“Europe is what member states make of it”

An assessment of the influence of nation states
on the European Security and Defence Policy

by

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Abstract

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has since its inception in 1999 developed with enormous speed. The crucial role of the member states herein has been recognised in that both ESDP’s weaknesses and strengths are usually explained by their considerable influence.

This thesis identifies, analyses, and compares the influence of France, Britain and Germany on the development and design of ESDP. To what extent have the three countries been able to shape ESDP according to their preferences? How did they proceed? These questions are addressed through a comparative analysis of the national agendas, the effective influence, and the mechanisms of influencing in three case studies representing key steps in ESDP development: the first institutions (1999/2000); the European Security Strategy (2003); and the Battlegroup concept (2003/2004). The analysis applies the concept of Europeanisation supported by policy analysis in order to grasp both, the uploading capacity of the countries as a process and the content wise result in form of ESDP.

The analysis confirms that the three countries decisively directed ESDP’s development in institutional, strategic and material terms. The preferences, which they intentionally uploaded to the EU level, informed the final outcome in form of ESDP.
Acknowledgements

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<tr>
<td>Artemis</td>
<td>ESDP Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>EU Battlegroups</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<td>CER</td>
<td>Centre for European Reform</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>Concordia</td>
<td>ESDP Operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
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<td>DGAP</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>EPC-B</td>
<td>European Policy Centre - Brussels</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU ISS (former WEU ISS)</td>
<td>EU/WEU Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>EU SG/HR</td>
<td>EU Secretary General/High Representative of the CFSP</td>
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<td>EUFOR CHAD/CAR</td>
<td>ESDP Operation in Chad/ Central African Republic</td>
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<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>ESDP Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2006</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>EU Special Representative</td>
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<td>FAWEU</td>
<td>Forces answerable to the WEU</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
<td>General Affair Council</td>
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<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<td>HG 2010</td>
<td>Headline Goal 2010</td>
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<td>HHG</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal</td>
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<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
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<td>Ifri</td>
<td>Institut français des relations internationales</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security and Assistance Force</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NATO - NAC</td>
<td>NATO - North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO IMS</td>
<td>NATO International Military Staff</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (USA)</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>Proxima</td>
<td>ESDP Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC/COPS</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee / Comité politique et de sécurité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCoop</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIIA</td>
<td>Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham house)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Rapid Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Services Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UK PermRep</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the European Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WEU SG</td>
<td>WEU Secretary General</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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CHAPTER 1:  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1 Aim of the thesis

This study seeks to identify, analyse and compare the influence of France, Britain and Germany on the development and design of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), within the timeframe 1999-2004. To what extent have the three countries been able to shape ESDP and to project their preferences to the EU level? How did they proceed? Put differently, what is the influence of the nation states on European policies, namely ESDP? This thesis defines as ‘influence’ as when national preferences, which member states intentionally tried to inject into EU negotiation processes, informed the outcome of the decision making at the EU level. Influence thus means that national preferences are present in EU decisions. It describes goal attainment, which has been achieved via processes of uploading.

The issue of member states influence is both of political and academic relevance. While the member states are usually recognised as the primary actors in ESDP (Adréani et al 2001, Hilz 2005a) such a statement remains both conceptually and empirically underexplored. Neither the processes nor the content of national influence on ESDP have been analysed in a conceptually concise and empirically meaningful way. This is however of crucial importance to understand the limits and opportunities of ESDP’s success and of its further development.

This study applies the framework of Europeanisation to identify the influence of France, Germany and the UK on ESDP. It focuses on both:
the Europeanising capacity of the countries as a process: that is, the processes through which they interacted with the EU level in view of developing ESDP, and

the resulting Europeanised policy area ESDP, that is, the content wise outcome of these processes in form of precise ESDP settings, such as institutions, capabilities or strategies.

This will be implemented by applying a comparative case study approach focussing on the role the three countries played (1) within the inception of an institutional structure, (2) the formulation of the European Security Strategy (ESS), and (3) the development of military capabilities.

2 Research interest

Although security and defence remains one of the key prerogatives of nation states, it is precisely in this domain that the EU has made spectacular progress over the last decade. Since the creation of the ESDP in 1999, the EU has empowered itself with several specific dimensions for the implementation of security and defence initiatives:

- an institutional dimension (composed of military and civilian bodies)
- a capability dimension comprising
  - a military realm (the Helsinki Headline Goal, the Headline Goal 2010)
  - a civilian realm (Feira European Council decisions, Civilian Headline Goal 2008)
- a strategic dimension (the European Security Strategy, regional and sectoral strategies)
- an industrial dimension (mainly the European Defence Agency).
The EU went as far as proclaiming that it aimed to frame a common defence dimension (art. 17 TEU). If ratified, the Lisbon Treaty will open further opportunities for intensifying cooperation in the area of security and defence (House of Commons 2008, Mölling 2008c). This increased intensity of co-operation in security and defence policy at the European level is particularly significant for a range of different but interlinked reasons.

First, it is noteworthy given that previous attempts – most notably in the European Defence Community in 1954 – failed so unambiguously (Messenger 2006; Ruane 2000). Since the 1950s European integration subsequently revolved around economic and commercial co-operation, leaving security and defence to NATO and the Western European Union (Maury 1996; Quinlain 2001).

Second, traditionally national strategic cultures (Longhurst 2004; Giegerich 2006; Mérand 2006) shaped national positions and expectations. This further complicated efforts to co-operate in the policy area within the parameters set by the Cold War. One expression of these historically conditioned divergent security and defence approaches is the intra-European gap between ‘Europeanists’ and ‘Atlanticists’ (Meyer 2005; Howorth 2000a,d).

This points to the third aspect that any attempt to further co-operation at the EU level in the field of security and defence is by its very nature highly political. For some, already the very concept of ‘European Security and Defence Policy’ implies a substantial European ‘actorness’ which points to a federalist vision of Europe (White 2004: 14). In an ongoing European integration process, and particularly after the abandonment of national currencies across the EU (with some exceptions) co-operation in this particular field touches upon one of the last remaining core tenets of national sovereignty. Traditionally considered as being outside and above the partisan domestic debate, defence and security matters were directly and indissolubly linked to the preservation of national sovereignty. They were seen as highly symbolic and therefore entrusted to the national executive. For example, in France, defence is the ‘domaine reservé’ of the President. Broadly speaking, any discussion about European
security and defence policy is thus inevitably part of a wider debate about European integration and its finality, and as such a very thorny political issue.

Given this picture of considerable structural barriers to the development of cooperation in security and defence policy at the European level, the phenomenon of a rapid institutionalisation and operationalisation of previously implausible co-operation – clearly outside of NATO and WEU and within the EU – gave rise to numerous analyses. Recent research has convincingly demonstrated that cooperation on security and defence issues within the EU framework became possible due to different interconnected reasons addressing domestic, European as well as international levels (Howorth 2000a,c,d, 2004; Duke 2000; Haine 2004; Jonson 2006; Quinlain 2001).

In terms of external influences, the crises in the Balkans demonstrated the EU’s powerlessness with regard to both military crisis management and effective foreign policy (Edwards 1997, Duke 2000). The changing role of the US in European security is often identified as an additional external factor. Most scholars agree that the external environment of the 1990s created a sense of urgency (Duke 2000, Haine 2004). At the same time, there was an increasing integration dynamic within the EU following the inception of CFSP, the IGC’s and the looming introduction of the Euro. Besides, domestic factors such as the government change in the UK (1997) added to create the momentum for ESDP (Williams 2005; Mayer 2003). Thus, the changing security parameters after the end of the Cold War, integration dynamics at the EU level as well as modifications to the domestic scene meant that previous obstacles comparatively lost in importance.

In these accounts, the crucial role of the member states in making ESDP happen has often been underlined (Howorth 2000a,d, 2004; Hilz 2005a; Hellmann 2005). ESDP is a curious area in that both its strengths and weaknesses are usually referred to as the success or failure of the member states. In terms of institutions, some observers claimed that the precise design has been successfully promoted by the UK and France (Jopp 1999; Juncos and Reynolds 2007). In terms of strategy, it has been claimed that the ESS has been
“watered down” by France and Germany (Heisbourg 2004a: 69). When the EU engaged in 2006 in RD Congo with a military operation (EUFOR RD Congo), it was widely considered a French driven endeavour in which the other member states only reluctantly engaged (Schmidt 2006). These are just some examples of a long list, which imply the decisive influence of the member states on ESDP.

This is mainly due to the fact that ESDP follows intergovernmental rules and therefore differs considerably from other EU policy fields. In the absence of a supranational authority, EDSF is subject not only to member states’ influence but precisely depends on their political, ideational and material commitment.

However, this does not exclude that member states have been Europeanised, that is, have been affected by cooperation at the European level. Recent research convincingly demonstrated how learning and socialisation processes impact upon CFSP and ESDP (Tonra 2003; Ginsberg 2001; Juncos and Pomorska 2006) and contribute to a Brusselisation (Allan 1998; Müller-Brandeck-Boucquet 2002) and Europeanisation of foreign and security policy (Tonra 2001; Wong 2006; Miskimmon 2007). Hence, national foreign, security and defence policies have changed. However, they have changed less than policies in already communitised areas, and this change followed different patterns.

In first pillar areas, vertical adaptation resulting from a hierarchical relationship between the EU and national levels causes domestic change (Börzel 1999, 2003; Knill 2001). Member states are obliged to translate European into national law and hence to adapt their legal settings, policies, institutions, and procedures to address the ‘misfit’ between European and national law (Knill 2001; Börzel and Risse 2000; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999). Contrary to this model, second pillar studies underlined that ESDP remains driven by the member states. It is their political and material commitment that governs the translation of ESDP into the domestic policies and also makes ESDP function at the EU level. However, what does it mean for the precise institutional, military or strategic settings of ESDP: do they reflect the preferences of the member states?
As several observers underline, a particular impetus for the creation and the further development of the ESDP came from France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), the EU’s major players in political, economic and military terms (Howorth 200a,d; Hilz 2005a; Boyer 2006; Andréani et al 2001). The Franco-British St. Malo meeting in December 1998 paved the way for the inception of ESDP in June 1999 under German EU presidency. Since then, several development steps have been initiated by the three countries, such as the Battlegroup initiative in 2003/04 (Lindstrom 2007b; Mölling 2006). Besides, Germany, Britain and France made high material commitments for ESDP, as their contributions to the Headline Goal 2010 illustrate. Their commitment was crucial in setting up military and civilian missions, in terms of troops, command structures and financial support. Recent EU operations such as EUFOR CHAD/CAR (since 2007) bear witness to this.

On the other hand, their strong commitment often gave rise to criticism (Stark 2002; Schmidt 2004; Schwegmann 2005; Hilz 2005a). Whereas some analysts insist upon the necessity of a leadership dimension to make ESDP work (Giegerich and Gross 2006; Everts 2000; Keukelaire 2001; Adréani et al 2001), others fear the predominant role of the three states and a potential imposition of their views. Both considerations, be they positive or negative, act on the assumption of the strong influence of the member states on ESDP. However, how does this influence manifest itself? How do member states proceed to influence European settings, more precisely ESDP?

This study seeks to identify, analyse and compare the influence member states had on ESDP. Focussing on the content dimension, this study investigates to what extent Germany, France and Britain were able to shape ESDP and to model it according to their preferences. To what extent were their preferences represented in the final ESDP settings? Focussing on the processes dimension, the study identifies the underlying mechanisms of this shaping capacity. How did the member states project their preferences at the European level? The thesis will focus on three case studies to analyse the member states commitment. They represent crucial steps in the development of ESDP, namely (1) the development of an
institutional structure, (2) the set up of military capabilities, and (3) the formulation of a strategy.

3 The development of ESDP as Europeanisation of security and defence policy

In this study, the inception and development of co-operation at the EU level in the form of ESDP is conceptualised as the Europeanisation of security and defence policy. In the knowledge that the term is used ever more frequently, a parsimonious definition and delimitation of the concept will be discussed in Chapter 2. Briefly, Europeanisation is understood as an ongoing circular movement composed of two interlocking parts capturing the growing ‘interwoveness’ of national and European levels and its consequences:

1) the uploading (‘bottom up’) dimension, emphasising the emergence of new structures of governance at the European level (Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001);
2) the downloading (‘top down’) dimension, describing the integration of EU input into the national level of politics, policy and polity (Ladrech 1994; Radaelli 2000, 2004).

Sometimes, a third dimension, the ‘crossloading’ is added. It seeks to grasp the exchange of ideas, norms and ‘ways of doing’ things between countries or other entities for which the EU sets the scene, thus change is not only ‘due’ to Europe but takes place ‘within’ it (Wong 2006, Major and Pomorska 2005). Generally speaking, Europeanisation is thus a shorthand term for a complex process whereby national institutions, structures and actors adapt to, and seek to shape, the trajectory of European integration/cooperation in general, and EU policies in particular (Bomberg and Peterson 2000: 2).

This study concentrates on the uploading dimension of Europeanisation. Drawing upon Ginsberg, it refers to the process by which co-operation in security and defence policy moves closer to EC norms, policies and habits without becoming supranationalised (Ginsberg 2001: 37). Put differently, it describes the manifestation of the EU integration process in the form of decision-making processes and structures designed to formulate, implement and monitor
policies (Andersen 2003: 43). This study concentrates on the process of uploading leading to a policy decision rather than the implementation. It is hence about ideas, planning and conceptions within the making of ESDP. Conceptualising the emergence of ESDP as the ‘Europeanisation’ of security and defence policy means thus paying attention to the ‘shaping’ capacities of the member states within the accretion of institutional and policy arrangements produced by cooperation/integration in this policy area.

Applying Europeanisation allows us to link the levels of analysis, namely the national and the European levels, and to identify the shaping capacities of the member states by addressing the mechanisms of uploading. However, it is not sufficient in grasping the different steps of the uploading process. Here, policy analysis offers additional insights. Initially set up for public policies, the policy circle offers a useful tool to retrace the development of a policy from its idea via its formulation up to its implementation (Howard 2005; Janning and Schneider 2006). It will allow the retracing of the process from the initial positions of the member states up to the decision at the EU level. Policy analysis hence allows to more precisely analyse how the uploading takes place within the overarching framework of Europeanisation in conceptualising it as a policy process.

4 France, Germany and the UK in a comparative study

France, Germany and Britain, the three major economic, political and military actors within the EU, will be at the centre of this study. It has been claimed that “without intense Franco-British co-operation”, and – I would add – German participation, “there is no possibility of developing either a credible CFSP or a viable ESDP” (Howorth 2000b: 34). Indeed, the traditional pattern of France and Germany taking a lead in furthering co-operation at the EU level was clearly challenged in ESDP. Since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, France and Germany have been considered the motor of European integration. However, in the area of security and defence policy, Britain no longer appeared to be the “awkward partner” (George 1998), forging ahead rather than lagging
behind when laying, together with France, the basis for ESDP at the bilateral summit at St. Malo in 1998 or when pushing for initiatives such as the Battlegroups in 2003.

The three countries often occupy opposite positions within European debates. Their unique roles within the EU integration process (founding members versus ‘late comer’), their different expectations regarding its ‘finalité’ (deepening versus widening) and the EU’s role in the world, and in particular regarding security and defence issues (transatlanticists versus Europeanists, use of force, force structure) constitute both the major challenge and strength of this study. These aspects will be further developed in chapter 2 to inform the conceptual framework.

5 Outline of the thesis

This study seeks to identify, analyse and compare the influence the UK, France and Germany had on ESDP, more precisely its institutional, capability and strategic dimensions. To what extent have the three countries been able to shape ESDP and to project their preferences to the EU level? This implies firstly analysing the national commitment and preferences in the three case studies. Second, these preferences will be compared to the ESDP settings finally agreed upon. In a third step, the study turns to analysing how the member states uploaded their preferences. What mechanisms allowed for a successful shaping of ESDP?

The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 explores the conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues connected with the study of security and defence policy between the European and the national levels. This includes a review and assessment of the different approaches and conceptualisations to the study of security and defence policy with special attention paid to the Europeanisation approach and policy analysis. Drawing upon this, a conceptual framework will be developed to guide the study.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 deal with the case studies, thereby offering the empirical contribution of this study. Chapter 3 examines the institutional dimension of ESDP and
analyses the creation of three distinctive bodies. Chapter 4 addresses the political strategic dimension of ESDP by investigating the making of the European Security Strategy. Chapter 5 explores the capability dimension through the analysis of the development of the EU-Battlegroup concept.

Chapter 6 offers a conclusion of the overall study. It summarises the main findings, outlines the contribution of the study and analyses its shortcomings. The study closes by presenting new avenues for further research in ESDP.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter addresses theoretical and conceptual issues with the aim of laying the conceptual foundations of the thesis. It develops a framework to study the member states’ influence on the development of co-operation at the EU level in the field of security and defence policy in the form of ESDP.

It is argued that ESDP can only be understood as a dynamic interplay between national and European levels. The concept of Europeanisation offers a framework suitable for conceptualising this dynamic. By linking national and European levels in a mutually constitutive process, Europeanisation attempts to capture the relationship between the actors and the system, between the nation-states and the EU, and thus between attempts for collective action and the persistence of national policies. The concept of Europeanisation will be completed with insights from policy analysis. Initially set up for public policies, policy analysis offer a useful set of tools to retrace the development of a policy from its idea via its formulation up to its implementation. It will allow us to retrace the process from initial positions of the member states up to the decision at the EU level, thereby allowing us to assess the influence the member states had on ESDP.

First, conceptual approaches to understand European developments and the interaction between national and European levels will be discussed. Subsequently, the concept of Europeanisation will be introduced, defined and complemented by insights from policy analysis. In a second part, these concepts will be operationalised and turned into an effective analytical framework for comparative purposes. Embedded in a social constructivist understanding, Europeanisation complemented with policy analysis offers the framework for
this study. The selected countries and the case studies will be presented, as well as the sources and methods.

1 Theoretical and conceptual considerations

This section addresses general aspects of the theoretical debate on how to understand ESDP development. It then introduces the concept of Europeanisation. Recognising the shortfalls of this concept, insights from policy analysis are developed as complementary tool.

1.1 Theoretical and conceptual considerations to approach the study of member states’ influence on ESDP

The main objective of this study is to grasp the influence the EU member states had on ESDP: To what extent were they able to influence the set up of ESDP by successfully uploading their preferences? The focus is thus on the relationship between the national level in the form of the policy of the EU member states and the EU level in the form of ESDP. More precisely, the emphasis is on the shaping capacity of the member states within the collective policy making leading to particular ESDP settings. From the main research question, three sub-questions can be deduced:

1) What are the motivations and preferences of the member states to set up ESDP?
2) To what extent are they reflected in the final ESDP set up, that is, to what extent were the member states able to upload their preferences?
3) How, with the help of which mechanisms, did the member states shape ESDP?

1.1.1 Member states and the EU level: thinking about agency and structure

A wide range of international relations (IR) theories attempt to explain the behaviour of states. This study centres on co-operation at the EU level and points thus towards integration theories within the discipline of IR. Parsimoniously speaking, European integration can be defined as “the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction
among previously autonomous units” (Wallace 1990: 9). However, what this precisely entails is open to debate. For Diez and Wiener (2004), European integration theory describes the

“systematic reflection on the process of intensifying political cooperation in Europe and the development of common political institutions, as well as on its outcome”.

As proponents of social constructivist approaches, they include the

“theoretisation of changing constructions of identities and interests of social actors in the context of this process” (Diez and Wiener 2004: 3).

These contending approaches to European integration demonstrate the need for a rigorous definition of what will be included in the analysis.

When searching for the explanation of political phenomena such as the development of ESDP, one needs to define what constitutes a valid explanation of a political outcome: How to explain the development of ESDP and the creation of precise settings? If we suppose that – since ESDP is intergovernmentally organised - national governments are the key actors driving ESDP, what then determines their actions? These questions point to the broader overarching ontological question in the social sciences, which deals with the relationship between structure and agency. Essentially it is concerned with the relationship between the identified political actors and the environment in which they act; in short, with the extent to which political conduct shapes and is shaped by political context.

Applied to the main question of this study, we need to ask what determines the commitment to ESDP: is it the international/European/domestic structure that defines how the agent (state) behaves? Or do European states act rationally and follow their interests in ways that are independent of external influences when creating ESDP? Thus, essentially it concerns the extent to which the national governments (as agents) are able to take decisions independently of the (international, European, domestic) structures in which their activity is bound.

Within integration theories, put simply, the main classical contrast is between forms of intentionalist and rationalist approaches which highlight actor (agency) centred and nation-state approaches, and the structuralist readings which are more context (structure) and
process and less actor oriented. However, with the further development of the EU into a distinctive *sui generis* entity, new approaches such as social constructivism or supranational governance attempt to overcome this classical dualism and in view of offering explanations pointing towards a duality of structure and agency. They also concentrate on explaining parts of the integration process rather than dealing with it as a whole. In the following, the key points of the structure and agency debate will be discussed as the ontological and epistemological basis of this study. Building upon this, the most applicable notions are developed into an analytical framework informed by Europeanisation.

1.1.2 ESDP and intentionalist approaches: agency promoting the role of national governments

When searching to explain political processes and outcomes, some authors emphasise the capacity of actors (agents) to shape the course of events. Here, agency refers to action, namely the capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in doing so, to realise his intention (Hay 2002b: 94). Such accounts emphasise the conduct of the actors directly involved, implying that their behaviour is responsible for the outcomes observed. However, the notion of agency implies more than mere political action (Hay 2002b: 94). It includes a sense of free will, choice or autonomy - that the actor could have behaved differently and that this choice between potential courses of action was, or at least could have been, subject to the actor’s conscious deliberation.

From such a perspective, national governments consciously committed to the development of particular ESDP settings by rationally making a deliberate choice for European co-operation that translates their intentions independently from the context. The governments (agents) consciously shape the structure (context) in which they act, that is the EU and more precisely ESDP. ESDP as political outcome could hence be explained by simply referring to the intentions of the actors involved. Such intentionalist accounts are characterised by the notions of *reflexivity* (the ability of the actor to monitor consciously and to reflect upon the consequences of previous action), *rationality* (the capacity to select
modes of conduct best likely to realise preferences) and motivation (the desire to realise a particular preference) (Hay 2000b: 95).

Assumptions on intentionalist and rationalist actor driven political outcomes are for example underlying in intergovernmentalism and its variant of liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993, 1995, 1998). Mainly drawing upon classical IR theories, most notably upon realist and neo-realist analyses of interstate bargaining, (liberal) intergovernmentalism builds upon the primacy of nations and the concept of an inherent balance of power between states who will not further develop their co-operation beyond interstate co-operation. States become involved in European co-operation without ceding sovereignty; they remain in control of the process and only share or delegate sovereignty but don’t transfer it to supranational institutions. The main ideas of a liberal intergovernmentalist understanding of European co-operation focus thus on rational state behaviour, state centrisim, national preference formation and inter-state negotiations.

Here, the state is considered the main actor because it has the legal sovereignty and the political legitimacy. States are conceived as being able to rank preferences and make choices independently of their context, be it social norms or material structures, and thus consciously shape the context they act in (Moravcsik 1998). Context is not considered constitutive for actions but an exogenous and controllable tool, or at least something that states as free agents might choose to take into consideration when it is considered useful for achieving certain purposes. Given that through this rationalist lens the context is seen as neutral, the focus when explaining European co-operation is automatically on the bargains between states, with the resulting idea that European integration is driven by intergovernmental bargains.

From such a point of view, the creation of ESDP has very little to do with normative considerations or socialisation into European co-operation and values. Purely actor driven, it is the result of a series of rational decisions made by actors to achieve certain purposes. Considered as “little more than the servants of member states” (Cini 2003: 97), supranational institutions at the EU level are not considered as playing an independent role. If
supranational institutions might be allowed a role in less controversial policy areas, their role in sensitive areas such as security and defence is minimal. It is the (intergovernmental) European Council that matters.

The interests that drive the European co-operation process are considered as deriving from the domestic policy of the states and not from the sovereign state’s perception of its relative position in the state system (Moravcsik 1998:7; Rosamond 2000: 137). It is mainly powerful domestic economic interests that determine national interests, that is, policy preferences are conceived as constrained by the interests of dominant, usually economic groups within society. As Moravcsik famously said, de Gaulle’s opposition to British membership in the European Community was not led by the “pursuit of French grandeur but the price of French wheat” (Moravcsik 1998: 7). Although limited through that economic lens, this statement implies nonetheless a very multidimensional and dynamic vision of state-society relations in that it deals explicitly with the interface between domestic and international politics.

How could the development of ESDP be understood through an intentionalist lens? Hoffmann (1966) introduced the difference between ‘low politics’, the economic sphere, where co-operation is more technocratic and less controversial and thus likely to occur, and ‘high politics’, the political sphere, where, for it touches upon issues of national sovereignty and identity, co-operation was not likely to take place. Building upon this assumption, co-operation in a high politics area such as security and defence, even intergovernmentally organised, would then per se be difficult to explain.

However, considering that Hoffman in later years “softened” on this issue (Cini 2003: 99), intergovernmentalist approaches can offer useful tools for understanding co-operation at the European level. Put simply, through an intergovernmentalist lens, co-operation within ESDP takes place for it suits the interests of the states and will supposedly benefit them. Normally contrary to their perception of sovereignty in such a sensitive area, co-operation in security and defence would have become acceptable and desirable insofar as it might strengthen rather than weaken their control over domestic affairs and permit to obtain goals
otherwise non achievable. Through co-operation within ESDP, the states involved might
enhance their domestic autonomy without running the danger of supranationalisation: ESDP
is intergovernmentally organised and involves only few constraints for the member states.

Although offering a parsimonious and clear understanding, such an approach seems
problematic. The concentration on rational actor behaviour, while neglecting ideational and
structural factors, potentially limits the understanding. Also learning processes resulting from
long term interaction at the EU level are not taken into consideration.

This is indeed where most of the criticisms of intergovernmentalist approaches start.
With their flawed actor centrism, they risk having the

“twin failing of losing sight of the structural environment in which bargains takes
place and aggregating and unifying actors into implausible collectivities such
as the state” (Rosamond 2000: 174).

Whereas in the case of ESDP the state seems certainly to be a unified actor, the
setting aside of the effects of ideas, values or identities unique to a country and of
socialisation and learning processes seems indeed to impoverish the argument.

In fact, the rationalist believes that political outcomes can be explained by simply
referring to the intentions of the actors, and that preferences, strategies and choices can be
ranked and predicted outside time and space is difficult to defend as actions and reasoning
about is “bounded by history and culture” (Wind 1997: 21). Recent research has shown that
the way a country deals with the EU is to a significant extent influenced by unique national
settings (Lequesne 1998: 126,127; Bulmer and Burch 2000; Knill 2001; see also Longhurst
2004; Giegerich 2006). This applies to country specific macro-institutional patterns, state
traditions, legal patterns, market and civil service traditions or the organisation of the state,
which are all historically embedded and reflect a country’s identity.

Besides, ongoing co-operation within the EU and the sole existence of the European
framework socialised national civil servants. The EU sets the scene for learning process
about good policy practice that in turn affects national decision-making (Juncos and
Pomorska 2006; Checkel 2001; Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Tonra 2003; Rittberger 2001;
Smith 2000). Recent studies on Europeanisation (Tonra 2001; Wong 2006; Bulmer and Radaelli 2004) and Brusselisation (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002; Allen 1998) support this hypothesis. Intentionalist accounts neglect the possible impact of such learning and socialisation processes framed by the *acquis communautaire*. Stating that interests and preferences can be exogenous to social interaction processes, culture and history yields as consequence that important elements such as the evolution and the change of norms, ideas and historically produced codes of conduct are excluded from the analysis. But excluding the historical meaningful context of action risks leaving the observer with little knowledge about particular events at all.

Thus, by mainly paying attention to the events rather than to the context and the underlying processes, history, and national opportunity structures, intentionalist-rationalist approaches disavow notions of structure and context. They not only disregard the effect of structural constraints on the ability of the actors to realise their intentions. They also neglect the structural consequences of their actions. Wind puts it even more drastically when stating that as explanatory tool

“rationalist approaches [...] are insufficient and [...] even directly misleading when it comes to detecting the often rather subtle elements of transition [...] Because of its focus on the EU as 'just' a classical international regime utilized by European states to maximize their power and general welfare, it is - in its ontological assumptions and concrete research design - completely insensitive to the working of dynamic institutional order” (Wind 1997: 16, 18).

1.1.3 ESDP and structuralist approaches – stressing the context

While intentionalist approaches emphasise the capacity of actors to shape the course of events, structuralist accounts consider actor behaviour as a function of the structures in which the agent is located. Thus, political outcomes are (almost) exclusively understood in terms of structural/contextual factors, whereas actors are marginalized.

The context within which political effects occur is considered beyond the immediate control of the actors involved. But the notion of structure entails here somewhat more than
the basic meaning of context and the setting within which social, political and economic events occur (Wight 2003: 707-708; Lewis 2002). It refers to the

“ordered nature of social and political relations – to the fact that political institutions, practices, routines and conventions appear to exhibit some regularity or structure over time” (Hay 2002b: 94).

Thus, appealing to the notion of structure means to assume that political behaviour tends to be ordered.

Structuralist approaches, although there are very few who consider themselves as pure structuralists, seek to account for regularities in patterns of political behaviour by appealing to systemic logics that are seen to operate in some sense independently of the actors, which are themselves considered in a uniform way. Given the ongoing European integration process since the 1950s, this approach appears convincing; after all, this process seems to have weakened the (national) governmental control and strengthened European institutions. The development of ESDP would then be embedded in a European integration/co-operation dynamic, which, anchored at both the national and the European levels and partly independently of the actors, drives the co-operation process further. ESDP would thus be explained rather by the influence of the systemic structures/context – be it domestic, European or international - than by the intentional decision of actors (governments).

Structuralist tendencies can be detected in institutionalist and in some neo-functionalist approaches. The neo-functional core concept of spillover describes the expansive logic of integration beyond the initial goal in a dynamic that member states find difficult to resist (Eilstrup-Sagiovanni 2006: 89-103, 181-185). Once the process of co-operation/integration is initiated, it develops a dynamic on its own and is extended over time in a way that was not initially intended and that becomes difficult to control for the actors (Lindberg 1963: 10; Haas 1968: 283-317). With regard to the EU, even though it was founded on a classical international treaty, it has over the decades developed much further towards ordinary constitution than it was possibly expected by the member states. It has indeed been difficult
for states to prevent this from happening despite they objected on several occasions, for instance, to the rulings by the European Court of Justice.

In such an account, ESDP could be understood as a result of a search for consistency in relation with other policy areas. It could also be considered the outcome of the expansive logic of integration which materialises in the spillover process. Nevertheless, by disavowing the role of actors, such an approach does not seem best suited to grasp the role member states played in the intergovernmental ESDP.

On the other hand, developments in the 1960s and the 1970s, particularly the slowdown of the European integration process, led to a revision of neo-functionalist thinking, including the idea of spillover. It seemingly could not account for the de Gaulle years, the primacy of national preferences and the Commission’s apparent retreat in the light of growing member state opposition. Particularly French president de Gaulle’s ideologically driven actions were considered questioning the initial idea of an assumed superiority of incremental economic decision-making over crucial political choices.

As a result, scholars like P. Schmitter retreated from the originally formulated idea of a certain determinism and a quasi-automatic and ultimately inevitable process towards further integration and pointed inter alia to the existence of interest-driven actors (Schmitter 1971, 2003, see also Nye 1970, McGowan 2007). In addition, the empirical evidence of the integration process led scholars to the conclusion that spillover was not given but just one possible development among numerous others, such as spill-around, build-up, retrench, muddle-about, spillback and encapsulation (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 100; Schmitter 1971, 2003; Transholm-Mikelsen 1991; see also Busch 1996). Particular attention has been devoted to the models of spill-around and spill-back. Spill-around describes an increase in the scope but not the level of integration, whereas spill-back captures the decision of national actors to withdraw from joint obligations, with the result of a decrease in either the level or scope of integration (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 137).

Nevertheless, despite reformulation, neo-functionalism does not seem to offer a useful approach to study ESDP. This is mainly due to the emphasis put on the role of non-state
actors in providing the dynamic for further integration. Although the role of member states as actors is recognised as setting the terms for the initial agreement, they are not expected to exclusively determine the direction and extent of subsequent change. Moreover, the focus on supranational institutions as the expense of state action seems inappropriate for a policy area where virtually no supranational aspects exist.

The structuralist stance is clearly perceptible in new institutionalist approaches, particularly historical institutionalism, which underline the mediating and constraining role of the institutional settings within which outcomes are realised (Peters 1999; Pierson 1996). The different institutionalist strands are unified under the core claim of ‘institutions matter’ and emphasise the ordering nature of social and political relations in and through institutions and institutional constraints (Pierson 1996; Pollack 2004; Hall and Taylor 1996; Bulmer 1998). By defining institutions as formal legalistic entities and sets of rules that set obligations upon actors, rational choice institutionalism (‘logic of consequentiality’) already tends to an intentionalist-rationalist approach as outlined above. Contrary to this view, historical and sociological institutionalisms seek a wider definition including rules, norms, conventions and procedures (Hall 1986: 6, 19). This largely defined institutional context then shapes the political outcome, with the parameters of the possible outcome increasingly confined through the emergence of habits and norms and their reinforcement over time.

Through this lens, the development of ESDP would be a continuation of already initiated co-operation schemes, reflecting embedded norms, procedures and socialisation processes rather than the consequence of rationalist-intentionalist actor decisions. For if institutions shape the actor’s adherence to a certain idea of what is reasonable (‘logic of appropriateness’), they are an important driving force. Agents behave the way they do because they have become used to behaving in particular ways in particular contexts and because it is difficult to imagine behaving in another way (Hay 2002b: 106). Here, context dependent norms of behaviour emerge to which agents conform out of habit, eventually becoming self-constraining.
The main idea of structuralist approaches can be subsumed as stressing the context, which constrains the parameters of political possibility (Peters 1999; Hall and Taylor 1996). It is then not surprising that the main criticism of structuralist approaches targets the weakness of agency, that is, the negligence of the influence of actors upon the course of events. Even when recognising structural influences, “in the last instance […] it is actors that make history” (Hay 2002b: 107). Put another way, without neglecting the impact of institutional settings, norms and rules that might have paved the way for co-operation and determined actors behaviour, the final decisions on ESDP came as a result of intergovernmental meetings and thus through actor’s agreement.

Furthermore, the focus on structural imperatives as determining elements risks leading to a simplified view on the policy process as a whole. If the behaviour of the states is essentially determined by (international or other) structures, the assumed reaction of those actors will be “limited to recognising what they are required to do by the system and adapting their behaviour more or less effectively” (White 2004: 19). This paints the image of actors as mere puppets in a process beyond their control, almost promoting fatality and passivity. Indeed, the assumption of structural imperatives determining the behaviour of actors struggles to explain change and defection in their behaviour.

This schematic comparison of individualist-intentionalist agency based and structuralist-context based approaches was intended to help in defining what constitutes an adequate explanation of political outcomes. It shows an evident polarisation and demonstrates that a mere concentration on one or the other is not very helpful. Consequently, the challenge is to complement the macro-approach of structuralism with some form of micro-centred agency, thus to reconcile structural and agential factors within a single explanation. Yet an account needs to be developed, which does not simply vacillate between theses poles but explores the middle ground and offers the understanding of the way in which agents appropriate their context and the consequences of that appropriation for their development as agents and for that of the context itself (White 2004; Hellmann et al. 2005; Ginsberg 2001). In recent years, different approaches addressed this challenge.
1.1.4 Constitutive approaches - overcoming the classical divide

The need to move beyond the opposition of structure and agency, recognising that they are both central to political explanations, is the main argument of recent discussion whose most well known proponents are Anthony Giddens (1976, 1984), Roy Bhaskar (1979), Margaret Archer (1995), Pierre Bourdieu (1977) and Colin Hay (2002b; see also Wight 2003; Lewis 2002). Rejecting the “theoretical poverty” (Hay 2002b: 116) of solely structuralist or intentionalist approaches, they claim that social life results from the interplay of structure and agency rather than being a product of one, with social structure and agency held to be recursively and inexorably related. With actors seen as drawing upon social structures in order to act, and in acting they reproduce or transform these structures, it is obvious that each of them, structure and agency, are consequence of and condition for the other.

Applied to ESDP, it means that the decision of the member states to set up ESDP, and their capacity to influence the related processes, is determined by the interaction with the context, be it European, international or domestic. This also points to different overlapping structure - agency relationships: national governments act on the one hand as agents within the European structure. But they also constitute the very structure in which national individual diplomats act as agents (Glarbo 2001: 143). If we focus on the national governments as agents within the European structure, it means that the evolving ESDP entity and the existing European structures act upon the member states and this influence in turn affects the position that the member states take towards ESDP.

However, beyond this core ontological agreement, there are different ways of conceptualising the relationship of structure and agency. The most well known are the structuration theory developed by Giddens (1976, 1984) and the critical realism of Bhaskar (1989) and Archer (1995), with the main issue of dispute being the ontological and analytical separability of structure and agency. Precisely with regard to IR, and also European integration, it was the “constructivist turn” (Checkel 1998) in the 1990s that took up these ideas and attempted to develop a new research agenda. The main commonly shared
assumption considers (social) constructivism based on a social ontology “which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and their collectively shared system of meaning” (Risse 2004: 160). Social constructivists claim that it is neither the structure (domestic, European, international) that form the identity of the states or the states that shape the character of the international system (Risse 2004: 160-161; Wendt 1999: 139-190; Wendt 1992). Rather it is the interplay of the two with both reproducing each other in a dynamic relationship.

Social constructivist thinking claims to offer a middle way between formerly dominating realist and liberal approaches, both considered as rationalist, and reflectivist approaches such as post modernism or critical realism. However social constructivism does not aim to offer yet another theory, but describes a meta-theoretical approach to the study of social phenomena and a particular position in the nature of social reality, thus a particular ontology (Risse 2004: 160; Christiansen et al. 2001: 12; Christiansen et al. 1999: 530). Accordingly, it is not so much about seizing the middle ground but about establishing the middle ground, i.e. relating the different poles, that is, reflectivism and rationalism, instead of staying at the opposite ends.

A main assumption of social constructivist thinking is that the structure of world politics is social rather than material (Wendt 1992). The behaviour of the actors is not simply determined by environmental factors but through their social interaction, with the actors themselves helping to construct their own environment. The structural context is thus neither fixed and external to state interaction nor are the identities and interests of actors formed exogenously; they are endogenous and constructed by social interaction. This social interaction is not random but governed by rules, norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour which are agreed and practiced. These intersubjective practices in turn are assumed to play a major role in shaping the identities and the interests of actors. To sum up:

“Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not dependent of time and place” (Ruggie 1998:33).
Much interest is given to the role of ideational, cultural and discourse-related factors and social processes. Considering interests as socially constructed rather than pre-given emphasises the causal and constitutive significance of ideational factors. One focus is on how collective thinking emerges and how institutions and social structure constitute the interests and identities of actors (Risse 2004: 161-162). Norms and ideas are thought to condition the construction of identities, interests and behaviour of actors (Christiansen et al. 1999: 535). With reference to the mutually constitutive nature of structure and agency, social constructivists also establish a mutually constitutive relationship in the second ontological core question, that is, between material and ideational factors.

In this context, they stress the importance of studying European integration as a process bound up with change, instead of seeing it as inter state bargaining (intergovernmentalist) or the EU as a political system (comparative politics). To consider European integration and co-operation as a long term process of political and social change implies the necessity to deal with the social ontologies that are subject to this change. Social constructivist thinking thus deals with questions about…

“social ontologies and social institutions, directing research at the origin and reconstruction of identities, the impact of rules and norms, the role of language and political discourse” (Christiansen et al: 2001: 12).

Particular emphasis is placed upon the constitutive effect of norms. It is through the internalisation of norms that actors acquire their identities and establish their interests, with identities and interests produced by dynamic interaction (Rittberger et al. 2001; Christiansen et al. 1999; Risse 2004, 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Defined as intersubjectively shared, norms are understood as value based expectations of appropriate behaviour and influence actor behaviour (Rittberger et al. 2001: 106-107). Thus, social norms regulate behaviour while also constituting the identity of actors as members of a social community.

It is through ideas that states finally relate to each other. They help to define the states’ interests, i.e. content and meaning are constituted by ideas and culture. In the case of ESDP, this would mean that member states might indeed pursue perceived interests but that these
interests have been derived from processes of identity formation, whether collective or individual (Jørgensen 2004: 44; Risse 2004; Christiansen et al. 2001). Socialisation processes are then the mechanism linking social norms and state behaviour. In the case of ESDP, at least two parallel socialisation processes are supposed to take place, namely, at the national and at the European levels.

Thus, in order to account for the interests of actors, social constructivists need to concentrate on their social identities, paying attention to the context they act in. Although embedded in various social communities and constituted by their social environment, actors nonetheless create, reproduce and change through daily practices this very context. This is clearly different to rationalists who believe that preferences, strategies and choices can be ranked and predicted outside time and space or that a motive of a national interest can be interpreted prior to or outside this constitutive context. From a social constructivist perspective, understanding action necessarily requires knowledge about more than rational actors assumed intentions or a-historical preference ranking but the reference to the social structure in which agents are embedded.

However, social constructivism is not a unified strand in IR. While there is mainly agreement on the relevance of ontology over epistemology and on the use of a “deep ontology”, the differences within social constructivist thinking become manifest in different epistemological positions, vacillating between rationalist and reflectivist poles (Christiansen et al. 1999: 543). Moreover, in some aspects, social constructivism overlaps with sociological institutionalism (such as processes of socialisations) or neo-functionalism (when talking about normative integration and common interests).

Often, a first differentiation is made between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ constructivism (Hay 2002b: 199) or “sociological constructivists” (Katzenstein 1996a) and “Wittgensteinian constructivists” (Christiansen et al. 1999: 535). While sociological constructivists seek to study the impact of norms on actors’ identities, interests and behaviours (Katzenstein 1996), Wittgensteinian constructivists defend a more radical way of applying philosophical constructivism, where the role of the discourse as constituting reality is emphasized.
(Kratchowil 1989; Onuf 1989). This study builds upon the ‘thin’ version that has been particularly developed by Wendt (1992, 1994, 1999), while also drawing upon the studies of Christiansen, Wiener (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 1999, 2001), Checkel (2001b, 1999), Risse (2003, 2004) and Diez (Wiener and Diez 2004).

Although often criticised that, “by any conventional definition of constructivism, Wendt is not constructivist” (Hay 2002b: 199), he strongly influenced the constructivist turn (Wendt 1992, 1994, 1999). His main claims are that

1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory;

2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective rather than material;

3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by social structures rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics (Wendt 1994: 385):

Wendt’s approach seems thus particularly suited to take into account the particularities of ESDP. It maintains the state as unit of analysis while recognising the intersubjective nature of key structures.

The above considerations thus offer first answers to the three questions initially asked. The member states’ commitment for and their influence upon ESDP development cannot be explained by a solely agency or structure based explanation but is a result of their interaction. While the state is at the centre of analysis, also the context has to be taken into account. This concerns particularly the state’s position in security and defence matters which are supposed to be to a great extent defined by social structures. Nevertheless, these considerations do not offer many insights about how to link the different levels of analysis of this study, that is, the national and the European. This is where the framework of Europeanisation offers a useful tool.
1.2 Europeanisation – bridging the national and European levels of analysis

If social constructivist approaches help us to explore the linkage of agency and structure and material and ideational factors by conceptualising them as mutually constitutive, Europeanisation helps to link the European and national levels of analysis of this study. With the ongoing European integration process, domestic and European institutional and political settings become increasingly and inexorably intermeshed. It is this growing interaction and interwovenness of national and European spheres and the consequences of this for both levels that the framework of Europeanisation aims to capture. The development of ESDP is here conceptualised as Europeanisation.

This chapter defines the concept of Europeanisation, with particular attention paid to the specific aspects it takes in the area of security and defence.

1.2.1 Defining Europeanisation

In recent years, “Europeanisation” has become a term commonly used in IR and particularly in European studies to describe a multiplicity of phenomena, mainly analysing “how Europe matters” in a particular policy field (Börzel 1999, 2003; Lawton 1999; Smith 2000; Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001; Tonra 2001; Knill 2001; Featherstone 2003; Radaelli 2004; Major 2005; Wong 2006; Dover 2007; Allan and Oliver 2008). Although often used, a lively debate still rages on how to define Europeanisation, with authors assigning the term different meanings that then undergo further differentiation when applied to different policy areas (Harmsen and Wilson 2000; Olsen 2001; Featherstone 2003; Dyson and Götz 2003). This is further complicated by the alternative use of other termini such as EU-isation (Hay 2002a; Vink 2002), ‘Europeification’ (Andersen and Eliassen 1995) or ‘Brusselisation’ (Allen 1998; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002) that also deal with the interface of European and national levels.
Research in the field of European studies, mainly concentrating on inter-governmental and neo-functionalist approaches, was initially concerned with conceptualising and explaining the effect that the EU member states have on the processes and outcomes of the European integration process, and thus on the role that the member states play at the EU level. From this ‘bottom-up’ perspective, Europeanisation has been defined as:

"the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative European rules" (Caporaso, Green Cowles and Risse 2001: 3).

Here, Europeanisation captures the manifestation of the integration process in the form of decision making processes, administrative and political structures designed to formulate, implement and monitor policies.

These studies also deal with the impact of national policy preferences and interests on institution building and policy-making at the European level, analysing to what extent member states tried to project their preferences to the EU level (Dyson and Götz 2003; Börzel 2003; Miskimmon 2007). With regard to foreign and security policy, Ginsberg defines Europeanisation as the

“process by which CFSP […] moved closer to EC norms, policies, and habits without […] CFSP becoming supranationalised” (Ginsberg 2001: 37).

Given the similar settings of CFSP and ESDP, this definition can be used for ESDP and is complementary to the one of Caporaso et al.

However, research over the last decade increasingly concentrated on the impact that the integration process and the evolving European system of governance have on the national level of policy, polity and politics particularly in policy areas within the first EU pillar. Here, Europeanisation describes domestic change caused by European integration in particular and co-operation at the EU level in general. It is

“an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of policies to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy making” (Ladrech 1994: 69).
These ‘top-down’ studies attempt to explain how, and to what extent, communitisation lead to domestic institutional and policy changes; and whether it generated a growing convergence of national policies through commonly defined norms, directives and laws (Börzel 1999, 2003; Knill 2001; Cole and Drake 2000).

Sometimes, a third dimension, the ‘crossloading’, is added. It seeks to grasp the exchange of ideas, norms and ‘ways of doing’ things between countries or other entities for which the EU sets the scene (Major and Pomorska 2005; Wong 2006; Gross 2009). Change is conceptualised not only as ‘due’ to Europe but as taking place within Europe. It seeks more to identify Europe as offering a scene for change than as emerging entity or cause of change.

In the above conceptualisations, Europeanisation either describes the emergence of genuine structures at the EU level or domestic change caused by an EU influence, with the different dimensions being clearly separated. The two main dimensions of Europeanisation have been defined as “uploading versus downloading”, “reception versus projection” (Bulmer and Burch 2000) or “shaping versus taking” of EU policies (Börzel 2003).

However, given that the member states constitute the EU and are therefore at the origin of the EU policies that they later have to adapt to, these two dimensions of Europeanisation cannot justifiably be considered separately. They need to be linked, thereby establishing Europeanisation as an ongoing, interactive and mutually constitutive process of change where the responses of the member states to the integration process feed back into EU institutions and policy processes and vice versa (Jeffery 2003; Börzel 2003). In fact, the way in which European integration affects a state is conditioned by how successfully it has been in “uploading” its institutional models, policy preferences and ‘ways of doing things’ to the EU level (see the ‘misfit’ hypothesis, Börzel 1999; Börzel and Risse 2000; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999).

Nevertheless, although intellectually satisfying, this definition of Europeanisation as being bound up in a circular movement raises methodological questions. By considering Europeanisation as a process it is suggested that this process generates an observable
result—an Europeanised entity. But taking into account the ongoing character of this process, it is difficult to define these “results”: the EU generated input that is viewed as modifying policies and institutions at the national level is also seen as being conceived at that same national level. EU policies and institutions can be regarded as modifying policy preferences at the national level while at the same time originating at this very national level. Therefore they can potentially serve as both a dependent or independent variable. Europeanisation will thus be both, process and constantly changing result at both European and national levels.

This definition of Europeanisation as a matter of “reciprocity between moving features” (Radaelli and Bulmer 2004: 3) is however of little help methodologically: it blurs the boundaries between cause and effect, dependent and independent variable. However, analytically, one should distinguish between a process and its effect. This is what Dyson and Götz call the “danger of a gap between an increasingly ambitious and demanding conceptualisation and theoretical approaches to Europeanization and what empirical work can reasonably be expected to deliver” (2003: 19). Conceptual and theoretical discussions can, at times, seem in danger of running away with themselves.

1.2.2 Identifying the ‘uploading’ dimension as the defining property of Europeanisation

Consequently, this study adopts a parsimonious definition: It defines as the main idea of Europeanisation the aim of retracing the underlying reasons, mechanisms and the outcome of the upload, that is, the emergence of new settings at the European level.

Dyson and Götz (2003: 15, 20) and Bulmer and Radaelli (2004: 4) already suggested a methodological ‘bracketing’ in order to enable for a rigid methodological approach and to hinder the theoretical discussion from “running away with itself” (see also Wendt 1987: 364f, Hellmann et al. 2005). They clearly separate the uploading from the downloading dimension and recommended concentrating on the downloading dimension as ‘defining property’. They bracket the uploading as ‘accompanying’ but not strictly defining property, which can be, for
the time being, neglected. This study follows their suggestion in so far as it concentrates upon one dimension of Europeanisation. But the novelty of this study is to concentrate on the so far rather neglected and under explored *uploading* dimension of Europeanisation as defining property.

This differentiation between a ‘defining’ and an ‘accompanying property’ helps not only to safeguard the internal coherence of the concept. It offers above all the necessary rigidity of an analytical framework. The bracketing can be justified analytically as it helps to unpack and think through the different stages in the Europeanisation uploading process. It thus offers a useful tool to grasp the member states influence on ESDP by conceptualising their actions as a process of Europeanising security and defence policy.

Europeanisation in its uploading dimension is hereby understood as a process where states seek to export particular policy models, ideas, and ways of doing things to the EU level. States are the primary actors in this process, and pro-actively project preferences to the EU level. By europeanising previously national policies and generalising them onto a larger stage, national and EU levels become increasingly linked. The potential benefit for a state is to increase its international influence, to reduce costs of pursuing a controversial policy against an extra European country, and to gain potential benefits resulting from a strong European presence in the world (Ginsbersg 2001; Regelsberger 1998; Gross 2009). National projection is expected to allow member states to take advantage of the EU to promote specific national interests, to increase influence by participating in or initiating EU policies, or to use the EU as a cover to influence foreign policies of other member states.

Thus, EU member states are not only passive recipients of pressure emerging from the EU level (‘europeanised’) but try to actively project preferences to the EU level (‘europeanising’). Europeanisation is an ongoing and mutually constitutive process of change composed of a defining property – the emergence at the EU level of policies and institutional structures – and an accompanying property – domestic change caused by European integration. This study focuses on the defining property, that is, the emergence of new
structures of ESDP governance at the European level (see also working definition in section 2.8).

Figure 1: Europeanisation as ongoing and mutually constitutive process of change linking European and national levels

1.2.3 Delimiting Europeanisation from other concepts

The above outlined methodological quandary underlines the need to delimit the concept of Europeanisation and to demarcate it from others which also address the interface of national and European levels. The danger consists of identifying Europeanisation with the different phenomena observable at the European level. Without going into detail (which has been done elsewhere, see Featherstone 2003; Harmsen and Wilson 2000; Radealli 2000; 2004; Major 2005), the main limitation necessary to establish in this study concerns European integration.

Although very close and partly overlapping, Europeanisation is not synonymous with European integration. Political integration is mainly concerned with integration theories in general and seeks to explain why national states (or other entities) agree to abandon parts of their sovereignty in order to pool it in supranational organisations (in this case the EU).
Thus, integration focuses on what happens to the state and its sovereignty (strengthening, weakening, etc). From such a point of view, Europeanisation is what happens as a consequence of that to domestic institutions, policies and actors (Börzel 1999: 576-577; Smith 2000; Knill 2001). Europeanisation appears as result of political integration, that is, in its downloading dimension.

Several scholars split the process of Europeanisation into two aspects, preserving the term integration for developments at the supranational level while referring to Europeanisation as the supplementary other mechanism “concerned with the consequences of this process for […] the member states” (Bulmer and Lequesne 2002: 16). Hence, from a European integration theories point of view, Europeanisation is just one mechanism within the broader construct of European integration and would not exist without it.

