to which both parties, government and the youth, took part (forDIA, 1997).

The National Youth Forum was important because youths in Tanzania had lacked an organized structure to freely exchange their ideas on how to harmonize their experiences, and discuss how to solve the problems that confronted them. They faced acute problems of identity, parallel to the social and economic crises biting hard into the social fabric. Economic policies promoting the

market forces and the political trend of those in power to want to hold it at whatever cost, needed the new strategy paving the way for emergence of new social forces, the youths inclusive (forDIA, 1997).

Nevertheless, contrary to the recommendation that the forum had to remain a meeting place for all youths in Tanzania, and that it should not be registered as an organisation, but allowed to operate as semi-permanent secretariat hosted by an annually elected member organisation of the forum, that could not be heeded to. Some disgruntled members of the self-proclaimed National Youth Council conspired to register the National Youth Forum (NYF) as an organisation to which they became ultimate leaders Kaiza (Interview,2/3/2008). Constrained by various deficits, NYF became as narrow as other self-styled NGOs in Tanzania today. As a result, the NYF lost members and defenders and when it entered a conflict with one Cabinet Minister during the launching of the state sponsored National Youth Council in 2001 in Iringa, to which the outcome was NYF deregistration, nobody seemed to be bothered. Former NYF leaders became founder members of two new “youth organisations”. These are the Leadership Forum and the Youth Countrywide Partnership (YPC). The government formally deregistered NYF on 2nd August 2002 (TANGO, 2003a).

The Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania (BAWATA) translated as the National Women’s Council is another landmark case of the struggle for defending democracy and promoting good governance in Tanzania. BAWATA was launched at the University of Dar es Salaam in 1991 at the Conference, which was largely organized by the Union of Women in Tanzania (UWT), the women wing of the ruling party CCM (BAWATA, 1994). It seems UWT had counted on the

allegiance of the BAWATA leadership as automatic, without taking into consideration, the political dynamics that would surface during the competitive multiparty political environment. By 1995, counting on the commitment of its Chairperson, Professor Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka; BAWATA had become a model women movement (unlike organisation) in Tanzania and beyond. It established branch offices in all districts of Tanzania Mainland (BAWATA, 1995).

During the first multiparty elections in 1995, and with millions of shillings from donors, BAWATA conducted a massive impartial civic education programme throughout the whole country. This was a threat to the government and the ruling party CCM. Various attempts by UWT to replace the BAWATA leadership failed. Through the then Internal Affairs Minister, and CCM Deputy Secretary General, Ally Ameir, BAWATA was, in 1996, ordered to amend its constitution so as the women's body could no longer have the political party-like network and administrative structures (BAWATA, 2003). By July 1997, the government had deregistered BAWATA, and the latter filed a constitutional litigation in the Supreme Court of Tanzania. The case took almost 13 years until 2009 when it was ruled in favour of BAWATA (Kapama, 2009). No one knows for sure why it took so long, but one possibility, is that government used delaying tactics because it knew it would not win the case.

The Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA) is another NGO formed primarily to defend the rights of women journalists, women and children. Kiondo and Mbogori (2006) argue that TAMWA was successful in its campaign to publicize the plight of women in Tanzania in terms of socio-economic rights, access to education, family structure and gender equality. He notes that TAMWA's success was based on the fact that the principal issues in its campaign were contained

in the main CCM party documents and policy pronouncements by the government. TAMWA also consulted and coordinated its activities with the government, thus ensuring that the government had a vested interest in the success of TAMWA programs (Mallya, 2001). Indeed, through efforts by TAMWA, the government introduced legislation outlawing many traditional practices which were seen to be unfair to women, such as the law of property and inheritance; and the issue of access to education by girls who traditionally had been shut out by the family's decisions on what child to send to school under conditions of resource and labour shortage. Invariably, boys were favoured under those circumstances. In response to such inequalities being pointed out by TAMWA, the government took measures to rectify the situation. Kiondo (2005) concluded, in his findings, that the NGOs, as a sector in general lacks the dynamic leadership it needs to engage the government effectively. The above observation was echoed by the TAMWA Executive Director, Ananilea Nkya who during the interview (20/4/2008) affirmed what Kiondo has written. She says "TAMWA had to shift its attention from its members to women and children because they realised journalist women are part of women who occupy lower social status in the society".

5.3 NGO Trends and Dynamics in the 2000s

The observation of the trends in the struggles for democracy, good governance and human rights defence, during the periods 1990-1995 indicates one interesting feature: that the struggle, is based on an individual persons' efforts, whims and craftsmanship. There is very little recorded as far as the efforts of institutions are concerned. This of course, is attributed to the fact that there were very few NGOs, during the one party era. Moreover, during the period of 1995-2000, the approach involved a few NGOs, as independent organisations. As a result, many NGOs could not

withstand the pressure from the government and the ruling CCM when confrontation became evident. The threat against TANLET, though it is not mentioned anywhere, could be the reason for its decision to phase out and transform itself into the name of a programme/project it had conceived, planned and implemented (Magoke-Mhoja and Kabudi, 2006). It seems the decision to transform TANLET into the Legal and Human Right Centre (LHRC) was reached after considering all these factors. It could be found to be easier to sacrifice its identity rather than face the pressure from government (Kaiza, 2003).

However for the period from 2000 onwards, it seems NGOs have learned and realized the importance of networking, coalition building and alliance over issues and devising collective actions. There seems to be shared understanding that the struggle for defending democracy, human rights and good governance is an endless endeavour. The ups and downs of evaluation, planning, deplaning, strategizing, planning again, improvement in the original plan and implementation with a new strategy and approach, are understood and appreciated as being common practices when defending democracy and good governance (TANGO, 2003b).

During this period it was observed that thematic networks and coalitions like Tanzania Education Network (TenMet), Policy Forum, Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD), Femact, Tanzania Coalition Sustenance Development (TCDC), were active and more NGOs are working under most of these networks. It is hard to find a single NGO in the country that is not a member of a network. And many are members of more than one network. TenMet is an education coalition with the mission of influencing education policies and practices, to promote accountability to communities, to ensure that meaningful learning is enhanced to all people

without discrimination. The Policy Forum has a mandate of encouraging NGOs to work together to open up and influence policy processes that improves the lives of all people, especially those who are socially disadvantaged and impoverished, in order to empower them to self-organize and become part of a social movement for change. The TCDD mission is to collectively influence, lobby, and advocate for debt cancellation and fair trade, good governance, and social-economic development, as related to economic, political and social endeavours to the extent that they are responsive to the peoples' interests, views and perspective. The Femact aim is to collectively influence, lobby, and advocate for gender equality and equity.

5.4 The Missing Link: Selective Activism

This section highlights the characteristics of Tanzanian NGOs. While there is a general consensus within government circles, the NGOs, media and the public, that NGOs are on the right track, I see that the credit being given to NGOs is overstated. Chachage (2003) is critical of NGOs in the country because of their tendency to move their struggle to safe grounds. This is in contrast to social movements or peoples' struggles and other grassroots organisations/movements. Not only that, but there are outspoken personalities in the NGOs who would like to see the maintenance of the status quo of the government and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other such institutions which are in the forefront in coming up with policies which NGOs are supposed to be opposing (Chachage, 2005). Seckinelgin (2002) explains how the current position of NGOs on development is anchored in the neo-liberal ideology of the World Bank and the IMF. Tanzanian NGOs, like many NGOs in developing countries, have found themselves in this ideological position without knowing.

Shivji (2003) explains that the characteristics of Tanzanian NGOs are: i) most of the NGOs are led top down by the elites; ii) they are not constituency or membership based organisations; iii) are funded and exclusively rely on foreign funds; iv) NGOs act without theorising and as a result they do not have vision of society; and v) many confuse NGOs with civil society. Shivji calls for Tanzanian NGOs to take stock and start to reflect on what they are, what they are not and what they ought to be. This was done during the Gender Bi-Annual Festival⁴ which is organized by one of the biggest Tanzanian NGOs, the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), when he gave a key note/ground setting speech. Shivji by then was lecturer⁵ at the Faculty of Law, the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. After his presentation, the debate, especially within and by NGOs, changed dramatically because of this critique. He later developed his presentation as one of the working papers of another local NGO, HakiElimu, (Shivji, 2003). And ever since, also he has gone on to expand on this in a book (Shivji, 2007). Through my experience of working with NGOs in the country, I concur with the observation by Shivji. This gave me the reason to expand on these features mentioned by Shivji in the following paragraphs.

The general characteristics of Tanzanian NGOs are elitist ruled top down and are urban based. They are not established to meet the needs of people (Mushi, 2008a). Rather elites establish them as a means of employment. The mushrooming of NGOs came at the time when the government started to implement the free market economy in the mid 1980s. In order to get grants and loans from the IMF and the World Bank and other western donors, they gave conditions to the government. Among the conditions of the IMF and the World Bank was to downsize the civil

⁴ The Author of this PhD Thesis happened to be one of the organizers of this Festival and also was involved in documenting and writing the report of this event and later in the evaluation of the festival. This gave him chance and opportunity to hear, record, and document what was said; hence the authenticity of what is recorded here.

⁵ He is founder and first Director and Chairperson of Local NGO fighting for control of land by people, Land Rights Institute (HakiArdhi).

service workforce, privatise state owned companies, observe good governance, and grant more freedom to civil society/NGOs to operate. By granting more freedom to NGOs, the IMF and WB argued, that this was one of the main indicators that the government was implementing good governance. Some of the elites, and those retrenched from the civil service workforce saw the opportunity in the NGO sector (Mushi, 2008a). So a good number of them rushed to establish NGOs in order to continue earning a living. At the same, donor money was made available to run the NGOs activities because NGOs claimed the state was not delivering so the best option was to redirect their aid and grants through NGOs. Donors claim that NGOs deliver and are close to the people. On the other hand it is not easy to blame them, rather the best option is to go to root cause which forced people out of their formal employment. In this context the need of the majority of working people is not the driving force behind the establishment of most of the NGOs. That is why when they do activism, they do it for the people, rather than with the people (Kitunga, 2003, Shivji, 2007).

This trend of NGOs becoming the main recipient and channel of funding should be analysed in a wider context of changes in international development and aid development in the late 1960s and 1970s. Most developing countries most of them being in Africa had and have continued seeking assistance from western countries and Bretton Woods Institutions to tackle their economic problems. In late 1970 the Breton Woods Institutions started to prescribe Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as the only way to economic recovery and the main conditionality for these countries to continue to receive aid and assistance from donors.

In the end of 1980s the world witnessed the collapse of state socialism in Eastern and Central

Europe. This signalled the triumph of the neoliberal economic ideologies and in practice this means free market economies which is in opposition to welfarism and provision of aid in general. It was in this context that aid budgets in the industrialized countries began to decline among the major donor countries. Aid, as a traditional tool for 'development' was being steadily withdrawn by the developed countries in favour of direct foreign investments [(FDIs) Hertz 2001].

Perhaps one question which needs to be answered as to why governments like that of the US, UK, Germany, Canada and international bodies like IMF and World Bank became interested in using NGOs is well answered by Chachage (2005, p.15) when he says:

This was at time when increasingly, there were liaison committees between official and voluntary sector. Thus there began the EEC/NGO Liaison Committee as an apex-mediating agency of Europe in the late 1970s. In reality, these various developments were an expression and a reinforcement of the WB and IMF sponsored SAPs. With the implementation of SAPs, NGOs and their participatory approaches became extremely important to disarm people. NGOs/civil society acquired a new importance in global developmental issues. They were increasingly developing an intimate relation with the states and international organizations through their demand that they be involved in policy formulation and evaluation, their popularization and implementation. Western grant contributions to NGOs/civil societies increased tremendously in the 1980s and 1990s, at a time when social services were facing funding cuts throughout the world.

NGOs have become the main conduit of the neo-liberal agenda because now societies have been made to see themselves in different categories such as gender, sexual orientation preference, youth vis-a-vi elderly, environment, etc. This multiplication of objectives moves the attention of people from the main focus and objective of exploitation. The main enemy-exploiters have been forgotten and now people are busy fighting the small but unimportant enemies, who mostly are the indicators of the presence of big problem-the exploiters. In chapter two, where the concept of hegemony has been expounded by Gramsci, we see although people through initiatives like civic groupings organise themselves by deploying different tactics, i.e. war of position; the ruling class, both at national and international front is constantly devising ways to diffuse these oppositions. One way they used was through co-opting sections of society and subaltern. The West is using aid which much of it goes through NGOs to influence the agenda of developing nations. NGOs find themselves in a situation where they have to compromise their societal vision and succumb to donors' agenda, because they need money for their survival.

Because of increasing number of NGOs towards the end of 1980s and the early 1990s, courses related to NGOs became popular at colleges and universities. There was a curriculum reorientation to meet the needs and demands of the workforce of NGOs. Students in colleges and universities were attuned to work in NGOs. This brings me to my personal experience. When I joined university in 1993, my relatives advised me to go for courses which would make it easy for me to get a job in the NGOs. By then sociology had become a very popular subject. I went to study Sociology. I still ask myself, if I chose to study sociology because of this advice or was it a coincidence. Deep inside me something keeps telling me that the increase in the numbers of NGOs had some influence in the choice of my study and later career. When I graduated in 1993,

in my class of 22 students, about 8 (37%) of them went to work with NGOs. It was during that time when university graduates started failing to get employment with the government and hence the only option was private sector including NGOs. In fact NGOs did not really care about courses taught at the university as they wanted calibre of people who were trainable. World Vision Tanzania (WVT) for example insisted on first degree as a minimum to join and hence whether you are a food scientist or mechanical engineer did not really matter. They had an induction system to de-school their employs as they instilled WVT values and World Vision (WV) development philosophy and approaches!

All these scenarios lead to the conclusion that NGOs are not rooted in the needs, daily experience and vision of the people. Elites become the experts on the people's problem. In 2001, I was conducting lobbying and advocacy training for NGOs in the Dodoma region. One male participant jokingly said that nowadays everybody is a social engineer. He said this because his background was in mechanical engineering but at this moment he was working with NGOs which had nothing to do with engineering. Also many people left their jobs as teachers and nurses to join or establish NGOs. In the 1990s if one wanted to earn a good salary then they got a job in the NGOs

The lack of accountability of NGOs to people is another feature of Tanzanian NGOs. Because many NGOs have no constituency or membership, they are not accountable to people even to those they claim to serve. They are accountable to a small group of elites who formed that particular NGO and to donors (Semezana, 2003). The main concern of many NGOs is to produce reports for donors who fund their programmes. An NGO might produce an annual report and other activity and financial reports with the main reason for donors to see them. Many NGOs are

not bothered that their members and the public may not see these reports. In 2002, at the TANGO General Assembly, TANGO was accused by member organisations that they hardly get to see reports from TANGO, but on the other hand TANGO made sure that every donor gets a report (TANGO, 2002a). Mussa Billegeya of TANGO (Interview, 03/03/2008) was so frank in explaining why NGOs put so much effort into the report to donors but they do not bother to give such attention to people they serve, he said:

You know nearly all NGOs get money from donors. If you don't report to them and make sure they get all the information they want, they will not give you money to run your organisation's activities. But although we would like to do the same to people but we do not have much pressure or motivation from them. If an NGO does not report to its constituency and people, that is a good indicator that there is not much they can do in terms of assisting them to solve their problems.

This observation by Musa raises concerns about the internal governance of NGOs and even their legitimacy. This makes me conclude that, if NGOs do not see the need and urgency of reporting to the people they serve and advocate for, then the impact of their activities is questionable.

Shivji (2003) observes that NGOs in Tanzania have been undermining peoples' organisations. Activism by NGOs is very selective. They rush for activism mainly when they see that the position of NGOs is being undermined. He gives the classical example of how towards the end of 2002, the government of Tanzania tabled an NGO Bill in Parliament. NGOs on seeing that the bill had some clauses which would affect their existence and operation, then faced up to parliament

and waged serious activism and the bill had to be re-drafted. At the same time there was another Bill of Terrorism which had clauses which affected nearly every Tanzanian, but NGOs kept quite as if nothing was happening. Chachage (2005, p. 30) agrees with Shivji when he says:

That is not all; NGOs also tend to depoliticise the masses by instilling the false belief that the problems confronting the masses are non-class and non-political. They push the view that there are possibilities of dealing with the problems confronting them through non-political strategies. In this way, they seek to demobilise the people by co-opting the best element into the establishment and reformism. Thus, in some instances, they have succeeded to rally even progressive and radical elements to the side of capital, while at the same time leaving them with space to articulate their radical postures.

In chapter six, I will discuss in detail how NGOs fought hard when the government was enacting the NGO Policy and Act. And in chapter seven I highlight the poverty campaign known as Global Campaign against Poverty-Tanzania (GCAP-T) by NGOs. By comparison the efforts put in by NGOs in the fight for the NGO Act and on the GCAP-T campaign, it is clear that the efforts differ. The advocacy against the NGO Policy/Act was more serious and well planned and organised compared to the GCAP-T campaign.

NGOs are exclusively funded by external donors. Donors directly or indirectly decide the agenda of the NGOs. In one study on Tanzania NGOs, the Foundation for Civil Society-FCS (2008) reveals that 98 per cent of NGOs admitted that all of their money to run their projects came from international donors. It is common practice when NGOs are writing proposals, that the first thing

to be given consideration is the areas that particular donors are interested to fund. There is a wise saying that goes, “he who pays the piper, calls the tune.” NGOs basically are implementing donor projects. A good example is that of the TANGO and Service Centre for Development Cooperation (KEPA) of Finland. TANGO and KEPA have a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which has been running from the year 2000. In the MoU, they have agreed that KEPA will fund certain TANGO advocacy activities. KEPA sets up priority areas to fund every three years. Once they have set up their priority areas they submit them to TANGO. From there TANGO sets their advocacy plan based on what KEPA has indicated is their priority (TANGO, 2000, TANGO, 2004). Both parts call the MoU a ‘partnership agreement’. But calling such an arrangement a partnership agreement does not do justice to the term ‘partnership’.

NGOs who receive funding from northern governments and institutions tend to defend the positions of those who fund them. There is evidence that aid and grants from the north to developing countries of Africa, regardless of what channel they go through, have tended to help perpetuate poverty because of the strings attached to these funds (Hancock, 2006). NGOs are one of the main recipients of these funds (AFRODAD, 2004). There are instances where donors have pushed their agenda at the expense of the interests of local NGOs and their corresponding stated objectives, missions and visions. When and where this has happened, NGOs fail to negotiate positions, hence compromising their own local interests and positions. The implication of this scenario is that very few NGOs are likely to stay long on their stated objectives, missions and goals (FCS, 2008).

Another anomaly Shivji (2003), points out for those NGOs engaged in activism, advocacy and

lobbying is that they have accepted the notion that they are civil society and have a big role to play without bothering to critically question this misconception. Failure to see this anomaly explains why activism has failed to be a force beyond the social and grassroots movement in the country (Shivji, 2003, Shivji, 2007). Activists are moving ahead without the people. Nicodemus Eatlawe, (Interview, 20/4/2008), Maarifa ni Ufunguo in interview acknowledges:

There are no serious NGOs doing advocacy in the country that is why compared to the number of the NGOs in the country, their impact is very little. The reason why there is very little impact is that most of the NGOs tend to go to the communities like experts, and start working at the issues that aggravate the community. Where NGOs have bothered to see people as the ones who are supposed to be on the driving seat impact have been massive. Not only impact, even you see community spirit being very high.

In chapter eight, I have discussed how NGOs could focus more on joining force with people and build strong civil society movement.

5.5 Networking and Coalition Building Among NGOs

Initially NGOs used to work individually, but as time went on, they saw the need for forming networks and coalitions with the aim of simplifying the work and having more impact. Also when many NGOs come together, it helped to create more legitimacy for their involvement in a particular issue. Starkey (1998) sees the need for NGOs to work closely with its stakeholders; create networks; build coalitions and alliances or consortiums. Starkey further sees that NGOs,

like individuals who create friendships and share resources, need relations and collaborations that contribute to the “health” and growth of the NGO sector. The collaborations can be binding or loose, formal or informal. More and more like-minded organisations form partnerships, alliances, networks and umbrella bodies in order to improve overall results and the impact of their engagements. Starkey insists furthermore, that the changing role of the state has not only promoted relationship between civil society organisations, but also between NGOs and the government and private sectors. The roles of these networks especially the regional NGO networks include coordination, capacity building, information sharing etc.

There has been a trend to set up umbrella networks and coalitions and organisations to coordinate and create networking among NGOs. The first umbrella organisation of NGOs in Tanzania is the Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO) which was formed in 1988. The same year the Tanzania Council of Social Development (TACOSODE) was established. Both umbrellas are generic. Thematic networks started to appear in 1995 when the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development was formed (TCDD) (TANGO, 1994). TANGO claims that TACOSODE was formed by the government with the aim of neutralising TANGO. It is claimed that the government feared TANGO could become a very strong movement of NGOs that would pose a serious challenge to the government. So by establishing TACOSODE it was thought that it would divide NGOs. During my field work I learnt that in the first years, TANGO and TACOSODE were in a constant tag-of-war. They competed for members as well as resources. The NGOs I interviewed do not see both TANGO and TACOSODE as strong networks. One of the reasons they gave behind this state of affairs is the competition between the two. Other factors are that the two networks’ staff members and Steering Committees were people who were still in government

employment or had been retrenched. These staff wanted to see these networks being run like government departments. Bagile (Interview, 27/02/2008) says:

In the early days of TANGO and TACOSODE, they were happy and satisfied to be identified and please the government more than people and communities at large. Although things have changed a bit, I think they still harbour the same mentality that if government is happy then they are on the right track. But unless they work more for NGOs and people I do not see any long future for them. They will die a natural death.

The sentiment expressed by Bagile, appears to be the same for regional and district networks. My telephone interview with the Coordinator of the newly formed Manyara Civil Society Network (MACSNET), Nemes Iriya, confirmed this. I asked him what was the main achievement of his network. He replied, "I am proud and pleased because the Regional Commissioner is pleased with what we are doing" (Telephone Interview, 16/08/2010). MACSNET was formed in 2008. Throughout my interview with him there was no mention of how they have managed to please the people.

In the 2000s, the establishment of networks has been at regional and district levels and thematic. By May 2010 there were 20 regional and 90 district networks. Examples are MRENGO for Mtwara, Union of NGOs (UNGO) for Morogoro, Arusha NGOs Network (ANGONET) for Arusha and Manyara Civil Society Network (MACSNET) for Manyara. The challenges facing networks at regional and district levels have been more or less the same as those facing the national groups. One of the main challenges for NGO umbrellas and networks is the competition

for funding with member organisations. As it has been explained elsewhere in this thesis, umbrella NGOs and networks in Southern Africa are weak, and the members are sceptical about if they will ever become strong, because they tend to implement activities similar to those of other members. They do not put much weight on those roles related to umbrellas/networks. Emanuel Mbwambo (Interview, 29/01/2008), TANGO Financial and Accounting Director, explained to me how in the 2005 general elections in Tanzania, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Tanzania Office, set aside funding for NGOs to conduct voter and civic education throughout the country. More than 200 NGOs applied for these funds, TACOSODE and TANGO applied as well. Both organisations were not given the fund. UNDP explained that the reason for refusal was that it was not fair for the umbrella organisations to compete for funding with their member organisations and other non-network NGOs. On the other hand UNDP argued that umbrella/network organisations cannot implement programmes and activities which are supposed to be implemented by member organisations and non-network organisations.

It seems that after NGOs realised that generic networks cannot deliver, they then turned to thematic networks. A good case to put this in perspective is the Consultative Group (CG) meetings of 2001 and 2002. CG is a consultative forum for donors and the government of Tanzania to consult on poverty strategies. This forum is very strategic for both government and NGOs to engage with the donor community. NGOs had expected TANGO would coordinate NGOs effectively in order to be able to contribute constructively in the meetings. But they were disappointed because TANGO could not do much. At the end of 2002, CG and NGOs decided to form the National Policy Forum, which later was turned into the Policy Forum (PF). The NGOs that established the PF stated that it was formed “on the urge of NGOs to effectively engage in

key policy processes.” This was due to dissatisfaction on the way that the NGOs were involved in the 2001 CG meeting” (NPF, 2002, p. 1). The objective of the PF was to focus on two key policy processes, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Public Expenditure Review (PER), (NPF, 2002). Thematic networks tend to focus on one or two related areas and this puts them in a better position to deliver.

The main challenge that faces most of the networks is that they have failed to address, and are not seem to be keen to want to overcome it, is that of ownership by members. Most of the networks, both generic and thematic, are not owned by members. After networks are formed, they remain the property of the secretariat and the NGO which houses the network. Sometimes one NGO finds itself a member of many networks, but its impact in these networks is minimal or zero. Because of this networks have little impact. Loyce Lema (Interview, 4/3/2008) said that ‘networks are not working’. It is for this reason Mushi (2008b) advises Tanzania NGO Networks to strive to be a role model for NGOs. If they live up to the expectations of their members, members will feel satisfied to identify with the networks. In chapter seven I have given a detailed account of how the Poverty Campaign was left in the hands of the secretariat by members of the Global Call Against Poverty-Tanzania (GCAP-T).

According to the Foundation for Civil Society-FCS (2008) Donors have the tendency to form networks and coalitions. As soon as the projects phase out or the money to run the particular project has dried up, that is the end of the coalition. Such initiatives by donors sometimes counterbalances the initiative of genuine networks which want to work from scratch and identify with the people’s needs and struggles. Adam Langson of HakiKazi of Arusha (3/9/2009) in an

email correspondence admitted that many districts networks are formed because there is donor money available and in order to access it there must be a NGO network/coalition. Sometimes this goes as far as district administration supervising their formation. If such things happen, there is no possibility for these networks to become strong and sustainable. Astronaut Bagile (interview 27/02/2008) who in early 2000s worked with the Care International Tanzania Office (CARE) shared how CARE would encourage NGOs, they were funding, to form a Network. In the 1990s and 2000s, CARE was funding HIV/AIDS projects in some districts in the country. Once projects that were being funded by CARE phased out the networks die a natural death.

Through discussions and interviews with NGOs, it became clear that NGOs have the challenge to create networks not only with other NGOs, but also with the civil society in general, especially at the grassroots level. In most cases, people in the communities are seen as people who need to be educated and their awareness raised. Seldom is people's knowledge taken into account (Chachage, 2003). People know what they want and when, but much interference from external agents like government and NGOs disable them (HakiElimu, 2005). This interference somehow is done deliberately because of the availability of donor money. Because recipients want to justify that the money was spent on the needs of communities, they conduct awareness raising programmes and write reports to justify that the money was for a genuine cause.