Although this traditional view of conceptualising Europeanisation mainly as ‘downloading’ and equating the uploading dimension with European integration has been convincingly challenged (Caporaso et al. 2001; Börzel 2003; Jeffery 2003; Ginsberg 2001; Paterson and Miskimmon 2003), the need to clearly distinguish the two is evident. What is the difference between integration, understood as “the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously autonomous units” (Wallace 1990: 9) and the ‘uploading’ dimension of Europeanisation understood as the emergence of distinctive structures of governance?

The main difference lies in the process character of Europeanisation, where, building upon a mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency, the consequences of up-and downloading feed back into new decisions, hereby creating Europeanisation as an ongoing process of change. Even when differentiating into ‘defining’ and ‘accompanying’ properties, there is still the idea of a feed back, of socialisation and contextual impact as different to a static snap shot. Europeanisation is here conceptualised as process and this includes, when viewed through a social constructivist lens, an imminent aspect of development over time, including successive learning and creation of new structures drawing upon previous experiences. The interest is indeed no longer exclusively on why integration
occurs and what form it takes, but also on how and through which processes it operates and through which the member states deliver and influence outputs.

Studying uploading-Europeanisation as a process of political and social change means concentrating the research efforts at the nature of this change. It implies asking to what extent, and in which ways, ESDP is being constituted, and what role the member states played within it. Here, the constructivist approach of critically examining transformatory processes will offer new insights on co-operation processes.

Second, Europeanisation defined as uploading implies a strong element of pro-active projection of national preferences to the EU level, which often falls short in traditional integration theories. It thus addresses the influence of the member states within the inception of new EU structures. Europeanisation focuses on the dynamics of building new co-operation settings and not only on the reasons for such a commitment. The mechanisms and conditions of this uploading, that is, the way member states try to shape European developments, is a main part of the Europeanisation concept and indeed its strengths. Moreover, it is an essential step to tackle the core question of this thesis, namely assessing the influence of the member states on ESDP settings.

Finally, Europeanisation as conceptualised here aims to go beyond analysing the motivations of member states commitment to European co-operation and attempts to grasp also the growing interwoveness of national and European spheres. Even in intergovernmental policy areas as ESDP, domestic and European institutional settings become increasingly intermeshed, with actors engaged in both vertical and horizontal networks and institutional linkages (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001: 1). It is this increasing concatenation, closely linked to the above mentioned feedback idea, that influences member state commitment to European co-operation and is thus an important aspect of the uploading dimension. From this perspective, Europeanisation offers indeed a “healthy corrective of overemphasise on interstate bargaining” (Ginsberg 2001: 38) and opens the door to new, more nuanced theoretical insights.
1.2.4 The novelty of applying Europeanisation to security and defence policy

Until now, however, there does not seem to be much research on the uploading dimension. The increasing number of Europeanisation studies mostly draw on a definition of Europeanisation as domestic change (downloading). Besides, they mainly cover policy areas that have already been communitised, dealing with subjects such as environmental policies (Knill 2001; Börzel 2003, 2006), citizenship (Checkel 2001a; Dell'Olio 2005), airline policies (Lawton 1999), financial services (Howell 2004), immigration policies (Geddes 2003; Ette and Faist 2007), parties (Ladrech 2002; Costa Lobo 2007), or telecommunications and electricity (Levi-Faur 2001; Schneider and Werle 2006).

Until recently, comparatively few studies addressed the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy (Tonra 2001 - on Holland, Denmark and Ireland; Paterson and Miskimmon 2003; Lüdeke 2002 - on Germany; Torreblanca 2001 - on Spain; Höll 2002 - on Austria). However, the growing interest of the last years generated an enormous amount of studies (Wong 2006 - on France; Miskimmon 2007 - on Germany; Dover 2007 - on Britain; Pomorska 2007 - on Poland; Alecu de Flers 2007 - on Austria; Vanhoonacker 2008 - on Belgium). However, with some exceptions (Gross 2009; Tonra 2001) those studies mainly concentrate on unique country case studies, neglecting a comparative approach and, rarely attempt to create a general conceptual approach to Europeanisation.

If the Europeanisation of foreign policies is today well covered, only very few studies address the Europeanisation of defence or military policies (Dover 2007; Irondelle 2003) or precisely examine the effects of ESDP (as distinct from CFSP) (Vanhoonacker 2008).

Finally, it is striking to see the dominance of studies dealing with the downloading dimension. With the exception of some studies, such as Börzel (2003) on environmental policies, Howell (2004) on financial services and Miskimmon (2007) on German foreign and security policy, little attention has been paid to the uploading perspective.

There are arguably some studies on the genesis of CFSP, quite similar to ESDP in its setting, from a social constructivist point of view (Glarbo 2001; Tonra 2003). There are also
studies on national foreign, security and defence policies, which address the European dimension (Williams 2005; Howorth 2000a,b, 2002; Treacher 2002; Menon 2002; Haftendorn 2006; Harnisch and Schieder 2006), as well as from a comparative perspective (Hilz 2005,b; Howorth 2004; Mérand 2006; Aggestam 2006). Recent research also addresses particular aspects of ESDP, such as crisis management (Gross 2009) or the (mis)-fit with national strategic cultures (Giegerich 2006; Meyer 2006; Toje 2008). But there seem to be no major study on ESDP as such, neither from a particular Europeanisation uploading perspective, nor in a comparative perspective. Arguably, this may be due not only to the methodological quandary outlined above but also to the unique nature of security and defence policy and the recent inception of ESDP.

1.2.5 The particular character of security and defence policy in Europe

Security and defence policy differs indeed from other policy areas. Particularly after the abandonment of national currencies, co-operation in this field touches upon one of the last remaining core tenets of national sovereignty. Traditionally considered as being outside and above the partisan domestic debate, security and defence matters were directly and insolubly linked to the preservation of national sovereignty and entrusted to the national executive. Hence co-operation which implied a limitation to national sovereignty was difficult.

Besides the constraining international political situation (Cold War) and security and defence settings (i.e. NATO), also the unique national opportunity structures which condition a country’s position in a policy field were here particularly salient. Historically rooted approaches to the European integration process in general (such as deepening vs. widening, the ‘finality’ of the EU) and CFSP/ESDP in particular (mainly Europeanists vs. Atlanticists), to the transatlantic relationship, national strategic cultures (mainly particular position on the use of force) and not at least different political and military capabilities made co-operation in security and defence matters at the European level difficult (Howorth 2000a,b; Maull 2000; Giegerich 2006). Overcoming, at least partly, these contrasts is one of ESDP’s biggest challenges.
Given these tensions, it was not surprising, that after the failure of the European Defence Community in the 1950s, co-operation in security and defence remained outside EC/EU frameworks, with NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the main arenas for security and defence co-operation. When finally institutionalised through the European Political Cooperation (EPC), CFSP and ESDP, co-operation in foreign, security and defence matters still avoided any supranationalisation, keeping the member states as main actors through the intergovernmental decision making process. It is nonetheless through these subsequent steps of institutionalisation, however loose they remain, that the sensitive area of security and defence has definitively become part of the integration process and entered the Treaties.

This also points to the difficulty of conceiving EU level co-operation in security and defence matters strictly as an interplay of national and European levels. The decision to co-operate is supposed to have been nurtured from different sources and cannot easily be restricted to a purely national decision. This also means that the topics member states wish to upload to the EU level/ESDP are not limited to the EU. Europeanisation of security and defence policy appears hence to incorporate two dimensions (member states and ESDP) and three interactive levels (international, European, national), thereby adding to the methodological quandary.
These particularities need to be taken into consideration when asking how Europeanisation works in ESDP and what the conditions for successful uploading are.

1.2.6 The uploading dimension: conditions and mechanisms

Despite an increasing modification of national policies, institutions and ‘ways of doing things’ subsequent to European impetus (the well documented downloading dimension), there is no process of homogenisation across boundaries within the EU (Lequesne 1998: 126; Knill 2001: 41-50; Olsen 2001: 15). Instead, different reactions to an EU generated input occurred in each country: in fact, the various historically grown national structures averted an uniformisation across Europe. Consequently, it is supposed that these national structures also considerably influence the way in which member states engage with the EU and towards ESDP (Giegerich 2006; Longhurst 2004; Mérand 2006). As indicated by
constructivist thinking, policy projection is supposed to be filtered through national strategic cultures. They thus require particular attention in the analysis.

Generally, historically embedded factors such as country specific macro-institutional patterns, state traditions, legal patterns, market and civil service traditions, the structure and organisation of the state affect a country's capacity to get involved in European processes (Lequesne 1998: 126-127; Bulmer and Burch 2000; Kassim et al. 2000). More precisely, administrative styles, ranging from an intervention to intermediation culture, the degree of dispersion of policy competences between policy sectors and levels of government, or the absence or presence of political and administrative mechanisms of vertical and horizontal co-ordination condition the capacity of a state to organise and articulate national positions towards the EU (Knill 2001: 61, 74). With regard to the EU level, the congruence in constitutional orders, norms and conventions can be enabling factors for successful uploading, as Katzenstein (1996) illustrated with regard to Germany.

This list needs to be complemented by criteria which affect the uploading capacity in the particular area of security and defence policy: factors such as the international role, alliance preferences, the global reach of diplomacy (in various forms such as Commonwealth), the military strength in material (such as resources, equipment or nuclear power) and human terms (such as expertise).

Attempts to categorise the potential for influencing EU developments have particularly been made by Börzel (2003). The following table illustrates the two categories she developed, dealing with the administrative and the political capacities of member states (Börzel 2003: 8):
Table 1: Criteria defining the uploading potential

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political capacity</th>
<th>Administrative Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political fragmentation (domestic veto players: a high number is likely to increase the capacity of Member States to shape EU policy outcomes)</td>
<td>Administrative fragmentation (dispersion of competencies in the national administration, co-ordination mechanisms between the ministries and other entities involved, capacity to develop unitary positions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political resources (national votes in the Council decisions, financial contribution to the EU budget)</td>
<td>Administrative Resources (Financial means, staff power, expertise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political legitimacy (support for European integration, Issue-salience, trust in political institutions)</td>
<td>Administrative legitimacy (perceived corruption)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, these criteria have been developed for communitised policy areas. Hence, they have only limited explanatory value for security and defence policy. For example, the criteria ‘votes in the EU council’ does not make much sense in ESDP that follows the rules of unanimity. These categories offer however valid pointers and will inform this study.

Closely linked and partly overlapping with the factors that influence the up-loading capacity of EU member states are the particular mechanisms through which ‘uploading’ takes place.

Several studies address the role of influence. However, they have mainly concentrated on domestic politics (Forbes 1995; Abney and Lauth 1985; Nownes and Freeman 1998) or international relations and organisations (Pressmann 2006; Cox and Jacobsen 1973; Jamison 1996; Princen 1994). Moreover, although they deal with the different forms influence can take, they do not explicitly tackle the mechanisms of such influencing. In a study on NGO influence on international negotiations Betsill and Corell define three categories to identify evidence of actors influence (Betsill and Corell 2001: 79):

- Their activities: What did NGO’s do to transmit information?
- Their access: What opportunities did NGO’s have to transmit information?
- Their resources: what source of leverage did they use to transmit information?
These categories are certainly helpful in gaining an understanding of the process of influencing. But they seem to touch upon both the conditions and mechanisms of uploading. Besides, they do not explicitly address how the “activities” take place, that is, what particular form mechanisms of uploading take.

Useful insights on potential dynamics and mechanisms of uploading can be gained from the American agenda setting debate (Cobb and Elder 1983; Cobb et al. 1976; Kingdon 1995; Cobb and Ross 1997), which has lately been enlarged to the EU dimension (Princen 2007). Agenda setting essentially answers the questions why one topic ends up at the agenda and another not. It is a highly political process: political actors seek actively to bring issues on the agenda if they are looking for a change of policy, or to keep them off the agenda if they want to defend the status quo. Hence, “agenda setting is as much political as the decision making itself” (Princen 2007: 22). Cobb et al. (1976) seek to explain how a topic can be placed on the agenda. Key to their argument is that public and political attention is rare and that there is hence a competition between the different issues. They developed specific models on how a topic can reach the agenda, such as external or internal diffusion (Cobb et al. 1976). Analysing agenda setting processes thus seems to offer a helpful tool to grasp uploading processes.

Interestingly, Paterson and Miskimmon defined agenda setting as one mechanism of uploading in their insightful study dealing with the Europeanisation of German foreign and security policy (Miskimmon and Paterson 2003; Miskimmon 2004a, 2007). They define four mechanisms:

- agenda setting; understood as the ability to use formal structural powers within the policy process.
- example setting; describing the consistent commitment to European rather than national solutions to foreign policy challenges, and the relative scarcity of overtly national posturing.
- discursive/ideational influence, which relies on a highly visible discursive input into policy developments which then inform EU decisions.
in institutional export which describes the proposition and channelling of domestic modes, practices or blueprints to the EU level.

Although developed for CFSP and in the unique context of Germany and thus difficult to generalise, these categories offer a useful starting point. However, they seem to concentrate on the ‘higher’ level of state co-operation and more direct means of influence, while paying less attention to other potential ways of exerting influence at different levels. This could be for example to offer expertise and staff power when policies and positions are prepared. Here, Börzel’s study (2003) offers additional insights.

1.2.7 The potential result of uploading: influence

Having addressed the mechanisms of uploading, the question arises as to how to define its outcome. What does ‘member states influence’ mean?

Although a basic concept in political sciences, defining ‘influence’ still provokes lively debates. This is partly due to its close links to another concept, that of power, where most of the attempts to define influence start. In classical IR, power usually relates to states and their capacities. According to Nye (1990: 24-25), power is the ability to achieve desired outcomes. With regard to the interaction of several states, power has been defined as the “general capacity of a state to control the behaviour of other states” (Holsti 1988: 42). The challenge is then to differentiate ‘influence’ from ‘power’.

Whereas some scholars consider influence as an aspect of power (Holsti 1988), other perceive of influence rather as one form among others that power could take (Sruton 1996: 262). Cox and Jacobson (1973) offer the most clear cut distinction. They define influence as when one actor modifies the behaviour of the other. Accordingly, influence expresses a relationship between actors which emerges in the political process. In turn, power refers to a capacity, that is, the resources at the disposal of the actor (Cox and Jacobson 1973). Thus, power might turn into influence, but does not necessarily have to.

Cox and Jacobsen’s definition is helpful in that it defines influence as an aspect of political interaction. However, the emphasis on influence as changing another actor’s
behaviour might be too narrow. In this study, influence is certainly conceptualised as relationship born of the political process, that is, an act to change the other's behaviour. But it also leads to a result. Hence, it is argued here that influence is both an aspect and the result of political interaction. Influence exists when preferences which have been intentionally uploaded by the member states in the negotiation process informed the final outcome in form of ESDP settings. Assessing influence would then meaning to analyse the process and the result, while also comparing the initial goal with the precise outcome in view of establishing goal attainment.

From this perspective, the extent to which the member states' preferences are represented in the final EU decisions indicates the success of the uploading and the magnitude of member states influence.
1.2.8 A working definition of Europeanisation

Taking these ideas together the following working definition of Europeanisation will be utilised in this study:

Europeanisation: entails processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated within the domestic identities, political structures and policies. EU member states are not only passive recipients of pressure emerging from the EU level (‘europeanised’) but try actively to project their preferences to the EU level (‘europeanising’). Europeanisation is an ongoing and mutually constitutive process of change composed of a defining property – the emergence at the EU level of policies and institutional structures – and an accompanying property – domestic change caused by European integration.

The defining property addressed in this study is the uploading dimension:

It is the process and the decision on setting up distinctive structures of ESDP governance at the EU level, with these structures moving closer to community norms without becoming supranationalised. In the course of this process, EU member states proactively seek to export policy models, that is, to project preferences, procedures, policy ideas and ways of doing things to the EU level. Europeanising previously national policies thus also means generalising them onto a larger stage.

To sum up, Europeanisation, embedded in a social constructivist understanding, allows us to link levels of analysis and to identify the shaping capacities of the member states by addressing the mechanisms of uploading. However, it is not very concise in identifying the content-wise development within the uploading process. This is where policy analysis offers helpful insights.
1.3 Policy analysis and policy cycle – retracing the way of policy content

Policy analysis is recognized as an important area within political science. It focuses on political substance (policy) in all its manifestations including drafts, laws and provisions (Hill and Hupe 2002; Weimer and Vining 1999; Lang 2004; Nyikos and Pollack 2003; Jann and Wegrich 2003; Howard 2005). Put simply, policy analysis seeks to identify how policy making occurs. It is a general historically situated model which offers an ideal type description of the processes of policy making.

Initially set up for public policies and mostly used for 1st pillar areas, policy analysis offer a useful set of tools to retrace the development of a policy from its idea via its formulation up to its implementation. Hence, it will allow to retrace the process from initial positions of the member states up to the decision at the EU level, thereby allowing to assess the influence the member states had on ESDP.

1.3.1 Policy analysis and the policy cycle

The main aim of policy analysis is to identify how policy making occurs. Rather than a theory, it suggests a general model which offers a formalistic description of the processes of policy making (Howard 2006). The ideal type development of policies is divided in phases which together form a policy cycle (Eberlein and Grande 2003; Jann and Wegrich 2003: 82ff). The cycle starts with the identification of a topic to be tackled. The following step is the negotiation process in which the policy is formulated. Subsequently, a policy decision is taken, to be, in the next step, implemented. The subsequent evaluation closes the policy cycle or, if the result is considered non satisfying, restarts a policy cycle.
Figure 3: Model of the policy cycle

Such a model acts on the assumption that a policy runs through typical stages from its inception to its termination, namely

“that policy is a process with discrete stages, that it involves some kind of problem solving, that different actors and institutions are involved at different stages; and that policies feed back into new policies.” (Howard 2005: 6).

Despite the use of different termini and subtle variations, there is general agreement about the main aspects of the model. Consequently, most versions of the policy cycle incorporate the following stages:

1) agenda setting or problem identification
2) analysis of the policy issue(s);
3) formulation of policy responses;
4) the decision to adopt a specific policy response;
5) implementation of the chosen policy;
6) evaluation of the policy, which potentially feeds back in the process or re-initiates the cycle.
Several criticisms have been raised regarding the policy cycle (Bridgman and Davis 2003; Everetts 2003; Sabatier 2003). As an ideal type it, has been criticised for its supposed lack of applicability. The main point is that such a model barely exists in practice, where different phases more often than not overlap or run side-by-side. Also the interaction with and the impact of external factors are not accounted for, which would render such a rigorous delineation difficult to achieve (Schneider and Janning 2006). Moreover, several ‘missing links’ have been identified and labelled as weakness. For example, the model does not explain how the policy cycle moves from one step to the other, hence it does not offer a causal explanation. Besides, it is hardly justified to delimit the policy cycle as a clearly confined moment of time (Sabatier 1993). Policies might be developed in different steps, involving different levels which moreover interact.

Such criticisms are certainly valid. They seem however to misconceive of what the policy cycle seeks to offer above all, that is, a model to analytically grasp policy processes.

1.3.2 Policy analysis complements the conceptual framework of Europeanisation

In fact, the policy cycle is not a theoretical framework but a conceptual tool to retrace the ways and forms policy making takes and to grasp the characteristics of this process. Its different stages serve above all as categories of analysis. Here, the policy cycle offers a useful tool to reduce both the complexity and the heterogeneity of policy making processes in order to enable for a rigorous analysis. By sub-dividing it into different phases, the model renders the policy process accessible for research.

Moreover, dividing the process in different steps supports the approach of this study where policy making is considered as a process rather than as a static snap shot. This is where the policy cycle complements the dimension of pro-active uploading in Europeanisation. It allows to further differentiating how the member states channelled their preferences via the different steps identified in the policy cycle to the EU level/ESDP. By
linking through a negotiation process the initial agenda of the member states with the final decision at the EU level, the policy cycle documents the content-wise development of member states commitment.

In addition, the policy cycle accounts for the different actors involved in the process. It explicitly assumes that actors with different positions attempt to shape the decision (Schneider and Janning 2006). Here, it connects with Europeanisation in that the actors and mechanisms of uploading impact upon the content of the final decision at the EU level. The extent to which interests are differentiated, the number of the actors involved, coalition building and resources impact upon the negotiation process and its outcome.

Thus, the policy cycle model is a conceptual tool to grasp the characteristics of the policy process, to unpack the uploading processes and to assess the influence member states had on decisions at the EU level. It can be taken as a reminder that processes start and end and are identifiable in terms of sections.

In this study, Europeanisation is conceived as both process and content. In terms of content, Europeanisation focuses on whether and to what extent ideas and procedures have been uploaded. In terms of process Europeanisation concentrates on whether and how an issue has been put on the agenda with the aim to lift it to the EU level. Consequently, Europeanisation essentially provides the frame for developing policies in that is opens the possibility for a policy process. While Europeanisation provides the link between the national and the European levels and sets the scene for hypothesised proactive uploading, policy analysis allows to precisely analyse how the uploading takes place in terms of content by conceptualising it as a policy process.

1.3.3 The policy cycle steps relevant to this study

In this study, not the whole policy cycle will be addressed. Only the first steps are relevant, namely the problem identification; the analysis of the policy issue(s); the formulation of policy responses and finally the decision to adopt a specific policy response. For the sake of this study, these steps are re-conceptualised in three stages:
1) **Agenda**: the definition of a topic at the beginning of the policy making process

2) **Negotiation**: the process of formulation of a policy leading to the final decision

3) **Decision**: the final decision taken at the EU level as a result of the negotiation

This project clearly focuses on the conceptual set up of ESDP and not on the implementation. With ESDP still being a comparatively young area, it seems too early to collect reliable and meaningful data to assess its implementation.

### 1.4 A framework informed by Europeanisation and policy analysis

A framework informed by Europeanisation with uploading as its defining property and completed with elements of policy analysis yields the following model:

*Figure 4: Process dimension of Europeanisation*

The model conceptualises how the member states project their national agendas via the process of uploading to the European level to inform the EU decision. This development follows the stages defined in policy analysis. The national and the European levels are linked by the Europeanising process, which offers space for negotiations and hence uploading. The main elements of the model are as follows:
- **The agenda** of the member states: the goals and positions of the three member states at the beginning of the policy process.

- **The process of uploading:** it provides the link between the national and European levels, thereby setting the scene for negotiations which can result in uploading.

- **The decision:** the final decision taken at the EU level by the member states in a precise area.

Analysing the process leading from the agenda to the decision will inform about the mechanisms the member states used to upload their preferences. The overlap between the agenda and the decision indicates how successful the member states have been in uploading their goals to the EU level during the negotiation process.

These elements are illustrated in the following table, which needs to be complemented by the identified mechanisms of uploading. The empirical case studies will be analysed building upon this table.

*Table 2: Empirical case studies and central categories*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case studies</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Uploading</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Strategy</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2 Operationalisation of the framework of analysis

The following section sets out to operationalise these theoretical and conceptual considerations and outlines the research design of the thesis. It first explains the choice of the case studies. Second, the different elements of the conceptual framework informed by Europeanisation, policy analysis and social constructivism are operationalised. The last section addresses the methods and sources used in this study.

2.1 Case study selection

This project applies a comparative case study approach in order to retrace French, German and British influence on ESDP (Collier 1993; George 1979). The motivations of the national governments, their influence on ESDP, as well as their mechanisms of uploading will be identified and compared with the help of three case studies. This will not only allow for a comparison a particular moment of time, but also in the development over time, taking into account the ongoing process character of policy making.

2.1.1 Country selection

France, Germany and the UK will be at the centre of this study. It has been claimed that “without intense Franco-British cooperation”, and – I would add – German participation, “there is no possibility of developing either a credible CFSP or a viable ESDP” (Howorth 2000b: 34). The central position of the three countries in the development of ESDP is mainly due to their leading roles in the economic, political and military domains. While Germany cannot equal the leading positions which the UK and France enjoy due to their military contributions and experiences, its diplomatic weight is recognised.

Their commitment was crucial in setting up ESDP in the first place. During the Cold War and up to the late 1990’s, efforts to co-ordinate co-operation in the area of security and defence within a European framework outside NATO did not yield results. The efforts were
undermined by the French unwillingness to consider foreign policy co-operation which explicitly excluded defence, as well as British reluctance to support a policy potentially independent from NATO. Germany, tied to both France and the US/NATO by strong bilateral relations, occupied the middle ground and tried to balance the two positions, while being generally reluctant to fully engage in international politics (Schwarz 1985; Maull 2000). The changing positions of all three countries in the late 1990s have been decisive to at least partly overcome these cleavages and create ESDP in 1999 (Mayer 2003; Quinlan 2001; Haine 2004).

In addition to their decisive role within ESDP, the three countries have been selected because they usually occupy different if not opposite positions in the main debates that characterise the European integration process. This concerns the overall integration process (founding members versus ‘late comer’), its ‘finality’ (deepening versus widening) but particular security and defence issues (transatlanticists versus Europeanists). Moreover, they considerably differ with regard to their force structure, military tradition, alliance preferences and readiness to consider and apply military force as a tool in international relations. These differences are mainly shaped by their historically grown national strategic cultures (Longhurst 2004; Giegerich 2006; Lantis 2002; Katzenstein 1996; Meyer 2006; Aggestam 2004, 2006; Mérand 2006).

Table 3: French, British and German conceptions in foreign and security policy
(building upon Mérand 2006, Howorth 2000c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Role of Europe and relation to integration process</th>
<th>Alliance Preference</th>
<th>Use of force/Force projection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Pragmatic support for Europe, reluctant towards further integration</td>
<td>Transatlantic High integration into NATO structures</td>
<td>Strong tradition (expeditionary culture), nuclear weapon state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Principal support for Europe and for deepening integration process</td>
<td>Transatlantic and European Integration into NATO structures, but also strong Franco-German co-operation</td>
<td>Weak tradition (culture of reticence/civilian power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Principal support for Europe, supports integration but insistence on intergovernmental structures in ESDP</td>
<td>European Low integration in NATO structures (not in IMS), Bilateral co-operation</td>
<td>Strong tradition (expeditionary culture), nuclear weapon state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The unique roles of the three countries within the EU integration process in general and regarding security and defence issues in particular constitute the major challenge of this study. It is also its key strength, facilitating a comparison of the three countries and enabling the significance of the findings to be clearly seen.

2.1.2 Case study selection

The motivations of the three countries, their influence on ESDP, as well as their mechanisms of uploading, will be identified and compared with the help of three case studies addressing constitutive aspects of ESDP, namely the institutional, strategic and capability dimensions. The analysis covers the timeframe 1999-2003/4, which corresponds to the originally envisaged timeframe for ESDP to reach operational capability. The Cologne declaration which established ESDP called for the EU to:

“have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Council of the EU 1999b).

Accordingly, the EU member states set up an institutional framework (1999/2000), military capabilities (1999/2004) and a strategy (2003). This study focuses on these crucial steps in the development of ESDP to efficiency, capacity to act, and identity, and uses them as case studies:

1) The institutional dimension. The creation of a decision-making capacity laid the basis for action. Analysing the institutional dimension means paying attention to the creation of the first permanent military and political ESDP bodies agreed upon at the EU summit in Nice (2000): the Political and Security Committee (PSC/COPS), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

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1 Annex III, European Council Declaration on strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence
2) **The political-strategic dimension.** The European Security Strategy (ESS), approved by the European Council in 2003, defines the strategic frame for action for ESDP, with a view to assisting the necessary prioritisation and further elaboration of EU foreign, security and defence policies.

3) **The functional-material dimension.** Military capabilities are the basic condition to assure military effectiveness in crisis scenarios. While the Helsinki Headline Goal (1999) made first steps to militarily operationalise ESDP, only the Headline Goal 2010 made substantial progress by incepting the EU battlegroups (BG). They are the a priori most palpable expression of EU military capabilities.

### 2.2 Operationalisation of the conceptual framework

With these issues in mind, the conceptual framework will be operationalised.

#### 2.2.1 Underlying rationales of the framework

Three rationales underlie in this framework. They concern the process character of Europeanisation, the central position of the state, and the process of interest formation.

First, this study concentrates on Europeanisation as both content and process. The uploading, identified as defining dimension of Europeanisation, describes the proactive attempt of states to project ideas (content) to the EU level and shape (process) the settings of ESDP. It is this link between national and European levels that this study aims to explore.

State centrim is the second assumption. The framework builds upon the assumption that the national governments remain the main actors, in terms of Europeanisation the main ‘shapers’ of ESDP structures. The extremely limited powers of the Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice have left the control over the agenda and the course of the policy field largely to the member states. They are the driving forces for progress in ESDP, which comes through intergovernmental decisions in Council meetings. National executives held the key positions in the decision making and influence the way in
which policies and institutions are shaped. Due to these particular features, ESDP can be considered an elite affair in all three countries.

The third assumption concerns the interest formation of the actors. Referring to Wendt (1999: 1, 1994: 385)

“the structures of human associations are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and [...] the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather then given by nature”.

Norms and rules shape national interests and offer guidance to the positions of states, i.e. decision making is bound by cultures, norms and socialisation processes. This means that member states indeed pursue interests but that these interests have been derived from processes of identity formation, whether collective or individual. Thus, for a consistent picture, the interaction of the actor (national governments) needs to be placed within the context in which they act.

2.2.2 Defining the main elements of the framework

The main research question seeks to assess the influence national government had on ESDP. Three sub-questions have been deduced from it:

1) What are the motivations and preferences of the member states to set up ESDP?
2) To what extent are they reflected in the final ESDP set up, that is, to what extent were the member states able to upload their preferences?
3) How, with the help of which mechanisms, did the member states shape ESDP?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to assess the member states’ motivations prior to the negotiations, that is, their agenda. Then, the outcome of the process, that is, the EU decision, will be compared to the agenda. This will allow assessing to what extent the member states have been able to upload their preferences within ESDP. Hence, it is necessary to retrace the uploading process by paying attention to the stages identified by policy analysis. The analysis will consequently concentrate on identifying:
- **The agenda** of the member states: that is, the goals and positions of the three states at the beginning of the policy process with regard to the institutional, capability and strategic dimensions.

- **The mechanisms of uploading**: that is, the mechanisms the member states applied to project their preferences to the EU level to shape ESDP within the process of uploading.

- **The success of uploading**: that is, the extent to which the results reached at the EU level (“decision”) correspond to their initial goals (“agenda”). This implies analysing the decision taken at the EU level in the three case studies and compare it with the agenda.

These elements of the Europeanisation framework will be operationalised as follows.

### 2.2.3 Assessing the “agenda” of the member states

Assessing the “agenda” of the member states is the essential starting point of the analysis. First, the agendas of each member state need to be identified. Second, they will be compared. This will allow identifying key aspects of the debate which might be different in each case study.

With the help of which criteria can the national agendas be assessed and compared? According to Krotz (2002), security policies come in four layers: international order policies; alliance politics; military and development strategies; force structure and armaments policies. While providing a useful start, these categories need to be adapted to the particular European context. Meyer (2006) and Stahl, Bökle et al. (2004) focus more on the European settings and propose to look at preferences for partner countries, preferences regarding the type of co-operation, positions on ESDP, and positions on the Iraq war. Giegerich (2006) suggests to address the degree of fit or misfit between ESDP and national strategic cultures within four categories: the purpose of the military, the instruments, basic conceptions of security and defence policy, and the preferred arena for co-operation. Such an approach is supported by insights from the strategic culture and security culture (Buzan et al. 1998) debate. According to Longhurst, a strategic culture is a
“distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experience” (Longhurst 2004: 17)

Hence, national approaches to the use of force could offer a category to assess and compare the agenda of the member states. Giegerich (2006), Longhurst (2004), Meyer (2006), and Mérand (2006) underscored the impact of national strategic cultures on ESDP.

Research on ESDP (Giegerich 2006; Meyer 2006; Gross 2009; Howorth 2000a,d,) has shown that the debates and the relevant steps in ESDP all involved considerations on transatlantic relations, the role of the EU as foreign policy actor, and the tools the EU should have at its disposal. Howorth demonstrated that the crucial difference between French and British positions is how autonomous ESDP should be from NATO. France’s long-term maximalist position was neither shared by the UK nor by Germany. Howorth (2000c) and Heisbourg (2000b) claim that three main cleavages hinder co-operation in the area of security and defence: the Europeanist-Atlanticist divide; different positions on the use of force; and the role of neutral countries. The last category is not very helpful here as it does not apply to the countries under study. On the other hand, a key element, which is the conception of the role Europe should play as security and defence actor, is not accounted for. Building upon Howorth and Heisbourg, but adapting it to this study, three cleavages can be defined which affect the Europeanising of security and defence policy:

- the Europeanist-Atlanticist divide, where the UK and France are usually placed at the opposite end of the spectrum while Germany seeks to reconcile both
- the acceptance of military force as legitimate means, where usually France and the UK on the one end of the scale oppose Germany at the other
- different conception of the role of Europe, where the UK defending a more pragmatic stance faces France and Germany with a more ideally driven approach of Europe as international actor.
These categories are helpful to generally compare different national positions on ESDP. But they might not be sufficient to take into account the precise agenda developed for the particular case studies, each at a different time and context. Hence, this analysis will be guided by two sets of categories:

1) a set of three general categories as outlined above that will be applied to each case study

2) a second set composed of particular categories relevant to each specific case study.

Analysing the debates which took place around each case study will allow to define the main contentious topics relevant to this particular case study. They will be introduced in each chapter and turned into categories to take into account the precise ideas at stake.

Building upon social constructivist considerations, the three general categories represent by their structural importance a strategic dimension of member states’ commitment. The particular national positions of the member states in these permanent categories are conditioned by their national strategic culture and inform the overarching approach of the member states towards ESDP. They are a constant point of reference and part of the cognitive structure of the member states. They are hence expected to yield relatively constant results. On the other hand, the additional categories seem to present more of a ‘tactical’ or ‘situational’ dimension applicable in the respective case studies. Here, greater flexibility is expected.
The combination of the two sets of categories yields the following table which will guide this study:

**Table 4: The two sets of categories to analyse national agendas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Transatlantic relations and NATO</th>
<th>Role of the EU</th>
<th>EU Toolbox</th>
<th>Additional categories relevant to the case studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This approach provides an instrument to reach evidence on the general expectations of the three countries toward ESDP over time, while also taking into account the particular characteristics of the three case studies. Now, the categories established to assess the national agendas need to be operationalised. What do these categories stand for?

**Table 5: Operationalisation of the three general categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transatlantic relations</td>
<td>What kind of relationship with NATO and the US do the member prefer?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What kind of relationship between the EU and NATO do the member states seek?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is their preferred arena for co-operation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the EU</td>
<td>What role for the EU in international affairs seek the member states?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do they define the role they want the EU to play?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In what areas is the EU expected to play a role?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do they link the role of the EU to their national policies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Toolbox:</td>
<td>How should Europe intervene in international crisis?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do the member states prefer certain instruments of the EU tool box to others?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is role of the military in the EU’s toolbox?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How should the terms for the use of force at the EU level be defined?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2.4 Assessing the mechanisms of uploading

The second sub question addresses the mechanisms of uploading that the member states use to project their preferences to the EU level in order to shape ESDP. Here, we look at the precise mechanisms of the process which links the national level (in form of the national agendas), with the European level (in form of the ESDP decision).

Drawing upon Miskimmon (2004a, 2007), Paterson and Miskimmon (2003) and Börzel (2003), the following mechanisms of uploading can be defined. Being simultaneously guidance for research and prospective result of this study, they are likely to be modified as a result of the thesis:

1. **Formal and informal agenda setting:**
   Agenda setting describes the advancement of particular ideas and objectives. Opportunities for agenda setting are offered for example by Council presidencies. The different stages of the policy cycle are usually assigned with different opportunities for shaping policies. While at the beginning of a cycle the role of cultural factors is comparatively high, institutional and material factors gain in relative importance later on. This means that agenda setting is highly influenced by the strategic culture.

2. **Example setting:**
   Example setting describes the explicit and outward orientated positioning in ideational or material questions.

3. **Bi- and multilateral co-operation:**
   Such co-operation, for example in form of common initiatives, can support the launch of ideas and strengthen positions. Coalition building skills can support the agenda setting and the shaping of positions. It overlaps with the agenda setting.
4. **Ideational export and preference shaping:**

The ability to shape cognitions, perceptions and preferences allows the exertion of influence on political, societal, material and institutional developments. Whether in terms of sophisticated blueprints or broad policy goals, ideational export is an essential component of policy discourses with the goal to shape policy options.

5. **Administrative commitment:**

This category sits ‘on the fence’ between mechanisms of and conditions for successful uploading. Resources such as staff power, money, expertise or the concentration of competences able to formulate and represent coherent positions can support a country's position and influence. Offering expertise at key points of decision making, such as positioning highly trained staff, is one way of injecting and defending national positions.

6. **Political capacities, influence and weight:**

This category is also located between mechanisms and conditions for successful uploading. The political weight member states can put in the ring might make a difference and offer an instrument to shape decision making. The permanent French and British seat in the UN, their global reach in diplomatic terms (such as through Commonwealth and Francophonie) or the mindset to use power can offer tools to support their positions or increase their weight.

Having defined these categories, the following table offers ways to detect and assess the mechanisms of uploading:
### Table 6: Operationalisation of the mechanisms of uploading

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms of uploading</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Operationalisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did the three countries develop or raise ideas which alimented the debate and became key points of it?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did they put particular topics on the agenda of the European debates?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were they able to impose certain topics?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal and informal agenda setting</td>
<td>Did the three states make particular commitments which were then emulated by others or established as a model at the EU level?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did a model-like commitment allow to push through certain decisions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example setting</td>
<td>Did bi/multilaterally formulated proposals allow to put ideas on to the European agenda?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did bi/multilaterally formulated ideas shape the decisions on the three case studies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did bi/multilaterally presented ideas yield more results than unilateral ones?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did any other form of bi/multilateral co-operation have an impact on the process and the final decision?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideational export and preference shaping</td>
<td>Did blueprints, food for thought papers or other documents emitted by the three states influence the debate and the outcomes of the case studies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative commitment</td>
<td>Did Brussels-based national experts offer expertise which was key in preparing the decisions regarding the case studies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did member states representatives based in the Council influence the debates about and the final shape of the case studies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did the nationality of the Council staff influence their actions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did capital-based expert influenced the negotiation and the decision?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political capacities, influence, weight</td>
<td>Did the fact that Germany, France and the UK are big countries with a considerable economic and political weight conferred to them additional influence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did the staffing in Brussels and the national capitals, as well as the general expertise at hand of the three countries offer them additional influence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The three countries are the main military powers in the EU. Did this fact lead the other countries to consider their propositions in a different way and/or attribute more weight to them?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2.5 Assessing the success of uploading

The third research question focuses on the extent to which member states were able to upload their preferences.

It is argued here that influence exists when preferences which have been intentionally uploaded by the member states in the negotiation process informed the outcome. Assessing influence requires a comparison between the initial goal and the precise outcome. Following the chosen stages of the policy cycle, the overlap of the “agenda” and the “decision” indicates the success of the uploading. It will allow the assessment of the magnitude of the member states influence. This overlap is not confined to precise ideas. Also the wording of a text, its structure or the absence of certain ideas offer indicators for influence.

This comparison will build upon the categories outlined above, that is, the general criteria and those criteria relevant to each particular case study. The following table seeks to incorporate the different aspects of the framework presented so far.

Table 7: General overview: case studies and categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case studies</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Uploading</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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2.3 Methods and sources of a comparative case study approach

This project applies a comparative case study approach in order to retrace French, German and British commitment to and influence on ESDP. The analysis will combine qualitative analysis in the form of text analysis (primary documents and secondary literature)
and semi-structured interviews to retrace the actions, processes and results of member states actions in ESDP.

Although the analysis focuses on national actors, ESDP is conceptualised as result of interaction of national and European levels. Consequently, the analysis comprises documents emanating from both the European and national (French, German, British) levels, and the interviews have been conducted at both levels, too.

2.3.1 Primary and secondary sources

This thesis relies on a variety of primary and secondary sources for qualitative analysis. Primary sources include parliamentary debates, speeches of policy makers, government white papers, strategy documents, ministerial working/briefing papers, enquiries to the parliament, memoranda of the governments and press statements. At the EU level, it includes preparative documents for EU summits, working papers, protocols of the meetings of the council, speeches and official statements.

Secondary sources include think tank publications, newspaper articles and academic literature on the conceptual approaches applied in this study; on the national foreign, security and defence policies of the member states; on the three case studies, and on European foreign, security and defence policy.

These data are collected at both the national and the EU levels, which both need to be broken down into the entities which are involved in the making of security and defence policy. At the domestic level, the analysis of relevant documents will include in particular documents emanating from ministries of defence, the ministries of foreign affairs, the Permanent Representations to the EU, the chancellery (Germany), the Prime minister (UK), the President (France) and the parliament. The focus of analysis will by adapted to the countries under study to take into account the particular national settings. For example, in the parliamentary political systems of Germany and the UK, plenary records offer useful insights. The difference lies however in the detail that the House of Lord treats issues such as ESDP,
whereas the Bundesrat, according to § 11 of the law organising the co-operation of the federal government with the Länder in EU matters, is not competent in the matter.

In the semi-presidential system of France, the focus shifts to the President of the Republic as the dominant actor in security and defence policy, while the parliament, given its limited competences, can be neglected.

This can be further differentiated with regard to the institutional sources of documents. In Germany, the Chancellor enjoys the Richtlinienkompetenz which means that he/she has the primary role in defining general guidelines and policy principles. The Foreign Ministry usually concentrates on the details and coordinates day-to-day policy. Nevertheless, in the period under study here, with Minister J. Fischer at his head, the foreign ministry played a more pro-active role. The MOD plays politically a minor role, but was particularly involved in the capabilities dimension, as were its British and French counterparts. The situation is comparable but more pronounced in France. Here, the President has the key decision making role. Both ministers involved, foreign affairs and defence, fuelled the debate by suggesting ideas, but the ministries mainly provide expertise for the presidential decision. In the UK, the Prime Minister has the key role in framing the general policy principles, whereas the ministries play mostly an administrative, advisory and implantation role. This particularly applies to Blair’s premiership. Hence, according to the case studies, the emphasis will shift.

At the EU level, the focus will be on the PSC, EUMS, EUMC, COREPER, DG Relex and the Council and the documents emanating from there.

2.3.2 Elite interviews

In addition, this thesis strongly builds upon qualitative research methods in the form of elite interviews drawing upon the personal experience of national and EU administrative and political representatives involved in the case studies. The thorough examination of official documents addressing French, German and British ESDP policies laid the basis for a sample of these semi-structured interviews. They have been carried out in the national institutions,
with the advisors to the governments (where possible), in the Permanent Representations of the member states in Brussels, EU institutions, and think tanks.

Several observers argue that politicians did not play a major role in setting up ESDP once they had set out the basic parameters (Howorth 2004; Grant 2002). Much of the hard work of building ESDP, they claim, has fallen to senior officials, mainly political directors and heads of policy in defence ministries (Grant 2002: 85). Accordingly, ESDP was developed by a relatively small but international group of policy experts from foreign and defence ministries who were trying to tackle the problems and were genuinely dedicated to make things work. This underlines the importance of interviews with these officials in addition to political representatives.

Interviews offer precious added value to this study. First, they can generate information which might not be accessible otherwise. They will also support the interpretation of the primary and secondary sources, thereby helping to assess events and developments and their significance. Second, they will contribute to provide a fuller understanding of the unique national positions in security and defence policy with regard to ESDP. Third, they will help to clarify the role of the member states at the EU/ESDP level as well as the effect they had in shaping policies and institutions.

This combined approach of interviews and text analysis will thus on the one hand permit to retrace the underlying motivations, actions and processes of decision making that allowed for member state influence on ESDP. On the other, it will allow the determination of how national preferences were channelled to the EU level, thus establishing the mechanisms and conditions of ‘uploading’. It thus offers a tool to considerably enrich the analysis.

2.3.3 Process tracing

A key method in this study will be process tracing. According to King, Keohane and Verba, process tracing provides an account of causality through identifying causal mechanisms (1994: 85-86). It can be used to clarify whether observed correlations between activities and outcomes are correct.
Process tracing has gained a lot of attention and recognition in social sciences in recent years mainly as a result of the comprehensive analysis proposed by George and Bennett (George and Bennett 2005, more critical Checkel 2005, 2008). However, it is not a new method (see for example George 1979; George and McKeown 1985). Process tracing was originally developed to incorporate historical narratives within highly abstract theories and explanations in the social sciences. While the recent re-assessment certainly increased the visibility of process tracing, the relationship between historical narratives and theoretical explanations, and between the particularity of historical events and the generalisations of law-like propositions have been debated for several decades and in various disciplines.

Alexander George and Timothy McKeown (1985) provided one of the earliest definitions of process tracing in political science. They defined it as a method of within-case analysis to evaluate causal processes. From this perspective, process tracing does not solely rely on the comparison of variations across variables in each case, but also investigates and explains “the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes” (George and McKeown 1985: 35). More precisely, they argue that process tracing “attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behaviour that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behaviour; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behaviour” (George and McKeown 1985: 35).

More recently, George and Bennett (2005: 206) defined process tracing as the method that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” It is hence about identifying the causal mechanisms that connect causes and effects. George and Bennett (2005: 137) define causal mechanisms as “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities”.

For this study, process tracing is a key method in that it will allow us to grasp the linkage between the level of the member states and the EU level, that is, the mechanisms through which member states tried to transfer their interests to the EU level. Working back
the temporal chain, i.e. establishing a detailed chronological order of events, will help in establishing a causal relationship. The hypothesis of member state’s influence on ESDP will thus be supported by demonstrating a logical sequence of evidence, that, based on various sources, reveals how member states uploaded preferences during the negotiation process, which have later been included in the final decision. Hence, process tracing permits to trace the links between agendas and observed outcomes, thereby transforming a purely historical account into an analytical explanation. This underlines that process tracing requires the collection of large amounts of data, ideally from a wide range of sources (as proposed in this study, see section 2.3.1. and 2.3.2) to link possible causes with observed outcomes.

George and Bennett (2005: 210-212) distinguish different varieties of process tracing, namely: detailed narrative; use of hypotheses and generalizations; analytic explanation and more general explanation. In this study, particularly the detailed narrative and to a lesser extent the analytic explanation will be used. The detailed narrative is the simplest variety of process tracing. Here, a detailed narrative is presented in a form of a chronicle with the purpose of “throw[ing] light on how an event came about” (George and Bennett 2005: 210). In this study, each case study will start with such a chronology that presents the main steps of the case study’s development and serves as basis for the subsequent analysis. This thesis also partly builds upon another variety of process tracing, namely the analytical explanation (George and Bennett 2005: 211). It converts a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation.

2.3.4 Triangulation

In addition, this study relies on “triangulation”, which describes the use of multiple data types, sources and methodologies to verify the information. Triangulation is supposed

“to support a finding by showing that independent measures of it agree with it, or at least, do not contradict it” (Miles and Huberman 1994: 66).

It both reduces the reliance on one particular data source (interviewees may consciously our out of oblivion retain information or present them in a certain way) and
increase confidence in the validity of the interferences and hence the overall result. The aim is to choose triangulation sources that have different biases and different strengths, so that they can complement each other.

Besides completing document analysis with interview and press articles, for this study it means for example, that at some point interviews with NATO or US officials have been sought to offer additional information or to verify it. Although outside the EU structures, NATO and the transatlantic relations impact upon ESDP and the member states.

Eventually, triangulation can also help to address a potential researcher bias, which might result from the great amount of time spent on the topic (Betsill and Corell 2001). Here, applying triangulation allows the development of confidence in the research outcome.
CHAPTER 3:

CASE STUDY 1: THE INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP OF ESDP

At the Helsinki summit, in December 1999, the EU member states agreed on setting up three institutions to underpin a Common European Security and Defence Policy, itself created just six months earlier, in June 1999, at the Cologne European Council. The resulting Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee of the EU (EUMC) and the Military Staff of the EU (EUMS) started to function on an interim basis in March 2000. They gained permanent status at the Nice summit in December 2000. With these institutions, the member states aimed to equip the EU with the necessary decision-making capacity for the tasks outlined in the 1999 Cologne declaration, namely, the “capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Council of the EU 1999b). For the first time, the defence dimension was recognised as an integral part of the European cooperation process. This led to the inception of the first institutions with military character in the EU.

This chapter aims to assess the influence France, Germany and the UK had on the development and shape of these three institutions. Following the analytical framework outlined in chapter 2, this chapter will (1) set the scene by providing the approximate context; (2) analyse the Agenda, that is, the objectives of the three countries when creating the institutional architecture; (3) assess their influence, that is, to what extent the three countries were able to upload their preferences within the inception of the three institutions, and (4) to

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2 In Cologne, the term “Common European Security and Defence Policy - CESDP”, was used. It was later changed into European Security and Defence Policy – ESDP. Although aware that in 1999 the term CESDP prevailed, this PhD uses the term ESDP, which since has become dominant, in order to avoid confusion.
examine the mechanisms with the help of which they sought to project their preferences to
the EU level.

The following analysis concentrates exclusively on the first three institutions PSC, EUMS and EUMC put into place in 1999/2000. The chapter’s aim is not to explain why ESDP as such has been created. It has been done exhaustively (Duke 2000; Meiers 2000; Howorth 2000a,b, 2001, 2007; Quille and Missiroli 2004; Haine 2004b; Wallace 2005; Hilz 2005a). It addresses precisely the first steps of the institutional design of ESDP, investigates why it took this particular shape, and analyses the member state’s role within it.

1 Background and chronology of the institutional set-up

1.1 The parallel structures of security and defence cooperation in Europe until the 1990s

Until the middle of the 1990s, co-operation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy in Europe was marked by the existence of parallel structures (Duke 2000, Smith 2004, Maury 1996). Within the EC/EU framework, it was characterised by a very late inception and institutionalisation; the intergovernmental mode of governance; the late integration into the treaties; and the absence of a defence dimension. Since the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954, co-operation in the realm of security and defence took place outside the European treaties in the parallel structures of the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. Their inter-organisational relationship was characterised by an overlap of membership and tasks which lacked a clear definition of responsibilities.

Attempts to link these parallel structures and improve European security and defence co-operation were made in the 1990s within the EU via the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and within the WEU and NATO via the Combined Joint Tasks Forces (CJTF), without however yielding satisfactory results.
Overall, at the end of the 1990s, the European security architecture was thus confusing, which was also due to particular national positions. Put simply, as one diplomat phrased it: France was reluctant towards NATO, the UK did not want the WEU to become part of the EU, the neutral and non-aligned states did not want the EU to engage in security and defence issues, and the EU wanted to assume a security role but did not have the means to do so (Interview in the UK Permanent Representation, 2005).³ This legacy conditioned the way the institutional setting of ESDP was to be developed when the issue surfaced in autumn 1998.

1.2 Timeline: the main steps leading to the inception of first ESDP institutions

The following chronology reproduces the main steps leading to the inception of the institutional set up of ESDP. It neither aims to present each summit nor an exhaustive record of the decisions taken at each event in the different areas. Rather, it concentrates on the significant steps in the restricted area of the institutional dimension. The chronology serves both as reference and tool for the analysis in part 2 of this chapter which addresses the national agendas.

Three main steps can be distinguished. First, October 1998 and early 1999, the institutional issue was put on the agenda. The main question was to decide where the new policy area would be located - inside or outside the EU. Once the decision was taken to locate it inside the EU-CFSP pillar, and not within WEU, NATO or a new fourth EU pillar, the debate entered the second stage. From early 1999 onwards, it turned to the precise design of the institutional set. The second phase ended with the Helsinki summit in December 1999, where the institutions were agreed upon. The third phase described the consolidation of the bodies until they gained permanent status in Nice (2000).