5.6 Conclusion

The chapter has highlighted the main factors that made people start to question the ability of state to provide for everything. Also these forces did not see why the governance affairs of the country should remain in the hands of only a few people. The chapter has shown how NGOs departed

from concentrating on service delivery to advocacy. Their main entrance into advocacy was to demand the widening of good governance, democracy, and human rights. The politics of demanding the reintroduction of multiparty democracy was played in the arenas of NGOs and political platforms. The activities of NGOs like TANLET, LHRC, TAMWA, MISA-T, NYF, has being revised with the intent of shedding light on these initiatives by NGOs to widen good governance and democracy. The chapter has given the characteristics of the forms of advocacy waged by NGOs. These are i) most of the NGOs are top down led by the elites; ii) they are not constituency or membership based organisation; iii) are funded by and exclusively rely on foreign funding; iv) NGOs act without theorising with the result that they do not have a vision of society and v) many conflate NGOs with civil society. The last section looked into how the NGOs formed umbrellas, networks and coalitions. Initially this was with generic umbrellas, such as TANGO and TACOSODE. In the 2000s, NGOs put more effort, into forming thematic networks and coalitions. The following chapter is based on empirical data about the NGOs fighting for their existence through engaging with the government by fighting to make sure it does not make NGO Policy and Act which put the operations of NGOs in jeopardy.

Chapter Six

The NGOs Fight for Creating an Enabling Environment for NGOs in Tanzania

6.0 Introduction

Chapters six and seven will specifically focus on the issue of how Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Tanzania engage with the government at policy level to ensure it implements policies that help to remove people from deep poverty. The main information will be the data collected from field work conducted in Tanzania in the period of January to the end of May, 2008. Chapter six, will focus on the case of advocacy on NGO Policy and Act enactment. Chapter seven focuses on the Campaign Against Poverty. Both processes were led by the Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO). Both chapters will help to answer research question five which says: Do NGOs behave differently when they engage in advocacy to defend their interest and that of the people?

This chapter discusses how NGOs under the leadership of TANGO, interact with the government to influence its decision, policies and actions. The case shows how TANGO led NGOs to fight for space for NGOs to organise and implement their activities with minimum (or without) interference from the government. The first section runs through the history of TANGO and how it developed its mandate of activism and advocacy. It shows how over time its approaches and agenda kept changing in response to the reality of the time and the government agenda. The chapter has used the case of the development and enactment of NGO Policy (2001) and Act 2002.

The NGO Policy and Act enactment process involved serious interaction with parliament and the government machinery. Most of the information in this chapter was researched through indepth interview and reading documented information available at the TANGO Resource Centre and from office files. I interviewed people who were involved in the process of setting up the the NGO Policy (2001) and Act (2000). In total, I interviewed 20 people for this chapter. This chapter answers research question iv that states: To what extent has advocacy and activism by NGOs been successful in influencing government policies?

6.1 TANGO in its Early Days

Because TANGO was involved with the advocacy and campaign on the NGO Policy and Act, I will give a brief overview of the organisation. TANGO was established in 1985, but the actual registration was in 1988. The process leading to the establishment of TANGO was through the United Nations (UN) Women Meeting which was held in Nairobi, Kenya in 1985. Womens' NGOs from Tanzania advocated for the meeting to address different issues. As the meeting progressed, it emerged that NGOs from Tanzania were not organised and coordinated. Each individual NGO was talking on behalf of Tanzanian women but it was not easy to see who was the true representative of the women. After the Nairobi meeting when the NGOs returned home, they discussed the importance of having a body which would unify all NGOs (TANGO, 1988). The thinking went far beyond that of looking into women's issues. NGOs saw there are many issues which needed a unified voice hence they decided to establish a coordinating body which will cater for all NGOs. 22 NGOs pioneered the establishment of TANGO (TANGO, 1989).

Although TANGO is a non-governmental organisation, and many of its documents say that it was 22 NGOs which agreed to form TANGO, however there is evidence that the idea of forming TANGO came from the government. The report by TANGO (1989) explains how the Prime Minister's office in 1985 requested some NGOs to form a coordinating body for the preparation of an UN NGO Forum which was held in Nairobi. Both the Minister and Principal Secretary for the then Ministry for Community Development, Culture, Youth and Sports played a key role in assisting TANGO to get registered on the register of societies in the Ministry of Home Affairs (TANGO, 1988). Beside that, the government was fully involved in the launching of TANGO. The then Deputy Minister for Local Government, Community Development Cooperatives and Marketing, Emmanuel Mwalumbukutu, was invited to officially launch TANGO on December 1988. In his officiating speech Mwalumbukutu praised TANGO for the way in which in such a short time it had managed to foster cooperation with the government (TANGO, 1989). On many occasions and at events when there was activity involving NGOs and the government both keep insisting on cooperation. If it happens that an NGOs is not ready to cooperate with government, then it is regarded as anti-government.

The TANGO membership has increased to over 800 NGOs from all over the country (TANGO, 2008). Apart from the increase in membership and the separation of governance and executive functions, the organisation has also gone through moments of prosperity, and challenges. Recognizing the need to respond more quickly to the emerging micro and macro issues, TANGO redefined its role and mission. This was done in line with the membership's expectations and needs in the changing environment of globalization. TANGO has played a major role in bringing together NGOs in the country to discuss various issues affecting NGOs and the general public.

The National NGO Forums in 2001 and 2002, and the later annual Tanzania Social Forum (TSF) have made significant achievements towards organizing and informing NGOs in Tanzania (TANGO, 2007).

6.2 Reorienting the Organisation Towards Advocacy in the 2000s

In 2002, due to the new millennium context and the seven years experience of following up on the NGO Policy and Act process, TANGO was convinced about the need for a shift, from pure service delivery and ad-hoc training, towards more advocacy work, policy analysis, information processing and sharing and capacity building. This was needed for effective engagement with the government, the donor community and other stakeholders. TANGO then decided that it will closely track the process of developing regulations, which will guide the implementation of the NGO Law and the formation of the NGO Council in order to make the necessary interventions to ensure that the democratic process is followed (TANGO, 2003b). Another insight gained is the understanding of the broader concept of democracy, which includes the rights, freedoms and the choice of people and groups to organize themselves for a good purpose. It was recognized that there is a growing role for civil society in the development process. This calls for the need to collaborate and play an activist and watchdog role. In addition, the global trend towards effective contribution in development not only recognizes NGOs as strategic development partners, but also demands that such organisations be more organized and work in collaboration to address the challenges of globalization in the context of poverty eradication ensuring sustainable and qualitative development of the people (TANGO, 2003b).

TANGO has about 800 NGOs members which have voluntarily agreed to join together in development promotion, policy advocacy, capacity strengthening, and information exchange endeavours and to be part of the family that shares a common set of values and beliefs. Since July 2002, members of TANGO have in addition, committed themselves to abide to a common Code of Conduct which they developed for themselves (TANGO, 2003b). The Association continues to strive to act as a unifying and representative body for its members and to enhance the service delivery and advocacy capacity of its members towards their targeted communities and the government. Moreover, the importance of networking and activism as well as protecting the interests and voicing the concerns and benefits of NGOs justifies the existence of, and the undertaking of the umbrella functions identified by TANGO since its inception (TANGO, 2009). Given its mandate, TANGO is supposed to engage with issues which cater for broad NGOs interests, such as policies and programmes (TANGO, 1988). One such issues is the NGO Policy and Act. The NGO Policy and Act was dealt with by TANGO in the late 1990s to the mid-2000s (TANGO, 2001; TANGO, 2003b; TANGO, 2004b; TANGO, 2005; TANGOa, 2006). In this chapter, I will look into the details of how this was done.

6.3 The Historical Perspective of the NGO Policy and Act: the Society Ordinance of Colonial Government

The phenomenon and quest for Tanzanian citizens and other civil society groups to organize, dates back some eight decades too when the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Servants Association gave a political upsurge to the country, as the people became formed in 1923 (Kimambo and Temu, 1969). The aim of this association was to secure the welfare of native civil

servants. This was followed by the formation of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) with the aim of promoting recreational and cultural affairs of Africans. There is no need to repeat here about the development of the NGOs sector in Tanzania, as this has already been addressed in detail in chapter four. Starting from the late 1940s to the 1950s they were more aware of their rights (Shivji, 1986). In 1954, the leader of TAA, Julius Nyerere, formed the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Under TANU, Tanganyikans were able to come together under one head and in 1961 were able to secure independence from the British colonial rule (TANU, 1964).

In the 1940s and 1950s, there were a growing mass movement towards nationalism which was not good news to the colonial administration. This made the colonial administration come up with a lot of tactics to discourage these movements. This was achieved by making new pieces of law (Lissu, 2000). In reacting to the growing mass movements, the colonial administration enacted the Trade Union Ordinance Cap.381; and the Societies Ordinance Cap.337. The aim of the Trade Union Ordinance was to regulate the activities of workers' organisations whilst the Societies Ordinance was enacted specifically to control voluntary associations which were increasingly engaging in political activities (Shivji, 1986). It is worth noting that it was in the same year (1954) that TAA was reorganised into TANU, when the Society Ordinance came into force. Lissu (2000) observes that for the effective implementation and enforcement of the laws, the administration put in place the office of the registrar who was vested with supervisory powers, for all players in the civil society organisations. The aim of the legislation was to curtail and control the activities of popular organisations. This was done by giving the holder of the position of registrar discretionary powers. According to sections 15 and 16 of the Societies Ordinance of 1954, the registrar had powers to cancel or refuse registration on numerous grounds, without any avenue of recourse

(Shivji, 1989).

The two pieces of legislation cited above were used to deal with social movements and associations, which did not live up to the dictates of the colonial administration. The other authorities given discretionary powers were the Governor and the Minister responsible for Home Affairs, as was stated in section 13 and 32 of the Societies Ordinance (Lissu, 2000). According to civil society activities of the time, the Societies Ordinance provided for the fusion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, which left citizens without a way out. Another characteristics of the Societies Ordinance of 1954, was that it imposed heavy sanctions on the societies, which contravened it. People convicted for offences under this Act could be imprisoned for up to 7 years. This also included people who attended, or whose premises were used to convene, these meetings (Shivji, 1993).

These two pieces of legislation have continued to affect the life of Tanzanians for almost five decades after independence. This is because, after independence, the government did not repeal them. Lissu (2002, p. 4) sums this up well when he says:

These provisions had devastating implications for the security of basic freedoms of association and expression and for the development of civil society during the colonial period. Even after four decades of independence, they have continued to cast a long shadow over the basic rights and freedoms theoretically guaranteed by the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as on the development of NGOs and social movements within the country.

6.4 Post Independence in the Mono-Party State of Tanzania

Shivji, ed. (1985) explains how that in the post independence, and more so the mono-party regime in Tanzania, was characterized by heavy concentration of powers and authority in the executive arm of the state, and personally in the President. There was very little regard for the representative organs of the masses such as the legislature and the courts, a factor, which diminished the prominence of these organs. IHEME (2005) further sees that Tanzania had all the characteristic of an authoritarian state, in terms of a legal system within which the law was used by the state to coerce the citizens rather than confer rights upon them.

In terms of the operation of NGOs, civil society and the voluntary sector, the independent Tanzania bore a strong resemblance with the previous colonial regime. The reason being that the new government inherited all the laws and institutions. The most significant being the adaptation of the Societies Ordinance without any major amendment and consideration of the underlying philosophy of authoritarianism, which had, informed colonial law and practice. I agree with IHEME (2005) that the new regime entrenched the somewhat authoritarian outlook under the pretext of fostering development in a young nation where there was a need to control such associations as mass movement, trade unions and political parties. The same reason was given when Tanzania made constitutional amendments in early 1960s, but did not adopt the Bill of Rights (MHOJA and KABUDI, 2006). This environment was even more restrictive to associations and made it virtually impossible for civil society to organize independently outside of the State. The only non-State voluntary associations, which were allowed to operate, were charities, religious bodies and relief

foundations, the reason being that these bodies were not political and did not pose a threat to the State (Mhoja and Kabudi, 2006).

6.5 The NGO Policy Formulation Process

After Tanzania adopted a multiparty democracy in 1992, there was an increase in the number of NGOs. Up to this time, there was no official policy and law to give guidance on the operation of these institutions. There were five pieces of law embedded in other laws which gave guidance on the operation of NGOs indirectly. These included Societies Ordinance Cap.337 of 1954; Companies Ordinance Cap.212 of 1956; Trustee Incorporation Cap.375 of 1956; National Sports Act No.12 of 1967 and Societies Act No. 6 of 1995 (Zanzibar). These pieces of legislation had neither reference to the word NGO nor to their definitions. By 1996, the government decided to make policy and an act to guide the operations of NGOs. According to the government, the reason for the formulation of the policy and the subsequent Act was due to the proliferation of NGOs, from 800 in 1994 to 3000 in 1996 (URT, 1996). Other reasons cited were the gaps in terms of control and coordination of NGO affairs. The government further said that the laws governing NGO affairs were archaic and obsolete. Other factors for drafting the law were the operational hurdles like the slow and bureaucratic registration process. It was also said that the factors outlined above made an environment that NGOs could not operate in. (URT, 1996).

It seems that the timing of the start of the process of making the Policy was influenced by the incidence and actions of some NGOs in the wake of the General Elections of the previous year, 1995. Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania (BAWATA) conducted massive civic education in every

district of the country (BAWATA, 1995). BAWATA was launched at the University of Dar es Salaam in 1991, at the conference, which was largely organized by the Union of Women in Tanzania (UWT), the women's wing of the ruling party CCM. It seems UWT had counted on the allegiance of the BAWATA leadership as automatic, without taking into consideration, the political dynamics that would surface during the competitive multiparty political environment. By 1995, counting on the intellectual competence and commitment of its Chairperson, Professor Anna Tibaijuka, BAWATA had become a model women's movement (unlike organisation) in Tanzania and beyond. It established branch offices in every district of Tanzania Mainland. During the 1995 first multiparty elections, and with millions of shillings from donors, BAWATA conducted impartial massive civic education throughout the whole country (BAWATA, 1995). That was a threat to the government and the ruling party, CCM. On its side BAWATA had clearly stated that its purpose was that of uniting women of all economic, social, and political backgrounds and to ensure gender equality in a multiparty democratic Tanzania (BAWATA, 1995).

Various attempts by UWT to replace the BAWATA leadership failed. Through the then Internal Affairs Minister, and CCM Deputy Secretary General, Ally Ameir, BAWATA was in 1996 ordered to amend its constitution so that the women's body could no longer have a political party-like network and administrative structures (Kaiza, 2003). BAWATA agreed to abide by the government and restructure the organisation by amending its constitution to become a research organisation. Nevertheless, in July 1997, the government deregistered the organisation. The deregistration was not without giving BAWATA the right to be heard, which is a fundamental principle of natural justice and also enshrined in the Constitution (URT, 1977). As a result,

BAWATA filed a petition in the High Court to challenge the government's decision and the constitutionality of the Societies Ordinance used by the government to deregister the organisation.

BAWATA argued that the action of the government to deregister the organisation was unconstitutional because it violated Articles 13(6)(a), 18, and 20 of the constitution which respectively provide for the right of a fair hearing, expression, and association and assembly (URT, 1977). BAWATA also argued that the government's decision was contrary to international instruments to which Tanzania was a party. These include the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the African Charter on Human Rights, and the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The High Court issued an injunction against the government. The injunction prohibited the government from deregistering BAWATA until the government's motion of lifting the injunction was heard in November 1997 (Kaiza, 2003).

It took about 13 years for the High Court to fully rule on the case. In 2009, the ruling was reached and BAWATA was allowed to continue to operate without any restriction (Kapama, 2009). By the time of the ruling, BAWATA was almost dead. Delay is a common practice in the Tanzanian legal system. It is easy to conclude that the government applied delaying tactics because it knew, with time; the zeal of BAWATA would cool and hence reduce the threat which BAWATA was posing. Regardless of the outcome of BAWATA's case, the government's action against BAWATA seriously impaired the freedom of association in Tanzania. As Nshala (1997) pointed out, by intimidating BAWATA, a well-known and active NGO, the government was sending out a strong message to all NGOs that they could potentially be deregistered at any time if they went

against government's positions.

It seems that after the government had seen the impact of BAWATA on the grassroots population, it also thought that the best option was to make policy and legislation to control the activities of NGOs especially in the multi party era. Thus, following the court's injunction on BAWATA, the government decided to establish a new department within the Vice-President's office to monitor and regulate the financial dealings of all NGOs (Nshala, 1997). The government wanted all NGOs to receive their funds from the donor community through this new department. Such procedures would have enabled the government to control NGOs. Many NGOs argued against such procedures but they were unable to stop the government from forming the department (Nshala, 1997).

Although BAWATA finally won the case, many Tanzanians expected the government to continue reforming existing laws or to pass new legislation giving it powers to regulate the financial dealings of all NGOs, as well as the constitutional setup and objectives of every NGO (Nshala, 1997). All NGOs would have lost their autonomy, thereby putting an end to many activities such as advocacy and independent monitoring. It was expected that many NGOs would halt operations and simply cease to exist. All government actions would be difficult to resist or challenge because the populace would not be able to unite under the banner of civil society. The resultant effect would have been that the government will again have to promulgate policies without public debate or scrutiny by the citizenry (Nshala, 1997).

The process of enacting the NGO Policy and Act stated in 1996. The government gave three

reasons why NGO policy and legislation was necessary: One was to bring about a better understanding of the dynamic of interaction between NGOs and their main institutional partners and create an enabling mechanism to foster synergies with a view to achieving their development goals. Second, was to enhance a better understanding and recognition among the government and other institutional partners of the supportive role of NGOs on the country's social and economic process. Lastly it was to provide a clear definition of what NGOs are and are not (URT, 1996).

It was envisaged that the immediate effects and indicators of the policy legislation review would improve networking between and among local NGOs to avoid duplication and waste of resources. One finds it very hard to be convinced that the government was so generous in making NGOs very strong. The government loves NGOs only when they implement projects which make people less critical. It becomes happy because someone else has provided resources and services which basically is the responsibility of the government. The government wanted to address the legal and institutional framework within which international and national NGOs operated. During my field work the sentiment which the NGO community still had is that the ultimate goal of enacting the NGO Policy and Act was to curtail the operations of NGOs. Mary Mwingira, TANGO's Executive Director, during the interview said:

NGOs took this stride to be a way for the government to curtail the operations of NGOs, especially with the trend with time of shifting donor support from government to NGOs (Interview, 11/02/2008).

The other immediate goal of the legislation process as stated by the government was to improve

knowledge among NGOs of the possibilities and limitations of their role in national development (URT, 1996). This kind of thinking is in line with the thinking that the role of bringing development lies with the government. But popular development informs us that there is no government that has the ability to develop people. People have enough knowledge about their environment so that they know what the priorities are. Also, they know what works in their environment and any attempt to try to import new knowledge will not help them much (Mshana, 1992). Toner (2008) sees that the role of bringing about development in society, lies with different actors.

The Policy formulation process was informed by a series of studies; undertaken by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), on the practical aspects of operations of NGOs and their external relationships (Lissu, 2002). It is common practice in Tanzania to conduct studies to inform new programmes, even when there is enough baseline data and supporting evidence. Yet studies would be conducted as way of justifying the use of funds (Interview with Astronaut Bagile, 27/02/2008). Although NGO issues are not a union matter the findings of the ILO studies on the mainland were compared and contrasted with those on the Isles (Zanzibar). In the Article of Union, there are issues which were decided would not be covered in the union. One of these is the issue of people associations and organisations such as NGOs. The findings were synthesized into an inventory of information/knowledge that existed in the policy/legal framework, in consultative workshops jointly organized by the Vice- President's Office and ILO in 1996 (URT, 1996). The workshops drew participants from the government; Umbrella Organisations: (TANGO; Tanzania Council of Social Development (TACOSODE); and Association of NGOs of Zanzibar- ANGOZA); NGOs, trade unions, employer's organisations, Bilateral and Multilateral donors,

researchers and academicians. The outcome of the consultative workshop was the formation of a Steering Committee to lead the process (URT, 1996).

The involvement of international institutions like the ILO and World Bank, instead of leaving this matter to the Government alone, raises some questions. For this process to be spearheaded by external agencies sounds odd; but this has become common practice in Tanzania and in many other developing countries. The reason behind this practice is that the donors have vested interests in the programmes they initiate. Chapter one highlighted how International Financial Institutions and donors have become fond of NGOs because it is easy to use them as agencies of neo-liberal agendas and convince them that there is no alternative to the development except the one prescribed by the neo-liberal model. Issa Shivji (2003) says for donors, this is a good excuse for reorienting NGOs and civil society in western thinking (neoliberal).

Another issue which one needs to note is the timing of the process of developing NGO Policies/Act in other countries of Southern Africa. During the same period that the NGO Policy/Act was under review in Tanzania, other African countries were under pressure from the World Bank to enact laws to oversee the activities of NGOs. These countries were Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Namibia (Nyang'oro, 2006). This makes it easy to arrive at a conclusion that external and internal pressures were the force behind enacting the NGO Act.

In a bid to stake a common understanding of what NGOs are or ought to be, the workshop and the subsequent Steering Committee, agreed to define an NGO in terms of the commonwealth definition which is based on the following elements: not for profit, voluntary, independent and not

self-serving (URT, 1996). There was a need to start with a definition because previously there was none. Perhaps due to the under representation of the NGOs in the workshop, in terms of quality of people, who attended the workshop, the meeting generally agreed that the local NGOs are young and therefore have very low capacity (Lissu, 2000). Joseph Mzinga explains why both NGOs and the government like workshops:

It is unfortunate that all these years, this notion that NGOs in Tanzania are young and need capacity building has been a major excuse for organizing endless capacity building training. As a result many capacity building workshops and training are organized every day. The implication of this is that, the resources that would have been used to work with community are being used by NGOs actors. I think the best way for NGOs to learn is to go to the field and learn from the actions and people themselves (Interview, Joseph Mzinga., 02/04/2008).

The observation by Kaiza, concurs with that of Green (2003) in Maghimbi (2004, p. 16) that currently money intended for participatory development goes to workshops. And this is contrary to what people want, whereas they want to see this money go to build strong institutions of economy and the social sectors.

URT (1996) further explains that the other issue noted to be weakening further the local NGOs was the lack of coordination, which was exemplified by the lack of information flow, exchange of experience and solidarity. Here the workshop suggested that efforts should be made to establish NGO networks based on sectoral interests and voluntarily. Other issues deliberated upon were that

of transparency. Government officials demanded NGOs to be open about their sources of funding. Regarding the legal and regulatory framework, it was noted that Tanzanian NGOs are registered under four pieces of legislation, which are old and need to be repealed or changed. The Workshop set out a timetable for policy to be ready by December 1997. This dream for policy to be completed and adopted did not come to pass until 2001. The workshop further put forward a budget of 41 million T.Shs (£17,083) for the process to be completed. The government was to contribute 6 million T.Shs (£2,500) and 35 million T.Shs (£14,583) came from the donor community. With donors paying out more than 87 % of the budget, the possibility of the donor agenda taking the upper hand is very high. A number of observations have been made about some of the policies/programmes in the country which have been implemented because of the interest to donors and sometimes they have nothing to do with the government commitment and needs (Shivji, 1992; LEAT, 1999; Chachage, 2003). Also Murene explains how western donors have used aid as an addiction and how they do not want to see African states free themselves from this addiction. He sums this up:

Recent developments in the relationship between the International community, meaning North America and Western Europe, and various African States show that the controlling mechanism in that relationship is aid addiction which, like other types of addictions, including drug addiction, is carefully orchestrated by the drug dealer or peddler to keep the addict perpetually hooked. It is a relationship between aid peddlers, and their multilateral institutions, and aid addicts who happen to be mainly African States, regimes, Non-Governmental organisations or NGOs, and civil society organs that depend on donors (Murene, 2007, p. 181).

6.6 The NGO Fight for Participation

NGOs observing the way things were not moving in their favour; decided to fight to make sure that policy and legislation, that will be produced, does not put the NGO sector at risk. TANGO working with other NGOs, notably members of the Feminist Action Coalition (FEMACT), the Legal Human Rights Centre (LHRC), the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) and Kuleana, in 1998, embarked on a campaign to make the Policy framework more NGO friendly. Among the actions taken was an information dissemination exercise, which informed the citizens of what was contained in the policy and various stages that the process was progressing into (Mary Mwingira, Interview, 11/02/2008). During interview, Zaa Twalangate (Interview, 5/3/2008) said, “NGOs and civil society were not happy with the way the government was handling the NGO policy formulation process”. Because of this, TANGO conducted research to see what the NGO sector was thinking about the process. This culminated in the organisation issuing a statement, which said that the NGOs were generally not happy with the way the government was handling the NGO policy formulation process. Following the TANGO statement, the donor community took the government to task demanding that it show how the NGOs were participating in the policy formulation process’ (Interview, 5/3/2008).

On the same note Mary Mwingira said:

Troubled by the donors’ reaction of suspending the disbursement of funds earmarked for the process, the government through the Vice President’s Office summoned TANGO to a

hearing. The government blamed TANGO for causing the citizenry to blame the government. The government further asked TANGO to clarify its claim that the people were not happy with the policy formulation process. TANGO provided the government with recorded and written statements from the civil society saying that the people were not happy at the way government handled the policy formulation process (Interview, Interview, 11/02/2008).

During my field work, I was able to learn that, the result of this approach was that, the government, in a bid to show the donors and the public that they were genuine about letting the NGOs participate in the policy and legislation process; invited the NGOs to comment on the policy draft, at a time when the draft was in the fourth phase. The NGOs lead by TANGO did not relent; instead they took the invitation by the government as a basis for them to conduct a nationwide policy content awareness and commenting campaign. As this went in parallel to national workshops conducted by the government; the NGO awareness campaign also took the same course, with a varied presentation of NGOs reflections on the policy process. Four workshops were conducted, coastal zone in Kibaha, southern zone in Mbeya, central zone in Dodoma and Lake Zone in Mwanza (TANGO, 1999). This was followed by a national consultation workshop in which selected people from the zones gave the zonal input to the then draft policy.

6.7 Government's Process

As has been started earlier, the government was also collecting its views and comments on the policy from a selected group of NGOs. This process was done in six zonal meetings held in

Zanzibar, Mbeya, Mtwara, Arusha, Dodoma and Morogoro respectively. Generally, the meetings said that the draft was satisfactory, but that the policy did not include people with disabilities. Secondly, that the policy should stipulate how the NGO Council on the mainland will collaborate with the other council on the isles (Zanzibar). Another suggestion was that only NGOs, which can afford an external audit, should do so; otherwise an internal audit could do for small and emerging NGOs. Further the meetings wondered if it was possible for the policy framework to establish how NGOs utilize resources. It was then difficult to establish the actual number of NGOs. It was hoped that the NGO Policy would establish criteria on how to assess the success and failure of the performance of NGOs in the country. It was felt that to ensure transparency the policy should put in place procedures and mechanisms for mutual accountability. The meetings went on to stress that the coordination referred to in the policy should not mean that the government coordination, which they said, is often more of control characterized by stringent rules and regulations (URT, 2000)

Further this meeting questioned the provisions in the policy on the current practice which empowered the Registrar to either grant or deregister an organisation with no other recourse not even the courts being able to question the decision. The Mbeya meeting also touched on the issue of coordination and that of networking; seeking that the policy should bring the issue of coordination into the open so as to allow for a pluralistic arrangement of networks in the NGO sector. Other issues brought out were the need to have one point of registration for all NGOs preferably under the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. Here the meeting asked the policy drafters to put in a clause, which will oblige the government to automatically transfer the registration of currently registered NGO to the new Act, that would result from the policy (URT, 2000).

Apart from grammatical and flow corrections, the Mwanza meeting was generally in agreement with the NGO draft policy content. However, it wanted the drafter (Vice-Presidents Office) to publicize the policy before it was adopted and the drafting of the bill and subsequent Act. Apart from what has been noted elsewhere; the concerns of the Mtwara meeting stressed the point of shortening the period of processing registration forms, it further called for the decentralization of the registration system urging the government to bring the registration closer to the district level. On the issue of publicizing the Act, the Mtwara meeting recommended the government to state clearly what the roles of NGOs are so that the public can monitor their performance at a micro level. Other issues considered in the meeting were that of sustainability and resources mobilization. There they said that this issue should not be looked at only in terms of profit making and sharing, but the policy should put in place a workable way of enabling sustainability of local NGOs. The meeting further suggested if a NGO committed an error then the maximum time of suspension should be no more than six months (URT, 2000).

Despite the fact that the meeting agreed with transferring the registration of currently registered NGOs to the new Act; the Mtwara meeting urged that the NGO existence be confirmed before a compliance certificate was issued. Regarding the demand for reports from NGOs; the meeting suggested that the NGOs should deposit the relevant reports with the government where the public can assess them for viewing (URT, 2000).

The Arusha meeting was concerned about the government's perspective of NGOs; that they are merely bodies which fill in the gaps that are left out. It urged that this would kill the spirit of the partnership between the state and NGOs. Regarding the issue of control, the Arusha meeting

stressed that NGOs are autonomous organisations and are controlled by their members, board of trustees and the law that governs NGOs and not otherwise.

Apart from including TANGO and its allies in the policy formulation process and commenting on the fourth draft, the group produced an alternative policy and presented it to the conveners, the Vice Presidents Office. Most of the elements pointed out by the NGOs alliance were incorporated into the policy document which lead to the NGOs accepting the policy document at a meeting held at Morogoro in December 2000 (Millinga and Sangale, 2000). The TANGO led process was further enhanced by the NGO Forum of 2001 which provided space for further debate and addition of comments on the policy. The Major outcome of the 2001 forum was that NGOs demanded a referendum before the NGO Act was enacted (TANGO, 2001).

Although the government had cautiously opened the doors for NGO participation; from time to time a note was given to NGOs that they should not go beyond what the government wanted. Lissu (2000) has documented how Lawrence Gama General Secretary, of the then ruling party, CCM, set the tone in one of the workshops while discussing the Policy Draft:

...debate on the NGO sector's role in the political process was expressly discouraged. Lawrence Gama, the guest of honour at the third National Consultative Workshop, set the tone in his opening speech when he told the delegates: "As I have stated, Non-Governmental Organisations have a duty to collaborate with the Government in various spheres. However, we must not allow these organisations to be turned into a channel to further the political interests of their leaders and even members. We have, in our country,

put in place procedures for individuals to participate in politics through (political) parties. Since the beginning we realized the importance of separating the activities of political parties and those of Non-Governmental Organisations. Mixing the activities of these organisations with politics could be the source of disruption of the peace and hence a hindrance to development. The policy for these organisations clearly sets out their characteristics and how they are supposed to operate. It is my expectation that the delegates to this conference will see this rationale” (Tandu's translation from Swahili) (Lissu, 2000, p.11).

After the zonal meetings the government convened a series of consultation meetings, which included representatives from the NGO sector. This culminated in a national stakeholders meeting. In this meeting the government and the NGOs could not agree on every aspects of the policy draft, but they agree that it was better than the previous four drafts. The government officially made it a policy document in 2001. After the adoption of the NGO Policy, NGOs continued with advocacy to seek the amendment of the policy. But because the process of drafting of the NGO Act followed immediately, they (NGOs) shelved the process until the Act had been adopted and become operational. Until when I was collecting data in 2008, NGOs had not made any serious demand for the amendment of the policy.

6.8 NGOs Thoughts on the Final Policy Document

The fifth draft was the one which was adopted and became the official Policy. There were issues which NGOs were not happy with and if they were allowed to be included in the policy the NGOs

sector would be in danger. NGOs advised the government to look into these aspects and amend them. When the final draft came out these aspects were not amended as had been recommended by NGOs. These included the definition of NGOs; the legal and institutional structures; registration and de-registration of NGOs; and the policy making process.

On the definition of NGOs: it was generally agreed that there was a change in the definition of NGO in the fifth draft (final), the most significant being that the proposed policy narrowed the classification of NGOs. The fifth draft/NGO Policy definition of an NGO is:

a voluntary grouping of individuals or organisations which is autonomous and not-for-profit sharing; organized locally at the grassroots level, nationally or internationally for the purpose of enhancing the legitimate economic, social and/or cultural development or lobbying or advocacy on issues of public interest or interest of a group of individuals or organisations” (URT, 2001a, p. 5). According to the draft policy only NGOs, which fit under the description, are eligible for registration (URT, 2001a).

NGOs think that this definition is too restrictive. Lissu (2000) notes the definition should have been broad enough to include groups like trade unions and faith based organisations

The fourth draft further proposed different legal and institutional structures for regulating NGOs (URT, 1999). A careful review of the new framework revealed that it was around the provisions of the Societies Ordinance, and therefore did exhibit traits of control, restriction and authoritarianism. It even stated that the aim of the policy was to control the affairs of NGOs; this

raised a lot of dust in NGO circles. Other new provisions in the fifth draft were that NGOs were not allowed to register as either sports or cultural organisations under the scheme of the National Sports Council Act, 1967; or as companies limited by guarantee under the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 212 of the Laws. In a way this avenue, which gave NGOs a leeway to exercise the freedoms of expression and association, alongside the restrictive Societies Ordinance was closed by the NGO policy (Lissu, 2000).

According to the framers of the fifth draft of the NGO policy the aim was to concentrate powers under one legal and institutional roof. Therefore, the draft policy document proposed that the Director of NGO Coordination in the ministry responsible for NGO affairs shall be the sole “contact” between the government and NGOs. Another proposition was the harmonization and consolidation of all existing laws governing NGOs. According to the policy there was to be enacted a new law for NGO affairs (URT, 1999). The NGO sector deemed this action as repressive as it curtailed the pluralistic manifestation of NGOs that prevailed earlier.

Other changes in the institutional framework and structures were that the central figure in the decision-making process would be the registrar, unlike in the Societies Ordinance where the central players were the President and the Minister. However, the same discretionary powers would be transferred to the register, who will work under the office of the Director of NGO Coordination. Perhaps a more positive proposal was that of the creation of the National Coordination Board, whose composition would be two thirds NGOs representatives and the other one-third government representatives. However, despite earlier recommendations that membership of the NGO Council should be voluntary; the framers of the fifth draft did not

address this concern. NGOs thought this draft policy proposed a structure, which was too heavy and that the membership of the NGO Council should be voluntary. The framers of the fifth draft did not address this concern. Lissu (2000) sees that this contradicted the provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, which prohibits compulsory membership to any association. It was deemed that this would defeat the very purpose of forming the association. When comparing the NGO thoughts about the provisions of the draft policy, one could conclude that the policy proposed a structure which was too heavy, especially when it says:

The Registrar of NGOs is to be charged with the responsibility of ‘actual’ registration of NGOs after (the National NGO Coordination) Board has approved the application for registration (URT, 2001, p. 6).

The same policy also granted the sole authority to de-register an NGO to the Registrar; however this Registrar could not act upon the instruction of the National NGOs Board. In essence this implies that, the application for registration will be submitted to the Board for determination. The decision of the Board shall then be transmitted to the Registrar who shall then “actually” register the applicant NGO (where the Board has approved the application for registration or been rejected by the Board (URT, 2001a). This, in the eyes of the NGO, was seen to be a duplication of roles and renders the Registrar a mere clerk whose job can be performed by any desk officer in the responsible ministry. It was suggested that there was no need for a separate Registrar since the Board was the one actually playing the role of registering NGOs (Mary Mwingira, Interview, 11/02/2008).

Further the policy stated that “The role of the Board will be to review complaints on registration and de-registration of NGOs” (URT, 2001a). This implies that the Board was to review complaints against decisions of some other institutions, since to suggest that the Board shall review complainants against its own decisions would fly in the face of all notions of fairness and justice. There is, in addition, an application in the final draft that the registration process may also start with the submission of an application for that purpose with the Registrar. Furthermore the Registrar was empowered to request annual activity and financial reports discussed above (URT, 2001a). These provisions suggested that the Registrar of NGOs would wield substantive powers over the registration of NGOs. Any other interpretation would tend to make the position of the Registrar redundant. This lack of clarity shows the potential for conflict over the mandates the two situations that might be realized should these proposals be implemented (Semezana, 2002).

Another positive change, over the preceding drafts, was in terms of shortening the registration process. Among the propositions in the Policy, is the limiting of the registration process of an NGO to three months. Here the registrar is required to inform the applicant whether the application for registration has been approved or rejected within one month of the submission of the application. In the event of rejection, the final draft proposed a right of appeal to the Minister responsible for NGOs who will be obliged to determine the appeal within two months. Thereafter, the applicant has the option of appeal to the ordinary courts of law. The draft further touched on the timing of the de-registration process. The final draft proposed that an NGO be afforded the right to be heard before it is de-registered by way of a written notice. The NGO will then be required to respond within three months (URT, 2003). It is implied that during this period the NGO will be suspended but this suspension will last for a maximum of six months after which the

suspension will presumably be lifted. Should the NGO concerned be dissatisfied by the decision of the Board, it shall have the right to appeal to the Minister who is required to determine the appeal within 30 days of its submission. Thereafter, there is a further right of recourse to the ordinary courts of law and while the appeals are pending in the courts, the NGO shall be allowed to continue with its operations. Reading from the above citations from the draft policy one could see how powerful the minister could be, such that the board is sidelined. Another possible change was the proposed decentralization of the registration process from central government institutions to regional and district authorities.

After adopting the policy, there followed a process of enacting the NGO Act which would provide the legal mechanism for implementing and operating the Policy.

6.8 The NGO Bill Drafting and Enactment Process

The NGO Bill⁶ drafting started quietly, even before the policy was completed. But it was not known until some drafters, who were sympathetic to NGOs, let out the information that the government had started drafting the NGO Bill. As a fore-runner in the fight for an enabling Bill; TANGO organized other NGOs and commissioned a legal consultancy firm to prepare working documents, which would be informed by the NGOs thinking of what a good law should comprise. This was preceded by broad consultations within the NGO sector on how the Act should look if it was to meet the objective of the NGO Policy. The government under the mediation of an

⁶ A bill is a proposed law under consideration by a legislature. A bill does not become law until it is passed by the legislature and, in most cases approved by the executive. Once a bill has been enacted into law, it is called an act or a statute

American Private Voluntary Organisation called the International Center for Non Profit Law (ICNL) promised the NGO sector that the Bill drafting process was going to be participatory (TANGO, 2002b). As part of the process of drafting the Bill the three parties (government, ICNL and a few selected NGOs) agreed that the government should convene a number of multi-stakeholders workshops in the regions and when the final draft is ready, there should be held a national workshop/conference (Interview Ngunga Tepani, 20/03/2008). The aim of these gatherings was to allow a wider section of the NGO sector to input into the Bill drafting process. However, there was only one such meeting, which was held at the White Sand Hotel, Dar es Salaam in May 2002. There was a feeling, at that time, that the government would not convene this meeting had there not been pressure from both the donors and NGOs. The White Sand retreat was attended by representatives of the NGOs, the drafters, NGO affairs conveners in the Vice Presidents Office and NGO law experts and donors. According to the report of the retreat the objectives were to: (i) have an ideal NGO law which answers the current and anticipated problems, (ii) to come out with clear principles of NGO law through free and democratic discussions and (iii) produce an improved version of a draft Bill (Invitation Letter sent to TANGO by Office of Vice President-NGO Division and Environment Division, 5 May, 2002).

According to NGO delegates to the White Sands meeting, there were a number of concerns raised on the zero draft of the Bill-most of which pointed to the fact that the Bill was written with the intention of Government control more than being an enabling piece of legislation. Led by TANGO, NGOs did, at the same meeting, present the Alternative Bill. After the meeting, the government made a further commitment when it promised the NGOs that it would incorporate their views and take into account their reservations on the zero draft of the Bill (TANGO, 2002).

Aileen Chuma who attended this meeting; explained the NGO perspective, and her comments were:

That there was need to make the registration and deregistration process transparent. Further the meeting urged the drafters to remove the powers of the registrar, wherever possible. In the same light it was suggested that some powers should be moved from the registrar's office to the council. Another issue was that the bill should ensure that the concept of independence of the NGO sector, by leaving room for the NGO sector to regulate themselves (Interview, Aileen Chuma, 10/3/2008).

The next stage in this process was to hold a second retreat with a wider gathering of NGOs and other stakeholders. The meeting was set for 29-30 August 2002, but it never took place, thereby creating tension among the NGOs. Unfortunately, the Vice President's Office, and the Poverty Eradication and Environment Division, the government contact point on matters relating to NGOs, informed a few select NGOs that the workshop had been postponed due to unavoidable reasons and that it would be held at a later date (Invitation Letter sent to TANGO by Office of Vice President-NGO Division and Environment Division dated, 28 July, 2002). Convinced of the seemingly 'gentlepersons' promise given by the government, NGOs patiently waited for the said workshop to be convened. In the meantime, the grapevine believed that the government had secretly completed drafting the Bill and that it was going to be tabled in the next parliamentary session which was November 2002. This raised alarms in NGO circles. The alarm was made real when information was obtained that the Attorney General (AG) had advised the government to halt these discussions and workshops because the zero draft had leaked to the public. Until 11

October 2002, when the government announced, through the government owned newspaper (Daily News 11 October 2002), that the NGO Bill was going to be tabled at the coming parliamentary session on November, 2002; all the information outlined was based on hearsay. However, this did not surprise some of the NGOs. Helen Kijo-Bisimba (Interview, 4/3/2008) summed it up well:

When one is dealing with the government, one needs to be alert all the time because it says one thing and does the other. Sometimes, it makes one ask oneself whether the government is run by individual will or by laid down procedures. In many occasions, the government has promised things to NGOs and the public in general, but it never honours its promise.

Worried by the information, in the grapevine, even before the government made the announcement; TANGO, the Tanzania Council of Social Development (TACOSODE), the Policy Forum (PF), HakiElimu, TGNP, LHRC and other NGOs, organized an emergency meeting in Dar es Salaam to deliberate on a way forward, with the aim of achieving an Act that is more NGO friendly. During this meeting they formed a special task force known as the NGO Bill Core Group. This consisted of TANGO, TACOSODE, HakiElimu, TGNP and LHRC. The Bill contained issues which NGOs felt that if not addressed before the bill became law; would have serious impact on the operation of NGOs in Tanzania. The Bill, overall, instead of promoting an enabling environment for NGOs, stressed control and restriction, which seemed to be contrary to the spirit of NGO Policy. In total there were about 36 clauses or sub-clauses which NGOs either wanted to be amended or deleted.

The main issues which NGOs identified needed amendment or to be deleted are as highlighted in

Box No. 1 below:

Box No 1: The National NGO Policy and The NGO Act 2002: Key Areas of Inconsistency

Addressing the confusion in existing laws

The Policy recognizes (para 1.1.3) that “Many laws governing the registration and operation of NGOs were a cause of confusion”, and that (para 1.1.4) “there was the need for measures aimed at addressing these problems. The Act does nothing to reform the existing laws but leaves them intact, with all the confusion. It does not repeal any of the existing laws but rather complicates the regulatory regime: It obliges a new NGO (section 11 (2)) to register under the Act and, ‘where its status requires’, under any of the existing laws as well. In the case of an NGO registered under an existing law, (by virtue of section 11 (3)), it is obliged to bring itself under the Act by applying for a certificate of compliance which is of the same effect as a certificate of registration. NGOs will now be required to comply with the requirements of two separate regulatory systems. This will be burdensome and conflicts could arise.

Addressing the problem of cumbersome processes of registration

The Policy recognizes (para 2.1.2) that due “to some extent [to] cumbersome processes of registration”, there are NGOs that are not registered even though they ought to be registered. It goes on to promise (para 6.1): “A new law shall be enacted to cater for the current deficiencies in NGOs registration, deregistration, appeals and termination.” The Act has failed to do this as it did not repeal or even amend the existing laws, but has merely added more deficiencies.

Safeguarding the freedom of association

This is recognized in para 4.0 (iii) as one of the specific objectives of the Policy. By sections 11, 18, 35 and 36, the Act introduces compulsory registration with strong penal sanctions against unregistered NGOs and those who run them. The fundamental freedom of association is thus abridged. (The appropriate internationally recognized approach is not to criminalize non-registration but to encourage registration by prescribing a package of benefits for registered NGOs.) In respect of the freedom of association among NGOs, section 25 (4) provides that after the establishment of the NGO Council, no person or body shall engage in NGO co-ordination or networking. Thus, it will probably become an offence to run an NGO umbrella group.

Protecting the freedom of expression and allowing NGOs to be innovative

The Policy recognizes (in para 3.1) that “NGOs address diverse issues ranging from lobbying, advocacy and human rights to service provision. They bring creativity, innovation and” In at least two ways, the Act seeks to discourage NGOs from playing the advocacy role and from being creative and innovative. Firstly, section 7 (1) (c), empowers the Board to “facilitate and co-ordinate activities” of NGOs, and section 7 (1) (i) empowers the Board “to provide policy guidelines to NGOs for harmonizing their activities in the light of the national development

plan". Accordingly, NGOs may no more be able to criticize government plans or propose alternative plans but will become mere implementing agencies for government plans. They will thus cease to be a driving force for change.

Facilitating ‘mechanisms for Government support to NGOs’

This is expressed in the Policy as one of the specific objectives. The Act however contains no provision in this regard.

Building a Government-NGO partnership

Running right through the Policy (and, as explicitly stated in para 1.1.1) is the notion that the government and NGOs are partners in the development process. However, the provisions of the Act (especially the penal provisions in sections 35 and 36) convey the impression that the Government sees the NGOs as adversaries who must be hunted down and liquidated.

Source: TANGO (2002c).

The above is a summary of the issues NGOs identified which posed threat to their existence.

NGOs under the leadership of TANGO organised follow up meetings, including a special delegation to the Minister of State in the Vice-President Office, the Poverty and Environment Division, Maokola Majogo. They attended the subsequent public hearing on 23rd and 24th October 2002. The core group requested an audience with the Minister responsible for NGOs, Hon. Maokola Majogo, well before the public hearing to try to influence his thinking on the bill bearing in mind that the Minister would assume too much power under the proposed bill but would also try to influence the perception of other parliamentary committee members. The Minister accepted some of the mischief and agreed to discuss them before the committee responsible for Constitution and Legal Affairs. The Minister assured members of the core group that he will be accessible 24 hrs of the day and hoped that the NGOs and government will be working “on the same side of the river” (Minutes of Meeting between Minister and Minister Majogo and NGO Bill Core Group dated 25th October, 2002).

On the 23rd and 24th October 2002, a public hearing was conducted by the Parliamentary Legal Committee in Dar Es Salaam, where several NGO Bill Core Groups, NGOs and the public participated in a debate that sought to get the views of concerned members of the public. The NGO Bill Core Group was able to submit the NGOs' recommendations and these were discussed by the Committee. The Members of Parliament agreed to amend or delete some of the provisions. Almost seventy five percent of the recommendations were accepted and promised to be amended. According to Tanzanian Parliament Committee Regulations, the proposed bills should be discussed at Committee level before it tabled in the parliament. Committees give their recommendations but have no mandate to change the bill. Rather it would incorporate them in their comments to be read before the Parliament and to be considered with other recommendations from all MPs. However, the Parliament Committees' recommendations are given high priority compared with those from other MPs on the floor.

On 25th October 2002, the NGO Bill Core Group met at HakiElimu to try to follow up on promises made by the Minister i.e. to keep the lines of communication open, and more importantly to follow-up on their participation in the Parliamentary Committee public hearing and what was decided when the committee met alone behind closed doors. The feedback from the Minister informed them that 75% of the recommendations given by the NGO bill core group were taken up and will be part of the Schedule of Amendments to be tabled to the Parliament. Two more meetings were held at TGNP and HakiElimu offices on the 28th October and 29th October, 2002 respectively. The meeting of TGNP had the objective of giving feedback of the meetings with Minister Majogo and the Constitution, Legal and Public Administration to all NGOs and lay down strategy for the way forward. In these two meetings, the conclusion was reached that unless

extra, systematic and well organised lobbying and advocacy are done to convince both the Parliament and the government to slow down the speed of enacting the law, the future of NGOs would be bleak (TANGO, 2002c). The meeting recommended that there should be engagement with the media and like-minded organizations. That a petition should be signed and they should come up with a position statement and hold a press conference but above all to engage with and lobby parliamentarians in Dodoma. The TGNP meeting agreed that the starting point should be that NGOs are given more time to input in the process of owning the Bill and the resultant Act. In the TGNP meeting, a course of action was agreed of which one was to send activists to Dodoma to lobby MPs (TANGO, 2002c). The 29th October meeting at HakiElimu aimed at preparing for comprehensive lobbying of MPs in Dodoma.

Before going to Dodoma, the NGOs had expected that the Bill would have been tabled before Parliament and gone through the 1st and 2nd reading and be adjourned to the April 2003 sitting. The Bill would then be presented and passed into legislation and become an Act. The NGOs first goal was to convince Parliament to let the Bill go through the 1st and 2nd reading and be adjourned to the April 2003 Parliament session when the third reading will be done. The aim of seeking to withdraw completely was to allow enough time for thorough consultations with stakeholders. And the second goal was, if the Parliament refused alternative one above, then for NGOs to convince MPs to do major changes in the Bill by deleting all discriminatory provisions and replace with favourable ones. It was not easy to convince MPs to withdraw the Bill. Therefore the second option of deleting discriminatory provision was pursued and the following recommendations were adopted.

The approach to the lobbying campaign in Dodoma included: seminars to groups of MPs, media, and the general public. The poster and the brochure containing the NGOs position statement in both Kiswahili and English languages. The Core Group wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Constitutional and Legal Affairs; urging for the postponement/delay in passing the Bill till the April 2003 session, in order to accommodate more views. Similar letters were sent to all MPs, the Attorney General, the ruling party (CCM) Secretary General for the 'party caucus' (seeking an audience with all CCM MPs which was eventually turned down). A letter to Minister Maokola Majogo urging him to withdraw the Bill using his powers as accorded to him by parliamentary rule number 74. The NGOs' leadership that was in Dodoma made interviews with media or hastily arranged news conferences to clarify some matters for the MPs and especially the general public. Also there was theatre plays to highlight and plead for the gravity of the issue if the Bill would be passed without due consultation with the primary stakeholders (NGOs) and the public. (TANGO, 2002d).

While in Dodoma, the NGOs representatives engaged with MPs and government officials both officially and in private. They explained to them the need for a slowing down on the process of approving the Bill. Some of the people they met individually include: the speaker, the ruling-party CCM vice-chairperson John Malecela, Wilbroad Slaa of the opposition party of CHADEMA, Patrick Qorro, Ibrahim Msabaha, Mutungirehi, Anna Makinda, Dr. Zainabu Gamas, Christant Mzindakaya, Kingunge Mwiru, Semindu Pawa, Joseph Mungai, Wislon Masilingi, Msindia Mgana and most of the women MPs. Lobbying continued sometimes up to midnight

The period from mid-1990s to early 2000s witnessed a rush by many countries in Southern Africa

to enact policies and laws which would coordinate the activities of NGOs. These included countries like Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Uganda. This sudden awakening of governments to write laws was because they realized that they could not ban NGOs, but they realised they can control the activities of NGOs so that they do not make people ungovernable. The thinking and dream of governments was to make NGOs function like one of the government departments. This dilemma Jennings (2003, p. 167) writing on the dilemma of many Third World countries, particularly in Africa, says that they have failed to find the solution to how development could be both directed and be fully participatory at every level. He asserts:

Development has often been more about structures, and mechanisms for control, than about the actual schemes themselves. Governments both colonial and post-colonial have identified the key problem as the potential and real resistance offered by the recipients of the development mandate. There has been an expectation of resistance, and in response successive regimes have concentrated on developing the structures and laws that will successfully overcome this potential opposition.

NGOs believe that any legislation to regulate their activities should respect the fundamental human rights on the freedom of association and expression as enshrined in the Tanzania's Constitution (Article 20 (1). The constitution also provides for the freedom of every citizen to fully participate in decisions affecting them, their lives and issues of importance to the nation, section 21(2) (URT, 1977). Bagenda does not see why the NGOs Act should contradict the constitution:

Thus NGOs were hoping that the intended law shall create an environment where NGOs prosper while being responsible to the various stakeholders and the public at large. They argue, whatever the law seeks to address, it should not contravene the Constitution which is above all laws of the land. That piece of legislation shall also be consistent with international law and good practices (Interview, Prince Bagenda, 24/01/2008).

The campaign maintained the need not to rush the Bill through Parliament and become law in the November 2002 session. The campaigners argued that the Bill required more work and needs to be redrafted, with the participation of NGOs nationwide and broad public debate, in a manner consistent with the country's Constitution and key policies, international law, fair principles of accountability and basic human rights. As it was the Parliament failed to heed the call of the primary stakeholders to have the Bill delayed, it was unanimously passed into an Act on 13th November 2002 (TANGO, 2002d).

When the Bill was ready in Parliament on November 2002; Minister Majogo and the NGOs were surprised to learn that although both Minister Majogo and the Constitution Committee had promised to accommodate more than 75% of their recommendations, none were taken on board. In Dodoma, NGOs fought tirelessly to convince the Parliament not to accept the Bill the way it was. NGOs continued to lobby MPs individually and used the media widely. HakiElimu (2003) shows the way the media covered NGOs demands and their position, made the public feel that both the government and MPs were anti-NGOs and also against civil society at large. HakiElimu recorded more than 100 newspaper stories most of them showing the negative side of the government. The government and Parliament became more unpopular. This position made the

Government very uncomfortable.