³ This quotation reiterates the interviewee’s statement. I personally don’t necessarily agree with this way of giving the EU personhood.
# Phase I: The preparative phase - Putting the topic on the EU agenda

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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>24-25 Oct. 1998</td>
<td>Informal European Summit, Pörtschach, Austria</td>
<td>In a press conference, Prime Minister Blair engaged the debate about developing a European defence policy inside the EU (Blair 1999b). The summit did not take any decisions.</td>
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<td>3-4 Nov. 1998</td>
<td>First informal meeting of the defence ministers, Vienna</td>
<td>The British minister Robertson proposed four options for developing a European defence policy (Agence Europe, 5 November 1998). This unprecedented meeting was informal and could not take decisions. There was consensus that Europeans had to be more effective militarily in dealing with future crises.</td>
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<td>16-17 Nov. 1998</td>
<td>WEU Ministerial Council, Rome</td>
<td>Ministers reaffirmed the WEU's desire for close co-operation with NATO, while also supporting the new EU development (Ministerial Council of the WEU 1998). They appealed for a debate on developing a European security and defence identity prior to the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty. They also called for the military role of the EU to be developed to handle the Petersberg tasks. No concrete decisions were taken, but a reflection process on the development of a European defence policy was engaged.</td>
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<td>1 Dec. 1998</td>
<td>Franco-German summit, Potsdam</td>
<td>Both countries expressed their will to progress in the implementation of CFSP and a common defence. They looked for ways to confer to the EU operational capabilities, be it by giving the EU its own means or via NATO. The issue of a WEU-EU merger was raised (Bundesregierung and Le Président de la République 1998).</td>
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<td>3-4 Dec. 1998</td>
<td>Franco-British summit, St. Malo</td>
<td>The summit was considered a mile stone in the development of a European defence policy. It called for the EU “to play its full role on the international stage” (HM Government and Le Président de la République 1998). The EU must have “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (par. 2). While the Union must be given appropriate structures, it has also to take into account the existing WEU assets and obligations (par. 3).</td>
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<td>7 Dec. 1998</td>
<td>US Secretary of State M. Albright publishes the “3D” analysis</td>
<td>M. Albright develops the “3D” analogy, insisting that the development of an EU policy should avoid any discrimination (of non EU European NATO members), duplication (of NATO capacities) and hence decoupling (of Europe and the US) (Albright 1998).</td>
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<td>11-12 Dec. 1998</td>
<td>European Council, Vienna</td>
<td>The summit welcomed the new impetus given to CFSP (Council of the EU 1998). It calls for “credible operational capabilities” to enable the EU to play “its full role on the international scene” (Title VII, art 76).</td>
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### Phase II: The 'shaping phase' – Negotiating the institutional design

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<td>24 Feb. 1999</td>
<td>German presidency paper</td>
<td>The German EU presidency submitted a working document to engage the informal reflection on Europe’s security and defence policy (Bundesregierung 1999a). It raised a number of questions on “how Europe can possess appropriate structures and capabilities [...] to conduct crisis management in the sense of the Petersberg tasks” (Bundesregierung 1999a – top II.1). The questions covered the issues at stake and set the EU-wide debate while also providing insights into the German position.</td>
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<td>1 May 1999</td>
<td>The Amsterdam Treaty comes into force</td>
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| 8 March 1999 | German proposal for the informal meeting of the foreign affairs ministers in Eltville 13/14 March ("Reinhartshausen Paper")
Building upon the German presidency paper and the comments it had received on it, Germany tabled a reworked paper in view of preparing the Cologne summit (Bundesregierung 1999a; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 March 1999). It stressed the need for appropriate EU decision making bodies and proposed a tripartite structure composed of a Political Committee, a Military Staff and a Military Committee (Bundesregierung 1999b – top II.4). |
| 18 March 1999| Trilateral meeting of France, the UK and Germany, Berlin
The meeting allowed the main ideas of the Reinhartshausen paper to be secured and to discuss the priorities of the upcoming 50th NATO anniversary summit (Le Monde, 20 March 1999). The three countries agreed on several issues regarding a European defence policy, mainly that the new structures would be intergovernmental and that no influence would be conferred to the Commission and the EP. No agreement was found on the future of the WEU. |
| 24 March 1999| Start of the Kosovo campaign
NATO air strikes started against targets in Kosovo and Serbia. |
| 23-25 April 1999| NATO/North Atlantic Council summit, Washington, DC
The Final Communiqué expressed the support for the European project and acknowledged the “resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” (NAC 1999a: par. 9.a). NATO declared that it would make the necessary arrangements for the EU to access the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance (par. 10a-b). The Communiqué referred to the EU and not the WEU when talking about the availability of assets thereby seemingly recognising the EU as main actor while reducing the WEU's role. However, it also called for an involvement of the non-European allies members of WEU (par. 9.d). |
| 10-11 May 1999| Ministerial Meeting of the WEU, Bremen
The ministers decided to make the necessary preparations for the EU to have access to WEU resources (Ministerial Council of the WEU 1999a; International Herald Tribune, 12 May 1999; Le Monde, 13 May 1999). Germany proposed a timetable for merging WEU and EU, which was rejected. However, the main ideas of the presidency report for the Cologne summit were approved. It foresaw the steps towards an EU-WEU, and the set up of an institutional architecture to equip the EU with a security and defence identity. |
| 17 May 1999  | General Affairs Council (GAC), Brussels
A new version of the Reinhartshausen paper was tabled, which, finalised after the NATO summit, offered additional details on the institutional design (Jopp 1999a: 12). It foresaw a committee for political and strategic questions, composed of permanent representatives, mentioned an International Military Staff and a Military Committee. Cautious on the WEU-EU merger, the paper proposed that the decision be taken in 2000 under French EU presidency. |
| 29 May 1999  | Franco-German security and defence council, Toulouse
The summit supported the European security and defence project while positively insisting upon the approval by the recent NATO summit. It called for improving the Eurocorps in view of constituting it as the core of a European rapid reaction unit (Le Monde, 29 May 1999). |
| 3-4 June 1999| European Council, Cologne
The Common European Security and Defence Policy was created. The EU should “play its full role on the international stage” and should for that effect be given “the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities” (Council of the EU 1999b). Most of the WEU functions were transferred to the EU, without however the two institutions being merged (Council of the EU 1999b, 1999c). |
Annex III). Provisions on the relationship with NATO were outlined. A permanent political body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee); an EU Military Committee, and a EU Military Staff is proposed. They should be developed until the end of the year.

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| 22 July 1999| French Action Plan: letter from Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, to the Finnish presidency of the EU  
President Chirac provided an Action Plan with precise suggestions on the further development of the institutional structures and particularly on the development of capabilities (Chirac 1999c). He insisted on giving priority to concrete progress rather than institutional or theoretical debates which risk slowing down the dynamic of St. Malo and Cologne. |
| 15 Nov. 1999| General Affairs Council (GAC), Brussels  
EU defence ministers met for the first time with EU foreign ministers in the context of the GAC (GAC 1999). They agreed that the upcoming EU summit should adopt reports on the progress of the military and non-military aspects of crisis management. They authorised the appointment of the High Representative (EU/HR) of the CFSP, Javier Solana, as WEU Secretary-General (WEU(SG)). |
| 22-23 Nov.1999 | WEU Ministerial Council, Luxembourg  
EU/HR Solana was appointed as new SG of the WEU (Council of Ministers of the WEU 1999b). This “double hatting” at the head of WEU and EU effectively started the process of merging WEU aspects into the EU. |
The summit sought to outline the required military assets for an EU defence force, with the key proposal calling for the establishment of a European rapid reaction corps (HMG and Le Président de la République 1999; Financial Times, 25 November 1999; Libération, 26 November 1999). It called the upcoming EU summit to develop the political and military structures and to endorse the proposals which the UK and France put forward on the Military Committee, Military Staff and the planning and conduct of EU led operations |
| 30 Nov. 1999 | Franco-German summit, Paris  
The conclusions echoed to a great extent those of the Franco-British summit some days earlier. Little attention was devoted to the institutional setting, whereas military capabilities are stressed. Both countries suggested to deploy the Eurocorps in Kosovo under NATO command. (Franco-German Defense and Security Council 1999; Le Figaro, 1 December 1999; Le Monde, 2 December 1999). |
| 10-11 Dec. 1999 | European Council, Helsinki  
Three permanent military and political structures were decided upon, namely a standing Political and Security Committee; a Military Committee and a Military Staff. Interim structures should be put into place in March 2000 until the permanent structures could be set up (Council of the EU 1999d, Annex I). Besides, when the GAC discusses “matters related to the CESDP, Defence Ministers as appropriate will participate to provide guidance on defence matters”. Together, this yielded the often quoted number of four new political-military components. Much more attention than the institutional issues gained the decision to develop military capabilities, the Helsinki Headline Goal. |
### Phase III: The consolidation phase – Implementation and differentiation of the institutions

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<tr>
<td>14-15 Feb. 2000</td>
<td>General Affairs Council, Brussels</td>
<td>Three interim structures were created to take up work in March 2000 (GAC 2000):</td>
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<td>- an interim Political and Security Committee (i-PSC)</td>
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<td>- an interim Military Body (i-EUMC)</td>
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<td>- “the secondment of national experts in the military field to the General Secretariat of the Council during the interim period”</td>
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<td>28 Feb. 2000</td>
<td>Meeting of the EU defence ministers, Sintra, ‘Toolbox paper’</td>
<td>The meeting focussed on military forces, mainly by discussing a report submitted by the UK, the so called “Toolbox paper” (HMG 2000; Le Monde, 29 February 2000). The paper also developed on the role and composition of the Military Staff and Military Committee (HMG 2000, top 5-14). Subsequently, i-PSC and the i-EUMC met for the first time. The set up of the EUMS had however not been terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20 June 2000</td>
<td>European Council, Santa Maria da Feira</td>
<td>The meeting welcomed the progress achieved, particularly that the interim bodies had started to function (Council of the EU 2000a). Most attention was devoted to civilian crisis management capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 Dec. 2000</td>
<td>European Council, Nice</td>
<td>The institutional set up for ESDP was approved and included into the treaty (art. 25). The interim institutions gained permanent status, as Political and Security Committee; Military Committee of the European Union and Military Staff of the European Union (Council of the EU 2000b).</td>
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This chronology has allowed the retaining of the main steps and defining characteristics of the institutional development of ESDP. The institutional question had already been raised, though very vaguely, at the first mention of a European defence policy in Pörtschach in October 1998. At the Cologne European summit in June 1999, three institutions were suggested, and were then further developed at the Helsinki European summit in December 1999. Their precise role, composition and tasks were definitively fixed at the Nice European Council in December 2000.

In terms of main characteristics, the chronology shows first that the decision on the institutional set up was strongly marked by the interaction with the existing structures of WEU and NATO and was not taken autonomously by the EU. Second, it reveals the strong influence of bilateral propositions on the debate and the results. Thirdly, it shows that the
institutional debate passed rather quickly to the second plan, while the development of capabilities became a central point.

Having outlined the development leading to the inception of the institutional structures, the expectations and motivations of the three countries - their agenda - will be analysed.

2 The French, German and British agendas for the institutional set-up

Assessing the agenda of the member states is the prerequisite to assess their influence on the outcome of the negotiation process leading to the inception of the first EU institutions in security and defence policy. This section first addresses the general characteristics of the debate in view of complementing the analytical framework outlined in chapter 2. This is followed by an assessment of the national agendas according to the framework. The time frame is limited by the first official mention of a European defence policy in Pörtschach (October 1998), and the EU Council in Nice (December 2000), where the three institutions gained permanent status.

2.1 Characteristics of the debate and framework of analysis

2.1.1 An experts debate: a closed drafting process and little public attention

With some exceptions, the institutional issues did not gain much public interest, neither in the academic and think-tank community, nor in the entities involved such as the relevant parliamentary bodies. This is first due to the very specific nature of the topic, which requires expert knowledge to get involved with. In addition, the role of the parliaments is very limited in the area.

On the other hand, it is often neglected that other issues ranked much higher on the European agenda during that period of time. In spring 1999, the Agenda 2000, the employment pact and the Eastern enlargement were hot topics. In terms of security policy,
the debate was absorbed by the Kosovo conflict. It also explains that when the debate turned to security and defence policy, it often focussed on military capabilities. Later in 1999, the recognition of the EU candidate status for Turkey caught the attention. Eventually, one has to admit that explaining the issues and challenges of an institutional architecture is not an easy task. Military capabilities are much more tangible than institutions. They quickly started to dominate the debate. In a process which was to be pragmatic and result driven (military capabilities), institutional issues were often considered as risking bogging down the debate in details, and to slow down the dynamics of the emerging policy co-operation.

However, “institutions matter” (Andréani 2000). They define the functioning of ESDP, the balance of power, modes of influence and thereby affect the nature of the EU, its power as international actor, and the role of the member states. The battle over the institutional status is consequently one about power and influence which will affect the direction of the policy field.

2.1.2 The basic parameters of the institutional debate

To complete the analytical framework as outlined in chapter 2, the main contentious issues of the institutional debate need to be defined. They will allow the assessment of the national agendas once it has been agreed that the new policy would be located within the EU settings. The following questions characterised the debate:

- **What relationship to establish with NATO?**

Defining the relationship with NATO was a contentious element of the debate. It is closely linked to the issue of the EU-WEU relationship. Different if not opposite expectations existed, considering a European defence policy as ultimate mean to strengthen NATO or as instrument to gain increasing autonomy from it. Is there a hierarchy between NATO and EU? How should institutional and operational links be organised? If parts of the WEU were to be merged into the EU, would it mean taking over existing responsibilities towards NATO?
These questions show that the EU internal debate included a clear external statement towards NATO. The new institutions would be a function of how independent the EU would be, or strives to be, from NATO.

- **What relationship to establish with the WEU?**

What should be done with the WEU when developing an EU policy? Member states rather quickly agreed to gradually transfer the WEU into the EU. But this required several issues to be addressed, mainly the different categories of membership and existing commitments. Previous arrangements had given three non EU European members of NATO (Iceland, Turkey, Norway) the right to fully participate in WEU activities. The role of these countries in a new EU setting was contentious. If it was to be an EU process, it would not be able to offer the same advantages to non-EU members. Moreover, in 1999, the recent Centrals and Eastern European NATO allies (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) enjoyed WEU membership but were not yet EU members. The EU also had to agree on how to deal with WEU commitments, mainly article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT).\(^4\) These questions had high blocking potential.

- **What kind of institutions were to be set up?**

The number, composition, tasks and working procedures of the new institutions needed to be established. Would a permanent committee be set up, and how would it be staffed? The staffing, mainly the level of seniority, is an indicator of importance.

How would the new institutions interact with the existing structures, particularly the Commission, EP and Council, but also NATO and WEU? Would a council of defence minister be set up?

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\(^4\) The Brussels Treaty signed on 17 March 1948 was amended by the Paris Agreements signed on 23 October 1954 and is since called Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT). Article V MBT stipulates mutual assistance: “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.”
2.1.3 The analytical framework as developed for case study 1

These questions governed the institutional debate. Together with the general categories outlined in chapter 2, they form the analytical framework for this case study.

Table 8: Categories of comparison for case study 1

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<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transatlantic relations and NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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This framework will guide the analysis of the national agendas.

2.2 The German Agenda

After some hesitations, mainly its surprise about the St. Malo initiative, the German government actively supported the European defence project (Interviews in the German MFA 2005, 2008; Hellmann 2005: 157; Schmalz 1999: 195). An enabling factor was that Germany held both the EU and the WEU presidencies in the first half of 1999.5

2.2.1 General considerations

The German debate was conditioned by external and internal factors. Internally, the red-green government elected in autumn 1998 started under Chancellor Schröder on an economic and social reform path after 16 years of the conservative Kohl government. Externally, the war in Kosovo confronted the government with complex political and moral questions only a few months after coming into power. Heated discussions in the political and public spheres addressed the pro and con’s of the German participation (Preuß 2000; Jötze

5 For the sake of thoroughness one should add that Germany also held the G8 presidency in I/1999. This was f.e. essential for the inception of the Balkan Stability Pact, but less decisive with regard to the institutional aspects of ESDP.
For the supporters of the war, Germany should assume its responsibility and act at the core of the NATO coordinated operation against flagrant human rights abuse. The opponents opposed the participation in a war which they considered illegal and not in line with German historically conditioned responsibility. Overall, the Kosovo war fuelled the debate about a common European security policy (Deutscher Bundestag 1999a,b,c).

Besides, traditional approaches to European policies characterised Germany’s stance. It was first driven by the genuine commitment to deepen the integration progress. This corresponds to the long established German preferences to establish a political union, and to europeanise a growing number of policy areas. In the realm of security and defence, this is illustrated in the civilian power approach, namely a preference for multilateral rather than unilateral actions, for a security and defence policy based on normative considerations, and for a mixed toolbox rather than purely military solutions (Duchêne 1973; Maul 2001; Maull 2002; Harnisch and Maull 2001, Longhurst 2004). Second, Germany sought to link EU and transatlantic approaches without harming either. Balancing the German attachment to both, the US via NATO and France within the EU, has been a defining feature of German European policies since the 1950s (Meiers 2002: 36-38; Regelsberger 2002: 35-39). Succeeding this balancing act became both the main goal and challenge for the German government within the set up of ESDP.

Several key documents reflect the German agenda. Defence minister Scharping outlined in February 1999 key aspects of the German position (Scharping 1999a). They were confirmed by two governmental working papers - the German presidency paper (Bundesregierung 1999a) and the Reinhartshausen paper (Bundesregierung 1999b) - and other governmental statements. The German agenda remained stable over time, as an article by minister Scharping in spring 2000 shows (Scharping 2000). Besides, it was to a high degree homogenous, and there was broad support beyond the lines of political parties, except the extreme left, for ESDP. The German debate will be analysed according to the above outlined criteria.
2.2.2 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

Germany sought to define the development of a European policy as inextricably linked with the strengthening of a European security and defence identity within NATO (Bundesregierung 1999a; Schröder 1999b; Fischer 1999a,b; Scharping 1999a; 2000).

It is striking to see that strengthening NATO is often the first aspect mentioned. Only then is the European dimension developed, and it is usually referred to as a mean to consolidate the Euro-Atlantic partnership. A seminal article by minister Scharping starts with outlining what a European policy should not be – before turning to what it should be (Scharping 1999a). Three key arguments characterise the German agenda:

First, NATO remains the basis of the European security order (Scharping 1999a, 2000). An EU policy is by no means an alternative, but always a complementary dimension to NATO (Schröder 1999b). It should help to relieve the US from its worldwide responsibilities, to create a new transatlantic balance through the sharing of responsibilities, to secure the US engagement in Europe via a fairer burden sharing and to link all transatlantic partners in a closely knitted security entity.

Second, NATO retains the exclusive responsibility for collective defence. Germany insisted on the difference between collective defence (NATO) and crisis management, which would fall to the EU but only if NATO decided not to engage (Scharping 2000).  

Third, NATO remains the main forum for consultation in security issues having transatlantic implications (Fischer 1999a; Scharping 2000). The EU should only intervene where the Alliance does not wish to become engaged, and only in full transparency and co-operation with it (Scharping 1999e, 2000). This establishes a clear hierarchy, with the right for the first decision going to NATO.

The German support for NATO is conditioned by a strong feeling of transatlantic solidarity, the fear of a US retreat from Europe, and by the pragmatic recognition that only NATO is militarily able to assure a common defence (Scharping 1999a, see also Pflüger

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6 This position is generally shared, also by the conservative opposition. see for example Glos 1999.
German armed forces remained deeply integrated in NATO structures. But the transatlantic relationship also contains normative and historical dimensions. President Bush’ (senior) invitation of a “partnership in leadership” was still kept in memory and reflects the idea of a special relationship wished for from both sides. Besides, the special historically conditioned German responsibility "for peace and security and against repression, eviction and the use of violence" has been repeatedly raised, such as with regard to Kosovo (Schröder 1999a).

These preferences translate into a strong commitment to accommodate US and NATO worries. Germany advocated to

- quickly establish institutional co-operation procedures between NATO and the new EU policy while avoiding any duplication (Scharping 1999a, 2000; Bundesregierung 1999b: part II);
- closely link the WEU and EU as a mean to assure the transatlantic link;
- verbally and institutionally guarantee that NATO retains a key role in European defence;
- confirm the transatlantic link by suggesting staff for the new institutions.

For Germany, adequate staffing should allow the bridging of the rather Atlanticist British and rather Europeanist French stances within the EU. By proposing the German general Schuwirth as first head of the EUMS, Germany sought to assure the transatlantic partners about the compatibility of ESDP and NATO, and the European partners about its commitment.

Hence, the commitment for ESDP was for Germany a mean to upload its dedication for both a deepening of the political integration process and a strengthening of the transatlantic Alliance. Here, the endorsement by the NATO summit of the European plans was essential. Several interview partners insisted that Germany would very likely not have engaged in ESDP if it had not had the official NATO and US green light (Interview in the German MOD, 2005). This reflects traditional German policies, where the key objective of advancing the
European integration process in close co-operation which France could only go as far as it would not affect the close relationship with the US, mainly via NATO.

2.2.3 Role of the EU

ESDP was considered a logical consequence of earlier European agreements and the next step in the integration process, naturally resulting from the monetary union (Scharping 1999a). Both the establishment of a political union and the deepening of European co-operation have been constant German goals (Scharping 2000; Fischer 1999a). It would also ensure the ongoing embedding of German policies in a multilateral framework, traditionally dear to German politicians.

Moreover, an efficient European foreign policy was perceived as an important vehicle to enhance the legitimacy of the European integration process, which suffered in this precise area from its impotence during the Balkans wars. Besides, it would allow to countering recent trends towards unilateralism (Fischer 1999a).

Putting the security and defence policy within the EU framework was also sought to inspire the EU member states with a sense of belonging. They no longer felt committed to the WEU. The EU seemed to offer a more promising framework to raise the feeling of responsibility and ownership, thereby leading to greater commitment of the member states.

Germany tried to upload this approach by actively embedding the St. Malo initiative into the framework of European governance during its EU presidency. It called for strong political structures, such as a permanent body of experts with pol/mil expertise, an for the EU to live up to its responsibility (Bundesregierung 1999b - top II).

2.2.4 EU Toolbox

Germany explicitly called for a comprehensive security approach where both military and civilian instruments should be integrated (Bundesregierung 1999b - top II; Scharping 1999c, 2000). It stressed the civilian dimension, which allowed addressing the concerns not
only of the domestic public but also of the non-aligned and neutral member states (Adam 2002: 141).

Germany tried to upload these preferences by insisting upon the complementarity of military and civilian means, on conflict prevention as complementary to conflict management, and by referring to the Petersberg tasks (Bundesregierung1999b – top II). This would make the EU not only particularly effective, but also endow it with a comparative advantage and an additional ‘raison d’être’.

2.2.5 Role of the WEU

Germany advocated a rapid merger of WEU and EU, and hence abandoning the WEU as quickly as possible (International Herald Tribune, 12 May 1999; Scharping 1999d). For the time being, a clear hierarchical relationship between EU and WEU was established, where the EU had the “Leitlinienkompetenz”\(^7\) towards the WEU (Schröder 1999a; Scharping 1999a).

This draws upon earlier German and Franco-German attempts to merge WEU and EU, mainly the unsuccessful Six Nations proposal submitted at the IGC leading to Amsterdam (see Jopp 1999a). At the WEU meeting in November 1998, the German and French governments again put forward a timetable for phasing the WEU into the EU framework (Ministerial Council of the WEU 1998; Aggestam 2001: 74, Interviews in the German MFA 2005). Subsequently, the Franco-German summit in December 1998 called for a reflection process on the “desirable integration” of the WEU into the EU (Bundesregierung and Le Président de la République 1998). It clearly illustrates the German preoccupation to re-organise the security institutions in Europe and to abandon the weak, disregarded and little effective WEU for a new start inside the EU. The German presidency paper and the

\(^7\) This term is difficult to translate. It encapsulates political guidance, supervision and authority. It comes close to the term "Richtlinienkompetenz", which describes the political guidance, authority and priority which the chancellor exercises towards its ministers.
Reinhartshausen paper are more cautious about the issue which is mainly due to the fact that they were drawn to reach European consensus.

The WEU was never highly regarded in Germany. Interview partners insisted that it was often considered a post-WWII organisation whose initial task to control German re-armament did not put Germany on an equal footing with the other states (Interviews in the German MFA and MOD 2005, 2008; Quinlan 2001). Besides, while recognising its role as a forum for debate, Germany doubted the WEU’s capacity to act. Although the Maastricht Treaty theoretically paved the way for WEU-EU co-operation, the WEU could not gain a higher profile in Germany as the construction was considered not particularly effective (Interview in the German MOD 2005; Jopp 1999a,b; Hilz 2005a). Germany felt that the WEU had ceased to command loyalty from its member states and interest from the countries associated with it, mainly due to the complicated settings which had resulted in an “institutional excess” (International Herald Tribune, 12 Mai 1999).

Hence, by uploading its preference for an EU framework and for abandoning the WEU, Germany intended to streamline the decision making system, while avoiding redundancy and getting bogged down in the EU-WEU-NATO triangle. The EU was considered better suited to form an effective European pillar than the WEU. Moreover, compared to the selective and complicated WEU membership scheme, the EU would involve all EU member states on an equal footing. It would constitute a mean rather than an end, as it was resented to have been the case of the WEU, given that one of its main tasks was to monitor German re-armament. Besides, Germany felt militarily weak in the WEU. In an EU framework, where other criteria than military capabilities define a country’s weight and position, Germany felt having a greater clout.

These preferences have been uploaded in form of explicit proposals to transfer WEU institutions into EU structures and in precise time tables for a WEU-EU merger (Fischer 1999b; Scharping 1999a; Bundesregierung 1999b; Le Monde, 1 June 1999). Germany first proposed to transfer the military entities, the WEU military committee, the planning cell, the situation centre, the Satellite centre and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to the EU and
assign them to the HR (Scharping 1999a; Le Monde, 20 March 1999) The first task of the EU/HR to be appointed in Cologne (June 1999) should be the integration of WEU into the EU. Therefore he should also be appointed SG of the WEU. This would emphasise the complementarity of WEU and EU while also highlighting that the institutions have largely overlapping membership and therefore draw on the same resources and personnel. Given that the WEU SG has the right to attend NATO meetings as an observer, this would also allow Europe to speak with one voice while demonstrating the transatlantic roots of the new European policy and express its compatibility with NATO (Scharping 1999a; see also Le Monde, 8 April 1999; Schröder 1999a,b).

Germany hence called for a “personality of great political weight” to be appointed (Scharping 1999a; Schröder 1999a). This opposes earlier ideas, where the post was sought to be more of an administrative than a political high profile job (Aggestam 2000; Hellman 2005; Interviews in the German MOD 2005). The thrust of the “double-hatting proposal” was further highlighted by suggesting the appointment of Javier Solana, whose term as NATO secretary general was coming to a close.

Recognising that the WEU integration necessitated a decision by the European Council, Germany suggested this decision be taken at the Cologne summit, while the precise provisions could be elaborated until 2000 (Scharping 1999a). Later on, the new EU institutions, although clearly modelled on the WEU/NATO structures, were no longer referred to as WEU legacy, but as genuinely European structures (Bundesregierung 1999b).

Germany tried to assure the rights of the different WEU membership categories. It stressed that necessary procedures be found to avoid any form of exclusion and to maintain existing participation modes (Scharping 1999a; Bundesregierung 1999b – top II.3). Recognising however the contentious nature of the issue, the German proposals in the presidency paper (Bundesregierung 1999a) and in the subsequent Reinhartshausen paper remain fuzzy (Bundesregierung 1999b).

8 Scharping’s liberal predecessor Kinkel still preferred a lower profile candidate who was to work under the authority of the council of ministers.
Interviews raise the impression that the German position was rather open for negotiations with the European partners (Interview in the German MOD, 2005). The issue had not been solved at the Cologne summit and developed into a contentious point with high blocking potential (Interviews in the German MFA 2005, 2008; Quinlan 2001). It is hence not surprising that Germany re-affirmed the aim of guaranteeing the different membership rights again a year later, in March 2000 (Scharping 2000).

2.2.6 What institutions, what staffing?

German preferences were sketched out very early, in the middle of February 1999, thus prior to the German presidency paper and the Reinhartshausen paper (Scharping 1999a). Political and military structures should be set up under the roof of the EU, without either duplicating NATO structures nor discriminating the WEU membership categories.

Overall, the WEU and NATO inspired the new EU institutions (Interviews in the German MFA, 2006; Bundesregierung 1999a – part II). Initially, it was suggested that the new institutions should mainly result from a transfer of existing WEU structures into the EU, namely the WEU Military Committee, the WEU planning cell, the Situation Centre, the Satellite Centre and the ISS (Scharping 1999a).

These provisions were further developed in the Reinhartshausen paper. Germany’s main concern was to assure the “minimum requirements for an effective decision-making capability” (Bundesregierung 1999a - top II) while also addressing US concerns, mainly the “3 D’s” (Albright 1998). Germany called for:

- “regular meetings (or ad hoc) of the General Affairs Council, including defence ministers;
- a permanent body consisting of representatives with pol/mil expertise;
- an EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives; and
- a Military Staff including the Situation Centre” (Bundesregierung 1999b – top II.4).
While earlier German statements called for a transfer of WEU institutions to the EU, these later proposals mention EU institutions without reference to the WEU – even if the similar structure catches the eye.

While explicitly calling for permanent structures, which would raise the importance of the new bodies, the German proposals remained silent about the level of staffing.

2.2.7 Summary of the German position

Building upon traditional policies, Germany sought to further the integration process, to reconcile transatlantic and European dimensions and to embed its policies in a multilateral approach. It tried to upload these preferences by:

- insisting on NATO’s primacy, calling to establish co-operation patterns and by modelling the new EU structures on those of the WEU and NATO;
- suggesting staff for the EU positions in order to reconcile transatlantic and Europeanist positions;
- calling for a rapid takeover of the WEU; and
- advocating a mixed military and civilian toolbox.

Germany actively committed itself to embed the ideas of Pörtschach and St. Malo into the European governance structures during its EU and WEU presidencies I/1999. It is striking to see the extent to which Germany tried to reconcile the different European positions and to avoid formulating a stance which could have been understood as particularly German.

Germany’s deepest concern was to assure the Euro-Atlantic security co-operation. Adding its transatlantic commitment to the equally strong commitment to Franco-German co-operation and the deepening of the European integration process, Germany faced a delicate balancing act of endorsing a more cohesive European foreign policy yet that does not appear to undermine NATO or to alienate the US.
2.3 The British Agenda

Although having initiated the debate by putting the topic on the agenda at the Pörtschach and St. Malo summits, HMG initially did not propose detailed blueprints for ESDP. This absence of a ‘project’ has been interpreted as sign that HMG was seeking above all a pragmatic approach to solve a capability problem within NATO, and not to create a new European venture.

2.3.1 General considerations

The British debate differed from those in Germany and in France in that the commitment for a defence policy within the EU framework clearly was a novelty, for Britain traditionally has been fundamentally opposed to it. Moreover, HMG had to face ferocious critique from the opposition and its own camp, being accused of jeopardising NATO and the UK’s independence for what was often suspected of being a French trap.9

The novelty was to acknowledge that the idea of a special relationship with the US and NATO was compatible with a greater role for the EU in defence issues. This opened new prospective for both traditional British thinking on ESDI, and on the WEU-EU relationship.

By strengthening the EU dimension, the UK never intended to give up on the transatlantic one, but rather aimed at strengthening the Alliance through the improvement of European capabilities. This explains that HMG made clear very early on that the debate was to be conducted focusing on military capabilities and should stay clear on institutional swamp in which previous attempts have been lost (Blair 1999a). Defence Secretary Robertson insisted that it is political will combined with the ability to act that matters first and foremost, rather than the way bureaucracies are wired together: “Institutional re-engineering alone will solve little […] You cannot send a wiring diagram to a conflict”.10

9 see for example Conservative defence spokesmen Ian Duncan Smith commenting upon St. Malo: “This whole deal plays to a French agenda which has been going for 40 years which is about dividing NATO”, quoted in Oakes 2000: 31.
10 UK Defence Secretary Georges Robertson, 10 March 1999, quoted in Howorth 2001:771; In October 1999, Robertson replaced Solana at the head of NATO.
The initial absence of any precise proposal is nevertheless striking. Until early 1999, the British position was more of a question and possibility catalogue than a fixed preference list. It led some observers to criticise that “Blair’s public statements raised more questions than they answered” (Whitman 1999: 6).

It reflects however also the genuine willingness to engage in new thinking on European issues. When it came to power in 1997, the Labour government expressed a desire to have a fresh start in Europe. It is for example reflected in the 1998 initiated restructuring of the UK administration, which aimed to change the UK’s position towards a more committed, pro-active approach, projecting its interests in EU decision-making and changing other member states’ perception of the UK (FCO 1998; Lunn, Miller and Smith 2008: 92-93). While first insisting on the UK’s traditional approach that a European defence identity should work through NATO and the WEU, the British position then shifted, as the meetings in Pörtschach and St. Malo illustrate, towards actively proposing the EU to play a greater role (Labour Party 1997; Cook 1997; Williams 2005; Howorth 2000a,b).

The roots of this re-thinking have often been attributed to a general change of direction in Whitehall, fuelled inter alia by a confidential memorandum on the UK’s role in Europe (May 1998), the Strategic Defence Review (SDR, HMG 1998), and influential think-tank analyses.11 In early 1998, FCO diplomat Robert Cooper was tasked to address ways to maximise the potential of the UK’s future in Europe. A key aspect of the resulting confidential memorandum was to substitute the WEU and to consider a European defence capacity able to act independently.12

This differs from the SDR, which engaged in an in depth review of the British Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War. The SDR acknowledges the EU’s “vital role in helping to preserve and extend economic prosperity and political stability”, including through the CFSP. But it does not go any further, and it does so only after having insisted on NATO’s

11 The one by Charles Grant, Centre for European Reform, is often referred to as the most influential (Grant 1998). He proposed to sacrifice the WEU to reach effective crisis management.
12 R. Cooper has been a close adviser to PM Blair. The memorandum is mentioned in Williams 2005: 59; Whitman 1999: 6; Hilz 2005: 188; see also The Guardian, 27 October 1998 and has been confirmed in interviews.
pivotal function (HMG 1998, Chapter 1, art 39). Both documents nevertheless demonstrate that the British position evolved and was open for new initiatives.

Several reasons have been suggested to explain this shift (Meyer 2003; Whitman 1999; Howorth 2000b; Williams 2005; Quinlan 2001). After the euro-sceptical it not euro-phobic stances of his predecessors, Blair aimed at presenting the UK as an integration friendly member state, wishing to “end the isolation of the last 20 years and be a leading partner in Europe” (Blair 1997; see also Labour Party 1997). A key motivation has been to avoid being excluded from European developments when remaining outside the first wave of the single currency.

The most promising opportunity for that seemed to be an initiative within CFSP. The UK had always had the ambition of a certain leadership, which is attributed to a historically conditioned link between leadership and responsibility in British strategic culture (Heiselberg 2003: 32; Foster 2000: 55). The realm of security and defence was one where Britain could clearly pretend to be in a leadership position, such as with regard to expeditionary experience, capabilities, and defence industry, without running the danger of engaging in supranational co-operation, given that CFSP’s intergovernmental character was generally recognised. Although the introduction of the Euro in January 1999 had symbolic significance, it also made the EU’s lack of progress in CFSP look even more anomalous. The Kosovo campaign in 1999 illustrated again the EU’s struggle to formulate a coherent policy, confirmed its inadequacy to address crises and hence its dependence on US military might, while in parallel revealing the reluctance of the US to robustly intervene.

Blair’s analysis was connected to the acknowledgment of the modified security situation in Europe since the end of the Cold War, which relativised the role of the US. Already during the Balkan wars the US had made clear that the Europeans had to take over greater responsibility in Europe while itself located its strategic objectives increasingly elsewhere. The UK recognised the necessity to dispose of an autonomous conflict solution capacity in the light of the decreasing US disposition to participate in European conflicts.
Besides, the experiences of the 1991 Iraq war and the Balkans had convinced the UK to transform its armed forces and adapt to new security challenges (as the SDR set out to do, see chapter 5). But it was also the experience of the British EU presidency in the first half of 1998, which shamefully revealed to the UK the Union’s incapacity to impact at the international scene.

Eventually, building an European defence policy also corresponds to the value based policy approach which Prime Minister Blair advocated (Lunn, Miller and Smith 2008). Aspiring to act as a force for good in the world also meant to strengthen the international community, as it has been later expressed in the doctrine on the international community, which engaged the UK for greater global commitment (Blair 1998b,d; see also Williams 2005: 121).

Other considerations which fed into this development include the recognition of the need to consolidate the European defence industrial sector. Co-operation in procurement, research and development were expected to create synergy effects and to increase the competitiveness of the European sector, including the UK industry, leading in this area (Guay and Callum 2002; Williams 2005).

These different factors were supported by a general conversion of positions, in the 1990s, within the EU, mainly between France and the UK. Although France remained outside NATO after the averted rapprochement in the 1990s, it demonstrated a more pragmatic policy towards the US and NATO. Since 1998, Blair had stressed the similarities of both countries and called for co-operation (see for example Blair 1998a).

The British position is mainly expressed in statements by Prime Minister Blair, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and Defence Secretary Robertson. Also lively parliamentary debates offer useful insights. The British debate will be analysed according to the above outlined criteria.
2.3.2 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

Britain’s main objective was to strengthen the transatlantic Alliance through a strengthening of the European defence dimension (Blair 1998b, 1999c). Such an approach conceives of a European defence policy above all as a mean to reinvigorate NATO (International Herald Tribune, 9 Mars 1999; Le Figaro, 20 October 1999). It establishes a clear hierarchy between the two organisations, insisting upon the primacy of NATO. Defence secretary Robertson insisted that “we are not in anyway undermining NATO – indeed, we are strengthening it”, when defending St. Malo in Parliament (Robertson 1998).

This insistence on an Atlanticist primacy in European security corresponds to traditional UK policies (Howorth 2000a; Williams 2005; Aggestam 2006; Foster 2000; Giegerich 2006; Bartlett 1992; Dumbrell 2001; Dunne 2005). The special relationship with the US served both as an “influence multiplier” for the UK but also as a security guarantee (Freedman 1999: 55). The 1956 Suez crisis revealed the limitations of the UK’s ability to conduct an independent security policy. The alliance with the US allowed the realignment of British resources with British interests and perceived responsibilities. The centrality of NATO and the close relationship with the US, marked by “intimacy, vitality and comprehensiveness well beyond the norm” (Bartlett 1992: 179) turned however out to be an obstacle for British commitment in the realm of European security in particular, and the European integration process in general (George 1998). For a long time, it was considered mutually exclusive.

When Blair came into power, he aimed at linking the two dimensions, calling the UK to be "the bridge between the US and Europe" (Blair 1997). This remained essential when he engaged in the debate about European defence:

“It means realising once and for all Britain does not have to choose between being strong with the US, or strong with Europe; it means having the confidence to see that Britain can be both. Indeed, that Britain must be both; that we are stronger with the US because of our strength in Europe; that we are stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US. […] We have deluded ourselves for too long with the false choice between the US and Europe” (Blair 1998c).
Traditionally, Britain feared that a credible European capability might jeopardise NATO by encouraging US isolationism. If Europe would demonstrate a serious capacity to manage its own security affairs, the argument went, the US might retreat and NATO break apart, possibly before credible European capabilities have been created. This approach increasingly changed: the maintenance and strengthening of the Alliance is now considered as depending on an enhanced European military capability. The UK perceived it as the most effective means to appease voices of isolationism and to counter US calls for burden-sharing. Eventually, this approach can be understood as a further development of ESDI ideas: the call for better European capabilities was linked with the demand to make NATO assets available for European operations. This corresponded very much to the 1996 NATO agreements, only that the WEU was now replaced by the EU.

The UK’s insistence that “NATO will rightly remain the foundation of our collective defence” was also based on practical considerations (Spellar 1999). To be effective, a European defence capability had to rely on NATO structures and planning procedures, the only credible structures which existed. A European policy was hence very practically considered a way of maintaining NATO credibility. In the immediate aftermath of St. Malo, the 1999 Defence White Paper sought to stress that the development of European capabilities would strengthen, rather than compromise, transatlantic security relations founded on NATO.

Nevertheless, HMG had constantly to defend itself against criticisms from the opposition but also its own camp that it would undermine NATO and surrender national control of defence and armed forces to Europe, if not advocate a European federal super state (Blair 1999c; Smith (I. D.) 2000). The UK hence aimed to assure US allies and the domestic public that ESDP would strengthen NATO and the transatlantic alliance; and that the endeavour is about strengthening capabilities and not so much about ideology and institutions (Agence Europe 1998: 3.) HMG was more committed to counter such concerns than about proposing precise settings.
However, although playing down institutional questions, HMG was aware that the stakes were high in that the institutions would determine the link to NATO and the EU’s political stature. Prime Minister Blair hence very early insisted that “we need to get the institutional mechanisms right, we need to make sure that the institutional mechanism in no way undermines NATO” (Blair 1998b).

The UK tried to upload the primacy of NATO by advocating very early on to establish effective links for co-operation, by double hatting staff, and by suggesting a tripartite institutional structure modelled on NATO settings. The insistence upon a clear military component reflects the priority given to pragmatic solutions and capabilities rather than political settings. Besides, HMG supported German candidates for the new institutions, who were thought to be able to assure the transatlantic balance.

In addition, HMG tried to upload its conception of hierarchy within the EU-NATO relationship by insisting on the wording of “autonomous” rather than “independent”. The first term would express the continued primacy of NATO, whereas the second was considered questioning it (Interviews in the UK Permanent Representation, 2005). The UK insisted that in official EU or bilateral statements the strengthening of the European defence component was not only justified with the need for Europe to make “its voice heard in world affairs”, but also with the contribution to the Alliance as “the foundation of the collective defence of its members” (HMG and Le Président de la République 1998).

2.3.3 Role of the EU

The British agenda followed its traditional lines of insisting on intergovernmental decision making which explicitly excludes any role the community institution, while also defining the EU’s role in terms of assuming responsibility rather than pretending to be a counterweight to the US or an political actor (Spellar 1999; Blair 1999a,d; Miskimmon 2004b; Williams 2005; Howorth 2000b).

The UK sought to develop the EU mainly as an actor in crisis management while defence would remain wedded to NATO. Terms such as ‘player’ are absent from most British
statements, which rather call for “Europe to have a stronger and more coherent force and voice in international affairs” (Blair, Chirac and Jospin 1998). This reflects the British preference for effective operational capabilities rather than political visions (Clarke 1998: 126; Blair 1999d; see also Giegerich 2006). It is worth repeating that the institutional debate took place in parallel to the Kosovo campaign, which demonstrated that capabilities are key to quell a crisis, whereas institutions are less tangible.

It is nevertheless striking to see how normative considerations influenced the UK’s conceptions of the role the EU should play. Close to the doctrine of the international community, the idea of Europe as “global force for good” was formulated:

“Of all the challenges we face, none is more important than how we develop our relations with the rest of Europe, and how Europe rises to the new challenges […] Get this right, and the New Britain can take its rightful place in the new Europe, and the new Europe can fulfil its potential as that global force for good” (Blair 1999d).

2.3.4 Role of the WEU

One of the greatest novelties in the UK approach was that HMG favoured the scrapping of the WEU and the partial transfer of its capacities to the EU. It was in stark contrast to previous positions, such as in the IGC leading to the Amsterdam Treaty (Whitmann 1999; Garnett 1999; Wallace (H.) 1997).

Still in May 1997, Foreign Secretary Cook insisted that Britain “will be working for better co-operation” between the EU and the WEU, “but not for a merger between them” (Cook 1997). At the end of 1998, HMG still hesitated on what to do with the WEU. In Pörtschach, the “possible integration” of WEU into the EU was mentioned, which equalled a landslide change in UK policies (Blair 1998b). Nevertheless, at the WEU meeting in November 1998, the UK, supported by the non-aligned members, rejected the Franco-German timetable for a WEU – EU merger.\(^{13}\) Yet in November 1998, at the informal defence minister meeting, a British food for thought paper proposed to:

\(^{13}\) Aggestam (2001: 74) mentions this incident, which has been confirmed by informal interviews in the German MFA 2005.
- reinforce and reinvigorate WEU; or to
- merge some elements of WEU into EU and the rest into NATO; or to
- integrate the WEU into the EU (Agence Europe 5 November 1998: 3).

These proposals reveal both, the openness of the UK position and its disregard for the WEU. Yet, the St. Malo Declaration was not clear on the issue either (HMG and Le Président de la République 1998). It was only in the run up to the Cologne summit that the position was defined into suggesting to transfer most of the WEU to the EU while striving for a separate agreement with NATO on the access to NATO assets for EU operations. The trilateral Franco-British-German meeting in March 1999 and the WEU meeting in May 1999 eventually revealed the UK’s approval of the transfer of WEU assets to the EU (Ministerial Council of the WEU 1999a; Le Monde 20 March 1999; Le Monde 13 May 1999; International Herald Tribune, 12 May 1999).

The UK’s dislike of the WEU resulted both from the WEU’s incapacity to act, and the UK’s concerns to avoid a possible competition with NATO (Hilz 2005a; Quinlan 2001; Whitman 1999). When in March 1997 the situation in Albania deteriorated and European governments discussed a military mission to master the disorder, Britain joined Germany in vetoing the use of the WEU. It is not that the UK refused to send troops. It rather on principle did not wish to buttress the importance of the WEU (Quinlan 2001; Grant 1998: 45). Recognising in Pörtschach that “the WEU is less than ideal” was a first step towards locating defence within the EU as a way to solve the European institutional quandary of EU, WEU and NATO (Blair 1998b).

Following the proposals submitted in Pörtschach and Vienna, the UK preference for abandoning the WEU did not materialise in other precise propositions. Interviews point to the fact that the WEU topic quickly lost importance in the British debate (Interviews in the UK Permanent Representation, Brussels 2005). Once it was agreed that the new policy would be located inside the EU settings, the British debate turned to concrete problems, that is, mainly capabilities. This reflects the fear to get trapped in institutional swamp at the expense of pragmatic solutions (Les Echos, 8 June 1999; Whitmann 1999).
However, the UK was deeply concerned about avoiding any discrimination against European NATO members, particularly Turkey (Blair 1999c). It was one of the reasons why it had opposed the WEU-EU merger in 1997. HMG suggested that the concerned countries would be allowed to attend the meetings of the EUMC as permanent observers, while the PSC would hold regular meetings with them (Howorth 2000b: 393).

2.3.5 EU Toolbox

The starting point and subsequent focus of the British commitment was the development of military capabilities. It shows the pragmatic lessons identified throughout the 1990s, mainly in Iraq and the Balkans, where the Europeans had to rely upon US military might:

“Europe's military capabilities at this stage are modest. Too modest. [...] To strengthen NATO and to make European defence a reality, we Europeans need to restructure our defence capabilities so that we can [...] deal with whatever level of conflict [...] European defence is not about new institutional fixes. It is about new capabilities, both military and diplomatic" (Blair 1999a).

HMG tries to upload this preference by increasingly insisting upon the capability dimension while warning that an insistence upon institutional fixes might lead to loosing the momentum. It also served to calm down opposition critiques on a policy which was perceived as potentially endangering NATO and the UK’s sovereignty.

For the UK, the Pörtschach and St. Malo initiatives were not an attempt to create a security role for an organisation which did not have one previously. Rather, it was to develop the EU’s military capability as one of a range of instruments it could deploy in pursuit of its values. Here, Labour’s morally motivated internationalist considerations were additional driving forces: one purpose of creating a military dimension was to develop the EU as a ‘force for good’ and enable it to project its liberal values beyond its borders (Blair 1999b,d; see also Williams 2005; Dunne 2005).

14 The UK then also argued that the neutral status of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden would make an EU-WEU merger unworkable. See Quinlan 2001; Howorth 2000b: 378.
2.3.6 What institutions, what staffing?

The British position was very open and was only defined in early 1999. One of the first ideas which floated even prior to the Pörtschach summit was to set up a fourth pillar to host the new European policy (Baudin 2000; Whitmann 1999: 5). It was raised in Pörtschach by Tony Blair as one possibility amongst others (Blair 1998b). The idea is however quickly abandoned. It neither figures in Robertson’s proposal at the Vienna defence minister meeting, nor in later statements.

Overall, the UK sought to keep the institutional debate at a low level. Its insistence on the pragmatic and capability side of the European defence policy materialised in institutional proposals which stressed the military dimension. The UK supported the ideas outlined in the Reinhartshausen paper, and particularly insisted on the permanent structure to be based in Brussels (Interviews in the UK Permanent Representation, 2005). Here, HMG clearly advocated a lower level of seniority, namely political directors (Cook 1999). This would allow to keep the institutions firmly under national control while also assuring that they would not gain too high a profile. A high level and permanently Brussels-based Committee, as called for by France, was suspected of potentially taking away influence from the capitals and opening the door to a ‘Brusselisation’ (Allen 1998; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002). Moreover, both the UK and the US feared that the PSC could potentially become a complicating factor in European security and transatlantic relations (Interviews in the UK Permanent Representation, 2005; Interviews in the U.S. Mission to the EU, 2005).

2.3.7 Summary of the British position

HMG exhibited a flexible but clearly Atlanticist approach which emphasised the importance of achieving tangible results over institutional debates. While the complementarity of European capabilities with NATO reflects traditional British positions, the

15This information has been confirmed by interviews in the UK Permanent Representation, 2005. See also Jopp 1999a: 21
novelty consists in the idea to clearly separate this European capacity from the WEU and to locate it in the EU settings. The main characteristics of the UK debate were:

- a clear break with the past when accepting to locate defence inside the EU framework;
- the genuine disposition to engage in a debate: HMG did not have a clear preference list but defined its positions during the debate;
- the clear Atlanticist stance, where the commitment for a European defence policy was understood as a mean to strengthen NATO;
- a clear preference for capabilities as compared to institutional fixes; and
- the support for a merger of WEU and EU, in clear difference to previous UK policies.

Eventually, some observers claim, St. Malo was for the UK just Atlanticist business as usual (Howorth 2004: 223, Haugevik 2005). Blair did not conceive of it primarily as a European project but rather as a mean to pragmatically solve NATO’s capability problems. The analysis confirms that the policy shift resembles more a change of tactics than a change in the UK’s overall Atlanticist strategy. Developing a EU defence capability was the necessary tactical instrument to reinvigorate the UK’s overall Atlanticist strategy. From such a perspective, getting rid of the WEU is the pragmatic recognition that it was not able to fulfil the task, and that European capabilities can be more easily developed without it. This also explains the reluctance to engage in detailed institutional debates: they were perceived as potentially obstructing the main debate, namely, the one about capabilities.

2.4 The French Agenda

Together with the UK, France has been one of the driving forces of the European defence initiative. Although the two are recognised as main military actors in Europe, their opposite approaches to security and defence policy issues had for a long time rendered co-operation within the EC/EU impossible. The novelty of St. Malo was first to overcome these traditional divisions, and second the establishment of a Franco-British alliance which differed from the traditional Franco-German pattern in the EU.


2.4.1 General considerations

France has for a long time been a fervent advocate of a greater role for the EC/EU in the area of security and defence, seeking to create a European political 'actorness' which would enjoy relative autonomy (see Fouchet Plan 1962; Bozo 1998a,b, 2000; Menon 2000a,b). This has often been accompanied by a critical stance towards the US and NATO, illustrated by the French exit of NATO’s Integrated Military Structures (IMS) under President de Gaulle in 1966. In 1995/6, president Chirac ventured an rapprochement with NATO, which eventually failed mainly due to disagreement over the French role in NATO (International Herald Tribune, 2 October 1996; Menon 2000a,b; Hilz 2005a: 158-166).

To understand the French debate a conceptual nuance dear to French politics has to be recognised. It opposes the positively connoted Alliance to NATO. The Alliance, perceived as bond beyond and above NATO and EU, is considered the preferential framework for Europe’s strategic partnership with the US. Contrary, NATO, considered a US-dominated institution, is viewed as a pure defence organisation.

The French stance in the institutional debate is the continuation of traditional French policies, but also the result of the French analysis of the modified security environment in post Cold War Europe. First, France had to recognise that it was not prepared for the new security environment - either in terms of capabilities or of strategy. Already the 1991 Gulf war revealed the inadequacy of the French military for power projection. But particularly the Balkan wars painfully demonstrated that France and the EU were ill prepared to deal with the new security challenges, while also highlighting the European dependence on the US. In addition, the US reluctance to engage with ground troops in Bosnia, and the US domestic debates nurtured French concerns that the US will retreat from Europe (Bozo 1998a). On the other hand, this could open opportunities for an increased European role.

Second, French policy makers feared losing the relatively independent power position that France had enjoyed during the Cold War. There was growing concern about the emergence of what France considered an uni-polar world dominated by the US (Védrine
Besides, traditional French power attributes, such as the nuclear weapons, lost their importance.

From this analysis results a perceived urgency of strategic and operative adaptation of French security and defence policy. Recognising that it enjoyed neither the international role nor possessed the necessary resources to tackle the modified security challenges of the post-Cold War era alone, France opted for a parallel solution which consisted in initiating national reforms while also increasing European cooperation (Freedman 1998; Blunden 2000; Major and Mölling 2007). A crucial step is the 1994 Livre Blanc/White Paper which defined the development of a “European defence” as a priority (Ministère de la Défense 1994). Externally, this concept was to offer a counterweight in the emerging uni-polar world order. Internally, it was to uphold stability in Europe.