Some, pro-NGOs MPs were intimidated within Parliament. Some activists, who were, in Dodoma, were also intimidated by security personnel. This led to some MPs withholding their positive contributions to the Campaign. In the initial stages a good number of MPs had indicated they would support the cause of the NGOs. But later they withdrew their support and became against the NGOs. MP Aggrey Mwanri, of the Siha Constituency, who initially seemed to sympathise with NGOs and supported their position; had advised NGOs to stick to their guns that the Bill should not be presented in the Parliament the way it was. It is documented in TANGO Minutes (2002d) that Mwanri said he was ready to convince other MPs to support NGOs proposal and position. He went further and advised that it would be a good strategy to target those MPs with high convincing powers. The NGOs trusted this particular MP. However, when the Bill was ready and MPs had time to discuss it, the NGOs delegation was puzzled to learn that Mwanri was one of the MPs who spoke vehemently against the position of the NGOs. This did not come as a surprise because the ruling party (CCM) had convened a meeting for all its MPs in which it warned them against supporting the NGOs. Mwanri went as far as equating NGOs with terrorist groups. NGOs appreciate that the MPs were not used to such serious engagement from members of any section of civil society and the public. Ngunga Tepani explains this scenario:

The lobbying campaign was quite a new phenomenon to our politicians/Parliamentarians-some viewed it as disturbance and lack of respect hence an unwelcome exercise. MPs could not understand the courage exhibited by NGOs. Some went as far as claiming there was a foreign donor who was in Dodoma and had a sack

full of money and their role was to dish money out to NGOs. The accusation to donors is a common thing from government circles and politicians (Interview, 20/03/2008).

Ephred Myenzi(Interview, 06/03/2008) commenting on parliament's reaction said:

Whenever MPs see an organised group trying to question state authoritarian practice a lame excuse which is put forward is to discredit such group by saying there has been/they are given money by 'enemies of the country' from outside. Since the debate of the NGOs Bill in Parliament occurred at the same time as the Terrorism Bill was being tabled in the Parliament, some MPs went as far as labelling NGOs as either terrorist groups or of are being financed by terrorist groups. Whereas the government receives more than 40% of its budget from donors, MPs do not dare to point the finger at the Government and accuse it of being implementers of foreign enemies' agenda".

The government did not take the NGOs lightly and it made sure it used every available weapon to discredit the NGOs. An opportunity came when President Arap Moi of Kenya gave a farewell speech to the Parliament as part of his farewell to Tanzanians. He was going to retire as President of Kenya in a few months time. President Moi used that opportunity to talk about NGOs. He said NGOs were being used by the enemies of African countries. In his speech, he equated NGOs with thieves and terrorists. He said:

The NGOs are getting a lot of money but the expenditures of that money is questionable...they (NGOs) are always being used by opposition parties to question the

transparency of governments but they do not show the way. If they (NGOs) are democratic as they claim to be they should therefore be transparent on the way they get the money and how they spend it. They should be transparent on how much they steal and how they spend their money (Daily News, 13 November, 2002).

It was obvious that President Moi was told by the government what to say. During his Presidency, Moi himself had a long history of fighting against NGOs and other civic groups. It seemed that the Tanzanian government decided to borrow an idea on how to deal with NGOs from President Moi because there was enough experience and evidence that back home in Kenya this was the order of the day. Ndengwa (1999, p.26) summed it up when he said:

...during the single party regime of Moi; the administrative consequences to the NGOs were: (1) deregistration, (2) forcing the removal of leaders or withdrawing of resources and privileges, (3) reconstituted into a new organisation by government fiat, (4) forced to withdraw or diminish contacts with the State to avoid antagonism, (5) co-opted by state and (6) openly opposed to a single party.

The NGOs had the expectation that since the Parliament was multiparty, then there would have been a broad freedom for MPs to speak their minds freely without intimidation from the government or their parties. But one of the NGO team members who were in Dodoma summed up this scenario well when he said: “It is easy to note that a “multiparty dictatorship” can be worse than a “Single party rule”. While contacting MPs and party-swingers for lobbying against the Bill, activists in Dodoma were expressly told that any motion that will be moved by the opposition

regardless of its sensitiveness and importance to the Tanzanian society shall be opposed by the ruling-party (CCM) MPs, simply because it has come from the opposition!

The campaign by the NGOs did not go as smoothly as the NGOs would have liked, because there was an internal leakage of information on the confidential strategies towards the government (very difficult to establish who the double agents among the team were). During the single party era and cold war days, there was a believe that state agents were in every sector of the society including worshipping houses to monitor those who were against the government. During the multiparty era, this was not very common. But it is still widely believed that the state continues to infiltrate its agents into the sensitive areas especially among groups that are obvious anti-government.

Other obstacle that they came across was the vested interests of some people, among NGO leaders, waiting on the wings to be offered top posts in the new structure proposed by the Bill. They thus hindered and distorted the process with their opportunistic expectations. Right from the early stages of the NGO policy process, there were some NGOs leaders who would always be careful with what they did and said, in order not to upset the government, because they wanted to be seen as the good guys. They behaved this way because they wanted to be seen by the government as good partners and possibly to be offered some posts when the Act come into force.

Regardless of the stiff opposition which came from every direction, NGOs were able to exert enough pressure on the Parliament and the Bill was withdrawn and written afresh within 24 hours. The new Bill accommodated some of the NGOs demands. There were a good number of provisions that were amended or deleted. Box No. 2 below shows the provisions which were

amended or deleted.

Box No. 2: NGO Act Bill 2002-Provisions Deleted or Amended

- The Definition of Public interest did not feature in the Bill. It was proposed to include it so as avoid the discretionary powers vested in the authority to define “Public interest”. The definition was included in the Bill in S.2.
- The introduction of an expiry date for the Certificate of Registration and the renewal of the certificate. S.15 and 18 of the first Bill. The provisions were deleted and there is now no expiry date for or renewal of a certificate of registration.
- The Temporary Registration as it was reflected under S.26 of the first Bill. The provision was deleted and there is now no Temporary Registration. The only condition that was added was to present a Certificate of registration to the Public Officer in the areas of operation.
- Penalties imposed on the defaulters in S.44 of the first Bill. Among the penalties was a ban on defaulter to stop them engaging in all NGO’s activity for life. This provision was amended to five years. The provision for a fine of 500,000 TShs was retained.
- The Application for registration in S.44 of the first Bill. The period of six months for application of registration was amended to a period of 3 months in S.12 and 13 of the Bill.
- The Recognition of other NGOs registered under other laws. The previous Bill was silent on the existing status and laws that were mandated to register NGOs. The amended Bill recognized other laws to register NGOs in S.11 of the Act.
- The Number of the Council. Formerly the Bill did not specify the exact number of members of the Council. In the new Act the number is specified in S. 25.
- Other conditions which were deleted include:
 - (i) Payment of fees to the existing NGOs when applying for registration.
 - (ii) Allowing fundraising in S.39 of the previous Bill.

Source: TANGO file titled ‘Documentation of NGO Act Campaign in Dodoma (2002-2003)’

After the adoption of the Bill which became the NGO Act of 2002; NGOs continued with their struggle by exerting pressure on the government. This pressure led to the amendment of the Act after two and half years of being in force. On Friday 10th June 2005, the government under the

Certificate of Urgency tabled the first, second and third reading of the amendment Bill to the NGO Act 2002. The NGOs were satisfied that most of the amendments were good simply because the government took on board their recommendations.

Regardless of the above achievements; the big problem that the NGOs noted was the fact that NGOs were at last excluded from the process. There was no single NGO that was given the opportunity to participate in the public hearing stages of these amendments. MPs from the opposition parties tried to object about the way the government tabled the amendment without consulting NGOs. One of them Mtungirehi said:

Honourable Speaker, it should borne in mind that the amendments of this Act; (NGOs Act of 2002) are being tabled under the Certificate of Emergency, but NGOs were not given a chance to air their views. That being the case, I recommend the Bill to be withdrawn, until NGOs have being given time to input. There is no need to rush these amendments. (Sunday News, 20 June 2005).

The Parliament disregarded the objection, and went on to discuss and pass it. The NGOs tried to raise their concerns about the amendments to the Act without consultation, through the Director of NGOs, Marcel Katemba, who wrote an email to the NGO Act Core Group which stated:

It is not true that the NGO Act amendments were tabled under the certificate of urgency. We thought that even before writing this e-mail you could have consulted me as a priority. As we're all aware or not, it was not possible to submit amendments of the NGO Act as a single bill. The only alternative was to table it through written laws amendments. This is what

happened. Let all be informed that the amendments made so far were not wholly but partly that could be accommodated under the written laws amendments which covered about 17 laws. All the 17 laws that was amended, neither had a public hearing because were just minor amendments. Nevertheless, I would like the NGOs to know that not all proposals made by them could be wholly taken on board. The process goes through the Cabinet Ministers, the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs and finally the Parliament. All these parties often give their comments of which some are positive and negatives. However, finally the consensus is reached. We believe, the 2nd NGO Act amendment will be taken as single bill and therefore NGOs will have opportunity to participate fully. By and large, the amendment made so far are beneficial to the NGO sector. But since the attitude has been fear and lack of trust on whatever the government does even if it is good, then you have a right to question it. The issue here is that you often don't like to see me, due to reasons best known to yourself. Please, my office is open and you're all welcome for further discussion...Remember that we are partners in development (Katemba, 15 June 2005).

The words 'we are partners,' as used by Katemba, are in most cases used by government actors when they try to justify any action which NGOs are not satisfied with. However, the main partners in any development initiative are supposed to be the people. At this point, I agree with the warning given by Chachage (2003) to those who celebrate the innovation of NGOs by thinking that they are saviours because there is no difference between NGOs and the government. Chachage accuses both governments and NGOs that they spend most of their time in five star hotels and board rooms discussing poverty and the poor instead of being where the poor are; and working together, with them, to solve their problems.

Having read the response from Katemba, one member of NGO Core Group, Mary Rusimbi, proposed a meeting aimed at protesting at the way in which the Act was amended without the full participation of the NGOs. The meeting was expected to have two main objectives: (i) sharing information on the content of the amendments, with participants and via media, to the public; and (ii) taking a stand on the exclusionary way in which the government and the MPs have acted (Rusimbi, through an email of 16 June 2005).

Harold Sungusia, lawyer by profession, instead of listening to what other NGOs were suggesting; seemed to be convinced by Katemba on partnership and he went on to suggest that there was no need to organize a meeting. Thus, on 16 June, he wrote an email to the TANGO, the NGO Core Group Coordinator in which, among other things he sided with the Katemba position:

As I said in my previous e-mail, the amendments that I have read seem to me to be very good, but the only concern I did pose (which is now ironed out) was on the way they were presented in the Parliament. Having talked to the Director, Katemba, I now know as to why that process was invoked, I now don't have any question on the process. Now therefore, we should not be troubled about the process but we should concentrate on the content (for which I will certainly congratulate Mr Katemba for having the law amended). We should now make arrangements for informing the rest of our partners as to what has been amended. I think you will promptly respond (Sungusia, 16/June/2005).

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter has largely focused on how the NGOs defended their existence. All the efforts which NGOs put to the NGO Policy and Act process were fuelled by the fact that their existence was threatened. In the whole case of this engagement, there is no single piece of analysis drafted by NGOs to show how people will be affected by the NGO Act. Saying this does not mean that such a restrictive law would not have a negative impact on people, but rather is to try to question the motives of the NGOs. In chapter seven, I turn my attention to the real essence of the NGOs establishment; that is fighting and defending people against the policies which rescue the people from impoverishment.

Chapter Seven

The Poverty Campaign (Ondoa Umaskini Campaign) and the Impoverishment Agenda

7.0 Introduction

Chapter six focused on the NGOs struggle to safeguard their existence and their place in the governance structure of the country. To recap, in chapter six, we have seen how NGOs for almost nine years, non-stop, put pressure on the government to make the NGO policy and Act that does not restrict how NGOs operate. An analysis shows that the government had in mind what kind of NGOs she wanted to see operating in the country. On the other hand, NGOs had their version, however they were very careful not to upset the government. In this chapter, I will focus on NGOs' practices in terms of fighting for peoples' well-being through poverty monitoring and campaigns. I have decided to look into poverty campaigns because many advocacy NGOs in the country, are engaged in poverty monitoring. And the second reason is that poverty alleviation has been the main preoccupation of the government since the beginning of the 21st century. The main focus of this chapter will be on the Global Call Against Poverty-Tanzania (GCAP-T) Campaign, or in Kiswahili, *Ondoa Umaskini Campaign* under the leadership of the Tanzanian Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO). The campaign emanated from two main poverty strategy initiatives: (i) the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (NSGPR), popularly known in Kiswahili as *Mkakati wa Kukukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini (MKUKUTA)*, henceforth, by the Tanzanian government, and (ii) the Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The data in this section was acquired through in-depth-interview, review of documented reports, participant observations, telephone calls and email correspondence. In chapter two I discussed in detail how each of these was done.

The chapter has three main sections. Section one deals with the shift from the development agenda to poverty eradication. It is argued that before the introduction of the poverty eradication agenda, the development agenda was the main agenda, since the country received her independence in 1961 to the late 1980s. Starting from the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) through the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and later the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) programmes forced developing nations to refocus their attention on poverty reduction which was less people-based and developmental. Section two, concentrates on the involvement of NGOs in poverty monitoring. Section three highlights the GCAP-T campaign under TANGO's captainship. It is argued that the campaign has missed the main ingredient which is the involvement of the people.

This chapter answers research questions two, three and five that is: why NGOs in Tanzania do not seem to have managed to become catalysts for people to engage the government? Is advocacy and activism by NGOs based on community and people's struggle? And, do NGOs behave differently when they engage in advocacy to defend their interest and that of the people?

In reviewing the GCAP-T campaign, I have adopt Chapman & Fisher's (2000) proposition where they argue that with the increase of NGOs in the policy analysis and influence arena; they need to understand the policy processes and how to intervene in them effectively. This is done by asking

themselves the following questions: (i) Effectiveness: how can NGOs effectively campaign in policy arenas? (ii) Impact: what difference does such campaigning make, especially for those on whose behalf NGOs seek to campaign? (iii) Relevance: is the campaigning relevant to the poor? (iv) Assessment: how can NGOs assess whether this work is effective and making an impact?

7.1 The Shift from the Development Agenda to the Poverty Eradication Agenda

After the Second World War, development of third world countries was the main concern of the international community (Nyerere, 1967; South Commission, 1991). Many programmes were established which aimed at assisting these nations to move from a low level of development to a level where every citizen is assured of availability and affordability of all important social and economic services. Among institutions participating in this initiative were the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), which are the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

With the economic crisis of the 1970s, the world witnessed the IMF and WB turning themselves into the economic policy makers for developing countries, hence, replacing the role of the national state (Hancock, 2006). This was because these countries needed to borrow money from the IFIs to revive their economies. In the late 1970s to the mid 1980s, the WB and the IMF forced many developing countries to implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as a main condition of accessing grants and loans from them and from other western nations (donors) (South Commission, 1991; Mbilinyi, 2003). Some of these conditions were: privatisation of public companies, introduction of user fees in social services like health and education; good

governance; and widening the room for freedom of civil society. By the end of 1980s, SAPs proved to be a big failure. Many countries ended up having more debts which they could not service. Having seen SAPs fail, both the IMF and WB invented poverty eradication projects. They argued that since poverty in most of the developing countries was severe, the best way to address it was with poverty eradication programmes (WB, 2000). They argued that the development agenda was too broad, so by narrowing the focus down to poverty eradication it would make the work easier. Stewart and Wang (2003) see this as manipulative because while the WB and IMF claim PRSP would empower poor nations and disempower the former; they believe the opposite is true.

The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network((SAPRIN),2002) argues because of the severity of the SAPs and massive debts, NGOs and civil societies, at national and international level, exerted pressure on these IFIs to cancel all the debts of the developing countries because they were unserviceable, acquired illegally, and were against human rights. After long and sustained pressure, the IMF and WB accepted the change of approach. However, instead of accepting the cancellation of debts, they did it in a tactical way by coming up with an initiative popular known as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). HIPC required poor countries, most of them in Africa, that the best way to service the debts, owned by their international creditors, is not to cancel them, instead, debt relief is the sustainable and responsible way. For a country to qualify for debt relief, it must prepare a strategy paper which shows how they will use the money given for debt relief. This paper was known as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). From the outset, phased debt relief sounded attractive and promising. However, the debt relief was not that straight forward. This is because HIPC came with a lot of

conditions. These included the liberation of economies, and the introduction of user fees in social services such as education and health. The money accrued from the debt relief was supposed to be spent on social services (health, education and water) and other production sectors like transport which might stimulate the economy, and governance (URT, 2000).

Tanzania, after she had qualified for HIPC in 1999, prepared her PRSP and by the first quarter of 2000 it was ready. One of the conditions before the country started to implement its PRSP is that it must be approved by both the IMF and WB. In the case of Tanzania, her PRSP was approved in April 2000 and it officially became the main policy strategy for poverty alleviation in the country (URT, 2001b). Because of the severity of poverty, the country could not tackle all its poverty problems at once. Instead, it chose seven strategic areas to stimulate the economy and to improve peoples' lives. These areas included: agriculture, health, education, water, governance, infrastructure (roads) and crosscutting issues which included environment, gender and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) (URT, 2000).

The Tanzania Social and Economic Trust (TASOET) (2000) concludes that during the PRSP formulation process, the NGOs and other non-state actors had very limited chance to participate and input to the process. This was not a surprise because, after all, this was not a government agenda, except that the PRSP was seen as a begging bowl in order to manage to continue to survive (Stewart and Wang 2003). On their side, NGOs prepared a position paper and submitted it to the government. However, most of their recommendations were not taken on board (TASOET, 2000). This should not be seen as something unusual because the idea of involving NGOs in the preparation of PRSP was that of the WB and IMF. 'This involvement did not go any further than a

mere consultation' (interview, Rebecca Muna, 20/4/2008). In chapter one, on the theoretical framework, I discussed in details why the WB and IMF, donors and other development agencies have focussed their attention on NGOs. One reason is because they want to maintain the status quo; hence focusing on NGOs is one of the ways they can use to diffuse resistance from the people. It is easier to mould the NGOs way of thinking than to handle the mass of the people.

During 1999 when the PRSP was prepared, the government organised zonal workshops which involved different stakeholders among whom were civic groups but mainly NGOs. The process of preparing the PRSP was hurried and it was undertaken by too few officials in the government (Bagile, interview, 27/02/2008). Even the Parliament was not well informed and during its implementation most MPs and other politicians kept complaining that they did not know much about the PRSP and how it was being implemented. The lack of information for Members of Parliament (MPs) did not come as a surprise because there are many programmes which the government initiates and implements without getting the consent of the legislature or even informing them. So long as donors want them to be done, government do not bother to get the consent of its citizens and the legislature. Later in the chapter, we will see how MPs admit that they are rubber stamps to government programmes.

During the implementation of PRSP, a series of awareness raising workshops were organised for MPs, politicians, civil servants and NGOs. The first four years of PRSP were used mainly in discourses and discussions about the strategy rather than the actual implementation of the strategy itself. Within the NGOs there was a joke that the PRSP was a poverty eradication strategy for a few governments and the NGO actors who had access to PRSP resources. Rebecca Muna is a

good witness of this. In an interview she explained:

When I was the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) Coordinator, I used to receive at least two letters every week inviting my organisation to attend workshops related to PRSP. And in most cases in these workshops you would not hear anything new, except things around the how and why of PRSP. It was rare to come across workshop strategising on how PRSP could be implemented effectively. (Interview, Muna, 20/4/2008).

While the country was implementing the PRSP, the MDGs were adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 2002 under the Millennium Development Declaration (MDD) (UN, 2002). The declaration requires each country that is a signatory to take concrete steps towards the realization of the eight MDGs by the year 2015. Unlike many other global commitments signed under the UN, the MDGs recognize the importance of collective responsibility of the different actors in meeting the targets set in the MDGs. The eight Millennium Development Goals are: (1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) to achieve universal primary education, (3) to promote gender equality and empower women, (4) to reduce child mortality, 5) to improve maternal health, (6) to combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases, (7) to ensure environmental sustainability and (8) to develop a global partnership for development (UN, 2002).

The Tanzanian government decided these goals will be streamlined in the PRSP/MKUKUTA. That means once the MKUKUTA target has been achieved, then automatically the MDGs will be achieved. This is possible because most of the MKUKUTA targets are higher than those of MDGs

(URT, 2005). My own experience with hundreds of NGOs in Tanzania, is that they question why the WB and IMF on one side, and UNDP on the other, both being international institutions, have come up with separate initiatives when their outcomes are similar. This compelled Mbilinyi (2003) to conclude that, the WB, IMF, and UNDP confuse developing countries, while time and resources to implement these initiatives are limited.

7.2 Monitoring the PRSP

After the PRSP was approved, the government came up with the programme for monitoring its implementation. The government acknowledged that it was the first time they have bothered to monitor the implementation of its poverty or development programmes. To monitor the poverty implementation, the government set up structures and machinery for this endeavour (URT, 2001). It included different actors, but as it is with many initiatives in these days of good governance, NGOs were one of the main actors invited to be part of the initiative. The main monitoring tool was known as the Poverty Monitoring System (PMS). This mechanism was still in place when this thesis was being written. The Poverty Monitoring System is the vehicle that keeps the PRSP 'alive'. The PMS developed four working groups which were assigned different aspects of monitoring (URT, 2001). While the Poverty Monitoring Committee had responsibility for giving general guidance to the system; there were four technical working groups that did the substantive work on putting the system in place. These technical groups were: survey and census, routine data, research and analysis and dissemination and sensitization (URT, 2001b).

The major concerns that led to the establishment of the comprehensive poverty monitoring

systems, according to URT (2001b), were that by that time in 2001 firstly, there was lack of information and clear understanding of the extent, the cause and changes in poverty in Tanzania. Secondly, although different institutions and agencies undertook poverty-related research and analysis, the approach remained ad-hoc and disjointed. This state of affairs led to a situation where data and information were not comparable and where there were gaps in data collection, thus making monitoring and evaluation difficult. Thirdly, there was no clear and well-understood institutional framework for poverty monitoring (Ibid, 2001b).

TANGO and other national NGOs were invited by the government to participate in the PMS by being members of both the Steering Committee and the Technical Groups. The NGOs which participated in the Committee were: the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), the Baraza la Waislamu Tanzania/Tanzania Muslim Council (BAKWATA), the Church Council of Tanzania (CCT) and the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) and the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) (TANGO, nd.). The committee was under the Vice President's Office (VPO) and was chaired by the Permanent Secretary in the VPO. After the 2005 General Elections, the poverty matters were shifted from the Vice President's Office to the President's Office. The Committee was comprised of many important stakeholders in Tanzania. These were 13 Permanent Secretaries of key ministries, representatives from NGOs, religious organisations, UN organisations, international NGOs, private sector, international development agencies and universities. The monitoring had to ensure the generation, analysis, storage and dissemination of the necessary information required to track trends in poverty against benchmarks set out in the poverty PRSP (URT, 2001b). Currently, the composition of the committee has changed a bit but it continues to comprise key poverty stakeholder like: donors, NGOs, academia (universities) and

religious institutions.

NGOs developed strategies for effective representation and participation in the Poverty Monitoring System. This ensured that the agenda of the Poverty Monitoring System is drawn from different perspectives, and therefore enjoys broad national ownership. In order to achieve the maximum effect of the NGOs engagement in the Poverty Monitoring System they decided to use two processes namely: government based monitoring and independent monitoring. The main objective of monitoring poverty is to see if the government do what it promised to do (TCDD, 2001). And in so doing, they do advocacy around forcing the government to do what they promised to do. NGO poverty monitoring would be considered as the duplicate of what the government was doing. And, more importantly, still some people would question its impact. The interest and focus of this chapter is the independent monitoring by NGOs.

7.2.1 The Involvement of NGOs and the Rhetoric of Partnership

The involvement of actors from outside the government in the poverty monitoring is based on the philosophy of partnership which has been around as long as poverty eradication was invented by the IMF, WB, UN and other international development agencies. The World Bank (2002) argues that the persistence of poverty in the developing countries is partly caused by the lack of government involvement in NGOs, civil society groups and the business community in planning and implementing poverty and other major economic plans. By the end of the 1970s with the advent of globalisation, they invited NGOs as part of the civil society to enter into partnership with the governments on peoples' behalf. Gramsci saw this tactic, in 1938, when he wrote in

Prison Notes especially when he talks about civil society and hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). In chapter one, I was able to explore in detail on why the WB, IMF and States are working more in partnership with NGOs. Gramsci (1971) says that the state always tries to win public support through civil society institutions and elites. To me the philosophy of partnership is biased and ill intentioned because it leaves out the keys partners and pioneers of development who are the people themselves.

For ages, with or without governments and donors; the people of developing countries have been devising different ways of development, but on many occasions when these strategies are better; governments have intervened by suppressing them (Maghimbi, 2004). This omission has concerned many writers and they insist that in order for poverty to go away and to be able to sustain developments; the people must be in the driving seat (Mshana, 1992; Mamdani, 2006). The case of the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA) in Tanzania and the way the government suppressed it, is a good example. The people of the Ruvuma Region in Tanzania established this association in 1960 and it became very successful in raising the standard of life of the villages which were participating in this initiative. When the government saw that the association was becoming powerful it disbanded it (Coulson, 1982; Maghimbi, 2004).

Many reports on poverty produced by NGOs, research institutions or even university researchers, tend to express concern over the lack of participation and involvement of NGOs, but do not mention the people or even peoples' representatives such as parliamentarians. Concerns about NGO's participation are much louder because the WB, IMF, UNDP and other donors want them to be part and parcel of these processes. When donors demand the involvement of NGOs in these

initiatives it is not that they really want NGOs to be in, rather through NGOs they are able to influence the processes. Many donors have programmes and the intention of being part of the poverty strategy and other programmes in the country. So, when donors give money to NGOs, they are using them to implement their own projects. Pius Makomelelo (interview, 4/4/2008) of HakiElimu during interview said:

Many NGOs are the implementing agents of donor projects-they do not bother even to ask themselves whether that has a positive or negative impact and image. What matters is for NGOs to be seen as implementing programmes/projects and are speaking the language and jargon of the donors especially those related to poverty eradication.

The government perspective on the role of NGOs and civil society in the implementation of poverty strategies says:

The civil society organisations/NGOs are key actors in poverty reduction. Their roles and responsibilities will include: building local capacity and empowering communities; participating in monitoring and evaluation at national and community level; mobilizing and enhancing community participation and mobilizing community resources for poverty reduction. NGOs will advocate for accountability of its members and the Government to the people (URT, 2005, p 57).

This raises a concern that such a serious key government policy guideline explicitly ascribes responsibilities to NGOs, but it does not give such a comprehensive role to communities and

people who are the primary beneficiaries of government programmes.

7.2 2 The Independent Civil Society Monitoring Process

With the adoption of PRSP, the government-NGO partnership was extended to the Monitoring Poverty Strategies. The WB and IMF put it clearly that governments must allow NGOs and civil society participation in monitoring and implementation of the PRSP (WB, 2001). Besides participating in the government led Poverty Monitoring System; NGOs came up with its own independent monitoring. In the early days of PRSP, NGOs charged the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) to lead them in poverty monitoring. They chose TCDD because by then it was the only organisation/coalition that had campaigned nationally and internationally for the debt cancellation.

The TCDD in collaboration with other NGOs including TANGO, developed strategies and systems to monitor poverty and the PRSP, independently from the institutional framework established by the Poverty Monitoring System. This process aimed to feed alternative thinking and perspectives to the Poverty Monitoring System, complementing and triangulating its data and information (TCDD, 2002). The independent monitoring aimed to feedback the official monitoring by the government. Right from the beginning, NGOs agreed they would participate in the monitoring of the PRSP both independently and also participate with government structures. But they made it clear that it is not easy to set clear boundaries between the two processes because they are intertwined. To achieve serious impact both must go together (TCDD, 2002).

Documents available at the TANGO office show that the idea and initiative to form TCDD was conceived by TANGO in 1995. By then national debt was mounting and NGOs felt they needed to intervene instead of leaving everything in the hands of the government. Besides, the government had no intention of forcing international creditors to cancel her debt (TANGO, 1995). In its meeting which was held in Dar Es Salaam; TANGO members decided that TANGO had a lot on its plate and had no more capacity to include such a big programme in its normal programmes. So, it was proposed that a better way to go about it would be to have a new strategy of forming an independent NGO coalition that would put pressure on international creditors to cancel their debts. Hence, they formed the TCDD to solely work on debt issues. By then the main concern was debt. Third World countries were heavily indebted to the WB, IMF and other Western Countries. Two strong arguments were put forward by NGOs why the debt had to be cancelled. First, indebted countries had no ability to service their debt, and if they did so, it will be at the expenses of their citizens. Second, these debts were illegal. They are illegal because of two reasons. One, they were acquired by corrupt leaders and were not spent on serving people, instead a big chunk of money was swindled by these leaders. Second, a good amount of the money was spent by creditor countries to pay for services like consultancies which were of a high price (TCDD, 2002). Shivji (2006) says consultancies gobbles up billions of dollars annually. He continues to cite Action Aid when he says:

Almost one fifth of total aid goes to pay consultants and so called technical consultants. Donors employ 100,000 experts in Africa. Tanzania paid US\$ 500 million annually to foreign consultants, more than three times it received annually in direct foreign investment between 1994 and 1999 (Shivji, 2006. p. 26).

During my field work the same concern was raised. Rebecca Muna, former TCDD Coordinator, in interview explained:

IMF, WB and donors knew how corrupt these leaders were and knew the money would not be spent to benefit the people but they went on to give them the money. So if they tell countries to service their debt they are punishing the people for the mistakes of others (Interview, (20/4/2008)).

The TCDD decided that independent monitoring would be done at national and district levels. At national level there was the Macro Group comprising of 10 NGOs of which TANGO was one. The main role of the Macro Group was to oversee the monitoring. The actual monitoring was done at the district level. NGOs were monitoring the expenditure of the district social services. Monitoring started with 38 districts out of the 120 that are in the country. It was planned in the second phase that another 38 districts will be included. In the final phase the remaining 44 districts will be monitored. The NGOs based in the respective districts were the ones carrying out the monitoring. NGOs opted for a phased system in order to go hand in hand with the Local Government Reform which was happening in each district. However, until the PRSP came to the end of its first phase in 2004; monitoring did not go beyond the first 38 districts (TCDD, 2004).

Mussa Billegeya⁷, the GCAP-T Coordinator, was of the opinion that the importance of monitoring the PRSP by the NGOs was that they managed to provide input which the government and NGOs admitted helped them broaden their perspective of issues and understanding of poverty especially

⁷ Initially, Ngunga Tepani was the Coordinator but later Mussa Billegeya replaced him.

the strategy to reduce it. Mussa asserts, “one vivid impact is that the government is now listening more to the NGOs and civil society than it used to , although much is still to be done to reach the desired state” (Interview, 03/03/2008). Through observation and interview, I was able to arrive at the conclusion that one major drawback in the monitoring was the capacity of NGOs to understand and analyse the policy issues at stake and engage in the PRSP and MKUKUTA process.

The PRSP was a four year programme; after which it was subject to review. The government reviewed the PRSP in 2004. After which the involvement of NGOs with poverty strategies became more efficient and systematic. During the review process the government set aside some funds for NGOs to access and use to solicit ideas and opinions from people they worked and spoke for (URT, 2004). TANGO was one of the NGOs that received funding to organise workshops for NGOs throughout the country.

This time the review produced a comprehensive and well articulated strategy compared to the previous one (URT, 2005). The strategy came up with three major clusters of outcomes for achieving poverty reduction. These clusters were: (i) growth and reduction of income poverty, (ii) improvement of quality of life and social well-being and (iii) good governance (URT, 2005). Nearly everybody I interviewed admitted that MKUKUTA was more people friendly and accommodated the demands made by NGOs compared to those of the PRSP. In the initial stages of preparation, governance and accountability were not one of the main clusters but due to persistent pressure from NGOs, eventually the government bowed to the demands of NGOs. However, NGOs are sceptical of the willingness and ability of the government to implement all

these. NGOs say that the Tanzanian government is good in producing nice policy documents but when it comes to implementation, they do not do much and when it is done, they aim at luring voters instead of seeing it as its commitment to development. They went as far as saying it is not appropriate for the nation to focus on poverty alleviations because that is too narrow and instead it should focus on the development agenda which is more broad and comprehensive. In an email of September 14, 2009, to me from Jimmy Luende of the Mwanza NGOs Network (MNN) stated that:

People have their own MKUKUTA, even if they are not documented and written in technical jargons that is why they are not interested in the government's one. People do not need MKUKUTA; this is one of the monsters of the WB, IMF and donors. Lets us leave them to President Kikwete (President of Tanzania) and his colleagues. Even the President himself does not believe in MKUKUTA, because although he keeps telling the nation, MKUKUTA is a blue print of national plans, but the government has been coming up with new development programmes which do not have any relationship with MKUKUTA or even goes against MKUKUTA. When you see such things happen, you should know either MKUKUTA has failed or it is a non start project.

7.3 TANGO and the Poverty Campaign

One of the main engagements of TANGO and NGOs in the 2000s has been the monitoring of poverty eradication strategies, implemented by the government. Serious and systematic engagement of monitoring poverty by TANGO started in 2005. And to date it is the leading

Poverty Campaigner in the country. The involvement of TANGO in monitoring poverty falls under its advocacy and activism programme and is guided by its mission which is to increase the qualitative and quantitative contribution of the NGO sector in Tanzania and to promote the growth of the sector and civil society through mandated representation and advocacy on common issues (TANGO, 2000; TANGO, 2003b). Since the Tanzanian Government adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2000; TANGO has been actively participating in monitoring the implementation of the PRSP/MKUKUTA and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As we saw in the proceeding section initially it was doing it under the leadership of the TCDD.

After the adoption of MKUKUTA in 2005, TANGO prepared a comprehensive plan of engaging the government to make sure MKUKUTA delivers its promises. This plan is informed by the TANGO 2006-2009 Strategic Plan where it states that advocating for just economic arrangements is one of its focuses (TANGO, 2005). The plan shows that the MKUKUTA monitoring was to be the normal programme for the TANGO three year strategic plans. Mary Mwingira (Interview, 11/02/2008), the TANGO Executive Director, explained to me how while TANGO was still looking for money to implement TANGO's plan, she attended the Civicus Assembly in Botswana in March 2005, where she heard, Salil Shetty, the United Nations (UN) MDGs Campaign Executive Director share with the delegates about the UN led MDGs Campaign. Afterwards, Shetty expressed to Mwingira his interest in visiting Tanzania to discuss with NGOs how to carry out the MDGs campaign in the country. Immediately after the Botswana meeting, Salil flew to Dar es Salaam and met some NGOs, mostly those who had attended CIVICUS meeting. Those who attended this brain storming meeting with Shetty were TANGO, Policy Forum (PF), Save the Children, Youth Employment and Food Production Foundation (YEFOFO) of Dodoma, Same

Association of NGOs (SANGO), United Nations Association of Tanzania (UNA-TZ) and Centre for Human Rights Promotion (CHRP) (TANGO, 2004c).

Up to this time, MDGs were not very well known or popular within NGO circles although they had been adopted by the UN since 2001. Salil stressed it was an opportunity that the NGOs should seize in order to push for development of the country. Participants understood that the campaign is an opportunity to push the poverty eradication agenda to a meaningful and effective status since many countries and global institutions have signed it (TANGO, 2004c). Although, initially the intention of TANGO was to focus on MKUKUTA which is an internal and national initiative, with the promise of money from the UN, it then slowly started to disown its own agenda and was prepared to focus on this agenda originating from outside. A scenario like this makes me agree with Shivji, (2003) that NGOs are baby sitters of neo-liberal ideology which partly is disseminated in the poor countries through aid, grants and socio-economic political policy prescriptions.

NGOs did not question a campaign that was an initiative of and led by UNDP but whose implementers were NGOs and civil society. This is enough to make one conclude that the campaign is not the NGOs agenda, but an UNDP one. To implement other people's idea is very challenging and it is like implementing their programmes instead of the implementing organisations. This agrees with observation by Pius Makomelelo (Interview, 20/02/2008) who told me that NGOs are implementers of donor projects. During the interview with Mary, she also explained that during the visit of Shetty to Tanzania; NGOs learnt that, the UN had organised meetings for NGOs from Eastern Africa in Maputo, Mozambique earlier that year, and Warren

Nyamugasira of African Women`s Economic Policy Network (AWEPON) of Uganda was appointed to coordinate East Africa civil society in the campaign. Tanzania NGOs had no representative in the Maputo meeting.

A few days after Shetty had met NGOs in Dar es Salaam; Nyamugasira visited Tanzania in mid April 2004. The objective of his visit was to introduce himself and discuss how the country wide campaign will be implemented. He met with a few NGOs who formed the initial team members for the MDG`s Campaign. Because NGOs had not much knowledge of the MDGs; Nyamugasira used a lot of time to educate the meeting about the ABCs of MDGs. The NGOs appreciated that the idea of a campaign was good and agreed that the campaign should be very broad. NGOs would use the MDGs as an opportunity to make both the government and donors accountable. In the same meeting, Nyamugasira reported that Oxfam Great Britain (GB), Oxfam Ireland and NOVIB of Netherlands have international MDGs campaign in 10 countries, Tanzania included. They were mainly focusing on MDG eight and were willing to join force with local NGOs (TANGO, 2004d). Later, Oxfam GB became a central pillar of the campaign in the country. They had an important role in the Campaign. Oxfam and other international NGOs came to play a central role in the campaign especially in deciding the agenda and direction.

The plan of these initial consultations, was the conduct of a national consultative workshop, which was held on 28th-29th June 2004 in Dar es Salaam (TANGO, 2004e). During the workshop, NGOs came together and started a joint campaign that would, among other things, hold the government and other decision makers accountable for the implementation of the MDGs in Tanzania. The objective of the consultative meeting was to enhance NGOs awareness of the MDGs Campaign

and its origin and value in promoting a human rights based developmental approach. Specifically the objectives were to: (i) clarify the difference between the MDGs general monitoring process and the campaign focus, so as to enable participants to understand the importance of the Global Campaign; (ii) to share on what is already going on regarding MDGs implementation and status; (iii) to discuss and agree on how to carry out the campaign in Tanzania and the role of various stakeholders especially NGOs and other NGOs in the MDGs Campaign and to agree on common priorities for the joint campaign (TANGO, 2004e).

A close look at the way things went in the early days of the campaign convinced me that the TANGO poverty monitoring agenda got hijacked by donors and external financiers. This may have happened without them realising it or they knew and decided to let things happen in that way because they needed the money to keep the organisation running. I will come to this later when discussing the role of donors in the campaign.

Before the campaign implementation began, the NGOs underwent a vision setting process to decide what the campaign wanted to achieve. The reason behind this process was that without a clear vision in the whole team, the campaign was thought to not achieve very much (Interview, Ngunga Tepani, 20/03/2008). During the vision setting meeting it was decided that the MDGs and MKUKUTA monitoring should be united to make it just one campaign (TANGO, 2004f). Because TANGO could not get money to implement MKUKUTA monitoring; it started to change its language and MDGs became more prominent than MKUKUTA. This shift came about because donors were more interested in MDGs than MKUKUTA. The NSGPR (MKUKUTA) pledged to mainstream MDGs in social services including education, children, environment, human

settlements and peace and security (URT, 2005). The campaign activities should ultimately translate into benefits for the poor. The main challenge the campaign had to solve in its early days was how to make it a Tanzanian campaign and not an UN one. In a meeting organised to discuss the vision for the campaign, the coalition decided this would be a national campaign instead of being part of global forum (TANGO, 2004f). During my field work, I learnt that this wish did not come to pass because the campaign continued to receive instructions and plans from financiers of the campaign and activities were aligned with those taking place in other countries participating in the GCAP worldwide. Although it was a poverty campaign, it was agreed that it was important for the campaign to ask questions about commitment to fighting poverty in Tanzania by using MDGs and MKUKUTA because they provide a window for holding leaders accountable (TANGO, 2004f).

The question which kept coming up during the field work, especially from those NGOs that were not in the Steering Committee, was “whose agenda was it?” TANGO planned that this would be a national campaign and it had nothing to do with the Global Campaign Against Poverty (GCAP). But slowly it found itself more and more identifying with the GCAP. The campaign was misguided in that it was nationally originated. But in its actual implementation, the trend appears to have followed the international demands, needs and assumptions. The campaign implemented all the activities which were identified at the international level by GCAP.

Based on the eight MDGs goals, the Campaign prepared demands for each goal (see appendix 2, for the comprehensive elaboration of the demand/s on each goal), which they wanted the government and donors to implement and work on (TANGO, 2004g p.4-9). However the main

focus of the campaign was on five areas which touch on every goal: (i) food security and environment (ii) provision of quality education services (iii) abolish health user fees and improve health services (iv) cancellation of all odious debts (v) good governance and accountability.

Food Security and Environment: constraints for the country to achieve food security include low productivity of land, labour and production inputs; inadequate, underdeveloped irrigation potential; limited capital and access to financial services; and inadequate agricultural technical services. The campaign demanded that information on food reserves is made more readily available and streamlined in relevant ministries and institutions to avert incidences of death due to hunger. Better management of food resources and its subsequent mobilization. As a long-term measure; the government to establish, maintain and expand food production through irrigation projects/schemes supported by a well-motivated farm / field extension workforce. Also the government should empower farmers to increase food productivity; processing and storage/preservation. Also, the campaign demanded the participation of NGOs and other civic groups in preparing agriculture policies and programmes. By focusing on these two areas goals 1 and 7 will be met respectively.

Provision of Quality Education Services: while goal three of the MDGs ends only at providing education to both boys and girls alike on equal terms, the focus of the Campaign on this area went beyond primary education to secondary education. However, the emphasis was on the provision of quality education, rather than simply education based on quantity and statistics i.e. how many children complete primary education. The campaign further demanded for quality education by increasing the number of teachers and improvement of their welfare and motivation (salary and

working environment), training of the teachers and the availability of working tools.

Abolish health user fees and improve health services: by concentrating on improving health services, the group had the Campaign thought that goals 4, 5 and 6 will be adequately met. The abolishing of user fees would have a great impact in improving the health status of the Tanzanian people which is characterised with inadequate and below standard health services plus unaffordable user fees.

Good Governance and Accountability: on *Good Governance* the demands were better and fairer use of resources and assuring the participation of the public in the decision making process. For the government to fulfil the promises made in MKUKUTA and the Millennium Declaration to implement and achieve the targets set. The government should also mobilize internal resources especially from the private sector to finance poverty eradication programmes (and thus supplement government budget allocation). And *donors* were asked to fulfil their commitment for development aid; increase resources to required levels and where possible to achieve the MDGs and eradicate poverty. And on Debt and Trade, the chief concern here was total cancellation of all odious debts, the process of debt contracting and ensure fair and equitable terms of International trade and practices.

7.4 Campaign Strategies

Because the main focus of my thesis is to examine and analyse the way Tanzanian NGOs interact with states, hence strategies and mechanisms deployed by NGOs have a lot to say about their

relationship with the state. Strategies are the main components of many NGOs engaged in campaigns all over the world. The strategies the campaigns use to monitor poverty include: coalition building, conducting dialogues with policy makers, organising open meetings and workshops, research and studies. Others include campaigning through engaging media, voters manifesto, and blending/localisation of international strategies and events (TANGO, 2004g). In the following discussions I will go through these strategies which were used to enable the campaign to meet its objectives.

7.4.1 Coalition Building

Coalition building with likeminded organisations/institutions and individuals has been the major strategy that NGOs and social movements worldwide have used in recent years to influence policy change. Coalition building enables NGOs to bring together their efforts with the aim of making their campaign effective and have a wide impact. Chapman and Fisher (2000) are of the opinion that for a campaign to succeed at different levels it needs different skills, strategies, and attitudes which are not easily found in one organisation hence the need of many organisations to join hands together. In the first days of the campaign much discussion and effort was directed into thinking how the campaign could build more effective coalitions of NGOs and even beyond NGOs to include other actors so long as they support the campaign and help achieve its goal. The main thrust was to build a culture and movement of people at community level who would hold leaders (village committees, councillors, MPs, etc) accountable for achieving national development targets stated in MKUKUTA as well as the MDGs (TANGO, 2004f).

The initial plan was for the campaign to involve as many NGOs as possible. There was an intention of involving other groups of society and individual citizens as well. GCAP-T started with 20 NGOs, and by September 2009, there were 80 NGOs which had identified themselves with the campaign. The Campaign's member-organisations included faith based organisations, NGOs, private sector associations and the trade unions. The number of organisations subscribing to the campaign though was small compared to the number of the NGOs in the country. In any campaign, the numbers matter a lot because big numbers help to convince both the public and the government that the cause is a serious one and needs a serious response and action. One reason to explain the poor response of NGOs is that the campaign was not on the agenda of many NGOs, thus, GCAP-T found it very challenging to convince NGOs to join the campaign. GCAP-T had to consider issues such as most NGOs are busy with their own work and to get them to be involved with the campaign would need very good reasons.

During the visioning process the team came up with the campaign/coalition name and mandate. The name of the campaign decided was the Tanzanian Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP-T) or in Kiswahili is "*Kampeni ya Ondoa Umaskini Tanzania*". In this study when I use the word "campaign" I am referring to GCAP-T. The name of a campaign does not usually have any serious implications or make someone think about it twice; but in this case, for the campaign to adopt the name which was designed by the UN Millennium Campaign and was being used worldwide in many countries where the UN campaign was being implemented, raised eye brows. The use of a name adopted from an international initiative was strategic; otherwise it would have been difficult to get money to implement the activities of the campaign. Most of the activities implemented locally were those that had been decided by the GCAP leadership team. Even the

approaches and strategies somehow did not reflect and appreciate local reality and appeals.

The campaign had three main aims: (a) to support the coalition members' advocacy activities related to the focus areas of providing better/quality basic social services such as education and health and the demand for accountability and good governance practices to ensure that the development goals are met and poverty is eradicated, (b) to provide a stronger joint voice for NGOs in the country so that they can lobby for common development issues with the government and other decision-makers, (c) to act in solidarity at sub-regional, regional and global level to ensure poverty is eradicated (TANGO, 2004g).

The policy document was developed in order to guide the campaign activities of the coalition members. TANGO was given the role of acting as a secretariat to the campaign simply because the idea of having a massive intervention on poverty and MKUKUTA implementation came from them (TANGO, 2004g). The coalition members had to subscribe to the campaign's guiding policy related to its target groups. The campaign motto was "No more broken promises, every Tanzanian has the right to better and quality social services". The main target of the campaign was government and decision makers at all levels. The campaign's specific demands focused on three basic social aspects; education, health and governance/accountability (TANGO, 2004g).

GCAP-T formed a steering committee which had the role of overseeing the campaign. Vision and strategic leadership is very important for a campaign to succeed (Shutz, 2003). The steering committee meet from time to time to oversee the campaign. My observation during my field work was that the actual work was being done by TANGO staff. Although, in the documents, the

campaign was known to be run by a coalition of NGOs but people and even participating NGOs saw it as a TANGO programme. Loyce Lema of Envirocare commented on why the situation was like this when she said:

In Tanzania, it has become a fashion to implement some projects under the name of coalition or network. But the reality is that, the use of coalition or network is used to show to the Government that the issue being pursued is a concern of many NGOs and it affects the majority of the population, but at the end of the day it is only one NGO or very few NGOs that have the passion with the issue. Same with the GCAP-T, many NGOs do not feel that they have any say on it. I myself do not see anything like GCAP-T. What I see is TANGO involving other NGOs in its campaign (Interview, Loyce Lema, 2/4/2008).

Apart from this observation by the likes of Loyce, many donors, especially those directly implementing projects have the tendency to tell NGOs that are involved in a particular project to form networks/coalition. As a result of this top-down approach, many coalitions die the moment the project comes to an end or the donor shifts the focus to other things. In chapter five, I gave a detailed account of the nature and challenges of NGO coalitions and networks in Tanzania.

Most of members of the campaign were based in Dar es Salaam (the country's former capital city and currently the biggest commercial city). For the NGOs to base their activities in the capital or big cities/towns has been a challenge to many NGOs in Southern Africa (Nyang'oro, 2006). When NGOs base their advocacy near where the bureaucrats are, it is nothing but perpetuating the status

quo although in a different style. Shivji (2003) in his reflection on the work of NGOs in Tanzania says that the closeness of NGOs to the government made it impossible to be critical in challenging it especially when conflict is needed. During my field work, I noticed that there was no serious effort to recruit members from upcountry.

Many activities of the campaign continued to be implemented by the secretariat (TANGO). This is contrary to the policy guiding campaign which identifies that NGOs and civil society should run their own activities with the secretariat supporting them. On the other hand, the secretariat had the expectation that members will be the driving force for the campaign. But the opposite is true, because all the time members were waiting for the secretariat to tell them what to do. 'Also, they expected the secretariat to fundraise and then send them money to implement the campaign' (Interview, Ngunga Tepani, 20/03/2008). One campaign member, Lillian Kallaghe of TAMWA, concurred with Ngunga when she said:

This was not a surprise to me because the Campaign was not member or people driven. Since when Salil visited the country in the early days of the Campaign and indicated that the UN will fund part of the Campaign it made NGOs to set their expectations to external resources and ideas (Interview, Lillian Kallaghe, 5/4/2008).

The secretariat planned and wanted the campaign to be grounded and rooted in the grassroots communities. The steering committee instructed the coalition members to submit individual plans showing what activities they will do in their localities which are linked to the GCAP-T. The plans were supposed to show the broad outline and the main strategies they will use, what type of

activities and the process. Some organisations were willing to implement the campaign in their localities, but some said they could not do that because of the lack of resources. Jimmy Luende of MNN commented:

the idea of implementing the campaign at district and local levels was good one, however, the reality on the ground especially lack of money to run the campaign makes this plan to be just a mere wish (Interview, Jimmy Luende, 10/8/2009).

The worst side of the campaign was based on the notion that money will do everything. If people were the first and foremost resources it would not be difficult to move on and register a remarkable success.

The challenge for the campaign was to ensure 'campaign ownership' and that more activities are done by the members and outside of Dar es Salaam. In its implementation plan, the campaign committed to go to organisations (alliance building) and ask them to own the campaign. They wanted to turn this into a very big campaign which aimed at having a big impact. They wanted to mobilise NGOs in every district to be part of the campaign. The campaign requires effective organising in order to be able to have a serious impact (Shutz, 2003). However, most members of the GCAP-T had a reservation on the seriousness and ability of TANGO to lead the Campaign. They did not see the TANGO Secretariat doing enough to make sure of maximum mobilisation. Jimmy Luende says:

We are not sure if TANGO is serious in making sure this Campaign is a national issue and

mobilising as many people and NGOs as possible. Most of their time is spent in organising Steering Committee meetings. I think Steering Committee members are happy with these meetings, because for every meeting they attend they get paid a transport allowance which is a substantial amount money” (Jimmy Luende in an email correspondence of September 14, 2009).

Sharing information was the main means which provided feedback to the wider coalition membership. From time to time, the secretariat of TANGO sent briefings to members, and members sent information to the secretariat which in turn was circulated to whole membership of the campaign. The campaign used every available opportunity to share its goal and visions. There was also an awareness raising platform through workshops. The campaign called for resources to be committed to development and poverty reduction programmes in several ways e.g. calling for the scrapping of user fees in health (covering goals four, five and six of MDGs).

One thing I noted among the members of the coalition and the public was a confusion of whether the GCAP-T, was about the MDGs or MKUKUTA campaign. The lack of clarity left no clear direction of who exactly is supposed to address the demands of the campaign. Although the TANGO (Secretariat) keep insisting it is was involved with the MDGs campaign, NGOs felt this campaign did not appeal to the people or to NGOs themselves because they felt the MDGs were too remote from reality compared to MKUKUTA which is locally grown. On the other hand many politicians were more concerned with MKUKUTA than MDGs. So sometimes when the GCAP-T team approached the government officials to demand them to work towards MDGs targets, sometimes they would tell them (GCAP-T) that they need to be educated on the local needs before

they address UN programmes. Another contradiction emanates from the fact that the government has acknowledged that, it has mainstreamed MDGs in the MKUKUTA. So it would be more appropriate and appealing if GCAP-T had narrowed down the campaign and stuck to MKUKUTA. But as I explained in the previous paragraphs; the campaign had subscribed to the UN-MDGs campaign. By subscribing to the international initiative it assured that GCAP-T would get money to run the campaign, but in the process they missed the local needs and focus.

GCAP-T organised many capacity building programmes for the campaign members. These activities were conducted both in the country and outside. For instance, TANGO staff and GCAP-T Steering Committee members attended capacity training workshops in the United Kingdom, Canada, Uganda, South Africa, and Senegal. Within the country there were a series of training workshops organised by TANGO, UNDP, International NGOs and donors. The capacity building programmes are regarded as part of the campaign but they do not help to achieve the campaign goal.

7.4.2 Community Dialogue

In the GCAP-T Action Plan it is stated that dialogue will be the main approach that will enable the campaign to achieve serious and tangible results (TANGO, 2004g). Dialogue gives all sides involved an opportunity to view things in a more realistic and holistic manner. GCAP-T was to engage in dialogue with ministers, principal secretaries, technocrats MPs, donors, embassies and representatives and officers of United Nation organisations based in Tanzania. GCAP-T believes that through dialogue they will be able to get the commitment of these institutions that have

decision or resource capacities to implement the demands of the campaign. Apart from that general plan of conducting dialogues, I was assured by TANGO staff that a comprehensive strategy of how to implement the dialogues was not prepared.

The strategy of dialogue ended at the planning level. It was not implemented as intended. There were times when the chance for dialogue occurred but the GCAP-T did not take any serious steps to take them. Two incidents are highlighted here. In the first one, Clifford Tandari who is a Senior Economist with the Poverty Eradication Division who was standing in for the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Empowerment participated in one of the GCAP-T workshop. After the workshop he offered to hold further dialogues with the GCAP-T on anti-poverty policy frameworks. Tandari also assured the GCAP-T coordinator that he would take the demands of the campaign into various poverty monitoring systems of the government (TANGO, 2005). During the field work, I tried to find out how the campaign secretariat had followed up on this strategic promise. I was assured that it had not been done. The second incidence is that of John Hendra, the United Nations (UN) Resident Representative in Tanzania, who offered the campaign a platform for dialogue and discussions with the UN system in Tanzania (TANGO, 2005). These organisations include organisations like the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Labour Organisation (ILO), and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). However, the campaign team did not follow up on this promise as well.