To enable France to successfully operate in the new environments, a fundamental reform of the French armed forces was initiated in 1996/7 (Ministère de la Justice 1996). The main changes were a redefinition of the missions, the abandonment of conscription, and the call for increasing capabilities for power projection. The new tasks of a professional army also required the modernisation of its equipment, thereby pushing for a reform of the French defence industry.

These reform steps fundamentally changed French security and defence policies while also paving the way for an increased European commitment. France’s interest in cooperation at the European level was twofold: stabilising Europe as a secure environment and using it as a “force multiplier” for French interests. In parallel, France pushed for a stronger role of the WEU, considered the most appropriate European structure to house the EU’s development into a security actor. The main outcome was that NATO forces were made answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) (Quinlan 2001: 16-26). But despite these often successful initiatives, France repeatedly expressed frustration at the lack of progress made at the EU level.

The domestic political context also influenced the institutional debate. First, other topics dominated the agenda, mainly the Agenda 2000, the employment pact, and German aims to
reduce its financial contributions which led some observers to state Franco-German frictions (see for example Chirac and Moscovici 1999; Chirac and Schröder 1999). Also the Kosovo campaign generated heated debates. The government has been accused of ‘suivisme’ and obedient behaviour towards the US and NATO, one of the most severe criticisms French politicians can possibly face.\textsuperscript{16} But the continuing lack of European (and French) military means to effectively intervene has also been severely critiqued. While it underlined the necessity to develop a European policy it also revealed that the transformation of the French armed forces had still not yielded satisfactory results.

Second, the ‘cohabitation’, that is, the coexistence at the executive of the Republic of different political camps, affected French political life. Conservative President Chirac had in 1997 dissolved the parliament in view of further enlarging the comfortable majority he already enjoyed. But instead of gaining additional seats, he lost the anticipated 1997 elections to the left who installed under Prime Minister Lionel Jospin a government composed of socialist, communist and green ministers. This dual leadership of a conservative president and a socialist prime minister not only engaged the country in debates about a constitutional reform. It also affected the decision-making even if the competences in security and defence policy are clearly the president’s prerogative.\textsuperscript{17}

The French position is mainly expressed by statements of President Chirac, defence minister Richard, Prime Minister Jospin, Foreign Affairs Minister Védrine and European Affairs Minister Moscovici. Given the limited role of the French parliament in security and defence issues, respective debates offer only little insights. The French position will be analysed according to the above outlined criteria.

\textsuperscript{16} by Communist Leader Robert Hue, quoted in Le Monde, 16 April 1999. It is also striking to see the high number of TV and radio interventions by president Chirac on Kosovo (see archives at www.elysee.fr); Libération, 18 June 1999; Libération 14 June 1999.

\textsuperscript{17} According to the Constitution (art. 15), the president is the head of the armed forces.
2.4.2 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

For France, ESDP should allow overcoming the perceived military and political dependence of the Europeans towards the US and NATO. The creation of European decision-making structures and military capabilities should strengthen the EU’s international role and thereby allow to counterbalance the US/NATO primacy in European security issues.

On the one hand, the frustrating experiences during the 1990s of developing capabilities within NATO, mainly the NATO-WEU acquis, neither led to satisfying results nor did they correspond to France’s conceptions of WEU-NATO interaction. Mainly, France did not appreciate the sequencing of decision making, which assured - by the possibility of a veto - the primacy of NATO and hence US leadership. While ESDI certainly gave the Europeans the right to act, France argued, it did not confer the right to decide. France refused the herein underlying idea of hierarchy and the perceived downgrading of the EU into a subcontractor of NATO (Defence Minister Richard as quoted in Le Monde, 22 November 2000; Védrine 2000).

On the other hand, France was concerned about the increasing US hegemony, which foreign minister Védrine labelled “hyperpower”, and which it considered affecting the balance in international relations (Védrine 1999a: 813-821; Chirac 1999a: 804-805). For France, instead of being crowded out, the EU should aim to become a first rank and autonomous political actor, which, at the heart of a multi-polar world, would make its voice heard globally (Chirac 1999b,d).

This has often been misunderstood as a rejection of NATO. But France did not question the Alliance as such (Errera 2000: 19; Chirac 1999d,b). It just defines NATO’s role and tasks differently than its European partners. While recognising NATO’s role as collective defence actor (Chirac 1999d, Chirac in HMG and Le Président de la République 1998), France sought to re-adjust the Alliance’s internal balance, which was perceived to be under US hegemony. France strived for a balanced Euro-Atlantic NATO with a credible European pillar, which would form the basis for an equal transatlantic partnership. This included a
refusal of a hierarchy between NATO and the EU, such as expressed in the ‘right of first refusal’ for NATO (Chirac 1999d; Errera 2000: 20).\(^\text{18}\)

Thus, the EU will necessarily remain allied to the US. But it will not automatically or blindly follow US policy wherever it strays – this is where the French policy has stayed consistent over the years since it left NATO IMS. The 1966 French withdrawal reflects the leitmotiv of an autonomous Europe and France in world politics. Given that, in 1966, France remained in NATO’s political council, the move had more impact upon NATO’s political cohesion than on its military strength. It allowed France to achieve a high level of independence without greatly jeopardising its own security.\(^\text{19}\) Gaulle’s aim was not to disengage France from NATO as such, but from US command.

The experience of the Kosovo campaign further strengthened this approach: it is not about excluding to the use of NATO/US means. But the Europeans should acquire the capacity to decide and act independently if they wish to do so (Richard 2000b; Chirac 1999d). France hence sought to upload the idea that while the Alliance remains “the essential element of Europe’s collective defence”, the EU would cover the Petersberg tasks, that is, tasks below art. V (Chirac in Blair, Chirac and Jospin 1998; Chirac 1999d,b).

Consequently, France stressed that the EU should strive for autonomy from NATO in both decision making structures and capabilities. It also warned about deciding to too early about the institutional contacts, fearing it would not put the two organisations an equal footing (Chirac 1999d).

Therefore, France opposed US pressure prior to the Franco-British summit in 1999 that formal procedures for EU-NATO consultations be agreed in Helsinki (International Herald Tribune, 26 November 1999). There was in fact Franco-British agreement that while accepting the necessity of co-operation, consultation and transparency with NATO, for the

\(^{18}\) US Defence Secretary William S. Cohen stated in 1999 “I prefer to say that NATO should have what I call a first option on any action that would be taken in the way of a military operation.” quoted in The Guardian, 20 November 2000, see also Cohen 1999.

\(^{19}\) Immediately after the decision to withdraw from NATO-IMS, France signed a series of agreements, mainly the Ailleret-Lemnitzer and the Valentin-Feber accords, about the nature of French participation alongside its allies in a conflict. See Hofmann and Kempin 2007; see also Menon 1995.
EU to establish procedures before having established its own institutional set up smacked of subservience (Chirac 1999d). In early 2000 the NATO-EU relations surfaced again as a problem. France wished that first agreement be reached in the EU, and only then formal negotiations with NATO would start. Other countries, mainly the UK, opposed this two stages process (Howorth 2000a: 46). Eventually, in April 2000, it was agreed that joint working group would be created, including one on permanent consultation mechanisms between NATO and EU (Council of the EU 2000a). In terms of institutional proposals this translates into the clear call for the members of the political body not to be double hatted with NATO representatives (Chirac 1999c).

2.4.3 Role of the EU

France clearly intended the EU to emerge not only as a regional but as a global political and military actor to assume responsibility for its own backyard and beyond (Richard 2000a). This role is justified by the values the EU embodies and the different dimensions of the European integration process - economic, political, and humanitarian - which the EU is the only entity to dispose of at this amplitude (Chirac 1999d; Errera 2000: 17).

ESDP is considered a logical step in the ongoing European integration process. It would equip the EU with the essential defence dimension and should lead one day to meaningful European autonomy, thereby complementing the Union’s increasing international economic and commercial weight (Chirac 1999a: 804-805; Chirac 1999b,d; Richard 2000a; Errera 2000: 17). Thus, the EU needs the defence dimension not because it must be protected, but because it will only then develop into a fully fledged actor:

“It is not because Europe needs to be better defended that a European defence is necessary today […], but because Europe now is seeking to play its role at the fullest […] An European defence becomes a natural and logical extension of the European construction. Defence and security, security and common policy, political union and economic union: today they belong together and are parts of our legitimate European ambition” (Védrine 1999b).²⁰

²⁰ Translation by the author/CM.
The French commitment for ESDP builds thus not only on pragmatic considerations on capability and autonomy improvement but is also driven by political-normative considerations. It reflects traditional French policies which favoured a political union and a strengthening of the EU beyond its economic and commercial role.

However, strengthening a political dimension does not equal supra-nationalisation. France insists on intergovernmental settings which assure its sovereignty and military autonomy and while also allowing for flexibility, such as to chose between creating coalitions of the willing or going through the time consuming bargaining for unanimity (Chirac in Blair, Chirac and Jospin 1998).

ESDP is thus part of a long term political strategy to establish the EU as a credible global actor in a multipolar world which would be able to independently shape the security order and to act as a counterbalance to the “hyperpower” USA.

2.4.4 Role of the WEU

The French position on the WEU is the most surprising, for it changed from clear support for an EU-WEU merger prior to the St. Malo meeting to reluctance in early 1999, to again lukewarm support after the Cologne summit. Not being able to postpone the inclusion of the WEU into the EU, France then concentrated on keeping the WEU *acquis* alive.

France had traditionally supported a strong co-operation of WEU and EU, as witness for example the 6-nations-proposal for a EU-WEU merger, submitted to the IGC in the run up to the Amsterdam summit. Still at the bilateral summit in December 1998, French and German governments expressed their interest of seeking integration of the WEU into the EU (Bundesregierung and Le Président de la République 1998).

From a French point of view, the WEU perpetuated politically the unhealthy balance between EU and NATO, whose rectification was key in the French desire to Europeanise security and defence issues. The WEU left the EU impotent in terms of decision making, conferring to it only the right to *act* but not to *decide*. Militarily, it enshrined the EU’s
dependency on NATO assets without offering any long-term guarantee that these assets would actually be available in case of crisis. This led France to call for a WEU-EU merger.

This changed considerably in early 1999. France increasingly expressed its reluctance towards a quick WEU integration, for the WEU, the argument now went, would play a useful bridge between the EU and NATO. Rather than merging WEU and EU, France now preferred to integrate WEU elements into the EU when the time comes. The WEU acquis should be preserved, whatever the fate of the institution itself would be (Richard 1999).

This scepticism was fuelled by what the French government perceived as too great a harmony between Germany, the UK and the US during the 1999 NATO summit (Interviews in the French MOD, 2007). It raised doubts about the direction the new European policy would take. France was particularly concerned that the WEU acquis might be watered down whether due to the reluctance of the neutral and non-aligned states about developing an EU defence dimension, or due to the UK taking the lead (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 May 1999; Gustenau 1999; Agence Europe, 2 June 1999). France was hence reluctant to accept a timetable for the WEU integration and sought to assure the WEU acquis until the EU had clearly defined its new role.

Moreover, the WEU provided an important tool of flexible multilateralism, which allowed France to maintain a large choice of policy options. The WEU could be used as an alternative or complement to other institutions, be it the EU, NATO or the UN (Jopp 1999a: 14). Besides, historically, the WEU was set up to monitor Germany and hence to closely tie it to France, while in the same time offering an alternative forum to NATO. Despite the relative inefficiency of WEU which France recognised, it was thus a useful element in the French toolbox aiming to assure a multi-polar world.

Eventually, there is also a domestic dimension. Prime Minister Jospin was critical about what he perceived as President Chirac’s too NATO-friendly approach (Interviews in the French Permanent Representation 2006; French MOD 2007). He was seeking assurance of real EU capabilities to be developed before giving up WEU, or at least a fundamental acquis such as art. V MBT.
However, France was clearly interested in pushing the European defence initiative forward and did not want to take the risk of missing the window of opportunity opened by the UK policy change. Recognising that it could not longer oppose the integration of the WEU into the EU wished for by the majority of the member states, France eventually accepted it. This was assured at the Franco-German summit in May 1999, and eventually at the Cologne summit. But France lobbied that the WEU continue to exist to give the EU the time to develop its role (Richard 1999).

This piecemeal approach of keeping WEU alive until the EU would have developed into real ‘actoriness’ is still perceptible in President Chirac’s Action Plan (July 1999, Chirac 1999c) and remains valid until the 2000 French EU presidency. In October 2000, France still insisted that some aspects of the WEU would be retained, such as the WEU Assembly (Oakes 2000: 32).

With regard to the different membership categories, France distinguished three groups which should be treated differently: (1) EU candidate countries who are NATO members; (2) EU candidate countries not yet in NATO; and (3) NATO members but not EU candidates (Richard 1999). Priority would be given to group 1 and 2. It was difficult for France to imagine why members of group 3 should be privileged. Since ESDP was an EU project, France argued, priority should be given to EU accession countries.

France tried to upload these preferences when first opposing the German time table for an EU-WEU integration, and once it was decided, to maintain parts of the WEU acquis. Besides, it lobbied for a preferential treatment of the EU accession countries.

2.4.5 EU Toolbox

France insisted on equipping the EU with the badly lacking military capabilities to allow for autonomous action (Chirac 1999c,d). Like Britain, France feared to see the debate getting bogged down in institutional finickiness:

“...The development of European military capabilities [...] represents the primary challenge for Europe in security and defence. No institutional developments [...] will be able to remedy the ascertained deficiencies [...] if Europe does not
succeed in bridging its defence deficits and in disposing of the necessary means to act when the moment arrives” (Chirac 1999c - top I.2, II.A).

These preferences translate into precise proposals to equip the EU with military competences, while also insisting that the PSC ambassadors would dispose of pol/mil expertise (Chirac 1999c).

### 2.4.6 What institutions, what staffing?

Given the overall objective of enabling the EU for a global and autonomous actor role, France called for strong military and political institutions. The most detailed description can be found in the French Action Plan of July 1999 (Chirac 1999c).

France insisted on a high level staffing for the PSC and suggested senior level diplomats with pol-mil expertise to underline the committee’s importance. It explicitly demanded that the double hatting principle would not apply to the PSC (Chirac 1999c – top II, part B/1 and C). Unless the PSC is an independent, genuinely European and high level body with a real ability to influence policies, it was argued, it would prove to be redundant and would neither be able create a European actor role nor to deal with NATO on equal footing.

France was equally keen to assure a visible and high level military institution to consecrate the European defence identity. Earlier plans on European security dimensions within WEU or NATO implied that Europeans would build up their capacities within NATO and would hence not need EU military institutions. The EU framework clearly changed this perception. France hence called for a strong military committee, the development of European military capabilities, and the preservation of art. V MBT (Richard 1997; Chirac 1999c - top II.A, 1999d). France recognised the double hatting with the NATO representatives only for the EUMC (Chirac 1999c – top II, part B/1).

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21 Translation by the author/CM
2.4.7 Summary of the French position

Overall, France’s key objective is to develop the EU into a global actor. The importance of achieving practical results is emphasised over debating institutional issues. Three themes dominated the French debate:

First, ESDP was part of a long-term political strategy to establish the EU as a credible political and military global actor in a multipolar world who would be able to independently shape the security order and to act as a counterbalance to the US.

Second, this required the EU to develop autonomous structures and capabilities to act, if need be, without the agreement of NATO and without recourse to NATO assets. The overall objective was a new power distribution between the US and European partners, which would re-adjust the US primacy within NATO. Consequently, France called for visible military institutions and a high-level staffed PSC. The French reluctance towards a WEU-EU merger and its effort to maintain the WEU acquis underline the objective to develop a European autonomy as clearly distinct from NATO.

Third, in a long term perspective, maximising the decision making and action autonomy of the EU aimed at reducing NATO’s role to questions of classical defence.

2.5 Common objectives and main differences

The analysis reveals a general agreement of the three countries that the EU should assume a greater responsibility in international security and defence issues and should to this end be equipped with credible military and institutional capabilities. There are however apparent differences when it comes to the details. Besides, it is interesting to note that France and the UK modified their positions during the negotiations process, whereas the German stance remained stable.
2.5.1 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

The most obvious differences concern the transatlantic relations. For France, a European security and defence policy is first and foremost a European project which nevertheless assumes readiness, when necessary, to make use of an Atlanticist instrument, that is, NATO. The EU as an autonomous organisation has the right to develop a security and defence policy as it wishes and seeks most appropriate synergies with NATO. ESDP is from that perspective a mechanism to develop European capabilities by initially making use of NATO structures and assets.

For the UK, the starting point is different in that it was seeking a way on how to best maintain NATO and the transatlantic alliance. The setting up of a European dimension has been identified as the best solution for that. Put differently, the UK adopted European tactics for its global strategy of keeping NATO alive. Whereas France would choose the NATO option in case of need while striving to build European capabilities in view of becoming autonomous, the UK linked on principle all military activities to NATO. This demonstrates the different levels of the debate: for France, autonomy was to a great extent a political question of principle, for the UK, it was more an issue of effective military operational capacity.

Germany came closer to British positions. Tensions between a traditional impulse to align with France, and a similar strong impulse to do so with NATO and the US explain Germany’s reluctance to clearly pronounce its preferences in the EU-NATO issue. Eventually, Germany preferred to let others lead the pro-NATO camp, namely, the UK. Fearing however that the French or the British might tend to favour one or the other approach in ESDP, Germany hence sought to play a moderator role. Nevertheless, ESDP offered for Germany a double advantage: it could embed its traditional attempts to reconcile its special relationship with Europe/France on the one hand and the US/NATO on the other into European settings; and it was released from the unrewarding intra-European task to act as a broker between different approaches to European security. Thus, ESDP seemed to offer
a chance to overcome the sometimes painful tensions that had in the past torn Germany between French and British views on European defence.

While France considered that the emergence of a credible ESDP would consolidate a more balanced Alliance, the UK and Germany feared that the opposite would be the case. If Europe demonstrated a serious capacity to manage its own security affairs, they feared, the US might retreat and NATO might disintegrate.

This reflects a profound difference in the understanding of the long-term perspective of transatlantic relations. France defended a maximalist position on how autonomous ESDP should be from NATO, which was not shared by Germany and the UK. While for France, ESDP could develop at will and would not threaten NATO, both the UK and Germany saw an imaginative red line, where, once it passed, the EU would start to destabilise NATO. They were hence both wary of approaching this line. French efforts to increasingly limit NATO to defence tasks are thus not supported neither by Germany nor the UK. While not denying the EU’s quest for autonomy, both tend to see this autonomy in more pragmatic terms. An European defence should certainly be developed. But NATO should remain the primary reference, and the well-being of the Alliance the central concern.

On the other hand, HMG considered that France’s long term aspiration towards autonomy was so unrealistic, that it could, at least for the time being, be ignored for the sake of co-operation. The most important issue for the UK was France’s willingness to cooperate on immediate pragmatic developments of crucial importance for Europe, that is, mainly capabilities.

The main differences with regard to the transatlantic relations can be summarised in three dualisms, opposing a hierarchical vs. an equal relationship; autonomy versus dependence or hegemony; and burden-sharing vs. power-sharing.

2.5.2 Role of the EU

This reading of the transatlantic relationship already indicates the understanding of the international role the EU should play. While France strives for a global role for the EU,
Germany and the UK define the geographic limits in more restricted terms to Europe, with a possible extension to Africa, but certainly not in global terms.

For France and Germany, ESDP is a logical step in the integration process which leads to a political role for Europe, and is hence worth being done for the sake of it. The UK meanwhile conceives of ESDP mainly as a pragmatic tool for capability improvement. While it supports co-operation where needed, it rejects integration as attempt toward sovereignty.

From a French perspective, the EU is an autonomous entity and has hence the right to create its own defence policy. Contrary, for Germany, developing a European actor role as part of the integration process is less about exerting European power but more about diffusing it, thereby preventing a re-nationalisation of policies which could lead to rivalry and mistrust between EU members. Germany perceived the deepening of the European integration process as a particular historical responsibility in which it must take a leading role. This German stance differs from both British and French positions. It contradicts the French perception of projection of power and independence as a global actor, but differs also from the UK insistence on co-operation without integration. Overall, while publicly supporting France and insisting on the historical Franco-German relationship, Germany seems ideas-wise to be closer to the UK.

On the other hand, France and the UK were constantly torn between wanting to increase their foreign actions via strengthening the EU, but being reluctant to restrict their freedom of manoeuvre by setting up potentially constraining multilateral frameworks. This explains the insistence on intergovernmental structures, which were however consensual within all EU member states, given the particular character of defence as core tenant of national sovereignty.

2.5.3 Role of the WEU

There was general recognition that the WEU was part of the problem, and not the solution. All three countries agreed that the new policy should be located inside the EU framework. It is however the aspect where the national positions were the most subject to
change. The shifts of opinion of the UK, from opposing a merger to supporting it, and of France, from open backing via reluctance to lukewarm support, were both a clear break with traditional policies.

The approach to the WEU also reflects the different understanding of the political importance (global role) and degree of autonomy (mainly from NATO) the countries wish the EU to enjoy. France, convinced that a collective defence commitment was an essential element for ESDP, was increasingly reluctant to abandon the WEU and sought to maintain its WEU acquis, mainly art. V MTB. Germany, unsatisfied with the record of the WEU and its position within it, favoured a quick takeover, and claiming that art. V of NATO was sufficient. Also HMG considered art V MTB largely irrelevant because of the NATO commitment.

The question of the WEU’s future and of the different membership categories became a recurrent topic at every stage of the development of ESDP. Whereas the UK and Germany insisted upon the non discrimination of the concerned countries, France distinguished in its approach between NATO members who were EU candidates and those who were not, with clear preference for the first.

2.5.4 EU Toolbox

While Germany insisted more on the civilian side, France and the UK worried that the military dimension could be watered down by too much insistence in the civilian aspects. They hence stressed the military dimension. However, Germany argued that an ESDP with both military and civilian capabilities would be particularly effective and would endow the EU with a comparative advantage over other security institutions.

2.5.5 What institutions, what staffing?

All three countries agreed to locate the institutions in the CFSP pillar, to set up military and political entities, and to do so quickly. France and the UK agreed on giving the military entities high visibility, while Germany sought to play a moderator role, such as when suggesting staff which would allow the bridging of the Euro-Atlanticist divide. Both France
and the UK agreed on the need to set up military capacities and feared that the institutional debate risked to make it loose momentum.

Once agreement found that the PSC would be staffed by permanently Brussels based diplomats, disagreement prevailed over the level of staffing. It reflects divergences about the importance ESDP should enjoy. France lobbied to appoint senior level diplomats who would not be double hatted with NATO in order to underline the importance of the new structures and to allow for an equal footing with NATO. The UK preferred a lower level of seniority to keep the institution under firm national control and to avoid turning it into a high profile entity. Germany did not defend a clear position. All three however agreed on the intergovernmental nature of defence policy, made clear that community institutions would have little if no role, and opposed the establishment of a council of defence ministers.

2.5.6 Outcome of the comparison

Overall, Germany and the UK often defended similar positions. France and the UK agreed mainly on the importance of capabilities. Germany and France politically cooperated but differed considerably in their proposals. Above all, the British debate differed from those in Germany and in France in that the commitment for an EU policy clearly was a novelty.

The comparison also reveals a difference in the way the debates took place. Only HMG had to face hostile reactions. But it did not really communicate either about the content of its policy nor about the reasons for it. Explaining that the UK engaged in a policy which would lead to the set up of European military co-operation and possibly joined operations would have raised enormous criticisms, and was considered domestically unacceptable. Equally, the reasons for the policy shift, namely, that NATO urgently needed reform, was not deemed digestible either. Hence, the UK rather communicated upon other policies, such as the humanitarian interventions as outlined in Blair’s doctrine of international community. In Germany, just as in France, there was broad agreement on the necessity to and the support for developing a European policy on security and defence.
This finds repercussions in the way the debate was approached. Whereas the UK preferred a rather discrete, bilateral or multilateral pragmatic step-by-step approach, such as in bilateral summits, France opted rather for grand declarations, such as the July 1999 Action plan, and high profile presidential or ministerial speeches in an attempt to drive the process politically. Germany particularly sought to assure consultation, broker agreements, and gain large support from other member states before exposing its suggestions.

Another difference consists in the way the three countries developed their visions of ESDP. British tradition and political culture fight shy over visionary approaches, favouring pragmatism and tactics above strategy. Hence, British thinking seemingly doesn’t go much beyond the medium term, preferring to concentrate on realistically attainable goals which are located in the capability realm while avoiding to discuss the finality of ESDP. Partly due to its priority to assure good transatlantic relations, Germany is also reluctant to engage in finality debates.

The opposite applies to France. While not omitting pragmatic steps, mainly the capability development, France is keen on developing a long-term project and grand strategy for Europe. These differences reflect diverging stances on the ultimate purpose the three countries relate with ESDP. France seemingly wished to take the process further than the UK and Germany.

Here, it is interesting to note that the overall tenor and the debate as such differed considerably in the three countries. In France, the overall spirit was optimistic and positive, discussing what ESDP should be, where it would take the EU, and stating the historic progress achieved with it. Contrary, in the UK, the debate turns more about what ESDP should not be, what it should not challenge (NATO, US primacy etc). Germany is, again, situated somehow in the middle: while rejoicing in the progress made in the integration process, particularly under its own EU presidency, German was wary to offend the US or cause a disengagement of NATO.
Table 9: National Agendas - Results for the categories of comparison for case study 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Transatlantic relations and NATO</th>
<th>Role of the EU</th>
<th>EU Tool Box</th>
<th>Role of the WEU (including membership issues)</th>
<th>What institution with what staffing?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NATO as primary framework</td>
<td>ESDP as essential element of the political integration process</td>
<td>accent of comprehensive approach while accepting military capabilities</td>
<td>Abandon the WEU</td>
<td>tripartite structure seeking to moderate between UK and France with staffing proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Right of first refusal for NATO</td>
<td>regional actor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall goal of strengthening the Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>NATO as primary framework</td>
<td>ESDP as pragmatic tool for capabilities generation</td>
<td>mixed tool box with insistence on generatio of military capabilitie s</td>
<td>Abandon the WEU</td>
<td>tripartite structure high visibility for military entities lower level of staffing for PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO, right of first refusal</td>
<td>ESDP to further national ambitions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall goal of strengthening the Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>global political actor role to assume responsibilities</td>
<td>mixed tool box with insistence on generatio of military capabilitie s</td>
<td>maintaining WEU acquis, mainly art. V MBT long term merger, but only when EU has assumed its role</td>
<td>tripartite structure visible military entity high level staffing for PSC double hatting for EUMC but not PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship on equal footing, refusal of hierarchy NATO limited to collective defence, Overall goal of balancing the Alliance</td>
<td>ESDP as logical step in integration process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 The influence of France, the UK and Germany on the institutional set-up

Identifying the national agendas is the first step to assess national influence. This chapter compares the national agendas with the outcome of the negotiation. This will allow to assess to what extent the three countries have been successful in uploading their preferences.
3.1 The EU decision: The Council Conclusions in Nice, December 2000

The final decision on the institutional setting was taken in Nice, under French Presidency, in December 2000. The three institutions, building upon first regulations agreed upon in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999), gained permanent status.

As a result, ESDP was to be located inside the EU, in the CFSP pillar, thereby continuing the preference for intergovernmental co-operation. Three institutions were set up, officially named as Political and Security Committee; Military Committee of the EU and Military Staff of the EU (Council of the EU 2000b22). They were partly a rethought of existing structures (PSC as upgrade of the PoCo) and partly genuinely new products (EUMC and EUMS).

3.1.1 The Political and Security Committee

The PSC is the “linchpin” of the CFSP and ESDP (Council of the EU 2001a). Its centrality was enshrined in the Nice Treaty (Art. 25).

The PSC will reside permanently in Brussels, unlike PoCo which met at political director level twice a month. Now, Brussels-based diplomats will meet at least weekly. Already in the Helsinki Conclusions, it was enshrined that the PSC would be appointed at the level of senior/ambassadorial rank. But it may also convene in Political Director formation. Although member states were free to send members at the level they consider appropriate, it turned out that the PSC representatives are usually referred to as ambassadors, even if they tend to be rather junior (Juncos and Reynolds 2007: 134). This difference in the form points to issues of political influence. Capital- based political directors are national policy makers and have fewer stakes to develop a European policy than Brussels-based ambassadors. The choice of a high level body and Brussels based committee hence potentially takes away influence from the capitals.

In close contact with the SG/HR, the PSC is the main player in the decision-shaping process and helps defining the EU's policy guidelines which then have to be endorsed by the Council. Representing each member state, it serves as a preparatory body for the Council. The PSC should "keep track of the international situation in the areas falling within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, help define policies by drawing up "opinions" for the Council, either at the request of the Council or on its own initiative, and monitor implementation of agreed policies" (Council of the EU 2000b - top 1, Annex III to Annex VI). After consulting the Presidency, the SG/HR may chair the PSC, especially in the event of a crisis. In addition, the PSC plays a major role in consultations, particularly with NATO and third states.

In times of crisis, the PSC exercises "political control and strategic direction" of the EU's military response. The PSC supervises the implementation of the measures adopted and assesses their effects. To that end, on the basis of the opinions and recommendations of the EUMC, it evaluates in particular the essential elements to be submitted to the Council (Council of the EU 2000b - Annex III to Annex VI: Political and Security Committee).

It is commonly suggested that the PSC represents an upgraded version of the PoCo established for EPC in the 1970s, with regard to the composition, frequency of meetings and authority (Juncos and Reynolds 2007). It is essentially the move from an institution created to assure policy co-ordination into one designed to shape policy decisions and potentially engage in decision-making.

### 3.1.2 European Union Military Committee

The EUMC is the highest military body set up within the Council (Council of the EU 2001b). It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, represented at weekly meetings by their Military Representatives. The EUMC meets at the level of Chiefs of Defence when necessary. Its chairman, appointed by the Council on the proposal of the Chiefs of Defence for a three-year term, takes part in PSC and GAERC meetings when
decisions with defence implications are to be taken. He also acts as military adviser to the SG/HR.

The EUMC is the forum for military consultation and co-operation between the EU member states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. It provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters, based on consensus. It gives military direction on all military activities with the EU framework. It is supported by the EUMS, to which it gives directions.

The EUMC monitors the development of the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspects, the progress of military operations and evaluates the strategic options identified by the EUMS and forwards them to the PSC together with its evaluation and military advice. All member states except France double hatted their military representatives to both the EU and NATO.

3.1.3 European Union Military Staff

The EUMS is the only permanent integrated military structure of the EU (Council of the EU 2001b, 2005). It is composed of military personnel seconded by member states to the Council's General Secretariat. The EUMS is the source of the EU's military expertise and works under the direction of the EUMC, to which it reports. It implements policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC.

It has three principal operational functions: early warning; situation assessment; and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including the identification of European national and multinational forces. The EUMS also has the responsibility to monitor, assess and make recommendations regarding the forces and capabilities made available to the EU by the member states, on training, exercises and interoperability.

Besides, the EUMS programmes, plans, conducts and evaluates the military aspect of the EU's crisis management procedures, including EU/NATO procedures.
3.1.4 EU-NATO

No definitive arrangements have been found on the establishment of a permanent EU-NATO relationship and arrangements for consultation and co-operation (Council of the EU 2000b\textsuperscript{23}). The annexes to the Nice conclusions on the principles for consultation, co-operation and transparency with NATO and the modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities constitute the EU’s contribution to work on future arrangements between the two organisations. The EU hopes for a favourable reaction from NATO so that these arrangements can be implemented on a mutually satisfactory basis.

Consultations and co-operation between the two organisations shall be developed in matters of security, defence and crisis management of common interest in order to assure the most appropriate military response to a crisis and ensure effective crisis management, while fully respecting the decision-making autonomy of NATO and the EU.

The meetings between the i-PSC and the NAC should support the development of a relationship of confidence between the EU and NATO, as should the ad hoc working groups set up at Feira. The Interim Security Agreement concluded by the two Secretaries-Generals has encouraged the development of these relations by authorising initial exchanges of documents.

3.1.5 EU-WEU

The Nice summit decided upon the inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU, a development which has already been initiated in Cologne (Council of the EU 2000b\textsuperscript{24}). The EU assumed the “crisis management functions of the WEU”. Existing entities such as the Satellite Centre and the ISS were set up as agencies. However, the WEU itself

\textsuperscript{23} IV: Common European Security and Defence Policy, and Annex VI: Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy, Top IV: Permanent Arrangements for EU – NATO consultations and Co-operation; see also Annex I to Annex VI: Military capabilities commitment declaration, and Appendix to Annex I to Annex VI: Achievement of the headline goal review mechanisms for military capabilities

\textsuperscript{24} IV: Common European Security and Defence Policy, and Annex VI: Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy, Top V: Inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU.
was not dissolved. Some aspects were maintained, such as the Parliamentary Assembly and art V MBT.

Table 10: The EU decision in case study 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Transatlantic relations and NATO</th>
<th>Role of the EU</th>
<th>EU Tool Box</th>
<th>Role of the WEU (including membership issues)</th>
<th>What institution with what staffing?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nice Council Conclusions</td>
<td>first co-operation procedures put into place, but definitive co-operation and consultation procedures need still to be agreed upon</td>
<td>call for the EU to assume its responsibilities no decision on reach (global vs. regional actor) no supranational institutions</td>
<td>mixed toolbox, but insistency upon first ever military institution s within the EU</td>
<td>transfer of most functions but no merger maintaining WEU acquis, mainly art. V MBT long term merger envisioned</td>
<td>institutions inside 2nd pillar tripartite structure visible military entity high level and Brussels based staffing for PSC double hatting for EUMC (except France) but not PSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 British, German or French: what influence on the institutional set-up?

Having assessed the national agendas and the EU decision, the two need to be compared. It is the overlap between agenda and decision which will allow to assess the magnitude of the member states influence. The criteria used to assess the national agendas again offer a useful starting point for the analysis.

3.2.1 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

The Nice presidency reiterated the formula already used in St. Malo, calling for an autonomous capacity to take decision for the EU “where NATO as a whole is not engaged” (see Council of the EU 2000b). NATO remains the basis of collective defence, while ESDP would contribute to the “vitality of a renewed transatlantic link” (Council of the EU 2000b).

These formulas all represent, as Council conclusions usually do, compromises. All three countries agreed upon NATO remaining the basis for collective defence, and that ESDP would somehow contribute to maintain the transatlantic link. The formula “where
NATO as a whole is not engaged” has since St. Malo been interpreted in different ways. For the UK, military scenarios in which NATO will not be involved remained hypothetical. The wording that the EU must enjoy the capacity to engage in autonomous action referred for the UK to the situation where the USA would not like to get engaged, rather than to one in which the EU decided to pro-actively take the lead. France interpreted the same formula as leeway for EU autonomous action whenever the EU wished to intervene, without asking NATO. It is the “constructive ambiguity” of the formula which allowed all member states to agree upon it (Howorth 2004: 28). It might hence be more interesting to see what has not been mentioned: for example, there is not clear decision about the ‘right of first refusal’, which France refuses, but the UK and Germany support.

This constructive ambiguity also applies to other formulas in the Presidency report. British diplomats claimed that for the UK, the difference between “autonomous” and “independent” was crucial. Accordingly, “autonomous” would express the continued primacy of NATO, whereas the “independent” was considered as questioning it. For France, autonomy clearly questioned NATO’s primacy.

On the other hand, it can also be considered a German merit in that the Germans during their Presidency helped to bridge the gap between the French and British interpretations. Germany’s coordinative discourse allowed to link France, the UK but also the neutral and non–aligned states with the objective to turn the inchoate bilateral St. Malo declaration into EU policy. It is to a great extent Germany’s credit that the April 1999 Washington summit endorsed the European project, and that the US and NATO gained confidence in it.

However, no definitive arrangements have been made regarding the EU-NATO coordination mechanisms. In Nice, the EU re-iterated the importance it attaches to co-operation with NATO, while also insisting upon the decision making autonomy of both institutions. Previous contacts have not led to the establishment of the contacts and procedures called for mainly by the UK and Germany.
Certainly, the iPSC and the NAC met, as did joint EU NATO working groups. One of the groups explicitly dealt with co-operation and consultation procedures (see Council of the EU 2000a – annex I). Besides, an Interim Security Agreement has been concluded which authorised exchanges of documents. But all this did not yield a definitive arrangement. This corresponds partly to French expectations according to which those procedures should only be put into place once the EU has set up and running its own institutions and procedures. This would allow the EU to deal on equal footing with NATO.

In the same time, it would be too easy to present the non-establishment of permanent consultation procedures as a French victory. Germany and the UK certainly sought to install the quickest possible EU-NATO relations. But first, the non-existence of permanent structures should not mask the existence of informal working structures. The ‘double hatting’ of national military representatives to NATO and EU certainly eased them. Second, the problems to install these structures are not only due to successful French lobbying (in the EU) or blocking (in NATO) but to other external factors, too. The relationship of non-EU European members of NATO, mainly Turkey, towards ESDP proved to be difficult.

When engaging into ESDP, the EU had sought to assure that this was not intended to push out of collective European efforts those non-EU countries who entered the different WEU membership categories.25 The EU initially expected that the rules that governed the WEU-NATO relationship would simply be transferred to the EU. In the minds of many, there was considered to be no distinction between the EU and the WEU, despite the difference in remit, membership, history, structures.

While most countries did not see many difficulties herewith, Turkey, an associate member of WEU and thus more or less fully represented in the WEU decision making, feared that it would be kept at greater distance than before. Not surprisingly, it vetoed the transfer of these rights to an institution where it was not a member, and required that its rights be transferred to the EU (Quinlan 2001).

25 For the ‘third country issue’ see for example Quinlan 2001; Webber, Terriff, Howorth and Croft 2002.
Not only France and Greece, but most EU member state opposed such demands, as it would have opened the access to EU processes without being EU member. This resulted in a deadlock, in that Turkey, using its formal veto power, blocked the NATO consensus on EU-NATO dialogue. But also France did not show the most cooperative stance. As a result, only a limited amount of topics could be discussed jointly by NATO and the EU, and the set up of definitive co-operation procedures were delayed (Touzovskaia 2006; Hofmann and Reynolds 2007; Quinlan 2001).

### 3.2.2 WEU-EU relations

This already explains parts of the EU-WEU relationship. While most of the WEU functions have been transferred to the EU, the EU has not entirely absorbed the WEU. This is mainly due to art. V MBT and the opposition of some WEU member states, mainly Turkey.

Maintaining the WEU and its acquis could, at a first glance, be interpreted as prevalence of French ideas. But as mentioned above for the transatlantic link, not only different factors but also different interpretations serve as explanation. Eventually, the WEU looked increasingly like an empty shell while the EU boosted its functions in crisis management and inherited of several WEU assets. Both Germany and the UK could hence be satisfied by the decisions taken so far and consider that their preferences for scrapping the WEU have been uploaded.

All three countries agreed on the ‘double hatting’ of the WEU/SG and the EU SG/HR in the person of Solana. His nomination was particularly welcomed by the Atlanticists because his appreciation for NATO, as former SG, was beyond doubt and he enjoyed a high reputation in the US. At the same time, the appointment of a Spaniard seemed more acceptable for the French than a possible appointment from an Atlanticist member state. Finally, it met the German concerns to have a political heavy-weight appointed. Put differently, Solana “met the French criterion for seniority and pro-activism, the British criterion
for user-friendly Atlanticism and the German criterion for Europeanism” (Howorth 2001: 771). He offered a compromise on which all could agree.

3.2.3 Role of the EU

This criterion is difficult to pin down in the EU decision. Calling for the EU to play “its role fully on the international stage” and to assume its responsibilities in face of crisis are compatible with the expectations of all member states.

3.2.4 EU Toolbox

The same applies for the EU toolbox. The wording that the “Union’s particular characteristic is its capacity to mobilise a vast range of both civilian and military means and instruments, thus giving of an overall crisis management and conflict prevention capability” (Council of the EU 2000b) corresponds to German expectations, which stressed the comprehensive approach. In the same time, it is neither something the UK or France would oppose, nor what would be exclusive to German positions. Sweden for example traditionally insisted upon the comprehensive approach.

3.2.5 The nature and staffing of the institutions

The nature and staffing of the institutions offer a visible example of successful collective uploading. First of all, the tripartite structure, favoured by the three countries, has been successfully uploaded. Seemingly modelled on the NATO and WEU settings, it had the advantage of pleasing the UK (for its correspondence to NATO models and a visible military part) but also France (for the political dimension and a visible military component) and Germany (for the political dimension and the NATO/WEU legacy).

Germany proposed the structure in the working papers in the run up to Cologne, and certain observers attribute them to German Foreign Minister Fischer (see Bundesregierung ___)

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Nominated in summer 1999, Solana took office as EU HR/SG in October 1999, and in November 1999 as WEU SG.
Instead of concentrating upon military capabilities, German developed an institutional structure in which it was assured its voice would be heard, and where close links to NATO would be assured. But other observers claim that the idea of a permanent committee with national representatives was essentially a British, if not Foreign Secretary Cook’s personal idea (Agence Europe, 15 March 1999; Howorth 2000a: 385, 2004: 225; Juncos and Reynolds 2007: 133). While interviews in the MOD confirmed that HMG claimed credit for the idea, they did not allow to establish it as an exclusively British offspring. Whatever the origin might be, the institutions apparently corresponded to the expectations of the three countries, and can hence be considered an example of successful collective uploading.

Second, France was successful in uploading its preference for a PSC staffed by high level diplomats, to be permanently based in Brussels. Also Germany stressed the political dimension in form of the PSC, thereby harking back to earlier ideas of a political union while also going beyond the military institution where its own voice would be comparatively weak. The UK opposed such a PSC model, but finally agreed upon it in the run up to Helsinki in exchange for a genuine commitment for military capabilities (Howorth 2001: 772). The PSC thereby received a higher political rang than the UK had thought of.

Eventually, the key determination of the three countries was to retain political control and to avoid a council of defence ministers. Even Germany and France considered that such a development would take the integration process too far. They used their collective blocking power to hinder such ideas to materialise. The emerging centrality of the PSC allowed to keep national control over the fledging ESDP. The institutional settings can hence be considered an example of successful uploading where all three countries found their account.

In terms of staffing, Germany succeeded in uploading its quest to reconcile Atlanticist and Europeanist tendencies in the EU by suggesting General Rainer Schuwirth as Chief of Staff. General Graham Messervy-Whiting, a British military with Franco-British roots, was appointed deputy (The Guardian, 20 November 2000). These appointments are said to have
come as a surprise for France, and have been partly interpreted as reverse in that France, as one of the initiators of the project, did not staff leading positions. That particularly the military posts which France was so keen to see develop at the EU level have been attributed to seemingly NATO friendly staff came as “unpleasant and thoroughly unexpected news” in France (Interviews in the German MFA, 2006; The Guardian, 20 November 2000).

3.2.6 Summary

The uploading capacities of the three countries are comparable. All three were able to upload preferences in key areas and to blocking certain ideas. Overall, the Nice Council conclusions obviously present a compromise.

Eventually, the key to understand the debate lies in what has been termed “constructive ambiguity” (Howorth 2004: 228). Each of the countries could interpret the final decision in its own way. If for the UK, ESDP was a NATO project implying European instruments, for France it was a European project embracing Alliance capabilities. Germany is situated somewhere in the middle. Accordingly, Howorth stated that,

“the UK appears to have crossed a European Rubicon; France appears to have made its peace with NATO; Germany appears to have relaxed its aversion to professional militarism and its preference for civilian approaches” (Howorth 2001: 767).

As long as this ambiguity was not transcended, ESDP advanced as it did in its institutional dimension.

4 Mechanisms of influence

Assessing the influence of the three countries also means discussing their shaping capacities. The negotiations process from St. Malo up to Nice offered a number of possibilities to inject national preferences in view of successfully uploading them. Two moments where particularly propitious:
1) the period from St. Malo to the Cologne summit, where the tripartite structure of the institutions has first been mentioned. This corresponds to the German EU and WEU presidencies.

2) the second half of 1999, when the fine tuning of the institutions took place.

4.1 The mechanisms of uploading used in this case study

The fact that the first institutional blueprints have been developed under German EU presidency made some observers claim that Germany used its agenda setting power to impose its preferences (Miskimmon 2005). Contrary, other observers give credit to Germany for having successfully used its presidency competences to translate a bilateral initiative (St. Malo) into European governance (Jopp 1999a). As opposite as these two claims might be at a first glance, they both assume that the EU presidency offers a particular propitious opportunity to set the agenda and influence developments.

The double WEU and EU presidency in I/1999 indeed offered agenda setting opportunities. Germany decided to take up the ideas of St. Malo and the Vienna European Council and integrate them into the presidency programme, thereby seeking to assure that the topic be treated, and treated beyond rhetorical declarations: the Cologne presidency report outlines the tripartite institutional structure which formed the basis of the Nice decisions. Although backed by France, the UK and other countries, it was thus essential for the St. Malo initiative to be supported by Germany to reach the top of the EU agenda.

This agenda setting opportunity allowed for ideational export and preference shaping. The German working papers submitted in early 1999 were certainly developed in consultations with its European partners, particularly the UK and France. But the final drafting was incumbent to Germany and allowed to post its preferred ideas. Instead of concentrating upon military capabilities, Germany developed a balanced institutional structure and assured close links to NATO. The positive outcome of the 1999 NATO summit was also due to German mediation (Interview in the U.S Mission to the EU 2005; German
MFA 2005). The German government stressed that it used its presidency above all for promoting European developments rather than national interests (Verheugen 1999).

Germany was indeed instrumental in bringing together the different strands of the embryonic European defence project in a coherent EU policy (Howorth 2000c: 31). It certainly does not dispose of the military and political weight which France and the UK enjoy. But in the 1999 negotiations, this turned out to be an advantage: Germany’s commitment in searching for a compromise acceptable for all EU member states, Europeanists as well as Atlanticist, neutral as well as non aligned states, benefited from its recognised mediator role. It was simply not suspected neither of wanting to kick NATO out, nor of striving for too much subservience or for a militarisation of the EU. Here, also the recognition which Foreign Minister Fischer enjoyed was helpful (Interviews in the EU Council, 2005; EU ISS, 2005).

Bilateral summits also offered opportunities for agenda setting, ideational export and subsequent uploading. The Franco-German summits in May and November 1999 or the Franco-British summits in December 1998 and November 1999 allowed the injection of ideas into the European debate. Accordingly, the joint Franco-German support allowed strengthening Solana’s position (Thorel 2001: 215; Interviews in the French MOD, 2007). Nevertheless, the conclusions of these summits demonstrate that since Cologne the institutional issue lost importance for the benefit of the capability development.

In the area of security and defence, the traditional pattern of Franco-German relations as pace setter is increasingly replaced by Franco-British co-operation. Both countries have, unlike Germany, a more far reaching and militarily characterised understanding of international relations. Additional affinity follows from their colonial past, the understanding of their role in the world, of the use of force, their expeditionary experience, the professional structure of their armies (as opposed to the German conscription model) but also from the military capabilities, whose financing and structure outclasses Germany. Both France and Britain recognised the crucial centrality “to engage closely with each other” upon European defence issues (Blair 1998b).
Also trilateral co-operation played a considerable role in successfully moulding the St. Malo initiative into the European governance settings. The three countries insist upon their particular responsibility (Moscovici in Moscovici and Chirac 1999; Chirac 1999b; Le Monde, 1 June 1999; Le Monde, 20 March 1999). One example is the trilateral meeting in March 1999 which allowed securing the main ideas of the Reinhartshausen paper. Besides, also trilateral blocking power was used such as when opposing the creation of a defence minister council.

The impact of collective/trilateral agenda setting and ideational export is evident. All three countries were very much committed to keep the momentum for a European security and defence policy. The resulting dynamic entrained the other countries. That the three traditionally occupied different if not opposite positions in this area made it easier for the other countries to endorse the initiative. Put simply, with France assuring the Europeanist aspirations, the UK the Atlanticist dimension, and Germany the civilian and moderating part, most of the European countries could find their preferences and were assured that the new endeavour would be a European one and not serve solely one country’s interests. Hence, the political weight and influence of the three countries was beneficial in reconciling the different European positions and in appeasing fears about one position or the other, mainly the fear of a rising militarism or anti-Americanism.

Overall, the trilateral co-operation offered what the Franco-German couple used to provide until then, namely, directional leadership. It has been facilitated by the affinity of Chancellor Schröder with Prime Minister Blair, which allowed to open the traditional Franco-German co-operation patterns which initially suffered from a lack of understanding between Schröder, Jospin and Chirac.

However, bilateral and multilateral co-operation goes beyond summits or punctual events. It includes formal and informal working contacts, meetings on different occasions, or exchange programmes. Personnel involved in the negotiations stress the importance of such settings for exchanging ideas, reaching consensus, and posting ideas (Interviews in the German MFA and MOD 2005, 2006; the French MOD 2007; the UK Permanent Representation 2005; the UK FCO 2006; the European Council 2005, 2007). Particularly
France and Germany have since the Elysée Treaty engaged in exchange programmes. But also the UK and France had started similar procedures, which intensified during the 1990s mainly thanks to Blair’s pro-European initiatives (FCO 1998; Lunn, Miller and Smith 2008: 92-93). Some observers underline the role of these epistemic communities in developing ideas and Europeanising them (Hanau Santini 2005; Howorth 2004).

Generally, the capacity to develop ideas is key to influencing the debate. Internationally trained staff, such as in the planning units, supported the development of commonly acceptable ideas and the negotiations to reach a common denominator. Besides, all three countries disposed of think tanks such as the FRS, Ifri (France), SWP, DGAP (Germany) or Chatham House, CER, RUSI (UK), which fuelled the debate with ideas.

Generally, the pro-active participation in the debate, mainly in form of submitting precise proposals, offered an opportunity for uploading ideas and thereby to shape the debate and influence its partners. Chirac’s Action Plan demonstrates that also outside an EU presidency ideas can be injected. Offering a draft means offering a working basis. Prime Minister Blair stressed that

“Half-hearted partners are rarely leading partners. […] If we wish Europe to be guided by the common sense part of our character, we must also use our creative vision to see that only by participating can we shape and influence the Europe in which we live (Blair 1999d).

All three countries, but particularly France and the UK, recognised that participation offered leadership opportunities and more possibilities to shape the environment than to stop out and eventually being confronted with decisions which can not be modified. The active and proactive participation in the debate can hence be considered a condition for successful uploading. The political, economic and military weight of the three countries however gave their words comparatively more weight that those of others.
4.2 To what extent apply the mechanisms outlined in the theory chapter?

In summary, the following mechanisms of uploading have been defined and identified in this case study:

Table 11: The mechanisms of uploading identified in case study 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms of uploading</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal and informal agenda setting</td>
<td>mainly by providing detailed proposals in speeches and French Action Plan</td>
<td>facilitated by WEU and EU presidency I/1999, when providing working papers for the Cologne summit</td>
<td>Initiated the debate, then lessC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example setting</td>
<td>Partly, by submitting blueprints</td>
<td>Partly, by submitting blueprints</td>
<td>- / -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral or multilateral co-operation</td>
<td>Franco-German summits, Franco-British summits, trilateral co-operation (France, UK, Germany)</td>
<td>Franco-German summits, trilateral co-operation (France, UK, Germany)</td>
<td>Franco-British summits, trilateral co-operation (France, UK, Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideational export and preference shaping</td>
<td>French Action Plan; Chirac speeches, supposedly suggested tripartite structure, for strong PSC and military entity</td>
<td>mainly German presidency paper, Reinhartshausen paper, Fischer speeches, supposedly suggested tripartite structure, for strong PSC</td>
<td>Supposedly suggested the tripartite structure, for strong military entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative commitment</td>
<td>Excellent national staff in planning units; bilateral exchange programmes help to create mutual understanding and develop acceptable ideas</td>
<td>suggesting staff (General Schuwrith); bilateral exchange programmes help to create mutual understanding and develop acceptable ideas</td>
<td>suggesting staff (Lt General Messeny Whiting; excellent staff in planning units, bilateral exchange programmes help to create mutual understanding and develop acceptable ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political capacities, influence, weight</td>
<td>recognised as main military and political power; initiator of St. Malo; weight strengthened capacities for ideational export and preference shaping; blocking power</td>
<td>recognised moderator role, allowing to reconcile different European countries, weight strengthened capacities for ideational export and preference shaping; blocking power</td>
<td>recognised as main military and political power; initiator of St. Malo, weight strengthened capacities for ideational export and preference shaping; blocking power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Conclusion

This chapter sought to evaluate the influence France, Germany and the UK had on the nature of the first three institutions set up for ESDP. It aimed to assess to what extent and how the three countries were able to project their preferences to the EU level within the creation of these institutions.