Things which lead to constructive dialogue and yield positive changes are not common in the agenda of many NGOs. Rajani (2001) is very concerned on the way NGOs in Tanzania do advocacy. He says the first thing they always consider is workshops. Rajani attributes this to the

lack of creativity and the stereo typed thinking of uneducated people. Rajan himself has been able to demystify the workshop culture. He has found and worked with three successful NGOs which have managed to do things differently and the impact is evident. These NGOs are Kuleana, HakiElimu and Twaweza. In the early 1990 he formed Kuleana which managed to highlight the plight of street children in Tanzania from a very different perspective. The success of Kuleana was its ability to get the voice of street children heard by the public and policy makers. A good example is the development of posters to publicize the plight of living in the streets. Kuleana sat down with children and let children develop the message and the drawing for the posters. Although the GCAP-T campaign speaks about the need to improve primary education; no primary schools pupils or teachers have been included in the core circle of the campaign. Their involvement is mostly attending public meetings organised by the GCAP-T. Teachers could have been a very good part of the campaign. When an individual or NGO speak about the plight of a certain group of society, they do not work with that group; so their work tends to lack the legitimate support of the public (Rajani, 2001).

Mkopoka, who has been the chairperson of NGOs in the Mtwara region of Tanzania for a couple of years, explains in RIPS (2004) that the lack of commitment of leaders and members of NGOs is one of the reason that NGOs are not registering any meaningful impact in terms of their work and not acting as a strong force to cement civil society. He attributes this shortcoming with a lack of management skills, lack of funds and lack of education He narrates how in order to address these problems, a series of workshops was organised by major NGOs like TANGO, TGNP and RIPS. Mkopoka believes that the inability of Tanzania NGOs to be reckoned as a force behind strong civil society will be eliminated through training workshops. But, Nicodemus Eatlawe of Maarifa

ni Ufunguo of Arusha does not agree with this explanation, rather he sees that many NGOs were established just to tap into donor money which was readily available.

Instead of dialogue, TANGO and the campaign team organised meetings, public rallies, workshops, forums, seminars and symposiums. To avoid repetition I will use 'workshop/s' to refer to any of these or all of them. The main participants in these workshops were NGO staff. During these workshops, papers would be resented by NGO staff and paid consultants. These meetings were mostly monologues. Papers and reports based on research would be read out to participants that have little chance of changing anything on what has been written. If they are lucky enough, at the end of the workshops, they will list down a number of recommendations that they want the government and donors to address. Then after the workshop, they go back to their NGOs to wait for another invitation to attend another workshop. Nestory Maswe, Capacity Building Officer at TANGO, admits that through his interaction with NGOs throughout the country, on average, an NGO officer spends about half of his working time attending meetings. He further says:

By looking at the way NGOs conduct their affairs, it make one think the main purpose of these NGOs is to attend workshops. Instead of workshops being the means to an end they have become an end by themselves. You can organise workshop any time you want because you are assured of getting participants. I may come to the office in the morning, and sent an invitation email to NGOs calling for a workshop the same day in the evening. And I assure you that workshop will take place because people will show up. (Interview, Maswe, 29/01/2008).

Activities which seek to engage with the government and with the citizens do not carry much weight. The campaign paid a visit to a parliamentary session in Dodoma on July 2006, MPs advised that it was good strategy to work with the government technocrats/officers who draft most of the government policies and programme before they are tabled before the legislature or other high level political bodies (TANGO, 2006). Most of the issues they discuss in the parliament are drafted by technocrats who have specialised expertise. When these proposals, are in the final stages, MPs have very limited chances of making changes. But when one works closely with technocrats at ministerial and departmental level, there is a good possibility that their demands would be considered or accommodated. When I tried to find out if this advice had been followed; the former campaign Coordinator, Ngunga Tepani assured me that they had not done so (Interview, Ngunga Tepani, 20/03/2008).

Instead of dialogue there is a practice which I term as 'speech marathon'. Whenever there is a workshop an official from a particular government department is invited to officiate or address a certain issue at that particular meeting. What they normally do is to read a speech and that is it. It is common practice among NGOs when they have an event involving the public; to invite a senior officer from the government to address the occasion as a guest of honour. Speeches are read by both government officers and NGOs. It is like everybody is talking but no one is listening. In most cases these guests of honours read speeches which have been prepared by the NGOs management. It is common practice for speeches to be prepared for the government officials who officiate or talk in the NGOs workshops, and other community activities. Sometimes government officials refuse to turn up to an event if the organisers do not prepare them a speech.

The culture and practice of reading and preparing speeches to and for leaders is caused by the lack of transparency and information dissemination culture. Ngunga comments justify this observation, he says; “the main problem is that the information system of the country is not realistic in the sense that it does not address the reality issues on the ground” (Interview, Ngunga, 20/03/2008). One would expect that NGOs would make it one of their aims to change this practice; instead, it is like they do not see it or are not willing to challenge and change it. People are tired of preparing and producing reports. At district level, ward level, village and even street level, leaders and officers are required to prepare reports/speeches, whenever there is a higher authority leader visiting the area. The problem with these reports is that these leaders are not serious about following up on the issues or that they do not want to find solutions to the problems raised. In situations like this it is not easy for people to produce anything serious or original.

Most of my interviewees admitted that government leaders are the ones who insist NGOs prepare speeches for them. After a speech has been handled to a particular officer, sometimes they would do some minor changes or they would just read them word by word. One interviewee explained the case of how their organisation organised a workshop in Arusha region and invited the Regional Commissioner to officiate it. Because this particular NGO did not prepare a speech for him, he said would not officiate at the event unless they wrote him a speech. Because the NGO needed him they wrote the speech.

NGOs think that this practice of preparing speeches for government leaders is an advantage to them. They believe they are able to put words in their mouths. Once the government has committed itself to do something, it makes it easy for NGOs to follow it up and demand for its

implementation. But this practice yields very poor results because government accountability to its promises is at a very low level. An example was given from the 2005 general elections; the aspiring presidential candidate on the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) ticket, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete promised his party that he would create about one million jobs. After winning the elections and a few months into office, he said his government has no capacity or ability to create jobs; instead people should engage in self employment. And later when the deputy minister for Labour and Youth Development was asked by the media, what plans had the government to create jobs; he said people should not expect government to give them jobs because it is not its responsibility. Three conclusions could be drawn from such a contradiction. One, the government promised to create jobs for the citizens, so it is was expected it would live up to its promise. Second, the role of creating jobs, primarily lies with government, so there is no way it can run away from it. Third, it is easy to conclude that when the president gave this promise, he did not mean it. And if he did not mean it, then his leadership lacks legitimacy. Also, it is possible to say that the President was not sincere in his promise, hence he did not show respect to them.

My respondents suggested ways of changing this speech marathon culture. Ngunga Tepani (Interview, 20/03/2008) advised: “as a nation, the whole people involved in different development initiatives should come up with different ways of sharing information and reports”. One alternative, Ngunga proposed, is for leaders, who are visiting somewhere or attending certain activities, to seek information beforehand and when they arrive, in the place where the occasion is taking place, to go straight to the point and start to engage in discussion and dialogue with the people in order to find realistic and genuine solutions for their problems. The same interviewee also gave another example of a government minister who if he is invited to give a speech; would

not accept the invitation unless he is assured of his 'allowance' which is famously known as an 'envelope' because these payments are put in an envelope (Msangi, 2/3/2008).

Officials participating in the activities of NGOs are paid an allowance/fee to compensate for their time, expertise and transport. The amount of payment differs according to the position of the official. For instance the ministerial fee differs from that of a senior officer. Sometimes, if the organisers do not allocate enough payment, there is a possibility of getting a junior officer who is not in position of implementing any of the things they want to be done. Also by having a junior officer at an event, it is an indicator that that event is not important.

It is argued that the allowance helps to supplement the income for civil servants and NGOs' staff because the salary they get is so meagre. A middle grade senior civil servant earns a salary of £75 per month while their actual needs are around £300 per month. That is why it is a common practice for a large proportion of the budget of governmental departments to be eaten up by allowances. Such allowances help to compensate for the little salary they get.

GCAP-T has not managed to make people part of the campaign. In the campaign guide policy, it is stated that people will be the centre of the campaign. It reads, "The main thrust of the campaign is to build a culture and movement of people at community level to begin to hold leaders (village committees, councillors, MPs, etc) accountable to achieve national development targets stated in MKUKUTA as well as the MDGs" (TANGO, 2004g, p.4). Even when there are activities which involve communities; people are seen as suppliers of information and inputs to the campaign. Beyond that they are not in the big picture. The campaign has conducted about four different

researches in different parts of the country. Methodologies which would empower people could have been used, but all these studies were used to generate reports which latter were discussed in workshops mostly in towns. Chachage (2003) see this as a neoliberal agenda where NGOs have replaced people, civil society and people's organisations.

Huge amounts of the campaign budget goes on campaign materials such as t-shirts, caps, fliers and brochures, banners, white bands. All these material have the intention of carrying the campaign message and increase the visibility of the campaign. By producing such big amounts of campaign materials it means that the major share of NGOs' funds end up benefiting businessmen more than the poor people who are supposed to be the main beneficiaries of NGOs projects and programs. I have reached the conclusion that only about 10% of the total budget of NGOs goes directly to the grassroots without having to pass into the hands of business people

In Tanzania, the average NGO staff member spend more of their time in workshops and travelling than in the activities related to their target groups. Most of these activities are conducted in hotels and conference halls. Also transport companies, stationery shops and t-shirt printers provide services of billions of shillings to NGOs. Consultants, researchers and facilitators of workshops are another service provider to NGOs. What makes the situation worse is that the NGOs are not disturbed by this trend and there is no initiative to challenge the situation. The argument for the workshop culture is that NGOs need to strategise and make strong arguments which will convince policy makers to make policies which are pro-poor.

I tried to calculate a rough estimate of the allocation of funds to NGOs. I concluded that in an average NGO; 50% of the budget goes on workshops, 20% on research, 20% on publications and

the remaining 10% on the things which could be said to benefit the poor directly. It seems that NGOs are working more closely with the business people than with real communities. Businessmen are the more regular visitors to the NGOs office than the poor. Perhaps the observation by Maghimbi (2004) is well placed to give the right perspective as to why development misses the target. He says:

... much money intended for participatory development goes to workshops. This is in contrast with the peasants' economic and social sectors...the peasants own view of rural development may be different from those who claim to be the purveyors of development (Maghimbi, 2004, p. 16)

All interviewees admitted that this is the main weakness, and NGOs need to be more serious and considerate, and also should reorient their initiatives towards things which would put them closer to the poor. Instead of NGOs spending most of their time with policy makers lobbying them to change policies, they could spend more time working with communities to strategise how the latter will be able to hold their leaders to account. There is no politician or leader who would dare to ignore vigilant citizens.

Donors have been blamed for being the main cause of this workshop culture. Donors prefer activities which can show results and quantity. When NGOs write proposals to request money from donors, they know it is easy to write a report and say x number of people participated in the workshop. That way it makes life easier for both donors and NGOs. Some donors are not ready to support programmes which take a long time to show any significant impact. NGOs reports are full

of statistics of how many workshops, posters, t-shirts and travels were produced. When an NGO gives statistics of how many workshops were conducted or attended, this does not help to reduce the poverty facing the majority of people.

Another reason why NGOs concentrate on workshops, is the notion which NGOs, development practitioners, government and donors have; that people (*wananchi*) are stupid and illiterate so they need a lot of education. Through training workshops people will be educated and so those who will be educating them need to be trained thoroughly. On the other hand, NGOs believe that policy makers and politicians do not have the skills or are not willing to put in place policies and programmes which benefit the poor. To address this, NGOs organize a series of meetings to strategize how to change their mindset without fighting them.

The workshop culture is a national problem facing both government and NGOs. For many years government has been using large amount of budget for administrative issues. Things such as travel allowances, expensive cars and furniture, just to mention a few, come first in the shopping list before those things which that particular department is there for. The actual development programmes end up getting very little share. One would expect NGOs to show the government how to use resources effectively for the benefit of the population instead of behaving like the government.

In my study, NGOs admitted that if 75% of the resources NGOs raise would be spent on the poor their work would have a big impact. Nicodemus Eatlawe of Maarifa ni Ufunguo advises:

NGOs need to be ahead of the government and do things differently. If they succeed in showing alternative ways of doing things, people will take that as a role model and demand the same from the government (Interview, 23/4/2008).

NGOs should make a 'u-turn' and work with people instead of working on their behalf. When NGOs work on people's behalf; once the project comes to an end then that is it. And when they work with people; then the capacity and knowledge of both NGOs and communities to solve their problems increases tremendously. Even when the project/programme comes to an end, people are capable of continuing to pursue the objective intended, because it was their programme from the beginning. Joseph Mzingo of the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) advised:

Donors, including internal ones like FCS, should stop funding projects which are geared towards endless meetings. On the other hand, NGOs should be bold enough to tell donors that workshoping will not solve peoples' problems. What they need is programmes which they could identify with. Instead of organizing one workshop of 50 'experts' which costs 20 millions Tanzania Shillings (TShs.) in a posh hotel, they could use the same amount of money to reach 20 villages and sit under the tree with people and come up with more realistic solutions. Once the first President Nyerere said, 'people know what they need, ask them' (Interview, 20/03/2008).

7.4.3 Elections Manifesto

The Voters' Manifesto was another strategy which the campaign used to influence the politics and

policies of poverty. In 2005 there were general elections to elect a president, parliamentarians and councillors. The campaign developed an election manifesto which was used as a tool to help citizens and NGOs leaders with reference materials that would be used directly in the campaign (TANGO, 2005). The aim of the manifesto was to influence the agenda of the candidates. It had a set of demands which the GCAP-T wanted the candidates to commit themselves to, once they are elected, that will make sure they are implemented. These demands are those which were also presented to other policy makers. The aspiring candidates were required to state how they were going to implement MDGs and MKUKUTA commitments; and at the same time to push the government to implement them.

Manifestos are produced and owned by political parties; they are instrumental in explaining their agenda and promises to the electorates. The Voters' Manifesto is an important strategy for people to influence politics in Tanzania. It is a key means to hold leaders and political parties accountable and to strengthen democracy. They make visible the voters' demands and aspirations on key development issues, as part of applying their democratic rights. Also the manifesto informs political parties and government that the peoples' votes are conditional. The manifesto helps people to hold to account leaders who will be elected in the new government (Rusimbi, 2005).

According to TANGO, (2005, p. 4) the voter manifesto was expected to have the following functions: (a) to raise public debate/civic education that is led by the people's voice, (b) to influence political parties processes through working sessions, discussion and lobbying, (c) to be used as a negotiation instrument between the new government and its citizens, (d) as an instrument for holding the new Government accountable for its implementation during the 5 years

in office and for the next elections, (e) to increase NGOs engagement with political parties with the aim of influencing their political manifesto/processes, (f) to provide civic education that focuses on broader democracy issues around elections, elections, leadership and gender and (g) to be used as part of advocating/supporting women and youths to aspire for leadership. Rusimbi (2005) sees election manifesto aim as reminding voters of the value of their votes.

It was planned that the voter manifesto was to be produced and distributed to all parliamentary and council aspiring candidates. Copies of the manifesto were produced but they were not distributed to the candidates. In the mid-term review of the campaign, the manifesto was not included as one of the aspects to be evaluated. Ngunga Tepani, GCAP-T former Coordinator, explained to me they had a lot of things to do and to include the voter manifesto in the strategy was not realistic enough. He states: "I think we were over-ambitious and we did not invest enough time into looking into the realities on the ground." (Interview, Ngunga Tepani, 20/03/2008).

7.4.4 The Media and the Campaign

Media is so powerful, to such an extent that Schwartz (1983) equates it second to God, because it can change the course of events like war, bring down presidents, and alleviate the lowly, by directing the attention of millions onto the same event and in the same manner. Shultz (2002) admits that it is through the media that politicians, power brokers, and movement leaders interpret and influence political winds. TANGO and other NGOs in Tanzania know that the media wields much power and they understand how television, radio and print journalism operate and can influence the kind of coverage each offers. Taking public action is about being able to

communicate with large numbers of people, and the media is the chief instrument for doing so (Shults, 2002). Because TANGO understood the advice given by Shults and Schwartz above; it has a well developed department which deals with the media.

The media was deliberately singled out by GCAP-T, as an outlet which the campaign would use to reach both the policy makers and the public. The effective and strategic use of media helps campaigns to achieve its goal easily compared to when media is not part of it. Shultz (2000, p. 132) argues that media advocacy like all aspects of public advocacy, must be strategic. He sums it up when he says, “taking public action is about being able to communicate with large numbers of people, and the media is our chief instruments of doing so.” Media reaches many people within a short time and is cost effective. GCAP-T activities in the media included spots on the radio and TV, issuing news releases, holding news conferences, offering media briefings and releasing research reports. Other means included pitching columnists, requesting supporting editorials, writing opinioned articles and letters to the editors as well as paying for advertisements. Also, the campaign members appeared on Radio and TV talk shows.

The campaign formed a media working group to advice the campaign on how to engage with the media. The group included people who have been in the media profession especially journalists. The group had responsibilities such as preparing media releases, arranging for interviews for spokespersons and organising workshops with media personnel. The campaign secretariat would meet the media practitioners from time to time to make sure the media conveyed the right message in the way it was intended. The main issue which was not addressed properly during the campaign was how to develop practical and concrete actions that people can work on, and

demands for government to implement programmes and actions that would reduce poverty.

The campaign developed a simple but effective message which could be easily picked up by the media so that they could be presented in a manner which is easily followed by the Tanzanian citizenry. I noticed though that, sometimes messages even in Kiswahili, which is a national language and spoken by almost every citizen, were very difficult to understand. There were instances when the message carried technical jargon and things which were not familiar to people. This made the media committee attentive all the time to make sure the message delivered by the media was easily understood by both public and the government as well as by donors. To achieve this, the team had to be very close to the media at all times.

Most of the messages were aimed at the gaps which the government and donors lacked in terms of implementing the MDGs and the MKUKUTA. Focusing on the gaps was intended to make the government and donors to act. Zaa Twalangate (Interview, 17/3/2009) insisted that in Tanzania many government officials tend to react and take action when the issues have been highlighted in the media. An example was given were the current President, Jakaya Kikwete, was able to win the 2005 general election because his campaign team managed to use the media effectively.

Working closely with the media is becoming common to most NGOs. And they specifically now set aside a budget for media outreach (TAMWA, 2006). However, it is only a handful of NGOs who have managed to use the media effectively to their advantage. Those who have mastered media relations have managed to have a far reaching impact. One NGO which has been effective in using the media is HakiElimu who produce messages that are geared towards generating

discussion and dialogue and are provocative. This is contrary to many campaign messages presented in the media by many institutions, including the government, whose message tends to be full of instructions and boring. But things have not been easy for HakiElimu, on a number of occasions; they have run into conflict with the government because of their sharp message. And this partly explains why many NGOs are careful and avoid generating messages which will provoke the government.

Using the media to campaign for development issues, like the MKUKUTA targets, was not an easy thing. One challenge that GCAP-T tried to address was the understanding of development issues among the Tanzanian media. This is because most of these issues do not readily sell newspapers and few media practitioners can understand development issues such as the content of the MDGs and the national targets set-out in the MKUKUTA. Zaa (Interview, 17/3/2009) explained to me why it was difficult for the media to give the campaign a high priority:

We have a lot of media in Tanzania, probably more than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Tanzania has one of the most diverse and vibrant media markets in East Africa. It boasts 11 national daily newspapers, almost 100 additional titles on sale on a weekly/monthly basis, and over 1,000 publications registered at the Tanzania Information Department (Maelezo). But most of them are not interested in serious and hard stuff which touch the core of the development. Most of these media are interested in entertainment issues and cheap stories which do not make people critical or see issues beyond the surface.

To a great extent GCAP-T was able to use the media effectively. From time to time the campaign news appeared in the local media. To me this is probably the strategy which was used most effectively and with reasonable effect. But the challenge still remains of to what extent this led the government to implement the campaign demands. What can be concluded is that, this helped to raise the general public's awareness on the MKUKUTA targets and MDGs. Also people now know that there are NGOs working on these poverty initiatives. But what they do not understand is why these NGOs are not working with, 'poverty experts,' like themselves. Astronaut Bagile (Interview, 27/02/2008), believes that by not working closely with the people, GCAP-T has missed the target. She says:

A Tanzanian NGOs, we need to change our strategies. For a long time we have behaved as if we know and have the solutions for problems facing the people more than the people themselves. If we want to see meaningful change in our engagement, then the only option we have is to work with the people. The government should be our second priority; let the people put pressure on the government. That way they (government) know if they do not listen, they will not get their votes.

7.4.5 Lobbying in the Parliament

Lobbying parliament has been the engagement of NGOs for many years. Even the essence of lobbying and advocacy was born in the corridors of parliament. One of the strategies of the GCAP-T was to interact with parliament so that the message of the campaign was considered when they debate and deliberate on the government budget and other planning sessions. There has

been a culture and practice of NGOs in Tanzania lobbying parliament when it is in session or during committee sittings. The thinking behind this approach is that parliamentarians will not implement issues which are beneficial to poor people unless they are pushed. This is true to some extent because over the years the country's economy has been going down. The main reason cited is corrupt leadership which puts personal gain before peoples' needs.

When the campaign started in 2004, the GCAP-Tanzania had four sessions with parliamentarians. The aim of these meetings was to share the campaign demands and lobby them that when the government budgets and other plans are discussed they do so in line with the campaign. For instance, the campaign team met with the Parliamentary Committees on Social Services and Constitutional Affairs, in July 2006, to recommend on how to improve the 2007/8 budget in order to speed up the fight against poverty. That meeting had the following objectives: (i) to introduce the campaign coalition to MPs and state its role, (ii) to initiate dialogue with the long-term aim of influencing policy planning and practice between coalition activists and decision-makers (MPs, councillors, government, and technocrats) and (iii) to represent the campaign position regarding the 2006/7 budget and offer recommendations for the 2007/8 budget planning and solicit support (as allies and spokespersons) in the coalitions future activities (TANGO, 2006). During this meeting, the MPs agreed with the demands and observations raised by the NGOs. However, they admitted that MPs do not have the power to alter or change the budget after it has been presented in the House. They see their role as mere rubberstamps. It is the executive who have the power to change the budget. They advised that the right people, for the GCAP-T, to present their demands to were the technocrats of different ministries.

Previous lobbying as in the NGO Act, as discussed in chapter six, had been vigorous. This time the lobbying did not have a serious focus. This time there was no high and serious lobbying or focusing on specific issues which they demanded to get the special attention of parliamentarians.

One challenge which faced the NGOs and other groups, when they want to engage parliamentarians, is the demand of MPs for attendance/sitting allowances. If they are not assured they will be paid the allowance; they do not show up. As discussed previously per diems allowances and sitting allowance are a challenge to every section of society. Ridde (2010) has found that per diems is a widespread problem in Africa. He traces its root to low wages paid to civil servants. And he further explains how per diems were brought in by donors in the late 1970s. He discussed in details how per diems undermine the implementation and success of many interventional programmes. This explanation by Ridde that MPs cannot justify, the scenario for Tanzanian MPs, because they are paid very huge salaries. Tanzanian MP earn more than seven million Tanzanian Shillings (TShs) (£3,000) per month. That is besides other benefits like fuel allowance, etc.

7.4.6 Information Sharing and Dissemination

Information dissemination and sharing played a big role in the success of the campaign. Different writers have attributed the success of formatting new networks/coalitions to information sharing. They argue that NGOs are entities which are too small and do not have all the information they need to effectively implement their activities (Shultz, 2002). Most networks/coalitions are established mainly to improve the information exchange among members; information sharing is

their primary objective (Starkey, 1998).

Information about the GCAP-T campaign was sent to coalition members from time to time. Information sharing and feedback from the coalition's membership was done through emails, websites like the UN Millennium Campaign, GCAP and Fahamu websites, newsletters, editorials and publishing some of the content locally through the press and electronic media including TANGO's website.

But unlike the use of media, the campaign largely lacked an information dissemination strategy. Most of the campaign materials like posters, booklets etc. which were produced, instead of distributing them to strategic places, were left at TANGO's office. Other campaign materials like t-shirts were mostly shared among NGO's staff participating in the campaign and their family members, instead of letting common people have them in order to widen and increase the number of campaigners and awareness. It is no surprise for a NGO worker to have more than 20 t-shirts from various campaigns they have attended.

The popular media is one of the most effective means of disseminating information. Mbilinyi et al (Mbilinyi, 2003) insists that a coalition must produce knowledge which can be disseminated by the popular media so that the powerless can use this as an empowerment tool to start to ask those who hold power to let them have power as well.

7.4.7 Research

In order to monitor poverty properly, NGOs undertake research to inform their actions and strategies. Because advocacy is about pushing public change; solid and reliable information helps NGOs understand in which direction they ought to be pushing (Shutz, 2002).

Since the start of the GCAP-T campaign, it has been backed by a number of research studies. I will highlight two. The first which was funded by Action Aid was conducted in June/July 2005. The aim of this research was to ascertain the progress made in achieving the MDGs in 14 districts of the United Republic of Tanzania, including two districts in Unguja and Pemba islands. This research was titled *Freedom Lost*. A popular "Kiswahili" version of the report was prepared and was used as part of the materials/publications and as a testimony for the launch of the campaign on October 2005. The second was the study which was conducted in the districts of Kilosa, Bagamoyo and Same and funded by UNDP in 2008. Both studies revealed that there is little awareness about the Millennium Development Goals in Tanzania. Among the gaps in information, is the understanding of what is contained in the millennium declaration and the subsequent targets of the MDGs (TANGO, 2005, TANGO, 2007).

The research for this campaign was supposed to be participatory. This would then empower those communities that participated in the research. All the research conducted by GCAP-T was referred as participatory. However, the actual implementation turned out to be a normal survey. They just enumerated the problems faced by people especially in rural areas and asked them to propose how these problems could be solved. Although from the face and word participatory

sound nice and promising to poor, Chambers (1997) as cited by Mbilinyi and Rajani (2001, p.3) highlights the abuse of these procedures. 'Participatory may be a cosmetic label, to make a proposal or a process sound good, but where the reality remains top down.' The second use is co-opting practice so as to mobilise local labour and reduce costs. This is very common today in Tanzania, and GCAP-T followed the same approach. Another example is the study conducted by the Mwanza Civil Society Initiative (MCI) on Monitoring Budget Education in Mwanza and Magu Districts in Tanzania. In their 25 page report, they explain that the study was participatory. But when one reads the report, what is in it is a list of the number of activities which was done. It does not show how these activities engaged people and empowered them to demand more accountability and delivery of better education from the government. During the interview with Jimmy Luende, who is the Chief Executive Officer of this network (MCI), he cited the lack of capacity and money to make the study more engaging. As long as NGOs continue to dwell on the survey approach, to please donors they will not be able to bring the change they claim they are catalysing.