The analysis revealed that the three countries decisively steered the debate about and influenced the decision on their precise form, composition and responsibilities. This has been recognised by other countries involved. Although the three countries have not been able to upload all their preferences, they assured during the negotiations the main aspects. This partly included trading them against other topics outside the institutional realm, or using blocking power. As a result, the EU has been equipped with a high level political and two visible military institutions. While most of the WEU functions have been transferred to the EU, it has itself not been scrapped. NATO has been recognised as main collective defence organisation. While institutional contacts have been sought, they have however not been established when the three institutions gained permanent status.

The main mechanisms of uploading were agenda setting and bilateral and trilateral cooperation, which offered excellent opportunities for ideational export and preference shaping. Germany profited from the agenda setting opportunities provided by the double EU and WEU presidencies I/1999. The administrative capacities and the political, economic and military weight of the three countries increased the impact of their contributions. It is however difficult to define to what extent the successful uploading has been solely their merit, or others not analysed here.

This points to a limiting factor of this analysis. Although the three countries under study here are undoubtedly the main actors in ESDP, their commitment and action cannot serve as all explaining factor. The establishment of permanent consultation structures with NATO were certainly hindered by France. But they were mainly due to unsolved membership issues between the EU, NATO and WEU.
This underscored that exogenous and endogenous factors explain together the commitment to the institutional set up. Endogenously, unique national strategic cultures, specific domestic situations or particularities of bilateral relations set the scene. In terms of exogenous factors, for example the Kosovo campaign as proximate event and the structural constraints of the existing NATO and WEU settings conditioned the room for manoeuvre.

Hence, the debate has not been conducted independently by the EU, but was closely determined by the latter’s interaction with NATO and the US. The new EU institutions being closely modelled to the NATO and WEU structures show this overall legacy. The WEU acquis again complicated the setting, as the debate about Turkey’s role demonstrates. The idea to solve the European security conundrum by locating security and defence issues inside the EU will materialise only in a long-term perspective. Here, it is interesting to note that France, despite disagreements, became more involved in NATO, such as when providing troops and the commander for the NATO-led Kosovo extraction force.

Moreover, the institutional debate was just one aspect of the European debates in 1999/2000, and not the one which gained priority treatment. The Agenda 2000 or the Kosovo campaign ranked for example much higher on the agenda. This is partly due to the technical and expert character of the institutional issue. However, it also points to the bigger European developments, in that the defence institutional debate took place against the background of a wider institutional debate leading to the constitutional treaty. Besides, the capability dimension quickly became the dominating topic in ESDP debates. Member states certainly recognised that institutions matter, as a factor of reassurance and commitment for them, as possible vector of influence given that their design influences the policy output, and in that they command legitimacy and loyalty. But the real challenges for establishing a European actor role were considered to be capabilities, financial and industrial issues.

While differences on the precise design and procedures existed, there was agreement on the overall goal of developing the EU into a security actor and equipping it with the necessary institutional and military tools. These common goals have however been interpreted in a different way by each country, as particularly the transatlantic relationship
and the finality of ESDP show. On the one hand, by admitting for various interpretations, the ambiguous wording allowed to reconcile the different approaches of the three countries. As long as it is not transcended, this constructive ambiguity allows ESDP to advance (Howorth 2004: 228; Heisbourg 2000). However, it risks postponing the problems and thereby to potentially block ESDP’s long term development.

The analysis unfolds that the member state’s commitment is driven by a mix of genuine commitment to European goals and strategic thinking to upload and thereby to further national preferences in view of influencing the EU policy making through a commitment at the European level. In addition, long-term processes of macro adaptation and micro socialisation in the European context also seem to have influenced the member states’ commitment. Successful co-operation on the ground in Bosnia revealed to France and the UK their common understanding of security challenges. The experience on the Balkans also forced all three countries to recognise that their current means for crisis management were ill adapted. Day to day co-operation, ministerial exchange programmes and interaction within the European settings eased concerns about EU level co-operation. Together with an overall positive experience regarding the outcome of the integration process, this made that the three countries no longer excluded to embed security and defence issues into the framework of EU governance.
CHAPTER 4:
CASE STUDY 2: THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

The Europeanisation of security policy implies providing the EU with competences to decide and to act in the security realm. The previous case study has shown that the development of ESDP started with initiatives in the institutional and capability realm. Less attention has been paid to the strategic dimension. However, without a minimal consensus over policy goals, threats and the means to address them, effective common action is difficult to achieve.

Member states aimed to address these questions when they adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. The ESS aimed to tackle what has been named a “strategic taboo” (Biscop 2005: 5), namely, the absence of a common analysis on threats, policy objectives and means, despite the concomitant progress of ESDP in institutional and material terms.

This chapter aims to assess the influence that France, Germany and Britain had on the ESS. Following the analytical framework outlined in chapter 2, this chapter will (1) set the scene by providing the background of the EU strategic development; (2) analyse the agenda of the three countries with regard to the ESS; (3) assess to what extent they were able to upload their preferences within the development of the ESS, and (4) examine the mechanisms used to project national preferences to the EU level.
1 Background and chronology of the EU’s strategic development

This section provides the background to understand the strategic development of the EU. First, the term ‘strategy’ will be defined. It will be followed by a review of the strategic development of the EU prior to the ESS. The third part will provide the proximate background of the ESS’s initiative in 2003. The last part will present a timeline resuming the main steps of the ESS’s development.

1.1 Defining Strategy

From its etymological origin, “strategy” has been conceptualised as the planned and coordinated use of force to achieve a certain political- or state-related goal. The Greek word stratēgos combines the terms stratos (army) and ago (leading). Stratēgos referred to a ‘military commander’ during the age of Athenian Democracy (Luttwak 1987: 248f).

Also the classical literature relates strategy to the military domain. The oldest reference is The Art of War by Sun Tzu, which dates back to the 6th century BC (Sun Tzu re-ed 1971). The subsequent presumably most influential text is Clausewitz’ On War (1833, re-ed 1976). Both define strategy as being about the threat of and the actual use of force to achieve political aims. Thus, although strategy has always also had a political dimension (see for example Machiavelli), the term was traditionally related to military force and the objectives of war, with military power considered as a legitimate instrument of policy.

It was particularly the end of WWII which heralded a “golden age” of strategic studies. During the Cold War, the military dimension was predominant with regard to both the content of strategic thinking and the background of the authors (Baylis and Wirtz 2006; Freedman 2003; Luttwak 1987). A wealth of definitions was produced, which were all exclusively aimed at the security and defence realm.
In its narrowest sense, strategy is about winning wars (Mahnken 2006: 68). Other scholars utilise “strategy” in a broader way and link it to the effective exercise of power. Accordingly, is strategy defined as:

“nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion – in conjunction with economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power – to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and tacit means” (Osgood 1957, quoted in Baylis and Wirtz 2006: 5).

The definition is taken a step further by Murray and Grimsley (1994: 1), who provide a procedural dimension of strategy as:

“a process, a constant adaptation to the shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty and ambiguity dominate”.

Traditionally, strategy therefore defined the theory and practice of the use and threat of the use of force for political purposes, and thereby provided a bridge between political and military spheres, while insisting on the latter.

By the 1980s, but particularly since the end of the Cold War, this confinement to the military realm began to fade and the political dimension came to the fore. Gray (1999) still defines strategy as related to the control, the use, and threat of the use of force for political purposes. However, he also emphasises that strategies need organisation and must control the means to ensure their applicability.

In fact, the militarily dominated perception of strategy seemed increasingly at odds with the prevalent belief in the early post-Cold War period that force was losing its utility (Dunne 2004: 895-896). Strategy increasingly turned from the art of employing military means to the art of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of security policy, such as diplomatic, economic, military, and informational tools, to achieve security objectives.

Moreover, the referent object of strategies changed. Traditionally, strategies were twofold state-centred: firstly, they focussed on defending the interests of states but neglected trans-national and intra-state security issues. Secondly, they were issued by nation states. This was increasingly challenged when collective security organisations, such as NATO, and entities resulting from political integration, such as the EU, began to issue strategic concepts.
For this study, the following definition will be utilised: a strategy governs the use of means to pursue political ends. It outlines perceived risks and threats to referent objects and defines the application of political, economic, diplomatic and military instruments to protect the objects. This embodies three phases:

1) The development of a strategic outline that defines the ends, identifies the means to reach them and rules for their applicability.
2) The preparation of the implementation, by creating the ability to decide and the capacity to act.
3) The implementation in view of reaching political aims.

These steps constitute a cyclical process. As outlined in the theory chapter, the analysis will concentrate on the first step of this cycle, namely, the development of a strategic outline.

1.2 The strategic development of the EU to 2003: a “strategic taboo”

When setting up ESDP, the member states agreed to equip the EU with the necessary means for effective crisis management. Subsequently, the creation of institutions (see chapter 3) and military capabilities (see chapter 5) was initiated. However, the strategic dimension was left vague. Ongoing confrontations between member states on issues such as transatlantic relations made it impossible to agree upon common policy goals and means.

There was also a strong flow of opinion about the EU learning the job without much theorising. However, the assumption that once institutional and military settings were in place, the strategic debate would follow automatically did not materialise. Conversely, the initial emphasis on capacities and generic types of operation rather than policy goals created a “strategic taboo” (Biscop 2005: 5) which constrained the EU’s external action.

Nevertheless, the absence of a strategy does not necessarily need to be a problem if the partners involved share the same views and can reach consensus in non-formalised ways. Yet this was not the case with ESDP. There was certainly a consensus on a multidimensional, comprehensive notion of security, which stressed the interdependence of
all dimensions of security rather than focussing just on the military. Yet the member states held very divergent views on the ambitions of the EU, its geographic priorities, the degree of autonomy it should strive for with regard to NATO/the US, the use of force, and the instruments it should develop.

From this perspective, the necessity of a common strategic framework to assure efficient policy making becomes evident. Without clarity about the objectives it is difficult to define the direction of ESDP and its needs in terms of civilian and military capabilities. Unsolved strategic differences between the member states might make them prefer other forms of co-operation, such as coalitions of the willing. Recent research has shown that member states tend to use military resources abroad often in a purely national way, or in ad hoc coalitions under non-EU leadership (Giegerich and Wallace 2004).

In addition, a strategic concept underlines the legitimacy and transparency of ESDP. A common security policy demands significant financial efforts of all member states and has a major impact on their armed forces. Continuing to entertain the vagueness on the objectives of ESDP might increase the risk of turning the public opinion against it. Contrary, a clear understanding of what ESDP stands for could allow the ‘responsibilising’ of the member states and encourage their commitment.

Eventually, a common strategy offers a line of argumentation. Without it, the EU would not only risk being restricted to reactive action when facing dominant players such as the US, who possess determined and regularly updated strategies. It would also be difficult for the EU to escape the US framework of thoughts and promote its own priorities (Biscop 2005).

The 2003 Iraq crisis demonstrated these aspects and made the EU recognise that it needed to tackle the “strategic taboo” if it wanted to be a security actor.27 However, already prior to the Iraq crisis, the strategic awareness grew in Europe in both political and academic circles.

27 In this chapter, the term ‘Iraq war/crisis’ refers exclusively to the 2003 US-led intervention.
The first example was the WEU Common Concept, adopted in 1995 (Extraordinary Ministerial Council of the WEU 1995). This first official European (although not EU) assessment of the changing security environment did not receive much attention, not least because the WEU had not succeeded in positioning itself as either a representative of Europe or as credible security actor (Quinlan 2001; see chapter 3). Besides, the work on the concept had revealed the difficulties of bridging the differences in security questions in Europe, which eventually hindered the elaboration of a clear statement. However, the WEU concept also lacked the political underpinnings as the CFSP, to which the WEU should serve as a military arm, was still in its infancy.

It was the 1999 appointed SG/HR Solana who gave a decisive impulse to the EU strategic development. By using the small means the Amsterdam Treaty (EU 1997, Title V, J. 1-3) conferred on him, mainly to initiate and draft strategies that then needed to be approved by the member states, Solana paved the way for an increasing acceptance of the member states for the EU becoming involved in strategic issues. The Treaty stated that the

“European Council shall decide on common strategies [...] in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available [...] The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions“ (EU 1997, Title V, J 3: 1-3).

Subsequently, Solana initiated Common Strategies on Russia and Ukraine (European Council 1999a,c). Although the influence of these strategies was debatable, the member states became used to idea of the Council playing a role in foreign and security policy. By 2003, they “were familiar with the idea of ‘strategies’, and they were looking [...] to Solana and his team to produce them” (Bailes 2005b: 5). Moreover, the growing awareness of the incoherence of EU policies stimulated debates in academic, policy and political circles. Subsequently, several national and EU initiatives set out to tackle the EU’s strategic gap.

The most prominent came from the Belgian presidency, which tasked in 2001 the EU ISS to develop a White paper on defence (Council of the EU 2001d). It resulted only in 2004 (thus after the ESS’s endorsement) in a report entitled ‘European defence: A proposal for a
White Paper’ (EU ISS 2004). The rather unsatisfactory outcome and the more critical than supportive approach of some member states demonstrated again the persistence of considerable differences in strategic questions (Interview in the EU ISS 2005; EU Council 2005). The Belgian presidency also ordered a comparative study of defence white papers in Europe (Biscop 2002: 479). Identifying commonalities and differences was thought to be a prerequisite for a common strategic approach at the EU level.

Another attempt was the “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts” which established conflict prevention as main objective of the EU. It was adopted by the Göteborg European Council (Council of the EU 2001c).

The work of the Convention (February 2002- July 2003) took these reflections further, particularly in the Working Groups VII and VIII dealing with security and defence issues.

In addition, several academic publications proposed blueprints to tackle the EU’s strategic gap, for example the Venusberg Group (Lindley-French, Algieri et al. 2004) and the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI – KIIB 2004).

Thus, despite several attempts to define an EU strategy, no comprehensive EU document was endorsed until 2003. Art 11.1 TEU defined the overall objectives of CFSP/ESDP and framed it as a general programme for conflict prevention. However, it only set a very general framework which was far too broad to provide references for daily policy making. On the other hand, the strategies on Russia or Ukraine and the Göteborg programme were far too narrow.

1.3 The context of the ESS inception in spring 2003

This tension between a growing strategic awareness and unsatisfactory results at the EU level was further fuelled by internal and external developments, which together provide the background for the inception of the ESS in 2003.

Internally, the EU’s preoccupation with the need for coherence and consistency in ESDP increased during the Convention but particularly with the launching of the first operations. *Concordia* was launched in Macedonia/FYROM in March 2003 (Council of the
EU 2003a). The first autonomous military operation Artemis began in the DR Congo in June 2003 (Council of the EU 2003b). The successful operationalisation of ESDP made the absence of an underpinning strategy look even more odd.

Externally, 9/11 had changed the perception of the international security agenda, particularly in the US. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the USA (NSS) (NSC 2002) expressed the US assessment of the post 9/11 security environment. While most Europeans would largely agree on the NSS threat analysis, they considered the proposed means to cope with them as being in sharp contrast to European approaches. Particularly the linking of democratic idealism with pre-emptive engagement and the justification of unilateral action provoked consternation (NSC 2002: 6, 19, 20; Dunne 2004: 899). It was perceived as threatening the transatlantic relations and the UN system.

The Iraq war eventually set the proximate scene for the ESS development. The discussions in 2002/2003 about a possible intervention triggered the outbreak of bitter transatlantic differences. However, rather than the reason, the Iraq issue was a catalyst for the eruption of transatlantic differences that had been growing from the end of the Cold War.

Since the early 1990s, the assessment of the security environment increasingly diverged between the USA and Europe. Whereas most of the European states progressively abandoned the security definition of the Cold War with its focus on the military dimension for a comprehensive security concept, the USA did not follow this development with equal intensity. Discrepancies during the 1990s on issues such as the International Criminal Court or the landmine agreement illustrate the growing transatlantic gap on basic questions of international relations, which revealed increasingly diverging world views. From this perspective, the Iraq dispute was just the last step in a long run of disassembling transatlantic partners.

One of the particularities of the Iraq crisis however was the overlapping of a transatlantic with an intra-European rift. The opponents of the war – mainly France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg – confronted the other European countries who
supported the intervention. Besides, most of the European publics, such as in the UK, opposed the war and found themselves in disaccord with their governments.

In early 2003, the transatlantic discords and those inside Europe were growing more aggressive. The way both the opponents and supporters of the US policy articulated their positions, often unilaterally and without prior consultations with the partners, contributed to deepen both the transatlantic and the intra-European rifts (Haugevik 2005: 35f).

France and Germany expressed their opposition on several occasions, such as the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty in January 2003 (Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 January 2003). Particularly France was passing increasingly from an opposition to the war to a strategy of confrontation with the USA. It was resented by many, particularly by the EU candidate countries, as an unjustified claim of the Franco-German couple to speak for Europe as a whole, and as arrogant and paternalistic behaviour.

On the other hand, the support for the US, such as in the ‘Letter of Eight’, signed by EU members and candidate countries in January 2003 (The Times, 30 January 2003), or the ‘Vilnius Letter’, signed by candidate and other non EU European countries in February 2003 (Vilnius Group Countries 2003), was resented as an unfair act. The US administration fuelled these tensions by opposing an ‘old Europe’, mainly France and Germany as opponents to the war, and a ‘new Europe’ supporting it and the US as such.

This situation harmed CFSP/ESDP. The traditional differences, mainly the Atlanticist-Europeanist divide, violently resurfaced and threatened the whole project. The most visible example was the European defence summit that assembled the war opponents France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium in April 2003 in Tervuren (European Defence Meeting 2003). The ideas put forward targeted the strengthening of the European security and defence co-operation and were partly consensual, such as on strategic air transport (European Defence Meeting 2003). Others, however, mainly, the proposition to create “a nucleus collective capability for planning and conducting operations” for the EU was severely

28 The Tervuren summit has later also dismissively been called ‘Chocolate summit’. It alludes to the fact that it assembled chocolate producing countries, but also dismisses their capacities and expertise in defence questions.
criticised, especially by the UK and the US. It contributed to deepen the tensions particularly between France and Germany on the one hand and the UK on the other.

However, the intensity of the overlapping intra-European and transatlantic differences also forced the member states to acknowledge the powerlessness of a divided EU. The Iraq crisis could have been the opportunity to demonstrate that a common EU policy existed – but instead it underlined its weakness. To avoid a premature death of CFSP/ESDP, the EU would need to overcome this disunity. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that the Iraq dossier has always been a controversial topic and has therefore been avoided at the EU/CFSP level (Interview in the EU Council, 2005). That of all things Iraq was to become the test case for CFSP/ESDP does not dispense with a certain tragedy.

In this context, the EU foreign ministers gathered for an informal meeting in Kastellorizo, Greece, in May 2003. As a result, HR Solana was tasked to produce a European strategic concept (Greek EU Presidency 2003b).

1.4 Chronology of the ESS drafting process

What followed was a unique drafting process involving not only the staff of the HG/SR and the member states but also the international research community. Three main steps can be distinguished. They cover the period from the inception of the ESS in May 2003, via the presentation of the first draft in June 2003, to its adoption by the European Council in December 2003.

(1) Informal EU foreign ministers meeting, Kastellorizo, 2-3 May 2003: the ESS is initiated

The EU ministers and their colleagues from the candidate countries agreed that the Union needed a "common European defence strategy" to react more cohesively and rapidly in the future (Greek EU Presidency 2003: 1). Solana was mandated to produce such a

29 Given the different nature of this case study, the chronology will be presented in a different form than those in the case studies 1 and 3.
document and to present it at the next European Council (Greek EU Presidency 2003b; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May 2003).

The idea is said to have been suggested by France, Germany and the UK. It resulted from a trilateral meeting in Brussels some days earlier, where the three foreign ministers had agreed that a common initiative was needed to avoid the CFSP/ESDP from breaking apart (Interviews EU ISS, 2005; in the Council 2005, 2006). The Greek presidency put the trilateral suggestion on the agenda of the Kastellorizio meeting.

Newspapers and national governments reported widely about the mandate given to Solana (Bundesregierung 2003a; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May 2003). However, there is no official EU documentation about it. The first official mention only appears in the conclusions of a GAERC meeting in June 2003 (GAERC 2003c: 9).

Solana was in fact not officially mandated by the Council, but charged in an informal way by the foreign ministers. Therefore, he was not obliged to use the official working channels that often risk complicating the decision making process. This unique mandate enabled Solana to maintain close control over the drafting process while also keeping, at least in the early period, the member states and the Commission at a distance. While seeking advice from external experts, in particular the EU ISS, the drafting was, at this first stage, kept under close control by a few individuals under the authority of Christoph Heusgen, head of the Policy Unit. Only shortly before the Thessaloniki Summit (June 2003), the text was presented to the PSC ambassadors and to the foreign ministers (GAERC 2003c: 9).

(2) Thessaloniki European Council, 20 June 2003: presentation of the 1st ESS draft

The result of this process, a 16-page document, was presented at the European Council (Solana 2003a). The Council welcomed Solana’s draft and tasked him:

30 Christoph Heusgen has become, in September 2005, the adviser for European affairs of the German chancellor Angela Merkel. Asked for his guidelines in foreign policy, he cited the ESS as his ‘mental landscape’. Die Zeit, 17 November 2005
“to bring his work forward […] with a view to submitting an EU Security Strategy […] to be adopted by the European Council in December” (Council of the EU 2003d: 17).

Solana was to work “in close co-operation with the Member States and the Commission” to redefine the strategy:

“that should […] encapsulate Member States’ interests and citizen’s priorities and constitute a living document subject to public debate” (Council of the EU 2003d: 17).

(3) June – December 2003: Further development of the draft

Following the Thessaloniki summit, the member states were invited to present to Solana their preferences regarding the ESS (Interview Council, October/November 2005). Furthermore, the drafting team was enlarged and now included inter alia C. Heusgen, R. Cooper, P. Bergamini, N. Burgess and M. Otte (Interviews in the EU Council 2005; EU ISS 2005).

A two-part process for the final step in the drafting process was put into place:

(I) September - October 2003: the input of the research community and of practitioners was sought;

(II) November - December 2003: the discussions continued in close co-operation with the member states and the Commission.

Phase I. September-October 2003: the input of academics and practitioners

In order to involve the international research community, the EU ISS was commissioned to coordinate three conferences in Rome (September), Paris (October) and Stockholm (October), focussing respectively on threats; EU objectives; and capabilities and coherences (EU ISS 2003a,b,c). They brought together over 200 academics and practitioners from Europe and beyond, thereby offering the possibility of discussing the draft and develop suggestions for redrafting. This fuelled the reflection of those responsible for the drafting in Solana’s staff (Interviews in the Council 2005; Commission 2005; EU ISS 2005).

Phase II. October-December 2003: involvement of the member states and the Commission
Although the member states were active in promoting their interests during the whole drafting period, it was particularly in this last phase that intergovernmental consultations but also discussions with the Commission took place. The PSC met in the formation of the political directors. The foreign affairs ministers have been informed about the development of the draft (GAERC 2003d: 7). As a consequence, a number of amendments were agreed on the Thessaloniki version. The GAERC endorsed the ESS on 9 December 2003 and forwarded it to the European Council for adoption (GAERC 2003e: 11).

(4) European Council, Brussels 12 December 2003: adoption of the ESS

The European Council adopted the approximately 15 pages long ESS without difficulty (Council of the EU 2004a: 21-22).

The smooth adoption of the ESS however received only a small amount of attention. If the Italian presidency succeeded in passing the ESS, it failed in reaching an agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. This failure dominated both the press coverage and the political debates. It seemed to be the logical conclusion of an ESS drafting process that was already dominated by the work of the Convention.

The drafting process is interesting for four reasons. First, it was a very quick process, at least when measured against the usual EU standards. The ESS was elaborated in little more than half a year.

Second, it produced a “mercifully short” (Everts 2003) and “unusually acronym-free” document (The Guardian, 12 December 2003). It makes it accessible for the wider public, which certainly is rare at the EU level.

Third, the drafting team sought to consult the international research community and the different European institutions. Bailes underlines the “novel and rather successful use made of intellectual resources in the […] security research community” (Bailes 2005b: 12).
Fourth, the ESS was developed almost exclusively under the authority of the Policy Unit. Although external advice was sought, the drafting took place in the Council, circumventing the usual working arenas of the member states. This allowed the Policy Unit to position itself as the core of European strategic thinking. National diplomats underlined that their quasi exclusion from the drafting process was salutary in that it avoided a “killing of the document by debate” (Interviews in the British and French Permanent Representation, 2005; German MFA 2005, 2006). It is indeed surprising not only to see the confidence placed in the drafting team but also the “self-restraint shown by the states when refrained from quibbling” (Bailes 2005b: 12), thereby avoiding the prolongation and complication of the drafting.

This description allows the retaining of the main steps and the defining characteristics of the ESS development. First, it illustrates the enormous speed of its elaboration. Second, it reveals the dominant role of the Council and particularly of the Policy Unit at the expense of the member states. Third, the smooth adoption without substantial modification implies a high level of agreement among the EU member states.

With this background in mind, the agenda of the three countries with regard to the ESS will now be analysed.

2 The French, German and British agendas for the ESS

Assessing the national agendas is the prerequisite to assess their influence on the ESS. This chapter will first address the general characteristics of the debate in view of complementing the analytical framework outlined in chapter 2. The national agendas will then be assessed following this framework. The time frame of the analysis is defined by the Kastellorizio meeting (May 2003), which tasked HR Solana to develop a strategy, and the adoption of the ESS in December 2003.
2.1 Characteristics of the debate and framework of analysis

2.1.1 A closed debate

The ESS was drafted quickly and without much controversy between May and December 2003. Since its first mentioning, it has generated a great amount of academic and policy analyses (Bailes 2005a, b; Becher 2004a; Biscop 2004, 2005; Andersson and Biscop 2007; Leonard and Gowan 2004, Heisbourg 2004a, b; Haine 2004a; Ponsard 2005, Reiter 2005; Dumoulin 2005; Quille 2004a; Major and Rieke 2006b). In view of the French EU Presidency in II/2008, French president Sarkozy proposed in spring 2007 to update the ESS. This again generated a considerable amount of studies (Valasek 2007; Pullinger 2007; Silvestri 2008; Biscop 2007) and led to the organisation of numerous events, inter alia again by the EU ISS.

The great academic and policy interest seems to be understandable in the light of the unique drafting process. In 2003, the Policy Unit was explicitly looking for input from the academic and policy circles. The outcome of the conferences organised by the EU ISS considerably informed the ESS.

On the other hand, there was surprisingly little interest at the national political level. This has been attributed to the overall consensus on the need for the ESS and broad agreement on the first draft (Interviews in the German Permanent Representation, 2005; UK Permanent Representation, 2005; French Permanent Representation, 2005).

However, it was also due to the prevalence of other topics on the European and national agendas. Besides domestic issues, the Convention and the looming enlargement occupied the parliamentary debates. The national parliaments had for example more impact within the Convention than they had on the ESS. It was however particularly the Iraq war and the resulting debates such as about the nature of the transatlantic relationship or the role of the EU in defence which were at stake.

The national agendas for the ESS can be retraced through the analysis of official documents as outlined in chapter 2. However, given the unique drafting process, there are
not many primary documents which are accessible. Interviews with national and European decision makers are hence comparatively more important than in the other case studies.

2.1.2 A comparison of the June and December versions of the ESS

To complete the analytical framework outlined in chapter 2, the main contentious issues with regard to the ESS need to be defined. They will allow us to assess and compare the national agendas. While the analysis of the overall debates surrounding the ESS’ development offer useful pointers on the issues at stake, the comparison of the first draft of the ESS (June 2003) with the final version (December 2003) also offers useful insights. The differences between the two versions point to the most contentious issues:

**Introduction:** Some changes in the wording give the final version a more affirmative and normative tone. The EU is now “inevitably a global player” (ESS December: 4) compared to the earlier “the EU is, like it or not, a global actor” (ESS June: 2). The EU should not only be ready to “share in the responsibility for global security” (ESS June: 2; December 4) but also “in building a better world” (ESS December: 2).

**Part I:** This section defining key threats has been re-organised content-wise. The June version outlines three key threats, while the final version states five. All five have already been mentioned in June, but “regional conflicts” and “state failure” are now separately mentioned. Thus, those threats whose importance has risen since 9/11, particularly terrorism, were de-singularised whereas the ‘traditional’ threats were re-evaluated. It makes the threat analysis more balanced and comprehensive and establishes a clearer distinction with regard to the NSS.

**Part II:** This part on the EU’s strategic objectives was considerably restructured. The three subsections changed their titles, with the most important modification being the
replacement of “Strengthening the international order” (ESS June: 9) by “An international order based on effective multilateralism” (ESS December: 15).

While some precise statements were removed, for example on Al Qaeda (ESS June: 11), others have been added, particularly regarding the “security in the neighbourhood”. Here, the Balkans and the Arab-Israeli conflict get further specification.

The subsection on “multilateralism” gained considerably in determination, for example when stating that the EU is “committed to upholding and developing international law” (ESS December: 9). The engagement for a rule based international order is more greatly stressed in the final version (ESS December: 10). The statement in the June version that “Pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future” was removed. A comparable sentence using “preventive” appeared in the December version in part III, dealing with policy implication.

**Part III:** This part dealing with the policy implications underwent small changes in its structure and content. Overall, the four sections advising the EU to be more active; more capable; more coherent; and to work with partners were maintained.

Within the section inciting the EU to be “more active”, the ESS specified that it aimed to apply the “full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities” (ESS December: 12). In addition, the December version insisted more on multilateralism and a greater support for the UN (ESS December: 12). A paragraph was added calling for “preventive action” of the EU to avoid future problems. As mentioned above, a similar sentence calling for “pre-emptive engagement” was withdrawn from part II.

Calling for a “more capable” EU, the December version underlined the necessity of developing military capabilities. The final version appeals for the establishment of a Defence Agency (ESS December: 18). A paragraph was added, stressing that the EU-NATO

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31 The European Defence Agency (EDA) has been created in 2004.
agreements “enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership […]. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century” (ESS December: 12).

The section calling for a more coherent EU in crisis management now contained a reference to Africa and the western Balkans (ESS December: 20).

Finally, a small modification was observable in the paragraph underlining the necessity to work with partners. The partnership with the US was emphasised, stating that “our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA” (ESS December: 13).

The overall conclusion again stressed the multilateral order, but went further in the December version when pleading for a commitment to a “fairer, safer and more united world” (ESS December: 21).

To sum up, the December version appeared to be a more tightened, precise and slightly more normative document than the June version. The following table presents the main differences:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parts of the ESS</th>
<th>June Version</th>
<th>December Version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- internal and external aspects of security are linked - globalisation might have positive aspects but also be resented as cause for frustration and injustice - further minor changes in the wording</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Strategic objectives</td>
<td>Subtitles: - Extending the zone of security in Europe - Strengthening the international order - Countering the threats</td>
<td>Whole part considerably restructured, subtitles modified and changed order:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Addressing the threats - Building security in our neighbourhood - An international order based on effective multilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- further stress on multilateralism, upholding and development of international law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Some precise statements, such as “we should have tackled Al Quaida earlier”, or on Moldova and Belarus - “Pre-emptive engagement”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Policy implications</td>
<td>Subtitles: - more active - more coherent - more capable - working with partners</td>
<td>Order of policy implications changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Further elaboration of the policy implications:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- ‘more active’: new: full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention (p.12), also new: stronger support for the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- ‘more active’: new: stress of EU- NATO agreement, emphasise on the partnership with the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Preventive engagement (‘pre-emptive’ transferred from Part II/June version to preventive in part III/December version)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These findings can be re-organised into four thematic clusters, which capture the main thematic differences between the June and December versions:

1) **The further stress on multilateralism/UN**
   The final version emphasised the role of multilateralism and the support or the UN as main features of European policy. It was perceptible in modified titles, additional and more pointed sentences and the fact that other international organisations such as WTO named in the June version were withdrawn from the final version.

2) **The clear mention of military means and the use of force**
   The use of military instruments was more clearly recognised. The December version mentioned the necessity to further develop military capabilities, referring explicitly to the European Defence Agency.

3) **The stress on the co-operation with NATO**
   The December version emphasised co-operation with NATO. Several additional paragraphs stressed the significance of the EU-NATO agreements and the strategic partnership between the two organisations.

4) **From ‘pre-emptive’ to ‘preventive’ engagement**
   In the June version, part II stated that “pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future” (ESS June: 10). In the December version, the term has disappeared but similar ideas appeared in part III (policy implications): “Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in future” (ESS December: 12).

### 2.1.3 The analytical framework as developed for this case study

Building upon the comparison of the June and December versions and taking into account the issues raised in the surrounding debates, the following questions can be identified as characterising the debate about the ESS:

- **How to define the transatlantic relationship?**

  Defining the transatlantic relationship was a contentious element of this debate. When defining its understanding of the international security situation in form of the ESS, the EU made a further step in defining European identity. This in turn affected its relationship with...
NATO. How should the transatlantic relationship be defined in the ESS? What degree of autonomy should inform the ESS’s stipulations? Should there by any definition of responsibilities, hierarchy, spheres of influence, and terms of cooperation?

- **Role of the EU**

  Defining the scope of EU security policy is a statement on its ambitions. Should the EU strive to be a global actor, or rather concentrate on its neighbourhood? Should particular areas of interest or responsibility be defined?

- **EU Toolbox, pre-emptive vs preventive engagement**

  How should the EU toolbox be composed? While there is agreement upon the civilian aspects, differences prevailed when it comes to the definition of a common position on the use of military force. Moreover, a position on preventive or pre-emptive action must be found.

- **Multilateralism and the UN**

  On what concept of international relations should the EU policy be based? Should preferential partners be identified? The final ESS version attributes more space to the UN and multilateralism.

  These questions governed the debate leading to the endorsement of the ESS. Together with the general categories outlined in chapter 2, they inform the analytical framework for this case study. The criteria ‘toolbox’ will be amended to include the debate about pre-emptive vs. preventive action. The following framework will guide the analysis of the national agendas.

**Table 13: Categories of comparison for case study 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transatlantic relations and NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2 The German Agenda

Germany together with France and the UK initiated the idea of a European strategy.

2.2.1 General considerations

The German agenda is to a great extent characterised by the debate about the Iraq war and the intra-European and transatlantic conflicts it yielded. It was the same Red-Green government which had initiated ESDP in 1999 which engaged in the ESS debate. It had been re-elected with a small majority in 2002 after an election campaign which was marked by the looming Iraq war and Chancellor Schröder’s refusal of German participation even with a UN mandate, which led to US-German disgruntlements.

The increasingly strained relationship with the US divided the political scene. Whereas the government claimed that friendship (with the US) included the right to criticism, particularly the Christian-Democrat opposition blamed the government for being disloyal with Germany’s most important partner in political, defence, and economic terms. They considered the government’s behaviour as a slap in the face of the country which had liberated and helped to reconstruct Germany after WWII and assured its security. The German rehabilitation after WWII built upon two pillars of integration into the Western world, namely in Europe with France and the EC, and through the transatlantic partnership with NATO and the US. Abandoning one of the pillars seemed irresponsible to most observers.

The transatlantic split also set the scene for a revival of the Franco-German relationship, such as when the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty offered the scene to announce the joint opposition to the Iraq war and also increased bilateral co-operation (Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 January 2003). Moreover, both countries took the transatlantic row as a pretext to engage in a further strengthening of the EU defence dimension, if needed without those countries which supported the US. Initiatives such as the Tervuren summit were clearly understood as entering in competition with NATO and the US.

In addition to this proximate background, some basic facts about the national strategic development should be reviewed to grasp the German positions in the ESS debate.
Germany has traditionally been considered a civilian power (Mauß 2000, 2007; see chapter 3). This includes a preference to act in multilateral frameworks and the general reluctance to the use of force while priority is given to civilian and legal instruments as tools in international relations (Longhurst 2004; Giegerich 2006).

Germany struggled to adapt to the new security situation after the Cold War. First attempts to define German security policy in the new settings were made with the 1994 Weißbuch/White Paper (Bundesministerium für Verteidigung 1994). Efforts of the subsequent governments failed to produce new strategic guidelines. Only in May 2003, that is, when Solana was tasked to produce the ESS, did the German MOD set out to define - for the first time since the end of the Cold War - the main lines of German defence policy. However, they were not published in form of a national strategy, but as „Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien“ (Defence Political Directives - VPR) (Bundesminister der Verteidigung 2003; see also Struck 2003b: 7-10). This formal difference hides a considerable disparity in political weight: the VPRs were not discussed by the cabinet, do not have the legal status of a national strategy and engage only the MOD. It shows how difficult it was to agree on German security and defence policy objectives at the national level. This was mainly due to unsolved questions on issues such as the threat analysis, the tasks and reach of the policies, their instruments, and conscription.

Thus, when the ESS debate was launched, Germany had just published the first document on national security and defence policy since the end of the Cold War, which did not even have the legal status of a national strategy.

The main actors to define the German agenda were the Foreign Ministry, the Chancellery and the MOD. The Bundestag had only very briefly alluded to the ESS (Deutscher Bundestag 2003a$^{32}$,d$^{33}$,b$^{34}$,c$^{35}$). There was an overall agreement in welcoming the ESS as a useful step which corresponded to German expectations. The European Affairs

$^{32}$ 4313D – 4314D, 4325D, 4331D – 4333C, 4338C-D
$^{33}$ 7134A – 7135A
$^{34}$ 5935B, 5942D – 5944A
$^{35}$ 6765A-D
Committee alluded to the ESS in the shortest possible way in a joint session held with the correspondent committee of the Assemblée Nationale in Paris, 24th September 2003 (Deutscher Bundestag 2003e). The opposition initiated in March 2004, thus half a year after the adoption of the ESS, a parliamentary request procedure. It required further explanations but did not question the ESS itself (Deutscher Bundestag 2004a). There was no further action once the MFA had answered this request (Bundesregierung 2004).

The German debate will now be analysed according to the above outlined criteria.

2.2.2 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

The German priority was to provide a new basis for the transatlantic relationship, which had reached a low point during the Iraq crisis (Irlenkäuser 2003: 7; Fischer 2003b). It should be achieved by providing the EU with clear guidelines in the security and defence policy, which would allow it to define the principles of the transatlantic relationship, the distribution of tasks and responsibilities, while also expressing the increasing autonomy of the EU in international affairs (Schröder 2003a,f).

Such a document should offer the basis for a constructive transatlantic dialogue and hopefully allow it to influence US foreign action through an exchange of ideas. This was deemed particularly necessary in view of the German opposition to the war and the bitter exchanges with the US. Given the historically conditioned special German-American relationship during the Cold War, the split over Iraq preoccupied the German government despite its constant insistence on a necessary emancipation (Fischer 2003a, Schröder 2003b; Interviews in the German MFA, 2005, 2006).

There is indeed a certain ambiguity in the German agenda. On the one hand, Germany insisted upon its opposition to the Iraq war and claimed the right not to follow the ally in a war it considered unjustified. Its position was at least in the beginning rooted in a deep unease regarding military intervention as such, not in a principled opposition to the US. Friendship, Germany argued, does not equal obedience but includes frank exchanges of opinions
(Fischer 2003a,c; Schröder 2003a). It hence engaged in critical stances towards the US and NATO, such as with the Tervuren declaration.

On the other hand, Germany recognised that the transatlantic relationship remains of fundamental importance for the German and international security and stability and that NATO was the only credible defence actor (Schröder 2003c). Hence it called for ESDP to be compatible with and not to compete against NATO (Struck 2003a). Although rejecting the invasion in Iraq, Germany however fulfilled its allied responsibilities, such as when allowing German soldiers to participate in NATO reconnaissance operations which indirectly supported the Iraq war.

Germany stood also for historical reasons up for the transatlantic partnership (Schröder 2003d,c). The German military has been socialised into NATO and rehabilitated at the international scene thanks to it and the US. Germany traditionally considered itself as a moderator, bridging the transatlantic and the European dimensions, which have always been understood as complementary rather than exclusive.

Consequently, despite the rhetorical sabre rattling, Germany supported a clear reference to the transatlantic relationship and co-operation with NATO in the ESS as a main basis for European policies.

2.2.3 Role of the EU

The ESS was considered as an opportunity to advance political co-operation in the area of security and defence through offering clarity in strategic questions and policy objectives (Schröder 2003f,b). As a result, the EU, knowing what it stood for, would be able to increasingly assume international responsibility (Struck 2003a). It would also allow embedding the call for a stronger German commitment in international politics into a multilateral framework. Recognising that the Europeans engaged far too late in a strategic debate on their own, Foreign Minister Fischer called for Europe to make up for this negligence (Fischer 2003a). For Fischer, this much-needed debate would concern – and would thus need to address – the fundamental questions of mankind. These would include
questions not only about the world order Europeans want to live in, the new threats and dangers they face, but also the way and the means to address them.

However, Germany wanted the EU to focus on particular areas instead of boldly pretending at a global role. Particularly Foreign Minister Fischer insisted on the Middle East, where he had personally been involved, and the European neighbourhood, mainly the Balkans, as key areas for European responsibility (Interviews at the German Permanent Representation 2005; French Permanent Representation 2005; German MFA 2005, 2006). It points to the strong normative dimension in German positions, whereas statements of national interests seems absent.

2.2.4 EU Toolbox

Germany tried to upload its traditional preference for a comprehensive security concept, with an emphasis on non-military means and civilian power principles (Irlenkäuser 2003; Fischer 2003b,d; Schröder2003c). It expected a clear definition of guidelines regarding crisis management and the use of force to emerge with the ESS. While the use of force should remain the very last resort, it was however referred to as necessary instrument of policy (Schröder 2003c; Bury 2003, Fischer 2003b,d; Schröder 2003e). Germany supported the ESS based on a:

“comprehensive concept of security […]. The new threats are not of a purely military nature. They therefore require more than a purely military response. […] The security concept therefore covers a broad range of crisis management and, above all, preventive measures. We laid particular emphasis on this […] The EU’s aim must be to take appropriate action before a crisis arises. Top priority must therefore be given to diplomacy” (Fischer 2003b).

The German position can be characterised as the attempt to find a European solution for a national quandary. Defining strategic objectives is a difficult exercise given the national strategic culture, deeply marked by a reticence towards the use of force and international deployments (see chapter 5). Since 1994, attempts to update the White paper had failed. The ESS seemed indeed to offer a substitute for a lacking German security strategy (Irlenkäuser 2003: 8; interviews MFA January 2005). By uploading a comprehensive security
approach to the European level, which however explicitly recognised military hard power, Germany hoped to facilitate the acceptance of those elements at the national level (Interviews in the German MFA, 2005, 2006). Downloading ESS hard power elements to the national level was considered a way to circumvent uncomfortable domestic debates and choices and thereby to advance the German strategic debate (Overhaus 2003: 5).

This is representative for a certain German attitude to shift critical issues to the EU level in order to avoid dealing with them at the domestic level. Referring to widely accepted EU documents offered an enabling dimension for the German government to deal with the tricky issue of content, reach and instruments of security and defence policy. While insisting that the ESS fully represents German positions, interviews have confirmed that drafting a national strategy would probably have been more difficult than drafting a European one (Interviews MFA 2005, 2006). It implicitly admits that national difficulties can be eased through the existence of a consensual European paper.

2.2.5 Multilateralism and the UN

Germany sought to upload a strong reference to international law, international organisations and multilateral action as the basis for EU foreign action, with a particular stress on the UN (Schröder 2003c,e; interviews in the German MFA 2005, 2006). It expected clarity on topics such as rules for the use of force as the last option and legitimised only by the UN.

This is explained by the proximate background of the Iraq war, where Germany felt that the UN has not been respected. The insistence on multilateralism also underscores the difference to the unilateral posture of the US. But it also corresponds to the traditional German preference to embed its policies in multilateral frameworks (Bundesminister der Verteidigung 2003; Bundesministerium für Verteidigung 1994; Schröder 2003c). Eventually, insisting upon the UN Charter as the framework for international relations and the UN as core body in international relations also represents the German tendency to externalise the
responsibility for the use of force, which would moreover facilitate gaining domestic support for military operations.

2.2.6 Summary of the German Agenda

The German Agenda was characterised by the wish to provide a new basis for the transatlantic relationship and to further the cooperation in the area of CFSP/ESDP, both through providing the policy field with clear principles. It sought to:

- define NATO as priority partner for European security, insisting upon an equal relationship and complementarity;
- strengthen the political cooperation at the EU level by linking the member states though a common security analysis;
- focus on a normative dimension of the EU’s actor role;
- upload a comprehensive security concept, where the focus would be on preventive action and diplomatic tools; and to
- project its preference for multilateral frameworks and a legal reading of international relations by stressing the UN’s role.

Germany also tried to externalise contentious issues of its national strategic debate. Disagreement on issues such as the use of force had prevented the elaboration of a national strategy. The existence of a European reference was hoped to facilitate the national debate and increase the chance to gain acceptance for controversial issues.

2.3 The British Agenda

Together with Germany and France, the UK initiated the development of the ESS. Its traditional Euro-sceptical stances and the special relationship with the US make the British commitment a particularly interesting case.

2.3.1 General considerations

The UK engaged in the ESS against the background of bitter rows with the opponents of the Iraq war, particularly France and Germany (Haugevik 2005; The Economist, 20
February 2003). Britain categorically opposed the Tervuren propositions which it resented as
targeted against the US and NATO. Given its special relationship with the US and its awkward
stance toward the EU, these positions have been interpreted as an anti-European stance
particularly by France (Kupferschmidt 2007; Dunne 2004). In 2002/03, the pro-European
policies Prime Minister Blair had sought to establish since arriving in office suffered from the
political tensions, which the Iraq war had generated (see chapter 2, 4).

The Iraq issue also affected the domestic political life. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
Development Secretary C. Short resigned, accusing Blair for having become “increasingly
obsessed” with securing his place in history (The Guardian, 13 May 2003). Also R. Cook
resigned from his post as Leader of the House of Commons and Lord President of the
Council, stating that he could not support military action in such circumstances” (Cook 2003).
The British commitment for the ESS is noticeable against this strained background.

Content-wise, the UK could build upon clear national guidelines. The 1998 Strategic
Defence Review (HMG 1998) redefined both the tasks and the means of UK defence policy.
The subsequent 2003 Defence White Paper further defines threats, mentioning for example
Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and international terrorism (HMG 2003b: 7). Both military
and civilian instruments are developed. Thus, the UK had clear references to underpin the
uploading of national preferences to the EU level/the ESS.

The British case is interesting in that the government has been suspected of
circumventing a domestic debate on the ESS. Lord Wallace of Saltaire stated in October
2003 that the government “has done its best to avoid debate” (Wallace 2003). The ESS has
“not been formally presented to Parliament, or to either of the two scrutiny committees, or
sent to opposition parties; no minister has referred to it in public” (Wallace (W.) 2003).

However, although the ESS was not submitted for debate, either in the Commons or in
the House of Lords, and overall gained very little attention, it was referred to at several
occasions by Foreign Minister Straw (2003a,d), the Minister for Europe, Denis MacShane
(2003a,b), and Prime Minister Blair (2003d,e).
The House of Lords referred briefly to the ESS (House of Lords 2003d), although only after Wallace’s criticism. The Sub-Committee C announced that it will monitor the ESS development (House of Lords 2003b: top 41). The ESS has also been the object of a detailed report of the same Committee in 2004 - after its adoption (House of Lords 2004b).

The European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons cleared the ESS in December 2003, stating that “no radical amendments are likely to be pressed for at this stage” (House of Commons 2003c: p: 73).

It is striking to see that the parliamentary interest apparently grew only once the ESS had been adopted. The Committees only became involved at a stage when any suggestion for modifications would have had very little chances of success. There was apparently no urgent need felt to introduce modifications into the ESS. It leads to the conclusion that the ESS was whether roughly in line with British positions or considered to be of minor importance.

The British debate will now be analysed according to the above outlined criteria.

2.3.2 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

The UK wanted to anchor the transatlantic partnership and the recognition of NATO as the main defence actor as core elements in the ESS while also assuring that the EU defence policy was not directed against the US and NATO (Blair 2003a,g; Interview in the UK Permanent Representation, 2005). It was also deemed necessary to convince the US that Europe was not “totally mired in delusional soft power thinking” (Hill 2004: 25). The ESS was considered an instrument to demonstrate the EU’s willingness to assume its international responsibilities and to adopt hard power when required.

The Iraq war had shown that the ‘bridge’ linking the two sides of the Atlantic which the UK had sought to promote (see chapter 3) was not able to bear the weight of the disagreement between ‘old Europe’ and the new conservatives in Washington. Blair’s decision to be at the US’ side “when the shooting starts” showed that the UK continued to place the bilateral relationship above other obligations (Dunne 2004).
Britain recognised however that abandoning ESDP to ‘old Europe’ increased the risk of ESDP being increasingly directed against the US. Here, a written strategy should allow for the reassurance of the US allies while also defending British interests (Blair 2003e,g). The ESS should codify the compatibility and complementarity of European and transatlantic security actions while also offering a basis for transatlantic debates. Blair welcomed the ESS as being “in line with British thinking” in that it:

“emphasises the importance of the transatlantic alliance, [...] the importance of dealing with the issues of weapons of mass destruction, and the need to take tough action against international terrorism” (Blair 2003e).

While representative of European worries, this enumeration also reflects the US positions as anchored in the NSS (NSC 2002), thereby expressing the proximity of UK and US thinking.

2.3.3 Role of the EU

The UK wished to make the EU acknowledge the new global security situation and adapt its foreign action to it. The ESS was seen as expression of the EU finally assuming its responsibility in a changing global security environment (Blair 2003h; FCO 2003b). It would no longer allow the EU to shy away in international conflicts. However, for the UK, this did not imply a greater political role for Brussels-based institutions (Blair 2003b). Cooperation should be based on a “basis of a Europe of nations” (Blair in Blair and Chirac 2003a). The ESS was thus thought of as a practical outline to support policy making and to organise the pragmatic use of military forces.

Moreover, for Blair, “membership of the European strategic alliance is a crucial part of the British national interest” (Blair 2003d). The active commitment to the ESS was thought to assure having a say in and defending particular ideas (mainly transatlantic relations), avoiding leaving the field to others not always supportive of British ideas (particularly France), or to those not having the power to defend them (the candidate countries).
The UK defined the reach of the EU’s foreign policy in reference to trouble spots, such as identified in the 1998 SDR or the 2003 Defence White Paper. This would certainly result in a global reach for the EU, but HMG did not aim at a global role for the sake of it or political ambitions (Interviews Council, 2005; UK Permanent Representation, 2005).

2.3.4 EU Toolbox

The UK wanted the EU to recognise the challenges of the global security situation and the resulting modifications in the threat analysis. An effective comprehensive approach clearly included, for the UK, the use of military force. The parallel inception of the BG concept, together with France, witnesses this preference. Via the definition of the EU toolbox, it aimed to make the EU acknowledge military power as policy instrument and to overcome illusory soft power thinking:

“What the UK wanted, and why it took such an interest in the drafting, was to give the impression - especially to its American audience – that the EU could finally talk the language of hard power in this age of terrorism [...]. The Security Strategy will therefore be regarded in London as a rather more serious document than most of its predecessors” (Hill 2004: 30-31).

It corresponds to the strategic re-orientation and re-definition of tools that the UK had undertaken at least since the 1998 SDR and the 2003 Defence White Paper, but also fits its traditional focus on military capabilities (see chapter 5). This should not be understood as the UK striving for a militarisation of the EU’s conflict management capabilities. HMG rather wanted the UK to overcome its overly civilian approach which risked obstructing the development of much needed capabilities and would eventually hinder the EU in living up to its global responsibilities (Interviews in the EU Council, 2005). Thus, the ESS was also seen as a means to encourage other member states to engage in the badly needed capability development (see chapter 5).

Besides, the support for ‘pre-emptive’ action as anchored in the June version of the ESS underlines the proximity with US strategic analysis.
2.3.5 Multilateralism and the UN

Official statements did not address this issue in particular. The 1998 SDR and the 2003 White Paper however expressed a general support for the UN. Moreover, also the parallel developed BG concept clearly refers to the UN and seeks to strengthen UN peacekeeping operations (see chapter 5).

2.3.6 Summary of the British Agenda

The British Agenda was marked by the wish to show European commitment after the rift over Iraq while also assuring the operational capability of ESDP and its compatibility with the transatlantic partners. HMG sought to:

- stress the partnership with NATO and the US as priority in ESDP;
- make the EU acknowledge the changing security parameters and the consequences for the threat analysis and the means to address them;
- upload a toolbox which clearly allowed for the use of force;
- minimise the role of EU institutions and a furthering of political integration; and
- encourage capability development.

Overall, the ESS was considered to offer policy guidelines that could be followed if judged appropriated, but not as a constraining limitation.