The communities, where these researches were conducted, did not get the results or any feedback of the research. MKUKUTA and MDGs are implemented at local level. If communities were to get feedback of the results; they could take some action (KIHACHA, 2002). NGOs have been in the forefront in accusing the government. What was done is to produce reports which are discussed in feedback workshops mostly in towns in posh hotels.

In the 1990s and 2000s there were numerous research tools, used by NGOs in Tanzania, which aim to bring change as the process continues. These tools are: Public Expenditure Tracking (PET),

Citizen Report Card (CRC), Score Card and Participatory Service Delivery Assessment (PSDA). One of the weaknesses of these tools is that they tend not to be critical enough and they do not leave people empowered. Those tools, which ask why people are poor, and allow people to engage with their leaders, are not favoured. For instance, methodologies like animation and social action research are not entertained because they will upset the status quo. Animation and social action have one behaviour and outcome. Normally these processes tend to empower the marginalised and in the process they start to ask tough questions and demand leaders to be accountable.

Research on Poverty Eradication (Repoa), a local research NGO of Tanzania, early in the 2000s realised this weakness which faces many NGOs in the country. This came after working and researching on poverty issues for a long time at macro level, and they wanted to improve its (Repoa) impact at grassroots level. To be able to achieve this, they commissioned Marjorie Mbilinyi and Rakesh Rajan to write a research paper on how they should go about this (Repoa, 2001). They came up with a well-researched, realistic and comprehensive paper explaining how NGOs could carry out action oriented research. The paper was entitled “Research and Social Action with the Grassroots.” This is the best paper in my opinion ever produced in Tanzania that gives NGOs the guidance and benefits of opting for research approaches which leave the community empowered and ready to lead social change instead of waiting for NGOs and politicians to do it. They open their paper by saying:

Participatory research, and participatory action research in particular, connotes the breakdown of barrier between research and action, as the poor/grassroots become the

owners of the research/action process. A wide variety of potential actions can be envisaged here, from short term strategic planning and implementation to solving short and long term problems at community level, to advocate for change at local and national level. In all cases, however, these actions are about the exercise in the use and control of power to depict reality, its causes and what to do about it. For these reasons, it is a mistake to view participatory research and action primarily as a set of techniques'' (Mbilinyi and Rajani, 2001, p. 1).

What they propose is contrary to the current practice in which communities all over the country are exhausted because they have been over researched and yet they do not see any impact. In the 1990s research by NGOs started to become common practice. Initially, when researchers went to villages to collect data about problems facing the communities, they (communities) tended to think the immediate intention of collecting that information is to solve their problems. As time went by they saw more and more researchers coming without seeing any change or action taken, never getting a copy of the research report, hence they became exhausted. Chachage, (1996) is not happy with the way these studies are conducted in the country, and this forced him to conclude that research undertaken in rural areas of Tanzania have impoverished people. Such statements send a very strong message to NGOs in the country; that if they want to see an impact made by their activities, they have to revise the approach they use to conduct research and advocacy.

The argument which Mbilinyi and Rajani are bringing is summed up in the word 'participation', which is stronger than the process of involvement. When the researcher reduces themselves to the level of the community participating in the research and lets them be the leading agency because

they are the ones who own the information; it sparks within them the desire to go beyond being just informants to one of becoming actors on the information. They elaborate what they mean by the term participation when they quote Holland who says:

Participation is a way of viewing the world and acting in it. It is about a commitment to help create conditions which lead to significant empowerment of those who at present have little control over the forces that condition their lives (Mbilinyi and Rajani, 2001, p. 1).

In chapter eight, I will discuss and give recommendations on how NGOs could improve on doing participatory action research that would help to empower the people.

7.4.8 Lobbying Embassies

Donors and development agencies have the upper say and contribution in policy development and implementation in developing nations. This is because they contribute large sums of money to support their budgets. This support comes in the form of grants and aid. About 40 per cent of the Tanzanian budget comes from donors and development partners (URT, 2009). Because of this support of budgets, they then have a very big influence on how the money they supply should be used. One of the main arguments given by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) when they invented the PRSP, towards the end of 1990s, was that it would help to reduce the external debts of the eligible nations. Regardless of this promise, Tanzania debt had been increasing steadily. By June 2010 Tanzanian debt stock was £6.14 billion (Uwazi, 2010). When PRSP started in 2000 Tanzanian debt was £3.97 billion (www.tzaffairs.org). This is an increase of

64 per cent. It is because of such a state of affairs, the GCAP-T campaign decided to put pressure on western embassies based in Tanzania, to convince them to cancel their debts.

In the early days of PRSP implementation in Tanzania; NGOs observed that the PRSP was a tool to acquire new loans. The government was forced to acquire new loans to try to cover the financial gap in the PRSP, and at the same time international financial institutions became keen to give huge concessional loans regardless of the country's debt (TASOET, 2002). This undermined the original purpose of the PRSP as a strategy to effectively allocate/channel debt relief funds. As a result, Tanzanian debt continued to grow instead of coming down as it was promised during the PRSP preparation process. This eroded the debt relief benefits and made the HIPC initiative useless to Tanzanians. And, yet there was no transparent strategy for new loan management (TASOET, 2002; AFRODAD, 2004). There was a concern among NGOs in Tanzania that after the government had accepted to implement the PRSP in the first place; that this money was not there and that is why she could not repay back loans, and now they are being told to use it for development (poverty) programmes. They regarded the PRSP as another trap which is less visible compared to the debt itself but the consequences are the same or more severe compare with that of debt. For instance, by June 2010, ten years of implementing PRSP, Tanzania external debts stood at £6.14 billion (Uwezo, 2010).

One of the approaches southern activists have been using, when it comes to the issues which have been caused by northern countries, is to engage with their embassies within the countries. They do this by seeking an audience with embassy officials or demonstration (Newman, 2007). The campaign team chose to organise a series of meetings with the western nations which give aid and

grants to Tanzania. These countries included: Germany, United Kingdom, United States , Canada, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherland, Belgium and Italy.

The campaign strategy included a plan to have dialogue with the embassies and ambassadors of northern countries located in Dar es Salaam, with the aim of convincing these countries to cancel debts which Tanzania owes to them. Although this strategy was well planned there was not much done to have these dialogues. One activity which was carried out but did not have a big impact was sending letters containing the demands of GCAP-T to G8 nations which have embassies in the county. The embassies of Germany and Canada were identified and campaign team members paid a courtesy call in 2005 to present the campaign demands based on MDG eight (TANGO, 2005). Specifically they “requested” these countries to cancel the debts Tanzania owed them. In a letter to the Canadian and German embassies, GCAP-T wrote:

In 2004, \$130 million of Tanzania’s budget went to service debt- equivalent to most of the health budget. In 2006/7 Tanzania would have to spend \$82 million to repay its multilateral debt-compared with \$45 million in 2003/4. Of this yearly repayment, Canada’s share is \$3 million. The Government of Malawi spends more on debt servicing than on health care. In the era of HIV/AIDS and rampant malaria, this imbalance should not be tolerated” (TANGO Letters to German and Canadian Embassies dated, 18th January, 2005).

When the team visited these embassies the ambassadors could not meet with them; hence they handed letters to officials in the embassy. Apart from the letters that were sent to the embassies

there was no serious engagement with the embassies or of any attempt to follow up the response to the letters. The idea for the courtesy call to the embassies was not the original idea from national campaign; but came from the campaign head office in New York. The letter which was written to the embassies, was drafted very carefully in such way that it would not upset the ambassadors.

7.5 Donors and Their Role in the Campaign

One criticism which has been directed at NGOs in developing countries is that because they are highly dependent on donor money from developed countries, they end up implementing the donors' agenda (Hancock, 2006). Although things are done in the name of people; their needs and demands are the last thing to be considered. Most donors set priority areas and an organisation wishing to access their funds has to fall into their priority areas. "Such a scenario makes it very difficult for NGOs to be able to stand firm to defend their position" (Nicodemus Eatlawe, Interview, June 10, 2009). Proposals are written to impress donors. Even when NGOs officials know that what they have written in the proposals do not reflect the reality. Sometimes, NGOs are forced to put community needs and priorities aside and listen to what donors think is the problem facing the community. Helen Kijo-Bisimba who has been the Chief Executive of the Legal and Human Rights Centre for more than 10 years summed this up well as to why NGOs behave this way:

Many NGOs find themselves compromising their agenda to that of donors otherwise they might end up getting nothing. Unless an NGO is very strong and experienced in negotiating with donors it is unlikely they will be able to get money to implement their

programmes. Many NGOs when they prepare their programmes, before they do anything they investigate what are the donors' priority areas and issues. In the early 1990s donors had the attitude that they know the problems of people sometimes more than people themselves. To date there are still some donors who continue to cling to this arrogance Helen Kijo-Bisimba (interview, 20/3/2008).

Likewise, the GCAP-T could not run away from this donor trap. Donors were participating in every stage of the campaign. They were in, strategically, to make sure the campaign took the direction they thought was the right one. When Salil visited Dar Es Salaam the hand of the donor was visible in many aspects. It is easy to conclude that when Salil visited Tanzania in the beginning of the campaign is when TANGO officially handed it to the donors. TANGO staff and other members of the campaign are aware of this and were not satisfied with the state of affairs but they admit it not an easy to break out of it. When I went through the campaign notes and documents, I could see over time how the direction was shifting from what NGOs thought were the needs and reality on the ground to those which had more international appeal. Zaa Twalanga (Interview, 30/03/2008), the programme officer of TANGO, admits that he was happy as an officer that TANGO was getting money to implement its programmes but he was concerned that the donor's agenda prevailed over TANGO's. Most of the money which was given out by donors was being closely monitored.

Even the way the campaign was run was dictated by the donor. When the campaign started there was an attempt by the International Coordinator (Salil), to appoint people who he wanted to lead the Tanzanian campaign: Mary Mwingira explained:

Salil wrote an email to two people he personally knew and happened to share the same ethnic background with him. In the email he wrote to two of them and copied it to TANGO. From the beginning he clearly indicated he wanted the campaign to be led by either one of 'his' people. And one of them consulted TANGO and she clearly indicated she was not happy for TANGO to lead the campaign. When she realised it was not easy to be the leader of the campaign she completely stopped being involved herself in the campaign (Interview, Mary Mwingira, 11/02/2008).

Oxfam GB who gave most of the campaign funds in the initial stages attended most of the Steering Committee meetings. When most of the fundraising proposals were being written, they would give directives of what should be included and not. For instance, Lucy den Teuling, the Programme Officer at Oxfam Novib and also Strategic Officer on the GCAP for the East African region, when she visited TANGO on the 4th April 2006 advised that if they wanted to get money when writing proposals they should be careful to ensure that outcomes/impact are pre-conceived. She told them, that they should emphasis the sharing of resources for the region (East Africa) and try to minimize the global focus. In the same meeting she went further to highlight the areas of focus for Oxfam as: "Strengthening national coalitions including linkage to other individual initiatives/campaigns locally. Monitoring at all levels e.g. budget tracking. Gender should be mainstreamed" (Summary of discussions with Lucy den Teuling, of Oxfam Novib with Steering Committee 4th April 2006 at TANGO offices).

The campaign was more answerable to donors than the people and local NGOs. The campaign

spent much of the time fundraising and writing reports to the donors. Even the correspondence and communication with the government officials who are the targets of the campaign was minimal compared with what was happening with the donors. For instance, most of the correspondence with the government was mainly when the GCAP-T needed an official to officiate or participant in an event organised as a part of the campaign. Ngunga Tepani (Interview, 20/03/2008) explained how he had to spend most of his time on administrative issues instead of implementing tasks such as visiting ministries to dialogue with policy makers on the campaign demands. “The outcome of all this was that the campaign was better known to the donors than to the government officials who were supposed to be the main targets of the campaign.

7.6 Impact of the Campaign

Raising public awareness was the main ingredient for most of the advocacy and activism campaign. When people have information about a campaign, they are likely to identify with the campaign and give support whenever possible, even if that support is just sympathy. At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that Chapman & Fisher (2000) explained that for a campaign by NGOs to succeed there must be a mechanism to assess if their work is effective and making an impact. Throughout my interviews and observations it became clear that there was no mechanisms/means or methodology to show that the campaign was achieving anything tangible. For instance, there was nothing much to report and GCAP-T secretariat had not recorded if their activities had registered any positive outcome. A good example is that of John Hendra (the UNDP Resident Representative for Tanzania) who promised GCAP-T to support the campaign by sponsoring a live television debate for presidential candidates for the 2005 general elections with

specific questions being answered by the panellists. After that promise there was no attempt by the campaign to follow up the promise with the UNDP.

Kitunga in (Mbilinyi et al, 2003) sees that the will of people will prevail if enough pressure is put on those who control the structures of power and decision-making. Although coalitions like TANGO aim to bring people together for this type of struggle; they fail because as Kitunga strongly believes, it is the collective energy of vision that provides people with the basis for a united front; which ultimately determines political direction. “Coalitions and networks of activists and activist organisations are the critical infrastructure within which such activism takes place. They offer avenues for consolidating a united front and sharing responsibilities for advancing the cause” (Mbilinyi et al, 200, p. 34). At every step of the process of the strategy (advocacy), it is public engagement which is used specifically to rally support and awareness of issues.

One attribute which made the campaign lack any documented serious impact on the ground is that the campaign was more interested to engage with policy makers both at national and international level than with the grassroots. During the Poverty Review Strategy (PRS) of 2004; the people told the NGOs to go and tell the government that what will solve their problem is a village or neighbourhood MKUKUTA and not the one which is made and based in Dar es Salaam. This voice was so open and high, but the campaign has not been able to carry it forward from there. The campaign is busy implementing a campaign designed in Washington, London, and elsewhere. Most interviewees admitted that NGOs do not carry the people’s agenda but mostly that of donors such as the IMF and World Bank. During the NGO Policy/Act campaign, NGOs seemed to be better organised because these policies would have a serious impact on their survival and life.

The GCAP-T secretariat was not able to assess whether the objective of the campaign was being achieved or not. In my email correspondence with Musa Billegeya, the GCAP-T Coordinator, he told me ‘I am not sure if the campaign has achieved its objectives because we did not set indicators when we started our campaign. Also there is no tangible commitment from the government that they will work on our demands’ (Email correspondence, Musa Billegeya, 12/08/2010). The message that kept coming across all the time is that through the campaign the awareness about MDGs (not MKUKUTA) has increased tremendously. Mussa Billegeya (Email correspondence, 6/4/2010) wrote:

Since we formally started to engage in the campaign, the public awareness about the MDGs has increased tremendously, before that it was rarely discussed or mentioned in policy discourses. This has been so because of the wide information dissemination. Whenever the campaign team gets an opportunity especially in policy debates, it tries to make sure the MDGs get enough attention.

Although GCAP-T claims that awareness has increased because of the campaign; it is not easy to attribute this to a single initiative because it is not only GCAP-T alone who are engaged with disseminating information about MDGs. During my field work, I read many newspapers and magazine carrying news about the MDGs from different sources. This way, the campaign cannot boast of any tangible impact.

One issue which makes it even more difficult to measure the impact of the campaign is the lack of

clarity and clear distinction between MDGs and MKUKUTA. People struggle to understand what was the actual focus of the campaign between the two policies; MKUKUTA and MDGs. The campaign team kept juggling between the two depending on the situation and audience. One is tempted to say, may be GCAP-T should have focused on MKUKUTA because it is a locally grown initiative. The concern of the government and the people is MKUKUTA. GCAP-T cannot conclusively say what is the demands they want implemented it is not clear whether it is the government of Tanzania or donors who are the focus of the attention. The campaign persistently has failed to be focused and clear on what they want to achieve.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter has looked into the GCAP-T. When Tanzania gained her independence in 1961 she embraced development as an inclusive focus and approach for society. Beginning in 2000, the government has engaged in the implementation of the poverty eradication programme initially known as the PRSP and later known in the Kiswahili language as MKUKUTA. This initiative saw NGOs devising different ways of monitoring its implementation. They participated both in the government led initiative and the independent one led by the NGOs. In the GCAP-T, the main objective and focus was to look into strategies employed to implement the campaign. The main strategies employed by the GCAP-T are; coalition building, conducting dialogues with policy makers, organising open meeting and workshops and research studies. Others included: campaigning through engaging media, and voters.

GCAP-T was very careful in employing these tactics in such a way that they did not upset the

government. They missed one main point which was to work with the people to put pressure on the government to use available resources effectively to implement MKUKUTA. In its plan, the GCAP-T says it wants to build an effective movement of people to make the government more accountable to the people. The chapter attempted to ask what tangible results the campaign has achieved over the three years it was running. It was not possible to identify any tangible commitment from the government or donors that they are doing A, B, or C because of pressure from the campaign.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

8.0 Introduction

The study set out to investigate the politics of Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) and how they engage with the state. The aim is to get an understanding of the context and the ways and means in which NGOs in Tanzania engage with the government to influence its policies and decisions. The thesis also aims to analyse the implications and role of NGOs in bringing about social change in Tanzania. Because my scholarship for this thesis requires me to suggest ways of improving the work and impact of NGOs in Tanzania; in section one I will suggest what NGOs could do differently in order to have more impact and contribute to building a strong civil society. The aim is to identify the potential of community-driven empowerment and development through grassroots activism and self governance. Section two will give a summary of the thesis. Section three will highlight areas for future research.

8.1 The Future of NGOs in Tanzania and Implications for Empowerment of the People

This section addresses some of the issues observed in the previous chapters especially chapter one, five, six and seven, and suggests what NGO could do differently. It raises issues which NGOs are grappling with which makes their activities fail to go beyond ‘workshopping’ and start

to engage with people in order to foster grassroots activism which asks the question of why people are poor instead of the current practice which rushes to tell the government to solve the problems facing the people (KIHACHA, 2002, Maghimbi, 2004). The focus of the suggestion will be in line with what NGOs ought to do, to be in-line with the peoples' struggles. This goes in line with the objective of my scholarship which is to see in what ways NGOs could play a more positive contribution to the development of the country. I believe some of the misnomers and mischief of NGOs practitioners are based on the lack of understanding of the agenda behind the proponents of neo-liberal based globalisation. Theoretical framework (chapter one) Gramsci explains how state and ruling class extends its hegemony through any means. State permeation throughout society of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations' society. Gramsci sees hegemony as involving both the consensual diffusion of a particular cultural and moral view through society and its interconnection with coercive functions: or when there is a corresponding equilibrium between ethico-political ideas and prevailing socio-economic conditions fortified by coercion (Gramsci, 1995). Chapter one depicted NGOs as a project of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in developing countries. Just to recap, Prince Bagenda says:

NGOs are donor driven, while Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are people organisations at grassroots. NGOs are supposed to embark on a learning process to reflect on their positions and actions in order to be demand driven and not otherwise. Because NGOs are not people organisations this makes them lack authenticity and legitimacy (Interview, 24/01/2008).

As we have seen in chapter one, Gramsci calls for very carefully tactics which helps the oppressed to overthrow the dominance and hegemony. The aim of the ruling and dominant ideology and class is to maintain their status quo. In various sections i.e. we have seen how NGOs have are being used to fulfil the agenda of state and international multinational business establishments and organisations like International Monetary Funds (IMF) and World Bank at the expenses of the society needs. NGOs tend to think because the state and other proponents of neoliberal agenda are talking 'liberative language' and use emancipatory jargons then they have good agenda. Chachage (2003) has clearly demonstrated that one objective of these institutions to promote NGOs is because they want to destabilise people's struggle. Gramsci (1999) advocate hegemonic dominance is so strong and civil society needs to be very strategic to overcome. Gramsci sees war of manoeuvre as waged by those attacking the hegemonic forces as somehow ineffective. Instead of relaying of war of manoeuvre. The war of manoeuvre or frontal attack, targeted directly at attaining state power might prove ineffective and transitory in certain countries (Morton, 2007). Gramsci observes that war of position or passive revolution is more strategic. This involves struggle on the cultural front in civil society-to overcome the 'powerful system'- in an attempt to penetrate and subvert the mechanisms of ideological diffusion (Gramsci, 1971). War of position (also called a passive revolution) focuses on consolidating, fortifying, and perhaps gradually reforming a given social order. Additionally, a counter hegemony could entail an 'underground war' involving the clandestine gathering of arms assault troops (Gramsci, 1992).

Proposal put forward by Gramsci to resist the hegemony forces of the ruling class, is still relevant today. War of position is more appropriate in this context. NGOs are part and parcel of Tanzanian development and governance and they will continue to influence governance and development

processes, agendas and discourses. Buberwa Kaiza (Interview, 20/3/2008) is convinced that there is a possibility of NGOs realigning themselves and shifting from being donor driven to CSOs, that is demand driven. He further sees “The NGO sector in the country is in transition and the destination is CSOs”. There are three issues NGOs would need to look into in order to align with societies’ needs and expectations. These are: visioning with society; researching for the empowerment of the people; and capacity enhancement of the communities

8.1.1 Visioning With the Society

There is no doubt that the increase of NGOs and other civil society groups has had a tremendous effect on the development of the country. The explosion of NGOs has changed the development and governance landscape in unrecognisable ways in just twenty years. But perhaps the biggest change has been the culture where now the government cannot execute programmes without the scrutiny of NGOs. In all these endeavours by NGOs there is a future emerging which makes the work of NGO fail in making a meaningful impacts. Most of their work is not rooted in the peoples’ daily struggle and realities. One could easily say that NGOs are marching forward without a vision of society In chapters six and seven I showed how the NGOs’s agenda and programmes originate from a global agenda, especially those based on globalisation. The making of the NGO Policy and Act, which was the focus of chapter six, was initiated by both the International Labour Organisations and the Government. In chapter six where I looked into addressed the Global Campaign Against Poverty-Tanzania (GCAP-T) and it’s campaign on poverty; it was revealed the campaign was started by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The situation applies to many projects which are implemented by NGOs.

Ephred Myenzi (Interview, 06/03/2008), Hakiardhi Executive Director, gives an explanation on what is currently happening within the NGOs. He says that NGOs jumped on the band wagon which they did not know where it was coming from and where was going. He proposes, after all these years, that NGOs should now spend more time reflecting on what is their role and proper ways of engaging with the state.

NGOs should not waste so much energy engaging with the state instead they should work with people. Their role should be that of an organic intellectual. Not only this but they should be able to answer the question - whose agenda?

This call by Myenzi, if put in right context, makes one to think on the Gramsci proposal of war of position. Within this war of position, various novel features need to be adopted. This means all those involved in the advocacy work need to think on how civil society could be activated. NGOs could promote various forms of mobilisation and new forms of organisation to gain wider national appeal. This mobilisation is part of the strategy of building up an overall counter hegemonic project within civil society. Morton (2007) call such efforts to mobilise civil society as a site of popular antagonism, which try to develop a solidarity of interests as the basis for counter hegemony.

In chapters five and seven, we see that NGOs are not close to the grassroots community, but are close to policy makers, politicians and donors. They spend most of their time attending activities such as workshops with policy makers and politicians. NGOs claim they are doing this on behalf of people, but because they leave people behind, it is like they are sabotaging their own efforts

and purpose. The more NGOs work and engage with public and communities the bigger their impact and relevance of their work will be. Chachage in Codesria (2004) poses some questions and reflections which need to be taken up by NGO if they want to be agents of change in the world. He notes:

Struggles that aim at transcending the current arrangements must go back to the basics and ask the questions: Who is producing? Who is appropriating? Under what social and political relations? What conditions sustain those unequal relations? What organisational forms can make it possible for the working people to transcend the current arbitrary social, economic and political relations? In the final analysis, it is politics of the working people, those class based politics (beyond liberal unionism and rural cooperatives), which will be decisive in the struggles against current forms of imperialism and not some NGO politics (Codesria, 2004, p.15).

What could be gathered from Chachage's remarks is that the struggle for a better life and social change must be led by the people themselves. No one knows the problems of communities better than they themselves. They face their problems and struggles every day and what they need is a little help in them organising themselves. This leadership is that which Wamba dia Wamba, E. (1994) calls organic intellectuals. The NGOs role could be that of organic intellectuals. Gramsci (1996, p. 60-1) propose more dramatic and how this could be done:

A realistic politics must not concern itself solely with immediate success... it must also create and safeguard those conditions that are necessary for future activity- and one of

these is the education of the people. This is the issue. The higher the cultural level and the greater the development of the critical spirit, the more 'impartial'-that is, the more historically 'objective' -one's position will be.

Kitunga in Marjorie et al (2003) suggests that the best way for people to go about their problems is to shout loud with a powerful voice in order to 'stop the vulture from its regular spoils.' She goes on to quote a song by Dora Tumara as quoted in Bullander who says:

You who have no food, speak

You who have no home, speak

You who have no jobs, speak

You who have no food, speak

You who have to run like chickens

From the vulture, speak.

People are not ignorant and do not need to be taught and told how to solve their problems as NGOs tend to suggest and think. People have knowledge and experience of their environment, and they know how to negotiate their environment and local politics of development (Cleaver and Toner, 2006, Toner 2008). It is common practice for an NGO to go to a particular community to address the problems which have been facing these communities for years. Once on the site they undertake a simple baseline survey to get a starting point. After the survey, what follows next is a workshop to discuss these problems and recommend how to solve them. They think that with one or two workshops they will be able to solve these problems. After the workshop, the NGOs go back to town to write reports to donors to explain how successful the workshop was. The report

will mainly show the process of the workshop and recommendations of attendants. And that report is used as an indicator that people have become more aware of their problems and with that report in place some of these problems will start to be solved. People know that any change is a process, but many NGOs tend to think, and their actions show, that social change is an event.

NGOs have to take the shape of People Organisations (POs). Most of what we have dealt with is formal registered NGOs. But as Omari (1992) notes there are many informal and unregistered organisations which are doing tremendous job. And we have seen the gospel of NGOs has been mainly coming from donors and not from people. If there was no donor money, I think there would be very few NGOs, but there would be plenty people organisations in the country. People have always been organising themselves to solve the problems they face in life. NGOs have suffocated and taken the place of informal people organisations. NGOs have created the illusion that NGOs are capable of making the government accountable to solve their problems. In practice, unlike NGOs, POs are closer to the people and can adapt easily. They are not bogged down by bureaucracy which is a common with NGOs. Informal organisations are very good at people for development programmes and initiatives.

In chapter one and six, I noted that the government attempts to use governance structures and machinery to ensure people do what it tells them to do, yet people want to solve their problems in their own way which suits their environment. In many instances they carry out their own development activities through informal networks and channels; as I showed in chapter three and four. Such informal groups draw cohesion and legitimacy by using traditional forms of organisations and networks which have their own norms and procedures (Omari, 1992).