2.4 The French Agenda

The French commitment for the ESS corresponds to its long term support for both a political role of the EU and the effectiveness of ESDP.

2.4.1 General considerations

The Iraq war set the scene for the French debate. After having initially signalled support, France was later at the forefront of the opposition to the invasion. However, it did not have a problem with employing military force. France advanced normative considerations to justify its opposition, such as the unilateral posture of the US and the disrespect of international law. The French position was also marked by a strong critique towards the US government as such, which led as well to an increasingly strained relationship with the UK as
the closest US ally in Europe (Sieg 2004: 7). However, if the political dialogue suffered from this situation, the practical aspects of Franco-British defence-economical cooperation continued (see also chapter 5).

This set the scene for a strong French commitment to European defence cooperation. Initiatives such as the Tervuren summit offered the opportunity to impose an Europeanist reading of EU defence as opposed to an Atlanticist one and to increase the Union's autonomy in the area.

President Chirac defended a particularly assertive stance in this regard. After having been restricted for the previous five years to the power-sharing arrangement in the cohabitation with the Socialists (see chapter 3), he was comfortably re-elected in 2002 and formed a supportive conservative government. He felt not only freer to push France's national interest but also considered himself the “doyen of Europe” (The Sunday Times, 2 February 2003), a role which he felt conferred to him a prominent role.

The French agenda for the ESS was supported by considerable national experience and an in-depth reform of its security and defence policies from the early 1990s, which had resulted in several national strategic documents (see also chapter 3).

A crucial step was the 1994 Livre Blanc/White Paper which defined the development of a “European defence” as priority (Ministère de la Défense 1994). Subsequently, a fundamental reform of the armed forces was initiated in 1996/7, which addressed the concepts, force structure and capabilities of French security and defence policy (Ministère de la Justice 1996). In addition, France increased its multilateral engagements, for example in peacekeeping operations (Rieker 2006). In evident continuity with the 1994 White Paper, the 2001 Defence Strategy (Ministère de la Défense 2001) and the subsequent 1996 military programme law (Ministère de la Justice 1996) made the EU a focus of French activities and confirmed the overall reform direction. These exercises allowed France to clearly define its interests, analyse threats and identify the means to address them, thereby providing it with blueprints to become involved in the European debate.
The main actors defining the French agenda were the President, the Foreign Ministry and the MOD. The parliament has in general very little influence and even less in security and defence matters.\textsuperscript{36} The ESS was not the object of an explicit debate or report in either the Assemblée Nationale or the Sénat, where it was only briefly mentioned by the relevant committees (Assemblée Nationale 2003a; Sénat 2003).

The French Agenda will now be analysed according to the above outlined criteria.

2.4.2 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

Via the establishment of the ESS France aimed to codify at the EU level a definition of the transatlantic relationship, which recognised an autonomous actor role for the EU and established an equal relationship with NATO and the US (Chirac in Blair and Chirac 2003b; Interviews in the French MOD, 2007; in the French Permanent Representation, 2005).

Defining the EU’s role with regard to NATO and the US has been a constant goal (see chapter 3). The ESS was considered as an instrument to develop the dialogue with the US based on European terms. For Foreign Minister de Villepin (2003a), a successful and trustful transatlantic dialogue would benefit from an EU able to “fully assume its responsibilities and reinforce its capabilities”.

In addition, the different tasks of the EU and NATO allowed, from a French point of view, an insistence on Europe’s self confidence and autonomy. France recognised NATO’s role as a collective defence actor and the only current credible multinational military force (Alliot-Marie 2003b; de Villepin 2003a,b). However, given the political force of the EU and its commitment in crisis management, France considered the Union as an equal player and refused subordination to NATO.

France hence sought to upload a clear role distribution to the EU level. While recognising NATO’s crucial role in defence, it insisted on the EU’s right to act autonomously

\textsuperscript{36} This has been confirmed by a French MP, member of the European Affairs Committee, who stressed that the French parliament has “nothing to say in ESDP matters”. Interview at the Assemblée Nationale, 2005.
in global crisis management. It refused a hierarchical relationship where NATO would have the right of first refusal.

2.4.3 Role of the EU

France aimed to strengthen ESDP as an expression of the EU’s actor role in security and defence policy, however within the clear limit of keeping it to intergovernmental co-operation (Chirac in Blair and Chirac 2003a; Interview in the French Permanent Representation, 2005). A stronger EU was also meant to increase France’s impact in world politics, by conferring additional instruments and the legitimacy of a multilateral framework (Interview in the EU Council, 2005).

Defining the EU’s role in the world has been a constant goal of French politics. From a French perspective, the Iraq debates demonstrated not only the existence of a distinctive European stance, but also its normative necessity (Interview in the EU Council, 2005, 2008). Referring to the concept of “Europe puissance”, France traditionally strived to strengthen the European identity, credibility and efficiency in the security and defence realm, which would also serve as a vehicle to strengthen its own international posture. If not a counter weight to the US and NATO, Europe should at least be an ‘autonomous’ actor whose political weight matches its economic power (Alliot-Marie 2003a; Bozo 1997; Hilz 2005: 52-60). It should have “the capacity to defend positions which can be different from those of the US and a capacity to act whenever military intervention proves to be necessary”, thereby making its own choices in world politics (Terpan 2005: 15). The ESS was deemed the necessary instrument to implement this approach. Through offering a strategic vision, which has been lacking until now, and strengthening a European identity by outlining common principles, it should allow greater credibility and efficiency in security and defence policies.

Aware of the US and British aversion toward the controversial term “Europe puissance”, French diplomats involved in the ESS drafting increasingly used a substitute term, namely, “Europe as a global actor” (Interview in the French Permanent Representation, 2005). Besides soothing worries, it also allowed the encapsulation of the French call for a
worldwide EU commitment, including areas such as the Middle East, but also the
development of strategic partnerships with India, Japan or China. The global reach of the
ESS was a core French expectation.

2.4.4 EU Toolbox

The ESS should allow the uploading of the French understanding of the necessary
tools for effective EU crisis management, which includes military means. The BG concept,
which was developed in parallel, underscores this preference (see chapter 5).

The ESS was considered an opportunity to boost the understanding for power politics
in those EU member states that were reluctant to embrace it. The chance to convince
Germany, for example, to commit to more robust missions was deemed higher in a European
framework (Sieg 2005: 8; Interviews in the French MOD 2005, 2008). Besides, it was hoped
that the ESS would put pressure on the other member states to increase their commitment in
developing military capabilities (de Villepin 2003a,b). This corresponded not only to the long-
term French focus of developing military capabilities at the EU level (see chapter 5). It also
fitted the national reform steps and strategic outlines (Ministère de la Défense 1994, 2001;

However, France strongly opposed the notion of pre-emptive strikes present in the
June version (Interviews in the French Permanent Representation, 2005). It was not so much
the concept as such which worried France, but the proximity with the NSS statements (NSC
2002: 6, 19-20). It hence lobbied for the term being replaced with “preventive action”.

2.4.5 Multilateralism and the UN

France aimed to upload a clear reference to the UN as core element in international
relations and only authority to confer legality for the use of force (Lenoir 2003a,b; Villepin
2003). The ESS should allow the reaffirmation of the principles to which France is attached,
“in particular multilateralism referring to the United Nations Charta”, thereby insisting upon
the difference to the US (Lenoir 2003b).
This preference builds on traditional French policies on the one hand, such as those anchored in the 1994 White Paper, and operational experiences. France led the first autonomous EU operation *Artemis* in summer 2003, which was launched to support the UN. Support in an area such as peacekeeping, badly needed by the UN, would allow positioning the EU in an essential area, which had been rather neglected by the US and NATO (see chapter 5).

On the other hand, the insistence on multilateralism and the UN should also mark the difference with the US, which was criticised for its unilateral and UN hostile behaviour in the Iraq crisis (Interviews in the French MOD, 2007). France thus tried to codify at the EU level the positions it had previously defended at the national level. Beyond increasing their weight, this should also allow to retrospectively justify them. The core elements of the ESS, be it multilateralism instead of unilateralism or crisis prevention instead of pre-emptive involvement, correspond to the positions defended by France during the Iraq crisis.

### 2.4.6 Summary of the French Agenda

With the ESS, France aimed to lay the basis for a self-confident and autonomous actor role for the EU which it had lobbied for since St. Malo. France sought to:

- define clear policy principles which would support the EU’s development towards a global role;
- mark the difference with NATO by establishing a clear task sharing (defence vs. crisis management) and refusing any hierarchical relation;
- establish the UN as central authority in a world order based on multilateralism;
- anchor the use of force as recognised tool at the EU level; and
- stimulate the EU capability development.

France sought to upload the positions it has defended during the Iraq crisis, thereby seeking retrospective justification. Additionally, the ESS was considered a means to codify at the EU level the requirements it wanted the other member states to fulfil, such as capability improvement.
2.5 Common objectives and main differences

The analysis reveals several common goals. Against the background of the Iraq crisis, all three hoped that the ESS would offer the much needed instrument of public diplomacy that would polish the discredited image of both CFSP/ESDP and the EU as a whole, recreate and further European cohesion and coherence, and serve as a basis for future transatlantic co-operation.

Initially, the ESS was thus considered mainly an instrument to overcome the Iraq crisis and prevent CFSP/ESDP from falling apart. It would do so by sketching out European principles and guidelines for furthering CFSP/ESDP’s credibility, efficiency and coherence. This would also allow overcoming both the so far reactive approach in European security policy and the mindset dominated by the US analysis. The precise interpretation of these aspects differed however in each country, as an analysis following the criteria of comparison shows.

2.5.1 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

All three aimed to develop clear policy guidelines to serve as a basis for transatlantic co-operation. As an EU reference document, the ESS should clarify positions, avoid dispute and thereby allow for efficient co-operation.

The difference lies in the understanding of the transatlantic relationship. While all three recognised the central role of NATO as a collective defence actor and the main ally of the EU, France insisted on a relationship on an equal basis which would, for example, allow the EU to act independently from a NATO decision. On the contrary, the UK insisted upon a clear burden-sharing and the recognition of NATO and the US as priority partners, to which the EU action should offer support. It insisted on pragmatic co-operation settings rather than political rivalry. Germany tried to moderate between these positions.

Moreover, France and Germany both tried to codify at the EU level positions they defended during the Iraq crisis, thereby seeking to retrospectively justify them. The stress on
the UN's role or the preference for preventive action have been considered as an attempt to mark transatlantic differences and underline the need for a distinctive European approach.

2.5.2 Role of the EU

Germany and France both considered the ESS as a necessary step to further the political co-operation at the EU level and increase the EU’s international posture. For Germany, it would allow circumventing difficult debates at the national level, such as on the use of force. For France, a stronger EU would allow to further its own international posture. More pragmatically, the UK expected the ESS to facilitate effective EU decision-making in crisis management. It did not aim at boosting the political role of the EU. France and Germany thus followed rather a political logic, while the UK saw the ESS more as a pragmatic tool to enable the EU for action.

While Germany advocated a regional focus for EU policies, France and the UK aimed at a global reach. The motivation for that differed however, with France linking the global approach with a political claim, whereas in the British thinking it would result from the location of trouble spots.

2.5.3 EU Toolbox

All three countries expected the ESS to establish clarity on the EU toolbox. While agreeing upon an overall comprehensive approach in crisis management, France and the UK differed from Germany in their insistence that an assertive approach to the use of force be included into the ESS. This was sought to help other member states to overcome their reluctance, while also giving a further impetus to the EU capability development. It is reflected in the parallel development of the BG concept (see chapter 5).

Germany insisted on preventive action and diplomatic tools, but also recognised the use of force. This recognition was hoped to facilitate gaining domestic support on such issues.
2.5.4 Multilateralism and the UN

France and Germany expected from the ESS clarity on topics such as multilateralism and the use of force legitimised only by the UN. The UK paid comparatively less attention to it. This was not due to an opposite position, but rather to a refusal of what it considered as being the underlying driving forces of those positions, namely an anti-US stance.

Table 14: National Agendas - Results for the categories of comparison for case study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Transatlantic relations and NATO</th>
<th>Role of the EU</th>
<th>EU tool box</th>
<th>Multilateralism/UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship on equal footing ESS as basis for transatlantic dialogue NATO limited to collective defence Insistence on EU autonomous actor role, refusal of hierarchical relationship</td>
<td>Global political actor role for the EU; global reach of EU policies insistence upon political dimension</td>
<td>comprehensive with stress on military Promotion of capability development Against ‘pre-emptive’ engagement</td>
<td>strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>NATO as primary framework Strategic partnership with the US and NATO ESS as basis for future transatlantic dialogue EU as actor where NATO is not engaged assuring US allies</td>
<td>ESS as offering pragmatic guidelines for crisis management, not for an increased political role for the EU Global reach for EU politics given the location of trouble spots, not because of political considerations</td>
<td>make the EU recognise the necessity to use military means assure US allies of EU’s capability to act also in high end operations - Promotion of capability development</td>
<td>-no direct mention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>complementarity of EU and NATO, insistence on partnership NATO as main defence actor</td>
<td>Support for political integration process Normative stance: EU should assume international responsibilities</td>
<td>comprehensive, recognising military but stress on civilian and diplomatic tools against “pre-emptive” engagement</td>
<td>strong insistence on UN and multilateralism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 The influence of France, the UK and Germany on the ESS

Having defined the national agendas, the ‘decision’ at the EU level now needs to be identified (3.1.) to be then compared with the agendas (3.2). It will allow the assessment of the national influence.

3.1 The EU decision: The ESS as adopted in December 2003

The informal foreign ministers meeting in May 2003 mandated SG/HR Solana to produce a European strategy paper (Greek EU Presidency 2003b; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May 2003). Subsequently, Solana presented at the European Council in June 2003 a 16-pages document (Solana 2003a). The Council agreed on it without substantial debates and invited Solana to take the work forward. The European Council in December 2003 adopted the modified version as the definitive ESS.

The ESS is a short (15 pages) and comprehensive document, at least when measured against the usual standard of EU documents. It is composed of three parts:

(1) Part I: Analysis of the security environment: global challenges and key threats
While also looking at the overall security environment and global challenges, five key threats to the security of the EU were identified: terrorism; proliferation of WMD; regional conflicts; state failure and organised crime (Council of the EU 2003e: 3-5).

(2) Part II: Definition of Strategic objectives:
The ESS highlighted three strategic objectives in view of defending the EU’s security and promoting its values: addressing in concrete terms the key threats; building security in its neighbourhood; and contributing to an international order based on effective multilateralism (Council of the EU 2003e: 6-10).

(3) Part III: Policy implications for Europe.
This analysis yields precise policy implications: If the EU wants to make a contribution that matches its potential, it has to be more active, more capable, more coherent, and needs to work with its partners (Council of the EU 2003e: 11-14). This is embedded in a general call
for the development of an European strategic culture and a culture of prevention to become
the principal features of a European foreign and security policy.

The ESS is the first comprehensive strategy agreed upon at the EU level. It offers a
common threat analysis of the post 9/11 situation, defines objectives and identifies the
instruments to achieve them. It is also a political statement: as much as the Constitutional
Treaty negotiated in parallel defines the EU’s internal finality, the ESS outlines its external
finality, tackling not only security questions but also issues relating to the Union’s identity,
values and political philosophy. In doing so, the ESS represents the most direct and self-
confident pronouncement yet of the EU’s pursuit of an independent global security policy
supported where necessary by military means.

However, the ESS is not a legally binding, but an explicitly political document. It is more
of a ‘food for thought’ paper for European governments, developed in a particular moment of
strategic awareness, than an action plan. It is not a policy statement of an elected
government which commands armed forces, as for example the French national strategy. It
was a declaratory text adopted by an intergovernmental meeting of 25 heads of state and
government against the background of violent disputes.

Consequently, beyond offering an analysis of the security situation, the ESS addresses
the governments within and outside Europe. It urges the former to perpetuate the strategic
debate while showing the latter that the EU is willing to play a role and take up global
responsibilities (Masala 2003: 63). The “little blue book”, as one Brussels official nicknamed
the ESS after Mao’s ubiquitous red volume, is not an ideological bible (Interview Council
2005). But it shows the Europeans and their partners what kind of global player the EU wants
to be. The ESS had indeed a “confidence building function” (Bailes 2005b: 14) and a
“psychological healing function” after the rift over Iraq (Interviews in the German MFA 2006).
These different aspect explain why the ESS is not the precise guidebook for political action
that is, for example, the NSS.
It also explains why the ESS remains vague about how to achieve the policy priorities. It neither elaborates on the expected impact of EU policies, nor does it impose time-frames or control mechanisms. In fact, the EU does not have the legal means to allocate resources. Thus, it can not be expected to create a ‘strategic doctrine’ without doing the same thing for the other instruments needed for that (Bailes 2005b). Consequently, rather than offering specific solutions, the ESS defines challenges, broad objectives and principles. It does not offer political solutions but strives to create a framework and a mindset in which such decisions can be taken. As Bailes (2005a) put it, the ESS is a “manifesto more than a programme, an inspiration more than a solution, a philosophy more than an operational doctrine”.

With regard to the categories of comparison, the ESS makes the following provisions:

3.1.1 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

The ESS explicitly stresses the co-operation with NATO and the US. While the relationship with the latter is judged “irreplaceable”, it should also be “effective and balanced” (Council of the EU 2003e: 20). The permanent EU-NATO agreement is stressed in that it “enhance[s] the operational capability of the EU and provide[s] the framework for the strategic partnership” (Council of the EU 2003e: 12). Also in part III when stating the necessity to work with partners, the US is referred to, claiming that “our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the US” (Council of the EU 2003e: 13).

The clear insistence of the ESS on both crisis management and conflict prevention, but also the necessary co-operation with NATO and the US, avoids the impression of rivalry and of the EU intruding into NATO’s competences.

3.1.2 Role of the EU

The ESS states that the EU is “inevitably a global player” (Council of the EU 2003e: 4), while the growing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity makes it a “credible and effective actor” (Council of the EU 2003e: 4). The EU
should be ready “to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (Council of the EU 2003e: 4).

With regard to the EU’s reach, the importance of the Balkans is underlined, stating that the “credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there” (Council of the EU 2003e: 13). Similarly, the Arab-Israeli and African conflict are mentioned.

3.1.3 EU Toolbox

The ESS calls for the application of the “full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities” (Part III, p. 17). It recognises that “in contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments” (p. 7).

Thus, while advocating a preventive and comprehensive approach, the use of force is clearly recognised. The ESS states that the “countries [who] have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society” and who are unwilling to join it again should “understand that there is a price to be paid.” Calling for a “more capable” EU, the ESS insists on the necessity to further develop military capacities and refers to the role the EDA should play in this regard (Council of the EU 2003e: 18).

However, the ESS identifies “preventive engagement” as core element of European policies. If the June version referred to “pre-emptive engagement”, the final ESS calls the EU to act “before countries around us deteriorate [...] Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in future” (Council of the EU 2003e: 12).

3.1.4 Multilateralism and the UN

The ESS emphasises multilateralism as a main feature of European policies, identifying “an international order based on effective multilateralism” as EU objective (Council of the EU 2003e: 15). It recognises that there are “few if any problems we can deal with on
our own” (Council of the EU 2003e: 20), claiming that “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own” (Council of the EU 2003e: 3).

The development of a stronger international society and a “rule based international order” are defined as EU policy objectives. The EU aims to “support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security”, is “committed to re-enforcing its co-operation” and to enhance “its support for the UN in short term crisis management situations” (Council of the EU 2003e p. 12).

Table 15: The EU decision in case study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Transatlantic relations and NATO</th>
<th>Role of the EU</th>
<th>EU Tool Box</th>
<th>Multilateralism / UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU as global player with responsibility for global security and regional reach of policies</td>
<td>full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention, including military calls for capability development preventive engagement as core element of EU policies</td>
<td>Multilateralism as main feature of EU policies Calls to reinforce cooperation with UN and enhance support for UN in crisis management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(December 2003)</td>
<td>Emphasises the “irreplaceable” cooperation with NATO and US, but also calling it be “effective and balanced”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 British, German or French: what influence on the ESS?

The EU “decision” now needs to be compared with the national agendas. It is the overlap between “agenda” and “decision” which allows the assessment of the magnitude of the member states’ influence. It can be assessed through a comparison of:

1. their initial expectations;
2. the content of the first draft (June 2003); and
3. the final ESS version (December 2003).

The criteria used to assess the national agendas again offer a useful starting point for the analysis.
3.2.1 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

The ESS accords a great importance, and comparatively greater than the June version, to the transatlantic relationship. Prime Minister Blair claimed it as clear British success:

“And I think it is an indication of the chance we have to influence the debate in Europe that when Britain speaks up for the NATO Alliance, we get the support of the vast majority of people including, I have to say, France and Germany who recognise that in the end European defence has no future as a competitor to NATO.” (Blair 2003g)

However, German diplomats also claimed that Germany wanted to see the transatlantic relationship anchored as a central element in the ESS and would have preferred an even greater stress (Interviews in the German MFA 2005, Bundestag 2005). Germany did not question the transatlantic relationship as such. While calling for a strong role for NATO and transatlantic co-operation, Germany at the same time asked for this co-operation to take place on equal terms. This shows the German ambiguity on the issue.

The statement that the transatlantic partnership should be “effective and balanced” seems to embody French preferences and has been considered an example of successful French uploading. However, it also partly corresponds to German expectations.

Moreover, the comparatively great space the ESS accords to the threat analysis has been claimed as French uploading success. It is seems to express the will to show distinctive European accents, thereby emphasising the difference between the EU and the predominant security assessments in form of the 2002 US NSS and the 1999 NATO Concept (NATO-NAC 1999b). In fact, the threat analysis of the June version comes closer to the NSS than the December version. The emphasis put on regional conflicts, organised crime and failed states reflects a perception of threat that is less organised in military terms than in terms of comprehensive security. This also offers the opportunity to underline that other means than military exist to address threats, which was dear to Germany.
3.2.2 EU Toolbox

The more assertive approach to the use of force corresponds to the preferences of all three countries, and can hence be considered a collective uploading success. However, they followed different motivations.

The UK and France had since St. Malo called for the development of military capabilities at the EU level and the necessary mindset for it to enable the EU to assume responsibility and to move, where necessary, beyond the civilian approach (see chapter 5). However, for the UK, this was considered a means to strengthen NATO and the transatlantic relationship. It also corresponds to the interventionist foreign policy which HMG had developed and in which military interventions were considered adequate means (Blair 1999b; Lunn, Miller, and Smith 2008; Williams 2005). Contrary, for France, military capabilities should enable European autonomy of action with regard to the US/NATO.

Germany also supported an assertive stance because it hoped that the existence of EU guidelines would facilitate addressing this controversial issue at the national level. On the other hand, the stress on conflict prevention and the emphasis on non–military instruments for crisis management reflected German objectives (Heusgen 2004: 31). German Foreign Minister Fischer expressed his satisfaction toward the ESS because it gave priority to diplomatic tools (Fischer 2003b).

Also noteworthy are the disappearance of the term “pre-emptive” (June version) and the emergence of “preventive engagement” in the final version. While some criticised it as a backward step (Everts 2004: 93; Ponsard 2005: 58) and critical “watering down” of European objectives due to Franco-German influence (Heisbourg 2004a: 69), others praised it as a victory of genuine European thinking (Interviews in the EU Council 2005; German MFA, 2006). It has often been attributed to successful French and German uploading (Interviews in the German MFA 2006; EU Council 2005; French MOD 2007).

Indeed, several observers insisted that it was the American use of the term which raised problems (Interviews Council 2005). The 2002 NSS, but also earlier documents, allow
for pre-emptive engagement (NSC 2002: 6, 19-20). For several EU countries it implied unilateral action and a problematic use of international law, such as in the Iraq war. The political connotation of the term and its prominent place in US thinking were controversial in Europe. Particularly France and Germany resented the use of the term as an unacceptable compliance with problematic US style and thinking and pleaded for its removal (interviews in the French MFA 2005; German MFA 2006; Council 2005).

For them, replacing “pre-emptive” with “preventive engagement” and moving it from the strategic objectives to the policy implications was a success in that it repulsed US thinking and erected preventive action as a European policy goal par excellence. German diplomat and member of the ESS drafting team C. Heusgen stressed that the emphasis on “conflict prevention as essential goal of European policy […] reflects German core concerns” (Heusgen 2004: 31). It supports the hypothesis of successful German influence. If the French unease with the term mainly resulted from the proximate context of the Iraq war, the German position was also rooted in its historically conditioned reluctance to the use of force and preference for multilateral engagements. Not surprisingly, it is hence coupled with the insistence on a further development of international law.

However, in most European languages, the difference between ‘pre-emptive’ and ‘preventive’ is difficult to translate. Some German versions of the June draft translated the English “pre-emptive” into a German “preventive” (Flechtner and Lerch 2004: 4). Numerous European officials hence claim that linguistic problems rather than content-wise considerations explain the withdrawal of the term (Everts 2004: 93; Interviews in the EU Council 2005).

Moreover, some observers argue that the “pre-emptive” (at least in English) as placed and used in the June version (p. 11) had very little to do with the US connotation of the term (Interviews in the EU ISS, 2005; EU Council, 2007; UK Permanent Representation 2005). It

37 Pre-emptive engagement means to anticipate an immediate threat, i.e. to tackle a threat that already exists. It describes a short term engagement. Israel referred to it in the 1967 war. Prevention means to avoid the emergence of sources of risks, thus describing a more long term commitment, which would eventually avoid to act pre-emptively (Sieg 2004 : 19).
was not located in a military context but in the context of development and trade policy instruments. It thus came closer to the understanding of “preventive action” as eventually used in the final version. The modification between the June and December version is from this perspective a linguistic rather than a content-wise difference.

Yet, interviews also raised the possibility that the term ‘pre-emptive’ was introduced by the UK simply to have a bargaining object which could at a later stage be abandoned in exchange for other more important goals, such as transatlantic co-operation (BBC News 2003; Interviews in the UK Permanent Representation, 2005). They attribute the term to R. Cooper, a British diplomat and member of the ESS drafting team, who has been considered as Blair’s foreign policy guru during his first term (Dunne 2004: 899; see also Haugevik 2005: 40). Opinions diverge whether this was a real attempt to inject British preferences close to those of the US, or rather an example of deliberatively creating a margin for bargaining.

It would hence be too easy to consider the abandonment of this term as a failure of the UK or as a Franco-German success. British diplomats stressed that they are “more than happy with the outcome of the ESS”, considering it as entirely in line with British expectations (Interview in the UK Permanent Representation, 2005).

3.2.3 Role of the EU

The recognition of Europe as a ‘global actor’ has been claimed by France as having successfully uploaded its preference for an autonomous actor role (Interviews in the EU Council 2005; French Permanent Representation 2005). The global reach, the call for a worldwide commitment or the development of worldwide strategic partnerships were core elements of the French agenda to underline the political role and impact the EU should have.

However, the use of the term “global actor”, which French diplomats considered a synonym of the formerly used “Europe puissance”, which had provoked other EU states too much facilitated the acceptance of this statement. A ‘global actor’ role did not pose problems for the UK and Germany. They did not confer the political connotation to it that France had
intended, but rather understood it in factual terms, that is, as defining possible areas of intervention.

3.2.4 Multilateralism, UN

The increased importance attributed to ‘effective multilateralism’ and the UN has been considered an example of successful French and German uploading (Interview in the French Permanent Representation, 2005; German MFA, 2005, 2006). Both considered these principles violated in the context of the Iraq war and wanted to state a distinctive European approach compared to that of the US. The stress on multilateralism here is understood as a further step in the emancipation from the US mindset and framework of analysis in foreign and security policy (Habermas and Derrida 2003). Moreover, it opens a new field of action for the EU, such as peacekeeping in support of the UN. Besides, Germany conceives its foreign and security policy exclusively in multilateral terms; military operations would only be conceivable in multilateral frameworks.

It has been claimed that the British influence weakened during the drafting of the ESS due *inter alia* to the difficulties in Iraq during the second half of 2003 and the fact that no WMD were found (Interviews in the EU Council 2005; Ifri 2005; EPC-B 2006; SWP 2006, RUSI 2006). However, the UK would certainly not object to the role of the UN or multilateralism. It had supported the UN on several occasions, such as when intervening militarily in Sierra Leone (in 1999; see Ginifer 2004) or when proposing the EU Battlegroup concept (see chapter 5). Blair famously stated that he fought for values, not for territories (Blair 1999b). The difference consisted in the fact that France and Germany followed an explicit political logic when insisting on multilateralism (as opposed to the resented US unilateralism), whereas for the UK it was a self evident statement.

3.2.5 Summary

The analysis reveals the difficulties in pinning down precise examples of uploading. All three countries seem to have secured their main goals and avoided opposite ideas being
included. That the idea of an EU strategic concept as such has been Europeanised and implemented in a short period of time is a collective uploading success of all three countries.

A key explanation is that each country interpreted the ESS statements in a different way. The compromise character of the ESS and its vague wording permitted various interpretations and allowed all three countries to be satisfied with the outcome despite their different agendas. Bailes (2005b: 14) insisted that the ESS “could only achieve its unity building aim by staying broad-brush enough for all EU members to read their favourite agendas into it”.

The different interpretation of the use of force is a good example; with the UK praising the assertive approach and Germany underlining its restricted use as the last resort. Another example is the reference to NATO. While all three countries agree on the inalienability of NATO and insisted that EU and NATO be complementary, they emphasised different aspects in practice.

With the ambiguous wording of the ESS allowing for various interpretations, it is difficult to assess to what extent a country was more successful than another in projecting its preferences to the EU level. Eventually, member states have been successful in uploading their ideas only in those areas which were of less importance for the others, or where the resulting compromise left enough leeway to still cover their preferences. The capacity of uploading is thus restricted by the vital interest of the other countries involved.

4 Mechanisms of influence

The influence of the three countries depends upon their ‘shaping capacities’. The negotiation process offered several opportunities to inject national preferences in the view of successfully uploading them. Two periods were particularly propitious:

1) the summer of 2003, after the publication of the first draft (June 2003) and prior to the conference cycle starting in September 2003. The member states were invited
to present their priorities to Solana’s team and were confronted with the positions of
the others; and

2) the intergovernmental negotiation process in November/December 2003 leading to
the endorsement of the ESS.

However, formal and informal consultations between Solana/his staff and the
governments took place during the whole drafting period. In any case, the informal drafting
process, short circuiting the official fora, entailed a very informal way of influencing, which
has meant that not many traces are left, let alone accessible.

4.1 The mechanisms of uploading used in this case study

The ESS offers an evident example of trilateral agenda setting. According to C.
Heusgen (2004: 29), “Germany, France and Great Britain launched the idea which was
subsequently endorsed by the Greek presidency”. The idea is said to have emerged at an
informal dinner of the Foreign Ministers Fischer, Straw, de Villepin and Solana just after the
Tervuren summit and prior to the Kastellorizio meeting (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4
May 2003; Interviews in the EU Council, 2005; EU ISS 2005).38 It was submitted to the Greek
presidency, which then put it on the agenda. Putting their combined weight behind the
proposition, the three countries successfully injected their idea into the European system of
governance, thereby displaying their ability to set the agenda, shape the official discourse
and export preferences.

This trilateral arrangement facilitated the uploading in Kastellorizio. It has also been
claimed that not only the idea itself but also the particular drafting process was “pushed by
France, Germany and the UK as part of their general attempt to regroup after the Iraq-related
split” (Bailes 2005b: 11). With the main drafters of the ESS in the Council being R. Cooper
(UK, Head of the External and Politico-Military Affairs Department), C. Heusgen (Germany,
Head of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit) and P. Bergamini (France, Policy

38 Other versions mention a conversion between the German representative to the EU Schafer and Solana as
origin of the ESS (Interview in the German MFA 2005, 2006).
Planning and Early Warning Unit), the national influence of the ‘big three’ seemed to be assured.

This is however a controversial argument. First, it implies that national representatives working at the EU level would still defend their national positions. Second, it suggests that there is a convergence of positions defended by these three persons and their national governments. If the latter might be true in the case of R. Cooper, former close adviser to PM Blair, and P. Bergamini, close to the Chirac government, it is different for C. Heusgen. He served under the previous Conservative government as deputy head of the special section in charge of negotiating the Maastricht Treaty and worked later in the Private Office of Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (Liberals). Even taking into account an overarching continuity in German foreign policy, there are some differences between the red-green government in power in 2003 and its Christian Democrat – Liberal predecessor. In fact, the allegations of defending national influences have mainly been made for Robert Cooper, and less for the other members of the drafting team (Interviews in the EU Council 2005; see also Haugevik 2005: 40).

There seems to be agreement that the presence of national representatives working under a European label is not a guarantee for assuring national preferences (Interviews at the Commission, 2005; Council 2005; EPC-B and Ifri Paris 2005). They might, as it has particularly been said of Cooper, watch that their country’s interests be represented, especially given that they know what their governments want. They can feed the EU policy process with ideas and combine them with others, thereby watching that their national positions would not be hurt. As a French diplomat put it, they are the “watch dog” of their governments (Interview in the French MOD, 2007; French Permanent Representation 2005; EU Council 2005). This doesn’t equal exercising national influence, but it allows assuring that the positions of their countries be respected, or at least not disrespected.

Eventually, the three countries needed to reconcile their approaches with those of the other countries and had to reshape their ideas into an original product. It finally boils down to a question of personalities, and R. Cooper has been suspected of being more inclined to
defend British positions than others. Overall, the three diplomats can be mainly considered as important gatekeepers assuring that national preferences would not be violated.

This emphasises the crucial role of administrative and political capacities and resources for successful uploading. It can take different forms, such as proposing high level staff for Council positions (Heusgen, Bergamini, Cooper), having national experts to draft meaningful proposals (all three countries), having foreign ministers who entertain a confident relationship with Solana (Fischer) or generally enjoy a high international reputation (Fischer and de Villepin). According to European and national decision makers, contacts at the ministerial level and informal discussions decisively influenced the ESS.

By suggesting the drafting of a security strategy, the three countries also displayed their capacity to grasp current developments, namely the increasing strategic awareness within the EU, and to absorb ideas circulating in academic and policy circles, but also in the Council/Solana’s staff (Interviews in the EU Council 2005). In his book “The breaking of nations”, in press in 2003, R. Cooper argued that if the Europeans do not like the NSS, they should develop their own document rather than just complain from the sidelines (Cooper 2004: 165).

Moreover, Greece had defined the need to “re-establish the transatlantic relationship on a new, equal, and mutually beneficial basis” as a priority of its EU presidency (Greek EU Presidency 2003a). Consequently, in preparation of the Kastellorizo meeting, it had invited renowned figures from international academic and political circles to analyse the current state of the transatlantic relationship and to formulate recommendations for improvement. These contributions, submitted inter alia by C. Hill, J. Nye, C. Nicolaïdis, G. Andréani, A. Menon and C. Bertram, were distributed as ‘food for thought’ papers prior to the Kastellorizo meeting.39 Menon and Lipkin recommend e.g. that, in order to improve transatlantic relations, a more sustained effort be made “to identify the Union’s position on the major global issues” (Menon and Lipkin 2003: 36). They suggested appointing a group of senior experts to

examine the possibility of “developing a US-style ‘Security Plan’ for the Union” (Menon and Lipkin 2003: 37).

This ‘pre-history’ doesn’t belittle the effect of the trilateral agenda setting capacity. On the contrary, it underlines the capacity of the three countries to shape the debate. Even if the idea of a strategy was already in the air, it was the three countries who succeeded in putting it on the agenda, thereby Europeanising it.

Acting together against the background of the Iraq crisis certainly helped to reach credibility in the eyes of most of the EU countries. Considering the different positions of the three countries now united behind a joint proposal, they did not fear national power politics or Franco-German manoeuvres and welcomed the project. Together, the three represent a broad coalition of interests within the EU with the UK being “more global and Atlanticist”, France keener on an “autonomous” Europe” and Germany embodying “the virtue of the European Union as a civilian power” (Andréani et al. 2001: 89). The three countries were able to reconcile through their trilateral agreement the different positions in the EU, thereby representing a wide range of concerns among the EU members. No other group of EU states is in that position and therefore “France, Britain and Germany represent a natural leadership group” (Andréani et al. 2001: 89).

Other forms of bilateral or multilateral co-operation yielded less evident results. A general convergence of French and German positions in security and defence matters was displayed at the Tervuren summit and in the parallel running working group VII and VIII of the Convention in form of common initiatives, such as for the solidarity clause. Franco-German positions were able to sweep along other countries, thereby becoming mainstream positions, which was said to have had a positive influence on the ESS. However, this did not materialise in precise results (Interview in the German MFA, 2005, 2006; in the Bundestag 2005; Altmaier 2003).

Overall, the involved personnel mentioned a gradual socialisation into European habits as a facilitating element for the reconciliation of different positions. They emphasised the importance of regular working relations, particularly through co-operation in Brussels, which
facilitated the negotiation of the ESS. Particularly the French and German representatives underlined the socialisation into (highly institutionalised) co-operation and a permanent coordination of positions, which socialised them into both a bilateral and a European perspective of thinking (interviews in the German MFA 2005; French MFA 2007: EU Council 2005). Together, these elements are supposed to have facilitated the commitment to and agreement on the ESS.

The ESS also illustrates that active participation is crucial to influence developments. Blair underlined that the commitment to EU activities is of vital British interest:

“[…] those that wanted to make foreign and defence policy the prerogative of the Brussels Commission were defeated, and I think it is quite important that we in Britain, when we enter into these European debates and win them, that we recognise that we have won them rather than looking for reasons to cavil at a result we should actually be very, very pleased at” (Blair 2003e).

Also France and Germany recognised active participation as means of influence.
4.2 To what extent apply the mechanisms outlined in the theory chapter?

Table 16: The mechanisms of uploading identified in case study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms of uploading</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal and informal agenda setting</td>
<td>By jointly suggesting the idea of a strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example setting</td>
<td>By submitting oral and written preferences to Solana’s staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral or multilateral cooperation</td>
<td>Indirectly in the convention working groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideational export and preference shaping</td>
<td>By suggesting the overall idea of a strategy by removing certain ideas (e.g. preemptive) and imposing others (e.g. global actor, capability improvement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative commitment</td>
<td>National diplomats in the drafting team (P. Bergamini), trained national staff, existence of national blueprints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political capacities, influence, weight</td>
<td>Together with UK, recognised as main military and political power and experienced international actor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Conclusion

This chapter sought to evaluate the influence France, Germany and the UK had on the ESS. The analysis reveals the predominant role of the three countries in uploading the idea of a strategy and in bringing it to a successful endorsement at the EU level. Although the three countries have not been able to upload all their preferences, they assured their priorities and blocked unacceptable positions.

The ESS differs however from the other case studies in that it is a genuine European product. The first blueprints for the institutional set up have been presented by the German EU presidency (see chapter 3). The first ESS version however was drafted under the almost exclusive authority of the Policy Unit, while the usual working arenas involving the member states were circumvented. Nevertheless, the first draft of the ESS was widely accepted, as was the final version. The member states thus certainly influenced the ESS. But their impact has been conditioned by the unique drafting process.

The analysis demonstrates that the national agendas are a mix of genuine commitment to European goals (such as the trilateral wish to enable the EU to assume international responsibility), strategic thinking to further national preferences and to influence the EU policy making through a commitment at the European level (such as the Franco-British push for capability development), and of long-term processes of macro adaptation and micro socialisation in the European context. For the latter, an incremental process of rapprochement of French, German and British positions in security and defence questions can be observed, with the UK becoming more ‘europeanist” and accepting the EU as a serious foreign policy actor, France getting more “atlanticist” in recognising the overall role of NATO and Germany moving beyond its exclusive civilian power stance.

The national stances are conditioned by exogenous factors such as the Iraq war, but particularly by endogenous parameters, such as national strategic cultures. All three
countries saw in the ESS a means to overcome the Iraq crisis and prevent ESDP from falling apart; to sketch out European principles and guidelines for furthering ESDP’s credibility, efficiency and coherence; and to offer a basis for further transatlantic co-operation. These common goals have however been interpreted in a different way by each country.

On the one hand, the vague wording of the ESS was key to its successful endorsement. It allowed the countries to construe the ESS statements in their way and to eventually reconcile different approaches.

On the other hand, this vagueness risked rendering the ESS into a “strategic junk room” (Pailhe 2004: 5). As an European official put it, the ESS could have been written by a schoolboy, so general and consequently meaningless in their ‘goodness’ are its statements (Interviews in the EU Commission, 2005; EU Council 2005). Its “laundry-list format and politically correct tone” did not hurt anyone’s sensitivities (Schmidt and Geipel 2004: 30). It mentioned everything without making choices. Having the context of the Iraq war in mind, it seemed for example contradictory to express support for the US and UN at the same time.

Moreover, as guidelines for the implementation are lacking, the ESS risks becoming a nice but finally little observed document. The ambiguous wording and the compromise character of the ESS are thus the key to both the successful elaboration at a moment of deep European controversy and to the seemingly little impact it has had so far.

The ambiguous wording also complicates assessing the success of the uploading. The most evident uploading mechanism is collective agenda setting, with the trilateral idea to develop a strategy being taken up and implemented by the Greek EU Presidency. Besides, offering expertise and staff power to the EU level (Policy Unit) and elaborated national positions conferred possibilities for ideational export, namely, to inject preferences into the drafting process.

Both trilateral agenda setting and ideational export considerably built upon political and administrative resources and capacities. Here, the personal influence of the foreign ministers

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40 Pailhe talks about a « fourre-tout stratégique », which can be translated with « strategic junk room ».
(Straw, de Villepin and Fischer), and of the national diplomats seconded to the Council (Cooper, Bergamini and Heusgen) was considerable. The ESS demonstrates the importance of trilateral initiatives for the development of ESDP. The French, German and British administrative and political capacities, their recognised political and economic weight and experience and their often opposite positions in European issues increased the weight of their joint proposal for a European strategy.

It is worth insisting that the ESS has been elaborated in the context of European disunity, and has been adopted under the Italian presidency that failed so miserably on the Constitutional Treaty. The mere fact to find an even small common European denominator in this context witnesses a strong commitment. It proved that the EU member states were able to reach agreement in a crisis situation and despite many disagreements with the US and among each other over specific policy issues, legal interpretations, the right wording and financial questions.

Eventually, the ESS demonstrates that the EU started to think in global terms; and that member states start to become engaged with challenges that are potentially beyond their reach, their available means and strategic horizon. Merely issuing a strategy means that the issuing body believes it has an influence. When endorsing the ESS, the EU stated its conviction that it can shape its environment and is not the victim of forces beyond its control. The adoption of the ESS is thus an affirmation of the EU’s ambition to make a proper mark on the course of global events through offering a strategy which has the potential to serve as an overall policy framework guiding the whole of EU external action across the pillars.
CHAPTER 5:
CASE STUDY 3: THE EU BATTLEGROUP CONCEPT

Since the 1999 Cologne summit, the EU has been striving to be politically and militarily able to effectively respond to a crisis. Subsequently, several structures have been developed to enable the EU for effective decision-making (see chapter 3). The ESS, as well as sectoral and regional strategies have been adopted to offer strategic guidance (see chapter 4). Concerning the material realm, military capabilities were called for. Here, the core elements are Rapid Response (RR) forces that are able to intervene quickly and to assure military effectiveness in crisis scenarios.

The first step was made with the endorsement of the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) in December 1999. However, recognising both the limited success in fulfilling the HHG and the changing security parameters, the EU endorsed in 2004 a new military objective - the Headline Goal 2010 (HG 2010). With regard to RR, it foresaw a new instrument, the EU Battlegroups (BG). These would represent the first effectively deployable EU RR elements. This analysis concentrates upon the development of the BG concept as the a priori most palpable expression of EU RR elements and essential tool to operationalise ESDP in military terms.

This chapter seeks to assess the influence of France, Germany and the UK on the BG concept. To what extent and how were the three countries able to project their preferences to the EU level towards the development of the BG concept? This chapter will (1) set the scene by providing the background of the development of EU RR forces; (2) analyse the agenda of the three countries with regard to the BG concept; (3) assess their influence, namely, to what extent the three countries were able to upload their preferences within the development of
the BG concept, and (4) to examine the mechanisms with the help of which they sought to project their preferences to the EU level.

1 The Background and development of an EU Rapid Response capability

This chapter provides a short overview of what is meant by RR and the hitherto steps in the EU capability development. First, the concept of RR will be defined. The second part reviews the development from the HHG to the HG 2010. This leads to the third part which provides the background of the development of the BG concept as part of the HG 2010. The final part sums up the main steps in a chronology.

1.1 Rapid Response - key elements of a concept

In the military domain, “rapid response” describes a distinct capability which enables a quick reaction in crisis scenarios. The novelty of recent years is that the concept has been adopted by international organisations, as the concomitant development of EU and NATO RR forces demonstrates (Meiers 2005; Mölling 2007b). Regarding the EU, RR forces should enable the Union to react rapidly and flexibly to a broad range of crises and thereby to enlarge its room for manoeuvre in regional and international security policy.

The focus of RR is mainly but not exclusively on preventive and early intervention in opposition to later-stage conflict management in escalated crisis situations. Contrary to the idea that the use of military force should be the ultima ratio of any action, RR is an instrument of an preventive approach which assumes that a timely, rapid and decisive intervention might allow for the prevention of the escalation of a crisis (ICISS 2001; UN 1992, 2000). It could allow the avoidance of subsequent larger, more violent, expensive and longer term interventions. In fact, an intervention at a later stage often risks narrowing down the options of the intervention forces. Military conflicts might enlarge, and might have created results which can then only be revised by applying the full range of military instruments. In
humanitarian terms, a late intervention often risks extending the suffering of the population and increasing the number of victims (Zenko 2004: 5-6).

On the other hand, the required rapidity of RR risks conflicting with the national and international procedures for its legitimisation. The processes of the obligatory parliamentary authorisations such as in Germany or Ireland are potentially difficult to reconcile with the time constraints of rapid deployments (Mölling 2007a; Nötzel and Schreer 2007; Keating and Tonra 2002). They risk slowing down the deployment or politically weakening the operation, or both.

Besides, some observers fear that a RR deployment might lead to ‘last minute killings’ or displacements, which ultimately contradicts the intention of a RR deployment (Interviews in the Council 2007, 2008; French MOD 2007). Eventually, the success of a mission depends upon the appropriate ratio between the threat of the use of force and its actual use; and the effective differentiation between combatants and civilians (Zlenko 2004). This might be particularly difficult in the early stages of a crisis (Levite and Sherwood-Randall 2002). In addition, the use of force or a high number of civilian casualties can damage the political legitimacy and affect the domestic support of a mission in its crucial early moments.

1.2 The development of Rapid Response capabilities in the EU: from the HHG to the HG 2010

The EU’s ambition to equip itself with RR forces is rooted in the experiences of the 1990’s, mainly the Balkan wars. They demonstrated that despite the impressive number of troops in the armed forces of its member states, the EU was neither politically nor militarily able to act quickly and decisively. The inception of ESDP targeted both the military and political shortcomings. As case study 1 has revealed, France and the UK, and to a lesser extent Germany, had played a significant role in this context.

41 In Germany, a parliamentary agreement is required for deployments of the Bundeswehr ("Parlamentsvorbehalt"). Ireland’s “Triple Lock system” requires the existence of an UN mandate, agreement of the government and parliament. Also in the Netherlands the parliamentary agreement is required.
Regarding the military dimension, the first step was made at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, when member states endorsed the HHG to develop military capabilities at the EU level (Council of the EU 1999d\footnote{Annex 1 to Annex IV.: Presidency progress report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence}). The term “headline goal” describes a capability objective which should be reached in a particular process and defined time frame. With the HHG, member states had themselves set the objective to be able, by 2003:

“to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks\footnote{The Petersberg tasks were first defined by the WEU at the 1992 Petersberg summit near Bonn. See “Petersberg Declaration” (Ministerial Council of the WEU 1992). They have subsequently been integrated into the EU with the Amsterdam Treaty (European Union 1997: article J.7(2)). Later on, and referring to the ESS, the range of Petersberg tasks has been enlarged to include joint disarmament operations and support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. See GAERC 2004a; ESS/Council of the EU 2003d; HG2010/Council of the EU 2004b: p.1. top 2} […] in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50-60,000 persons). […] Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.” (Council of the EU 1999d\footnote{Annex 1 to Annex IV: Presidency progress report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence}).

However, although referring to RR, the HHG had remained vague on the provisions of these elements. Consequently, an additional process was initiated at the Laeken European Council in December 2001, which invited the incoming Spanish presidency to take the work on the issue forward (Council of the EU 2001d). As a result, Spain tabled in February 2002 a working plan for the development of procedures and concepts required to deploy RR elements. The EUMC then tasked the EUMS to produce the conceptual aspects of a RR capability.

In view of the first satisfying results, the GAERC tasked the PSC and the EUMC in November 2002 to finalise the work (GAERC 2002: 13). As a result, the EUMC agreed in January 2003 upon a “Military Rapid Response Concept” (MRRC, Council of the EU/EUMC, 2003).\footnote{Adopted in 2003, the MRRC has been partly de-classified 11 June 2007.} It provides a general conceptual basis for the conduct of EU-led military operations requiring a RR capability by describing its main elements, measures and possible actions.

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\footnote{Adopted in 2003, the MRRC has been partly de-classified 11 June 2007.}
The HHG was to be met by June 2003, or December at the latest. But already in December 2001, the same Laeken European Council which initiated the MRRC declared first results (Council of the EU 2001d). The May 2003 GAERC meeting confirmed that “the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls” (GAERC 2003a). Subsequently, the December 2003 European Council closed the process initiated in Helsinki although the HHG has not entirely been achieved (Council of the EU 2004a).

In fact, despite quantitatively meeting the targets set in Helsinki, there were significant qualitative shortfalls in key capabilities such as transport, force protection, or operational mobility. Particular problems have been recognised with regard to the upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity. Although in principle the member states were able to provide the required number of troops, it was questionable whether these troops could be equipped, deployed, supplied, sustained and rotated as required. Most observers hence claim that the HHG has not been met and consider the declaration of operationality as a political move rather than one supported by military-material evidence (Garden and Clark 2001; Quille 2006b: 9-11).

Already before the HHG process was closed in December 2003, EU foreign and defence ministers agreed at an informal meeting in October 2003 to revisit the Petersberg tasks under a new headline goal (ICG 2005: 24). It was meant to translate the ESS, which was finalised at the same time and was to be endorsed a month later (see chapter 4), into concrete military objectives.

As a result, the new HG 2010 was approved by the GAERC in May 2004 (GAERC 2004b) and endorsed by the European Council in June 2004 in Brussels (Council of the EU 2004d). Member states agreed to:

“commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union” (Council of the EU 2004b: 1).
The EU’s ability to deploy high readiness forces in response to a crisis was considered “a key element of the HG 2010” and was to be based on the BG.

Overall, the HG 2010 aimed to remedy to the capability shortfalls recognised in the HHG process. It attempted to link the capability development process within the EU with a new framework reflecting recent operational experiences, such as first ESDP operations, and institutional innovations, such as the ESS and the European Defence Agency (EDA). Contrary to the HHG, the HG 2010 could indeed build upon a consensus reached within the EU in form of the ESS over the definition of threats, the means to address them, and the role of military force. It both facilitated its adoption and increased its EU-wide acceptance.

The differences between the HHG and the HG 2010 are striking. They reflect an EU learning process which led to several modifications in the understanding of capability development processes and the methods required for reaching meaningful results.

First, with the HG 2010, the feasibility has improved. Constituting or participating in a BG is clearly more feasible than deploying, rotating and sustaining 60,000 troops for a year. Second, when putting the BG at the core of EU RR forces, the HG 2010 recognises that the nature of the military capabilities primarily required has shifted from large to more rapidly deployable, technologically equipped, and intelligence-based forces that can perform a wide range of tasks. Whereas the HHG was geared to the Balkan wars and particularly focussed on quantitative targets, the HG 2010 focuses on crisis management and qualitative targets.

Third, the force generation process changed its dynamic from a rather top-down to a more bottom-up approach. Member states can offer whole force packages or part elements for BGs instead of fulfilling the EU-set target as in the HHG. The possibility to contribute smaller units and niche capabilities allows to ‘responsibilise’ the member states and to increase their commitment.

However, the overall method of governance did not change, and no sanction mechanisms have been introduced to monitor the member states commitment. From this perspective, the HG 2010 was more an adjusting of goal posts than an improvement of the method which already showed its limits in the HHG.
Nevertheless, despite all criticism, the HHG was successful in getting member states to focus on capability gaps and voluntarily commit themselves to seeking ways to solve them. It eventually led to the inception of modified provisions in the EU capability building process with the HG 2010, and the establishment of the EDA. Moreover, it initiated and accelerated the development of RR concepts at the EU level, eventually leading to the MRRC.

1.3 The background of the BG concept

A main innovation of the HG 2010 was the BG concept, which should allow for the development of the core of EU RR forces. By doing so, the HG2010 aimed to operationalise the EU RR concepts developed so far, mainly the MRRC.

The BG concept has developed with an unusual speed for European issues and introduced new aspects into EU capability development. The idea has often been traced back to the Franco-British summit at Le Touquet in February 2003, which highlighted the need to further develop the RR dimension of ESDP (HMG and Le Président de la République 2004). Chronologically, Le Touquet took place between the endorsement of the MRRC (January 2003) and the closure of the Helsinki process (December 2003), seemingly pushing the MRRC forward while anticipating the limited achievements of the HHG. In November 2003, the subsequent Franco-British summit in London revealed further specifications of the concept (HMG and Le Président de la République 2003c,b).

France and the UK then approached Germany. Together, they formally introduced the BG concept to the EU via the submission to the PSC on 10 February 2004 of a joint “Food for Thought Paper” (Food for Thought Paper/HMG, Le Président de la République and Bundesregierung 2004; Le Monde, 12 February 2004). It was welcomed by the GAERC in March (GAERC 2004a). Subsequently, the GAERC adopted the HG2010 in May 2004 (GAERC 2004b), and the European Council endorsed it in June 2004 (Council of the EU 2004d). The HG 2010 makes references to the BG concept but calls for a separate document to be elaborated on the military and operational provisions (Council of the EU
Several factors contributed to the swift adoption of the BG concept. First, the experience of the 2003 French–led EU operation *Artemis* in DR Congo provided the EU with confidence that it was able to carry out a demanding military operation on another continent, within a short time frame, and for the first time autonomously, that is, without recourse to NATO assets (Council of the EU 2003b; Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU 2007).

*Artemis* took place between the emergence of the BG concept in February 2003 and its further specification in November 2003. The BG concept draws heavily on the *Artemis* experience with regard to size, capabilities, timeframe and requirements. Furthermore, *Artemis* symbolised the EU’s support of ‘effective multilateralism’ and the UN even before it had been endorsed in the ESS in December 2003 (see chapter 4). That *Artemis* was carried out against the background Iraq war and the bitter European rifts only increased its political significance for ESDP.

Second, the EU was confronted with a general UN request to provide rapidly deployable troops for Chapter VII missions (Granholm and Jonson 2006; House of Lords 2004a). Faced with a growing number of increasingly demanding missions, the UN only had limited capabilities to undertake operations at short notice and lacked particularly high readiness units (Tardy 2005; Novosseloff 2004).

By offering such forces to the UN through the development of the BG, the EU would be able to honour its commitment to the UN as stated in the HHG and reiterated in the ESS, while also enhancing its own ability to conduct RR operations. Besides, by filling a gap in the international needs, the EU could gain the opportunity to play a role in an area that had been neglected by NATO and the US, thereby enhancing its international role (Everts and Keohane 2004: 5-6). Just after *Artemis* was concluded, the EU and the UN adopted a “Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management” (EU and UN 2003). The implementation of these commitments with regard to military crisis management was addressed by the same European Council which endorsed the HG 2010.
A third driving force can be found in the provisions for a ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (PSCoop) in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, which was negotiated in parallel to the BG concept (Mölling 2006; Granholm and Jonson 2006). It would allow committed member states to more quickly advance in security and defence issues. To participate in the PSCoop, member states had to fulfil certain provisions which corresponded more or less to those required for the participation in BGs (Granholm and Jonson 2006). While the BG concept offered especially for smaller countries an opportunity for participation by contributing niche capabilities to multilateral BG, it was also hoped that PSCoop would create an incentive among member states to develop, reform and improve their military capabilities, independently from the underlying integrationist dynamic of the PSCoop.

Eventually, recognising that the HHG had not delivered the expected results, France and the UK also sought to further push the overall capabilities development at the EU level, incite other member states for commitment, and to adapt the EU targets to the new strategic environment. The BGs were thus intended to assure both, the necessary adjustment to respond to the new security environment and the effective development of military capabilities called for since 1999.

1.4 Timeline: the main steps of the development of the BG concept

The following chronology shows the main steps from the inception of the BG concept to its endorsement at the EU level. It serves both as reference and tool for the analysis of the national agendas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-11 Dec. 1999</td>
<td>Member states endorsed the HHG, the first EU initiative to develop military capabilities inside the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Dec. 2001</td>
<td>The EU declared itself “capable of conducting some crisis management operations”, thereby signalling first results in the operationalisation of ESDP and regarding the HHG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Feb. 2002</td>
<td>The EUMC tasked the EUMS to develop the conceptual aspects of a European RR capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Nov. 2002</td>
<td>The GAERC tasked the EUMC to finalise the work on a RR concept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jan. 2003</td>
<td><strong>EUMC, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Feb. 2003</td>
<td><strong>Bilateral Franco-British summit, Le Touquet</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20 May 2003</td>
<td><strong>GAERC, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June 2003</td>
<td><strong>European Council, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 July 2003</td>
<td><strong>European Convention, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Sept. 2003</td>
<td><strong>Trilateral Meeting, Berlin</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sept. 2003</td>
<td><strong>European Council, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Nov. 2003</td>
<td><strong>Franco-British summit, London</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-13 Dec. 2003</td>
<td><strong>European Council, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Feb. 2004</td>
<td><strong>PSC, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 2004</td>
<td><strong>GAERC, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-18 June 2004</td>
<td><strong>European Council, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Oct. 2006</td>
<td><strong>PSC/EUMC, Brussels</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chronology allows the identification of the main steps and defining characteristics of the development of the BG concept. It illustrates the strong influence of bilateral and trilateral propositions in its development, while also revealing the high speed of its adoption.

With this background in mind, the agendas of the three countries with regard to the BG concept will be analysed.
2 The French, German and British agendas for the BG concept

Assessing the agenda of the member states is the prerequisite to assess their influence on the BG concept endorsed at the EU level. This section will first address the general characteristics of the debate in view of complementing the analytical framework outlined in chapter 2. The national agendas will then be assessed following this framework. The time frame of the analysis is defined by the Franco-British summit in Le Touquet (February 2003), when the BG concept was first issued, and the HG 2010 (June 2004), which endorsed the BG concept.

2.1 Characteristics of the debate and the framework of analysis

2.1.1 A closed debate, a “side scene”

The BG concept gained comparatively more public attention than the institutional and strategic debates, which might be due to the fact that military capabilities are a tangible element of European defence. But this increased attention meant only that the media reported comparatively more on it. The precise provisions of the concept were only addressed by a small circle of experts in the national and European administrations. The relevant parliamentary bodies had little impact on the development of the concept, and mainly enjoyed their right of information.

The very nature of the topic requires an understanding of military terms and procedures, which made it difficult for non-experts to substantially engage in the military aspects of the debate. Besides, information on these aspects is often only partly accessible. This applies to the EU level, as the late and only partial declassification of the MRRC and the BG concept illustrates, but also to the national level. There is for example almost no information available on the ‘Cellule Guépard’ which generates the French RR forces.

This might also explain why most of the BG analyses concentrate upon the general aspects of the concept (Quille 2006a; Boyer 2007; Gowan 2005; Kamp 2004; Kerttunen...
2005), while only a few address the military aspects in more detail (Granholm 2006; Granholm and Jonson 2006; Lindstrom 2007b; Mölling and Schlickmann 2008; Hamelink 2005), or particular countries (Kempin 2004 on France; Mölling 2007a on Germany). The noticeable exception is the Nordic Battlegroup, on which a considerable amount of studies has been generated (Andersson 2006; Granholm and Jonson 2006; Jeppsson 2005; Kerttunen 2005; Lindberg 2006).

Moreover, it is worth reminding the other issues on the national and European agendas at that time. The BG concept was first raised in February 2003, and was subsequently elaborated against the background of the Convention46 with its debates about the ESDP provisions, *inter alia* PSCoop and the solidarity clause. However it was also framed by the Iraq war, the bitter rows emanating from it, and the topics it had indirectly brought up with the Tervuren summit (April 2003), such as on an EU headquarter (EU HQ) (see chapter 4).

However, as divided as the EU stood in 2003, it was not only able to formulate the first ever European Security Strategy (see chapter 4). With operation *Artemis*, it also carried out its first autonomous military operation. Furthermore, although the Tervuren meeting generated heavy criticism in the UK, US and elsewhere, most of its provisions were later implemented (Major and Mölling 2007). It shows that the operationalisation of ESDP still ranked high on the national and EU agendas. The BG concept seemed to offer a precise opportunity to carry on with ESDP. Concentrating upon pragmatic aspects of ESDP - capabilities - also allowed overcoming ideational debates raised by the Iraq war, the Tervuren summit or the Convention.

### 2.1.2 The basic parameters of the debate

To complete the analytical framework outlined in chapter 2, the main contentious issues with regard to the BG concept need to be defined. This will allow the assessment and comparison of national agendas. The following questions characterised the debate:

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What relationship with NATO should be envisaged?

Analogous to the other two case studies, the relationship with NATO was a contentious topic. The BG would be a further step in defining the autonomy of ESDP, and hence also its relationship with NATO. Would the BG endanger the transatlantic relationship in general and in particular the existing capability commitments, mainly for the concurrently set up NATO Response Force (NRF)? Moreover, who should have the authority to certify a BG, national governments, the EU or should they be certified according to NATO standards?

What for & what destination?

Defining the area of deployment was also contentious. Should there be a geographic preference anchored in the BG concept, and if yes, which one?

Besides, were there any other underlying objectives, which were not directly linked to RR, and which should be achieved via the BG concept? The debate often mentions the BG as a means to spur on force transformation.

How should the BGs be composed?

BGs can be nationally or multinationally composed. While the multinational character would reflect the political reality and legitimacy of ESDP, the national differences potentially affect the efficiency of an operation. Should the BG concept recommend anything at all? Moreover, how many troops should be utilised? Should the EU formulate a generic number or leave it to the troop contributing state(s) and the requirements of the operation?

2.1.3 The analytical framework for this case study

These questions governed the debate leading to the endorsement of the BG concept. Together with the general categories outlined in chapter 2, they form the analytical framework for this case study. There is however one exception. The criteria “EU toolbox”, addressing the general orientation of EU policy between civilian and military tools will not be applied in this case study. Given that this chapter explicitly deals with military capabilities, the category does not constitute a meaningful criterion of analysis. The following framework will guide the analysis of the national agendas.
Table 17: Categories of comparison for case study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transatlantic relations and NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 The German Agenda

Germany joined France and the UK in late 2003/early 2004 on the BG concept, that is, once the main axes of the concept had already been defined. Most of the German positions are hence defined in reaction to the existing Franco-British proposals.

2.2.1 General considerations

Germany joined the BG concept under the same Red-Green government which had initiated ESDP (1999, see chapter 3) and the ESS (2003, see chapter 4). The strained transatlantic and intra-European relationships and the concomitant attempts to further develop European security and defence cooperation (f.e. the Tervuren summit, ESS) also set the scene for the debates surrounding the inception of the BG concept (see also chapter 4).

Some basic facts should be briefly recalled to understand the German positions towards RR, above all, the three leitmotivs of German security and defence policy (see chapter 3 and 4). The preference for multilateral solutions; the aim to mediate between the EU and NATO, France and the US; and the reluctance to the use of force allow the understanding of the particular situation in the political and military realms with regard to RR.
At the political level, each deployment of the Bundeswehr has to be authorised by the parliament, which usually leads to heated debates (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2005). This not only presents a political risk for the government at the domestic level, where its policies and the government can be questioned. It is particularly a risk with regard to its international commitments (Eitelhuber 2004; Mölling 2007a; Nötzel and Schreer 2007). Given that there is always the possibility that the parliament will refuse to authorise a deployment, it is difficult for the government to make binding commitments. For political, but also pragmatic reasons, Germany thus prefers multilateral engagements which allow it to share the responsibility, increase the legitimacy, avoid any impression of German “Machtpolitik” and thereby facilitate domestic acceptance.

At the military level, the German strategic culture explains the differences between the German and other European armies. The Bundeswehr does not have the expeditionary experience of its French and British counterparts mainly because it did not - for historical and legal reasons- engage in military or security policies abroad during the Cold War. Furthermore, Germany engaged comparatively late and slowly in the transformation of its military and defence policies. Only in 1994 did the Constitutional Court judgment authorise out of area deployments of the Bundeswehr, thereby paving the way for both taking on more international responsibility and the necessary transformation of the German security and defence policy (Longhurst and Harnisch 2006, Becher 2004b).

Further steps were made with the 1994 Weißbuch/White Paper (Bundesministerium für Verteidigung 1994) and the 2003 VPR/Defence Political Directives (Bundesminister der Verteidigung 2003) (see chapter 3). Ensuring security and protection of the population were defined as main objectives. This would be assured by embedding German policies and instruments into multilateral cooperation, mainly the EU, NATO and the UN (VPR 2003: 22).

In view of growing international expectations for German contributions and the acknowledgment that the structures of the Bundeswehr were not up to meet them, the VPR 47 Exceptions § 4 (simplified approval for low intensity operations) and §5 (allowing for ex post authorisation by the parliament in case of emergency, such as evacuation).
was operationalised with the 2003 “Instruction for the further development of the Bundeswehr”. Its main aim was to concentrate the Bundeswehr’s capabilities in certain key areas. It divided the Bundeswehr into three categories, namely crisis reactions and intervention forces (35,000 troops); stabilisation forces (70,000) and support forces (148,000) (Bundesminister der Verteidigung 2004).

With regard to force planning, precise threat scenarios were abandoned for general deployment scenarios. The focus shifted from territorial defence to conflict prevention and crisis management (VPR 2003: 24; Schneiderhan 2005). This also led to modifications in the force generation process, where the idea of ‘Jointness’, that is the integration and cooperation of the different armed services, is stressed (VPR 2003: 31).

Thus, when the BG concept emerged in 2003/4, Germany had just begun an in-depth reform of its armed forces in view of enabling them for crisis management. It did not yet dispose of tested mechanisms to generate RR troops, nor had it gained substantial operational experience.

The main actors who defined the German agenda were the Foreign and the Defence ministries and the Chancellery. Very few sources has however been made accessible. The main information used here results from official statements, press articles and informal interviews. The positions taken in the Convention also offer additional insights. The German debate will now be analysed according to the criteria outlined above.

2.2.2 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

Germany sought to ensure that the development of EU military capabilities was inextricably linked with the strengthening of the European pillar within NATO and would not endanger the transatlantic relationship (Schröder 2003b,c, 2004a). The BG should under no circumstances jeopardise the development of the NRF and the German commitment to it.

Germany tried to upload this understanding of the transatlantic relations by insisting that NATO remains the basis of the collective defence and refusing any competition between

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48 “Weisung zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr”, translation by the author/CM
NATO and the EU (Schröder 2004a). Sometimes, Germany was even tempted to consider the BG as forum for co-operation for NATO states (Struck 2004). It persisted upon a clear definition of tasks where solely crisis management operations fall to the BGs (as different to defence), while also insisting upon the difference in nature, size and tasks of the BG in comparison to the NRF. Moreover, the BG should only engage where NATO as a whole does not wish to do so. Germany also insisted that the BG be certified according to NATO standards (Interview European Council, 2007). Beyond expressing the political support for NATO, this would allow for the assurance of the quality of the contributions and the reconciliation of commitments for the EU BG and the NRF.

2.2.3 Role of the EU

Germany considered the BG the logical consequence of earlier ESDP commitments, be it the institutional development, the ESS or the HHG. The strengthening of the military dimension is considered a means to empower the EU to live up to its international responsibilities, such as those called for in the ESS, and to further the political cooperation process towards the establishment of a united Europe (Schröder 2003b). Germany increasingly recognised that military tools might be necessary for furthering that process (Schröder 2004b; Fischer 2003a), as also the ESS demonstrates.

Given the German strategic culture, it is important for Germany to continue its ongoing embedding within multilateral frameworks (Maul 2000; Schröder 2004a). This is expressed in the German preference toward a UN mandate for EU deployments (Interviews in the EU Council, 2007). It would not only allow the uploading of the German preference for multilateralism but also facilitate to gain the domestic support for deployments.

In addition, Germany conceived of the BGs as a driver to deepen the political co-operation in ESDP. Multinational BGs in which each interested country could participate would both externally and internally symbolise the European idea and increase its legitimacy. This corresponds to traditional German policies where the deepening of European co-operation has been a constant goal.
Overall, the political will to support the integration process and assume responsibility at the EU level has repeatedly been advanced as driving forces (Interviews European Council 2007, German MOD 2005).

2.2.4 Destination

Germany rejected the initial French and British focus on Africa as primary area of deployment and proposed alternatives such as Central Asia (Interview in the Deutscher Bundestag 2005; EU Council 2007).

First, the German government argued that it would be difficult to find a majority of support within the EU for an African focus. It warned about potential criticisms towards France and the UK on whether they were trying to solve their post-colonial problems or to strengthen their traditional spheres of influence via the EU (Morning Star, 21 April 2004; Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 February 2004). From a German perspective it seemed wise to avoid such debates in order to (1) improve the chances of the concept to be accepted, and (2) to avoid debates which would risk slowing down the urgent EU capability development.

Second, the government feared that an African focus would complicate gaining domestic support for the concept as such, and if accepted, hinder to deploy a BG in time. For historical reasons, Germany’s reluctance to militarily engage is particularly valid for the African continent (Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 February 2004; Interview in the Deutscher Bundestag 2005). Considering that reaching the required parliamentary approval for Bundeswehr deployments was, and continues to be difficult, the government feared that an African focus would make it impossible.

Nevertheless, this position contradicts the German support for the UN. Africa is currently the focus of UN crisis management, which, given that the BGs were also set up to support the UN, explains why France and the UK focussed on this continent. Refusing the reference to Africa would look like limiting the support to the UN. Here, the impact of German historical considerations on current politics is evident, and results in seemingly contradictory statements.
Germany tried to upload its concerns by requesting the removal of the Africa focus while in parallel suggesting alternative preferential areas for deployment, mainly Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and asking that if the suggested alternative regions would not find support, the aspect remained open (Interviews in the EU Council 2007).

2.2.5 Composition of the BG

Germany advocated a flexible approach to the generic troop number for a BG. This preference is rooted in national premises. Given the lack of operational experience and the only recently initiated transformation of the Bundeswehr, Germany worried about the effectiveness of its troops in high intensity operations. While European partners praised the German contributions in most areas, they were more critical with regard to the high end of the spectrum (Interview in the French MOD 2008; EU Council 2007). Moreover, Germany does not dispose of a specific mechanism to generate RR and preferred not to fix a number which might be difficult to attain.

In addition, from a military effectiveness point of view, Germany argued that the fixation on a number contradicts the idea that the overall goal is to achieve a tangible result (Interview in the EU Council 2007; German MOD 2006). If for that 2000 troops would be necessary, it should be possible to deploy them.

Consequently, Germany proposed to take the suggested 1500 troops (Food for Thought Paper/HMG, Le Président de la République, Bundesregierung 2004, top 5) solely as a reference point, and not to include precise provisions into the final document (Interview in the German MOD). This should allow increasing or decreasing the number if deemed necessary to adapt the BG to both, the existing national contributions and the particular requirements of the operation.

With regard to the composition, Germany pushed for the multilateralisation of the concept. Instead of national BGs, it called for a maximum of multinational BGs to be set up. It sought to upload the “1+2” formula as norm, which foresees the co-operation, within one BG, of one larger with two smaller member states.
On the one hand, by demonstrating the political legitimacy of ESDP and mirroring the extent of different national contributions, this formula was sought to further support the political integration dynamic. Germany thus clearly followed a political logic, not a military one.

On the other hand, the “2+1” formula takes into account domestic premises. First, the German government could not envisage an operation which it would carry out on its own, even under EU flag. Besides, it was aware that it would be politically easier to make the parliament accept the deployment of multilateral BGs, where the German elements would be embedded, than a national one. It only proposed contributions for multinational formations, such as for a Franco-German BG (Granholm 2006: 66; Lindstrom 2007b: 88).

While this preference certainly corresponds to the general German preference for multilateralisation, the leitmotiv of “never alone”, and the support of the integration process, it also reflects the pragmatic recognition of what would be domestically possible, and what can reasonably be promised (and fulfilled) to the EU partners.

2.2.6 Summary of the German position

In evident continuity with traditional policies, Germany sought to further the integration process, to reconcile transatlantic and European partners, and to advocate a multilateral approach to crisis management. Besides, it tried to make the BG concept compatible with its military capabilities and particular domestic settings. It tried to upload these preferences by:

- insisting on the complementarity of NATO and the EU capability development;
- calling for a “2+1” BG norm instead of national ones, thereby soothing domestic concerns and taking the BG as a driver for political integration in the EU;
- rejecting the Africa-focus; and
- insisting on a flexible approach to the generic force number.
2.3 The British Agenda

France and the UK issued the BG concept in February 2003 and defined its main elements.

2.3.1 General considerations

In 2002/03, the pro-European policies Prime Minister Blair had sought to establish since arriving in office suffered from the political tensions in the EU which the Iraq war had generated (see chapter 4). Initially scheduled for December 2002, the Le Touquet summit was postponed after a public spat between Chirac and Blair on EU policies (Financial Times, 5 February 2003; The Economist, 6 February 2003). It eventually took place in February 2003 against the background of increasingly strained Franco-British relations, mainly with regard to Iraq, the EU, but also Zimbabwe (The Economist 20 February 2003; Financial Times, 4 February 2003). HMG resented as an affront that France invited President Mugabe to Paris for an Africa summit, despite British entreaties and an EU travel ban declared as reaction to human right abuses by the Zimbabwean government (Sunday Times, 2 February 2003).

On the other hand, despite these tensions, the expectations towards the summit were high, particularly in the area of defence (Financial Times, 3 February 2003). For the UK minister for European Affairs, St. Malo was the theory, but “Le Touquet will be the practice” (Agence France Presse, 2 February 2003a). This might be due to the fact that the economic cooperation seemed to a relatively small extent touched by the political tensions. Just one week prior to the summit, the UK had awarded parts of a new aircraft carrier contract to French arms group Thales (Financial Times, 31 January 2003).

The British commitment for the BG concept builds upon considerable operational experiences and an in-depth reform of its armed force since the early 1990s. The 1991 Gulf war forced HMG to recognise that it was considerably lagging behind the US, which it considered the main reference in military terms. Subsequently, the Balkan wars
demonstrated that the UK and France were the only European countries able to deploy capable military forces. Moreover, the UK realised that the US was reluctant to get engaged, but also that the UN was not able to offer an effective framework for crisis management.

These experiences informed the Strategic Defence Review (SDR/HMG 1998), which redefined both tasks and capabilities of UK defence policy. It formulated eight missions for UK armed forces, with a focus on regional conflicts and peace support and humanitarian operations (HMG 1998: chapter 3). This illustrates the shifting focus from large-scale conflicts to smaller regional crises, as well as the changing geographical focus - now defining areas at the NATO periphery as future trouble spots, such as Northern Africa and the Middle East. The 2003 Defence White Paper broadened this lists to geographically include Sub-Saharan Africa und South Asia, and content-wise international terrorism (HMG 2003b: 7).

These reform steps also heralded the shift towards an increasing importance of RR. The 1998 SDR identified RR forces for crisis management and ‘Jointness’ in operations as the two pillars of capability development (HMG 1998: 14; Oakes and Dodd 1998). Consequently, traditional heavy, land-based formations were abandoned for mobile, flexible and modular formations to be quickly deployable in expeditionary operations. In addition, the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) was created as a mechanism to generate RR forces (Connaughten 2000).

The 2003 Defence White Paper recognised the twin concepts of Jointness and the JRRF as the backbone of the transformation of the UK armed forces (HMG 2003b: 7; House of Commons 2004) and proposed further steps to improve crisis management abilities.

Thus, when initiating the BG concept, the UK had already considerably transformed its armed forces with regard to strategy, structure, training and equipment in view of assuring crisis management tasks. It already had extensive operational experience and with the JRRF now had a mechanism to generate RR forces.

The main actors defining the British agenda were the Prime Minister, the FCO and the MOD. Very little information has however been made accessible. The main information results from official statements, press and informal interviews. The positions taken in the
Convention also offer additional insights. The British debate will be analysed according to the above outlined criteria.

### 2.3.2 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

The UK defended its traditional approach in that any development of the EU capability dimension should not rival with NATO, but on the contrary contribute to its strengthening. HMG insisted that NATO remains the cornerstone of European defence (Blair in Blair and Chirac 2003b; Blair 2003b). Consequently, the BG should enable the EU solely to act where NATO is not engaged (Blair in Blair and Chirac 2003b).

HMG had to defend itself against domestic and US criticisms that its policies would undermine NATO (Financial Times, 4 February 2003, Blair 2003c). Foreign Minister Jack Straw asserted the two main aspects that enable the UK to support ESDP without abandoning its Atlanticist credentials, namely that it “is simply about capabilities, not operations”, and that ESDP is:

“limited to the so called Petersberg tasks […] All those tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including the support of third countries in combating terrorism in their own territories. They do not, however, relate to mutual defence […]” (Straw 2003b).

Consequently, HMG insisted that the BG concept be discussed with NATO, particularly in view of avoiding any duplication with the NRF. With each “providing a positive impetus for military capability improvement”, HMG saw considerable potential for synergy (Hoon 2005). Not only the format (about 1500.-2200 troops for the BG, 25,000 for the NRF), but also the types of missions would be complementary rather than duplicative. The NRF was designed to participate in the full range of NATO’s missions, up to and including high intensity war-fighting. The BG would be limited to the expanded Petersberg tasks.

Moreover, the BG’s were expected “to act as a useful stepping-stone for countries who want to contribute to the NRF, by developing their high readiness forces to the required standard” (Hoon 2005). Participation in the BG should motivate EU countries to transform

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49 “This just proves that France wishes to destroy NATO and Mr Blair should have no truck with this idea”. Bernard Jenkin, Shadow Defence Secretary, in Financial Times, 4 February 2003.
their armed forces, which would benefit both the EU and NATO. The UK later on claimed the merit of having, when initiating the BG, “focus[ed] European minds on achieving the appropriate standards for forces, and ensuring compatibility with NATO’s Response Force” (House of Commons 2005b: top 200).

This corresponds to the objectives set out in the SDR and confirmed by the 2003 White Paper. NATO and the EU would be the organisations of choice through which the UK would respond to international crises. However demanding expeditionary operations were unlikely to be conducted without the US and NATO. This was confirmed in the “White Paper on the EU Constitution”, where HMG states that a

“flexible, inclusive approach and effective links to NATO are essential to the success of ESDP. We will not agree to anything which is contradictory to, or would replace, the security guarantee established through NATO” (HMG 2003a).

HMG tried to upload these preferences by stressing the capability aspects of the BGs instead of the political one, and by insisting upon the NATO acquis to assure the complementarity of EU BG and NATO NRF. Wherever possible, standards, practical methods and procedures for BGs should be analogous to those defined for the NRF and the BG certified according to NATO standards.

2.3.3 Role of the EU

HMG’s objective when co-proposing the BG concept was to find a pragmatic solution for the capability shortfalls, and not a means to advance political integration. Considering that the current situation was not satisfactory, the UK engaged in reflections about how to adapt the EU capability objectives and assure their fulfilment (Howorth 2004: 176; House of Commons 2005b).

The UK certainly wanted to enable the EU to assume greater responsibility. For Blair, “it is perfectly possible for Europe to become more powerful, but as an ally and partner of the United States of America” (Blair 2003c). He warned about a multipolar world dear to France, which he feared would lead to the existence of “rival centres of power” and bring back “into the world the divisions that we wanted to get rid of when the Cold War finished” (Blair 2003c).
The experiences of the 1990s and of recent operations such as in Sierra Leone (1999) and RD Congo (2003) explain the British focus on capabilities (Cornish 2004; House of Commons 2005b: top 195).\(^{50}\) By adding resources to the pool of European capabilities available to both the EU and NATO, the BG would serve as an instrument to improve the availability of high readiness capabilities in the EU, which should allow for burden-sharing (Hoon 2005; Blair in Blair and Chirac 2003b). HMG thus explicitly recognised the EU’s right to act, but in material, and not in political terms:

“[…] European defence is necessary. There will be circumstances in which the United States of America does not want to become engaged. In those circumstances, Europe has got to have the capability to act.” (Blair 2003b)

The preference for capabilities and the concomitant reluctance for a political commitment is also reflected in the British stance in the Convention (Lunn, Miller and Smith 2008: 39; Knowles and Thompson-Pottebohm 2004). Here, Britain had taken a very critical stance on PSCoop, not only because it remained unconvinced about its utility, but also for loyalty reasons vis-à-vis the US. PSCoop was perceived as overstressing the political dimension of ESDP as it would have allowed some member states to cooperate more intensely. Besides, first drafts included an assistance clause comparable to NATO’s art. V.

Following German-British-French talks in November 2003, HMG however, accepted compromise proposals (Interviews in the EU Council 2007). First, the development of EU military capabilities has been a long-time goal of the UK. Second, within the bargaining over the constitution, the assistance clause was finally erased. Thus, if for some PSCoop was a mechanism leading to deeper cooperation in defence matters, for the UK it was above all a mechanism to encourage member states to improve capabilities. The latter is a key for the UK and allowed to ignore the first.

In addition, moral considerations influenced the British agenda. Blair’s increasing passion for military interventions and his interventionist foreign policy made an EU

\(^{50}\) The British military contribution to Artemis in RD Congo—codenamed Operation Coral—was in the form of a squadron of army engineers, medical and other support services, transport aircraft and staff officers at various headquarters. See Cornish 2004.
“actorness” acceptable if it would “act in the interest of Europe and the wider world” (Blair in Blair and Chirac 2003b, Lunn, Miller and Smith 2008). It is also reflected in the explicit support for the UN (House of Lords 2004a).

Thus, HMG objected to any step which implied a bigger role for the Brussels-based institutions and insisted on the capability development. Any further step in integration through ESDP was feared to generate negative repercussions for its sovereignty and the transatlantic relationship.

2.3.4 Destination

The UK defined Africa as main focus of the BG. The declarations resulting from the summits in Le Touquet and London call “to promote peace and stability in Africa” and propose contributions for “conflict prevention and peacekeeping”, particularly via ESDP (HMG and Le Président de la République 2003c, 2004). It was confirmed by the parallel adoption of a declaration on cooperation in Africa (HMG and Le Président de la République 2003b; Le Monde, 29 November 2003).

This focus corresponds to the provisions of the 1998 SDR, which located future trouble spots in Northern Africa, and in the 2003 Defence White Paper, which enlarged the geographical focus to include Sub-Saharan Africa.

Moreover, mainly as a consequence of its status as former colonial power, the UK maintains strong ties to some African countries, especially via the Commonwealth. As the example of Zimbabwe had demonstrated, HMG realised that the EU offered additional policy tools, which allowed the multilateralisation of its engagements and to increase their legitimacy and impact (Williams 2002). HMG thus increasingly drew upon its relationship with the EU to supplement its own bilateral and multilateral efforts.

Also recent operational experience explains this focus. If for France, Artemis served as blueprint, for the UK it was the operation in Sierra Leone (House of Commons 2005b: top 195; Ginifer 2004). In addition, the BGs were developed to support the UN, which is currently focussing on Africa (House of Lords 2004a).
The UK insisted upon the Africa focus, even after it had disappeared from the drafts (Times Online, 8 October 2004; Interviews in the EU Council 2007). This is for example witnessed by the 2005 EU Africa Strategy, which had been initiated under UK presidency (Commission of the EC 2005).

2.3.5 Composition of the BG

The UK pleaded for a flexible approach to the BG numbers, stating that the BGs should be tailored to the specific mission requirements (interviews in the UK MOD 2006). Given that the BG provision remained under national authority, the number issue would anyway be decided by the contributing nations. HMG hence considered that the issue was actually not worth a spat, and downplayed the London declaration and the Food for Thought Paper (top 5) which both mention “around 1500 troops” (HMG and Le Président de la République (2003c).

More attention was given to the composition, where Britain pleaded for the highest possible number of national BGs. From both the political and military perspectives, the UK perceived multinational BGs as a critical endeavour. First, HMG sought to keep the highest possible number of forces under national competence as expression of its sovereignty. Second, aware of the risk of overstretched its forces, the UK wanted to remain flexible. Third, it saw major obstacles to military efficiency and interoperability. This is perceptible in the Food for Thought Paper (top 9), which mentioned national BGs but stressed the need “to demonstrate a high degree of interoperability” when it came to multinational ones. In the earlier declarations the latter remark was absent. This has been explained with the German insistence on the 1+2 formula, which raised French and British concerns.

The British experience has shown that national units are comparatively more effective as they share the same standards (Cremin, Mills, Phipps et. al. 2005). Successful experiences in operations exist mainly in standing multinational formations or in bigger organisational units. Moreover, the more member states participate in a BG, the more complicated the strategic decision-making becomes (Lindstrom 2007b). Contributing
countries have to acquire the national authorisation for deploying their contingencies abroad. While some countries dispose of such procedures (for example, Ireland and Germany), others had to change or to develop them from scratch (Central Europe). An additional challenge is the co-ordination between the countries involved. The resulting risks for the timetable, the delivery of the national contributions and consequently for the RR operation as a whole are high.

These preferences were reflected in the proposed British contributions (House of Commons 2005a). First, the UK proposed national BGs drawn from the JRRF, and available on a 24/7 basis (Connaughten 2000; House of Commons 2005c). Their readiness is even higher than required for a BG: they can be deployed within 48 hours. The second contribution is the British-Netherlands Amphibious Force, Europe’s oldest integrated military unit. Its high level of interoperability is underlined by a common education, arrangements and a NATO based doctrine. It has gained enormous experience through regular joint training exercises and operations (e.g. Iraq 1991, 2003, Balkan 1995) (Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces 2002: 472, 479-480).

In fact, providing for a BG did not require particular efforts for the UK because it could draw upon already existing capabilities. The only effort it had to make was to assign units out of its JRRF pool as BG.

2.3.6 Summary of the British position

In continuity with traditional priorities, the main British objective was to enhance military capabilities. HMG’s engagement was problem-driven, output-oriented and sought to:

- improve EU capabilities which should also benefit NATO in view of burden sharing;
- uphold the UK’s special relationship with the US;
- assure the complementarity of EU BG and NATO RF;
- avoid any deepening of political cooperation;
- define Africa as the focus of the BG’s; and
- assure the efficiency of the BG’s by insisting upon national BG’s or experienced multinational formations.

In view of assuring a capability commitment without political commitment, HMG sought to support the European partners in their capability development, but kept them largely out of its own force planning and structures. The proposed contributions for BGs would allow avoiding both political commitments and the complications resulting from multinational BGs.

2.4 The French Agenda

Together with the UK, France initiated the BG concept and defined its main aspects.

2.4.1 General considerations

Despite the background of political tensions as outlined above, France recognised the UK as the only credible partner in defence in Europe and actively engaged in bilateral cooperation to develop the BG concept.

The French commitment for EU RR elements builds upon considerable experience and an in-depth reform of its armed force since the early 1990s. France had to recognise that neither in terms of capabilities nor in terms of strategy it was prepared for the post Cold War security challenges (Freedman 1998). Comparable to the UK, it was particularly the Gulf and the Balkan wars which demonstrated the shortcomings and painfully underlined the dependence on the US.

France hence engaged in an in–depth strategic and operative adaptation of its policies, which build upon a parallel approach of inciting national reforms while also increasing European cooperation (see chapter 3). A crucial step is the 1994 Livre Blanc/White Paper which defined the development of a “European defence” as priority (Ministère de la défense 1994). In terms of military engagement, the emphasis shifted from territorial defence to expeditionary missions, particularly crisis management operations. In parallel, France sought to increase its multilateral commitment in both financial and material terms, for example through participation in peacekeeping operations (Ould-Abdallah 2006: 83-84; Rieker 2006:
This offered the opportunity to train French crisis management abilities while also demonstrating its presence and influence on the international scene.

Subsequently, a fundamental reform of the French armed forces was initiated in 1996/7 in order to equip it with the appropriate concepts, force structure, equipment and capabilities to operate in the new environments (Ministère de la Justice 1996). The main changes were a redefinition of the missions, the abandonment of conscription, and the call to increase capabilities for power projection. This is further addressed in the long-term reform project _modèle d’armée 2015_ (Ministère de la Justice 1996; Irondelle 2003). The subsequent 2001 French defence strategy (Ministère de la Défense 2001) and the military programme law 2003–2008 (Ministère de la Justice 2003), which includes an update of the long term reform project _modèle d’armée 2015_, confirm this direction.

More precisely, the 2003-2008 programme law defines four strategic tasks for the armed forces, namely, nuclear deterrence, prevention, protection and projection (Ministère de la Justice, 2003). The last category refers to RR. Moreover, a force generation mechanism for RR has been set, the “Céllule Guépard”, which is comparable to the British JRRF. RR had thus become a focus within French policies, the reform of the armed forces and the force generation process.

When initiating the BG concept in 2003, France had thus already considerably transformed its armed forces with regard to strategy, structure, training, equipment in view of assuring crisis management tasks, where it also built upon operational experience. With the Céllule Guépard, it now possessed a mechanism to generate RR forces.

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51 The « _modèle d’armée 2015_ » has been published as an annexed report to the military programme law 1997-2002 (Ministère la Justice, 1996). It has been updated in the 2003 military programme law (Ministère de la Justice 2003).

52 The “Céllule Guépard” comprises about 5 000 land forces. There is not much information accessible about it. It is merely mentioned in some rare public accessible documents, such as in a 2005 Senat report, _Avis n° 77_ (2004-2005), p. 7. The here given statements are based on confidential interviews in the MOD’s _Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques_, Paris, March 2007, the _Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale_, Paris, November 2007, February 2008, and the _Headquarters of the French Rapid Reaction Corps_, Lille, April 2008.
The proximate domestic background was characterised by the more assertive foreign policy of comfortably re-elected President Chirac (see chapter 4), who considered himself the “doyen of Europe” and hence a main actor (The Sunday Times, 2 February 2003).

Statements mainly from President Chirac, but also from Defence Minister Alliot-Marie provide insights into the French agenda. Very little information has however been made accessible. The main information results from press statements and informal interviews. The positions taken in the Convention also offer additional insights. The French debate will now be analysed according to the above outlined criteria.

2.4.2 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

France defended its traditional approach aimed at developing the EU into an internationally recognised security actor to carry out crisis management tasks below NATO art. V while trying to limit NATO to classical defence tasks (Alliot-Marie 2003a, Chirac in Blair and Chirac 2003b; Hofmann and Kempin 2007). The BGs were considered an important step towards more autonomy by offering the actual capacity to act.

This is not to be misunderstood as a wish to weaken NATO (Chirac in Blair and Chirac 2003b; Alliot-Marie 2005). What France was striving for with the BGs was to provide the EU with real capacities to act autonomously from NATO, not to undermine it.

France’s relationship with NATO certainly is ambiguous and it particularly likes to emphasise that “Ally does not mean subject”53 (Le Figaro 24 March 2003). But it also recognised that so far it cannot do without NATO, and that the Alliance is at least for some tasks better suited than the EU (Alliot-Marie 2003b). The Le Touquet declaration demonstrated this recognition when stating that progress in the area of RR will “strengthen the European contribution to the establishment of a NATO Response Force and to ensure compatibility between the two” (HMG and Le Président de la République 2004).

53 « Allié ne veut pas dire sujet » (translated by the author/CM). Article by the French intellectual M. Druon, former minister and member of the Académie Française. Le Figaro, 24 March 2003
However, by strongly committing itself to several BGs, France sought to demonstrate that not only France but also the EU was able to act and was becoming an autonomous actor with regard to concepts, means and operations, which could potentially be able to outshine NATO in the area of the Petersberg tasks (Alliot-Marie 2005; Interviews in the French MOD 2007). Here, France with pleasure referred to the upcoming EU takeover of the former NATO missions in Macedonia/FYROM and Bosnia (Alliot-Marie 2003b).

Although France considered NRF and BG as complementary, it declared a clear EU priority (Interviews French MOD 2007). France would not consider eventual assignments for NRF in case of a BG deployment, claiming that it would not be justified to leave forces on call for NATO if they could in the same time be effectively deployed for an EU operation (Interviews in the French MOD 2007; see also Kempin 2005: 11).

France tried to upload these preferences by insisting on the autonomous capacity to act of the BG, including planning, command, logistic etc, thereby rejecting the recourse to NATO assets. These preferences were also reflected in the ideas brought up at the Convention and the Tervuren summit, such as a standing command structure for EU operations.

Moreover, France was critical towards a certification according to NATO standards and insisted that the BG certification remain under national authority (Interviews in the French MOD 2008). If at a first glance this seems contradictory given that France also participates in the NRF and thus complies with the necessary standards, it demonstrates again the political dimension behind the military.

2.4.3 Role of the EU

France sought to strengthen the EU’s international actor role by increasing its capacity to act via the BGs (Alliot-Marie 2003a; Interviews in the French MOD, 2007, 2008). This approach is rooted in the French reading of international relations as increasingly developing into an uni-polar world under US hegemony, which negatively affects the balance in international relations (Védrine 1999a: 814f, 819). France questions this situation:
“The US defence secretary considers that the US are the only worldwide power in the military, economic and financial areas. We don’t share that vision” (Alliot-Marie 2003a).54

The EU should stand up against the US primacy and become a major pole in a multipolar world (Alliot-Marie 2003a; Chirac 1999a: 804f). This materialises in the French concept of an autonomous and political Europe, which, at the heart of a multipolar world, assumes its global responsibilities.

The BG concept was considered a crucial step in strengthening the EU’s capacity to act and hence its international role which would in turn also be a means to enhance France’s international status. The EU hence appears as a vehicle for French power politics. This is however not to be confused with political integration. It was clear for France that security and defence would stay clear of any communitisation (Interviews in the French MOD 2007).

The BG concept was crucially influenced by the experience of operation Artemis, which boosted the EU’s and France’s self-confidence (Granholm and Jonson 2006). Not surprisingly, most elements in the Artemis-inspired BG concept correspond to French objectives in security and defence policy, such as the intensification of EU-UN cooperation. By providing troops for the UN, the EU could for example enhance its international and normative standing by playing a role in an area so far neglected by NATO and the US (Interviews in the French MOD 2007; EU ISS 2005, 2007).

2.4.4 Destination of the BG

France had conceived the BGs with Africa in mind. The joint declarations after the Le Touquet and the London summits called for the EU to

“examine how it can contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa, including through EU autonomous operations” (HMG and Le Président de la République 2003c).

54 Translated by the author/CM
The “Declaration on Franco-British cooperation in Africa” published after the London summit supported this focus, which was also present in the French press (HMG and Le Président de la République 2003b; Le Monde, 29 November 2003).

While this focus was consistent with the strategic reorientation in the 1990, it also resulted from proximate EU and national operational experiences, mainly the operations Artemis and Licorne, deployed since 2002 in the Ivory Coast (Weiss 2004; Balmond 2004). Referring to Artemis, the UK and France proposed after the London summit,

“that the EU should aim to build on this precedent so that it is able to respond through ESDP to future similar requests from the United Nations, whether in Africa or elsewhere” (HMG and Le Président de la République 2003c).

The African focus thus also expressed a support for the UN, given its massive commitment to the continent.

Moreover, as a former colonial power, France has maintained close ties with Africa, mainly via extensive commercial, economic and cultural activities, but also in form of security and defence agreements such as with Ivory Coast or Chad (Gregory 2000; Dumoulin 1997: 24-36; Basso and Nechifor 1998). Recognising however that it is no longer able and or willing to shoulder the military and financial burden on its own, and seeking additional legitimacy, France has been striving in the last few years to multilateralise its engagements in Africa (Sénat 2006, top I.C.2; Interviews in the MOD 2007, 2008, Klein 2008). Here, ESDP appeared as a “honourable way out of the unilateralist dead-end” (Sadoux 2005: 69). One prominent example is RECAMP, which supports the development of military capacities for African Armed Forces with regard to peace-keeping.56 Initially a national contribution to a larger UN programme, RECAMP it is now becoming increasingly Europeanised (Bergeon 2007; Interviews in the MOD 2007).

ESDP thus offers the opportunity to stay engaged in Africa despite a relative loss in power and to develop and implement a global policy approach which France would not be

55 translation by the author/CM
56 Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix / Strengthening of the African Peacekeeping Capacities, translation by the author/CM
able to guarantee on its own. Moreover, the multilateral framework offers increased legitimacy and burden-sharing while also allowing it to orientate EU policies towards areas dear to France.

But there is also a practical element. France still possesses military bases in Africa, such as in Chad, which could considerably facilitate EU deployments. This happened with *Artemis*, and later with EUFOR RD Congo (2006) and EUFOR Chad CAR (since 2007).

Even once the Africa reference had disappeared from the BG concept, France continued to consider it as the natural focus of the BGs (Interviews in the French MOD 2007, 2008). It also strongly supported the UK in the adoption of the 2005 EU Africa Strategy (EU Commission 2005).

Eventually, the BGs were also conceived as a means to incite the long overdue reform of armed force in other EU member states. France was frustrated about the lack of transformation efforts undertaken and perceived it as an unfair burden-sharing at its own and the UK’s expense.

### 2.4.5 Composition of the BG

France insisted upon the reference number of 1500 troops for a BG. Interestingly, also the French press referred to it, while the German and English speaking press did not (Le Monde, 12 February 2004; Le Figaro, 11 February 2004). The declaration of the London summit and the trilateral Food for Thought paper both mention the number 1500.

Moreover, whereas Germany quickly abandoned the rather unpractical German term of “Gefechtsverbände für die schnelle Krisenreaktion” and adopted the handy “battlegroup”, France still insists on the French term of “groupement tactique” (GT), which is usually completed by the number 1500 (Interviews in the MOD 2008; Sénat 2004: 8).

The fixation on the numbers is on the one hand inspired by the *Artemis* settings. On the other, it corresponds exactly to what the French RR mechanism can generate (Interviews in the MOD 2008). With that number, France could draw upon existing capabilities and did not have to restructure its military settings. Both, the transformation process initiated since the
1990s and operational experiences, had prepared France for operations of a comparable size. By uploading the “GT 1500” concept, France hence sought to assure that its national settings could assure providing for a BG without engaging in substantial reform efforts.

The particular national settings also explain why France insisted on keeping the provision of BG elements under national authority. The rotations mode of the Céllule Guépard is inferior to the 6 months which a BG is supposed to be on stand-by (Interviews in the MOD 2008). If the provision remains national, it is up to France to assure the availability of troops for the BG on call. If a European system were to be set up, France would have to change its procedures to match the EU requirements, which would demand an enormous effort. Thus, while certainly conceiving of the BG as a means to improve the interoperability of the military forces of the different EU member states, France was also wary to keep external influences out of its own settings.

With regard to the composition, France preferred national BGs. It accepted multinational formations when building upon common experience (such as a Franco-German BG) or for political considerations (such as the Weimar Triangle BG). The proposed French contributions encompassed both (Granholm 2006: 66; Lindstrom 2007b: 88). The preference for national BGs was influenced by sovereignty and efficiency considerations. This latter concern is, for example, expressed in the resolve “to demonstrate a high degree of interoperability” when mentioning the principle of multinationality in the trilateral Food for Thought Paper (top 9), a statement which was absent from earlier bilateral statements. It has been explained by the German preference for multinational BGs, which France feared would affect their efficiency.

Like the UK, France feared that the multinationality would affect the efficiency and interoperability, mainly with regard to language, doctrine, or level of training. It would place a heavy burden on the framework nation and endanger the overall success of the operation.

With regard to the composition and numbers within the BG, France sought to upload its national models, which would allow limiting the extent of domestic adaptation.
2.4.6 Summary of the French position

In line with traditional priorities, the main French objectives were to adapt the EU to the new security challenges and enhance its role in international crisis management. France sought to:

- improve EU capabilities to strengthen the autonomous international actor role for the EU;
- demarcate the EU’s role (crisis management) from that of NATO (defence);
- assure national authority over most of the BG’s aspects;
- define an Africa focus;
- define 1500 as generic troop numbers; and
- impose national BGs.

While France aimed to strengthen the international role of the EU, it refused any interference into its national settings or any decision which would have limited its national sovereignty in the area. The BG should certainly encourage the other member states to reform their armed forces, which would subsequently allow for intra-European burden-sharing. But in view of assuring the national authority over its military commitments, France sought to support the European partners in their capability development, but kept them largely out of its own force planning and structures.

2.5 Common objectives and main differences

The analysis reveals a great overlap between French and British positions in the military dimension, whereas France and Germany seem closer in the political realm. Overall, the preferences of the countries remained stable during the negotiations process.

2.5.1 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

Although all three countries recognised the pivotal role of NATO as a collective defence actor and insisted on the complementarity of EU and NATO, they drew different conclusions on what it would mean for the BG concept.
Whereas the UK explicitly considered the BG as a tool to strengthen the transatlantic strategic partnership and improve NATO capabilities by building up European elements, France saw the priority clearly in the EU camp. Seeking to develop the EU as a major pole in a multi-polar world, France conceives of the BG primarily as an European endeavour which should improve the European capacity to act independently in the military realm. The BGs were understood as a means to increase the EU’s autonomy from the US and NATO. They should thus primarily strengthen the EU as such, not the transatlantic relationship.

Germany occupied the middle ground by insisting upon NATO’s pivotal role and the complementarity of NRF and BG, while stressing the BG’s role as driver of the political and military co-operation. It tried to avoid any competition with NATO and retreated to the safe area of political integration.

Rooted in a political reading of the transatlantic relationship, this role distribution is also perceptible in the certification debate. While the UK and Germany called for the certification according to NATO standards, France was opposed to it.

2.5.2 Role of the EU

France called for a global political role for the EU, supported by an effective security and defence policy in which the BG would be an essential element.

The UK, meanwhile, conceived of the BG as a pragmatic tool for capability improvement. HMG argued that the EU should assume international responsibility, but this should not lead to a greater political role. While HMG supports co-operation where needed, it rejects political integration as challenge to sovereignty and the transatlantic relationship.

Germany again linked these two positions by considering the BG as a driver for further political co-operation, as for example the preference for multinational BGs illustrates. Political considerations clearly compete with military efficiency considerations. This contradicts the French perception of the EU as an autonomous global actor projecting its power, but differs also from the UK insistence on co-operation without integration.
2.5.3 Destination

All three countries agreed to deploy the BGs in support of the UN. The main difference concerned the operational areas. While France and the UK initiated the BG concept with reference to Africa and defined it as the main focus of deployment, Germany preferred an open list of potential operational areas where Africa would be just one area among many.

France and the UK also conceived of the BG as an instrument to encourage other member states, including Germany, to transform their armed forces.

2.5.4 Composition of the BG

While France and the UK proposed both national and multinational BGs, they preferred for military efficiency reasons national or existing multinational formations. They were both reluctant to restrict their freedom of manoeuvre by setting up potentially constraining and inefficient multilateral frameworks. This explains the insistence on national authority in the provision of the forces, the training and the overall procedures of the BG concept.

Contrary, Germany followed a political logic of inclusion when favouring multinational BGs in which each country could participate. It would reflect the political legitimacy of ESDP while also strengthening the intra-European cohesion. There is thus an evident divergence between the preference for a political (Germany) or a military objective (France and UK).

Regarding the generic strength of a BG, France insisted upon 1500, whereas Germany and the UK both favoured a flexible approach.
### Table 18: National Agendas - Results for the categories of comparison for case study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Role of the EU</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Autonomy, Relationship on equal footing, limit NATO to collective defence, balancing the perceived tendency towards a unipolar world via setting up the EU as major pole, No NATO certification</td>
<td>for a global political actor role, BGs as necessary mean to assure capacity to act, Recognition that HHG was not successful and that strategic environment changed</td>
<td>Global, with focus on Africa</td>
<td>“GT 1500” preference on national or experienced multinational entities (political and military logic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>NATO as primary framework, Strengthening the Alliance through the improvement of European capabilities, Strategic partnership with the US and NATO, No rivalry, warning against multi-polar world visions, NATO certification</td>
<td>ESDP as pragmatic tool for capabilities generation which would also serve the Alliance, EU as actor where NATO is not engaged</td>
<td>Global, with focus on Africa</td>
<td>Preference for national BGs or already standing formations (military logic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Complementarity of NATO and EU, EU BG and NATO RF, greater EU self confidence but must avoid competition, NATO certification</td>
<td>BGs as driver in the political cooperation process, Assume international responsibilities, focus on neighbourhood, Central Asia avoid exclusive Africa focus</td>
<td>focus on multinational BGs, 1+2 formula (political logic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3 The influence of France, the UK and Germany on the BG concept

Having defined the national agendas, the ‘decision’ at the EU level needs to be identified (3.1.) to be then compared with the agendas (3.2).