Above all, NGOs are expected to have a clearly defined vision on social development. Though their activities are restricted at a micro level; NGOs have to be conscious of the fact that their projects are part of the overall movement of civil society toward social development. NGOs are expected to have a clearly defined strategic view about the process for social development. This requires NGOs to acquire adequate knowledge and strategic understanding of the issues surrounding the functioning of the international economy, world trade and the world capitalist market in particular including the role and function of international finance organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Shivji, 2003, Shivji, 2009). It is within this scope, i.e. through a combination of a clear vision on social development, awareness of the functions of the international economy and international financial organisations, analysis of the causes and consequences of injustice and poverty; that NGOs can be clear of their strategic role in the process of the emergence and development of civil society.

In 'Articulating an Activist World View and Choosing Sides' Shivji,2003; Mushi, 2008b; Mushi, 2010) suggests that, NGOs and activists in Tanzania need to give to take a hard look at themselves and take stock of their activities. They need to evaluate themselves in the light of their values and principles and their mission to create a better world. If, indeed, an alternative world is possible, and it is, NGOs need to know their existing world. And they must not only know the existing world, but also know who keeps the existing world going. Why and how does the existing world keep reproducing itself, in whose interest and for what purpose? And NGOs have to choose sides; either the side of those who are struggling for a better world or those who want to maintain the existing world. NGOs simply cannot be neutral.

NGOs need to take time to better understand the world they are working in. If they have to change the world they must thoroughly understand the world view rooted in the experiences of the poor and marginalized people. Shivji (2007, p. 10) continues to say that the question before NGOs is, “Can they really understand the existing world better, so as to create a better world, without a grand vision, a grand theory, a world view rooted in the experiences of the working people?”

The people should be the ones who are supposed to set the agenda of NGOs. Since NGOs are implementing donor agendas, they have to change and let the people set the agenda. When one attends training on how to sustain NGOs and fundraise; the main emphasis taught is to how to make sure that when proposals are written that one knows in which areas donors are interested in. There is not much discussion among NGOs on how to make sure that donors see the NGOs agenda as important and how donors could be helped to align their activities with those of the NGOs.

NGOs might defend themselves by saying that they have to know and align their activities with donor agendas if they are going to get money for implementing their activities. But this is a lame excuse. If NGOs are soft and cannot stand firm to tell donors what the people want; then they cannot justify what they are doing. Such NGOs which lack boldness to defend people agenda before the donors are supposed to exist Maswe recommended:

If NGOs cannot defend the agenda and views of the people before the eyes of donors they

are not supposed to exist. In other words they are illegal and citizens should not welcome such NGOs because they are not of any use to them. I think communities will not always tolerate such organisation which cannot defend. It will come a time, communities will refuse NGOs to work in their communities (interview, 29/01/2008).

8.1.2 Researching With People and Not on People

The research practice of NGOs needs to depart from the current practice of listing and enumerating problems (Mushi, 2010). Social action research or animation is what will lead to NGOs research having impact. The main advantage of social action and animation is that it leaves communities empowered. When a community is empowered it is easy for them to take actions even when NGOs are not involved.

As ways of research keep changing; NGOs adopt new research tools from academic, donors, government and other development agencies. These tools do not go deeper and ask why people are poor rather than just producing lists of problems. Ananilea Nkya (Interview, 10/3/2008) of proposes:

For us NGOs, if we need to be relevant and do things differently we have to change the way we do research which inform our advocacy. If NGOs could reorient their research approaches and adopt methodologies which give communities more of a voice in the research processes, it would make a big difference and would motivate people to participate in research conducted by NGOs.

Mbilinyi et al (yr) cited in (Mbilinyi and Rajani, 2001) explains how rural communities in Tanzania see the right to increase access and control over key resources as significant to people. Such resources include land, natural resources, human resources and social services. They also add the right to information as well. Mbilinyi and Rajani (2001) have observed that the government is not comfortable with grassroots advocacy while at the same time they welcome advocacy done by professional organisations and find it easy to welcome them in consultative workshops and policy formulation groups. Members of the government find it unacceptable for ordinary citizens and the less educated to get power and authority in decision making.

While participatory research was celebrated in the 1990s worldwide, as advanced by Chambers (1997), for poverty related studies of which there are about 28 types. The main relationship in this type of research is that between the researcher and those being researched. Although the word “participatory” sounds nice and promising to the poor; Chambers as cited by Mbilinyi and Rajani (2001, p. 3) highlights the abuse of these procedures. ‘Participatory may be a cosmetic label, to make a proposal or a process sound good, but where the reality remains top down.’ The second use is the co-opting practice so as to mobilise local labour and reduce costs. This is very common today in Tanzania, in the context of local government reforms and the extension of cost sharing and user fees in basic social service delivery. The third use, involves an empowering process which enables local people to do their own analysis, to take command, to gain in confidence and to make their own decisions. One particular participatory method known as Animation research, has been applied by the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), with great success. This could be the role model for many NGOs in the country. TGNP (1993) cited in (Mbilinyi et

al, 2003, p. 53) defines animation as:

a participatory process of finding out or sharing information among the poor and disempowered, providing feedback to the groups and/or communities involved, and using this information for social change action. The basic assumption is that the people know about their own oppression and exploitation and, and have a good idea about basic causes and possible solutions. Through joint analysis with the external and local facilitators/animators, the people's knowledge is broadened so as to include, for example, a deeper understanding of the nature of the state and how it rules, and about vested corporate interests who seek to control local resources against popular interests. These dialogues generate new knowledge about the situation, its causes and potential actions. There is a direct linkage between analysis and action, theory and practice, whereby the poor and disempowered are key participants and leaders in reflection and action components.

Unlike many other participatory techniques, animation research is based on an emancipatory philosophy which calls for different ways of researching, reporting and organising. Central to Animation research is the wide dissemination of knowledge acquired, through popular forms of media, and ensuring it reaches all the communities and organisations in the country. Pioneers of animation research were disturbed by the imperial-bourgeois way of knowing and organising which does not go beyond that of what is seen to start questioning why the arrangements and structures are the way they are. Animation research always prioritises the democratisation of knowledge. Knowledge produced through animation research is put into simple forms which any

member of society can understand and access. The owners of the knowledge are the people and not researchers.

Information on animation research in the box No. 3 below is adapted from TGNP (2003) and sums up well the role of researcher as facilitator with people taking control of every stage of the research, and this is what this thesis is recommending.

Box No. 3: The External Researcher as Facilitator

The External Researcher as Facilitator

Catalytic initiatives are taken by persons, normally coming from the well-educated class, independent of macro social organisations such as political parties and government departments, to promote self-mobilisation of the disempowered for groups or organised action, which emerges from their own deliberations.

The starting point is to encourage the disempowered to get together to find out why they are poor and oppressed, through social investigation and analysis of their own, plus promoting their critical awareness of their environment and wider forces.

The disempowered are encouraged to discuss what they could do by uniting to overcome poverty and oppression; to form groups or organisations absolutely of their own, whose structure and functioning are to be decided by them and through these to take economic and social action according to their self-deliberated priorities.

Attempts are made to generate a self-reliance consciousness among the disempowered and an attitude of assertion of their knowledge, views and decisions vis-a-vis outsiders. Materially, external resources and expertise are not considered to be primary in solving their problems - these are offered only as supplements, when needed and available, for the mobilisation of the people's own resources and skills. In the use of external resources, emphasis is placed on the further development of people's own resources and skills for them to achieve progressively greater self-reliance.

The people are encouraged to meet periodically in camps or people's workshops to review their experiences, to undertake periodic fact-finding investigations of their environment, and to take decisions for subsequent action based on their own research thus conducted-seeking thereby to generate a process of people's praxis, i.e. a progressive action-reflection rhythm.

The people, once they have developed experience in mobilising and in organised action, are encouraged to stimulate and assist other disempowered people to start similar action, and to

gradually form higher-level organisations by federating smaller ones, and to develop links with other organisations of this type.

Dependence of the people on the initial catalysts is supposed to cease, through the generation and development of internal leadership, cadres and skills. This does not necessarily mean actual physical withdrawal of the catalysts from people's processes, but the people should within a reasonable time be able to carry on with their collective activities on their own, while a catalyst may continue his or her association with such processes and seek new roles in their progressive development.

The initiators of such action have not only a practical but also a research interest, in generating and assisting such self-reliant people's processes. This includes a search for methodology of self-reliance-sensitive catalytic action, for a role for intellectuals in the development of people's praxis and people's power, and inquiry into the implication of such interaction for social transformation. This research, however, is subordinate to the people's collective interests as perceived by them, and to a commitment to protect information whose dissemination might be contrary to this interest.

8.1.3 Capacity Enhancement the People and Communities

NGOs could put more effort into capacity building of people instead of policy advocacy. This would enable people to demand their own rights by themselves. While NGOs are busy lobbying and advocating in the corridors of power; very little time is spent on working with people and devising together strategies which will make the people to be in the front line of the struggle.

The message which came out of my field work and literature review, was the major impact which NGOs could have by engaging in capacity enhancement in communities to enhance their capacity to be more vigilance on governance and their own development. What people need is a catalyst which will speed up their development. There are a few NGOs who are trying this approach and the results show that this approach has sustainable outcomes. In a telephone interview with Adam Foya Tanganyika of Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) in Tanzania (20/08/2009); he explained how their organisation has managed to build a group of local

communities which they work with. TRCS spends most of their time in villages working with people where the communities take the lead, and the role of TRCS is mainly to raise the literacy level of the communities. They have placed animators (mobilisers) in the villages who work with people step by step to identify issues which they need empowerment with. They always try to avoid making the village leadership their main focus. This approach is different from the one preferred by many NGOs where they focus on the leaders. Foya sums up this experience:

The process grows step by step, after a time people become aware of many processes and see many possibilities and opportunities they could not see before which they use to make their leaders work with communities instead of letting them dictate what is to be done.

Benini (2008, p. 97) reports how TRCS have managed to empower communities they work with:

In Tanzania, for example, village councils elect and operate seven special committees. Early on, most of these were not functioning. 'TRCS breathed life into them,' claimed councillors in Kiduduye (Kiduduye Village Council 2007), 'our security committee now organizes night patrols and the environment committee passes bye-laws. We fined eight people for starting bush fires. Also, we passed a rule that every house must plant 15 tree seedlings per year (Benini, 2008, p. 97).

8.2 Key Issues Emerging From the Research

The contribution of the research has examined the contribution of NGOs in the development of

Tanzania through engagement in policy development. The idea of NGOs working on areas of policy advocacy is supported by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other western donors and the states. Their support of NGOs agrees with Gramsci (1971) who says “that the state always tries to maintain its hegemony by influencing certain sections of civil society.” The research has been able to contribute on the debate on role of the NGOs. It has shown contrary to what many believe, the agenda of NGOs mainly comes from donors instead of the people, they claim they are fighting on their behalf. NGOs are donor driven. The main aim of this study was to get an understanding of the context, the ways and means in which NGOs in Tanzania engage with the government to influence policies and decisions. And to achieve this aim, this study was guided by five research questions:

- i. To what extent NGOs are leading the people to real social change and sustainable development.
- ii. Why NGOs in Tanzania do not seem to have managed to become catalysts in helping the people to engage with the government.
- iii. Is advocacy and activism by NGOs based on the community and people’s struggle.
- iv. To what extent advocacy and activism by NGOs has been successful in influencing government policies.

- v. Do NGOs behave differently when they engage in advocacy to defend their interest and that of the people?

Chapter one has set a framework for studying the NGOs especially in the context of developing countries most of them being in Africa. I was able to employ the understanding of Gramsci (1971) who argues that 'civil society is a non-state sphere of outright domination (hegemony) controlled, directly or indirectly, by the bourgeoisie'. 'By hegemony, Gramsci means the permeation *throughout* society of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in the power relations of society'. International institutions like United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, in the 1980s and 1990s rediscovered NGOs and through them pushed for globalization projects which were based on the neo-liberal agenda, hence it was easy to maintain the status quo of exploitation with less resistance. The reason they opted for the NGOs was because they were a newly emerging organisational form around the world, were more conducive, and they appeared to be more reform oriented and small in size to the sorts of changes perceived to be necessary for democracy and good governance. Good governance which is guided by neo-liberal agenda.

Chapter three and four are closely related. Chapter three shows there is an attempt to impose the western notion of the civil society in Africa. All recent attempts of incorporating the civil society into partnership with the state ignore the reality that African civil society is different. References are made to three arrangements which inform the civil society in the region and perhaps elsewhere in Africa: patrons-clients networks, self-help groups and ethnic associations and traditional

authorities. We further saw that immediately after independence in the early 1960s, many states engaged in national building projects and this required all the citizens to speak with one mind. So the state had to incorporate all civic groups in the ruling party machinery and structures. The relationship between the state and civil society has been that of 'cat and rat'. The ruling elites see civil society as a threat to their positions. At the same time civil society thinks that the state is not doing enough to protect and provide for the community. In the neo-liberalization era, the state has invited civil society to be partners for development. However, this invention was devised by the propagators of globalisation based on neo-liberal agenda. This partnership aims at incorporating developing countries, most of them being Africa nations, in the liberal economic system. The chapter demystified the argument that NGOs are a Panacea for development in Africa. The opening of a door for civil society in the form of NGOs is not the 'medicine' to cure Africa's underdevelopment. Evidence has cited that NGOs have been much in the scene; this has been at the expense of reducing and rendering the state powerless and at the same time excusing the state for not providing for its citizens. By making the state powerless, it leaves room for western companies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to have a big say on the way economies and politics should be run. Most NGOs rely on money from donors. This puts them in a difficult situation to be able to defend their agenda hence they found themselves safeguarding the interests of donors.

Subsequently, chapter four reviewed the development of civil society and NGOs in Tanzania. In pre-colonial Tanzania, before 1885, civil society was fused in the state/tribal governance organisation. Ethnicity and tribes had evolved into some sort of organisation. There were two main formations; state and stateless. Colonialists reoriented the Tanzanian economy towards the

international capitalism system. Colonial economy and governance produced a civil society distinct from that of pre-colonial times. Peasants, workers and civil servants all formed organisations to fight for their rights. The struggles of civil society to be free from colonial chains culminated in the formation of one big political party, TANU which took Tanzanians to independence.

After independence, the state entered into a project of building nationalism and development. The wisdom of the time was that the state can do everything and one way of doing this was to adopt a single party system and shut-out all other civil actors. In the period from 1980 up to the present, the state failed to deliver as promised; the civil society became unhappy and critical. They reacted to the situation by fighting for their freedom, and at the same time they started to provide some social services which the government was no longer able to provide. They also started to engage in policy advocacy, because they believed the government was not making policies and programmes which were geared towards the marginalised sections of the society.

Chapter five focused on the evolving of advocacy by NGOs in Tanzania. This chapter revolved around the research questions one and two that is to what extent are NGOs leading the people to real social change and sustainable development. And why do NGOs in Tanzania not seem to have managed to become catalysts for people to engage the government. The economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s undermined the government's capacity to provide essential social services to people. People realized that the government was no longer able to provide for them and in a way this made it lose its credibility in the eyes of the people. Donors began to criticize Tanzania's socialist policies and recommended structural adjustment measures. The international community

was pressing for the formation of alternative structures which would bypass the established bureaucracy in social service delivery and programme implementation that would reach the poor mass (Bratton, 1990). NGOs seemed to be the viable alternative. During the same period the people at grassroots were developing self-reliance groups and structures which would help them solve their developmental problems. So by the early 1990s the number of NGOs started to increase massively. In the 1970 and 1980s few NGOs, which were operating in the country, focused on social service provisions like health and education. Towards the end of 1980s, NGOs turned to demanding for the defence of democracy and good governance. NGOs stood firm in demanding the reintroduction of multiparty parties. In 1992 the country adopted multiparty democracy. From 2000 onwards, NGOs have realized the importance of networking, coalition building and alliance over issues and devising collective action. The chapter further highlighted the characteristics of advocacy waged by NGOs. They are: i) most of the NGOs are top down led by the elites, ii) they are not constituency or membership based organisation, iii) are funded by and exclusively rely on foreign funding, iv) NGOs act without theorising and as a result they do not have a vision of society, and v) many confuse NGOs with civil society. These characteristics helped to answer the research questions posed and the outcome of why NGOs have not registered meaningful impact and helped society change compared with their massive numbers. These characteristics of the NGOs, are the best explanation as to why NGOs are not the best and better development agencies because by large are removed from the people daily struggle and reality.

The research question five which says do NGOs behave differently when they engage in advocacy to defend their interest and that of the people was answered by both chapter six and seven which are based on empirical field work. Chapter six studied the advocacy waged by the NGOs of

Tanzania in defending the formulation of the NGOs Policy and Act in 1996-2005. During the nine years of the process of NGO Policy and Act, NGOs stood firm to prevent the government enacting policy which would jeopardize their operation and survival. The status of the NGO Policy and the Act does not pose a big threat to NGOs. But this did not come without a price. NGO Policy went up to five drafts until NGOs were able to get a final document which they were satisfied with. The process of enacting the NGO Act saw three drafts. Because the final draft did not grant NGOs their safety, they continued exerting pressure on the government and within two years the Act was amended. When compared with the advocacy of the Global Action Against Poverty-Tanzania which is discussed on chapter seven, it proves NGOs were more vigorous when they were defending their survival than when they worked to defend people and communities.

But when one moves to read actions of NGOs to defend people demand as discussed in chapter seven, discovers NGOs were very soft in confronting the government. And this best understood when research question three is asked, is NGOs advocacy and activism based on the community and peoples' struggle? The conclusion drawn from the GCAP-T campaign shows that although NGOs were fighting for things which affect the population, people were not involved. The aim of the campaign was to build a social movement that will hold government at all levels accountable. Chapman & Fisher (2000) say that NGOs engaged on the campaign need to consider how NGOs can effectively campaign in policy arenas? And what difference does such campaigning make, especially for those on whose behalf NGOs seek to campaign? Due to the nature of strategies applied they were not able to achieve their main goal. And because of this, after three years of the campaign, it was not possible to show that the campaign achieved its goal or made any noticeable impact.

Both chapters six and seven were able to show how that by using different tactics i.e. policies, laws and programmes; the government made sure that NGOs operated within the parameters set by government. When NGOs attempted to go beyond, what is perceived by government to be their rightful area of work, the government would not allow this. This was more vivid in chapter six. Because NGOs do not want to upset government, they avoided being confrontational in their GCAP-T campaign. In chapter six I mentioned how Nemes Iriya (Interview, 16/08/2010), Manyara Civil Society Network (MACSNET) Coordinator, said: "I am proud and pleased because the Regional Commissioner is pleased with what we are." This shows how NGOs do not want to enter into trouble or seem to be anti-government. Truly, this experience agrees with Gramsci (1971) that the state permeates all sections of societies i.e. NGOs and media. Bobbio (1999) as cited in Orvis (2001, p. 19), further admits that Gramsci saw civil society as a non-state sphere of outright domination (hegemony) controlled, directly or indirectly, by the bourgeoisie.

8.3 Areas for Further Research

This project has focused mainly on formal organisations - NGOs. However, as it was mentioned in chapter five there is a lot of influence coming from informal civil society rooted in people's daily experience and struggle. These informal organisations have not received much attention in research. All these groups have a very great influence on local politics but they have not received enough research attention compared with NGOs. This is one of the areas I would like to carry out further studies.

Another area of potential research is social movement. Social movement in Tanzania, let alone in Africa, has not received enough attention because it remains under researched and under theorised. In the future I would like to devote more time to study about social movement in Africa. The study of African social movements remains a neglected field of research in at least two respects. The Centre for African Studies Basel (2010, <http://zasb.unibas.ch>) summarise very well, the pathetic situation of social movement studies in Africa:

On the one hand, Africa remains largely absent from research using a social movement perspective. Indeed, social movement theory largely focuses on socio-political movements in Europe, North and South America. On the other, the social movement theory literature has so far hardly been taken up within African studies, even though there is a growing number of empirical studies' dealing with different forms of civil action and political mobilisation in an African context.

This background draws my interest to research more on social movement in Sub-Saharan Africa.

8.4 Conclusion

The research has examined the contribution of NGOs in the development of Tanzania through engagement in policy influence. The idea of NGOs working on areas of policy advocacy is supported by International Financial Institutions and other western donors and the government. The support given to the NGOs makes one to agree with Gramsci that always the state tries to maintain its hegemony by exerting influence through NGOs. The agenda of NGOs mainly comes

from donors instead of the people they claim they are fighting on behalf of. NGOs in Tanzania need to align their activities with society needs and vision.

Annexes

Appendix I: GCAP-T Campaign Demands

Goal one calls for eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. Constraints for the country to achieve it include low productivity of land, labour and production inputs; inadequate, underdeveloped irrigation potential; limited capital and access to financial services; and inadequate agricultural technical services. Others are poor rural infrastructure; gender relations; weak producers' associations; and limited technological capacity. The campaign demanded information of food reserves is made more readily available and streamlined in relevant ministries and institutions to avert incidences of death due to hunger. Better management of food resources and its subsequent mobilization. As a long-term measure; establish, maintain and expand food production through irrigation projects/schemes supported by a well-motivated farm / field extension workforce. Also government should empower farmers to increase food productivity; processing and storage/preservation. Also, the campaign demanded the participation of NGOs and other civic groups in preparing agriculture policies and programmes.

A comprehensive research which was done by KIHACHA from 1998-1999 in three districts of Tanzania on rural food security in the country found that the problem of food security is mainly caused by governance systems and how resources are allocated and appropriated. Farming implements for small holders farmers are sold at high prices which when they sell their produce they get cannot cover production costs. The government could intervene to make sure production costs are affordable to farmers (KIHACHA, 2001).

Goal two is about achieving universal primary education ensuring that all boys and girls complete primary school. About one-third of all Tanzanian cannot read and write (URT, 2005) and women account for 36% of these. Campaign demanded every citizen has the right to better social services therefore the government and donors must increase and focus investment on quality education. All children completing primary school education get chance to continue with free secondary education and other vocational trainings. Train more qualified teachers to reduce ration of instruction to pupil and cater for expansion of sector. Build more schools and use existing public institutions such as ward offices for adult education classes. Ensure pupils remain in schools by making sure are well fed; reduce voluntary contributions (sometimes enforced by education administrators especially in rural areas and thus act as a disincentive). The campaign further demanded for quality education by increasing the number of teachers and improvement of their welfare and motivation (salary and working environment), training of the teachers and the availability of working tools.

Goal three calls for promotion of gender equality and empower women, eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and at all level by 2015. Although there is much achievement in making sure there is equal ration for boys and girls at primary school education level, but as they continue with high levels number of girls keep dropping down. The campaign demanded girls and women be enabled to gain greater access to university technical training and Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Without progress towards gender equality and equity, the improvement of women's lives that is the ultimate goal; none of the goals will be achieved. Government to be tougher on parents, people

and communities which embraces practices which hinder women rights to education and ownership of land and other resources.

Goal four demands the reduction of child mortality by two-thirds of the number of children dying before the age of five. The campaign demanded reduction of child mortality (under five) from 154/1000 to 79/1000 by the year 2010. Reduction of malaria related mortality amongst under-five children to 8% by year 2010. Improving health services include health and balanced diet for children, providing vaccination and prevention of mother to child HIV transmission.

Goal five calls for improvement of maternal health. By 2015 the target is to reduce three quarters of the number of women who die in child birth. Life expectancy for Tanzanians has gone down from 51 years in 1992 to 43 years in 2003. 529 for every 100,000 women die during giving birth. Only 47% of pregnant women deliver in hospital related facilities. The rest deliver at home, and out of this, only 40% get assistance from traditional birth attendants who have undergone some sort of training.

Campaign demanded all pregnant women to get free medical services. Delivery services should be available at distance of not more than half an hour walking distance from where a woman live. And goal is to reduce mortality rate from 529/10000 to 265/10000 by 2015. Increase trained personnel for birth attendance and increase their salaries. In the sector of health the demands is quality health by increasing the number of doctors and nurses and improvement of their welfare and motivation (wage and working environment), training of the doctors and nurses and the availability of working tools.

On goal six which is related to combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases by 2015 halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV and AIDS, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. AIDS is largely a poverty related illness. Campaign demands: Financing of the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis needs to be increased (quadrupled) from current levels if Tanzania were to achieve its targets. Government should take deliberate efforts to have official statistics on HIV/AIDS infections. All people living with HIV/AIDS should have free access to ARVs and other medicines for HIV opportunistic diseases. Provide tax exemption of Malaria vaccines, ARVs and drugs/medicines for opportunistic diseases. Appropriate information to all citizens on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and TB must be provided in order to enhance culture of prevention and getting right and appropriate healthy care. Since there is misinformation on the proper use of ARVs, people must be provided with right and timely information about these drugs. And efforts should be increased in fighting stigmatization of people living with HIV/AIDS.

Goal seven: Ensure environmental sustainability. The official statistics concede that about 47% of rural households are still using unprotected sources of drinking water. The national demand annually is 3000 new water points. Long distances to sources of drinking water are still a major concern and are a burden especially to women and children in rural areas. The cost of domestic water is unaffordable for the urban-poor. As though that is not enough, around 90% of urban households resort to on-site sanitation solutions. Demands: Special purpose grant for access to (flowing) water points be made to district councils to implement projects especially in rural areas. This can be financed by donor/central government grants but with limited Government regulation. People should be allowed to drill water wells and they should not pay fee for owning these wells

and be provided with training on how to use water purification chemicals. People should be capacitated on how to use alternative sources of energy which do not compromise on environment. Remove all taxes and levies for equipment/facilities that use alternative sources of energy and power e.g. solar energy. Industries should be responsible in protecting environment against all forms of pollution and waste management.

Central government and local governments should provide infrastructures which for waste disposal and sewerage system especially in urban areas where the problem the problem is big due to rapid urbanization and rural urban migration. Unlike current practice, industries should be building far from residential areas. Discourage new slums/informal/unplanned settlements and improve environmental amenities in existing slums and /or unplanned settlements. Speed should be increased of providing and developing plots for building residential houses.

Goal eight calls for development of a global partnership for development by international community. On *Debt and quality aid campaign* demands were: Complete cancellation of debts should be free from economic conditionality such as unilateral privatisation and liberalization. Setting up a fair and transparent arbitration procedures to address unsustainable debt burdens. There should be additional funding from the donors to achieve the pledged 0.7 per cent of aid. Effective and transparent special treatment for poor countries within the global trading system. Abolition of all forms of subsidy by the rich countries that distort trade balance. Making effective and transparent international mechanisms that support prices of commodities, and to compensate developing countries for price fluctuations.

On *Good Governance* the demands were better and fair use of resources and assuring the participation of public in the decision making process. To Government: To fulfil the promises made in MKUKUTA and the Millennium Declaration to implement and achieve the targets set. The government should also mobilize internal resources especially from the private sector to finance poverty eradication programmes (and thus supplement government budget allocation). And *Donors* were asked to fulfil their commitment for development aid; increase resources to required levels and where possible additional to achieve MDGs and eradicate poverty. And call for the total cancellation of all debts and ensure fair and equitable trade practices.

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