#### 3.1 The EU decision: the HG 2010 and the BG Concept

The BG concept was formally introduced to the EU by the UK, France and Germany via the submission to the PSC of a trilateral “Food for Thought Paper” in February 2004.
(HMG, Le Président de la République and Bundesregierung 2004). Subsequently, the EUMS was tasked to develop a separate BG concept. The European Council in June 2004 endorsed the HG 2010 with the BGs as a core element (Council of the EU 2004d).

The EUMC and EUMS took the work on the BG concept forward. The process was concluded in October 2006 with the delivery of a single BG Concept (Council of the EU-EUMC 2006).  

The HG 2010 as political statement and the BG Concept as a military specification together form the EU decision, that is, the outcome of the negotiations process, and serve as reference in this analysis.

According to the BG Concept (Top D, par. 7 and 8), a BG as a specific form of RR elements…

- “is the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations,
- is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements […]
- will be based on the principle of multinationality.”

The generic composition is about 1500 troops (BG Concept Top D, par. 9b). While the core units are pre-defined, the BG can be tailored for specific mission requirements through the attachment of maritime, air, logistical or other special enablers. The BG’s ability for RR is underlined by its short timeframe for deployment: BGs are to be deployable within 10 days after a Council decision. Their sustainability is 30 days, and can be extended to 120 days if appropriately supplied (BG Concept Top D, par. 9a, c, d).

When endorsing the HG 2010, member states agreed to establish an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) from 2005 onwards, having one BG on call. From 2007 onwards, the Full Operational Capability (FOC) should allow the EU to have two BGs ready to be deployed in

57 The BG Concept has only been partly declassified in April 2007.
concurrent theatres. Summing up, the central provisions and requirements of the BG concept are:

Table 18: Provisions and requirements of an EU Battlegroup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Designed for a range of possible missions</td>
<td>Utility across extended Petersberg tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic composition of a BG = +/- 1500 troops</td>
<td>on UN request or under UN mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All deployment assets &amp; capabilities will be associated with it</td>
<td>Potential area of deployment outside EU (including long range operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability: 30 days, extendable to 120, if re-supplied appropriately</td>
<td>Concurrency: 2 single BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close relation between the core of the BG (Infantry Battalion) and the Force Headquarter; prior training and interoperability required.</td>
<td>Number on standby: minimum 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Readiness: 5 - 10 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assured deployability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training and certification is national responsibility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The BG concept can be understood as a mechanism which places the identification, generation and preparation of RR capabilities at a moment prior to the actual deployment, thereby seeking facilitate the force generation process. These steps are completed with the provision of a BG force package to the EU, and are hence depoliticised. However, the provision of a BG does not automatically lead to its deployment. The decision of the Council to deploy a BG operation must necessarily be accompanied by the national decision-making procedures. The involved states keep the sovereign right to decide about the deployment and its terms. The BG concept thus places the responsibility for the generation and deployment of a BG firmly on the member states.

With regard to the four categories of comparison, the HG 2010 and the BG concept made the following provisions.\(^{58}\)

\(^{58}\) Given that the BG concept has only partly been declassified, the following statements only refer to the now accessible parts. It is possible that additional statements have been made in the parts which have not yet been de-classified.
3.1.1 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

Both documents insist upon the complementarity of EU and NATO initiatives. From a political point of view, the HG 2010 calls to ensure the “complementarity and mutual reinforcement of EU and NATO initiatives” in the RR realm (HG 2010, B.11). Procedures to assess and certify the BG should be developed (HG 2010, A.3).

From a military perspective, the BG concept states its “complementary with NATO Response Force documents” (BG Concept, D.10, see also G.19, G.24). It requires that wherever possible and applicable, “standards, practical methods and procedures […] are analogous to those defined within NRF” (BG Concept, G.24). The certification remains a “national responsibility”, but should be undertaken “according to fixed EU-agreed procedures”. The EUMC is defined as guiding authority to monitor the certification process (BG Concept G. 21).

3.1.2 Role of the EU

According to the HG 2010, the EU “is a global actor, ready to share the responsibility for global security” (HG 2010, A.1). Already in the title, (“a more active and capable European Union”) but also when defining the EU’s role in the world, the HG 2010 refers to the ESS and states that “the availability of effective instruments including military assets” plays a crucial role (HG 2010, A.1.).

The BG Concept does not comment upon this aspect.

3.1.3 Destination

Neither the HG 2010 nor the BG Concept identify precise operational theatres. The HG 2010 states that the EU has a responsibility to “make a major contribution to security and stability in a ring of well-governed countries around Europe and in the world” (HG 2010 A.1). Referring to the ESS, it defines the EU as global actor (HG 2010, A.1, A.2). The geographical scope of the ESS and the HG 2010 can thus be considered as agreed operational areas (see chapter 4).
The HG 2010 explicitly considers the development of capabilities as an instrument requiring the member states to “voluntarily transform their forces by progressively developing a high degree of interoperability”. Overall, the “commonality of security culture should be promoted” (HG 2010, B.8). It thus conceives of the BG as driver for force transformation.

3.1.4 Composition of the BG

The BG Concept and the HG 2010 both mention the multinational character of BGs, while also explicitly insisting upon the requirements of interoperability (HG 2010 A.3; BG Concept D.8c, D.9e, G.20). National BGs are not explicitly mentioned.

The BG Concept defines a strength of around 1500 troops as the generic BG composition (BG Concept D.9b).

Table 20: The EU decision in case study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content of</th>
<th>Transatlantic relations and NATO</th>
<th>Role of the EU</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headline Goal 2010 (June 2004)</td>
<td>Call for the principle of complementarity and mutual reinforcement Procedures for certification are required to be developed</td>
<td>“a more active and capable European Union”, EU as global actor, clear reference to ESS</td>
<td>Global, no specific mention for Africa Cooperation with UN Transformation of national armed forces Promotion of a common security culture</td>
<td>No number mentioned multinational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Concept (October 2006, initiated in March 2004)</td>
<td>EU BG concept considered complementary with NATO RF documents Where possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures are analogous to those defined in NRF</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>around 1500 multinational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2 British, German or French: what influence on the BG concept?

The EU “decision” now needs to be compared with the national agendas already outlined. It is the overlap between “agenda” and “decision” which allows the assessment of the magnitude of the member states influence. The criteria used to assess the national agendas offer again a useful starting point for the analysis.

3.2.1 Transatlantic Relations and NATO

Given that despite their differences all three countries agreed upon the need for complementarity and compatibility between the EU BG and NATO NRF, only details can offer insights into the successful uploading of national preferences.

One example is the certification and training. While the recognition of the complementarity of the BG concept with NRF documents (BG Concept D.10) and the call to use “wherever possible” NATO standards (BG Concept, G.19) sounds like a reference to NATO, keeping the certification and the training under national authority and EU procedures (BG Concept, G.20, 21) clearly opens the door to EU and national systems. This vague reference to the NRF has often been considered a French success. The formulation of “wherever possible” allows for the rejection of NATO procedures. However, the decision remains with the member states. France was certainly aware that most countries are likely to refer to NATO standards given that it would facilitate to prepare contributions to both NRF and BG. However, what counted for France was to avoid what it considered a submission to NATO rules.

Britain and Germany accepted the outcome, because the use of NATO procedures was recommended and because they could expect that most countries would do so anyway, given the great overlap of NATO and EU membership, and that in the military realm NATO rules and procedures have so far been the only existing.
3.2.2 Role of the EU

This criterion is difficult to pin down as the ‘decision’ mainly refers to military aspects. The HG 2010 refers to the ESS and calls the EU a “global actor”, underlining its “responsibility for global security” (HG 2010, A.1.) Given the overall agreement on the ESS as reference for the external finality of the EU, these remarks can be considered compatible with the expectations of all member states.

3.2.3 Destination

A clear difference between earlier provisions of the BG concept and the final outcome consists in the operational areas, namely the removal of the Africa focus.

Interviews confirmed that this can be considered a success of German uploading (Interview in the EU Council 2007; French MOD 2008). While Africa was still mentioned as main focus in Le Touquet and was referred to in the trilateral Food for Thought Paper, there was no reference to it anymore in the HG 2010 and the BG Concept.

Although Germany participated in the Food for Thought Paper, it increasingly lobbied to remove the Africa focus in view of accommodating domestic concerns. It argued that an open list of areas of deployment would still allow the deployment of BGs to Africa, as wished for by France and the UK. The translation of the trilateral proposal into European policies allowed Germany, supported by other countries, to remove the African focus. However, calling it a Franco-British defeat might be too easy. The possibility to deploy in Africa still exists, and is supported by the strong reference to the UN. It was thus more of a compromise offered to Germany in view of supporting it to gain domestic support for the BGs.

Eventually, the qualification of the BGs as motor for intra-European force transformation, together with the insistence upon the importance of interoperability and military effectiveness are both anchored in the HG 2010 and the BG concept and clearly express British and French concerns. It was one of their motivations for uploading the BG concept.
3.2.4 Composition of the BG

The BG concept’s statement of a generic composition of around 1500 troops has been considered an example of successful French uploading. On the other hand, the concept still recognises the necessary flexibility and the need to tailor the BG according to specific mission requirements, thereby allowing the number and composition to be adapted and hence eventually leaving this decision to the member states. Thus, while 1500 certainly does represent French preferences, it did not contradict German or British positions.

The focus on multinationality and the removal of an explicit mention of national BGs seems to exemplify German preferences. While the Food for Thought Paper still explicitly mentions national BGs (top 9), the reference has disappeared from both the HG 2010 and the BG concept.

France and the UK would have preferred a clear mention of national BGs, which they considered a means to ensure military efficiency. It is thus interesting to note that since Germany joined France and the UK on the BG concept, the latter two increasingly identified multinationality as potential problem. They consequently began to stress the need for interoperability and military efficiency. Thus, whereas it is absent from the London declaration, the need “to demonstrate a high degree of interoperability” is explicitly mentioned in the trilateral Food for Thought Paper (top 9) and the BG concept (top D. 8.c). The compromise was found in the rule that the combat units, which form the core of a BG, will usually be nationally composed and provided by the lead nation. This allowed reconciling supporters of multinationality (Germany) and military effectiveness (France and the UK).

3.2.5 Summary

Above all, it should be emphasised that the BG concept has at all been successfully uploaded, with its main aspects almost unchanged. Thereby, the three countries successfully uploaded their perception of RR to the EU level, and succeeded in doing so in an impressively short period of time.
The analysis reveals the prevalence of French and British influence. Their pro-active engagement assured that their main ideas have been uploaded, or if modified, then in a way that it was still acceptable for them. By introducing numerous nuances and compromises into the BG concept which allowed for various interpretations, none of the three countries had to accept opposite ideas or to completely abandon preferences.

In fact, the first bilateral proposals displayed a large convergence on RR, thereby reflecting a striking convergence of French and British national premises and expectations. Both had already reformed their armed forces and strategic concepts, had developed the mechanisms to generate RR (Céllule Guépard, JRRF), and gained operational experiences. The converging expectations towards RR at the EU level facilitated joint uploading.

However, Germany also succeeded in injecting its preferences such as removing the African focus. But given that it joined the concept at a later stage, it was more of a reactive modification of the existing proposals than a pro-active participation in their development.

All three countries thus display successful uploading capacities in a double understanding, that is: to upload preferences or block ideas in key areas. However, France and the UK were mainly able to successfully secure the overall adoption of their preferences thanks to their early pro-active commitment.

Overall, the HG 2010 and the BG Concept are obviously compromises. Their “constructive ambiguity” allowed each country to interpret the final decision in its own way. Member states have been successful in uploading their ideas only in those areas which were of less importance for the others, or where the resulting compromise left enough leeway to still cover their preferences. The capacity of uploading is thus restricted by the vital interest of the other countries involved in the negotiations.
4 Mechanisms of influence

The effective influence of the three countries depends upon their shaping capacities. The negotiation process offered several opportunities to inject national preferences in view of successfully uploading them. Two periods were particularly propitious:

- the period of bilateral Franco-British cooperation, between the inception of the BG concept (February 2003) and prior to the trilateral Food for Thought Paper (February 2004). Here, the main axes of the concept have been defined.
- the EU process, covering the period of the official introduction of the concept to the EU in February 2004 until the decision in June 2004/October 2006.

4.1 The mechanisms of uploading used in this case study

The Europeanisation of the BG concept provides a clear example of bilateral and trilateral agenda setting. France and the UK put the idea on the European agenda, and joined by Germany, introduced it to the European governance system when presenting it to the PSC. It was quickly incorporated into the EU agenda. This was supported by the fact that (1) all EU member states agreed on the urgent need to address capability shortfalls, (2) the expertise of the three countries in the area was recognised, (3) that the three possessed the political and administrative capabilities to submit an elaborated proposal and defend it, and (4) that the three were considered representative of the different EU opinions.

The “trilateralisation” of the initially bilateral BG concept facilitated its introduction into the EU and improved its chances for acceptance. It looked in fact like a clever move of France and the UK to invite Germany to jointly submit the proposal. While the participation of France and the UK assured on issues of military experience and efficiency, the German involvement constituted the political dimension, calmed concerns about an increasing militarisation of the EU and dispersed suspicions of a Franco-British leadership or of post-colonial ambitions. The different positions of the three countries on transatlantic relations, EU integration, and military questions, but also within the broader picture of the Iraq war and the
Constitution, made the other EU countries believe that if all three were on board, the BG concept would be balanced and take into account the different European positions.

The BG concept also illustrates that the collective agenda settings builds to a great extent upon bilateral and trilateral cooperation. This increased the chance to develop proposals that would be acceptable for the other EU members, and conferred comparatively more weight to them. The bilateral summits in Le Touquet and London, trilateral meetings such as in Berlin, or trilateral gatherings at the brink of other summits were key moments driving the BG concept forward.

The bilateral/trilateral co-operation profited from well established contacts at the working level, existing exchange programmes which created a common understanding, but also from comparable experiences. The bilateral proposals benefited from a striking convergence of interests, which resulted from converging French and British national premises, experiences and expectations on RR. It is due to a comparable operational and reform experience, the first in Africa, the latter mainly regarding strategic concepts and force generation processes. According to the involved personnel, this considerably facilitated reaching a consensus.

Joint proposals offered evident opportunities for ideational export. Developing the idea of RR from scratch in form of the BG concept is a clear example of ideational export which led to successful preference shaping at the EU level. Submitting a concept as fine-tuned as the trilateral Food for Thought Paper allowed the export of preferences to the EU level by setting the main yardsticks. Here, France and the UK were particularly successful. They uploaded a system of RR which was modelled on their national settings and succeeded in imposing it on the rest of the EU.

While for the latter, including Germany, the compliance with the BG concept often required considerable efforts, for France and the UK, it did not involve much, either in terms of force generation and command structures or in terms of training or timely provision. Both could draw upon existing capabilities. The Céllule Guépard and the JRRF had perfectly prepared for the BG. The UK and possibly also France even exceed the EU baseline criteria
in most aspects. Given the transformation process initiated since the 1990s, most of the problems other member states are confronted with were no longer issues for the UK and France. Basically, they already possessed BG capabilities before they uploaded the concept. For them, the Europeanisation of the BG concept hence allowed for a potential burden sharing at extremely low costs. The tasks of international peacekeeping they thought they would be called on for (as Sierra Leone and Licorne had shown) could now, at least in a long term perspective, also be supported or even carried out by other countries.

The situation is completely different for Germany, which joined the BG concept later - at a moment when the main axes were already defined. It certainly succeeded impressively well in uploading some preferences, such as when stressing the multinational-political nature of the BG process. However, given the late and incomplete transformation of the armed forces and the political constraints, Germany does not possess RR forces or a force generation mechanism comparable to those of the UK of France. Participation in the BG has hence required considerable and costly national commitments.

Overall, the three countries exerted a directional leadership at the EU level. Although not always positively connotated, it was recognised as a matter of fact by the other member states (Le Figaro, 11 February 2004; Frankfurter Rundschau 18 February 2004).

Interestingly, the cooperation patterns which form the basis for this leadership and ideational export worked despite evident political tensions and external and internal critiques. The Franco-German relationship was criticised as weak by observers (tageszeitung, 16 January 2003; Berliner Morgenpost, 22 January 2003), but confirmed as motor of European integration by the political elite and the factual results (Agence France Presse, 21 January 2003; Schröder 2004b).

Particularly France and the UK openly aspired at a leadership role in EU defence issues (Alliot-Marie 2003b; Blair 2003c; House of Commons 2005b: top 195). From time to time one or the other claimed the exclusive ownership of the BG concept (House of Lords 2004a; Assemblée Nationale 2005).
The UK Minister for European Affairs McShane stated prior to the Le Touquet summit that “in areas of defence, it will be France and Britain which will have things to say” (Agence France Presse, 2 February 2003a). Prime Minister Blair insisted that France and the UK remained the “two leading defence nations” in Europe despite evident differences. But he also stressed the need to enlarge the tandem and include Germany and other countries in the debates defining European defence (Blair 2003c).

France also recognised that however stormy the bilateral relationship would be, it would display a certain stability when it comes to defence. French defence minister Alliot-Marie praised the outcome of the Le Touquet summit, which, in the midst of the Iraq crisis, allowed for an unprecedented advance in the defence realm (Alliot-Marie 2003b). The “esprit de St. Malo” (Le Figaro, 5 February 2003) was still alive, and the two countries felt that it conferred to them a particular responsibility.

This points to the fact that sole participation offers opportunities to exert influence. Particularly for Germany, the political logic of supporting the integration process and taking up responsibility at the EU level has repeatedly been advanced as a means to influence EU developments (Interviews in the German MOD 2005, 2007). Accordingly, a crucial element in the German decision to actively support the BG concept was the wish to avoid a situation where France and the UK would again impose their visions on ESDP, coupled with the consideration that Germany itself should eventually assume leadership in the EU. The BG initiative offered an opportunity for both.

It is however worth reminding the difference between supporting an existing process and initiating it itself, thus between the pro-active uploading of France and the UK on the one hand and the reactive stance of Germany on the other. The latter sought to assume leadership as such, while France and the UK sought to upload a precise concept. Germany was invited to join the concept at a stage where the core elements were already fixed. It did not initiate the idea of the BG and neither did it seek to join it at an earlier stage. Germany merely reacted. It then certainly did become engaged, and successfully modified some aspects. But it was not involved in the inception of the idea. Thus, rather than an expression
of leadership, the German participation looks more like a tactical move of France and the UK to improve the chances for acceptance of an already predefined proposal. Nevertheless, participation allows the injection of ideas, and possibly more importantly as the German example shows, to modify others.

Particularly the UK and France sought to upload their preferences by setting clear conceptual and material examples. Conceptually, they proposed precise provisions of the BGs, the military terms of which have almost been entirely adopted at the EU level. In material terms, they proposed BG contributions which set clear benchmarks for the other countries in terms of quality and efficiency.

All the mechanisms of uploading benefited from the availability of administrative and political resources, be it in form of experienced staff to draft proposals and successfully defend them at the EU level, or the political, economic and military weight the three countries could put in the ring. It provided them with a clear comparative advantage.

4.2 To what extent apply the mechanisms outlined in the theory chapter?

Table 21: The mechanisms of uploading identified in case study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms of uploading</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal and informal agenda setting</td>
<td>by issuing the BG idea at bilateral summits; subsequently by its trilateral submission to the PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example setting</td>
<td>Conceptual and material: by developing the concept and proposing BG contributions of high standard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bilateral or
multilateral
cooperation

Franco-British cooperation
at bilateral summits and
working contacts to initiate
and fine-tune the concept;
trilateral cooperation with
Germany to Europeanise
the concept

Trilateral cooperation
with UK and France
when submitting the
concept to the PSC

Franco-British cooperation
at bilateral summits and
working contacts to initiate
and fine-tune the concept;
trilateral cooperation with
Germany to Europeanise
the concept

Ideational
export and
preference
shaping

by developing a RR
concept modelled to its
national structures and
proposing BG contribution
of high standard, thereby
seeking to establish quality
benchmarks; and to
impose preferences,
(national BG’s or
experienced formations)
less successful on
transatlantic relations
(mainly rhetorical)

comparatively less.
political logic of
integration by
favouring multinational
BG’s and removing
African focus

by developing a RR
concept modelled to its
national structures and
proposing BG contribution
of high standard, thereby
seeking to establish quality
benchmarks; and to
impose preferences,
(national BG’s or
experienced formations)
by assuring compatibility
with NATO and NRF

Excellent staff to develop
BG concept. Bilateral (FUK) working contacts
Administrative facilitated inception of joint
proposals and subsequent
commitment
uploading

Enabled for uploading
of modifications, such
as removal of Africa
focus, but less than
UK and France given
the late arrival in the
leadership group

Excellent staff to develop
BG concept; bilateral (FUK) working contacts
supported drafting of joint
proposals and subsequent
uploading

Together with UK,
recognised as main
military and political power,
and experienced capacity
in military realm/RR;
weight strengthened
capacities for ideational
export and preference
shaping

recognised moderator
role, allowing to
reconcile different
positions in the EU,
and to increase
acceptance of the
proposal

Together with France,
recognised as main
military and political power,
and experienced capacity
in military realm/RR;
weight strengthened
capacities for ideational
export and preference
shaping

Political
capacities,
influence,
weight

5 Conclusion
This chapter sought to evaluate the influence of France, Germany and the UK on the
BG concept. The analysis underlines the predominant role of the three countries in bringing
the concept to its successful adoption at the EU level. It reveals that France and the UK have
been the crucial actors in the inception and development the concept, while Germany only
joined them at a later, less decisive stage. Although the three countries have not been able
to upload all their preferences, they assured the main aspects and blocked, at least for them,
unacceptable modifications.
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The main mechanisms of uploading were bilateral and trilateral agenda setting, bilateral and trilateral cooperation, ideational export and example setting. Particularly the Franco-British cooperation succeeded in agenda setting, which offered excellent opportunities for ideational export. The BG concept demonstrates the importance of both the converging interest of the larger and more capable member states in military terms, and of bilateral or trilateral initiatives for the conceptual and practical development of ESDP. The respective French and British administrative and political capacities and their recognised political and economic weight and experience in the area of military crisis management increased the weight of the BG proposal. However it also raised suspicions about them imposing their ideas to the EU, or following post-colonial tendencies.

Here, the inclusion of Germany when Europeanising the BG concept allowed the dispersion of suspicions. The BG concept was successful because it seemingly reconciled different expectations and allowed for various contributions. For the more capable member states, it allowed for burden-sharing. For smaller countries it offered the opportunity to contribute to ESDP, as it was precisely looking for niche capabilities. It also offered a road map for those who had to engage in force transformation but did not know which direction to take (Granholm and Jonson 2006). Finally, it enabled the EU to show a concrete commitment to the UN.

Overall, interlinked exogenous and endogenous factors impacted upon the development of the BG concept. Endogenously, unique national strategic cultures, specific domestic situations or particularities of bilateral relations set the scene. Germany’s historically conditioned reluctance regarding the African focus is one example. In terms of exogenous factors, the Iraq crisis and its repercussions, the ESS, the debates about a European HQ and the Convention framed the debate. The BG concept was just one issue on the political agenda in 2003/2004, and inextricably linked with others.

It was however apparently the one which generated the least conflict, at least when compared to others such as the European HQ. While differences on the method persisted, there was general agreement on the need to improve military capabilities at the EU level, that
is, to implement the idea of RR. The other member states acknowledged their dependence on the UK and French commitment in the field, in both military-material and political-conceptual terms. Nevertheless, it is difficult to ultimately define whether the content-wise specification of the concept once it has been introduced in the EU system has been solely the merit of the countries under study here, or of others not included in the analysis.

The analysis shows that the member state’s commitment is driven by a mix of (1) genuine commitment to European goals, and (2) strategic considerations to upload ideas in view of furthering national preferences and influencing EU policy-making through an active commitment at the European level. In addition, (3) the long-term processes of macro adaptation and micro socialisation in the European context also seem to have influenced their commitment. Successful operational experience in Africa, such as in operation Artemis/Coral, demonstrated to France and the UK the need to equip the EU for challenges they feared they would otherwise be called on to solve nationally. Moreover, at least since St. Malo, the UK and France considered themselves the driving forces in EU defence issues, and that despite political tensions such as in 2002/3.

Overall, the chapter allows to argue that capability targets and operational demands served as the two main drivers for the significant step in ESDP development which is the adoption of the BG concept. The capability generation process had benefited from the operational demands (such as Artemis), which have also provided the conceptual framework for discussing capability shortfalls and adequate solutions (the BG concept). Moreover, the BG concept has already acted as a driver in the capability generation process, by providing at least some guidance regarding the kind of intervention for which the EU would like to be able to provide collective crisis management capabilities.

However, the BG concept also illustrates that the success of the EU in developing capability targets and meeting operational demands, as well as developing innovative concepts and planning arrangements, all depend on sustained political will and initiatives of the member states. France and the UK, later joined by Germany, embodied both when developing and uploading the BG concept.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

1 Introduction

The eternal theme in European Studies is the development of an European political, economic and social order. A defining feature herein is the interaction between the member states and the EU level, captured for example in the concept of Europeanisation. Here, ESDP presents a unique case. Given that it addresses a core domain of national sovereignty, and that member states hold very different views on its key issues, security and defence has only belatedly been Europeanised and cooperation has been limited to the intergovernmental approach. However, it is precisely in ESDP that phenomenal progress has been made over the last years. While the key role of the member states in shaping ESDP is generally recognised, research to understand how exactly national influence is exercised and what repercussions it has had on ESDP has just begun.

Placed within this wider context of investigating the emerging European order, this thesis addressed the question of how national influence affects the European settings. Building upon the concept of Europeanisation, it investigated why ESDP took its particular form and analysed the role of the member states within it. This overarching interest has been broken down into three questions to investigate crucial steps in the development of ESDP:

- **Ideas/agenda**: What were the national preferences in particular dimensions of ESDP (institutions, strategies, capabilities)?
- **Effective influence**: To what extent were the member states able to integrate these preferences into the ESDP acquis?
- **Mechanisms**: Through which mechanisms did the member states upload their preferences to the EU level?
By addressing these questions, this study made both conceptual and empirical contributions to the current debates on ESDP governance and its defining features. Firstly, it generated new empirical evidence about all three case studies. Secondly, it has driven the conceptual debate forward by operationalising the framework of Europeanisation for comparative purposes in ESDP in view of assessing national influence and grasping the underlying patterns. Overall, the results of this study offer unique insights, not only about the driving forces of ESDP and the national influence on its settings, but also the prospects and limits of ESDP development.

2 Courses and Cases of Research

This study identified, analysed and compared the agendas, mechanisms of influence and effective influence that Britain, France and Germany had on the institutional, strategic and material design of ESDP.

2.1 Case study 1: The institutional design of ESDP (1999)

Case study 1 analysed the first steps in the institutional development of ESDP, namely the inception of the PSC, EUMS and EUMC. It conferred to ESDP the capacity to decide.

Agendas: The institutional debate was characterised by the prevalence of traditional cleavages in the national positions. Britain defended an Atlanticist, pragmatic and capability-informed reading of European security. It insisted upon the primacy of NATO and stressed a result-oriented approach when emphasising military institutions, limiting political ambitions for the EU, and calling to abandon the WEU. France held a Europeanist view where the ESDP should allow the EU to establish itself as an autonomous global actor, able to deal on equal footing with the US and NATO. It hence called for strong military and political institutions, and for keeping the WEU acquis alive until a credible European policy was achieved. Germany bridged these positions by calling for a political actor role for the EU but only to the extent it did not question NATO; insisting upon both political and military institutions, and advocating the scrapping of the WEU.
Influence: The analysis highlighted that the three countries decisively steered the debate and shaped the EU decision on the form, function and composition of the institutions. All three countries expressed satisfaction with the EU decision. They were not able to upload all their preferences, for example the UK would have preferred a lower level of staffing for the PSC. However, they ensured that their main preferences were respected, mainly thanks to compromises, package deals and an EU decision which left enough room for interpretation. In the case of the PSC, it was eventually up to the member states to decide about the level of staffing. The results illustrate that influence not only means to Europeanise preferences but also to prevent unacceptable proposals. The three countries for example successfully opposed the creation of a council of defence ministers.

Mechanisms: The main mechanisms of uploading were agenda setting and bilateral and trilateral cooperation. They offered excellent opportunities for ideational export and preference shaping. Germany profited from the agenda setting opportunities provided by the double EU and WEU presidencies I/1999 to suggest institutional blueprints, such as the Reinhartshausen paper. The administrative capacities and the political and military weight of the three countries conferred to their contributions additional weight. Bilateral and trilateral meetings allowed them to reach agreement prior to EU meetings, such as on the tripartite institutional structure, which then increased the weight of trilaterally defended proposals.

In summary, the proactive commitment of the three countries has been crucial in defining the first steps of the institutional design of ESDP. Their traditionally different preferences in security questions allowed to reconcile the different positions inside the EU and to secure EU-wide support. It also calmed worries about one country or the other imposing its views. The analysis moreover demonstrated that the institutional debate was not conducted independently by the EU but was closely determined by the latter’s interaction with NATO and the legacy of previously existing structures, mainly the WEU and NATO.
2.2 Case study 2 - The European Security Strategy (2003)

The second case study addressed the strategic development of the EU and analysed the national influences on the first EU security strategy. The ESS differs from the other case studies in that it is a genuine European product. While the first blueprints for the institutional architecture and the BG concept are respectively of German and Franco-British offspring, the ESS was drafted in the EU Council.

**Agendas:** The preferences defended in the three general categories correspond to the pattern displayed in case study 1. In addition, France sought to upload its positions in the 2003 Iraq crisis as a distinctive Europeanist approach, such as when insisting upon the importance of multilateralism and preventive action. Defending its traditional Atlanticist stance, Britain sought to avoid political debates and insisted upon developing pragmatic policy guidelines, such as making the EU recognise the need for military tools. Germany again supported a European political role as long as it did not enter in competition with NATO, called for a mixed toolbox, preventive policies and a strong role of the UN and multilateralism.

**Influence:** Although the consensual wording of the ESS and the European drafting process complicated assessing the success of the uploading, the analysis confirmed a dominant role of the three countries in europeanising the idea of a strategy and regarding its content. All three countries praised the ESS as a success, even though not all their preferences were uploaded. The vague wording of the ESS allowed the disarming of differences. While France and the UK welcomed the ESS for it recognised military hard power as a tool, Germany praised it as defending a mixed toolbox with an emphasis on civilian and diplomatic means.

**Mechanisms:** The most evident mechanism of uploading was collective agenda setting. The idea to develop a strategy had been proposed by the three countries to the Greek EU presidency, which put in on the EU’s agenda. Subsequent ideational export, such as via direct contacts in the Policy Unit, allowed the injection of preferences into the drafting
process. Agenda setting and ideational export both benefited from political and administrative resources. Here, the personal influence of the Foreign Ministers (Straw, de Villepin, Fischer) and of the national diplomats seconded to the Council (Cooper, Bergamini, Heusgen) was considerable.

In summary, the proactive engagement of the three countries has been crucial in Europeanising the idea of a strategy and shaping its content. Their administrative and political capacities, their recognised political power and experience increased the weight of their joint proposal and supported the injection of preferences into the EU processes. Their often opposite positions on key issues calmed worries about a potential trilateral leadership.

2.3 Case study 3 - The BG concept (2004)

The third case study addressed the material-military dimension of ESDP in form of the BG concept. It aimed to complete the EU capacity to decide (institutions), based on a common strategy (ESS), with military means.

Agendas: The national positions corresponded to the pattern revealed in case study 1 and 2, opposing the traditional Atlanticist (UK) and Europeanist (France) readings. The main Franco-British difference concerned the certification of BGs. However, it is striking to see how the Franco-British agreement on the necessity for effective military capabilities allowed the setting aside of ideational differences. Germany sought to bridge Europeanist and Atlanticist positions, stressed the political dimension of the BG, while also trying to make the concept compatible with its domestic settings, such as when opposing the African focus.

Influence: The three countries have been the key shapers of the BG concept. The EU decision took up the main provisions of the Franco-British blueprint. Unacceptable modifications were blocked, mainly due to compromise formulas. Germany for example succeeded in removing the African focus. However, given that the BG concept does not specify the areas of deployment, and clearly refers to the UN, Africa might still become the primary focus for the BGs.
**Mechanisms:** The main mechanisms of uploading were bilateral and trilateral agenda setting, bilateral and trilateral cooperation, ideational export and example setting. Particularly the Franco-British cooperation succeeded in setting the agenda, which offered excellent opportunities for ideational export. Their joint administrative and political capacities and their recognised experience in military crisis management increased the credibility and hence the weight of the BG concept. The trilateralisation of the BG concept through the association of Germany allowed to disperse suspicions of possible French or British national or post-colonial purposes. The trilateral commitment was key to successfully Europeanising the concept.

The BG concept illustrates in rare clarity how national settings enable for successful uploading. Britain and France Europeanised a RR concept which was largely modelled to their national structures. It enabled them not only to present a very precise proposal, thereby imposing their preferences from very early on. It also led to a large degree of 'fit' between the national and EU settings, which in turn limited the efforts of the two countries when re-translating the EU policy at the national level. In fact, military elements corresponding to BG standards existed in both countries before the BG concept as such as been incepted.

The results of the three case studies illustrate the decisive influence of the three countries on the design of ESDP and highlight their trilateral directional leadership for ESDP development. The preferences, which they intentionally uploaded in the negotiation process, informed the outcome in form of ESDP in all three case studies while undesired developments were successfully avoided. Thus, the three countries decisively directed ESDP’s development in institutional, strategic and material terms.
3 Comparison of the overall results with regard to questions 1-3

The results of the case studies allow to identify communalities and differences, but also overarching trends with regard to agendas, influence and mechanisms.

3.1 Ideas: Commonalities and differences in the national agendas

The case studies revealed a great disparity between the three national agendas but also illustrate a striking continuity over time in the three permanent categories within each national agenda. When developing the categories of comparison, it was hypothesised that the permanent categories represent by their structural importance a strategic dimension of member states commitment. The positions in these categories, conditioned by the national strategic cultures, were expected to inform the overarching approach of the member states towards ESDP. As a constant point of reference and part of the cognitive structure, these categories were expected to yield relatively constant results. The three case studies confirm this hypothesis. The ideas captured in the permanent categories determine the potential of Europeansation in security and defence issues.

The British, German and French positions on transatlantic relations, the EU role and the EU tool box remained stable over time and in the different areas (strategy, institutions, capabilities). Thus, the space for cooperation and joint agenda setting remained similar. The only adumbrated modification concerns the German position. While still insisting upon diplomatic and civilian tools, Germany increasingly recognised military force as essential element of the EU toolbox. While this did not affect the overall German position, it seems to indicate a development which might intensify over time.

Conversely, the additional categories, representing more of a ‘tactical’ or ‘situational’ dimension, were expected to show a higher degree of variance. This hypothesis has also been confirmed. It is in these additional categories that most of the modifications have been observed, and where member states have been the most likely to negotiate compromises.
They are nevertheless estimated to have played a rather minor role in the overall Europeanising process: they were not able to disarm conflict on the permanent criteria.

Overall, the study revealed that while the tactics (expressed in the additional categories) might have changed, the strategic objectives (expressed in the permanent categories) each country is pursuing with ESDP remained stable over time.

3.2 Influence

In this thesis, ‘influence’ has been defined as describing both an aspect and the result of political interaction. Influence exists when preferences which had been intentionally uploaded by the member states in the negotiation process informed the outcome in form of ESDP settings. The case studies confirm that the three countries decisively influenced the institutional, strategic and material development and design of ESDP.

They also highlighted that not only describes that preferences have been anchored at the EU level, but also that the endorsement of undesired development has been avoided. Influence thus describes both, a shaping and a blocking power.

Having acknowledged the national influence on ESDP, the question arises of how the considerably different agendas could be reconciled and moulded into a European decision. This study illustrated that the progress of ESDP depends on the degree of convergence of the security cultures between the countries involved (Buzan et al 1998; Katzenstein 1996). The degree of overlap in ideas or perceptions on a given issue is what allows reaching a decision, that is, ESDP advanced where the three countries were able to find a common denominator. The overlap of national agendas may change over time, thereby enabling further cooperation or constraining it.

3.3 Mechanisms of uploading

This thesis not only confirmed the relevance of all hypothesised mechanisms of uploading but also allowed to further specify them. First, the mechanisms tend to intervene at different moments and in a specific order during the uploading process. The agenda setting
initiated the uploading process in all case studies. Subsequently, the content-wise design starts, and the other mechanisms of uploading intervened, sometimes in parallel, sometime consecutively. Second, whereas some mechanisms describe passive supportive-enabling functions, such as administrative capacities, others depict pro-active shaping tools, such as preference shaping. They are however mutually reinforcing; it is their concerted use which allows for successful uploading.

The most frequently applied and very effective mechanism was agenda setting, be it in unilateral (the German EU presidency putting the institutions on the EU agenda), bilateral (France and the UK proposing the BG concept) or trilateral (the three countries proposing the ESS) versions. The trilateralisation of ideas linked with agenda setting, such as the ESS, has proven to be equally effective. In reconciling different approaches to political and security issues, trilateral commitment allowed the calming of various worries inside and outside the EU on potentially one-sided proposals or national leadership claims. It increased the potential for acceptance at the EU level of proposals, and allowed for the directional leadership of the three countries.

Agenda setting also offered excellent opportunities for ideational support. It provided the member states with the opportunity to submit elaborate proposals, thereby defining the yard sticks. Agenda setting thus not only confers the capacity to put a topic on the agenda as a matter of fact, but also to define its content-wise direction. Member states were aware that pro-active commitment increased the chance for successful uploading.

Ideational export builds upon several mechanisms. First, example setting increases the weight of proposals and encourages the commitment of other member states. The material commitment of the three countries to the BG’s put pressure on the other member states to also contribute. Second, bilateral and multilateral cooperation supports ideational export, as the Franco-British elaboration of the BG concept shows; thereby also providing the opportunity to exert directional leadership. The exemplary commitment in material and conceptual terms allowed the three to be recognised as leading group but also to impose the core elements of their proposals.
Crucial for successful ideational export and agenda setting proved to be the national political and administrative capacities. They enabled the member states to develop promising proposals, to inject them into the European structures, defend them, and support their endorsement. This allowed to direct the debate from very early on. Their recognised military, political and economic weight, operational experience, and international posture gave their commitment comparably more weight. The BG concept bears witness to this enabling function of domestic capacities, which allowed France and Britain to propose a fine-tuned concept which set the yardsticks for the debate.

However, the structure of national administrations, such as the fragmentation of competences, can also negatively affect the uploading capacities. The German administration seemed to not yet have been sufficiently transformed to efficiently project national influences (Bulmer, Maurer, Paterson 2001). Conversely, the restructuring of the UK administration initiated by Prime Minister Blair with the aim to enhance the UK’s influence in the EU yielded convincing results.

In summary, three central lessons can be formulated:

First, ESDP developed through the joint commitment of Britain, France and Germany, which form an informal trilateral leadership group. ESDP even advances if one of the three is less committed – but it will not progress when faced with clear opposition of one of them. Individual preferences could only be uploaded if there was no explicit opposition from the other two countries; or if these issues were of marginal importance to the other actors.

Second, trilateral action was an essential tool in securing the uploading. Preferences had more chanced to be uploaded after being multilateralised.

Third, package deals and the constructive ambiguity of EU decisions were the enabling conditions to reconcile different elements in a common position while also allowing each country to “keep the face”. For ESDP to progress, the EU decisions had to stay broad-brush enough to not hurt sensitivities and for each member state to read its preferences into it.
4 Implications for the overall question and research design

These considerations allow answering the main research question on national influence on ESDP. Besides, they point to both the contributions the study has made and the shortfalls it has revealed.

4.1 ESDP and the directional leadership of the three member states

The study confirms that ESDP is crucially influenced by the member states. The joined commitment of the militarily, politically and economically more capable and committed member states - France, Germany and the UK - drove ESDP forward. Their ability to develop fine-tuned solutions to recognised shortfalls in the areas of institutions, strategy and capabilities, and their recognised leadership position in security and defence issues conferred the opportunity to define the direction such developments should take. The shaping capacity of the member states depended on sustained political will. This leads to the hypothesis that without the commitment of the three countries, ESDP would not have reached its current operational status.

However, directional leadership does not mean that the three could then or now unilaterally decide about the future of ESDP. They always have to redesign their ideas, reconcile them with those of the other member states and combine them into a commonly acceptable final product. This also explains why certain issues still remain unresolved, such as questions over ESDP’s reach. It concerns precisely those issues where no agreement or vague enough formula could be found.

These conclusions raise the question about the overall driving forces of the commitment of the three countries. The findings show that its is driven by different but complementary and interlocking motivations, which are not only informed by considerations directly related to security and defence issues. First, the domestic level and partly non security related domestic considerations also conditioned the commitment. The ESS served for example as an *ex post* legitimisation for the French and German governments of their
opposition to the Iraq war. Second, the international level, mainly the transatlantic relationship, considerably impacted upon the decision to commit to, and how to commit to ESDP. The rift over the Iraq war pushed the member states to address the European “strategic taboo” and develop the ESS.

This underscores that exogenous and endogenous factors together explain the commitment to a particular development step in ESDP. Endogenously, unique national strategic cultures, such as Germany’s preference for multilateral frameworks, specific domestic situations, such as the pro-European stance of the new Blair government, or the particularities of interaction schemes, such as the strained French-US/NATO relationship, set the scene. In terms of exogenous factors, each case study was characterised by particular events, such as the Iraq war.

Consequently, three sets of interlocking driving forces to grasp the commitment to ESDP can be defined:

1. **Commitment driven by policy content.**
   It captures the commitment to ESDP as driven by the wish to see the EU developing into an increasingly capable and autonomous international security actor, which, equipped with relevant instruments, assumes its international responsibilities. All three countries agreed, although for different reasons, to strengthen the EU’s actor role.

2. **Commitment as an instrument of policy in the domestic and international arenas.**
   Commitment to ESDP enabled the three countries to have a stronger impact on the positions and policies of their European partners in the field of ESDP, to inject their preferences into EU settings and also to address domestic issues that were not necessarily security related.

   The BG initiative illustrates how ESDP commitment offered the opportunity to exert influence. The Franco-British commitment in form of a blueprint for the Battlegroup concept clearly was an opportunity to (successfully) project preferences in the realm of RR to the EU level. Moreover, this initiative allowed France and the UK to convince Germany of the necessity of setting up European RR capabilities and eventually to join the proposal. Here,
France and the UK were able to influence German positions, and subsequently those of the other member states.

In addition, commitment to ESDP can be considered as an instrument of policy in that it allowed the addressing of security and non-security related domestic issues. The analysis of the three case studies has effectively demonstrated how domestic considerations, which have not always been security related, have tended to impact upon the choice for the design and content of ESDP institutions, strategy and capabilities. Analysing the domestic dimension can thus help explaining national policy decisions toward the EU level. As such, Chancellor Schröder’s refusal to support the Iraq invasion and the parallel support for ESDP issues such as during the Tervuren summit have often been explained by the upcoming elections in Germany and his aspiration for re-election rather then by security considerations.

By committing to a further Europeanisation of security and defence policy, the three countries thus followed not only the goal of strengthening EU security and defence policies but also addressed their national agendas. This includes the shifting (externalisation) of contentious security and defence policy issues to the EU level, which facilitated dealing with them at the domestic level. The reference to the EU level allowed putting issues on the national agenda that otherwise might not have been consensual. Here, the commitment to ESDP offered an enabling dimension for the national governments. The acceptance of the use of force in the ESS made it for example easier for the German government to convince a reluctant German public to also accept it at the national level.

The participation at the EU level also served to legitimise national policy stances by integrating them into European decisions. This applies to all three case studies and all three countries. France and the UK sought to develop robust military institutions, which materialised with the set up of the EUMS and the EUMC. All three countries considered the ESS a platform to express their particular readings of EU security policy. For France, it meant for example stressing the global reach of EU commitment; for Germany the insistence on a large tool box; for the UK the explicit recognition of the use of force.
Finally, cooperation within ESDP created new options and enhanced national capacities via the development of EU capabilities and structures. It was thus considered as an instrument to strengthen and enlarge the reach and impact of national policies. France and the UK succeeded to focus EU policies on Africa, where both have been considerably engaged. From a different perspective, also the BG concept serves as example for such an enabling function: the BG were set up to permit an increased burden sharing in international crisis management. This would relieve France and the UK, who so far contributed the major part of troops in international crisis management.

Eventually, these different considerations also illustrate that a commitment for ESDP, which might initially not necessarily have been driven by the genuine wish to strengthen ESDP (but rather the goal to reinforce national positions and policies), often turned out to generate essential steps to strengthen the institutional, capability and strategic basis of a European security and defence policy.

(3) Commitment facilitated by socialisation and learning processes within the EU settings.

This category, which describes a cross cutting mechanism rather than a reason for commitment, became obvious in the development over time which the three case studies allowed to grasp. They have shown that the commitment for cooperation on security and defence issues has been facilitated and supported by long term learning and socialisation processes within general European structures (not necessarily and exclusively in ESDP). This describes the feedback loop of Europeanisation: the socialisation into European settings affects national decision makers and administrative personnel and encourages further cooperation.

Overall, the findings of the three case studies highlight that the degree to which national and European interests overlap is crucial for the success of ESDP. While the socialisation of nation states into European settings influences the decision making at the
national level, the overall driving force of ESDP remains national interests in its different direct and indirect configurations.

4.2 Shortcomings

Although it delivered clear results, this study has to recognise potential shortcomings in the research design and outcome. First, the access to information was very difficult. This is a general problem in the sensitive area of security and defence, which has already been raised in the methodology chapter. Documentation is often rare (JRRF, Célulile Guépard); it can be difficult or not at all accessible (intermediate drafts of the ESS, national working papers), or only partially accessible (documents are often only partly de-classified, MRRC).

This also explains why interviews are comparatively more important than in other policy areas: they are often the only source of information. However, interview partners in this area tend to be rather sparing with information, or only share it after having established a long term relationship. This means that information might be available, but that the process tends to be comparatively more difficult than in other policy areas.

This points to a second problem, namely the potential bias in the information provided in the interviews. Consciously or not, interview partners might be tempted to highlight their own role, sugar-coat developments, or simply do not give the exact account of events. In this thesis, triangulation, process tracing and a comparative approach over time certainly helped to detect such biases. However, these risks cannot entirely be eliminated.

Third, with regard to the research design, the general category of comparison which addressed the “role of the EU in the world” turned out to be not very instructive. While the national agendas offered clear information, the EU decision on it proved to be difficult to pin down. The degree of ‘constructive ambiguity” reached here was too high to yield meaningful results.

Fourth, while the directional leadership of the three countries under study has been convincingly demonstrated, EU decisions might have also been influenced by other countries
not analysed here. This potential bias has been methodologically addressed by interviewing council staff and personnel from other countries than the three under study.

4.3 Contributions of the study

This project made both empirical and conceptual contributions to the contemporary debates on the ESDP.

First, new empirical data have been generated on the motivations of France, Britain and Germany to develop institutions, capabilities and a strategy for ESDP. It shed light on what ESDP represents in the views of the member states, which in turn provides insights into the preconditions and prospects for ESDP development by outlining limits and opportunities of cooperation. In addition, the study provided first hand empirical data on the three case studies, thereby delivering the often missing micro foundation for wider debates and analysis in the three areas. It presents particularly for the BG concept cutting edge empirical results.

Second, the thesis brought the conceptual debate forward by operationalising the framework of Europeanisation:

- It applied Europeanisation, usually confined to 1st pillar areas, to the intergovernmental ESDP.
- It concentrated on the so far neglected uploading dimension of Europeanisation and operationalised it for research in an inter-governmental policy area.
- It developed a framework for comparative purposes.

Thereby, this study enhanced the conceptual understanding of the interplay between national and European levels. The combination of Europeanisation with the policy cycle has allowed the grasping of the process dimension of Europeanisation, and its result in form of ‘influence’.

Third, the thesis clarified the crucial influence of the member states on design and processes of ESDP. So far, the extent to which national policies influence ESDP, and how, has not been subject of systematic enquiry. The research results allowed moreover the
further specification of the definition of influence. It describes both an enabling (successful uploading) and a constraining capacity (to block the uploading of undesired aspects).

5 Research Agenda

The results of this study open several new research avenues.

First, the developed framework can be applied to investigate other dimensions of ESDP, other countries, and long term developments within the overall European integration process. Possible additional dimensions within ESDP are operations - both civilian and military, the defence industrial dimension, and the further institutional development. The latter is a moving target. It would hence be interesting to analyse whether the ongoing institutional development of ESDP follows the same patterns as identified in this thesis.

In terms of countries, the study can be enlarged to include other member states, or more generally a greater number of member states. Do other countries, such as Sweden or Poland, increasingly shape ESDP? Is there a difference between the shaping capacities of old and new member states, and if yes, how should it be explained? Have the patterns of uploading changed in an EU with 27 member states? Such an analysis would offer insights into the overall development potential of ESDP in an enlarged EU.

This also points to investigating how potential socialisation processes which take place inside the trilateral leadership group affect the other member states and ESDP as such. Do they help to reconcile different standpoints and policy making practices, thereby allowing for greater coherence and faster progress for ESDP? Would an enlarged core group, for example with Italy, provoke the establishment of other uploading strategies and patterns of influence? In this context, it is also worth asking whether and to what extent the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty (mainly PSCoops), if ever ratified, might modify the course of ESDP. Will they change the conditions and mechanisms of influence, and thereby modify the role of the directional leadership team the three countries currently form?
Another research avenue consists in further developing the study’s conceptual design. Going beyond the first step of the policy cycle analysed here and addressing the whole cycle will offer precious insights into the patterns and development potential of ESDP. Of particular interest would be to analyse the implementation of the ESS and of the BG concept. To what extent does the implementation correspond to the initial agenda of the member states? Were the three countries also able to exercise directional leadership during the implementation?

This thesis has offered a conceptually grounded empirical analysis of how the member states influence the development and design of one of the most dynamic policy areas in the EU, namely ESDP. It applied the concept of Europeanisation to show how member states can and successfully have influenced the institutional, strategic and military development and design of ESDP. It analysed what pattern this influence followed, on what conditions it built, and what form it took. Overall, it enhanced the conceptual knowledge, contributed valuable empirical data on the case studies and offered insights into the normative views of member states, their power, and their limits and opportunities of influence. These findings also include a policy relevant research dimension in that the results offer pointers on the future of ESDP.
1 Primary Documents

1.1 France


### 1.2 Germany


Deutscher Bundestag (1999b) 41. Sitzung, Plenarprotokoll 14/41. Berlin, 8 June.

Deutscher Bundestag (1999c) 43. Sitzung, Plenarprotokoll 14/43. Berlin, 11 June.

1.3 United Kingdom


1.4 United States

1.5 Joint Declarations and Statements


1.6 EU Documents


Council of the EU (2001d) European Council Summit in Laeken, 14-15 December, Presidency Conclusions; SN 300/1/01 REV 1.


Council of the EU (2003d) Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June, Presidency Conclusions (revised) 11683/03. Brussels, 1 October.


GAERC (2003b) 2518th Council Meeting, External Relations. Luxembourg 16 June. 10369/03 (Presse 166).

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1.7 NATO Documents


1.8 WEU Documents


1.9 United Nations Documents


1.10 Institutions – Joint documents


2 Public interventions, press conferences and interviews


3 Press articles


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5 Confidential interviews at the national and EU levels

This thesis strongly builds upon elite interviews with national and EU administrative and political representatives in Germany, the UK, France and Brussels; and with policy experts. All interview partners have requested to remain anonymous. The following list outlines the institutions in which the confidential interviews have been carried out 2004-2008:

Germany

Chancellery

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Defence

Parliament (Bundestag)
France

Prime ministers services
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
Parliament (Assemblée Nationale, Sénat)

United Kingdom

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
Parliament (House of Commons)

Brussels

EU Council
EU Commission
European Defence Agency
European Parliament
UK Permanent Representation to the EU
French Permanent Representation to the EU
German Permanent Representation to the EU
US Mission to the EU
NATO

Think tanks

Centre for European Reform (CER, London)
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP, Berlin)
Egmont Institute / Royal Institute for International Relations (RIIA, Brussels)
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR, Berlin and Brussels offices)
European Policy Centre (EPC, Brussels)
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS, Paris)
German Marshall Funds (GMF, Berlin)
Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri, Paris)
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, London)
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI, London)
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, Berlin)